European University Institute

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Europe's Military Responses to Humanitarian Crises

Katharina Wolf

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Florence, 13 April 2018

European University Institute
Department of Political and Social Sciences

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Acknowledgements

I was looking forward to writing these lines of my PhD thesis. They are the final lines of a big project which accompanied me during the last four or five years of my life. Having accomplished this project is a great feeling by itself. But it makes me particularly happy that I can dedicate these lines to the people who motivated, supported, challenged, distracted, and cheered me up during this journey.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Ulrich Krotz who helped me find my way through this PhD and finish it. There could have hardly been a supervisor more enthusiastic about my PhD project than Ulrich. He supported me from the very first day when I entered seminar room 4 to present my PhD proposal to the EUI jury until the very end. He helped me asking the big questions and finding my own way of answering them. I therefore feel privileged that I had the chance to write this PhD under Ulrich's supervision. Thank you, Ulrich.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Jennifer Welsh, Antonio Missiroli, and James Sperling for accepting to be on my PhD panel and for providing their valuable feedback on my thesis. Their comments and critique helped me improve this thesis in essential ways.

During these last four years many people contributed in shaping and improving my research project. I would like to thank the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and in particular Antonio Missiroli for providing me with a wonderful office space in Paris while carrying out my interviews. More than that, my stays at the EUISS offered a unique opportunity for me to dive into real life security and defense affairs and were a fantastic professional experience. In this regard, I am also hugely indebted to my interviewees at the French Foreign and Defence Ministries, national representations to the EU in Brussels and NATO headquarters for the time they spent with talking to me and answering my questions.

Furthermore, I would like to thank Claudia Morsut, Giulia Tercovich, and Kenneth McDonagh for giving me the opportunity to present my research at various ECPR panels. These conferences were very helpful in refining my project. In this respect, I would also like to thank in particular Martin Lestra and Jonas Driedger, who, at different stages, read early drafts of this thesis and provided their valuable comments and critiques. Moreover, I wish to

thank Francesca Bianco who did an excellent job as a language editor and helped improve my writing a lot. Finally, I would like to thank the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the EUI for providing me with the financial support necessary to carry out this research project and for their support with financing my missions and conferences.

During these last four years I was very lucky with the people I met. They made Florence and the EUI not only a wonderful place to write my PhD but also a great place to live.

Sara has not only been a fantastic and fun flatmate but more importantly she welcomed me into her family and integrated me into her circle of friends. Through Sara I met Marti, Leti, Lorenzo, Fede, and Consi. I am very thankful for having them as my friends in Florence and for how welcoming they were with me.

At the EUI, I met fantastic friends, too. João, Martin, Camille, Daniel, Marti, the two Marianas, Fabian, Maria, Olga, Bene, David, Lorenzo, Magnus, Katharina, Alexis, Estelle, Dani, Elisa, Fred, Patrice, Malte, Reto, Endre, Björn, and Swen always provided the necessary distractions, fantastic dinners and evening events that made writing this PhD a wonderful experience. Martina has not only been a great friend but also the best administrative support I could possibly wish for.

Having lived abroad for a few years by now, I would like to thank my friends at home – in particular Linda and Yvonne and their families – for making me feel as if I had never left whenever I return and for always coming to visit me wherever I go.

Finally, I would like to thank my loved ones.

I would like to thank my brothers, Alexander and Guido. Ihr beide, jeder auf seine eigene Weise, zeigt mir immer wieder, dass ich das Leben öfter mal auf die leichte Schulter nehmen sollte. Und wenn es dann doch mal hart auf hart kommt, weiß ich dass ich mich immer auf euch verlassen kann.

João, thank you for being my biggest and most tireless supporter but, most importantly, for making life be so much more than a PhD.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents. Mama und Papa, vielen Dank für all eure Unterstützung, Liebe, Zuspruch und Motivation. Danke, dass ihr mich immer und überall begleitet und mir aber auch das Gefühl gebt, dass ich immer wieder umkehren kann. Meine Doktorarbeit ist euch gewidmet.

Abstract

Why do European Union (EU) member states sometimes respond collectively to prevent or address large-scale humanitarian crises while, at other moments, they use different institutional channels? More than once, EU states have pondered, hesitated, disagreed and let others interfere when widespread and systematic killing of civilians were looming. Instead of using the EU's military crisis management capacities, member states have acted through different institutional channels such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ad-hoc coalitions of states or single state-led operations to interfere in humanitarian crises. At times, they have decided not to intervene at all. Why does Europeans' involvement in humanitarian intervention vary so strikingly?

To examine this striking variation in European states' responses to large-scale humanitarian crises, the thesis draws on in-depth case study evidence from the conflict in Libya during 2011, the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire during 2010/2011, the sectarian war in the Central African Republic during 2013 and 2014 and the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. The cases capture the entire range of variation on the dependent variable covering EU operations, NATO operations, ad-hoc operations, and non-intervention.

The thesis develops a three-step model to explain why, when, and how European states use military force for humanitarian purposes. The model is situated at the intersection of domestic preferences and the international opportunities and constraints under which European states seek to realize their foreign policy goals. The findings show that, in combination, these factors condition European states' readiness to intervene. Hence, a preference for non-intervention is easier to maintain if others are willing to intervene, but more difficult to pursue if the resort to force is urgent and the non-European actors are unable or unwilling to offer an appropriate response. At the regional European level, states' power resources and preferences influence the institutional channel through which European states ultimately decide to intervene militarily. The findings show that the deployment of EU and NATO operations is likely when member states' preferences are at least weakly congruent and backed by the interests and preferences of the organizations' most powerful states. Diverging preferences among member states severely hinder common military operations and compel states to resort to ad-hoc arrangements.

The dissertation concludes that European states' preferences, the political contexts in which they operate and their ability to pursue their goals at the international and the regional level considerably influence why, when, and in which format European states intervene in humanitarian crises.

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List of Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
AQIM	Al-Qaida in the Maghreb
AU	African Union
AU PSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
BINUCA	Bureau intégré de l'organisation des Nations Unies en Centrafrique
CDNS	Council of Defense and National Security
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
Cobra	Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSU	Christian Social Union
CT	Counterterrorism
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of Western African States
EDF	European Defence Fund
EDC	European Defence Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESS	European Security Strategy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Military Force
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
FACA	Central African Armed Forces
FOMUC	Force Multinationale en Centrafrique
FRCI	Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HR	High Representative
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICG-CAR	International Contact Group on the Central African Republic
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IR	International Relations
IS	Islamic State
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISR	Surveillance and Reconnaissance
LAS	League of Arab States
MICOPAX	Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MP	Member of Parliament
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFZ	No-fly zone
NSC	National Security Council
NTC	National Transitional Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OIC	Organisation of the Islamic Conference
OUP	Operation Unified Protector
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PFCA	Political Framework for Crisis Approach

PM	Prime Minister
PMG	Politico-Military Group
PRIO	International Peace Research Institute
PSC	Political and Security Committee
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SDSR	Strategic Defence and Security Review
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UK	United Kingdom
UMP	Union pour un mouvement populaire
UN	United Nations
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union

1. Introduction

"World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it" (Schuman, 1950).

The use of military force for humanitarian purposes seems paradoxical. Military force is not easily associated with benevolence. Its use is however even more perplexing when troops are deployed to solve faraway crises from which no direct security risks emanate for the intervening force. Yet, this is exactly what the European Union (EU) has done multiple times since 2003. The EU's not so infrequent resort to force over the last fifteen years often slips under the radar. Created as primarily an economic project of internal purpose – to bring peace to Europe – the EU did not dispose of any capacities in the field of security and defense for the large part of its existence. Although the idea of creating a European Defence Community (EDC) had been around since the 1950s, member states kept a firm grip on this highly sensitive policy field and coordinated their policies through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU) for most of the second half of the 20th century. More than forty years after the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of armed conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s gave renewed impetus in the quest for an autonomous European capacity in security and defense. In 1999, the Cologne European Council demanded that:

> "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises" (European Union External Action Service, 2013).

In 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) reaffirmed that "Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world" (European Union, 2003: 1). In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon (Heads of State or Government of the EU, 2007: C 306/35) affirmed that: "the Union may use civilian and military means […] [for] humanitarian and rescue tasks, […] conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks […]." By then, the EU had already turned rhetoric into action. In March 2003, the EU had launched its first military operation, Operation Concordia, under the new Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)[1] with the aim to prevent the resurgence of violence in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Only three months later, the EU rapidly intervened a second time to protect the civilian population at risk in the Democratic Republic of Congo's

[1] Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, CSDP was called the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

(DRC) civil war (Operation Artemis) (Gross, 2009, Helly, 2009a, European External Action Service, 2012). In slightly over a decade, the EU has been engaged in 35 crisis situations. In roughly a fifth of these instances, the EU used military force for humanitarian purposes[2] (Di Mauro et al., 2016).

1.1. Different Frameworks, Varying Responses – Puzzle and Research Questions

The crises addressed in this thesis cover a wide range of situations, including armed conflicts and civil wars. Yet, they are not limited to these, but also include instances in which civil war and formal armed conflicts had not yet broken out, and yet populations were being subjected to widespread or systematic killing. This best illustrates European states' responses to various crisis situations. However, in all of the crises addressed in this thesis, military intervention could have been justified with the purpose to prevent or address large-scale human suffering and widespread killing of civilian populations.

Even though EU states have shown willingness and capability to deploy military force for humanitarian purposes, they have not consistently intervened when civilians were at risk. Instead, member states have used different institutional frameworks such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ad-hoc coalitions of states or national operations,[3] to get engaged in crisis situations where more robust action was required. At other moments, they decided not to intervene, leaving the main responsibility to prevent or address large-scale human suffering to other security organizations, the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) or the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS). The examples of this are numerous.

Despite an explicit request by the UN and previous experiences of crisis management in the DRC, EU states failed to respond to the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in the country in 2008 and left the responsibility over intervention to the UN. Furthermore, when the Libya crisis broke out in 2011, France, the United Kingdom (UK), Demark, Belgium, Italy, and Spain intervened through an ad-hoc coalition with the United States, Qatar, Canada, and

[2] This thesis focuses on situations in which European states intervened militarily with the purpose of preventing or addressing large-scale human suffering and widespread killing of civilian populations. Please refer to chapter 2.3 for a definition of humanitarian intervention as it is used in this thesis.

[3] I use the term 'national operations' instead of 'unilateral' intervention since the latter notion presupposes that states act outside of the legal international framework when intervening individually, which is not true for the majority of individual interventions aiming at the prevention or halt of widespread human suffering. France's Operation Licorne in Côte d'Ivoire, its intervention in Mali and the Central African Republic all received authorization by several UN Security Council Resolutions.

Norway to protect the Libyan population from the regime's atrocity crimes. The coalition partners later handed the command of military operation to NATO while the EU stayed on the sideline. Only six weeks after the launch of the Libya intervention, France deployed troops to support UN peacekeeping forces to contain the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire while the EU was again standing aloof.

In a nutshell, when and how European states have intervened to prevent or halt large-scale humanitarian crises has varied considerably. *Why do European states sometimes intervene collectively with the purpose of preventing or halting widespread human suffering while at other moments they fail to do so? When and why do they leave the responsibility to address these situations to other international players?*

The different responses indicate that military operations deployed by the EU are only one possible framework which European states can choose to respond to the threat or commission of widespread human suffering. CSDP operations, as EU military operations are typically called, "are part and parcel of a broader spectrum of international peace operations carried out under different flags – especially the UN and NATO, but also the AU and even OSCE" (Missiroli, 2015). By neglecting the other actors in the field, we miss an essential part of what CSDP does and when EU member states are willing to use it for humanitarian purposes. The different organizations and coalitions provide European states with different frameworks, channels, or venues through which they can engage in varying constellations to prevent or stop large-scale human suffering and widespread killing of civilian populations.[4]

The distinct forms of Europe's responses correspond to three broad outcomes of Europeans' efforts to address or prevent widespread human suffering and systematic killing of civilian populations: (1) European states can respond collectively to humanitarian crises. *Collective intervention* covers all instances in which European states deployed military force through the EU and/or NATO; (2) European states can intervene through an ad-hoc coalition. *Ad-hoc intervention* encompasses all cases in which individual European states decided to act alone or in a group of states to prevent or halt large-scale humanitarian crises; and (3) European states can decide not to intervene in such circumstances. *Non-intervention* comprises all cases in which European states did not respond collectively, by a group of states or individually, thereby delegating the responsibility to prevent or halt widespread human suffering to other international players and security organizations.

[4] I consider the terms 'framework', 'channel' and 'venue' synonymous and use them interchangeably in this thesis.

1.2. Contribution and Argument

International relations theory offer predictions and explanations for state behavior in the international system which helps derive assumptions on when, how, and why states exercise military force. Realism stresses the importance of the national interest and geostrategic concerns as key factors driving state behavior in international politics. From a realist point of view, intervention in foreign countries is driven by the primary aim to secure the survival of the state and maximize its power. Military action for other reasons should be avoided because of the high risks and unintended consequences involved (Morgenthau, 1967). Moreover, in a system of anarchy and self-help, as realists believe, security cooperation between states is unlikely to last and will fracture as soon as the national interests of one of the states involved are under threat (Grieco, 1988, Glaser, 1994/95). From a realist perspective, the EU should never have developed capabilities in the field of security and defense, let alone use them for humanitarian purposes. If at all, realists would expect European states to practice humanitarian intervention on rare and carefully picked occasions, conducted primarily through national operations or ad-hoc coalitions of the willing rather than through institutionalized frameworks (Gegout, 2005, 2009a).

In contrast, constructivism emphasizes norms, values and beliefs as the driving forces behind state behavior in the international system. Constructivist scholars highlight how foreign policy is shaped by a state's identity and culture, influencing how states interpret the international environment (Wendt, 1992, Bellamy, 2003). For them, humanitarian intervention by European states is conditioned by the international normative context, the EU's own norms and values and corresponding European security cultures. What's more, unlike realists, constructivists are much more optimistic about the prospects of cooperation between states. According to constructivist scholars interaction between states promotes the exchange of ideas and can yield valuable socialisation effects. From a constructivist perspective, European crisis management operations should engender a growing convergence of national belief systems, making the launch of common European operations more frequent and consistent in the future (Meyer, 2005, Giegerich, 2006, Meyer, 2006, Dyson and Konstadinides, 2013: 133).

Both research programs offer valuable insights into state behavior in the international system and the central forces propelling state interaction and use of force. Yet, realist and constructivist analyses remain incomplete. Even though Europeans' geostrategic interests in poor African countries have been negligible, the EU launched several missions to address or

prevent large-scale human suffering in African conflicts. Moreover, European states have quite frequently cooperated in this highly sensitive area of security and defense affairs by launching common military operation rather than ad-hoc or national operations as realists might assume. Similarly, concerns for human rights and the promotion of the EU's values did not always urge Europeans to initiate common operations though the scale of the crises would have justified it. Given the EU's multiple experiences of common military operations over the last decade, constructivist scholars would have expected EU states to give increasing priority to CSDP operations rather than continuing to launch ad-hoc or NATO operations.

This thesis proposes a distinct theoretical framework to explain the varying responses of European states to large-scale humanitarian suffering: why they, at times, become militarily involved to prevent or address mass atrocity crimes, at other moments prioritize different channels and institutional frameworks, and why occasionally responsibility is assigned to other international actors. To explain these variations, this thesis focuses on domestic preferences and goals, their international feasibility and how these preferences interact at the regional level. Drawing upon domestic politics theories, linkage or two-level games theories and liberal intergovernmentalism I combine these factors in a three-step model of foreign policy formation and decision-making.

Thereby the model offers the opportunity to analyze the interplay between factors and causes at three levels of analysis which previous research has tended to study only in isolation. The interaction between the domestic and the international level is central to understand not only what states *want* (preferences, goals and interests) but what they *do* (policies, strategies and international activities) in international affairs. Finally, at the regional level, states' converging and diverging preferences influence the institutional venue through which European states ultimately decide to intervene militarily. National preferences and goals may be motivated and advanced by different factors and actors; they may not always correspond to states' activities and policies. Understanding the factors that impact preference formation, when they are advanced, how they are translated into policies, and their international consequences form the crucial task of this thesis' analysis.

The model generates testable hypotheses that I use to explore this thesis' research questions. The three-step model's ability and accuracy to explain international outcomes is tested through the lens of Europe's responses to large-scale humanitarian crises. Yet, the three-step model can potentially be applied beyond the particular focus of this thesis to explain foreign policy formation in various areas, to scrutinize the impact of domestic politics

on international outcomes, and more broadly, to understand European states' decision-making in security and defense affairs.

The model does not ignore the relevance of material and ideational factors driving and constraining European interventions to prevent or address the widespread killing of civilian populations and humanitarian suffering. National security interests, norms and values often influence what states want and do in international relations. But this thesis argues that material and ideational factors do not independently affect international outcomes. Instead, the impact of these factors is conditioned by (1) whether they can generate domestic consensus around foreign policy goals, (2) international feasibility, and (3) whether states can reach an agreement at the regional level. First, at least in democratic states, foreign policy requires domestic consensus or at the very minimum a reasonable level of support by those domestic actors who shape foreign policy. As a consequence, whether or not democratic values and security interests affect international outcomes will to a large extent depend on the state elites that formulate foreign policy goals.

At the same time, states can hardly ignore the international system in which they operate and seek to realize their goals. Indeed, stretching from economic to environmental and security and defense affairs, there is a great deal of foreign policy goals which European states wanted but failed to realize, could only partially implement, or had to adjust to international realities. No matter how strong or weak material and ideational drivers of foreign policy are, their impact on international outcomes ultimately depends on whether states' goals are feasible under the particular external conditions and constraints in which they operate.

Finally, more than in any other policy area, European security and defense affairs remain governed by intergovernmentalism. While geostrategic interests and humanitarian concerns are central when European states decide upon common policies in this highly sensitive field, their influence on the outcome is conditioned primarily by whether states can find a common agreement, that is, whether states' preferences overlap.

This study shows that European states' readiness to intervene has indeed been strongly shaped by the interaction of national preferences for and against intervention and the international constraints which European states faced when seeking to realize their goals. In two of the four conflicts analyzed in this thesis, European states would have preferred not to intervene but eventually deployed troops because the conditions at the international level made non-intervention unfeasible. The cases show that a preference for non-intervention will be difficult to maintain if the resort to force is urgent and other international actors (i.e. the

UN, AU, and ECOWAS) are either unable or unwilling to offer an appropriate response. By the same token, European states never pursued intervention without regard to the international constraints imposed on the use of military force. Domestic preferences never hindered intervention where international conditions urged action. However, domestic opposition always stalled intervention and encouraged the support for alternative responses. Without attending to the interplay between domestic preferences and international structures and constraints, Europe's varying responses to humanitarian crises will be difficult to comprehend and explain.

Furthermore, at the regional level, the findings show that states' preferences are central to understanding when European states launch military operations collectively and when like-minded states have to resort to alternative frameworks and channels. However, their constellation of preferences does not explain sufficiently the launch of collective interventions. States' power resources are an integral component of CSDP and NATO military operations as the research in this thesis demonstrates.

To the best of my knowledge, there is no other study to date which situates Europe's responses to large-scale humanitarian suffering within the wider context of international interventions and peace operations. Analyzing variation in Europeans' humanitarian military interventions as a deliberate choice made under international constraints rather than an outcome which can either fail or succeed provides innovative empirical findings of why, when and how European states decide to deploy military force with the purpose of preventing or addressing large-scale humanitarian suffering. Despite the vast amount of literature on European security and defense affairs and the EU's crisis management operations, "[s]cholars have tended to focus on CSDP in isolation […] without considering the other actors in the field" (Hofmann, 2011: 115). This thesis highlights the processes through which the launch of CSDP military operations is intertwined with the activities of other international players on the one hand, and the policies and aspirations of the EU's member states on the other. This perspective not only provides a fresh view into the workings of European security and defense cooperation. It also reveals factors and processes which previous research in this field has largely neglected.

Understanding why European states have at times prioritized alternative channels and institutional frameworks to intervene militarily to prevent or address widespread killing while at other times delegated responsibility to other international players provides us with a more comprehensive view on European interventions, yielding relevant political implications. This research directly addresses issues of life and death, violent conflicts, and the prevention and

containment of widespread human suffering. A better understanding of Europe's responses to humanitarian crises is vital for European states' credibility on the world stage and the EU's role as a global actor. This thorough investigation of the factors which can make foreign policy initiatives fail despite policy makers' best intentions casts light on the constraints imposed on intervention at the international level. European state leaders cannot always be held to account for their failures to act while seeking to uphold international law. At the same time, this analysis draws attention to possible alternative frameworks which European states use to respond and the processes that have shaped them. Understanding that ad-hoc operations are often deployed out of necessity (rather than because of states' appetite for autonomous action) may also increase the legitimacy attached to these operations within the realm of European public opinion.

1.3. Methodology and Data Collection

Using qualitative and comparative methodology, this dissertation draws on in-depth case study evidence from the conflict in Libya during 2011, the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire during 2010/2011, the sectarian war in the Central African Republic during 2013 and 2014, and the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. Each case is disaggregated into several time frames ending each in different types of responses to widespread human suffering. This creates a total number of ten cases which capture the entire range of variation on the dependent variable covering EU operations, NATO operations, ad-hoc, and national operations as well as the delegation of intervention to other international players including the UN, the AU, and African regional organizations. In each case, I test the hypotheses developed in this study through congruence and process-tracing tests. Where useful to the analysis, I employ counterfactual reasoning. The evidence from within-case analyses is complemented by a cross-case comparison to further increase the external validity of the study (George and Bennett, 2005). The analysis draws upon a wide variety of primary and secondary sources including parliamentary debates, governmental documents, official statements, speeches and declarations, 18 semi-structured elite interviews[5] and more than 250 media and newspaper articles in French, German, and English[6].

[5] I conducted the interviews for this research in Paris and Brussels during January and February 2016. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes and one and a half hours and all interviewees consented to the interview being recorded. My interview strategy was as follows. I first asked my interviewees about the beginning of debates (within EU/ NATO institutions and member states respectively) on a specific crisis and whether military measures where discussed as a possible response. I then asked my interviewees about the reasons for the

1.4. Structure of the thesis

Chapter two establishes the structure of this thesis by tracing Europe's humanitarian interventions back to their historic precedents and reviewing the different frameworks through which European states can engage (or not) in humanitarian interventions. This section also provides a definition of what I consider instances of humanitarian intervention. Chapter three discusses realist and constructivist assumptions on European states' intervention in humanitarian crises. Based on the identified merits and shortcomings of these two research programs, I develop a three-step model of foreign policy formation and decision-making to analyze Europe's varying responses to the threat or commission of widespread and systematic killing of civilian populations and large-scale human suffering. Chapter four describes the methodology used in this study, describing the operationalization of the variables used in this thesis and explaining the case selection strategy. Chapters five to eight reconstruct the processes, negotiations, and major decision-making steps leading up to the diverse responses by European states to large-scale human suffering. Each of the chapters provides excellent empirical grounds to test the hypotheses developed in chapter three, providing thorough insights into the issues at stake at the national level, the constraints imposed on Europe's responses at the international level, and the constellation of preferences within regional fora. Chapter nine offers a cross-case comparison, summarizes findings, and draws a conclusion.

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specific response to the crisis by individual member states and institutions and the driving and inhibiting forces/ states behind them. I drew particular attention to the position of the most powerful states, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States and asked about their role in the negotiations. Finally, I asked interviewees about the reasons behind European states' choices for institutional frameworks and channels and their respective advantages. Because of their temporal proximity, the majority of interviews focused on the crisis in the Central African Republic and Boko Haram's activities in the Lake Chad Basin region. The cases on the Libya crisis and the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire are underpinned more by alternative primary and secondary resources which are easier to publicly access.

[6] Evidence from French and German sources have been translated into English.

Part I

History, Theory and Methods

2. History, Institutional Frameworks and Definitions

Against conventional wisdom, humanitarian intervention is not just a modern practice of the late 20th and early 21st century but has been undertaken since at least the 16th century. It has been undertaken since at least the 16th century. Importantly, "[w]ithout knowing and understanding the earlier links in the chain, we will not understand how the […] concepts of universal human rights and of using power to protect them […] came to be forged" (Trim, 2011: 387). Below, chapter 2.1 reviews how the doctrine of humanitarian intervention emerged and highlights continuities and discontinuities with today's concept, thereby placing Europe's responses to humanitarian crises in a historical context. This is followed by an overview of modern European states' practices of intervention and the distinct channels they have used to deploy military force to address or prevent widespread human suffering in chapter 2.2. Chapter 2.3 provides a definition of 'humanitarian intervention' used in this thesis to distinguish it from related concepts and activities.

2.1. Humanitarian Intervention – a (not so) Brief History

When in 2011, the UN Security Council (UNSC) for the first time in its history authorized the use of "all necessary measures […] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack" against the Libyan regime, many were convinced that a new age had just begun (United Nations Security Council, 2011h). The Security Council's explicit reference to the "responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population" raised hopes that after the many failures of the international community in the 1990s and the 2000s, international consensus had finally been reached on a political commitment to halt genocide and mass atrocity crimes. After a decade of discussions on the meaning and scope of state sovereignty and its relation to the protection of human rights, it was thought that the 'Responsibility to Protect'

doctrine would provide a possibility to integrate both concepts in one normative framework (Homans, 2011).

Although the adoption of this normative concept is historically unique given its scope and the clear intertwining of human protection with coercive measures, the idea and practice of intervening on ethical grounds is not new.

Indeed, the principle of humanitarian intervention holds deep historic roots, with early beginnings established in the 16th, 17th and 18th century (Hehir, 2010: 168f., Pattison, 2010: 2-3, Simms and Trim, 2011: 3, Everill and Kaplan, 2013: 5f., Howorth, 2013: 290). Bass (2008: 3, italics added) stresses that

> "[t]he tradition of humanitarian intervention once ran deep in world politics, long before Rwanda and Kosovo came to the world's fitful attention. Over a century ago, it was a known principle that troops should sometimes be sent to prevent the slaughter of innocent foreigners. That principle has recently reemerged with fresh strength in the aftermath of the Cold War, *but it is anything but new*."

Already in the 16th, 17th and 18th century a range of treaties existed which endowed states with the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states, legally justified through the protection of religious minorities at that time. The roots of these principles go back to early religious and 'just war' theories based on the works of Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius. Vitoria saw it as the duty of civilized states to spread Christian values to replace the natives' inhuman living standards and moralities in which case intervention would be justified; Grotius added to this the defense of chastity and idolatry (Parekh, 1997: 50-51). In 1648, the peace treaties of Westphalia – known for the high status assigned to the principles of sovereignty and the territorial integrity of states – explicitly recognized the protection of religious minorities as a legitimate basis for European powers to intervene if those provisions were violated (Krasner, 2001: 21-22, Osiander, 2001: 264-265, Simms, 2011: 92).

Sates outside of the Holy Roman Empire adopted similar regulations, the examples of which are numerous. The most famous is the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, where Russia guaranteed to protect the rights of Orthodox Christians living in the Ottoman Empire (Bass, 2008: 354). In 1660 the Treaty of Oliva was signed, giving Sweden, Brandenburg and Britain the right to interfere in Polish Prussia to safeguard Protestant rights (Thompson, 2011: 82). Moreover, in forming an alliance, Great Britain and the Dutch Republic obliged Victor Amadeus

of Savoy in 1704 to respect the religious liberty of the Christian movement 'Vaudois' (Trim, 2011: 382-383).

These agreements were not just empty promises but used by states as a legal basis to act in several instances. In 1725, Britain and Prussia referred to the Treaty of Oliva to pressure Augustus of Saxony-Poland to restore the rights of Protestants in Poland after inter-religious tensions between Catholics and Protestants had resulted in the seizure of Protestant churches by Catholics and the imposition of fines and death sentences on Protestants (Thompson, 2011: 81-82). In 1655, Britain used diplomatic and coercive means as well as financial aid to ensure that the religious liberty of the Vaudois remained warranted in France and Savoy. Hence, although the Peace of Westphalia had enshrined non-interference and the sovereign rights of states as key principles of the international system, the 'sacrosanct' principle of sovereignty was all but absolute during that period. The threat of force and interference in other states' domestic affairs was repeatedly wielded to end confessional conflicts and the repression of minority rights. On that note, Trim (2011: 391-392) argues that: "[…] military force as often as not has been really the only way to achieve concrete results and even limited successes. Even when diplomacy succeeded, it often did so *because* of the implicit or actual use of force".

In the 19th century a stronger adherence to sovereignty principles arose. Following the pervasive experiences of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 enshrined the Great Powers' right of intervention in cases where regime stability was threatened by internal uprisings. While some argue that the Concert of Europe, as which the Congress of Vienna came to be known, forms an early antecedent to today's concept of multilateralism; the rationale behind it was very different. The primary goal of the arrangements was to maintain stability and peace on the continent; to safeguard peoples' rights was a secondary concern (Bass, 2008: 363). Yet, even though Great Power's balancing strategies subordinated humanitarian concerns, the protection of human beings from despotism did not disappear entirely from the continent. In fact, significant momentum came from another source during that period. The profound transformations in the European political system between 1789 and 1815 provided a fertile ground from which ideals of the Enlightenment, values of civilization, liberty, and an emphasis on the individual could spread (Trim, 2011: 384-385).

Any effort to provide a legal basis for the recognition and protection of human rights however suffered a severe setback in the early 20th century. The Covenant of the League of

Nations and the Kellogg-Briand pact lacked any reference to humanitarian intervention principles. The international community looked on helplessly during World War I when the Ottoman Empire systematically killed more than one million Armenians and during World War II when Germany's Nazi regime exterminated approximately six million Jews (Massingham, 2009: 811-812, Homans, 2011).

In response to the mass atrocity crimes in the first half of the 20th century, the post-World War II period opened up the opportunity to establish a legal basis for the punishment of crimes against humanity and acts of genocide. At the Nuremberg trials, 19 Nazis were convicted for charges on war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity. In 1948 the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Homans, 2011).

Despite these efforts and the positive spirit of the post-War period, the century-old tension between sovereignty and the protection of human rights persisted. Parallel to the condemnation of genocide under international law, the United Nations Charter established the principle of non-intervention as a legal norm applicable to all states. Chapter 1 Article 2 of the UN Charter stresses the "sovereign equality of all its Members" and exhorts states to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state […]" (United Nations, 1945). The right to individual or collective self-defense and situations threatening international security and peace form the only exceptions from this norm (Parekh, 1997: 52; Fiott, 2013: 770). Apart from legal tensions, superpower rivalry and Cold War international politics further contributed to the subordination of humanitarian concerns to geostrategic goals (Massingham, 2009: 812-813).

With the end of the Cold War and superpower rivalry, many considered the time finally ripe for a more consistent commitment to humanitarian intervention (Franck, 1992, Smith, 1998: 66). The disintegration of the Soviet Union signified that communism had failed, and forged a somewhat stronger agreement on what a legitimate political order was, and that the protection of individual rights would form an integral part of it (Mandelbaum, 1994: 13-14). The attitude of the UN Security Council and state action in the early 1990s initially seemed to confirm this optimism. Alarmed by the huge flow of Iraqi and Kurdish refugees seeking protection from the repressive Iraqi government, the UNSC for the first time in 1991 addressed a humanitarian crisis as a threat to "international peace and security" (United Nations Security Council, 1991). Yet,

disillusionment soon replaced concern when the international community again failed to act in face of the mass killings during the Yugoslav wars between 1993 and 1995 and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Determined to avoid another such failure, the 1999 NATO bombings of Yugoslavia to stop the violent activities of the Serbian government against ethnic Albanians, are – albeit illegal because Russia and China vetoed the intervention in the UNSC – widely recognized as a more successful example of humanitarian intervention (Solana, 1999: 5, Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, Harvey, 2006).

To provide a clearer legal basis for the use of military force for humanitarian purposes in the future, the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), formulated the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) concept. The idea was ground-breaking in that it made states' sovereignty rights conditional on the protection of their citizens. Adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005, the doctrine emphasizes that sovereignty necessitates responsibility and obliges states to protect their population against four crimes including genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. If states are unable or unwilling to live up to this commitment, the international community has the responsibility to assist and – in severe cases – intervene if necessary with coercive measures, including the use of force (Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations, 2013).

Even though from a historical perspective the principle of intervening for humanitarian purposes was not new, the R2P doctrine is historically unique in its legal scope and clear reference to human rights: "[t]he concept of people deserving protection evolved: from confessional co-religionists, to all fellow Christians, to all human beings" (Trim, 2011: 387). As the concept of human protection expanded, so did the tasks associated with it. Encompassed under the concept of crisis management, external intervention in the domestic affairs of states nowadays is associated with a wide array of activities including the protection of civilians. But it also covers the restoration of peace and order, the disarmament and reintegration of armed forces, the creation of safe areas and institution-building efforts (Finnemore, 2003: 136, Tardy, 2015a: 11). Due to the diversity of these activities, the responses by states to international crises

are typically termed ‘crisis management operations’[7] (Tardy, 2015a: 11). They frequently include human protection tasks but often go beyond this (Engberg, 2015: 72-73).[8]

In sum, the concept of humanitarian intervention developed in spurts and it experienced setbacks shaped by countervailing forces from which the idea of human protection emerged gradually (Trim, 2011: 387). Rather than historically unique, the concept is the tip of the iceberg forged by centuries-old state practices of intervention based on moral grounds rather than a revolutionary development in international law. As Simms and Trim (2011: 24) find:

> “the modern phenomenon known as ‘humanitarian intervention’ is like a river formed from the combination of several different tributaries: these include confessional solidarity, opposition to ‘tyranny’, abolitionism, that transcended race, and belief in a variety of values, including liberty, civilization, democracy, and (eventually) human rights.”

And yet, while the protection of human beings presently enjoys greater legal status than ever before, the application of the norm remains contested and intervention on humanitarian grounds strained by selectivity. Despite these important legal breakthroughs, real world politics shows that – just as over the centuries – the practical implementation and consequences of the norm remain contested. Only shortly after the UN Security Council had invoked R2P for the first time to legitimize intervention in the Libyan civil war and subsequently in Côte d’Ivoire, quarrels over the extensive interpretation of the norm and the refusal of China and Russia to approve intervention in the Syrian civil war demonstrate that the doctrine is anything but a universally accepted concept (Hehir, 2010: 174-176, Weiss, 2016).

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[7] To be distinguished from ‘crisis management *missions*’, which typically comprise civilian tasks.
[8] For a definition of how I define intervention for humanitarian purposes and delimit it from other related concepts, see section 2.3.

2.2. Europe's Venues, Channels and Institutional Frameworks for Intervention

As the doctrine of intervention on humanitarian grounds gained normative consensus, it remained unclear which entity would be willing, capable and eligible to execute it. While the UNSC reserves the right to authorize military force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the conduct of humanitarian intervention has been mainly delegated to regional organizations and coalitions of the willing.[9] In contrast to UN operations which typically – albeit not always – adhere to the principles of host state consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force, regional organizations and coalitions of the willing are less constrained in their use of force and the principles of consent and impartiality (Weiss, 2015: 78, Carment et al., 2016).

In the aftermath of the Cold War and encouraged by the UN, several regional organizations developed the capabilities, institutions and strategic concepts to take over responsibility in managing violent conflicts and humanitarian crises. And they have demonstrated their willingness to use them: since the 1990s regional organizations have increasingly taken up the initiative or acted alongside the UN and deployed numerous operations to restore peaceful conditions in conflict-stricken countries as Figure 1 shows.

[9] Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides the UN Security Council with the responsibility to determine any threat to (international) peace and acts of aggression and decide which measures, including the use of coercive means, should be applied.

Figure 1: *Regionalization of peace operations, 1947-2013*



Source: Bellamy and Williams (2015: 21). Note: the data in Figure 1 does not distinguish between coercive and non-coercive, consent-based peace operations.

European states formed an integral part of this trend. Already in the early 1990s, European states began to intervene collectively on behalf of human rights and peace. At the time, they mainly used the transatlantic alliance to prevent the smuggling of weapons, protect civilians and restore peace and order in the Balkan conflicts. In December 1995, NATO launched its first peacekeeping operation, the alliance's Implementation Force (IFOR), in Bosnia-Herzegovina to enforce the Dayton Peace Accords and to end the Bosnian conflict (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2009). The conflicts in the Balkans and the changes in the security environment following the end of the Cold War propelled alliance members to expand NATO's security doctrine from a pure defense alliance to a broadly defined security provider. Accordingly, in the alliance's 1999 strategic concept, NATO member states pledged to contribute to "the management of crises through military operations" addressing "a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including humanitarian emergencies" (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1999). Since then, NATO has launched interventions in Kosovo, the FYROM and Libya with the aim to address or prevent widespread human suffering and systematic killing of civilians (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2009, 2016b, The North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2016a: 186). Table 1 provides an overview of NATO's operations since the 1990s. Those explicitly motivated by the aim to address or prevent humanitarian crises (at least as one part of the mandate) are highlighted in grey.

Table 1: *NATO peacekeeping and crisis management operations*

Operation	***Country/Region***	***Date***	***Mission/Role***	***Force size***
Operation Maritime Monitor/Sharp Guard	Adriatic Sea	1992-96	Enforcement of economic sanctions and arms embargo against former Yugoslavia	Naval forces
Operation Deny Flight	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1993-95	Enforcement of no-fly zone and close air support for UN peacekeeping force	Air forces
Operation Deliberate Force	Bosnia and Herzegovina	August-September 1995	Airstrikes and artillery attacks against Bosnian Serb targets to coerce acceptance of a peace agreement	Air and ground forces
Implementation Force (IFOR)/ Stabilization Force (SFOR) Operation	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1995-2004	Support and enforce Dayton peace agreement	60,000 troops
Operation Allied Force	Kosovo/Serbia-Montenegro	March-June 1999	Airstrikes to halt Serbian attacks on Kosovar Albanians and coerce acceptance of deployment of a NATO ground force	Air and naval forces
Kosovo Force (KFOR)	Kosovo	1999-present	Enforce cease-fire and withdrawal of Serbian military and police forces; support maintenance of peace	55,000 troops, 4,500 troops (2017)
Operations Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony	Macedonia	2001-2003	Disarm Albanian guerrilla groups; protect and support international monitors	3,500 troops
Operation Eagle Assist	United States	October 2001-May 2002	Help protect US airspace post-9/11	Surveillance aircraft
Operations Active Endeavour and Sea Guardian	Mediterranean Sea	2001-	Monitor and escort vessels for counterterrorism purposes	Naval forces
Operation Display Deterrence	Turkey	February-April 2003	Deter Iraqi attacks on Turkey	Surveillance aircraft and

				missile defenses
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Resolute Support	Afghanistan	2003-present	Assist Afghan government in exercising its authority; help create conditions for stabilization and reconstruction; training, advice and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions	130,000 troops for ISAF; 13,000 personnel for Resolute Support
Distinguished Games	Greece	August-September 2004	Maritime and airspace surveillance during Olympics	Naval and air forces
NATO Assistance to the African Union (AU) in Darfur	Darfur, Sudan	June 2005-December 2007	Provide support to AU peacekeeping mission	Air forces (transport of AU troops)
NATO Assistance to AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	Somalia	June 2007-present	Airlift and sealift support for AU peacekeepers, capacity-building support, expert training support to the African Standby Force (ASF)	Air forces, naval forces and NATO experts
NATO Training Mission in Iraq	Iraq	2004-2011	Train Iraqi armed forces and security personnel	Training inside and outside Iraq
Operations Allied Provider, Allied Protector and Ocean Shield	Seas off the Horn of Africa	2008-2016	Provide protection to civilian vessels and deter/counter piracy	Naval forces
Operation Unified Protector (OUP)	Libya	March-October 2011	Protect civilians and enforce no-fly zone and arms embargo	Air forces
Air policing	Baltic region, Albania and Slovenia	2014-present	Patrol the airspace of Allies; detect, track and identify violations of its airspace, jets	Air forces

Source: adapted from Cottey (2013: 162-163) and The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2016b). This table does not include NATO's disaster relief operations in Pakistan and the United States in 2005 and 2006.

While the EU had not disposed of its capabilities to take over responsibilities in the field of security and defense for the large part of its existence, the Yugoslav wars also encouraged the EU to develop capacities for crisis management. In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the so-called Petersberg tasks in the Treaty on European Union and thereby specified the range

of possible military missions EU states could undertake.[10] These included humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, crisis management and peacemaking tasks. The 1998 Saint Malo Declaration and the Cologne European Council in 1999 reaffirmed the Union's commitment to develop a military capacity in international crises. In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon extended the range of military tasks the EU could undertake to also include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks as well as post-conflict stabilization tasks (European External Action Service, n. Y.).

Since 2003, the EU has conducted 12 military operations, six of which explicitly mentioned humanitarian purposes or the prevention of conflict in their mandates (see Table 2, those operations explicitly motivated by the aim to prevent or address human suffering are highlighted in grey). The EU deployed its first military operation in 2003 to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with the objective to "provide for the general safety and security of the nation". Further operations explicitly motivated by humanitarian purposes followed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the DRC, Chad, and the Central African Republic (Tsitsikostas, 2017: 83).[11] Compared to NATO which has mainly focused on operations at the higher end of the conflict spectrum, CSDP missions have been much smaller in scale and involved tasks at the medium or lower end of the conflict spectrum (see Table 1 and 2) (Dyson and Konstadinides, 2013: 48-49). Depending on the mandate assigned and the conflict environment in which CSDP operations were conducted, the troop size of the operations ranged between 70 (EU Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic) and 7,000 (EU Military Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA/ BiH)) (Di Mauro et al., 2016). As with NATO, troop contributions for military operations are provided by the member states. If NATO so approves, the Berlin Plus agreement provides the EU with access to NATO assets and facilities for crisis management tasks. This enables the EU to conduct more complex and long-term military operations, such as operation Althea. While the Berlin Plus agreement provided NATO with the 'right of first refusal' to engage in a conflict, the EU has often acted

[10] The EU adopted the Petersberg tasks from the Western European Union. The Western European Union was a military alliance between seven European states. With the establishment of CSDP, its tasks and institutions have been gradually transferred to the EU and the organization has been formally closed down in 2011. WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION. 2010. *Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High Contracting Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty – Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom* [Online]. Available: http://www.weu.int/Declaration_E.pdf [Accessed 26 July 2015.].

[11] Some also count EUFOR Libya which was established by the Council but was never deployed.

autonomously or in tandem with the transatlantic alliance (Hofmann and Reynolds, 2007: 2, Sloan, 2012: 256). Significantly, even though both organizations have developed and adjusted their civilian and military competency to address international crises and external threats, they did not fundamentally challenge each other's relevance in the field of security and defense (Webber et al., 2012: 195-197). The EU's "'comprehensive' approach to security […] has, by and large, been complimentary to rather than in conflict with NATO" (Webber et al., 2012: 202). Accordingly, the EU and NATO have shared the responsibility of managing the crises in the Balkans with the EU taking over the NATO-led operations in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both organizations have also launched maritime operations to fight piracy off the Horn of Africa. Hence, the involvement of NATO in crisis management has not precluded the engagement of the EU and vice versa. Rather on the contrary, both organizations have coexisted and at times even cooperated in the field.

Table 2: *CSDP military operations (as of June 2017)*

Operation	***Country/Region***	***Date***	***Mission/ Role***	***Force size***	***Total Costs (€ million) at 2016***
EU Military Mission CONCORDIA/ FYROM, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	2003	Provide for the general safety and security of the nation. Monitor and assist in the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement	400	39.2
EU Military Mission ARTEMIS, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Democratic Republic of Congo	2003	Stabilize security conditions. Improve humanitarian conditions in Bunia	1,807	58.3
EU Military Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA/ BiH)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2004-present	Provide safety and security. Deny conditions for a resumption of violence. Uphold the Dayton Accords	7,000	597.5
EU Military Force in Congo (EUFOR RD Congo)	Democratic Republic of Congo	2006	Secure the region during DRC's transition to democracy, focusing on elections in 2006. Support UN mission MONUC	2259	139.2
EU Military Bridging Mission (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)	Chad and the Central African Republic	2008-2009	Protect civilians, displaced persons and refugees from Darfur. Assist the delivery of humanitarian aid. Ensure the safety of UN personnel and facilities	3,300	826.7
EU Naval Force Somalia ATALANTA (EU-NAVFOR Somalia)	Coast of Somalia	2008-present	Protect international aid vessels and shipping. Help deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy.	1,943	461.7

EU Somalia Training Mission (EUTM Somalia)	Somalia and Uganda	2010-present	Provide training for the development and strengthening of Somali security forces	125	412.5
EU Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali)	Mali	2013-present	Fully restore constitutional and democratic order. Help the Malian authorities to exercise fully their sovereignty over the whole of the country. Neutralise organised crime and terrorist threats.	570	384.2
EU Military Force RCA (EUFOR RCA)	Central African Republic	2014-2015	Provide temporary support in achieving a safe and secure environment in the Bangui area, with a view to handing over to African partners. Protect the populations most at risk, creating the conditions for providing humanitarian aid	700	255
EU Military Advisory Mission, Central African Republic, EUMAM RCA	Central African Republic	2015-2016	Support the CAR authorities in the preparation of the upcoming Security Sector Reform.	70	65.8
EU Naval Operation Mediterranean SOPHIA	Mediterranean Sea	2015-present	Disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks. Capacity building and training of, and information sharing with, the Libyan Coastguard and Navy. Implementation	1,666	98.3

			of the UN arms embargo		
EU Military Training Mission, Central Africa Republic	Central African Republic	2016-present	Contribute to the Defence Sector Reform in the CAR within the Central African Security Sector Reform process coordinated by MINUSCA. Working towards the goal of modernised, effective and democratically accountable Central African Armed Forces (FACA)	170	151.5

Own illustration, source: Di Mauro et al. (2016).

Even though the development of crisis management capacities in the EU and NATO provides European states with two organizations to deploy military force collectively, individual member states have at times launched military operations outside of these institutional frameworks. Instead of using the EU's or NATO's crisis management capacities, European states sometimes acted through ad-hoc coalitions of the willing or launched national operations to contain humanitarian crises.

Among European states, only France and the United Kingdom possess the military capabilities and the willingness to use them in military action. Other European states do not dispose of the capacity and/or willingness to launch and sustain military intervention and are therefore not prepared to engage in humanitarian intervention outside multilateral frameworks.[12]

Although both France and the UK assign primacy to conduct military operations within multinational frameworks and more explicitly through the EU and NATO, both countries

[12] In Germany, the unilateral use of force is considered a political no-go. The *Bundeswehr* has not been conceived for unilateral deployments; nor has it been equipped with the weapon systems to carry out such tasks. Berlin did carry out reforms after the end of the Cold War to make the *Bundeswehr* fit for the challenges of the twenty-first century and is committed to maintain a wide spectrum of conventional weapon systems. Contributions to out-of-area operations, however, are strictly limited to activities in the framework of multilateral organizations. For further reading see: KROTZ, U. 2015. History and Foreign Policy in France and Germany, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan. (p. 101-102). BOHNEN, J. 1997. Germany. In: HOWORTH, J. & MENON, A. (eds.) The European Union and National Defence Policy. London and New York: Routledge. (p. 57).

reserved the right to engage in autonomous action if necessary. The 2013 French White Paper on Defense and National Security (Ministère de la Défense, 2013a: 25) notes that "the operations in which it [France] will participate are conducted, as much as possible, in multilateral frameworks." At the same time, "France believes that it will contribute even more to a collective response if it disposes of the capacity to take the initiative and autonomous action which also allow it to lead and unite the actions of its allies and partners" (Ministère de la Défense, 2013a: 136, also see: 83, 87-88). In a similar vein, the UK's 2015 Strategic Defense and Security Review (HM Government, 2015: 29) notes that "[w]hile our Armed Forces can and will whenever necessary deploy on their own, we would normally expect them to deploy with allies such as the US and France; through NATO; or as part of a broader coalition." Similar statements and ambitions were made in previous Defense White Papers (HM Government, 2010: 17, Ministère de la Défense, 2013a: 82-83).

In line with their ambitions, France and the UK conducted multiple national operations and formed the driving forces behind ad-hoc military coalitions. British armed forces primarily used military force in cooperation with the US, Britain's key ally. Participation in US-led military operations motivated by humanitarian purposes included the intervention in the 2011 Libya crisis and the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq since 2014 and Syria since 2015. In 2000, British military forces intervened in the Sierra Leone civil war through the national Operation Palliser.

France has conducted an even higher number of national missions and ad-hoc coalitions. Between 1990 and 2015, France conducted or participated in 98 operations of this kind, albeit not all of them were motivated by humanitarian reasons (Di Mauro et al., 2016). Despite its advocacy of European security and defense cooperation, France continued to deploy national military interventions in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Chad and the Central African Republic after the launch of CSDP in 2003. Further, in a multi-state coalition with the UK and the US, France conducted airstrikes on Libya during the country's civil war in 2011 and deployed military force in the fight against ISIL in Iraq since 2014 and Syria since 2015 (Ministère de la Défense, 2016: 36, Ministère de la Défense, 2017: 33).

Even though European states have become increasingly involved in the management of violent crises since the 1990s through the EU, NATO and ad-hoc interventions, they have not consistently used these frameworks when action was urgent. Even when other security

organizations and actors seemed ill-positioned or badly prepared to solve a conflict and requested help, European states sometimes refused to intervene. Even though French troops were already present in the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010/2011 and although Côte d'Ivoire's regime had requested UN peacekeepers to withdraw, the UN reinforced its mission to protect civilians from the use of heavy weapons by the conflicting parties (Guéhenno, 2016: 383). France only deployed its troops four days after the UN, while the EU was standing aloof. Further, despite an explicit request by the UN, European states refused to deploy troops to the DRC in 2008 to support the UN's mission. Moreover, European states also refrained from military action to fight Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region even though the terrorists caused one of the world's most devastating humanitarian crises since 1945 and left the African states with the responsibility to solve the conflict. Finally, despite a devastating war and grave humanitarian situation, European states, as others, have so far been reluctant to put an end to the fighting in Yemen.

Table 3 illustrates the diverse responses of European states to selected African humanitarian crises and also sheds light on the crises in which European states did not intervene. Why do European states sometimes intervene collectively in humanitarian crises while at other moments they fail to do so? Why, despite the EU's global ambitions and military capacities, do European states sometimes prioritize alternative frameworks to prevent or address widespread human suffering and the killing of civilian populations? When and why do they leave the responsibility to address these situations to other international players?

Table 3: *Deployment of civilian and military operations to selected humanitarian crises in Africa, 2003-2014*[13]

Country	Operation I	Operation II	Operation III	Operation IV	Operation V	Operation VI
Burundi	AMIB (AU 2003-2004)	ONUB (UN 2004-2006)	VIP Protection Force (AU 2005)			
Central African Republic	FOMUC/MICOPAX (ECCAS 2002-2013)	MINURCAT (UN 2007-2010)	MISCA (AU 2013-2014)	Sangaris (France 2013-2016)	EUFOR RCA (EU 2014)	MINUSCA (UN 2013-)
Chad	MINURCAT (UN 2007-2010)	EUFOR Chad/CAR (EU 2008-2009)				
DR Congo	MONUC/MONUSCO (UN 1999-)	Artemis (EU 2003)	EUPOL/EUSEC (2005-2014/2016)	EUFOR RD Congo (EU 2006)		
Ethiopia	UNMEE (UN 2000-2008)					
Côte d'Ivoire	Licorne (France 2003-2015)	MINUCI/UNOCI (UN 2003-2017)	ECOMICI (ECOWAS 2003-2004)			
Liberia	ECOMIL (ECOWAS 2003)	UNMIL (UN 2003-)				
Libya	Harmattan/Ellamy (France/UK 2011)	OUP (NATO 2011)	UNSMIL (UN 2011-)			
Mali	Serval (France 2013-2014)	AFISMA/MISAHEL (AU 2013-)	EUTM (EU 2013-)	MINUSMA (UN 2013-)		
Nigeria	MNJTF (Lake Chad Basin 2015-)					
Somalia	AMISOM (AU 2007-)	EUNAVFOR (EU 2008-)	EUTM (EU 2010-)	UNSOM (UN 2013-)		
South Sudan	UNMISS (UN 2011-)	EUAVSEC (EU 2012-2014)				
Sudan	UNMIS (UN 2005-2011)	MVM (IGAD 2014-)				
Uganda	EUTM Somalia (EU 2010-)					

Source: own compilation.

[13] I only look at crises which have occurred since 2003 because CSDP only became operational in 2003 and the inclusion of earlier crises would exclude EU intervention a priori. Finally, the cases selected are limited to crises which happened on the African continent to further ensure case comparability. This reduces the generalization of this study's results but increases the internal validity of the cases chosen (see chapter 4.3).

To sum up, European states have responded to humanitarian crises in diverse ways and constellations. According to the different channels, their responses fall into three broad categories, corresponding each to different outcomes of humanitarian interventions (see Table 4).

The first category encompasses all cases in which European states respond *collectively* to humanitarian crises. In this case, European states use common institutional frameworks, the EU and/or NATO and the organization's military structures to deploy military force. In both organizations, all members have to agree collectively on the launch of a common operation or at least not veto it. Those corresponding outcomes fall under CSDP military operations and NATO operations.

The second category comprises all crises in which European states intervene through an *ad-hoc* arrangement. In this situation, individual or groups of European states introduce military action outside of common institutional frameworks and instead employ an ad-hoc coalition to deal with a specific crisis. The corresponding outcomes are national and ad-hoc operations, typically established by the EU's most powerful states France and the UK .Only they possess the capabilities and resources to launch and sustain military action on their own.

The third category encompasses all crises in which European states are reluctant to deploy military force through a common institutional channel or an ad-hoc arrangement deferring responsibility over intervention to other security actors. The corresponding outcomes are European *non-intervention* while other security organizations such as the UN, the AU, ECOWAS or the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) may intervene. Individual EU states can contribute (token) troops to UN peacekeeping operations but their participation is not predetermined by the launch of the respective operation.

Table 4: *European states' responses to humanitarian crises*

European States' Response	Outcome	Example
Collective intervention	CSDP military operations and NATO operations	EUFOR DR Congo, EUFOR Chad/ CAR, Operation Unified Protector
Ad-hoc intervention	National operations and multinational operations led by EU states (France and/ or the UK)	Operation Sangaris (France), Operation Ellamy (Britain), Operation Harmattan (France)
Non-intervention	UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, operations conducted by other regional organizations or non-intervention	DR Congo 2008, Central African Republic (January 2013- December 2013), Boko Haram-affected areas

Source: own illustration.

Naturally, individual outcomes do not imply that other outcomes cannot occur concurrently. Frequently, crisis management operations by one actor are launched in parallel or sequence to crisis management operations conducted by other actors (Sarjoh Bah and Jones, 2008). Tardy (2015a: 11) calls this the 'hybridization of operations' "whereby operations are no longer the product of one single institution but rather the result of the interaction of several conflict management policies and/or cultures"

Before I introduce hypotheses to explain this variation in chapter three, the next passage provides a definition of humanitarian intervention, which is needed to classify and delineate different forms of intervention.

2.3. Definition of Humanitarian Intervention

Throughout history, state intervention on ethical, religious, or moral grounds has been contested and its relation to sovereignty and non-interference principles difficult. Still today, where the universality of human rights enjoys greater prevalence than ever before, the topic of humanitarian intervention is surrounded by controversy. The importance of this issue attracts a vast number of scholars from different backgrounds. Political scientists, international relations scholars, international lawyers, historians, philosophers, scholars of ethics, policy practitioners, and the media have all contributed to the discussion. The result is a very rich field of study which, however, lacks agreement on central conceptual issues and definitions (Welsh, 2004b: 3, Simms and Trim, 2011: 2).

The measures I consider as cases of humanitarian intervention go well beyond its legal definitions.[14] A broad description of humanitarian intervention is analytically useful for this thesis because the aim is to capture all interventions motivated (at least in part) by humanitarian goals. I therefore adopt Welsh's (2004b: 3) definition of humanitarian intervention which encompasses cases of "*coercive interference in the internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of addressing massive human rights violations or preventing widespread human suffering*".

Although tasks associated with intrusion into another state's internal affairs have risen and frequently comprise non-military tasks, this thesis focuses on military interventions by states and international organizations. This excludes cases of non-coercive interference in states' internal affairs and therefore disregards the multiplicity of non-military or civilian activities carried out by other international actors such as non-governmental organizations and relief agencies (Welsh, 2004b: 3). Military tasks associated with humanitarian intervention can vary in intensity and include the interposition of forces between civilians and diverse armed groups, war-fighting, the disarmament and demobilization of military forces and militia, the enforcement of a ceasefire and the creation of safe havens. The cases considered in this thesis illustrate the multidimensionality of military operations but all encompass humanitarian purposes as at least one component of the intervention's mandate backed by credible military force and the willingness to use it. In contrast, civilian crisis management operations and traditional UN peacekeeping operations which adhere to the use

[14] The standard legal definition defines humanitarian intervention as the use of armed force by one or more states or international bodies in another state without the consent of its authorities with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants. See Welsh, 2004: 184.

of military means only for reasons of self-defense are not considered in this thesis (Weiss, 2015: 85-86).

Moreover, unlike traditional peacekeeping, this thesis' analysis includes cases wherein the consent of the host government was absent. The reasons for this are purely practical (Hehir, 2010: 18, Burke, 2013: 7, Everill and Kaplan, 2013: 3). In fact, Welsh (2004b: 3-4) notes that, "the legal requirement of 'non-consent' is in practice very difficult to maintain […]." The Australian-led intervention in East Timor in 1999 is a case in point. At the outset, Indonesia's government was highly critical of intervention and only gave its consent after considerable international pressure (Hehir, 2010: 18, Pattison, 2010: 1). Thus, when consent is coerced, the degree of government consent is difficult to establish and maintain. What is more, conflict and regime instability might at times not allow the identification of the authority entitled to give its consent to foreign intervention. The formal government might have collapsed or be itself a party to the conflict and the entity committing human rights abuses and mass atrocity crimes (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009: 103). The emergence of R2P illustrates the relevance of this point and has found practical implementation in the Libya campaign during 2011. Instead of the consent of the government, the establishment of a no-fly zone over the country depended on the support of the National Transitional Council of Libya, as the representative body of the revolutionists, and the Arab League (CNN, 2011, Ramoin, 2012). Weiss (2015: 83) therefore suggests that "consent is better imagined as a continuum rather than an air-tight category".

This thesis looks at UN Security Council authorization not as a condition for intervention but as part of the process that requires explanation. The lack of UNSC authorization renders intervention more contested but yields crucial explanatory power for when and how states and international organizations intervene in humanitarian crises, as this study will show (Orford, 2003: 4-5, Hathaway et al., 2013: 501). Additionally, regional powers have become important actors in humanitarian interventions over the last decade, and are increasingly seen as an additional source of legitimacy and a substitute if UNSC agreement is missing. The recent intervention in the Libya crisis and the NATO intervention in Kosovo illustrate this point (Orford, 2003: 4-5, Welsh, 2004b: 6).

3. Theoretical Perspectives

Which factors can explain *why, when,* and *how* European states get involved in military crisis management for humanitarian purposes? Realist and constructivist scholars have led the main theoretical discussion on state intervention in foreign crises. The next section reviews the assumptions of both theoretical strands on the reasons *why, when, and how* (European) states participate in humanitarian intervention. Following an analysis of the merits and shortcomings of the two research programs I elaborate an alternative theoretical model focusing on the linkage between domestic, international and regional politics.

3.1. Realism and European intervention in humanitarian crises

According to realists[15] national interest reigns supreme in international politics. In a world of anarchy and self-help, where no world government regulates state relations and punishes the violation of universally applicable laws, the principal concern of states is to preserve national security and power. The international system's polarity and distribution of power determine the interaction between states, potential for conflict, and the balancing behavior of states. These central realist tenets have critical consequences for how realists view military intervention in foreign countries and their justifying objectives (Morgenthau, 1973, Waltz, 1979, Grieco, 1988).

Because the primary concern of states is to safeguard security and survival, they are well advised to exercise prudence in the conduct of foreign policy. Military intervention, from this perspective, is risky and might involve unintended consequences. Intervention, for these reasons, should only be practiced in rare occasions; based on a thorough assessment of the interests at stake and power available. As Morgenthau (1967: 436) notes: "Intervene we must where our national interest requires it and where our power gives us the chance to succeed." Realism does not exclude the possibility that states intervene in other state affairs on moral grounds but realists warn of the potential for even greater conflict accompanying intervention. Human rights are not a universally accepted concept and military intervention driven by the rationale to spread these

[15] I refer here mainly to the structural account of realism, also termed neo-realism. In contrast to neo-realism, neo-classical realism takes unit-level characteristics into account while retaining neo-realists emphasis on international structure as the main explanatory factor of states' foreign policies and international outcomes. For a neo-classical realist account of NATO's politics see: SPERLING, James 2016. Neo-classical realism and alliance politics. *In:* WEBBER, M. & HYDE-PRICE, A. (eds.) *Theorising NATO: New perspectives on the Atlantic alliance.* London and New York: Routledge.

values could arouse a dangerous foe's anger (Morgenthau, 1971: 195, Fiott, 2013: 768, Hyde-Price, 2016: 48). States, for this reason, must calculate carefully when military power is used. Indeed, as Waltz (1981: 51) argues:

> "We should guard against adopting expansive definitions of our vital interests, as great powers often do, assuming by extension that military force should be used to secure them. […] By defining vital interests narrowly and by using force sparingly, we can avoid the unnecessary commitment of force that would risk our having force unavailable in those rare cases where it might be well to use it."

And while traditional realists find that the temptation to use military power on moral grounds should be avoided entirely, contemporary analyses of realist writers contend that the theory's central tenets hold significant explanatory power to explain the dynamics driving state intervention in the post-Cold War era. According to them, the underlying factor essentially motivating military action is the concern for geostrategic goals and the national interest rather than humanitarian motives (Crawford, 2000, Welsh, 2004a: 58, Ratti, 2006: 99). Reviewing the motivations behind state intervention in the early 1990s to early 2000s, Wheeler and Morris (2007: 448) stress that "in no case states intervened when there were no vital interests at stake […]. This produces a pattern of intervention that is highly selectively, frequently driven by considerations of national self-interest rather than humanitarian need."

Analyses on European military operations inspired by realist thought reflect these assumptions. Gegout (2009b: 408) argues that France used Operation Artemis in the DRC to maintain influence in its former colony and enhance the EU's prestige as a security actor. The mission's launch, under the auspices of the EU, had several advantages for France that could have avoided accusations of neo-imperialism while sharing the operation's responsibilities and financial burdens with its European partners. Similarly, Helly (2009b: 393-394) and Weber (2009: 71) find that security, trade and commerce were the driving factors for mobilizing support in the establishment of the EU's naval operation fighting pirates off the Somali coast. Likewise, Davidson (2013: 317, 323) argues that the threat posed by refugees, economic interests, and terrorism pushed the French and British governments to intervene in the Libya crisis in 2011. Further, Hyde-Price (2016: 50) asserts that NATO launched its crisis management operations because they helped to foster US influence.[16]

[16] Similar arguments have been used to explain states' participation in UN peace operations. See THAKUR, Ramesh 1980. Peacekeeping and Foreign Policy: Canada, India and the International Commission in Vietnam, 1954-1965. *British Journal of International Studies,* 6**,** 125-153, NEACK, Laura 1995. UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self? *Journal of Peace Research,* 32**,** 181-196, FINDLAY, Trevor 1996. Introduction. *In:* FINDLAY, T. (ed.) *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers.* Oxford: Oxford University Press/ SIPRI, BERMAN,

Moreover, realists are highly skeptical about prospects of cooperation between states in military issues. The absence of a global authority governing inter-state relations indicates that states are suspicious of cooperation; they fear that today's partner may turn into a future foe (Krasner, 1991: 342). Therefore, realists assume that states privilege national solutions to international crises and will only cooperate if collective security is at stake (Fiott, 2016: 9). For cooperation to materialize, realists assign special importance to the most powerful states because only they have the capabilities to perform military operations (Webber et al., 2012: 71f.). Hence, from a realist perspective, cooperation between states will be determined by the position of the most powerful states, be short-lived and finishing as soon as the common danger has been averted (see quote by Kenneth Waltz on NATO's disappearance after the Cold War, in: Hellmann and Wolf, 1993: 17, Keohane, 1993: 286, Webber et al., 2012: 33).

In line with realist logic, scholars argue that European foreign, security and defense cooperation is a response to US dominance in international politics and an attempt by the Europeans to balance or constrain American influence (Posen, 2004, 2006, Jones, 2007). To explain more specific instances or patterns of cooperation in security and defense affairs along realist lines of argument, Bellamy and Williams (2013b: 421) find that states typically use those institutions "they believe will further their security goals at minimum cost." France is commonly viewed as the driving force behind the launch of EU operations in Francophone Africa for instance (Koepf, 2014: 91, Pohl, 2014b: 15). In a similar vein, Webber et al. (2012: 75) argue that NATO's crisis management missions "have been characterized in various ways by US political and military leadership." Hyde-Price (2016: 52) observes that US military power was central to NATO's engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo. Moreover, Williams (2013: 96-97) explains that the UK has only selectively engaged in UN peacekeeping operations because it possesses more influence over operations conducted by ad-hoc coalitions.

If realists are taken at their word, we should expect that states privilege launching ad-hoc operations over common action through institutional frameworks such as the EU and NATO unless there is a common threat to alliance members (Keohane, 1993: 286). Given the concern for other states' intentions and the desire for great powers to maximize their own power and influence, the deployment of NATO and EU missions should occur much less frequently.

Eric G. 1998. The security council's increasing reliance on burden-sharing: Collaboration or abrogation? *International Peacekeeping,* 5**,** 1-21, GILLIGAN, Michael & STEDMAN, Stephen John 2003. Where Do the Peacekeepers Go? *International Studies Review,* 5**,** 37-54..

Empirical proof of realist assumptions is, however, thin. European states have quite frequently launched military operations under EU guidance over the last decade and likewise NATO has expanded its range of military tasks. What's more, when states do assent to launch a military operation through an existing institutional channel, they should do so only in response to a shared threat. However, in his analysis of EU military operations, Pohl (2014b: 166) finds little evidence that the EU sought to constrain the influence of the US. In contrast, both have frequently acted together. On top of that, empirical evidence which substantiates the claim that economic interests and security concerns were the driving factors behind European participation in crisis management operations is similarly weak. Even realists like Gegout (2009b: 407-408) have to admit that "[c]onflicts in Africa […] do not represent a security threat for European states […]" and "trade relations between European and African states, which have to deal with violence and which are among the poorest states in the world, are negligible." Finally, the realist proposition that common EU and NATO military operations primarily occur under the leadership of the organizations' most powerful states is harder to deny. Nonetheless, the most powerful states did not always succeed in generating consensus even though their interests were directly at stake. France lobbied strongly for EU intervention in the 2011 Libya crisis but EU states failed to find a common position. Similarly, notwithstanding US power, NATO member states' stark disagreement over the 2003 Iraq crisis first prevented common military action and later limited the alliance's role in the conflict (Webber et al., 2012: 71).

In sum, realism draws attention to the national interest involved in military operations. The theory offers valuable insights into the complex security considerations of states when using force in international relations and their concerns over cooperation in military issues. However, realist explanations are incomplete and leave many questions unanswered. In particular, realist accounts fall short of explaining variations in the frameworks European states harness to intervene. In addition, realists fail to explain why European states have quite frequently used military force even though humanitarian crises did not pose a direct threat to their own security. Realism, as Hyde-Price (2016: 55) argues,

> "can explain the broad patterns of cooperation and conflict in contemporary Europe and transatlantic relations, but cannot elucidate the tactical calculations of individual states when they consider specific policy issues, such as, military intervention in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan […]."

3.2. Constructivism and European intervention in humanitarian crises

To date, the main challenge to realist explanations for intervention and non-intervention is articulated by constructivist research. Constructivist analyses shed light on the relationship between state foreign policy and its identity and culture. Scholars writing in this school of thought highlight the impact of norms, values, and beliefs as the predominant forces that shape states' foreign policy. Constructivists challenge the explanatory power realists assign to structure and power distribution in the system. They maintain there is no such thing as objective reality determining state action, but that states act on the world according to the perceptions they hold. "Anarchy," as Wendt (1992: 395) famously claimed, "is what states make of it".

From a constructivist perspective, humanitarian intervention must be seen within the wider international normative framework and state adaptation of related norms and values (Bellamy, 2003: 327). Accordingly, analyses with a constructivist angle on European crisis management highlight the convergence of national ideas and international norms such as the protection of human rights and international law to explain contributions to crisis management operations (Finnemore, 1996: 85-88, Davidson, 2013: 312).

In this way, constructivist research has highlighted the distinctive features of the EU as a foreign policy actor which pursues normative (Manners, 2002), civilian (Bull, 1982) and ethical (Aggestam, 2008) goals firmly grounded in international law (Manners, 2002, Cooper, 2003, Sjursen, 2006: 244-245, Manners, 2008, Duke, 2009: 402, Riddervold, 2011: 389, Smith, 2011c: 152-153, Pohl, 2014b: 16-17). From this view, European states participate in peace missions because the promotion of human rights and good governance resonates with their own constitutional principles and their activities in common institutions such as the EU, NATO, and the UN (Bellamy and Williams, 2013a: 11-12). Martin (2007: 71) for example notes that "[…] EUFOR was human security in action, breaking new ground in the way that a military mission could be used to promote the long-term wellbeing of individuals with no ambition to control or defend territory […]". Likewise, Riddervold (2011: 400) argues that "Atalanta was initially launched to promote and uphold UN resolutions in a legitimate way. […] With Atalanta, military means were established to uphold global law as part of a law enforcement operation." Several scholars similarly point out that NATO's value system was central to the launch of its operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan (Webber, 2009: 452-453, Kitchen, 2010: 109, Webber et al., 2012: 82-83) and that "a failure to act would have undermined NATO's very raison d'être"

(Webber et al., 2012: 83). Vlasic (2012: 159) correspondingly underlines that "European and North American states […] may have done more than any other block of countries to aid the victims of humanitarian crises" and argues "the ideals and principles that compose RtoP are central to their national identities"

In contrast to realists, constructivists are much more optimistic about the prospects of cooperation between states. Constructivist scholars argue that interaction between states furthers the exchange of ideas and can yield valuable socialisation effects. As interaction in common frameworks increases, states create shared meaning that fosters understanding and an intensification of coherent and consistent common activities (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 15, Lowndes, 2002: 95-96). Meyer (2006) in particular finds that through processes of learning and socialisation, European strategic cultures have gradually converged and differences between states using force in humanitarian crises have decreased. Similarly, Schmidt and Zyla (2013) argue that Europe's strategic culture influences the EU's military and civilian missions through the normative framework it provides for the member states. In contrast, persisting divergences in national strategic cultures are used to explain why in some areas European states' foreign, security, and defense policies remain distinct (Meyer, 2005, Meyer, 2006, Giegerich, 2006). More specifically, Doeser (2016) and Britz (2016) contend that varying strategic cultures account for why some European states contribute to military operations while others refrain from doing so. Similarly, Zyla (2011) emphasizes NATO's and the EU's divergent strategic cultures to explain the organization's different approaches to crisis management operations.

While concern for human rights, strategic cultures, and compliance of international law certainly plays a role in European operations (Pohl, 2014: 171) and states' contributions to them, constructivist theory fails to comprehensively explain the striking pattern of European states' intervention and non-intervention in humanitarian crises. In fact, there are several examples of humanitarian crises in which European states failed to intervene even though normative rationale would have justified military action (Gegout, 2009b, Engberg, 2010, Engberg, 2014, Mello, 2014, Pohl, 2014a: 197). Despite an explicit request of the UN, a worsening humanitarian crisis and previous interventions in 2003 and 2006, European states were not inclined to deploy a common military operation to the DRC in 2008. What's more, while the EU intervened in Chad in 2008, it was absent "earlier in Darfur proper, when the humanitarian situation was far worse" (also see: Nováky, 2014: 3, Pohl, 2014a: 195). Explanations of strategic culture do not fare much

better. Although the Libya crisis in 2011 was seen as an ideal case for the deployment of a CSDP operation, EU member states could not agree on common military action (Larivé, 2014b: 209-210). Together with the US, France and the UK launched an ad-hoc operation and later handed the command over the operation to NATO. In addition, although NATO allies invoked the mutual defense clause – which forms the alliance's ideational core – following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US NATO member states did not launch common military action. Instead, Washington instigated an ad-hoc coalition of the willing to combat terrorism in Afghanistan (Sperling and Webber, 2012: 345).

Constructivist accounts of European foreign, security, and defense policy provide valuable insights but they ultimately fail to explain striking patterns of the phenomenon. Firstly, constructivist theory does not provide a comprehensive analysis of when and when not European states decide to launch common military operations. Normative and ideational factors did not always trigger intervention when military action could have been justified on the basis of humanitarian reasons or liberal-democratic values. Secondly, constructivist explanations only offer limited insights into Europeans' choice of different institutional channels to intervene. Almost twenty years after the launch of CSDP, European states frequently fail to reach common agreements on foreign, security, and defense policies. Instead of deploying a military operation through the EU (or NATO), France and the UK have at times preferred to launch ad-hoc operations outside institutional frameworks. In short, neither constructivist nor realist assumptions deliver satisfying answers to why, when and how European states get their act together at one moment and launch military action through common institutional channels, while at others they prefer different frameworks or decide to go at it alone.

3.3. A Three-Step Model of European Decision-Making in Security and Defense Affairs

Realists and constructivists provide powerful arguments to answer why or why not states intervene in humanitarian crises. However, they suffer difficulties in explaining successfully why these factors only work sometimes to motivate states to intervene militarily and fail at other instances. To overcome the problems associated with constructivist and realist theories, this thesis develops a three-step model of European foreign policy decision-making. The model draws upon domestic politics theories, linkage and two-level games theories, as well as liberal intergovernmentalism.

Domestic politics approaches and two-level games theories argue that the state is not the unitary actor realists[17] and constructivists assume it to be (Moravcsik, 1997, Regan, 1998: 759, Pohl, 2014b: 180). Instead they affirm that state leaders, as rational actors, are responsive to the demands of domestic actors and their constituency because they are concerned about their chances for re-election (Downs, 1957, Putnam, 1988: 458, Moravcsik, 1993: 483, De Mesquita et al., 2003, De Mesquita and Smith, 2012, Pohl, 2014b: 22, Pohl, 2016).[18] According to this strand of research then, foreign policy is motivated by domestic political considerations and influenced by a variety of domestic actors, including the domestic public, lobbyists, the media, parliament, and the cabinet.

Yet, domestic politics do not determine foreign policy outcomes. Subsequently, state leaders seek to pursue domestic preferences at the international level. They interact and negotiate with other state leaders to reach an international agreement in line with domestic demands (Hanrieder, 1967, Rosenau, 1967, Hanrieder, 1971, Rosenau, 1971, Katzenstein, 1976, Morrow,

[17] Neo-classical realism forms an exception here.

[18] Similar assumptions have been made by those scholars interested in the formation and design of security alliances emphasizing the domestic trade-offs the decision to join alliances involve. Accordingly, Haggard and Simmons (1987: 516) note that "[g]overnments, when making choices about [international] regime creation and compliance, try to preserve the benefits of cooperation while minimizing the costs that may fall on politically important groups." For an overview of the debate see: ALTFELD, Michael F. 1984. The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test. *The Western Political Quarterly,* 37**,** 523-544. BARNETT, Michael N. & LEVY, Jack S. 1991. Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73. *International Organization,* 45**,** 369-395. MORROW, James D. 1993. Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security. Ibid.47**,** 207-233, SIVERSON, Randolph M. & STARR, Harvey 1994. Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances. *American Journal of Political Science,* 38**,** 145-161. KIMBALL, Anessa L. 2010. Political survival, policy distribution, and alliance formation. *Journal of Peace Research,* 47**,** 407-419.

1988, Putnam, 1988, Moravcsik, 1993, Legro, 1996, Moravcsik, 1997: 520, Zürn, 1997, Lake and Powell, 1999). In other words, foreign policy outcomes are determined by both "the opportunities and strictures presented by the nation's external, operational environment and […] the internal, psychological environment prevailing in the national system" (Hanrieder, 1967: 972).

While constructivist and realist approaches still dominate the field, several scholars have adopted domestic politics or two-level games theories to explain European foreign, security, and defense affairs. Pohl (2014b) and Engberg (2014) integrate domestic politics in their analyses to explain when European states launch common military operations. Similarly, Koenig (2016) uses liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions to examine the coherence of EU states in their responses to the crises in Libya, the Sahel and Somalia. To explain the decision-making on the EU's police mission in Afghanistan, Pohl and van Willigen (2015) develop an innovative two-stage model. Moreover, Haaland Matláry (2009) argues that state elites use international duties to ward domestic opposition and to advance domestic change. Finally, Pohl (2016) employs liberal international relations theory to explain NATO's endurance and activities since the end of the Cold War.

Although two-level game approaches provide novel insights into European foreign, security, and defense policy some shortcomings persist. First of all, the assumption that state elites pursue foreign policy goals mainly for domestic political gains is dubious in the field of European security and defense. Although these considerations certainly play a role, it has been shown that foreign and security policy issues do not rank high on the public's agenda. In addition, while some international agreements require domestic ratification, others do not. The selection of actors and the conditions under which these actors advance specific domestic demands, therefore, still requires more attention.

Secondly, there exists a preoccupation with positive outcomes, that is, cases in which European states acted internationally. In contrast, relatively limited attention has been paid to the factors which facilitate foreign policy inaction or negative outcomes. If such cases are studied, they are often simply portrayed as being caused by the absence of those conditions which otherwise facilitate agreement. Yet, this might not always be the case. Despite the significant contributions of two-level game approaches to the study of European security and defense

affairs, most studies have left the conditions under which non-events can be realized internationally underspecified.

Third, most studies in the field of European security and defense policy conceptualize international outcomes dichotomously, that is the primary question is whether international players can reach an agreement or not (Engberg, 2010, Engberg, 2014, Pohl, 2014b, a). This might be helpful analytically, but it disregards the possibility of outcomes other than agreement and non-agreement. Indeed, actors may negotiate with more than one player and at several negotiation tables to find an agreement which best fits domestic demands. In other words, actors can realize their foreign policy goals in more than one format and through different coalitions of states. Where the formation of one possible framework fails, agreement in another framework may still be possible. This has been researched extensively in the field of international trade agreements where the economic benefits from cooperation and non-cooperation are concrete (Putnam, 1988, Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). However, it has received less attention in the field of military coalition formation where the benefits from cooperation and non-cooperation are less clear. Hence, a focus on not only *whether* but also *how* foreign policy is realized adds complexity to two-level games. Negotiations at a third level and – potentially several negotiation tables – are necessary to reach agreement on the framework (i.e. the parties to the contract) where an international agreement will be fulfilled.

To provide a comprehensive analysis, this study analyzes the factors that condition European states' responses to humanitarian crises at three levels: the domestic, the international and the regional level. Drawing upon Hanrieder's (1967) two-level explanatory framework, I argue that intervention depends on (1) whether influential domestic actors can reach *consensus* on the pursuit of military intervention and (2) whether military intervention is *compatible* with international conditions. That is, the model considers how foreign policy preferences on intervention are formed domestically and the opportunities and constraints politicians face when they seek foreign policy implementation internationally. Third, at the regional level, (3) preferences and power of EU and NATO states influence the institutional channel used to carry out operations.

3.3.1. The Domestic Level: consensus and opposition among domestic actors

According to Hanrieder (1967: 978), the concept of consensus provides an "aggregate of the motivational and psychological preferences" of states and, consequently, shapes the extent foreign policy goals[19] are acceptable for the domestic audience. Consensus is therefore:

> "[…] a standard of feasibility, especially in a democratic political system; it determines, in the long run, what foreign policy goals a government can pursue without losing popular support and office" (Hanrieder, 1967: 977).

Domestic consensus around foreign policy goals is vital for domestic politics because democratic leaders are accountable to their constituency and may be voted out of office or impeached if their foreign policies fail. In addition, domestic consensus around foreign policy goals is important at the international level and impacts on state leaders' ability to pursue their goals. Consensus among domestic actors facilitates coordination and cooperation with state leaders and institutions, enabling them to speak with 'one voice' internationally. In other words, domestic consensus is critical to maintain support among constituents and enables state leaders to pursue a coherent strategy at the international level. In this respect, Frieden (1999: 68) notes that, "[t]he more concentrated the interest, the more likely it is to be successful in organizing to achieve its goals." In contrast, divisions among domestic actors may cause fragmentation of decision-making and lead to foreign policy inaction, stagnation, or undermine unitary foreign policy action (Hill, 2016: 96-97). According to Allison (1971: 157-158),

> [p]olicymaking is therefore a process of "conflict and consensus building." The advocate of a particular policy must build a consensus to support his policy. Where there are rival advocates or rival policies, there is competition for support, and all the techniques of alliance appear – persuasion, accommodation, and bargaining."

Therefore, consideration of the preferences of those domestic actors that can influence foreign policy decision-making will not only thwart political crises and domestic instability but also increase the coherence of foreign policy goals and raise state leaders' ability to achieve them.

[19] While some scholars strictly distinguish between states' foreign policy preferences and foreign policy goals, I consider them here interchangeably, referring both to what states *want* in international affairs. Foreign policy preferences and goals can change in response to interaction with other states. They have to be distinguished from states' strategies and policies, that is what states do to achieve their goals. For further reading see: MORAVCSIK, Andrew 1993. Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 31**,** 473-524, MORAVCSIK, Andrew 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization,* 51**,** 513-553, FRIEDEN, Jeffry A. 1999. Actors and Preferences. *In:* LAKE, D. A. & POWELL, R. (eds.) *Strategic Choice and International Relations.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, MORROW, James D. Ibid.The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics.

Hence, domestic consensus measures whether there is domestic agreement among influential actors around certain foreign policy goals. Which actors influence foreign policy goals depends on their representation in the decision-making system. Domestic actors formally or informally involved in the decision-making on the use of force will exert more influence on decisions than those that are not included in the decision-making process[20] (Moravcsik, 1997: 518, Kaarbo, 2001).

In line with liberal international relations theory, domestic consensus does not make any assumption on the type of preferences state leaders pursue. Foreign policy goals can be motivated by material interests as well as ideational factors.[21] Security interests, humanitarian concerns and domestic political considerations can all motivate intervention. However, in contrast to constructivist and neo-realist assumptions, ideational and material factors do not influence foreign policy in the absence of domestic actors. Ideas, norms, identities, geopolitical and security interests only influence states' foreign policy if domestic actors agree to pursue related goals at the international level. Therefore, domestic consensus around one or several of these factors is critical for states to define their foreign policy preferences and to pursue coherent foreign policy strategy at the international level.

Given the high issues at stake and required resources, consensus between domestic actors should be particularly crucial when it comes to the use of force. At least in democratic states, the decision to deploy military operations is typically not taken by one state leader alone but involves consultation and coordination with the foreign and defense ministries, and advisors. It may even be subjected to parliamentary scrutiny. We should therefore expect that consensus between relevant domestic actors around the use of force to resolve humanitarian crises enhances the government's ability and willingness to pursue corresponding foreign policy goals at the international level. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1a: Consensus among influential domestic actors facilitates the use of military force.

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[20] For this reason, this thesis' analysis focuses on intra-elite consensus and opposition. Chapter 4.1.2.1 explains the reasons behind this specific focus and reviews the actors involved in the decision-making behind European states' interventions included in this thesis.

[21] This is in line with liberal international relations theory which assumes that national preferences can be informed by material and ideational interests alike. For further reading see: POHL, Benjamin 2016. NATO and liberal International Relations theory. *In:* WEBBER, M. & HYDE-PRICE, A. (eds.) *Theorising NATO: New perspectives on the Atlantic alliance.* London and New York: Routledge. MORAVCSIK, Andrew 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization,* 51**,** 513-553.

In contrast, opposition amid relevant domestic actors against the use of force should impede the government's willingness and ability to advocate interventionist policies at the international level. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1b: Opposition among influential domestic actors inhibits the use of military force.

Domestic consensus on intervention forms a key condition for intervention. Consent among relevant domestic actors is critical for intervention but it is not sufficient to launch intervention. Just because there is consensus among domestic leaders that intervention is imperative does not tell us much about if and how intervention is implemented. In fact, there have been occasions wherein some European states favored intervention but military force deployment was postponed or called off because of interstate disagreement or a blocked UN Security Council. In fact, as Morrow (1988: 77) reminds us: "Social outcomes cannot be determined from the actors' preferences alone; process matters as much as preferences." Domestic politics are an essential part of the explanation but remain incomplete without the consideration of international level variables.

3.3.2. The International Level: the compatibility of foreign policy preferences

As a second step, state leaders must weigh national preferences against the constraints and opportunities at the international level (Hanrieder, 1967: 977). Namely, the preferences formed at the domestic level do not determine foreign policy action but must be considered within the strategic setting wherein foreign policy takes place. While "[…] an actor's evaluation of the outcomes – its preferences – determines which outcomes it would like to realize", […] [o]utcomes are the result of the strategic interaction" (Morrow, 1999: 113). Similarly, Putnam (1988: 434) argues that at "the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments."

Accordingly, preferences formed at the domestic level inform a state's ranking of all possible outcomes and give rise to certain strategies state leaders employ to achieve their preferred outcome (i.e. foreign policy goal) (Moravcsik, 1997: 520, Frieden, 1999: 41-42,

Rosecrance, 2001: 398). However, when seeking to realize their preferences, states must take the international level into account. The international level can be highly constrained and impose severe limits in the extent to which states can realize their preferences. Conversely, it can also offer opportunities for interstate cooperation, coordination, and joint action (Hill, 2016: 191).[22] To measure whether states can realize their foreign policy preferences given the constraints at the international level I use the concept of *compatibility,* "a concept of feasibility" (Hanrieder, 1967: 977).

Depending on the perspective, there are potentially multiple factors at the international level which may constrain and facilitate the realization of states' preferences.[23] Drawing upon the liberal concept of policy interdependence, I measure the compatibility of European states' preferences regarding their feasibility given other states' preferences and activities (Moravcsik, 1998: 63-65, Hill, 2016: 185-191). Liberalism uses the concept of policy interdependence to describe how decisions made by one state affect the policies and choices of other states and their societies (Moravcsik, 1997: 520). Namely, when states seek to realize their preferences, their activities have consequences on other states' ability to fulfill their preferences.

Military interventions (and non-interventions) in the domestic affairs of other states will without a doubt always affect the activities of others in a variety of ways. Intervention will first and foremost impact the recipient state and its citizens. But it may also affect neighboring countries and international players with a stake in the matter. We can expect that European states will encounter less difficulties in fulfilling their foreign policy preferences if they are compatible with the preferences and activities of the host state, neighboring countries, and international players. Conversely, conflicting goals may cause tensions between states, which will make it difficult for European states to realize their foreign policy preferences. In this case European states may have to adjust their goals, or even abandon them. States may therefore opt to pursue their second-best outcome as their first preference involves serious obstacles and unfeasibility.

We can now hypothesize that when states' foreign policy preferences are compatible with the preferences of international actors, states can pursue their foreign policy preferences

[22] For further reading see: HILL, Christopher (ed.) 2016. *Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century,* London: Palgrave Macmillan. And ZACHER, Mark W. 2001. International Organizations. *In:* KRIEGER, J. (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World.* Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

[23] Realists would emphasize more the distribution of power at the international level while constructivists would highlight the international normative context as the primary constraint on member states' behaviour.

unfettered by international constraints and can freely realize their goals. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H2a: Compatibility between European states' preferences and the preferences of international players facilitates the realization of European states' foreign policy goals.

In contrast, when European states' foreign policy preferences are incompatible with the preferences of international players, states will encounter difficulties to realize their foreign policy goals. In this situation leaders may face resistance and obstacles when pursuing their preferred foreign policy outcome. This leads to the following hypothesis.

H2b: Incompatibility between European states' preferences and the preferences of international players hampers the realization of European states' foreign policy goals.

Thus, domestic consensus and international compatibility are both important conditions for the realization of states' foreign policy goals. If foreign policy "failed on the first criterion then achievement on the other would be undermined, and vice versa" (Hill, 2016: 304). If and to which extent European states get involved in humanitarian military intervention depends on the specific constellations of domestic consensus on foreign policy preferences and their compatibility with international players' preferences and activities. It must be noted that international compatibility is a relational concept. The international context is not compatible or incompatible by itself. On the contrary, the international context is compatible or incompatible *in relation* to states' foreign policy goals. Four constellations emerge from this (Table 5).

First, there is consensus among domestic actors around intervention which is compatible with international actors' preferences. European states can thus realize their foreign policy preferences unaffected by international strictures and constraints. This constellation favors European-led military operations through the EU, NATO and ad-hoc coalitions of states, including single state-led operations. In the Libya war during 2011, the UNSC (and regional organizations) rapidly reached consensus that military intervention was necessary to stop the killings by the Gaddafi regime, allowing France, the UK, and the US to establish a no-fly-zone over the country.

In the second case, there is consensus among domestic actors around intervention but intervention is incompatible with international players' preferences. In this situation, European states' goals are not feasible given international conditions. If and how European states pursue their preferences depends on the ability of state leaders to renegotiate preferences with domestic actors and their willingness to pursue second-best outcomes. If European states' preferences cannot be reconciled and remain incompatible with the preferences of international players, European states may still be able to realize their goals although it might trigger conflict. In contrast to the Libyan crisis, China and Russia's vetoes in the UNSC hampered military intervention by the US and European states in the Syrian civil war on several occasions.

Third, domestic actors oppose intervention but international players' preferences are incompatible with European (non-)action. Domestic opposition renders European intervention less likely but given international level restraints, non-intervention in this case is difficult to realize. Here, European states' foreign policy activities again depend on the ability of state leaders to renegotiate preferences with domestic actors and their willingness to make concessions regarding their foreign policy goals. Even though President Hollande had ruled out French-led intervention in the crisis in Mali during 2012 and advocated an African multinational force, African states' difficulties to deploy the force, doubts about its effectiveness and the Malian government's request for assistance led the French government to reconsider its opposition to military intervention. In January 2013, French troops intervened in Mali despite prior opposition by powerful domestic actors against intervention (Henke, 2017).

In the final case, domestic actors once more oppose intervention, which is compatible with international players' preferences. In this situation, non-intervention by European states is facilitated by international conditions and European states can abstain from intervention unencumbered by international pressure and constraints. Just as in the crisis in Mali, French and other European state leaders opposed intervention in the DRC in 2008. Even though intervention was debated, regional actors were skeptical towards EU intervention. In parallel, the situation in the crisis-stricken country improved, taking considerable international pressure off the Europeans to deploy troops (Gowan, 2011, Pohl, 2014a).

Table 5 illustrates the four constellations between consensus/conflict at the domestic level and compatibility/ incompatibility of at the international level.

Table 5: *Constellations of domestic preferences and international conditions*

Domestic Level	International Level	Likelihood of European Involvement
Consensus	Compatibility	High
Consensus	Incompatibility	Medium
Opposition	Incompatibility	Medium
Opposition	Compatibility	Low

Source: own illustration.

The concepts of consensus and compatibility give us a more general sense of the likelihood that European states intervene in humanitarian crises and the difficulties they may encounter when doing so. Yet, they are insufficient in explaining which framework(s) European states choose to intervene in cases in which European-led operations are possible (Cases 1 – 3 in Table 5). The next section specifies hypotheses on the emergence of diverse frameworks (i.e. EU, NATO, ad-hoc) to carry out military intervention in humanitarian crises.

3.3.3. Framework Choices: the congruence of foreign policy preferences

European states' preferences on intervention in humanitarian crises are only one set of a range of preferences that inform foreign policy action at the international level. After successful negotiation among domestic actors and strategic interaction with other players internationally, European states have to decide on the framework through which they carry out military action. This involves a third level of interaction where European states negotiate and bargain with their EU and NATO allies.[24]

Finding possible frameworks for intervention adds complexity to state interaction (Morrow, 1999: 96, 101). The issue is no longer only one of compatibility but whether European states can find an acceptable agreement for every state involved in a possible coalition for intervention. According to two-level games and liberal intergovernmentalism, states' ability to reach an international agreement is influenced by the interdependence of states' preferences and bargaining power (Putnam, 1988, Moravcsik, 1993, 1997).

Three basic constellations between state preferences are conceivable and generate differing policy outcomes. State preferences on the institutional framework for intervention can be congruent and create opportunities for cooperation, they can be mixed and incite tensions, or they can be incongruent and prevent cooperation (Moravcsik, 1997: 521).

To begin with, if the preferences of states are congruent, cooperation is possible. In other words, states possess complimentary preferences that facilitate the pursuit of common goals and the launch of a joint operation. Congruent preferences are particularly important for EU and NATO operations because both organizations require a unanimous vote by the member states (Moravcsik, 1993: 485). The EU's primary decision-making body in military matters is the European Council, which consists of the heads of state or government of the member states. According to Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty, EU operations can be proposed by individual member states or the High Representative of the EU but must be decided unanimously by the European Council (European Union, 2008). The requirement of unanimity implies that all EU member states must give their consent to the launch of a common operation. This does not necessarily mean that all states be in favor of intervention, but they should not fundamentally

[24] Albeit in reality all three processes (domestic, international and regional) evolve simultaneously, I keep them separated here for analytical reasons.

oppose it. Reluctant states can make use of the principle of constructive abstention and abstain from the decision without blocking a common operation. What's more, member states are not obliged to contribute personnel to operations despite having given their consent. The launch of NATO operations closely resembles the launch of CSDP military operations. The primary decision-making power over the launch and deployment of NATO operations rests with the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC consists of permanent representatives of all member states. Similar to EU operations, NATO operations require a unanimous vote of all member states. This requires the consent of 22 EU states which are members of both organizations, and the additional approval of six non-EU member states: Albania, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the United States. As with the EU, the unanimity requirement does not necessarily mean that all states must be in favor of intervention, but they should not fundamentally oppose it. Hesitant states can abstain from the decision without blocking a final decision (European Union, 2008: 30, Art. 42, NATO, 2014). Therefore:

H3a: If states' preferences are congruent, opportunities for inter-state cooperation are large.

In the second case, state preferences are mixed, i.e. their preferences are only partially or faintly congruent. Consequently, opportunity for cooperation shrinks. For instance, several EU or NATO states may not be willing to mobilize resources for a common operation. In this case, opportunities for cooperation may depend on states' ability and willingness to bargain and advance their own preferences. According to Morrow (1999: 96), "[a]ctors bargain when many solutions are available and they do not agree on the ranking of those solutions." In bargaining situations, states' power resources are crucial to advance their preferences. Powerful states dispose of resources to secure agreements by using side-payments, issue-linkages, and persuasion to convince reluctant partners. Because powerful states are less dependent than other states on collective security arrangements, they can use their power to credibly threaten the pursuit of alternative options – so-called outside options – if negotiations stall (Krasner, 1991, Snyder, 1997: 166, Morrow, 1999: 97).

This assumption is reinforced by empiric studies on EU and NATO operations. Although formally, military operations carried out by the EU and NATO require the formal approval of all their member states, long-term observers of CSDP and NATO operations have found that the

preferences of the most powerful member states strongly influence whether or not agreement can be achieved (Waltz, 1979: 198, Hyde-Price, 2006: 222, Gegout, 2009b: 410, Soder, 2010: 4). Gegout (2009b: 413) for instance argues that EU military operations "tend[] to occur at the initiative of one of the more powerful member states." The same applies to the launch of operations under the auspices of NATO which is still considered by some a "US 'tool box'" (Harsch and Varwick, 2009: 5, Webber et al., 2012: 71). Although the unanimity rule of NATO requires that decisions "conform to the preferences of the most cautious NATO members", […] "[i]n practice, many NATO members take their cues from NATO's (five) most powerful members: France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S." (Auerswald, 2004: 633-634).

Figure 2: *EU's major troop contributors*



Own compilation, data source: Di Mauro et al. (2016)

This leads to the following hypothesis.

H3b: If states' preferences are mixed, the preferences of the most powerful states will influence opportunities for inter-state cooperation more than those of other states.

Finally, if the preferences of states are incongruent, tensions may arise and opportunities for cooperation become considerably low. A large portion of EU or NATO states may strongly oppose the use of common institutions to carry out intervention. In particular, the most powerful states may be at loggerheads and prevent negotiations to reach an agreement. In this case, states are required to seek alternative frameworks for intervention. This makes the resort to ad-hoc coalitions of states and single state-led operations more likely. Therefore:

H3c: If states' preferences are incongruent, opportunities for inter-state cooperation are small.

Figure 3 illustrates a hypothesized mechanism for Europe's responses to humanitarian crises according to the three-step model. Table 6 summarizes predictions and explanations by realism, constructivism and the three-step model on military intervention and institutional frameworks for security and defense cooperation.

Figure 3: *A hypothesized mechanism for Europe's responses to widespread human suffering*



Source: own illustration.

Table 6: *Driving forces behind intervention and determinants of institutional frameworks in international relations theory*

Theory	Reasons for Intervention	Determinants of Institutional Channels
Realism	National self-interests; i.e. geostrategic factors, security interests.	States mistrust cooperation and typically seek national solutions to foreign, security, and defence policy. Therefore, states prefer national and ad-hoc solutions over institutional responses. States only cooperate militarily on the initiative of the most powerful states and if their collective security is threatened. States should therefore refer to common threat perceptions. This also includes the assumption that Europeans use CSDP operations to militarily balance against the US.
Constructivism	Humanitarian reasons, rule of law, values, norms, identities, and strategic cultures.	Intervention is carried out on the basis of the institutions' and states' ideas, strategic culture, normative framework, historical experiences and learning processes. European states consciously choose the institutional channel based on common norms and values.
Three-Step Model	Reasons for intervention can be various and include geostrategic as well as humanitarian factors. Intervention must meet **domestic approval** and be **feasible** given the **preferences of other actors**.	Institutional channels for intervention are chosen on the basis of European states' preferences and the power resources they possess to persuade others.

Source: own illustration.

4. Methodology

This chapter provides the methodological framework to test the hypotheses specified in chapter 3.3 in the empirical part of this study. I outline the operationalization of the variables, elaborate on the research design used, and describe the case selection strategy.

4.1. Operationalization

4.1.1. The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of this thesis varies from collective intervention, ad-hoc intervention to non-intervention, measuring the different responses European states can give to humanitarian crises. Collective intervention comprises all cases in which European states launched EU or NATO operations. Ad-hoc intervention encompasses all cases in which a group of or individual EU states launched intervention outside institutional frameworks. Finally non-intervention covers all cases in which European states did not decide to get directly involved in humanitarian intervention, leaving the responsibility of ending or preventing large-scale human suffering to other actors such as the UN, the AU or ECOWAS (see chapter 2.2.). The different outcomes can be directly observed given the institutional arrangements under which military intervention is conducted.

4.1.2. Independent Variables I

The first set of independent variables measures the likelihood of European intervention in humanitarian crises, ranging from high to low depending on the constellation of domestic consensus and international compatibility.

4.1.2.1.Domestic Consensus

The first independent variable accounting for European states' likelihood to intervene is the existence of domestic consensus around intervention. I conceptualize domestic consensus as a continuous variable ranging from the existence of full consensus among domestic actors (domestic consensus) around intervention to the complete absence of consensus around intervention (domestic opposition). The degree of consensus around intervention can be

assessed on statements expressed by those domestic actors that influence intervention decision-making. If the majority of actors agree on the necessity of intervention we can assume that consensus exists. If several or the majority of domestic actors express doubts, or even openly reject intervention, we can assume there is domestic opposition against intervention.

This raises the question as to which domestic actors influence the decision-making on foreign policy issues. Scholars working in the field of foreign policy analysis have examined the influence of a myriad of domestic actors who shape and constrain the domestic decision-making process. This includes individual leaders, parties, social classes, interest groups, public opinion, organizations, bureaucratic processes, cabinets, and coalitions (Rosenau, 1967, Haas, 1968, Allison, 1971, Rosenau, 1971, Katzenstein, 1976, Wittkopf, 1986, Putnam, 1988, Holsti and Rosenau, 1990, Evans, 1993, Moravcsik, 1993, Gowa, 1998, Auerswald, 1999, Tago, 2005, Aldrich et al., 2006, Knecht and Weatherford, 2006, Kaarbo, 2015: 198). Nevertheless, not all of these actors influence foreign policy to the same extent, in all countries, and all the time. For example, parliament's influence on foreign policy should be higher if international agreements are subject to parliamentary scrutiny and ratification. The parliament may matter less in countries where foreign and security issues are the head of state's prerogative. Which domestic actors influence the decision-making process in foreign affairs may ultimately depend on institutional structures and decision-making processes (Moravcsik, 1997, Kaarbo, 2001: 170, Hudson, 2005: 7-8).

In all four case studies reviewed in this thesis, France and the UK have influenced the varying responses to crises more than other European states. It was France and the UK which were mostly been called on to lead intervention. Both states launched ad-hoc operations and both were central to the deployment of NATO and CSDP operations. The analysis of domestic consensus in the following empirical chapters therefore concentrates on France and the United Kingdom. The next section reviews the respective decision-making processes in both countries to select which domestic actors inform foreign policy decision-making.

Decision-making bodies and procedure in France

In France, the President of the Republic is the chief of the armed forces and all decisions related to the deployment of the military reside with him. The decision-making process in defense and security affairs is short and possibilities for contestation limited. The President of the Republic shares his decision-making power only with the Prime Minister and the Ministry

of Defense. All decisions related to defense and national security are prepared in the Council of Defense and National Security (CDNS). The CDNS is presided by the President of the Republic and brings together the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of the Economy, and the Minister of the Budget. It receives guidance by the Advisory Board for Defense and National Security composed of independent experts. For issues related to the launch of military operations, restricted Council meetings are held where the Defense Minister presents options for action prepared by a crisis unit in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Présidence de la République, 2008, Chauveau and Gaymard, 2015: 34) .

The Prime Minister directs the implementation of all decisions taken in the CDNS and bears the responsibility of the policies concerning national security in the parliament. The latter responsibility is shared with the Minister of Defense. Although the French parliament's influence on defense-related issues was strengthened in 2008, it still plays a minor role in the decision process. The Assemblée National is not formally involved in the decision-process but possesses the right of information regarding deployment within three days from the launch of intervention. Furthermore, for the troop deployments that continue on for more than four months, the parliament's approval is required (Ministère de la Défense, 2012, Tardy, 2016b: 3). In addition, the parliament must approve the defense budget and any additional funds that may be required annually on top of the military program law adopted for a five-year period. The parliament can, however, not interfere in the conduct of ongoing operations (Conseil Constitutionnel, 2001). As a final mechanism of accountability, the High Court[25] can remove the president from office with a two-thirds-majority if the president fails to live up to his constitutional duties (Legifrance, 2007).

Decision-making bodies and procedure in the United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, the queen or king of Great Britain is the Head of the Armed Forces. In practice however, deployment decisions rest with the Prime Minister who is supported by the Cabinet (Select Committee on the Constitution, 2013a). Policy formulations take place in the National Security Council (NSC); the cabinet committee responsible for all issues related to national security, foreign policy and defense. It meets once a week and brings together the Prime Minister as the committee's chairman, senior Cabinet ministers, senior armed forces

[25] The High Court is a special court which can be convened upon the proposal of one chamber of parliament and with the consent of the other chamber.

personnel (including the Chief of the Defense Staff), and the heads of the intelligence services. It primarily plays an advisory role for the Cabinet's decision-making (Select Committee on the Constitution, 2013a).

Military operations are conducted under the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Defense and his fellow Ministers. The Secretary of Defense is supported by the Head Office which develops defense strategies and directs military operations at the strategic level. The Permanent Under Secretary provides policy advice and the Chief of Defense Staff is the primary advisor to the government on military issues (Ministry of Defence, 2015).

Similar to France, the House of Commons does not have formal decision-making authority when it comes to the deployment of the armed forces. Yet, it has become a convention to involve the parliament in the decision-making process, to keep it informed on ongoing conflicts and allow the opportunity to vote on deployment decisions. The parliament was critically involved, for example, in the decision-making on the UK's participation in airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria in 2014 and 2015 (Select Committee on the Constitution, 2013b, House of Commons Library, 2016). The parliament's conventional influence is reinforced by its right to hold the government to account through a vote of no-confidence if it has serious doubts on the legality and legitimacy of governmental policies (Curran and Williams, 2016).

4.1.2.2.International Compatibility

The second independent variable accounting for European states' likelihood to intervene is compatibility between European states' preferences and international players' preferences and activities. I conceptualize international compatibility as a continuous variable ranging from the existence of complete compatibility between European states' preferences and international players' preferences to its complete absence.

The degree of compatibility between preferences can be observed empirically on statements expressed by those European states and international players involved in intervention's planning, authorization, and implementation (Frieden, 1999: 53-66). Here, the preferences of UNSC members authorizing intervention, regional organizations, neighboring countries and the host-state deserve particular attention. Information on international players' preferences and activities can be found in Security Council meeting records and reports, regional organization's statements, reports by 'What's in Blue' and in secondary literature.

The degree of compatibility between European states' and international player's preferences can also be found in the costs and benefits – so-called positive and negative externalities – that arise as consequences of other states' attempt to fulfill their own preferences. Costs and benefits can be both material and ideational. Incompatible preferences can produce material and ideational costs, inhibiting states from realizing their preferences. Material costs include the escalation of tensions between states resulting in an increase of casualties and financial overspending due to states not coordinating their goals. Ideational costs include the loss of legitimacy and international prestige when states implement their preferences and thereby violate international law, norms, and principles upheld by other states. In contrast, compatible preferences can yield material and ideational benefits, facilitating states' preferences. Material benefits include coordination and the division of labor between states, which reduce tensions and boosts burden-sharing. Ideational benefits entail the increase in international prestige and the preservation of legitimacy when states comply with international norms upheld by other states.

Table 7: *Policy interdependence and material and ideational costs and benefits*

Policy Interdependence		
	Costs	**Benefits**
Material	Escalation of tensions, increase of casualties, financial overspending.	Cooperation, coordination, division of labor.
Ideational	Perceived loss of legitimacy and prestige.	Perceived increase in legitimacy and prestige.

Source: own illustration

4.1.3. Independent Variables II

The second set of independent variables accounts for the framework in which European states carry out intervention in humanitarian crises and therefore refer to outcome one and two of the dependent variable (collective intervention and ad-hoc intervention). This includes CSDP operations, NATO operations, ad-hoc operations, and national operations.

4.1.3.1.The congruence of preferences

The congruence of preferences is the first independent variable that accounts for the framework in which European states carry out intervention. Whereas the variable *compatibility* in the first analytical step measures whether European states' foreign policy preferences are broadly compatible with other actors' preferences, the agreement on a framework for intervention requires state preferences to *converge* around a common outcome.

Preferences on the framework for intervention can be congruent, mixed and they can be incongruent. The degree of congruence of preferences can be assessed on the basis of statements made by the EU's and NATO's heads of state and government. In addition, the activities and documents produced by the preparatory and decision-making bodies of both organizations can provide supplementary information on the congruence of preferences among member states. For the EU, this includes first and foremost the European Council, the External Action Service (EEAS), the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Union's High Representative, the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS)[26] (Rehrl, 2015: 27-31). With regards to NATO, this includes the North Atlantic Council, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and NATO's Military Committee (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2011e, 2015).

[26] If a military response is regarded as a potential option to a humanitarian crisis, the EU military committee (EUMC) in collaboration with the EU military staff (EUMS) prepares military strategic options (MSOs) which are then adopted by the PSC. Through the adoption of a Joint Action, the Council (drawing upon the RELEX Working Group) provides the legal basis for CSDP operations; it appoints the Operation Commander (Head of the Mission for civilian missions) and provides the financial reference amount. The EUMS drafts the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) to guide the Operation Commander. The Operation Commander will then develop the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN) which define the details of the operation and their implementation. A decision by the Council launches the operation.

4.1.3.2.Power resources

In situations where the EU and/or NATO member states hold heterogeneous preferences over the outcome they favor most, the outcome is more strongly influenced by an intervening variable; power resources. In this situation, actors bargain for an agreement acceptable to everyone. When bargaining, actors usually have a threshold at which they are still willing to accept an agreement. When that threshold is crossed, they will be unwilling to enter into an agreement. A common outcome is only possible if states share a zone of agreement (set of possible outcomes acceptable to all actors involved). Power resources are crucial when preferences are mixed because they allow states to advance their preferences by using side-payments, issue-linkages, and persuasion. In this case, power resources can widen the zone of agreement, making for a common outcome acceptable to states otherwise unwilling to enter into an agreement (Morrow, 1999: 96-103).

I measure power resources as states' material and non-material resources to exert influence, ranging between high and low (Krotz and Schild, 2013: 22-24). I measure material power resources as the material means which an actor possesses to influence decisions on the launch of military operations. This comprises economic resources (measured by a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or growth rates), a states' defense budget, and its military capacities. States can use their material power resources to influence the decision-making process in their favor by providing side-payments or shouldering a larger share of the common burden.

Non-material resources refer to states' soft power. They indicate the degree of acceptability for other actors to leverage certain countries. Non-material resources include states' expertise (here: humanitarian crises) but also the legitimacy ascribed to their leadership. Non-material resources can be measured through indicators such as states' diplomatic networks, missions and staff with knowledge on the crisis (information and expertise), and on the basis of other actors' expressions regarding the legitimacy of influential countries.

4.2. Research Design and Methodology

This study follows a qualitative and comparative research design. Given the scarcity of comprehensive data on European states' military operations and the problems connected with the measurement of European states' choices regarding the framework for intervention, qualitative methods are best placed to conduct this study. Qualitative research helps to receive in-depth insights into complex phenomena that lack understanding.

I draw upon case studies to carry out this research because they prove "particularly useful for theory development […] for achieving high conceptual validity […] for fostering new hypotheses […], to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases […] [and] for addressing causal complexity" (George and Bennett, 2005: 19).

The first and major part of this study draws upon congruence analysis and process-tracing to test the hypotheses specified in chapter 3.3.1 – 3.3.3. The congruence method and process-tracing are useful instruments to test the explanatory power and consistency of a theory. The congruence method examines whether the values of the independent variables are congruent with the values of the dependent variable. Typically, the starting point of the congruence method is the assessment of the values of independent variables followed by an evaluation of how consistent the observed outcome is with the theory's predictions. It is, however, also possible to reverse the application of the congruence method. I do this in the following empirical chapters by first identifying historical cases and their outcomes and then assessing the consistency of the observed outcome with the values of the independent variables (George and Bennett, 2005: 200-201, Schoeller, 2016: 60).

Because the congruence method only assesses the consistency of the variables' values with those predicted by the theory, it does not provide proof of a causal link or mechanism between the independent and the dependent variables, even if their values are congruent. I therefore complement the within-case analysis through the process-tracing method. Process-tracing is useful because "[t]he process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George and Bennett, 2005: 206). Process-tracing fills in the information and observations that the congruence method omits. Tracing the causal process (or causal mechanism) therefore substantiates the explanation,

adds to the understanding of the mechanisms and processes at work and further helps to assess the explanatory power of the theory (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, Beach, 2016).

I use process-tracing tests to evaluate how much individual pieces of evidence contributed to strengthen or weaken the confidence in the three-step model. The strength or weakness of evidence depends on how certain and unique the predictions of a theory are. Certainty implies that we must find evidence for the theory's predictions if they are valid. If no evidence substantiates the theory's predictions, we must have serious doubts about the validity of the theory. Uniqueness in turn implies that the theory's predictions are unique vis-à-vis alternative explanations. Thus, uniqueness helps to rule out competing theories. If the uniqueness of the predictions is low, we do not have to reject the theory but cannot ascertain whether competing causes are at play. According to the certainty and uniqueness of predictions, Van Evera (1997: 31-32) develops four tests to evaluate process-tracing evidence. These are hoop tests, smoking-gun tests, straw-in-the-wind tests, and doubly decisive tests. The tests are classified according to their certainty and uniqueness of the theory's predictions in Table 8. I briefly explain each test sequentially.

Straw-in-the-wind tests provide the weakest of the four tests. Evidence to pass this test is neither unique nor certain to confirm or disconfirm a specific hypothesis. Therefore, straw-in-the-wind tests are neither necessary nor sufficient for causal inference. If a hypothesis passes this test, confidence in the plausibility of the hypothesis only somewhat increases and slightly weakens alternative hypotheses. Conversely, if a hypothesis fails the straw-in-the-wind test, it slightly decreases confidence in its plausibility but does not eliminate it (Collier, 2011). For instance, if there is evidence of state leaders' political motives to maintain domestic consensus (because of upcoming elections or institutional requirements) confidence in hypothesis 1a would slightly increase. In contrast, if such evidence was missing, this would not allow rejecting the hypothesis.

Hoop tests provide more demanding tests since passing them is necessary for affirming causal inference. Evidence that passes a hoop test only slightly strengthens the plausibility of a hypothesis and does not allow rejecting alternative hypotheses (low uniqueness). It is, however, necessary to confirm the hypothesis' validity. In other words, failing a hoop test eliminates the hypothesis. For example, if there is no evidence that European state leaders discussed or mentioned the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire at the European level, this would severely weaken the plausibility that the congruence of their preferences influenced the decision for or against common European intervention.

Smoking-gun tests provide strong tests to confirm a hypothesis. Evidence that passes a smoking-gun test is sufficient (but not necessary) to affirm causal inference and substantially decreases the plausibility of alternative explanations. Evidence that European states agreed to deploy troops following pressure by powerful state(s) despite prior disagreement strengthens the plausibility that power resources (rather than the congruence of preferences) influenced the deployment of a common European operation.

Finally, doubly decisive tests provide the most demanding tests for affirming causal inference (Collier, 2011). Evidence that passes this kind of test strongly confirms the hypothesis and disconfirms alternative hypotheses. Evidence to pass a doubly decisive test is difficult to find in the social sciences. But combining evidence from multiple tests can still allow meeting the high standards of this test. Evidence passing a doubly decisive test would need to eliminate realist and constructivist hypotheses through (several) hoop tests and confirm the validity of the three-step model's hypotheses through a strong smoking gun test for instance.

The process-tracing tests help to understand and evaluate the explanatory power of the three-step model. I do not endeavor to demonstrate the inferiority or superiority of alternative approaches. Indeed, doing so would require the development of alternative hypotheses drawing upon realist and constructivist approaches. For this reason, doubly decisive tests are not used in the thesis to reject realist and constructivist assumptions. Instead, alternative realist and constructivist views are used to understand the strength and weaknesses of the three-step model.

Table 8: *Process-tracing tests for causal inference*

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="2"></td><td colspan="2">Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)</td></tr>
<tr><td>High</td><td>Low</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)</td><td>High</td><td>Doubly Decisive</td><td>Smoking-gun test</td></tr>
<tr><td>Low</td><td>Hoop test</td><td>Straw-in-the-wind test</td></tr>
</table>

Adapted from: Collier (2011).

As a second step, I conduct a cross-case comparison to enhance the external validity of the results. To do so, I use Mill's Method of Difference and Mill's Joint Method of Agreement and Difference (also called Indirect Method) to identify those factors shared across positive (negative) cases and those factors that distinguish positive and negative cases. The cross-case analysis contributes to a better understanding of the explanatory power of individual variables and how the impact on the outcome in conjunction. As Mill (so quoted in: Caramani, 2009: 50) argues:

> "If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance; the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon."

4.3. Case Selection

I test the propositions established in chapter 3 in four major crises on the African continent including the Libya crisis during 2011, the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire during 2010/2011, the sectarian war in the Central African Republic during 2013 and 2014 and the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region for closer investigation.

Alarmed by the brutal crackdown of the Libyan regime on its own population during 2011, the UNSC evoked the principle of R2P for the first time in its history, calling on the international community to stop the killings. Within a mere two days from the UNSC's resolution, France and the UK were ready to intervene through an ad-hoc coalition of states to contain the crisis in Libya. The EU debated military intervention but did eventually not get involved. Instead, NATO took over military operations from the ad-hoc coalition of states, imposed a no-fly zone (NFZ), enforced an arms embargo, and conducted airstrikes to protect the civilian population in Libya. NATO's involvement and the EU's absence in the Libya crisis are particularly striking because typically the EU, rather than NATO, has intervened in African conflicts.

In parallel, post-electoral violence threatened to plunge Côte d'Ivoire into a civil war. For more than three months, European states and the UN refused to intervene in the crisis despite a steady increase of violence between the two camps and displacements of a massive scale even though UN peacekeepers and French forces were already present. Eventually, the UN deployed its troops and shortly thereafter, France brought in aid. The EU could have sought to restore its image as a crisis manager following its heavily criticized inaction during the Libya crisis. Yet, European states did not even discuss a collective and robust response to the Ivorian crisis and limited the role of the EU to that of a donor and that of NATO to a spectator.

While most of the world's attention was focused on the Syria war in 2013, the Central African Republic suffered one of the worst conflicts in its history, creating a devastating humanitarian crisis in the already impoverished African country. As in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire, European states hesitated initially to intervene and left crisis management to African states. Eventually, France deployed troops while other European states remained reluctant. Two months later, Europeans reversed their decision and finally launched a CSDP military operation to contain the sectarian violence. The sectarian war in the Central African Republic in 2013 is interesting for the analytic purpose of this thesis because it illustrates the entire range of the dependent variable.

Finally, the uprising of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region is included as a purely negative case. Even though the deadly attacks by the terrorist group exceeded the death toll caused by ISIS and generated one of the world's most devastating humanitarian crises since 1945, European states refused to be directly involved in the fight against Boko Haram. Instead, African states took charge of military intervention and deployed a Multi-National Joint Task Force to thwart the terrorists.

The cases selected follow a diverse selection strategy which reflects the full variation of the dependent variable, including collective intervention through the EU and NATO, ad-hoc intervention, and non-intervention (Gerring, 2007: 97-99). By selecting cases which represent the full variance of the dependent variable, I avoid the risks of truncation and selection bias frequently associated with case selection on the dependent variable (Collier and Mahoney, 1996: 62-63, 66, George and Bennett, 2005: 23). I disaggregate each case study into several time frames ending each in different types of responses to large-scale human suffering. The disaggregation of each crisis increases the number of observations or units of investigation and thereby yields "additional leverage over the causal inference" (King et al., 1994: 221).[27] This creates a total number of ten cases that capture the entire range of variation on the dependent variable covering one EU operation, one NATO operation, three ad-hoc interventions, and five cases in which European states did not intervene but delegated responsibility to prevent or address large-scale humanitarian crises to other international players. The inclusion of negative cases is crucial to strengthen the internal validity of this study by reinforcing "conclusions drawn from positive cases" (Ragin, 1987: 41). In each of the four crises, European states had initially insisted they did not want to intervene but they eventually deployed military force in three out of four.

The cases selected all qualify as large-scale humanitarian crises accompanied by armed conflict, the risk of genocide, atrocity crimes, and crimes against humanity. In all of them civilians were subjected to widespread killing or massive human rights violations. Therefore, the cases selected are similar enough to make cross-case comparisons possible and allow for rigorous hypothesis testing while holding the level of violence and human suffering within a constant range (Gerring, 2007: 131). The comparability of cases is further strengthened by the selection of crises which occurred on the African continent between 2011 and 2014. This reduces the possibility that other variables such as the proximity of the crises

[27] For a similar approach, see MORAVCSIK, Andrew 1998. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht,* Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, KROTZ, Ulrich 2011. *Flying Tiger. International Relations Theory and the Politics of Advanced Weapons,* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

influenced the outcome, and diminishes the risk that a broader process of temporal change impacted on the results (Caramani, 2009: 18).[28] Furthermore, by paying careful attention to the similarities of the cases chosen, I assure that only those negative cases are included in this analysis where military intervention would have been possible given the threat or commission of widespread killing of civilian populations and large-scale human suffering (Skocpol, 1984, Mahoney and Goertz, 2004, Caramani, 2009).[29] The majority of military EU operations have taken place in African countries and it would be there where we would be most confident that Europeans will intervene collectively if a crisis occurs. Yet, they did not always do so.

At the same time, the individual crises are not related to one another and presented European states with very different problems including a civil war, post-electoral violence, sectarian violence and the threat posed to civilians by terrorism. Each crisis also contained diverse considerations for European states' responses and cooperation in humanitarian intervention. They could have responded collectively in each crisis but did not always do so. Certainly, the individual cases in each crisis are not completely independent from one another; some of them are temporally interdependent to some degree. But the processes and mechanisms that led to each outcome vary and throw light on distinct issues at stake in each case. For instance, the EU only intervened once in response to France's ad-hoc operation but stayed aloof during the crises in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire despite preceding French operations. Moreover, tracing how European states' preferences on intervention changed or abandoned as the political and international context of humanitarian crises evolved, is central to understanding the various frameworks through which European states have responded to the threat or commission of widespread and systematic killing of civilian populations.

Finally, each case offers ideal empirical grounds to test the propositions outlined in chapter 3 with respect to how European states can fulfill their intervention preferences, when they are forced to adjust and the factors influencing the diverse frameworks of intervention.

[28] Arguably, the influence of other variables is not completely excluded by the case selection in this thesis. The Libya crisis during 2011 occurred in the EU's southern neighbourhood and the proximity of the conflict cannot be omitted as an explanatory factor for European's response. Although this reduces the similarity of the cases chosen, the inclusion of the Libya crisis in this thesis' analysis is important since it marked the first time that NATO launched a major intervention on the African continent where typically the EU has been much more present as a crisis manager. In order to avoid biased inference, I control for the proximity of the Libya crisis as an explanatory factor in the analysis.

[29] For further information on the indicators I use to further ensure comparability of the cases chosen, please refer to the annexe.

Part II

Empirical Analysis

The next chapters form the analytical part of this study and use case study research to investigate why, when, and how European states respond to large-scale humanitarian crises with military force.

5. Libya's 2011 civil war

Inspired by the so-called 'Arab Spring'[30] protests in Tunisia and Egypt (Green, 2011, UK Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011), peaceful demonstrations against the corrupt and authoritarian regime of Muammar al-Gaddafi began to unsettle Libya in mid-January 2011. Soon, the protests spread across the country and turned increasingly violent as the regime crushed the revolts with force. Desertions from the army and the regime helped the armament of rebels and fueled the conflict further (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 838). The rebels advanced rapidly and already controlled vast parts of eastern Libya by February 23, including the cities of Bengazhi and Tobruk in addition to other major cities (BBC News, 2011g). Yet, by early March 2011, pro-Gaddafi forces pushed the rebels back and regained control over several towns (The Guardian, 2011). It was estimated that the brutal clashes between the two sides caused more than thousand deaths by February 25, 2011 (BBC News, 2011f). During the first days of the crisis, thousands of people fled the conflict, seeking refuge in neighboring countries (Sayare and Cowell, 2011). This, and Gaddafi's threat to "cleanse Libya house by house" and execute anti-regime forces raised the concerns of the international community that the country may plunge into a fully-fledged civil war (Gaddafi, so quoted in: BBC News, 2011e, g).

[30] The Arab Spring refers to protests and uprisings in Middle Eastern and North African countries since 2010 in reaction to their authoritarian and corrupt regimes as well as socio-economic inequality. Whereas in some countries like in Tunisia and Egypt, a change of government ensued rapidly, in other countries such as in Libya and Syria, the protests triggered a civil war.

5.1. Non-intervention in the Libya crisis I

Following the Gaddafi regime's crackdown on protesters and the outbreak of violence in Libya in late February 2011, debates among European states ensued about what kind of action should be taken. The debate was particularly vibrant in France and the UK and their respective foreign policy executives issued statements asking Gaddafi to step down. Britain took the lead on the issue at the UNSC level. On February 26, 2011, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1970 but limited the measures against the Gaddafi regime to the imposition of sanctions and referred the regime to the ICC. Military action was debated but ruled out at that point in the conflict. Despite the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Libya and Gaddafi's threats, why did European states refrain from intervening in the crisis?

5.1.1. To intervene or not?

The rapid escalation of the conflict in Libya took the French and British foreign policy executives by surprise. State leaders and foreign policy officials from both countries strongly denounced the assaults and demanded an immediate end of the conflict. Even though military intervention was debated as a means to stop Gaddafi, in neither London or Paris could consensus surrounding the use of military force be reached. Whereas the French foreign policy executive rejected military intervention straightaway, the British foreign policy executive held contradictory views regarding the appropriate response to the conflict.

In an interview with the French radiobroadcaster '*Europe 1*' on February 21, 2011, the Minister of European Affairs, Laurent Wauquiez (so quoted in: Vie Publique, 2011), condemned the "disproportionate use of force" in Libya. At the same time the Minister excluded any interference in the internal affairs of the crisis-shaken country. During the initial days of the conflict, Paris's primary concern was the security of French nationals in Libya.

The French foreign policy executive clearly favored a political solution over military means. French President Sarkozy (so quoted in: Le Figaro, 2011j, italics added) called accordingly for "the immediate cessation of violence and for *a political solution*". The special adviser to the President of the French Republic, Henri Guaino (Le Figaro, 2011k) similarly demanded stricter sanctions on Libya but expressed his doubts about a possible military intervention: "[…] I do not believe that the solution is to go to war in Libya to add more

deaths to the dead and blood to blood." Hence, a military response was not an option seriously considered by the French foreign policy executive (Grand, 2015).

The preference of the French foreign policy executive not to intervene in the conflict remained steadfast even when pressure by the media and political parties on the government mounted. Following the recent failures of French diplomacy during the Arab uprisings, critics called for a more active French foreign policy. In an open letter published by the so-called *Marly* group (2011) on February 22, 2011, in the French newspaper *'Le Monde'*, former French diplomats complained:

> "Against the announcements made for the past three years, Europe is powerless, Africa eludes us, the Mediterranean begrudges us, China subdues us and Washington ignores us! At the same time, our Rafale aircraft and our nuclear industry, far from the announced triumphs, remain on the shelf. All the worse, the voice of France has disappeared in the world."

Numerous politicians joined in the critique in late February 2011. Martine Aubry (so quoted in: Jarrassé, 2011), chairwoman of the socialist party, argued that France was "shrinking in the world," whereas the socialist party member François Hollande (so quoted in: Jarrassé, 2011) described France's diplomacy as "incoherent," "contradictory," and "without result." Critique equally came from the president of the extreme right party 'Front National', Marine Le Pen, and members of Sarkozy's own political party UMP (Union pour un mouvement populaire) (Jarrassé, 2011). Ségolène Royal, the former presidential candidate of the socialists for the 2007 elections, demanded a commission of inquiry to investigate the arms sales of France, in particular during the visit of Gaddafi in 2007 at the beginning of Sarkozy's presidency (Bourmaud, 2011). In parliament, French state leaders were criticized for their failure to support decisively the Arab Spring uprisings from the very start and members of parliament (MP) demanded a change in French foreign policy (see for example: Assemblée Nationale, 2011a: 1393, 1399, Assemblée Nationale, 2011j: 1631). Furthermore, public approval ratings of French President Sarkozy sat at a record low in the end of February 2011 plummeting to less than 30% (Fraser, 2011, see also: Nougayrède, 2011d).

In the days that followed, President Sarkozy made serious efforts to compensate for France's failure to address the Arab Spring protests. To restore the image of French diplomacy, he replaced Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie with Alain Juppé on February 27, 2011, because of the former's questionable connections with North African leaders and her blundering reaction to the Tunisian uprising in January 2011 (Willsher, 2011b). Yet, apart from this and despite pressure from the media, political parties, and the public, the French president's hesitancy to embrace a military solution to the conflict persisted. Sarkozy (so

quoted in: Irish, 2011) noted that: "[r]egarding a military intervention ... France would consider any initiative of this type with extreme caution and reserve."

Meanwhile in London, the outbreak of violence in Libya took the UK's state leaders by surprise too (The Financial Times, 2011). When the crisis broke out, Prime Minister Cameron was on a trade tour to toppling authoritarian Middle Eastern countries and Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, had to end his skiing holiday early to make it to the emergency meeting of the Cabinet on February, 25, 2011, to discuss the crisis. The British foreign policy executive was generally inadequately prepared for the outbreak of violence in Libya (Chulov et al., 2011, House of Commons, 2011g, f, Richards, 2011, Stephens, 2011b). "[C]overage of Libya was very limited, and both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence had a poor understanding of the situation in the country" (Goulter, 2015: 154).

The UK's foreign policy executive then discussed the crisis in Libya in several meetings of the National Security Council and the Cabinet Office Briefing Room A (Cobra)[31] chaired by the prime minister in late February, bringing together Foreign Secretary William Hague, Defense Secretary Liam Fox, Chancellor George Osborne, and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg. Although the meetings aimed at coordinating the government's response, the British foreign policy executive found it difficult to define what the appropriate response to the Libya crisis should be (Cabinet Office et al., 2011, Coates et al., 2011, House of Commons, 2011f) and the UK's foreign policy looked "sluggish" and like "a bit of a mess" (Richards, 2011). The British foreign policy executive debated the establishment of a no-fly zone[32] which had been proposed at the UN level a few days earlier as a means to prevent Gaddafi forces from attacking the civilian population. In particular, the neo-conservative Education Secretary Michael Gove insisted that Britain as "a beacon for free and democratic countries" had to give a tougher response to dictators (Coates and Watson, 2011). Defense Secretary Liam Fox and Chancellor George Osborne tended to support a tougher foreign policy line too (Parker and Blitz, 2011, Seymour, 2011). However, Prime Minister Cameron and Foreign Secretary Hague argued for a cautious response to the conflict and rejected the establishment of an NFZ. There were concerns over the evacuation of British

[31] Cobra is an emergency council that coordinates the British Cabinet's responses to high-priority issues. For further information see: GARDINER, Joey. 2002. What is Cobra? *The Guardian, 21 October 2002* [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/oct/21/Whitehall.uk [Accessed 04 January 2018].

[32] A no-fly zone bans aircrafts from flying over a certain area and has been used in military conflicts to prevent air attacks.

citizens who had suffered from logistic shortcomings and delays (Coates and Watson, 2011, Pickard et al., 2011).

Surprisingly, given his opposition, Cameron nevertheless announced that he was looking into arming rebels and instructed the Ministry of Defense to draft plans for an NFZ (Dombey et al., 2011a). In a speech in the House of Commons on February 28, 2011, Cameron (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2011f) did not exclude the use of military assets:

> "We must not tolerate this regime using military force against its own people. In that context, I have asked the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff to work with our allies on plans for a military no-fly zone. It is clear that this is an illegitimate regime that has lost the consent of its people, and our message to Colonel Gaddafi is simple: go now."

Yet, at the same time, Cameron clearly restricted preparations to contingency planning and cautioned that the implementation of a no-fly-zone covering as vast a territory as the Libyan airspace was highly complex, resource-intensive, and its effectiveness to prevent Gaddafi from killing his own people unclear (Barker, 2011b). Cameron's caution reflected the concern of British senior military officials about the UK's potential participation in a military operation in Libya. In light of recently agreed cuts to the British armed forces under the UK's 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), they warned that, should a crisis erupt, Britain may not be capable of launching an additional operation in another country of higher strategic interest (BBC News, 2010b, Blitz, 2011c, a, Fox, 2011). "After Afghanistan, the UK probably has one other reasonable operation left in the locker," so a government official (so quoted in: Blitz, 2011b) told the *Financial Times*, a British newspaper. The same official further noted:

> "The question therefore for the prime minister is: do you really believe that Libya is a high-end priority for what you have left? […] If something else kicks off in the region, you really could be stretched. As a result, the military is very wary of advising the government to get involved in Libya on an enduring basis."

Likewise, Lord Richards, the Chief of the Defense Staff of the British Armed Forces (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2016) between 2010 and 2013, later recalled that:

> "I was not that keen on putting too much effort, relatively, in Libya [...]. If you cast your mind back to that time, there were serious suggestions that Israel might unilaterally attack Iran, for example, and we were planning to be ready to help our Gulf Arabs in that eventuality. Given that the SDSR was beginning to hurt us, I was conscious that we might not have the assets to handle a war in Libya and a potential war in the Gulf, and do what was expected of us in Afghanistan."

In line with the opposition by French foreign policy leaders against intervention in the Libya crisis and the British division over the conflict, Paris and London's foreign policy activities

during late February and early March remained modest. The state leaders of both countries urged Gaddafi to step down, advocated sanctions, and Sarkozy called on Europeans to convene a summit dedicated to Libya (Cabinet Office et al., 2011, Irish, 2011, Mevel, 2011, Nougayrède, 2011d, Stroobants, 2011, Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014). Yet, neither London nor Paris actively promoted military measures at the international level (Security Council Report, 2011e). Hence, the foreign policy executives of both countries seemed to prefer indirectly managing the conflict. While the French foreign policy executive clearly expressed its preference for non-intervention, the British foreign policy executive found itself divided over the appropriate response to the crises.

Table 9: *Domestic preferences on intervention in the Libya crisis I*

Country	Consensus/ Opposition	Domestic preference
France	Opposition	Non-intervention
United Kingdom	Opposition/ Division	Non-intervention/ NFZ?

Source: own illustration

Conditions at the international level were compatible with Paris's opposition to military intervention and also accommodated the British indecisive stance. International and regional players rejected military intervention, implying that the use of force would have stirred international tensions and legally and normatively contested. In addition, resistance by the US would have also posed serious capacity constraints on military intervention.

In response to the violent crackdown of the Gaddafi regime on protesters, the UNSC held several emergency meetings on February 22, 25 and 26, 2011, to discuss the crisis in Libya. Council members agreed on the situation's severity and categorized the crisis in Libya "as a threat to international peace and stability." But they were still divided over the means to contain the conflict. In particular, regional, and international players were reluctant to embrace the proposal by Libya's permanent representative, Ibrahim Dabbashi, who had called for the setup of an NFZ over Libya and the establishment of a humanitarian corridor to deliver aid to the Libyan population (Le Monde, 2011i, Moynihan, 2011, What's in Blue, 2011e). While there was wide support for a sanctions regime in the discussions at the UNSC, the US, Russia and China clearly signaled their reservation to the proposal of establishing a no-fly zone and warned against the launch of a military intervention (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 839, Security Council Report, 2011h, What's in Blue, 2011e, Adler-Nissen and Pouliot,

2014: 898). The non-permanent UNSC members, India and Brazil, were also unconvinced of the Libyan representative's proposal and expressed their misgivings (What's in Blue, 2011e). African and Arab regional countries in turn were divided over military intervention. Although the Arab League condemned the violence used by the Gaddafi regime and subsequently suspended Libya from its meetings on February 22, 2011, the League and other regional organizations did not issue any statements expressing support for a military solution to the conflict (Shenker, 2011).

In addition, the fact that the United States were unconvinced of military action suggested that the establishment of a no-fly zone would have run into resource difficulties had European states wanted to take such action. Although US President Obama (so quoted in: Lee, 2011) had asked his administration "to prepare the full range of options […] to respond to this crisis" on February 23, 2011, the US administration was wary of launching a military operation. In particular, US Defense Secretary Gates voiced strong doubts about the prospects of a potential military intervention in Libya. In an interview on February, 23, 2011, Gates told journalists from the *Wall Street Journal* and the *Weekly Standard* that it would be difficult for the US to establish a no-fly-zone because their capabilities in the region were limited (Hayes, 2011). However, the wars in Bosnia and Iraq in the 1990s exposed just how essential US capabilities were for the establishment and enforcement of no-fly zones. In both Bosnia and Iraq, the US Air Force had shouldered the largest portion of combat missions. Due to technical issues, French Mirage aircraft were unable to contribute to the no-fly zone over Iraq and British Tornadoes were unsuitable for the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia (Bellamy, 1993, Coughlin, 2011). Spending and equipment cuts in both Britain and France following the 2008 financial crisis reinforced these problems. Hence, even though European states' military capabilities clearly outnumbered Libya's (Larrabee et al., 2012: 97-98) it would have been difficult for Europeans to establish a no-fly zone had they wanted to do so.

Finally, the use of military force would have been legally and normatively questionable had France and the UK wanted to intervene. As a result of the divisions among UNSC member states and the caution voiced by regional players, the UNSC restricted its response to the conflict in February to non-military measures. On February, 26, 2011, the UNSC adopted UN Resolution 1970 under Chapter VII of the Charter which called for "an immediate end to the violence," established a sanctions regime and referred the crisis in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Security Council Report, 2011d, United Nations Security Council, 2011i). Allegedly, British officials had drafted and subsequently

circulated a UN resolution on February, 25, 2011, which included the authorization of "all necessary measures for humanitarian access" – a UN paraphrase authorizing the use of military force (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014: 898). Similar resolutions had been adopted by the UNSC to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 through the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and in the Chad in 2008 through the EU's operation EUFOR Chad/CAR for instance (United Nations Security Council, 1992a, b, 2007, Sloan, 2011: 143, 276). What British senior officials exactly intended with the phrase, which actor they saw in the responsibility of ensuring humanitarian access, and whether the UK would have been willing to enforce such a UN mandate, remains unclear. Ultimately, the clause was deleted from the draft mainly due to Russia's reservations. UN Resolution 1970 did not mention therefore the use of any military measures to contain the conflict in Libya (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014: 898). Following the adoption of the resolution on February, 26, 2011, Russia's ambassador (so quoted in: UN Security Council, 2011) explained that:

> "A settlement of the situation in Libya is possible only through political means. In fact, that is the purpose of the resolution adopted by the Council, which imposes targeted, clearly expressed, restrictive measures with regard to those guilty of violence against the civilian population. However, it does not enjoin sanctions, even indirect, for forceful interference in Libya's affairs, which would make the situation worse."

Given the opposition by international and regional players, intervention would have been highly contested and could have stirred worldwide tensions. In addition, reluctance by the US to engage would have also confronted Europeans with considerable capacity shortcomings had they favored the establishment of an NFZ. Yet, since the French foreign policy executive firmly opposed intervention and Britain's state leaders and military officials were divided over military action, the compatible preferences of international players facilitated non-intervention. This implied that France and the UK could abstain from intervention unencumbered by international pressure and constraints (Table 10).

Table 10: *Domestic preferences and international compatibility in the Libya crisis I*

Domestic Level	Domestic Preference	International Level	Outcome
Opposition	Non-intervention	Compatibility	Non-intervention

Source: own illustration

5.1.2. Results

In sum, France and the UK's foreign policy executives (largely) rejected the use of military means to stop the crisis in Libya during February 2011. The French and British foreign policy executives' preference for non-intervention was compatible with conditions at the international level, helping both countries stay out of the conflict during the early stage of the crisis. The outcome of this first case is, thus, perfectly in line with the predictions of the three-step model which expects non-intervention if domestic actors oppose intervention and have compatible preferences with international players.

The French foreign policy executive uniformly rejected military intervention to contain the Libya crisis. French state leaders subsequently limited their demands to the imposition of sanctions against the Gaddafi regime and requested the Colonel to step down. Even though the humanitarian situation was alarming, the primary concern of French state leaders was the protection of their own nationals. They seemed convinced that a political solution would still be possible and a military intervention could worsen the situation. Even though the media and opposition party advocated for a more decisive response, the French foreign policy executive firmly opposed military force. Domestic opposition subsequently restricted the foreign policy goals of the country to non-military measures.

In contrast to their French counterparts, parts of the British foreign policy executive considered the establishment of an NFZ to stop the killings of the Gaddafi regime in late February 2011. Emphasizing Britain's role in the world, the Education Secretary Gove demanded a tougher foreign policy line which was also supported by Defense Secretary Liam Fox and Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne. In contrast, British Prime Minister Cameron and Foreign Secretary Hague opposed intervention with concerns over the evacuation of British citizens from the country. In addition, British military officials warned that the launch of a military intervention would restrict Britain's ability to deploy another operation in a region of higher strategic interest.

Even though no direct security interests were at stake and military intervention could have ended in a disaster given the UK's scarce military resources, Cameron instructed the Ministry of Defense to provide contingency planning for the establishment of an NFZ. British officials ultimately did not pursue these goals at the international level. Yet, whereas ideational factors would have justified intervention and material considerations would have clearly prescribed non-intervention, only insights into the domestic divisions among the country's state leaders can account for Britain's somewhat messy and uncoordinated foreign

policy at the early stage of the Libya crisis. As a result of domestic divisions, perhaps Britain would have ultimately used force to provide humanitarian access to the Libyan population as British officials had encouraged in a draft UN resolution.

Yet in addition to domestic opposition, international conditions would have clearly hampered military intervention by both the UK and France. Regional and international players opposed foreign intervention, making intervention legally disputable and materially difficult. As a result of the divisions between UNSC member states and the caution voiced by regional players, the UNSC restricted its first resolution on the Libya crisis to non-military measures. This also rendered redundant the British proposal to use force for humanitarian access. Finally, reluctance by the US would have made in particular the establishment of a no-fly zone cumbersome given previous experiences and European states' resource shortcomings.

In sum, the available evidence strengthens confidence in hypothesis 2a (international compatibility) but pose questions on the extent domestic opposition (H1b) can hamper foreign policy action. It is unclear what would have happened had the UNSC approved the British draft resolution. It is possible that the UK might have intervened to protect humanitarian aid deliveries despite domestic opposition against intervention. But then again, Britain might have not and requested others to intervene instead to ensure humanitarian access.

Table 11: *Process-tracing tests and evidence for non-intervention in the Libya crisis I*

		Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)	
		High	Low
Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)	High	**Doubly decisive test**	**Smoking-gun test**
	Low	**Hoop test** H1b: French state leaders opposed intervention and advocated non-military measures. H2a: International and regional players opposed the use of military means. UNSC only authorizes non-military measures.	**Straw-in-the-wind test** H1b (failed): British state leaders were divided over intervention but PM Cameron instructed the Ministry of Defence to do contingency planning on an NFZ. H1b: Primary concern of French and British foreign policy officials was protection of nationals in Libya. British resource constraints. H2a: Preference for political solution. US capabilities in the region were limited.

Source: own illustration.

Realist premises suggest the same outcome. Realists would stress the absence of French and British strategic interests in Libya to explain why they did not intervene. These considerations indeed played a decisive role for non-intervention in both countries. Yet, realists would have a hard time explaining why British foreign policy officials still considered intervention and even proposed the use of force for humanitarian access internationally. From a constructivist view, France should have at least taken military intervention into consideration given its strategic culture and its traditional support for the R2P principle. In Britain, such ideational considerations played into the discussions but were eventually subordinated to domestic material considerations and dismissed by opposition internationally. Both theoretical strands, therefore, fail to comprehensively explain the reasons, considerations, and constraints behind France's and the UK's non-intervention in the Libya crisis during February 2011.

5.2. Non-intervention in the Libya crisis II

During the first days of March 2011, consensus among the French and British foreign policy executives regarding the use of military means to stop the massacres of the Gaddafi regime visibly grew. Paris and London publicly demanded robust action and the establishment of an NFZ. Despite strengthening consensus, however, European states still did not interfere in the conflict. Why did France and the UK abstain from intervening despite their shifting domestic preference for military intervention to stop Gaddafi?

5.2.1. (No)-fly zone?

Fueled by the seething conflict in Libya, France's and Britain's foreign policy executives continued to debate the crisis during the first days of March 2011. Whereas rebel forces had rapidly taken control of eastern Libya toward the end of February 2011, regime forces launched a counteroffensive in early March that pushed back the poorly armed rebels with heavy artillery and airpower in several strategic towns including Brega, Ras Lanouf, Zawiyah, Bin Jawad, and Benghazi. This, and Gaddafi's refusal to allow humanitarian access to the country and respect the conditions laid out in Resolution 1970 fueled fears that Libya was on the edge of a civil war with disastrous humanitarian consequences (compare Figure 4) (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 840, Blomfield, 2011, The Huffington Post, 2011).

Figure 4: *Fatalities during the Libya crisis, January -April 2011*



Own compilation, data source: ACLED (2017)

Friendlier domestic climates in both countries brought forth consensus building in France and the UK. The resignation of France's disputed Foreign Minister Alliot-Marie reorganized the French foreign policy executive and put Alain Juppé at the head of the French Foreign Ministry. Juppé would later become a central figure in the domestic and international drive for intervention in Libya. In the UK, the termination of delayed rescue operations eased domestic tensions and contributed to a more open consideration of options to shut down Gaddafi (Grand, 2015). Accordingly, meetings of the national security councils dedicated to the Libya crisis noticeably increased in both countries during early March 2011. Statements by British and French foreign policy officials following the meetings indicated a strengthening deliberation of establishing a no-fly zone over Libya to stop the Gaddafi regime (Assemblée Nationale, 2011b, BBC News, 2011b, Blomfield, 2011, House of Commons, 2011b, d, MacAskill et al., 2011, Nougayrède, 2011c, The Huffington Post, 2011, Watt, 2011a). After an emergency meeting between President Sarkozy, Prime Minister Fillon, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs Juppé, and the Defense Minister Longuet on March, 1, 2011, the French Foreign Minister (so quoted in: Assemblée Nationale, 2011b) announced in a parliamentary debate that:

> "Different options can be explored, in particular that of a no-fly zone. But I say here very clearly that no intervention will take place without a clear mandate from the UN Security Council."

Several factors contributed to the change in the French foreign policy executive's preference. In particular, the threat that Gaddafi was using chemical weapons to attack rebels and the dreadful memories of the atrocities in Srebrenica and elsewhere bolstered domestic consensus that the establishment of an NFZ over Libya was ever more imperative to stop Gaddafi's bombings (Nougayrède, 2011c). France's clumsy, plodding response to the protests in Tunisia and Egypt reinforced the feeling among the French foreign policy executive to no longer watch the crisis from the sidelines. A more decisive foreign policy in the Libya crisis, so the French planned, would provide an opportunity to restore the image of France in international politics (Nougayrède, 2011a, The New York Times, 2011a, Davidson, 2013: 317). "The French had been caught snoozing over the Arab uprisings, and Mr Sarkozy hoped that his reshuffled diplomatic team would restore credibility in foreign affairs" (The Economist, 2011).

Moreover, a meeting between President Sarkozy and two emissaries of the National Transitional Council (NTC),[33] as well as discussions with the French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy allegedly further strengthened the conviction of the president that military action was required to stop the Libyan massacres (Le Monde, 2011e). Reporting from the events in Benghazi, Lévy told Sarkozy that "French flags were everywhere. He told him if he allowed a bloodbath there the blood would stain the French flag. That really affected him." It was an adviser to Sarkozy (so quoted in: Hollinger, 2011a) who explained the aforementioned in *The Financial Times*. These factors – even if to different degrees – evidently affected a change in the president's determination and propelled Sarkozy to take charge of the situation. Following the meeting, the French president's office announced that France recognized the NTC as the legitimate government of Libya (BBC, 2011, Le Monde, 2011d).

Although the move by Sarkozy took the French foreign policy executive by surprise, the majority French officials' position completely changed from caution of military intervention to support in just a few short days. There was now wide consensus among France's top government officials that Gaddafi had to be stopped, and if necessary with force (Davidson, 2013: 317, 320). On 8 March 2011, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé (so quoted in: Assemblée Nationale, 2011h) informed the French National Assembly that France was "available to intervene with others to protect the populations by preventing Gaddafi from

[33] The National Transitional Council was formed by the Libyan rebels to organize their resistance and coordinate the protests.

using his air assets" if there was support by the Arab League and the African Union. Alarmed about the migratory flows to Europe, the previously unconvinced Minister of European Affairs Laurent Wauquiez argued that a blood bath in Libya had to be prevented and appealed to Europeans to act jointly (Le Monde, 2011b, Davidson, 2013: 316). Defense Minister Longuet did not publicly express support but also did not voice any opposition to a military intervention. The defense minister generally played a minor role in foreign policy-decision making under Sarkozy's presidency (Chivvis, 2016: 96).

Although the escalating crisis in Libya also fueled debates among the British foreign policy executive about the appropriate means to stop Gaddafi's atrocities, state leaders there were still more hesitant to clearly set out their foreign policy preferences.

In the wake of completing evacuation operations for British nationals in Libya, the British prime minister markedly toughened his stance on the Gaddafi regime (see the statements by Prime Minister Cameron in: House of Commons, 2011b, Winnett et al., 2011). In a parliamentary debate on March, 2, 2011, the prime minister not only repeated that Britain was planning for an NFZ but implicitly threatened Gaddafi to realize this plan if the brutal killings of the Libyan population continued. Cameron (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2011b, Watt, 2011a) argued that:

> "it is the job of leaders in the western world in particular to prepare for all eventualities and all the things that might happen, particularly if Colonel Gaddafi unleashes more things on his own people. On those grounds, we should be and we are looking at plans for a no-fly zone."

Although the Foreign Secretary Hague backed the prime minister's proposal both state leaders kept their demands for a no-fly zone moderate (BBC News, 2011b). They maintained that the UK was merely carrying out contingency planning. However, by conditioning the ultimate implementation of these plans on a worsening security situation in Libya, Hague and Cameron increased the likelihood that force would later be used against the Gaddafi regime (MacAskill et al., 2011, Davidson, 2013: 322). Hague (BBC News, 2011b) stressed that:

> "we are not proposing a no-fly zone at the moment - simply the planning on that. […] But, as the prime minister has said, if people were being attacked in huge numbers, then it's unlikely the world would just want to stand idly by."

Defense Secretary Liam Fox implicitly indicated his support for military action and silenced doubts about the ability of the British armed forces to contribute to the potential establishment of a no-fly zone in light of recent cuts (Cornish, 2011: 5-6, Cross and Hall, 2011). In a parliamentary hearing on March, 2, 2011, Fox (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2011d) explained that, "the changes [to the British army] are being considered—they will be

announced later in the year—so obviously none will impact on any short-term decision about a no-fly zone in Libya."

Similar to their French counterparts, British state leaders became increasingly concerned about the brutal crackdown of the Gaddafi regime and a possible humanitarian catastrophe as in Srebrenica. In an inquiry by the UK's Foreign Affairs Committee on Britain's foreign policy towards Libya following the 2011 intervention, the Defense Secretary Liam Fox (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2011c) explained what had caused the government's changing strategy towards Libya:

> "I think that all of us felt collectively that when we saw the threat that was very clearly apparent to the civilians of Benghazi, our hand had been forced on that. Had Gaddafi taken his forces back west at that point and not threatened Benghazi and its civilian population, that might have changed the attitude towards a UN resolution and conflict might even have been avoided at that point, but he was the architect of what came to be his own destruction."

Fox (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2011c) further explained that:

> "The question at the time was not just, "Was it the right thing to intervene, and what would the consequences be of intervening?" but, "What might be the consequences of not intervening?" I think people remembered what happened in the Balkans, and neither politicians in London nor politicians in other European capitals, Washington, or many of the Arab capitals were willing to take the risk of seeing the wholesale slaughter of civilians when we perhaps could have done something about it before. There was a fear of, if you like, another Srebrenica on our hands that was very much a driving factor in the decision making at the time."

Even previously dovish members of the NSC, such as Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, eased into a tougher British foreign policy line (Davidson, 2013: 323). The more assertive stance by Prime Minister Cameron and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg and concessions by Foreign Secretary Hague and Liam Fox gradually shifted the balance in the government in favor of its more interventionist members (Coates and Watson, 2011). In fact, the NSC institutionalized the quest for domestic consensus to avoid ad-hoc and informal decision-making that had characterized decision-making under Prime Minister Blair (Williams, 2004: 917). After the termination of British evacuation operations, there was a strong feeling among Cabinet members that Britain – similar to France – had to get a grip on the crisis it had failed to foresee and restore the image of its foreign policy. In a parliamentary debate on March 9, 2011, opposition leader Edward Miliband (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2011a) attacked the government's sluggish reaction to the Libya crisis voicing his "concern about the Government's competence on the issue." In response, Prime Minister Cameron (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2011a) highlighted British leadership on the Libya crisis emphasizing:

> “we have led the way in getting a tough UN resolution on Libya, getting Libya thrown out of the Human Rights Council and making sure that the world is preparing for every eventuality, including a no-fly zone.”

Strengthening consensus in France further accelerated the process and an NFZ increasingly won support at the NSC meetings on March 4 and 8, 2011, (House of Commons, 2016, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016: 11). On March, 8, 2011, the Foreign Secretary Hague announced publicly that the UK was working with allies, in particular France, on a UNSC resolution to authorize a no-fly zone. In doing so, he called on the EU to impose tougher sanctions on Libya (BBC News, 2011d, a, England et al., 2011).

The British government’s growing activism in the crisis and its strengthening support for military intervention drew on support from the parliament. Most importantly, the opposition leader, Edward Miliband, welcomed the prime minister’s idea of an NFZ (Barker, 2011a, House of Commons, 2011f). Even though formal approval by parliament was not required for the launch of British military action (House of Commons, 2011a), support by the opposition was absolutely vital. It provided the government with domestic backing for its campaign and reduced the risk of electoral punishment should its foreign policy fail (Hope, 2011). Therefore, Prime Minister Cameron was keen to keep the House of Commons informed and so the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and Defense and International Development appeared in parliament to answer questions (Prime Minister's Office and 10 Downing Street, 2011b: 17).

Table 12: *Domestic preferences on intervention in the Libya crisis II*

Country	Consensus/ Opposition	Domestic preference
France	Consensus	Intervention (NFZ)
United Kingdom	Consensus	Intervention (NFZ)

Source: own illustration

In line with the growing consensus among the French and the British foreign policy executives around the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya, state leaders of both countries intensified contacts with international and regional partners to explore possible venues for action. Paris started to work closely with the rebels, regional organizations and the United Kingdom “to obtain a resolution of the UN Security Council creating a no-fly zone to avoid the bombings,” so French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé (so quoted in: Le Figaro, 2011c) explained on March 5, 2011. In addition, the Foreign Minister was in close phone

contact with Younès Abdel Fatah, resigned Minister of the Interior of Libya, and met with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), Amr Moussa. For his part, British Prime Minister Cameron consulted with US President Barack Obama about the next steps in the Libya crisis, including the potential establishment of an NFZ. In their conversation, Cameron and Obama (so quoted in: England et al., 2011) agreed to:

> "press forward with planning, including at Nato, on the full spectrum of possible responses, including surveillance, humanitarian assistance, enforcement of the [UN] arms embargo and a no-fly zone."

On March 10, Prime Minister Cameron and French President Sarkozy wrote a joint letter to the President of the European Council, van Rompuy, calling on the EU to give a common and decisive response to the Libya crisis, including the discussion about an NFZ (Cameron and Sarkozy, 2011). The letter stressed that the Libyan regime's intransigence and the continuing use of violence against the population were "utterly unacceptable" (Cameron and Sarkozy, 2011, Gaskarth, 2014: 55-56). In the extraordinary European Council meeting on March 11, Sarkozy publicly called for the establishment of an NFZ (Watt, 2011b) which Cameron viewed as "perfectly practical and deliverable" (so quoted in: Barker, 2011a). Around the same time, France and the UK circulated a draft resolution at the UNSC to authorize the establishment of an NFZ over Libya (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 840, Jones, 2011: 53).

Despite a clear consensus in both countries that military action against the Gaddafi regime was becoming inevitable, neither France, nor Britain rushed into action. On the contrary, French and British foreign policy makers made intervention contingent on regional support and international approval. In their joint letter to the President of the European Council, Sarkozy and Cameron clearly spelled out the conditions under which they would support military measures against the Libyan regime, including that of "a no-fly zone or other options against air attacks." These were a "demonstrable need" to protect civilians against attacks by the regime, a "clear legal basis" through a UNSC resolution and "firm regional support." These requirements were backed by the French Foreign Minister and Britain's Foreign Secretary. In a parliamentary debate on Libya on March 7, 2011, Foreign Secretary Hague (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2011g) had already stressed that:

> "many conditions should be attached to trying to implement a no-fly zone […]: there should be a demonstrable need that the whole world can see; there must be a clear legal basis for such a no-fly zone; and there must be clear support from the region—from the middle east and north African region—as well as from the people of Libya themselves […]."

Similarly, the French Foreign Minister Juppé (Assemblée Nationale, 2011h) emphasized that intervention had to be carried out necessarily "in full liaison with the Arab League and the

African Union." Writing later on his blog on 16 March 2011, Juppé (2011) again confirmed that:

> "[o]nly the threat of the use of force can stop Gaddafi. By bombarding the positions of his opponents with the dozens of planes and helicopters he actually has, the Libyan dictator reversed the balance. We can neutralize its air assets by targeted strikes. This is what France and Great Britain have been proposing for two weeks. On two conditions: obtaining a mandate from the UN Security Council, […] and with "the effective participation of Arab countries."

However, France's and Britain's preferences were clearly incompatible with the conditions at the international level. Whereas regional support for a no-fly zone was fostering, regional and international players still opposed foreign military intervention. In particular the authorization by the UNSC seemed essentially out of reach at this moment and persisting reluctance by the US continued to raise questions of military capacity.

On March 5, 2011, the NTC issued a letter urging the international community to provide protection for the Libyan population but demanded that there would be no "direct military intervention on Libyan soil" (Security Council Report, 2011d). In a similar vein, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) called for the establishment of a no-fly zone on March 7 and 8, 2011 respectively but the OIC also clearly signaled its opposition towards foreign military troops on the ground (Security Council Report, 2011d, g). The AU, however, held the most cautious position on foreign interference. Despite the African Union's condemnation of the Gaddafi regime's clampdown, the organization sought a political solution to the conflict and member states opposed the use of force (Aning and Edu-Afful, 2016: 131). What's more, "[…] Africa was divided. While most of the continent wanted Gaddafi gone with minimal disruption, a few leaders were sympathetic to the 'Brother Leader'" (de Waal, 2013: 373). Accordingly, in a communiqué published on March 10, 2011, the AU's Peace and Security Council (so quoted in: African Union, 2011: 1) reaffirmed its "strong commitment to the respect of the unity and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as its rejection of any foreign military intervention whatever its form."

Furthermore, Russia and China clearly signaled their opposition to military intervention, in particular given the AU's reluctant position, while Germany, India, and Brazil strongly preferred preventive measures over military means (Security Council Report, 2011g).

In addition, the US administration's caution vis-à-vis military action endured. In particular, US Defense Minister Gates still seemed unconvinced about the effectiveness of an

NFZ over Libya, fearing that it would draw the US into a long-term military commitment. But President Obama also was believed to resist involving the US' military in Libya although he publicly insisted that he was considering all options (MacAskill, 2011, so quoted in: Sanger and Shanker, 2011b, The New York Times, 2011b).

As a result of regional and international players' caution toward military intervention, military resource and legal issues continued to question the feasibility of a no-fly zone (see chapter 5.2.1.). Indeed, the Franco-British draft resolution on an NFZ failed to gather support among other UNSC members and hence a no-fly zone would have lacked a legal basis had Paris and London pursued their goal (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 840, Jones, 2011: 53). British and French foreign policy makers were aware of international players' resistance to military intervention. Despite the emphasis put publicly on the requirement of UNSC authorization, Britain's Foreign Secretary Hague and France's president privately considered to ignore the divisions within the UNSC if humanitarian need and regional support required it (MacAskill et al., 2011). More specifically, Sarkozy explained that (so quoted in: France in the United Kingdom, 2011):

> "The decision is clear; we need a clear legal basis for intervening; a United Nations mandate is necessary. (…) If this mandate doesn't exist and there's regional and Libyan demand, then we'll see."

However, despite these ambiguous positions, France and the United Kingdom did not ignore the discontent in the UNSC and, instead, continued to lobby for international approval and the adoption of a UNSC resolution authorizing the establishment of a no-fly zone. The delay of British equipment cuts eased some of the military capacity issues related to the establishment of a no-fly zone. However, other issues persisted: with the US still unconvinced of military action, European states would have eventually run into equipment shortfalls had they decided to create the no-fly zone drawing on their own capabilities only (Engberg, 2014: 158-159). Ultimately, neither France nor the UK intervened unilaterally, although domestic consensus could have justified the use of military force. Incompatibility between the two countries' foreign policy preferences and the preferences of international players hampered the establishment of a no-fly-zone and hence military intervention. As Bellamy and Williams (2011: 841) find:

> "The deteriorating situation and Anglo-French activism ramped up the rhetoric, but with the US decidedly uncommitted and with authorization from the UN Security Council thought highly unlikely owing to Russian, Chinese, Indian, Brazilian and German opposition, the prospects for military action appeared slim."

Table 13: *Domestic preferences and international compatibility in the Libya crisis II*

Domestic Level	International Level	Outcome
Consensus	Incompatibility	Non-intervention

Source: own illustration.

5.2.2. Results

In sum, during the first days of March 2011, domestic consensus in France and the United Kingdom around the necessity of intervention in the Libya crisis fostered. In combination, continuing massacres in Libya, the reorganization of the French Foreign Ministry, and France's clumsy response to the Arab Spring protests created consensus between domestic actors that they had to advance a tougher foreign policy line. The escalating security situation in Libya provided the opportunity to lead and restore France's image in the world. There was strong domestic consensus around this goal. President Sarkozy, Foreign Minister Juppé, Prime Minister Fillon and the Minister for European Affairs Wauquiez all expressed their support for the establishment of an NFZ over Libya. Defense Minister Longuet did not publicly voice his approval of military action but also did not oppose it. Subsequently, President Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Juppé pressed forward with their demand for military intervention to stop Gaddafi.

In the UK, similar considerations played a role. The escalating security situation in Libya and the somewhat clumsy reaction by the British Foreign Service persuaded the British foreign policy executive to respond more decisively. Following the termination of evacuation operations, ideational considerations advanced by military intervention supporters gained the upper hand in the Cabinet. And in so doing, silenced material scruples concerning the UK's capacity to conduct a military operation. Together with their French counterparts, British state leaders publicly called for the establishment of a no-fly zone in the Libyan airspace and sought partners to implement this plan.

Although Paris and London were in favor of an intervention broadly supported by the countries' foreign policy executives, their preferences were incompatible with international level conditions. Some UNSC states and the majority of regional African organizations continued to oppose foreign intervention. As a result, France and the UK failed to gather support for a UNSC resolution authorizing intervention.

Despite their public pledges, French and British officials privately considered ignoring the opposition in the Council and launching military action in the absence of a

UNSC resolution. It is unclear whether France and the UK would have intervened without the approval of the UNSC on the basis of a stronger regional demand had opposition persisted in the long run. Had they done so, it would have certainly created serious tensions with Russia, China, Brazil, and India and greatly damaging the legal and normative basis for intervention. Yet, in the short run, they did not.

Militarily, US reluctance continued to pose questions of capacity. France and the UK may have launched an air campaign with their own military capabilities, but not having the support of the US would have undoubtedly created difficulties to enforce the NFZ in the long term. Hence, the preferences of international players were largely incompatible with France and the UK's foreign policy goals. Despite their ambiguous statements, they both refrained from military intervention at that stage of the crisis. Meaning, the incompatibility of French and British preferences with international players' hindered military action. The outcome of this second case is, therefore, in line with the predictions of the three-step model. It expects that even though domestic actors may favor intervention, they will have difficulties to realize their goals if they are incompatible with international players' preferences and activities. Conversely, had all UNSC members and African regional states approved of the use of military force, in all likelihood France and Britain would have intervened in the second week of March 2011.

To conclude, the available evidence strengthens confidence in hypothesis 1a (domestic consensus) and 2b (international incompatibility). Domestic consensus in France and the UK propelled leaders to advocate the use of military force. French and British considerations to intervene despite disagreement among UNSC members (slightly) weakens hypothesis 2b but ultimately incompatible preferences internationally hampered the resort to force.

Table 14: *Process-tracing tests and evidence for non-intervention in the Libya crisis II*

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="2"></td><td colspan="2">Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)</td></tr>
<tr><td>High</td><td>Low</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)</td><td>High</td><td>Doubly decisive test</td><td>Smoking-gun test
H1a: French and British domestic actors voice consensus on intervention despite lack of clear-cut strategic interests.

H2b: Majority of UNSC members and regional organizations oppose the use of military means. France and Britain refrain from intervening.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Low</td><td>Hoop test
H1a: Libya crisis is discussed in several NSC meetings in France and Britain.</td><td>Straw-in-the-wind test
H1a: Deterioration of situation, reorganization of French Foreign Ministry, desire to restore French and British image in the world, termination of evacuation operation.

H2b: Preference for political solution. US unconvinced of effectiveness of NFZ.
H2b (failed): French President Sarkozy and UK Foreign Secretary Hague privately consider intervention in absence of UNSC mandate.</td></tr>
</table>

Source: own illustration.

Alternative theoretical perspectives find it difficult to comprehensively explain France and the UK's non-intervention in the Libya crisis. Although realists would have also expected Europeans not to intervene in the Libya crisis, they would have a hard time explaining the underlying reasons for European states' absence from crisis management. Realists would emphasize the lack of clear-cut strategic interests in Libya and highlight the riskiness of military intervention. However, from a realist perspective, France and the UK should never have even considered military intervention. It is not entirely clear how constructivists would explain the outcome. From a constructivist perspective, intervention may have been more likely given the strategic cultures and identities of France and the UK, their collectively held norms, and use of military force in previous crises. Indeed, French and British preferences were driven by humanitarian motives, the desire to restore prestige in international politics, and the memories of Srebrenica. On the other hand, from a constructivist view, intervention would have also violated international norms and principles such as the sovereignty and non-intervention norms and the authority of the UNSC. Regardless of how constructivists would

explain exactly the outcome of non-intervention, the considerations at the domestic level in France and the UK goes beyond the constructivist reach. And therefore, their explanations would necessarily remain incomplete.

5.3. Ad-hoc intervention in the Libya crisis III

Although the prospects of intervention in the Libya crisis seemed bleak until the second week of March 2011, France, the UK, and the US launched attacks against Libya's air defense systems and military facilities on March 19, 2011. Why did France, the UK and the US intervene despite the strong international opposition against intervention just a few days prior?

5.3.1. Arab states paving the way

On March 12, 2011, the LAS joined the GCC and the OIC in their support for an NFZ and requested the UNSC to take the necessary measures to enforce it. The LAS (so quoted in: Council of the League of Arab States, 2011) argued that the Libyan authorities had lost their legitimacy and called on the UNSC,

> "to take the necessary measures to impose immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in Libya, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring States."

The LAS demand changed the situation fundamentally. The support by regional organizations proved decisive because it established "the conditions under which the Security Council could consider adopting enforcement measures" (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 839, 841). Indeed, the LAS statement initiated a series of reactions at the international level that fostered international support and provided the legal and military conditions for the establishment of a no-fly zone. In particular, the Arab League's support for the establishment of an NFZ led Washington to revise its cautious stance and ultimately support military action. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (so quoted in: Landler and Bilefsky, 2011) confirmed that notion: "The turning point was really the Arab League statement on Saturday." First signs of the US administration's changing position appeared two days after the Arab League's resolution on March 14, 2011 when US Secretary of State Clinton met the rebel leader Mahmoud Jibril in Paris to discuss the situation in Libya (Michaels, 2014: 20-21). Following the meeting, Clinton travelled to the Gulf region to ensure support from Arab countries. Subsequently, she

joined French and British calls for a UN resolution authorizing military force against Gaddafi (Rinke, 2011). During a visit to Cairo the next day, the US Secretary of State (so quoted in: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011) argued that:

> "there is a British-French-Lebanese Security Council resolution that is being discussed at this time in New York. We are consulting with the Arab League about their understanding of the goals and modalities of a no-fly zone as well as other forms of support. […] we believe that this must be an international effort and that there has to be decisions made in the Security Council in order for any of these steps to go forward."

At a meeting of the US National Security Council that same day, Clinton made the case for intervention and received support by US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice and Samantha Power, the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights on the US National Security Council. Given the warnings by senior officials and advisers, US President Obama ultimately re-evaluated his position in favor of military intervention (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 843). At the meeting, the US administration concluded that an NFZ would no longer be sufficient to stop Gaddafi in light of the recent setbacks for opposition forces in Benghazi and regional demands to prevent a victory of Gaddafi forces. Instead, they asked for further reaching military options to stabilize the Libya crisis (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 843, Landler and Bilefsky, 2011, What's in Blue, 2011b, Michaels, 2014: 21). The following day, March 16, Susan Rice stated publicly that the US administration was considering military action against Gaddafi. Rice (so quoted in: Gertler, 2011: 3) noted that:

> "we need to be prepared to contemplate steps that include, but perhaps [should] go beyond, a no-fly zone at this point, as the situation on the ground has evolved, and as a no-fly zone has inherent limitations in terms of protection of civilians at immediate risk."

The growing military support by the US eased the legal barriers and resource constraints which had so far obstructed military intervention. Noticing the increasing enthusiasm by regional players and the US, France and the UK were keen to finalize a Chapter VII resolution authorizing member states to ban flights over Libya and receive approval by the UN Security Council before counter-blocks could form (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014: 901-902, Engelbrekt et al., 2014: 43). Accordingly, President Sarkozy and French Foreign Minister Juppé pulled their weight behind the resolution. Just before the vote, Sarkozy (so quoted in: Portes, 2011) again appealed to UNSC members:

> "It is more than time for the international community, through the Security Council, to come together to draw the consequences of this situation and respond without delay to the urgent appeal of the League of Arab States."

For his part, Foreign Minister Juppé went to New York to convince UNSC member states to give their support to the resolution on March 17, reminding of the violence used by the regime against its population and the responsibility of the international community to stop the brutal repression by Gaddafi forces (United Nations Security Council, 2011l: 3). France and the UK were backed by the US administration which sought to convince others – in particular Russia and South Africa as a non-permanent member of the UNSC at the time – of the necessity of intervention to contain the crisis: "the US diplomatic machinery went into overdrive, with intensive contacts at the UN and telephone diplomacy to key capitals" (Jones, 2011: 54).

Regional support for the establishment of an NFZ and US diplomacy softened the opposition to military action by Russia, China, and the non-permanent UN Security Council members too which, in addition, were aware that blocking the resolution would come with high international costs given Gaddafi's brutality (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 844-846). On March 17, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973 with ten votes in favor and five abstentions by Russia, China, Germany, India, and Brazil. Through their abstention, the UNSC members intended to signal their continuing skepticism of military action while not obstructing international action either (Jones, 2011: 53-54, Grand, 2015: 188). The resolution authorized member states to "take all necessary measures […] to protect civilians" and to impose a no-fly zone in Libya's airspace (so quoted in: United Nations Security Council, 2011f: 3).

Following the vote in the UNSC, France and the UK swiftly voiced their readiness to implement the resolution. Even before the vote in the UNSC, French Foreign Minister Juppé (so quoted in: United Nations Security Council, 2011l: 3) stated that France was "prepared to act with Member States – in particular Arab States – that wish to do so", urging that "[w]e do not have much time left. It is a matter of days, perhaps even hours." Similarly, Sir Mark Lyall Grant (so quoted in: United Nations Security Council, 2011l: 4), Britain's ambassador to the UN, declared that "[w]e, along with partners in the Arab world and in NATO, are now ready to shoulder our responsibilities in implementing resolution 1973 (2011)." After the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1973, French President Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Cameron called US President Obama to discuss possible military options. While it was likely that the US would lend support, it was unclear to what extent Washington would militarily get involved (Bilefsky and Landler, 2011). This relieved – at least temporarily – some of the concerns about European military shortfalls which could not have prevented but hampered military action by France and the UK.

While regional support for a no-fly-zone and the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1973 clearly signaled that the foreign policy goals of French and British officials had become largely compatible with those of international players, the days following the adoption of Resolution 1973 reaffirmed the strong domestic consensus in France and the United Kingdom around military action in Libya (Table 15).

Immediately after the successful adoption, French Prime Minister Fillon and President Sarkozy organized several meetings on March 18 to discuss the implementation of the resolution with Foreign Minister Juppé, Defense Minister Longuet, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Admiral Edouard Guillaud and the main parliamentary leaders. In addition to French foreign policy officials, the government could draw upon the support of all political parties in parliament (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2011a: 7, Jaigu, 2011, Davidson, 2013). According to journalist Alain Frachon (2011) there was "a kind of French consensus. The idea of an intervention not only rallies the most traditional intellectuals and supporters of the interference. It is shared by the 'realists'."

Similar to Paris, London swiftly announced its commitment to implement the resolution. The final decision that the UK would contribute to a military intervention in Libya was taken in an NSC meeting on March 17 following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1973. Given the institutional arrangements of the NSC Foreign Secretary Hague (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2011c) later described how the decision to intervene was made:

> "[…] the decision to intervene if a UN resolution could be passed was taken at a meeting of the NSC. This truly was the end of sofa Government in these matters. The decision was taken in the NSC with all relevant people present […]. And having taken opinions from all around the room, he [Prime Minister Cameron] concluded that it was [in the British national interest to intervene]. So that was specifically the terms of the NSC decision."

Similarly, the report on the British government's management of the Libya crisis by the national security adviser confirmed that:

> "Decisions on key policy issues were taken in Cabinet, particularly the deployment of UK military forces following adoption of UNSCR 1973, which the full Cabinet formally approved on the recommendation of the NSC and in accordance with the Attorney General's advice, which was circulated to all Cabinet members." (Prime Minister's Office and 10 Downing Street, 2011b: 7).

Statements by British leaders in a parliamentary debate on March 18 offer confirmation of the strong domestic consensus on intervention. Prime Minister Cameron (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2011e) insisted that "[n]ow that the UN Security Council has reached its decision, there is a responsibility on its members to respond. That is what Britain, with others, will now do." His line of reasoning was reiterated by Attorney-General Dominic Grieve and Foreign

Secretary William Hague, who stressed the responsibility the resolution placed on Britain to act (Morris et al., 2011, Parker, 2011). The liberal Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg (so quoted in: Rigby and Blitz, 2011) and coalition partner of Cameron's conservative government expressed his support for military action in Libya stressing that "[t]his is not Iraq, we are not going to war, we are not invading Libya. The political parties[34] in the House of Commons strongly supported the government's stance and agreed that action by Britain was imperative in stopping Gaddafi's atrocities (House of Commons, 2011e, Parker, 2011, Prime Minister's Office and 10 Downing Street, 2011b: 18, Rigby and Blitz, 2011). As Sperling (2016: 72) finds: "Consensus on policy towards Libya within the Conservative-Liberal coalition (as well as between the government and opposition) […] rendered a no-confidence motion moot."

On March 18, France, the UK, and the US issued an ultimatum to Colonel Gaddafi demanding an immediate end to the attacks, threatening to use military force to impose Resolution 1973 if the Colonel failed to do so (Jarry, 2011). As the fighting continued in spite of a ceasefire announcement by the Libyan government, French Foreign Minister Juppé (so quoted in: Barluet, 2011b) responded saying that everything was ready for intervention.

On March 19, the Élysée Palace organized an emergency summit on Libya which brought together representatives of the Arab League, the African Union, and the European Union to discuss the implementation of the resolution and individual state contributions for a no-fly zone (Vampouille, 2011). Before the meeting's end, Paris announced that French forces had started to enforce the NFZ and the protection of civilians in Libya (Clarisse, 2011, Willsher, 2011a). A few hours later, the British Prime Minister Cameron too, reported that British planes had been deployed to enforce Resolution 1973. In partnership, the US started to carry out airstrikes supported by Spain, Canada, Norway, and Denmark (BBC NEWs, 2011c, Erlanger, 2011b, Service International, 2011). Military intervention in Libya was led by an ad-hoc coalition of the willing with separate operations and chains of command: Operation Harmattan by France, Operation Ellamy by the United Kingdom, and Operation Odyssey Dawn by the United States (Willsher, 2011d).

[34] In particular, opposition leader Edward Miliband welcomed the UN Security Council Resolution in the parliamentary debate preceding intervention and argued (so quoted in House of Common, 2011i) that "it would be quite wrong, given what is happening in Libya, for us to stand by and do nothing." What is more, on March 21, 2011, the broad majority of MPs voted in favor of a motion which backed UK military action in Libya with 557 to 13 votes (Prime Minister's Office and 10 Downing Street, 2011b: 18)

Table 15: *Domestic preferences and international compatibility in the Libya crisis III*

Domestic Level	International Level	Outcome
Consensus	Compatibility	Intervention

Source: own illustration.

5.3.2. Results

In conclusion, regional actors' support for an NFZ and in particular the demand by the League of Arab States proved essential for national and international decision-making on intervention in Libya. Following the request by the LAS, China and Russia lowered their resistance to the use of military means. The US even reversed its position and became an advocate of more extensive military measures. This considerably lowered the legal barriers for military action and enhanced the military feasibility of intervention. On March 17, 2011, the UNSC authorized the use of military means. Afterward, the importance attached to the LAS resolution would attract criticism since UNSC members had clearly prioritized the Arab League's position over the cautious stance of the AU (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 846). Yet, in view of the escalating security situation in Libya and Colonel Gaddafi's intransigence, a political solution essentially become unfeasible.

Increasing international compatibility clearly facilitated the launch of military intervention by France and the UK during the Libya crisis. Even though Britain and France had lobbied for military action since the first week of March 2011, they launched military action only after regional players announced their support and UNSC Resolution 1973 authorized military intervention. Had France and Britain desired, they could have acted without the formal approval by the UNSC, as well as regional and international support. Without the US on board, military action could have protracted the crisis; missing UNSC authorization would have doubtlessly raised international criticism. But, in principle, military action was possible. France and Britain, however, refrained from acting militarily in the absence of regional and international approval. Thus, the compatibility of international players' preferences with France and the UK's foreign policy preferences was crucial for launching military action.

Meanwhile, consensus around the necessity of intervention had remained strong between the French and British foreign policy executives. Domestic consensus clearly facilitated the pursuit of France and Great Britain's interventionist preferences. All major foreign policy actors worked in tandem internationally. British and French officials cooperated closely to swiftly draft the UNSC Resolution 1973 and pushed it through the Security Council.

President Sarkozy, Prime Minister Cameron, and French Foreign Minister Juppé lobbied actively for the adoption of the UNSC resolution and advocated military action against Gaddafi. Only two days after the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1973 France, Britain and the US opened airstrikes against military facilities of the Gaddafi regime. It is evident, therefore, that the outcome of this third case sits in line with the predictions of the three-step model. Intervention is likely if domestic actors oppose intervention and their preferences are compatible with the preferences and activities of international players.

Would Sarkozy or Cameron have launched intervention in the absence of consensus among the respective foreign policy executives? The available evidence cannot completely rule out this possibility. Sarkozy was well known for his authoritarian leadership style and some observers suggest that he may have wanted to boost his record-low approval rates with the intervention in Libya (Chrisafis, 2010, 2011). Yet, given France's disastrous foreign policy during the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, it would have been politically risky for Sarkozy to ignore the views of his ministers and cause another reshuffling of the French government. Meanwhile in the UK, Prime Minister Cameron would have had a hard time acting not only against the advice of British military officials, but also counteracting the Cabinet. Doing so would have also required Cameron to ignore the institutional arrangements of the NSC, which he had established precisely to avoid ad-hoc decision-making.

The available evidence strengthens confidence in hypothesis 1a (domestic consensus) and 2a (international compatibility). Domestic consensus propelled France and the UK to lobby for military intervention internationally and enabled them to promptly intervene when international players' preferences became compatible with their goals. But France and the UK only intervened after the UNSC provided its formal authorization for the use of force.

Table 16: *Process-tracing tests and evidence for intervention in the Libya crisis III*

		Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)	
		High	Low
Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)	High	**Doubly decisive test**	**Smoking-gun test** H2a: UNSC authorizes intervention and US confirms military support. France, Britain and US intervene only after authorization.
	Low	**Hoop test** H1a: All major domestic actors support intervention. They intervene swiftly after adoption of UNSC Resolution 1973. H2a: French and British domestic actors continue to lobby for the creation of an NFZ internationally. Majority of regional organizations and UNSC members approve of the use of military means.	**Straw-in-the-wind test** H1a: Ignoring the views of the ministers would have been politically risky for Sarkozy and Cameron. Parliament voices support for intervention in both countries before and after intervention. H2a: LAS joined the GCC and the OIC in their support for an NFZ and requested the UNSC to take the necessary measures to enforce it.

Source: own illustration.

It is important to note that constructivist reasoning would have also suggested military intervention. Constructivists would stress the humanitarian motives, strategic cultures of France and the UK, and their adherence to international norms, most significantly the responsibility to protect and the authority of the UNSC which backed intervention. These ideational factors evidently impacted France and the UK's decision to intervene and provide an alternative reading of the ad-hoc intervention in Libya. In contrast, France and the UK's intervention in the Libya crisis sits uncomfortably with realist logic. Expected refugee flows may have figured in both countries' considerations but are unlikely to have tipped the balance in the French and British decision over the use of force. Military intervention in Britain was a particularly risky undertaking and, from a realist perspective, could have reduced its ability to deploy the armed forces in another country of higher strategic interest. It is therefore unclear how the Libya intervention could have helped France and the UK to maximize their power. They did not seek to balance against the US but instead advocated cooperation. Just as little did US capabilities play a decisive role. US involvement clearly facilitated intervention but given their domestic preferences, France and the UK would have likely intervened also if the US had decided against force following the adoption of Resolution 1973. In fact, Britain and France opened airstrikes against the Libyan regime before the US launched its operation. Thus, while constructivist premises explain France and Britain's intervention in the Libya

crisis, realism fails to comprehensively account for military force in the absence of a clear-cut threat to French and British security interests.

5.3.3. EU paralyzed, NATO at strife

Why did France, the UK and the US choose to intervene through an ad-hoc coalition of the willing in the Libya war although they could have used the military capacities of the EU or NATO to conduct military action and establish a no-fly zone?

Although there was consensus among the political elites in France and the United Kingdom that military intervention was necessary to stop the killing by Gaddafi's forces, both countries held different ideas regarding how intervention should ultimately unfold (Gomis, 2011: 8). Paris had a strong desire to see the EU taking over the lead in crisis management. By early March 2011, President Sarkozy had called on EU partners to convene an emergency meeting of the European Council to discuss the crisis in North Africa. Before the meeting, Sarkozy's Foreign Minister indicated Paris's ambition to convince not only regional countries but also its European allies to resort to joint action in the Libya crisis. More specifically, he (so quoted in: Assemblée Nationale, 2011h: 1523-1524) stated that:

> "We need a UN mandate. We are available to intervene with others to protect the population by preventing Gaddafi from using his air assets. Finally, it is necessary to do so in full liaison with the Arab League and the African Union. That is what we are working on. Next Friday, at the European Council which will be exclusively devoted to the situation in Libya and the south of the Mediterranean, France will make strong proposals"

Paris's decision to recognize the NTC as the only legitimate representative of the Libyan people on March 10, 2011, was meant to push the EU to find a common position (Koenig, 2011: 21). However, this unilateral decision antagonized France's fellow European partners (Rettman, 2011a). One EU diplomat (so quoted in: Watt, 2011b) called Sarkozy's move "irresponsible," another diplomat (so quoted in: Euractiv, 2011) found the decision "idiotic," whereas the Netherland's Prime Minister Mark Rutte (so quoted in: Watt, 2011b) complained that the recognition was "a crazy move by France." However, an even deeper rift between member states opened when Sarkozy expressed his preferences regarding crisis management. At the EU's extraordinary summit on March 11, Sarkozy attempted to get the Council on board for an NFZ and convince fellow EU leaders to launch a maritime operation under the auspices of the EU (Rettman, 2011b, Engberg, 2014: 153). The French president (so quoted

in: Watt, 2011b) explained that air strikes could be justified "if Mr Gaddafi makes use of chemical weapons or air strikes against non-violent protesters."

The proposal for a maritime operation seemed reasonable as the EU already had several border management missions in the Mediterranean (operated by the EU's agency FRONTEX) and could have additionally drawn upon the experiences and resources of its maritime operation EUNAVOR Atalanta, which was fighting piracy in the Indian Ocean. A new embargo operation could have unified the command over the different missions in the Mediterranean. The option was, therefore, not that far-fetched and had already been discussed by the EU's PSC on March 8, 2011, based on an EEAS option paper. Yet, in particular the UK staunchly refused to consider this idea. Furthermore, intervention was clearly incongruent with the preferences of the majority of other member states (Engberg, 2014: 153-154).

Although France's tough stance on the Libya crisis received backing by British Prime Minister David Cameron, both leaders diverged on the strategy and institutional channel through which intervention should be carried out (Khalaf and Chaffin, 2011, Nougayrède and Ricard, 2011). Britain was uneasy with the idea of involving the EU directly in a military campaign in Libya and clearly preferred to use NATO's military structures to establish the NFZ and conduct the maritime operation. At a press conference following the EU summit on March 11, 2011, Cameron (so quoted in: Euractiv, 2011) argued that:

> "Of course the EU is not a military alliance, and I don't want it to be a military alliance. Our alliance is NATO, which discussed these issues yesterday. But I think on the urgent question of how do we deal with Libya, how do we turn up the pressure, we've made good progress today and it was worth having this meeting."

Long before the meeting, British officials had directly expressed their preference for a NATO-led campaign in Libya. Statements by government representatives and British MPs show that NATO was considered the main forum to discuss and prepare for an eventual NFZ (House of Commons, 2011g). For instance, in a debate in the House of Commons on March 7, 2011, Foreign Secretary William Hague (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2011g) explained:

> "[…] we are making contingency plans for all eventualities in Libya. NATO has been tasked to work on a range of options, including the possible establishment of a no-fly zone, the evacuation of civilians, international humanitarian assistance, and support for the international arms embargo. There will be further NATO meetings this week."

The UK government did not categorically reject EU involvement in crisis management but what London had in mind was a financial and political rather than a military contribution by the Europeans (House of Commons, 2011h, Engberg, 2014: 153-154).

The majority of other member states equally opposed the EU assuming control over military intervention. In particular, Germany offered fierce resistance to plans which involved the use of military force. Questioned on the potential participation of Germany in a military operation to oust Gaddafi following the European Council summit, German Chancellor Angela Merkel so quoted in: Rettman (2011a) expressed:

> "deep scepticism on military action and on what such a mission might actually achieve [...]. It is not a good idea for Nato and the EU to play a prominent role, instead of regional organisations. This is, after all, an Arab area. We of course want to alleviate problems, but more on a political level - sanctions, that's our role."

Similarly, at the G8 summit on March 15, 2011, Germany's Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle (so quoted in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2011b) maintained that " [a] military solution is not a solution" and insisted that Germany would not want to be dragged into a war in Libya (Bacia, 2011). Other European countries also voiced their skepticism about the French proposal (Bolzen, 2011, Euractiv, 2011, Spiegel Online, 2011b). Romania argued that the moment was not ripe for a military intervention and considered NATO to be in charge first. Bulgaria suspected oil interests behind the initiative and Poland viewed the crisis as an issue of Libya's internal affairs (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012: 52-53). What's more, the Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, warned of the risks involved in an NFZ while another EU diplomat cautioned (so quoted in: Watt, 2011b) that:

> "The risks are high for potential civilian casualties and potential collateral damage. The efficiency of a no-fly zone is very questionable. Apart from anything else, European command and control facilities would not be able to get a no-fly zone up and running in less than five or six weeks, and Nato is suggesting it would take at least three to four weeks."

Finally, the President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy (so quoted in: Louati, 2011) contended that "we don't live in a colonial era any more where foreign powers intervene where they like."

Given the strong opposition by the majority of EU states against intervention, there was little room for France to convince its European partners of common action (Table 17). French foreign policy officials were aware of strong opposition by their EU partners to their proposal. One French official (so quoted in: Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012: 52) summed up EU member states' response to the Franco-British proposal with: "The answer was a flat 'NO, forget about it.'" France's powerful position within the EU could not change this. Although France is one of the EU's major military powers, has often initiated the launch of EU military operations, and has many French nationals working at the EEAS, the UK is just

as powerful. In addition, Germany, even though militarily less powerful than France and the UK, is the EU's major economic power with the largest GDP among EU member states in 2011 (Kollewe, 2011, OECD, 2016). As a result "[t]he absence of agreement between Europeans made it impossible for the EU to even consider sending a military ESDP mission to Libya" (Louati, 2011).

Hand in hand with discussions at EU level, similar debates took place within NATO. NATO member states discussed the crisis in Libya for the first time at an emergency meeting of the NAC on February 25, 2011 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2011b). The main focus of the meeting was humanitarian assistance and evacuation. But NATO subsequently embarked on prudent contingency planning of possible military options even though military action by the alliance was downplayed publicly (Cooper and Landler, 2011). In a press conference on March 3, 2011, Rasmussen (so quoted in: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2011a) stressed "that NATO doesn't have any intention to intervene. But as a defence alliance and security organization we do prudent planning for all eventualities." Due to largely overlapping membership, NATO struggled with much of the same problems as the EU (Bumiller, 2011, Engberg, 2014: 154). At their meeting on March 10-11, NATO's defense ministers discussed an embargo operation, the establishment of an NFZ, and support for humanitarian activities (Engberg, 2014: 154). NATO had enforced an NFZ over Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1993 and 1995 and had many years of experiences with maritime embargo operations, and hence would have been well-positioned to intervene in the Libya crisis (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2016b). Yet, NATO member states' incongruent preferences on the use of force hampered the alliance's involvement in the Libya crisis.

Whereas London attributed NATO with a central role in a potential military intervention in Libya very early on (see chapter 5.4.1.), Paris was wary about involving the transatlantic alliance in a military campaign in Libya (Erlanger, 2011c, Landler and Shanker, 2011, Nougayrède, 2011b, Gyllensporre, 2012: 180, Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014: 905, Engberg, 2014: 156). In a parliamentary debate on March 8, 2011, Foreign Minister Alain Juppé reiterated his opposition to involve NATO in the resolution of the Libya crisis. He (so quoted in: Assemblée Nationale, 2011h: 1523) asserted that

> "[i]t is now time to stop the murderous repression that the regime of Colonel Gaddafi continues to deploy. France has taken a very clear position: NATO is not the right organization to do it."

Initial skepticism signaled by the US administration reduced the prospects of a NATO operation further. In line with the doubts expressed by the US administration, American ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder questioned the effectiveness of an NFZ to halt the crackdown of Colonel Gaddafi. He (so quoted in: Sanger and Shanker, 2011a) remarked that: ”[n]o-fly zones are more effective against fighters, but they really have limited effect against helicopters or the kinds of ground operations we've seen” in Libya. This skepticism was reinforced by other US defense officials. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen (so quoted in: Bumiller, 2011) for instance cautioned that an NFZ was “an extraordinarily complex operation to set up”; General Mattis reminded that the establishment of an NFZ was linked to considerable challenges (Bumiller, 2011), and US Defense Secretary Gates (so quoted in: Hollinger et al., 2011) explained that the alliance was “very mindful of opinion in the region,” arguing that NATO would only act with support from the region.

Opposition voiced by Germany, Turkey, and Poland against a military intervention further diminished the chances of reaching agreement among allies (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014: 904-905). German Defense Minister de Maizière (so quoted in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2011a) criticized the debate about an NFZ and found that it was “not the hour of NATO.” Opposition by the majority of alliance members including the US, France, Germany, Turkey, and Poland against an intervention by NATO in the Libya crisis rendered the UK’s promotion of alliance interference void (Table 17). Accordingly, NATO’s defense ministers meeting on 10-11 March 2011 did not bring about any significant advances regarding the launch of a military operation. Member states only agreed to move NATO maritime assets in the region to improve the alliance’s capability to monitor the conflict and support the arms embargo included in the UNSC’s Resolution 1970. Other than that, NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen insisted that the alliance had “no intention to intervene in Libya” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2011c).

Table 17: *Congruence of preferences among EU/NATO states during the Libya crisis III*

Crisis	Timeframe	Congruence of Preferences		Outcome
		EU states	NATO states	
Libya	Mid-March 2011 -late March 2011	Incongruent	Incongruent	British-French ad-hoc intervention

Source: own illustration.

5.3.4. Results

To sum up, incongruent preferences among EU and NATO states prevented the launch of a common military operation through the EU and NATO. France, the UK, and the US had no other choice but to launch military action through an ad-hoc state coalition. The launch of an ad-hoc intervention in the Libya crisis therefore falls in line with the predictions of the three-step model.

France, especially, advocated for the launch of an EU maritime operation and the creation of an NFZ over Libya. However, EU states' preferences on military force strongly and visibly diverged, preordaining the failure of the French initiative. While two of the most powerful EU countries opposed EU military action, others also voiced their opposition. Whereas Germany offered stark resistance to the use of military means, the UK had a notable preference for NATO establishing the NFZ and the maritime embargo operation. Had opposition by – in particular – Germany and the UK been less fierce, France could have potentially succeeded to convince its fellow EU allies to launch an EU embargo operation, while NATO could have taken the lead in the air campaign.

However, due to overlapping membership, NATO struggled with very much the same problems as the EU. While the UK enthusiastically advocated for NATO leadership in the crisis, France fundamentally opposed transatlantic involvement. The US only eventually reviewed its position and had long regarded the creation of an NFZ reluctantly. Others such as Germany and Turkey simply rejected military intervention. As a result, the transatlantic alliance embarked on contingency planning while alliance military intervention was excluded during the initial phase of the crisis. Had the US supported military intervention from the outset, the preference distribution within the alliance might have been more favorable for the involvement of NATO in the air campaign. Yet, as predicted by the three-step model, member states in the EU and NATO could not find a shared position and thus, incongruent preferences clearly prevented common military action. In consequence, France, Britain, and the US used an ad-hoc arrangement to intervene in the Libya crisis.

In conclusion, the available evidence provides support for hypothesis 3c. Because the EU and NATO member states' preferences on intervention diverged starkly, France, Britain, and the US opened airstrikes through an ad-hoc coalition (Table 18).

Realist and constructivist theories cannot equally or sufficiently explain the Franco-British resort to an ad-hoc arrangement to intervene in the Libya crisis. In contrast to realist assumptions, the ad-hoc coalition was not a matter of choice. Instead, France and the UK

actively advocated common military action through the EU and NATO respectively but failed to convince other members, despite their powerful positions within the organizations. The ad-hoc intervention also sits uncomfortably with constructivist logic. A constructivist perspective would emphasize the ideational sources of France's promotion of a common EU military operation and the UK's lobbying for a NATO military operation. They would further highlight the continuing discrepancies among national strategic cultures to explain the non-emergence of a common military operation. Ideational factors evidently influenced disagreement among EU and NATO states. At the same time, constructivists have a hard time explaining why neither the EU nor NATO launched a military operation although such operations would have been accommodated by the identity and values of both organizations, drawing also upon similar previous experiences.

Table 18: *Process-tracing tests and evidence for institutional frameworks in the Libya crisis III*

		Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)	
		High	Low
Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)	High	**Doubly decisive test**	**Smoking-gun test** H3c: France proposes EU military operation but member states reject it despite previous experiences (Atalanta). H3c: UK advocates NATO leadership, but the majority of member states refuses to intervene despite multiple previous experiences with maritime operations and the enforcement of an NFZ.
	Low	**Hoop test** H3c: EU and NATO states discuss crisis but no official plans for military operation.	**Straw-in-the-wind test** H3c: UK opposed EU intervention, France opposed NATO leadership. Germany, Poland, Turkey and Romania oppose military intervention.

Source: own illustration.

5.4. NATO intervention in the Libya crisis IV: the Launch of Operation Unified Protector

In spite of the serious quarrels between member states just a few days earlier, NATO announced its decision to enforce the NFZ over Libya on March 24, 2011. Why did NATO decide to launch military action even when the majority of member states had fiercely opposed intervention? If they did, how did member states overcome their incongruent preferences and find a common stance?

5.4.1. US exit strategy: call NATO

As France, the UK, and the US opened airstrikes on Libya, NATO allies continued to debate the transatlantic organization's potential involvement in conflict resolution. However, member states remained divided as to whether NATO should play a role in the Libya intervention, and if so, what tasks it should carry out. Several options were on the negotiating table including evacuation and humanitarian assistance operations, the enforcement of an arms embargo, and finally the imposition of an NFZ. While NATO countries had been at loggerheads merely a few days earlier, regional support for the NFZ, the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1973, and the subsequent ad-hoc intervention by France, the UK, and the US completely changed the debate. Following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1973 on March 18, 2011, NATO's Secretary-General Rasmussen signaled that there was more room for maneuver and a greater willingness within the alliance to take over in the Libya campaign (Dombey et al., 2011b). The Secretary-General (so quoted in: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2011f) argued that

> "NATO is now completing its planning in order to be ready to take appropriate action in support of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, as part of the broad international effort. There is an urgent need, firm support from the region and a clear UN mandate for necessary international action. Allies stand behind the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people for freedom, democracy and human rights. the alliance was "completing its planning in order to be ready to take appropriate action."

London and Washington in particular were keen to see NATO's central role in the military campaign, however, several states maintained their opposition towards alliance involvement. British Prime Minister Cameron (Prime Minister's Office and 10 Downing Street, 2011a) argued that NATO possessed the "tried and tested machinery" necessary to carry out the

military campaign in Libya, while Washington was eager to hand its responsibility over military action and swiftly reduce commitment (Cooper and Lee Myers, 2011, McGregor and Dombey, 2011, Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012: 49). Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway also demanded that NATO command operations to continue their military support for the ad-hoc intervention under the command of France, Britain, and the US (Willsher, 2011d, Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012: 55, Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014: 906, Michaels, 2014: 24).

However, while Paris still feared that involving NATO could antagonize the region, Germany regarded military options as risky and refused to take part in any operation (Spiegel Online, 2011d, c, Michaels, 2014: 21-22). Alain Juppé explained that "the Arab League does not wish the operation to be entirely placed under NATO responsibility. It isn't NATO which has taken the initiative up to now." France was willing to provide NATO with operational control but resistant to relinquish political oversight of the operation (Erlanger, 2011a). In particular, France wanted to retain the ability to target regime forces on the ground to protect civilians at risk which was strongly opposed by Turkey (Blanchard, 2011: 18). Furthermore, Turkey's Prime Minister Erdogan was exasperated by Sarkozy's choice not to invite Turkey to the Paris summit on March 19, 2011. "We will continue to question the results of this conference," Erdogan (so quoted in: Gottschlich, 2011) insisted, adding that "Turkey will never take part in bombing Libyan citizens." Other member states felt they were insufficiently informed about the intervention and expressed their frustration with Paris, London and Washington's extensive interpretation of the resolution (Jaffe and DeYoung, 2011). Due to the resistance by several states, debates at NATO's headquarters were tense. At a NAC meeting, the German and French representatives allegedly left the room after other alliance members attacked Germany for its reluctance to engage in the conflict and quarrels over France's objections to involving NATO in the campaign (Spiegel Staff, 2011).

Notwithstanding the persistent incompatibility of member states' preferences on intervention in Libya, the NAC eventually reached an agreement on a NATO military intervention on March 23, 2011. The next day, NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen (so quoted in: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2011g) declared that NATO was

> "taking action as part of the broad international effort to protect civilians against the attacks by the Gaddafi regime. We will cooperate with our partners in the region and welcome their contributions. All NATO Allies are committed to fulfill their obligations under the UN resolution. That is why we have decided to assume responsibility for the no-fly zone."

Certainly, preferences were more aligned than previously: France had decreased its resistance to a NATO-led campaign and the US had become a vital supporter of handing over

responsibility to the alliance. Yet, member states' preferences were clearly not congruent and can therefore not account for the launch of NATO's intervention. Where preferences are only weakly congruent or mixed, bargaining games likely ensue and render power resources as a central element in negotiations among member states. In the Libya crisis, the power resources of those states advocating the transfer of responsibility over military operations to NATO clearly outweighed the power resources of those states objecting to it.

The US was the most powerful player involved in the debate on how intervention in the Libya crisis should be organized. In 2011, the US was the world's biggest military power with a defense budget of more than 740 billion US dollar. Within NATO, US defense spending dwarfed spending by the UK with the second largest defense budget (63 billion US dollar in 2011) and France with the third highest spending (53 billion US dollar in 2011) (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2017, SIPRI, 2017). What's more, although France and the UK shouldered much of the burden with regards to combat power, the US provided the largest part of military capabilities needed to establish the no-fly zone including command and control structures, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), air-to-air refueling, strategic and tactical transport as well as medical support and smart munitions (Gertler, 2011: 16, Webber et al., 2012: 75, Engberg, 2014: 158). The majority of sorties was flown by US aircraft (Stephens, 2011a). Lindström and Zetterlund (2012: 45) note that:

> "the European partners were to a considerable extent dependent on US capabilities – the United States accounted for 80 per cent of all air-to-air refuelling, much of the air monitoring and practically all electronic warfare […]."

Similarly, Engberg (2014: 156) explains that "Europeans, whether in the EU or NATO, needed the US for sustainability and recourse to US assets […]."

From the outset, President Obama had made clear that US involvement in the military intervention would be limited to "days not weeks" and that his administration favored a stronger role of European countries (Cooper and Lee Myers, 2011, McGregor and Dombey, 2011, Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012: 49). In a letter to Congress on March 21, 2011, President Obama (2011) explained that the

> "United States forces are conducting a limited and well-defined mission in support of international efforts to protect civilians and prevent a humanitarian disaster. Accordingly, U.S. forces have targeted the Qadhafi regime's air defense systems, command and control structures, and other capabilities of Qadhafi's armed forces used to attack civilians and civilian populated areas. We will seek a rapid, but responsible, transition of operations to coalition, regional, or international organizations that are postured to continue activities as may be necessary to realize the objectives of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973."

Despite the shift in the American position on military intervention, the US administration was still wary of Arab states' perception of US involvement in the intervention and the domestic reluctance to engage militarily in Libya. In a nutshell,

> "[t]he United States, short on cash, bruised by Iraq and Afghanistan, did not want to head the charge into a third Muslim country, even if the Arab League had backed intervention. Discreet U.S. military assistance with France and Britain doing the trumpeting was sensible" (Cohen, 2011).

Therefore, the US government was keen to transfer the command of the operation to NATO as soon as possible (Blitz and Dombey, 2011). NATO leadership would allow the US to scale down its commitment in the air campaign while retaining its influence. Moreover, US officials believed that only NATO possessed the command-and-control structures necessary to coordinate the multi-state operations in Libya (Chivvis, 2015: 24).

In consequence, the US used its institutional assets at NATO headquarters in Brussels through its dual-hatted personnel to convince their partners to transfer the command of the operations to NATO (Gertler, 2011: 16). It was also US generals who developed plans for the handover of command and control of the operation to NATO (Chivvis, 2015: 28, Kidwell, 2015: 137). The US received support by a UK equally keen to see NATO taking over the command of the operation. In retrospect, General Richards (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2016), head of the British armed forces later remembered that the French

> "were happy to see it be a bi-national or national operation; they did not want NATO in it to begin with. I had to get very steely with one or two people over that, because I did not feel that we had the command and control arrangements and it would be more demanding than perhaps they were thinking, but they soon fell into line, so I don't think it was a big issue. […]."

France gradually gave up its resistance after several phone calls by Obama and US Foreign Secretary Clinton (Blitz and Dombey, 2011, Chivvis, 2015: 25). In a similar vein, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan finally gave in to US pressure and consented to NATO taking over command and control of the military campaign in Libya after a phone call by President Obama (Landler and Erlanger, 2011b). In return, the US and the UK accommodated the demands by reluctant allies. Turkey asked for the three-pronged military campaign to come under the full command of NATO while political oversight was handed over to an ad-hoc committee to accommodate French interests (Landler and Erlanger, 2011a, Traynor and Watt, 2011).

Furthermore, Germany provided political support in the NAC meeting by not vetoing the launch of a NATO operation. They decided to withdraw naval forces under alliance command in the Mediterranean out of fear that they could eventually be drawn into the

military campaign in Libya (Spiegel Online, 2011a). Defense Minister De Maizière (so quoted in: Handelsblatt, 2011) justified Germany's position arguing:

> "The international community says that it is admissible to intervene here. And we take the right to say […] that we do not take part this time." He added that "We are not convinced by this military action. […] We do not consider it as our duty [to intervene] but we support if others do that, but without our participation."

On March 31, 2011, NATO finally took over full operational command. Operation Unified Protector (OUP), as the NATO operation was named, comprised three key tasks: enforcement of the arms embargo, the no-fly zone and the protection of civilians (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2011d). However, in line with the weak congruence of preferences among member states, US Secretary of Defense Gates (so quoted in: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012: 73) observed that, "every alliance member voted for [the] Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission." Accordingly, after NATO had taken over the command of the operations, US engagement in the campaign decreased but NATO allies remained heavily reliant on US logistical and intelligence capabilities. Dual-hatted US generals were present in the command throughout the NATO operation (Chivvis, 2015: 25-26).

Table 19: *Congruence of preferences and power resources among NATO member states during the Libya crisis IV*

Crisis	Timeframe	Congruence of Preferences (NATO)	Power resources	Outcome
Libya	March 23, 2011 onwards	Mixed	High (US)	NATO intervention

Source: own illustration.

5.4.2. Results

The US preference to keep its role in the Libya campaign limited ultimately proved decisive in overcoming the differences within the alliance. It also helped to hand over the military operation's responsibilities to NATO.

Although support for an involvement by the transatlantic alliance strengthened over the course of the campaign, a handful of member states still opposed intervention. In particular France still preferred to maintain the operations under national command and cooperate through an ad-hoc arrangement. Turkey and Germany, too, retained their skepticism over military action. At best, preferences on intervention among NATO states were mixed. However, the air campaign led by France, the UK, and the US was heavily reliant on the latter's capabilities and used its dual-hatted personnel to prepare the handover of the operation to the alliance. After several phone calls by US President Obama, Paris agreed to pass over command to NATO. At the same time, the US was willing to compensate for France's concessions by giving the political oversight of the operation to an ad-hoc committee, instead of the NAC. Germany abstained from vetoing a NATO operation but chose to withdraw its personnel from alliance command structures in the Mediterranean. Subsequently, NATO gradually took over the responsibility of enforcing the NFZ, the embargo operation, and the protection of civilians.

Given that NATO members launched a common operation although preferences among them were mixed at best, preferences alone cannot have determined the outcome. Instead, the preferences of the most powerful state in the alliance, the US, clearly impacted the choice of the institutional framework in the Libya crisis more than the preferences of other states. Hence, the launch of a NATO operation is in line with hypothesis 3b which predicts that when state preferences are mixed, the preferences of the most powerful will influence the outcome more than others (Table 20). Had negotiations taken place between France and the UK only, largely equal in military power, without the US involved, military strikes might have continued under an ad-hoc coalition of states.

Table 20: *Process-tracing tests and evidence for institutional frameworks in the Libya crisis IV*

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="2"></td><td colspan="2">Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)</td></tr>
<tr><td>High</td><td>Low</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)</td><td>High</td><td>Doubly decisive test</td><td>Smoking-gun test
H3b: NATO launches military operation despite disagreement and in absence of common threat perception.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Low</td><td>Hoop test
H3b: US and UK urge for NATO intervention.</td><td>Straw-in-the-wind test
H3b: US wants to keep its role in the military campaign limited. Ad-hoc coalition is heavily reliant on US capabilities. US is the most powerful state in the alliance.</td></tr>
</table>

Source: own illustration.

Alternative realist and constructivist assumptions do not sufficiently explain NATO's takeover of the Libya campaign. Realism would emphasize the powerful position by the US in the alliance and the American demand to bring the operations under NATO control. US power was indeed crucial in engineering agreement among NATO states. US capabilities were central to the Libya campaign and helped to convince at least some NATO allies to accept NATO leadership. However, the underlying reasons why the US promoted NATO leadership in the first place go beyond the explanatory framework of realism. There is no evidence that suggests NATO states shared a common threat assessment. Instead, the main driving force behind NATO's takeover was US preference to reduce commitment to the campaign and let European allies assume the main responsibility over the Libya intervention. The launch of NATO's OUP is even harder to explain from a constructivist perspective which emphasizes the identity and collectively held values of the alliance. However, the deployment of force in spite of the continuing disagreement among NATO members about military intervention sits uncomfortably with constructivist logic. There is plenty of evidence that NATO allies did not share a unitary view on intervention and that they diverged sharply over the appropriate response to the conflict. The launch of NATO's military campaign was everything other than a conscious choice – as constructivists would assume – but it was forged by the preferences of the alliance's most powerful member states and the concessions of reluctant allies.

Figure 5: *Fatalities by type in the Libya crisis, January 2011 - April 2011*



Own compilation, data source: ACLED (2017).

6. Post-electoral violence in Côte d'Ivoire (2010-2011)

Following contested presidential elections during late 2010, Côte d'Ivoire suffered its latest political crisis in a long history of power struggles since the country's independence from France in 1960. Alassane Ouattara, a former prime minister of Côte d'Ivoire, challenged the incumbent President Gbagbo in long-postponed presidential elections on October 31, 2010. The contested results of the elections and Gbagbo's refusal to cease power plunged Côte d'Ivoire into a renewed phase of political turmoil which eventually led to the interference of UN peacekeepers and French forces.

Because the first round of the presidential elections had not produced a winner, runoff elections were held on November 27, 2010 between the incumbent President Gbagbo and his contestant, Ouattara. The elections spurred ethnic tensions and incited clashes between the two camps which resulted in bloodshed across the country (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 832). The Independent Electoral Commission announced a victory of Ouattara but Gbagbo refused to accept the results arguing that Ouattara's supporters committed voter fraud. The Constitutional Court, under the control of one of Gbagbo's close allies, came to the same conclusion and declared the incumbent president the winner. On December 4, both candidates swore an oath of office as president of Côte d'Ivoire, meaning that in practice the country had two presidents (Bassett and Straus, 2011: 134). For months, Gbagbo and Ouattara clung on to power. Mediation efforts by regional players failed to resolve the crisis and the violence between the two camps escalated and contributed to a steadily increasing death toll (Cook, 2011: 24-26). By March 2011 more than 200,000 people had fled the country and hundreds had been killed (Bax and Smith, 2011).

6.1. Non-intervention in Côte d'Ivoire I

Although France had been present in Côte d'Ivoire since the first Ivorian civil war in 2002 with the French Operation Licorne, Paris refused to interfere in the conflict between December 2010 and the end of the following March. Why was no intervention established although France could have deployed its personnel already present in Côte d'Ivoire?

6.1.1. France's new Africa policy: zero interference in power struggles

Already in December of 2010, the French foreign policy executive had the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire on their agenda. Following the contested elections, Gbagbo refused to give in to the demands of the AU, ECOWAS, the EU, and the UNSC ordering Gbagbo to respect the election results and cease power. Instead, Gbagbo called on the UN peacekeeping operation UNOCI (United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire) and French forces which had been in Côte d'Ivoire since the 2002/2003 civil war to leave the country (Aboa, 2010, Lasserre, 2010, Le Figaro, 2010). The French foreign policy elite and the UN were fast to reject Gbagbo's request, arguing that Gbagbo was not the legitimately elected president of the country and therefore did not possess sovereign authority. The French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, Michèle Alliot-Marie (so quoted in: La France au Royaume-Uni, 2010) reiterated that:

> "[t]his [Gbagbo's ultimatum] does not mean anything! […] Neither for UNOCI nor for France! There is a president, Mr. Ouattara, who has informed the United Nations that he wants to maintain UNOCI."

Although the UNSC reaffirmed UNOCI's mandate to "use all necessary means" to protect civilians and its authorization of French forces to support UNOCI in Resolution 1962 on December 20, 2010, Paris retained a cautious attitude towards direct interference in the crisis (United Nations Security Council, 2010a: 2, 4, Weiss, 2011: 290, Simonen, 2012: 366). In fact, the French foreign policy executive vehemently opposed intervention in the conflict. Instead, the French foreign policy elite saw African states and the UN in charge of taking over the responsibility to resolve the crisis (Hall, 2010, Hollinger, 2011b).

In an interview with TV5 MONDE-RFI-Le Monde on December 19, 2010, Alliot-Marie rejected any idea that French forces in Côte d'Ivoire were obligated to resolve the conflict and instead emphasized the role of the United Nations force. The Minister of Foreign

and European Affairs (so quoted in: La France au Royaume-Uni, 2010) insisted that the troops of Operation Licorne were not there to interpose themselves between the Ivorians.

> "There is the International Force which is there for that. And it is up to the International Force to act. The French soldiers of Licorne have a very precise mandate in this framework, but it is not up to them to interpose themselves and they will not do that."

Jean-Marc Simon, French ambassador to Côte d'Ivoire, confirmed the Foreign Minister's view. Asked about the role of Operation Licorne in the African country, he (so quoted in: Hall, 2010) made clear that French troops "only do what is required to protect its citizens that are threatened. Things are very clear."

The deteriorating security situation in Côte d'Ivoire did not change this position. Despite warnings of a looming civil war by the UN Secretary General already in December 2010 (BBC News, 2010a), French President Sarkozy (so quoted in: Le Figaro, 2011r) insisted in January 2011 that "our soldiers, the soldiers of France, have no vocation to interfere in the internal affairs of Côte d'Ivoire. They are acting under a UN mandate," adding that their "primary concern" was "the protection (of) French nationals." The Defense Minister, Alain Juppé (so quoted in: Guibert, 2011), expressed a similar position stating that "France will not take the initiative of a military intervention" to bring the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire under control. Furthermore, following the appeal by Ouattara's Prime Minister Guillaume Soro to the international community to coerce Gbagbo to resign, Henri de Raincourt (so quoted in: Le Figaro, 2011aa), French Minister of Cooperation explained that the recourse to force "is a responsibility that pertains to the African Heads of State."

The strong opposition of French leaders was in line with the changes in France's Africa policy that Sarkozy had demanded in his electoral campaign in 2007. The changes he had called for focused on a break with France's colonial links to African states, the entanglement between the French and African elites, and France's frequent unilateral involvement in African civil wars and crises. President Sarkozy subsequently pledged to shift the focus of France's Africa policy from unilateral interventions to value-based peacekeeping missions under a multilateral framework and to reduce its military presence on the African continent (Mehler, 2008). Following these principles and the gradual stabilization of Côte d'Ivoire between 2005 and 2009, France reduced the French troops in the country from roughly 5,000 in 2004 and 2005 to 900 in 2010, adopting "a position of political and military 'restraint'" (Assemblée Nationale, 2010, the quote refers to: Banegas, 2011: 458). Accordingly, since 2007, the primary tasks of Licorne forces focused on the preparation of elections, the disarmament, demilitarization and reintegration of former combatants, and

support for the redeployment of administrative structures rather than combat activities (Mehler, 2012: 204-206, Simonen, 2012: 366).

In contrast to the Libya crisis, where the media and other domestic actors pressured the French government to act, the cautious approach of the government in the Côte d'Ivoire crisis met with silent domestic approval. In parliament, there was relatively little discussion around the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Only on three occasions between January and the end of March 2011 the situation in Côte d'Ivoire was on the agenda of the Assemblée Nationale: on January 18, 2011, on February 8, 2011 on the occasion of a visit by the ambassador of Côte d'Ivoire to the parliament, and on March 9, 2011 (Assemblée Nationale, 2011e, Commission des affaires étrangères, 2011b, c). In the debates, MPs – just like the government – emphasized that the main responsibility of addressing the crisis rested with the UN rather than French forces (Assemblée Nationale, 2011e, Commission des affaires étrangères, 2011b: 10) and appealed to the French government to invest in a peaceful solution to the conflict (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2011d: 8-9, Vauzelle, 2011). There was hardly any pressure on the government to do more let alone to intervene militarily.

Internationally, then, France pursued a coherent foreign policy strategy akin to its preference not to intervene. To keep French forces out of the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, Paris advocated the reinforcement of the troop level and mandate of the UN peacekeeping force UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire (What's in Blue, 2011c, a).

Table 21: *Domestic preferences on intervention in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire I*

Country	Consensus/ Opposition	Domestic preference	Foreign policy strategy
France	Opposition	Non-Intervention	Reinforcing UNOCI's mandate

Source: own illustration.

France's foreign policy strategy proved largely successful. Recognition that UNOCI was insufficiently equipped facilitated the authorization of additional military resources. This, and regional and international players' opposition against military intervention by any foreign force was compatible with France's preference to keep Operation Licorne out of the conflict.

Despite pressure by African organizations, several mediation attempts by the presidents of South Africa, Benin, Cap Verde, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Tanzania and with condemnation by the international community, Gbagbo continued to

refuse to recognize the results. Thus, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire increasingly escalated. Angered by international opposition to Gbagbo, forces loyal to the incumbent president not only attacked Ouattara supporters but also committed attacks on UN personnel and vehicles, restricting the movement of UN forces (Ban, 2011). Conflict spurred further when Ouattara, in retaliation, called on the *New Forces*, a movement formed during the 2002-2007 civil war, to dislodge Gbagbo from office (El-Khawas and Anyu, 2014: 50). Through a series of conquests first in the west, and later, the center and east of the country, pro-Ouattara fighters quickly gained control over a vast territory of Côte d'Ivoire.

Acknowledging the escalating crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, UN officials and diplomats recognized that UNOCI forces were not sufficiently equipped and mandated to control the situation (Ban, 2011, Smith, 2011a). In a letter to the UN Security Council on January 7, 2011, the Secretary General noted that the UN forces in Côte d'Ivoire were "operating in an openly hostile security environment with direct threats from regular and irregular forces loyal to former President Gbagbo," warning that "[t]he precarious security situation could quickly degenerate into widespread conflict" (Ban, 2011: 1). On January 19, 2011, the UN SG's Special Adviser on Genocide and R2P (so quoted in: United Nations, 2011) warned of "the possibility of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing in Côte d'Ivoire."

Driven by concerns over the escalating security situation in Côte d'Ivoire, France drafted a UN Security Council resolution to reinforce the UN peacekeeping operation in Côte d'Ivoire. While UNSC members were able to agree on the deployment of additional personnel and military equipment for UNOCI, an intensification of its mandate and authorization of military interference by any foreign force looked unlikely in January and February 2011 given the preferences of regional and international players.

The first factor complicating foreign interference were the country's internal power struggles: Gbagbo's demand on international forces to withdraw, and an ambiguous position of Outattara's administration. While President Ouattara expressed wishes for a peaceful solution of the conflict on January 5, 2011, he called on West African countries to remove Gbagbo with force the next day (Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire, 2011b, Whitaker, 2011). Ouattara's Prime Minister Soro (and Ally Coulibaly, Côte d'Ivoire's ambassador to France) equally called on the international community (and more explicitly European states) to use force to coerce Gbagbo to resign. On the other hand, factions of Côte d'Ivoire's civil society in turn publicly rejected the idea of foreign military intervention (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2011c, Le Figaro, 2011aa, 2011l, Le Monde, 2011c).

In addition to the equivocal stance of Côte d'Ivoire's domestic actors, the attitude of regional and international players was also ambiguous. While there was strong consensus among the AU and ECOWAS that Ouattara was the only legitimate president of Côte d'Ivoire, there was also a serious lack of agreement regarding the appropriate means to resolve the crisis (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 834, Deen, 2011, Charbonneau, 2012: 518). Nigeria, which had the presidency over ECOWAS at the time, promoted a military solution to the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Nigeria was supported by Gabon, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Togo, and Niger. The Heads of States of ECOWAS had considered removing Gbagbo with military force following their extraordinary session on Côte d'Ivoire on December 24, 2010, if he failed to agree to a political solution (ECOWAS, 2010, Security Council Report, 2011a). Yet, South Africa, a non-permanent Security Council member back then, and Ghana highly opposed the idea of military intervention and favored a power-sharing agreement. South Africa had not even officially recognized the victory of Ouattara in the presidential elections (Charbonneau, 2012, Security Council Report, 2016). To overcome these differences, the AU set up a high-level panel that could elaborate a plan to contain the crisis (Le Figaro, 2011p, Smith, 2011a, Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016: 690).

Intra-African disagreement spilled over to the UN Security Council. While the US, the UK, Germany, and Portugal signaled support for the reinforcement of UNOCI's mandate and the UK voiced its openness to a military intervention by African states, Russia and China rejected foreign interference in Côte d'Ivoire's internal affairs (Reuters, 2010, Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 835, Geneste, 2011, Le Figaro, 2011aa, Security Council Report, 2011a, Smith, 2011b). They argued that the French draft resolution was "too political" with regards to President Gbagbo – a UN paraphrase for being too critical – and were uneasy with the idea of the UN taking sides in the conflict. Only after France and the US accommodated Russia's and China's concern by not mentioning Gbagbo and Ouattara by name, they voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1967 on January 19, 2011 (Geneste, 2011, What's in Blue, 2011g). Ultimately, the Security Council was able to equip UNOCI with additional military resources which could help the mission to fulfil its mandate and contain the situation. The troop strength of UNOCI increased by 2,000 personnel and additional helicopters and an aviation unit were redeployed from the UNMIL mission in Liberia to reinforce UNOCI (United Nations Security Council, 2010a: 4, United Nations Security Council, 2010b: 2, Geneste, 2011, Le Figaro, 2011t, United Nations Security Council, 2011j, What's in Blue, 2011g).

In February 2011, pro-Ouattara forces (renamed the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (RFCI)) proceeded with their advance and seized several towns in the west of Côte

d'Ivoire which led to an increasingly fragile security situation on the ground (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 834, United Nations Security Council, 2011g). On February 16, 2011, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1968, which extended the temporary deployment of troops and helicopters from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) mission in Liberia to UNOCI. Meanwhile, the scope of UNOCI's and Operation Licorne's mandate stayed the same. This approach fitted well with the attitude of the UNSC which was "mainly in a wait-and-see mode, awaiting the outcome of the work of the AU panel" (Security Council Report, 2011c).

It is clear that diverging views between African states and divisions within the UN Security Council considerably hampered the authorization and launch of military intervention in the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire during January and February 2011. The UNSC could agree on reinforcing the troop strength of UNOCI and providing additional military equipment. The idea was that this could enable the mission to carry out its mandate. However, regional and international players opposed direct military intervention in the conflict. This meant that Paris's preference for non-intervention was compatible with international level conditions, broadening the possibility that French forces could remain at the sidelines of the conflict (Table 22). Military intervention would have been incompatible with the preferences of some African states, Russia, and China and would have likely stirred tensions had France wished to intervene.

Table 22: *Domestic preferences and international compatibility in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire I*

Domestic Level	Domestic Preference/ Foreign Policy Strategy	International Level	Outcome
Opposition	French non-intervention	Compatibility	Non-intervention

Source: own illustration.

6.1.2. Results

Although warnings of a looming civil war, previous interventions by France in Côte d'Ivoire, the authorization of Licorne forces to support UNOCI, and fear of losing influence in its former colony could have justified intervention, the French foreign policy executive clearly opposed the deployment of French forces in a combat role and decided not to intervene when violence broke out in Côte d'Ivoire in late December 2010 and early 2011. All major French state actors, including President Sarkozy, Defense Minister Juppé, Foreign Minister Alliot-Marie and the Minister of Cooperation Raincourt expressed their rejection of military intervention. The French foreign policy executive pursued a coherent foreign policy strategy. Instead of deploying French troops in Côte d'Ivoire, French state leaders wanted the UN to take a stronger role in the crisis and advocated the reinforcement of UN peacekeeping forces in Côte d'Ivoire. All major French foreign policy actors shared this view and lobbied for the strengthening of UNOCI's mandate at the UN level. Hence, domestic opposition to intervention was a crucial factor which prevented state leaders to advocate French intervention and propelled them to lobby for alternative solutions instead.

The French foreign policy executive's strategy was largely compatible with the conditions at the international level. Although intervention could have been feasible given the presence of French forces on the ground, and legitimate given its existing mandate, the preferences of other international and regional actors imposed constraints on military intervention. UNSC members were able to agree on the deployment of additional personnel and military equipment for UNOCI, which they thought was sufficient to contain the crisis. However, some African states, as well as Russia and China, opposed direct military interference. Even though France therefore failed to reinforce UNOCI's mandate, resistance by regional and international players against military intervention allowed France to stay out of the conflict and to realize its preference not to intervene. In other words, Paris's preference for non-intervention was compatible with international players' preferences. As a result, during December 2010 and March 2011, no military intervention in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire took place. Hence, the outcome of this fifth case is perfectly in line with the predictions of the three-step model: European states will not intervene if domestic actors oppose intervention and if their preferences are compatible with international actors'. The findings therefore strengthen confidence in hypothesis 1b (domestic opposition) and 2a (international compatibility) (Table 23).

Alternative explanations put forward by realists and constructivists cannot adequately account for France's non-intervention in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Drawing upon their core assumptions, it is not clear what response realists would expect France to give. On the one hand, realists would argue that the faraway conflict in Côte d'Ivoire does not directly affect French security interests and military intervention therefore be foolish. In consequence, as realists could argue, French state leaders advocated the reinforcement of the UN's peacekeeping operation while keeping the role of French forces limited. On the other hand, France's inaction sits uncomfortably with realist reasoning when one considers that the power struggle in Côte d'Ivoire could have very well threatened France's influence in its former colony. According to realist logic, this could then have very well provided a persuasive reason for intervention. A constructivist perspective also does not offer a more compelling explanation of France's non-intervention in Côte d'Ivoire. From a constructivist perspective, it remains unclear why France abstained from intervention even though the humanitarian situation would have justified it. Constructivism would rightly stress France's adherence to non-intervention and sovereignty principles as well as France's new Africa policy. However, intervention would have been permissible given Operation Licorne's mandate, France's strategic culture and its multiple previous conflict management experiences in Côte d'Ivoire. Thus, both realism and constructivism miss important aspects of the double constraints placed on France at the domestic and the international level which ultimately led the state to abstain from intervening

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Table 23: *Process-tracing tests and evidence for non-intervention in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire I*

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="2"></td><td colspan="2">Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)</td></tr>
<tr><td>High</td><td>Low</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)</td><td>High</td><td>Doubly decisive test</td><td>Smoking-gun test

H1b: French state leaders advocated UN intervention in France's former colony.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Low</td><td>Hoop test

H1b: French state leaders did not advocate French intervention.

H2a: International players did not express any preference for French intervention. Russia and China opposed the reinforcement of UNOCI's mandate. African countries were divided over military action.</td><td>Straw-in-the-wind test

H1b: Primary concern of French foreign policy officials was protection of nationals. Non-interference is in line with new French Africa policy.

H2a: Preference for political solution and fear that the UN would take sides.</td></tr>
</table>

Source: own illustration.

6.2. French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire II[35]

In spite of the French foreign policy executive's rejection of intervention by French forces in the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, President Sarkozy authorized Operation Licorne on April 4, 2011, to support UNOCI in its mandate to prevent the use of heavy weapons with all necessary means. Why did France intervene in spite of fierce opposition by the French foreign policy executive against intervention previously? Did the French foreign policy executive refine its preferences in favor of intervention? If it did not, what role did international level negotiations play? What does this tell us about the relevance of domestic consensus?

6.2.1. African settlements and French (strategic) action

While during February 2011 the debate on addressing the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire somewhat dissipated, it gained momentum again the following month in March. Renewed outbreaks of violence raised concerns in the international community that the country could descend into civil war (Le Figaro, 2011v, w, x). Gbagbo forces committed attacks on civilians in Abidjan, the country's economic capital, while forces loyal to Ouattara, the now-called *Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire* (FRCI)[36] launched military attacks on Yamoussoukro and seized Côte d'Ivoire's political capital in late March (Security Council Report, 2011b, Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016: 693). By the end of March 2011, 100,000 people had been forced to leave their homes and up to one million Ivoirians had been internally displaced (Cook, 2011: 29-32, Le Figaro, 2011y). Moreover, since the beginning of the crisis 3,000 people had fallen victim to the conflict with human rights violations, rape, and torture committed on both sides (Le Figaro, 2011u, Adeyeri, 2015: 64).

Whereas for much of February 2011, the Security Council had been in a "wait-and-see-mode" (Security Council Report, 2011c), the escalating security situation renewed impetus to readjust UNOCI's mandate. Confronted with the rise in violence, the UN Secretary-General called for an emergency meeting of the UNSC to examine the situation in Côte d'Ivoire (Le

[35] Even though French forces were present in Côte d'Ivoire before the outbreak of the post-electoral crisis in 2010 and authorized to support UNOCI, French activities in the country in 2011 are typically characterized as a new intervention. For further reading see: Mehler (2012: 2015), Simonen (2012: 365) and Weiss (2011: 290).
[36] On 17 March 2011, Ouattara unified the New Forces with forces loyal to him of Cote d'Ivoire's national army.

Monde, 2011f) following which the Security Council (so quoted in: United Nations Security Council, 2011b) reiterated its concern about the "escalation of violence in Côte d'Ivoire" in a press statement on 3 March 2011. On 4 March 2011, the French head of the UN Blue Helmets, Alain Leroy (so quoted in: Smith, 2011a), warned that the country was "on the brink of civil war" while the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2011) raised alarm "that the illegitimate president is prepared to fight to the end, even if it means throwing Côte d'Ivoire into anarchy and economic disaster."

The deteriorating security situation certainly set in motion an international debate on the crisis, but did not directly lead to foreign interference. Instead, the escalating violence in the Côte d'Ivoire demonstrated that peaceful containment strategies clearly failed to contain the conflict. Incrementally, this forced African states and international players to reconsider their opposition to foreign interference and adjust their goals.

First, on March 10, 2011, the AU's High-Level panel released its recommendations for an overall political solution in Côte d'Ivoire and called for the formation of a unity government under Ouattara (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2011: 1-2). This significant report displayed a consensual view by Africans on conflict resolution in Côte d'Ivoire. Even South Africa, which had previously shown the most ambiguous stance on the conflict, embraced it. However, Gbagbo rejected the proposal by the High-Level panel, sending a clear signal to the AU's member states that peaceful resolution was increasingly unlikely (Cook, 2011: 36-37).

Secondly, UNOCI's military resources were clearly insufficient to get the situation under control. The UN mission could not contain the violence and its peacekeeping forces even came under attack by Gbagbo's forces several times. Consequently, UNOCI raised alarm bells on March 22, 2011, warning that the Gbagbo camp was using heavy weapons against the civilian population more frequently. UNOCI's obvious deficiencies were later essential in the debates in the Security Council on how to resolve the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire, 2011a, Security Council Report, 2011f).

As a third factor, on March 24, ECOWAS marched on with a letter to the UN Security Council in which its member states reiterated their concern about violence and the development of a "humanitarian emergency" in Côte d'Ivoire. More specifically ECOWAS (so quoted in: United Nations Security Council, 2011d: 2) requested the

> "Security Council to strengthen the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, enabling the mission to use all necessary means to protect life and property, and to facilitate the immediate transfer of power to Alassane Ouattara."

ECOWAS' statement showed that it was not prepared for military intervention and instead expected the UN to act. Although ECOWAS repeatedly threatened to remove Gbagbo from power by military force, it was doubtful whether the organization had the capacity to do so. Previous interventions focused on stopping civil wars rather than ousting leaders from office and it was questionable whether the ECOWAS standby force could successfully contain Gbagbo's forces (Nossiter, 2010).

ECOWAS' request was reinforced by the newly installed representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the Security Council, Mr. Bamba, who (so quoted in: United Nations Security Council, 2011e: 6) on March 25, 2011, called on the Security Council "to immediately adopt robust measures against former President Gbagbo and all those who support him." Mr. Bamba called on the UNSC to adopt a series of measures to end the conflict. This included a robust mandate for UNOCI and French forces to protect civilians and install Ouattara in office, the disarmament of the forces loyal to Gbagbo, the destruction of their weapons, and a travel ban and asset freeze against Gbagbo and associates (United Nations Security Council, 2011e: 6).

The clear failure of a political solution, UNOCI's deficiencies, and ECOWAS' strong demand for Council action gave France's demand for military intervention by the UN peacekeeping forces a new impetus (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 835-837, Charbonneau, 2012: 519). On March 25, 2011, French President Sarkozy (so quoted in: Le Figaro, 2011ac) condemned the use of heavy weapons by the Côte d'Ivoire belligerents and indicated that France was planning to submit a resolution to the UNSC and reinforce UNOCI's mandate by authorizing the UN force "to ban heavy weapons at least in Abidjan." Other members of the French government clearly supported this goal. Sarkozy's Foreign Minister Alain Juppé (so quoted in: Le Monde, 2011g), shared the president's view and underlined that the peacekeepers had "the right to use force not only for self-defense, but to stop the fighting." As a result, the French Foreign Minister appealed to the United Nations to "ensure that UNOCI plays its role." Likewise, the French ambassador to the UN, Gérard Araud (so quoted in: Le Figaro, 2011p) assessed that the peacekeeping forces in the country needed a "more robust" mandate.

Together with Nigeria, France prepared a draft resolution which was circulated and debated among Council members on March 28, 2011 (Le Figaro, 2011b, What's in Blue, 2011d). The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (so quoted in: Le Figaro, 2011g) made clear that it was pushing for a "rapid adoption" of the resolution in order to ensure that UNOCI could exert its mandate with "the necessary determination".

As in Libya, the positions of regional organizations were critical to ease resistance by China, Russia, India, and Brazil on foreign interference, leading them to readjust their stance on the use of force to contain the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 833). The United Kingdom reaffirmed its approval of a military option whereas the US did not voice any objections (Le Figaro, 2011ab, 2011h, i). India, Brazil, China, and South Africa were still uneasy with the idea that UNOCI could interfere in favor of one of the two conflicting sides but eventually relented (Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016). Consequently, on March 30, 2011, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1975 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with fifteen votes in favor (Le Figaro, 2011m, What's in Blue, 2011f). The resolution urged Gbagbo to cease power and confirmed the Council's support to UNOCI, stressing its authorization

> "to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, including to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population […]" (United Nations Security Council, 2011c: 3).

The resolution also called upon

> "all parties to cooperate fully in the operation of UNOCI and French forces which support it, in particular by guaranteeing their safety, security and freedom of movement with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of Côte d'Ivoire, to enable them to fully carry out their mandate" (United Nations Security Council, 2011c: 3).

The authorization to prevent the use of heavy weapons was unusual for a civilian protection mandate. It not only reaffirmed the existing mandate but "widened the range of military measures deemed permissible in pursuit of civilian protection" (Hunt, 2011: 700). Following the adoption of the resolution, UN peacekeeping forces seized control of the airport on March 31 and entered into several fire exchanges with Gbagbo forces as heavy fighting broke out between the Ouattara and Gbagbo camps (Coulibaly and Cocks, 2011).[37]

The reinforcement of UNOCI's mandate in resolution 1975 could have provided French forces with the basis for a more offensive role too. However, the French foreign policy executive made clear that the extension of the mandate was not sufficient to justify French military interference.

On April 1, 2011, French President Sarkozy organized a meeting with Prime Minister François Fillon, Foreign Minister Alain Juppé and Defense Minister Gérard Longuet at the

[37] Shortly after the adoption of Resolution 1975, disagreement on the interpretation of the resolution flared among UNSC member states. In particular, China and Russia criticized UNOCI for violating the principle of neutrality in its implementation of the resolution.

Élysée Palace "to take stock of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire" (Le Figaro, 2011q). Other similar meetings followed during subsequent days (Le Figaro, 2011z, s). On April 3, France had increased its troops in Côte d'Ivoire from 900 to roughly 1,650 personnel, "to deal with any evolution of the situation and to assure the security of foreigners" (Security Council Report, 2011f). At the same time, the French foreign policy elite was keen to emphasize that the task of Operation Licorne remained restricted to guaranteeing French and other nationals' safety in the country without direct interference in the conflict (Le Figaro, 2011o, n, Security Council Report, 2011f, Wyss, 2013: 98). Thus, the reinforcement of UNOCI's mandate was not sufficient to cause France to intervene to support UN peacekeepers.

The French foreign policy was steadfast in its rejection of a more offensive role even when Ouattara officially requested the help of France's Licorne forces on April 3. The French president (so quoted in: Bernard et al., 2011) argued that "[t]he French forces will not take the initiative to destroy the heavy weapons and remove Gbagbo." Although regional and international players provided their approval of military action by the UN, Resolution 1975 had not explicitly authorized French forces to intervene and France was wary of taking sides in the conflict (Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016: 692). Sarkozy (so quoted in: Bernard et al., 2011) made clear that French interference would only be considered "if UNOCI requests this." A senior French official (so quoted in: Bernard et al., 2011) confirmed that the deployment of French troops was not possible "without explicit request from the UN, coming either from the Security Council or from the Secretary General." Other members of the French foreign policy executive did not contest this position.

French officials were fully aware of UNOCI's military shortfalls and the reluctance of some of its contingents to take over combat activities. Even though France had succeeded to reinforce UNOCI's mandate, Paris started to recognize that this was insufficient to contain the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Gbagbo repeatedly refused to follow demands by the AU Chairperson Jean Ping, ECOWAS, France, and the United States to transfer power to Ouattara. Instead, he requested loyal troops to counter attack pro-Ouattara forces and UNOCI, through which a group of UN peacekeepers came under attack in a humanitarian mission on April 2 (Le Figaro, 2011f, e, Security Council Report, 2011f).

As early as March 29, one day before the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1975, a senior French official (so quoted in: Bernard et al., 2011) commented that "In case of a problem, who will they [UNOCI] appeal to? To us, of course." The UN's call indeed came on April 3, 2011. In a letter to the Security Council, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (so

quoted in: United Nations Security Council, 2011k) recognized that despite the reinforcement and expansion of UNOCI's mandate:

> "the security situation in Abidjan has deteriorated dramatically over the past days with fighting having escalated between the forces loyal to President Ouattara and elements of the former Republican Guard and Special Forces who still remain loyal to Mr. Gbagbo. Over the past days, these forces loyal to Mr. Gbagbo have intensified their use of heavy weapons such as mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and heavy machine guns against the civilian population."

The UN Secretary-General (so quoted in: United Nations Security Council, 2011k) further reaffirmed UNOCI's mandate "to take the necessary measures to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population" and also asked for "the support of the French forces" to carry out this task. What's more, in order to formally request the support of French forces to assist UNOCI to neutralize the heavy weapons used by forces loyal to Gbagbo, Ban Ki-moon sent a letter to France's President Sarkozy that same day. The Secretary General's letter to the UNSC and formal request for French help provided the legal basis which Sarkozy had requested. The French president responded instantly to the UN's call for assistance and authorized French troops to participate in coercive actions conducted by UNOCI forces on April 4 (Le Figaro, 2011d, Security Council Report, 2011f). In his reply to the UN Secretary-General, Sarkozy (so quoted in: Le Monde, 2011a) justified his decision with the protection of civilians:

> "I agree with you that the protection of civilians under threat in Côte d'Ivoire is an urgent necessity, in parallel with the political efforts of the entire international community to resolve the current crisis."

That day, French forces began to attack military camps and destroyed weapon stockpiles in support of UN forces. These activities signified a crucial shift in France's response to the conflict and a significant departure from its previous position of military restraint. Even though French forces could have intervened earlier given their existing mandate, they only employed military action following the request by the UN. As Weiss (2011: 290) notes, "the UN soldiers on the ground did little until the early-April 2011 action led by the 1,650-strong French Licorne force."

Gbagbo was able to retain himself in office for another week but was finally arrested in his residence by Ivorian forces on April 11 and handed over to the UN (Cook, 2011: 1). The attack on the presidential compound was immediately criticized by Ivorian media controlled by Gbagbo, French parliamentarians, as well as Russia, China, and South Africa because they felt that the UN and France had overstepped their mandate by siding with Ouattara (Le Figaro, 2011a, Le Monde, 2011h, Charbonneau, 2012: 835).

It is not entirely clear what had caused the French foreign policy elite to reconsider its preference for military intervention. Evidence that the French foreign policy executive supported the president's authorization of military action only came *after* the deployment of Operation Licorne. Two main explanations of the change in France's intervention policy are conceivable. First, it is plausible that the French foreign policy executive indeed preferred to keep French troops on the sidelines (see chapter 6.1.1.) but realized that this preference was becoming difficult to maintain in light of international constraints. Given the deteriorating humanitarian situation, UNOCI's deficiencies, the presence of Operation Licorne in Côte d'Ivoire and the mission's authorization to support UNOCI, France – more than any other actor – was pre-positioned to provide military support. Indeed, considering these constraints, French refusal to meet the UN Secretary General's request would have been difficult to explain internationally. Accordingly, in a parliamentary debate on April 5, Prime Minister Fillon (Assemblée Nationale, 2011g) highlighted that:

> "[…] the French forces intervened in Côte d'Ivoire at the express request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on the basis of resolution 1975, in support of UNOCI forces, with one objective and one single: to neutralize the heavy armaments of the forces favorable to Laurent Gbagbo in order to avoid a bloodbath and to protect the civilian populations."

Alain Le Roy (so quoted in: Barluet, 2011a), the French Deputy Secretary General of the UN and head of the UN peacekeeping operations argued that:

> "UNOCI had only three attack helicopters, French support was necessary to carry out simultaneous strikes against heavy weapons, tanks, armed vehicles, machine guns and RPGs of all kinds."

Similarly, the minister for European affairs, Laurent Wauquiez (Assemblée Nationale, 2011f), emphasized that

> "This crisis has been managed by ECOWAS and the African Union within the framework of UN resolutions. Our forces, in fact, only intervened under the mandate of the UN Security Council and at the request of UNOCI. It was only because UNOCI turned to us, telling us that it was not capable to intervene effectively on the ground without the rapid support of the French forces that we decided to intervene."

An alternative explanation may be that French state leaders secretly held a preference for intervention but feared domestic opposition against their change of course. If this was indeed the case, French state leaders may have actively contributed to and later exploited the growing international pressure on France to facilitate a wider range of military measures that would have otherwise been difficult to justify domestically. In fact, close observers of UNSC politics argue that France may have inserted the phrase about "heavy weapons" into Resolution 1975 to pave the way for French military action (Bellamy and Williams, 2011:

835, fn. 39). This also ties in with Sarkozy's close contact with Ouattara whose wedding he officiated as the mayor of Neuilly in the 1990s and the strong criticism the intervention attracted in parliament (AFP, 2011, Assemblée Nationale, 2011i, d, c, Willsher, 2011c). The truth, as usual, probably lies somewhere in the middle of the two explanations.

Whatever the motives behind France's changing strategy towards intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, President Sarkozy had little to fear from authorizing intervention given the support by the French foreign policy executive and international approval. This, in spite of previous domestic opposition against the use of force and criticism in parliament. Even though the 2012 presidential elections were nearing, foreign policy issues did not feature prominently in public opinion polls while, at the same time, the majority of the French population generally approved of the president's defense policy (Vinocur, 2011). Elite support and the negligible influence of foreign policy issues on the public's voting behavior ultimately allowed Sarkozy to depart from earlier foreign policy goals unfettered by criticism in the parliament and his record low approval ratings

Table 24: *Domestic preferences and international compatibility in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire II*

Domestic Level	International Level	Outcome
Opposition	Incompatibility	Intervention

Source: own illustration.

6.2.2. Results

Despite the fierce opposition by the French foreign policy executive against intervention by French troops in the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, France eventually deployed Operation Licorne. Paris' preference for non-intervention became unfeasible given the escalation of the crisis, UNOCI's insufficient capacity to contain it, and Licorne's mandate to support UNOCI. Hence, the outcome of this sixth case sits comfortably with the predictions of the three-step model. To reiterate, the model expects that domestic actors must review their opposition to intervention if international players' preferences are incompatible with their preferences for non-intervention (H2b).

Following Gbagbo's rejection of the AU's High-Level panel recommendations African states had to acknowledge that mediation attempts had failed to contain the crisis peacefully. The deteriorating security situation and the use of heavy weapons by forces loyal

to Gbagbo clearly showed that a political solution was out of reach. Instead, robust action would be required to contain the crisis.

Unprepared for military intervention itself, ECOWAS requested the Council to act and resolve the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire with the use of force. Just as in Libya, regional consent was crucial for Russia, China, Brazil, and India to reduce their rejection of foreign interference. France restarted the initiative to reinforce UNOCI's mandate and drafted UN Resolution 1975, which was adopted with unanimity by the UNSC member states. Following the authorization by the UNSC, UNOCI entered into several fire exchanges with Gbagbo forces to prevent the use of heavy weapons.

Even though resolution 1975 could have provided French forces with the basis for a more offensive role in the conflict too, the French foreign policy executive made clear that the reinforced mandate was not sufficient to justify French military interference. The French president only authorized Licorne forces to intervene when the UN Secretary General officially requested France's help to support UNOCI.

Domestically, the French foreign policy executive publicly justified the decision to intervene only *after* Operation Licorne had already been deployed. It is therefore not entirely clear what had caused the French foreign policy elite to reconsider military intervention despite initial domestic opposition against it. The French foreign policy executive may have preferred to keep French troops on the sidelines but realized that this preference was becoming difficult to maintain given the deteriorating humanitarian situation, UNOCI's deficiencies, the presence of Operation Licorne in Côte d'Ivoire, and the mission's authorization to support UNOCI. Alternatively, French state leaders may have secretly held a preference for intervention but feared domestic opposition against their changing position. If this was indeed the case, French foreign policy officials may have actively contributed to create and later exploited the growing international pressure on France to intervene which would have otherwise been difficult to justify domestically. No matter what motives propelled the French foreign policy elite, it is clear that France's initial preference for non-intervention had become unfeasible given international actors' preferences. As a consequence, the French foreign policy abandoned its non-intervention goal. Backed by international approval and the support of Foreign Minister Juppé and Prime Minister Fillon, President Sarkozy could authorize intervention unconstrained by the criticism in parliament and his low approval ratings. Hence, the evidence from France's intervention in Côte d'Ivoire weakens our confidence in hypothesis 1b (domestic opposition) and strengthens confidence

in hypothesis 2b (international incompatibility) (Table 25). International conditions were more influential for the deployment of French troops than domestic preferences.

France clearly prioritized the preferences of some international actors over those of others. The request by the UN Secretary General and UNOCI's military capacity shortfalls evidently formed the main factors which prompted France to deploy Operation Licorne. In contrast, the preferences of other international and regional players (i.e. AU, individual UNSC members) apparently played a minor role in France's decision-making on intervention. Some of them later criticized French intervention.

Realist and constructivist theories offer alternative explanations for France's intervention in the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Yet, both realists and constructivists have a hard time explaining the abrupt changes in France's foreign policy. Constructivists would rightly point to the deteriorating humanitarian situation and the request by the UN Secretary General which indeed provided crucial normative drivers behind France's decision to intervene. Realists in turn could emphasize that the brutal power struggles in Côte d'Ivoire threatened France's influence in its former colony which triggered Paris to intervene. Even though constructivist and realist explanations provide relevant insights into France's decision to intervene, the shift in French foreign policy preferences from firm adherence to non-intervention to rapid and decisive intervention go beyond the reach of both theories. Drawing upon realist and constructivist assumptions, France could have intervened earlier but preferred to abstain from deploying force to contain the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Understanding why France departed from its goal of non-intervention requires a careful consideration of the international constraints imposed on Paris's foreign policy goals and domestic actors' willingness and ability to adjust these goals to international realities.

Table 25: *Process-tracing tests and evidence for intervention in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire II*

		Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)	
		High	Low
Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)	High	**Doubly decisive test**	**Smoking-gun test** H2b: France intervened despite initial preference for non-intervention but only after the request by the UN.
	Low	**Hoop test** H1b (failed): French officials domestically justified intervention only after Operation Licorne had been deployed. H2b: UNOCI's difficulties and the request by the UN Secretary-General hindered France to realize its non-intervention preference.	**Straw-in-the-wind test** H2b: Non-intervention would have been difficult to justify internationally given the deteriorating situation, UNOCI's difficulties to contain the conflict and Operation Licorne's mandate to support UNOCI.

Source: own illustration.

6.2.3. Crises all over: EU and NATO standing aloof

Given the involvement of France in the conflict management in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as the request by Ouattara's Prime Minister Soro to outside powers, the EU and/or NATO could have launched a common military operation, but both organizations abstained from intervention. Why did France intervene through an ad-hoc operation rather than using a common framework to stop the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire?

EU states discussed the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire at several European Council meetings and Foreign Affairs, External Relations and Africa working groups (Council of the European Union, 2010, 2011b, d, c, f, e). Following the run-off elections in 2010, EU states issued statements congratulating "Mr Alassan Ouattara on his election as President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire," adopted and extended restrictive measures against those obstructing the electoral process and condemned the use of violence (The Council of the European Union, 2010c: 11, The Council of the European Union, 2010b, a, Council of the European Union, 2011b, a, General Secretariat of the Council, 2011a: 3).

The deployment of a CSDP operation to Côte d'Ivoire could have formed a reasonable response by the EU to the conflict. In 2008, the EU deployed a military operation to the Chad and the Central African Republic under similar circumstances and with the mandate to protect civilians and UN personnel (Gegout, 2009b: 407). Further, already in 2004, the EU and the UN identified possible scenarios for EU-UN cooperation in crisis management. The 'standby model' by which the EU deploys a reserve force for an ongoing UN operation was mentioned as one possible option and could have been put into action in Côte d'Ivoire (Brosig, 2015: 117-118). Finally, involving the EU could have provided additional legitimacy for France's intervention and reduced charges of neo-colonialism.

However, the crisis in the Côte d'Ivoire did not seem to be a priority for EU states. In spite of the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Côte d'Ivoire and similar previous experiences of conflict management, the conclusions of the European Council meetings on February 4, March 11 and 24-25 did not make any mention of the crisis (General Secretariat of the Council, 2011b, d, c, Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area, 2011).

In a press statement on March 17, Kristalina Georgieva, the EU's commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid, and Crisis Response, sought to draw the attention of EU member states to the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Arguing that the conflict had

been overshadowed by the civil war in Libya and the nuclear disaster in Japan[38], she (so quoted in: Rettman, 2011c) raised alarm that, "[t]his crisis deserves equal attention because the numbers of people affected actually exceeds those that have been affected so far in Libya." Calling attention to the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, the EU's commissioner (so quoted in: Rettman, 2011c) warned that:

> "[w]e are at the brink of civil war ... fighting in the country is creating fear and pushing people to the edge of their capacity to cope. […] It is important not to lose sight of the suffering of people in the Ivory Coast."

Notwithstanding this call for action and the scale of the crisis, EU states did not seriously consider any further-reaching measures to increase pressure on Gbagbo and limited themselves to the imposition of sanctions, humanitarian aid and a 180€ million "recovery package" (European Commission, 2011, Wallis, 2011, Koepf, 2012: 420). As Barrios (2011) confirms "[i]n the case of Ivory Coast, the EU has insisted on limiting its role to that of donor, rather than becoming a strong diplomatic partner." In fact, "the idea of substituting French forces with an EU operation (as in Chad and the Central African Republic) was never even suggested" (Barrios, 2011: 3).

Indeed, there is no evidence that France sought to initiate discussions with its European partners about a common military mission. Given the unique expertise of French foreign policy officials on the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, France's historic ties and presence in the country as well as its role at the UN level, it was in the situation to shape the European debate on addressing the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire.

Paris may well have anticipated Europeans' reluctance to engage militarily and therefore decided not to employ its powerful position within the EU to convince its hesitant partners to deploy force (see chapter 5.3.3.). Whereas Paris had been eager to Europeanize its military operations by launching operations in partnership with its European partners since the launch of CSDP in 2003, Paris became less willing to persuade fellow Europeans of engaging jointly on the African continent as of 2009. More than once, European states repelled France's initiatives with skepticism regarding Paris's ulterior motives in its former colonies and hesitated to mobilize their resources for common military action (Koepf, 2012: 416-422). Heavy disagreement among European heads of state and government following France's proposal to establish a no-fly zone and airstrikes to stop the killings in Libya came

[38] On March 11, 2011, a major earthquake shook Japan and triggered a tsunami and nuclear catastrophe at the nuclear power plant in Fukushima. The tsunami caused core meltdowns in several reactors, explosions, fire and the release of contaminated water during March 12 and 15, 2011. Due to the earthquake thousands of people lost their lives.

as a stark reminder of European states' hesitance. As a consequence, Koepf (2012: 423) explains that:

> "[i]n Paris, a pragmatic, or even "hyperpragmatic" approach is increasingly taking the place of an ideological vision in which the creation of a Europe of defense was an end in itself. Paris now prefers to choose on a case-by-case basis the most appropriate and / or simply available framework of action - a recent approach known as a "supermarket" approach."

Accordingly, France "was relatively detached from collective EU action. "Rather than working closely with the EU delegation in Ivory Coast, France prioritized the Security Council and its own bilateral relations," so Barrios (2011: 3). Ultimately, Paris's prioritization of the UN and unilateral conflict management implied that "France's strength precluded EU leadership" (Barrios, 2011: 3).

Indeed, had France attempted to convince its European partners of a common European military operation, such an initiative would have most likely failed. As France may well have anticipated, the majority of European states were wary of intervening in a crisis where mainly French interests seemed to be at stake. Moreover, the simultaneous eruption of the Libya crisis had revealed deep divisions among member states which did not only overshadow developments in Côte d'Ivoire but also made agreement on intervention in another crisis highly unlikely. While one component of the member states was already heavily engaged in the crisis management efforts in Libya and Afghanistan, the other was reluctant to provide resources and troops a priori (Barrios, 2011: 3, Bruxelles2, 2011). In particular, Germany and the UK rejected the idea of military intervention. While Germany favored a peaceful resolution of the conflict, the UK advocated African ownership of crisis management (Auswärtiges Amt, 2011d, c). In the UNSC, Germany, a non-permanent member of the Security Council during 2011 and 2012, voted in favor of Resolutions 1967 and 1975 (Auswärtiges Amt, 2010, 2011a, b) but emphasized (so quoted in: United Nations Security Council, 2011a: 6) its preference for a political solution implemented by regional security actors:

> "[t]oday's resolution should not be seen as substituting for a political process. We strongly welcome the efforts undertaken by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union to seek a political resolution of the crisis in concert with the Security Council. We encourage the African Union and ECOWAS to redouble their efforts to find a lasting political solution."

Berlin did not see itself in charge of addressing the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. In fact, military action was not even debated domestically. The German Bundestag did not devote one single in-depth debate to the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. The crisis was merely mentioned on the

sidelines of broader discussions on current conflicts and crisis management (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011b, c, a).

The United Kingdom did not show more interest to get involved in containing the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. At the time when the crisis there was escalating, Britain was strongly involved in Libya. Another military commitment was out of question (Coughlin, 2011, Harding, 2011). Already by December 2010, the UK's Foreign Secretary William Hague (so quoted in: Reuters, 2010) had eliminated the possibility of British intervention, arguing that "[t]here are U.N. peacekeepers in Cote d'Ivoire, there are large numbers of French forces there." This position hardened with the beginning of the Libya campaign. Three weeks into the British-French-American intervention in the Libya war, the first capacity shortfalls became apparent. A UK diplomat (FT reporters, 2011) warned that "[s]hould France begin to concentrate their focus elsewhere [to Côte d'Ivoire], there will be an unbearable burden on those left to manage Libya." Accordingly, Lord Howell of Guildford (so quoted in: House of Lords, 2011), Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office explained that:

> "Côte d'Ivoire is perhaps an example of the general point that we cannot engage in everything, but that does not rule out our need to focus carefully on certain selected areas."

Instead, British foreign policy officials saw African states, ECOWAS and the AU, in charge of crisis management in Côte d'Ivoire (House of Lords, 2010, Reuters, 2010).

Hence, incongruent preferences among member states would have nipped any proposal of common European military action in the bud (Table 27). With Germany and the UK opposed to intervention and the majority of member states focused on crisis management elsewhere or uninterested, France would have most likely failed to secure support if it had tried to convince its partners to launch a common operation.

The transatlantic alliance also did not offer a viable alternative. As with the EU, military intervention by NATO in Côte d'Ivoire was never even debated. In addition to German and British opposition, the US – as the most powerful state of the alliance – did not express any desire to interfere. Even during the Libya crisis, US government officials were wary of Arab opinion should the US intervene and hence, an additional operation on the African continent would have been difficult to justify. As a result, the US limited its activities to financial sanctions and the imposition of a travel ban on Gbagbo, his wife, and his associates (Cook, 2011: 50- 52). Had the US indicated its preference to intervene as previously done in the Libya and Darfur crises, the situation might have changed. However, the lack of any serious debate and statements by the US on its preference to intervene make it difficult to assess the congruence of NATO member states' preferences.

Table 26: *Congruence of preferences among EU and NATO states during the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire II*

Crisis	Timeframe	Congruence of Preferences		Outcome
		EU states	NATO states	
Côte d'Ivoire	April 2011	Incongruent	n.a.	French ad-hoc intervention

Source: own illustration.

While member states' incongruent preferences over conflict resolution would have certainly complicated discussions over the launch of an EU operation, the fact that member states did not even debate common intervention within the EU and NATO indicates that incongruent preferences alone cannot comprehensively account for the absence of the EU and NATO in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Realists and constructivists may be better positioned to explain why there was not even a debate about common military efforts in either organization.

Rather than anticipating opposition by EU and NATO members, realists would argue that France preferred a national operation *a priori*. Given the urgency of the situation and the request by the UN, a national operation allowed France to respond rapidly and retain its autonomy in decision-making. In contrast, an EU operation would have taken up time to plan, set up and deploy. Therefore, if EU states had been willing to deploy a common military operation, France would have probably still deployed Operation Licorne. In that case, a CSDP operation could have been subsequently launched to support rather than to substitute French troops. The launch of a NATO operation was similarly out of the question since the violence in Côte d'Ivoire clearly did not pose a common threat to the alliance, as realists would argue. It would have also drawn the US into the conflict, risking France's influence in its former colony. Then again, NATO launched military operations in Libya and off the coast of Somalia, for instance, where the threat to the alliance was similarly vague.

In light of the EU's multiple experiences of military intervention in African countries and the alarming humanitarian situation, constructivists would have expected the EU to intervene in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Yet, although the EU had launched a military operation to support the UN during the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2006 and had strengthened its crisis management mandate under the Lisbon Treaty, the Union's previous experiences and ambitions did not trigger intervention. Indeed,

ideational factors did not even provoke a serious debate on military intervention, casting doubt on the explanatory power of constructivist assumptions.

In contrast, constructivist logic is better suited to explain NATO's absence from the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. Constructivists would highlight the ideational discrepancy between the transatlantic alliance's strategic culture, its shared values and historic experiences on the one hand, and the features and context of the crisis on the other. In contrast to the EU, NATO was founded as a collective defense alliance and has placed stronger emphasis on high-intensity warfighting with crisis management and peacekeeping tasks found at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Humanitarian intervention in Africa, in particular, does not feature prominently in the alliance's strategic objectives and NATO has never deployed troops on the ground in African countries (Gyllensporre, 2012: 185). Instead, NATO's missions on the continent have primarily focused on logistical support to the African Union's mission to Darfur and counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. In contrast, NATO's involvement in Libya resulted more from US reluctance to lead rather than allies' shared values and strategic principles (see chapter 5.4.1.). In addition, many African countries also view NATO with suspicion as they associate the alliance with US military clout (Gyllensporre, 2012: 186). This and France's uneasy relationship with NATO (see chapter 5.4.2), so constructivists would argue, reduced the likelihood of NATO's involvement in containing the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire during 2011 to a minimum.

6.2.4. Results

Rather than proposing a common military operation to its European and transatlantic partners, France intervened through a national ad-hoc operation in Côte d'Ivoire. France has long been a strong advocate of European defense cooperation and, thus, a common European operation would have been the natural choice from an ideational perspective. Yet, EU states did not even discuss common military intervention. In light of recent intra-European struggles on the launch of an EU operation in the Libya crisis, France may have anticipated disagreement at the EU level. Indeed, preferences among EU states were clearly incongruent and the majority of member states were unwilling to intervene on behalf of French interests. To avoid disagreement at the EU level, France may have preferred to launch a national ad-hoc operation. Whereas a CSDP operation was possible in principle, the deployment of a NATO operation was not even open to debate.

Even though member states' incongruent preferences may have complicated discussions over the launch of a CSDP operation in Côte d'Ivoire, the fact that member states did not even debate common intervention in the EU and NATO suggests that preferences alone cannot comprehensively account for the absence of the EU and NATO in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Realists and constructivists may be better positioned to explain why there was not even a debate surrounding common military efforts in either organization.

France's launch of an ad-hoc operation is perfectly aligned with realist logic. Realists would argue that France preferred a national operation a priori. In contrast to EU and NATO operations, an ad-hoc operation allowed France to respond rapidly to the crisis and retain its autonomy in decision-making. In addition, realists would point out that the violence in Côte d'Ivoire did not pose a common threat to EU and NATO member states. Drawing other states and particularly the US into the conflict would have been risky, threatening France's influence in its former colony.

In contrast to realism, the deployment of France's Operation Licorne sits uneasily with constructivist assumptions. Given France's traditional promotion of a common European defense policy and the EU's multiple experiences of military crisis management in African countries, constructivists would have predicted the launch of a CSDP operation in Côte d'Ivoire rather than a French ad-hoc operation. Constructivist assumptions fare better explaining NATO's absence from humanitarian intervention in Côte d'Ivoire. Constructivists would highlight the ideational discrepancy between the transatlantic alliance's strategic culture, its shared values and historic experiences on the one hand, and the features and context of the crisis on the other. In contrast to the EU, which intervened in similar conflicts before, NATO's focus on high-intensity warfighting would have been inapt to contain the post-electoral violence in Côte d'Ivoire. In addition, NATO has never deployed ground troops in an African country and a military intervention by the alliance would have sit uncomfortably not only with African states which associate NATO with US military clout but also with France, which has traditionally preferred to act through the EU rather than NATO in military crisis management issues.

In sum, while EU member states' incongruent preferences may have influenced France's choice for an ad-hoc operation in Côte d'Ivoire, realists and constructivists may be better positioned to explain why there lacked a debate about common military efforts in the EU and NATO. Even though the outcome is generally in line with the expectations of the three-step model, the absence of the causal mechanism decreases confidence that incongruent

preferences (H3c) formed the main explanatory variable which caused France’s ad-hoc intervention (Table 27).

Table 27: *Process-tracing and evidence for institutional frameworks in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire II*

		Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)	
		High	Low
Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)	High	**Doubly decisive test**	**Smoking-gun test**
	Low	**Hoop test** H3c (failed): EU states discussed crisis but EU and NATO states did not discuss a military operation. France may have preferred ad-hoc operation a priori. NATO’s strategic culture did not accommodate intervention and would have risked French influence in its zone of primary strategic interest.	**Straw-in-the-wind test** H3c: Intra-European quarrels over the Libya intervention may have caused French choice not to propose EU operation in anticipation of disagreement.

Source: own illustration.

Figure 6: *Fatalities by type in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, December 2010-May 2011*



Own compilation, data source: ACLED (2017).

7. Sectarian conflict in the Central African Republic (2013-2014)

December 2012 began with what has become known as "the worst crisis in […] [the Central African Republic's] long history of armed rebellion, coups d'état, mutinies, foreign intervention, and human suffering" (Cinq-Mars, 2015: 3). The scale of the crisis exceeded previous violent conflicts in the country. The death toll rose to several thousand people and roughly 25 percent of the local population was internally displaced (International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic, 2014: 19, UNHCR, 2015).

The crisis in the Central African Republic was triggered by the social grievances and marginalization of the Muslim minority group nurtured by a system of nepotism and corruption. Drawing upon several longstanding rebel movements, the Muslim Séléka alliance launched its rebellion against President Bozizé in December 2012 and soon made considerable territorial gains in the northern, eastern, and central regions of the country (Cinq-Mars, 2015: 6-7). Ceasefire talks were held in January 2013 after Séléka rebels had taken more than half of the country. Yet, Bozizé proved unwilling to live up to the promises made under the ceasefire agreement which included, among others, the formation of a government of national unity and the organization of elections. As a result, the Séléka rebels continued their advance and took control of the capital on March 24, 2013. President Bozizé was forced to flee the country. The following day, rebel leader Michel Djotodia declared himself president. After initial objections against the forceful overthrow and seizure of power by the AU, a regional summit in N'Djamena in April 2013 recognized him as the CAR's transitional president (United Nations Security Council, 2013b, Security Council Report, 2017).

Despite the power grab by Djotodia, the Séléka rebels continued to assault supporters of ex-president Bozizé, the Christian majority population, and the Central African Armed Forces ((FACA) (French: Forces armées centrafricaines)). The country's armed forces proved incapable against the rebels. They were badly equipped, disarmed and a majority deserted (United Nations Security Council, 2013c: 2). In response to the brutal crack downs and raids by the Séléka rebels, these groups began to build up self-defense groups as of September 2013 which became known as the anti-balaka. The initially defensive raison d'être of the group soon turned into an offensive doctrine and spurred the conflict between Muslims and

Christians further (Cinq-Mars, 2015: 8).[39] The escalating conflict raised concerns that the country could nosedive into a civil war, or even worse, genocide (Nichols, 2013).

7.1. Non-intervention in the CAR's Sectarian War I

Despite previous involvement in crisis management in the CAR during 2008 and 2009, European states did not intervene militarily through any channel or institution for almost a year into the conflict. France already had troops in the country through Operation Boali, but refused to deploy. Instead, the responsibility to contain the crisis rested almost entirely with African states and the mission MICOPAX (French: Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique) under the auspices of ECCAS and the AU. Why, despite previous crisis management efforts in the CAR, did European states refrain from intervening in the escalating conflict during much of 2013? Why did France not deploy Operation Boali to stop the bloodshed in the CAR?

7.1.1. Another end of Françafrique

"That time is over," insisted France's President Hollande when President Bozizé requested French and American assistance to stop the advance of the Séléka rebels in late December 2012 (Châtelot, 2012). Although the French government had positively responded to a similar request by Bozizé in 2006 and was already present in the CAR through Operation Boali[40], the French president refused to deploy the troops to protect Bozize's regime (BBC News, 2006b, a, Ministère de la Défense, 2013c). He (so quoted in: Le Figaro, 2012c) emphasized that:

> "If we are present, it is not to protect a regime, it is to protect our citizens and our interests, and in no way to interfere in the internal affairs of a country, in this case the Central African Republic. These days are over" (also see: Châtelot, 2012, Le Figaro, 2012d, e, Spiegel Online, 2012).

President Hollande's refusal to deploy French forces in the CAR fit very well with his broader foreign policy doctrine towards Africa. Just as his predecessor Sarkozy, President Hollande had pledged to break with the interventionist practices of the past and to normalize

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[39] By December 2014, the brutal violence inflicted by the anti-balaka had reduced the Muslim population by 99 percent according to the INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC. 2014. *Letter dated 19 December 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,* [Online]. Available: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_928.pdf [Accessed 30 November 2015., 94.

[40] Operation Boali supported the establishment of the first multinational African force in Central Africa, the so-called Force Multinationale en Centrafrique (FOMUC) and the instruction of the CAR's armed forces (FACA)

Paris's relationship with its former colonies (Berthemet, 2012). At a state visit to Senegal in 2012, the newly elected French president (so quoted in: France in the United Kingdom, 2012) had explained that:

> "[t]he age of what was once called "Françafrique"[41] is over. There's France and there's Africa. There's the partnership between France and Africa, with relations based on respect, clarity and solidarity."

Hollande's departure from this policy during France's intervention in Mali in January 2013 already indicated some ambiguity (Henke, 2017: 313-314). To deviate again for a second intervention in the Central African Republic just a few months later would have raised serious doubts about the president's commitment to his doctrine and could have caused domestic criticism.

Uneasy relations between the French government and CAR's President Bozizé, his unwillingness to reform the country and respect the accords of the Libreville ceasefire agreement signed with the Séléka rebels in January 2013 reinforced the reservations of the French foreign policy executive further (so quoted in: England, 2013). In consequence, the idea to intervene on behalf of a disputed regime was not popular among the French foreign policy executive. Echoing President Hollande, Jean-Christophe Belliard (so quoted in: Assemblée Nationale, 2013b: 9), Director of Africa and the Indian Ocean to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, later explained in a hearing in the Foreign Affairs Commission that, "[i]t is indeed difficult to intervene on behalf of someone who does not honor the commitments made at the end of a good agreement."

The worsening security situation in the CAR following the Séléka's accession to power on March 24, 2013, did not change this. Paris condemned the coup and increased the troop numbers of Operation Boali by 300 in response to the increasing brutality of the conflict and concerns over the development of ethnic and religious dimensions. Yet, the objectives of the operation remained unchanged: the mandate of French troops remained limited to the protection of French nationals in the CAR, diplomatic assets and the international airport M'Poko in Bangui. Repeated calls for French military assistance by the CAR's Prime Minister Tiangaye in April and May 2013 to reinstate security and stability in the country went unheeded (Barna, 2013: 4, Le Monde, 2013a, g, Ministère de la Défense, 2013c, Reuters, 2013b, United Nations Security Council, 2013d: 7, Cinq-Mars, 2015: 11). In a hearing in the defense committee on June 11, Defense Minister Le Drian (so quoted in:

[41] Term to describe France's former, somewhat proprietorial Africa policy, often based on personal relationships.

Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, 2013b) reaffirmed the view of President Hollande, explaining that:

> "400 men are in Bangui today to ensure the safety of our nationals. […] They are not intended to support one of the parties involved […]. It is up to the African Union, or the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to assume their responsibilities."

As with President Bozizé, the French foreign policy executive questioned the legitimacy of the rebel leader Djotoda, newly in power, and continued to refuse to interfere in support of one of the two camps (Berthemet, 2013). In a parliamentary discussion on the situation in the Central African Republic, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (so quoted in: Assemblée Nationale, 2013c: 4529) emphasized that France was "available to support any effort to return to stability; but legitimately recognized authorities must be put in place, which is not the case of the current president [Djotoda]."

Instead of intervening itself, all central French state leaders – the president, the foreign minister and the defense minister – emphasized the responsibility of African states to carry out crisis management tasks and restore stability and peace in the CAR (Le Figaro, 2012b, a, Le Monde, 2012, Irish and Flynn, 2013, Le Monde, 2013e, so quoted in: Le Monde, 2013c). At the occasion of the UN General Assembly in September 2013, French President Hollande (2013) expressed his hope that:

> "the Security Council will issue a mandate and grant logistical and financial means to an African force whose first mission would be to restore stability in the Central African Republic."

French state leaders were keen to avoid the same allegations they were accused of following the intervention in Mali in 2013 when African states felt that France's deployment had precluded African ownership of crisis management. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (so quoted in: Commission des affaires étrangères, 2013a) contended that "France has no vocation to intervene in all conflicts! Had there been a regional force, it would have been up to her to intervene in Mali."[42] Jean-Christophe Belliard (so quoted in: Commission des affaires étrangères, 2013b), the director of Africa and the Indian Ocean at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed the view of the Foreign Minister, explaining that:

> "The CAR poses again the question of intervention. But France will not make the same choice as for Mali. Since a few months, France works with ECCAS. Although the Africans asked us to reinforce our presence on the spot – 600 men – we, instead, announced our intention to reduce it to 450 men in order to encourage the countries of the region to address the problem. I think we contributed to a realization on their part

[42] In January 2013, France launched Operation Serval to counter the offensive of radical Islamist groups in northern Mali.

> that the work in the field was their responsibility. We do not have the intention to send several thousand men in the CAR as has been the case in Mali."

On the international stage, the French foreign policy executive promoted the goal of a regional solution to the conflict. Accordingly, France participated in the summit of the Heads of State and Government of ECCAS in N'Djamena on April 18, formed part of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic (ICG-CAR), and supported the reinforcement of the ECCAS-led mission MICOPAX from 700 to 2,000 troops (Ministère Affaires étrangères, 2013). Rather than taking the lead in containing the crisis, the French foreign policy executive believed that their primary role was to mobilize international players. As Belliard (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2013b) explained:

> "Our role today in the CAR consists primarily to mobilize the international community, namely the ECCAS countries, the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations in order to first, obtain logistical support by the UN to the African force, and second, to implement a peacekeeping operation. […] France's policy is based on its ability to mobilize the international community rather than act alone."

Table 28: *Domestic preferences on intervention in the crisis in the CAR I*

Country	Consensus/ Opposition	Domestic preference	Foreign policy strategy
France	Opposition	Non-Intervention	African intervention

Source: own illustration.

France's reluctance to take the lead in containing the crisis in the CAR and its preference for African ownership of crisis management was largely compatible with African states' goals and international players' preferences.

Indeed, African states were keen to take the lead to end the conflict in the CAR. After they had felt sidelined during the crisis in Mali in early 2013, African states wanted to prove their ability to contain the conflict and play a central role in crisis management.

African states appeared well positioned to lead crisis management. The Economic Community of Central African States was already present in the CAR through the mission MICOPAX. The mission had assisted with the post-conflict stabilization and the peace process following the country's civil war in 2002/2003 and was very familiar with the terrain (Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix, 2013). In light of the deteriorating security situation during the first months of 2013, ECCAS member states decided to increase the troop strength of MICOPAX by 2,000 troops and on April 18 asked the AU to provide assistance at their summit in N'Djamena. It was there that they also agreed on a transitional roadmap for the CAR (BBC Monitoring Africa, 2013, Welz, 2014).

Despite ECCAS' willingness to step up its crisis management efforts, additional troop contributions were slow to reach the conflict-stricken country. MICOPAX was clearly outnumbered by the Séléka rebels and lacked the heavy weapons used by the rebel forces. As a result, the African forces were not able to stop the Séléka rebels advance on Bangui in late March 2013. Accusations that the Chadian contingent was siding with the rebels and the build-up of the anti-balaka, which benefitted from the collapse of the CAR's former national security forces, created additional problems (Welz, 2014: 601-610, Cinq-Mars, 2015: 13-14). As a result of these shortcomings, on 19 July the AU Peace and Security Council decided to take over the responsibility over MICOPAX and transform it into a new and larger mission named MISCA (French: Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine) (African Union, 2013c). MISCA would draw upon a total of 3,652 personnel (2,475 military troops and 1,025 police forces) and the transformation begin on August 1 (African Union, 2013c).

Regional and international players approved African states' willingness to take the lead in containing the crisis. The transitional prime minister of the CAR welcomed the reinforcement of MICOPAX and asked the Security Council to provide the mission with a Chapter VII mandate (African Union, 2013b, a, United Nations Security Council, 2013d: 7, Gaibulloev et al., 2015).

European states and the US welcomed the African states initiative too. Most states doubted the ability of ECCAS to gain control of the situation in the CAR and therefore supported the leadership of the AU and the rehatting of MICOPAX troops. French officials, in particular, were eager to help African states to reach their potential. In line with its preference for non-intervention, Paris was unwilling to step in and fill the Africans' capacity shortfalls. By showing restraint, Paris wanted to "encourage the countries of the region to seize the problem" (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2013b). Accordingly, France provided active support to the AU and ECCAS to develop a credible concept of operations for MISCA (Geneste, 2013c). Together with the EU and the UN, France co-chaired a ministerial meeting on the humanitarian crisis in the CAR, organized a consultation with non-governmental organizations, while French state leaders time and again highlighted the need to support the African force. As the conflict aggravated in summer 2013 and regional actors experienced difficulties to contain it, France and UN officials urgently appealed to the UNSC to act and lend its full support to the African force (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2013b, United Nations Security Council, 2013g: 4-5).

From the beginning, the UN supported the transformation of MICOPAX into MISCA and assisted in the development of the concept of operations. Although the AU had asked the Security Council to authorize the deployment of MISCA, delays in troop contributions to MISCA and differences between Council members regarding support measures for MISCA slowed down the adoption of a resolution (United Nations Security Council, 2015b: 4-5, Moelle, 2017: 250-251). However, the UNSC commended the efforts by ECCAS and the AU to resolve the crisis in UNSC Resolution 2121 (adopted on 10 October 2013) and encouraged member states to support MISCA with a request to the UN Secretary General to propose specific options in this regard (United Nations Security Council, 2013f: 2, 4-6). The official authorization by the UN followed in December 2013. Until then, MISCA was operating based on the authorization by the AU PSC adopted on July 19, 2013 (Moelle, 2017: 250-251).

Table 29: *Domestic preferences and international compatibility in the crisis in the CAR I*

Domestic Level	Domestic Preference	International Level	Outcome
Opposition	Non-intervention	Compatibility	French non-intervention
Consensus	African intervention	Compatibility	African intervention

Source: own illustration.

7.1.2. Results

Although French troops were already present in the CAR when conflict broke out in early 2013, and in spite of the CAR authorities' repeated request on Paris to intervene, all main French foreign policy actors, including the French president, the defense, and the foreign ministers rejected intervention publicly. The French foreign policy executive insisted that African countries, rather than France, had to take charge of containing the crisis. France's foreign policy preferences were compatible with international actors' preferences and goals. African countries were keen to lead crisis management and hence the outcome of this seventh case is perfectly congruent with the expectations of the three-step model.

In line with their preference not to intervene in the CAR, French state leaders embarked on an international strategy to realize their goals. French foreign policy officials actively lobbied for African ownership of crisis management and helped them to develop a credible concept of operations. The idea was that this should enable Africans to take

responsibility for their own security. Hence, domestic opposition clearly hindered French intervention and instead propelled French leaders to promote an alternative crisis management strategy which shifted the responsibility to African states (H1b).

France’s preferences were evidently compatible with the preferences and goals of international actors. Following their frustration about France’s intervention in the crisis in Mali in early 2013, African states were keen to take over a leadership role in containing the crisis in the CAR. ECCAS was already present in the country through operation MICOPAX and the AU was ready to take over the authority and reinforce the mission as the security situation deteriorated. The African initiative was supported by European states, the US, and the UN, which assisted the AU with developing a concept of operations.

African states’ willingness to shoulder the responsibility in the CAR clearly helped France to keep its role limited to the protection of its own nationals. This ultimately allowed France to realize its foreign policy preference and keep its troops out. Thus, the available evidence strengthens confidence in hypotheses 1b (domestic opposition) and 2a (international compatibility) (Table 30). French state leaders’ opposition to intervention was compatible with the preferences of international and regional players. If in contrast Africans had been unwilling to reinforce their troop contingents, it is possible that France would have faced considerably more pressure to control the situation (as it did in Côte d’Ivoire) given that it was already present in the CAR through Operation Boali and in light of the strong historic ties between France and its former colony

.

Table 30: *Process-tracing and evidence for non-intervention in the crisis in the Central African Republic I*

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="2"></td><td colspan="2">Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)</td></tr>
<tr><td>High</td><td>Low</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)</td><td>High</td><td>Doubly decisive test</td><td>Smoking-gun test
H1b: French foreign policy executive advocates African ownership of crisis management in its former colony. France did not increase troops despite request.

H2a: African countries preferred to take the lead in crisis management. They also had the resources and authorization to do so.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Low</td><td>Hoop test
H1b: French state leaders rule out military intervention.

H2a: International and regional players did not express any preference for French intervention.</td><td>Straw-in-the-wind test
H1b: France's primary concern was protection of French nationals. Non-interference is in line with French Africa policy.

H2a: African states were keen to take over leadership because they felt side-lined in the crisis in Mali.</td></tr>
</table>

Source: own illustration.

Alternative realist and constructivist explanations cannot adequately account for France's non-intervention in the CAR. Realists do not offer a clear prediction of France's response to the conflict. As with the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, realists could argue that the conflict in the CAR did not generate any direct security risks for French national interests and therefore military intervention was unnecessary. Consequently, French state leaders advocated African ownership of crisis management while keeping the role of French forces limited. But then again, the turmoil in the country could have threatened France's influence in its former colony as well as its many nationals living there and could have formed a compelling reason for intervention according to realist logic.

A constructivist perspective also does not offer a more persuasive explanation. From a constructivist perspective, the deteriorating humanitarian situation and France's previous experiences of crisis management in the CAR could have justified intervention. On the other hand, constructivists could also emphasize France's adherence to its new Africa policy and the non-intervention principle to explain non-intervention. Thus, both realism and constructivism provide ambiguous insights into France's response to the crisis in the CAR. Both theories fail to account for France's domestic drivers behind its non-intervention policy

on the one hand, and the opportunity at the international level to realize this preference in light of Africans' eagerness to take the lead on the other.

7.2. The Launch of France's Operation Sangaris in the CAR II

Despite the French foreign policy executive's firm opposition to military intervention in the conflict in the CAR during December 2012 to September 2013, France announced the launch of the French Operation Sangaris in support of the African Union mission MISCA in December 2013. This raises several questions. Why did France intervene in the CAR in spite of domestic actors' clear preference to stay out of the conflict? How was French intervention compatible with the Africans' commitment to lead crisis management in the CAR?

7.2.1. How "No we won't!" became "Yes, we will."

At the end of September 2013, Defense Minister Le Drian (so quoted in: Guibert, 2013) announced that "France is ready to provide operational support […]." Yet, despite Paris's apparent change of course, a fully-fledged French military operation did not become France's preferred foreign policy option. Indeed, the defense minister promptly added to his announcement that France "will not take the initiative." The French Defense Ministry prepared three possible forms through which France could eventually participate in the CAR crisis management. This included deploying an autonomous force, the transformation of the French troops already installed in the CAR into rapid reaction forces, and a French support mission to assist the African-led mission MISCA (Guibert, 2013, Preésidence de la République française, 2015). What had happened to the French foreign policy executive's fierce opposition to intervention?

Despite their active support for African ownership of crisis management, French state leaders had been skeptical from the beginning regarding the Africans' capacity to tackle the conflict. They had serious doubts that ECCAS and the African Union would be able to obtain the necessary troops and achieve operational readiness within the set timeframe. Africans' capacity shortfalls and struggles to deploy MISCA proved them right (Guibert, 2013). In addition to African states' military deficiencies, French foreign policy officials believed that only a UN peacekeeping operation could address the security, political and institutional challenges in the CAR effectively (What's In Blue, 2014c). Even though France was advocating African crisis management efforts publicly, the French Permanent Representative

to the UN had mentioned the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force already in a closed-door session with UNSC members in May 2013 (Assemblée Nationale, 2013b: 4, Cinq-Mars, 2015: 14). However, France knew that the process of launching a UN peacekeeping operation would take at least several months to a year. Therefore, France's original plan was to enable MISCA to intervene and sponsor a resolution at the UN providing the legal scope and assistance to the African force in autumn 2013. France thought that this would help improve the conditions in the CAR, smooth the way for the UN, and buy time to lobby unconvinced UNSC members so that a UN peacekeeping force could eventually be mandated and established in spring 2014 (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2013a). Accordingly, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (so quoted in:Commission des affaires étrangères, 2013a) explained:

> "Probably we will proceed in two stages: presentation of a first draft resolution in October and then a second draft in the spring, in order to launch a peacekeeping operation, which is impossible today, since there is no peace."

Fabius (so quoted in: Commission des affaires étrangères, 2013a) further clarified that:

> "A peacekeeping operation corresponds to a specific legal category, defined by the UN; this type of resolution is not easy to obtain because it has to meet very strict criteria - and, first of all, as its name implies, there must be peace, which is far from being the case in the Central African Republic today."

However, as the AU's problems with obtaining troops and deploying MISCA continued and the security situation in the CAR worsened (Figure 7), the French foreign policy executive realized the difficulty in deploying a UN operation as planned. As a result, the French foreign policy executive had to change its strategy and step in to prevent the security and humanitarian situation from further deteriorating. At the same time, however, French foreign policy officials did not depart from their initial preference. They insisted that France's commitment must stay limited and that the main responsibility of conflict management should remain with African states. Already in October 2013, the French Foreign Minister (so quoted: Commission des affaires étrangères, 2013a) contemplated strengthening France's presence in the CAR:

> "The Central African Republic is surrounded by countries such as Chad, Cameroon, Sudan. If a situation of lawlessness ensues, there is the danger that all of this part of Africa will be contaminated. [...] We could increase our contingent on a provisional basis, but only if we take a strategic approach and give legal support to operations: as in Mali, international support is needed."

French foreign policy officials were particularly concerned that the absence of functioning state structures and the spread of extremism could lead to the destabilization of the entire Great Lakes and Sahel region. France's 2013 Defense White Paper defines it as an area of "primary interest" due to a shared history, the presence of French nationals, and the challenges

these regions confront (Geneste, 2013b, Ministère de la Défense, 2013a: 54, 55). An anonymous French official (so quoted in: Guibert, 2013) revealed that Paris did not want "a black hole in the middle of states like Cameroon, Chad, Congo, which have their own weaknesses or will enter in transition." French President Hollande (Le Monde, 2013c) was plagued by the same worries and explained that France "would not remain on the reserve […] [b]ecause chaos will bring terrorism […]." Continuing massacres by the Séléka rebels all throughout autumn 2013 strengthened these concerns and nourished fears of genocide, evoking memories of the international community's failure to intervene in the crisis in Rwanda in 1994 (Barluet, 2013b, Le Monde, 2013b, Smith, 2013). Following a renewed wave of violence in November 2013, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (so quoted in: Bensimon, 2013) warned that the CAR was "at the edge of genocide".

Figure 7: *Fatalities in the Central African Republic, January 2013-April 2014*



Own compilation, data source: ACLED (2017).

While security conditions and humanitarian concerns influenced France's decision-making, these factors only come to the fore because African states did not succeed in containing the crisis earlier. Defense Minister Le Drian made clear that France was ready to support but not

replace the African force. The defense minister (Le Monde, 2013f) emphasized that, “France will support this African mission […]. We will do it in support and not enter first, as we were able to do for Mali, and for a brief period, of about six months.” A diplomat (so quoted in: Bensimon, 2013) at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that view, stressing that “[w]e must get the message through that we are here to help the Africans, not to substitute them.”

Progress in the CAR’s internal affairs was an additional factor which helped increase domestic acceptance of France’s adjustments to foreign policy strategy. While the French foreign policy executive had been reluctant to intervene on behalf of a shady state leader, the international recognition of President Djotodia markedly improved when he initiated a transition process leading to new elections and pledged to step down after they took place (Reuters, 2013a). In addition, Djotodia had dissolved the Séléka rebels in early September 2013 and threatened to impose sanctions in case of non-compliance (BBC, 2013). These were regarded as positive signs of gradual progress by the French foreign policy executive (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2013b: 4, 5, 7).

Moreover, progress in other international crisis arenas discharged France from some of its conflict resolution efforts, allowing it to concentrate its attention and military resources on the CAR. While much of Paris’s attention during spring 2013 had been focused on the fight against militant Islamists in Mali, the establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on April 25 produced relief and enlarged Paris’s room for maneuver elsewhere (Geneste, 2013a). “It was difficult for France, which was absorbed by the Malian crisis to do more despite the wish expressed by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,” explained the Director of Africa and the Indian Ocean to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2013b). What’s more, through a series of past military operations in the country and Operation Boali which was already present in the CAR at the time, the French armed forces were familiar with the terrain they were operating on. As a result, France – more than any other international player – was well positioned to launch military intervention in the CAR. In mid-November 2013, France pre-positioned its troops in the region and was subsequently ready to intervene (Bensimon, 2013).

Although France could have launched intervention already by mid-November, it was wary of deploying its troops without explicit international approval (so quoted in: Irish, 2013b). To obtain the UNSC resolution, French foreign policy officials were very active

internationally. Together with Rwanda, France organized an Arria-formula meeting[43] at the UN level to discuss the humanitarian situation in the CAR. Paris prepared a security summit with African states for early December and drafted a resolution which called for the establishment of a trust fund to provide financial support to the African force. It also called for an authorization of MISCA as well as French troops to intervene in the crisis in the CAR, using all necessary means. On November 25, France submitted the draft resolution to UNSC members (Bensimon, 2013, Monde, 2013, Security Council Report, 2017).

Table 31: *Domestic preferences on intervention in the Central African Republic II*

Country	Consensus/ Opposition	Domestic preference	Foreign policy strategy
France	Consensus	UN intervention	French support operation

Source: own illustration.

French foreign policy officials were right to believe that the launch of a UN peacekeeping operation would encounter serious difficulties and was incompatible with the present international conditions. The major part of resistance to deploying a UN peacekeeping force came from African states (Riols, 2014). Quarrels among African countries started already in July 2013, when ECCAS was supposed to give responsibility over MICOPAX to the African Union. ECCAS saw itself in the better position to bring the crisis under control whereas the AU questioned the capacity of ECCAS to solve the conflict (Châtelot, 2012, Blas, 2014, Welz, 2014, 607, Cinq-Mars, 2015: 14).

Leadership quarrels not only slowed down the transformation of MICOPAX into the African Union force but also hampered the transfer of responsibility from the AU to the UN. Following the AU's embarrassing experience in Mali in early 2013, due to France's decisive ad-hoc intervention, the AU now wanted to demonstrate its capacity as a security provider and prove that it could carry out its mandate. Aware of its limited resources, the AU requested support by multilateral institutions and individual states; it was in principal not opposed to the launch of a UN peacekeeping operation but it did not want to be overlooked by the international community either (Manson, 2014). As a result, AU officials insisted that

[43] Arria-formula meetings are informal gatherings which allow Security Council members to exchange views and hear the opinion of government representatives, civil society, international organizations and non-state actors. See: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. *Working Methods Handbook - Background Note on the "Arria-Formula" Meetings of the Security Council Members,* [Online]. Available: http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/bgarriaformula.shtml [Accessed 02 June 2017.

the organization would be in the lead of crisis management for an adequate period (roughly 12 months) (What's in Blue, 2013b, Welz, 2014: 608). An AU diplomat (so quoted in: Bozonnet, 2014) explained: “We are not against the principle of a peacekeeping operation. We simply want that the decision process is respected.” In a briefing of the UN Security Council by UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman, an AU representative (so quoted in: United Nations Security Council, 2014e) again confirmed this view arguing that:

> “the priority for the international community, and of the United Nations in particular, should be to support MISCA so that the Mission can create the minimal conditions for the deployment of a United Nations operation in due course. While the efforts of the African Union and its peace and security structures must also be strengthened, it is also true that a lasting solution to the continent’s crises will be possible only by strengthening African capacities. Regardless of their good intentions, our partners will not always be able to assume the burden of peacekeeping on the continent. In our view, any other approach risks undermining the efforts that MISCA is currently undertaking, with the support of Operation Sangaris, by generating uncertainty, which would undermine the gains already made and complicate the situation on the ground. Such a situation would make any deployment of a United Nations operation more difficult.”

The CAR’s Head of State of the Transition shared the AU’s view and demanded that before a UN peacekeeping operation could be launched, the forces of MISCA had to deploy first (United Nations Security Council, 2013c).

Debates about the appropriate timing to transfer the responsibility over MISCA to the UN extended to the UNSC level. In contrast to France, which favored a fast deployment of the UN peacekeeping force, the United States and Russia supported the AU’s demand to maintain the control over MISCA for a longer period and preferred a regional response to the conflict (What’s In Blue, 2014c). Financial constraints played a role too. In particular, the US (together with the United Kingdom) were concerned about the costs of a UN operation and wary of establishing a mission financed by the UN but commanded by the AU, as had happened previously with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Bensimon, 2013, Geneste, 2013a, Le Monde, 2013d).

In addition, there were concerns that a UN peacekeeping operation would not be able to meet the security challenges in the CAR. In particular, the US saw advantages in the AU’s more robust rules of engagement which it thought would enable the organization to handle the situation and the disarmament of the Séléka rebels and anti-balaka more effectively than the UN (Welz, 2014: 608-609). “A traditional UN peacekeeping operation will not be able to carry out this type of operations,” insisted the US ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power (so quoted in: Riols, 2014). As a final advantage of MISCA, the US pointed out that in

contrast to the African force which was already operating on the ground, troops would have had to be found for a UN operation. Given these objections within the Council, it was highly unlikely that the UNSC would authorize the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in the short run. Hence, international players' preferences were clearly incompatible with the launch of a UN peacekeeping operation.

In contrast, the French foreign policy executive's intention to deploy a military support operation was certainly compatible with the preferences of regional and international players. Despite disagreement between Council members about the transformation of the AU force into an UN peacekeeping operation, UNSC members agreed that MISCA desperately required support. Moreover, quick action in the CAR was imperative in light of the escalating conflict (Le Monde, 2013f, What's in Blue, 2013b, a). UN officials reinforced these sentiments and insisted that action was urgent. Adam Dieng, the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and John Ging, Director of Operations at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), warned of the risk of genocide (Bensimon, 2013). For his part, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on the Security Council "to authorize immediate and collective action to protect the civilian population from further violence and attacks" (United Nations Security Council, 2013c: 12). He noted the logistic and operational challenges which the African-led Operation MISCA faced and proposed five options to provide international support (United Nations Security Council, 2013c: 6). In a briefing of the Security Council on November 25, Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson reinforced the Secretary-General's sense of urgency, insisting that "prompt and decisive action" was needed (United Nations Security Council, 2013e: 2).

African states did not contest this assessment. AU member states were aware that without financial and logistic support, MISCA would find it difficult to contain the spread of violence in the CAR. The Chairperson of the AU Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, admitted African states' limited capacities in a meeting with General Babacar Gaye, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of BINUCA (French: Bureau intégré de l'organisation des Nations Unies en Centrafrique), on October 7 (What's in Blue, 2013c). These concerns were picked up by the CAR's transitional prime minister (so quoted in: Irish, 2013b) who warned of the grave consequences that neglecting the crisis may cause, demanding that "[e]very effort must be made to stop this." Thus, France's offer to provide support to MISCA was certainly compatible with the preferences of regional and international players. In late November 2013, Mr. Ayebare, the AU's Senior Adviser for Peacebuilding and Development to the UN, welcomed the prospect of the forthcoming

cooperation between MISCA and French forces in a briefing to the UNSC (United Nations Security Council, 2013e: 8).

General agreement among African states and international players regarding necessary intervention in the CAR gave way to smooth negotiations over France's draft resolution and was unanimously adopted by the UNSC on December 5, 2013. As proposed by the French, UNSC Resolution 2127 authorized MISCA to "take all necessary measures" and "the French forces in the CAR, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, and for a temporary period, to take all necessary measures to support MISCA in the discharge of its mandate" (United Nations Security Council, 2013a). Within hours after the resolution's adoption, France doubled Operation Boali's troop strength and launched Operation Sangaris in support of the African-led Operation MISCA (Ministère de la Défense, 2013b).

Table 32: *Domestic preferences and international compatibility in the crisis in the Central African Republic II*

Domestic Level	Domestic Preference/ Foreign Policy Strategy	International Level	Outcome
Consensus	French support operation	Compatibility	Intervention

Source: own illustration.

7.2.2. Results

Although President Hollande, his Defense Minister Le Drian and Foreign Minister Fabius had initially strongly opposed military intervention, they realized that African capacity shortfalls and the deterioration of the conflict would make it difficult to maintain this preference. Despite believing that only UN blue helmets would be able to address the security, political, and institutional challenges in the CAR effectively, they knew that the present conditions made a UN operation difficult. The French foreign policy executive recognized the need to step in and support the Africans and lay the groundwork for the launch of a UN peacekeeping operation. They were particularly concerned that the conflict in the CAR could destabilize the entire Great Lakes and Sahel region and evolve into genocide. These ideational and material factors certainly played a large role in France's decision to abandon its non-interventionist stance. Yet, they only became essential factors in France's decision because African states could not previously contain the crisis. In line with their

initial preference not to intervene, the French foreign policy executive agreed that any engagement by France must be limited.

Domestic consensus around the necessity of French intervention undoubtedly smoothed the way for France's intervention (H1a). All major French state leaders supported the change of strategy and did not lose time taking necessary steps to coordinate foreign policy goals with international actors. Given the strong initial opposition to military intervention, France's international action would have probably been much more uncoordinated had there not been strong domestic consensus that French military support was unavoidable. Furthermore, the French president's second intervention in a former French colony within one year could have been much more politically costly had he acted against the preferences of his cabinet. This is all the more true as both interventions made adjustments to the French military programming law necessary (Assemblée Nationale, 2013a, Ministère de la Défense, 2016).

As France had expected, the launch of a UN peacekeeping operation was clearly incompatible with the goals and preferences of international players at the time[44]. African states wanted to maintain the lead in crisis management and UNSC members opposed the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force for the moment. It was also clear that the launch of a UN force would in any case take several months at least.

Whereas the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force was therefore nonviable under the international conditions at the time, France's intention to launch a support force assisting MISCA was clearly compatible with international players' preferences. African countries were well aware they lacked the resources to handle the situation effectively. In addition, international actors welcomed Paris's initiative because they were concerned that the conflict may descend into genocide. Accordingly, the UNSC was quick to provide legal authorization to MISCA and the French support operation. Relieved of crisis management duties on other

[44] In line with France's preferences, the UN established the peacekeeping mission MINUSCA in April 2014 which later took over the African Union-led mission AFISMA-CAR. Whereas the launch of a UN peacekeeping operation had not been feasible during 2013 due to resistance by African states and some UNSC members as well as hostile conditions within the CAR, a window of opportunity opened during February to April 2014 which rendered France's demand more compatible with international players' preferences. Although MISCA and Operation Sangaris had helped stabilize the situation, it was clear they did not possess the necessary mandates and expertise to address the manifold problems of the CAR. As a result, the UN Secretary-General recommended the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation. His recommendations, the consideration of UNSC member states' budgetary concerns and the delayed deployment of the UN operation contributed to a growing openness among African states and UNSC member states which had previously offered resistance to the launch of a UN peacekeeping operation. On April 10, 2014, UNSC member states authorized the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force MINUSCA through the adoption of Resolution 2149. Hence, a stronger compatibility between the preferences of the French foreign policy executive with international players' preferences clearly facilitated the realization of France's foreign policy goal of launching a UN peacekeeping operation (H2a).

fronts (Mali), France disposed the necessary resources to launch intervention and could deploy Operation Sangaris in support of the AU force MISCA as soon as all actors signed off.

Compatible preferences of regional and international actors evidently facilitated France’s decision to launch the operation (H2a). Had African states succeeded in containing the crisis early on, France would not have had to deploy a support force. Reversely, had UNSC members or African states opposed intervention by France, it would have been more difficult for France to launch intervention. In sum, the outcome of this case is perfectly congruent with the expectations of the three-step model which expects European states to intervene if there is domestic consensus around the use of force and if European states’ preferences are compatible with international players’ preferences (Table 33).

Table 33: *Process-tracing and evidence for intervention in the crisis in the Central African Republic II*

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="2"></td><td colspan="2">Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)</td></tr>
<tr><td>High</td><td>Low</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)</td><td>High</td><td>Doubly decisive test</td><td>Smoking-gun test

H2a: African countries fail to reach envisaged force levels and ask for support. France launches military operation only after UNSC authorization.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Low</td><td>Hoop test

H1a: All major French state leaders agree that intervention is necessary. French officials draft UNSC Resolution and move troops.</td><td>Straw-in-the-wind test

H1a: Concerns over regional destabilization and fear of genocide.

H2a: African state leaders have difficulties to contain the crisis.</td></tr>
</table>

Source: own illustration.

Realist and constructivist theories suggest alternative explanations for France’s intervention in the conflict in the CAR but cannot account for the changes in France’s foreign policy. Constructivists would highlight the escalating crisis, the fear of genocide, and the legitimacy provided by the UNSC resolution as explanatory factors for intervention. These factors indeed provided crucial ideational and normative drivers behind France’s decision to deploy military force. Yet, the authorization of force by the UN only facilitated France’s intervention because of prior domestic consensus in France to lobby for intervention, and owing to

international players' approval. Realists would have emphasized France's desire to maintain its influence in its former colony as the main driver behind intervention. This and the protection of French nationals certainly played a role in France's decision to intervene. However, according to realist and constructivist assumptions, France could have intervened earlier to prevent the crisis from deteriorating further and to ensure its influence in the CAR. Both theories fail to provide a comprehensive account of the shift in French foreign policy preferences. Understanding why France departed from its goal of non-intervention requires a careful consideration of the constraints imposed on Paris's foreign policy goal internationally and the willingness of domestic actors to adjust these goals to international realities.

7.2.3. European hibernation

Although in 2012 President Hollande had promised that France would not carry out military operations in a purely national framework, France launched Operation Sangaris in December 2013. Even though Sangaris provided support to the African-led Operation MISCA, France's European and transatlantic partners remained absent from containing the crisis. Why did France choose to intervene through an ad-hoc operation in the CAR rather than mobilizing its European or transatlantic partners to multilateralize its operation?

As French state leaders planned for a possible military intervention in the CAR, they carried the discussion about the crisis to the European level, as well. Even though the EU had gained experiences with military intervention in the CAR when it deployed the military operation EUFOR Chad/CAR in 2008/2009, European states showed a lack of interest in France's crisis management plans. Following their joint visit to the CAR on October 13, 2013, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius and the EU's Commissioner for International Co-operation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, Kristalina Georgieva, debriefed the Foreign Affairs and General Affairs Councils on the situation in the crisis-stricken country on October 21 and 22, 2013 (European Commission, 2013, House of Commons, 2013b). After the briefing, the Council of the European Union expressed deep concern about the deterioration of the crisis in the CAR and emphasized its support for the actions taken by the AU, ECCAS and regional actors but stressed that "[t]he Central African Republic bears the primary responsibility" to guarantee the protection of civilians, compliance with human rights and international law (Council of the European Union, 2013: 2). The conclusions of the European Council meeting

held on October 24 and 25 did not even mention the conflict in the CAR (European Council, 2013).

Despite the apparent lack of interest among EU states, French EEAS officials drafted plans to deploy an EU battlegroup to the CAR in November 2013. EU battlegroups can be deployed within ten days and thus, could have in principle substituted Operation Sangaris. Never deployed before, the crisis in the CAR would have provided the ideal conditions for their use so practitioners and close observers argued (Tardy, 2015b, EU Member State Defense Counsellors, 2016, Interview 10, 2016). However, apart from minor support by Sweden, the idea did not prove popular among Europeans. In particular, two of the most powerful governments in the EU opposed military intervention. The British government strictly rejected plans to deploy the battlegroups, preventing any official discussion in the EU's military structures such as in the Politico-Military Group (PMG), the PSC or EUMC (Pop, 2013, Nováky, 2016: 98). As the lead nation of the battlegroups and since they opposed intervention for domestic considerations, London held control over the deployment of the forces which blocked the discussions around their use (Nováky, 2016: 98). The UK's Secretary of State for Defense, Mr Philip Hammond (House of Commons, 2013a) insisted:

> "The Government have no intention to deploy UK troops in a combat role and have therefore clearly defined the level of support that we will provide to France."

The UK's engagement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had raised the political threshold for military deployment and produced a British public increasingly hostile to military intervention. An independent observer (so quoted in: The Financial Times, 2013) explained that "the UK public has been traumatized by those conflicts. It is hard to imagine Britain deploying combat troops overseas today unless its core national security were at stake." London did not have any national interests at stake in the conflict and on top of that, the idea of intervening within a European framework did not spark the interest of the traditionally transatlantic-oriented British foreign policy executive, either. "London […] intends to keep its full and complete freedom of action and, above all, without a flag of stars that covers it," noted Gros-Verheyde (2013), in describing Britain's stance.

The German perspective on the conflict reflected similar considerations and constraints. Similar to London, Berlin did not see any direct national interests at stake in the CAR. Indeed, Germany did not even possess a diplomatic representation in the country. A German representative to the EU (Interview 10, 2016) explained Germany's reluctance by highlighting that, "[…] this is not our world region! That's not our focus on Africa. We are already in Mali. We lacked expertise and we had no national interests associated with the

Central African Republic." As a result, during public and political debate in autumn 2013, deployment of troops was not even mentioned as a possibility. The conflict was only discussed in the Bundestag when France requested assistance for Operation Sangaris in December 2013. Germany welcomed France's initiative, the support measures authorized by the UNSC Resolution 2127 of December 5, 2013, and the financial assistance to MISCA through the African Peace Facility (APF) (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013b: 1-2, Deutscher Bundestag, 2013a: 6-7). Yet, pointing to the parliamentary scrutiny the deployment of troops required in Germany, Berlin excluded any direct involvement in the conflict. "It is constitutionally impossible to directly support France during its mission in the Central African Republic," the German State Secretary of Defense Christian Schmidt, a member of the Christian Social Union (CSU),[45] explained.

The majority of other European member states also did not eagerly push for intervention. Although they agreed on the severity of the humanitarian situation, most EU states disposed of very limited expertise about the Central African Republic and did not see why they should get embroiled militarily (Interview 10, 2016, Nováky, 2016: 96). One diplomat (so quoted in: Lasserre, 2013) involved in the matter recognized "a general disinterest in this abandoned country in the heart of Africa […]. In Europe and elsewhere, the trend has been to turn to France."

At the same time, France did not appear to be willing to persuade its European partners to involve militarily in the CAR. France could have tried to influence its EU partners through the many French nationals who work at the EEAS. France has more diplomats and administrative officials working at the EEAS than any other EU member state (Balfour and Raik, 2013: 170). Combined with the unique expertise of French foreign policy officials on the crisis in the CAR through France's historic ties and presence in the country as well as its role at the UN level, France was in the situation to shape the European debate on crisis management. However, with Germany and the UK opposed to military intervention and the rest of EU states similarly reluctant, French foreign policy officials' efforts to push for a European military operation would have probably been in vain. As a result, France doubted that the EU would be able to react timely and decisively to the rapidly deteriorating security situation (Interview 7, 2016). Well aware the frequent European reluctance to engage militarily (see chapters 5.4.1. and 6.3.3.), the launch of a common European operation did not seem to be a priority for French foreign policy makers (EUobserver, 2013d, c, Rettman,

[45] The CSU is the Bavarian sister party of Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU).

2013). Accordingly, a senior EU official (so quoted in: Euractiv, 2013) commented: "We have not received any request from France" to deploy the battlegroups.

More than comprehensive military contributions, Paris desired symbolic and financial support by European states to endow Operation Sangaris with a European coating (Barluet, 2013a, Bruxelles2, 2013, Euractiv, 2013).[46] Accordingly, the French president (so quoted in: Gardner, 2013) explained that:

> "[w]e don't need extra troops but a presence. […]. What I would like to see, politically, is a European presence. That it not be said that 'France is alone'."

In launching an EU operation, Article 44 of the Lisbon Treaty was also considered (Interview 15, 2016). Article 44 entrusts EU action to a group of member states that are willing and capable to deploy military force while others can abstain. It aims at speeding up the deployment of civilian and military missions and enhancing flexibility when usual EU procedures would slow down action (Tardy, 2014). Accordingly, the EU's Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on December 16 pledged,

> "to examine the use of relevant instruments to contribute towards the efforts under way to stabilise the country, including under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), in both its military and civilian dimensions" (General Secretariat of the Council, 2013: 2, 4).

However, just like typical CSDP operations, Article 44 would have required the unanimous consent of the European Council and French foreign policy officials were aware of the opposition by EU states. Instead, they prioritized bilateral channels to garner assistance. French President Hollande shifted his demands on the establishment of a European fund to support member states' unilateral operations at the European Council meeting on December 19 and 20 (EUobserver, 2013c, b, Rettman, 2013). Yet, Angela Merkel (so quoted in: Rettman, 2013) swiftly rebuffed his idea, insisting that "[w]e cannot fund military missions in which we are not involved in the decision process."

As a result of European states' incongruent preferences on deploying force in the Central African Republic, France only acquired bilateral assistance by its European partners through non-combat related activities. The UK and Germany sent transport aircraft with French equipment and troops to the CAR and provided tanker aircraft. Logistic support proved uncontroversial in London and Berlin since it demonstrated solidarity with France but did not involve British and German troops in any combat activities (Heyer et al., 2013, Weiland and Gebauer, 2013). In addition, Poland, Belgium and Spain considered bilateral

[46] Belgium was expected to send 150 troops to secure the airport in Bangui.

measures of support to France, too (EUobserver, 2013a, House of Commons, 2013a, Sallon, 2013).

As incongruent preferences among member states hindered an EU operation, NATO could have offered an alternative framework for a multilateral operation. However NATO countries did not even discuss possible military action in the CAR (Interview 15, 2016). Given that NATO states did not consider common military efforts in the CAR, incongruent preferences cannot comprehensively account for NATO's absence. Realism and constructivism may offer more compelling arguments to explain why involving the transatlantic alliance was not even a subject to debate.

From a realist perspective, the launch of a NATO operation was out of question. The violence in the CAR did not pose a common threat to the alliance and would have also drawn the US into the conflict, risking France's influence in its former colony. However, contrary to realist assumptions, NATO states have at times deployed military force in the absence of a clear-cut external threat to their security. For instance, during the Libya crisis and off the coast of Somalia (Webber et al., 2012: 65). There is also little empirical evidence that France feared US meddling in the CAR. Neither did the US seem to challenge French leadership in the country nor did French state leaders indicate any fear of American meddling. Indeed, Washington welcomed "France's decision to reinforce its military presence" in the CAR and announced that it would provide two C-17 transport aircraft to convey African troops to the CAR and to support MISCA and French forces with military aid (Pop, 2013). Furthermore, the US government made clear that it was not willing to deploy troops to contribute to crisis management efforts (Irish, 2013a, Lynch, 2013, Sallon, 2013). Rather than rejecting US engagement in the CAR, French state leaders welcomed the offer by the US to provide logistical and financial support to MISCA and French forces. They were keen to emphasize the support by France's partners and highlighted that France was not acting unilaterally in its former colony (see comments by Laurent Fabius, in: Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, 2013a).

A constructivist explanation seems to offer the most compelling argument for NATO's absence from humanitarian intervention in the CAR. Constructivism would highlight the mismatch between the transatlantic alliance's strategic culture, shared values and historic experiences on the one hand, and the crisis' characteristics and context on the other. In contrast to the EU, NATO was founded as a collective defense alliance and places stronger emphasis on high-intensity warfighting rather than crisis management and peacekeeping tasks. The eruption of the Ukraine crisis and Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 came as

a stark reminder of the continuing relevance of NATO's focus on collective defense (Dyson and Konstadinides, 2013: 48). As a military representative to the EU and NATO explained:

> "NATO is built for something else, it is more about – let's call it – hard power. It is a purely defensive organization despite attempts to transform it into a security organization. And now with the Ukraine crisis and Russian aggression, it is returning to its traditional role. The EU has different tools, other powerful instruments which work much better in that environment." (Interview 15, 2016).

In addition, NATO does not even possess a strategy on humanitarian intervention in Africa (Gyllensporre, 2012: 185). NATO's missions on the continent have focused on logistical support to the African Union's mission to Darfur and counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. In contrast to the EU, NATO has never deployed troops on the ground in Africa (Gyllensporre, 2012: 186). As a result of the discrepancy between the transatlantic alliance's strategic ambitions and the nature and context of the conflict, NATO had no ambition to intervene militarily in the crisis in the CAR. Diverging preferences among member states may have played a role, albeit a secondary one. Had the US favored NATO's involvement in resolving the conflict in the CAR as it had done in the Libya and Darfur crises, NATO might have provided logistic support to the AU. But given the complete breakdown of law and order in the country, the sectarian violence and the underlying socio-economic grievances of the population, NATO's hard power would simply not have been a good fit to resolve the conflict.

Table 34: *Congruence of preferences among EU and NATO states in the crisis in the Central African Republic II*

Crisis	**Timeframe**	**Congruence of Preferences**		**Outcome**
		EU states	**NATO states**	
Central African Republic	October 2013 – December 2013	Incongruent	n.a.	French ad-hoc intervention

Source: own illustration.

7.2.4. Results

The crisis in the CAR during 2013/2014 could have been an ideal case to finally deploy the EU battlegroups, as some EU practitioners and observers argued. The EU deployed a military operation to the CAR in 2008/2009 and could have drawn upon this previous experience to set up an operation. Although ideational conditions would have been optimal for the deployment of an EU operation, the EU remained absent from containing the crisis in the CAR during December 2013.

Incongruent preferences certainly hindered the EU to intervene in the CAR (H3c). There is evidence that France had a strong preference for an EU-led operation which it privileged over an ad-hoc mission to contain the conflict. Indeed, French EEAS officials drafted a proposal for the deployment of the EU battlegroups in the CAR. However, with Germany and the UK, two of the major EU powers opposed to intervention and the French proposal was doomed to fail. Other member states did not show more interest in drawing up a military operation. Had the UK expressed its interest in intervention, it could have paved the way for the deployment of the EU battlegroups as the UK was in charge of the battlegroups at the time. The EU battlegroups could then have replaced, or at least supported, Operation Sangaris. In all likelihood, Germany would not have obstructed the deployment of the battlegroups and could still have abstained if the UK and others had wished to intervene. Yet, in line with the expectations of the three-step model, incongruent preferences among EU member states indeed hampered the deployment of the EU battlegroups and thus the launch of a common European military operation severely (Table 35).

In contrast to EU member states, NATO countries did not even discuss common military action in the CAR. There is no evidence that France enquired NATO states on a common military operation. With the US, Germany and the UK reluctant to intervene any such initiative would have most likely failed.

Even though incongruent preferences prevented the launch of a common EU operation, alternative explanations for the absence of in particular NATO – and to a lesser degree the EU – cannot be excluded.

Realists would argue that France may have still launched a national operation even if preferences among EU states had been congruent. Indeed, France did not seem eager to put too much effort into persuading its EU partners of a common military action. Instead, Paris prioritized bilateral channels to receive financial and logistic support for Operation Sangaris. France's initial goal, as realists would argue, may well have been to get Europeans to provide

support to Operation Sangaris rather than to substitute it. The fact that France had pre-deployed its troops already by mid-November 2013 strengthens this assumption.

Realists also offer an alternative explanation for NATO's absence as a crisis manager in the CAR. Realists would argue that involving the alliance may have risked France's influence in its former colony, drawing the US into the conflict. In addition, realists would stress that the sectarian violence did not pose a security threat to the alliance. Indeed, given that NATO members did not even discuss the crisis in the CAR and France never proposed common military action, realist assumptions rather than incongruent preferences may have caused NATO's absence. But then again, NATO has launched military operations in crises where its security interests were vague too and the US – rather than competing for influence – supported France's efforts.

Constructivists may provide the most compelling explanation for NATO's non-involvement. Constructivists would place special emphasis on the ideational discrepancy between the transatlantic alliance's strategic culture and the context and characteristics of the crisis. NATO's high-intensity crisis management capabilities would have been inadequate to solve the sectarian conflict in the CAR. Indeed, NATO has never deployed ground troops for this purpose in African countries before. Constructivists would also emphasize that the Ukraine crisis's simultaneous eruption spurred renewed impetus to NATO's traditional role as a collective defense alliance and focused its strategic ambitions elsewhere. Finally, as constructivists would argue, France would have rejected military intervention by the alliance, which traditionally prefers to act through the EU rather than NATO in these issues.

In contrast to their explanation of NATO's absence from intervention, constructivists fail to provide a complete account of France's ad-hoc intervention in the crisis in the CAR. Given the optimal conditions for the deployment of the EU battlegroups and previous experience of crisis management in the CAR, constructivists would have expected the EU to intervene.

In sum, a focus on states' incongruent preferences is crucial in understanding why EU states failed to deploy the battlegroups to the crisis in the CAR and why France intervened through an ad-hoc operation. The lack of any common threat to NATO member states, and in particular, the alliance's strategic culture and focus on high-intensity warfighting seem to be more relevant explanatory factors underlying NATO's absence from crisis management in the CAR.

Table 35: *Process-tracing and evidence for institutional frameworks in the crisis in the Central African Republic II*

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td colspan="2">Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td>High</td><td>Low</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)</td><td>High</td><td>Doubly decisive test</td><td>Smoking-gun test

H3c: Majority of member states reject French proposal even though conditions were optimal for deployment.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Low</td><td>Hoop test

H3c: EU states discuss crisis and possible military operation.

H3c (failed): NATO states did not discuss the launch of a common military operation. NATO’s distinct military identity and the absence of a common threat probably played a more important role.</td><td>Straw-in-the-wind test

H3c (failed): France did not seek to persuade EU member states of common operation, considered use of Art. 44.</td></tr>
</table>

Source: own illustration.

7.3. EUFOR CAR and the limits of cooperation in the CAR III

Even though the prospects of a common European military operation looked bleak in late December 2013, European states agreed to deploy a military operation under the auspices of the EU just two months later, in February 2014. Why did European states deploy a common military operation even though some member states had openly opposed intervention and others had shown little interest in drawing up a CSDP operation?

7.3.1. French power and European acquiescence

Despite the equipment of the African-led mission MISCA with a robust UN mandate and the deployment of the French support force, violent clashes continued in the CAR during December 2013 (Figure 7) (Willsher, 2013). In December 2013 alone, 1,000 people lost their lives (Rettman, 2014a). The massacres reinforced concerns that the CAR was on the brink of genocide. In mid-January 2014, John Ging (Smith, 2014) raised alarm bells and warned that the conflict

> "has all the elements that we have seen elsewhere, in places like Rwanda and Bosnia. The elements are there, the seeds are there, for a genocide. There's no question about that."

To make matters worse, France's Operation Sangaris was criticized by both conflicting parties. The ex-Séléka rebels criticized the disarmament by the French forces, feeling that they were left defenseless against the attacks by the anti-balaka. Conversely, the anti-balaka blamed French troops for not doing enough to stop the conflict and disarm the ex-Séléka forces. To top it all off, criticism was also levelled against contingents of the AU-led Operation who were accused of siding with one or the other camp (Jaulmes, 2013).

In light of the persisting difficulties of French forces in containing the inter-communal violence between Muslims and Christians in the CAR, French foreign policy officials had to admit their underestimation of the conflict's severity (The Economist, 2014). In mid-January 2014, Gerard Araud (so quoted in: BBC NEWs, 2014), French ambassador to the UN conceded that "[w]e knew that there was some inter-sectarian violence, but we didn't forecast such deep ingrained hatred." He further judged that the situation was "nearly impossible" to manage for French troops. Similarly, a source (so quoted in: Lasserre, 2014) at the French Ministry of Defense told the French newspaper *Le Figaro* that:

> "We thought we were dealing with armed gangs that had taken control of the mining wealth of the country. In fact, the Séléka rebels had a real political project. They moved

> to Bangui to take power. To think that our arrival would be enough to frighten them was an evaluation error."

Despite the ever-deteriorating security situation in the CAR, French President Hollande refused to increase the troop strength of Operation Sangaris. Instead, the French president hoped to convince European partners that their support in protecting the airport in Bangui, medical assistance, and humanitarian action was required at the meeting of EU foreign ministers on January 20, 2014 (Gardner, 2014b). The idea was also supported by Defense Minister Le Drian, who hoped that the launch of an EU military operation would increase the tactical scope of French forces and allow France to withdraw some troops from Operation Sangaris (Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, 2014b, Commission des Finances, 2014). This would not only provide relief for the French forces but also help Le Drian to implement his promise in keeping the deployment of French forces limited. It would further facilitate the transition from the AU operation to a UN peacekeeping force (Lasserre, 2014).

On top of operational shortcomings, French state leaders felt increasing domestic pressure to involve Europeans in the CAR. Although the launch of Operation Sangaris on December 5, 2013, had received wide-spread support in parliament, domestic approval of the intervention went hand-in-hand with the demand to integrate France's efforts in a multilateral framework and to involve Europeans in the resolution of the conflict. Mirroring wide-spread sentiments among French politicians (Assemblée Nationale, 2013a), former Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin (2013) penned an opinion piece in *Le Monde* following the launch of Operation Sangaris, arguing that:

> "France has the duty to act but the prohibition to act alone. […] France has to act in a European framework. It is a European force […] which has to be mobilized and not a French force."

Despite initial disagreement in December 2013, the discussion among EU member states on a European military operation moved forward rapidly in January and February 2014. A proposal drafted by the EEAS in January 2014 stressed that "[r]estoration of security can only be achieved through increasing the military presence on the ground" (Rosemberg, 2014).[47] On January 10, 2014, the EU's PSC approved the EEAS proposal and agreed to deploy an EU military operation to secure the environment in Bangui. At their meeting on January 20,

[47] The first option envisaged by the EEAS' proposal comprised the rapid deployment of forces to stabilize the situation in Bangui through policing, safeguarding the airport and the protection of refugees and aid workers. The second option consisted of force deployment in the west of the country to protect the corridor to Cameroon.

the foreign ministers of the member states then approved the Crisis Management Concept and highlighted that "political agreement on a future CSDP military operation" had been reached. The Council (Council of the European Union, 2014: 1) further noted that:

> "[t]he operation will provide temporary support, for a period of up to six months, to help to achieve a secure environment in the Bangui area, with a view to handing over to the AU. This objective takes full account of UN Security Council Resolution 2127, and in particular of the possibility of MISCA being transformed into a UN peacekeeping operation."

As requested by the European Council (2014) on January 20, the United Nations Security Council authorized the EU to deploy a military operation to the CAR on January 28 through Resolution 2134, which authorized the EU "to take all necessary measures within the limits of its capacities and areas of deployment" (United Nations Security Council, 2014d: 11). Why did EU member states so rapidly decrease their resistance and launch an EU military operation?

Although member states discussed the crisis at several EU meetings and finally reached agreement, statements displaying the motives of their support were rare. EU states argued that their absence from crisis management was no longer justifiable given the intensifying security and humanitarian situation and the fear that terrorist networks would settle in the country (Rosemberg, 2014, Interview 5, 2016, Interview 10, 2016, Interview 12, 2016). However, even though EU member states had agreed on the launch and objectives of the operation, the majority of states continued to view a common military intervention in the CAR with doubts. Although the operation had been planned under the EU's fast-track procedure, reducing the CSDP planning process to the most essential steps, six troop contribution conferences were necessary to attain the planned strength of the operation (Nováky, 2016: 100-101). French officials engaged in several bilateral conversations and put pressure on fellow EU countries to overcome the capability shortfalls. During an EU summit on March 20-21, 2014, President Hollande (so quoted in: EUbusiness, 2014) again called on EU states to help fill the gaps, fearing that member states' were risking "Europe's credibility." However, troops remained scarce. Greece argued that the mission's conceptual deficiencies and financial restraints prevented it from contributing troops. To show its solidarity, Athens offered the Greek Headquarter in Larissa as the Operational Headquarter (Nováky, 2016: 98-101). Italy in turn justified its non-participation by economic difficulties and domestic politics, while Denmark pointed to its substantial engagement in Afghanistan to explain its limited support (Gros-Verheyde, 2013). The UK and Germany also stayed reluctant to contribute troops to the EU's military operation. The UK eventually sent a staff

officer to support the work of EUFOR CAR at the headquarters, whereas Germany strengthened its contribution to the crisis management efforts in Mali to free up French resources there (Gebauer, 2014, House of Commons, 2014c). Finally, rather than worrying about the crisis in the CAR, the majority of EU member states' had focused on the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in their neighborhood (Interview 12, 2016, Krotz and Maher, 2016: 1058-1060, Nováky, 2016: 103-104).

Congruent preferences can therefore not explain the agreement among EU states and the launch of the common military operation. Rather, EU states' agreement to send an EU operation to the CAR seemed to be a sign of solidarity to France (Rettman, 2014b, Interview 3, 2016, Interview 5, 2016). As a national representative to the EU explained:

> "We didn't see ourselves at the forefront in the CAR. Our position at the time was that if the French are motivated to do this, we don't stay in their way. They have the means to do this" (Interview 5, 2016).

Similarly, Nováky (2016: 103) finds that:

> "[s]ince launching the operation was considered urgent, EU Member States had been approving the plans presented to them by the EEAS out of a sense of 'collective responsibility' rather than genuine consent."

Given that EU states established a common military operation while their preferences were mixed at best, the preferences of the more powerful states must have influenced the outcome more than the overall preference distribution.

As French foreign policy officials grasped their underestimation of the dreadful security situation in the CAR, they engaged in a series of bilateral meetings with the EU's two major powers, Germany and the UK, that had fiercely resisted the launch of a common European operation in December 2013. Berlin had markedly lessened its opposition to a European military operation following the discord with France at the European Council summit in December 2013. Berlin's change of course followed a more general shift in German foreign policy initiated by the country's foreign policy elite in the beginning of 2014. At the yearly Munich security conference in January 2014, Germany's Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen (so quoted in: Rettman, 2014c) announced that the federal government was

> "prepared to enhance our international responsibility. […] We are willing to reinforce our contribution to efforts in Mali and, if needed, to support the European mission in the Central African Republic."

The defense minister's remarks were echoed by Germany's President Joachim Gauck (so quoted in: Rettman, 2014c) who noted that "Germany should make a more substantial contribution and should make it earlier and more decisively in order to be a good partner."

At the bilateral meeting with the French Foreign Minister on January 21 – the third of such meetings within four weeks – Germany's Foreign Minister Steinmeier emphasized his endorsement of the French engagement in the CAR, highlighting how France should not be left alone in their endeavor. Both ministers also stressed the importance of Franco-German collaboration in European foreign affairs (Auswärtiges Amt, 2014).

The UK-France summit on January 31 drew similar conclusions underlining that "the EU's operations and missions in Africa, including in Mali and CAR, are making an important contribution to our security" (UK government, 2014b). The UK's resistance to a common military operation notably decreased as it handed the leadership of the battlegroups to Greece in January 2014 (Interview 12, 2016). This did not fundamentally alter the preference of the UK which remained reluctant to engage directly in intervention. It did, however, open the door to a common European military operation (Nováky, 2016: 100). A national representative involved in the discussions over the launch of the EU operation remarked that:

> "there is an understanding between the French and the Brits. The Brits let the French go ahead in one part of Africa and the French let the Brits go ahead in another part of Africa or other issue areas. Sometimes it just depends on a good chat between the ministers" (Interview 5, 2016).

In addition to Germany and the UK's increased openness towards a common European military operation, member states agreed to a range of compromises to accommodate their diverging preferences. The EEAS proposal of January 2014 took note of member states' resistance to the deployment of the EU battlegroups which had been heftily opposed by the UK and later Greece – the new lead-nation of the Hellas-Bulgaria-Romania-Cyprus (HELBROC) battlegroups as of January 2014. Instead it proposed member states to contribute troops to an EU operation on a voluntary basis (Gardner, 2014a).

What's more, the PSC's decision of January 10 limited the deployment area of the EU's force to the 3rd and 5th district of the capital Bangui and the M'Poko airport rather than to the west of the country. Member states felt that this was the more secure option. It also accommodated the UK's preference to keep the operation geographically limited and President Hollande had highlighted the area as France's preferred option at the EU summit in December 2013 (Rettman, 2014b, Nováky, 2016: 100-101).

In addition, to accommodate the UK's preferences regarding the length of the operation, the Council decision of February 4 limited the duration of the EU operation from four to six months with the aim to "contribute to the provision of a safe and secure environment." Envisaged as a bridging operation, EUFOR CAR would then hand over responsibility to the African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (AFISM-CAR). The objective of the mission would be in establishing and guaranteeing security in the capital Bangui, the protection of civilians, and to create the conditions for the delivery of humanitarian aid (Council of the European Union, 2014: 1-2).

On April 2, the EU force could finally be deployed with a troop strength of 800 personnel (Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, 2014c: 5, Nováky, 2016: 102-104). Owing to member states' reluctance to contribute troops, the operation depended largely on the resources and commitment of France which provided the bulk of the personnel (400 troops) (Présidence de la République, 2014). It was followed by Georgia, a third country. In addition to France, only eight other EU member states, namely Spain, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, and Romania deployed personnel to the operation (France in South Sudan. Embassy in Juba, 2014). Significantly, France was again central in commanding the operation as it wanted to facilitate coordination with Operation Sangaris by appointing the French Major General Philippe Pontiès as the Operation Commander.

Table 36: *Congruence of preferences and power resources among EU states in the crisis in the Central African Republic III*

Crisis	**Timeframe**	**Congruence of Preferences (EU)**	**Power resources**	**Outcome**
Central African Republic III	January 2014 – March 2014	Mixed	Medium-High (France)	EU intervention

Source: own illustration.

7.3.2. Results

As fighting between the Séléka and anti-Balaka continued in the CAR despite France's support to MISCA, French foreign policy officials admitted how they underestimated the conflict's severity. France appealed to EU states to support France's efforts in order to get the conflict finally under control. Even though EU heads of state had been at odds over the intervention issue in the CAR at their summit in December 2013, they agreed to mount an EU military operation: EUFOR CAR. EU states emphasized the appalling humanitarian situation and concerns that terrorists could settle in the region to justify their change of heart. Although ideational and material factors certainly played a role, these concerns were not sufficient to motivate member states to mobilize resources for intervention later on. Even though member states shared the view that the conflict in the CAR needed to be contained, their preferences on military intervention still diverged. Hence, preferences alone cannot have caused the establishment of EUFOR CAR.

Instead, France's preferences influenced the choice of the institutional framework for the conduct of military operations in the CAR more strongly than other member states' preferences (H3b). France pulled its weight behind the launch of a common European military operation as it felt the difficulty in containing the worsening conflict. To achieve its foreign policy goal, France engaged in bilateral meetings with member states and asked them to provide their consent and resources. In return, several compromises made the operation acceptable to member states. Because member states did not want to obstruct the military mission and demonstrate their solidarity with France, they ultimately provided their consent. The EU's most powerful member states in particular, Germany and the UK, eased their reservations over the launch of a common military operation but made clear that they did not want to participate. In consequence, EUFOR CAR remained first and foremost a French-led operation with a European coating. Accordingly, the launch of EUFOR CAR is in line with hypothesis 3b which predicts that when states' preferences are mixed, the preferences of the most powerful states will influence the outcome more than those of other states (Table 37).

Realists would largely arrive at the same conclusion. Similar to the three-step model, realists would argue that EUFOR CAR was ultimately contingent on the willingness of France to initiate and lead the operation. In addition, realists would stress that EUFOR CAR chiefly served French interests in its former colony. Yet, the complex logic of domestic preferences and international constraints which generated France's initiative at the EU level goes beyond the realist theory's reach. In contrast, constructivists would highlight the

humanitarian concerns stressed by EU heads of state to account for the launch of EUFOR CAR. From a constructivist perspective, the EU deployed military force because the operation in the conflict-stricken country affirmed the organizations' norms, values, and principles. Even if these factors played a role, constructivists find difficulty explaining why EU states were not prepared to uphold their shared values and principles and contribute to the military operation. In sum, a focus on the interplay between French domestic preferences, its powerful position within the EU, and international constraints on French foreign policy goals best explains why EU member states launched a common military operation.

Table 37: *Process-tracing tests and evidence for institutional frameworks in the crisis in the Central African Republic III*

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="2"></td><td colspan="2">Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)</td></tr>
<tr><td>High</td><td>Low</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)</td><td>High</td><td>Doubly decisive test</td><td>Smoking-gun test
H3b: EU states launched intervention despite partly diverging preferences and in the absence of common threat.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Low</td><td>Hoop test
H3b: France urged for EU military operation.</td><td>Straw-in-the-wind test
H3b: France underestimated the situation's severity. France accepts compromises to the EU operation, France was the main provider of troops.</td></tr>
</table>

Source: own illustration.

Figure 8: *Fatalities by type in the Central African Republic, January 2013-April 2014*



Own compilation, data source: ACLED (2017).

8. The Fight against Boko Haram (2014 – 2015)

In April 2014, the brutal activities of one of the world's most deadliest terrorist groups came into the limelight when 276 school girls were abducted in Nigeria's Northern state Borno (Die Zeit Online, 2015). While the Boko Haram terrorists[48] had not systematically used violence to enforce a strict implementation of Sharia law in Nigeria and fight against Western influence in Africa before, they turned increasingly radical and intensified their fight against the Nigerian state as of 2009 (Chothia, 2015, Home Office, 2015: 11). Since July 2014, Boko Haram pursued a strategy of escalation and unrestrained violence, it strengthened ties to Al Qaida and declared that it aimed at establishing a Caliphate in West Africa in September 2014. In March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the militant jihadist group of the Islamic State (IS)[49] and copied IS tactics by using human bombs and young girls to carry out its ruthless attacks on cities and villages (Blair, 2015, Home Office, 2015: 21-22, Locke et al., 2015, The Guardian, 2015).

For a long time, Boko Haram was regarded as Nigeria's problem. The terrorist attacks had primarily concentrated on state institutions in Nigeria's north-eastern states. However, since 2013, Boko Haram increasingly descended on Nigeria's neighboring states Cameroon, Chad, and Niger and targeted civilians of both Christian and Islamic faiths, churches, schools, and universities alike (Ploch Blanchard, 2014: 4-6, US Department of State, 2014: 36). In 2014, Boko Haram took control of three towns and several communities in Cameroon's far north. In 2015, the terrorists committed more than 80 terrorist attacks in Cameroon, Niger and Chad (International Crisis Group, 2016: 12, Ploch Blanchard, 2016: 11, International Crisis Group, 2017a: i, International Crisis Group, 2017b: 10). As a result of Boko Haram's strategy of escalation and territorial expansion around Lake Chad, the terrorist group surpassed IS as the world's deadliest terrorist movement with a death toll of 6,664 people killed in 2015 alone, an increase by 317 percent in fatalities compared to the previous year (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015: 4). By January 2015, the terrorist group had expanded its control over a territory of between 20,000 and 30,000 square miles and controlled all three borders of Nigeria's Borno state with Chad, Cameroon and Niger (Barnes, 2015, House of Commons, 2015b, Oladipo, 2015). By October 2015, Boko Haram's brutal attacks had cost the lives of 17,000 people in total and displaced more than 2.5 million people

[48] The real name of the terrorist grouping is 'Sunni Community for the propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad' (Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad).
[49] The Islamic State is also known under its Arabic acronym Daesh, ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria).

in Nigeria's north-east (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2015, Teissier, 2015: 30).

8.1. Non-intervention in the fight against Boko Haram

Even though European states had used military power against terrorists in several other occasions including the fight against Al Qaida in Afghanistan, Tuareg rebels in Mali, and ISIL in Iraq and Syria, and although geostrategic factors and humanitarian concerns would have clearly justified military intervention, European states refused to interfere with force and limited their activities to counterterrorism cooperation with Nigeria. The military combat of Boko Haram was mainly left to regional forces (Faul and Meldrum, 2014, Haaretz, 2014, Irish and Felix, 2014, Lunn, 2014: 4, Ploch Blanchard, 2014: 12). Why, despite the grave humanitarian situation and concerns about the very real rise of terrorism, did European states leave the fight against Boko Haram to regional states?

8.1.1. Intelligence and training, but no further assistance (wanted)

The French and British governments were the most active Western players in the fight against Boko Haram. After the abduction of the Chibok school girls, France and the UK were fast to offer their assistance in finding them. Representatives of both states expressed their shock over the horrific attacks committed by the terrorist group and asked for immediate action. Foreign Minister Fabius (Faul and Meldrum, 2014) stressed that "[i]n the face of such an appalling act, France, like other democratic nations, must react. This crime will not go unpunished." The French president (so quoted in: Jacinto, 2014) further promised Nigeria to assist the country in its fight against Boko Haram, stating that: "Your struggle is also our struggle." […] "We will always stand ready not only to provide our political support but our help every time you need it, because the struggle against terrorism is also the struggle for democracy."

In a similar vein, the UK's Prime Minister Cameron (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2014b) condemned the abduction of 276 school girls as "an act of pure evil" and promised that "Britain stands ready to provide any assistance, working closely with the US, as immediately as we can."

On the request by the Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, Paris organized a security summit on May 17, 2014, at which the governments of Nigeria, Mali, Chad, Benin,

Cameroon and Niger together with French, American, British, and European Union representatives pledged to form a coalition against Boko Haram. At the summit, the state leaders decided to strengthen intelligence sharing regarding terrorism and arms trafficking, coordinate the activities of their armed forces and military missions in Africa, and to conduct joint border patrols (Irish and Pineau, 2014, Présidence de la République, 2014). What's more, building on previous cooperation in security matters (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014), London and Abuja further deepened their cooperation on counterterrorism. The UK provided military advice, surveillance assets trained Nigerian specialists in counterterrorism, assisted with the establishment of a response mechanism in case of terrorist attacks, and signed a memorandum of understanding on bilateral military cooperation (Norton-Taylor, 2013, Lunn, 2014: 4-5, UK Government, 2014a: 7, Comolli, 2015: 148-149).

However, despite France and the UK's willingness to support the fight against Boko Haram, state representatives from both countries made clear that a military offensive against the terrorists was not an option they considered. Shortly after the security summit held in Paris on May 17, French President Hollande (France in the United States. Embassy of France in Washington D. C., 2014) stressed that:

> "[w]e can give it [the Nigerian army] information, we can support it in terms of training, but there's no question of France intervening militarily. What we've decided on is military in the sense that it may have implications in terms of the use of force, but it's firstly intelligence, information and coordination."

Singing from the same hymn sheet, French Defense Minister Le Drian (so cited in: Aljazeera, 2015) emphasized that France did "not intend to take part in the fighting."

Similar to France's initial reluctance in the crisis in the CAR and Côte d'Ivoire, the French foreign policy executive insisted that African states would be mainly responsible for fighting the Boko Haram terrorists. Jean-Christophe Belliard, Director of Africa and the Indian Ocean to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2015a: 8) explained that:

> "it is important that the African countries are capable to solve their problems themselves. We do no longer have the vocation to intervene here and there in Africa; on the contrary, we can help the Africans to act by themselves."

French Foreign Minister Fabius (so quoted in: Commission d'enquête sur la surveillance des filières et des individus djihadistes, 2015: 11, italics added) even expressed his surprise that:

> "it is France which is called upon to combat Boko Haram in Nigeria, *a former British colony*. This is a great credit of esteem but we can only act with the means at our disposal and we do not want to take the place of the Africans to solve their problems. We

wish that they equip themselves with military means and that the African Union and the UN work together in a convergent manner."

Unlike France's close relationship to some of its former colonies such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, Paris's links with Nigeria were rather weak which reinforced the French foreign policy executive's reluctance to engage in the fight against Boko Haram. For many years the relationship between the two countries was tense. President Hollande's visit to Abuja in February 2014 was only the second visit of a French president to Nigeria in one hundred years (Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, 2014a, Dautreppe, 2014: 7). No defense treaties or military cooperation agreements existed that connect France to many of its former colonies and provide for French military assistance, training, and support in case of internal turmoil, instability, or external aggression (Charbonneau, 2008: 60-61, Sénat, 2016). Le Drian (so quoted in: Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, 2015a: 13) explained that:

> "We are not present there [in Nigeria] and to be clear, we do not have the intention to go directly into combat. If one of our allies, like Niger or Chad would need our support, we would provide it […]. Our mission in the region covers assistance, advice, intelligence in the framework of the coordination and cooperation cell installed in N'Djamena for the areas which fall under the commando of operation Barkhane."

This does not imply that Boko Haram did not concern Paris. On the contrary, French officials feared that the terrorist group would use the security vacuum in other African countries (in particular the Central African Republic which experienced a civil war simultaneously) to establish a terrorist hub and destabilize the entire Sahel Sahara region (Assemblée Nationale, 2014, Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, 2014c, Commission des affaires étrangères, 2014)."There still is a major risk that jihadists develop in the area that runs from the Horn of Africa to Guinea-Bissau," noted the French Defense Minister (so quoted in: Balt, 2014). In August 2014, security concerns propelled France to reorganize its troops in the Sahel Sahara region and to launch Operation Barkhane[50] as a follow-up to Operation Serval in Mali and Operation Epervier in Chad. The new operation tangibly embodied France's strategy of encouraging African countries to take responsibility for their own problems while refraining from military intervention itself. Based in Chad's capital

[50] Operation Barkhane, some 20 helicopters, 200 tanks, 6 fighter aircraft, 3 drones and 10 transport aircraft (Ministère de la Défense France, 2014). In addition, operation Barkhane could draw upon 1000 troops deployed to a regional base in Gao, in northern Mali, an intelligence center with 300 troops in Niger and special forces in Burkina Faso. See: MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE FRANCE. 2014. *Lancement de l'opération Barkhane, 01 August 2014* [Online]. Available: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/actualites/lancement-de-l-operation-barkhane [Accessed 10 November 2015. Also see: LARIVÉ, Maxime H. A. 2014a. Welcome to France's New War on Terror in Africa: Operation Barkhane. *The National Interest, 7 August 2014* [Online]. Available: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-frances-new-war-terror-africa-operation-barkhane-11029 [Accessed 10 November 2015].

N'Djamena, the primary aim of Operation Barkhane was to assist Burkina-Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad in fighting Islamist extremists in the region. However, the combat of the Boko Haram terrorists only formed a secondary priority for France and Barkhane's mandate primarily focused on the fight against Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) (Ministère de la Défense, 2013a, France in the United States. Embassy of France in Washington D. C., 2014, Gnanguênon, 2014, Haaretz, 2014, Irish and Felix, 2014, Le Drian, 2014, Griffin, 2015: 26). On top of this, Barkhane's activities were focused on counterterrorism in its former colonies; the fight of the Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria did not fall under the operation's mandate.[51]

Finally, even if Paris so desired, it would have been difficult for France to extend the mandate of Barkhane and its area of operations even farther (Griffin, 2016: 907-908). Although the deployment of Operation Barkhane "made France the largest non-African military force on the continent," French troops were relatively thin stretched given the vast territory they covered (Chivvis, 2016: 154). Since 2013, France had launched four major military operations[52] which doubled the number of troops deployed in external operations from 11,440 to 20,900 between 2012 and 2013. In parallel, spending for operations increased by 43.2% within two years (European Defence Agency, 2015: 58-62). The surge in operations considerably stretched French armed forces and required an actualization of the *loi de programmation militaire*, the French military planning law (Bui, 2015: 43, Ministère de la Défense, 2015: 5)[53]. Hence, additional commitments would have made it challenging for France to take a leading role in fighting Boko Haram.

Similar to their French counterparts, the British foreign policy executive made clear that its assistance would not go beyond military advice, training, and intelligence cooperation. This does not imply that military force was not considered. On the contrary, individual politicians in the House of Commons reflected using more robust means to fight Boko Haram (see statements by MP Bob Stewart and MP John Redwood in: House of

[51] Interestingly, Operation Barkhane was not explicitly authorized by the UNSC. The French viewed Barkhane as a continuation of existing operations and a reorganization of its troops in the Sahel Sahara region and not as a foreign intervention. See: TARDY, Thierry 2016a. France: the unlikely return to UN peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping,* 23**,** 610-629.
[52] This includes Operation Serval to counter the terrorist revolt in Mali, Operation Sangaris to stop the civil war in the CAR, Operation Chammal to contain the expansion of ISIL in Syria and Iraq and Operation Barkhane to the fight terrorist groups in the Sahel.
[53] A large majority of the parliament voted in favour of the actualisation of the loi de programmation (with 438 votes for the adoption, 86 against and 42 abstentions). See: ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE. 2015. *Analyse du scrutin n° 1109; Deuxième séance du 05/05/2015; Scrutin public sur l'ensemble du projet de loi relatif au renseignement (première lecture), 05 May 2015* [Online]. Available: http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/scrutins/detail/(legislature)/14/(num)/1109 [Accessed 01 January 2018.

Commons, 2015a) but the deployment of UK troops was quickly ruled out by the UK government: “[n]o British troops will be deployed in that role [to get decent intelligence and provide reassurance to the population] in Nigeria” (House of Commons, 2015a). Instead, Hugo Swire, the Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office argued (so quoted in: House of Commons, 2015a) that “[t]he best thing we can do is what we have done, which is provide satellite imagery, training, and surveillance and intelligence assistance to the Nigerian authorities.”

In contrast to French foreign policy officials, who simply had their priorities elsewhere, the British government’s main concerns were of an ideational nature. London in particular was alarmed at the Nigerian army’s approach to counterterrorism operations and the security forces’ brutal crackdown on communities in their search for Boko Haram terrorists (House of Commons, 2014a, UK Parliament, 2014, House of Commons, 2015a). The Nigerian security forces’ approach to counterterrorism made the British government uneasy with regards to Nigerian demand for military training and assistance. A parliamentary report on the UK’s response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa noted that:

> “[a]longside the very understandable human rights concerns, it appears that the UK Government is anxious about the possibility of advice and training given in good faith being subsequently misused in a field setting, and of the British officer who provided the training becoming implicated” (UK Parliament, 2014).

Even more bluntly, the Head of the Counter-Terrorism Department, Simon Shercliff (UK Parliament, 2014) emphasized that:

> “what we cannot do, and cannot afford to do ... is to blindly go into these alliances with countries that are wilfully and openly transgressing international human rights norms. That is something that our democracy doesn't stand for. We cannot afford to be, for example, handing over intelligence on Nigerian terrorists for the Nigerians then to go and find the people and hang them up by their toenails. .... So we assist the Nigerians to go round the place and find the terrorists, because that is very much in our national interest, and at the same time—from the top level of political exhortation to the practical capacity building level—we continually exhort them to do their work while maintaining international standards of human rights. You can't do one without the other.”

Moreover, the UK government viewed the Boko Haram extremists primarily as a “regional threat.” The terrorists did not pose direct risks to the UK’s own security and therefore did not require Britain to take military action. According to the British government, the response to the terrorists therefore had to be coordinated by regional actors rather than international players. A government report on extremism and instability in North and West Africa noted that:

> “while extremists in the region do not currently pose an ‘existential threat’ to the UK, they remain a significant threat in the region. Our assessment remains that extremists in the area are currently not capable of conducting attacks on the UK mainland. Their focus remains on activities within the region, which can still impact on British nationals and interests. Most terrorist groups in the region are motivated by the local struggle, and so do not target UK interests directly” (UK Government, 2014a: 9).

British senior officials were also convinced that regional actors, in particular Nigeria, possessed the necessary resources to fight Boko Haram. This made external interference redundant and assistance would therefore only be required to support the Nigerian government through advisory tasks. In line with this, the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hugo Swire (House of Commons, 2015a) emphasized that:

> “Nigeria is one of the richest countries in Africa and it spends 20% of its own budget on defence expenditure. In the normal course of events, it should be able to handle these things itself, but it cannot, and that is why we are providing assistance to enable it to do so.”

In accordance with France and Britain’s restrained approach to the fight against Boko Haram, the foreign policy executives of both countries kept their international activities limited. Rather than taking a key stance at the UN as France had done in the crisis in the CAR, Côte d’Ivoire, and Libya, Paris did not make any particular efforts to put the Boko Haram crisis on the agenda of the UNSC. As a result, France’s ambassador to the UN did not even explicitly mention Boko Haram in the UNSC’s first discussion of the Boko Haram threat on June 19, 2014, within the framework of the UN’s integrated strategy for the Sahel. Instead, the ambassador focused his statements on the crisis in Mali and France’s efforts in resolving the conflict there (United Nations Security Council, 2014a: 6-7). Britain was not much more active internationally to advance the fight against Boko Haram. However, because meetings were often held informally, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive assessment of Britain and France’s activities and statements in the UNSC (United Nations Security Council, 2014b, a, 2015c, a).

Table 38: *Domestic preferences on intervention in the fight against Boko Haram*

Country	Consensus/ Opposition	Domestic preference
France	Opposition	Non-intervention
United Kingdom	Opposition	Non-intervention

Source: own illustration.

The refusal by the French and British foreign policy executive to intervene in the fight against Boko Haram and their preference for a regional solution to the problem was compatible with international level conditions.

The main opponent of foreign interference in the fight against Boko Haram was the Nigerian government itself. Despite the increase in the frequency and lethality of Boko Haram's attacks during the first three months of 2014[54], the Nigerian regime was highly reluctant to address the crisis publicly. The government in Abuja made clear that it was wary of foreign interference and accepted France, the UK, the US and Canada's offers of assistance in finding the girls just three weeks after they had been issued (Coons, 2014, Griffin, 2015: 2). Nigeria's lack of urgency irritated foreign powers and considerably hindered attempts to pacify the crisis. The British Minister of State (House of Commons, 2015a) explained that:

> "the UK is at the forefront of trying to assist Nigeria, but we cannot impose assistance if it is not asked for. There is something called sovereignty […] and the Nigerian Government are perhaps, as I have said, too slow to ask the international community for help."

Similarly, French Defense Minister Le Drian (so quoted in: Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, 2015a: 13) reiterated that "there was no demand for intervention in Nigeria." Due to the membership of Nigeria in the UNSC during 2014 and 2015 and the country's presidency of the Council in April 2014, Nigeria hindered serious discussions on the crisis in the UNSC and hence international initiatives to fight Boko Haram. On top of this, the other UNSC member states disagreed on the appropriate response to the attacks and were in disagreement on a common statement condemning the terrorist assaults. Whereas Australia, France, Luxembourg, the UK, and the US wanted to include a reference to the ICC to hold violators of human rights and law accountable, Chad, Russia, and Rwanda opposed the inclusion of such reference (United Nations Security Council, 2014c, What's in Blue, 2014b). Due to the sensitivity of the issue for the Nigerian government and divisions among UNSC members, a formal Council reaction only followed on January 19, 2015, with the adoption of the first presidential statement on Boko Haram (What's in Blue, 2014a, United Nations Security Council, 2015d, What's in Blue, 2015b). Given the divisions among Council members and Nigeria's refusal to discuss the crisis, military intervention by external powers would have incited tensions, possibly incited open conflict with Nigeria, and would have lacked the legal grounds. Since the UN Security

[54] According to a report by Amnesty International, 1,500 people were killed.

Council had difficulties approving a presidential statement on Boko Haram, the adoption of a UNSC resolution on the terrorist group was essentially out of reach.

What's more, even if Nigeria had been more open to discussing the Boko Haram problem, external intervention would have been unnecessary from a military perspective. Indeed, activism by regional states helped contain the terrorists, rendering international action against Boko Haram unnecessary (Figure 9 and 10). While Nigeria's neighbors had been slow to respond to the terrorist threat they mainly viewed as an internal problem of Nigeria, a series of deadly attacks on border communities in Cameroon's far north in 2014 rapidly changed the dynamics and propelled regional states to counter the terrorists (International Crisis Group, 2016: i-ii, International Crisis Group, 2017b: 8-9). Following the assaults, Cameroon declared war on the terrorist group and deployed 4,000 troops to rein in the threat (International Crisis Group, 2016: 11). The national response was soon succeeded by a regional initiative. After a regional summit in Niamey on October 7, 2014, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria – the so-called Lake Chad Basin Commission members – and Benin declared their decision to deploy a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) as off 1 November 2014 to fight the Boko Haram terrorists militarily (Security Council Report, 2014).

The initiative met with wide-spread approval among African states. At its meeting on January 29, 2015, the AU's PSC welcomed and officially authorized "the deployment of the MNJTF, for an initial period of twelve months renewable and for a strength that could go up to 7,500 military and other personnel" (African Union, 2015). The mandate of the MNJTF included, among other things, the "conduct [of] military operations to prevent the expansion of Boko Haram and activities of other terrorist groups, and eliminate their presence" (African Union, 2015). Authorization by the UN Security Council proved more cumbersome. The AU's Peace and Security Council (African Union, 2015)

> "urge[d] the UN Security Council […] to urgently adopt a resolution that would […] (i) endorse the deployment of the MNJTF, (ii) authorize the establishment by the Secretary-General of a Trust Fund for the sustenance of the MNJTF operations, and (iii) call for the provision of international support to the MNJTF and other related efforts against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups."

What prevented the resolution adoption on multiple occasions in late 2014, January 2015, and March 2015 ranged from Nigeria's unease with the consideration of the conflict at the UNSC level, its resistance to a Chapter VII resolution, disagreement in the Council over the necessity of such a resolution, tense relations between the Chadian President Déby and Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, and an incomplete concept of operations (European Parliament, 2015: 2, United Nations Security Council, 2015e, What's in Blue, 2015b,

International Crisis Group, 2017a: 18). Although France possessed leverage to convince Nigeria of the necessity to foster regional cooperation in the fight against the terrorist group, neither Paris nor London were willing to impose a Security Council resolution against the will of the Nigerian government (Security Council Report, 2015).

The election of the new Nigerian President Buhari in May 2015 eased some of these issues but others persisted to obstruct progress in the fight against Boko Haram. On the one hand, Abuja's preference to control its internal affairs and UNSC member states' concerns over human rights violations by the troops of the MNJTF continued to hamper the adoption of a Chapter VII resolution (What's in Blue, 2015c, a). Legally the MNJTF therefore operated on the basis of the mandate authorized by the AU PSC. On the other hand, the election of President Buhari cultivated military cooperation between Nigeria and its neighbors and led to a more determined Nigerian approach to deal with terrorism. Better relations between the new Nigerian president and Chad's President Déby not only facilitated intelligence exchange but Buhari also announced his growing tolerance of neighboring countries' troops on Nigerian territory to chase down Boko Haram (France 24, 2015, International Crisis Group, 2017a: 18). Moreover, the new Nigerian president began addressing the problem of corruption among Nigerian officials, reorganized the army, and moved the operational headquarters from the capital Abuja to Maiduguri in Nigeria's north-east. That area also happened to be Boko Haram's center of operations. The Nigerian armed forces multiplied their long-distance patrols alongside the borders and strategically refocused their operations (Ploch Blanchard, 2016: 9). Although some coordination problems between Nigeria and its neighbors persisted, the military offensive of African states proved efficient. By May 2015 (Figure 9 and 10), considerable area controlled by the terrorists was recaptured and troop contributions surpassed the level envisaged by the AU (Flynn and Felix, 2015, Ploch Blanchard, 2016: 11, What's In Blue, 2016, Bond and Wisniewska, 2017).

Figure 9: *Fatalities related to Boko Haram's activities, January 2014-December 2015*



Own compilation, data source: ACLED (2017).

The prompt successes of the regional counterterrorism offensive were regarded as positive signs in the fight against Boko Haram, making international action less urgent. Unlike the crisis in the CAR and Côte d'Ivoire, the regional initiative's effectiveness helped Paris and London to maintain their preference for non-intervention. One year into the conflict, the French defense minister (Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, 2015c) was pleased to see that:

> "[t]he Africans have thus taken their security in their own hands with the help of instructors and the support of French and British intelligence […] which begins to be really effective."

Moreover, Le Drian reiterated his unchanged position and French interference in the fight against Boko Haram remained excluded. In a hearing in the Foreign Affairs Committee on October 28, 2015, the Minister (Commission des affaires étrangères, 2015b) noted that:

> "that France was not in a position to assume everything in this area. So we do not intend to deploy military personnel in the fight against Boko Haram, but we bring intelligence and logistical and medical support."

In a hearing with the Defense Committee on November 3, 2015, Le Drian again affirmed his stance and his content with the more active commitment of the new Nigerian President

Buhari to fight Boko Haram and support regional security initiatives (Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, 2015b).

The British foreign policy executive's refusal to intervene militarily remained similarly steadfast. Following the election of the new Nigerian president Buhari, the UK government decided in December 2015 to deploy 300 British forces to train and advice the Nigerian army as it felt that the new president was more committed to the fight against the terrorist group. As before, the British foreign policy executive excluded the involvement of their forces in combat (MacAskill, 2015, Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Sir Michael Fallon, 2016).

In line with France's and the UK's refusal to interfere militarily in the fight against Boko Haram, European initiatives to tackle the issue remained limited, too. The European Union condemned the attacks and welcomed the launch of the MNJTF (Présidence de la République, 2014). The Council further offered its support, "including the possibility of recourse to the African Peace Facility and EU crisis management tools" (Council of the European Union, 2015). However, the EU's High Representative (so quoted in: European Council, 2015) emphasized that "[o]nly intensive regional co-operation between Nigeria and its neighbours can generate the local leadership that will bring a durable solution to a multidimensional challenge."

Following the worsening humanitarian crisis in Nigeria in February 2015, the Council had considered to develop a response strategy to Boko Haram and use the battlegroups to train the MNJTF in the Lake Chad countries (Council of the European Union, 2015). However, the idea and the corresponding elaboration of a Crisis Management Concept, as the necessary basis for the launch of a military operation, never materialized. NATO did not even consider military intervention to fight the terrorists in any form (Interview 15, 2016). Ultimately, opposition by French and British foreign policy officials against military intervention against Boko Haram, Nigeria's opposition to foreign interference, and the effectiveness of the MNJTF made military involvement by European states not only highly unlikely but also unnecessary.

Table 39: *Domestic preferences and international compatibility in the fight against Boko Haram*

Domestic Level	International Level	Outcome
Opposition	Incompatibility	Non-intervention

Source: own illustration.

8.1.2. Results

Even though geostrategic factors and humanitarian concerns could have justified military intervention to confront Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin region, European states did not interfere in the crisis. Domestic opposition by the French and British foreign policy executives clearly inhibited a military approach by France and the UK to fight the terrorists (H1b). French state leaders were concerned about terrorism in the Sahel-Sahara region but argued that African states were in charge. British foreign policy officials in turn were alarmed about the human rights abuses of the Nigerian armed forces and also did not see the terrorists as a threat to UK national security. As a result, the pair provided assistance to Nigeria through intelligence cooperation and military training but opposed to get militarily involved in the combat of the terrorist group.

Compatible preferences of international players helped France and the UK to achieve their foreign policy goals and steer clear of the conflict (H2a). The Nigerian government opposed foreign interference and prevented serious discussions about an appropriate response to the terrorist group through its membership in the UNSC during 2014 and 2015. External intervention would therefore not only have incited tensions with Nigeria but also lacked a firm legal basis. In addition, African states were capable of launching a counterterrorism initiative, which proved effective and made external intervention unnecessary. Hence, the outcome of this tenth case is perfectly congruent with the expectations of the three-step model which expects non-intervention if domestic actors oppose intervention and if international actors' preferences are compatible with these preferences (Table 40).

Constructivism and realism only provide ambiguous insights into France and the UK's limitation to combat Boko Haram with non-military means. From a constructivist view, it is hard to explain why France and the UK did not intervene despite the appalling humanitarian situation. They could have prioritized humanitarian concerns over the non-intervention norm as they did in the fight against ISIS. Constructivists could, however, also emphasize the UK's concern for the human rights abuses of the Nigerian armed forces. Those concerns sat uncomfortably with the UK's own principles as a liberal democracy and, therefore, prevented intervention. In contrast, a realist perspective would emphasize the absence of clear-cut national interests to explain why France and the UK abstained from intervening. This factor certainly played a role for the UK's reluctance to intervene but falls short in explaining France's non-intervention as Paris was evidently concerned about the terrorist movement. Even though both theories provide relevant insights, the interplay

between domestic preferences and international opportunities which allowed France and the UK not to intervene in the conflict, despite humanitarian and security concerns, go beyond the reach of both theories.

Table 40: *Process-tracing tests and evidence for non-intervention in the fight against Boko Haram*

		Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)	
		High	Low
Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)	High	**Doubly decisive test**	**Smoking-gun test** H2a: Nigeria prevented discussions at UNSC level. African initiative proved efficient.
	Low	**Hoop test** H1b: French and British foreign policy officials opposed intervention and subsequently provided non-military support. H2a: Nigeria did not request assistance from France and the UK.	**Straw-in-the-wind test** H1b: British officials were concerned about human rights abuses by the Nigerian armed forces. French officials argued that Nigeria was not a former colony. Neither France nor the UK saw Boko Haram as a direct threat to national security. H2a: Nigeria has strong preference for non-interference in its internal affairs.

Source: own illustration.

Figure 10: *Fatalities by type related to Boko Haram's activities, January 2014-December 2015*



Own compilation, data source: ACLED (2017).

9. Comparative Results and Conclusion

This chapter provides comparative results from a cross-case analysis, summarizes the findings of this thesis and presents proposals for future research.

9.1. Cross-case analysis

A cross-case analysis is valuable as it complements the results from the case study analysis and enhances the external validity of the findings. The cross-case analysis draws upon Mill's Method of Difference and Mill's Joint Method of Agreement and Difference. The Method of Difference ascertains the cause of a phenomenon by detecting the factor which sets positive and negative cases apart while holding other variables constant. In contrast, the Joint Method is a combination of Mill's Method of Agreement and Mill's Method of Difference: it identifies factor(s) shared across positive cases and matches those positive cases with negative cases that lack those factor(s). Rather than testing the impact of individual variables, the Joint Method therefore helps detect multiple causation and combinations of variables causing the outcome (Caramani, 2009: 47-50).

Table 41: *Comparative results for European states' intervention and non-intervention I*

Crisis	**Timeframe**	**Domestic Consensus** (IV)	**International Compatibility** (IV)	**Intervention** (DV)
Libya I	February 2011 – early March 2011	0	1	0
Libya II	Early March 2011 – mid-March 2011	1	0	0
Côte d'Ivoire I	December 2010-March 2011	0	1	0
Central African Republic I	January 2013-September 2013	0	1	0
Nigeria	April 2014 – December 2015	0	1	0
Libya III and IV	As of mid-March 2011	1	1	1
Central African Republic II	October 2013 – December 2013	1	1	1
Côte d'Ivoire II	April 2011	0	0	1

Source: Own Illustration. Note: IV=Independent Variable, DV=Dependent Variable.

Table 41 shows that neither domestic preferences nor international players' preferences are necessary or sufficient in causing European intervention. Both domestic consensus and international compatibility have been present when intervention did not occur. However, two combinations of domestic preferences and international conditions are jointly sufficient to trigger intervention. First, a combination of domestic consensus on intervention and compatible preferences of international players accounts for intervention by European states. When France and the UK intervened in the crises in Libya during 2011 and when France interfered in the Central African Republic during 2013 and 2014, the country's foreign policy executives uniformly supported intervention. In both cases, domestic preferences were compatible with the preferences of international and regional players. In contrast, and although there was consensus among the French and British foreign policy executives in early March, neither France nor the UK intervened in the Libyan war before international and regional players had provided their approval for the use of force. Hence, we can conclude that international compatibility is a necessary condition for European states to realize their preferences on intervention. Jointly, domestic consensus and international compatibility are sufficient conditions for intervention by European states.

Table 42: *Comparative results for European states' intervention and non-intervention II*

Crisis	**Timeframe**	**Domestic Consensus (IV)**	**International Compatibility (IV)**	**Intervention (DV)**
Libya I	February 2011 – early March 2011	0	1	0
Libya II	Early March 2011 – mid-March 2011	1	0	0
Côte d'Ivoire I	December 2010-March 2011	0	1	0
Central African Republic I	January 2013-September 2013	0	1	0
Nigeria	April 2014 – October 2015	0	1	0
Libya III and IV	As of mid-March 2011	1	1	1
Central African Republic II	October 2013 – December 2013	1	1	1
Côte d'Ivoire II	April 2011	0	0	1

Source: Own Illustration. Note: IV=Independent Variable, DV=Dependent Variable.

The second combination of variables sufficient to trigger European states to intervene is a conjunction of domestic opposition with incompatible preferences at the international level (see Table 42). Even though the French foreign policy executive opposed intervention in Côte d'Ivoire's post-electoral crisis, France ultimately deployed troops because non-intervention was incompatible with the preferences of international and regional players. In a nutshell, incompatible preferences of international players pushed Paris to intervene despite previous domestic opposition against intervention by the French foreign policy executive. Conversely, European states never intervened when domestic actors opposed intervention and their preference for non-intervention was compatible with international players' preferences. In other words, compatibility of preferences facilitated the realization of European states' preference for non-intervention multiple times. Non-intervention in this form occurred in all humanitarian crises studied in this thesis, at some stage of the conflict. Thus domestic opposition and international compatibility are jointly sufficient for non-intervention. Reversely, domestic opposition and international incompatibility are jointly sufficient for intervention.

More broadly, the cross-case analysis allows concluding that there is no independent effect of domestic preferences on international outcomes. In the cases studied in this thesis, international conditions either facilitated or hampered the realization of the foreign policy goals advocated by foreign policy executives and state leaders. Hence, international conditions proved generally more decisive for Europe's responses to humanitarian crises than domestic preferences.

As a second step, it is also possible to assess the causal effect of the second set of independent variables – the congruence of preferences among EU and NATO states and their respective power resources – on the institutional frameworks European states chose in those cases where they decided to intervene. The outcomes comprise of EU and NATO intervention and ad-hoc intervention launched by France and the UK (see Table 43).

Table 43: *Comparative results for institutional frameworks and channels*

Crisis	Timeframe	Congruence of Preferences (IV)		Power resources (IV)	Framework (DV)
		EU states	NATO states		
Libya III	Mid-March 2011 -late March 2011	Incongruent	Incongruent	Medium-High	British-French ad-hoc intervention
Libya IV	23 March 2011 onwards	Incongruent	Mixed	High	NATO
Côte d'Ivoire II	April 2011	Incongruent	n.a.	Medium-High	French ad-hoc intervention
Central African Republic II	October 2013 – December 2013	Incongruent	n.a.	Medium-High	French ad-hoc intervention
Central African Republic III	January 2014 – March 2014	Mixed	n.a.	Medium-High	EU intervention

Source: Own Illustration. Note: IV=Independent Variable, DV=Dependent Variable.

Drawing upon Mill's Method of Difference, it is possible to test the effect of EU member states' preferences while holding power resources constant. In the crises in Côte d'Ivoire and the Central African Republic, France possessed a medium to high amount of power resources to influence the institutional framework for intervention. Whereas France's power resources were the same in these crises, the preferences among EU member states varied between incongruent and mixed preferences. This allows the conclusion that the variation in member states' preferences caused the difference in the outcomes. During the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire and early on during the conflict in the CAR, EU member states' intervention preferences diverged sharply, whereas member states' preferences were mixed later on in the crisis in the CAR. Reduced resistance by EU states against common intervention opened a window of opportunity for the launch of a CSDP operation. Preferences seemed to influence the outcome more than power resources.

Although the influence of power resources cannot be tested through a controlled comparison here, it does not imply that power resources did not matter. The within-case-analysis proved that preferences alone cannot account for the different outcomes. In the crisis in the CAR, France influenced the outcome more than any other EU member state. Power resources are influential in conjunction with preferences rather than independently from them. Increased openness by EU states (= mixed instead of incongruent preferences) made

the launch of a CSDP operation possible because they allowed France to use its powerful position in EU security and defense affairs to tip the balance in favor of its own preferences, namely the deployment of EUFOR CAR. Thus, power resources do not seem to matter independently from member states' preferences. They can shift the balance when preferences are mixed but will matter less when member states' preferences diverge sharply.

9.2. Conclusion

European states have quite frequently deployed military force for humanitarian purposes. Yet, they did not launch military operations consistently and engaged varying institutional frameworks to address or prevent large-scale humanitarian crises. Even though the EU and NATO have the capacity to intervene in such circumstances, European states have at times decided to act outside institutional structures and used military force through ad-hoc coalitions of the willing or national operations. In other moments, European states decided not to intervene at all, leaving the responsibility over humanitarian intervention to other actors including the UN and alternative regional organizations.

It was the aim of the preceding chapters to explore and explain this striking variation in European states' responses through in-depth analysis of four major humanitarian crises including the conflict in Libya during 2011, the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire during 2010/2011, the sectarian war in the Central African Republic during 2013 and 2014, and the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region during 2014 and 2015. European states responded differently to all of these crises. This thesis developed a three-step model to elucidate the dynamics behind Europe's varying responses to humanitarian crises. It also threw light on factors at the domestic, the regional European, and the international level. Until now, these factors and their interplay have received limited attention in the study of European security and defense affairs. The cases examined in this thesis therefore provide novel and innovative insights into the mechanisms of humanitarian interventions by European states. The thesis concludes that much of the variation in European responses to humanitarian crises can be explained through the interplay of domestic preferences, their international feasibility, and the ability and willingness of European states to find a common agreement.

Causal Combinations

According to the three-step model, European states' intervention and its varying frameworks is contingent on (1) whether military intervention generates domestic consensus (2) whether intervention is feasible given international players' preferences and (3) whether states can find an agreement at the regional European and transatlantic level. All ten cases analyzed in this thesis provide abundant evidence in favor of the three-step model. The model comprehensively explains why, when, and how European states decide to intervene in some humanitarian crises but refrain from intervening in others.

In particular, two combinations of domestic preferences and international level conditions have caused intervention by European states in the preceding chapters. First, European states intervened when there was consensus among powerful domestic actors around intervention and was feasible given the preferences and activities of international actors. As a second combination, European states also intervened when domestic opposition against intervention was incompatible with the preferences of international and regional players. Reversely, two further combinations of domestic preferences and international conditions accounted for European states' non-intervention. First, European states never intervened when their preferences for non-intervention were compatible with the preferences of international actors. Second, European states also refrained from intervening when it was incompatible with international actors' preferences.

The three-step model also performs well in accounting for the different institutional channels which European states have used to intervene in humanitarian crises. Even though empirical evidence for the hypotheses relating to institutional frameworks and channels (H3a, H3b, H3c) is generally strong, alternative explanations for how European states intervened could sometimes not be excluded. Evidence in the case studies allows for the following conclusions. European states resorted to ad-hoc arrangements to intervene in humanitarian crises when preferences among EU and NATO states were incongruent and hindered common action. Alternatively, the EU and NATO deployed military force when member states' preferences were at least weakly congruent and backed by the interests and preferences of the organizations' most powerful states. In none of the cases examined in this thesis did European states intervene to prevent or halt widespread human suffering because their preferences were perfectly congruent. Owing to lacking empirical evidence, the congruence of preferences (H3a) could not be tested as an explanatory factor in this thesis and will require future research.

I review each of the hypotheses examined in this thesis sequentially.

Hypotheses, Evidence, and Alternative Explanations

In seven of the ten cases reviewed in this thesis, consensus and opposition among powerful domestic actors influenced whether European states were ready to intervene or passed the buck to alternative actors. Domestic consensus (H1a) among the foreign policy executives in France and the UK was a powerful driving force behind the two country's promotion of military intervention in the 2011 Libya crisis. Consensus was critical for both French and British state leaders which firmly held together and lobbied decisively for the use of military force to protect the Libyan population from the regime's atrocity crimes. Domestic consensus was also essential for the launch of France's ad-hoc intervention in the CAR in December 2013. Domestic consensus around the necessity of French intervention clearly smoothed the way for France's intervention. Domestic consensus among all major French state leaders on the necessity of intervention was critical to overcome the strong initial domestic opposition to military intervention in France's former colony. In the absence of such consensus, the French president's second intervention in a former French colony within one year (the first being Mali in early 2013) would have been much more politically costly given his promise to put an end to Françafrique.

In contrast, opposition by powerful domestic actors against intervention (H1b) hampered intervention in all cases studied in this thesis, at least temporarily, and encouraged the search and promotion of alternative solutions. At the initial stage of the Libya crisis, firm domestic opposition against intervention by the French foreign policy executive and divisions among British state leaders evidently postponed a robust response by France and left the UK's reaction as indecisive and sluggish. In a similar vein, firm opposition by French state leaders delayed French intervention in the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire in 2011 and the sectarian war in the CAR during 2013 and 2014. Owing to domestic opposition, Paris instead lobbied for the reinforcement of the UN peacekeeping operation in Côte d'Ivoire and promoted African ownership of crisis management in the CAR. Finally, domestic opposition also played a role in France and the UK's refusal to interfere in the fight against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. Due to domestic opposition, both countries never even considered military intervention. Instead, they supported African efforts to contain the threat and preferred alternative non-military measures to combat the terrorists. Only once, during the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, France ultimately intervened even though the French foreign policy

executive had opposed intervention previously, casting (minor) doubt on the validity of hypothesis 1b (see Table 44).

In the majority of cases, however, domestic consensus (H1a) and opposition (H1b) were essential to maintain support domestically and promote intervention or justify non-intervention internationally as several hoop and straw-in-the-wind tests (see Table 44) have shown. Yet, this kind of evidence is necessary but not sufficient to claim that domestic consensus facilitates and domestic opposition hampers the use of military force for humanitarian purposes. In other words, domestic consensus did not determine European intervention and non-intervention in all cases studied in this thesis.

Indeed, this thesis provides ample evidence that careful consideration of the interplay between domestic politics and international structures – widely neglected by realist and constructivist scholars – is imperative in understanding Europe's varying responses to humanitarian crises. Domestic consensus and opposition facilitated or hampered intervention but what European states ultimately do in response to humanitarian crises depends on the compatibility of their foreign policy goals with the preferences of international and regional players. The findings of this thesis show that only a convergence of domestic preferences with international conditions can comprehensively account for the variation in European states' responses to humanitarian crises. Compatible and incompatible preferences at the international level generated material and ideational opportunities and constraints which made European intervention necessary or unnecessary, legitimate or illegitimate.

This thesis provides strong support that compatibility between European states' preferences and those of international and regional players facilitated the realization of the former's foreign policy goals. Six of the ten cases reviewed in this thesis provide necessary (hoop test) and/or sufficient (smoking gun) evidence that support H2a. Straw-in-the-wind tests provide additional evidence in favor of H2a.

During the initial stage of the Libya crisis, the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire and the Central African Republic, the preferences of international and regional players were compatible with European states' preferences not to intervene and delayed European intervention in all three crises. Perfectly in line with European states' foreign policy goals of non-intervention, international actors and African regional organizations preferred non-military solutions or strongly desired taking the lead in crisis management themselves. This ultimately allowed European states (at least temporarily) to refrain from intervening. In the fight against Boko Haram, refusal by Nigeria to discuss the problem and an effective counter-

offensive by African countries meant that military intervention by European states was not even considered.

Likewise, compatibility between European states' preferences and those of international and regional players enabled intervention when European states' goal was to use military force to quell humanitarian crises. Even though domestic actors supported intervention, France and the UK hesitated to deploy force during the Libya crisis and the conflict in the CAR until regional and international players expressed their approval. Support by the Arab League, the GCC, and the OIC was crucial to convince Russia, China, and the US of the necessity of military intervention in Libya and to provide their approval in form of UNSC Resolution 1973. Two days after, France and Britain realized their foreign policy goals and intervened in the Libya conflict. Similar conditions facilitated France's intervention in the CAR in December 2013. Suffering from severe capacity shortfalls, African states asked France to come to their aid while international players' fear of genocide meant that intervention was essentially uncontested, making international approval a simple task.

Conversely, in the two cases in which international and regional actors' preferences were incompatible with the preferences of European states (H2b), international conditions imposed severe constraints on European states' ability to realize their foreign policy goals. This thesis provides not only necessary (hoop test) but also sufficient (smoking gun) evidence to affirm H2b. Incompatible preferences hampered European states' responses and even compelled them to adjust their foreign policy goals accordingly. Despite strong domestic consensus on the necessity of intervention in the Libya crisis and considerations to ignore disagreement among UNSC members, France and the UK hesitated to use military force in the absence of regional and international approval. In much the same manner, African states' failure to solve the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire politically, the UN's capacity shortfalls, and its request on France to intervene implied that Paris had to abandon its foreign policy goal of non-intervention. As a result, Paris interfered although domestic actors had opposed intervention, providing strong evidence in favor of hypothesis 2b.

Thus, the findings from the within-case-analysis and from the cross-case-comparison shed light on the interplay between domestic and international politics and the opportunities and constraints at both levels driving European states' interventions and non-interventions in humanitarian crises. The results demonstrate that European states' responses to humanitarian crises are neither determined by domestic preferences alone nor are they simply a reaction to international pressures and constraints. European states' readiness to intervene is conditioned by the interplay of domestic preferences and the international opportunities and constraints

under which European states seek to realize their goals. Studies that examine these factors in isolation risk ignoring essential dynamics that drive European states' responses to large-scale human suffering.

Admittedly, in all cases examined in this thesis, material and ideational factors were instrumental in shaping domestic consensus and opposition on the one hand, and international compatibility and incompatibility on the other. In consequence, the evidence provided in this thesis does not allow rejecting realist and constructivist explanations. Humanitarian considerations, non-intervention and sovereignty norms, multilateralism, the R2P principle, strategic cultures and identities – factors stressed by constructivism – as well as national interests (and the lack thereof), security threats, and power – elements emphasized by realism – evidently shaped European states' responses to humanitarian crises. Even though these factors frequently influenced European states' decision to intervene or not in the crises studied in this thesis, they never affected international outcomes in the absence of (1) state leaders who, drawing upon consensus or opposition domestically, promoted the respective foreign policy goals at the international level and (2) international constraints and opportunities generated by the preferences of other international and regional players. Hence, no matter how strong or weak material and ideational drivers of foreign policy preferences and decisions are, their impact on international outcomes ultimately depends on whether states' goals are supported by powerful actors domestically and feasible under the particular external conditions and constraints in which they operate.

As a second analytic step, this thesis focused on states' converging and diverging preferences at the EU and NATO level, as well as states' power resources to explain the institutional framework European states used to militarily intervene.

In three of the four crises examined in this thesis, European states employed ad-hoc arrangements or national operations to intervene militarily. In contrast, European states used the EU's and NATO's common military structures and capacities only twice to conduct military operations. Furthermore, the launch of common EU and NATO operations was not in any way certain in any of the crises studied here. The findings of the within-case analysis and the cross-case comparison show that states' preferences are central in understanding when European states launch military operations collectively and when like-minded states have to resort to alternative channels. Incongruent preferences among member states (H3c) prevented the launch of a CSDP operation and complicated the involvement of NATO in the Libya crisis. As none of the common frameworks were available for intervention, France and the UK intervened through an ad-hoc coalition of the willing. EU member states' diverging

preferences on intervention in the sectarian conflict in the CAR made the prospects for EU intervention look similarly bleak. France therefore deployed a national operation to contain the crisis.

Alternative realist and constructivist research programs cannot explain the frequent resort to ad-hoc arrangements equally well. Contrary to realist assumptions, France lobbied for the launch of CSDP operations in both crises but failed to gather support among EU member states despite Paris's powerful position. Contrary to constructivist assumptions, ideational conditions would have been optimal for the deployment of CSDP operations in Libya, the CAR, and Côte d'Ivoire, which could have drawn upon previous experiences of crisis management. Yet, member states heavily disagreed or did not even consider common action at all. Hence, the evidence in this thesis – substantiated by several smoking-gun and hoop tests (see Table 44) – is sufficient to claim that diverging preferences among member states (H3c) severely hindered common action and compelled states, more than once, to resort to ad-hoc arrangements even when they would have clearly preferred EU or NATO operations.

Nonetheless, in several cases alternative explanations could not be disconfirmed. In particular, the hypothesis on incongruent preferences (H3c) failed to explain comprehensively the absence of any debate within NATO on possible military efforts in the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire in 2011 and the CAR in 2013 and 2014. Given that European states did not even consider intervention through NATO in the two conflicts, it is doubtful that incongruent preferences caused NATO's absence. Alternative constructivist explanations proved better positioned to explain why NATO never even considered intervention in Côte d'Ivoire and the CAR. In particular constructivist assumptions help to shed light on the discrepancy between the transatlantic alliance's strategic culture and the characteristics of the two crises. Rather than highlighting member states' incongruent preferences, constructivists rightly emphasize that NATO's military machinery would have been ill-suited to resolve the conflicts in the CAR and Côte d'Ivoire. And indeed, NATO typically focuses on high-intensity missions and collective defense rather than small to medium-sized crisis management operations. In addition, military operations for humanitarian purposes in Africa particularly do not feature prominently in the alliance's strategic objectives. NATO has never deployed ground troops for such purposes in African countries before.

Further, realist assumptions provide a compelling alternative argument to explain why France never initiated a discussion about a potential European military operation in Côte

d'Ivoire, even though Paris has traditionally been a vocal supporter of European security and defense cooperation. Rather than anticipating opposition by EU members as the three-step model assumes, realists highlight the possibility that France preferred a national operation *a priori* because it allowed Paris to respond rapidly and retain its autonomy in decision-making. In contrast, an EU operation would have taken time to be planned, set-up, and deployed. Given that EU states never debated common action in Côte d'Ivoire, realist assumptions may be better suited to account for the EU's absence as a crisis manager in Côte d'Ivoire.

Even though there is robust evidence that incongruent preferences are sufficient to explain when EU and NATO member states fail to intervene collectively, the findings of this thesis indicate that preferences alone cannot account for the launch of collective EU and NATO interventions. Indeed, in all crises reviewed here there is no evidence which supports the assumption that the EU and NATO launched common operations because their members' preferences were congruent (H3a). In both cases where the EU and NATO intervened, member states' preferences were mixed at best and the preferences of the most powerful member states clearly influenced the outcome more than those of less powerful countries.

Drawing upon several straw-in-the-wind, hoop, and smoking-gun tests, this thesis provides sufficient evidence that states' power resources (H3b) are an integral component of CSDP and NATO military operations. In the crisis in the CAR, France used its powerful position within the EU to convince member states to launch a common European military operation as it understood the difficulty to contain the deteriorating conflict alone. Similarly, the transfer of command over the operations in Libya from the ad-hoc coalition to NATO was primarily engineered by the US as the most powerful state in the alliance. Others such as France, Germany, and Turkey would have preferred to keep the alliance out of the conflict but the US preference to keep its role in the Libya campaign limited proved more decisive. To realize their preferences, both France in the crisis in the CAR and the US during the Libya conflict engaged in bilateral meetings, demanded their fellow partners to provide resources or at least their consent, made compromises, and offered compensations to make the operations acceptable to their partners. Even though agreement could ultimately be reached, member states' weakly congruent preferences had severe material implications for both operations. EUFOR CAR and NATO's OUP had to draw their resources from the contributions of only a handful of member states, dividing the burden of the operations unequally among states.

While constructivists fail to provide a comprehensive account of NATO's OUP and EUFOR CAR which were everything other than a conscious choice by member states,

realists, admittedly, would similarly emphasize the role of the most powerful states in shaping agreements in the EU and NATO.

In sum, even though the three-step model did not explain all cases analyzed in this thesis equally well, alternative realist and constructivist research programs cannot explain just as well why European states only sometimes intervened collectively to prevent or address widespread human suffering, why they employed ad-hoc arrangements instead, and why they failed to intervene at other moments. Examining European states' responses to large-scale human suffering at three levels of analysis is central to understand not only whether European states *want* to intervene but whether they ultimately *use* military force for humanitarian purposes. Finally, at the regional European and transatlantic level, states' preferences and power influence whether European states intervene collectively through the EU and NATO or have to resort to ad-hoc coalitions.

Table 44*: Hypotheses and evidence*

Hypotheses/Evidence	Straw-in-the-wind test	Hoop test	Smoking-gun test
H1a: Domestic consensus	*Passed:* Intervention in Libya and the CAR without consent would have been politically risky given institutional requirement of consent (NSC meetings) in France and the UK. Concerns over deterioration of situation in Libya II and CAR II, fears of genocide.	*Passed:* All major French state leaders support intervention in the CAR II prior to intervention. All major French and British state leaders support intervention in Libya III prior to intervention.	*Passed:* French and British state leaders voice consensus on intervention in Libya II/III despite lack of clear-cut strategic interests.
H1b: Domestic opposition	*Passed:* Primary concern of French (and British) foreign policy officials was protection of nationals in Libya I, the CAR I, and Côte d'Ivoire I/II. No direct security risks at stake in the crises. Non-interference was in line with new French Africa policy in Libya I, Côte d'Ivoire I, and CAR I. *Failed:* British state leaders were divided over intervention in Libya I but PM Cameron instructed the Ministry of Defence to do contingency planning on an NFZ.	*Passed*: (Initially) French state leaders opposed intervention in Libya I, the CAR I, Côte d'Ivoire I, and Nigeria and advocated for alternative measures. *Failed:* French officials domestically justified intervention in Côte d'Ivoire II only after Operation Licorne had been deployed.	*Passed:* French state leaders advocate for UN/African intervention in former colonies in Côte d'Ivoire I and CAR I.
H2a: International Compatibility	*Passed:* Where domestic consensus: African state leaders/UN have difficulties to contain the crisis in the CAR II and Côte d'Ivoire II. Regional players' support for intervention was critical in Libya III and Côte d'Ivoire II. Where domestic opposition: African states were keen to be in charge of intervention in the CAR I and Nigeria because of previous experiences and their own interests. Preference for political solution and non-interference in Libya I, Côte d'Ivoire I, and in Nigeria.	*Passed:* Where domestic consensus: regional and international players approve of intervention in Libya III, Côte d'Ivoire II, CAR II. Where domestic opposition: Regional and international players (initially) opposed or did not express preference for foreign (Western) intervention in Libya I, the CAR I, Côte d'Ivoire I and Nigeria.	*Passed:* Where domestic consensus: France (and Britain) only intervene(s) in Libya III, the CAR II and Côte d'Ivoire II after regional and international players approved/requested intervention, UNSC mandate. Where domestic opposition: Nigeria prevented discussions at UNSC level in resolution authorizing intervention. African initiative proved efficient.

H2b: International Incompatibility	*Passed:* Where domestic consensus: Preference for political solution in Libya II and Côte d'Ivoire I. US was unconvinced of effectiveness of NFZ over Libya I/II. Where domestic opposition: UNOCI is attacked by rebel forces and experiences difficulties to contain the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire II. African states' mediation attempts failed.	*Passed:* Where domestic opposition: UNOCI's difficulties, deteriorating situation, Licorne's mandate and the request by the UN Secretary-General hindered France to realize its non-intervention preference in Côte d'Ivoire II.	*Passed:* Where domestic consensus: Confronted with regional and international opposition to intervention, France and Britain refrain from intervening in Libya II despite domestic consensus. Where domestic opposition: France intervened in Côte d'Ivoire II despite preference for non-intervention but only after the request by the UN. *Failed:* Where domestic consensus: French President Sarkozy and UK Foreign Secretary Hague privately consider intervention in absence of UNSC mandate in Libya II.
H3a: Congruent preferences	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
H3b: Mixed preferences and power resources	*Passed:* US wanted to keep its role in the military campaign in Libya IV limited. Libya intervention was highly reliant on US capabilities. France underestimated the conflict's severity in the CAR III. France accepted compromises to the CSDP operation, and was the main provider of troops.	*Passed:* France urged for CSDP operation in Libya III and the CAR III. US and UK urge for NATO intervention in Libya IV.	*Passed:* NATO launches military operation in Libya IV despite disagreement and in absence of common threat perception. EU launched CSDP operation in the CAR III despite partly diverging preferences and in the absence of common threat.
H3c: Incongruent preferences	*Passed*: During the Libya crisis III, the UK opposed EU intervention, France opposed NATO leadership. Germany, Poland, Turkey and Romania oppose military intervention. Intra-European quarrels over the Libya intervention may have caused French choice not to propose CSDP operation in Côte d'Ivoire II in anticipation of disagreement. *Failed:* France did not seek to persuade EU member states of common operation in the CAR II.	*Passed:* EU and NATO states discuss crisis in Libya III but no official plans for military operation. EU states discuss crisis and possible military operation in the CAR II. *Failed*: EU states discussed crisis in Côte d'Ivoire II but EU and NATO states did not discuss a military operation. France may have preferred ad-hoc operation a priori. NATO's strategic culture did not accommodate intervention in the CAR II and Côte d'Ivoire II and would have risked French influence in its zone of primary strategic interest.	*Passed:* France proposed EU military operation while the UK advocated NATO leadership in Libya III but EU and NATO member states rejected intervention (initially) despite similar previous experiences. Majority of member states rejected French proposal to deploy CSDP operation/battlegroups to the CAR II even though conditions were optimal for deployment.

Source: own compilation

Avenues for Future Research

Future research can draw upon the findings of this thesis and fill the remaining gaps which will broaden and deepen our knowledge on European military interventions, and security and defense cooperation. There are at least four major avenues through which future research projects can further corroborate, test, and expand the results of this thesis. This includes further testing of the interplay between domestic preferences and international conditions, exploring the congruence of preferences as an explanatory factor for the launch of EU and NATO operations, more systematic testing of alternative explanations, and the application of the three-step model to other fields.

Firstly, future research should examine in more depth the effects of the interplay between domestic preferences and international conditions, and how both factors interact. In this thesis, international conditions always took precedence over domestic preferences. European states never pursued their foreign policy goals when they were incompatible with the preferences and goals of international players. Instead, European states adjusted or abandoned their goals in line with international constraints. Future research could therefore examine the conditions under which state leaders are unwilling or unable to make concessions and act in opposition to domestic preferences. Namely, when do domestic preferences and goals take priority over international conditions? This thesis mainly concentrated on domestic decision-making and the foreign policy of France and the UK. In both countries, the decision-making process in foreign, security, and defense affairs is short and possibilities for contestation are relatively limited. In addition, in none of the cases examined in this thesis were domestic elections sufficiently close for public opinion to exert measurable influence on the decision-making of European states on military interventions. Therefore, one potential avenue for future research is to examine the interplay between domestic preferences and international conditions in states that are more constrained by domestic ratification processes or pending domestic elections. Here, domestic preferences might impact international outcomes more than international conditions.

Secondly, the available evidence in the cases investigated did not allow testing the congruence of preferences as an independent explanatory factor for the launch of common military operations through the EU and NATO. Future research should therefore examine and compare the driving forces behind additional CSDP and NATO operations. The most successful and uncontested military operations of both organizations are particularly suitable for this kind of research and provide the most compelling conclusions. This includes the EU's

military mission in the Chad and the CAR during 2008/2009, EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR Congo in 2006, and the EU's training mission in Mali. For NATO, this includes the alliance's operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), in Kosovo (KFOR), and in Afghanistan (ISAF). Future studies in this area could allow us to better understand the influence of power and preferences on the launch of common EU and NATO military operations and the interaction of both factors.

Thirdly, the aim of this thesis was to develop and explore a comprehensive and novel account of European states' responses to humanitarian crises. To test the model, the analysis of this thesis gathered competing arguments and claims offered by realist and constructivist research but did not develop hypotheses to test the three-step model against alternative theories systematically. Future research should overcome this shortcoming by developing competing hypotheses and test alternative explanations against the predictions of the three-step model in cases of European states' collective, ad-hoc interventions, and non-interventions. Alternatively, future research could also integrate material and ideational factors in the three-step model and show to what extent and how these factors are crucial in shaping domestic consensus and opposition and international compatibility and incompatibility.

The fourth and final avenue for future research is the application of the theory to other fields. This thesis developed the three-step model to examine and explain the variation behind European states' interventions in humanitarian crises. The explanatory reach of the three-step model can be further investigated, refined, and tested by applying the model to decision-making processes in security and defense affairs of other regional organizations and countries in Africa, the Americas, or Asia. Alternatively, the model could also be further tested in different issue areas pertaining to European foreign, security and defense policy. This contains, for instance, different arrangements for cooperation in defense industrial policies and practices such as the development and procurement of armament programs and weapon systems. Building on this, the three-step model could also be examined for its usefulness as a general theory of European security and defense cooperation.

Recent Developments and Outlook

There is no other study to date that has situated Europe's responses to humanitarian crises within the wider context of international interventions and peace operations and examined Europe's behavior at three levels of analysis. Without considering the various actors in the field – international and domestic – it is hard to understand the dynamics behind Europe's military (non-)interventions. A better understanding of Europe's responses to major humanitarian crises is vital, however, for European states' credibility on the world stage. But, it is particularly important when Europe's immediate environment to the south is thrown into turmoil, producing one of the most devastating humanitarian crises of our time.

This thesis' explanatory framework potentially reaches beyond the cases studied in this thesis and will continue to be relevant in order to understand Europe's responses to future crises. Indeed, recent developments in European and international affairs will most likely enhance the importance of the particular focus and explanatory scope of this thesis. Among other events, the impending exit of the UK from the EU will have (and already has) important consequences for future European security and defense cooperation.

In combination with Germany's recent commitment to shoulder more responsibility in international politics, the UK's exit – which frequently blocked initiatives in the area of EU security and defense in the past – may open up new possibilities for closer cooperation in this field. The establishment of a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)[55], the launch of the European Defence Fund (EDF),[56] and the agreement of 25 EU states to set up the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)[57] on defense, provide first signs of a positive trend for future European security and defense cooperation (Fiott et al., 2017: 5, 7, 48-49). The power shifts related to Brexit may also facilitate future CSDP operations in humanitarian crises. While power resources may therefore become less central to EU decision-making in security and defense affairs, preferences will remain a crucial factor conditioning European

[55] The Military Planning and Conduct Capability is responsible for the command and control of the EU's non-executive missions at the military strategic level. At the time of writing (2017) this includes the EU's training missions in the CAR, Mali and Somalia. For more information on the MPCC please see: EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE. *The Military Planning and Conduct Capability - MPCC,* [Online]. Available: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/mpcc_factsheet.pdf [Accessed 28 December 2017.

[56] The EDF has the aim to encourage EU states' defence cooperation. The fund supports, coordinates and augments joint defence research and capability development. For further information see: FIOTT, Daniel, MISSIROLI, Antonio & TARDY, Thierry 2017. Permanent Structured Cooperation: What's in a name? *Chaillot Paper N°142.* Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

[57] PESCO aims at deepening EU member states' defence cooperation and enhancing their coordination in defence investments, capabilities and operational readiness. For further information please see: EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE. 2017. *Permanent Structured Cooperation - PESCO, 16 November 2017* [Online]. Available: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_14-11-2017.pdf [Accessed 28 December 2017.

states' intervention in the time to come. Indeed, there is little indication that EU member states will surrender their decision-making authority over the launch of common operations to supranational operations and will therefore decide upon military deployment case-by-case.

At the same time, intensified cooperation on security and defense within the EU does not imply that NATO and alternative ad-hoc arrangements will lose its importance. On the contrary, Brexit may encourage cooperation within the alliance on issues that affect member states of both NATO and the EU. Ad-hoc operations conducted on a multilateral or bilateral basis as seen during the Libya crisis may benefit from the UK's exit, too. The UK already began reviving and strengthening bilateral and multilateral frameworks for security and defense cooperation, which may increase and diversify the resort to ad-hoc arrangements where cooperation within the EU and NATO is not an option (Major and von Voss, 2017). At the same time, the UK also pledged to maintain its contributions to EU operations (BBC, 2017). Hence, studying European states' varying responses to humanitarian crises and the diverse frameworks they use in intervention will become rather more relevant than less in the foreseeable future.

No matter how future frameworks for European cooperation in the field of security and defense are exactly forged, European states' preferences, the political contexts in which they operate and their ability to pursue their goals at the international and the regional level will continue to considerably influence when, where and in which format European states intervene in large-scale humanitarian crises.

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Annex

Indicators of Humanitarian Crises

The following sections explain relevant indicators for humanitarian crises used in this thesis to select cases for in-depth analysis. Since this study centers on the analysis of military operations, the presence of violent conflict forms a necessary condition for case selection, as is conventional practice. Table 45 shows a list of the fifteen conflicts that occurred in African countries between 2003 and 2014. The table provides information on several more indicators of humanitarian crises and their thresholds, which are often directly or indirectly caused by or related to war (Väyrynen, 2000, Binder, 2009). The indicators are described in more detail below.

Table 45: *Violent conflicts and related humanitarian indicators*

Country	Conflict activity	Intensity Level	Mortality Rate Under 5	Undernourishment	Percent of IDPs	Political Terror
Burundi	2003-2006, 2008	1	>100	.	<10	4
Central African Republic	2006, 2009-2013	1	>100	>25	>10 (2013)	>=4 (2006, 2009-2011, 2013)
Chad	2003, 2005-2010	1-2	>100	>25	<10	>=4 (2006-2010)
DR Congo	2006-2008,2012-2014	1-2	>100	.	<10	5
Ethiopia	2003-2014	1	>100 (2003-2006)	>25 (2003-2013)	0	4 (2003-2005, 2007, 2011-2012, 2014)
Côte d'Ivoire	2003-2004, 2011	1	>100	<25	<10	>=5
Liberia	2003	2	>100	>25	>10	5
Libya	2011, 2014	1-2	<100	.	<10	5
Mali	2007-2009, 2012-2014	1	>100	<25	<10	4 (2012-2013)
Nigeria	2009, 2011-2014	1-2	>100	<25	<10	4
Somalia	2006-2014	1-2	>100	.	>10 (2007-2014)	>=4
South Sudan	2011-2014	1-2	>100 (2011-2012)	.	>10 (2014)	>=4
Sudan	2003-2014	1-2	<100	.	<10	5
Uganda	2003-2014	1-2	>100 (2003-2005)	>25 (2003, 2009, 2013)	<10	4 (2003-2007)

Own illustration, data sources: Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Centre for the Study of Civil Wars (2015), UN Refugee Agency (2015), The World Bank (2015a,b), Gibney et al. (2014b, 2015).

Armed Conflict

Violent conflicts can take many forms and may range from low-intensity clashes to full-scale wars. For this reason, it is important to define what is meant by conflicts in this thesis. Wallensteen and Sollenberg (2001: 643) define armed conflicts as "a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths." I adopt this definition, since it captures those instances in which humanitarian military interventions might be deployed.

Violent conflicts are one of the major sources of humanitarian crises. Wars directly and indirectly produce human suffering. The consequences of conflicts are often not only felt locally but can threaten regional stability and might even raise the security concerns of countries on other continents. Conflicts provide a breeding ground for terrorism, organized crime, and extremism as well as heightened migratory and refugee flows. Here, I use version 4-2015, 1946-2014, of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) (Nils Petter et al., 2002, Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015, Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, 2015) to identify the conflict intensity in conflict stricken countries. The UCDP/PRIO database is particularly informative as it provides precise data on the timing, duration, intensity, and type of conflict as well as the parties involved in it. Only those crises which caused at least 25 battle deaths during at least one year in the UCDP database are considered in the analysis.

Displacement of People

In addition to battle deaths, the number of internally displaced persons (IDP) is a second major indicator for humanitarian suffering, conflict and instability (Väyrynen, 2000: 68). In order to receive a precise picture of the degree of internal displacement, the number of IDPs is weighed against the total population. The threshold is set at 10% of the population which is informed by a categorisation of the Global IDP Project and Norwegian Refugee Council (2002) on countries suffering from severe internal displacement. Data on IDPs is drawn from The UN Refugee Agency (2015) and The World Bank (2015c).

Hunger and Disease

Hunger and disease are more indirect consequences of war which gradually contribute to human suffering (Väyrynen, 2000: 63-64). Hunger can be measured by the prevalence rate of undernourished people in percentage of the total population. The mortality rate of children under five (per 1000 live births) is taken as the indicator for disease. Information on both measures is available at the World Bank database (The World Bank, 2015b, a). The threshold for the hunger indicator is set at 25% of the population which demarcates countries with high and very high rates of undernourishment according to the Statistics Division of the Food and Agriculture Organization (2013). In line with the definition of very high levels of child mortality by the WHO, the threshold for the under-five mortality rate is set at 100 deaths per 1000 live births (World Health Organization, 2014).

Human Rights Violations

Another indicator for the presence of instability and a grave humanitarian situation are human rights violations. These can be measured using the Political Terror Scale Ratings dataset (Gibney et al., 2014b). This dataset ranks countries on a scale from one to five, where one indicates that the rule of law governs the country and five that people are endangered by serious human rights violations. The ratings used in this study are based on the reports of Amnesty International; missing scores are complemented with the reports of the US Department of State (Gibney et al., 2015). Based on the definition of the worst human rights offenders by Gibney et al. (2014a), the threshold for this indicator is set at four.

Process Tracing Tests and Evidence

Table 46: *Process-tracing tests H1a – Domestic Consensus*

	Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)	
	Doubly Decisive	**Smoking-gun test**
Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)	Combination of multiple tests	State leaders publicly show coherent view on intervention in absence of clear-cut interests and norms on intervention.
	Hoop test	**Straw-in-the-wind test**
	State leaders debate intervention secretly or publicly. NSC meets to discuss crisis. No evidence of opposing views. *Failure*: if prime minister or president takes decision alone and disregards other ministers' views.	There is evidence which illuminates state leaders' motives to maintain consent (upcoming elections, no-confidence vote).

Source: own compilation.

Table 47: *Process-tracing tests H1b – Domestic Opposition*

	Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)	
	Doubly Decisive	**Smoking-gun test**
Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)	Combination of multiple tests	State leaders publicly voice opposition despite request for intervention, UN mandate or strategic culture would allow for intervention.
	Hoop test	**Straw-in-the-wind test**
	State leaders do not mention possibility of intervention or oppose it. *Failure*: if they oppose intervention but prime minister or president acts alone.	There is evidence which illuminates state leaders' motives not to disregard domestic opposition (i.e. institutional requirements, strategic culture, lacking material capabilities).

Source: own compilation.

Table 48: *Process-tracing tests H2a – International Compatibility*

	Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)	
	Doubly Decisive	**Smoking-gun test**
Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)	Combination of multiple tests	International players take actions which accommodate European preferences. *If domestic consensus*: other actors encourage Europeans to intervene. Europeans mention position of other actors (regional and P5) and only act with their approval. *If domestic opposition*: other actors want to intervene instead of Europeans, have capabilities to do so. Europeans encourage others to intervene despite humanitarian concerns and security interests.
	Hoop test	**Straw-in-the-wind test**
	If domestic consensus: European state leaders seek international approval, coordinate with other actors. *If domestic opposition:* no external pressure on European states to intervene.	*If domestic consensus*: reasons why other actors embrace intervention (failed mediation attempts, conflict deteriorates). *If domestic opposition*: reasons why other actors embrace non-Western intervention (mediation successful, intervention goals of other actors).

Source: own compilation.

Table 49*: Process-tracing tests H2b – International Incompatibility*

	Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)	
	Doubly Decisive	**Smoking-gun test**
Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)	Combination of multiple tests.	International players take actions which do not accommodate European preferences. *If domestic consensus*: other actors oppose intervention (not just lack of interests and norms). Europeans mention position of other actors (regional and P5) for non-intervention. Do not intervene without their approval. *If domestic opposition*: other actors do not have capabilities and willingness to intervene. There is a request for European intervention. Europeans intervene even though security interests and norms are vague.
	Hoop test	**Straw-in-the-wind test**
	If domestic consensus: European state leaders seek international approval but delay or refrain from intervention. *If domestic opposition:* External pressure on European states to intervene.	*If domestic consensus*: reasons why other actors oppose intervention (prefer meditation or non-Western intervention). *If domestic opposition*: reasons why other actors favour European intervention (mediation failed, conflict deteriorates, lacking regional capabilities).

Source: own compilation.

Table 50: *Process-tracing tests H3a – Congruent Preferences*

	Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)	
	Doubly Decisive	**Smoking-gun test**
Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)	Combination of multiple tests.	European leaders express common preference for intervention. Security interests are vague, no previous experiences in this country.
	Hoop test	**Straw-in-the-wind test**
	European leaders discuss crisis; crisis is mentioned in official documents.	Motives why other European states want to intervene (humanitarian reasons, culture, solidarity, material goals).

Source: own compilation.

Table 51: *Process-tracing tests H3b – Mixed Preferences and Power*

	Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)	
	Doubly Decisive	**Smoking-gun test**
Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)	Combination of multiple tests.	European states do not show common views but launch intervention even when security interests and/or norms are vague.
	Hoop test	**Straw-in-the-wind test**
	Powerful states shape/push for intervention, i.e. France drafts CMC.	Reasons why power matters (Powerful state provides troops, makes compromises and side-payments).

Source: own compilation.

Table 52: *Process-tracing tests H3c –Incongruent Preferences*

	Certainty (passing the test is necessary for affirming causal inference)	
	Doubly Decisive	**Smoking-gun test**
Uniqueness (passing the test is sufficient for affirming causal inference)	Combination of multiple tests.	European states do not show common views even though there are security concerns and previous experiences of crisis management.
	Hoop test	**Straw-in-the-wind test**
	European states discuss crisis but military operation not mentioned in official documents.	Reasons why other European states do not want to intervene (culture, conflicting goals, lacking resources, domestic constraints).

Source: own compilation.