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EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
Department of Political and Social Sciences

A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF PARTY BEHAVIOUR

by
Anna Triandafyllidou

Thesis submitted for assessment with
a view to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of the
European University Institute

Florence, January 1995

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to my parents Ντίνα and Δημήτρης
to my grandma and grandpa Αθηνά and Αλέκος

The collaboration of a number of people has been indispensable for the accomplishment of this piece of work. It is my honour and my great pleasure to address my thanks to professor Jean Blondel who has had the patience to read and comment on my work during these four years. This doctoral dissertation would not have been completed without his invaluable help and constructive criticism. I am particularly grateful to professor Stamos Papastamou who has closely followed my work despite geographical distance and whose guidance and advice have been precious for me. I am also indebted to professor Klaus Eder whose scientific expertise but also friendship and support have been most helpful in the writing of the thesis. Finally, I would like to thank my fellow researchers and professor Steven Lukes who participated in the thesis seminar of the academic year 1993-94 and all professors and fellow researchers with whom I have had the pleasure to discuss and collaborate during my stay at the E.U.I.

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CHAPTER I

General Introduction

Little is known about the socio-psychological processes that condition party behaviour during pre-election campaigning and post-election negotiations. Competing parties communicate and interact with one another. They adopt specific styles of behaviour in an effort to influence the voters. Party behaviour expresses not only the ideology of a party but also its power position, namely its majority or minority character. Therefore, this study examines the different styles of behaviour adopted by parties which occupy a minority or a majority position. Do these parties behave in different ways? How does a party that has a majority position confront an opponent party which holds a minority position? How does a minority party resist to the influence of an opponent that occupies a majority position? These are the main questions addressed by this study.

Moreover, party behaviour is embedded in a nexus of ideological and political relationships which structure the political spectrum. Thus, the fact that a party has an ideological or political affinity or, on the contrary, is diametrically opposed to a given rival party affects the strategies that the party uses to confront the specific opponent. Therefore, party identity is examined as a factor that influences the strategies used by parties in campaigns and negotiations. Which strategies do parties that have common or opposed identities use to confront one another? This is the second major focus of the research.

The study aims to introduce a socio-psychological insight into party behaviour. To that end, different theoretical approaches to party behaviour in campaigning will be briefly discussed. Thereby, the originality of our approach will be highlighted by emphasising the different theoretical perspective that is implicit in our

model.

1.1 Theoretical approaches to party behaviour in campaigning

Party behaviour and especially pre-electoral campaigning are subjects that are discussed widely and frequently amongst political scientists. Various theories have been developed in an attempt to explain and, even more, to predict party behaviour. Indeed, there are three main theoretical approaches which attempt to analyse party campaigning and the concomitant strategies: behaviouralism, the communications approach and rational-choice theory. Moreover, there is also a managerial approach which aims at examining the problem in a pragmatic perspective, namely from the point of view of campaign organisers and politicians.

The theory of behaviouralism is composed of two primary approaches. The first approach which adopts a sociological dynamic was first introduced by Paul Lazarsfeld and his collaborators (1944) at Columbia University in the early forties. The basic assumption of this model was that voting intentions were mainly determined by a voter's social characteristics. Pre-election campaigning, therefore, had little impact on voting decisions since the latter depended on a voter's political predispositions, i.e. his/her long standing party-loyalties. Furthermore, political campaigning had a primarily reinforcing and predisposition-activating effect rather than a prominently converting and persuading one. This sociological approach underestimates the short-term changes that may occur during a campaign, focusing, from the beginning, on long-term explanatory variables such as social characteristics. Little attention is paid therefore to the campaigning itself and to the possibility of alternative stimuli for the existing predispositions of a voter if a different sort of campaign is run. Besides, the manifestation of, what might be called a conversion effect, may be seen in more subtle and covert

ways than that represented by the voters' partisan preferences. Indeed, the campaign can produce changes in the way candidates or parties are perceived or the manner in which agenda of political issues is formed. As a result, such a phenomenon may significantly influence the outcome of the elections.

A second approach, within the framework of behaviouralism, is one that was developed at the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes 1960). Compared to the previous model, the main difference highlighted by this model results from the importance given by the approach to socio-psychological variables. As a result, there are three types of "attitude" toward political stimuli which were distinguished: party-identification, support for campaign issues and candidate appeal. The conclusions that were reached concerning individual voting decisions confirmed those that had been drawn formerly by the Columbia group. Indeed, the stability of partisan opinions and behaviour was emphasised. However, the explanation offered for such phenomena was different. Long standing loyalties were seen as relying on party identification. That said the role of campaigning was once again minimised.

Despite the fact that the conclusions of both these behaviouralist approaches have been largely accepted in political science, there has also been a great deal of criticism levelled against them. The concern has focused upon both the degree of sophistication involved in the typical voter's decision-making and the possible influence of political issues rather than party identification. Moreover, the neglect of the short-term impact resulting from the relationship between political events and voters' attitudes and behaviour has also been highlighted.

A second theoretical framework of party campaigning is the communications approach. This approach emerged from the early work of behaviouralists (Lazarsfeld P F, et al. 1944; Berelson b R, Lazarsfeld P F & McPhee W N 1954) and emphasises more the role of

campaigning as *political communication*. A common perspective that is held by a large group of academics who have studied this model is based upon the premise that election campaigns are a form of persuasion. Thus, political communication is to be seen in that context.

A large proportion of studies relevant to this field focus upon the impact of the mass media on voting decision-making and consists mainly of a panel survey of intact communities (Kline G F & Tichenor Ph J (eds) 1972; Kraus S & Davis D (eds) 1976). Another part of communication research, however, turns this approach on its head by considering not what the media do to people, but rather what voters do with the media, i.e. as a mechanism for endowing the public with a more significant and pro-active role than had been witnessed hitherto.

The communications approach, as a result of these innovations has offered a new standpoint from which to view political campaigning for it has shown how important it is to understand the scope and the nature of mass communications which take place within political campaigning. However, the utility of this model with respect to the effects of political communication has been relatively narrow and limited for it has focused mainly on political conversion and, generally speaking, fails to distinguish between the effects engendered by different types of media. Furthermore, it almost wholly ignores the power of personal contact. Moreover, a methodological weakness of the approach is its use of correlational data. As a consequence, the model runs the risk that the causal sequence will be shown in reverse order, i.e. changes in vote intention might precede relative discussions or changes in media habits.

Last but not least, in this brief overview, is the "rational-choice", or "positive" approach. Within this perspective, which was originally developed as a model within the discipline of economics, candidates, political parties and voters are viewed as *rational actors* who are committed to the maximisation of their

individual goals. Decisions and behaviour, therefore, stem from this objective rather than from any effort to be responsive to the environment.

Moreover, a variety of models have also been developed within this approach and they can be thus summarised: the "decision theoretical model" which is based upon an individual's voting decision (Buchanan and Tullock 1965), "game theoretical models" which focus upon political coalition formation (Riker 1962), "spatial models" of party competition (Downs 1957) and "resource-allocation models" which concentrate upon the inherent dynamic and tension within campaigning decisions (Brams 1978, Kramer 1966)

Among these models, that of Downs has had a large influence upon political science, especially in the domain of party competition, and has led to the development of a number of "spatial models" of party-behaviour. However, these models often cannot produce robust results because they fail to match specific empirical data-sets to their basic theoretical assumptions. Thereby, their main virtue, i.e. their resistance to ad hoc explanations and their independence from structural elements is, at the same time, a fundamental weakness.

The relative independence of rational choice theories from the particularities and peculiarities of empirical case-studies has been brought into question by neo-institutionalist theories, such as those of March and Olsen (1984), Schlesinger (1984) and Shepsle (1979). More recently, however, attempts have been made to understand party behaviour by taking into account both institutional and organisational constraints while assuming that parties, or at least party-leaders, act rationally (Strom 1990).

Finally, in what has been an attempt to look at political campaigning and party behaviour from the point of view of campaigners and politicians, a pragmatic approach has been put forward. This approach has been characterised as *political marketing* because it focuses upon the managerial aspects of campaigning. To that end, the selection of campaign strategies

depends upon the personal taste or style of individual candidates, as well as their pragmatic situation in terms of resource allocation, opposition and potential coalition formation.

Two elements are taken into account within this framework: first, the principal medium of communication (mass media or personal contact) and second the professional or non-professional organisation of the campaigning (Mauser 1983: 49-50). A typology of four basic types of political campaigning has been formulated. They can thus be summarised: *political marketing* i.e. the professional use of mass media; *protest movements*, i.e. the non-professional use of mass-media; *professional organisers*, i.e. the professional use of personal contact; and *party machines*, i.e. the non-professional use of personal contact.

The pragmatic approach provides a different viewpoint from which to understand party behaviour in campaign situations and tackles important practical questions. Rarely, however, does it go beyond empirical observations and the simple description of political campaigns. Moreover, there is a significant gap between simply reporting these events and providing an analytical framework for the understanding of them and/or the predicting of party strategies whilst campaigning is taking place.

1.2 Political reality and socio-psychological theory


Political Science and Social Psychology are disciplines that are quite distinct in their development, having evolved along entirely different lines. Nevertheless, a socio-psychological view can be extremely useful in understanding political phenomena. The aim of this study, therefore, will be to apply a set of socio-psychological concepts to political reality. To achieve this goal, the direction of the research will be divided into two main sections. First, it will strive for a better understanding of party behaviour. Second, the research will propose a revised theory of applied social psychology.

The theoretical model that is the focus of the research dynamic has analysed social influence and social change. The model is known as the "genetic model of minority influence" and its primary concern is the role of active minority groups in influence processes (Moscovici 1976). Moreover, the research that has taken place on minority influence has been conducted, almost exclusively, within experimental settings. As a consequence, there is a growing body of literature on the character of majority vs. minority groups, as sources of influence, on the styles of behaviour and negotiation techniques and tactics that these majority and minority groups use, as well as on their strategies in confronting each other in influence situations¹. This study will seek to highlight certain shortcomings that afflict this theoretical model on minority influence which are, to a large extent, due to the inherent limitations imposed by laboratory research. In this work, the model is applied directly to political reality.

Party behaviour in both pre-election campaigning and post-election bargaining has been chosen as potentially rewarding territory for the study because such parties can be characterised as majority or minority groups. Furthermore, political parties engage openly in campaigning in order to influence the voters. Party campaigning therefore offers a real-life context within which specific social entities, namely political parties, try to influence another social entity, i.e. the electorate, whilst at the same time, reacting to any attempts made by their adversaries to increase their influence. These processes of group interaction and influence can be represented in an experimental setting. However, such experiments normally fail to capture the external, and uncontrollable, factors that are inevitably and intrinsically involved in party campaigning. The international situation, the contingent character of a large number of campaigning events, the multiplicity of agents and, indeed, the complexity of the campaign itself, as an arena for influence discourse, these are all elements which cannot be formalised and manipulated in a laboratory. On the contrary, raw empirical material takes into account any factors

that inevitably interfere in party interaction and the influence process itself.

F i g u r e 1



This limitation upon studies of minority influence is reflected in the development of analytical concepts. Analytical categories, such as the majority or minority character of a source of influence or the strategies of resistance to an adversary influence source, do not fully cover the phenomena and the activities of political parties in campaigning and post-election negotiations. This study, therefore, proposes some specific modifications of these analytical categories. Figure 1 (see *supra*)

presents the structure and scope of the research in a schematic form.

1.3 A socio-psychological approach to party behaviour in campaigning and negotiation situations

The theoretical approach introduced from social psychology to politics offers an insight into the content and context of party communication that takes place in campaigning. Party campaigning and post-election negotiations are examined as a field in which parties develop their discourse and, consequently, engage in process of interaction. Thus, party behaviour is seen as contingent upon the socio-psychological mechanisms which contribute to the formation of party identity and which influence the relationships between the parties. These mechanisms are conditioned, on the one hand, by the power position of the party, namely its pragmatic resources and its status, and, on the other hand, by the specific party identity, i.e. the political tradition of the party, its ideology and its policy positions.

The socio-psychological concepts used in this analysis will be seen within a specific real-life context. The specific circumstances of pre-election campaigning and post-election government formation will be taken into account, as well as the content of the communication, which will be analysed thematically. Moreover, the social cognition embodied in the messages between the various parties/sources of influence will be examined by studying the framing packages mobilised by these messages. A framing package is an interpretative scheme based upon social representations that are shared by the large majority of people living in a specific society at a given historical time. These representations form an integral part of the (political) culture, the common knowledge and collective memory of a society. The direction of the communication between the competing parties will

also be taken into account and related to the power profile² of each party.

For the purposes of the research an analytical model will be proposed which organises the study of party interaction at two layers. The first layer of the model will examine the relationship between the majority or minority character of a party and its style of behaviour and negotiation. Moreover, the strategies of influence and resistance adopted by a party against its adversaries will be related to its minority or majority character. The second layer of the model will examine the impact of the common or opposed superordinate identities that two adversary parties may have³ on the strategies they use to confront one another. The second layer of the model will take into account the framing packages and, consequently, the social representations that are mobilised in the campaigning and negotiation process. These will be considered in relation to party styles of behaviour or strategies of influence. The study of the framing packages embodied in the party discourse will contribute to a qualitative analysis of the results of the research.

The following chapter (Chapter two) provides an overview of the case-study undertaken whilst the theoretical base of this two-layer approach to party interaction and communication is developed in Chapters three and four. The hypotheses for the study will be presented in Chapter five whilst the method used for the analysis of the data will be presented in Chapter six. The elaboration of the data, together with the results obtained will be presented and discussed in Chapters seven and eight. Finally, some concluding remarks will be made in Chapter nine, regarding the application of socio-psychological theory to political reality. Furthermore, several new directions of research will be proposed which may help to capture the complexity of political reality.

The questions that will be addressed in this research will

concertrate primarily on the relationships between parties and, consequently, on party interaction. The socio-psychological factors in inter-party relations and communication will also be used to analyse the campaign discourse and to reveal the mechanisms which organise communication. The prime interest of the thesis will be on party behaviour at the group level rather than at the level of the individual. To that end, the thesis will examine socio-psychological mechanisms in their capacity as a background for party behaviour and interaction between parties.

The theoretical approach proposed will be applied to Greek politics at a national level. The "micro-level" represented by sub-groups or sub-divisions of constituencies, as well as local factors conditioning the close environment of these sub-agents, will not be examined. Furthermore, for the purposes of this study, it will be assumed that parties as organisations act in a unitary manner under electoral competition conditions. These assumptions do not constitute a theoretical or normative viewpoint about parties as political actors, communicators or agents of influence; they are simply an assumption.

The institutional setting, in which the three electoral contests and two government formations take place, remained stable throughout the whole of the period under examination. The constitutional arrangements concerning the succession in government have remained unaltered, as has the electoral law. There have been no significant demographic changes in the country. In summary, the social, economic and institutional setting of the research offers a relatively stable framework for the enactment of the political game. This has allowed the research to examine party relationships from a socio-psychological perspective, with the assumption that they are not affected by significant institutional changes. However, in keeping with the above observations, variables referring to the afore-mentioned domains (the social, economic or institutional) will not be included in the analysis.

1.4 The case-study: the Greek governmental crisis in 1989-1990

This study will focus upon an analysis of the behavioural styles and strategies of Greek political parties in the period between June 1989 and April 1990. The period 1989-1990 is characterised by the longest political and governmental crisis since the collapse of the dictatorship in 1974. During this period, three parliamentary elections were organised within only ten months (18th June 1989, 5th November 1989 and 8th April 1990). Moreover, two provisional governmental coalitions (July-October 1989 and November 1989-February 1990) were formed during that period, however, no stable and fully responsible government emerged from these coalitions. Indeed, the three consecutive elections that took place in this period offer a particularly fruitful ground for research on party behaviour in pre-election campaigning and post-election negotiations.

N O T E S

1. See bibliographical references for an informative account of literature on these concepts.

2. Power profile refers to the image of a leader or a party as a probable party incumbent. A large party which challenges the governing party, or the governing party itself disposes of such a power profile. The electorate perceives them both as parties which may acquire governmental office. On the contrary, a small party which enters the pre-election campaigning as an outsider, is not viewed, neither by its own supporters, as a potential incumbent of power. The vulnerability, though, of parties with a strong power profile disposition is that their rivals may attack, deny and discredit this image of theirs.

3. The concept of the majority or minority character of a political party as well as the party (super-ordinate) identity are discussed in Chapters three and four.

CHAPTER II

Greece: a summary of the main political events in the period between June 1989 and April 1990

2.1 The Socialists in crisis: at the threshold of the elections

The Greek political spectrum in the 1970s and 1980s has been dominated by three political parties. The largest and most influential were the *Panhellenic Socialist Movement* (P.A.S.O.K.) which was in government from October 1981 until June 1989, and *New Democracy* (N.D.), the main right-wing party. New Democracy was in office during the period between the democratic transition of 1974 (after the collapse of the colonels' junta) and 1981, when it lost the election.

The founder and leader of P.A.S.O.K., and Greek Prime Minister for the eight years before the election of June 1989, was Mr. Andreas Papandreou. However, the party went through an acute internal and external crisis during the winter of 1988-1989. Various scandals had been revealed in which Ministers, the General Directors of the public services and even the Prime Minister himself seemed to be involved.

Moreover, these scandals were two-fold, effecting both the private and the public spheres. Indeed, the private life of Mr. Papandreou was one of the main foci of criticism during that period. This was the result, primarily, of his recent separation from his wife and his unofficial engagement to an air-hostess, who was some 35 years younger than himself. Furthermore, these changes in the Prime Minister's personal life had serious political implications for, on the one hand, the moral correctness of his action became a topic for discussion, given that Mr. Papandreou was not married to his new companion whilst, on the other hand, the Prime Minister's ex-wife was the President of the Women's

Organisation that was attached to the Socialist Party. As a result, the importance of the matter was systematically and repeatedly emphasised by the main opposition party, New Democracy, to such an extent that it was turned into an electoral issue.

However, Mr. Papandreou's wayward private life was not the only problem that confronted the electorate in 1989. The so-called "scandal of the Bank of Crete" proved to be the most salient matter during the last months before the election. The "scandal" concerned the embezzlement of public money, public companies' finance (telecommunications, electricity, post etc.), as well as the acquisition of a large number of airplanes for the national Air Force, which were, subsequently, proved to be inappropriate. The political personality at the heart of the matter was the then Minister of the Presidency¹ and vice-President of the government, Mr. A. Koutsogiorgas. He was presented as having been the go-between during the whole scandal and, as a result, was prosecuted for his allegedly illegal behaviour. In effect he served as a political scapegoat for the Socialist Party on the eve of the elections of June 1989².

In addition, Mr. Papandreou suffered from serious health problems during that period, which gave the Opposition the opportunity to claim that he was no longer able to accomplish his tasks as Prime Minister.

The main opposition party during the eight years of Socialist government was New Democracy. N.D. was the conservative right-wing party which had been in office from 1974 until 1981 under the leadership of Mr. Konstantinos Karamanlis. Its leader, who had been elected two years earlier, Mr. Konstantinos Mitsotakis, had re-organised the party at the decision-making level in order to establish what was, in effect, one-man-rule. Indeed, at the local and sectoral level, a significant development of the party organisation occurred. Local committees and what might be called "mobilisation nuclei", which had been virtually non-existent when the party was in government, were established. As a consequence, the electoral force of New Democracy was on the increase, according

to the opinion polls and the general "feeling" of political commentators.

The third party, included in this study and the third largest electoral force is called '*Synaspismos tis Aristeras ke tis Proodu*' (SYN.), namely *Alliance of the Left and the Progress*. It consisted of the allied communist and other left-wing forces. Its electoral force was mainly derived from the two Greek Communist parties which had formerly separated in 1975. The *Synaspismos* (SYN.) was provisionally directed by a General Committee chaired by the Greek Communist Party's General Secretary, Mr. Harilaos Florakis. The leader of the E.AR. (United Left, the second Communist Party, which followed the direction of "Euro-communism") was appointed General Secretary of the SYN.

The Alliance of the Left (SYN.) was one of the most widely discussed political events of that period. Indeed, negotiations between the two main participants were still going on when the pre-election campaigning period started in June 1989.

2.2 The elections of June 1989.

The results of this first electoral contest were as follows:

New Democracy:	44,25%	(145 seats in Parliament)
PA.SO.K.:	39,15%	(125 seats)
Synaspismos:	13,12%	(28 seats)
DI.ANA.:	1,01%	(1 seat)
Ebistosini :	0,21%	(1 seat)

Note: "Ebistosini" was the party created by the independent muslim candidate in the constituency of Rodopi, a district in northeastern Greece, where the major part of the Turkish muslim minority lives.

The changes in electoral force of the three major parties are presented in figure 2.1 (appended).

Figure 2.1
about here

A brief commentary on the results highlights the following points. According to the predictions of the Conservative party (N.D.), PA.SO.K. would, and should, have fallen to the lowest level of electoral power that it had held during the last ten years. The scandalous affairs preceding the election, its irresponsible economical policies and the lack of any substantial change in the economical and social sectors were, according to the opposition, valid indicators for an electoral defeat that PA.SO.K. was bound to suffer. However, the Socialists still managed to win a percentage that approached forty per cent of the vote thereby achieving a strong second position in the elections. Indeed, the Socialist rank-and-file characterised this result an electoral victory.

The Conservative party, whilst gaining the first place in the elections, failed to obtain a parliamentary majority. There was no doubt that they had gained a victory but it did not suffice to bring them into office. It is worth noting that with the electoral law that was in use until spring 1989, New Democracy would have obtained a large majority in Parliament. However, a quasi-proportional-representation electoral system had been introduced by the Socialists in Parliament a few months prior to the election. With respect to the Alliance of the Left, political commentators stated that it simply represented the total of the votes gained by the formerly divided communist forces. The percentage that the party obtained, 13,12%, represented the 11% of votes won by the Greek Communist Party (K.K.E.), plus the 2% of the Greek Left (E.AR.). The new political formation of the left, therefore, seemed not to have convinced the voters for it had failed in

presenting itself as a substitute or alternative to the Socialists.

2.3 The formation of a provisional two-party "unorthodox" government

In the event of this 'hung' parliament, the normal procedure envisaged by the Constitution of 1974 had then to be followed. The term "catharsis" was coined to summarise the overall scope of the investigation of scandals in which the Socialist government appeared to have been involved. However, a problem arose, as a result of the Constitution, for under its terms any investigation of suspected public fraud had to be brought to a conclusion within two parliamentary sessions. If the investigations took longer there could be no further prosecution or investigation of the ex-Ministers involved. Given that the investigation had already started during the previous session of Parliament, the second parliamentary session, as foreseen by the Constitution, was that of the Parliament formed after the election of June 18th, 1989. The formation of a government was, therefore, absolutely necessary for those who wanted the suspected frauds to be investigated. It was this unsavoury reality that led to the governmental coalition of New Democracy with the Alliance of the Left, an alliance of legal convenience.

The new government was formed under the Chairmanship of Mr. Giannis Giannetakis, an important political personality of the right-wing although not one who belonged to the most powerful order. The new parliament held its first session on the 3rd of July 1989 and pursued its functions regularly until the 6th of October. The government declared its commitment to take on the catharsis and to take all the administrative decisions needed to run the state apparatus. However, it avoided taking any crucial decisions on financial or social matters.

This so-called "unorthodox" coalition caused severe internal

conflicts in the Alliance of the Left (SYN.). Moreover, these conflicts led to the resignation of the General Secretary of the Communist Youth Organisation (K.N.E.) as well as the withdrawal of a large number of its members from the Alliance and the Communist Party.

Not surprisingly, a bitter post-election negotiation fight was run among the three parties before the formation of the government. The Socialists, who found themselves under political and moral attack by the other two parties, adopted a rigid and aggressive behaviour very soon after the election. They refused any collaboration with the N.D. and accused SYN. of being as "traitors who trade off their ideology for governmental office". The PA.SO.K. sustained that argument by saying that the motive of the leaders of SYN., in accepting the coalition with the N.D., was driven by their "revengeful attitude" and "jealousy" against Mr. Papandreou and his government.

On October 4th, 1989, Mr. Papandreou founded the Democratic Coalition which was constituted by the Panhellenic Socialist Movement and political personalities and intellectuals of the centre-left.

The government resigned on October 7th, as had been scheduled since its formation, announcing that its task had been accomplished. The leader of N.D. called for a unification of all liberal political forces before what was the imminent electoral contest. The administrative government of Mr. I. Grivas took office on October 12th, so that the pre-electoral campaign and the elections themselves would be executed properly. The second pre-electoral campaign started in a more hectic manner than ever for the three major parties. The two larger ones were both running in the election with the aim of achieving an absolute majority in Parliament and a single-party majority government³ (as opposed to a coalition). However, the polls predicted that no party would attain an electoral percentage that was high enough to obtain an absolute majority of MPs. Various scripts were put forward by the

press in their attempts to foresee the election outcome and the chances of the adversaries achieving their respective goals. The SYN., on the other hand, merely aimed at a strengthening of its position and rejected any possibility of a post-electoral coalition with either of the larger parties.

2.4 The election of November 5th, 1989: the formation of a National Unity government

The results of the election were as follows (see also figure 2.1) :

New Democracy:	46,19%	(148 deputies out of a total of 300 members of the Parliament)
PA.SO.K.:	40,67%	(128 deputies)
SYN.:	10,96%	(21 deputies)
"Greens":	0,58%	(1 deputy)
Others:	0,72%	(2 deputies)

Note: The 'others' include the independent muslim candidate in the constituency of Rodopi and the independent centre-left candidate in the constituency of Lefkas (one of the Ionian islands) who was supported by both PA.SO.K. and SYNASPISMOS.

All three major parties claimed to have won the elections. Soon after the elections (November, 8th) negotiations began between the PA.SO.K. and the N.D., with the hope of forming a national unity government (a "universal" government as it was called). This was in order to avoid political disorder and a prolongation of the

governmental crisis. No more than ten days later (November, 17th-21st), key meetings between the leaders of the three parties (N.D., PA.SO.K. and SYN.) and the President of the Republic were held. The negotiations seemed to lead to a final decision for a national unity government.

The new government proposed by all three parties received the almost unanimous vote of Parliament in the session of November, 23rd. Mr. Xenophon Zolotas was selected for the post of Prime Minister⁴. All the political parties considered him to be a respectable and trustworthy man, the right person for such a mandate.

A general plan for economic policy was then proposed and increases in the prices of primary goods and services were agreed. The government also declared that the country was suffering from a severe economic crisis and called upon all Greek citizens to sustain the government's efforts in return for substantial but long-term amelioration. At the beginning of January 1990 a new set of economic measures was proposed by the Prime Minister which was based upon an economic policy of restraint in all sectors. It is important to mention that all governmental measures were discussed and decisions were taken, by a cabinet that was formed by the three party leaders together with the Prime Minister. Moreover, this 'peak' cabinet held its meetings regularly, almost every day.

The catharsis also continued. Many ex-Ministers of the Socialist Party, as well as personalities from the close social environment of Mr. Papandreu were questioned and some also prosecuted for embezzlement of public money.

In early February another political event gave rise to further change in the political situation, namely the presidential elections which were then close at hand. After three successive votes (on the 19th and 25th of February and the 3rd of March) in which the Parliament failed to elect a new President of the Republic, the Parliament had to be dissolved, as required by the Greek Constitution.

As a result, the third pre-election campaign started. Indeed,

for all practical purposes it had never completely stopped since the summer of 1989 and the political climate was more intense than ever. New Democracy, whilst accusing PA.SO.K. of being responsible for the present difficult situation, claimed to be the winning party, having gained a margin of at least ten per cent.

On March 12th, 1990, the first public debate between the three main party leaders took place at the Panteion University of Athens. Thenceforth, the pre-election campaign was run very intensely by all the parties throughout the country. One week before the actual day of the elections, on April 1st, quarrels broke out between supporters of N.D. and PA.SO.K., during a public speech that was being given by Mr. Mitsotakis, in the city of Herakleion in Crete. This unfortunate confrontation caused the death of one person and severe injuries to five others.

2.5 The elections of April 8th, 1990: the end of the governmental crisis

The results were as follows (see also figure 2.1):

New Democracy:	46,88%	(150 deputies)
PA.SO.K.:	38,61%	(123 deputies)
Synaspismos:	10,28%	(19 deputies)
"Greens":	0,77%	(1 deputy)
DI.ANA.:	0,60%	(1 deputy)
Independent candidates:	1,02%	(3 deputies)

Notes: "DI.ANA." was a small right-wing party produced by an earlier schism of the New Democracy. The "Independent Candidates" were candidates supported by both PA.SO.K. and SYN. in the single-deputy constituencies.

The day after the elections, the leader of N.D., Mr. K.

Mitsotakis had a short negotiating meeting with the leader of DI.ANA., Mr. K. Stefanopoulos. Mr. Stefanopoulos agreed to support a coalition government with N.D. and, thereby, offered to New Democracy the 151st deputy it needed to gain an absolute majority in Parliament. This was the only chance for the Conservative party to form a government. The only guarantees Mr. Stefanopoulos asked for were the general conditions that public money would be respected, that the state would not be subordinated to the governing party and that the principles of equality and meritocracy would be implemented.

On April, 11th, 1990, the new conservative government obtained a confidence vote albeit a marginal one, in Parliament, when 151 out of the 300 deputies pledged their support. As a consequence, the catharsis procedure progressed. Fifteen ex-General Directors of the public services were prosecuted. However, the presidential elections were soon at stake again. Both PA.SO.K. and SYN. rejected the candidature of Mr. K. Karamanlis. However, he was proposed and supported by the governmental coalition and as a result won the presidential election.

The reactions of the two opposition party leaders to the formation of the new government differed significantly. The leader of PA.SO.K., Mr. Papandreou, at the first session of the party's General Committee, appointed a shadow cabinet of Ministers in order to maintain firm opposition against the new government. He foresaw wrongly, as it transpired, that the marginal parliamentary majority, which sustained the new government, would not last long. On the other hand, Mr. H. Florakis, President of the Alliance of the Left (SYN.), declared that the country was entering a new political phase, in which his party would do its best to play an active and decisive part, also in the role of opposition.

These events in Greek political life had a particular political significance. Indeed, repeated elections almost every three months is an exceptional case in Greek politics and enables a study to take place of the evolution of party behaviour and any

consequent changes that took place in the relationship between the three parties. In addition, the coalition governments that were formed in between these elections signalled an important change in Greek political geography.

The governmental coalition of the summer of 1989, in effect, restructured the political spectrum. What had traditionally been called "the wide Left" or the "left-of-centre space" saw itself divided in two when its most radical element, namely the Alliance of the Left (SYN.), participated in a provisional government together with the N.D., the party of the right. As a consequence, the ideological and programmatic differences were no longer, at least for a limited period, expressed on a single left-right dimension. On the other hand, parties which until the mid-seventies had not been recognised as legal political formations, i.e. the Communist party, gained governmental office, even though only temporarily. The entrance into government of a small and ideologically extreme political party had a symbolic weight that could not be neglected.

In keeping with this first de- and re-composition of traditional political dimensions, the national unity government was another innovation for Greek inter-party politics. The participation at the same decision-making table of the three competing party leaders and the adoption of common policies for three months represented a unique event in Greek politics⁵. Moreover, these governmental coalitions had several important implications for what might be called the "power character" of the parties. Formerly well defined and distinguished political categories such as between Left and Right, small and large parties, parties that were likely to govern and outsiders/minority parties, seemed to lose their significance during that period. Nevertheless, in each of the three pre-election campaigns examined, the parties ultimately returned to their previous positions, re-attributing, in effect, the distinction between Left and Right. Such an ideological and governmental mobility offers a particularly interesting opportunity to apply a model on inter-group relations

and strategies of influence/resistance.

N O T E S

1. The ministry of the Presidency is an office of a particular character within the Greek cabinet. The duties of the Minister of the Presidency is to assist the Prime Minister in his functions and in the co-ordination of the government. S/he often prepares and checks the files issued by other Ministries and Parliament with the aim of facilitating and reducing the amount of work of the Prime Minister. A shorthand name for this Minister is the Minister "next to the Prime Minister".

2. The study seeks to remain neutral with respect to the aforementioned scandals and the involvement of one or other political figures in them. Besides, the validity of the accusations against Mr. Koutsogiorgas can hardly be discussed nowadays for two reasons. First, because Mr. Koutsogiorgas suffered a cerebral attack during the trial at the Special Court (a Court set up for judging the involvement of the Socialist government in the set of illegal affairs called altogether "the scandal of the Bank of Crete"), fell into a coma and died a week later, in April 1991. Second, because after a trial which lasted 11 months (it started in February and concluded in November 1991), Mr. A. Papandreou was released for lack of substantial evidence against him. Two important politicians of P.A.S.O.K. have, however, been prosecuted and received to one and a half and three years in prison respectively, and have also been deprived of their political rights for five years.

3. The concept of "self-reliance", i.e. single-party majority government is of great importance in Greek politics. In the period between 1974 and 1989, no coalition governments had ever come into office. A single-party majority government has always (up to now) been considered as the only viable solution of an electoral contest and as the ultimate guarantee of political and governmental stability.

4. Mr. Zolotas is a Professor at the University of Athens in the department of Economics. He is a world renowned economist and a member of the Academy of Athens.

5. The two larger parties are usually in bitter competition relations with each other. The following incident taken from the pre-election campaign of October 1993 in Greece can serve as an example of the hostility and mutual resentment that the leaders of N.D. and PA.SO.K. sometimes express. During that campaign, the leader of PA.SO.K., i.e. Mr. Papandreou, when invited to meet in a televised debate with the (until the election) Prime Minister and leader of the governing party, Mr. Mitsotakis, refused to do so suggesting that it would be humiliating (1) for him to discuss politics at the same table with Mr. Mitsotakis. The uniqueness of the National Unity government period during which the three leaders, namely Mr. Papandreou, Mr. Mitsotakis and Mr. Florakis, used to meet, discuss and make decisions every other day needs no further comment.

Figure 2.1

Graphic representation of the electoral force (in%) (figure 2.1a) and of the parliamentary representation (number of seats) (figure 2.1b) of the Greek parties in the elections of the last decade (1981-1990).

Figure 2.1 a





Figure 2.1 b



Notes:

1. The electoral contests took place on: October 18th, 1981; June 2nd, 1985; June 18th, 1989; November 5th, 1989; April 8th, 1990.

2. The two Greek Communist parties, i.e. KKE and KKEs. and other leftist forces formed in January 1989 the Alliance of the Left and the Progress, (SYN.) The Greens only participated at the election of November 1989 and April 1990 and the small right-wing party DI.ANA. at the elections of June 1989 and April 1990. The column "other party" refers to political formations which have gathered a significant percentage of votes in some election but have been dissolved afterwards: In 1981, the "other party" is the "Progressive party", of a fascist orientation and strong links with the colonels regime. In 1989a, "other party" is the independent muslim candidate at the constituency of Rodopi where the large majority of the Turkish-muslim minority lives. In 1989b and in 1990 the category of "other party" covers the local and temporary electoral coalitions between the PA.SO.K. and the SYN. in single-deputy constituencies.

CHAPTER III:

The social psychology of inter-party behaviour: From the genetic model of minority influence to the socio-psychological mechanisms of party campaigning

The assumption underlying the thesis is that socio-psychological theory on inter-group relations and the mechanisms of social influence can be applied to party communication and party attempts to influence the electorate. A two-layer model is proposed to study party interaction. The first layer concerns the interaction of the parties with one another during the campaigning and negotiation processes. The party discourse is analysed in terms of styles of behaviour, namely the ways in which each party introduces and represents itself in the field. Communication exchanged between parties in an effort to confront and discredit one another is examined in terms of strategies of influence and resistance. Both the styles of behaviour and the strategies of influence and resistance are analytical concepts taken from the active minority theory. Therefore, the analysis is based upon the fundamental distinction that was introduced by active minority theory, regarding minority and majority groups, which is applied in this study to parties. The styles of behaviour and strategies adopted by each party are related to a party's "power character", namely minority or majority.

However, party interaction is embedded within a wider socio-political context, which conditions the relations between the parties. The second layer of the model concerns the socio-political, ideological or other features that are perceived by the electorate to characterise a party and the ways in which these characteristics interfere with the organisation of inter-party behaviour and discourse. It is assumed that these features constitute a party's identity. They provide, therefore, the basis for a process of group/party formation as well as for a concept of socio-psychological identification of the individual with it.

Party identity is, therefore, a factor that influences inter-party behaviour and, consequently, inter-party relations.

The interaction process is inscribed within a specific socio-cognitive system. Thus, the second layer of the model takes also into account the social representations which prevail in a given society at a given historical time, namely, contemporary Greece. The specific social representations that were mobilised in the party discourse are examined in order to understand better the meaning attributed to the specific styles of behaviour and strategies adopted by each party.

Our two-layered model may be represented schematically as follows:


Figure 1.0

about here

The aim of this chapter is to provide the theoretical framework for the first layer of the model, i.e. to discuss concepts of active minority theory and any necessary modifications for their application to party behaviour. First, the analytical categories are presented which form the basic structure of the genetic model of active minority influence. These categories will be examined more fully within the context of party campaigning and post-election negotiation (chapters 3.1 & 3.2). The application of the categories will be investigated through examples taken from the empirical data on Greek party campaigning which took place in 1989-1990. The contribution of socio-psychological analytical categories to a better understanding of party discourse and behaviour will also be discussed.

Figure 1.0
A two-layer model for studying party interaction


socio/political and socio/cognitive context in which interparty relations and party discourse and behaviour are embedded



party (minority and majority) behaviour and discourse:
styles of behaviour and strategies of influence and resistance that parties
address against each other

3.1 The distinction between minority and majority groups in social psychology: The operationalisation of the two categories in political reality.

The genetic model of minority influence views social reality as a three-dimensional field. The communication and interaction takes place amongst three social entities: the majority, the minority and the population (Mugny 1982) (see figure 1.1, *infra*). These are social agents of a different character and function within society. The majority and the minority are the agents of influence and they are characterised by their effort to act upon the third social entity, namely the population. Their common feature is their direct relationship with power. The majority disposes of power and authority that has been legitimised by the population. Furthermore, it also sets the norms that are generally accepted within a specific society. The population follows these norms when engaging in social activities but it does not participate actively in their formation. The opinions and positions of the majority are established as the general rule and the standards of objectivity are set according to them.



The minority, on the contrary, is a social entity which is responsible for the phenomena of social change. It is deviant and in most cases a conflictual agent. The minority positions do not possess of any *de facto* validity, especially when they are explicitly opposed to the beliefs of the majority. Indeed, the role of the minority is to introduce a possibility for change and to break any consensus regarding the *status quo*. An active minority (Moscovici 1979), i.e. a minority group which by its stable and consistent behaviour attempts to breakthrough the established norms is the social change agent *par excellence*.

"Il est presque certainement vrai qu'une minorité ou un groupe actif, face a une majorité anomique (inactive) agira comme source d'influence" (Moscovici 1979: 89)

The minority group is defined as the pole of influence which is opposite to the majority group. An active minority is, therefore, always understood in contrast to a majority. Thus, ~~the~~ support of alternative positions against those that are generally accepted necessarily places the minority in explicit confrontation with the majority. Conflict created by a deviant minority's position is usually the first step to exerting minority influence.

The numerical prevalence of the majority group has both a pragmatic and a symbolic value. On the one hand, the size of the majority guarantees its power. On the other hand, due to its numeric prevalence, the majority position is embedded within the so-called *objectivity norm*. According to this norm, which expresses a "common sense" attitude, what most people assert or believe is true, is true indeed. Truth is, therefore, the preserve of the majority. This attitude is based on a heuristic concept of consensus, according to which the idea considered valid is the idea that most people share (Chaiken 1986). In an influence situation, it is highly likely that people tend to be influenced by the majority message, and to deem it valid. This inevitably follows

from such cognitive heuristics. The majority standpoint possesses of a *superior* symbolic status because of its large diffusion and acceptance within society. The minority position, on the other hand, when the objectivity norm is activated, is discredited by the mere fact that it is supported only by a limited number of individuals. Within this normative context, minority groups make themselves visible by their firm opposition to the majority.

The target/object of attempts to gain influence by both the majority and the minority group is the population (figure 1.1 *supra*). The relationship of the majority with the population is based on the majority's pragmatic and symbolic authority. Deviance from the majority position, particularly when expressed in a public setting, has a social cost. Indeed, it puts in danger the validity of an individual's beliefs and entails a direct confrontation with dominant positions.

The relationship of the minority with the population concerns an attempt to gain social influence by a minority group which seeks to make its own point of view acceptable to a larger group. The population, however, is a highly diverse aggregation of individuals who share the beliefs that are generally accepted within the society, albeit with different levels of commitment. Indeed, there are various sub-groups within the population and an individual has multiple memberships, being active in more than one sub-group. Thus, in an influence process, interaction is not a series of linear sender-recipient relations for the multiplicity of audiences opens space into which a minority can manoeuvre.

Contrary to the negotiation margin that exists in a relationship between a minority group and the population, majority and minority relations tend to be absolutely and diametrically conflictual; the two agents of influence are in rival positions. Moreover, the conflict that takes place between the majority and the minority also interferes with any relationship between the minority and the population for the latter accepts the established beliefs, even if it does not actively support them. Yet, the minority, according to active minority theory, is still able to

exert some influence on the population. Indeed, its very minority position becomes its base of power, under specific conditions. This point will be analysed further in the following chapter.

The three-dimensional influence space can serve as an analytical scheme for politics. The population is identified with the electorate. The latter is formed by various sub-groups which share, to a greater or lesser degree, the ideas of one or other party or, indeed of no party at all. Political parties are divided into two categories, those of the majority and those of the minority. In the vocabulary of political science, the majority party is the one which has obtained the majority of the national vote or, at least, a majority in Parliament. Scholars speak, therefore, about single-party majority governments and coalition (majority) governments. The term minority party, on the other hand, has a double meaning. First, it refers to parties which express the interests and beliefs of minority groups such as those of an ethnic, religious, linguistic, gender or other nature; second, the term relates to opposition parties who are a minority within the electorate. Even a large party can, in this sense, be a minority party. On the other hand, a small party can participate in a coalition government becoming, thereby, one of the governing political agents. A small party in government implements, at least in part, its own programme and, thus, ceases to be a deviant and conflictual agent. However, such a small party holds beliefs that conform with the established order and, therefore, does not fall into the category of "active minorities" as defined in the genetic model. Active minorities, according to this model, adopt, by definition, beliefs that are against the *status quo* and the established social norms.

The theoretical distinction between majority and minority agents of influence that is proposed by the genetic model is insufficient for the field of politics. Indeed, the complexity of power relations that exists between political parties cannot be expressed in the dichotomy of majority vs. minority groups. In the

social field, pro- and anti-normative positions can be identified and distinguished in a clear-cut way (Mugny and Perez 1986; Moscovici and Mugny 1987). In parliamentary democracies, on the other hand, the power position of each party is contingent upon a complex set of factors. On an ideological left-right spectrum, majority parties are those which conform to a dominant political orientation, whilst minority parties are those which adopt extreme positions. Parties which are close to the centre of the left-right axis (eg. Social-democrats, Socialists, Christian Democrats, Conservatives, Liberals) fall into the majority category of the genetic model with respect to their beliefs. On the contrary, Communist or Fascist parties, as well as other extreme leftist or rightist groups and movements of specific social categories (eg. gender or race movements or the Hunters' party) and which sustain extreme positions, are minority groups, according to the genetic model.

Leaving ideological concerns aside, office incumbency is, however, the most important expression of political power. Parties which are office-holders are thus the majority groups which possess and dispose of power and authority. Parties in opposition, even though their ideas may be convergent with those of the dominant political power still fall into the minority category. The "in or out of office" feature is linked but does not coincide with the size of a party.

The intersection of these elements leads to a more complex analytical scheme than that proposed by the genetic model of minority influence. In addition to the size of a group (numerical majority or minority) and the group's normative positions (pro- or anti-*status quo*), the incumbency of governmental office or not is introduced as a third criterion. Table *3.1 (*infra*) shows schematically the difference between the two theoretical propositions.

Table 3.1

Party or group type:	majority	minority	incumbent	challenger	outsider
Criteria for each type:					
numerical	large	small	large	large	small
normative	pro-norm.	anti-norm.	pro-norm.	pro-norm.	anti-norm.
govern.power			government	opposition	opposition

The typology of parties that is generated, introduces three types of party. The incumbent party is one that possesses significant electoral force. It also possesses governmental power and the positions it adopts represent and follow the generally accepted pro-normative¹ policy and/or ideological orientations. A challenger party is an opposition party despite its large size and pro-normative positions.

Even though a challenger party and an outsider party share a common feature, i.e. their being in opposition, they also possess a fundamental symbolic/ideological difference. The outsider adopts anti-normative, extreme and conflictual positions which go beyond the field of acceptable divergence. The challenger, on the contrary, holds different but, nevertheless, convergent beliefs with the general norms, ideas and positions.

The Greek party system², since the late seventies, has been constituted by two large (New Democracy, PA.SO.K.) and one smaller (K.K.E. and later SYN.) parties³. The election outcomes have sometimes led towards a two-and-a-half party system. However, the system has not functioned, up to now, as a typical two-and-a-half

party system in which the third party plays a complementary role by forming coalitions with one of the larger two. The strict opposition policies followed by the Greek Communist Party (K.K.E.) and the existence of single-party majority governments account for the development of a bi-polar, N.D. vs. PASOK, system.

New Democracy, the major conservative party, has been in office for much of that period. Its high mean percentages (over 35% of the national vote) and its long stay in office, both N.D. (1974-1981)⁴ and its conservative predecessors in the 1950s and 1960s⁵, give to the party a dominant position in the Greek political spectrum.

The Socialist Party (PA.SO.K.), on the other hand, has also been a large party since 1977⁶ and governed during the period 1981-1989. During the years of the PA.SO.K. government, the socialist viewpoint and policies were imposed upon the State-apparatus.

The elections of 1989-1990 were also characterised by the presence of a third party, the Alliance of the Left (SYN.). The SYN. was constituted by the two Greek Communist parties and other leftist groups. Neither SYN., nor, indeed, any of its components, had ever been in government. The party represented the extreme left-wing in the Greek political spectrum. The orthodox Communists, which were the major component of the coalition, had been, until 1989, closely attached to the Soviet Union, whilst its most moderate section, named E.AR. (United Left), had adopted a Euro-communist orientation, similar to that held by Berlinguer in Italy in the mid-to-late seventies.

According to the classification scheme presented above, the SYN. falls into the outsider category, while PA.SO.K. and N.D., before the election of June 18th, 1989, fall into the incumbent and challenger category respectively. However, the period under study evolves in an increasingly complex manner. Indeed, the electoral outcomes and the formation of two coalition governments have several implications for an attempt to classify either party into an analytical category. The situation is schematically represented

in table 3.2 (see *infra*).

T a b l e 3.2

the three elections studied:	June 18	Nov. 5	April 8
party character:			
incumbent	PA.SO.K	N.D.	N.D.
challenger	N.D.	PA.SO.K.	PA.SO.K
outsider	SYN.	SYN.	SYN.

<p>July, 2nd</p> <p>government formation</p> <p>N.D. & SYN.</p>
--

<p>Nov., 27th</p> <p>government formation</p> <p>N.D. PA.SO.K. SYN.</p>
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The Socialists and Conservatives switched positions after the election of June 1989. The Socialist party lost the election and ceded the first position at the polls to New Democracy. The former incumbent party became, thus, the challenger, whilst the main opposition party gained a relative majority of votes and became, thereby, a potential office-holder. However, the electoral percentage that was gained by the Conservative party did not suffice for the formation of a single-party majority government. New Democracy, therefore, was forced to form a governmental coalition with the SYN. during the period between July and October

1989. The Alliance of the Left, therefore, came into office in spite of its small size and extreme ideology. However, the government of N.D. and SYN. was limited in duration and scope and was dissolved, as planned, in October 1989 and new elections held on November 5th, 1989. During the pre-election campaign, parties returned, in terms of programme positions and occupation of office, to those that had been defined by the electoral outcome of June 18th. More specifically, the N.D. maintained its incumbent status⁷, given that it was the winning party, whilst the PA.SO.K. kept its challenger position, being the main opposition party. It is assumed that the Alliance of the Left maintained its outsider position despite the fact that it spent some time in government during this period. The Alliance of the Left does not acquire an incumbent power character because the governmental coalition in which it participated was of an explicitly provisional and exceptional character.

The results of the elections of November 1989 were not significantly different from those of the previous one. The N.D. and PA.SO.K. increased slightly their respective percentages and maintained their existing positions as incumbent and challenger as they were. The N.D., however, still did not possess the necessary electoral force to form a single-party government. The Alliance of the Left lost 2,2%, falling from 13,12% to 10,96% of the national vote, and remained, therefore, the outsider political force.

In the period between the November 1989 and February 1990, the three parties participated in a national unity government. It is assumed that during that period the Socialist party and the Alliance of the Left retained their challenger and outsider positions respectively despite their stay in office since the governmental coalition had an exceptional character and aimed to offer only a provisional administrative solution.

Finally, during the last pre-election campaign the classification of N.D. as the incumbent party, PA.SO.K. as the challenger and SYN. as the outsider remained. Moreover, the

parties retained these positions after the elections. New Democracy eventually formed a single-party majority government, whilst PA.SO.K. became the main opposition party and SYN. maintained its electoral force (albeit with a small loss of 1%).

As noted the coalition of the SYN. with the Conservative party did not upgrade its position from an outsider to an incumbent party. It modified, however, its relationship with the Socialists, with whom SYN. entered into an explicit confrontation by the mere fact of its cooperation with the N.D.

The typology proposed, i.e. the incumbent, the challenger and the outsider party, has sought to broaden the genetic model analytical framework in order to take into account the particularities of political reality. Furthermore, the notions of styles and strategies of group behaviour will be introduced. The styles of behaviour and negotiation and the strategies of influence and resistance to the adversary influence constitute a set of fundamental concepts within the framework of active minority theory. These concepts are used to analyse the conflict generated between the majority and minority group, the ways in which each group handles this conflict and the implications for the image that people form about the minority and the majority in the given influence context. The next chapter will introduce styles and strategies of behaviour as analytical categories, how they relate to the concept of incumbent, challenger and outsider party, before, and, finally, locating them within the context of party behaviour. Specific instances of party discourse will be used as examples of party styles of behaviour and strategies.

3.2. The styles of behaviour and the strategies

3.2.1 Consistency as a style of behaviour of the influence source

The genetic model of active minorities is concerned with factors which give a specific social group potential to influence. The population, which finds itself subject to a process of influence develops a relationship of dependence, internal or external (Faucheux & Moscovici 1967), with the groups which possess majority status. Indeed, it is this domination-dependence relationship which offers the majority groups the possibility to influence. However, numerically small and deviant groups, namely minorities, often succeed in introducing their ideas and in obtaining some influence, into the population. These groups are conflictual and represent an opposition to the status quo. Their influence is derived, according to the genetic model, from their conflictual character.

Conflict can be managed and even manipulated in different ways by a deviant group in order to obtain a stronger, weaker or sometimes even no effect on the beliefs of the population. The concept of *styles of behaviour* is an analytical category that was introduced (Faucheux & Moscovici *ibid*; Moscovici, Lage & Naffrechoux 1969) in order to investigate conflict management and its implications for minority and majority behaviour. Several styles of behaviour are distinguished as factors which affect the influence potential of a group: autonomy, rigidity and flexibility and last but not most important, consistency. The term autonomy refers to the perception that the group- or individual-source of influence forms its beliefs and acts accordingly, i.e. independently of other people's or groups' influences. Moreover, autonomy is not a feature of the content of opinion of the influence source. Indeed, it depends on the actions or discourse of the source which reveals an attitude of self-confidence and self-determination, namely an autonomous behaviour, and, thus, has a positive effect on the

source's ability to influence (Nemeth & Wachtler 1974).

The focus of the research will be on the consistent style of behaviour of a source of influence and on the rigid or flexible way it has of negotiating its ideas. The reasons for this selection are two-fold. The literature that is relevant to active minority influence has developed these two concepts on the basis that they are central for the analysis of relations between a minority, a majority and a population. Moreover, consistency is the first prerequisite for a small deviant group to infiltrate a process of influence; indeed, consistency is a desirable feature for large and powerful groups too.

Consistency is considered as an indispensable characteristic for a minority to place itself as a (potential) source of influence within a specific context. The minority must insist on its positions, persist and not cede to the reaction of other social agents in order to be recognised as a distinctive, alternative social agent. The coherence and stability of the minority responses are perceived as features of a stable behavioural pattern, i.e. minority consistency. Therefore, its responses, throughout a series of questions, need to be coherent and not influenced by situational or conjunctural factors. People perceive reality and form expectations with respect to it by linking the temporary and spontaneous expressions of behaviour with stable and recurring patterns (Heider 1958). Thus, to the extent that various expressions of a specific attitude during different events are linked to a stable and persistent background (namely the consistent set of positions of the minority) the distinctiveness and consistency which characterise these positions becomes a point of reference for the population. The minority position, thus, acquires the status of an alternative solution.

The recognition of minority ideas as a possible alternative to established beliefs represents an important first victory for a minority. Indeed, the acceptance of the established social order is, to a large extent, often based on little more than lack of an

alternative. Moreover, the social order is presented as unique, i.e. it cannot be substituted by a different one (Asch 1959: 380-1). The minority, however, puts this order into question through the firmness of its opposition. Furthermore, the consistent repetition of its beliefs guarantees its firm conviction and its continuing adherence to a set of beliefs.

The minority needs to stick to its point of view even though it is opposed to the established norms and in spite of the fact that it is, thus, brought into explicit confrontation with the dominant group. Indeed, the minority's decisiveness accentuates the conflict because it puts forward the minority beliefs and positions as of an equal value to those of the majority. The consistent, non-random pattern of the minority response is, therefore, made visible and even prominent for the population.

Given that a minority position is irreconcilable with a majority one, it introduces a socio-cognitive dilemma for the population. Experimental research (Moscovici, Lage & Naffrechoux 1969) has shown that this dilemma can cast doubt on the validity of an explicit rule, i.e. a rule perceived as a quasi-natural law as is for instance the perception of colours. The validity of this rule is based on a spontaneous and unanimous agreement about it (Moscovici, Lage & Naffrechoux *ibid*: 354). The insistence and consistency of the minority in sustaining its diverging opinion, namely in "seeing" a different colour than the colour that the majority perceives, can undermine the validity of the majority opinion and influence the population.⁸ The findings of the Moscovici experiment support the assumption that the consistent style of a minority endows it with a power to influence which initially it does not possess because of its marginal and deviant position (Papastamou 1989: 272).

Within the same line of argumentation the studies of Asch (1956) are reviewed and re-interpreted from a different perspective than that of their author (Faucheux & Moscovici 1967; Mugny 1984). The Asch experiment⁹ was said to confirm the view that individuals tend to comply with a majority group even when the majority

opinions are of a manifest arbitrariness and in opposition to what would be called an objective judgement of the situation.

A re-examination of the Asch study, in light of consistency as a fundamental characteristic of a minority influence source leads, however, to a contradictory conclusion. The influence of the subjects in the Asch experiment was not due to the pressure exercised by a majority but to the consistent behaviour of a minority. The wrong judgement expressed by the group of two people was a deviant judgement produced by a minority. Even though not represented in the experimental setting, the majority of society would support the subject's initial correct accomplishment of the experimental task. The latter involved the evaluation of the length of lines drawn in paper. The visual perception of a natural dimension represents an established norm. It has the validity of a natural law. The judgements of the vast majority of people concerning space dimensions (length, width, height) are unanimous. For this reason the two-people group, which insisted in its incorrect judgements was, in fact, a minority group which succeeded by its persistence and stability in changing the majority responses with respect to the specific task. The specific circumstances of the experiment, i.e. isolation from the social environment and intense adversary propaganda in which the subject found him/herself, account for his/her change in attitude¹⁰. In conclusion, therefore, the experiment of Asch offers another example of the significance of a consistent style of behaviour by a minority group with respect to its influence potential.

Furthermore, consistent behaviour is validated on two levels, synchronic and diachronic (Moscovici 1976). The first level refers to the consistency and coherence of the responses given by the various members of a group. Synchronic consistency reaches its peak when there is unanimity within the group. The group, thus, shows a stable and decided attitude towards the object at stake in a specific interaction situation. Diachronic consistency, on the other hand, guarantees the stability of the group and the firm and

resolute support of its beliefs in the course of time, as well as under different sets of circumstances.

The distinction between the two expressions of consistency indicates that consistency has not a value *per se* as a style of behaviour of a source of influence because its power is activated only when it becomes salient or prominent as a feature of the attitude of the source of influence. The actual features of behaviour can vary, to a certain extent, and yet still enhance the perception that the group behaviour possesses a stable and congruous character. In fact, the mere repetition of a group's beliefs and its insistence upon giving exactly the same responses under different circumstances is not the best expression of consistent behaviour. On the contrary, a certain variation of the positions adopted, structured, however, around the same organising principle and in agreement with each other, leads to a clearer perception of a group's consistent attitude (Nemeth, Swedlund & Kanki 1974). The minority group, therefore, highlights the focal point of its influence attempts for it does not stick to a mechanic, imitative repetition of its beliefs. Indeed, the various instances of a minority discourse and action are the means by which it communicates its ideas. Its behaviour being a means to communicate the content of its specific beliefs and attitudes. Its consistent, although non-repetitive behaviour, shows its responsiveness to situational elements which, however, do not modify its positions. Thus, the minority group presents itself not only as a supporter of deviant opinion but also as an exemplary agent of socially divergent attitudes¹¹. The perception of the minority as an autonomous, self-confident agent of influence, together with its consistent style of behaviour, result in a mutually reinforcing impact (Nemeth & Wachtler 1973).

Furthermore, the consistent style of behaviour of a group acquires major significance in an influence situation in which a decision has to be made and the population seeks for a group that adopts a lasting and firm position (Moscovici 1979). In this

sense, consistency and stability are not notions alien to the literature on party behaviour. This is particularly so with respect to behaviour in party campaigning. Party credibility before an electoral contest is largely a function of the popular perception of its former behaviour and of its programme positions as being consistent and coherent. Indeed, voters seem to reward parties whose positions are consistent over time and whose pre-election promises are not forgotten when they take office (Downs 1957). Consistency is related also to the size and power character of a party. A party that has been in office or which has been a significant electoral force or has had a long political tradition may derive its credentials from various pragmatic and symbolic resources. However, a relatively new, small or extreme party is dependent on the perception of its behaviour in pre-election campaigning alone, given that its resources from the past are limited. On the other hand, the mere existence of a political past poses several constraints on the ability of a party to manoeuvre. A slight change in its policy positions or ideology risks being perceived as a sign of inconsistency. The manoeuvring of small or new parties is, therefore, easier as the party possesses a larger margin of acceptable variation (Mauser 1983). These observations are in agreement with the findings of socio-psychological research on the meaning of consistent behaviour in processes of influence. The incumbent or challenger type of party possess symbolic and pragmatic power which makes the principles that organise their positions more visible than those of outsider parties. A large part of the electorate is likely to have been concerned with the policy positions of a large party which is a potential power incumbent. Thus, recent policy choices of the party are often compared and tested against its earlier ideas. Nevertheless, outsider parties also need to present a stable and coherent set of positions. The difference lies in the fact that a consistent style of behaviour by an outsider may concentrate more on a synchronic level than on a diachronic, as its political past is relatively short and/or a limited number of voters have been concerned with

its programme positions.

Social interaction takes place within a specific social field that is structured by the power relationships between various groups that are active at a specific point in time. Collective memory and experience, as well as references to shared values and symbols organise the understanding of inter-group relations and communications. Politics, as an important expression of social life, is also situated within such a context of social representations¹². Furthermore, these condition the perception and understanding of party behaviour in a specific way making it a salient feature amidst alternatives. Thus the consistent behaviour of a political party is embedded in the social environment in which party campaigning and interaction between parties take place. Not surprisingly, a perception of consistency is contingent upon a normative context being salient in a specific environment at a given point in time. Stable and divergent behaviour by a social group or party can be interpreted as being consistent and coherent or as stubborn and narrow-minded. The position the party sustains may be understood as an alternative solution or as deviant and abnormal behaviour which is in complete disaccord with social reality.

The interpretation of a minority opinion in terms of deviance or, in contrast, in terms of originality has been proved to alter significantly the influence potential of the minority group (Mugny, Rilliet & Papastamou 1981; Mugny 1983). Studies on active minority influence change the normative context prevailing in the experimental situation by activating a specific norm for the evaluation of divergent positions. This being a norm of deviance or of originality. Furthermore, the argumentation used to support an opinion is also manipulated in these experiments. References to arguments of a conflictual nature, such as socio-political and class interests, which accentuate the confrontation between a majority and a minority group, are alternated with arguments based on universal values; humanistic principles for instance, around

which there is general consensus¹³ (Mugny, Kaiser & Papastamou 1983). Both socio-political and humanistic types of argumentation are used to support one and the same position. These changes in the normative context and in the type of argumentation used in the experiment have an impact on the type of influence, i.e. direct or indirect¹⁴, exerted on the subjects who participated in the experiment. Indeed, the degree of conflict intensity perceived, and the legitimate character of the minority positions recognised by the population, vary as a function of the values and norms activated.

The phenomenon of dissimilar or even antithetic interpretations of a position or attitude can be observed in politics. The extreme or moderate character of a policy depends, to a considerable degree, upon which party supports a specific policy. Indeed, the power position of a party acts as a distorting lens through which one or other feature of a policy issue is selectively emphasised. Furthermore, the argumentation a party uses to put forward its position and the ideological pre-constructions embodied in it, affect the positive or negative representation that an electorate forms about a specific policy issue. An example of party behaviour taken from the period analysed serves to highlight the functioning of such normative contexts, which condition the perception of consistency as a feature of the behaviour of a specific party.

The example chosen concerns the outsiders of the Greek party system, namely the Alliance of the Left (SYN.), and its choice to support a temporary coalition government, in conjunction with the Conservative party (N.D.) in the summer of 1989 instead of forming a long-term governmental coalition with the Socialist party (P.A.S.O.K.).

The Socialist party maintained that the acquiescence of SYN to a governmental coalition of the "wider Left" was required by the SYN.'s political tradition and conformed with the popular will which "had given an absolute majority of votes to the forces of the Left". Moreover, the Socialists stressed that the consent of SYN.

to this "wider Left government" would be a legitimate action, consistent with the party's ideology. The Conservatives, on the contrary, evaluated this very same attitude as a "betrayal of the principles of Greek parliamentary democracy" and "proof of compliance with the immoral and dishonest attitude of the departing government of shame". Such a "lack of courage", they asserted, would be "inconsistent with the promise that SYN. had given before the elections" and "it would be politically unjust" because "it would ignore the will of the Greek people, as was expressed by the national vote of June, 18th". The participation of SYN. in a long-term governmental coalition with the Socialists was subject to a range of contradictory interpretations that were based on competing normative contexts. These included justice vs. criminality, law and order vs. disorder, and transparency and popular control of government vs. authoritarian and dishonest practices on the part of State authorities. The same behaviour was simultaneously an ideologically consistent, lawful and courageous strategy and an inconsistent behaviour, deviant from the political norms of Greek society.

As if it were by means of analogy, the ultimate decision made by SYN. to support, at least for a limited period, a governmental coalition formed by the Conservatives, was judged as being "inconsistent", "politically dishonest", "illegitimate" and "an act of betrayal" by the Socialist party. Whilst, according to the N.D. (Conservatives), it was "an act of courage", "a moral obligation that the SYN. had to fulfil" and "respectful to the principles of democratic rule". The contrast between consistency and loyalty to the democratic rule vs. dishonesty and deviance served again to highlight competing interpretations of one and the same attitude.

The interest of the Alliance of the Left was to render more prominent the norms that activated a positive evaluation and justification of whichever decision they eventually took. The line of argumentation stressed, therefore, by the Alliance of the Left (SYN.) was, briefly, the following: the main political task of the Parliament at that moment was to investigate the scandals and to

prosecute those public officials and ministers who were found guilty. Only by taking this indispensable first step would Greece escape from the governmental crisis. Moreover, the ideal agent for such "a nationally significant task" was a national unity government which possessed as large an electoral base as possible. The prospect of such a three- or more- party government was, however, prevented by the firm decision of the Socialists not to participate in any governmental coalition with the Conservative party. The Socialists countered the national unity government proposal with a demand for a stable governmental coalition that possessed long-term objectives that were based on a set of common policies. It is worth noting that the promotion of stability was paramount in the rigid negotiation line that was adopted by the Socialists. The Conservatives had not been very fond of the idea of a national unity government themselves emphasising their resentment towards the "immoral and corrupted Socialists". Under these circumstances, SYN. failed to overcome the dilemma through the introduction of a third possible choice. The Alliance of the Left, therefore, had to (and could only) justify its eventual choice as being one that was between two evils it chose the lesser one, thereby embedding itself within the appropriate normative context.

The prominence of a normative context is contingent upon the power position of a party that endorses it. Besides, the composition of the population to which the normative appeals are addressed is also highly relevant. The population concerned in this example, i.e. the electorate, was not homogeneous. Socio-political predispositions, ideologies, individual interests and situational or other factors organised the party preferences of the voters and conditioned their responses to political norms, values and ideologies. Moreover, the symbolic power and pragmatic resources that SYN. possessed in order to impose its interpretation were limited. Indeed, its resources were quantitatively and qualitatively inferior to those of either of its opponents, PA.SO.K. and New Democracy.

On the other hand, the effect of the appeals launched by each of the three parties was differentiated. The supporters of the Socialist, Communist or other leftist parties were sensitive to references about a "wider Left government" and shared, at least to a certain extent, a reluctance at the prospect of a coalition with the right-wing party. The assertion, put forward by the Socialists, that SYN. would commit "an act of betrayal" if it allied with the Conservative party was a strong impulse amongst the supporters of the Left. Its inconsistency with respect to the political and ideological tradition of the Communist and leftist parties was felt in those quarters to be more pronounced than the inconsistency perceived if SYN. allied with the Socialists. This being in spite of the fact that the former had been accusing the latter of mismanagement and public fraud. In contrast, it is likely that conservative voters attached greater importance to the norms of justice and honest practices in governing rather than to any perceived need for ideological consistency with the values and beliefs of the Left. Any appeal to a feeling of a shared common *super-ordinate* identity amongst "the wider Left", and to a common political tradition, was meaningless for a right-wing voter and its effect on him/her (the voter) was practically nil.

The Alliance of the Left (SYN.) chose to adhere to a provisional coalition government, working in conjunction with New Democracy. The normative context which was mobilised to support and legitimate this decision was two-fold. On the one hand, they referred to the principles of democratic governing, i.e. the popular control of those occupying public offices. On the other hand, they also stressed the courage and autonomy of parties and politicians who dared make choices outside the political mainstream. The appeal to the values of democratic governing was ideologically neutral and, therefore, capable of being perceived and understood by the whole electorate. The interpretation, however, of SYN.'s choice, in terms of realism and autonomy, created a confrontation between an autonomous attitude, on the one hand, and the loyalty to its socio-political background, on the

other. Indeed, the latter had been particularly stressed by the Socialists in what was a constant and intensive manner. The common political history and ideals of the leftist parties and the significance of the Right-Left cleavage might have made the norm of political autonomy negligible.

This account of the normative context and its resonance with specific parts of the Greek electorate was confirmed by the electoral results of November 5th, 1989¹⁵. The Alliance of the Left lost approx. 2 per cent, i.e. 20 per cent of its electoral force. Whilst there is no survey evidence that this loss was due to its participation in the coalition government, that executive caused the withdrawal of a large number of members of the Communist party and of the Communist youth organisation (K.N.E.) from the Alliance of the Left. If the decision of SYN. had been perceived in terms of consistency and autonomy by the members/supporters of the party its percentage would not have decreased further.

The example has been presented in order to underline the role played by normative contexts with respect to the perception of consistency in party behaviour. The validity of a normative context depends on the source that promotes it and also on the population to whom it is addressed. This link between the perception of consistency and the character of its source confirms that a more or less consistent style of behaviour possesses no validity as such. It is contingent upon the perception held of it by the population at large, i.e. the electorate. For this reason, the measurement of a level of consistency of the behaviour of a party should look at the representation of behaviour as consistent or inconsistent rather than at its actual 'objectively' consistent character. To that end, this study uses the party discourse in the partisan press as the main source of information about the party behaviour. The analysis of the party discourse in terms of consistency concerns the party's judgements and its evaluation of its own actions. The party states its positions and asserts that they are stable, coherent, resolute or persistent or, on the

contrary, unstable, inconsistent or contradictory. The evaluation of party behaviour as consistent or inconsistent is based on statements and judgements that are inherent in the party discourse. The analyst does not seek to evaluate the degree to which the party maintains its programme positions or is consistent and coherent within its overall policies; this is not the object of this study. The operationalisation of consistency as an analytical category, bears upon the party discourse through the press, with regard to its own behaviour. Therefore, the vocabulary and the expressions used in newspaper articles, the adjectives which characterise the behaviour and the overall representation of a specific behaviour within each paragraph of the text will be examined.

In conclusion, the fact that the Alliance of the Left as an outsider party was unsuccessful in imposing its opinion as an alternative solution does not imply that political outsiders and social minorities will always be losers. Social change and innovation does take place but not always by means of a totally conflictual and deviant attitude for the fundamental element of consistency, diachronic and/or synchronic, in minority behaviour is not sufficient for a minority position to be accepted. On the other hand, minority groups and outsider parties have scarce resources to control the normative interpretations of their actions. They possess, however, the possibility of creating conflict and, at the same time, of negotiating a resolution to this conflict. The outsider deviant group breaks the majority rule and starts a negotiation process with the population in order to make the latter recognise, if not actually accept and adopt its beliefs. It was Gabriel Mugny (1975) who first suggested the concept of the *style of negotiation* of conflict by a minority. Moreover, the new concept serves to distinguish the handling of a conflict against a majority, from the handling of a conflict with a population with which negotiations are to take place. This implies that minority consistency can inflict a decisive rupture in majority/population

relations.

3.2.2 Negotiating the conflict: rigidity and flexibility

The concept of conflict is used as a heuristic notion to indicate the difference between the social role of a majority and a minority. The majority group represents the established order of things and the generally accepted rules and norms. Furthermore, a large part of the population is supposed to adopt the status quo and to conform with it. Hence, the relations between the population and the majority group are characterised by regularity and conformity. Conversely, the relationships of a minority group with other social entities are characterised by their conflictual nature. The majority cannot ignore the existence of the minority because the latter disturbs the regular function of the established order. It has either to absorb the minority, by forcing it to re-align to the norms or to resolve the inherent conflict, in some way.

The rupture of any relationship between a majority and a minority introduces conflict and potentially breaks any relations that may exist between a minority and that part of the population that agrees with the majority ideas. The population to a large extent, shares the majority beliefs even if it does not participate actively in their formation and establishment (Moscovici 1979). In the event that a conflict introduced by a minority is extremely intense, most of the population will tend to resolve it through a complete rejection of minority positions. Furthermore, the socio-psychological shock that people suffer because of a conflict will inevitably lead to a total block of any communication with a minority. Therefore, a minority has to negotiate its position with a population, so that the initial conflict will be settled by negotiation and, therefore, offer the former an influence "pay-off".

This conceptualisation of the relationship between majority, minority and population can be useful with respect to inter-party and party-electorate relationships during pre-election campaigning. Parties adopt stable positions that are conflictual, to a greater or lesser extent, with one another. They tend to be reluctant to negotiate their programme positions, at least before the elections. Most often, opposition parties attack the government for the policies it has implemented. The opposition parties, namely the challenger and the outsider stick to their own positions so that the latter are perceived as alternative solutions to the relevant policy issues. They must not comply with compromises proposed by the governmental party¹⁶, otherwise they lose the possibility to influence the electorate in favour of their own position.

The incumbent party has a double interest to resolve the conflict on a policy issue. On the one hand, it seeks to ensure the acceptance and implementation of the measure(s) it has taken. On the other hand, an attenuation and absorption of a conflictual position tends to cancel the influence potential of its opponents and, thereby, strengthens the power position of the incumbent party.

During a pre-election period, relations between the incumbent and the challenger or outsider parties are highly conflictual and competitive. Indeed, for the challenger and the outsider seek to introduce their programme as a plausible and also preferable alternative to that of the previous government. However, a major part of the electorate is probably in favour of the governmental policies and some part is against them. Given that the incumbent party is, by definition, a large party with an electoral percentage often close to fifty per cent¹⁷, the challenger and the outsider are also interested in influencing that part of the electorate which agrees with and adopts governmental choices. The challenger introduces positions and ideas which are familiar to the electorate¹⁸. As a consequence, challenger beliefs tend to be moderate and conform with the generally accepted rules and norms. Therefore, the conflict between a challenger and the voters who

support the incumbent party is of a moderate nature. This enables the challenger to possess a relatively large degree of negotiation leverage¹⁹. On the contrary, the ideas of the outsider party are by definition extreme, anti-normative and deviant. Their conflictual character is their main characteristic. Their perception as a plausible alternative is to a large extent contingent upon successful negotiations with the voters who, at their vast majority, support the incumbent or the challenger party. By means of its negotiation style, an outsider party, just like a minority group, has to make patently clear its consistent but pluralistic and open-minded attitude.

The significance of the negotiation style is also supported by spatial models of party-competition. Political parties select their strategies in an issue-space with the aim of attracting electoral support. Moreover, a party programme consists of stands on issues of concern to voters. These positions are classified, not only along an ideological dimension (liberal-conservative), but also along a dimension of political style (extremist-moderate). New and small parties which aim to introduce new issues and/or new ideas onto the public agenda not only need to adopt a credible, stable and self-confident position but also to show a certain degree of flexibility.

The relationship between a minority group and a population is best analysed in terms of *negotiation styles*, namely in terms of rigid or flexible behaviour of a minority group towards that same population. The notion of styles of negotiation refers to the different ways of supporting one and the same opinion. Negotiation styles may vary, however, the opinion advocated remains unchanged (Mugny 1975). A rigid style in discussing an argument presents the latter as part of a strictly organised set of ideas and focuses on the repetition of an affirmative, uni-dimensional proposition (Papastamou 1989: 459). Rigidity stresses the unwillingness of a group sustaining a specific position to take into account the opposite point of view. A flexible style of behaviour, on the

contrary, implies the good will of the source of an argument to discuss a problem and identify points of dispute. A position can then be negotiated, at least to the extent that underlying values and ideas are respected and any new position is consistent with them.

The style of negotiation that an influence source adopts affects its influence potential. Experimental research (Mugny 1975) has demonstrated that the style of behaviour remaining equal, i.e. consistent, it is the style of negotiation that facilitates or impedes its ability to influence. Indeed, Mugny²⁰ (Mugny *ibid.*) demonstrated that when a minority group adopted a rigid style and rejected totally a position to which the population could be in favour of, instead of bringing the subjects closer to its opinion, it ended up creating the opposite tendency, a reaction that was probably caused by the absolute character of its stance. Indeed, the rigid version of the minority argumentation indicated that the socio-cognitive universe of the minority was organised in a monolithic way. Therefore, positions and arguments which were not derived directly from it were unacceptable. Conversely, when the minority expressed its beliefs in a subtle and flexible manner, it obtained some influence on the subject. The minority maintained the same anti-systemic attitude but adopted a less rigid viewpoint. Furthermore, the minority recognised a common basis for agreement and a mutual approach with the population.²¹

The influence effect produced by a minority is related to the image that a population forms with respect to a minority source (Ricateau 1970-71)²². A rigid attitude adopted by a minority and the block on any communication that results from a total rejection of an opinion favoured by a population, affects the perception of a minority's consistency (Mugny & Papastamou 1984). Thus, the perception of consistency is intertwined with the perception of rigidity (or flexibility).²³ Not only is a minority then perceived as intolerant and authoritarian but it is also perceived as being less determined, less rational and less self-assured. The

correlation between the two dimensions becomes higher as the rigidity becomes more salient. The consistency of the minority is then distorted by the lens of rigidity. Indeed, the stable behaviour of a minority becomes an indication of its narrow-minded and obstinate viewpoint. What initially was perceived as self-confidence and determination is then considered as arrogance and authoritarianism. Conversely, when a flexible and cooperative attitude is adopted, the consistency of a source is perceived as being intact.

The misrepresentation of a minority caused by its rigid attitude is an indication of the close relation between the cognitive and the relational aspects of the influence process. At a cognitive level, a part of the population recognises the consistency and coherence of a minority's positions and is, implicitly or explicitly, affected by them. However, a refusal to negotiate by a minority accentuates a confrontation between itself and a population. The object of the influence is then translated into a dispute between two groups, a minority or its representatives (the spokesman in the experiment) and a population, namely the specific individuals concerned in the given instance. The relational aspect of influence becomes therefore more prevalent and the inherent dynamic usually leads to a dead end. Under these circumstances, the substance of the matter at stake is neglected, at least in relative terms. In its stead, a negative representation of a minority group prevails and leads to a significant decrease in minority influence.

The question of rigid or flexible attitudes is posed also for majority groups. The difference, however, with respect to minorities is that they do not need a conflict to make their position visible in the social field for a majority position is already prevalent. The symbolic and pragmatic authority of a majority source is the credentials for such a position. The more or less effective control of the social field by a majority group

is one of the fundamental means that a majority uses to impose its rule. Nevertheless, the introduction of conflict by a minority group obliges the majority to deal with such an occurrence. The majority can afford a refuse to negotiate and reject a minority position. When, however, the minority is persistent, it may be in a majority's interest to seek a compromise so that the minority opinion is integrated within a system. A majority possesses a large margin of manoeuvre ability between more or less rigid/flexible attitudes. The success of its negotiating style, however, depends on the social representations that are activated and images of a majority and of a minority group that are formed by a population.

The last observation is particularly relevant to party campaigning. An incumbent party has an interest in discrediting its adversaries by embracing their beliefs to the extent that this does not undermine its own credibility. Specific circumstances often demand that an incumbent party shows itself intolerant to divergent positions. Furthermore, an incumbent party possesses privileged access to financial resources, employment opportunities, status positions and the mechanism of the State in order to render its position effective. It can, thus, afford not to take into account the opinion of the others. However, sometimes an incumbent party that adopts a moderate and understanding style of behaviour is closer to the ideal of a just and 'objective' governing party which can be relied upon to look after the "collective good", than if it demonstrated a fanatic and/or intolerant behaviour.

It has also been argued that outsider and challenger parties need to delineate their position and heighten the profile of their consistent and distinct characters. To that end, they seek to communicate with the electorate in order to pass their message on. To do this, they must in turn sustain their positions in more (the outsiders) or less (the challengers) flexible ways. Styles of negotiating, however, have no substance per se for their effects depend largely on relations between the parties and the symbolic-

ideological structure of a political field. The degree of flexibility that might be considered suitable for an outsider or for a challenger under each set of circumstances is, therefore, contingent upon the social representations which organise the image of a party.

Moreover, each party carries with it a set of political and ideological "givens" that are derived from a party's own past and tradition and which organise the image of a party. Therefore, the effects of a party's flexible or rigid behaviour on the perception of its image varies. A Communist party, for instance, in a Western European parliamentary democracy (like Greece) is often perceived as intrinsically dogmatic and authoritarian. For that party, a rigid negotiating style may be useless, if not disastrous, because it casts doubt on its consistency and creates a perception of narrow-mindedness. Besides, when an electorate is divided into polarised groups, any outsider party runs the danger of being discriminated against beforehand with the result that its consistency will be perceived as rigidity. However, when the party system is not characterised by clear-cut distinctions between the parties, an outsider party possesses a larger leverage within which to manage its conflictual disposition. Negotiating conditions are somewhat different for challenger parties. They can organise their behaviour according to the specific conditions and issues they are confronted with. Moreover, their relatively established position allows for a certain degree of closeness and a rejection of the beliefs of opponents.

In conclusion, perception of the behaviour of a challenger or an outsider party is conditioned by the interaction between party behaviour and the social representations that organise a party's image prior to an interaction situation. There is, however, a reciprocal effect: social representations affect the perception of a party's behaviour but also party behaviour may cause a change in a party's image.

The evaluation of a party's behaviour, as represented in its discourse through the press, as either flexible or rigid, is based on the particular linguistic elements that might be found in the text. Such elements as the use of expressions which have an absolute meaning and which bear on dogmatic principles, tend to create impermeable barriers between one idea and another or emphasise a party's positions. Statements like "It is absolutely indispensable..", "It is unacceptable.. " or "We will never concede to..." are indicative of this phenomenon. The self-attribution of dogmatic behaviour and explicit reference to authority to justify a party's beliefs are also clear instances of rigid behaviour. Conversely, the fact that a party embodies its opinions in a discourse which concerns general values, democracy, the good of the nation or economic and cultural development, for instance, is considered as an instance of flexible behaviour. The explicit or implicit acceptance of negotiation and the recognition of the positions of the opponent as reasonable ones (as well as statements of self-critique) are regarded as signs of an open-minded and understanding attitude.

3.2.3 The strategies of influence and of resistance to the influence of the opponent

The application of concepts such as consistent or inconsistent styles of behaviour and flexible or rigid styles of negotiating is the first step towards an analysis of party behaviour. Styles of behaviour and negotiating are related to the self-representation of a group which enters an interaction process and seeks to a degree of influence. A political party enters the campaigning field as a result of its behaviour, namely through the introduction, maintenance and negotiation of a set of distinct positions. However, an influence process also involves confrontation between competing groups/sources of influence. More specifically, a pre-

election campaign or post-election negotiation carries with it the implication that each party must confront its opponents and if possible eliminate their influence potential. The study of communications and confrontations between parties during campaigning is based upon the concept of strategies of influence, as well as strategies of resistance to the influence of opponents. In the pre-election period the role of these strategies is to enhance the electoral power of a party and discredit rivals. However, during the post-election bargaining for the formation of a governmental coalition, strategies are used to undermine the opponents' position and enhance its own. Conversely, they can be used to facilitate or impede the formation of a coalition.

The strategies analysed here have been originally developed within the theoretical framework of the genetic model of minority influence. The strategies that were initially defined and studied were three-fold: categorisation, psychologisation and denial. This study will look at the applicability of these three strategies to party campaigning. In addition, a new strategy entitled "affirmation" will be introduced. The analytical purpose of affirmation is distinct but, nevertheless, complementary to those of the other three strategies.

3.2.3. a) The perception of category membership as a variable interfering in the influence process: Categorisation as a strategy against the influence of opponents

The influence process takes place within a specific social and political structure. The study of the influence potential of a social group or of a political party implies an investigation of the process of social categorisation. In other words, the classification of the individuals-members of a specific society as members of specific entities called 'social groups' or 'categories'. All social units²⁴ which take part in an influence process are perceived to be members of distinct social groups.

Moreover, the formation of such group-categories is primarily based on the shared perceptions of two or more individuals that they themselves are members of the same social group or category (Turner 1982: 15). Group membership, in this sense, concerns the psychological, rather than the formal, institutional conditions of group formation. Awareness of membership to a group is a necessary and minimal condition for a group to be formed (Turner *ibid.*: 27).

The distinction between social groups or categories has psychological effects concerning mutual perception between the groups. More specifically, categorisation involves an illusory group-behaviour correlation which, in general terms, leads to an exaggeration of differences in beliefs between members and non-members of a group.

"Results from the frequency estimation measure provide the clearest evidence that perceived group-behaviour correlations are influenced by the social perceiver's group membership. Unaffiliated subjects perceived illusory correlations that associated the minority group with infrequent, and hence distinctive, behaviours. Subjects who were assigned to a group perceived illusory correlations that favoured their own group, regardless of whether they were members of the majority of the minority group." (Schaller 1991: 33)

Furthermore, categorisation promotes an overestimation of any similarities that may exist among the members of the same group (Tajfel & Wilkes 1963; Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy 1971; Turner 1980; Schaller 1991). There is a growing body of literature on the effects of categorisation on inter-group bias. The question addressed here, however, concerns mainly how individuals structure a perception of themselves and others by means of relatively abstract social categories and organise their social behaviour accordingly.

Therefore, the categorisation of the political continuum, at least in terms of parties as separate political groups influences the cognitive elaboration of a party's positions and also the voter's affective and evaluative orientations towards a party.

Furthermore, the perception of a party as a separate and distinct political unit is based upon a set of political, ideological and symbolic elements. These elements are regarded as categorical attributes because they entail the positioning of a party along certain socio-political dimensions which, in turn, relate to broad political categories. A party is identified as a specific socialist or conservative party, the P.A.S.O.K. or the N.D. for example, a party of the leader X or Z, eg. the supporters of Mr.Papandreou or Mr.Mitsotakis. A party may also be classified as right- or left-wing, democratic or authoritarian, an ideology-based or catch-all party as well as along several other socio-political lines. Moreover, an electorate is usually aware of any specific features that have been assigned to each party. A correlation is then perceived to exist between these features and a party's programme. The messages of an incumbent, challenger or outsider party are mediated by the category features that are associated with it and, in particular, by those features which have become prominent within the pre-election campaigning and post-election negotiations.

The access of a source of influence to a target-population can be blocked by stressing categorisations which should be judged as negative and derogatory in the social field. Thus, the categorisation strategy can have a negative impact on the influence potential of a small party which suffers from low symbolic status and limited power. Clearly, an incumbent party and, to a certain extent a challenger one, are in an advantageous position with respect to the categorising process because of their symbolically dominant position and their large material resources.

The structure of a social space is more complex than a simple dichotomy between pro- and anti-normative groups or normal and abnormal ones, 'goodies' and 'baddies' so to speak. Social actors are subject to multiple and possibly overlapping categorisations and so, indeed, is the population. Categorisations may be of a different hierarchical order, group-specific or more general, even

super-ordinate in their nature. The same party, for example, was perceived as the supporters of Mr. Papandreou, as P.A.S.O.K., as a Socialist party, as a left-wing party and as a democratic party. The category with which the party was associated being broadened on each occasion. Several attempts have been made within the field of political science to define a number of axes along which political parties can be classified (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Regardless of which axes represent political reality most cogently, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that parties are inevitably subject to "crossed categorisation".²⁵ Such a finding has important implications for the understanding of the functioning of a categorisation strategy within party competition. Indeed, a number of different categorical memberships are available for each party as weapon with which to discriminate against opponents. The emphasis assigned to one or other dimension of the party character is, therefore, based upon the extremity of its positions, its progressive or conservative character, its more or less democratic nature, the economic and social profile of the voters of the party or the party's local or national character. Indeed, all are factors which can affect the positive or negative image associated with the party.

Furthermore, categorisation takes place within an already structured social and political environment. Dominant groups and/or incumbent parties establish their view of social reality by assigning importance to category features which naturally privilege themselves. Nonetheless, given the multiple categorisations that organise political reality, an outsider party may introduce an alternative categorisation dimension which actually renders its image more positive. An outsider party can accentuate, for example, meritocracy as a governing principle as opposed to clientelistic practices in public administration or the internal democratic organisation of a party vs. parties based on little more than a leadership's 'one man show'.

On the other hand, re-categorisation is possible and may, indeed, reduce inter-group bias. For example, a number of

individuals who have been persuaded that they belong to two separate and distinct groups may be re-categorised as a single super-ordinate group. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the introduction of common one-group membership induces change in the patterns of behaviour amongst the individuals-members of two groups (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell & Dovidio 1989). The same strategy, namely the introduction of a super-ordinate categorisation (which brings together two formerly separated groups) may also function in a party competition scenario. An outsider left-wing party may induce a change in how it is represented as a marginal extreme leftist party merely through the introduction of a different categorisation dimension, as an egalitarian party for instance. An incumbent socialist party may, however, re-categorise the political field characterising a small leftist party as dogmatic or unrealistic and, in contrast, promote its own image as an open-minded, realistic and successful party. The categorisation strategy is, therefore, an important weapon in the hands of all parties and which through the manipulation of features which identify a category and which organise political reality, can improve their social image. As a consequence, they increase their influence.

The relationship between categorisation and social or political influence is mediated by the behaviour of the influence source. A strategy of categorisation may be efficient when addressed against minority groups or small and marginal parties, given the low status of such groups. This does not imply that the effect of categorisation is automatic, however. Indeed, the impact of categorisation is contingent upon the styles of behaviour of a categorised minority group. The latter can get its message through, even if that same message is attributed as having derogatory category features. Furthermore, socio-psychological studies have proved that minority groups which share a common category feature with the population can afford a rigid and aggressive behaviour for that will eventually lead to the

acceptance of beliefs that had, hitherto, been rejected (Mugny G, Perez J A, Kaiser C & Papastamou S 1984). By way of an analogy, an extreme leftist party may adopt a rigid style of behaviour towards voters with a left-wing orientation while espousing a more flexible attitude towards conservative voters. In the first case, its sharing a common feature as "left-wing" may render its intransigent behaviour more efficient. However, with respect to right-wing voters, a mild and moderate behaviour might help the party communicate beliefs and may, therefore, increase the party's influence potential.

In brief, categorisation can be used by a group or political party both as a powerful strategy of influence and as an efficient resistance towards the adversary groups. Furthermore, categorisation has a number of different expressions within party discourse, at least within the context of party campaigning and bargaining. The operationalisation of the concept is based upon the detection of expressions which can make appeal to one or other social or political feature. The reference to specific or general social and political groups and the attribution of social or political characteristics to the allied or opponent party are the main indications of a categorisation strategy.

Instances of categorisation within party discourse are numerous and they have appeared on various occasions. In news reports, the reference to the different categorical memberships of each party is often provoked by a topical event. In political commentaries or interviews, on the other hand, categorisation is constructed to highlight specific aspects of reality and, thus, inevitably leads to biased interpretations. Naturally, each party promotes the category memberships favourable to itself and deprecatory for its opponents. The prominence, and the acceptance of one or other categorisation by an electorate has not yet been investigated. However, the impact of the power position of parties and of the inter-party relationships on the use of the strategy will be analysed.

3.2.3.b) Psychological explanation of social beliefs: the strategy of psychologisation

The term "psychologisation" refers to the establishment of a causal link between the behaviour and the positions of a group/source of influence and its psychological characteristics. The latter are supposed to have conditioned the actualisation of a group's behaviour. The strategy of psychologisation functions in a way similar to that of categorisation. However, instead of linking the beliefs of a group to its socio-political features, it attributes them to a specific psychological profile that is shared by the members of the group. It does not act, however, by means of a mere individualisation but rather it acts in particular as a recognition of behaviour and ideas which are common to several groups to equally common psychological characteristics. Psychologisation, thus, relates the ideas of the source of influence to a psychological idiosyncratic dimension which is highlighted to the detriment of the objective aspects of the arguments (Mugny & Papastamou 1984).

Minority groups, because of their conflictual behaviour, are more likely to be subject to psychologisation. Their *unusual* positions are attributed to causes which refer directly to their idiosyncratic features.

"C'est qui se passe, par exemple, lorsque les "tares caractérielles" comme le manque de volonté, les "passions irrépressibles", antinaturelles, les croyances "égarées" ou rigides sont déduites lorsque l'on sait d'une personne qu'elle est (ou tout simplement qu'elle a été) alcoolique, mentalement dérangée, droguée, emprisonnée, chômeur ou d'extrême-gauche. C'est aussi ce qu'induirait, en général, la rigidité du style de négociation minoritaire." (Papastamou, Mugny & Kaiser 1980: 45)

Thus, psychologisation generates an explanation of the

potentially alternative discourse of a minority group by attributing it to a psychological profile, composed by characteristics supposedly shared by the group members. Psychologisation accentuates the norm of 'objectivity' according to which the social consensus²⁶ about the definition of an object or about an opinion is the ultimate criterion of validity and truthfulness. The socio-cognitive conflict introduced by the divergent, innovative positions of a minority is, thus, translated into a mere expression of its intrinsic psychological specificity (Mugny, Kaiser & Papastamou 1983). The ideological disagreement between a minority's and a majority's beliefs is reduced to a psychological differentiation and, consequently, deprived of any objective validity.

There is experimental evidence (Papastamou 1986) that people, whose beliefs are ideologically 'distant' from those of a minority group, tend 'spontaneously' to interpret a minority's behaviour in terms of psychological imbalance. On the other hand, when such a psychological determinant concerns the opinions of a majority group such negative effects have not been observed. The population (in particular, that part of the population which is ideologically 'close' to the source) which is aware of the majority character of the source, concentrates on the validity of its opinion more than on any possible psychological imbalance or rigidity of attitude. The latter features prevail, however, in any image formed by the population about a minority group (Papastamou *ibid.*).²⁷

The relevance of psychological elements and personality traits as factors explaining the behaviour of one or other political party or leader is quite common in politics. Often socio-political demands such as wage increases and social security measures are interpreted as syndromes of revenge by the 'poor' against the 'rich', as extreme aggressiveness or as unrealistic and irresponsible behaviour. Psychologisation is often applied against party leaders. Indeed, in accordance with the experimental findings cited earlier (Papastamou *ibid.*), the personality traits

of major political figures (such as Mr. Papandreou or Mr. Mitsotakis in this case study) were highlighted as factors determining the party programme. The empirical data used for the analysis provided several examples in which the immoral character, senility or obsession with women of Mr. Papandreou, (alleged inherent characteristics of his personality) are supposed to have conditioned the policies of the Socialist party and government. Similarly, the policies of the leader of the Conservative party, Mr. Mitsotakis were dictated by the syndrome of revenge that he felt against Mr. Papandreou. The campaigning of the Alliance of the Left was represented as guided, either by the unrealistic attitude of its leaders or by their obsession with power and their feelings of failure. Moreover, the behaviour of SYN. was often represented as conditioned by little more than a syndrome of treason which had stigmatised the history of the extreme Left since the 1940s.

The strategy of psychologisation was introduced into this analysis of party behaviour in pre-election campaigning and post-election negotiation in order to check the extent and forms of its use. The relationship between the power character of each party (incumbent, challenger or outsider), the ideological proximity between the opponents (i.e., its common or diverse superordinate political identity), their collaborating or strictly antagonistic behaviour (in terms of governmental coalition formation) and their reciprocal use of psychologisation is also investigated.

The operationalisation of the concept is not based upon a simple psychological description of a party or of party members or leaders but rather on an explicit reference to a direct relationship between the supposed psychological traits of a party and a party's positions or behaviour. The explanation of a party's policies or strategic moves, on the basis of the intrinsic psychological specifics of the leaders or supporters of the party, provides instances of the psychologisation strategy. Attempts also

to discredit a party as a potential government, in terms of psychological imbalance and inadequacy of its leadership, will also be studied as psychologisation. An additional psychologising argument will be the attribution of a specific psychological profile to the supporters of a party which justifies their political preferences or their actions.

3.2.3. c) Rejecting the validity of the arguments of the opponent: the strategy of denial

Categorisation and psychologisation as strategies of influence and resistance to the influence of the opponents share a common feature. They both establish a deterministic relationship between an intentional and, in most cases, cognitive object, such as specific behaviour or opinion, and a non-cognitive object, an uncontrollable but permanent factor such as a social or psychological feature. Moreover, they relate attitudes, behaviour and beliefs to specific characteristics of a subject who performs a series of actions or holds a range of relative beliefs. A socio-political or psychological profile is built as an 'objective framework' around the social actor and is used by categorisation and psychologisation respectively, as an explanatory element. These similarities do not imply, however, that the nature or the impact of the two strategies are identical. Psychologisation and categorisation function in distinct ways and are related in different ways with social and political reality. Their common features, however, distinguish them from another type of strategies of influence/resistance, the strategies of denial and of affirmation.

The mechanism of denial attacks directly an attitude or opinion for it involves a refusal to attribute the minimal truth or validity to an opinion opposite to one's own. The ideas and behaviour of a rival group are seen as deviating from a rational way of thinking. Moreover, they are contradictory to 'reality', as

the latter has been consensually defined in a given society. The dissident thus sees its discourse turned down as incoherent and false. The social, political or psychological features of the source of the divergent opinion are not of interest. The target of the denial strategy is an opinion that is opposite to the established beliefs, that a group/source of influence sustains.

Opinions which diverge from prevalent, and generally accepted beliefs, are likely to be characterised as extravagant, unrealistic or simply wrong. In this sense, a minority group which holds beliefs that deviate from the established norms provides fruitful ground for the strategy of denial. A conflictual attitude is more vulnerable to statements denying its "rationality", its "truthfulness" and the suggestion that it is "contrary to the common sense". However, just as censure may sometimes make the prohibited object more popular, the denial of a minority opinion can actually increase its impact (Moscovici & Mugny 1987: 253). Experimental research has revealed that a strategy of denial at a direct level discredits the specific position against which it is addressed. On the other hand, it often provokes an indirect effect for it leads to a re-examination of the general topic to which the opinion refers. Eventually, the opinion of the population is changed in the direction of the minority beliefs. However, this occurs at a later time and in an indirect manner (Moscovici, Mugny & Perez 1984-85; Perez, Mugny & Moscovici 1986).

Furthermore, beliefs and attitudes that are vested with a majority status, namely beliefs about which there is a social consensus, are unlikely to be rejected as either totally untruthful or false. Consequently, groups which sustain positions that conform with the established beliefs are less likely to be denied. The discourse uttered by large political parties with moderate positions is, thereby, less frequently subject to denial by the opponents than that of small and extreme parties. Moreover, an incumbent party vests its positions with governmental authority which puts pressure on the majority to accept that their realistic character and their conformity with common sense simply cannot be

called into question. Naturally, there can be different opinions about a policy issue. The second largest party which challenges governmental office may deny the validity of the incumbent's positions. Nevertheless, both types of parties remain within a range of moderate attitudes and generally acceptable beliefs with which a large part of the electorate is familiar. Besides, the truthfulness and rationality of the incumbent party is in some sense guaranteed by the very fact that the party has been in government and has, at least in part, implemented its policy.

On the contrary, an outsider party in an electoral contest may see the validity and rationality of its programme denied by its rivals. The divergent positions of an outsider and their innovative and probably extreme character, represent an Achilles' heel with respect to the strategy of denial making relatively easy for its well-established opponents to discredit its alternative views and impede any direct influence that might be exerted by the party. However, it is worth noting that whilst the latent influence that the denied opinions provoke (Moscovici *et al.*, *ibid*; Perez *et al.*, *ibid*) may be significant in a long-term process of social change, it seems to be of limited value with respect to the maximisation of votes in a national election campaign.

The varied and diverse linguistic expressions used in the press by one or other party to deny the opinion of a rival have certain features in common. The most usual form of denial involves an absolute statement. Denial is, thus, expressed either by a negative sentence with a positive adjective, eg. "Their programme is not realistic (..) they do not have a coherent political programme" or by a positive clause with a negative adjective characterising the attitude of the adversary, eg. "Their promise for a true 'catharsis'²⁸ process is untruthful (..). It is irrational to believe that those responsible for the embezzlement of public money will investigate and prosecute themselves (..)" or "their ideas are unrealistic and obsolete". Furthermore, the denial strategy can also be applied through a statement of absolute

negation: "They cannot apply this policy" or "None of our rival parties has a developed programme of economic and social policies (...) nor do they have any programme policies" or even "Mr. X (the Prime Minister, a party leader or a minister) is lying".

In brief, the denial strategy is addressed through simple clauses which include an absolute statement. The statement refers in an explicit way to the positions of a rival party and not to any features that characterise a party. Finally, such a statement does not involve any elaborate argumentation against the a rival's positions. Indeed, it mainly consists of a total rejection based upon the premise that they are contrary to reason, reality or 'the truth'.

3.2.4 When non-events become part of reality: the strategy of affirmation in party-campaigning

Affirmation, in contrast to the three strategies discussed before, is not derived from the active minority theory. It is however hoped that it may be, to some extent, integrated into the theory as a result of this study. Still, at present, it is a strategy derived from, and which primarily refers to, party behaviour in campaigning and coalition negotiations.

A minimal definition of the strategy of affirmation involves *false statements which present as 'facts' events which have not actually taken place*. The strategy has a two-fold application. First, when it refers to the party that has issued it, it takes the form of a self-fulfilling prophecy and presents a favourable expectation as a fact, as an event that has already happened. Second, and on the other hand, when such a strategy is directed against a rival party, it concerns the statement of negative 'prophecies'. False events or virtually non-existent events, which have a negative value for the opponent are stated and confirmed as uncontestable truths.

Parties which are campaigning often have an interest in creating events. Indeed, for there is often a "flood of pseudo-events", as Boorstin (1961) calls them, i.e. campaigning events organised specifically for the purpose of gaining additional publicity for a party. The object here, however, is not such organised pseudo-events, rather it is those parties who invent 'false events' in their campaigns in favour of themselves or against their rivals. Affirmation, as a strategy, covers such declarations and/or announcements of events as well as facts which are little more than imagination, lies or, at best, wishful thinking.

Affirmation also appears in relation to various types of policy issues. Particularly fruitful ground for affirming gloomy events and criticising the policy of a rival party is the national economy. "The disaster is already on our doors", "the country is in deep economic crisis", "one more month of governmental instability and foreigners will take over all of our economic activities", "Greece has been bankrupted" are some of the statements addressed by the Opposition to the governing party. One can well argue about the validity of one economic policy in comparison to another, or foresee a deterioration of the national economic situation. However, presenting a possible outcome of actual policy as an event that has already passed is a wholly different type of 'argumentation'.

Naturally, events are always presented as positive when they refer to the party behind them. The governing party explains to the electorate that their budgetary policy of the last years will produce "a re-valuation of the national currency after the election" and that their next mandate will give them "the opportunity to complete their plan for economic development". A re-valuation of the national currency after the election is, therefore, stated as a fact of reality two days before the election. A party by failing to restrain itself from uttering its belief in a clear affirmative way, it hopes to transform belief

into 'fact'. The same thing happens with the "next governmental mandate" for it has 'happened' even before people have cast their votes.

Statements similar to those cited are uttered by all parties about all policy issues as a matter of electoral course. "All public hospitals are on the edge of bankruptcy" asserts the right-wing Opposition against the departing socialist government. The governing party fires back: "their public health and welfare policy signifies the end of any type of welfare system in Greece" or "With Mr. Mitsotakis in office, the National Health System will be dismantled in one day". Moreover, supportive or criticising opinions about the present or the future are stated as having been earlier events. According to the party which expresses them, these virtually non-existent events are part of 'objective' reality.

Such official and public 'lies' are also uttered in connection with issues that are more suitable for pre-election propaganda, such as an election outcome, the power profile of a party leadership or a specific issue such as the prosecution of several Socialist ministers for the embezzlement of public money. These types of issues are directly related to the image of a party and its leadership. Affirming that the party "has lost the election" and that "the power of the leader within the party is contested because he is held responsible for the party's electoral defeat", before an election, undermines the image of the party as a potential governing party and puts into question the capacity of its leader to become a Prime Minister. The statement that a rival leader is a "loser" and that his power is contested even within his own party, puts into question a leader's very capacity to lead. Furthermore, such messages tend to activate symbolic and affective responses that can affect the decision-making of a voter. Reference to the personality traits of a leader, his alleged fear and confusion because, "he knows his electoral defeat is imminent" or the characterisation of a leader as a, "criminal who is not yet in jail only because of the pre-election period" really consist of little more than emotive appeals to the voter. The terms,

"criminal" and, "jail" are key-words which suggest to a "collective imagery" consciousness criminality, penal law and the attribution of justice. These events have not happened and may never do but their statement as 'facts' enhances their affective and symbolic potential, usually already strong in the social imagery that takes place prior to an election.

When affirmation concerns policy matters, the positive or negative connotation of a message engenders a form of cognitive elaboration of a specific policy problem. "The bankruptcy of the country", is a false statement, however, a party that announces it as an 'event', is referring to a specific problem, i.e. the national economy. Conversely, propaganda issues have no substantive topic at stake for they do not refer to the suitability of a party programme or a party's ability to deal with certain problems. Propaganda issues primarily reinforce the issuer or contest the rival's power character, the personal characteristics of a leader or the political and moral values of the party and of its leadership. Thereby, they create an explicit relationship between an election outcome or the formation of a government and the image of a party. Affirming false events which in fact concern only propaganda issues acquires a particular significance. Stating that, "the government has already put us in a situation of deep economic crisis" has a negative value for the governing party. Declaring, however, that "the (rival) party leader is politically dead" while, "Andreas (the issuing party's leader) has been deified by more than one million people, who have entrusted him to govern the country again" puts into doubt the overall image of a rival party as a challenger to governmental power. That form of affirmation can result in a re-definition of the power and status position of each party. Nor does this form of re-definition involve cognitive elaboration for it concerns neither a party's positions, nor its programmes nor its previous work. The interest is focused rather on the social representations that have been attributed to the party. The discourse focuses on symbolic or affected elements instead of cognitive ones.

The strategy of affirmation takes various forms in party campaigning discourse. An adequate operational definition is necessary to ensure the validity and usefulness of such a concept. One element which has already been identified is the issue to which affirmation refers. Issues are distinguished by two types: a) policy issues, i.e. pragmatic problems, topics on which measures are to be taken (eg. the economy, foreign policy, labour policy, the environment and others) and, b) propaganda issues which refer directly to the election, the formation of a governmental coalition or the personality traits of a party's leadership. Propaganda issues include discussion of political norms, such as democracy or popular sovereignty and their relationship to topical themes, such as private or public scandals.

The second element is the party-source of the strategy. It is a party which utters the false statement activating, thereby, affirmation as a form of resistance towards its rivals. A party-source and a party-object (to which the message refers) of an affirmation strategy may be one and the same. A source seeks, through an affirmative statement, to enhance its own position, i.e. it makes a positive statement. On the other hand, affirmation is used to discredit the message and the image of opponents through statements which have purely negative connotations. The 'event' presented normally concerns an alleged opinion or action of the rival party.

The reference to a party-object is not always explicit in the text. If affirmation is expressed in one single sentence then the link between the 'event' and a party-object is direct: "Mitsotakis is dead", "Papandreou's political career is already finished", "We are surely at 48%", "The elections were won in the grandiose rally of last night". The strategy can also develop within a whole paragraph reaching a peak only at the last sentence: "We are in a deep economic crisis (..) it is uncertain whether the day after the elections the State can afford to pay salaries and pensions (..) the other E.E.C. members are ready to kick us out if they do not see a radical improvement in our economic situation (..) the only

party able to lead us out of the crisis and into a path of prosperity and development is New Democracy (..) the people have already decided (..) Mitsotakis is the Prime Minister of Monday²⁹ (..) the program of the new government is (..)". The situation was first described and then commented upon. Finally, a false statement is produced enhancing its symbolic power by its thematic opposition: crisis/disaster-Mitsotakis/saviour with full popular support.

The function of affirmation is in accord with the *elaboration likelihood model of persuasion* (Petty & Caccioppo 1980; 1986a; 1986b). People, depending on the conditions under which an influence attempt takes place, tend to use peripheral (non-cognitive) cues in elaborating a message. That means that in case of insufficient knowledge about a subject, lack of experience or lack of interest with respect to a problem, they base their decision making on non-cognitive elements. Petty and Caccioppo (1986a; 1986b) investigated a series of factors which conditioned the effectiveness of peripheral cues. What is of interest for the present argument is that voters often have a partial knowledge about politics and a limited understanding of topics such as economy, foreign policy, protection of the environment, organisation as well as of the educational system and many others. Thus, on several occasions, an opportunity is presented to parties for them to use impressive, but false, affirmative statements which offer the electorate a handy peripheral cue on which to make their voting decision.

All parties, irrespective of their power character, may be subject to such a strategy of affirmation, to the extent that the latter is used against their policy positions. Affirmation discredits their validity and consistency since it 'creates' new positions for a rival party which are contradictory to its previous ones.

This is a first elaboration of the role played by affirmation in group relations and influence. The nature of the potential

outcome and the mechanisms on which it is based will be further analysed. Clearly, there are limitations to this form of analysis. Party campaigning offers empirical ground on which to test the concept of affirmation. The examples will be collected from primary sources (newspaper articles) and, thus, offer a close representation of reality. Contextual and conjunctural elements present in everyday reality situations will also be taken into account, to the extent that it is possible at least. Our main aim is to provide an adequate definition of the concept and its integration within the socio-psychological model for group interaction and influence. Bearing this aim in mind, it is contended that affirmation fills a gap and opens up new directions for research. It complements the discussion that was opened by the strategies of categorisation, psychologisation and denial. A group-source of influence, by means of these strategies, can attribute the message of influence to the character of the group that expresses it and to the political, social or psychological features of that group. A group that launches a false statement, about a non-existent event, undermines such image and the ideas of a rival party through the use of such a statement. Affirmation relates the beliefs of a group to its image but in a different way than either categorisation or psychologisation. The latter two attribute the opinions expressed by a group/source of influence to its social or psychological characteristics and, thus, manages to disprove the validity of that opinion. Affirmation transforms an alleged 'new' belief into a 'fact' through the use of a false statement and then uses it to discredit the image of a rival group. To some extent, affirmation functions in a way that is parallel to that of the denial strategy. The latter discredits the opinion of a group through totally rejecting the truthfulness and realistic character of that opinion. Denial, however, does not touch upon the image of the group/source of the opinion in the same way as that achieved by a process of affirmation.

A P P E N D I X

Table 1
 Number of subjects showing a change of opinion in the direction of influence (+), by rejection of influence (-) and showing no change (0)

	N (n=20)	Direction of change		
		(+)	(0)	(-)
Experimental situations	14	1	5	
	R (n=19)	9	0	10

Notes:
 1. N = negotiation condition, R = rigid condition, n = number of subjects who participated in the specific experimental condition.
 2. Source: *Mugny & Papastamou 1984*

Table 2
 Image of the source

Source	Dimension	
	consistency/inconsistency	flexibility/rigidity
Flexible	+ 3,90	+ 3,20
Rigid	+ 2,15	+ 1,35

Source: *Mugny & Papastamou 1984*

N O T E S

1. The term pro-normative is used here as a shorthand version for the political/ideological beliefs which form the general rule in a given society. Beliefs and positions derived from this rule are also called pro-normative. On the contrary, ideas which deviate and contradict the general rule are called anti-normative. To give an example: the acceptance of both private and public education in Greek society and the co-ordination of the two types of schools following the same educational structure is the generally accepted rule in Greece nowadays. All policy measure following the above statement as a guideline are pro-normative. The abolition of private education and the substitution of private schools by public ones is an anti-normative position. Any opinion or policy sustaining the norm that only public education should be allowed is anti-normative, i.e. conflictual and deviant.

2. Additional information about the three parties studied, namely PA.SO.K., N.D. and SYN., their actions and electoral outcomes is given in chapter 2.

3. The most recent national elections of October 10th, 1993 resulted in four parties in Parliament with the following percentages: PA.SO.K. 46.9%, New Democracy 39.8%, Political Spring 4.9% and K.K.E. (Greek Communist Party) 4.3%. A fifth party, namely the Alliance of the Left obtained 2.92%, but is not represented in Parliament because its electoral force was below the national threshold of 3%. It is important to note also that the party "Political Spring" is a new centre-right party formed by the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the N.D. government, Mr.Samaras.

4. The electoral percentages obtained by N.D. in the period between 1974 and 1989 are the following: 1974, 54.37%; 1977, 41.84%; 1981, 35.86%; 1985, 40.85%; 1989 (June), 44.25%.

5. Conservative parties in Greece have been in office since the second World War; E.S. (Ethnikos Synagermos) until 1956 and E.R.E. (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi) from 1956 until 1963. The short interval of the E.K. (Enosi Kentrou), a centre party, in 1963-1965 ended abruptly by the governmental crisis of 1965-1967 and the coup d'état by the colonels in April 1967. New Democracy was founded in 1974 by K.Karamanlis, former founder and leader of E.R.E.. A significant continuity can be traced between the two parties in terms of activists,

supporters and ideological orientation.

6. The electoral percentages obtained by the Socialist Party in the period between 1974 and 1989 were the following: 1974, 13.58%; 1977, 25.34%; 1981, 48.06%; 1985, 45.82%; 1989 (June), 39.15%.

7. New Democracy was not actually in government during the pre-election campaigns of November 1989, which was run under a provisional administrative government. It had, however, the status of officeholder, because it had been the main component of the governmental coalition and was also the winning party of the previous electoral contest.

8. In the Moscovici experiment (Moscovici, Lage & Naffrechoux 1969), the subjects of the influence participated in a game based upon colour perception. According to the findings, the subjects who at a control condition perceived a specific colour slide as "blue", when faced with a stable minority who declared that the same slides were "green", saw more "green" slides than before. The influence of the minority, however, was not as strong in the explicit judgement of the colour of the slides as much as it was in the modification of the subjects' code of colour perception. There was a change in their responses vis-à-vis which colour shade should be considered, "green" and which, "blue". This effect demonstrated that minority groups generate an indirect influence effect. A further investigation of the image that the subjects formed with respect to the minority group showed that they considered the latter as being less competent than themselves in accomplishing the experimental task but more self-confident.

9. The task involved in the Asch experiment concerned the comparison in terms of length of one line with three others. Each line was of a different length and drawn on a piece of paper. The "majority", which consisted of two people, opposed an individual who represented the population. The majority, who were experimental accomplices, insisted in stating that the line in question was equal in length to a line that, actually, was either shorter or longer than the first one. As a result, the subject began making wrong judgements which, however, conformed with the majority responses. Asch interpreted this effect as being compliance with the behaviour of the majority. These findings were confirmed by a series of experiments that Asch conducted (Asch 1951; 1956) in which he changed the number of people which constituted the majority group or reversed the roles, thereby introducing a lone individual who insisted upon giving wrong responses.

10. Faucheux and Moscovici compare the situation in which the subject found him/herself in the Asch experiment with that of people submitted to specific treatment with the scope of their alienation from their previous social environment. The research of Stein (1957; 1960) on soldiers captured at war and people receiving special treatment in educational, religious and other institutions is cited in support of this argument.

11. The existence of a socially deviant agent who adopts a viewpoint different from that of the majority has important implications on the possibility and capability of the other agents participating in an interaction process, individuals or groups, to escape or ignore the majority pressures and adopt a deviant viewpoint themselves too, without on the other hand necessarily agreeing with the standpoint of the initial deviant agent (Kimball & Hollander 1974).

12. The term *social representations* here refers to the bits of collective memory and cognitive or symbolic schemes which organise understanding and communication within a society. However, social representations are proposed further (Chapter four) as an analytical category which contributes to an in-depth analysis of inter-group behaviour and the image related to a social group or political party.

13. More than generally consensual, the humanistic values introduced in the experimental study of Mugny, Kaiser and Papastamou (1983) are perceived by the subjects as "socially objective". The subjects themselves reported after the experimental manipulation: "tout simplement ils (the minority) ont raison, ils sont objectifs".

14. Within the literature on active minority influence, the term "direct influence" refers to an effect expressed immediately after the experimental manipulation, publicly and on the same issue as that discussed in the experiment. The term "indirect influence", in contrast, refers to an influence effect that appears at a later time, in relation to private rather than public responses and with respect to topics that are related to the issue discussed in the experiment however not with respect to this same issue.

15. The analytic results of the elections of November 5th, 1989 and an account of the main events during the mandate of the N.D.-SYN. provisional government is given in chapter 2.

16. Opposition and governmental parties together with other collective actors, such as trade unions, interest groups or corporate actors, may participate in formal or informal negotiation processes with the scope of finding solutions on various public issues. During the pre-election campaigning period, however, parties aim to influence as great an electoral force as possible and not to accommodate competing interests.

17. In the Greek political system, from which the case study is taken, incumbent parties have always had electoral percentages higher than forty per cent.

18. The term "electorate" is used as equivalent to the term "population" in the context of inter-party relations and pre-election campaigning or post-election bargaining.

19. The margins of negotiation for each type of party are discussed later in relation to relevant literature on the styles of negotiation adequate for minority groups under different conditions.

20. The experimental study concerned attitudes towards an army, in this case that of the Swiss. Forty subjects participated in the experiment, all of whom were students at a technical school in Geneva. The experiment was divided into three phases. The first and the third consisted of 24 propositions about the Swiss army, which the subjects had to characterise as "Right" or "Left" opinions, i.e. of a conservative or progressive character. During the second phase, all the subjects had to listen to a speech, delivered by a young man with long hair and a beard, who was an experimental assistant. The speaker used a terminology generally identified as characteristic of political groups of the extreme Left. In two of the experimental conditions the speech remained unchanged. The rigid or flexible style in the speaker's attitude was introduced by specific slogans delivered after the first and second third of the speech. These slogans criticised "conscientious objection" as a means of resistance to the army and the military service. According to the results gained from a pre-test, students who participated in the experiment considered conscientious objection as one of the most effective means of bringing pressure to bear against the army. The slogan expressed after the first part of the speech was as follows:

"We think that revolutionary action against the army from the inside is the only effective means of weakening it; for us, for example, conscientious objection is an excessively personal method." (Mugny

1975: 217)

The slogan introduced a conflict between the minority group, represented by the experimental assistant, and the population, namely the students. The minority created a conflict with the army as an institution, i.e. with the established rule of the State authorities and, at the same time, offended one of the fundamental beliefs of the population.

After the second part of the speech, the style of negotiation was introduced by using two different slogans in two different experimental conditions. The rigid one was:

"In the struggle against ideological regimentation, we think that means such as conscientious objection are false, personal, "petit-bourgeois" and quasi-reactionary. As we said before, we think that it is necessary to fight the army from within." (Mugny 1975: 217)

Conversely, a flexible slogan reconsidered the criticism expressed initially about conscientious objectors in the following way:

"I would like to come back to a consideration of our position on conscientious objection which I expressed badly just now. We think that conscientious objection which is collective and organized is a good and valuable way of fighting the army. I simply wanted to say that we also think it important to contend against the army from the inside." (Mugny 1975: 217)

21. The experimental results indicated a differentiated impact of the two negotiation styles. The flexible minority influenced the beliefs of the subjects (+4.45 units approx. in the 24 questions-propositions). On the contrary, the rigid minority, instead of bringing the subjects closer to its opinion, it ended upon creating the opposite tendency (-0.85 units approx., i.e. slightly negative influence). Further analysis of the results shows that the rigid style of the source had a bi-polarising effect (see table 1 in the appendix).

22. Ricateau (1970-71) showed that the differentiation of the social images of a consistent minority in an experimental influence process resulted in differentiation of the degrees of influence obtained. More specifically, if a minority was perceived as dogmatic, it had a weaker impact on the population.

23. Measurement of an image of the source in the experiment presented above (Mugny *ibid*) shows the impact of a rigid vs. flexible style of a minority on the perception of a minority by a population along the dimensions of consistency vs.

inconsistency and rigidity vs. flexibility (see table 2 in the appendix). The measurement of the image of the source was based on forty adjectives spread evenly between the two poles of two dimensions, namely the dimension of consistency/coherence/stability called (K+) contrasted to the lack of these properties named (I-), and the dimension of a flexible negotiating attitude (F+) opposed to the rigid style of negotiation/rejection of the other's point of view (R-). An example of the adjectives used for each dimension is as follows: confident, considered, determined, rational for (K+); changeable, confused, disorderly, immature, irresponsible for (I-); adaptable, cooperative, frank, tolerant, understanding for (F+); and arrogant, authoritarian, dominating, obstinate for (R-). The subjects who participated in the experiment were asked to put a cross beside any adjective which they felt to correspond with their image of the spokesman of the minority, whose opinions they had heard. Thus, an indices was calculated for each dimension based on the number of adjectives chosen in each category (Mugny 1975: 216). These indices are reported in table 2 (see appendix).

24. The term "social units" here refers to individuals, groups and sub-groups taking part in a communication process. The process may be verbal or written, direct, in the sense that the "interlocutors" are physically present, or through a communication channel, such as the mass media. The individuals or groups are considered as unitary actors within the specific interaction process. They are "social" because any type of communication and influence procedure requires a basic set of shared meanings and symbols, internalised through a socialisation process.

25. Experimental studies suggest that multiple and intersecting social categorisations tend to attenuate inter-group discrimination (Deschamps & Doise 1978; Vanbeselaere 1987). Brown and Turner (1979) following the assumptions of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979) suggest the opposite, namely that both simple and crossed categorisation conditions generate inter-group discrimination. Their findings have been, however, disproved in more recent studies (Vanbeselaere, *op.cit.*).

26. The use of social consensus as a criterion of objectivity of beliefs, attitudes, ideas and even individual or collective abilities has been developed by Festinger (1954) in his theory on social comparison processes.

27. Further experimental research has looked at the effects of psychologisation on the influence potential of a minority group leader. The attribution of the minority deviant behaviour to the idiosyncrasic features of its leader affects

positively the influence potential of the minority. An unrealistic, imbalanced leader has been perceived as more independent, more courageous and firm in his/her convictions (Papastamou 1985).

28. Catharsis is the term coined in 1989 by the Opposition parties (New Democracy and Synaspismos) referring to the investigation of the embezzlement of public money by the Papandreou (P.A.S.O.K.) government. Catharsis has acquired both symbolic and pragmatic meaning as the "purification" of political life. It has signified the prosecution of those involved in the scandals and the introduction of a new ethos in government. In the election of June 1989, catharsis was a particularly salient issue within which ideological and moral questions, as well as policy matters, were addressed.

29. Monday is the day after the election since the election day is always a Sunday in Greece.

CHAPTER IV

Social influence and group/party membership: the socio-psychological mechanisms underlying political communication

4.1 Introduction

The theoretical analysis undertaken in the previous chapter has concentrated on the behaviour of a group or party as a potential source of influence. The styles of behaviour adopted by a social group/political party have been looked at as the mechanisms through which this influence potential is activated. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight certain socio-psychological mechanisms which contribute to a better understanding of inter-group and, more specifically, inter-party relations and attempts at mutual influence. The theoretical concepts discussed here examine the psychological organisation of the social and political context in which inter-party behaviour and communication are embedded. They concentrate on the second layer of our model, namely the wider social environment in which party interaction is located.

Research on voting behaviour and voter (re)alignment has focused on questions related to party membership, prior voting preferences and ideology. The impact of socio-political predispositions and of contextual elements of the close social environment (family, friends or neighbours) on voter decisions have already been investigated. However, such studies have not considered the socio-psychological parameters which affiliate the voter to his/her party and mediate the impact of the social environment on the voter decision. This chapter is concerned with the relationship between party behaviour and the mechanisms of socio-psychological identification of the voter with the party. More specifically, this chapter concentrates on the socio-psychological mechanisms which underlie party identity and which, as a result, condition the relationships among parties and the

behaviour of parties towards one another.

4.1.1 The mechanism of socio-psychological identification with a group or with a political party

In order to explain the process of socio-psychological identification with a social group, an adequate definition of the latter and, more specifically, of the party as a particular type of group needs to be given.

A group emerges when two or more individuals engage in cohesive and stable social relationships. A group structure develops through the interaction among members of the group. From this perspective, a political party is a group with organised, stable relationships among its members who occupy differentiated structural positions within the party. Moreover, a party is a group with well defined internal rules and procedures which shape the interaction among its members. Finally, a party is a political group whose main objective is to maximise its electoral strength and eventually to have access to governmental power. The institutionalised character of the party as a group includes the party organisation and the party rank-and-file. To a certain extent, it also includes those supporters who are formal party-members and participate regularly in party activities. However, such a restricted conception of the party as a political group excludes all the voters who (may) support the party at a given point in time in informal and irregular ways. Still, these supporters may perceive themselves as members, in a broad sense, of the party, identify with it and perceive the party's behaviour as the behaviour of their own political group.

An alternative view is introduced at this point to cater for a broader definition of the concept of the group and, thereby, of the political party as a specific type of group. A cognitive and psychological perspective is considered. It is proposed (Turner

1982: 15) that "a social group can be defined as two or more individuals who share a common social identification of themselves or, which is nearly the same thing, perceive themselves to be members of the same social category.¹". This definition is not incompatible with the formal organisation that a group may have. Under either condition, namely, if the group is formally or informally organised, its members perceive themselves as a group, communicate and interact. The difference between the two definitions lies in the fact that the cognitive-psychological definition introduces the collective perception of the social existence of the group alone as a sufficient condition for its members to act as a group (Turner *ibid.*). The group membership is thus contingent upon the subjective sense of the individuals that they belong to that group, their conception of a 'we' as contrasted to some 'they'.

The socio-psychological identification with the group implies that the individual perceives him/herself as a member of the group. Furthermore, the individual links this membership with some emotional and value significance (Tajfel 1972). In this sense, a voter who perceives him/herself as a supporter of or a voter for or a member (in a broad sense) of a party identifies, to a certain extent, with that party. Moreover, the party supporter organises his/her perception of him/herself and others on the basis of his/her own and the others' specific party membership (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes 1960: 120-136).

4.1.2 Identification with the ingroup and differentiation from the outgroup: Ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination

The self-assignment of group membership implies the self-attribution of a set of flattering characteristics (Turner 1982). Mutual esteem among the members of the group is, thereby, produced.

Prestige, ability and any other desirable social characteristic and/or behaviour are reciprocally attributed on the basis of the common group membership. The own group or category membership is also assigned higher value in comparison to other categories or groups with which the individual does not identify. Eventually, both an intra-group and an inter-group evaluative bias is produced².

Inter-group bias has been identified by several researchers (Sherif et al. 1961; Blake & Mouton 1961) as being a consequence of intergroup competition and conflict. However, group bias has also been activated in groups which were formed on a random basis following arbitrary criteria and whose members were not similar to each other in terms of attitudes or characteristics (Billig & Tajfel 1973).

The effects of group bias involve an increased positive evaluation of one's own group and of fellow members of the group and an explicit ingroup favouritism when individual or group rewards are at stake (Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy 1971)³. It should be noted, however, that ingroup and outgroup bias function selectively. The biased perception refers only to features that are regarded as being related to the distinction between the two groups (Tajfel, Skeikh & Gardner 1964).

The concepts of ingroup favouring bias and discrimination against the outgroup are particularly useful for the analysis of party behaviour. Communication and interaction between parties who compete for electoral power are conditioned by the same kind of inter-group bias. Parties employ strategies against their opponents which tend to manipulate this inter-group bias. They may enhance ingroup favouritism with reference to partisan voters and diminish differences between opposite parties in order to reach ideologically 'distant' voters.

4.2 Reducing inter-group bias by introducing a common super-ordinate identity: The case of party coalition

Group interaction neither always nor necessarily concludes with inter-group differentiation. Situational and/or contingent factors may enhance the salience of features common between two groups. The introduction of a new categorising dimension which emphasises a set of common features between two groups may lead to convergence between them.

The introduction of a single group representation to the members of two initially distinct social groups reduces inter-group bias. Former outgroup members are perceived as more attractive when they are re-categorised as members of one's own group (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell & Dovidio 1989). To the extent that group formation is viewed as the internalisation of social categorisation in the individual identity, a re-categorisation implies a re-definition of 'us' and 'them' (Turner 1982).

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The introduction of a common super-ordinate group identity is a complicated process. Individuals may internalise a new super-ordinate category membership if they assume that their goals are shared by former outgroup members and if they are also concerned about the objectives of the former outgroup. Common super-ordinate goals must not only be introduced but also *recognised* and *perceived* as ingroup objectives by members of both sides. In order to reduce inter-group hostility, it is necessary to reduce or, if possible, to remove salient inter-group differences (Worchel 1979). For this to occur, a set of common modal characteristics must become relevant to all members of the new super-ordinate group.

The problem that arises with respect to the formation of party coalitions concerns the extent to which a process of re-categorisation can be introduced into party relations and the ways in which this can be done. A competitive party system involves by definition inter-party differentiation which is in turn followed by

inter-party discrimination. Thus parties accentuate their differences and enhance their own positive distinctiveness and superiority over their adversaries. This assumption is particularly relevant for parties which share a set of beliefs and/or policy positions. Two parties that are ideologically close will tend to emphasise their distinctiveness which is their *raison d'être* as separate parties.

On the other hand, party ideology and positions are usually consolidated throughout the life of a political party. The party, as a relatively stable and institutionalised organisation, carries with it a set of political principles, practices and ideological traditions. These represent the modal features of the party as a socio-political group. Thus, re-categorisation of political parties seems to be a difficult enterprise. Still, under specific circumstances, parties themselves undertake a restructuring of the categorisation of the political field. This happens when an electoral or governmental coalition is formed.

This study is concerned with the latter type of coalitions, namely with post-election negotiation between parties aiming at the formation of a government. Governmental coalitions concern the cooperation of two or more parties in office. However, such cooperative interdependence, especially if it is provisional, does not necessarily imply a re-categorisation of the allies and their fusion into a single party.

One might expect that the resolution of conflict through cooperative tasks would remove inter-party discrimination. However, experimental research has demonstrated that the functional interdependence of goals is not a sufficient condition for group boundaries to be redefined. The conflictual or collaborating orientation of intergroup behaviour does not eliminate ingroup favouritism nor outgroup discrimination (Doise W, Csepele G, Dann H D, Gouge G C, Larsen K & Ostell A 1972; Brewer & Silver 1978). Therefore, the provisional governmental coalition formed by the Alliance of the Left (SYN.) and the Conservative Party (N.D.) is


not expected to overrule decades of mutual conflict and hostility. Neither is the provisional national unity government expected to eliminate hostility and bias between the collaborating parties. Indeed, in both cases, parties returned to their antithetic and antagonistic positions as soon as the government was dissolved.

On the other hand, situational variables also interfere with the perception of the coalition partner. The intensity and duration of previous conflict as compared to the limited, both in frequency and in duration, cooperative encounters impede the production of positive attitudes towards the cooperating group. Status and power disparities also prevent the fusion of the formerly divided groups (Worchel 1979). Incumbent party members who would adopt a common group membership with the supporters of an outsider party would endanger their own prestige and power.

4.2.1 Political and instrumental super-ordinate party identity

Coalition government is not sufficient for the redefinition of political identities. However, goal interdependence and cooperative activity modifies party relations for a period of time. Therefore, it is assumed that coalition government introduces a common instrumental super-ordinate identity between coalition partners. Let us however elaborate more fully on the specific forms that a super-ordinate identity may take within the party interaction process.

Super-ordinate party identity has two different means of expression in politics. On the one hand, it is based on ideological position and political tradition. Thus, parties may be located along a general dimension of left-right. According to a left-right division, the N.D. is situated at the right-of-centre side of the continuum, the PA.SO.K. is placed at the left-of-centre side and the SYN. is located at the left side of the PA.SO.K. (further on the left of the continuum). The three parties may be schematically situated as follows:



The SYN. and the PA.SO.K. share a common super-ordinate identity as parties of "the wider Left". The N.D., on the other hand, is the main representative of the right in Greek politics. Greek political history confirms the opposition in social, political and ideological terms between the SYN. and the N.D., on the one hand, and between the PA.SO.K. and the N.D., on the other.

The super-ordinate categorisation of the three parties along a left-right dimension is based on their political tradition and ideology. However, it also conforms with the concept of group and party identity as a feeling of belonging to a community of people. It is assumed that a feeling of we-ness between the party members and supporters of the PA.SO.K. and the SYN. may be activated with reference to their common identity as "the Left." Conservative party supporters, conversely, are assigned an outgroup identity; they are regarded as being opposed to the supporters of "the Left".

On the other hand, super-ordinate identity is expressed through cooperation and goal interdependence between parties. Parties that share a set of common goals and that are interdependent regarding the achievement of these goals, share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity. Their common super-ordinate identity is not thus related to their ideology and/or political tradition but to the fact that they engage in co-operative activity. This super-ordinate identity acquires thus a instrumental character.

Common or opposed super-ordinate political identity is affected by the formation of coalitions between two or more parties. Coalitions may be built on the basis of shared ideological positions and policy programmes. The parties that participate in the coalition are eventually linked by both their common political tradition and their actual collaboration.

A governmental coalition, however, may also be formed between parties that are situated at opposite sides of the left-right continuum. Interdependent goals due to conjectural factors or to exceptional circumstances may lead to such coalitions (eg. the national unity government in Greece in November 1989). A common instrumental super-ordinate identity is thereby imposed on the parties participating in the coalition.

As noted, provisional governmental cooperation cannot break the ideological and socio-political barriers that traditionally separate two parties. Consequently, it is not a sufficient condition for the creation of a common political identity which would incorporate the formerly opposed party identities. However, our assumption is that a temporary governmental co-operation may dismantle a common super-ordinate political identity. More specifically, it is assumed that the fact that the Alliance of the Left formed a coalition with the N.D. destroyed the feeling of 'witness' between the two parties of the Left, i.e. the Alliance of the Left and the Socialist party (P.A.S.O.K.). The perceived ideological and political 'distance' between these two parties was increased. Thus, it is assumed that as long as the coalition held, the two parties, i.e. the P.A.S.O.K. and the SYN., no longer shared a common super-ordinate political identity. The change of the socio-political dimensions structuring the party system seemed to phase out traditional party identities.

The national unity government is, however, assumed to have re-activated a common super-ordinate political and instrumental identity based on ideological affinity and governmental co-operation between the Alliance of the Left (SYN.) and the

Socialists (PA.SO.K.). This common instrumental and political superordinate identity is expected to have affected the interaction between the two parties.

4.3 Modifying the image of the party in the course of party interaction: Social representations

The concept of inter-group bias refers to instances of discrimination against the 'other' social group, i.e. the outgroup. It consists of a discriminatory behaviour because it accentuates a negative image of the outgroup and an ever more favourable conception of the self and one's own group both of which extend beyond factual, objective evidence. The images of the two groups are based on the activation of relevant favourable or unfavourable social representations. The social representations linked to a social group or political party are likely to affect the willingness or reluctance of the population to identify with that group or party. When the social representations lead to the formation of a positive social image of the group, the population is more likely to adopt the group positions. On the other hand, when the group is linked to unfavourable social representations and a negative social image is assigned to it, the population is more likely to reject the group's ideas and also potential group membership.

4.3.1 Social representations: a definition

"[Social representations are] a set of concepts, statements and explanations originating in daily life in course of inter-individual communications" (Moscovici 1981: 181)

"[Social representations are] cognitive systems with a logic and language of their own [...] They do not represent simply "opinions

about", "images of" or "attitudes towards" but "theories" or "branches of knowledge" in their own right, for the discovery and organization of reality" (Moscovici: xii, preface in Herzlich 1973)

Social representations acquire various forms and function at different levels of social reality; cognitive, ideological and psychological. However, they always maintain their main and characteristic function, namely they offer a particular form of perception and interpretation of the world that surrounds us. As Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) wisely argue, representative thought uses images and symbols to provide for explanations of empirical reality.

Social representations are the analytical category used to conceive and investigate the role that social cognition plays with respect to the mental and psychological activity in which individuals engage when dealing with reality (i.e. with situations, events, communication or simple objects). The cognition embodied in social representations is collectively elaborated and shared (Jodelet 1984: 360). It includes individual experiences but also knowledge, information and norms which are reciprocally transmitted among the members of a given society. Social representations are a 'practical knowledge'⁴ (Jodelet *ibid.*); they help individuals manage and (re)construct their social reality. In brief, social representations are conceived as the product and the process of the socio-psychological elaboration of reality. They involve a specific form of thinking about social events, objects and social relations which guides people's understanding of social reality.

A social representation is a branch of social cognition which fulfils the basic function of representing. It involves a subject and an object. The subject is the individual or group who applies a specific social representation to a given 'object.' The latter may be a task, an event, a personality, a problem, a behaviour or an attitude. The social representation reflects the role and

position of its subject (Plon 1972; Gilly 1980). Thus, the social representation links the subject, which is socially defined through its position, role and status, with a social object. The representation is realised through the linking of the perceived object with a concept. This concept assigns meaning to the object and links it with specific symbolic elements through metaphors. The social representation has a constructive, autonomous and creative character (Jodelet *ibid.*: 365).

Several forms of social representations have been identified within different theoretical approaches. A social representation attributes meaning to social experiences (Kaes 1968; Herzlich 1973). More specifically, it reflects the social position and role of the subject that uses it (Plon *ibid.*; Gilly *ibid.*) and/or expresses the group membership of the subject, namely the beliefs and values that prevail in the social group/category with which the subject identifies (Codol 1970a; 1970b). Consequently, social representations also reproduce ideologies and, in particular, dominant ideas and established norms. It follows from this that they also regulate, anticipate and justify the relationships between social groups (Doise 1979) and accordingly affect the attempts of the various groups to exert some influence.

The usefulness of the notion of social representations lies in their function of conventionalising objects, persons and events with which the individual is unfamiliar. Thus, social representations help people to locate these objects within known existing categories. Social representations have a prescriptive power over people. They determine, through collectively shared knowledge, experience and ideas, what one perceives and conceives. The function of social representations comprises two processes; objectification and anchoring (Moscovici 1984). The process of anchoring concerns the integration of a new object or idea in the pre-existing cognitive framework. The new 'object'⁵ is inserted and becomes an organic part of the existing system of thought. For instance, the appeal to the necessity of investigating political scandals and of prosecuting those held responsible, i.e. the case

of the 'catharsis' of the Socialist government scandals, link the specific event to existing norms about the use of public money or to past experience of corruption in the public administration and government. The new object or idea is positioned, through the anchoring process, within the given socio-cognitive order. Social representations thus contribute to the organisation of the social space.

Social representations create a link between the 'object' that is to be represented and a perceivable, material element. This is the function of objectification which transforms something abstract, i.e. an attitude, an opinion, a belief or a set of specialised knowledge, into something almost concrete; a person, an object or an image that represents a person or an object. Objectification takes place by means of personification and figuration (Moscovici & Hewstone 1983). Personification refers to the association of theories or ideas with an individual, designated by name; nuclear physics and Einstein, for example. The process of figuration substitutes complex and unfamiliar knowledge, eg. complex projects of modernisation and development, with images and simplistic metaphors, eg. young, well-dressed, smiling people in an office with modern furniture and equipment. Personification and figuration are used also in political campaigning. Political issues or values are very often identified with specific politicians. Policy programs are communicated through images and metaphors much more than argumentation and relative data.

4.3.2 Social representations and inter-group relations

Within an influence process, a group adopts styles of behaviour and applies strategies of influence and resistance that activate specific social representations. These representations lead to a favourable interpretation of the attitudes and image of one's own group and discredit the beliefs and the image of the adversary group. Unfavourable social representations may thus

cancel the influence potential of the rival group. When the beliefs of that group are, for instance, interpreted through their linkage to psychological characteristics, eg. when a social representation of abnormality, deviance or psychological imbalance, is activated in relation to that group, its opinions are discredited.

Inter-party relations are conditioned by social representations in a similar way. The ideas and policy positions of the various parties are related to the social representations that they or their rivals activate. These guide the interpretation of the party beliefs and program. The same policy position, for instance, proposed by the Alliance of the Left (SYN.) or the Conservative Party (N.D.) may acquire a different meaning because it is linked to different and even contradictory social representations. Let us suppose, for instance, that both the SYN. and the N.D. sustain that the State should control the price of consumer goods. The SYN. embeds its position in a representation of social justice and equal allocation of fundamental consumer goods. The control over the prices is thus presented as a redistributive function. The N.D., on the other hand, vests the same policy position in a social representation of a competitive international market and in the need for the country to improve its position within it. One proposed measure for this improvement is the regulation of the national market. The regulation of the prices of consumer goods appears thus in both party programs as a positive measure. However, each party relates it to different socio-economic principles.

The prevalence of one social representation over several possible social representations is contingent upon the group or party that activates it. An incumbent party which enjoys power, authority, recognised competence and prestige has an advantageous position with respect to a challenger party that is out of office. The outsider party is even weaker in mobilising social representations because it is often regarded as an extreme or

marginal political force.

Each party uses the strategies of influence and resistance in order to assign derogatory social representations to its rival parties. The strategy of denial, for instance, produces an interpretation of the adversary positions in terms of falseness, lack of objective validity, inconsistency with respect to reality and so on. The Conservative party, for example, used the strategy of denial to discredit the proposal of the Socialist party that the national welfare system should be further developed. The Conservatives maintained that such a proposal, if implemented, would impede the country's growth and that the Socialist party leadership "[had] lost contact with reality and the actual needs of the Greek people." This is an attempt to deny the validity of the policy. The proposal of the Socialist party is represented as being untruthful and non-realistic.

Parties also use the strategy of affirmation, i.e. the utterance of false statements about events which have not taken place in order to discredit the image of the adversary party. The Conservative party maintains that the Socialists, although they have adhered to the national unity government, undermine the functioning of the government and tacitly prepare new elections. The Conservative party thus represents the participation of the Socialists in the common government as a dishonest and illegitimate competition practice.

Social representations of psychological imbalance may be activated against rival party leaders. The personal life of the leader of the Socialist party, Mr. A. Papandreou is interpreted in terms of senility, physical weakness and mental disorder. In this way, the rival parties put into question the capacity of Mr. Papandreou to accomplish the duties of a Prime Minister.

Categorisation is the strategy used *par excellence* to activate social representations. The same socio-political dimensions, eg. democratic vs. authoritarian attitudes or social equality vs. exploitation of the poor, are applied reciprocally by the parties. The left-wing parties, for instance, present their positions as

democratic and egalitarian and accentuate the conservative and authoritarian character of the ideas and practices of the right-wing party. The Conservatives, on the other hand, emphasise the progressive character of their beliefs and represent the position of their left-wing rivals as extremist, unrealistic or dogmatic. Thus, the social representations activated through the strategy of categorisation confirm the party opinions and lead to a negative interpretation of the ideas of rivals.

4.3.3 A typology of social representations interfering with inter-group or inter-party relationships

It has been argued that social representations interfere with relationships between different and often opposed social groups. More specifically, inter-group behaviour determines the character of inter-group relations through the mobilisation of specific social representations (Sherif 1967). Rival group encounters have been proved to produce negative representations and mutual dislike between groups. It has been demonstrated that when two groups share a set of incompatible goals, namely both groups desire some objective which can be attained only at the expense of the other, competition turns to hostility and stimulates the creation of unfavourable attitudes towards the opposite group (Blake & Mouton 1961). Hostility also generates negative stereotyped images of rivals. The latter are, thus, positioned at a certain social, ideological and psychological 'distance' from the ingroup.

Nonetheless, when conflicting groups face a common superordinate goal, i.e. a series of activities which require cooperation and coordination of forces, inter-group relations show a significant improvement. Hostile outgroup attitudes and derogatory stereotypes gradually disappear and the perceived social or ideological 'distance' between the two groups is reduced. Future inter-group conflicts become thus less probable (Sherif et al. 1961; Sherif 1967). These experimental findings confirm that

inter-group relations generate social representations which in turn affect the attitudes and the relations between social groups.

Alternation between incompatible and common interdependent goals is frequent in inter-party relations. Parties interact with each other in a competitive way. However, they may also engage in post-election negotiation with the aim of forming a coalition government. Social representations interfere with inter-party relations under conditions of competitive but also cooperative behaviour.

Social representations influence the relationships between groups or parties in various ways: they function selectively, they justify and anticipate group behaviour.

(a) Selective social representation

Interaction between two rival groups is embedded in a mutual construct of unfavourable representations. The attitude towards, and image of, the rival group is related to a negative representation. This representation does not affect the image of the outgroup in a homogeneous way. It functions selectively; the representation refers to the causes of action of the rival group rather than to its social characteristics or to the collective or personal abilities of the members of the outgroup (Avigdor 1953; Wilson, Chun & Katayani 1965). The outgroup is attributed negative characteristics, egoism, envy or aggressiveness for instance, which justify the hostile behaviour of the ingroup. The egocentric attitude of the ingroup is projected to the rival group (Wilson & Katayani 1968). The competing groups may behave in a similar manner. Still, they perceive each other as more aggressive, more competitive and less generous than themselves. Thus, each deems the other to be responsible for the intergroup conflict.

Negative social representations which particularly focus on the motives of action of the rival group are also identified in party coalition negotiation. An example from the case study of

Greek parties highlights the selective function of social representations in inter-party politics. The example refers to the negotiations between the three larger Greek parties in July 1989, soon after the national election of the 18th of June 1989. The Conservative party (N.D.) and the Alliance of the Left (SYN.), in spite of their fundamental ideological and political differences, formed a coalition government. The Socialist party accused the Alliance of the Left of political opportunism. It, thus, blamed the SYN. for the breakdown of the negotiations between the two of them. The Socialist party sought to discredit the motivation of its opponent by relating it to unfavourable social representations. It is, however, arguable that the attitude of P.A.S.O.K. differed little from that of the SYN. The Socialists had negotiated, albeit without success, the formation of a coalition government with the Alliance of the Left. A few months later (on October 4th, 1989) they formed the "Democratic Coalition," which embraced several small parties and politicians of the Centre-left-wing, in an attempt to increase their electoral force. However, the Socialist party projected its own political opportunism to the Alliance of the Left and, thus, deemed the latter party to be responsible for the conflict between the two of them.

(b) Justifying social representation

Specific social representations are used in group interaction to justify the behaviour adopted by the ingroup. Discrimination against ethnic or economic minorities, for instance, is justified by the development of negative stereotyped images. Thus differentiation between black and white pupils in the U.S. is justified by a negatively biased estimation of the learning capacities of black children (Clarke & Campbell 1955). Social stereotypes are often used to justify social behaviour. Thus, reality is perceived through distorting lenses which interpret the same behaviour in different ways.

Ingroup favouritism and outgroup discriminating bias may lead

to opposite evaluations of the same behaviour. A type of behaviour performed by members of an outgroup is assessed in different ways than would be the same behaviour performed by members of the ingroup. Peabody's study (1968) on ethnic group stereotypes, for instance, demonstrated that Filipino and Chinese people regard the same action as being "thrift" ("generosity") if it is performed by a member of their own group and as "stinginess" ("waste") when it is performed by a member of the opposite ethnic group. In general terms, ingroup activity is vested with a positive interpretation while outgroup behaviour is embedded in a negative social representation.

Justifying social representations are also used in the context of elections. Commentaries on elections in the press provide a biased evaluation of the election results, the direction of the bias being dependent on the party affiliation of each newspaper. The example that follows concerns the Greek national election of November 5, 1989. All three parties interpreted the results as a victory for themselves and as a failure for their opponents. The N.D. maintained that it had won the electoral contest because it had increased its percentage of votes and it was the largest party. The fact that the party failed to achieve its main aim, namely absolute majority in Parliament, was downplayed. The social representation of power, authority and prestige focused on the electoral percentage more than on its consequences, namely the fact that the party could not form a single party government.

The PA.SO.K., on the other hand, claimed that the election results demonstrated that progressive voters wholeheartedly trusted the Socialist party. The PA.SO.K. represented itself as the winner of the elections because it had managed to slightly increase its electoral force. Furthermore, the election outcome was interpreted as a success for the Socialists because the N.D. did not succeed in obtaining a Parliamentary majority. The fact that the increase in voter support for the PA.SO.K. was smaller than that of the N. D. was ignored, as was the fact that the PA.SO.K. had also failed to achieve a parliamentary majority. The PA.SO.K. was represented as

a left-wing, courageous and realistic party which "struggled against" the Conservatives.

The Alliance of the Left (SYN.), whose electoral power decreased (it lost approx. 20% of its votes), maintained that the party had successfully fought the electoral battle due to the fact that it remained faithful to its beliefs. The election outcome was interpreted as being absolutely favourable to the SYN. since the party succeeded in preserving its "significant political weight" which enabled it to influence political matters. Thus, even the absolute defeat, in quantitative terms, of the SYN. was interpreted positively. The SYN. was associated with a social representation of political honesty and ideological commitment which created a flattering image of the party.

In brief, all parties justified their claim to have 'won' the elections. The election outcomes were represented by each party as a success for itself as a failure for its opponents.

(c) Anticipating social representation

Interaction between social groups may be anticipated through the activation of social representations. Before an encounter of two groups takes place, an image of the 'other' group is formed which provides the grounds for group behaviour. The mere expectation of a future interaction between two distinct social groups increases the inter-group bias to the same level as that obtained following inter-group behaviour (Doise 1969; 1972; Doise et al. 1972). Thus, expected interaction leads to the activation of unfavourable social representations with respect to the outgroup. These representations anticipate the actual behaviour of the other group. They also justify the competitive or hostile behaviour of the ingroup towards the outgroup.

Social representations that anticipate party interaction are mobilised by means of inter-party competition and negotiation. These social representations may result in a moderation of aggressiveness among parties as these foresee or aim at a future

collaboration in an electoral or governmental coalition. Furthermore, social representations change when expectations about the rival party behaviour are also modified.

The changing representation of the Greek parties in the period between the elections of June 1989 and November 1989 may highlight the part played by social representations which anticipated party interaction. The parties involved in the post-election bargain for the formation of government were the PA.SO.K., the N.D. and the Alliance of the Left (SYN.). The Socialists (PA.SO.K.), overtly hostile towards the Conservative party (N.D.) (no 'Grand coalition' was conceivable), adopted a flexible style towards the SYN. They emphasised the ideological proximity between themselves and the SYN. and represented the latter as a progressive left-wing party, courageous and honest in supporting its beliefs. The PA.SO.K. opted for a long-term governmental coalition with the SYN. and expected that the SYN. would react positively to their proposal. The Conservative party, on the other hand, did not engage in post-election negotiations with the SYN.. It adopted a competitive style and accentuated its political and ideological distinctiveness. The SYN., however, rejected a representation of itself and the Socialists as the "wider Left" and refused to participate in a coalition government with the PA.SO.K. Consequently, the Socialists activated a different type of social representation; this would guide the interpretation of their own actions and the actions of the SYN. They represented the SYN. leadership as power-obsessed, revengeful and selfish. The hostile reaction of the SYN. was thus discredited without putting into question the identity of the PA.SO.K. as "left-wing". The leaders and/or supporters of the SYN. were represented as "the traitors of the Left." For their own part, the Socialist party vested themselves with the representation of a realistic, consistent and honest left-wing party.

The governmental coalition formed by the N.D. and the SYN. led to their reciprocal positive evaluation in spite of their ideological difference. The common dedication of both the SYN. and

the N.D. to the principle of justice and their common willingness to struggle against public fraud were used as a kind of social representation that linked the two parties. Their cooperation was thus assigned a positive meaning.

4.3.4 Operationalising the concept of social representations in the context of inter-party behaviour

Party discourse in the press is one method of public communication used by parties to express their attitudes and to explain their behaviour. Party discourse is related to social representations in two ways. It is embedded in social representations and it simultaneously activates them. On the one hand, party behaviour is attributed value and meaning through its linkage with the collective knowledge of society, namely the social representations that are inherent in the given socio-cognitive system. On the other hand, parties use social representations purposefully. Social representations are integrated in the dynamics of party interaction and competitive or cooperative relations. Parties use favourable social representations when they talk about themselves. On the contrary, if the object of their discourse is a rival party they activate unfavourable social representations. The ingroup or outgroup identity of the party-object, its ideological proximity with the party-source, the perception of a set of shared characteristics and of crossed category memberships between the two parties and, eventually, their interdependent or conflictual goals condition the kind of social representations that is being used in inter-party relations.

The intertwining of social representations with the relationships between political actors makes them an important element of media discourse. Parties express their beliefs through the press, and, in particular, in Greece through the partisan press. Parties act as if the electorate interprets their behaviour in terms of social representations. Therefore, specific discursive

'frames'⁶ are used to guide the understanding of a message and of the relevant image of the party-object of the discourse. These 'frames' are schemes of interpretation which function as 'tool-kits' of symbols, stories, rituals and world-views that people use to make sense of the world.

The "framing" packages that parties use in their discourse are provided by the socio-cognitive system of a given society. Each society disposes of a limited pool of "frames", i.e. a set of social representations that are meaningful within the given society and which may function as interpretive schemes.

For the purposes of the present study, the notion of social representations is operationalised in terms of framing packages inherent in media communication. A set of framing packages⁷ has been produced on the basis of contextual knowledge of Greek politics and on the basis of knowledge of, and material from, the specific period under study. The initial set of packages has been complemented by additional categories introduced during the coding of the raw material.

The framing packages which guide the interpretation of the content of the newspaper articles involve references to symbolic and ideological elements, to values or to psychological characteristics. They range from the positive to the negative pole of a dimension. Each dimension refers to a pair of antithetic social representations, eg. progressive-conservative ideas, peaceful/moderate - fanatic/violent people or honest/moral - dishonest/immoral behaviour. The positive side of the representation refers to the ingroup and the negative side to the opponent party. A message from a party source is associated by the party itself with a favourable social representation. The strategies of influence and resistance addressed against the rival parties are matched with negative types of social representations.

Parties polarise the discourse by positioning themselves at the one pole of the representation continuum and the opponent at the opposite pole. The Socialist party may thus emphasise ideological differences with the Conservatives by framing its

economic policies in terms of social justice, i.e. a social representation of equal allocation of resources, of progressive, leftist policies. On the contrary, it relates the Conservative party to a social representation of exploitation and inequality.

However, parties may also emphasise ideological or political proximity by associating the same favourable representation to themselves as well as to potential collaborating parties. The formation of the governmental coalition between the Conservative party (N.D.) and the Alliance of the Left (SYN.) was framed with values such as fairness and honesty in politics. The SYN. projected the same social representation both onto itself and onto its coalition partner. The political identities of both parties were included in a common super-ordinate category, namely the 'incorruptible' parties. The discrepancy between their ideologies and policies was, therefore, concealed and overlooked.

In conclusion, social representations are an important element of party discourse. They assign meaning to the discourse and guide its understanding. They also contribute to the (re)definition of common or opposite super-ordinate identities between parties. Social representations are activated in the newspaper discourse through framing packages. This term is used to distinguish the methodological concept, namely the 'framing' or interpretive packages, from the general notion of social representations.

NOTES

1. A social category is a group of people who share or are perceived as sharing a common set of characteristics. These characteristics are typical to the category. Members of the specific group/category may be differentiated from members of other groups or categories on the basis of the characteristics typical to them.
2. The application of mutual ingroup favouritism culminates in intergroup discrimination and differentiation during processes of interaction between different groups. *Intergroup discrimination* concerns behaviour towards the outgroup while *intergroup differentiation* concentrates mainly on perceptions of and attitudes towards the outgroup.
3. Ingroup bias may also involve a differentiated perception of ingroup and outgroup homogeneity -the outgroup is perceived as more homogeneous than the ingroup- (Simon & Brown 1987; Brown & Smith 1989; Simon 1990; Simon & Pettigrew 1990), an overestimation of belief similarity among the members of the outgroup (Simon & Mummendey 1990).
4. "Aussi est-elle (la représentation sociale), par bien des côtés, une *connaissance socialement élaborée et partagée*. Sous ses multiples aspects, elle vise essentiellement à maîtriser notre environnement, comprendre et expliquer les faits et idées qui meublent notre univers de vie (...) En d'autres termes, c'est une *connaissance pratique*. (...) elle forge les evidences de notre réalité consensuelle, concourt à la construction sociale de notre réalité" (Jodelet 1984: 360-361, *emphasis in the original*).
5. The term 'object' refers to events, personalities, attitudes, instances of behaviour or communication.
6. The notion of 'frames' refers to the everyday use of schemes of interpretation which render social reality meaningful (Goffman 1974). The concept is operationalised as a discursive device used in the media discourse in order to promote a specific interpretation of an action, situation or statement.
7. See appendix to Chapter six: Index of framing packages.

CHAPTER V

Hypotheses

5.1 The impact of the party's power position upon its styles of behaviour

Introduction

In the previous chapters, a two-layer model has been developed which organises our approach to party behaviour. Our hypotheses link the model's first and second layers. The styles of behaviour and the strategies of the incumbent, challenger and outsider party are the dependent variables of the study. The independent variables are derived from either layer of the model. More specifically, the first set of hypotheses refers to the relationship between the power character of each party; namely incumbent, challenger or outsider, and the styles of behaviour, i.e. consistency/inconsistency and rigidity/ flexibility, adopted by each party. A second set of hypotheses is developed which examines the relationship between the power character of the parties and the common or opposed super-ordinate identities that two parties may have (independent variables) and the strategies of influence and resistance used by the parties against one another (dependent variables).

According to the first set of hypotheses, the power character of a party, i.e. its incumbent, challenger or outsider position, conditions the styles of behaviour that the party adopts, namely its varying degrees of consistency or inconsistency as well as its flexibility or rigidity. Differences in power position affect the ways in which parties develop their campaigning discourse.

The analysis is divided into three phases which correspond to three periods of time. The overall period studied includes

three national elections (June 1989, November 1989 and April 1990) and two provisional governments (July-October 1989 and November 1989-March 1990). The three periods of analysis are defined as follows:

- 1st period: before and immediately after the election of June 1989
- 2nd period: before and after the formation of the first government (July 1989) and before the election of November 1989
- 3rd period: before and after the formation of the second government (end of November 1989) and before the election of April 1990

A set of initial hypotheses is proposed regarding the first period of analysis (see *infra* about the division of the analysis in periods). These hypotheses are related to the specific conditions under which the elections of June 1989 took place. A second set of hypotheses is developed concerning the evolution of the styles of party behaviour during the second period under study. Changes in the power structure and the reshaping of social representations with respect to the first period, due to important events which have taken place meanwhile, are, therefore, investigated. The analysis of the third period examines further changes in party behaviour with respect to the second period.

5.2 Hypotheses concerning variation in styles of party behaviour

I. All types of political parties, i.e. of all three power positions, will tend to be consistent, but outsider parties particularly

The evaluation of consistency with respect to party behaviour is based on the way in which the party presents its opinions and policy positions. Consistency as a style of behaviour is measured by reference to party statements which assert that the party is consistent in its ideas and policies.

The incumbent and challenger party are expected to promote a moderate but clearly positive level of consistency in their behaviour. Their presentation of their ideology and policies as stable and coherent over time follows the general need of parties to confirm their electoral credibility. Indeed, political marketing approaches maintain that all parties have an interest in displaying relatively stable behaviour since voters tend to reward consistency (Mauser 1983).

The outsider party, in particular, which has at its disposal a low symbolic status and little power, is expected to use its consistent style of behaviour as a means to make its ideas salient in the political field. Outsider parties, just like minority groups, accentuate their stable and coherent behaviour so that they acquire a distinct and 'visible' position in the electoral contest. Consequently, the consistency score of the outsider party is expected to be not only extremely positive but also higher than that of the incumbent or the challenger party.

II. Both extremes of the power character (incumbent and outsider parties) will adopt rigid styles of behaviour. The intermediate power position (challenger party), on the other hand, will adopt a flexible style of behaviour

The term 'intermediate' power character refers to the challenger party which although large and in conformity with the *status quo*, is excluded from governmental authority. Given this position of *potential incumbency*, the challenger is expected to display a flexible, consensual and conciliating style of behaviour in order to propose itself as an alternative to its predecessor. Its flexibility may help cover its possible weaknesses. On the other hand, a flexible style of behaviour contributes to the image of a governing party with realistic positions, a party that "looks after the good of the nation."

Parties that enjoy high authority and prestige or those which dispose of low power and status are expected to adopt a rigid style of behaviour. The motives are distinct for each kind of party. The incumbent is the "ruler of the game." It thus may display a high degree of intransigence. Given that the incumbent party occupies governmental office until the election day, its policy positions are salient and vested with governmental authority. The incumbent party is expected to support its opinions in a rigid way, and thus reinforce their validity. This rigidity is related to its 'superiority' in terms of size and authority. It holds power and does not accept any questioning of its ideas. The incumbent party thus emphasises its dominant position.

The outsider party, on the other hand, is also expected to show a rigid style of behaviour. Its rigidity, however, is based on different grounds than that of the incumbent party. The unconventional positions, the small size and the 'alternative' character of the outsider party attribute to it a conflictual character. The policy positions and ideas of the outsider party are contrary to those of the incumbent and challenger parties. They also diverge from the beliefs of a large part of the electorate. The small size of the party and its lack of authority cannot generate prestige and validity for its ideas. According to Moscovici and Ricateau (1972), the influence potential of minorities lies in their capacity of disrupting the social consensus and creating conflict. Therefore, it is argued

that the "power" of the outsider parties is based on their rejection of dominant ideology. The outsider party is thus expected to adopt an intransigent and uncompromising style of behaviour in order to make its beliefs salient in the political field. Its rigidity accentuates the distance between itself and the larger parties and thus stresses its distinctiveness.

Both outsider and incumbent party are therefore expected to show higher levels of rigidity than the challenger party. The following table represents schematically the expected general findings:

TABLE 1		
	Consist./Inconsistency	Rigid./Flexibility
Incumbent	+	+
Challenger	+	-
Outsider	++	+

Note: The symbol (+) indicates a tendency towards the left component of the dimension, i.e. it indicates a consistent (+) or very consistent (++) behaviour and a rigid (+) or very rigid (++) style of negotiation. On the contrary the symbol (-) indicates the tendency of the party to adopt an inconsistent (-) or very inconsistent (--) and a flexible (-) or very flexible (--) style of behaviour.

Table 1 shows the predictions in terms of styles of behaviour adopted by parties with different power characters. These predictions are further developed: three sets of expectations are provided which follow the evolution of the political situation in the three periods under analysis. The first set plays the role of a control matrix because it represents a regular election situation within the Greek political environment. The predictions referring to the first period of analysis (before and immediately after the election of June 1989) are represented in table 2.

TABLE 2

	Consist./Inconsist.	Rigid./Flexibility
Incumbent (PASOK)	+	+
Challenger (ND)	+	-
Outsider (SYN)	++	+

Note: See table 1 for the meaning of the symbols (+), (-).

The power character of the three parties was modified after the elections of June 1989. The Conservatives (N.D.) became the incumbent party since they possessed the highest electoral percentage, although that percentage was not high enough to secure them a parliamentary majority. The Socialists (PA.SO.K.) were out of the government and thus became the challenger party while preserving the vast majority of their votes. The Alliance of the Left, i.e the SYN., remained the outsider.¹

The aim of the second set is to examine the deviations from the findings verified in the first period. During the second period, the power position of a party is not the only factor that conditions its rigidity or flexibility. The strategic decisions of a party regarding its participation in a governmental coalition are introduced as a factor that influences the rigid or flexible style of behaviour of each type of party.

The formation of a provisional government during the second period is expected to have a significant impact on the styles of party behaviour. The analysis distinguishes party behaviour in terms of concrete action from the styles of party behaviour. It is assumed that a party uses the media discourse as a response to and as a mediator of its strategic choices. Therefore, significant events of the campaign and the negotiations such as adherence to or rejection of participation in a governmental coalition are taken into account as a factor that affects the party styles of behaviour. Thus, the following hypothesis is

made:

III. Parties that act consistently with their power position will reinforce their strategic decisions by means of their rigid behaviour. In contrast, parties that take decisions which are contrary to their power position will tend to mediate their behaviour by reducing their rigidity or by increasing their flexibility.

More specifically,

III.a. The incumbent and the challenger party that act in accordance with their power position, i.e. the incumbent occupies office and the challenger remains in the opposition, will reinforce their strategic decisions by increasing their rigidity. The outsider party which acts contrary to its power position, since it participates in a coalition government, will adopt a less rigid/more flexible style of behaviour.

During the second period of the analysis, the SYN., although an outsider party, negotiated and eventually adhered to a provisional governmental coalition formed with the incumbent party (N.D.). The fact that the outsider party consented to participate in this governmental coalition was inconsistent with its outsider party character. As a matter of fact, its behaviour may be regarded as being contradictory with respect to its former positions. Therefore, the party is expected to guide the interpretation of its decision in terms of a generally flexible and conciliating attitude. The style of behaviour of the party will be in conformity with its decision to participate in the coalition and will attenuate its previously highly conflictual behaviour.

The challenger party, namely the PA.SO.K., was left alone in the opposition. The fact that governmental office was occupied by the joint forces of the incumbent and the outsider

party is hypothesised to have caused a polarisation of the field of competition. The rivalry between the incumbent and the challenger was accentuated because the challenger party remained isolated. It is thus expected that the two parties adopted a style of behaviour less flexible/more rigid than in the previous period.

Furthermore, both parties made choices that were consistent with their power positions. The N.D. formed a governmental coalition in accordance with its incumbent character. Thus, according to the hypothesis that parties which act consistently with their power character, i.e. an incumbent party that occupies governmental office, will reinforce their decision by means of their uncompromising style of behaviour, the incumbent party (N.D.) will follow an intransigent style of behaviour in its press discourse. It thus will emphasise that it is the party that occupies the highest power position and governs the country.

The predictions of the second period of analysis are summarised in table 3 (see *infra*).

<u>TABLE 3</u>			
	Consist./Inconsist.		Rigid./Flexibility
Incumbent (ND)	+	++	more rigid than in the first period
Challenger (PASOK)	+	+	less flexible than in the first period
Outsider (SYN)	++	-	less rigid than in the first period

The PA.SO.K., on the other hand, conform with its challenger position, refused to participate in a coalition government. The challenger party thus made a strategic decision that was consistent with its power character and is, therefore, expected

to adopt a less flexible/more rigid style of behaviour than it did in the first period. A rigid style of behaviour will be in conformity with its determination to reject any provisional governmental solution. The challenger thus will stress its rivalry with the incumbent party and its decision to challenge governmental power.

During the third period the three parties formed a wide governmental coalition on the basis of national consensus. The formation of this national unity government does not imply that all parties became incumbent. This government provided a solution to what was considered to be a national emergency and was clearly of a provisional character. Therefore, the power character of each party during the third period is assumed to have remained the same as in the second period². Thus, the N.D. maintained its incumbent position, the PA.SO.K. remained at challenger status and the SYN. retained its outsider character. Therefore, in accordance with hypothesis III (see *supra*), the following prediction is made with respect to the third period under study:

III.b. The incumbent party which acts in accordance with its power position, i.e. it occupies office, will reinforce its strategic decisions by increasing its rigidity. The challenger and the outsider party which act contrary to their power position since they participate in a coalition government, will adopt a less rigid/more flexible style of behaviour.

Thus, the formation of the national unity government is expected to have different effects on the styles of behaviour of each party. During the third period, the outsider party (SYN.) consented to a governmental coalition with the two larger parties contrary to its dissenting beliefs. Therefore, the outsider party is expected to display a relatively flexible style of behaviour in order to 'justify' its behaviour.

According to hypothesis (IIIb) (see *supra*), the challenger

party (P.A.S.O.K.) will adopt a more flexible/less rigid style of behaviour than in the second period because during the third period the strategic decisions of the party are inconsistent with its challenger position. The participation of the P.A.S.O.K. in the national unity government is contrary to its character of a party that challenges the governmental power of the incumbent. Therefore, the party will support its decision by means of attenuating its rigidity and emphasising its conciliating attitude (no *revanche* politics) and, above all, its preoccupation with the good of the nation. Furthermore, it will thus seek to reinforce its image as a potential governing party.

Table 4 represents the expectations of the styles of behaviour adopted by the parties in the third period under examination.

TABLE 4			
Consist./Inconsist. Rigid./Flexibility			
Incumbent (ND)	+	++	more rigid than in the second period
Challenger (PASOK)	+	-	more flexible than in the second period
Outsider (SYN)	++	-	equally flexible as in the second period

Finally, according to hypothesis (IIIb) (see *supra*), the incumbent party whose decisions are consistent with its power character, is expected to maintain and further stress its rigid style of behaviour. The incumbent party will support its strategic choices with its intransigent style of behaviour thus enhancing its image as a powerful party most likely to form a single party government. The incumbent party is expected to demonstrate its determination and unwillingness to compromise on

any issue. Its rigidity will point to its high power and high status position.

5.3 The power character of the party and the common or opposed super-ordinate party identities: Implications for party strategies

The second set of hypotheses investigates the effect of two independent variables, namely the power character of the party and the shared or distinct super-ordinate identities of two parties on the strategies that each party employs to confront its rivals. The confrontation between rival parties is analysed in terms of strategies of influence over and resistance to opponents. The following strategies are used to analyse party communication and interaction: categorisation, psychologisation, denial and affirmation.³ It is expected that the strategies that each party follows with respect to an opponent are contingent upon the power character of the party and of its rival and also upon the perception of the party that it shares a common super-ordinate political identity with its rival or that the two of them have different and conflictual super-ordinate identities.⁴

The power character of parties interferes with inter-party behaviour. Parties are aware of their different status and power positions when they communicate, compete or collaborate with each other. Their power and status differentials are hypothesised to influence the development of party relations during pre-election campaigning and post-election negotiation. This effect is reflected in the strategies that rival parties use to discredit the beliefs of one another.

On the other hand, the common political or instrumental super-ordinate identity or the opposed super-ordinate identities that two parties have is also expected to influence the strategies employed between parties.

The following hypotheses are forwarded with respect to the effect of the independent variables, namely of the power character and of the common or opposed super-ordinate party identity on the dependent variable, i.e. the strategies of influence and resistance followed with respect to the adversaries. Hypotheses are presented separately for each strategy.

a) Hypotheses concerning the frequency of the use of the categorisation strategy in party interaction

I. Parties that share a common super-ordinate political identity will categorise more vis-à-vis one another than parties with opposed super-ordinate identities

The effect of the common or opposed super-ordinate identity on the application of the categorisation strategy is related to the mutual perception of parties in terms of 'us' and 'them.' Parties with opposite super-ordinate identities are expected to stress the difference between their beliefs and the beliefs of other parties. A left-wing party, for instance, will emphasise the differences between its own ideology and the ideology of a Conservative right-wing party. The ideological discrepancy between the two is already made salient by the name of the parties, by their ideology and also by their policy positions, however. The relationships between these parties may be characterised by inter-group discriminatory bias. Both parties are expected to use the categorisation strategy to highlight their own superiority. However, each party holds a different set of values and beliefs on which it builds its political identity. Thus inter-party differentiation is not regarded by the party as being essential in order for it to make explicit its positions and justify its distinctiveness from the rival party.

In contrast, parties that share a common super-ordinate political identity, a socialist and an extreme leftist party for

instance, have an interest in affirming their positive distinctiveness. They are expected to differentiate from each other in order to achieve positive superiority with respect to the relevant outgroup, namely the party with which the ingroup shares a significant part of its political identity. As a matter of fact, "the strongest competition might be expected to occur where in reality there is the least reason to prefer one group to the other" (Turner 1975: 22). Consequently, the less the parties differ from one another, the more they will differentiate themselves from, and discriminate against, one another.

Furthermore, the (potential) party voters that belong to the same super-ordinate political category overlap. The parties compete, to a certain extent, for the same portion of the electorate. Each party is, therefore, expected to forward a claim of validity and uniqueness for its own party identity and beliefs which it in turn contrasts with the identities and beliefs of its adversary. Each party may thus seek to discard the identity of the rival as 'false.'

In summary, parties that share a common super-ordinate political identity are expected to apply the strategy of categorisation towards one another more frequently than those with opposed super-ordinate identities.

A party uses categorisation to differentiate from and discriminate against its opponents. We shall argue that categorisation is related to specific socio-political characteristics which either refer to the party identity or to the common tasks that two parties share. Given that inter-group bias refers only to features that are regarded as being related to the distinction between two groups (Tajfel, Skeikh & Gardner 1964), it is argued that categorisation as a strategy between rival parties will also stress those elements which play an important role in the relationships between the parties. Therefore, each party is expected to link the strategy of categorisation with specific sets of socio-political characteristics according to its sharing a common political or

instrumental or both types of super-ordinate identity with the specific rival party towards which categorisation is directed.

Consequently, the following hypotheses are formulated:

II. a) Parties that share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity will relate categorisation to dimensions relevant to political values and/or policy questions concerning their interdependent goals

b) Parties that share a common political super-ordinate identity will categorise against one another along general political dimensions which do not explicitly refer to their ideological affinity

c) Parties that share both a political and an instrumental super-ordinate identity will categorise along political dimensions which, however, do not refer explicitly to their ideological affinity, and will also categorise with reference to policy questions concerning their interdependent goals

As noted earlier, a common instrumental super-ordinate identity does not unify former opponents. An instrumental super-ordinate identity involves cooperative activity between parties. However, it does not cancel the ideological and policy difference between the cooperating parties. Therefore, an instrumental super-ordinate identity is not expected to increase the need for positive differentiation from a coalition partner. Consequently, it is hypothesised not to provoke an increased use of the categorisation strategy.

However, a qualitative shift is expected in the application of categorisation when an instrumental super-ordinate identity is imposed on two competing parties. These parties are expected to concentrate on dimensions relevant to their functional interdependence. Thus, their use of categorisation will be related to the decision-making of the coalition government,

namely on policy questions or on the socio-political principles that guide policy decisions.

Parties that share a common super-ordinate political identity are expected to discriminate against each other in ways that accentuate their distinctiveness, however, without explicitly referring to their common beliefs. They are, therefore, expected to seek positive distinctiveness by categorising themselves and their adversaries in terms of general political values or practices or even in terms of psychological features. They may also seek positive distinctiveness from each other in terms of additional, 'new' ideological dimensions.

Finally, parties that share both an instrumental and a political super-ordinate identity are expected to stress policy questions as categorisation dimensions seeking thus to differentiate themselves from their coalition partners. Moreover, these parties are expected to avoid ideological dimensions which may make salient their common beliefs. They are rather expected to prefer categorisation along general political dimensions; namely dimensions regarding abstract political notions or principles, eg. democratic - authoritarian practices; which may create ideological 'distance' between them.

III. Parties with a high power position will direct categorisation towards parties with a lower power position more frequently than the latter are likely to do against the former.

The impact of the party power character on the application of categorisation against a rival party is conceptualised in terms of a mutual awareness of power relationships between opponent parties. It is assumed that parties 'know' the stereotyped characteristics of their own and of their rival parties and are aware of the categorisation of the social and political field. According to Turner (1982: 30), an individual forms or learns the stereotyped norms of a social category and

perceives the categorisation of social reality accordingly. Consequently, it is assumed that subjects involved in an influence situation are informed about the stereotyped characteristics assigned to the social groups participating in the influence process (Mugny & Papastamou 1982: 381). This assumption may be further extended to political influence situations. Parties interacting and competing with each other can be assumed to be also aware of stereotyped images attributed to themselves and to their rivals. Therefore, those parties which enjoy high prestige and a strong power position are expected to prefer the use of categorisation as a strategy which highlights their superiority. Conversely, parties with a low power profile⁵ are expected to demonstrate a less frequent use of categorisation against rivals which have at their disposal pragmatic and symbolic authority. Past experience and present knowledge makes them conscious of the unfavourable outcome of such a categorical distinction.

b) Hypotheses concerning the use of the psychologisation strategy in inter-party relations

The use of psychologising claims against rival parties modifies the focus of party competition. Political or social criteria concerning the party's capacity to govern are replaced by psychological features. The use of psychologisation between opponent parties is therefore independent of their relative power and status positions. However, psychologisation is closely related to the ideological proximity between the psychologised group and the population subject to the influence of psychologisation. Subjects ideologically 'close' to a group are those most sensitive to the attribution to group beliefs of psychological characteristics or emotional states. They perceive most intensely the lack of objective validity of the psychologised positions (Papastamou 1986). The correlation between the impact of psychologisation and the ideological affinity between the source and the subjects of influence leads

to the following hypothesis:

I. Psychologisation is used by sets of parties which perceive themselves as being ideologically and politically distant from one another, i.e. by parties whose super-ordinate political identities are opposed. Parties that share a common super-ordinate, instrumental or political, identity will use psychologisation against one another less frequently.

Following earlier research findings on the effect of psychologisation on subjects 'close' to the source of influence (Papastamou *ibid.*), it is hypothesised that competing sources of influence, i.e. parties, that are ideologically close will be sensitive to the psychologisation of their 'neighbours.' When the ideas of a group are discredited by being linked to psychological features, subjects who share, at least in part, these ideas run the risk that the validity of their own beliefs will be undermined. Consequently, parties that occupy adjacent positions along a relevant political or ideological dimension are expected to show little preference for psychologisation as a strategy against one another. Furthermore, the psychological factors used to explain the policy positions of their coalition partner may undermine the validity of the own positions as well. Therefore, parties that have a clearly distinct orientation are expected to apply the strategy of psychologisation against one another more often than parties that share a common socio-political background or that are engaged in common tasks.

More specifically, a decline in the use of psychologisation between the N.D. and the SYN. in the second period is anticipated because of the fact that they formed a coalition government. A general decrease in the use of the strategy is also expected in the third period due to the fact that the participation of all three parties in the national unity government imposed on them a common instrumental super-ordinate identity.

c) Hypotheses concerning the use of the strategy of denial in party competition and cooperation

The following hypothesis is made with respect to the use of the denial strategy by an incumbent, challenger or outsider party:

I. The strategy of denial will be directed more often by a party with a high power position towards a party with a lower power position than vice versa.

The strategy of denial is directly related to the power position of the parties that use it against one another. The rejection by a party of the truthfulness and of the plausible character of the ideas of its rival party is contingent upon the power relations between the two parties. Beliefs and policies vested with government authority are unlikely to be dismissed as contrary to factual reality. Parties which have never or at least not recently been in government, for example extremist and marginal political groups, provide, on the contrary, fertile ground for the use of the strategy of denial.

The statements uttered by a party are vested with the status and power character of their source. An incumbent party and to a certain extent a challenger party also can raise a claim to the truthfulness of their positions based on their consensual character. Indeed, a large part of the electorate approves of them. The outsider party positions are by definition deviant and, therefore, a suitable target for the denial strategy. Moreover, outsider party policies have not been implemented with the result that there is no factual evidence for their realistic and plausible character. Their character is divergent from the established beliefs and, given that 'reality' for an opinion is created through cohesion imposed by social forces (Schachter 1951), the alternative beliefs of outsider parties may be regarded as false.

d) Hypotheses concerning the use of the strategy of affirmation in party interaction

The strategy of affirmation is related to the power structure which organises party relationships in a way similar to that of the denial strategy. That means that the use of affirmation statements is conditioned by the relative power position of their party-source and of their party-object. Thus, the following hypothesis is put forward:

I. A party that enjoys a high power position will apply affirmation against its lower status rival more often than the latter is likely to do against the former.

This hypothesis is based on the social construction of 'objective' reality. False statements which claim factual truth for events that have not taken place at the time of the utterance of the statements seek to impose a 'new' reality on people. The prevalence of social definition over the perception of natural phenomena has been confirmed in numerous studies in social psychology (Asch 1951; 1956 but also Faucheux & Moscovici 1967; Moscovici, Lage & Naffrechoux 1969; and others). These findings suggest that the unanimous claim of a majority or the consistent and persistent opinion of a minority group may modify or, indeed, distort visual perception. Political reality is not about natural phenomena and, therefore, one should be cautious in extending the validity of the above results to political beliefs. Nonetheless, it is arguable that a positive statement which expresses and affirms the truthfulness of a non-event may have an impact on the perception both of social reality and of the relevant social actors.

Party campaigning and negotiation as situations characterised by intense antagonism and fluid outcomes create uncertainty about the definitions of 'objectivity.' Under these circumstances, social consensus is discontinuous. Thus, the "affirmation" of events that have not happened or of statements that have not been said may affect positively or negatively the

image of a party.

Different social groups promote competing definitions of social reality. A majority group occupies a privileged position in a competition due to its established position and pro-status quo character. Its opinion is supported by the majority of the people and therefore is perceived as correct and valid. Incumbent parties, and to some extent challengers, also enjoy such prestige. Their discourse is vested with a claim of truthfulness and validity because of their large size and high power position. As noted earlier, all parties are assumed to be aware of the modal features⁶ that characterise each of them. Thus, parties with high status and power are expected to apply affirmation more frequently against their lower status rivals because they 'know' that they benefit from an *objectivity norm*. This means that the claim for an objective truth with respect to social phenomena is based on the consensual majority opinion. The majority defines 'objectivity' and assigns the status of 'real' and 'false' to social objects. Conversely, parties with low symbolic and pragmatic power, such as outsiders, are expected to use affirmation strategy against their high status adversaries only occasionally. The small size and the lack of power that characterise an outsider party do not provide the necessary credibility and prestige for the party to state and "affirm" falsely events that have not taken place.

The use of affirmation, however, is also hypothesised to be contingent upon the common or opposed super-ordinate identities of competing parties.

II. Affirmation is more likely to take place among parties that share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity than among parties that share a common political super-ordinate identity or parties with opposed super-ordinate identities

The strategy of affirmation 'attacks' the opponent party in an indirect way. It is not a straightforward rejection of the behaviour or ideas of the opponent. Affirmation discredits the

opponent by disrupting the continuity and coherence of its positions. The rival party is portrayed, through the use of affirmation, as being self-contradicting, unstable or confused. Its influence potential is undermined by the introduction of non-existent events as factual truth. These presumed events have a negative meaning for the adversary. The supposed ideas or actions committed by the rival group, which become a 'fact' as a result of the affirmation strategy, are inconsistent with respect to the actual beliefs and policies of that group.

The impact of the strategy is subtle and indirect because it undermines the overall credibility of the rival group in the campaigning or negotiation process. Therefore, parties are expected to use the strategy most frequently under conditions which constrain overt criticism and hostility. These constraints are salient when parties with divergent ideologies participate in temporary governmental coalitions. Conversely, when parties share a common political super-ordinate identity or have opposed super-ordinate identities, they need not use subtle, indirect ways to confront one another. These parties have no reason to prefer affirmation among other strategies since they are not subject to constraints regarding their overt and explicit confrontation with one another. Therefore, parties that share a common political super-ordinate identity or parties that have opposed super-ordinate identities are expected to use affirmation against one another less often than parties that share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity.

Two sets of hypotheses have been specified regarding the interaction between the independent and the dependent variables of our study. The first set of hypotheses, namely those concerning the effect of the party power position on the styles of party behaviour aim at investigating the role of these styles of behaviour in political reality. These hypotheses aim also at contributing to an understanding of the incumbent, challenger and outsider party as analytical categories. The second set of hypotheses refers to the organisation of inter-party discourse

and behaviour. The power relations and ideological orientations which structure the political field are used to explain the strategies adopted by each party in its campaigning and negotiation. Overall we thus seek to integrate a socio-psychological perspective into the study of party behaviour.

N O T E S

1. The election results are given in Chapter two.
2. The participation of the three parties in a wide coalition government is assumed to have modified the super-ordinate party identities by introducing a common instrumental super-ordinate identity among the three of them.
3. The relevant analytical concepts and their operationalisation are discussed in Chapter three.
4. The concept of (super-ordinate) party identity is introduced in Chapter four.
5. The terms 'power character', 'power profile' and 'power position' are used interchangeably. They all refer to the party power character, namely its incumbent, challenger or outsider position.
6. The modal features are inherent in the party identity and are regarded as being shared among the party supporters.

CHAPTER VI

Methodology: From qualitative to quantitative analysis in party campaigning discourse

6.1 Introduction

The point of departure in developing a discursive scheme for the coding of textual data has been the need to analyse the party campaigning discourse in the press. The study focuses on the three larger Greek parties and their campaigning strategies and styles of behaviour between June 1989 and April 1990, a period in which three national elections took place (June 18, 1989; November 5, 1989; April 8, 1990). The data available consists of the commentaries and propaganda that each party addressed to the electorate or to its adversaries through the newspapers. The object of the methodology proposed concerns the coding and analysis of a large set of textual data maintaining both content and contextual information. The term contextual refers to the relationship between the content, the social actor-source and the social actor-object of a text. Content, on the other hand, refers to the meaning of the text but also to the social cognition embodied in it in the form of interpretative schemes.

The increasing volume of work on methodology in social sciences reflects the interest in and need for more effective methods for analysing data. Efforts to devise quantitative schemes suitable for measuring qualitative data began several decades ago. An important step forward has been made by the introduction of computers to aid in the process of data. Still, some crucial matters such as relational organisation of complex data and flexibility in coding remain problematic. Such problems have impeded the development of research on textual data, namely newspapers, magazines, books, personal notes or other forms of written communication. Our specific concern is with data taken from daily newspapers, namely news reports, interviews or political commentaries. These articles are analysed as expressions and instances of party behaviour given that they are published in partisan newspapers.

Different methodological approaches are available for the analysis of the content and the context of textual data. 'Classic' methods such as traditional content analytical schemes have been extensively used in the social sciences for the study of media communication. Content analysis has been applied not only to words or text segments but also with reference to 'issues' addressed in the text or "cultural indicators" inherent in public communication. Some content analytical approaches relate the content of the text to interaction processes within small groups. Alternative approaches to text analysis have been developed recently, eg. semantic text grammars, with the aim of producing general linguistic schemes applicable to different types of text. Our aim is to retain some useful elements of these schemes and to apply them in a way which overcomes the difficulties and disadvantages of past methods.

6.2 An assessment of traditional content analysis

The methodology first used for the quantitative treatment of qualitative data was content analysis (Krippendorff 1980; Holsti 1969; Berelson 1952; Berelson & Lazarsfeld 1948). Semantic content analysis, namely subject-matter analysis (frequency counts of specific issues, problems, or simply character strings), assertion analysis (frequency counts of the link between evaluative assessments and specific persons or objects) and attribution analysis (frequency counts of specific social and/or psychological features), provides quantitative information on a text. Texts can be compared in terms of content analytical scores such as occurrences and co-occurrences of words or segments of phrases. Emphasis scores have been introduced as indices of over- or under-emphasis of subject or idea categories, with respect to the norm of expected category use (Pirro & McTavish 1990). Emphasis scores have also been used within sets of related categories.

Content analytical schemes dispose of flexible structures allowing the researcher to build his/her own analytical

framework. Words or segments of phrases are classified into subject or idea categories. These categories are determined either by the scope of the analysis or by information inherent in the text. They may also be created with the aid of a specific "dictionary" developed in previous research.¹ It is the researcher's task to draw the line between the data to be processed and the contextual information to be retained from the wider set of information available. Definition and interpretation of the context builds upon general dimensions supposed to reveal the social meanings of the text. The emphasis on specific categories, for instance, is hypothesised to characterise such social contexts as institutions, social groups, organisations or other socially defined situations. In that case, however, the emphasis scores of different categories can explain everything and nothing. They may be all-encompassing and fit an overly large number of cases. On the other hand, if the explanatory dimensions bear on the interests of the specific research, there may be a bias in the results.

Content analysis has been developed to provide a solid and, after the introduction of computer-assisted techniques, handy methodological tool. Recently developed computing packages for content analysis² carry out frequency counts of words or segments of phrases, classify them into categories, perform keyword-in-context or co-occurrence searches and also more complex statistical analysis such as cluster or factor analysis. For all their advantages, i.e. they require only simple preparation for the raw data to be entered and they are highly automated, content analytical methods remain descriptive in nature. They lack an explicit specification of the relationship between the categories in which the content is coded and the sources or objects of the message in the text. 'Context' is meant as the shared meaning and/or social definition of a situation. It provides orientation and makes possible expectations for subsequent action and interaction. However, there is no indication of the direction nor of the modes of communication between different actors-'interlocutors'.

Content analysis suggests that individuals or groups become

aware of the meaning of a situation by the use of typified ideas/words/subjects. Thus, descriptive information on the text is used to create a link between the content (ideas, subjects, language features) and the context (character of the interaction but also actors participating actively or passively, directly or indirectly, relations of status and power among them). The information derived from the text on ideas, themes or different linguistic styles is assumed to characterise the specific social context and is subsequently used to analyse that context. However, the examination of co-occurrences between a theme or idea and a social actor does not demonstrate the nature of the relationship manifested by their simultaneous occurrence. Therefore, this type of analysis is not adequate for the study of party behaviour and inter-party relations through their discourse in the press.

This study investigates the communicative relationship between the source and the object of the text. Context ought not to be seen as a static set of conditions or features but as the link between the content and its production in society. The relationship between the interacting, competing or collaborating social actors plays a significant part in the production and communication of messages. These actors are the ones to be linked to the content and not any abstract, albeit 'social', definition of a situation.

Holsti (1969) has argued that the analysis of content refers to questions of communicative relations between a sender and a recipient. According to him, the operationalisation of content analysis can be based on three fundamental questions: a) what, how and to whom something is said b) why it is said and c) with what effects. However, it is unclear how these questions have been or can be answered by means of traditional content analysis. Holsti himself developed (1969) a computer-assisted model for evaluative assertion analysis³. The text is thus reduced to assessments of "complexes of qualities" and "complexes of performance" based on an initial syntax coding which indicates the agent-action-target relationship. The complexes of qualities and those of performance were operationalised in the following

triplets: attitude object-connector-evaluative term and attitude object1-connector-attitude object2. The relational structure of the scheme constitutes, without doubt, a considerable contribution to a more comprehensive analysis than the mere counting of content elements. Still it was grounded on a semantic differential dictionary which provided the tags with which to code the evaluative terms. Inevitably, the scheme was theory-bound. The coding norms reflected and were determined by the goals of the analysis. The need for a methodology based on the general, structural elements of discourse rather than on the scope of each specific study was not fulfilled by Holsti's contribution.

The level of aggregation of the analytical categories in content analysis is also determined by the theoretical assumptions of the research. Paraphrasing W.J.Paisley (1969: 140) we would agree that

"if the goal of the analysis is simple description, then the analyst is bound by a cartographer's obligation not to omit significant features from his map. (...) If the goal of the analysis is inference, then the choice of content elements will be governed by the logic of any connection between them and the tagged categories. This is a validity problem, and content elements should be chosen provisionally, then tested against external criteria."

If alternative hypotheses emerge during the coding, the disaggregation of data may be impossible. The optimal method of coding and analysis should allow for the maximum flexibility so that the data collected can be used for investigation of secondary theoretical concerns.

In conclusion, content analytical methods allow for the quantitative treatment of words or short segments of text and prepare the raw textual material for further statistical analysis but they do not help to account for the relationship between the text and the social actor that produced it.

6.2.1 Beyond traditional schemes in content analysis

Leaving aside the initial "simplistic reliance of content analysis on counting qualitative data" (Krippendorff 1980: 17), mass communication research (Lasswell, Lerner & De Sola Pool 1952) has shifted to more sophisticated approaches such as those proposed by Gerbner (1969; Gerbner, Gross, Signorielli, Morgan & Jackson-Beeck 1979) concerning the *cultural indicators* to be found in media communication⁴. This approach refers mainly and almost exclusively to the media's effect on the public. This is traced via Institutional Process Analysis (IPA), via Message System Analysis (MSA), and via Cultivation Analysis (CA). The first (IPA), refers to the production of TV programmes examining both the pressure groups involved and their decision making process. The second, (MSA), concerns a thorough analysis of the content of those programs as indicators of the prevailing issues and points of view which attract public attention. Cultivation Analysis, taking as its starting point the results of the other two analyses investigates the impact of these programmes on attitude-, opinion- and preference-formation. It is obvious that the approach adopts a one-way, namely source-target, perspective. It relies on the deterministic assumption that "the media do things to people." Pressure groups involved in the mass media economy are viewed as external to the rest of the public. Power relations are investigated only among those pressure groups while the reactions of the public and the feedback from the public to the media are neglected. The approach does not cast any light on factors such as social cognition, social structure or inter-group relations which influence the media impact on attitudes, tastes and preferences.

The subject of cultural indicators has been also addressed by Swedish scholars, more precisely by the Swedish Symbol System 1945-1975 Research Program (CISSS) (Rosengren et al. 1977; Rosengren 1980; Namenwirth 1969; 1973; 1977; Namenwirth & Bibbee 1976; Weber 1979). The aim was to build a broad sociological approach and to address questions such as to the extent to which

economic change influences social change and vice versa. For the change in social values and symbols to be measured, a set of standardised instruments, namely the cultural indicators, was created. These indicators were intended to measure important aspects of the symbol system in a specific culture and to relate them to each other and to broader economic, political and social trends. Some examples of this research are:

:
"The project on domestic policy especially investigated the values of *freedom* and *equality* on the basis of content analysis of editorials of five leading Swedish newspapers. From this, it appeared that the policy developed from a liberal to a socialist one (at the end of the 60s) with, after 1975, a tendency to return to a liberal policy.

(..) With the aid of editorials from newspapers, the project of foreign policy investigated those geographical areas to which attention had been paid in Parliament during a certain period. From this, it appeared that the distant areas orientation increased drastically during the period from 1963 to 1965. Before this period attention for these areas had been rather small, after that period the attention remained rather large. This points to an internationalization of daily life.

(..) the project on advertising examined the way in which the public is addressed by advertisements; from 1965 onwards the more informal "du" has won grounds strongly, which is being reflected in spoken Swedish. This could be interpreted in terms of increased equivalence." (Reijnders & Bouwman 1984: 43, *emphasis in the original*)

The problem with such an approach rests with the representativeness of the chosen cultural indicators. In other words, the extent to which the frequency of appearance of a value or idea in the print media of a specific type reflects a shift towards or away from that value or idea. The mere fact of paying attention to distant geographical areas does not necessarily imply an internationalisation of policies. The correlation assumed between such qualitatively different elements is spurious. Hence, the diagnostic value of cultural indicators as indices of social change is highly debatable. Furthermore, the approach does not take into account the discursive character of media communication, i.e. who utters the message, to whom the

message is addressed and which social representations can be linked to which subjects. The contextual variables that influence the content and the style of the communication are also neglected.

Both cultural indicator approaches described above remain purely quantitative and insensitive to the communicative structure of the message. Consequently, they are inadequate for a socio-psychological analysis of party behaviour and interaction through media texts. Cultural indicators are handy, methodologically robust instruments for sociological research but they end up as value or subject scores presumed to capture the substance of a specific cultural environment.

Psychological applications of content analysis have gone more in-depth using the Thematic Aptitude Test stories (tests de nature thématique) (Ghiglione, Beauvois, Chabrol & Trognon 1980) which relate the issues and their structure (co-appearances more frequent than if they were random) with the interaction process⁵. Small group interaction processes have also been used to analyse the content of verbal communication (Bales 1950), with the analyst practically intervening in the process. Such methods are applicable only to small-scale research and provided that group interaction and study take place simultaneously. Therefore, they are not suitable for the study of interaction among large groups such as political parties. Besides, the interaction of the parties through the press discourse does not involve the physical presence of the social actors. Party interaction through the media is of an indirect character. Thus, the Thematic Aptitude Test Stories or the Small Group Interaction approaches are not applicable to this study.

6.3 One step forward: Semantic text grammars

The shortcomings of content analysis have recently been overcome by the creation of hierarchically and relationally organised coding schemes, the semantic text grammars. Their

point of departure is linguistics. The latter have initially led to the construction of *Sentence grammars* which introduce syntactic structures as schemes for the analysis of the content of a text. The system of rules conditioning the phrase-structure⁶, i.e. a sentence grammar, is the platform used on which to code the various elements of the text without using any specific theoretical assumptions.

The same principle underlies the concept of *semantic macrostructures* (Van Dijk 1980; 1985), i.e. the fairly simple bits of information which language users formulate in order to summarise larger and more complex units of discourse. Hence, the view of natural language as a set of words structured in phrases which can be constructed on the basis of a few prototypic schemes⁷ is applied to the text as a complete semantical unit made up of sentences organised around one or more topics. If one of these topics is characterised as being dominant for a specific text then it is assumed that sentences follow a specific relational structure within the text according to this main topic. Thus, sentences are to texts what words are to phrases.

A general structure is needed so that it may be applicable to all kinds of text just like syntax is valid for all phrases. In text grammars this structure is borrowed from semantics. It consists of the fundamental semantic triplet of subject - action - object (Franzosi 1989). Textual data such as that contained in narrative or action discourse can be adequately represented in that canonical form. Additional information on one of the three basic elements can be inserted as a *modifier* of the actor or the action. Comments or the verbal reactions of the actors which do not explicitly make up part of the semantic triplet fall into a separate category of "comments" or simply are not coded.

Semantic text grammars provide the structure and the functionally relevant categories which map the organisation of a text. The data falling into a common category is semantically equivalent irrespective of difference in their content or in their grammatical form. Text grammars have been used to date to develop coding schemes for collective action events (Franzosi 1989, 1990) or for the content analysis of narrative discourse

(Mandler 1978; Rumelhart 1975). However, implementation of the semantic grammar scheme in texts that do not refer to action or events is impossible. As has been pointed out by scholars who have elaborated semantic grammars^a, texts which do not follow the rudimentary structure of actor (subject)-action -actor (object) can neither be coded nor analysed using semantic text grammars. Party discourse in the press does not always refer to action events. Campaigning discourse, in particular, which is meant to persuade the voters and discredit the opponent parties is most likely to take the form of political commentaries or interviews with party leadership. The same is true for inter-party bargaining and negotiation. Bargaining discourse anticipates future action. It does not, however, involve the realisation of this action.

6.4 A discursive syntax

The need for a different methodological tool when dealing with political or ideological texts (eg. news commentaries, editorials, public statements and declarations, personal opinion accounts) will be filled by the method proposed in this Chapter. The texts under consideration are particular forms of written communication. Their authors express opinions and beliefs and make comments about situations, problems, people, individuals or groups. When these texts are embodied in a situation of social influence they may be regarded as a means of interaction between the social or political actors involved in the influence process. Newspaper articles which refer to politics, in particular when they are published during periods of accentuated party competitions, eg. pre-election campaigning or post-election negotiations, are regarded as a means of communication between parties.

A piece of written communication is characterised by its source, namely its author, and by the message the author expresses. The message involves an issue, a problem or, more generally, a theme which, explicitly or implicitly, refers to


another social actor who is the object of the message. Newspaper articles which address political issues are characterised by their author who may either be the party or a sub-actor within the party (eg. the party leadership, a candidate of the party, a journalist or political commentator who is a party member/supporter and so on). These articles may refer to an event, to a policy or to an ideological issue in relation to a specific political actor, i.e. a party or a sub-actor within a party (eg. the party leadership, the party rank-and-file or the party as government if the party is in office). The content of the article is, thus, related either to the same party that is the source of the article if the article forwards the ideas or positions of this party, or to another party whose positions are presented and/or commented upon. The party to whom the content refers represents the object of the article.

It is assumed that newspaper articles which refer to inter-party politics represent a means of communicating party ideas and opinions to the electorate. These articles may also be regarded as representing interaction between parties given that each party supports or criticises the positions of the other through the medium of newspaper articles. This study examines the newspaper discourse as a form of party behaviour in pre-election campaigning. The relationship of the newspaper articles to the environment in which they are produced is determined by the parties as sources but also as objects of the text.

The newspaper article represents an incomplete dialogue between the party-source and the party-object. The unidirectional nature of the newspaper as a medium of communication does not provide the party object with the means for an immediate response. However, the party-object is simultaneously a source of messages via its own partisan newspapers. Each article contains one direction of the communication. Thus, party interaction is not completed within the boundaries of one newspaper article; the discursive relationship among the parties is realised through the simultaneous and reciprocal communication of opponent parties via newspapers with differing political orientations.

The analysis of party behaviour through the party discourse in the press concentrates on the 'incomplete' communication embodied in each newspaper article. For this reason, two levels of analysis are distinguished. First, a global level is defined which refers to communication and persuasive messages exchanged between the parties. This general level of analysis involves different newspapers, affiliated with rival parties. The relationship between the parties is described in terms of sets of messages. Different messages are produced by each party. The object of these is either the party-source itself or a rival party. Within the overall exchange of messages during the pre-election campaign or the post-election negotiation, parties play the role of the source and the role of the object alternatively. A party (party X or party Z) is a source of messages; i.e. it is the source of articles published in its partisan newspaper(s). The same party (party X or Z) is at the same time the object of the messages of its rivals. The communication network is schematically represented in figure 6.1 .

F i g u r e 6.1



The second level of analysis focuses on the uni-directional

relationship between a party-source and a party-object within a newspaper article. The relationship is examined as a speech-action executed by the party source and referring to the party-object of the message. The content of the message is analysed in terms of socio-psychological behaviour categories, namely the styles of behaviour and the strategies of influence introduced earlier (see chapter 3).

This level of analysis of uni-directional communication is equivalent to the analysis performed by semantic grammars. The semantic triplet subject-action-object is replaced by the discursive triplet source-message-object. The message addresses a commentary or expresses an idea or belief which is related to the object. The triplet represents the discursive syntax of the text. It defines the three main elements of the discourse, namely the source, the message and the object. It also determines the direction of the relationship between them, i.e. that party X (the source) generates a message about party Z (the object).

This method aims at decomposing and recomposing the text in a way similar to that of a syntax which organises a language. A language syntax defines the basic syntactic structure of a sentence, namely the triplet subject-verb-object. Thus, the reader can recognise which word fulfils the function of the verb, for instance, and then examine the specific forms it takes and the various expressions in which the same verb may be used. The unsuspecting language user can always decompose a sentence into its syntactic elements and then study their relationships within the sentence as well as within the whole text. Similarly, the discursive syntax defines the fundamental discursive structure of the text, i.e. the triplet: source of the message - message/content of the text - object of the message. Thus, the analyst can recognise which element falls into each category (source, content, object). The analyst can, thus, decompose the text into these three elements and study each of them separately. More complex structures identified within a text can be rewritten and coded on the basis of the fundamental triplet.

The syntax assigns a functional role to each component of the discursive triplet. The elements falling in the source and object categories are interchangeable. As stated earlier, their roles may be reversed. The object of one message can become source of another, given the interactive nature of communication. Both roles are of the same nature since they link the text to a wider field of discourse where these actors are located. Not only the content of the text but also the power and status positions, in a given context, of the source and the object of the text can be analysed. These offer an understanding of the content as a link between two social actors engaging in a discourse. This is particularly significant for texts that form part of public discourse like news articles, editorials or political propaganda. Party leaflets, for example, used in election campaigning contain messages referring to the party or to its rivals. Messages may also be exchanged between a sub-actor of one party and a sub-actor of the rival party, eg. the leadership and rival party activists, or between the party candidates and the supporters of the adversary. For all this variety of actors who are potential sources or objects of a message, their role in the discursive syntax may be clearly defined.

In content analytical terms a discursive syntax links the text to its context. Information on the source and on the object of the message allows one to locate both the source and the object in a broader social space and to form some idea about the discursive universe⁹ in which the message has been produced. Thus, the message is assigned some context-specific features and meaning. McTavish and Pirro (1990: 248) argue that different social contexts are characterised by typical usage patterns of specific words and word groups. The social definition of the context gives us some guidance as to the activity likely to take place in a situation.

Discursive syntax goes beyond the shared meaning of a specific situation. It seeks to decipher and code the relationships between the actors communicating through the text.

Contextual information is used to reconstruct the discursive structure of a message, i.e. the relationship between source and object through the message. Content and context elements are coded following the direction of the communication as it is represented in the raw text. Given that public discourse follows the general scheme described above, i.e. actor-source - message - actor-object (see Figure 6.1), this scheme can fit different types of situations and a variety of subjects. It captures the direction of the communication and it reproduces its basic structure.

The message includes the content of the text, i.e. the argument put forward or the opinion expressed and the actor who is the object of reference in the text (see figure 6.2), namely the social/economic/political group or the personality about whose action and/or ideas the text gives information. The group or individual is attributed capacities or psychological features or is the object of evaluations.

The content of the text is subjected to thematic analysis. The issue addressed by the message, namely the policy issue, the situation, the problem or idea discussed is coded on the basis of a set of tagged categories defined by the analyst. These categories largely depend on the type of discourse represented in the text. A political or ideological discourse, for instance, may include policy issues, eg. finance, education or social welfare, event-issues, eg. government formation, or value-issues, eg. partyism of the State, *revanche* politics or corruption in public administration. Some previous knowledge of the material can be helpful in defining these categories. Spare categories may be left open for the addition of new categories during the coding.

The 'framing' packages inherent in the communication process are coded (see figure 6.2 *infra*). They are schemes of interpretation based on social cognition. 'Framing' packages organise experience according to prior knowledge and related social representations. The bits of social cognition and collective memory they activate generate the viewpoint of the actor, i.e. the party-source of the message, and guide the

analyst in processing and understanding the text¹⁰. These socio-cognitive elements are organised as discursive frames (Goffman 1974) which attribute meaning to the textual data. They function as a "tool-kit" of symbols, stories, rituals and world-views that people may use in varying configurations to answer different types of questions (Gamson & Modigliani 1989).


An interpretative scheme consists of a core, called a frame, which is its central organising idea guiding the understanding of whatever is at issue. The package offers a number of condensing symbols that suggest the core frame and positions in shorthand (Gamson & Modigliani *ibid.*). Thus, the package may be displayed as a whole with a metaphor, a catch-phrase or other symbolic devices. These devices¹¹ help in coding each package under a relevant tag in a package index. A frame need not be developed in detail or even with reference to all its main components to become visible. A message may be characterised by one specific frame but may also be organised around competing or converging frames. Such a co-occurrence highlights specific features of the discourse between specific actors or indicates links between symbols or representations that were not expected initially.

6.5 A discursive syntax for the socio-psychological analysis of political discourse

The discursive syntax includes the analysis of the message in socio-psychological terms. The syntax of each discursive unit is further developed to account for the styles of behaviour and the strategies of influence as categories for the analysis of party discourse. The extended scheme applied in this study is represented in figure 6.2. The sources and objects of the text are political parties and the sub-actors within them, eg. the party rank-and-file, the local party committees, the party as organisation and the party leadership or the party supporters to the extent that they appear explicitly as sources or objects of the textual messages¹². The thematic and socio-cognitive

analysis of the message is based on pre-defined indexes of issues and of 'framing' packages.¹³ Spare open categories are provided within each index for new options to be specified, if necessary, during the coding.

Figure 6.2



Two sets of analytical categories have been added to the coding scheme (see figure 6.2 *supra*) in order to analyse the party discourse in socio-psychological terms: the styles of behaviour applied by the parties in the course of their pre-election propaganda or post-election bargaining and the strategies used by the parties to confront one another¹⁴. These categories have been added to the scheme because of the specific interest of the study in the socio-psychological features and mechanisms underlying party discourse. They do not alter the fundamental structure by means of which the texts are read and coded. If the research involves different analytical concepts than those introduced above, these can be substituted. As long as the discursive nature of the text is respected, the syntax provides a flexible methodological scheme for the analysis of texts.

6.5.1 The computer-assisted application : Matching quantity with quality

The coding scheme used by this research has been incorporated into a computing application on a database management system. This was necessary because of the large size of the database to be processed and in order to prepare the data for quantitative analysis. The application programme distinguishes between three levels of coding : (1) the article as aggregate unit, (2) the paragraph as the main unit of coding and analysis and (3) the sub-unit of comments which provides a direct link to the raw data.

The article is the aggregate level which organises the paragraphs within the database. Identifying information and the title of the article are included in this level. The paragraph is selected as the basic unit of analysis because it is coherent with regard to the topics and actors referred to within it. It is indeed rare to find that more than one actor addresses different messages to another actor within the confines of a

single paragraph¹⁵. For the sake of clarity and reliability of data, when more than one party-source is included in one paragraph the latter is coded as if it were comprised of two separate units.

The coding scheme is applied to each paragraph and the elements found in the text are retained by typing in the relevant codes. The coding is divided into sections and the relationship between the sections is specified. Thus, the coder has simply to identify the elements fitting into the sections and enter them by assigning them numbers, namely the coding values. The program provides the coder with the opportunity to enter a small segment of the original text, a comment, whenever a coding value is typed in. Thus, the raw text is incorporated into the coding and coding values are linked to the lower-level data.

The three-level structure of the scheme preserves the hierarchical links within the original text while allowing for an explicit definition of the relationships between the elements coded. The segments of the raw data which are entered offer the possibility of quick validation tests without the need to go back to the newspapers. Even though the data which were coded were complex and rich, the application of the database management system to the discursive syntax made the data easy to handle.

Actor-object of the message (2 col.) (variables O1 & O2 - values 1-3 & 1-6 respectively): (categories same as for the actors-sources of the message)

value: (1) *PA.SO.K.* (1) leader
value: (2) *N.D.* (2) candidate(s)
value: (3) *SYN.* (3) supporter(s)
(4) journalist(s)-commentator(s)
(5) party as government
(6) party as organization

Styles of behaviour (2 col.) (variables S1 & S2, values 1-5):

Stability - Instability

Rigidity - Flexibility

five degree coding scale: value (1) very stable (1) very rigid
value (2) stable (2) rigid
value (3) neutral (3) neutral
value (4) unstable (4) flexible
value (5) very unstable (5) very flexible

Strategies of the parties (3 col.) (variables ST1-ST5, values 1-5) :

Categorisation

Psychologisation

Denial

Affirmation

five degree coding scale: value (1) very positive
value (2) positive
value (3) neutral
value (4) negative
value (5) very negative

connotation in the use of the strategy towards some agent.

Framing packages (28 col.) (variables F1-F28, values 1 or 2) : an index of interpretive schemes is derived from a pilot-study of the data - five options are initially left open for eventual additions.

value: (1) positive aspect of the frame used
value: (2) negative aspect of the frame used

Issues (29 col.) (variables I1-I29, values 1-6) : an agenda of policy issues is constructed through a pilot study on the data and with the help of general background information on the pre- or post-election circumstances.

value: (1) supportive - retrospective reference to the issue

value: (2) supportive - programmatic reference to the issue
value: (3) criticising - retrospective reference to the issue
value: (4) criticising - programmatic reference to the issue
value: (5) neutral - retrospective reference to the issue
value: (6) neutral - programmatic reference to the issue

A P P E N D I X I I
Index of the framing packages

- 01 Health - Illness : eg. ill, old, unable, weak
- 02 Sexuality (positive or negative connotation): private life, sexism, abnormal couple, political anomaly, sharing one's life, caring
- 03 Catharsis - corruption (as state of affairs in society): eg. need for catharsis, purification of the polity, transparency in public actions -contrasted to- embezzling money, theft, illegal practices, falsification of the elections
- 04 Social justice, leftness - Frugality, exploitation, capitalism:
social justice, equity - capitalist exploitation, pseudo-socialists
- 05 Real Left - Pseudo Right: honest consistent Left, historical credits (past class struggles) -contrasted to- dogmatic Left, supporting the return to conservatism
- 06 Governmental power - Lack of power and office: speaking as if one were already elected, programmatic discourse before one enters office - confessing inability to influence decision making, distancing from the power positions
- 07 Realism - Unrealistic attitude: realistic strategy, brought Socialism to power - losing the historical opportunity, stuck to unrealistic ideas
- 08 Success - Failure, Winners - Losers
- 09 Future - Past
- 10 Development, prosperity - Crisis, calamity: development, progress, prosperity - crisis, underdevelopment, decline, economic or political or governmental chaos

11 Patriotic, national reconciliation - anti-patriotic, national discord: national pride, defense of the national interest and independence - reference to past political events, deserter, unfaithful, traitor

12 Democratic - Authoritarian: individual freedom, democratization of the State, democratic practices within the party, democratic tradition - dogmatic political beliefs, authoritarian attitude and practices in government or within the party

13 Morality, honesty - Immorality, dishonesty: honest, sincere - immoral, lowest, hypocritical attitude

14 Stability, consistency - Instability, inconsistency (as a political behaviour and/or personality feature): trustworthy, responsible - unstable, changing opinion all the time, inconsistent, irresponsible attitude

15 Balanced, reserved - Unbalanced, confused (as emotional state or personality feature): calm, clear, balanced - fear, disillusionment, panicking, extreme spontaneity, exaggerated enthusiasm, loss, insane, unhappy

16 Impartiality, objectivity - Revengeful attitude (as political principle or personality feature): government of and for all Greek citizens, objective judgement - revengeful, mean person or behaviour

17 Altruism - Egoism: sacrificing personal interest for the common interest - extreme ambition, power obsession, self-centred person

18 Peaceful - Violent (behaviour or person) : peaceful demonstration, calm climate in the campaign aggressiveness, vandalism

19 Politicized - 'de-politicized': thinking citizens, political argumentation - de-politicized manifestation, like a "fiesta", shouting crowd

20 Clever - Stupid, foolish (person)

21 Separation of party and State mechanisms and functions - Partyism, nepotism : correct, impartial governing practices - abuse of the State apparatus, mandarins of the administration, extreme partyism

22 Participation in the commons, courage - Absence, cowards: active, involved in politics, criticising, proposing, indicating ideas/policies

- absent, afraid to criticise, afraid to contradict the government / the majority

23 Dignity - Vulgarity (as political attitude/practice)

24 Reference to animals, positive - negative (metaphors referring to animals as a means to emphasise personality traits and specific behaviours)

25 Progressive - Conservative (use of the traditional political cleavage): a majority of the progressive democratic forces, progressive policies - conservatism

The issue index

- 01 'Catharsis'
- 02 Military in politics
- 03 Scandals (private life of politicians)
- 04 Scandals (embezzlement of public money)
- 05 Environment
- 06 Foreign policies
- 07 Education, culture, sports
- 08 Ideology/political values
- 09 National reconciliation
- 10 Social health and welfare
- 11 Economic policies and finance
- 12 Peace
- 13 New elections
- 14 Class distinction and opposition
- 15 Electoral law
- 16 Democratization
- 17 Health and private life of A.Papandreou
- 18 Popular sovereignty
- 19 Single-party majority government
- 20 Election campaigning - OR - Reactions to government formation, plans/actions
- 21 PASOK intra-party politics
- 22 ND intra-party politics
- 23 SYN intra-party politics
- 24 Formation of government after the elections
- 25 Feminist issues

NOTES

1. Examples of widely used dictionaries of this type are the Harvard Social-psychological dictionary (Stone et al. 1966, 1974), the Lasswell Value dictionary (Peterson and Brewer 1965, Lasswell 1968), the Institutional Rhetorics dictionary (Cleveland 1972, and others) and the Verbal Style dictionary (Hart 1984).
2. Textpack, University of Mannheim, Germany; Spad.t, C.I.S.I.A., Fontenay-St-Cloud, France, MCCA 8.3, Minnesota Contextual Content Analysis Computer Program, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, U.S. are the computer programs most widely used.
3. Holsti proposes the notion of evaluative assertion analysis as this was developed in Osgood 1959.
4. See Gerbner G. (1969) Toward "cultural indicators": the analysis of mass mediated public message systems, in Gerbner G. et al. (eds), The analysis of communication content. N.York: Free Press, p. 123-132. An application of the concept is made by Gerbner himself in Gerbner G., Gross L., Signorielli N., Morgan M. and Jackson-Beeck M. (1979) Violence Profile no 10: trends in network television drama and view conceptions of social reality, 1967-1978. Annenberg School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania.
5. "Le bus de cette phase de l'étude était de dépasser le niveau des représentations et de l'idéologie atteint avec les entretiens, pour essayer de préciser comment les étudiants... vivaient et se situaient par rapport aux principaux aspects de la relation" (Ghiglione, Beauvois, Chabrol & Trognon 1980: 68).
6. Phrase structure is the syntax at the core of each language which provides the transformation rules which allow us to infer from different *surface* structures the common *deep* structure underlying them and, thus, to rewrite and code various complex structures according to a basic scheme.
7. An argument followed by many linguists; see in particular Lyons 1970 for a discussion of the generation of phrases in a language.
8. "Simple structures such as the canonical noun phrase/verb phrase form can adequately represent the syntactical constructs of factual stories (...) The canonical form, however performs quite poorly in representing the more complex syntactical constructs likely to be found in *verbal reactions* and *comments*." (Franzosi 1989: 275-276, *emphasis* in the original).
9. The term *universe* refers to a set of conditions, actors and relationships which characterise a specific situation. A *discursive universe* refers more specifically to the communication and interaction process within a specific situation. It indicates that communication and interaction take place under a particular set of circumstances which involves specific actors playing

socially defined roles.

10. "A goal of well written text is to assure that only allowable mappings are attempted. Such text is sprinkled with various cues to guide the reference processes." (Metzing 1980: 96)

11. Gamson and Modigliani provide a typology of devices used to give prominence to various framing packages. They distinguish between framing devices: a) metaphors, b) exemplars, c) catch-phrases, d) depictions and e) visual images and reasoning devices: a) roots (causal analysis), b) consequences (a particular type of effect) and c) appeals to principle (a set of moral claims) (Gamson & Lasch 1983; Gamson & Modigliani 1989).

12. See in appendix I, under the title "paragraph" the description of "Actors-sources of the message" and of "Actors-objects of the message."

13. See appendix I under "Issues" and under "Framing packages" about the coding procedure followed in respective cases. See also appendix II for the issue index and the framing package index used in the coding.

14. The relevant theoretical concepts are developed in Chapter three.

15. For the paragraphs as units of discourse see Dijk Van 1982.

CHAPTER VII:

The impact of the party power position on the evolution of its styles of behaviour

7.1 Introduction

7.1.1 Presentation of the data: Sources of data, division into periods of analysis, the raw textual material

In this chapter, our attempt to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of a socio-psychological analysis of party behaviour will be applied to a case study. The behaviour of the three major Greek parties, namely the Socialist (P.A.S.O.K.), the Conservative (N.D.) and the extreme leftist party (Alliance of the Left or SYN.), in the period between June 1989 and April 1990¹ constitutes a suitable case to be investigated.

The analysis of party behaviour to be undertaken is based on the party discourse in the media, in the daily press in particular. The articles published in the partisan press are analysed as messages by which a party expresses its opinions and seeks to influence others. The party that a specific newspaper supports is deemed to be the author of political articles in that newspaper. A number of sub-actors are identified within each party. These include the party leadership, the party candidates for Parliament, the members or supporters of the party, the journalists or other political commentators, the party as government and the party as political organisation.² It may be argued that the party is not the actual author of the newspaper articles; nonetheless, parties control to a large extent the content and the style of their partisan newspapers, especially during election campaign. Moreover, partisan newspapers are commonly regarded as echoing the views of a particular party.

The styles of party behaviour as they are expressed through the party discourse in the press relate to the concrete actions of

the parties but they are not identified with these actions. Let us assume for the sake of analytical clarity that the party behaves in a unitary manner during the election campaign or the post-election negotiation³. The party takes decisions which it may realise through concrete actions. A decision to participate in a coalition government, for instance, is realised through the participation in government of the party leadership and candidates to the Cabinet and their involvement in government decision making.

On the other hand, the party also engages in various forms of communication which make up part of its effort to influence the voters. These forms play a complementary role with respect to party action. Party public communication and propaganda and the specific actions that the party undertakes are interrelated and reciprocally influence one another. A party supports its actions through its discourse but it also may (re)construct the meaning of these actions. The newspaper discourse of a party is a means of public communication among the parties and between a party and the electorate. This discourse may refer to the single party or to its opponents. A message sent by a party which concerns the party itself constitutes a style of behaviour adopted by the given party. Messages referring to a rival party constitute strategies of influence and resistance that the parties apply to one another.


The political discourse in the press has been selected as an important field in which attitudes and beliefs are communicated. This choice is based on the fact that media discourse is the prevailing communication 'arena' in which political beliefs are expressed, public issues are discussed and attempts at persuading people take place. Newspapers play an important part as a medium of political communication and are sometimes used in the dissemination of party propaganda. This does not mean that television or radio play a less important part in public communication; but in the period under examination, it is difficult to identify television or radio channels overtly supporting a specific party which could be used as sources of information about the styles of behaviour and strategies of that party. Besides, the study of audio-visual media requires technical facilities to which is not possible to have access. Partisan newspapers have therefore been selected as a primary channel that Greek parties use to put forward their own positions and ideas and to discredit those of rival parties.

a) The newspapers

Two newspapers have been selected for each of the larger parties; "Eleftheros Tipos" and "Apogevmatini" for the Conservative party (N.D.) and "Avriani" and "Epikerotita" for the Socialists (PA.SO.K.). All these newspapers are published in Athens, have a nation-wide circulation and have explicitly supported their respective parties in the period under study. Figure 1 shows the national monthly circulation of each newspaper.

Figure 1

National newspaper circulation: total of copies/per month



Note: The newspaper "Rizospastis" is the only morning edition newspaper among the five newspapers represented in the graph. The total national circulation provided here includes both the morning and afternoon editions. The national newspaper circulation for each edition separately is represented in the following two graphs (figure 1a and figure 1b)


Source: E.I.H.E.A. (National Foundation of Athens Daily Press), monthly circulation bulletin.

The newspapers "Eleftheros Tipos" and "Avriani", despite their commercial character gave explicit support to the N.D. and the PA.SO.K. respectively.⁴ Furthermore, the owners of the newspaper

"Avriani" were candidates for Parliament for the Socialist party and were thus directly involved in the election campaign. The owner of "Eleftheros Tipos", on the other hand, had close personal and political links with the rank-and-file of New Democracy. These two newspapers have been selected as suitable sources of information concerning the styles of behaviour and the strategies of influence and resistance adopted by the N.D. and the PA.SO.K.

Figure 1a


National newspaper circulation: afternoon edition



Data has also been collected from the newspapers "Apogevmatini" and "Epikerotita". These have a relatively large circulation (see figures 1 and 1a) but are to a certain extent financially dependent on the N.D. or on the PA.SO.K. The newspaper "Epikerotita" was founded under the auspices of the organisation of the Socialist party and was indirectly managed by the latter⁵. "Apogevmatini" is a traditional right-wing newspaper which has suffered from a declining circulation. Nonetheless, it occupies an important position as a 'transmitter' of Conservative party

positions in the period examined.⁶

Figure 1b
National newspaper circulation: morning edition



The behaviour of the Alliance of the Left (SYN.) has been investigated by reference to the discourse of the party in the newspaper "Rizospastis." The latter is the major morning newspaper⁷ in Greece (see figure 1b) and has functioned as the traditional organ of the Greek Communist Party. The formation of the Alliance of the Left (SYN.), which brought together the Greek Communist Party (K.K.E.), the E.AR. (i.e. what might be called the "Euro-communist" party) and other minor left-wing forces in January 1989, transformed "Rizospastis" into the official 'voice' of the Alliance (SYN.). The partisan character of this newspaper is indisputable, "Rizospastis" has also been the only explicitly left-wing newspaper with a significant and stable circulation (approx. 3.5%-4% of the total, see also figures 1 and 1b). This newspaper is thus a good data source for the analysis of the styles of behaviour and strategies of influence of the Alliance of the Left.

b) The periods of the analysis

The textual material is divided into three sub-sets of data corresponding to three periods of analysis.⁸ Each period is

organised around the main events of the case study. During the overall period examined three national elections took place (June 18, 1989; November 5, 1989 and April 8, 1990) and two provisional coalition governments were formed (July-October 1989 and November 1989-March 1990). The first period covers the styles of behaviour and the strategies followed by the parties with respect to the first electoral contest. The party campaigning and interaction before the election as well as their reactions immediately following the election outcome are investigated. The data set concerning the first period comprises a total of 355 articles (1310 paragraphs) published on June 16 and on June 20, 1989.

The definition of this first set of newspaper material is based on two criteria. First, the first election is a typical electoral contest after the four-year administration of a single-party government. The Socialists had won two consecutive governmental mandates in the periods 1981-1985 and 1985-1989. The election campaign of June 1989 took place therefore under normal circumstances. Second, the outcome of the same election led to the alternation of power positions between the two major parties, while the outsider party, the Alliance of the Left, retained approximately its electoral strength.

The first period is used as a control set against which change in the following periods can be tested. The analysis of this subset of data provides an initial indication of the effect of the party power character on the styles of behaviour adopted by each party. Party relationships in the first period are organised along traditional ideological and political cleavages, namely left-right or progressive-conservative. The SYN. and the PA.SO.K. may be regarded as belonging to the same super-ordinate political 'family,' "the Left," since they share a significant part of their ideology and political tradition. A number of the leading political figures of the Socialist party (PA.SO.K.) originate from the Communist and other radical left-wing parties. Greek political history also confirms the joint participation of members or supporters of the PA.SO.K. and the SYN. in resistance organisations that opposed the Colonels' regime (1967-1974). Despite these common elements, differences did exist between the ideas of the two parties as well as between their programme declarations. Indeed, the Socialist party and the Alliance of the Left differed in most of their policy positions.

The ideological orientation, the leading personalities, the practices and symbols of the N.D. were regarded as opposed to those of 'the Left.' Such a left-right cleavage originates from the Civil War in the period 1945-1948 and has characterised Greek politics in the post-war period. The dominance of the two super-ordinate political 'families' in Greek politics is reflected in party interaction and in strategies used by competing parties in the first period of the analysis.

The second set of data refers to the formation of a provisional government between the N.D. and the Alliance of the Left in the summer of 1989 and also to the following pre-election campaign in November 1989. This set of data includes the inter-party negotiation for the formation of a coalition government given that the outcome of the election of June 1989 did not yield a parliamentary majority to any party. The relevant articles have been retrieved from the newspapers published on June 27, July 1 and July 5. The same period also comprises the election campaign of the parties after the dissolution of the provisional government. For this reason, all relevant newspaper articles published on November 3, 1989 have been coded and analysed. The second set of data is constituted by a total of 283 articles which consist of 755 paragraphs-units of analysis.

A third set of data refers to the styles of behaviour and the strategies of the parties in the period before and immediately after the formation of the national unity government in November 1989 and also to the party campaigning before the electoral contest on April 8, 1990. The styles of behaviour and the strategies of influence adopted by the parties in this period are investigated through the newspaper articles published on November 21st and November 25th, 1989, namely a few days before and a few days after the formation of the government. The pre-election campaigning of April 1990 is analysed by reference to data collected from newspapers published on April 6th, 1990, i.e. two days before the election. The data coded and analysed with reference to the third period of the analysis consist of 578 paragraphs derived from 258 articles.


c) The textual material and the data produced

The material from the newspapers includes different types of articles and other types of published material, e.g. political advertisements or photos. The coding category "Type"⁹ specifies the following options: reports of events, headlines or short abstracts which introduce an article on a different page, editorials, various types of commentaries on politics, public speeches or interviews delivered by party leaders or candidates and letters by or interviews of the readership. During the coding, two further options were added; the party or candidate advertisements and the photos or graphs published independently from relevant articles. The vast majority of political advertisements have been collected from the newspapers "Eleftheros Tipos" and "Apogevmatini" and to a lesser extent from the newspapers "Avriani" and "Epikerotita". The newspaper "Rizospastis" did not publish any party or candidate advertisements.

The distribution of the different types of articles within each period of analysis is represented in figure 2 (*infra*).

Political commentaries represent the dominant type of articles in the whole database. They alone account for approximately fifty per cent of all articles coded in each period (see figure 2). This predominance of political commentaries is in part due to the strategy followed in the collection of the material. Articles which were mere citations or announcements of an event, lists of the candidates in a specific constituency or simple announcements of party activities have been omitted from the data set. Their exclusion is based on the fact that these are informative texts that do not express a style of behaviour or a strategy of the relevant party. These types of reports provide topical information to the readership. Clearly, purely informative articles can be regarded as a means of advertising party activities or party candidates; yet they have been excluded from the data set because they do not express opinions, evaluations or any type of comments with respect to any party. Articles which reported events and also offered a short comment or an evaluative hint in the introduction to the report have been included in the database.

Figure 2
Distribution of types of articles within each period of analysis



The interviews or public speeches (reported in full or in abstract form) delivered by party leaders or candidates and political advertisements of parties or of individual candidates make up a significant part of the data set. Headlines or short introductory abstracts, the majority of which are front-page articles, event reports and editorials also account for a large part of the data coded. With the exception of political advertisements which, at times, included very short propaganda statements related to the specific candidate, and also excluding some event reports which offered little information about the view of the party with respect to a specific event, all other articles have proved to be valuable sources of information about party behaviour.

The articles selected have been divided into paragraphs following the structure of the original text. In some paragraph-units of coding, and mostly in those with a descriptive content, no style of behaviour could be identified in relation to the party-source of the message. The percentage of these paragraphs remains, however, low with respect to the overall data coded and analysed (see figures 3a, 3b and 3c)¹⁰.

Figure 3a

Total number of paragraphs in which the PA.SO.K. has been coded as the party-source of the message and total number of paragraphs in which at least one style of behaviour or strategy has been coded with respect to that message and its source.





Figure 3b


Total number of paragraphs in which the N.D. has been coded as the party-source of the message and total number of paragraphs in which at least one style of behaviour or strategy has been coded with respect to that message and its source.



More than one framing package may be associated with the style of behaviour or strategy coded. Multiple coding of framing packages is often necessary in order to include all relevant, complementary or contradictory, social representations mobilised in the party discourse. The policy issue(s) discussed within each paragraph are also included in the coding.¹¹

Figure 3c


Total number of paragraphs in which the SYN. has been coded as the party-source of the message and total number of paragraphs in which at least one style of behaviour or strategy have been coded with respect to that message and its source



The database consists of a total of 896 articles divided into 2643 paragraphs-units of coding and analysis. The distribution of the data, articles and paragraphs separately, into the three periods of analysis and related to the specific dates of publication is represented schematically in figures 4a, 4b and 4c.


Figure 4a

Distribution of the data in the three periods of analysis




Note: Each period includes the following dates:
 1st period: June 16, June 20, 1989
 2nd period: June 27, July 1, July 5, Nov. 3, 1989
 3rd period: Nov. 21, Nov. 25, 1989, April 6, 1990

Figure 4b
Graphic representation of the distribution of articles coded per date



The concentration of the data on some specific dates (see figure 4b and 4c) and the general decrease in total number of articles/paragraphs coded in the second and third period with respect to the first (see figure 4a) are random since the collection and coding of texts has been based on selected dates (see chapter 7.1.1.b) and has included all articles relevant to party behaviour.

Figure 4c
Graphic representation of the distribution of paragraphs coded per date



7.1.2 Clustering of the framing packages

A set of options has been specified in the coding scheme with reference to the coding category of 'framing' packages. Three additional options have been introduced to the original set during the coding in order to account for framing packages that did not fit into the existing options. The complete index of framing packages (see appendix) includes 25 different options which have been grouped into ten clusters. Each cluster either accounts for a specific social representation or for more than one social representation which are closely interrelated.

The clustering occurs around two axes. The first refers to the political or non-political character of a framing package and to the relevant social representation that this produces. Thus, framing packages that relate to psychological, emotional or physical features are distinguished from those that stress political values, ideas or public issues.

The second axis distinguishes between concrete vs. abstract 'objects' to which the framing packages refer. Three levels of this axis may be identified: (1) concrete situations or problems, (2) attitudes or practices concerning political or social 'objects' and (3) abstract notions. Framing packages that concentrate on situational factors and concrete issues focus on the specific problems through a lens that perceives and understands politics in general. The scandal concerning the Bank of Crete, for instance, in which the Socialist government appeared to be involved, was related to the more general problem of public fraud and mismanagement of public finance. This eventually emphasised the problem of moral and honest administration vs. immoral and corrupted people or practices in government as the main issue that the voter should consider. Framing packages that refer to concrete problems or situations also include pragmatic factors that condition the human organism, e.g. age or health. Reference to attitudes or practices as framing packages within party discourse distinguishes between attitudes towards political and towards social objects. The packages referring to abstract notions may stress a political value or a belief. They may also include heuristic cues to understand behaviour or events. These cues relate to pure propaganda, e.g. "We are the winners, you are the losers" or "You are the past, we are the future", or to non-political heuristic cues such as

psychological predispositions.

The intersection of these two axes produces the following matrix:

	Political	Non-political
Problems/Situations	Public issues related to political values	references to the human condition
Attitudes/practices	attitudes towards political 'objects'	attitudes towards society and other people
Abstract notions	political values and/or propaganda	Psychological features or personality traits

Different clusters of framing packages are specified within each cell of the matrix. The cell of public problems related to political values includes two different clusters of framing packages; the cluster of " 'catharsis' vs. corruption" (F3, F13)¹² as a concrete situation and as a general question about (im)morality and (dis)honesty in government¹³ and also the cluster of "national development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation" (F10, F11) which relates the problem of prosperity and growth vs. underdevelopment to patriotism and national reconciliation contrasted with national conflict. Only one cluster falls into the cell which refers to the human condition. This cluster includes the framing packages of health vs. illness (F1), of sexuality (F2) and of animals (F24) used as metaphors in the party discourse.

Two clusters of framing packages fall into the cell which refers to attitudes towards political 'objects.' The "dignity vs. vulgarity" (F23) cluster deals with dignity or vulgarity as political attitudes and practices that one follows when one participates in politics. The cluster of "citizen attitudes towards participation in politics" relates to modes of participation, e.g. "peaceful vs. violent" (F18) or " 'thinking citizens' vs. 'shouting crowd' " (F19) and also to "attitudes towards political participation" (F22), namely involvement in politics, partisan attitude, courage contrasted to indifference,

reluctance to participate and fear to raise one's own voice. The adjacent cell which includes attitudes towards society and 'others' is represented by the cluster of "self vs. others". This cluster comprises the framing packages of "impartiality, objectivity vs. revengeful attitudes" (F16) and "altruist vs. egoist attitude" (F17).

The cell labelled "political values and/or propaganda" comprises the relevant cluster of framing packages which refer to political values or principles and ideology. The framing packages included in this cluster are the following: "social justice/equality vs. capitalism/exploitation of labour" (F4), "democratic vs. authoritarian regime" (F12), "separation of the mechanisms of the governing party and the State, meritocracy vs. partyism, nepotism and abuse of the State apparatus" (F21) and "progressive vs. conservative ideology and policies" (F25). A purely ideological framing package falls into the same cell of the matrix. It is the framing package of " 'real' Left vs. pseudo Right" (F5) which refers to a supposed distinction and differentiation between 'genuine' or 'true' left-wing ideas or policy positions and beliefs which are presented as left-wing but which express conservative, right-wing positions.

The same cell also comprises a cluster of framing packages related to propaganda, namely that of "power/future vs. failure/past". The framing packages that constitute this cluster are "governmental power vs. lack of power and authority" (F6), "winners vs. losers" (F8) and "we are the future vs. you are the past" (F9). This last framing package implies electoral success contrasted to failure since a party that has electoral success will govern the country in the future while a party said to belong to the "past" is characterised as obsolete and deprived of power.

The non-political notions used as heuristic cues in the party discourse are represented by the cluster of "psychological characteristics/personality traits." The framing packages involved in this cluster are "realistic or unrealistic attitudes" (F7) as a psychological predisposition, "consistent/responsible vs. inconsistent/unstable personality" (F14), "balanced/reserved vs. psychologically unbalanced/confused personality" (F15) and "clever vs. stupid person" as a mental ability pre-defined by nature (F20).

	Political	Non-political
Problems/Situations	'catharsis vs. corruption' (F3, F13) 'national development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation' (F10, F11)	'human condition' (F1, F2, F24)
Attitudes/practices	'dignity vs. vulgarity' (F23) 'citizen attitudes towards political participation' (F18, F19, F22)	'self vs. others' (F16, F17)
Abstract notions	'political values and ideology' (F4, F12, F21, F25) 'real Left vs. pseudo Right' (F5) 'power/future vs. failure/past' (F6, F8, F9)	'psychological characteristics and personality traits' (F7, F14, F15, F20)

The classification of the framing packages into ten clusters serves two purposes. First, it reduces the number of variables specified within the same analytical category. Thus the discourse of different parties may be analysed on the basis of the association of a style of behaviour or strategy with specific framing packages. This association is used to highlight the meaning assigned to each style of behaviour or strategy by each party and the way in which this meaning contributes to the organisation of the party styles of behaviour and strategies. Second, the division into ten clusters illustrates the variety of framing packages included in the party discourse.

7.2 The power position of the party as a determinant of the styles of behaviour that the party adopts

7.2.1 The measurement of the styles of behaviour

The first hypothesis of this research concerns the impact that the power position of a party has on the styles of behaviour that a party adopts in campaigning or negotiation. A score has been computed from the coded data which indicates the degree of consistency or inconsistency and of rigidity or flexibility for each type of party in each period of the analysis.

This score has been calculated on the basis of the frequency of occurrence of a specific style of behaviour for each party in each period. Styles of behaviour are coded on the basis of a scale, according to which coding values ranging from 1 to 5 indicate degrees of consistency/inconsistency (1 very consistent - 5 very inconsistent) and rigidity/flexibility (1 very rigid - 5 very flexible). Each occurrence is assigned a relative weight on the basis of its coded value. Relative weights are assigned values from (-2) to (2) so that a value equal to (0) would indicate party neutrality on the specific style of behaviour. Positive scores demonstrate relevant degrees of consistency or rigidity while negative scores show relevant degrees of inconsistency or flexibility.

The values of the consistency scale represent the following styles of behaviour: (2) very consistent, (1) consistent, (0) neutral, (-1) inconsistent, (-2) very inconsistent. The rigidity scale is: (2) very flexible, (1) flexible, (0) neutral, (-1) rigid, (-2) very rigid. Thus the number of occurrences of each value of the scale are multiplied by these values (e.g. -1 for inconsistent style of behaviour or 2 for very consistent style of behaviour etc.). This product is divided by the total number of occurrences of the specific style of behaviour. The quotient of the division, thus, ranges from 2 to -2 and represents the score of consistency or of flexibility of the specific party in a given period.

Let us present an example which illustrates the procedure applied in the computation of the scores : Let us calculate the flexibility score of a party for which in the first period 40 occurrences of a rigid

or flexible style of behaviour have been coded. These 40 occurrences included 16 occurrences of a very rigid behaviour, 6 of a rigid behaviour, none of neutral behaviour, 17 of a flexible style of behaviour and 1 of a very flexible style of behaviour. The score is calculated as follows:

$$\frac{16 \times 2 + 6 \times 1 + 0 \times 0 + 17 \times (-1) + 1 \times (-2)}{40} = 0.47$$

Within a range of possible values between 2 (very rigid) and -2 (very flexible), this party obtains a flexibility score of 0.47 which represents a rigid style of behaviour.

7.2.2 Discussion of the results on consistency and inconsistency as styles of behaviour of different types of parties.

The results on consistency or inconsistency in line with our hypothesis, are characterised by highly positive scores for consistency for all parties in all three periods analysed. Inconsistency as a style of behaviour for political parties appears only infrequently. This does not imply that parties are indeed highly stable and consistent in their ideas and policy positions. It means, however, that parties maintain that they are consistent and coherent in their ideas and practices. The instances of inconsistent styles of behaviour displayed by parties range between none and one in each period of analysis (see data in the appendix II).

The consistency scores computed for each type of party in the three periods of analysis are given in table 1.

Table 1
Consistency/Inconsistency

	Periods of analysis		
	1st	2nd	3rd
Incumbent	1.96	1.79	1.8
Challenger	1.95	1.86	1.87
Outsider	1.97	1.89	2

Note: Consistency/Inconsistency score= n , $max_n = 2$, $min_n = -2$.

Overall the consistency scores for all three types of parties are remarkably high. Our hypotheses are thus fully supported. In the first period of analysis parties obtain consistency scores very close to the maximum score. A slight decline is registered in the second period for all three types of parties (see table 1). The incumbent and the challenger party maintain the same level of consistency in the third period; they show an increase of 0.01 with respect to the score of the second period. The outsider party, on the other hand, reaches the maximum value on the consistency score in the third period (see table 1).

The results support our hypotheses that all parties, irrespective of their power character, tend to adopt a consistent style of behaviour. Moreover, the outsider party displays the highest degree of consistency of all parties in every period. This finding is in line with the relevant prediction that the outsider party which disposes of the lowest symbolic and pragmatic status among the three makes itself visible in the pre-election campaigning and post-election negotiation by emphasising its consistency.

This finding also conforms with the assumptions of the active minority theory. Experimental research has demonstrated that a style of behaviour which is consistent, or is perceived as such, is

a *sine qua non* for an active minority to exert some influence (Moscovici 1979). Indeed the outsider party accentuates its coherent, stable and resolute behaviour in the course of the three election campaigns and two post-election negotiations.


The slight decrease in the consistency scores of all parties in the second period, a decrease which persists also in the third period for the incumbent and the challenger party, may be attributed to the governmental instability that characterised both periods. The lack of a single party parliamentary majority during the second and the third period created a fluid political climate. Furthermore, the chance of the incumbent or the challenger party acquiring governmental office was contingent upon them negotiating a governmental coalition with the outsider party. The small decline of their consistency score may, therefore, be explained by reference to the fact that governmental power was contingent upon negotiation more than upon electoral success.

On the other hand, the incumbent and the challenger party have at their disposal large symbolic and practical resources which make their positions salient. Consistent behaviour is desirable because it is assumed that voters tend to reward it but, according to the genetic model of influence, it is not essential to a majority group, e.g. an incumbent or a challenger party, in order for it to exercise influence on a population, e.g. the voters.

Overall the results on consistency confirm the relevant hypotheses. However, the extreme positive character of the consistency scores and the small differences between the different types of parties do not offer a clear view of the role that consistency plays in party behaviour. These findings suggest that all parties demonstrate high levels of consistency irrespective of their power character. Therefore, an analysis of the meaning assigned to party consistency has been undertaken. The framing packages that the parties relate to their consistent style of behaviour are examined in an effort to understand better the ways in which different types of parties organise their behaviour. The analysis seeks to highlight the implicit meanings embodied in the style of behaviour by mobilising specific framing packages¹⁴.

Figure 5.1

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages in relation to consistency as a style of behaviour adopted by the incumbent party



Note: The symbol *s1* represents the consistency score computed for each party in each period of analysis. The value of '*s1*' ranges between -2 and 2. Values are grouped into three groups: consistent, neutral and inconsistent. A consistent style of behaviour is related to a positive score on the consistency variable (*s1*>0); a neutral style of behaviour is related to a score which equals zero (*s1*=0) and an inconsistent style of behaviour, finally, is related to a negative score in terms of consistency (*s1*<0). The values *s1*=0, i.e. a neutral score of consistency and *s1*<0, namely a negative score of consistency have been omitted from this and also from the following two graphs because they have extremely low frequency of occurrence (equal to 0 or 1). The symbols '1st p', '2nd p' and '3rd p' refer to the first, second and third period respectively.

Figures 5.1 (see *supra*), 5.2 and 5.3 (see *infra*) show the distribution of framing packages related to a consistent style of behaviour. Each figure represents the distribution for each type of party, i.e. incumbent, challenger and outsider in the three periods under analysis.

Four clusters of framing packages are primarily related to the consistent style of behaviour of the incumbent party (see figure 5.1). These account for approximately 75% of the occurrences of incumbent party consistency. Among these four framing packages, the 'psychological features/personality traits' and the 'political values and ideology' are most prominent.

The prevalence of the 'psychological features' frame indicates that the consistent style of behaviour of the incumbent party is embodied in a psychologising context. The party stresses the qualities of its leadership and of its members in terms of realism

(F7), stability and consistency (F14), calm and sangfroid (F15) and competence (F20). The incumbent party relates its claims of consistent behaviour to these intrinsic psychological properties. In the first period, the incumbent party also emphasises its consistency in relation to its beliefs and ideology. The party stresses its consistency in terms of its left or right-wing policies (F4), its progressive or conservative ideology (F25), its democratic or authoritarian practices and beliefs (F12) and its respect for the principle of meritocracy in public administration as contrasted to *partyism* and abuse of the State apparatus (F21). The increase in prominence of the 'psychological features and personality traits' framing package after the first period corresponds to a relative decrease in the use of the 'political values and ideology' frame.

Overall, these two framing packages have compatible and even complementary meanings. They suggest that the consistent style of behaviour of the incumbent party embraces not only political values and beliefs but also psychological features. The incumbent party, more specifically the incumbent party leadership is not only *ideologically consistent* but also *psychologically balanced*.

The prevalence of the psychological features as factors which highlight the consistent style of behaviour of the incumbent party in the second and third periods of the analysis may also be related to the exceptional circumstances of these periods. The incumbent party spent a short time in office in each of the two periods. Its mandate was provisional and its stay in office seemed unstable. Government was formed on the basis of provisional coalitions grounded on 'exceptional' conditions. Under these circumstances, the framing of consistency in terms of psychological qualities stressed the determination of the party leadership to establish a stable government. Under normal circumstances, namely during the first period, consistency in terms of ideological orientation was accentuated (see figure 5.1, 1st period).


The consistent style of behaviour of the incumbent party is related also to the 'national development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation' and the 'power/future vs. failure/past' framing packages (see figure 5.1). These account for approximately 1/3 of the occurrences of a consistent style of behaviour adopted by the

incumbent party in each period. These framing packages have a common reference to the future and to the development of the country as a function of the party that comes in power. One may argue that this is a commonplace assumption, namely that the development and prosperity of a country is contingent upon its government. It is worth noting, however, that the incumbent party thus creates an image of itself as a powerful party that guarantees a prosperous future to the nation.

The framing packages related to the consistent style of behaviour of the challenger party are represented in figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages related to consistency as a style of behaviour adopted by a challenger party



The challenger party relates its consistent style of behaviour to the framing package of 'psychological features and personality traits' in all three periods in a regular way. It also stresses the 'power/future vs. failure/past' framing package during the first and third periods in particular. It appears, therefore, that consistency is, on the one hand, adopted as a psychological feature of the party leadership or of the party members and, on the other hand, it is embedded in the representation of the party as the winner of the election and future government of the country. However, the reduced significance of the 'power/future vs. failure/past' framing package in the second period (see figure 5.2) demonstrates the insecure power character of the challenger party

during that period in which it remains isolated in the opposition.

The second and third periods are characterised by an increasing emphasis on consistency in terms of ideology and policies. This tendency suggests that the challenger party seeks to establish itself as a valid alternative for government. Under conditions of governmental crisis and political instability, its consistency focuses on a distinctive ideological and policy orientation.

It is worth noting the difference between the incumbent and the challenger party in their framing of a consistent style of behaviour. Under conditions of governmental instability, namely during the second and third period, the incumbent party stresses the psychological background of its consistency and seeks to reassure its voters by representing itself as the guarantor of national security and prosperity. In contrast, the challenger party emphasises its political and ideological consistency as the main component of its style of behaviour. It thus represents itself as a valid alternative to the incumbent party and as the solution to the governmental crisis.

During the third period, the framing packages of 'power/future vs. failure/past' and 'national development vs. chaos/conflict within the country' are embodied in the consistent style of behaviour of the challenger party. Thus, the challenger party relates its consistent behaviour to the future of the country and to its governmental incumbency in a similar way as does the incumbent party.

The meanings assigned to consistency as a style of behaviour by the incumbent or challenger party appear similar. A main feature of consistency for both types of parties is the intertwining of the ideological and psychological framing packages. Psychological factors and political beliefs seem to be integral parts of the representation of the incumbent and challenger parties as consistent. The incumbent appears stable and determined in its use of metaphors such as 'power,' 'future,' 'the Nation' or 'development.' These metaphors are in conformity with its dominant position in terms of power and size. The challenger party, on the

other hand, assigns a more diversified meaning to its consistent behaviour. The 'power' and 'national prosperity' metaphors are sometimes replaced by marginal¹⁵ framing packages (see figure 5.2) such as 'catharsis vs. corruption,' the 'human condition' or the 'real Left vs. pseudo Right.' There is no clear organising pattern in the way the challenger 'frames' its consistency.

Overall, the different power positions of the incumbent and challenger party do not seem to affect significantly the content of their consistent style of behaviour. Thus an alternative hypothesis is tested. It is hypothesised that the consistent style of behaviour of an incumbent or challenger party is vested in a party-specific set of framing packages irrespective of the changes in the power character of each party. Indeed, the Conservative party (N.D.) regularly applied the 'psychological features/ personality traits' and the 'political values and ideology' framing packages. It also stressed the 'national development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation', the 'power/ future vs. failure/past' and the 'catharsis vs. corruption' frames. These framing packages are embodied in its consistent style of behaviour in a regular and constant manner in all three periods studied (see figure 5.1, 2nd & 3rd period in which the N.D. is the incumbent party and figure 5.2, 1st period in which the party occupies a challenger position). The continuous reference to the 'catharsis' framing package is attributed to the topical nature of the issue and also to the fact that this frame had a particularly negative effect on the opponent Socialist party which had been accused of public fraud. Some variation in the use of the other framing packages, namely the relative decrease in the 'power/future vs. failure/past' frame which is counterbalanced by an increase in the use of the 'national development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation,' does not modify significantly the framing pattern of the consistent style of behaviour of the N.D. during the three periods studied. The 'psychological features' frame has a predominant position in the framing of consistency of the Conservative party. Its frequent and systematic use may be contrasted with the scarce reference to 'political values and ideology' (see figure 5.1, 2nd and 3rd periods and figure 5.2, 1st period).

Indeed, this seems to be the main point of differentiation between the framing pattern of consistency adopted by the

Conservative party and that adopted by the Socialist party. Irrespective of the alternation of the two parties in power, the Socialists seemed to prefer the importance of beliefs and political principles as matters to be related to their consistent and stable behaviour (see figure 5.1, 1st period in which the Socialist party is the incumbent one and figure 5.2, 2nd and 3rd period in which it occupies the challenger position) while the Conservatives accentuated either psychological stability and balance or their moderate and responsible attitudes as the main frame to be related to their consistent style of behaviour.

This finding, namely that the framing of consistency by the two major parties follows a party-specific pattern and is not bound to, or at least it is not explicitly conditioned by, the power position of the party, raises several questions. On the one hand, it indicates that, throughout the whole period studied, the Socialist party stressed its partisan identity. The party represented its positions as ideologically grounded, contingent upon its overall political orientation (i.e. progressive party (F25), democratic (F12) party struggling for social justice (F4)). The Conservative party, in contrast, emphasised some inherent qualities of its leadership and/or rank-and-file as important factors that conditioned its consistent and coherent behaviour. Whether challenger or incumbent, the N.D. emphasised the importance of psychological properties more than ideology with respect to its consistent behaviour.

It may be argued that the difference in the framing of consistency by the two parties is related to their opposed ideological orientations, namely progressive, socialist vs. conservative, neo-liberal. However, two elements contradict this explanation. First, if this was an element intrinsic to parties with left-wing ideology, the 'political values and ideology' framing package should prevail also in the press discourse of the Alliance of the Left, i.e. the outsider party. However, this party does not particularly prefer references to ideology among the various framing packages associated with its consistent style of behaviour.

Second, both the N.D. and the PA.SO.K. are large parties. Both have spent a number of years in government. The divergent representations seem related to the fact that the Socialist party had spent the previous eight years in government and, therefore,

opted to stress its consistency over time. The N.D. accentuated its synchronic consistency given that the party had undergone important changes in leadership and in organisation in the previous years¹⁶.


Furthermore, the PA.SO.K. had to differentiate itself in terms of policy and ideology from its left-wing opponent, i.e. the Alliance of the Left (SYN.). Thus, the PA.SO.K. sought to make its ideas and policy positions stand out distinctively on the left-wing ideological canvas¹⁷. It raised the social representations of social justice and equality, progressive positions and 'the Left' as a socio-political group. Thus it appealed to left-wing voters, representing itself as the government that had always represented and still represented them. The N.D., on the contrary, had no significant right-of-centre rival except for the DI.ANA. The latter is a small party that was created as a result of a split of the N.D.. The DI.ANA. withdrew its candidates from the November 1989 election and supported the N.D. in order to help the latter gain an absolute majority in Parliament. Thus, the N.D., was the *de facto* incumbent party that represented right-wing voters. No competing party was in a position to cast doubt on the symbolic and pragmatic weight of the N.D. in the right-of-centre part of the Greek political spectrum.

The party-specific framing of consistency as a style of behaviour of an incumbent or of a challenger party brings into question the hypothesised relationship with the party power character. It may be assumed that power incumbency does not affect the ways in which large parties frame their consistency. Given that both parties have a large electoral support and defend ideas congruent with the established order, the meaning assigned to their consistent behaviour is conditioned by different factors. These may be internal to the party (e.g. intraparty change in leadership or in organisational forms) or external, namely a particular conjuncture in ~~campaigning~~ campaigning or in government formation. The specific circumstances of the period under study and, particularly, the predominance during this period of the problem of corruption in government, led the governmental policies of the Socialists to come to be examined thoroughly by public opinion; this became a central theme of election campaign. Thus the Socialist party sought to react to the unfavourable situation by stressing ideological considerations and traditional political cleavages, e.g. left-wing

vs. right-wing policies.

Figure 5.3

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages related to consistency as a style of behaviour adopted by the outsider party



The consistent style of behaviour of the outsider party is embodied in a different set of framing packages (see figure 5.3, *supra*). Surprisingly, 'political values and ideology' played a secondary role in contextualising the outsider consistency. The 'real Left vs. pseudo Right' framing package was only marginally applied in the first period. In contrast, the outsider party framed its consistent behaviour by reference to the realistic (F7), trustworthy, responsible, moderate and balanced (F15) attitudes of its leadership and of its members (i.e. 'psychological features' framing package). The consistent style of the outsider was complemented by the framing package regarding 'citizen attitudes towards participation in politics'. Thus representations of citizens engaging in peaceful demonstrations (F18) as 'thinking' individuals and of people actively involved in politics (F22) complemented the representation of the outsider party leader and supporter.

These framing packages demonstrate that the outsider party does not assign a primarily ideological content to its consistent style of behaviour. Consistency is applied in relation to a set of attitudes and psychological features. These suggest a specific type of citizen who supports the outsider party beliefs and also

adopts a specific pattern of behaviour, namely that of a moderate, balanced, thoughtful though active citizen.

On the other hand, the outsider consistency is linked to 'power' (F6), 'success' (F8) and 'the future' (F9) (see figure 5.3, the 'power/future vs. failure/past' framing package). These demonstrate clearly that consistency is related to the power potential of the outsider party. Indeed, consistency, according to active minority theory, functions as the main source of power for the outsider party.

The relevant large increase in the use of the 'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package (F3, F13) in the second period (see figure 5.3) suggests a shift in the representation of the outsider party. Its participation in the governmental coalition during that period was manifested in its styles of behaviour. The party associated its consistency with its determination to investigate public fraud. The significance of the power potential of the party ('power/future vs. failure/past' framing package) was, therefore, overshadowed. This implies that the outsider party sought to avoid the interpretation of its participation in the coalition as a power-seeking behaviour. The 'self vs. others' framing package (see figure 5.3) complements and further supports the representation of the outsider party behaviour as impartial (F16) dedicated to the common interest more than to canvassing (F17).

During the third period, the emphasis on the 'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package decreases while the share of the 'power/future vs. failure/past' frame increases. This change in the representation of the outsider party's consistent behaviour is related to its participation in the national unity government. The exaltation of the national emergency and the fact that the party remained in office despite its outsider character lead to an accentuation of references to the success and power (potential) of the party.

In conclusion, it appears that the outsider party applies consistency within a general 'framework' which includes a variety of framing packages. Consistent behaviour conveys meaning to the positions of the party and embodies them with a distinctive pattern of behaviour. However, it does not stress their conflictual

character. The outsider relates consistency to the representation of itself as a group of people who hold stable and moderate beliefs and who demonstrate responsible, balanced and even altruist and impartial political behaviour.

7.2.3 Some additional remarks concerning consistency as a style of behaviour of political parties

The 'framing' of consistency has been investigated in order to explore the meaning assigned to consistent behaviour by the different types of parties. However, the exceptionally high level of consistency registered in party behaviour in pre-election campaigning and post-election negotiation give rise to several questions. It casts doubt on the validity of consistency vs. inconsistency as a suitable concept for the analysis of party behaviour. The high scores for consistency indicate that all parties under all circumstances maintain that they are stable and coherent in their positions. This implies that either they are indeed consistent or that they pretend to be. In either case analysis could start with the assumption that parties seek to show a consistent behaviour in order to attract votes or to negotiate their way into governmental office.

Before accepting such a generalisation, we will explore possible alternative explanations of the role that a consistent style of behaviour plays in party campaigning and negotiation. The qualitative analysis of consistency shows that differentiation in the meaning assigned to consistency is contingent upon the minority or majority character of the parties as social groups. Therefore, the outsider party organises its consistent style of behaviour in a different way than an incumbent or a challenger does. In contrast, the element of office incumbency, which distinguishes an incumbent from a challenger party, is not a valid predictor of the framing pattern related to consistency. Specific campaigning and negotiation circumstances or intraparty factors seem to affect the meaning vested in the consistent style of behaviour of the incumbent and challenger parties.

In conclusion, on the one hand, consistency as such seems to be adopted always and generally by parties in their campaigning

behaviour. Therefore, it is not a distinctive element that characterises the behaviour of different types of parties. On the other hand, external factors may influence the character given to consistency. Parties adopt their styles of behaviour under changing conditions. Thus, the campaigning style of the party and consequently, its consistency, are subject to changes according to the needs of the party under different circumstances.

The conditions in which situational factors prevail over the power position of the party should be investigated in future research. Outsider parties seem to follow a specific pattern of global consistency which stresses a specific representation of the party. In contrast, challenger and incumbent parties tend to respond promptly to external conditions and do not seem to adopt a specific framing strategy in relation to their consistent style of behaviour. These conclusions require further investigation in order to be confirmed.

7.2.4 Findings concerning rigidity and flexibility as styles of behaviour of different types of parties.

Parties generally demonstrate the consistency and firmness of their positions. However, consistent parties may also adopt a flexible or rigid style of behaviour when they negotiate their positions. Official negotiation takes place when an inter-party agreement needs to be reached and, in particular, if an electoral or governmental coalition needs to be formed. A party may also use a rigid or flexible style of behaviour as a strategy to reach the electorate.

It is hypothesised that parties adopt either a flexible or rigid style of behaviour depending upon their power position. The results obtained with respect to this hypothesis are presented in the following table. The rigidity ($n > 0$) or flexibility ($n < 0$) scores of each party in each of the periods analysed are represented in table 2 (see *infra*).

The findings with respect to the more or less flexible behaviour of each type of party in the first period support the relevant hypotheses. The incumbent and the outsider party register a relatively high score for rigidity; the challenger party

demonstrates a flexible style of behaviour.

	Rigidity/Flexibility		
	Periods of analysis		
	1st	2nd	3rd
Incumbent	0.47	0.76	0.77
Challenger	-0.54	0	-0.10
Outsider	0.73	0.04	0.03

Note: Rigidity/Flexibility score= n , $max_n = 2$, $min_n = -2$.

The polarising effect foreseen with respect to the second period is confirmed by the rigidity scores of the incumbent and challenger party. The incumbent further accentuates its rigid style of behaviour while the challenger reduces its flexibility to the level of absolute neutrality. The relevant data (see appendix II) on the rigid and flexible styles of behaviour adopted by the challenger party demonstrate that the neutral score does not mean neutrality in negotiation. Rather it indicates that instances of extreme rigidity and extreme flexibility in the challenger's behaviour counterbalance one another.

The change in the rigidity and flexibility scores of the incumbent and challenger party may also be related to the specific parties that occupy the relevant positions in each period. The Socialist party (incumbent in the first period) displayed a rigid style of behaviour in the first period. However, it became more flexible in the second period once it became a challenger. This finding confirms the hypothesis that a challenger party tends to adopt a flexible style of behaviour. This hypothesis is confirmed also by the finding regarding the Conservative party. The N.D. adopted a rather flexible style of behaviour in the first period during which it was the challenger; it adopted a more rigid attitude in the second period in which it became incumbent.

According to the hypothesis, there is also a polarising effect in the second period caused by the fact that a party adopts strategic decisions that are or are not consistent with its power position. Thus, as predicted, the incumbent party accentuated its rigidity in the second period. As a matter of fact, it adopted a style of behaviour more rigid than that of the incumbent party in the first period (see table 2). The challenger party, on the other hand, adopted a neutral style of behaviour (n=0). The Socialist party, which occupied the challenger position in the second period adopted a less rigid style of behaviour than it did in the first period when it was the incumbent party. Moreover, its behaviour was more rigid than that of the challenger party in the first period since its decision to remain in the opposition was consistent with its challenger character.


As hypothesised, the incumbent party maintained a high rigidity score during the third period of the analysis (see table 2). The challenger, as predicted, displayed slightly flexible behaviour. The data reveal that this marginal flexibility is related to a variability in the negotiation style of the challenger party. The party seems to oscillate between very rigid, rigid, flexible and very flexible styles of behaviour (see chart 1, *infra*).

As hypothesised, the outsider party adopted a milder form of behaviour during the second period than it did in the first. It registered a slightly positive rigidity score. Not surprisingly, the same score was maintained during the third period of the analysis (see table 2). The hypothesis that the outsider party modified its intransigent and conflictual character after the first period is thus supported: the outsider party displayed responsive behaviour in these periods. It stressed its open-mindedness and its flexible attitude. According to the hypothesis, the outsider party made a shift towards flexibility in order to justify its participation in the coalition government. However, the argument requires further analysis of the framing packages in which the rigid or flexible styles of behaviour of the outsider party are embodied.

Chart 1

Graphic representation of the distribution of instances of rigidity and

flexibility in the behaviour adopted by the challenger party in each of the periods studied




Note: The chart is based on the data quoted in appendix II.

The analysis of the rigid or flexible style of behaviour is not limited to computation of the relevant scores. These simply represent the general tendency of the party behaviour. They do not, however, express the variation and the different meanings assigned to flexible and rigid styles of behaviour by each party.

Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of the framing packages related to the rigid ($s_2 > 0$) and flexible ($s_2 < 0$) styles of behaviour adopted by the incumbent party.

Figure 6.1

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages related to rigidity/flexibility as a style of behaviour adopted by the incumbent party



Note: The symbol 's2' represents the score for rigidity/flexibility as a style of behaviour assigned to a party during a period of analysis. 's2' has values ranging from 1 to 5. These values are grouped into three groups: rigid, neutral and flexible. A rigid style of behaviour is related to a positive score on the

rigidity/flexibility variable ($s_2 > 0$). A neutral style of behaviour in terms of rigidity/flexibility is expressed as $s_2 = 0$. A flexible style of behaviour is related to a negative score on the rigidity/flexibility variable ($s_2 < 0$). Values of $s_2 = 0$ have been omitted from this and the following graphs because of their low frequency of occurrence (see appendix II). The symbols '1st p', '2nd p' and '3rd p' refer to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd period respectively

The 'framing' of rigidity and flexibility by the incumbent party appears diversified within each period and discontinuous in its evolution over time. There seems to be no clear pattern of framing packages that organise rigidity and flexibility as styles of behaviour and negotiation of the incumbent party. The incumbent party follows an increasingly rigid style of behaviour along the three periods (see table 2, *supra*) but the meaning of flexibility and rigidity as styles of behaviour of the incumbent party is (re)constructed within each period separately.

During the first period, the incumbent party stresses its intransigence in terms of political attitudes and practices (see figure 6.1, the 'citizen attitudes towards political participation' frame). The party accentuates its uncompromising attitude with respect to political principles. The focus is on participation in politics (F22) and on peaceful campaigning (F18) based on political argumentation (F19). Ideological intransigence, however, is not a leading frame. The rigidity of the incumbent party is related to its determination to win power. Furthermore, the party embodies its rigidity in a representation of prosperity and development. The 'power/success vs. failure/past' (F6, F8 and F9) and the 'national prosperity vs. chaos/conflict within the nation' (F10 and F11) framing packages emphasise its high power position and its resolution to maintain its governmental office.

Finally, the 'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package appears relevant to a rigid style of behaviour of the incumbent party in all three periods (see figure 6.1). The topical and controversial character of this framing package calls for particular caution in its interpretation. In the context of an intransigent style of behaviour, the 'catharsis vs. corruption' frame emphasises the determination of the incumbent party to deal with the problem when it enters office. It thus emphasises further the power character of the party.

The combined occurrence of the 'psychological features/personality traits' and of the 'political values and ideology' (F4, F12, F21 and F25) packages in relation to both flexibility and rigidity of the incumbent party in the first period suggests that they do not represent the core of either a rigid or a flexible style of behaviour. They are adaptable to the style of behaviour instead of imposing a specific meaning on it. This is indeed revealing of the nature of rigidity and flexibility as a style of behaviour. Neither of them refers to the beliefs of the party as such. These may be moderate or extreme, progressive or conservative. Rigidity and flexibility concern the representation and interpretation of these beliefs.

The 'power/future vs. failure/past' framing package covers more than fifty per cent of the overall occurrences of a rigid style of behaviour of the incumbent party in the second period. This indicates that the power character of the party is highly emphasised. The intransigence in its negotiation is associated with its high electoral percentage and governmental authority. This in fact confirms the hypothesis that an incumbent party emphasises its rigid style of behaviour in order to make salient its governmental authority.

The flexible style of behaviour of the incumbent party in the same period is, on the other hand, dominated by the 'self vs. others' framing package. The party stresses that it is impartial in its behaviour towards citizens (F16) and that it gives absolute priority to the common good even if it stands in contrast to the party interest (F17). The flexibility of the incumbent party is, thus, presented as objectivity. The flexible style of behaviour is further framed in terms of 'national development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation'. Thus the flexibility of the incumbent party is also related to its patriotism and reconciliatory attitudes (F11) and to its struggle for national development (F10).

The rigid style of behaviour of the incumbent party is embodied in references to power. It 'frames' rigidity with dichotomies such as success-failure, winners-losers or power-lack of power. The substance of its incumbency, however, i.e. its policies, is linked to a flexible style of behaviour. Thus, it appears that the incumbent party uses a double communication strategy to pass its message through. The party members may be

touched by the image of the strong, powerful, winning party. The non-partisan voters, on the other hand, may be reached by references to the prosperous future that lies ahead if the party gains office. This future is a common, national future independent of party affiliations ('self vs. others' framing package, see figure 6.1).


Rigidity and flexibility as styles of behaviour adopted by the incumbent party, appear interrelated in the third period (see figure 6.1). Their framing is identical with the exception of the 'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package that appears only in relation to rigidity. The party however demonstrates a high rigidity score (see table 2) which indicates that it uses flexibility with a much lower frequency than it applies rigidity during that period.

The distribution of framing packages with respect to rigidity and flexibility in the third period indicates a homogenisation of the behaviour of the incumbent party. In contrast to the findings concerning the first and the second period, the party assigns a similar meaning to both styles of behaviour in the third period. This may be related to the formation of the national unity government during the same period. The cooperation of three parties with contradictory ideas and policies provoked a certain symbolic and ideological confusion from the parties themselves and from the party supporters. Party leaders who had bitterly fought each other until a few weeks earlier, sat at regular meetings and made decisions together. Thus, the distinctive meaning of rigidity and flexibility loses its reference points. The association of rigidity or flexibility with symbolic references to power, to the future of the nation or to ideology may thus make no difference. It seems that the different styles of behaviour are reduced to different linguistic expressions of the same content. 'Catharsis vs. corruption' remains, however, the only framing package which differentiates the incumbent party's rigid style of behaviour from its flexible style during the third period. This finding may, however, be attributed to the particularly topical character of this package.

Figure 6.2 represents the distribution of the framing packages with reference to the rigidity or flexibility demonstrated by the challenger party in the three periods analysed.

Figure 6.2

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages related to rigidity/flexibility as a style of behaviour of the challenger party



The 'political values and ideology' framing package appears to dominate in instances of both flexible and rigid behaviour (see figure 6.2). This frame covers between approximately twenty and fifty per cent of the rigidity or flexibility occurrences during each period. This reveals an internal contradiction in party behaviour. It seems that a party expresses its intransigence in relation to its ideology and to given political principles. Nonetheless, at the same time, the party demonstrates its flexibility with respect to the same subjects. It is argued that this contradiction reflects the ambivalent position of the challenger party. The party accentuates its distinctiveness and differentiates itself from the incumbent by means of firm and rigid ideological and policy orientation. However, the challenger party seeks also to create the image of a large and secure governing party. Consequently, it needs to display responsive open-minded behaviour with respect to ideological and political conflicts.

The rigid and flexible instances of behaviour of the challenger party in the first period present no significant peculiarities. The party adopts moderately flexible behaviour (see table 2 *supra*) although instances of rigidity are not totally

absent. Its rigidity is related to the 'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package which is highly topical in that period.

The flexibility of the challenger party in the same period is related to various framing packages. The 'psychological features' and the 'political values' framing packages seem, however, to predominate in the discourse. The party builds its flexible style on the basis of its realistic (F7) and trustworthy (F14) character and of its clear and balanced (F15) behaviour. It also stresses its flexibility in terms of policy and ideology. The 'catharsis vs. corruption' frame is the main element that differentiates between the flexible and the rigid style of behaviour of the challenger party in the first period (see figure 6.2). The rigid style of behaviour adopted by the challenger party concentrates on topical issues, namely the salience of the governmental scandals during that period.

The challenger party registers a neutral score for rigidity/flexibility in the second and third periods (see table 2 *supra*). As noted earlier, the data point to the existence of a high level of variance in the rigid and flexible styles of behaviour. The behaviour varies from extreme rigidity to extreme flexibility and eventually counterbalance each other (see chart 1, *supra*). These contradictory styles of behaviour are based on different framing packages. With the exception of the 'political values and ideology' frame which is related in a regular manner to both rigid and flexible behaviour during the second and third period (see figure 6.2), the distribution of framing packages changes dramatically from rigidity to flexibility.

The rigid style of behaviour of the challenger party is related to its representation as the powerful party (F6), the winner of the election (F8) and the future government of the country (F9) and also to its ideology ('political values and ideology' framing package). On the contrary, flexibility is assigned a variety of meanings. The challenger party shows a flexible attitude in relation to 'human condition' questions, to the problem of 'catharsis vs. corruption' and to the issue of 'national development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation.' It adopts a flexible style of behaviour on 'political values and ideology' matters as well as on questions related to political participation ('citizen attitudes towards participation in

politics'). The flexibility of the challenger party is also related to its impartial attitude (F16) and to its respect for the common interest (F17) ('self vs. others' framing package). In conclusion, the challenger party 'frames' its flexibility in a variety of packages while it concentrates its rigidity on political values or ideas and on electoral success or governmental power.

The relationship between these two framing packages, namely 'political values and ideology' and 'power/future vs. failure/past' and the challenger's rigid style of behaviour seems, however, to be contingent upon situational factors or, more specifically, to general events that take place during the second period. The formation of the governmental coalition by the incumbent and outsider party and their joint opposition against the challenger made the latter accentuate its distinctiveness in terms of ideology. The ideological rigidity of the challenger party was opposed to the mixing of right and left-wing ideas and policies in government. On the other hand, the fact that this party was the only party of significant size remaining in the opposition lead to its focusing its rigidity on symbolic references to power and success.

It may be argued that the change in the framing packages associated with the challenger party's flexibility or rigidity between the first and the second period is related to the fact that different parties occupy the challenger position in each of these periods (N.D. holds a challenger position in the first period while in the second period the Socialists become the challenger party). However, this explanation seems inadequate. On the one hand, the distribution of the framing packages related to the rigidity or flexibility of the challenger party in the third period is dissimilar to that of the second period (see figure 6.2). Neither is the distribution of framing packages linked to rigidity or flexibility of the incumbent party in the third period similar to that of the second period (see figure 6.1). Therefore, the framing of rigidity or flexibility cannot be related to the specific party, namely the Socialists or the Conservatives, which occupies the relevant position during the second and third period.

During the third period, the two styles of behaviour share a set of common references to 'national development vs.

chaos/conflict within the nation' and to political values and ideology'. However, the 'political values and ideology' frame accounts for more than fifty per cent of the instances of rigid styles of behaviour. The coverage of the same frame with respect to flexibility is in contrast limited (see figure 6.2). This shows that the challenger party, in spite of its participation in the national unity government, framed its rigidity prevalently in terms of ideas and policy positions. It thus sought to maintain its distinctive position as an alternative to the incumbent party.

Indeed, the party's flexible style of behaviour is embedded in the 'psychological features and personality traits' framing package. The party represents its comprehensive and open-minded attitude as having its roots in a stable, responsible (F14) and calm, moderate (F15) character and in a realistic attitude (F7). The rigidity of the challenger party is also related to the 'power/future vs. failure/past' framing package and to the 'catharsis vs. corruption' and 'human condition' frames. Rigidity is, therefore, framed prevalently in terms of political problems or questions while flexibility draws upon non-political elements, namely supposed psychological features of the party leadership or of the party members.

Not surprisingly, the frame which refers to 'national development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation' plays a neutral role regarding the rigid or flexible behaviour of the challenger party. The pivotal position of the frame is in conformity with the fact that it is explicitly related to the so-called 'mission' of the national unity government, namely to relieve the country from its economic and political crisis. Consequently, the 'national development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation' framing package, although it is particularly salient during the third period, is not typical of the behaviour of one party in contrast to the behaviour of its coalition partners.

In conclusion, the framing of rigid or flexible styles of behaviour of the challenger party does not follow a party-specific pattern. The challenger party seems to have followed situational factors in the organisation of its rigid or flexible style of behaviour. It accentuated its intransigence on the question of 'catharsis' during the first period when the subject was highly topical. When the party was confronted with the governmental

coalition of the incumbent and the outsider, it stressed its ideological intransigence and framed its rigidity in terms of electoral success and governmental power. Finally, in the third period, during which time co-operative action was counteracted by divergent beliefs, the challenger party stressed its rigidity in political values and ideas while at the same time supporting its flexible style of behaviour with a psychological background.


The fact that the responsiveness of the challenger party to situational factors conditioned its rigid or flexible styles of behaviour may be explained by reference to its high but insecure power position. The party had a large percentage of the vote but did not possess governmental office. Consequently, it sought to exploit conjectural factors in order to cover the small but critical distance that separated it from office incumbency.

In contrast to the incumbent and the challenger parties, the rigid and flexible behaviour of the outsider party is embedded in a relatively uniform pattern of framing packages (see figure 6.3).

In spite of the relevant changes in the rigidity/flexibility score of the outsider party, a common set of five framing packages organises its flexible and rigid styles of behaviour in all three periods. The 'power/future vs. failure/past', the 'political values and ideology', the 'psychological features and personality traits' and the 'citizen attitudes towards political participation' framing packages are related to instances of both flexible and intransigent behaviour of the outsider party (see figure 6.3, *infra*).

Figure 6.3

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages related to rigidity/flexibility as a style of behaviour of the outsider party



A specific framing pattern underlies the rigidity or flexibility of the outsider party in all periods irrespective of the eventual prevalence of a flexible or rigid style of behaviour. The outsider party uses multiple framing packages with respect to both styles of behaviour. Framing packages that are based on concrete problems such as 'catharsis vs. corruption' are related to both flexible and rigid styles of behaviour. The 'psychological features' and 'political values and ideology' framing packages are also applied to both styles of behaviour in a constant and regular manner.

The set of framing packages related to rigidity and flexibility demonstrates a coherent organisation of outsider party behaviour. The variation in rigidity or flexibility may be regarded as a global strategy of negotiation which is expressed by a stable set of framing packages used in the party discourse. Consequently, it is assumed that the rigidity or flexibility scores of the party reflect actual overall shifts in the party style of behaviour.

Nonetheless, some irregularities in this uniform pattern of frames highlight the meaning behind the outsider's shift towards less rigid behaviour in the second and third periods. Consistent with the hypothesis that the outsider seeks to organise the meaning of its actions on the basis of its flexibility and sensitiveness to

the common interest, two framing packages which are underrepresented in the first period acquire importance during the second one, namely the 'national development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation' and the 'self vs. others' framing packages (see figure 6.3, second period). These frames are equally related to rigid and flexible styles of behaviour. This shows that the party stresses the importance of its decision in terms of progress and prosperity of the country (F10) and national reconciliation (F11). The outsider party accentuates its impartial attitudes (F16) and its attachment to the common national interest instead of its party-specific temporary gains in votes (F17) in instances of both rigid and flexible behaviour. 'Political values and ideology' and power and electoral success considerations ('power/future vs. failure/past framing package) are relatively under-emphasised (see figure 6.3, 2nd period). On the other hand, psychological qualities such as consistency and reliability (F14), sangfroid, calm (F15) and realism (F7) are stressed with particular reference to flexibility.

Instances of rigidity and flexibility of the outsider party are counterbalanced and, therefore, also produce a neutral rigidity/flexibility score in the third period. The linking of the 'self vs. others' framing package to the flexible behaviour seems to confirm the hypothesis that the outsider party mediates the interpretation of its actions through its non-rigid¹⁸ behaviour. The party embodies its flexibility in the framing package of impartiality and objectivity (F16). It also relates flexible behaviour to altruist views of the world, namely to the normative prevalence of the collective over the private good (F17).

In the same period, the outsider party appears to emphasise more the relationship between its views of 'citizen attitudes towards participation in politics' and its rigidity more than it emphasises its flexibility (see figure 6.3). This indicates that the rigidity of the outsider party is meant to be peaceful and calm (F18) and based on political argument instead of party 'fiestas' and "shouting crowds" (F19). Furthermore, its rigidity is embodied in a representation of courageous and active involvement in politics and in an effort to resolve problems (F22). The use of these framing packages is consistent with the hypothesis that the outsider party adopts a less rigid style of behaviour in order to avoid the interpretation of its actions as ideologically

inconsistent and power-driven.

7.2.5 Conclusions

The findings concerning rigidity and flexibility as styles of party behaviour support the relevant hypotheses. Indeed, during the first period, parties with extreme power positions, namely incumbent and outsider parties adopt a rigid style of behaviour while parties with an intermediate power character, i.e. challenger parties, show a more flexible style of behaviour. Conform with our second hypothesis, during the second and third period, parties which act in a manner consistent with their power position (i.e. an incumbent party that is in government or a challenger or outsider party that remain in the opposition) support their decisions by a more rigid/less flexible style of behaviour. Conversely, parties which take strategic decisions incongruent with their power position (e.g. an outsider party that participates in coalition government) mediate their behaviour by means of more flexible/less rigid styles of behaviour.

Moreover, there seems to be a qualitative difference between the ways in which different types of parties relate their rigid or flexible behaviour to specific framing packages. First, both rigid and flexible styles of behaviour of the incumbent party are related to its ideology and policies and also to psychological characteristics. On the other hand, the incumbent party focuses its rigid behaviour on general political norms, regarding political participation for instance, and on symbolic elements like power, success or future which contrast with its flexible style embodied in claims of objectivity, altruist attitude and the common national good. This selective emphasis has not been detected in the challenger party behaviour. The behaviour of this party seems to be influenced by changes in situational factors. The modification of the political situation is reflected in the framing of the rigid or flexible behaviour of the challenger party. This indicates a high degree of adaptability to changes in external conditions.

The main characteristics that organise rigidity and flexibility as styles of behaviour of the incumbent and challenger party confirm the power position of each of them. The dominant

position of the incumbent party is in conformity with the selective framing of its rigidity and flexibility. The party frames its rigidity in terms of power and/or political principles. On the other hand, its rare displays of a flexible behaviour are embedded in a representation of the just governing party which looks after the national good. References to ~~ideology, policy or psychological~~ features play a pivotal role in relation to the incumbent party's rigidity and flexibility.

The challenger party congruent with its large symbolic but limited practical power, seems to adapt its behaviour to the changing circumstances. On the one hand, the challenger party most often relates both rigid and flexible styles of behaviour to its ideology and policy positions. On the other hand, the framing of its rigidity seems to be conditioned by situational factors in all periods. In the first period, it relates its uncompromising attitude to the governmental corruption which is a topical subject in that period. During the second period, it emphasises its ideological intransigence and links its rigidity with references to power and success. Finally, in the third period, the challenger party stresses its ideological intransigence and thus its distinctiveness despite its participation in the national unity government.

Overall the framing of rigid and flexible styles of behaviour seems to be conditioned by the power position of each party, namely its incumbent or challenger position. No party-specific pattern of rigidity or flexibility is detected in our data. Furthermore, the 'political values and ideology' framing packages which refer to the ideological and political orientation of each party and, therefore, might be linked to the specific party identity, are used by the Conservative and Socialist parties in different ways when the parties occupy different power positions.

The outsider party frames its rigidity and flexibility in a way consistent with the theoretical assumptions about its power character and in line with the relevant predictions regarding its rigid or flexible style of behaviour. The organisation of its rigidity and flexibility follows a different pattern than that of the other two parties just as the power character of the outsider party is qualitatively different than that of the incumbent or challenger party. Their qualitative difference lies in the fact

that the outsider party is not only small but also deviates from the established norms. Its rigidity is related to various social representations. It is not mainly or solely expressed through ideology, political values or the problem of catharsis. It is related to different pragmatic and symbolic aspects of politics.

The outsider party has been hypothesised to mediate its decision to participate in a coalition government through its shift towards a less rigid style of behaviour during the second and third periods of the analysis. Indeed, this hypothesis is confirmed by relevant changes in the framing packages linked with the outsider party behaviour in these periods. The relative increase in the use of the 'self vs. others' and 'citizen attitudes towards political participation' framing packages emphasises the altruist orientation of the party which claims to look after the common good. On the other hand, the decreasing significance of the 'political values and ideology' and of the 'catharsis vs. corruption' frames indicates a moderation of the conflictual behaviour of the outsider party. The use of these framing packages confirms that the outsider party moderates its rigidity in order to negotiate its actual behaviour.

A P P E N D I X I

Index of clusters of framing packages

1. 'Human condition'

F1 Health - Illness : e.g. ill, old, unable, weak

F2 Sexuality (positive or negative connotation): private life, sexism, abnormal couple, political anomaly, sharing one's life, caring

F24 Reference to animals positive - negative (metaphors using animals to accentuate personality traits and specific behaviours)

2. 'Catharsis vs. corruption'

F3 Catharsis - corruption (as state of affairs in society): e.g. need for catharsis, purification of the polity, transparency in public actions - contrasted to- embezzling money, theft, illegal practices, falsification of the elections

F13 Morality, honesty - Immorality, dishonesty: honest, sincere -, immoral, liar, hypocritical attitude

3. 'Power/future vs. failure/past'

F6 Governmental power - Lack of power and office: speaking as if one were already elected, programmatic discourse before one enters office - confessing inability to influence decision making, distancing from the power positions

F8 Success - Failure, Winners - Losers

F9 Future - Past

4. 'National development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation'

F10 Development, prosperity - Crisis, calamity: development, progress, prosperity - crisis, underdevelopment, decline, economic or political or governmental chaos

F11 Patriotic, national reconciliation - anti-patriotic, national discord: national pride, defence of the national interest and independence - reference to past political events, deserter, unfaithful, traitor

5. 'Real Left vs. pseudo Right'

F5 Real Left - Pseudo Right: honest consistent Left, historical credits (past class struggles) -contrasted to- dogmatic Left, supporting the return of conservatism

6. 'Political values and ideology'

F4 Social justice, leftness - Frugality, exploitation, capitalism: social justice, equity - capitalist exploitation, pseudo-socialists

F12 Democratic - Authoritarian: individual freedom, democratisation of the State, democratic practices within the party, democratic tradition - dogmatic political beliefs, authoritarian attitude and practices in government or within the party

F21 Separation of party and State mechanisms and functions - Partyism, nepotism : correct, impartial governing practices - abuse of the State apparatus, mandarins of the administration, extreme partyism

F25 Progressive - Conservative (use of the traditional political cleavage): a majority of the progressive democratic forces, progressive policies - conservatism

7. 'Dignity vs. vulgarity'

F23 Dignity - Vulgarity (as political attitude/practice)

8. 'Psychological features/personality traits'

F7 Realism - Unrealistic attitude: realistic strategy, brought Socialism to power -contrasted to- losing the historical opportunity, stuck to unrealistic ideas

F14 Stability, consistency - Instability, inconsistency (as political behaviour and/or a personality feature): trustworthy, responsible - unstable, changing opinion all the time, inconsistent, irresponsible attitude

F15 Balanced, reserved - Unbalanced, confused (as emotional state or personality feature): calm, clear, balanced - fear, disillusionment, panicking, extreme spontaneity, exaggerated enthusiasm, embarrassment, insane, unhappy

F20 Clever - Stupid, foolish (person)

9. 'Citizen attitudes towards political participation'

F18 Peaceful - Violent (behaviour or person) : peaceful demonstration, calm climate in the campaign, aggressiveness, vandalism

F19 Thinking citizens, political argumentation contrasted to public rally similar to popular "fiesta", shouting crowd

F22 Participation in the commons, courage - Absence, cowardliness: active, involved in politics, criticising, proposing, indicating ideas/policies -

absent, afraid to criticise, afraid to contradict the government/the majority

10. 'Self vs. others'

F16 Impartiality, objectivity - Revengeful attitude (as political principle or personality feature): government of and for all Greek citizens, objective judgement - revengeful, mean person or behaviour

F17 Altruism - Egoism: sacrificing personal interest for the common interest - extreme ambition, power obsession, self-centred attitude

A P P E N D I X II

Data on the frequencies of occurrence of styles of behaviour for each type of party in each period

Data on the first period of analysis

Parties:	Incumbent (PA.SO.K.)	Challenger (N.D.)	Outsider (SYN.)
Styles of behaviour			
Consistency/Inconsistency			
total	49	101	79
very consistent	47	96	77
consistent	2	5	2
neutral	0	0	0
inconsistent	0	0	0
very inconsistent	0	0	0
Rigidity/Flexibility			
total	40	35	56
very rigid	16	4	29
rigid	6	7	7
neutral	0	0	0
flexible	17	14	16
very flexible	1	10	4

Data on the second period of analysis

Parties:	Incumbent (N.D.)	Challenger (PA.SO.K.)	Outsider (SYN.)
Styles of behaviour			
Consistency/Inconsistency			
total	24	36	48
very consistent	22	34	46
consistent	1	1	1
neutral	0	0	0
inconsistent	0	0	0
very inconsistent	1	1	1
Rigidity/Flexibility			
total	17	28	50
very rigid	10	10	11
rigid	0	0	10
neutral	1	4	6
flexible	5	8	16
very flexible	5	6	7

Data on the third period of analysis

Parties:	Incumbent (N.D.)	Challenger (PA.SO.K.)	Outsider (SYN.)
Styles of behaviour			
Consistency/Inconsistency			
total	20	31	26
very consistent	19	30	26
consistent	0	0	0
neutral	0	0	0
inconsistent	0	0	0
very inconsistent	1	1	0
Rigidity/Flexibility			
total	18	19	26
very rigid	10	4	8
rigid	2	4	4
neutral	0	0	0
flexible	4	8	9
very flexible	2	3	5

N O T E S

¹ The reasons for choosing this specific case study and further particulars on the most significant events of the period studied are given in Chapters one and two.

² See also the coding scheme appended to Chapter six.

³ This assumption is made in order to clarify the purposes of this study. The author does not claim that intraparty politics are irrelevant for the analysis of party decision making and behaviour. The assumption that parties behave in a unitary manner serves only to delineate the subject of the research, i.e. the inter-party behaviour.

⁴ The newspapers "Eleftheros Tipos" and "Avriani" adopted, during that period, the typical style of the 'yellow Press.'

⁵ It is worth noting that "Epikerotita" has been the only newspaper founded by the Socialist party which showed a certain level of continuity matched with a significant circulation, namely between 7% and 8% of the national daily circulation of Athens newspapers. After the elections of June 1989 the Socialist party founded a new partisan newspaper called "Nike." The latter achieved higher circulation percentages than did "Epikerotita." However, the circulation of "Nike" after a peak period (October-November 1989) during which it accounted for between 10% and 12% of the daily circulation of Athens newspapers at a national level, dropped to approximately 5% in March 1989 (data provided by the archive of the E.I.H.E.A. (National Foundation of the Athens Daily Press) on monthly newspaper circulation). The late appearance of "Nike" and its fluctuating circulation made it unsuitable for the purposes of this research.

⁶ There are no official data available on financial aid from the Conservative party to this specific newspaper. However, there have been explicit and close political and personal links between the party organisation and the newspaper management in the period under examination.

⁷ The largest Greek newspapers which have a national circulation make up part of the afternoon edition. The morning edition includes four or five daily newspapers which account for approximately 7.5% of the total (morning and afternoon) daily circulation of Athens newspapers.

⁸ See also Chapter five.

⁹ See variable "Type" under the headline "Article" in the coding scheme appended to chapter 6.

¹⁰ The following table includes the number of paragraphs in which a specific party has been coded as the source of the message and those in which it also applied a style of behaviour or a strategy of influence and resistance.

	Number of paragraphs in which the party is the source of the message	is the source of the message and applies a style of behaviour or strategy
1st period		
PA.SO.K.	340	282
N.D.	519	411
SYN.	460	300
2nd period		
PA.SO.K.	251	209

N.D.	283	203
SYN.	221	201
3rd period		
PA.SO.K.	199	138
N.D.	244	184
SYN.	135	108

These data are represented schematically in figures 4a, 4b and 4c.

¹¹ The decision to specify a coding category of "issues" aimed mainly at acquiring some concrete knowledge about the thematic structure of the newspaper discourse. The category of "issues" has not however been used in the analysis of party behaviour and inter-party relations.

¹² The symbols "F.." refer to the number assigned to the specific package in the index of framing packages found in the appendix.

¹³ With reference to the use of the 'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package, the following remark should be made. The problem of corruption in the public administration dominated the political debate in Greece during the period 1989-1990. Therefore, the relevant framing package reflects the topicality of the issue. Furthermore, the whole question about public fraud was addressed against the departing Socialist party government. Therefore, the 'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package is most likely to be taken up by the N.D and by the Alliance of the Left, irrespective of their power character.

¹⁴ The terms 'frame', 'framing package' or 'interpretive package' are used interchangeably.

¹⁵ The term "marginal" here refers to the low frequency of use of these framing packages. It does not imply that the content of these framing packages is extremist or deviant.

¹⁶ See Chapter two for further details.

¹⁷ The ways in which the Socialist party (PA.SO.K.) seeks to differentiate itself from the Alliance of the Left (SYN.) are investigated in the following chapter (Chapter eight).

¹⁸ The behaviour of the outsider party cannot be characterised as flexible since its rigidity/flexibility score in the second and third period is very close to zero (see table 2). However, it is not rigid either. Given the conflictual character of the party, its style of behaviour in terms of rigidity/flexibility may be characterised as 'non-rigid.'

CHAPTER VIII:

Analysing the dynamics of inter-party behaviour: Strategies of influence applied between parties with different power positions and with common or opposed super-ordinate identities

8.1 Introduction

The second set of hypotheses investigates the interaction between rival parties. This interaction takes the form of strategies of influence and resistance pursued by each party toward its rivals. Three of these strategies, namely categorisation, psychologisation and denial, are based on socio-psychological concepts that have been developed by experimental studies¹. This study examines the function of these strategies in a real-life context: the campaigning and negotiation of political parties. The extent to which the strategies are applicable in non-experimental settings and additional factors which may interfere with their application in politics are investigated. The fourth strategy, i.e. affirmation, is a new concept which it is hoped to integrate into the socio-psychological analysis of party behaviour. The findings concerning this strategy offer a first insight to the role played by affirmation in party communication and interaction.

It is hypothesised that the application of the four strategies is affected by the power position of each party and by the links existing between the competing parties. The power position is important in relative terms, namely to the extent that one party has a stronger or weaker power position than the opponent against whom it addresses a strategy. The common or opposed super-ordinate political or instrumental identity is the second independent variable which affects the application of the strategies within each pair of interacting parties.

The results regarding the use of each strategy by two interacting parties are expressed in percentage that each strategy occupies within the total instances of communication addressed by a given party against an opponent. Thus, the findings refer to the preference of a party to use one specific strategy out of the total

number of strategies available.

8.2 Categorisation: quantitative and qualitative effects

The findings regarding the use of categorisation strategy between pairs of parties are presented in the following table (table 1):

	Incumbent Challenger	Incumbent Outsider	Challenger Outsider
hypothesis I	n.a.	confirmed	confirmed with respect to challenger unconfirmed with respect to outsider
hypothesis II			
a.	confirmed	confirmed	n.a.
b.	n.a.	confirmed	n.a.
c.	n.a.	n.a.	partially confirmed
hypothesis III	partially confirmed	unconfirmed	unconfirmed

NOTES:

hypothesis I: Parties that share a common super-ordinate political identity will categorise more vis-à-vis one another than parties with opposed super-ordinate identities

hypothesis II: a. Parties that share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity will relate categorisation to dimensions relevant to political values and/or policy questions concerning their interdependent goals
b. Parties that share a common political super-ordinate identity will categorise against one another along general political dimensions which do not explicitly refer to their ideological affinity
c. Parties that share both a political and an instrumental super-ordinate identity will categorise along political dimensions which, however, do not refer explicitly to their ideological affinity, and will also categorise with reference to policy questions concerning their interdependent goals

hypothesis III: Parties with a high power position will direct categorisation towards parties with a lower power position more frequently than the latter are likely to do against the former.

n.a. = non applicable


8.2.1 The effect of the party power position on the use of categorisation by the parties

The findings suggest that the power relations between the interacting parties, namely the higher or lower power character of each party, is not a consistent predictor of categorisation strategy use. Our hypothesis that a party which enjoys a high power position uses the strategy of categorisation against a party with a weaker power position more often than the latter does against the former is supported only to a very limited extent.

In the second and third period, the results regarding the use of categorisation as a strategy between the incumbent and the challenger party confirm the hypothesis that the incumbent party categorises against its lower status rival, the challenger party in this case, more than the latter does against the former (see figures 8.1 and 8.2). In contrast the results regarding the first period show a converse tendency, namely the challenger party applies categorisation against the incumbent party more often than the latter does against the former. During the first period, practically every second statement of the challenger party in its partisan newspapers consists of an attempt to emphasise the negative socio-political features of the opponent incumbent party. Indeed, categorisation between the incumbent and the challenger party seems to follow a party-specific pattern. The Conservative party (N.D.), which had a challenger power character in the first period but occupied the incumbent position in the second and third period, uses categorisation against the Socialists (PA.SO.K.) more often than the latter do against the former (see figures 8.1 and 8.2).

Figure 8.1


Graphic representation of the distribution of socio-psychological strategies used by the incumbent against the challenger party



Note: the graph represents schematically the percentage covered by each strategy with respect to the overall communication addressed by the incumbent party to the challenger party in each period under analysis. The relevant data on which the graph are based are appended to the end of this chapter.

Figure 8.2

Graphic representation of the distribution of the strategies addressed by the challenger against the incumbent party



Note: the graph represents the percentage accounted for by each strategy with respect to the overall communication addressed by the challenger party towards the incumbent party in each period under analysis. The relevant data on which the graph are based are given in the appendix.

The inconsistency of the results for the first period with respect to the hypothesis may be explained to an extent by a qualitative analysis of the categorising statements of the challenger party. As figure 8.7.2 (see *infra*) shows, the main dimension on which the challenger party categorises against the incumbent party in the first period is that of 'catharsis vs.

corruption.' Discrimination against the incumbent party is based on the framing packages of morality and honesty as political values (F13)² and on their application in government and in society in general (F3). These packages are used in more than half the instances of categorisation coded (see figure 8.7.2). During the second and third periods, in contrast, the challenger party totally ignores the 'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package while it stresses the 'political values and ideology', the 'self vs. others' and the 'citizen attitudes towards political participation' framing packages (see figure 8.7.2, *infra*).

This change in the framing of categorisation may seem to be related to the fact that the challenger position is assigned to the Conservative party (N.D.) during the first period while during the second and third period the challenger position is occupied by the Socialist party (PA.SO.K.): the analysis of the categorisation strategy addressed by the incumbent against the challenger party rules out this explanation. The framing packages used by the PA.SO.K. during the first period differ from the framing packages which the same party uses to categorise the other party during the second and third periods (see figure 8.7.1). The 'catharsis vs. corruption' frame prevails in the first period while in the second and third periods it is neglected. References to the 'political values and ideology' and the 'citizen attitudes towards political participation' packages, on the other hand, are limited in the first period; during the second and third periods they are used to a greater extent. Moreover, the 'self vs. others' framing package, hardly ever used in the first period, becomes salient in the other two periods. Consequently no party-specific set of framing packages is retained throughout the different periods independently from changes in the power position of the party.

Figure 8.7.1

Distribution of framing packages when the strategy of categorisation is used by the incumbent against the challenger party





Figure 8.7.2

Distribution of framing packages when the strategy of categorisation is used by the challenger against the incumbent party.



However, power and status differentials are to be seen as elements of the party interaction process. Under certain circumstances, the advantage of a party's high power position may become a disadvantage: governmental power may be linked to unfavourable social representations which cancel the relative advantage enjoyed by the incumbent. These social representations

are easily used when controversial issues are at stake. The problem of political corruption, for instance, was a salient and highly controversial issue, especially during the first period. Thus, the challenger party introduced it as a relevant political-moral dimension along which to categorise against its incumbent opponent. Therefore, it may be argued that the challenger party uses categorisation against the incumbent party in the first period more than hypothesised because the 'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package offers a suitable dimension on which to use categorisation against its opponent incumbent party.

The outsider party (see figures 8.5 and 8.6) also applied categorisation against the challenger more often than was hypothesised (see table 1, hypothesis III) in all periods.

With respect to the third period, the inconsistency of the findings with the hypothesis may be explained by the fact that the two parties share a common super-ordinate political identity. Therefore, according to the first hypothesis (see table 1, hypothesis I), the challenger and the outsider party were likely to use categorisation more often in the third period than in the other periods during which their super-ordinate identities were opposed.

However, the results obtained with respect to the first and second periods cannot be explained by this hypothesis. Let us however examine the framing packages related to categorisation by the outsider party in these periods.

Figure 8.5

Graphic representation of the distribution of the strategies addressed by the challenger against the outsider party





Figure 8.6

Graphic representation of the distribution of the strategies addressed by the outsider against the challenger party



Note: These graphs represent the percentage accounted for by each strategy with respect to the overall communication addressed by the challenger to the outsider party and vice versa in each period of analysis. The challenger and the outsider party have opposed super-ordinate political identities in the first and second period. During the third period they share a common political and functional super-ordinate identity. The data on which the graphs are based are given in the appendix to this chapter.

During the first period, the 'citizen attitudes towards political participation' was given particular attention as a relevant categorisation dimension, but its percentage of the overall coverage of the strategy decreased significantly during the subsequent periods. Thus the unexpectedly frequent use of categorisation in the first period seems related to the use of the 'citizen attitudes towards political participation' framing package, which accounts for approximately thirty per cent of the categorising discourse of the outsider party during that period (see figure 8.7.6). The active but peaceful participation of the outsider party members in campaigning and their critical attitude towards government (F19) was contrasted with the aggressiveness and fanaticism of the challenger party supporters (F18). The outsider party represented them as a "shouting crowd" (F19) afraid of exercising criticism towards the government or their own party (F22). The outsider party discriminated against the challenger party along 'alternative' categorisation dimensions: it stressed political principles with universal values such as active but critical participation in politics or peaceful campaigning.

During the second period, particular emphasis is given to the

'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package. As argued earlier, this framing package is a highly relevant categorisation dimension against the Socialist party in particular (which occupies the challenger position in the second period). Therefore, the use of categorisation by the outsider against the challenger party in the second period may be, at least to a certain extent, related to the specific categorisation dimension.

Figure 8.7.6

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of categorisation is used by an outsider against a challenger party




Figure 8.3

Graphic representation of the distribution of strategies addressed by the incumbent against the outsider party





Figure 8.4

Graphic representation of the distribution of the strategies addressed by the outsider against the incumbent party



Note: These graphs represent the percentage accounted for by each strategy with respect to the overall communication addressed by the incumbent party to the outsider party and vice versa in each period of analysis. The relevant data on which the graphs are based, are appended at the end of this chapter.

Moreover, the outsider applied categorisation against the incumbent party more frequently than had been hypothesised during the first and third period. The unexpectedly frequent use of categorisation by the outsider against the incumbent party in the first period may be attributed to their common political super-ordinate identity. The significant increase in the use of the categorisation strategy by the outsider party against the incumbent in the third period (see figure 8.3) cannot, however, be explained by the hypothesis regarding the party super-ordinate identities since the incumbent and the outsider party do not share a common super-ordinate political identity in the third period.

An explanation for the unexpected increase in the use of categorisation by the outsider party in the third period may be given by the frequent use of the "self vs. others" framing package during that period. The outsider stressed general political norms such as the prevalence of the common vs. the private interest and the impartiality of government contrasted to *revanche* politics ('self vs. others' framing packages) as an alternative dimension by which it distinguished itself from its coalition partner. It thus represented the participation of the incumbent party in the coalition government as power-obsession and egocentrism.

The emphasis placed by the outsider party on the 'citizen

attitudes towards political participation' framing package as a categorisation dimension towards the challenger party and the 'self vs. others' framing package as a relevant categorisation dimension against the incumbent party in the third period conforms with experimental findings on the alternative dimensions introduced by a group in judging its performance with respect to a given task (Sherif et al. 1961; Lemaine 1966). A group which is deprived of the necessary means to accomplish a specific task introduces alternative criteria for the evaluation of its work, e.g. aesthetic criteria or originality of the work effectuated. Similarly, the outsider party introduces the 'citizen attitudes towards political participation' or the 'self vs. others' framing package as an alternative criterion on which it rates better than its opponent challenger or incumbent party. Active involvement in politics, dedication to the common good or a reluctance to participate in *revanche* politics are issues relevant to politics but they are not contingent upon power. Thus, the outsider party uses them as a favourable categorisation dimension between itself and the challenger or the incumbent party.

Overall, the findings that differ from the hypothesis that a party which disposes of power categorises against a party with less power more often than the latter does against the former seem related to specific categorisation dimensions. An unexpected increase in the use of categorisation by a given party seems linked with specific framing packages used as relevant categorisation dimensions during a given period. Furthermore, the behaviour of the outsider party suggests that, to some extent, power inequality between rival parties can be surmounted. The disadvantaged party, namely the outsider, may confront its opponent on 'new' dimensions, favourable to itself.

However, further evidence is needed for this alternative explanation to be confirmed. Moreover, further research is necessary in order to clarify the impact of party power relations on their use of categorisation against one another.

8.2.2 Common or opposed super-ordinate identity: a frequent predictor of the use of categorisation between parties

Common super-ordinate political identity has been shown to be a frequent predictor of quantitative and qualitative changes in the use of categorisation. The increased use of categorisation expected when the competing parties share a common super-ordinate political identity is confirmed, albeit with one exception (see table 1, *supra*, hypothesis I).

The incumbent and the outsider party opt for the categorisation strategy more often when the two of them share a common super-ordinate political identity than when they share merely an instrumental one (see figures 8.3 and 8.4, *supra*). The outsider party reduces, as hypothesised, the frequency of its categorising attempts in the second period since the incumbent is no longer a rival with a common super-ordinate political identity but only shares a common instrumental super-ordinate identity with the outsider party.

The data regarding the use of categorisation between the challenger and the outsider party confirm only partially the hypothesis however. The results regarding the use of categorisation by the challenger party support the hypothesis (see figure 8.5) but the findings with regard to the outsider do not: the party uses categorisation less often in the second than in the first period although the two parties have opposed super-ordinate identities in both periods (see figure 8.6).

As noted earlier, this finding also is inconsistent with our third hypothesis (see table 1, hypothesis III), according to which the outsider party should adopt categorisation as a strategy against the challenger less often than the challenger would against the outsider. As noted earlier, a possible explanation may be given by the salience of the 'catharsis' as a categorisation dimension. During the second period, the outsider party uses the 'catharsis vs. corruption' framing packages at forty per cent of the categorisation instances while during the first period it uses the same package at twenty five per cent of the categorisation instances (see figure 8.7.6). However, the extent to which a salient and topical matter can overrule the impact of the power

position and/or of the party super-ordinate identity on the use of the categorisation strategy between rival parties is a question that needs to be further investigated.

Our predictions regarding the effect of a common or opposed super-ordinate identity of two parties on the categorisation dimensions that the parties stress (table 1, hypothesis II.a, b & c) have been to a large extent confirmed. Let us however examine each hypothesis separately.


First, parties which share a common instrumental and political super-ordinate identity, namely the outsider and the challenger party in the third period, (see table 1, hypothesis II.c), concentrate on policy questions and on general political dimensions. The distribution of framing packages (see figure 8.7.5) in the challenger party discourse in the third period is in conformity with the hypothesis (table 1, hypothesis II.c) while the framing packages used by the outsider against the challenger party in the same period support the hypothesis only partially. Although it has been hypothesised that political beliefs are not stressed explicitly as relevant categorisation dimensions between parties that share a common super-ordinate political identity, the outsider party relates categorisation attempts against the challenger to the 'political values and ideology' framing package. On the other hand, in conformity with the hypothesis the party stresses the 'real Left vs. pseudo Right' framing package and also introduces general political values (i.e. the 'self vs. others' and the 'citizen attitudes towards political participation' frames) by which it differentiates itself from the challenger party.

On the other hand, the categorisation dimensions predicted to be used only or mainly between parties that share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity on policy questions for instance ('catharsis vs. corruption' framing package) are neglected by the outsider party. The need to differentiate oneself from the challenger in ideological and political terms dominates the categorisation discourse of the outsider party in the third period. Common instrumental super-ordinate identity seems thus to be overshadowed by common political super-ordinate identity. The prevalence of the political super-ordinate identity may be related to its stable character over time as contrasted with the

provisional character of goal interdependence between the two parties which was due to particular circumstances. An interesting question to be further examined regards, therefore, the conditions under which common political super-ordinate identity between two parties becomes a dominant categorisation dimension while their instrumental interdependence is downplayed.

Figure 8.7.5

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of categorisation is used by a challenger against an outsider party



Second, the hypothesis regarding the categorisation dimensions stressed by parties that share a common functional super-ordinate identity is supported by the results (table 1, hypothesis II.a). The incumbent and the challenger party, in conformity with the hypothesis, stress political values and attitudes and general policy questions (e.g. 'catharsis vs. corruption' or 'national development' frames) in their categorisation discourse with one another during the third period (see figures 8.7.1 and 8.7.2). The findings regarding the categorisation dimensions applied between the incumbent and the outsider party during the second and third period also support this hypothesis (table 1, hypothesis II.a).

A special remark is relevant with respect to the use of categorisation between the incumbent and the outsider party in the second period. Categorisation attempts of the outsider against the incumbent party and vice versa in the second period are extremely

limited in number. As a matter of fact, categorisation is used by the outsider against the incumbent party only twice during this period. The incumbent party also only applies categorisation against the outsider in three instances. The fact that the two parties share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity seems to constrain their use of categorisation against one another. The total of items coded with respect to each pair of parties in the second period is given in table 1.1 (see *infra*).

The parties exchange fewer messages with one another than they do with the challenger party. It seems that both parties use categorisation to overemphasise their opposition to the challenger party. A supplementary hypothesis may thus be developed that parties which share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity focus their categorisation discourse on the non-collaborating parties more than on their partners. However, further research is needed to investigate this hypothesis.

TABLE 1.1					
Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirm.	Total	
Interacting parties:					
Inc. against Chall.	38	31	23	42	134
Chall. against Inc.	9	11	6	11	77
Inc. against Outs.	3	2	5	5	15
Outs. against Inc.	2	5	4	5	16
Chall. against Outs.	24	11	15	16	66
Outs. against Chall.	26	20	30	17	93

Third, parties which share a common super-ordinate political identity consistent with our hypothesis (table 1, hypothesis II.b) are relatively reluctant to emphasise ideology as a dimension along which to differentiate themselves from their rivals. More specifically, the incumbent and the outsider party during the first period differentiate from and discriminate against one another along dimensions that do not explicitly refer to their ideological affinity. As hypothesised, they introduce alternative categorisation dimensions of a political or even non-political character (in particular, 'real Left vs. pseudo-Right' and 'human

condition' frames, see figure 8.7.3 and 'catharsis vs. corruption', 'psychological features' and 'real Left vs. pseudo Right' framing packages, see figure 8.7.4).

Figure 8.7.3

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of categorisation is used by an incumbent against an outsider party.





Figure 8.7.4

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of categorisation is used by an outsider against an incumbent party



Overall, this study demonstrates that the common or opposed

super-ordinate identity that two parties may have affects the use of the categorisation strategy both in terms of frequency and with respect to the categorisation dimensions emphasised by the parties. The power character of the interacting parties, in contrast, has been proved not to be a consistent predictor of the increased or reduced use of the strategy.

8.3 The use of psychologisation by parties

Results concerning the use of psychologisation fully support the hypothesis that parties which perceive themselves as ideologically 'close' or which have interdependent goals are reluctant to psychologise against one another (see table 2, *infra*).

Table 2: P S Y C H O L O G I S A T I O N

	Incumbent Challenger	Incumbent Outsider	Challenger Outsider
hypothesis I	confirmed	confirmed	confirmed

NOTES:

hypothesis I: Psychologisation is used by sets of parties which perceive themselves as being ideologically and politically distant from one another, i.e. by parties whose super-ordinate political identities are opposed. Parties that share a common super-ordinate, instrumental or political, identity will use psychologisation against one another less frequently.

The incumbent and the challenger party, conform with the hypothesis, use psychologisation against one another less often in the third period during which they share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity, than in the previous periods (see figures 8.1 and 8.2). The incumbent and the outsider party, in accordance with the hypothesis, use psychologisation to a limited extent in all periods given that they share a common super-ordinate political identity in the first period and a common super-ordinate instrumental identity in the second and third periods.

Psychologising statements account for less than ten per cent of the communication addressed by the incumbent party to the outsider in any of the periods studied (see figure 8.3). The outsider party applies the strategy of psychologisation also to a limited extent, in the first and third periods in particular.

The second period is characterised by an increase in the use of psychologisation between the outsider and the incumbent party. The significance of this result is, however, limited, given that the total number of messages in which the incumbent and the outsider refer to one another during that period is limited (see table 1.1, *supra*).

The data regarding the use of psychologisation between the challenger and the outsider party in the third period, during which the two parties share a common political and instrumental super-ordinate identity, also support the hypothesis that parties that share a common super-ordinate identity apply this strategy to a lesser extent than parties which do not.


An exceptional instance of psychologisation is worth mentioning. The challenger party applies psychologisation against the incumbent party most frequently during the second period (see figure 8.2). Moreover, the strategy is embedded in a purely psychological framework composed of the 'psychological features', the 'self vs. others' and the 'human condition' framing packages (see figure 8.8.2). The challenger party finds itself isolated and excluded from governmental office during that period. According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979; Turner 1982), the party seeks to achieve a positive social identity, namely to cancel the negative connotation of its exclusion. Therefore, it attributes the decisions and actions of the opponent incumbent party to the personality traits of their leadership. Revengeful attitude, power obsession and dedication to the narrow party interest ('self vs. others' framing package) characterise the opponent party leadership. Consequently, it is neither possible nor desirable for the challenger party to compromise or collaborate with them. Besides, the opponent party opinion is deprived of its validity because it is attributed to psychological predispositions instead of to political argumentation and/or to factual truth.

This finding suggests that psychologisation does not only function as a strategy to discredit the beliefs and actions of the

rival party. It is also a mechanism that re-constructs social reality. Altruism and egoism, dedication to the common or private interest or power obsession acquire specific value as alternative interpretations of political behaviour. Therefore, the use of psychologisation in party interaction and competition is an interesting subject to be further investigated.

Figure 8.8.2

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of psychologisation is used by a challenger against an incumbent party



The framing packages embodied in psychologising discourse demonstrate the intertwining of psychologisation with politics. References to psychological features and emotional states are often associated with ideological and political framing packages. The beliefs of a rival party are discredited because they are attributed to the psychological features supposed to characterise whoever holds these beliefs. Thus, psychologisation is introduced as the key-element explaining incongruent beliefs.

Furthermore, the intertwining of psychologisation with a concrete political issue, governmental corruption and the relevant prosecution of members of the Cabinet for instance ('catharsis vs. corruption' framing package), indicates that implicit 'theories' of personality are often mobilised to explain the mismanagement of public affairs. The governmental scandals are explained in terms of the immoral character of the Prime Minister and his intrinsic

tendency towards illegal activities. Similarly, tackling these problems is deemed to be contingent upon honesty and sincerity as personality traits of the future head of government. The institutional setting, policy implementation and political values are, thus, factors irrelevant to dealing with public issues.

The same type of reasoning is developed with respect to the attitudes of the citizens towards politics ('citizen attitudes towards political participation' frame). Ultimately, participation in politics is a matter of courageous and dynamic personality. The functioning of the polity depends on the emotional involvement of the individuals. The role of democratic institutions such as the actual election or the parties themselves is thus neglected.

The argument here is not that emotive or psychological factors do not play a significant role in politics. Our main aim is to show the ways in which these factors are manipulated in party discourse so that rational accounts of public problems are avoided. The reduction of principles and systems of government to a number of psychological features supposedly inherent to the personality of one or other leading political figure goes further than a mere psychological insight into politics.

A significant amount of literature attributes historical events, e.g. the Nazi regime, to the personality traits of the relevant leader. According to Friedlander (1971), Adolf Hitler suffered from a psychological syndrome which led him to project his hatred for his father on Jewish people. The antisemitism of Hitler has also been attributed to traumatic psychological experiences he had suffered in the past (Binion 1982). However, the Nazi regime is not a unique example of the use of psychological factors in political history. The unsuccessful policy positions adopted by Woodrow Wilson, former President of the United States of America, have been explained in terms of a self-destroying behaviour which he supposedly adopted whenever facing an important but controversial issue (George & George 1964).³

A common element which characterises these studies is their effort to provide an explanation for the occurrence of exceptional, 'abnormal' political situations. The Nazi regime is viewed as an instance of pathology of political systems. Similarly, George and George (*ibid.*) seek to explain the irregularities of the behaviour of W. Wilson, his failure to promote the League of Nations for instance. Thus, to the extent that their irregularity is

recognised, explanation by means of individual or collective psychological features is accepted. However, this research suggests that psychological factors are mobilised in the everyday political discourse within *normal* institutional settings and under *regular* circumstances in order to construct suitable explanations for and/or solutions to public problems.

Psychologisation provides heuristic cues for the understanding of complex social or economic problems. These emphasise psychological factors to the detriment of political argumentation and thus disorient the electorate. The questions of national development, of economic growth or crisis and of corruption in public administration are related to psychologising discourse. It is thus suggested that there are explicit or implicit links between policy choices on these matters and psychological qualities of governors and the governed. In other words, psychologisation seems to propose an esoteric account of politics in which political values and beliefs and also governmental practices or political institutions have little significance.

8.4 The strategy of denial in party behaviour

The hypothesis that the strategy of denial is used more often by parties with higher power position against parties with lower power position than vice versa has been only partially supported (see table 3, *infra*).

Regarding the incumbent and challenger parties, the results support the hypothesis, namely the incumbent party uses denial against the challenger more frequently than vice versa. The difference is, however, limited (see figures 8.1 and 8.2 *supra*). The data regarding the use of denial between the incumbent and the outsider party during the first and second periods support marginally the hypothesis (see figures 8.3 and 8.4 *supra*). On the contrary, the findings with regard to the challenger and the outsider party show that the outsider uses the denial strategy against the challenger party more often than vice versa and, therefore, do not support the hypothesis.

The overall findings with respect to the strategy of denial

are presented schematically in the following table:

Table 3: D E N I A L			
	Incumbent Challenger	Incumbent Outsider	Challenger Outsider
hypothesis I	confirmed (but marginally)	confirmed marginally with respect to 1st & 2nd period unconfirmed with respect to 3rd period	unconfirmed
NOTES:			
<p>hypothesis I: The strategy of denial will be directed more often by a party with a high power position towards a party with a lower power position than vice versa.</p>			

During the third period, contrary to the hypothesis (see table 3, hypothesis I), the outsider party uses denial against both the incumbent and the challenger party more often than they do against it (see figures 8.3, 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6).

This finding may be related to the conflictual character of the outsider party which seems to lead the party to reject the validity of the beliefs of its powerful rivals. It is worth noting that the increase in the use of denial by the outsider party is registered in the third period during which all three parties participate in a wide coalition government. Thus, the preference of the outsider party for the strategy of denial may be regarded as a means of stressing its different opinions within the national unity government. The specific weight of the outsider party within the coalition is limited because of its small size and marginal position. The use of denial may enable it, despite its limited power, to resist the pressure to conform that exists within the government.

The analysis of the framing packages related to denial by the outsider party seems to be in conformity with this argument. The prevalence of the 'political values and ideology', 'catharsis vs. corruption' and 'national development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation' framing package during the third period (see figures 8.9.4 and 8.9.6) demonstrates that the outsider party uses denial against the incumbent and the challenger party as a means of ideological and political confrontation.⁴

Figure 8.9.4

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of denial is used by an outsider against an incumbent party





Figure 8.9.6

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of denial is used by an outsider against a challenger party



The argument that the outsider party used denial as a means of disrupting the consensus and resisting to conformity pressures that exist within a coalition government is consistent with the basic assumptions of active minority theory according to which a minority

group is characterised by the conflict it introduces (Moscovici 1979). This argument may lead to the alternative hypothesis that under conditions of high consensus and goal interdependence, an outsider party will use the denial strategy against a rival party even if the latter disposes of a higher power position. Clearly, further evidence is required in order to accept this alternative hypothesis.

On the other hand, the outsider party, contrary to the hypothesis (see table 3, hypothesis I), uses denial against the challenger more often than the latter does against the former in all three periods (see figures 8.5 and 8.6, *supra*). This difference may be related to the fact that the challenger party does not dispose of governmental power to impose its beliefs. Thus, the outsider party has more chances to dismiss the challenger ideas as unreasonable and contrary to factual truth than it has with respect to the incumbent party positions.

This interpretation of the results implicates a modification of the relevant hypothesis. The use of the denial strategy should be seen as conditioned by the incumbency of governmental office instead of the overall power position of the parties: a party which is in office would be expected to use denial against a party that is deprived of governmental power more often than the latter would against the former. The results regarding the use of the strategy of denial between the incumbent and the challenger parties support this hypothesis. The findings with respect to the use of denial between the incumbent and the outsider party also conform with this alternative hypothesis except for in the third period. Therefore, further research is needed in order to find evidence in support of this alternative hypothesis.

An unexpected yet interesting finding concerns the content of the denial strategy. The analysis of the framing packages related to denial by all parties suggests that statements which deny the truthfulness of the rival party beliefs are usually related to either 'subjective' or controversial issues. Psychological features and personality traits on the one hand and contested issues like economic scandals of the government, on the other hand, are embodied in the denial strategy.

Personality traits are features supposed to characterise an

individual or a group. These features are externalised and become perceivable only through behaviour. Specific instances of behaviour are meant to prove, or at least to indicate, whether an individual is psychologically balanced or not, whether s/he is reserved or impulsive, consistent or inconsistent and so on. However, the establishment of a link between behaviour and specific psychological characteristics is a matter of vague theoretical assumptions much more than a question of 'objective truth.' Thus, the framing of denial in psychological terms ('psychological features/personality traits' or 'self vs. others' framing packages) provides for impressive non-verifiable statements.

Programme positions, namely those regarding the tackling of public corruption or propaganda statements, e.g. estimations of the electoral force of each party ('power/future vs. failure/ past' frame), are of a controversial character. It is easy to reject the validity of the claims of the opponent that refer to these topics. There are no facts that can confirm or reject either assertion. The parties, thus, find fruitful ground on which to contradict one another without offering concrete arguments to support their claims.

The strategy of denial is most often and by all parties related to the 'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package⁵. The question of 'catharsis' is topical and highly controversial, thus, during the period studied the floor is open for each party to deny the validity of the positions and the truthfulness of the intentions of its rival parties on this topic.

In ~~conclusion,~~ there is a generalised preference of all parties to associate their denying statements with elements which are not verifiable at the moment of their denial because they are 'subjective.' The framing packages embodied in the strategy of denial confirm that the aim of the strategy is to cast doubt on the validity of an opinion through an authoritative statement rather than to argue against a specific position.

8.5 The use of affirmation in election campaign and post-election negotiations

The study of the use of affirmation as a strategy of influence and resistance between political parties is of an exploratory nature. False assertions about 'events' that have not happened are regarded as a specific strategy which competing parties apply against one another. The overall findings with respect to the strategy of affirmation are presented in the following table:

	Incumbent Challenger	Incumbent Outsider	Challenger Outsider
hypothesis I	confirmed partially	confirmed	confirmed
hypothesis II	confirmed partially	confirmed partially	unconfirmed

NOTES:
hypothesis I: A party that enjoys a high power position will apply affirmation against its lower status rival more often than the latter is likely to do against the former.
hypothesis II: Affirmation is more likely to take place among parties that share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity than among parties that share a common political super-ordinate identity or parties with opposed super-ordinate identities.

8.5.1 The use of affirmation by parties with different power positions

The findings regarding the use of the strategy of affirmation between the incumbent and the outsider party support fully the first hypothesis (see table 4, hypothesis I).

The incumbent party applies affirmation against the outsider more often than the latter does against the former, in particular during the first and third period. Affirmation accounts for approximately fifty per cent of the communication addressed by the incumbent towards the outsider party (see figure 8.3 *supra*) while

the outsider party uses less often affirmation against the incumbent and during the third period does not use it at all.

The results regarding the use of affirmation between the challenger and the outsider in all three periods also support the hypothesis that parties with a stronger power position tend to use affirmation against their rivals with a weaker power position (table 4, hypothesis I). The challenger party expresses and affirms false statements which tend to discredit the outsider party more often than the latter does against the former (see figures 8.5 and 8.6).

The results obtained with respect to the use of the strategy of affirmation between the incumbent and the challenger party are more complex. The first hypothesis, namely that affirmation is applied less often by a party with a low power position against a party that enjoys a higher power position than vice versa is confirmed with respect to the first period of the analysis (see figures 8.1 and 8.2); but the challenger party directs the strategy of affirmation to the incumbent with increasing frequency. Therefore, the findings regarding the use of affirmation between the incumbent and the challenger party during the second and third periods do not support the hypothesis.

The frequent use of the strategy during the third period, on the other hand, may be explained by the fact that the two parties acquire a common instrumental super-ordinate identity during that period and, therefore according to the second hypothesis (see table 4, hypothesis II) they are expected to use the strategy of affirmation more frequently than when they had opposed super-ordinate identities.

8.5.2 Affirmation and super-ordinate party identity

In conformity with the second hypothesis (see table 4, hypothesis II), the challenger uses the strategy of affirmation against the incumbent party more often in the third period, during which a common instrumental super-ordinate identity links the two parties, than in the previous periods. During the third period affirmation accounts for approximately fifty per cent of the total

communication addressed by the challenger to the incumbent party (see figure 8.2).

On the other hand, the incumbent party uses affirmation against the challenger at about the same rate (thirty per cent) during all three periods. Therefore, the second hypothesis (see table 4, hypothesis II) is partially sustained as the introduction of a common instrumental identity between parties which previously had opposite super-ordinate identities does not lead to an increased use of affirmation by the incumbent party.

The use of the strategy of affirmation between the incumbent and the outsider party supports is to a large extent inconsistent with the hypothesis that parties which share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity use affirmation more often than parties which do not. The incumbent party, contrary to what was hypothesised, uses affirmation against the outsider less often in the second period during which the two parties share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity than in the first period (see figure 8.3). Moreover, the outsider party totally neglects the strategy of affirmation during the third period despite the fact that the two parties have a common instrumental identity (see figure 8.4).

The results of the use of affirmation between the challenger and the outsider party do not support the second hypothesis either. The challenger party, contrary to the hypothesis, uses affirmation against the outsider less often in the third period, during which the parties share a common super-ordinate instrumental identity than in the previous periods (see figure 8.5). The outsider party also in disagreement with the hypothesis uses affirmation equally often during the second and third periods (see figure 8.6).

An alternative explanation for this difference from the hypothesis is that the two parties share also a common super-ordinate political identity during the third period which instigates the use of other strategies, namely categorisation or denial. These strategies account for a much larger part of the communication between the two parties than the strategy of affirmation (see figures 8.5 and 8.6).

Overall, these findings demonstrate that the common

instrumental super-ordinate identity is not a consistent predictor of an increase in the use of the affirmation strategy. Thus, the relevant hypothesis (table 4, hypothesis II) is not confirmed. However, a qualitative effect has been observed. The framing packages related to the strategy of affirmation seem to vary as a function of changes in the super-ordinate identities of the parties.


More specifically, when two parties have a common political super-ordinate identity or opposed super-ordinate identities, false statements refer to the power potential of the opponent party or directly to its ideology and policy positions. Thus, affirmation discredits explicitly the ideas and overall credibility of the opponent. On the contrary, if overt hostility is constrained because the parties have engaged in co-operative activity and, therefore, share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity, affirmation is mainly related to controversial or abstract questions. In this context, affirmation seems to undermine implicitly the overall credibility of the rival party.

Evidence for this qualitative effect of a common instrumental super-ordinate identity on the use of affirmation is found in most pairs of parties.

First, a change in the framing packages related to affirmation used between the incumbent and the challenger party is observed in the third period during which a common instrumental super-ordinate identity is introduced between the two parties. The frequent use of the 'power/future vs. failure/past' framing package by the incumbent party in the first and second periods is reduced in the third period while the 'psychological features' and the 'national development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation' framing packages become dominant in that period (see figure 8.10.1).

Figure 8.10.1

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of affirmation is used by an incumbent against a challenger party



Second, the framing packages related to affirmation by the incumbent and the outsider party change when a common instrumental super-ordinate identity is imposed on these parties (see figures 8.10.3 and 8.10.4). During the first period, in which the two parties have a common political super-ordinate identity, the 'power/future vs. failure/past', the 'political values and ideology' and the 'real Left vs. pseudo Right' framing packages are prevalent. However, the use of these framing packages is reduced or they are not used at all in the second and third periods during which the two parties share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity. During the second and third periods, affirmation is embodied in the 'catharsis vs. corruption' and the 'psychological features/personality traits' framing packages.

Figure 8.10.3

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of affirmation is used by an incumbent against an outsider party





Figure 8.10.4

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of denial is used by an outsider against an incumbent party




Moreover, the framing packages related to affirmation by the challenger against the outsider party in the third period, during which the two parties share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity are different than those used in the first and second periods. During the third period, the challenger party relates a

large part of the affirmation instances to the 'citizen attitudes towards political participation' and to the 'human condition' framing packages which were neglected or only marginally used in the previous periods.

Figure 8.10.5

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of denial is used by a challenger against an outsider party



In conclusion, the party super-ordinate identity seems to affect the use of the strategy of affirmation between opponent parties. However, the effect of changing super-ordinate identities seems to be expressed at the qualitative rather than at the quantitative level as was initially hypothesised. The analysis of the framing packages related to affirmation has demonstrated that a change in the framing of affirmation is often, but not always, provoked by the introduction of a common instrumental super-ordinate identity between two parties. Further research is necessary in order to corroborate this finding and also gain a better insight into the socio-psychological mechanisms involved in the strategy of affirmation.

N O T E S

¹ The concepts of all four strategies and the relevant literature are discussed in Chapter three.

² The symbols F1, F2, ... , F# refer to specific framing packages included in the relevant cluster. The index of framing packages grouped in clusters is given in the appendix of chapter 7.

³ The nature and scope of psychologising explanations in history is discussed in detail by Papastamou (1989b: 117-130).

⁴ Ideological matters are related to denial during the first period also, albeit in a lower degree (see figure 8.9.4, first period).

⁵ See figures 8.9.1, 8.9.2, 8.9.3, 8.9.4, 8.9.5 and 8.9.6. Figures 8.9.1, 8.9.2, 8.9.3 and 8.9.5 are given in the appendix of this chapter.

A P P E N D I X I

PSYCHOLOGISATION

Figure 8.8.1

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of psychologisation is used by an incumbent against a challenger party




Figure 8.8.3

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of psychologisation is used by an incumbent against an outsider party




Figure 8.8.4

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of psychologisation is used by an outsider against an incumbent party




Figure 8.8.5

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of psychologisation is used by a challenger against an outsider party





Figure 8.8.6

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of psychologisation is used by an outsider against a challenger party



DENIAL

Figure 8.9.1

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of denial is used by an incumbent against a challenger party




Figure 8.9.2

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of denial is used by a challenger against an incumbent party




Figure 8.9.3

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of denial is used by an incumbent against an outsider party




Figure 8.9.4

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of denial is used by an outsider against an incumbent party





Figure 8.9.5

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of denial is used by a challenger against an outsider party



AFFIRMATION

Figure 8.10.2

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of affirmation is used by a challenger against an incumbent party





Figure 8.10.6

Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy of denial is used by an outsider against a challenger party



A P P E N D I X I I

The following tables represent the data regarding the use of each of the strategies by each pair of interacting parties. The data has been retrieved from the database created for the purposes of this research. This database is based on the codification of newspaper texts.

Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide the data regarding the first, second and third periods of analysis respectively. The data quoted represent the number of occurrences of each strategy in each period and for each pair of parties separately. The direction of the communication, namely which party addresses a strategy to which rival has been taken into account in the measurement. The following results have been produced:

TABLE 1
(Data regarding the first period of the analysis)

Interacting parties:	Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirm.	Superordin. Identity
Inc. against Chall.	39	25	23	37	opposed
Chall. against Inc.	115	48	24	50	opposed
Inc. against Outs.	10	4	8	18	common political
Outs. against Inc.	62	29	27	22	common political
Chall. against Outs.	6	3	4	5	opposed
Outs. against Chall.	24	12	16	8	opposed

Note: During this period, the Socialist party (PA.SO.K.) is characterised as the incumbent party, the Conservatives (N.D.) occupy the challenger position and the outsider power position is assigned to the Alliance of the Left (SYN.).

TABLE 2

(Data regarding the second period of the analysis)

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirm.	Superordin. Identity	
Interacting parties:					
Inc. against Chall.	38	31	23	42	opposed
Chall. against Inc.	9	11	6	11	opposed
Inc. against Outs.	3	2	5	5	common instrumental
Outs. against Inc.	2	5	4	5	common instrumental
Chall. against Outs.	24	11	15	16	opposed
Outs. against Chall.	26	20	30	17	opposed

Note: During the second period of the analysis, the Conservative party acquires the incumbent power position, the Socialists shift to the challenger party position and the Alliance of the Left keeps its outsider character.

TABLE 3

(Data regarding the third period of the analysis)

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirm.	Superordin. Identity	
Interacting parties:					
Inc. against Chall.	39	23	31	41	common instrumental
Chall. against Inc.	9	6	10	21	common instrumental
Inc. against Outs.	2	1	2	6	common instrumental
Outs. against Inc.	7	1	15	0	common instrumental
Chall. against Outs.	10	0	9	5	common instrumental
Outs. against Chall.	9	2	13	6	common instrumental

Note: During the third period of the analysis, the power position of the three parties remains the same as in the second period.

Tables 4-10 provide the data on the distribution of the framing packages associated with the strategies applied by the parties. The data quoted express the number of co-occurrences between each cluster of framing packages and the specific strategy applied within each pair of interacting parties in each period. A given strategy may be associated with one, more than one or

with no framing packages. Therefore, the sum of the co-occurrences of each framing package with a strategy is often not equal to the total number of occurrences of the specific strategy (quoted as "total") in the given period between the given parties.

TABLE 4

T A B L E 4.1				
INCUMBENT against CHALLENGER party - 1st period				
	Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:				
'Human condition'	1	2	2	1
'Cath.vs. corr.'	9	5	6	10
'power/future vs. fail./past'	2	1	1	12
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	4	0	0	5
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	0	0	0	0
'polit.values/ideol.'	5	0	1	2
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	2	1	1	1
'psychol.features'	5	7	8	3
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	7	8	2	1
'self vs. others'	1	2	0	2
Total	39	25	23	37

T A B L E 4.2				
INCUMBENT against CHALLENGER party - 2nd period				
	Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:				
'Human condition'	3	7	1	5
'Cath.vs. corr.'	15	6	11	17
'power/future vs. fail./past'	3	3	10	16
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	5	3	0	3
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	1	0	0	0
'polit.values/ideol.'	9	0	0	0
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	1	0	0	0
'psychol.features'	4	7	2	1
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	6	7	0	4
'self vs. others'	0	2	1	4
Total	38	31	23	42

T A B L E 4.3

INCUMBENT against CHALLENGER party - 3rd period

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation	
Clusters of framing packages:				
'Human condition'	3	4	2	0
'Cath.vs. corr.'	11	3	11	15
'power/future vs. fail./past'	1	0	4	4
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	11	4	3	13
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	0	0	0	0
'polit.values/ideol.'	9	0	1	1
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	0	0	0	0
'psychol.features'	6	10	11	11
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	3	2	1	1
'self vs. others'	4	4	2	1
Total	39	23	31	41

TABLE 5

T A B L E 5.1

CHALLENGER against INCUMBENT party - 1st period

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation	
Clusters of framing packages:				
'Human condition'	4	10	1	2
'Cath.vs. corr.'	61	6	9	5
'power/future vs. fail./past'	16	0	1	29
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	15	0	0	3
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	0	0	0	0
'polit.values/ideol.'	20	3	2	6
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	3	2	1	0
'psychol.features'	7	25	9	1
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	8	5	0	2
'self vs. others'	0	2	0	2
Total	115	48	24	50

T A B L E 5.2

CHALLENGER against INCUMBENT party - 2nd period

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:			
'Human condition'	1	0	0
'Cath.vs. corr.'	0	0	4
'power/future vs. fail./past'	0	0	1
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	1	0	0
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	0	0	0
'polit.values/ideol.'	2	0	0
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	0	1	1
'psychol.features'	0	3	3
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	4	0	0
'self vs. others'	2	7	0
Total	9	11	6

T A B L E 5.3

CHALLENGER against INCUMBENT party - 3rd period

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:			
'Human condition'	0	1	0
'Cath.vs. corr.'	0	1	3
'power/future vs. fail./past'	0	0	2
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	1	1	1
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	0	0	0
'polit.values/ideol.'	4	1	1
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	1	0	0
'psychol.features'	2	1	2
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	1	0	0
'self vs. others'	2	2	1
Total	9	6	10

TABLE 6

TABLE 6.1

INCUMBENT against OUTSIDER party - 1st period

	Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:				
'Human condition'	2	0	0	1
'Cath.vs. corr.'	1	0	2	5
'power/future vs. fail./past'	1	0	0	4
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	1	0	0	1
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	4	1	3	3
'polit.values/ideol.'	1	0	1	1
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	0	0	0	1
'psychol.features'	0	1	1	3
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	1	1	0	0
'self vs. others'	0	2	2	3
Total	10	4	8	18

TABLE 6.2

INCUMBENT against OUTSIDER party - 2nd period

	Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:				
'Human condition'	0	0	0	0
'Cath.vs. corr.'	1	0	0	1
'power/future vs. fail./past'	0	0	1	0
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	0	0	0	0
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	0	0	0	0
'polit.values/ideol.'	1	1	1	0
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	0	0	0	0
'psychol.features'	0	1	1	2
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	1	0	1	1
'self vs. others'	0	0	1	1
Total	3	2	5	5

T A B L E 6.3

INCUMBENT against OUTSIDER party - 3rd period

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:			
'Human condition'	0	0	0
'Cath.vs. corr.'	0	0	1
'power/future vs. fail./past'	1	0	0
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	0	0	0
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	0	0	0
'polit.values/ideol.'	1	0	0
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	0	0	0
'psychol.features'	0	1	0
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	0	0	0
'self vs. others'	0	0	1
Total	2	1	2

T A B L E 7

T A B L E 7.1

OUTSIDER against INCUMBENT party - 1st period

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:			
'Human condition'	3	4	0
'Cath.vs. corr.'	28	7	11
'power/future vs. fail./past'	7	1	4
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	5	1	1
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	9	2	2
'polit.values/ideol.'	15	4	4
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	6	1	0
'psychol.features'	12	17	9
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	7	0	2
'self vs. others'	2	1	3
Total	62	29	27

T A B L E 7.2

OUTSIDER against INCUMBENT party - 2nd period

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:			
'Human condition'	0	0	0
'Cath.vs. corr.'	0	1	0
'power/future vs. fail./past'	0	0	1
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	1	0	0
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	0	0	0
'polit.values/ideol.'	1	1	2
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	0	0	0
'psychol.features'	0	2	0
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	0	0	0
'self vs. others'	0	0	0
Total	2	5	4

T A B L E 7.3

OUTSIDER against INCUMBENT party - 3rd period

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:			
'Human condition'	0	0	0
'Cath.vs. corr.'	1	0	3
'power/future vs. fail./past'	1	0	3
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	1	0	0
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	0	0	0
'polit.values/ideol.'	1	0	6
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	0	0	0
'psychol.features'	1	1	2
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	1	0	1
'self vs. others'	3	0	1
Total	7	1	15

TABLE 8

T A B L E 8.1

CHALLENGER against OUTSIDER party - 1st period

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:			
'Human condition'	0	0	0
'Cath.vs. corr.'	1	0	1
'power/future vs. fail./past'	0	0	2
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	0	0	0
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	0	0	0
'polit.values/ideol.'	0	0	1
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	0	0	0
'psychol.features'	2	3	1
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	0	0	0
'self vs. others'	1	0	1
Total	6	3	4

T A B L E 8.2

CHALLENGER against OUTSIDER party - 2nd period

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:			
'Human condition'	1	0	0
'Cath.vs. corr.'	4	4	2
'power/future vs. fail./past'	0	0	2
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	0	1	1
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	7	3	3
'polit.values/ideol.'	5	2	4
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	2	0	0
'psychol.features'	5	1	2
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	0	0	0
'self vs. others'	1	1	1
Total	24	11	15

T A B L E 8.3

CHALLENGER against OUTSIDER party - 3rd period

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:			
'Human condition'	0	0	1
'Cath.vs. corr.'	4	0	2
'power/future vs. fail./past'	2	0	0
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	0	0	0
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	4	0	1
'polit.values/ideol.'	0	0	0
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	0	0	1
'psychol.features'	5	0	5
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	0	0	1
'self vs. others'	1	0	1
Total	10	0	9

T A B L E 9

T A B L E 9.1

OUTSIDER against ~~CHALLENGER~~ party - 1st period

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:			
'Human condition'	1	1	0
'Cath.vs. corr.'	8	5	6
'power/future vs. fail./past'	3	2	0
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	1	0	1
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	0	0	0
'polit.values/ideol.'	7	0	1
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	1	0	0
'psychol.features'	1	4	9
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	9	6	0
'self vs. others'	1	1	1
Total	24	12	16

T A B L E 9.2

OUTSIDER against CHALLENGER party - 2nd period

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:			
'Human condition'	0	1	0
'Cath.vs. corr.'	12	3	5
'power/future vs. fail./past'	0	1	2
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	2	1	3
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	2	0	3
'polit.values/ideol.'	9	3	2
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	2	2	1
'psychol.features'	0	5	7
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	2	1	1
'self vs. others'	0	4	4
Total	26	20	30

T A B L E 9.3

OUTSIDER against CHALLENGER party - 3rd period

Strategies: Categ/tion	Psych/tion	Denial	Affirmation
Clusters of framing packages:			
'Human condition'	0	0	0
'Cath.vs. corr.'	0	1	5
'power/future vs. fail./past'	1	0	1
'nat.developm. vs. chaos/confl.'	0	1	3
'real L.vs. ps.Right'	2	0	0
'polit.values/ideol.'	4	0	3
'dign.vs. vulgarity'	1	1	0
'psychol.features'	0	1	2
'citizen attit.tow. polit.participation'	1	0	0
'self vs. others'	2	0	3
Total	9	2	13

CHAPTER IX

Social Psychology and the study of party behaviour

The main objectives of this research have been to test socio-psychological theory in a real-life setting, namely party campaigning and negotiation, and also to examine party politics from a socio-psychological perspective. For these purposes, an analytical model organised at two layers has been proposed. The first layer of the model has concentrated on the interaction of the parties with one another during election campaign and post-election negotiations. The party discourse has been analysed in terms of styles of behaviour, namely the ways in which each party introduces and represents itself in the field. Furthermore, party interaction and the mutual efforts of rival parties to confront and discredit one another have been analysed in terms of strategies of influence and resistance.

The second layer of the model has taken into account the impact of the common or opposed super-ordinate identities that two rival parties may have on the strategies they use to confront one another. Moreover, the second layer of the model has looked at the framing packages and, thus, at the social representations that are used in the campaigning and negotiation process. These have been considered in relation to party styles of behaviour or strategies of influence. Thereby, party interaction has been seen within its proper socio-political context. The latter includes the socio-political, ideological or other features that are assumed to characterise party identity and the ways in which these characteristics interfere with the organisation of inter-party behaviour and discourse.

The elaboration of the theoretical concepts and the findings derived from the case-study suggest the following concluding remarks.

9.1 Incumbent, challenger and outsider parties and their styles of behaviour

The attempt to apply the active minority theoretical model on party behaviour has led to the need to define the concepts of incumbent, challenger and outsider party. The fundamental distinction that the active minority theory draws between minority and majority groups has been developed in order to include governmental office as a factor conditioning the power character of a party. Thus majority parties, namely large parties whose beliefs conform with the *status quo* of a society are assigned an incumbent or a challenger character according to their being in government or in the opposition. Minority parties whose electoral power is limited and whose beliefs are different from the established norms are assigned an outsider party character.

Party behaviour has, therefore, been related to the incumbent, challenger or outsider position of a party rather than to its majority or minority character. The concepts of consistency/inconsistency and rigidity/flexibility that were introduced in social psychology as styles of behaviour of minority and majority groups have been used to analyse party behaviour. The hypothesis which has oriented the empirical research is that the incumbent, challenger or outsider character of a party conditions its styles of behaviour.

a) Consistency

The case-study undertaken (i.e. the analysis of the Greek party behaviour in the period between June 1989 and April 1990) has displayed some problematic aspects regarding the application of socio-psychological concepts on party behaviour. The validity of consistency as a suitable analytical category for the analysis of party behaviour has been called into question. The measurement of consistency as a style of behaviour adopted by a party has given

extremely high consistency scores for all parties in all periods examined. The outsider has registered the highest score for consistency, however, overall, differences between the consistency scores of the different parties have been marginal.

These findings cast doubt on the significance of consistency as a feature typical of active minorities (Moscovici, Lage & Naffrechoux 1969; Nemeth 1974; Moscovici 1979; 1980 et al.). A two-fold conclusion is derived from the findings concerning consistency. First, these findings suggest that consistency is essential for all types of parties and, therefore, it is not a feature typical of a specific type of party. Furthermore, the results of the research show that a consistent style of behaviour is not, or is only marginally, affected by the incumbent, challenger or outsider character of a party.

Nevertheless, the analysis of the framing packages related to consistent styles of behaviour has shown that the *meaning* assigned to consistent behaviour is influenced by the incumbent, challenger or outsider position of a party. More specifically, the consistent behaviour of the outsider party has been shown to be embedded in a specific set of framing packages which remained unchanged in all periods under examination. Consistency has, thereby, been associated with political attitudes, psychological features and ideology. Thus, a consistent outsider party was represented as a group of people who are stable and moderate in their beliefs and whose attitude towards politics is responsible and impartial.

However, the analysis of the incumbent and challenger party behaviour has shown that their power position did not affect the framing packages in which the consistency of these parties is embedded. A party-specific framing pattern has been found in the data. The Conservative party stressed the psychological qualities of its leadership as the main factor related to its consistent behaviour. The Socialists emphasised their consistency in terms of beliefs and political values. These tendencies were not related to the conservative or progressive ideology of each party but rather to their adaptation to intraparty (changes in leadership and party

organisation) or environmental (salience of specific campaigning issues) conditions.

Consistency plays a different role in the organisation of minority (outsider) and majority (incumbent or challenger) party behaviour. An outsider party constructs a global consistency representation which organises the image of the party in election campaign and in coalition negotiations.

These findings confirm, however only at a qualitative level, that consistency is a style of behaviour which characterises active minorities, i.e. outsider parties. Indeed, outsider parties have been demonstrated to organise their consistent style of behaviour in a specific manner. On the other hand, further research is required to corroborate the finding that the framing of consistency by an incumbent or a challenger party is affected neither by office incumbency nor by party ideology. Indeed, alternative factors such as the intraparty organisational structure or the presence of a charismatic party leader which may influence the framing of consistent behaviour should be investigated.

b) Rigidity and Flexibility

The importance of rigidity and flexibility as styles of negotiation is shown by the study of party behaviour. Two complementary findings have highlighted the use of rigid and flexible styles in party interaction. On the one hand, rigidity and flexibility have been related to the power position of a party. Parties that hold extreme positions in terms of power, namely outsider and incumbent parties, tend to adopt a rigid style of behaviour while parties with an intermediate power position, namely a challenger party, demonstrate a more flexible and understanding attitude.

An incumbent party, that has governmental power at its disposal, stresses its intransigence and emphasises its prevalent position, whilst a challenger party tends to negotiate and display

an open-minded attitude. On the other hand, the outsider party confirm adopts a rigid position striving to breakthrough the majority rule.

However, rigidity or flexibility in party behaviour is also affected by strategic decisions adopted by the parties. According to the findings, a party that takes decisions that are in accordance with its power position, namely an incumbent party that holds governmental power or a challenger or an outsider that remain in the opposition, adopts a rigid style of behaviour. Conversely, a party whose decisions are inconsistent with its power position, namely a challenger or an outsider that participate in government or an incumbent party that remains in the opposition, displays a more flexible/less rigid style of behaviour.

The analysis of the framing packages associated with rigid or flexible instances of behaviour has shown that, indeed, rigidity or flexibility are used to *mediate* the party decisions. The rigid or flexible style of behaviour of a party and the specific framing packages embodied in its discourse are used to assign meaning to its actual decisions. The participation of a party in a coalition government for instance, is represented in a positive way because it is related to the flexible and understanding attitude of the party and its dedication to the national good. Thus, the party stresses a positive interpretation of its actions.

Rigidity or flexibility have been proved to play a significant role as a means to negotiate party beliefs for both majority (incumbent, challenger) and minority (outsider) parties. Not only an outsider party supports its dissident ideas by means of its rigid or flexible behaviour, incumbent and challenger parties also use rigidity and flexibility in campaigning and negotiations. Furthermore, rigidity and flexibility have been shown to be related to the party strategic decisions. Parties adopt more or less rigid styles of behaviour in order to assign positive meaning to their actions. In summary, the styles of negotiation are categories

useful for the analysis not only of minority but also of majority party (or group) behaviour.

c) Categorisation

Party super-ordinate identity has been shown to affect not only the use of the strategy of categorisation but also the categorisation dimensions rendered salient between rival parties. Parties that share a common political super-ordinate identity use categorisation to confront one another more often than parties whose super-ordinate identities are opposed. Indeed, parties that shared a common set of beliefs tended to use categorisation as a strategy against one another. Thus a party strived to achieve positive distinctiveness from a rival party with which it was ideologically 'close'.

The dimensions on which two parties categorised against one another were conditioned by the features that played an important role in the relationships between the two parties. They strived to show themselves distinct on those features in which they were in some way interrelated. Indeed, parties that shared a common instrumental super-ordinate identity stressed political values and policy questions as relevant categorisation dimensions. On the other hand, parties with a common political super-ordinate identity categorised against one another with reference to political notions or psychological features. They did not, however, stress explicitly their ideological affinity but rather introduced 'new' or alternative ideological dimensions on which to discriminate against one another. Finally, parties that shared both an instrumental and a political super-ordinate identity stressed policy questions that were relevant to their cooperative activity and also general political principles which did not touch directly upon their common beliefs.

The use of categorisation strategy is independent from the

power character of the competing parties. Party identity seems to be the main determinant with respect to the use and the content of categorising statements.

d) Psychologisation

Parties that are ideologically close or instrumentally interdependent are reluctant to psychologise the beliefs of one another. Political values, ideology and policy positions, on the one hand, and psychological features and personality traits, on the other hand, are intertwined in the psychologising discourse of the parties. Ideas, beliefs or arguments are attributed to the psychological characteristics of the party that maintains them.

Psychologisation is often used in party campaigning and negotiation as a shorthand account for contested issues not only in exceptional circumstances or for unexpected behaviour but also in policy issues. These explanations stress the role played by psychological predispositions and emotive states instead of institutional factors and political norms. Psychologisation as a party strategy not only discredits the beliefs of the opponent but also reduces the significance of political norms.

However, psychologisation may also be seen as a media strategy for providing the public with simple and impressive explanations of complex problems. The use of psychologisation by the media as a means of interpretation of political behaviour is an interesting subject for future research.

e) Denial

Socio-psychological research regarding the strategy of denial has concentrated on the effects of the strategy on the minority influence potential. The fact that a minority also may use denial as a means to disrupt the social consensus and introduce conflict

has not been investigated in laboratory studies. This study, in contrast, has examined denial as a strategy used by minority (outsider) and majority (incumbent or challenger) parties in campaigning and negotiations.

Under conditions of general consensus and compliance, namely during the national unity government in which all three parties, the incumbent, the outsider party seems to have used denial to contradict the opinions of the incumbent and challenger party. The outsider seeks to disrupt the consensus within the government by rejecting the truthfulness of the policies and ideas of its partners. Denial seems thus to be used by the outsider party to introduce conflict.

The party power position does not condition the use of the strategy of denial between rival parties. The use of denial is affected but to a relatively limited extent by the office incumbency of a party or its being in the opposition.

It is worth noting that denial attempts are embedded in framing packages which refer to 'subjective' or contested issues. The strategy consists of non-verifiable statements. These statements are used as a means for negative propaganda against the adversaries. Indeed, the framing of denial confirms that the strategy discredits an idea by rejecting its validity, however, without offering argumentation against the specific idea.

f) Affirmation

Parties that share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity tend to relate their false statements to controversial or abstract issues. Cooperation in government, even though provisional, appears to constrain the use of affirmation between coalition partners: these do not express overt hostility against one another but rather seek to undermine the overall credibility of

their rival by reference to controversial or 'subjective' questions. Conversely, parties that have opposed super-ordinate identities use their false statements both to discredit the ideology and policy positions of the rival party and to undermine its overall power potential.

Under conditions of cooperation and interdependence between parties, affirmation may be used to discredit indirectly the image and credibility of an opponent, but it may also be used in campaigning as a strategy of overt confrontation. On the other hand, the introduction of a common instrumental super-ordinate identity between interacting parties has no effect on the frequency of use of the strategy of affirmation between these parties.

The use of affirmation is conditioned by the power position of the competing parties. Parties with a high power character express false statements about their lower status opponents more often than the latter do against the former. Incumbent and challenger parties seem to benefit from an *objectivity norm* according to which the 'objective' truth regarding social phenomena is defined by the majority. Thus, in party campaigning and negotiation situations, in which competing definitions of social reality are maintained by each party, incumbent and challenger have a relative advantage with respect to the outsider in asserting that a false statement is true.

This study has sought to demonstrate that concepts originally developed in the field of Social Psychology and, more particularly, in experimental studies may be suitable and, indeed, very useful for the study of real-life settings such as political reality. Taking into account the particularities inherent in case-studies, we believe that much can be gained from the interaction between research in laboratory and in real-life situations. The latter may allow for the refinement of theoretical concepts developed in the former while also the former can serve as pioneers for research

that can subsequently be used to explain specific phenomena.

Furthermore, there is a lot to learn from the study of the socio-psychological mechanisms underlying political behaviour. The mechanisms of group formation and socio-psychological identification which underlie inter-group behaviour can be used to explain behaviour between parties in competitive or cooperative contexts. Thereby, a better insight into party campaigning and coalition negotiation is gained which may contribute to the prediction of party behaviour under different conditions. Knowledge of the mechanisms that condition party identity and the socio-psychological identification of the voter with a party may also be used in order to achieve better results in party campaigning.

The analytical category of majority or minority character of a group is used to explain party behaviour in relation to the incumbent, challenger or outsider position of a party. Thus, the impact of governmental power, electoral strength and pro- or anti-status quo ideology on party behaviour can be analysed. Moreover, the concept of active minorities helps us gain a better insight into the mechanisms that condition the behaviour of small parties and also the factors that enhance or impede their influence.

The investigation of social representations that are embodied in party discourse and of their relationship with specific campaigning strategies allows for a more in-depth analysis of party discourse. Social representations are used by parties as a means to support the ingroup opinion or as a means to discredit the ideology of the opponent party and distort its image. Therefore, the study of social representations offers a better insight into political rhetoric in election campaigns.

Inter-party behaviour is only one of the many fields of political behaviour on which social psychology can be applied.

Indeed, socio-psychological analysis may be used to understand and explain different sides of political reality such as intraparty relations, for instance, the role of leadership within a party or within a government and also relations between supporting parties in a coalition government.

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