



Discursive movement politics of the crisis: frames, ‘subjects’ and cultures of sociopolitical contestation

A comparative analysis of the anti-austerity and
pro-democracy mobilizations of Greece and Spain

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

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Abstract

The financial crisis of 2008, which plunged the global economy into unprecedented recession caused a dramatic downturn in economic activity and exceptionally increased political instability. In the years of the crisis civil unrest became part of the daily routine of afflicted countries around the world, reaching its peak in the global wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of late 2010-2011. Protesting the politics of austerity and the diminished solvency of the political system, the mobilizations rose above the business-as-usual type of protesting and summoned an exceptionally heterogeneous population raising strong demands for democratization and the political empowerment of the people. The characteristically heterogeneous constituency of the mobilizations, the characteristically broad demand for democratization and the fact that in many instances this demand was raised in sociopolitical contexts of consolidated democracies highlighted a central puzzle with three angles: *What does the demand for democratization mean, when it is raised in already democratic contexts? What does the mobilizations' demand for democracy practically imply? Who constitute the 'subject' of the mobilizations and through what processes have they been 'constructed' as a collective demanding democracy?*

Narrowing down the focus on the European wave of mobilizations, this research seeks to find answers to these questions by examining comparatively the anti-austerity mobilizations of Greece and Spain. The hypothesis of this comparative examination is that the mobilizations' commonly raised demands for democratization and their similar advocacies -for 'Direct Democracy' in Greece and 'Real Democracy' in Spain- are effectively filtered through the lens of nation-specific cultures of contestation. Relying on qualitative methods of analysis, this research examines patterns of contestation and relationships in the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity mobilizations and demonstrates that the Greek and Spanish movement politics of the crisis represent distinct examples of contemporary sociopolitical contestation that cannot be comprehensively understood on the basis of some sort of European -or for that matter Southern European- sameness, despite their firm embeddedness in the European wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of late 2010-2011.

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Introduction

On September 15, 2008 Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank in the US, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and this remains today the largest bankruptcy filed in US history. What in 2007 had started as a crisis in the subprime mortgage market in the US, by the end of 2008 had developed into a full-blown international banking crisis, which plunged the global economy into the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s,¹ and culminated in a severe downturn of national economies across the world.² Although a series of bank bailouts sponsored by national governments prevented the collapse of large financial institutions, the downturn in economic activity was not avoided, and in fact was soon accompanied by increased political instability in view of desperate government attempts to contain the effects of the crisis. Today, looking back at the policies progressively employed since 2008, it is safe to say that the politics of the crisis actually sparked a dramatic backlash. In fact, rather than soothing the social repercussions of the financial crisis, in reality they deepened its effects; they contaminated the real economy and, ultimately, they highlighted a deep crisis of the political itself.

¹ Paul Krugman was among the first to raise the point when he compared the downturn of industrial production in the US in the periods 2007-9 and 1929-30 and argued that 'at this point we're sort of experiencing half a Great Depression', see. Krugman, P. 2009. 'The Great Recession versus the Great Depression', New York Times, 20 March 2009. <http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/the-great-recession-versus-the-great-depression/?module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=Opinion&action=keypress®ion=FixedLeft&pgtype=Blogs>. see also Eichengreen, E., O'Rourke, K.H. 2009a. 'A Tale of Two Depressions', *Advisor Perspectives. Actionable advice for financial advisors: newsletters and commentaries focused on investment strategy*, 21 April 2009. http://www.advisorperspectives.com/newsletters09/A_Tale_of_Two_Depressions.html, and Eichengreen, E., O'Rourke, K.H. 2009b. 'A Tale of Two Depressions: June 2009 Update', *Advisor Perspectives. Actionable advice for financial advisors: newsletters and commentaries focused on investment strategy*, 21 April 2009. <http://www.advisorperspectives.com/articles/2009/06/30/a-tale-of-two-depressions-june-2009-update>.

² see Almunia, M. et.al. 2009. 'From Great Depression to Great Credit Crisis: Similarities, Differences and Lessons', paper presented at the *50th Economic Policy Panel Meeting*, October 23-24, Tilburg, p. 1.

Thus, in the years of the crisis, civil unrest became an ordinary state of affairs, with protests and demonstrations comprising part of the daily routine of afflicted countries around the world. The turning point at which the sociopolitical effects of the crisis reached a peak was 2011, when the people of the Arab world, the US and Europe alike massively took to the streets to protest the politics of austerity and the diminished solvency of the political system. The mobilizations of 2011 caused a far-reaching turmoil, far removed from the politics-as-usual type of protesting, surpassing by far the expectations of both national governments (whose austerity policies and deeply rooted corruption were the object of protest) and of the protestors themselves (Prentoulis and Thomassen 2013). Furthermore, the mobilizations of 2011 held firmly fixed at their core demands for democratization and people's political empowerment (Sitrin and Azzellini 2014; Prentoulis and Thomassen 2014).

The Icelandic protests of 2009 are the first instance of anti-austerity mobilizations, which actually foreshadowed the critique of the politics of the crisis and the intensity of the demands that were to be raised around the world some two years later. Demanding the resignation of the government and the embedding of participatory methods in political decision-making, Iceland's 'Saucepan Revolution' counts as the first instance of contemporary anti-austerity mobilizations, ascertaining: (a) the strong political embeddedness of the contemporary financial crisis, (b) the lack of political actors' accountability to citizens and, vice versa, the citizens' lack of oversight of the political class, and (c) the diminished political efficacy of ordinary citizens in the democratic process (Flesher Fominaya 2014a). The catalyst in the spreading of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, however, was the massive protests that took over Tunisia in 2010-2011, after the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in response to the harassment inflicted on him by municipal officials. In fact, the Tunisian Revolution was the breaking point at which the simmering public anger burst out in a revolutionary wave that took over the Arab world -most notable being the experience of the Egyptian Revolution.

The impact of the Arab Spring on the western world marked a second turning point in the expression of sociopolitical contestation worldwide, with the US and Southern Europe following closely. In this direction, in 2011 the US experienced the emergence, and in fact the rapid development of a massive movement against democratic subservience to financial interests and corporate elites. The motivational call was given by the Adbusters magazine, and was actually inspired by the Egyptian Revolution of 2011: 'Tahrir succeeded in large part because the people of Egypt made a straightforward ultimatum -that Mubarak must go- over and over again until they won. Following this model, what is our equally uncomplicated demand? (...) It's time for DEMOCRACY NOT CORPORATOCRACY. We're doomed without it' (Adbusters 2011; original emphasis).

In a similar fashion, in the most afflicted European countries, the anti-austerity mobilizations came to represent a strong indictment of austerity politics and a radical call for democracy. Southern Europe, more specifically, emerged as the most critical site of sociopolitical contestation, with protestors in Spain decisively declaring '*They call it democracy, but it is not*', and protestors in Greece reviving the momentous slogan of the Polytechnic uprising against the military dictatorship for 'Bread, Education, Freedom' in the most historical square of the country, Syntagma Square, with banners reading '*Bread, Education, Freedom. The junta did not end in '73*'. From the MENA region, to the US, to Europe, the message of this global wave of protests against austerity was stated expressly as a call *for democracy*. In the case of the Spanish mobilizations the slogan was 'Real Democracy Now', while in the case of the Greek mobilizations it was 'Direct Democracy Now'.

The global spreading of mass anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations between 2010 and 2011 is indeed a compelling feature of contemporary collective action. As such, however, it discloses a rather puzzling configuration with three angles. First, democracy is a widespread but distinctly broad conception that lends itself to the possibility of significant misunderstandings and confusions in the public discourse. Second, the

mobilizations of this global wave of protests calling for democracy have been exceptionally heterogeneous, making it even more difficult to clearly account for specific significations of democracy, should confusions as to its conceptualization be overcome. Third, the demand for democracy, in most cases around the world and certainly so in the European wave of mobilizations that concerns this research, has been raised in contexts that are already democratic. That is, it has been raised in sociopolitical systems of consolidated democracies, such as those of Greece or Spain for example. This puzzling configuration automatically urges us to question who it is that is calling for democracy in already democratic settings, and what exactly they mean by it. The present research singles out of the global wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations the Southern European cases of the Greek Aganaktismenoi and the Spanish Indignados, and seeks to find answers to a set of questions arising from the compelling puzzle outlined above. To this end, the present research is divided into five parts and each of these parts deals with a different research question, raised in view of the puzzling configuration of the Southern European anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011 and in view of the central argument of this research: despite the fact that in 2011 we are confronted with a global wave of social contestation, and for what immediately concerns this research also a European wave of social contestation, this wave, rather than transforming into a unified European movement of anti-austerity opposition and democratic advocacy, essentially remained a largely improbable assemblage, even though an impressive one, of national-specific movement.

The first part of the research deals with the implications of the comparative examination of the Greek and the Spanish mobilizations. It makes clear the *ceteris paribus* rule of the analysis and searches for the crucial difference between the two country cases, against which the findings of the research can be understood in an integrated manner. Consequently, the central argument that runs through it is that the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011, despite being connected through a

diffusion of tactics, repertoires of action and the adoption of a rather broad framework of contestation of the crisis of democratic legitimacy, in reality can be rendered wholly intelligible only through a close understanding of the specific national context in which they emerged. In other words, albeit connected on the European level under a broad and inclusive demand for democracy, they can only be effectively understood as individualized cases, in regards to the specific movement cultures through which this broad and inclusive demand was processed. In fact, these are movement cultures that appear to closely follow national specificities and accordingly to filter movement demands for democratization in different ways, although these demands (along with the proposed solutions and the ‘constructed’ identifications) appear to be explained on the basis of some sort of European - or even some sort of a more restricted Southern European- sameness.

The second part of the research deals with the implications of the comparative examination of the Greek and Spanish mobilizations as critical instances of anti-neoliberal resistance. Accordingly, it is dedicated to delineating the broader framework of movement politics the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations belong to. Furthermore, it is dedicated to provide some first answers in respect to the role of nation-specific culture of anti-neoliberal contestation in the development of the contemporary anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, examining the first phase of anti-austerity mobilizations of 2010 in Greece and Spain. Parts three and four are dedicated to searching to specific research questions arising in view of the puzzling configuration of the South European anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011. In particular, the third part is dedicated to searching for answers to the very basic questions: *What does the demand of the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011 mean, when it is raised in already democratic contexts? What does the mobilizations’ demand for (real/direct) democracy practically imply?* The examination of this part focuses on the political critique of the mobilizations and explores the diagnostic framings of the political crisis, as

well as the political advocacy of the mobilizations and focuses hence on exploring the prognostic framings of the mobilizations. The fourth part examines the collective identifications of the Greek and the Spanish mobilizations and searches for answers to the question: *Who are the 'Aganaktismenoi' and the 'Indignados' of 2011? Through what processes have they been 'constructed' as a collective demanding democracy, and what type of 'construct' do they actually represent?* The fifth part, finally, explores the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of the third phase (2011-2014) under the light of the findings of the examination of the previous parts of the research trying to provide some provisional answers to the very basic question: *What ever happened to the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados?*

The analytical premise of the research

The puzzling character of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations has formed an integral part of the sociopolitical analyses of the experience of 2011. It is a combination of factors -i.e. demands susceptible to a variety of interpretations, being articulated by an indeterminate subjectivity, and the employment of one of the most ambiguous conceptions subject to sociopolitical analysis (i.e. democracy),- that has set up the compelling framework of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011. To these factors is to be added the high intensity and the resounding dynamic of the mobilizations, which appear to have deeply affected broader sociopolitical perceptions of the general public. First, this is on account of strong feelings about a globally shared experience that appears to have influenced broader perceptions of the public about the social order and the institutions that preserve it. Second, it is on account of the strong influence that the general experience of the mobilizations appears to have had on changing lifestyles and courses of sociopolitical involvement more broadly. This explains why the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations in 2011 took by surprise activist and scholarly circles alike, and came to constitute an integral part of

sociopolitical analyses of contemporary collective action. The resistance hero and politician of the Left, Manolis Glezos, in Greece, essentially captured the far-reaching character of this European wave of protest when he spoke of the mobilizations as a widespread manifestation of anger that ‘has gone beyond us’ (Glezos 2012).

Developing along such lines, scholarly discussions on contemporary contentious politics have often employed the theme of ‘newness’ in the analysis of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, speaking of the protests of 2011 as ‘spontaneous, unprecedented and unexpected’ (Flesher Fominaya 2015: 142). ‘Newness’, along with the theme of ‘spontaneity’ has been long considered a conceptual tool with which to capture the dynamics of change in political involvement, especially so for the type of political activism that followed the broad rearrangements in the political Left and the increasing questioning of orthodox Marxism during the 1960s and the 1970s. It is in the wake of these developments that social movement research came to put strong emphasis on ‘*the new*’, which, *inter alia*, was found to be a help for galvanizing collective action (Polletta 1998), and was considered an integral element of the ‘strategic amnesia’ employed by movements with the aim to distinguish themselves, and also distance themselves, from failures of the past (Flesher Fominaya 2015). Alongside the above, the emphasis on newness was also found to be a strategy effective in circumscribing interpretative schemes that provide common ground for building collective identities. Eventually, this emphasis on ‘the new’ was considered a strategy for actually effecting ‘identity-synchronization’ of new and old actors (Tejerina and Perugorria 2012). However, notwithstanding the contribution of such approaches in social movement research, at the same time, emphasis on newness, novelty and spontaneity appears to have often triggered processes of de-politicization in the analyses of social movements (Polletta 1998). Such analyses often appear to have propelled enmeshed representations of collective action (Zamponi and Fernández González 2016), which on the one hand ‘unwittingly (or not) deny agency to social movement networks and actors’ (Flesher Fominaya 2015:

143), and on the other hand deny recognition of the influence of the historical structural tensions of capitalism in the emergence and development of social movements (see Hetland and Goodwin 2013).

A key feature in order to understand the ‘de-politicization’ effect of such approaches is the pronounced tendency to leave ‘history’ out of the analytical frameworks employed in social movement research. This tendency has largely favoured more constricted analyses of collective action (i.e. examinations of movement politics from ‘too close’, so to say), and has relegated the idea of larger historical contexts to a marginal concern in movement research, broadly speaking (Zamponi and Fernández González 2016: 2-4). In general terms, this tendency seems to be progressively addressed in a growing volume of research on social movements and collective action (see for example Flesher Fominaya 2013; 2014a). Meanwhile, however, the long sustained emphasis of social movement research (after the ‘cultural turn’ of the late 1960s and the 1970s) on stricter micro- and meso-level analysis has had a strong impression on the scholarship. Hence, macro-analyses of structural forces at play behind collective action have been progressively neglected. Along with them, however, it is also the critical approaches in micro- and meso-level analyses that appear to have further receded. Indeed, contemporarily, theoretical concerns specifically focusing on the *conditions* of the practical critique of social movements appear to be only remotely present in the relevant research. It is in this sense that Hetland and Goodwin (2013) speak of the *Strange Disappearance of Capitalism from Social Movement Studies*, suggesting that ‘recent scholarship tends to overlook not only the direct and proximate effects of capitalist institutions on collective action, but also the ways in which capitalist dynamics indirectly influence the possibilities for protest, sometimes over many years or even decades, by, for example, shaping political institutions, political alliances, social ties, and cultural idioms’ (Hetland and Goodwin 2013: 86).

A study of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011 is increasingly susceptible to such a model of analysis. The fact that the

mobilizations of 2011 are largely apprehended against the background of the crisis is conducive to this. The reason is that ‘crises’, as a matter of orders of things being interrupted, tend to be understood more in terms of the rapidity of developments, rather than in terms of the sharpening of existing elements. Long present but latent processes, therefore, can be easily disregarded, at the same time that breaking changes can be intensely and almost self-evidently highlighted. Thus, the theme of ‘crisis’ tends to favour narratives of ‘rupture’ which overshadow the *recurrent* dynamics of historical capitalism.³ But, by failing to systematically appreciate the ‘continual re-creation of contradictions and conflicts between labor and capital’ in historical capitalism (Silver 2003: 3), narratives of rupture further compromise a close appreciation of the critically anti-capitalist spirit of social movements oriented to effect social change. On the meso-level of frame analysis, the risk of neglecting the ‘time-consuming detours’ of the history of social change (Streeck 2014) is that the discursive formulations of these movements become decontextualized and are understood as somehow given, as discourses which in Foucauldian terms ‘we tend to feel (are) without history’ (Foucault 1977: 139). In other words, the risk is to fail to recognize the historical character of the conditions of the emergence and of the discourses of movements, which even when they are not found expressly denominated as anti-capitalist, essentially respond to various (also cultural) derivatives of the structural tensions of extant capitalist systems, in the different forms that these tensions present themselves, and in the different phases of the sociohistorical development of capitalism.

Trying to find a way out of this uncomfortable situation in which contingency meets ‘history’, and culture meets structure, I commence from the

³ In respect to this, Önis and Güven explain for example: ‘The crises of neoliberal globalization in the semi-periphery started with the Turkish and Mexican financial shocks in 1994, continued with the devastating Asian Crisis of 1997, reached full steam during the Russian and Brazilian meltdowns of 1998 and 1999 respectively, and came to an end with the collapse of Turkish and Argentine economies in 2011. When these episodes are treated as a specific marker in the evolution of neoliberal globalization, the preceding one and a half decades also emerge as a unique phase in itself, see Önis, Z. and Güven, A.B., (2010), “The Global Economic Crisis and the Future of Neoliberal Globalization, Rupture versus Continuity”, GLODEM (Center for Globalization and Democratic Governance) *Working Paper Series 01/2010*, p. 4.

general precept that history matters. First, it matters because it repeats itself (Marx [1852]1969/1973: 340), and therefore it matters if we are not to stand unmindful and bewildered in front of the sociopolitical transformations of our times. Second, history matters because indeed ‘the transformation and dissolution of a major social formation such as capitalism simply takes rather longer’ (Streeck 2014: 1). Therefore, meanwhile, our analyses, rather than doing away with the critical role of capitalist contradictions in the development of collective action, need to stay attuned to the ways in which all different concerns of collective action (structural and cultural alike) are effectively underpinned by the structural tensions of capitalism. Along these lines, the present research tries to stay attuned to an understanding of the contemporary political crisis as part and parcel of the crisis history of capitalism, and in turn of the fact that the crisis history of capitalism is in reality the reflection of the fundamental tension between capitalism and democracy. Wolfgang Streeck explains the point clearly: ‘In so far as the legitimation problems of democratic capitalism turned into accumulation problems, their solution called for a progressive emancipation of the capitalist economy from democratic intervention. The securing of a mass base for modern capitalism thus shifted from the sphere of politics to the market [...] *This splitting of democracy from capitalism through the splitting of the economy from democracy*—a process of de-democratization of capitalism through the de-economization of democracy— has come a long way since the crisis of 2008, in Europe just as elsewhere’ (2014: 4-5; original emphasis).

Along the same lines, this research examines the framings of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011, not as the framings of a historically unique instance of popular desire for social change and of innovative and unprecedented democratic sentiments, but as part of a broader history of antagonism (see also Vradis 2009; Mavrommatis 2015; Cox 2013). In other words the present research understands the mobilizations’ challenging of the crisis of the democratic legitimacy of late capitalism to be embedded in a broader framework of critique of the politics of neoliberal

capitalism (see also Graeber 2013). In fact this is a critique that can be found expressed in a large variety of movements (such as civil rights and indigenous rights movements, feminist and LGBTQ movements, as well as peace and environmental movements and so on). Finally, it is a critique that in recent history can be heard voiced on a global scale through the Global Justice Movement (GJM) at the turn of the century: that is, an instance in which global social antagonism expressly and in common agreement named its rival: economic and political neoliberal capitalism (Flesher Fominaya 2014a). The outstanding commitment that the mobilizations of 2011 exhibited to decentralized, horizontal and non-representative decision-making structures - all of these elements closely associated with the antagonist movement against globalized neoliberal capitalism (see Flesher Fominaya 2014a; Maeckelbergh 2012; della Porta and Rucht 2013) - constitutes evidence that their practical critique indeed falls into the same narrative as that of movements challenging the legitimacy crisis of capitalism.

All the above summarize primarily the analytical premise of the present research, but it is deemed important that while they inform it they are not imposed as the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations' framings and collective identifications. For that matter, I opt to consistently understand the Greek and the Spanish mobilizations of 2011 as mobilizations firmly embedded in broader narratives of challenging neoliberal capitalism, but at the same time to recognize that such narratives and the 'basic orders of collective action' associated with them are susceptible to differential interpretations (see Melucci 1995), and therefore can be differently expressed in different (national) contexts, since social movements actually 'experience the same principles of classification as the societies from which they come, even if they are seeking to transform them' (Fillieule and Blanchard 2013: 80). Keeping this in mind, the present research, rather than examining the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations as an indivisible whole, seeks to examine the differential interpretations of political crisis they put forward. In particular, it focuses on exploring the differential interpretations of the political crisis

advanced by the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ in Greece and the ‘Indignados’ in Spain, found in their diagnostic framings of the crisis, their prognostic framings of alternatives to it, and finally their collective identifications as movements steadily oriented to effect social change.

The examination of the diagnostic framings of the mobilizations sheds light on such differential interpretations by means of exploring the basic elements of the political critique of the protestors, which are captured in the core diagnostic tasks of ‘problem identification’ and ‘responsibility attribution’ (Snow and Benford 1988; 1992). To this end, this examination seeks to provide answers to questions about how the protestors themselves frame the crisis of the democratic legitimacy of capitalism, about their interpretations of the structural tensions of capitalism, and about how they attribute responsibility for these tensions. The examination of the prognostic framings of the mobilizations sheds light on the differential interpretations of the protestors through a close exploration of the basic elements of their political advocacy, which are captured in the core prognostic task of proposing solutions (Benford and Snow 2000). This examination seeks to provide answers about what sort of alternatives the protestors themselves propose to the crisis of the democratic legitimacy of capitalism and how they opt to redress it. Finally the examination of the collective identifications of the mobilizations sheds light on the very foundations of these differential interpretations, as it helps us grasp the socio-economic and ideological characteristics that make them possible in the first place. Collective identities, understood to be macrohistorically constructed (della Porta and Diani 1999; Edelman 2001), constitute indeed the most critical element that bridges the gap between structure and culture in collective action (Polletta and Jasper 2001), essentially putting the pieces of the puzzle together. In other words, the examination of collective identification sheds light on the *socioeconomic* characteristics of ‘the subject’ of collective action, which are underpinned by the contradictions of capitalism, as these are expressed in a given context, while at the same time shedding light on the *ideological* characteristics of ‘the

subject' of collective action, which are inextricably bound to the contradictions of capitalism, as these have historically developed in a given context. Further, then, it facilitates the subsequent examination of the relevance that the national context has in fostering cultures of sociopolitical contestation, which link diagnoses, prognoses and identifications of collective action and present them as parts of a comprehensive whole. Like this, finally, the pieces of an exhaustive examination of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011 are brought together: that is, an examination that tries to bring capitalism and history back into the analysis of social movements - while trying to allow the movements to speak for themselves.

Methods, cases, research design

Although dealing with a primarily global wave of social contestation, the scope of the present research is delimited to Europe and in particular the Southern European cases of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of Greece and Spain. The 'Aganaktismenoi' in Greece and the 'Indignados' in Spain are largely considered to constitute the most prominent sites of development of the European anti-austerity and pro-democracy wave of mobilizations. In fact, these sites are closely interconnected by means of the increased mobility of activists and the wide diffusion of the patterns of organization and repertoires of action (Oikonomakis and Roos 2013), allowing the cross-national fertilization of movement politics on the basis of similarly structured social relationships and shared systems of values (McAdam and Rucht 1993). This research explores and seeks to understand contemporary movement politics in Greece and Spain by emphasizing a set of historical and contemporary commonalities between the two countries. On the one hand, Greece and Spain are embedded in a common narrative of economic and political development largely contoured by their virtually simultaneous transition to democratic rule of law in the mid-1970s. On the other hand, both countries are embedded in a common framework of socio-economic development vis-à-vis the contemporary crisis, figuring as integral parts of the

troubled economies of the GIIPS. And last, both countries have come to face similarly generalized political instability in the current context of the crisis. At the same time, however, this research seeks to explain contemporary movement politics in Greece and Spain by focusing on a set of historical divergences between the two countries. These have to do with the different democratic transition paradigms that they represent, the different political cultures these paradigms are found to foster (i.e. what I tentatively describe in this research as a ‘consensual political culture’ in Spain and a ‘dissensual political culture’ in Greece), and accordingly the different movement cultures that seem to have been shaped for the two countries, guided by different logics of sociopolitical contestation (i.e. what I tentatively describe in this research as the logic of the ‘Big Night’ in Greece and the logic of the ‘Long Days’ in Spain). Altogether, these similarities and differences allow Greece and Spain to be juxtaposed in accordance to the logic of comparative research (Gerring 2007), and in particular the quintessential logic of comparative political research, through the ‘most similar system’ design. This is, namely, a system of research dictating that ‘one should find cases that are as similar as possible, in as many aspects as possible, and then find a crucial difference that can explain what one wants to explain’ (Przeworski 1995: 17).

As outlined above, this research examines comparatively the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of Greece and Spain. For reasons relevant to the economy of the research, the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ of Greece are examined through the biggest mobilizations of the key cities of Athens and Thessaloniki, while the ‘Indignados’ of Spain are similarly examined through the biggest mobilizations of the similarly key cities of Madrid and Barcelona. The comparative examination of ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and ‘Indignados’ takes the form of a qualitative analysis. Relevant information for the research is collected by means of a variety of qualitative methods.

First information is collected through in-depth interviews with movement participants. Interviews constitute a fundamental tool of social research, to gather information on the specific issues examined. Essentially

interviews give voice to the protagonists of social movements, as they call on the participants of movements to provide their own interpretations of challenges, dilemmas and differential understandings of politics, structures, identities and cultural issues in collective action. In-depth interviews in particular, facilitate further the in-depth understanding of meanings, significations and attitudes of the protagonists of collective action, which become palpable to the researcher through the accounts of the protagonists themselves. While biases in the analysis of the information collected are a constant problem to be attentive to, in-depth interviews, better than any other qualitative method, can establish agency at the centre of the analysis (see della Porta 2014). Hence, the protestors are given the space necessary not only in order to voice their own interpretations (Mason 2003; Legard et.al. 2003), but to further make any necessary clarifications so that the information collected is as detailed and as unambiguous as possible.

For the purpose of the present research, interviews were conducted with participants of grassroots movement groups and neighborhood assemblies, the vast majority of which were born around the period of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011 and all of which were active during the period 2013-2015, when fieldwork research was conducted. Relying on my previous participation in informal networks of grassroots movements in Greece and acquaintances in grassroots movements in Spain, the first step of information collection for this research involved contacts with key informants of grassroots groups and neighborhood assemblies. The key informants contacted provided me with valuable information about the overall geography of the grassroots politics of the crisis in Greece and Spain, as well as with further contacts with movement participants in the two countries. More specifically, 6 key informants were contacted in Greece (3 in Thessaloniki and 3 in Athens) and 5 key informants were contacted in Spain (3 in Barcelona and 2 in Madrid), while through snowball technique 13 more movement participants were contacted and interviewed in Greece (8 in Thessaloniki and 5 in Athens) and 8 more movement participants were contacted and interviewed

in Spain (4 in Barcelona and 4 in Madrid). In total, 19 movement participants were interviewed in Greece (11 in Thessaloniki and 8 in Athens) and 13 movement participants were interviewed in Spain (7 in Barcelona and 6 in Madrid),⁴ although the overall number of movement participants contacted in the two countries exceeds by far the total of 32 interviews conducted. Mainly two reasons appear to have inhibited the process of interviews in both Greece and Spain: the first reason was the limited availability of movement participants and the second reason was fatigue.

In overall terms, the movement participants contacted for the purpose of the present research were willing to provide information about the movement politics of the crisis. However, in their majority, they were available for limited time intervals in between the organization of movement activities and the programming of a wide set of non-movement activities. Owing to their willingness to provide me with relevant information, I had a series of rather informative discussions with a large number of them, albeit under circumstances that were not appropriate for conducting an interview. At the same time, fatigue of the respondents posed as another inhibiting factor. The great interest of a series of actors (such as academic researchers, movement participants with an interests in conducting non-academic research about the movement politics of the crisis, journalists etc) in the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011 meant the involvement of movement participants in an exhaustive series of informative talks, discussions and interviews in the years that followed the mobilizations of the squares. The result of the above was that, during the years that fieldwork research was conducted for the present work (2013-2015), movement participants appeared to be ‘tired of giving interviews’, as many of them reported. Their continuous involvement and interest in the movement politics of the crisis, however, was a key factor that allowed me to have informal talks with them. Accordingly, a plethora of field notes was generated during informal encounters with the

⁴ see Appendix A, Table 1.

mobilizations' participants at contexts non-related to movement participation, as well as at events and contexts directly and indirectly related to their sociopolitical activism (e.g. open discussions, documentary screenings, solidarity concerts, squats etc). Field notes have been treated as off-the-record information and as such they have not been marked and numbered as distinct pieces of information, as in the case of interviews. They have served to enhance greatly my overall understanding of the movement politics of the crisis and to minimize biases in the analysis of interview materials and, accordingly, they are incorporated in the main body of the analysis of this research.

The sample of movement participants that were interviewed for this research can be variably accounted for, in terms of gender, age, educational and occupational background, experience with movement activism, political affiliations and type of grassroots movement groups participated.⁵ In particular, the total sample of interview partners of this research consists of 60% male and 40% female movement participants, more than half of whom (59,5%) belong to the age group '36-55' years old, have received higher education (62%) and mainly represent the occupational category of the 'precarious' (25%). In respect to their experience with movement activism only 9,5% of the total sample of interviewees identified themselves as 'first time participants', with the vast majority (56%) self-identifying as 'systematic participants' and 34,5% self-identifying as 'regular participants' of social movements. Furthermore, 37,5% of the interviewees self-identified during the interviews as being affiliated with left-wing politics, 28% commented that they belong to the broader anti-authoritarian/anarchist space, 31,5% declared no political affiliation, while only one participant self-identified as being 'proponent of the popular right'. Finally, 69% of the movement participants interviewed for this research are active members in neighborhood assemblies

⁵ For a detailed description of the demographic characteristics and social movement related features of the sample of movement participants interviewed for the present research, per country (Greece and Spain), per city (Thessaloniki, Athens, Barcelona, Madrid), per category (gender, age, education, main occupation, experience, movement groups and political affiliations), see Appendix B of this research (Tables 2 - 10).

born after the mass mobilisations of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados, while 31% of the interviewees take part in the movement politics of the crisis through participation in solidarity initiatives and grassroots movement groups that embrace the call for real/direct democracy and political participation and are active on a variety of fronts from the privatisation of public companies and public assets, evictions and housing, to immigration, unemployment, flexible forms of labour and precarity.

Second, information is collected through participant observation, in movement activities such as the coordination assemblies and informative events that followed the mobilizations of 2011. Participant observation is a technique that allows one to collect valuable information hardly discovered with other techniques. It is a fundamental tool for acquiring a deep understanding of the dynamics of interaction in collective action (see Robson 2007). In fact, it is a tool to collect ‘thick’ information that otherwise remains hidden in typical interactions between the researcher and the protagonists of social movements (see Balsiger & Lambelet 2014). For that matter, while the research essentially starts after the mobilizations of 2011, and therefore participant observation, in the process of either the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ or the ‘Indignados’, for the purpose of the research was not possible, participant observation in the process of the grassroots movements that followed the mobilizations of 2011 (but are driven by the protagonists of 2011), was opted for for three reasons: first, as a means to help grasp better the interactions that developed in the mobilizations of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados, beyond what has been registered in their manifestos, documents, decrees etc. Second, participant observation was opted for in order to follow closely the type of social relationships that outlived the acampadas of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados. Last, it was opted for in order to gain familiarity with the protagonists of the mobilizations and by extension to help secure access to valuable information revealed off-the-record, but also to gain close familiarity with the larger ecosystem of social contestation of the crisis that has been progressively built since the first phase of protests in 2010.

For the purpose of the present research participant observation was conducted in assemblies and events organised by grassroots movement groups and neighborhood-assembly groups active during the period 2013-2015, when fieldwork research was conducted. The assemblies of the grassroots movement groups that have been followed for this research have been open assemblies with no barriers in participation. However, in all instances participant observation followed the conducting of in-depth interviews with key informants, who helped guarantee easy access and smooth reception by the assembly members. In total, 28 assemblies and events were participated in the two countries, 20 in Greece (13 in Thessaloniki and 7 in Athens) and 8 in Spain, all of which in Barcelona.⁶ In particular, I participated in 14 assembly processes (6 in Thessaloniki, 4 in Athens and 4 in Barcelona) and 14 events organised by the grassroots movement groups (7 in Thessaloniki, 3 in Athens and 4 in Barcelona) (see Appendix C, Table 11). The assembly processes included organizational assemblies of neighborhood movement groups (i.e. ‘neighborhood assemblies’) as well as organizational assemblies of other grassroots movement groups with local action.⁷ More specifically, I followed 10 neighborhood assemblies in both Greece and Spain (6 in Thessaloniki, 1 in Athens and 3 in Barcelona) and 4 organizational assemblies of other grassroots movement groups (3 in Athens and 1 in Barcelona). It is deemed important to note here that the information collected from one neighborhood assembly in Thessaloniki has been used to enhance my overall understanding of the movement politics of the crisis, but it has not been included as such in the analysis, after the request of the participants of the assembly group. Furthermore, the information collected from one neighborhood assembly in Athens is partial and its use for the analysis has been limited, as it comes from

⁶ Participant observation was not conducted in Madrid; instead all information for the grassroots politics of the crisis in Madrid comes from in-depth interviews with Madrid based activists.

⁷ Although the actions of some of the grassroots movements groups I followed in Greece extends at the national level, with groups set up in various cities, the organizational assemblies I followed were specifically focused at the coordination of local action of the local chapters of the movement groups.

a pre-assembly process, while access for participation in the assembly was not granted.

The events at which participant observation was conducted include thematic talks, movement conferences/meetings, local events, demonstrations and one referendum. In particular, I participated in 6 thematic talks (2 in Thessaloniki, 2 in Athens and 2 in Barcelona), 2 movement conferences/meetings (1 in Thessaloniki and 1 in Barcelona), 3 local events (2 in Thessaloniki and 1 in Athens), 2 demonstrations (1 in Thessaloniki and 1 in Barcelona) and 1 referendum (in Thessaloniki). More specifically, I followed 2 thematic talks in Thessaloniki on evictions and the housing situation during the crisis, 1 thematic talk in Athens on real democracy and political participation, and 2 thematic talks in Barcelona about the politics of the crisis, urban development and gentrification and about grassroots activism and police repression. Furthermore, I followed 1 movement conference/meeting in Thessaloniki on international actions against the privatization of water companies with examples from Latin America and 1 movement conference/meeting in Barcelona. In regard to the local events, I attended 2 in Thessaloniki focusing on the organization of non-intermediary open markets and 1 in Athens focusing on the organization of local-level actions and the institution of defense groups of the spaces of grassroots local action. I also participated in 1 demonstration in Thessaloniki against the closing of the Public Broadcasting Company (ERT) that was followed by statements of local actions (movement groups and neighborhood assemblies) on the crisis and the central political scene and 1 demonstration in Barcelona against gentrification and the implementation of the Plan de Usos in the city of Barcelona. Last, I followed 1 local referendum in Thessaloniki, initiated by movement groups against the privatization of the water company of the city, in which I participated as volunteer in local polling stations. The referendum was designed to take place the same day as the Municipal Elections, thus

guaranteeing great participation and marking a deafening 98% against the privatization of the water company of Thessaloniki, EYATH.⁸

The third step of information collection for the present research involved the analysis of documents (online or otherwise) produced by the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ in the form of manifestos, decrees, minutes of popular assemblies, communiques etc. Document analysis is a technique of qualitative research which essentially takes advantage of primary sources of information that can be actually revisited multiple times. Further, it allows the researcher to put information together in an ordered fashion, in terms of dates, and therefore to create a map of the way ideas are developed over time and of the way that different meanings get highlighted at different times in the cycle of mobilizations. In overall terms, documents produced by the protestors of 2011 have been retrieved from multiple sources, such as websites, blogs, google drive accounts, and Facebook pages, when archives were not kept by the protestors or access to them was denied. Alongside manifestos, communiques, assembly decrees and statements, particular emphasis is also placed on documents which disclose information relevant to the protestors’ positions towards the project of democracy, such as statements of identification, the ‘identity’ or ‘about us’ sections, and the ‘objectives’ sections of their websites, blogs, Facebook accounts etc. (see Appendix D, Table 12).

Overall, the fieldwork research (interviews and participant observation) and the process of information collection through movement documents, has not been without challenges. In respect to fieldwork research distinct challenges were faced in the cases of Greece and Spain. In Spain, fieldwork challenges were related to limited familiarity with the national specifics of grassroots activism, which functioned as an obstacle for acquiring access to movement participants and guaranteeing their availability. At the same time,

⁸ see <https://www.newsit.gr/topikes-eidhseis/thessaloniki-ta-apotelesmata-toy-dimopsifismatos-gia-to-nero-vrontero-oxi-ton-politon/1612968/> and <https://www.newsit.gr/topikes-eidhseis/ta-prota-apotelesmata-toy-dimopsifismatos-gia-to-nero-vrontero-oxi-ton-thessalonikeon/1612550/>

in spite of explaining the purpose of my research and the fact that it is conducted in my capacity as academic researcher, I was often misunderstood as a journalist covering the 'Indignados' for the Greek press. Accordingly, while the movement participants contacted were willing, in their vast majority, to provide information about the movement politics of the crisis over an informal talk, they would often question whether having the discussion recorded is necessary 'since you are a student'. In Greece, fieldwork challenges were related to issues that have to do with trust in academic institutions and funded research. In two instances, radical grassroots movement activists refused to provide information for what they considered 'a state funded research'. Accordingly, in both instances I was questioned about the funding of the present research, interviews were explicitly denied, further participation in assembly meetings was implicitly denied, while in one instance the use of any information retrieved from the discussions that took place in my presence was explicitly denied too, in fear that information would be purposively manipulated. Although it is impossible to claim that the encounters with both movement groups have not contributed in shaping my overall understanding of the development of interactions in the movement politics of the crisis, with respect to the activists' request, no information retrieved from my field notes of these encounters has been used in the analysis of this research. In general terms, however, information collection (through interviews and participant observation) for the Greek 'Aganaktismenoi' has been significantly easier when compared to the overall process of information collection for the Spanish 'Indignados'. The reason for this is my greater familiarity with the Greek movements and therefore my more efficient engagement in analyzing the dispositions of movement participants and accordingly using cues that helped establish better rapport and relative trust with them —thus in turn helping establish better bridges of communication and secure that valuable information is indeed revealed.

Finally, information collection through movement documents for the Greek 'Aganaktismenoi' posed the greatest challenge of this research,

compared to process of retrieving movement documents of the Spanish 'Indignados'. The reason for this is that while a large amount of protest material of the 'Indignados' is kept online and remains accessible to the public, the information infrastructure of the 'Aganaktismenoi' has largely dissolved, with the Facebook accounts of the mobilizations deleted and the official websites shut down. From all the above a problem of asymmetry of information collected for the two country cases is raised, which indicates potential biases in the analysis. However, the combined examination of the information collected through documents produced by the protestors, the information collected from in-depth interviews with the protestors and the information collected through participant observation in the processes of collective action, may be relied on to redress such biases as much as possible, thus setting up a system for understanding of the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011 that is as integrated as possible. This system of understanding has been further polished by information retrieved from relevant material such as magazines, fanzines, posters etc, produced by the protestors. Next to this, for both mobilisation cases, messages depicted on mobilisation banners are also included in the analysis, as well as messages depicted in graffiti activity (see Appendix E, Visual Materials). This was so on the basis of understanding them as instances in which we can see the creation of highly visible 'alternative counter-hegemonic spaces of representation' (Zaimakis 2015: 373), which capture the collective consciousness of the protestors and thus provide invaluable information about their framings and their identifications. Last, all information collected for the purpose of this research is treated under the premise of source anonymity, as it was guaranteed to the interviewees at all instances and as it was in turn underlined by some of them, with the exception of information from materials that are already made public by the various movement groups themselves, such as magazines, newspapers etc., and which are accordingly cited and references in the bibliography section.

The outline of the research

This research consists in five parts. The first two parts focus on rendering wholly intelligible the country cases (Greece and Spain) and the unit of analysis of this research (European wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations) in their own right. In this direction the first part of the research puts the Greek and the Spanish cases in historical perspective and examines them comparatively. Here, historical similarities and differences are delineated between the two countries, which help understand how Greece and Spain are embedded in a ‘most similar system’ design, being cases as similar as possible yet exhibiting a crucial difference that can accordingly help explain differences in the characteristics of contemporary sociopolitical contestation (chapter 1). The second part of the research puts the conception of ‘movement politics of the crisis’ in historical perspective. Here, the movement politics of the crisis is examined in the broader framework of the autonomous tradition, as resistance to neoliberalism. The basic precepts of horizontality, deliberation and prefiguration are explored in the broader history of anti-neoliberal resistance inspired by the autonomous tradition. Accordingly, the Global Justice Movement is closely followed and lines of continuity between the ‘movement of movements’ and the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2010-2011 are traced (chapter 2).

Contemporary movement politics of the crisis are further examined in Greece and Spain in particular, by following nation-specific movements identified as early risers of contemporary anti-austerity mobilizations and brokers of the autonomous precept of anti-neoliberal resistance, in Greece and Spain. In turn, the way in which contemporary sociopolitical contestation is informed by historically shaped movement cultures of resistance is examined. The first phase of the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity mobilizations in 2010 is examined here and two distinct movement cultures are revealed for the two countries -closely informed by the distinct political cultures of Greece and Spain respectively. In accordance to the logic of sociopolitical contestation that

these movement cultures reference, I term them the logic of the ‘Big Night’ in Greece and the logic of the ‘Long Days’ in Spain (chapter 3). Parts three, four and five focus on the cross-national comparison of the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations and deal with specific research questions. In particular, the third part of the research examines the crisis of the political and specifically explores the political critique of the mobilizations by means of engaging in an analysis of their diagnostic framings (chapter 4). Furthermore, the movement politics of the crisis are examined in this part and specifically the political advocacy of the mobilizations, by means of an analysis of their prognostic framings (chapter 5).

The fourth part of the research examines the collective identifications of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations and specifically explores the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados as constructs of ‘tense unity’. First, focus is placed on examining the collective identifications of the mobilizations as constructs of *relative unity*. The key features signaled out in this examination are processes of de-classing and the incipient formation of an indeterminate identification of the ‘precari-us’ (chapter 6). Then, focus is placed on examining the collective identifications of the mobilizations as constructs of *relative tension*. The key feature singled out in this examination is tensions in the ideological interpretations of the Aganaktismenoi, and accordingly tensions in the ideological interpretations of the Indignados, which altogether show each of the two movements to actually be a movement with two ‘souls’ (chapter 7).

Last, the fifth part of the research examines the third phase of the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations between 2012-2014. This examination demonstrates that the third phase of mobilizations in Greece and Spain is similarly characterized by crucial differences that have to do with the different logics of sociopolitical contestation employed in each case (these logic being shaped by broader historical sociopolitical developments in the national context), therefore concluding that contemporary collective action in Greece and Spain is

informed by nation-specific cultures of resistance, despite commonly belonging to a broader European, or for that matter South European, wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy contestation (chapter 8).

Part I - NATIONAL HISTORY & CULTURES OF SOCIOPOLITICAL CONTESTATION

Anti-austerity and pro-democracy movements emerged in many different countries around the world. Arab countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, took the lead in late 2010, while in the spring of 2011 large-scale mobilizations in response to the contemporary crisis of democratic legitimacy swept many European countries, among which were Portugal, Spain and Greece. The relevant scholarly literature has provided a number of comparative analyses of these cases, exploring the transnational dimension of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, and the presence of linkages (political and cultural) between anti-austerity protests taking place across different countries and even regions (see for example a comparative examination of the Greek and the Tunisian protests, Sergi and Vogiatzoglou 2013) or continents (see for example the examination of linkages between the Spanish protests and the protests of OWS in the US, Romanos 2016). In all these instances the diffusion of discourses that contested extant political systems and the diffusion of practices of democracy oriented towards grassroots political involvement are firmly acknowledged. In this direction, the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2010-2011 are largely understood to represent a global wave of protests (see Flesher Fominaya 2014a), which developed through ‘cross-national diffusion of frames and repertoires of action from one country to the next’ (della Porta 2012: 274). Accordingly, in its analysis, recent research has often employed theories and concepts developed in the wake of the wave of global justice mobilizations that started with the demonstrations of Seattle in 1999 and spread around the world.

What we commonly refer to as the GJM (Global Justice Movement) spread around the world as a ‘movement of movements’ (see Mertes 2004),

through transnational networks of activists and later on also through the institution of organizational bodies such as the World Social Forum (WSF) and the European Social Forum (ESF), which further facilitated the construction of common frameworks of critique of neoliberal globalization (see della Porta 2007). These frameworks of critique have represented the existence of multifaceted networks, reflecting different significations of democracy and different practices that were intermingled in a global wave of resistance to neoliberal capitalism (see della Porta 2007; 2009b). The anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2010-2011 essentially represent a new global wave of mobilizations following up on this mix of critique and practices of the GJM (see also della Porta 2012). The discourses and practices developed in the 'movement of movements', rather than disappearing, have effectively remained alive and kicking. In this direction social movement research on the contemporary movements of the crisis understands the global wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations as a new cycle of contestation, which crossed national boundaries on account of the protestors' critique, significations and practices of democracy, resonating between different countries, regions, and continents: a matter of spatial diffusion from Arab countries to Europe and the US (see della Porta and Mattoni 2014). At the same time, however, in the relevant literature it is also highlighted that the contemporary global wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, rather than a 'movement of movements' in the sense that the GJM was examined, retains elements of more constricted frameworks which are of key importance for its thorough understanding (see also Flesher Fominaya 2014a).

In what regards the European anti-austerity mobilizations of 2011, the relevant literature proposes that they are mobilizations characterized by the absence of a 'shared European vision', which in turn reflects 'the absence of a pan-European democratic space and of a clear set of European political institutions social movements can confront in pursuing their goals' (Pianta and Gerbaudo 2015: 33). On account of such absence of an integrated European democratic space and institutions to be contested by social movements, it is

suggested that the contestation of neoliberal politics increasingly appears to ‘retreat to the context of national politics’ (ibid. 2015: 2). Along these lines, it is not only argued that national politics have increasing relevance in the analysis of the European wave of anti-austerity mobilizations, but that this may represent an actually worrisome development in the field of social movements and collective action. The reason is that it could possibly reflect a progressive shift of priorities in social contestation that confronts us with ‘the idea of a reversal of European integration’ (Pianta and Gerbaudo 2015). While this is an interesting argument, I find a different angle to the absence of a ‘shared European vision’ from the recent anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations. This angle has to do with the increasing necessity to bring ‘history’ back into the analysis of collective action. So, next to Pianta and Gerbaudo’s concern for a possible retreat of anti-neoliberal contestation ‘to the context of national politics’, the present research adds also a concern for the need to re-appreciate the relevance of national (socioeconomic and political) histories in contemporary anti-neoliberal contestation and social movement analysis.

Recent research shows that while the economic crisis does matter in sociopolitical contestation, in terms of representing ‘a shared experience able to produce consequences on political processes’, it does so ‘not as one monolithic factor that generates homogeneous outcomes’ (Zamponi and Bosi 2016: 421). Instead, such different political processes appear to be differently pronounced in different European countries, this having to do with differences in overall socioeconomic and political developments in these countries (see also Karyotis and Rüdig 2017). In this direction, some scholars further suggest that despite the transnational diffusion of cultural elements, in reality what are often examined as aspects of a generalized cosmopolitanism (in regards to politics, but also in regards to social contestation) can be actually understood as elements which coexist in varying degrees in many countries without, however, necessarily changing the ‘hardcore of national identities’ (see Sakellaropoulos 2011).

Critical examples that highlight the significance of national histories for understanding the recent European -or more specifically Southern European- anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations are the cases of Italy and Portugal. Compared to their Southern European counterparts (i.e. Greece and Spain) that represent the contemporary front of Southern European occupy-style anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations (see Baumgarten 2013; Zamponi and Fernández González 2016; Flesher Fominaya 2017), Italy and Portugal emerge as the outliers of the Southern European response to the global crisis, although they have been also significantly affected by the crisis. The relevant scholarly research suggests that the explanatory factor of this variation is national history. In regards to Italy, Zamponi proposes that the reasons for the much less influential role of the Italian protests in the global but also the European wave of anti-austerity mobilizations, and the failure to start similar occupy-style mobilizations, can be found only through a closer exploration of the political context of Italy, allowing a deeper historical contextualization and understanding of the Italian movements in particular (see Zamponi 2012). The large-scale highly heterogeneous mobilizations of the ‘Geração à Rasca’ in Portugal, set it apart from the Italian case, but the absence of sustained occupy-style mobilizations, such as those of Greece and Spain, put it next to Italy as an outlier of the Southern European response. Baumgarten, similarly to Zamponi for the case of Italy, concludes about the Portuguese anti-austerity mobilizations: ‘the state is the main target of the Portuguese protests and the public discourse is Portugal-specific...The organizational structure as well as most of the claims and frames of the movement remain country-specific’ (2013: 469).

At the same time, it holds true that when singling out of the Southern European wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations the cases of the Greek and Spanish movements we are immediately confronted with a set of striking similarities, from their historical embeddedness in a common narrative of economic and political development contoured by their late and virtually simultaneous transition to democratic rule of law in the mid-1970s, to

their contemporary embeddedness in a common narrative of fiscal and socio-economic indiscipline granting them a prominent place in the troubled economies of the South, or even the outlook of their recent response to the crisis delineated by sustained occupy-style mobilizations, similar repertoires of action with peaceful protests severely repressed by the police forces and similar demands for democratisation. In this sense, even if national history can be an explanatory factor for the Italian and Portuguese cases, it feels counterintuitive to suggest that the same is true for the Greek and Spanish mobilizations. Instead, the great impact of the crisis on Greece and Spain (see harsh economic adjustments, implementation of tight fiscal policies and austerity measures accompanied by generous cuts in public spending and processes of a hasty rationalization of the organizational core of the state apparatus) appears to have greater leverage in the analysis, in the sense that the recent anti-austerity and pro-democracy movements cannot be understood without including into the equation the recent economic/financial crisis.

The recent scholarly research suggests that the impact of the economic crisis in itself is not enough to explain variations in the emergence and development of these mobilizations across country cases (Flesher Fominaya 2017). The cases of Italy and Portugal discussed above clearly illustrate the point. I suggest that the cases of Greece and Spain follow in the same direction. The reason is that the background against which the broader European wave of mobilizations emerged and developed (both prominent examples, such as Greece and Spain, and outliers, such as Italy and Portugal), is sketched by a double crisis, not just by the economic/financial crisis. This background cannot be understood without bringing 'history' back into the analysis, in order to render intelligible that what we are dealing with is an economic crisis on the one hand and a crisis of democratic legitimacy on the other. Therefore, speaking about 'the crisis' as an explanatory factor of the recent mobilizations, it is necessary to be attentive to the fact that we are not speaking about economic crisis alone, rather we are speaking about a historical crisis with two

edges, a crisis with two faces, or what Flesher Fominaya describes as ‘twin crises’:

[T]he financial crisis and austerity policies brought into sharp relief the long-term crisis of legitimacy of representative democracy in Europe. To the extent that these ‘twin’ crises are framed synergistically, they can be seen as *counter-hegemonic*, as they seek not only to contest specific austerity policies but to rupture the (post-political) consensus around the neoliberal order underpinning the (neo)liberal state and representative democracy (2017: 2; original emphasis).

Following the above, it becomes clearer why the task of examining the European anti-austerity and pro-democracy movements requires us to be attentive to the role of national history -even when at first sight it seems to be of little relevance. Rather than recurring to a strictly ‘economistic’ explanation of contemporary sociopolitical contestation that becomes confined to the ‘economic side’ of the crisis, as a point of rupture in economic normality, it is necessary to broaden the perspective of contemporary movement research and pay attention also to the ‘democratic side’ of the crisis, containing the fundamental tension between democracy and capitalism: i.e. a tension that manifests itself in the recurrent dynamics of historical capitalism and the recurrent crises of democratic legitimacy. The fact that, despite their clearly anti-austerity character, the mobilizations of late 2010-2011 were self-denominated as ‘democracy movements’, underlining thus their pro-democracy character, is also a testament to this. Along these lines, I argue that the contemporary European anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, rather than confronting us with the ‘idea of a reversal of European integration’ (Pianta and Gerbaudo 2015), most importantly confront us with the necessity to re-examine the institution of representative democracy, its different historical expressions across Europe and, accordingly, the way it is

being differently contested across country cases on the occasion of the recent economic crisis; rather than due to the economic crisis alone.

In this direction, the present research argues that the recent European wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations is not so much stirring concerns about a possible retreat of anti-neoliberal contestation to ‘the context of national politics’, but it is primarily urging us to revise priorities in movement research by bringing national histories back into the analysis of social contestation. The scholarly literature proposes that the anti-neoliberal contestation of late 2010-2011 confronted us with an assemblage of movements: that is, a ‘global wave of movements’, rather than a ‘global movement’ itself, in the sense that ‘national contexts continue to provide the most immediate and relevant point of reference for movement actors —from legal restrictions or opportunities for protest, levels of repression, national political cultures that facilitate or constrain mobilization, national alliance structures between political parties, trade unions and grassroots movements, and much more’ (Flesher Fominaya 2014a: 194). Following on this, I propose that the movements of the recent European wave of anti-neoliberal contestation need to be treated as clusters of experiences that can be wholly understood only through a closer inspection of the sort of cultures of resistance they represent against the historical and recurrent crisis of democratic legitimacy.

Finally, thus, even if the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity mobilizations of 2011 form part of the global, European, Southern European wave of contestation of capitalist restructuring, they cannot be properly understood without paying closer attention to the national histories of the two countries. This is suggested, though, neither as a move of ascertaining some sort of reversal of European integration nor as a move of ascertaining some sort of plasmatic ascendancy of national identities. Instead, it is suggested to be a necessary move for reorienting movement research to grasp subtle variations behind similar movement responses to the crisis: in short, that is, to render intelligible movement responses that reflect historically shaped cultures

of resistance to the crisis of democratic legitimacy. The first part of this research develops in this direction and examines the cases of Greece and Spain comparatively and in historical perspective, with the purpose to delineate the context in which Greek and Spanish movements developed in the recent history of the two countries. By delineating the socioeconomic and political histories of Greece and Spain, the ultimate aim of this part of the research is to shed some light on the way the Greek and the Spanish movement culture of resistance has been shaped in recent history, in order to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the culture of sociopolitical contestation that informs the recent Greek and Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, before delving deeper into examining comparatively their specific aspects.

1. Greece and Spain in historical perspective

In broad terms, the examination of movement politics as a question of a relatively consistent whole of social critique and political practice (rather than a matter of individual protest groups and instances of mobilization) is understood as a task that calls for taking into account a series of factors that either critically affect or simply inform, but in all instances indisputably influence and eventually shape this politics. The specific focus of this quest, however, varies in respect to different philosophies of analysis of sociopolitical developments. In this direction we find the scholarly literature of social and political sciences divided between those approaches traditionally concerned with the economic preconditions of democratic sociopolitical development (see Dahl 1971: 62-80; Diamond 1992; Lipset 1960; 1994; Przeworski et. al. 1996; Przeworski and Limongi 1997), and those approaches underscoring the special role of political attitudes in influencing democratic development as a whole (but also their role in influencing the specific functioning of democratic institutions in particular) (see Almond and Verba 1963). Merits are recognized in both approaches and in this direction it is largely acknowledged that in reality both structural and cultural concerns in regards to the shaping of movement politics inescapably 'lead us into the central system of the industrial-capitalist mode of production and among others into its system of classes' (Williams 1985: 130). Notwithstanding the merits of both approaches, the present research opts to emphasize the relevance of political culture in shaping the whole of critique and practices that movement politics represent. The reason is that the cases examined in this research, that is Greece and Spain, have been similarly stigmatized by rather significant sociopolitical developments in their recent history, thus hinting at the possibly greater importance of political culture in the examination of movement activity.

Political culture as such, however, while it might be deemed of greater relevance in the analysis of movement politics, constitutes a fairly abstract

category of analysis, thus raising some critical difficulties in regards to how its role can be understood and examined. This is because the link between movement activity and highly abstract categories is practically ‘broken’, since in reality ‘movements do not react to abstract categories but to a limited set of their derivatives’ (della Porta 1995: 56). Taking this into account, we can actually see the role of political culture in the configuration of movement politics appropriately explored by way of examining ‘derivatives’ of the broader political culture of specific national contexts. Following on this, I propose here that in cases such as those of Greece and Spain, in view of their turbulent sociopolitical history and their similar classification as third wave democracies, it is the role of narratives of democratic transition and post-transition that can be singled out as such ‘derivatives’, and that can shed some light on the political culture of Greece and Spain —accordingly, then, also help shed some light on the ways the Greek and the Spanish movement culture has developed. This, however, automatically raises here issues of temporality, since what it essentially means is to use earlier frames of political culture in order to explain new politics. The key to resolving this tension is the conception of ‘eventful temporality’ as explained by William Sewell. That is, a recognition of the fact that ‘events are normally “path dependent”, that is, what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time’ (Sewell 1990: 16; see also Sewell 2005: 100).

Following along these lines, I argue that contemporary movement politics in the Southern European cases of Greece and Spain can be understood as politics that draw on the broader political culture of the two countries as shaped in their recent post-transition histories. There are two demands satisfied in this argument. The first is the demand to take into account the significant impact of historical events on the life courses and the political choices of the participants, but also on their descendants, because the symbolic relevance of these events also ‘spreads to those not directly involved, changing routines and disrupting institutions’ (della Porta 2008: 220). Therefore, understanding contemporary movement politics through the influence of

political culture, specified here as the outgrowth of earlier sociopolitical transformations bound up with democratic development, makes the analysis more receptive to tracing the symbolic relevance of political history for the political critique, practices, desires and struggles of today. The second is the demand to establish a system of comparative analysis in which meaningful national and cross-national interpretations become possible. In other words it serves to render movement politics intelligible within the specific sociohistorical context of the two cases of Greece and Spain on the one hand, and on the other to set a scheme of analysis that fits the quintessential logic of comparative research through a most-similar system design —i.e. a system of classification for which ‘one should find cases that are as similar as possible, in as many aspects as possible, and then find a crucial difference that can explain what one wants to explain’ (Przeworski 1995: 17). The tracing of a connecting line between contemporary movement politics in Greece and Spain and the narratives of democratic transition and post-transition in the two countries, serves both these demands since it helps render the case of each country intelligible as a whole, and takes advantage of the remarkably similar recent historical contexts of Greece and Spain, to establish a most-similar comparative design that renders the cross-national interpretations intelligible too.

This chapter unfolds thus in two parts. The first part explores the historical parallels between Greece and Spain through a brief examination of their post-war socioeconomic transformations and the political transformations tied to their development. The aim here is to establish the *ceteris paribus* rule that can effectively show Greece and Spain as cases indeed ‘as similar as possible, in as many aspects as possible’. The second part explores the historical divergences between Greece and Spain by means of focusing on their democratic transition and the way it shaped their post-transition political culture. Here the aim is to find the ‘crucial difference that can explain what one wants to explain’: that is, to find the key that can help explore the *Aganaktismenoi* and the *Indignados* as cases of protest that belong

to the same wave of contestation, but represent different, nation-specific types of social relationships in their collective identifications and different, nation-specific types of confrontation in view of achieving their common demands. In short, the aim of the second part is to trace the impact of national histories on contemporary transnational contestation.

Historical parallels

Exploring movement politics in the Southern European cases of Greece and Spain is a task that presupposes a clear understanding of the specific sociohistorical context of the cases of the two countries. More specifically, this is a task of setting clear the sociohistorical correspondences between Greece and Spain, and thus of acquiring a sense of proportion of the similarities (and thereafter also the differences) of the two countries in regards to their larger sociohistorical development. Three markedly similar developments that have fundamentally contoured the Greek and the Spanish sociopolitical environment are highlighted here:

- a) the socioeconomic transformations by way of which domestic bourgeoisies have been historically established in Greece and Spain, ‘divided by internal contradictions and dependent on foreign capital’ (Poulantzas 1976: 51)
- b) the unease and turbulent passage through the 20th century, which resulted in late transitions to the democratic rule of law for both countries (Huntington 1991; 1992)
- c) the challenging processes of democratization, through which a democratic state was formed and political institutionalization was achieved (Lyrintzis 1984; Caciagli 1984; Kohler 1982).

Socioeconomic transformations: dependent capitalism, process of proletarianization, and politicization in post-war Greece and Spain

One of the most commonly examined features of noteworthy similarities between Greece and Spain is that of their socioeconomic trajectories since the

early 1950s (see Poulantzas 1976). These are trajectories, which have been largely set against the backdrop of delayed industrialization processes, and which in turn meant a protracted reliance of the larger socioeconomic development of both countries on pre-capitalist modes of production, well into the era of the capitalist economy. In economic terms, the period that starts after the end of WWII and up to the early 1950s, most commonly referred to as the postwar economic boom, is considered to have been one of the most affluent periods in the history of the 20th century and is often characterized as the Golden Age of Capitalism (Marglin and Schor 2000). Greece and Spain followed on the trail of the flourishing global economy throughout the 1950s, while exhibiting certain distinctive, and commonly shared, features of socioeconomic development. Greece followed the economic growth of the postwar period throughout the 1950s, recording the highest rates of economic growth in its history (Tsaliki 1991). This trend of rapid growth is largely accounted as having fostered the progressive shift from the old economic model of agriculture-based production to an economy of industrial production. In fact, in the first decade after the end of the war the production based economy had doubled, and by the end of the 1960s the contribution of agricultural and industrial production was almost equalized (Tsaliki 1991). Spain followed pretty much the same model of rapid economic growth around the same period. While the period that preceded the 1950s has been commonly registered in public memory as '*los años de hambre*' (the hunger years) for Spain (Romero Salvadó 1999: 126), the decade of the 1950s is the decade during which previous regulations in the economy were progressively relaxed by virtue of forces of 'cautious liberalization', which brought about the acceleration of growth rates (Prados de la Escosura et.al. 2010: 2). These processes were very much linked with the Francoist regime and the fact that by the mid-1950s it had entered a phase of normalization and political stability (Romero Salvadó 1999: 146), which actually represented a turning point for the Spanish economy, breaking away from the economic policies that had

marked the country since the mid-19th century (Prados de la Escosura et.al. 2010: 5).

However, in both cases of Greece and Spain, the economic growth of the 1950s, and the modernization of economic activity by which it was accompanied in both countries, took place not so much by virtue of contained forces, as by an ‘accelerated penetration and reproduction of capitalism’, which forcefully swept away previous patterns of distribution of socioeconomic power (see Poulantzas 1976: 69). The result was that the large peasantry of the agricultural economies of Greece and Spain, which had traditionally dominated the broader socioeconomic order, were abruptly sidelined, opening space for the rapid development of a ‘domestic bourgeoisie’ around the growth of small-scale production.⁹ This had a double socioeconomic effect for post-war Greece. On the one hand, the rapidity with which economic modernization took place meant leaving unaddressed the major economic weaknesses behind this development, and this absence of necessary economic consolidation meant the creation of a bourgeoisie that lacked economic strength and autonomy. So, expanded but significantly weak, the emergent economic elite remained heavily dependent on foreign capital¹⁰ (see Poulantzas 1976). On the other hand, the haste of the industrialization processes left its mark on the social terrain, as it resulted in an equally rapid proletarianization of the population, which in combination with rapid urbanization processes led to an alarming increase in suburban unemployment rates (see Kornetis 2008). In Spain the picture is similar to that of Greece, altogether summarized in the generation of processes of increased urbanization and proletarianization, by virtue of

⁹ The ‘domestic bourgeoisie’ is considered to represent nationally confined interests, distinct from the interests of foreign capital, which are commonly represented by the ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ or ‘oligarchy’ see Poulantzas, N. (1976), *The Crisis of the Dictatorships. Portugal, Greece, Spain*, London: NLB, p. 42. For the concept of ‘comprador economy’ in the contemporary socio-historical phase of capitalist development see Fouskas, V.K. (2013). “Whatever Happened to Greece?”, *The Political Quarterly*, 84(1): 132-8.

¹⁰ In fact, in the period between the 1950s and the mid-1970s, the yearly growth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows was recorded to be of a significant 8.7% see Tsaliki, P. (1991). *The Greek economy: sources of growth in the postwar era*. New York: Praeger; Alexiou, C. and Tsaliki, P. (2007). “Foreign Direct Investment – Led Growth Hypothesis: Evidence from the Greek Economy”, in *Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business*, 10(1): 85-97.

economic reforms pushed forward by a weak bourgeoisie, and altogether resulting in high 'foreign 'dependency' and increased internal tensions (Prados de la Escosura 2007: 148). On the one hand economic modernization in the closed Spanish domestic market was practically impossible, thus unleashing an uncontrolled inflation and sharpening the deficit in the balance of payments (Romero Salvadó 1999: 147). In fact, this was so much so that by 1959 Spain, it is suggested, was recording an indeed 'untenable economic situation' (Prados de la Escosura et.al. 2010: 3). On the other hand, the processes of the economic liberalization had brought agriculture to a situation of stagnation. Progressive proletarianization, in combination with rising prices and static wages, created an explosive mixture, even for the standards of the highly repressive Francoist regime, in the industrial centres of Spain, thus generating a series of strikes for wages' increase (Romero Salvadó 1999: 147).

In the years that followed throughout the 1960s, in Greece, the old dominant peasantry was progressively thrust at the margins of economic activity and was progressively transformed into an increasingly large 'suburban proletariat'. At the same time, however, the domestic bourgeoisie remained substantially weak, deeply divided, and largely incapable of handling the 'internationalization of production' (see Kornetis 2008: 253; Poulantzas 1976: 51). The result was an explosive combination, progressively built: of increasing demands of the proletarianized peasantry for social welfare on the one hand, and the deepening of internal contradictions in the 'power bloc' on the other. Altogether, these were developments that echoed the major unresolved tensions of the industrialization-proletarianization nexus. They were tensions which were not to be resolved by way of meaningful structural reforms, but by means of a significant enlargement of the 'education apparatus', which was understood to be sufficient to postpone the solution of the problem until the next generation (see Poulantzas 1976: 68-9). In this direction, higher education was progressively established as the only 'viable exit' for the children of the old peasantry, which however was still seeking to find its place in the economy of industrial production. Indeed, the Greek youth

of the 1960s, albeit highly educated (when compared to the generation of its parents) and settled in the urban centres of industrial production, remained largely disconnected from the actual processes of production. This is understood here as a sociohistorical instance of great import for it has actually led to one of the most significant social transformations in the modern history of Greece. That is, standing at the margins of capitalist growth, while at the same time deeply embroiled in a politicized understanding of this production and its specificities, the Greek youth of the 1960s grew into a different ‘mode of generation’.¹¹ Put in other words, it emerged as a ‘separate social category’ (see Kornetis 2013: 13), distinct from the generation of its parents, and with potential that came to fruition in the years that followed, playing a critical role in the larger sociopolitical developments of the 1970s: in the decade during which the world was confronted with the end of the capitalist miracle of the postwar (i.e. the 1973 oil crisis, the effects of which were strongly imprinted on the Greek economy too),¹² while in Greece, socioeconomic configurations resembled an unconvincing ‘combination of free market economy with strong elements of statism’ (Pepelasi 2011), and the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1974 was introducing the country to a new historical era.

Relatively similar processes as those unfolding in the case of Greece are recorded also for the case of Spain. First, by the 1960s the previously dominant peasantry was finding itself socially displaced and neglected by the regime’s technocratic planning, while at the same time it remained unrepresented by

¹¹ The concept of ‘mode of generation’ grows beyond the obvious generational cleavage described in terms of age-groups. It originates from Pierre Bourdieu’s study on asset systems and in particular on emerging discrepancies between economic and cultural capital —the certified form of which constitutes education. Bourdieu conceptualizes the ‘mode of generation’ as a system of changes “in the state of the relations between the education system and the class structure”. In this direction, it is used here to summarize the outgrowth of such different relations between education and class worked out over different social trajectories. see Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, pp. 82-3.

¹² In the period from 1973 to 1981, the yearly growth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flow was recording a dramatic low of -19,57%. Given the heavy dependence of economic growth on foreign capital this decrease was translated as a particularly heavy blow to the economy. It is in the early 1980s that the general picture seems to be reversed, although in reality it was not significantly changed, for what is often interpreted as a growth of the economy in the mid-1980s was actually funds from the then European Economic Community for purposes of administrative modernization, see Tsaliki, P. (1991). *The Greek economy: sources of growth in the postwar era*. New York: Praeger.

the official unions. In view of the increasing proletarianization around this period, the Catholic associations took the lead as the most safe route to 'unionizing' under Franco's repressive regime, thus becoming attractive for a significantly large part of the workers (Romero Salvadó 1999: 150). In fact, workers standing in opposition to the Church's allegiance to the regime still played, through the church's associations, a critical role in the organization of the first strikes during the early 1960s. By the end of the decade they had already created extended networks of organization, which organized labour unrest despite the regime's repression, so that 'despite being punished by law, Spain in the 1970s was the country in the Western world with the highest level of industrial action and labour militancy' (ibid.: 151). Second, by the late 1960s Spain had managed to catch up with its neighbouring countries, as much in economic as in social terms. In this direction, along with economic modernization the country was also witnessing the creation of a 'modern consumer society', fueled by the modern values of western Europe (Kornetis 2008). The old conservative middle classes, which by the 1960s consisted of the 'new industrial and commercial elites which had replaced in economic power the old landed oligarchy', shifted away from the authoritarian regime, which was not providing them with outlets for political expression, and was impeding 'Spain's accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) and increased the likelihood of social unrest' (Romero Salvadó 1999: 152). Third, the economic boom of the 1960s brought an increase in numbers of higher education graduates who were exposed to critical revolutionary texts and were radicalized to anti-Francoist resistance through their university experiences, creating a powerful force which the regime was proving incapable of containing. This was so especially in view of the tensions being transferred from the general society to the political establishment, by means of the mighty confrontation of the *inmobelistas* by the *aperturistas*, propelling the opening up of the regime (Romero Salvadó 1999: 155), and setting conditions which after the death of Franco would introduce Spain to a new epoch.

Political transformations: late transitions and ‘difficult’ democracies

Altogether, it is correct to say that the tracing of similarities between Spain and Greece certainly does not stop at their post-war socioeconomic development. Quite the contrary: the identification of commonalities between the two countries is well established in the legacy of experiences of considerable political instability. Turbulent civil wars and authoritarian regimes are the major historical features that have deeply stigmatized both countries and have strongly shaped their sociopolitical development (see Figure 4). Spain, on the one hand, experienced a harsh civil war from 1936 until 1939, which was followed by the establishment of a long-lasting authoritarian regime from 1939 until 1975, by way of Franco’s dictatorship. Greece, on the other hand, experienced a series of turbulent historical events in the same period, which include the establishment of Metaxas’ dictatorship from 1936 until 1941, a brutal and deeply divisive civil war from 1946 until 1949 that lead to a deep national schism, and a harsh military dictatorship from 1967 until 1974. Next to all the above, the political histories of Spain and Greece are further paralleled by the contemporaneous collapse of their latest authoritarian regimes during the mid-1970s, which in turn signaled a common late and virtually simultaneous entry into a lasting struggle for the firm consolidation of democratic rule of law.




Figure 4: Sequence of civil wars and authoritarian regimes in Greece (above) and Spain (below)

In the broader European perspective, the late democratic transitions of Greece and Spain classify them as ‘third wave democracies’ (see Huntington 1991; 1992). In practice this means that both countries fall under the same analytical paradigm of late democratic development and subsequent relative political backwardness. Indeed, both countries represent examples of a largely contested democratic consolidation. This was the case almost ten years after the transition had taken place, when the firm consolidation of democracy was still disputed (see Pridham 1984; Lyrinzis 1984; Caciagli 1984), and it remained so also during the second decade that followed (see Pridham 1990). In this direction, the sociopolitical status of both Greece and Spain, especially in regards to the first period after the transition, has been accurately summarized by the concept of ‘difficult democracies’ (see Pridham 1984). In the relevant literature ‘difficult democracies’ are so classified in respect to three main elements: a) inefficiency of political bureaucratic structures, b) extreme government ‘overload’ due to socio-economic backwardness, c) instability and possible threats to the continued existence of these democracies (Pridham 1984: 10). Altogether, these are elements that constitute common denominators of the political systems of both Greece and Spain. In fact, put together, these elements provide a succinct and comprehensive summary of the larger political configurations of post-military junta Greece and post-Francoist Spain, well into the 1980s: i.e. considerably erratic political systems primarily focused on the configuration of (contested) political party organizations, rather than on citizens’ rights.

In scholarly political analysis, emphasis on political party organizations, over the system of relations maintaining civil society, is largely interpreted as a characteristic intrinsic to processes of regime change. In the words of Peter Mair, ‘in situations where democratization has resulted from a change of regime rather than from a process of enfranchisement, we see democracy itself being identified not in terms of the citizens’ rights, but rather in terms of the existence of a plurality of parties, which compete against one another in free elections’ (Mair 1995:41). The post-transition political landscape of Spain

constitutes an excellent example of this premise. In broad strokes, the Spanish ‘pacted-transition’ meant the limited participation of citizens in the negotiations for political restructuring, which were mostly secretive and exclusive to a limited number of political elites (see Field and Hamann 2008: 4-7). In this context, the notion of civil society appeared remote and emphasis was placed instead on institutional politics and their defense (through the introduction of conflict-control mechanisms) against the compromised willingness of political elites to collaborate for the restructuring of the political system. The Spanish party scene of the post-Francoist era was characterized by such an increased political fragmentation that, after the legalization of political parties in 1976, Spain was counting almost two hundred of them (see Caciagli 1984; Kohler 1982). Nevertheless, being parties of significantly small political leverage, they were soon sidelined by persisting centralization tendencies.

In a similar fashion the emphasis on institutional politics constituted the central concern of political life in post-dictatorial Greece. However, the ‘involvement’ of citizens at large was different compared to the Spanish case. In Spain pressures for political change were mainly built up from below but actual political changes were initiated from above, in closed off negotiations: a process which signified an official break between popular demands and elite responsiveness. In Greece, by contrast, democratic pretensions about political inclusion were considerably more pronounced (even though they did not always translate into corresponding political practices). Throughout the sweeping political changes after the inter-war period and the series of erratic political alliances that these political changes implied, Greek politics were traditionally dominated by the cultivation of a patriotic rhetoric, which translated the ‘political development’ into ‘national interest’ and the ‘citizen’ into ‘patriot’. In search of a decisive break with the conservative connotations embedded in this rhetoric (as well as the strong anti-communist sentiments it has been consistently accompanied by), Greek politics in the aftermath of the transition embraced a popular rhetoric aspiring to redress the conservative and anti-communist political culture of the past. In reality, however, this

meant only the embeddedness of a clientelist politics, where far-reaching patronage networks became established as viable routes of political activity. In this sense, the Greek political system functioned as an extended system of political patronage, where “special favors” became the “valid currency” of politics and favoritism almost assumed a “moral quality” (Gounaris 2008: 122). In sum, these processes declared the ‘client-citizen’ a central figure of post-transition Greek politics, which under the guise of a participatory polity allowed clientelism to ‘take on a life of its own’ (Gounaris 2008: 124).

In all the above we see how the overall political developments of post-Francoist Spain and post-dictatorial Greece have been deeply marked by significant ideological fluidity and organizational fragmentation, owing to weak political institutions and closed-off or clientelist party systems (see Hopkin 2001; Lyrantzis 1984; Gounaris 2008): although strong centralization tendencies were soon to bring about relative clarity in the political landscape of both countries in the years that followed. In Spain, it was such centralization tendencies that, less than a year after the transition, came to make up the central party configurations that have dominated Spanish political life since the mid-1970s in the form of the centre-right UCD [Unión de Centro Democrático - Democratic Centre Union], the centre-left PSOE [Partido Socialista Obrero Español - Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party], and the communist PCE [Partido Comunista de España - Communist Party of Spain].¹³ In Greece, the national elections of 1981 brought precisely the same result, when the political parties that were to dominate Greek political life from the mid-1970s came to the fore as the centre-right ND [Néa Dimokratía - New Democracy], the centre-left PASOK [Panellínio Sosialistikó Kínima - Panhellenic Socialist Movement], and the communist KKE [Kommounistikó Kómma Elládos - Communist Party of Greece] (see Kohler 1982). Noteworthy

¹³ The Basque and the Catalan nationalist parties remained present in the party scene as well. However, in the first years after the transition they have been only relatively significant compared to the dominating UCD, PSOE, and PCE. The same is true also for the conservative right-wing AP (Allianza Popular - People’s Alliance); although it assumed a leading role after 1989, when it was re-founded as the contemporary conservative PP (Partido Popular - People’s Party), practically occupying the place of the UCD which had dissolved in 1983.

among these strongly parallel developments is also the characteristic ideological haziness that both countries' right-wing parties exhibited. Encompassing competing trends pulling towards more democratic and more authoritarian politics at the same time, both the UCD and the ND grew into tangible manifestations of the fact that the struggle for democratic consolidation had not been concluded by democratic transition¹⁴ (see Lyrantzis 1984; Caciagli 1984). In other words, they provided a further vindication of the notion of 'difficult democracies', as a matter of real potential threats to the continued existence of the democratic rule of law.¹⁵

Historical divergences

Having examined above the historical parallels between Greece and Spain and having understood them as indeed rather similar cases in as many aspects as possible (socioeconomic and political transformations alike), this section turns to explore the historical divergences between the two countries. The aim is to single out the crucial difference between the two cases, which can help delineate the specific political culture of each one and by extension understand better the culture of sociopolitical contestation it informs. Altogether, these are differences that could ultimately help shed some light on different, national history-specific types of social relationships in the collective identifications of

¹⁴ This is a struggle of double relevance: First, an intra-party tug of war between the more democratic tendencies and the fractions pledging allegiance to the Francoist regime and the dictatorship of the colonels respectively. Second, a struggle with a certain appeal for society at large, for it reflected the largely persistent political leverage of the ordinance of the Francoist era in Spain, and the failed depuration of the State apparatus from the ordinance of the military dictatorship in Greece, see. Danopoulos, C.P. (1991). "Democratising the military: Lessons from Mediterranean Europe", *West European Politics*, 14(4): 25-41.

¹⁵ In Greece, in particular, the idea of 'depuration' of the State apparatus from dictatorial residuals in the aftermath of the transition was taken up as central political stake by the first ND government in 1974. Reversely, the problem of dictatorial 'droplets' resisting the processes of democratization formed a central stake of the pre-electoral campaign of the centre-left PASOK. Overall, however, the issue of a problematic and incomplete process of purging the state apparatus from authoritarian residuals still remains a large part of the political debate. The emergence of the neo-nazi Golden Dawn (GD) party is analysed as part of this incomplete process, which in 1984 made possible the establishment of the nationalist party EPEN by the political initiative of one of the imprisoned colonels of the military dictatorship and through direct delegation for the organization of its Youth section to the current leader of GD. On the question of prolonged post-transition processes, threats to democratic consolidation, and the role of deeply ingrained militaries see Field, B.N. and Hamann, K. (2008). *Democracy and Institutional Development. Spain in Comparative Theoretical Perspective*. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados, and accordingly explain different, national history-specific types of sociopolitical contestation reflected by them—despite their common starting point (i.e. the contemporary crisis) and their common orientation to effect a specific type of social change (i.e. the embeddedness of real/direct democracy).

Democratic transitions: delineating the post-transition political culture

In the examination of the previous section of this chapter a similar post-transition political context has been outlined for Spain and Greece, which in both cases appears to have fostered a top-bottom political culture and to have in turn fueled skewed democratization processes. The premise on the basis of which these politics thrived, however, has been radically different for the two countries. This difference is rendered intelligible in view of the distinct paradigms of transition represented by the Spanish and the Greek cases, respectively. The Spanish ‘pacted transition’ on the one hand involved repeated negotiations and pacts amongst political elites, which were used as a way to keep at bay polarization tendencies. According to Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, a critical characteristic of such pacts is the intention to ‘avoid certain worrisome outcomes and, perhaps, to pave the way for more permanent arrangements for the resolution of conflicts’ (1986: 37). The Spanish model represents a precise reflection of such intentions—i.e. to keep society afloat during the transition and to halt polarizations (developing between *rupturistas* and *continuistas*)¹⁶ that could eventuate to violent confrontations (see also Linz 1978; Mangen 2001; Hopkin 2000; 2004). A critical aspect of the Spanish example of ‘pacted transition’ is that in reality the Francoist authoritarian regime did not collapse; rather it came to an end only with the death of Franco himself. In political terms this meant that the Francoist ordinance in effect retained its political leverage during the

¹⁶ On the ‘Spanish model’ and the distinction between revolutionaries, rupturists, reformists, openists, continuists, and involutionists, see Colomer, J.M. (1991). “Transitions by Agreement: Modelling the Spanish Way”, in *American Political Science Review* 85(4): 1283-1302.

processes of the transition. This is confirmed by the fact that it actually constituted the key actor channeling the return to democracy (O'Donnell et. al. 1986). In this sense, the Spanish case accounts for a regime launched transition on conditions unfavourable for radically doing away with the authoritarian origins of some of its main political actors. The implications of this particularity are visible in the ways in which historical memory has been handled in the Spanish case and the ways in which legitimization of past struggles for social change has (not) taken place.

One of the most noteworthy characteristics of the Spanish transition to democracy is actually the appraisal of Franco's dictatorship. The Spanish transition, despite signaling a historical moment of moving away from an authoritarian past marked by coercion, severe repression, mass imprisonments and mass killings and executions, presents at the same time a rare case of total absence of transitional justice, having paradoxically witnessed 'no military trials, no truth commissions, and no bureaucratic purges. Not even a condemnation of the old regime was part of the Spanish experience' (Encarnación 2012: 180).¹⁷ From the first years of the transition the fear of political destabilization that such processes could provoke (leading to possibilities of a new civil war or another dictatorship) cultivated in Spain an informal consensus on avoiding transition justice. It is in this direction that Spain chose to seal the transition with the Pacto del Olvido [Pact of Oblivion] that would ensure the absence of conflicts and would engrave a consensual approach to decision-making in the constituent processes of 1977 (which actually allowed the joint participation of different elite political groups, right-wing and left-wing alike). In reality, however, the social function of the Pacto del Olvido was to guarantee the continuation of the 'uncivil peace', which had started with the end of the Civil War and the rise of Franco to power, long after the latter's death in 1975 and well into the era of democratic rule of law (see

¹⁷ Although, in the years that followed Franco's death, there are instances recorded as expressing some vindication of the veterans of the Civil War as having stood in 'defense of human liberty against fascism', see. Jackson, G. (2004), "Multiple Historic Meanings of the Spanish Civil War", *Science and Society*, 68(3): 272-276; 276.

Graham 2004: 314). As an agreement that in effect ‘institutionalized collective amnesia about past political excesses, including the mass killings of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the repression of the Francoist era (1939-1975)’ (Encarnación 2008: 437), the Pact of Oblivion is singled out here as a keystone of the post-transition political culture of Spain, representing the embeddedness of a type of ‘consensual politics’ based on silencing the past.

Overall, however, the most fascinating aspect of this politics, and in fact the aspect most relevant for grasping its wide acceptance as a critical element of the Spanish post-transition culture, is the strong public embrace of the consensus of the political elites. Indeed, the Pact of Oblivion, despite being an agreement largely accounted as serving the interests of political elites, at the same time is largely understood as not having fallen short of securing strong support from a vast proportion of the Spanish society. In this respect Encarnación reports that ‘following Franco’s death, an impressive 61 percent of the Spanish public approved of the idea of a blanket amnesty’ (2008: 442). According to him, this puzzling public conformity and the absence of social demands to actually confront the past, can be rendered intelligible by highlighting two relevant issues. The first of these is the existence of certain socioeconomic forces, such as the economic boom of the 1960s, which had largely encouraged a culture of ‘distancing oneself from the past’ (2008: 445). The second is the analytically valuable existence of a “‘generational memory gap” between those who actually lived the war and those who experienced its consequences’ (2008: 444-5). Other analyses suggest that the most powerful explanation for the broad acceptance of the Pact of Oblivion is the generalized fear of awakening the ghosts of the past. Helen Graham explains that:

[I]t was *widespread social fear* that underlay the ‘pact of silence’: the fear of those who were complicit, the fear and guilt of the families and heirs of those who denounced and murdered, as well as of those who *were* denounced and murdered. Fear, in short, of the consequences of reopening old wounds that the social and cultural politics of Francoism

had, decade on decade, expressly and explicitly prevented from healing (Graham 2005: 324; original emphasis).

In this respect, next to the threats of political destabilization, the shame imposed on those victimized by the Francoist regime as well as on the families that survived them, is a second crucial factor to be taken into account in the attempt to understand how the story of the Spanish post-transition culture was established as a story of concessions and silences, steered from above but largely embraced from below.

The characteristics of the Greek transition are considerably different. First, the ordinance of the dictatorship in Greece, in contrast to the Spanish 'hard-liners' and the Francoists more specifically, had lost much of its political clout by the time of the transition. A critical role in that had the events that followed Ioannidis' 'coup within the coup' in 1973, which led to the overthrow of the military junta leader, Papadopoulos, in Greece, as well as the overthrow of the president of Cyprus, Makarios III, and the subsequent Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Second, in contrast to the model of the Spanish transition, the Greek transition was characterized by a more majoritarian approach to decision-making during the constituent processes that started in 1974 with the first regular parliamentary elections. Lijphart et al, examining the seemingly cohesive Southern European democratic model, in terms of the contrasting 'majoritarian' and 'consensus' models, find Greece to be indeed 'the closest approximation of the majoritarian model' (1988: 20). In particular, they note that 'with regard to the composition of its cabinets, Greece has been a perfect example of majoritarianism. It had minimal winning cabinets during the entire 1974-86 period, and each cabinet was composed of members of only one party with majority support in Parliament: the New Democracy party from 1974 to 1981 and the Socialists (PASOK) since 1981' (Lijphart et.al. 1988: 20). Last, the third characteristic to set the Greek case apart from the Spanish example of transition is the fact that in Greece it is the military that was actually ruling the country during the dictatorship and in this sense it is rather difficult to clearly

locate the transition on the ‘regime’ versus ‘state’ axis (see also Lijphart et. al. 1988).

In all the above it is important to add that, in contrast to the Spanish case, the desire for some kind of transition justice was widespread in Greece. The instigators of the military dictatorship eventually underwent trial in 1975. Of course, when examined in its detail, ‘the trial of the junta’ cannot be said to have provided the resolution that is emphatically missing from the Spanish transition. Disappointing the hopes for such resolution, the coup was deemed a ‘momentary’ rather than a ‘continuous’ crime and in reality the collaborators of the dictatorship were never prosecuted. Moreover, most of the Junta officials received only very light sentences and some of them were even acquitted (see Kornetis 2013). Nevertheless, the desire for redemption and expiation was emphatically present and the idea of bringing justice in the aftermath of the dictatorship was significantly stronger, when compared to Spain. Indicative in this respect is the fact that while the Spanish transition effectively meant turning the page of history, in post-transition Greece lustration mechanisms were applied and the cleansing of the political system from the residuals of the old regime was proclaimed a central political task.¹⁸ Such proclamations, however, were not to completely take over the public discourse until 1981 and the rise to power of the socialist PASOK, which was founded on the triptych ‘National Independence, Popular Sovereignty, Social Emancipation’ and campaigned for ‘change here and now’ —a slogan that became synonymous with rising popular expectations for actual social change in the post-transition era. This was a rather broad political campaign that found fertile ground in Greek society, for indeed in the period between the collapse of the dictatorship

¹⁸ According to a United Nations document on transition justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, lustration ‘entails a formal process for the identification and removal of individuals responsible for abuses, especially from police, prison services, the army and the judiciary’, see UN Doc. S/2004/616. The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies. Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, 23 August 2004, p. 52. For more information on transition justice in the EU see the website of the project Transition Justice and Memory in the Eu, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (CSO2011-15919-E) <http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.es/transition-aljustice/>. For more information on the application of lustration mechanisms, in particular see <http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.es/transitionaljustice/content/lustration-mechanisms>

in 1974 and 1981 the political situation was largely appraised as a truly transitory situation, as much in regards to emerging desires for redemption as in regards to widespread feelings of political disenchantment and subsequent radicalization.

In the years immediately after the collapse of the dictatorship, redemption was particularly elusive for the Greek society. The return of Karamanlis in 1974 added to this by generating widespread disappointment, especially in the guard of the anti-dictatorship struggle and the student movement in particular. Being strongly identified as having the principal responsibility for the cultivation of a climate of political violence in the pre-1967 era¹⁹, Karamanlis' return was read not so much as manifestation of a real change of regime, but rather as a 'change of guard' (see Kornetis 2013: 292-303). The deafening 54% he received in the elections of '74, was only to add to the disenchantment, implying that there was also a significant change in the public legitimization of the political propositions of the anti-dictatorial struggle: 'At this point, these exponents of the antidictatorship student movement had shifted from voicing popular dissent to being out of tune with society as a whole' (Kornetis 2013: 295). In analytical terms, without doubt, there is no basis for conflating a right-wing government with a dictatorship. Yet, notwithstanding the differences, the idea of liberation being granted in the name of Karamanlis was accounted as a major blow for the anti-dictatorship movement, largely animated by left-wingers. Antonis Liakos reports about the period: 'There was a diffused feeling that the expected revolution had not come and its time had passed. The social hierarchies were restored. Our own efforts and plans had failed' (Liakos 2001: 50, cited in Kornetis 2013: 296). This is the period in which the non-violent student movement in Greece, having been nurtured in hyper-politicization during the dictatorship and at the same time

¹⁹ 1963 was the last time Karamanlis was prime minister before his return to power in 1974 after the collapse of the military dictatorship. In the elections of 1961 when he came to power, however, the security forces and the military were accused of having embarked on a widespread pre-electoral terrorization against the political parties of the Centre and the Left, naming Karamanlis as responsible for the generalized climate of violence that prevailed and characterizing the 1961 electoral process as the 'elections of violence and fraud'.

deeply disappointed by the transition, became increasingly radicalized. Kornetis notes that the overwhelming feeling that the transition was a mere ‘prolongation of the dictatorship’ was the most decisive factor for this radicalization (Kornetis 2013: 299).

At this point, another major difference in the character of the post-transition culture of Spain and Greece is detected. While in Spain the concerted efforts to leave the past behind meant, largely, an embrace of peaceful tactics in political activity, in Greece by contrast the radicalization of the generation of the anti-dictatorship struggle was producing its first results already in 1975, in the form of the terrorist organization 17N [17 November]. If an equivalence is to be drawn between the two countries in regards to terrorist activity, then indeed the early ’60s foundation of ETA [Euskadi Ta Askatasuna —Basque Country and Freedom] needs to be included in the discussion. Nevertheless, this is only a superficial parallel, for while ETA was an armed branch of the large Basque National Liberation Movement, principally involved in the Basque conflict and with demands for the independence of the Basque country, 17N in Greece drew directly on the legacy of the anti-dictatorship struggle. In fact, it can be seen as the most immediate enactment of the generalized desire for vindication of the anti-dictatorship struggle. Kornetis gives a precise account of the relation between the frustrated expectations for liberation and democratization in 1974 and the subsequent rise of 17N as ‘avengers’ of the failed transition, who actually enjoyed inordinate public sympathy in their cause:

When some of the most notorious torturers received asymmetrically low sentences —some of them were even acquitted— many in the extreme Left became convinced of the fact that the democratization and de-Juntification processes were a facade. And this was precisely the moment in which terrorist organizations, such as ‘17 November’, leveled up their actions as ‘avengers’. The killing of the notorious torturers Evangelos Mallios and Petros Bambalis, in 1976 and 1979 respectively, generated

sympathy for the terrorists' cause and tolerance for their practices among vast segments of the Greek population — above all among the young. This was a powerful indication that for a considerable part of the society the post-1974 justice system had failed to right the wrongs (Kornetis 2013: 300).

In what follows thereafter, radical politics in Greece, taken up by the new generation of students in the post-transition era, were informed by tendencies to 'express a much greater intransigence than their legendary predecessors' (Kornetis 2013: 301). In this direction, in the new guard of the continuous struggle for social change combative sections of the Marxist and anarchist movements assumed a leading role.

In total, seen in comparison, throughout the processes described above, it is correct to say that Spain and Greece arrived in the early 1980s with political schemes diametrically opposed. On the one hand, Spain was led by a generalized fear of new conflicts, rhetorical and legal encouragement for silencing the past, and public condoning of the consensus of political elites: in short, a 'consensual political culture' in which the survivors of the Francoist regime 'learned how to not talk about it, as if it were a stain on their families' (Encarnación 2008: 444). Greece, on the other hand, was fuelled by intense public bewilderment in front of the right-wing succession of the dictatorship, widespread disenchantment with the processes of democratization and failed 'de-Juntification', and increased radicalization of political activity, solidified by general public sympathy: in short, a 'dissensual political culture' in which participation in combative action that would reference the combative spirit of the anti-dictatorship resistance was a source of pride and public admiration —so much so that at instances it seemed that, as Periklis Korovesis puts it, 'the mass resistance against the Junta appeared during the *Metapolitefsi*' (see Korovesis 1997: 17, cited in Kornetis 2013: 301; original emphasis). All in all, these are models of transition, narratives of democratization and representations of past struggles for social change that

appear to have fostered rather distinct political cultures for Greece and Spain. The influence of these political cultures in shaping also broader cultures of sociopolitical contestation in the two countries can be seen in the fact that collective action in the recent history of both Greece and Spain essentially gets shaped during the post-transition.

Amidst the largely unfavourable political climate before the transition, in both cases, movement activity (mostly taken forward by the student youth of the 1960s and the 1970s) is largely accounted as having been ‘prevailingly cautious’ and characterized by ‘inefficient recruitment processes, resulting in small nuclei of clandestine action and practically non-existent movement visibility’ (Kornetis 2008: 254). The progressive liberalization of the regimes, by the early 1970s in Greece and significantly earlier in Spain (with the law reform of the minister of information, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, in 1962), may be considered as the first step towards the surfacing of anti-regime information and of the growing ‘sophistication’ of the anti-regime audiences. In this climate the Greek student youth of the period acquired considerable symbolic power in anti-regime activity, which eventually led to the strengthening of social movement activity more generally (Kornetis 2008: 257). The same is true for the Spanish youth of the 1960s, largely regarded as the main symbol of anti-Francoist resistance,²⁰ and, albeit facing ups and downs in the decades that followed, appearing to have remained relevant for social movement activity more generally (see Cilleros and Betancor 2014; Fernández González 2014). In this sense, in broad strokes, what is seen as the beginning of the Spanish and Greek movement culture, in the late 1960s and early 1970s respectively, becomes shaped in similar terms —although it is only towards the end of the Spanish and the Greek dictatorial regimes that it gets shaped more concretely. In the more favourable political environment of the post-transition, then, the

²⁰ Although in the case of Spain the central frame of analysis draws more on the political context (which is indeed delineated by the anti-Francoist opposition and later on the transition to democracy) rather than the strengthening of movement activity per se and the development of a clear and consistent movement culture. see Zamponi, L. (2015). *Memory in Action: Mediatized Public Memory and the Symbolic Construction of Conflict in Student Movements*. (dissertation), Florence: EUI.

Spanish and the Greek cultures of sociopolitical contestation can be understood as being indeed informed by their broader Spanish and Greek political cultures respectively.

Post-transition cultures of sociopolitical contestation: anarchist movements and communist parties

In overall terms, the theoretical currents of Marxism and anarchism are the inevitable points of reference, as much for the theoretical analysis as for the practical alternatives for a type of collective action that takes a position against capitalist integration at large, as it aims at radical social change (Chrysis 2016). Hence, they are deemed to represent the most relevant variants of movements politics that set at the core of their critique democracy in late capitalism. In what regards the Marxist influence in political action, Castoriadis notes characteristically:

For anyone who is preoccupied with the question of society, the encounter with Marxism is immediate and inevitable... Ceasing to be a particular theory or a political programme professed by a few, Marxism has so impregnated language, ideas, and reality that it has become part of the atmosphere we breathe when we come into the social world, part of the historical landscape that frames our comings and goings (Castoriadis 2005: 9).

Anarchism is the other arm of the radical theoretical and practical critique of contemporary sociopolitical organization. In many accounts, anarchism is branded as the 'poorer cousin' of Marxist theory (Wigger 2016: 8) and in this direction more often than not it is marginalized in the theoretical analyses of social change. Nevertheless, in all instances, devalued, discredited or repudiated, anarchism, similarly to Marxism, is constitutive of the theory and practice of radical social change that addresses antagonism in capitalist modernity as the key to unlocking the struggle for social change (see Epstein

2001; Wigger 2016; Graber 2002; Gordon 2007; 2008; Newman 2007).²¹ In fact, the relation between Marxism and anarchism can be seen as a dialectical relationship in the sense of classical philosophy dialectics, proceeding through a dialogue of arguments and counter-arguments, propositions and counter-propositions, so much so that invoking Marxism perforce means invoking anarchism and vice versa (see Chrysis 2016). The same is true for the relation between Marxism and anarchism on the one hand, and capitalism on the other. So, examining cultures of sociopolitical contestation against capitalist modernity means perforce examining them in reference to Marxist and anarchist movements and organizations.

> Anarchist movements in Greece and Spain

In the accounts of radical movement politics, although the role of the anarchist movement is unquestionably important for its significant contribution in shaping the conditions of social antagonism at large, analyses of Marxist and neo-Marxist tendencies tend to dominate the debate. The contribution of the anarchist movement is discussed, more often than not, as of relatively little relevance for the general sociopolitical developments of the 20th century. Examined in historical perspective, the idea of the limited influence of the anarchist movement at large can be understood as expressive of a more general historical trend, which has recorded an attenuated

²¹ For one thing, the central anarchist tendency to avoid structured experiences that would risk excessive statism, accounts for a self-induced retreat virtually representing a formidable ‘flight from politics’, and which had eventually rendered anarchism (seemingly) politically irrelevant, see Boggs, C. (1977). “Revolutionary Process, Political Strategy, and the Dilemma of Power”, in *Theory and Society*, 4(3): 359-93. For another thing, the marginalization of anarchist thought and action has been part of a widespread and commonplace aphorism that anarchism, far from a political theory, is a provisional name for a project of violence, destruction, and chaos, see Graeber, D. (2002). “The New Anarchists”, *New Left Review*, 13: 61-73. It is in this respect that Emma Goldman writes ‘What, then, are the objections? First, Anarchism is impractical, though a beautiful ideal. Second, Anarchism stands for violence and destruction, hence it must be repudiated as vile and dangerous. Both the intelligent man and the ignorant mass judge not from a thorough knowledge of the subject, but either from hearsay or false interpretation’, see Goldman (1998 [1910]). “Anarchism: What it Really Stands For”, in Shulman, A.K. (ed). *Red Emma Speaks. An Emma Goldman Reader*, New York: Humanity Books, p. 62. Last, on this account, it is the intellectual inquiry itself that has often denied the political relevance of anarchism by means of negating sophistication in anarchist theory and by means of discrediting anarchist political thinking through reductionist platitudes, see Wigger, A. (2016). “Anarchism as emancipatory theory and praxis: Implications for critical Marxist research”, *Capital & Class*, 40(1): 129-45.

contribution of anarchism in European politics of the 20th century. Williams and Lee note in this respect:

After the war and the Bolshevik Revolution, anarchism went into a period of demobilization and decline as Communism gained increased legitimacy amongst the Left as a revolutionary ideology that was perceived to be succeeding in the USSR (Williams and Lee 2012: 578).

In reference to Greek and Spanish politics in particular, however, we find different patterns by which this precept is confirmed/disproved, respectively. On the one hand it is practically impossible to speak about the recent history of Spain without speaking about the Spanish Civil War and the contribution of the anarchist movement. In this direction the literature covering the 20th century sociopolitical formation of Spain traces an increasingly important contribution of the anarchist movement already since the early 1920 and the 1930s. On the other hand, the Greek case appears to be exactly the opposite, with the anarchist movement being mainly referenced for its contribution in the history of the late 19th century. Indeed, the literature covering the 20th century sociopolitical developments in Greece traces the first revival of the Greek anarchist movement only very late in the 20th century, around the period of the transition and mainly during the post-transition era (see Sagris et. al. 2010). Here, the model becomes reversed. While in late 20th century (and even more specifically, post-transition) Spain the anarchist movement appears to be significantly marginalized when compared to the movements of the Left which were enjoying increasing legitimacy, in post-transition Greece the anarchist movement gains a central role in the broader antagonistic movement of the country at times even surpassing the overall legitimacy of the movements of the Left. This mismatch is understood here as an indication of the different role that the anarchist movement has played in the general sociopolitical configurations of Spain and Greece and in particular as an

indication that it played a significantly different role in shaping the post-transition culture of contestation in the two countries.

As noted above, it is impossible to speak about the recent history of Spain without speaking about the Spanish Civil War and by extension about the anarchist movement. Indeed, any reference to the anarchist influence on the political culture of Spain, in an almost automatic fashion, invokes a broad literature in the field of history studying the Spanish Civil War in particular (Graham 2005; Brenan 1950; Ackelsberg 2014; Casanova 2004). The reason for this is that it was principally the period from the early 1920s, and most importantly throughout the 1930s, that the anarchist movement actually shaped the characteristics of social and political struggle in Spain. So, the historical contribution of the Spanish anarchist movement appears to be powerfully fixed in the period of the Spanish Civil War during which ‘the anarchist movement attained a mass following in Spain to a degree that it never did elsewhere, and had a significance in its history unparalleled in any other country’ (Duncan 1988: 325). Of course this is not to suggest that Spanish politics of the early 1930s was dominated by the anarchist influence alone. Quite the contrary: socialist tendencies were emphatically represented as well. Next to the anarcho-syndicalist CNT [Confederación Nacional de Trabajo — National Confederation of Labour], also the strength of the socialist leaning UGT [Unión General de Trabajadores — General Union of Workers] was increasingly significant in sociopolitical terms (see Jackson 1970). Nevertheless, the different socioeconomic interests represented by the CNT and the UGT meant also differences in the diffusion of their ideas and, by

extension, differences in the support they enjoyed.²² By the mid-1930s the anarchist movement had made remarkable advances by putting its ‘theoretical ideas into practice’ (Kaplan 1971: 101).

The fact that through CNT the anarchist movement was able to win on multiple social fronts, however, was not only a proof of its strong popular appeal, but also indicative of the intense discomfort it was causing to the Spanish political elite. Indeed, the social and political leverage that the movement was gaining put it in the spotlight of the counterrevolutionary forces. In this direction, while in the rest of liberal Europe the eminent threat in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution was Bolshevism, in Spain it was the anarcho-syndicalist movement that was actually alarming elite political groups (see Graham 2005: 5). Controlling large parts of north-eastern Spain, empowering the peasants and ultimately setting up a historical example of libertarian communes, the anarchist movement became a paradigmatic force of opposition, resistance and social change in the country and ‘it was not until its suppression by Franco’s forces in 1939 that anarchism ceased to play a major role in Spanish politics’ (Duncan 1988: 325). Indeed, although, it is argued, the anarchist movement managed to keep the guerrilla war alive long into the regime throughout the 1950s and until the late 1960s (Romero Salvadó 1991: 141), its great social and political leverage was to end with the end of the Civil War. The defeat of the Republicans and the rise of Franco to power marked the beginning of a 36 year long period of repression. Thereafter, only a history of violence is recorded, with the Spanish anarchist movement being essentially ravaged by the destructive fury of Franco’s dictatorship. The

²² By the beginning of the Civil War the CNT is estimated to have reached 1.5 million members, by virtue of having an almost direct appeal to the large population of ‘unskilled and landless poor, whose lack of bargaining power and social defenselessness made socialist promises of gradual change through the ballot box seem immensely improbable, if not downright incredible’, see Graham, E. (2005). *The Spanish Civil War. A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 13. The highly uneven socioeconomic development of Spain in the period allowed the CNT to easily win over the severely affected rural Spain. The distinctively different socioeconomic experiences of the constituency represented by the UGT, however, meant an even more limited appeal of the UGT and, by extension, created a larger target population to be won over by the anarchist appeal, which spread also in the urban centres of socioeconomic production. The most pronounced example is the case of Barcelona, or as it was called during that period, ‘Red Barcelona’, see Graham, E. (2005). *The Spanish Civil War. A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 5.

first instance of its regeneration after the end of the Civil War is detected only very much later in the history of the 20th century —in particular, after Franco's death, and the revival of the CNT in the late 1970s. However, as much then as in the decades that followed, the movement did not regain back its old strength and while it re-assumed its social validation (expressed in a significant rise in membership), it remained only remotely relevant in political terms when compared to the movements of the Left. The scholarly research provides the most emphatic confirmation of this by virtue of its extremely rare references to the contribution of the anarchist movement in post-transition sociopolitical contestation of Spain.

In the Greek case, on the other hand, the anarchist movement is totally absent from the history of the first half of the 20th century. While the Greek anarchist movement represented a relevant force for social change during the late 19th century, by the beginning of the 20th century, even though individual anarchists remained active in the larger struggles of social antagonism, anarchism in Greece had actually faded away as a mass movement. Along with the deafening absence of diffusion of anarchist ideas in the country since the beginning of the century, and in particular during the 1930s, with Metaxas' dictatorship, anarchism was reduced to a rhetorical device in the discursive armour of counterrevolutionary forces that were issuing 'warnings' against anarchist subversive activity and against deviance from the triptych 'fatherland-religion-family'. In practice, however, around the same time that in Spain the anarchist movement was leading social antagonism and its strength was assuming alarming proportions for the counterrevolution, in Greece the conservative patriotic front was instead horrified by the 'communist threat' and -although the example of Spain was making headlines in the propagandistic discourse of the state- Metaxas' dictatorship was declaring war specifically against the threat of 'communist tyranny':

None of you, except the well-known demagogues and the insane subverters, wants to see our country following the fate of poor Spain.

You did not lose your freedoms. It is exactly now that you will acquire your true freedoms. Don't you all feel redemption? It is the redemption from the double yoke, of communist tyranny and micro-political tyranny (Metaxas, 1969 [1936]: 16-17).

In the Greek context, communism was systematically posed as the number one threat for all the conservative forces that led the country. It remained so until the end of Metaxas' dictatorship in 1941, and it was not to be any different in the years that followed his rule. Indeed, there remained a virtually unchanged pattern of anti-communism, and especially so during the Axis occupation of Greece, propelled by an intense fear that, should the communists win the resistance, a communist regime would be established after the liberation.²³ The period of the Civil War from 1946 to 1949, the nearly two decades of deep national divisions that followed, and the military dictatorship of 1967, are all historical moments inextricably intertwined with the Greek communist movement and an unceasing anti-communist hysteria. Indeed, in the decades that followed the end of the Civil War, political persecutions continued unabated, consistently informed by the fear of the 'communist threat'. And it is against this 'threat' that the leader of the military dictatorship declared in 1967 that the time had come to 'put the patient in plaster'.²⁴ In that period, however, under the influence of the events of May '68, the first signs of the awakening of the anarchist movement are traced, which over the years shook the movement out of inactivity and later on inspired the first sparks in the student struggles against the military junta (see

²³ In fact, the intensity by which this was perceived led to continual conflicts between the different resistance organizations in the country —the most prominent being the KKE dominated EAM [Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο — National Liberation Front] and the anti-monarchist EDES [Εθνικός Δημοκρατικός Ελληνικός Στρατός — National Republican Greek League], see Tzoukas, V. (2013). *Oi oplarchigoí tou EDES stin Ípeiro 1942-1944* (Οι οπλαρχηγοί του ΕΔΕΣ στην Ήπειρο 1942-44), Athens: Vivliopoleio tis Estias.

²⁴ Throughout the years of the military dictatorship, Papadopoulos used in his speeches an analogy in which the country appeared to be a 'patient' who need to be operated or be put in a cast in order to recover from the threat of communism. For an analytical account of Papadopoulos' speeches, interviews, public proclamations from 1967 to 1972, see Floros, I. (foreward) (2015) *Georgios Papadopoulos - Dictator? 1967-1972*. Athens: Stratigikes ekdoseis.

Karamichas 2009). In this sense, in a similar fashion as in the case of Spain, the revival of the anarchist movement in Greece comes only at a much later point during the post-transition period. In contrast to the Spanish case, however, the Greek anarchist movement soon gained leverage as a politically relevant force in the struggle for social change during the student mobilizations of the early 1980s, and even more substantially during the mass student movement of the 1990s. This is the period during which the anarchist movement in Greece progressively re-gained its coherence as a mass movement, and intervened in the practices of social antagonism, introducing new tactics in the struggle. The legacy of school occupations in the post-transition history of Greece is part of this renewed repertoire of action, which by the end of the long cycle of the mobilizations was fully incorporated into the repertoire of post-transition social movement activism in general. Thereafter the Greek anarchist movement becomes increasingly relevant for the development of sociopolitical contestation as it recasts the logic of political confrontation (which becomes direct and combative), introduces the logic of a low intensity warfare in clashes with the forces of the police and leads a series of momentous instances of mobilizations that significantly contributed in shaping the post-transition movement politics of the country. Nevertheless, comprehensive accounts of the contribution of the anarchist movement in shaping the post-transition culture of sociopolitical contestation in Greece remain characteristically absent from the scholarly literature, which appears to have largely shifted attention onto the movement only very recently, around the insurrection of December 2008.

In summary, the virtual absence of the anarchist movement from the sociopolitical developments of the post-transition in Spain can be interpreted as indicating that the post-transition culture of sociopolitical contestation in the country has been mainly shaped in close relation to the developments on the front of the political Left. In Greece, by contrast, the more rapid and effective revival of the anarchist movement can be interpreted as indicating that the responsibility for shaping the post-transition culture of contestation of

the country was essentially shared by the anarchist movement (embedding its combative spirit as part of this culture) and the movements of the political Left. Accordingly, then, in what follows I briefly explore these developments with the aim to grasp better the terms on which social contestation has been shaped in the two countries. Finally, then, I hope to come closer to understanding the way in which the distinct political cultures of Spain and Greece (identified earlier in reference to their distinct transition paradigms) may have accordingly shaped the development of two distinct cultures of sociopolitical contestation —i.e. a culture of contestation built around consensual politics and guiding smoother social relationships in Spain, and a culture of contestation built around dissensual politics guiding more confrontational social relationships in Greece.

> The communist parties in Greece and Spain

The post-transition legalization of the PCE and KKE in 1977 and 1974 respectively, besides reflecting the broader political journey towards democratic consolidation in Spain and Greece, functioned also as the symbolic legitimation of the promise of socialist transformation that was largely capturing the political imaginary of movement activity around the transition. On this basis and in the context of a widespread and virtually normalized top-bottom approach to politics after the transition, the vision of social change appears to have remained largely fastened onto the party politics of the PCE and KKE and in particular onto the socialist promise they traditionally held. The specific character of this top-bottom politics, however, appears to have been significantly different in the two cases, in the sense of considerably different expectations cultivated in regards to the premise of ‘consensus’ and ‘unity’ in politics. This is of great interest, then, for understanding better the post-transition culture of contestation in Spain and Greece. In Spain this is because -given the limited post-transition leverage of the anarchist movement- the Marxist influence and accordingly the developments in one of its prominent expressers (i.e. the PCE) can be assumed to have decisively shaped

the Spanish post-transition culture of contestation. In Greece it is because, alongside the leverage of the anarchist movement, the Marxist influence and accordingly the developments in one of its prominent expressers (i.e. the KKE) had their fair share in shaping the Greek post-transition culture of contestation.

The critical point of reference to capture one of the greatest discursive differences between the PCE and KKE is their interpretation of the question of socialist transformation, which has decisively shaped both parties and has further influenced the developments in their youth organizations.²⁵ In this direction, the case of the ‘Real Existing Socialism’ of the Soviet Union poses the most critical dimension, for in both cases it has been the interpretation of Soviet imperatives that has deeply divided the PCE and KKE, causing irreparable fragmentations and permanent splits. Yet the intensity of the divisions, as much as the central tendencies that summarize the parties’ approaches, does not subscribe to a commonly shared narrative. On the one hand, the Spanish PCE effectively acted upon the Eurocommunist trend of the 1970s, renouncing fidelity to pro-Soviet positions. The youth of the party followed in the same direction. Overall, while dissent was expressed in the party, it has been only of minor influence and was resolved in politically inconsequential splits, practically tying the socialist promise to the dominant and largely unified Eurocommunist stance of the PCE. In this direction, guided by a close appreciation of ‘unity’ in politics, when in 1986 a political campaign against the inclusion of Spain in NATO agreements sought the creation of an alternative political force, the PCE responded to the call and joined the new political force that was later to represent the main Left political opposition of contemporary Spain: namely the IU [Izquierda Unida - United Left]. The

²⁵ The youth organizations of the Communist Parties of Greece and Spain, comprising mainly students, can be also seen as a distinct social and political body, assigned a special role vis-à-vis social and political conflicts, in the sense that it is consistently informed by the political lines of the party but at the same time it effectively penetrates into the milieu of grassroots movement activity. It is in this sense that students are seen to have ‘gradually acquired social force to affect politics’ representing a type of an intermediary political body standing in between institutional politics and non-institutionalized grassroots movement action. see Kornetis, K. (2013). *Children of the Dictatorship. Student Resistance, Cultural Politics, and the “Long 1960s” in Greece*. Oxford: Berghahn Books, p. 14.

strength of the narrative of 'consensual politics' is visible not only in organizational terms, that is, in the plain fact that different Left political forces in Spain consented to form a coalition against the political developments of their time. Rather, it is also clearly pronounced and underlined discursively, as the founding declaration of IU reveals:

The fading of the project of change, as follows from the centrist attitude of the government of PSOE on economy, and its right-wing turn on all matters concerning foreign policy and defense policy, posed to all the progressive forces of Spain *the necessity to search for the basis of convergence, on which to reach an agreement*, with a view to form a *joint electoral platform* in face of the legislative elections of 22 June, 1986 (Political Agreement Document for the Foundation of IU, 1986).²⁶

By contrast to the above, in Greece dissent was expressed through the adoption of Eurocommunist positions, while the KKE remained profoundly pro-Soviet, thus falling behind the major developments that shaped the Western European communist parties of the 1970s. The intense character of the dissent, however, coupled with the political backwardness implied in the political choices of the KKE, had profound effects on both the evolution of the party and its youth organization. While by the end of the 1980s Spain was witnessing the convergence of the PCE with left political forces against centrist and right-wing forces, the KKE in Greece, rather than seeking a coalition with progressive social forces, was instead resorting to an electoral coalition with the right-wing ND. This was a coalition which, albeit short-lived, made its way into public memory as the 'dirty '89' and created considerable turmoil, as much in the ranks of the party as in the ranks of its youth organization, KNE [Kommounistikí Neolaía Elládos - Communist Youth of Greece]. The result was a series of divisions that had considerable impact on Left institutional and movement politics. First, there was a major split in the KNE in 1989, followed

²⁶ Accessible online at: <http://www.izquierda-unida.es/sites/default/files/1169749294628.pdf>

by further splits later on during the 1990s, which affected developments in the grassroots organization of movement activity by introducing discursive but also organizational divisions in the broader antagonistic movement. Second came yet another split for the KKE that in 1991 led to the creation of the political coalition SYN [Synaspismós tis Aristerás kai tis Proódou – Coalition of the Left and Progress], which in 2004 constituted the major political variant around which contemporary SYRIZA [Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás – Coalition of the Radical Left] was formed. In the wake of these developments, in contrast to the PCE's course, the KKE remained consistently in opposition to the idea (and practice) of a unified political Left, despite efforts in that direction. Thus in the post-transition history of Greece (by contrast to what appears to be in Spain a narrative of 'consensual politics') the Greek Left appears to have emerged consistently guided by a culture of 'dissensual politics'. A short but indicative account of the 'dissensual' culture of the broader political Left in Greece can be found also in the reckoning of its post-transition course, as it appears in the founding declaration of SYRIZA.²⁷

In the meantime *the Left got fragmented*. KKE witnessed successive splits, most importantly the one of 1968 which led to the formation of KKE Internal —which subsequently met its own splits and transformations — and to the stable and influential registration in the political scene of the demand for the renewal of the communist movement and the Left in general. [...] This way, the *actual political power of the Left was significantly decreased*, although it retained the moral advantage... *The impairment intensified* with the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the regimes of 'existing socialism', as well as with the accompanying adventures for the formation and the further development

²⁷ Notwithstanding internal confrontations, fragmentations, deep divisions and subsequent splits in SYRIZA as well, its founding declaration originating in 2013 captures the drive for the creation of a joint new political force of the Greek Left, and in this sense it serves as an indirect confirmation of the generalized and persistent dissensual culture of Greek politics.

of the Coalition of the Left and Progress, but also of the other variants of the Left (SYRIZA Founding Declaration, 2013).²⁸

In summary, the developments described above can be understood to contribute to more general patterns of politics, which appear to be different for Spain and Greece —despite the many historical similarities of the two countries. In Spain, the brief examination of the post-transition development of the PCE (as a preeminent expression of the broader political Left, at least early on during the post-transition) appears to confirm the predominance of a type of ‘consensual politics’, in which ‘unity’ is prioritized. In Greece, the brief examination of the post-transition development of the KKE (as a preeminent expression of the broader political Left, at least early on during the post-transition) appears to confirm the predominance of a type of ‘dissensual politics’, guided by conflicts and divisions. Altogether, these patterns can be understood as a close approximation of the broader political cultures of the two countries -political culture of a pronounced consensual character in Spain, and of a tumultuous, dissensual character in Greece-, providing strong indications about finding indeed different interpretations of the premises of ‘consensus’, ‘unity’, ‘conflict’ and ‘division’ in the two countries’ cultures of sociopolitical contestation.

Conclusions

The hypothesis that guided the examination of this chapter is that the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity mobilizations can be thoroughly understood by following the national histories of the two countries, accordingly tracing their sociopolitical culture of resistance, and ultimately arriving at a more nuanced understanding of the Greek and Spanish movement culture informing contemporary contestation. In this direction this chapter examined socioeconomic and political developments in the recent history of Greece and

²⁸ Accessible online at: http://www.syriza.gr/pdfs/idrytiki_diakiriksi_syriza.pdf

Spain with the aim to delineate their border political cultures and accordingly the cultures of sociopolitical contestation they have shaped. Furthermore, the examination of this chapter helped establish the *ceteris paribus* rule of the analysis, in accordance to the premise of the most-similar system design of comparative research: that is, the premise that ‘one should find cases that are as similar as possible, in as many aspects as possible, and then find a crucial difference that can explain what one wants to explain’ (Przeworski 1995: 17). In this direction, this chapter tried to set clear the sociohistorical correspondences between Greece and Spain in order to acquire a sense of proportion of their historical similarities and differences. It unfolded in two parts.

The first part of the chapter focused on exploring a set of similarities in the broader socioeconomic transformations of Greece and Spain since the 1950s. This examination found that Greece and Spain represent two rather similar models of socioeconomic development with commonly pronounced features. The picture in Greece is summarized in the emergence of a weak domestic bourgeoisie, lacking economic strength and autonomy and growing significantly depended on foreign capital, at the same time that haste industrialization and urbanization processes were forcing the rapid proletarianization of the population. Similarly, in Spain, the economic reforms of a weak bourgeoisie, altogether highly dependent on foreign capital and marked by internal tension, were found to have contributed to the generation of processes of increased urbanization and proletarianization of the population. Alongside socioeconomic similarities between Greece and Spain similarities in the political transformations of the two countries were also delineated. These similarities have to do with the turbulent passage of both countries through the 20th century and their late democratic transition, by virtue of the virtually simultaneous collapse of their latest authoritarian regimes during the mid-1970s —justifying thus their common classification as ‘third wave democracies’ (Huntington 1991; 1992) and in particular as ‘difficult democracies’ (Pridam 1984). Along these lines, the examination of the political

transformations in the post-transition history of Greece and Spain found similar patterns of erratic political systems with top-bottom political cultures and contested political party organizations. Overall, it was found that the Spanish 'pacted transition' produced a generalized compromise over actual political reforms, which was translated into insufficient party penetration into society, and alienation of the Spanish political body (see Caciagli 1984; Field and Hamann 2008). On the other hand, populist politics in post-transition Greece were found to have effectively declared Greek civil society a 'mere facade' (for concealing the domination of the ruling class), progressively 'cannibalized by the state' (see Veremis 2008: 140-145).

The second part of the chapter focused on exploring a set of differences in the broader sociohistorical development of Greece and Spain, by following more closely their democratic transitions. This examination found that Greece and Spain, although actually presenting cases as similar as possible in as many aspects as possible, can be actually understood as representing two distinct paradigms of transition, shaping two distinct political cultures throughout their broader post-transition period. The democratic transitions of Greece and Spain were examined on a number of issues such as the character of the transition, the role of the ordinance of the authoritarian regime during the transition, the type of democratic model, the question of transitional justice and the handling of historical memory. In all instances, significant differences were detected between the two countries, effectively delineating two contrasting political cultures. The Greek democratic transition, on the one hand, was found to have shaped a 'dissensual political culture': fueled by widespread disenchantment with the overall processes of democratization and failed 'de-Juntification', thus increasing radicalization in political activity. The Spanish democratic transition, on the other hand, was found to have shaped a 'consensual political culture': geared by generalized fear of new conflicts and the rhetorical and legal encouragement for silencing the past that secured the public condoning of the consensus of political elites.

The different political cultures of Greece and Spain were further examined in regards to the shaping of broader cultures of sociopolitical contestation in the two countries. In this direction, cultures of sociopolitical contestation were examined in reference to the anarchist movements and communist parties of Greece and Spain. Anarchism and Marxism essentially represent the inevitable points of reference of sociopolitical contestation driven by the desire for radical social change. I singled out communist parties in particular, however, given the irredeemable fragmentations of the movements of the Left and the fact that the post-transition legalization of the KKE and PCE essentially functioned to symbolically legitimize and fasten the promise of radical social change onto them. In overall terms, the brief examination of the contributions of the Greek and the Spanish anarchist movements in the post-transition cultures of sociopolitical contestation of the two countries did not provide much information. In the case of Spain, the reason for this is that the anarchist movement, following its severe repression by Franco, managed to partly gain back its social legitimacy during the post-transition but remained only remotely relevant in political terms. In Greece, by contrast, it appears that the presence of the anarchist movement has been increasingly relevant during the post-transition, in the sense of (re)shaping sociopolitical contestation by introducing a fresh combative spirit and new confrontational tactics. The scholarly literature, however, dealing with its contribution in shaping the broader post-transition culture of sociopolitical contestation in the country, is extremely limited, thus allowing only very sketchy information to be collected. The brief examination of developments in the communist parties of Greece and Spain, however, confirmed the strong relevance of the countries' broader political cultures for understanding also their cultures of sociopolitical contestation in particular. In this direction, a mainly dissensual approach to doing politics was found in the brief examination of the development of the Greek communist party and its role in shaping social antagonism, and a mainly consensual approach to doing politics was found in the brief examination of the development of the Spanish

communist party and its role in delineating the post-transition movement culture of the country.

In summary, the aim of this examination was to delineate the broader cultures of sociopolitical contestation of Greece and Spain in order to help contextualize contemporary Greek and Spanish movements. In this direction, two distinct political cultures were revealed for Greece and Spain, shaped around the different paradigms of transition the two countries represent. Further, then, the contribution of these cultures in shaping two different cultures of sociopolitical contestation in particular was confirmed. The findings of this examination can contribute to explore closer the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2010-2011, through the more nuanced understanding they offer of the particular culture of resistance that informs contemporary movements in Greece and Spain. Nevertheless, they cannot substitute the need to contextualize further the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, in respect to the activist tradition by which they are informed. The following part of the research is devoted to this task, in order to achieve two things: first, to provide an integrated understanding of the kind of movement politics with which the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations is connected and, second, to explore the ways in which the lessons of this movement politics of anti-neoliberal resistance have been processed in Greece and Spain, through the lens of the distinct cultures of resistance singled out here for the two countries.

Part II - MOVEMENT POLITICS OF THE CRISIS & CONTEMPORARY RESPONSES IN GREECE AND SPAIN

The global wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests of 2010-2011 is registered, in the scholarly literature and the public discourse alike, as mobilizing an increasingly heterogeneous and indeterminate subjectivity around two of the most ambiguous conceptions of sociopolitical analysis -i.e. democracy and democratization. Noteworthy is also the intensity by which the demands of the protestors were voiced, alongside the resounding dynamic of the protests that affected deeply, on a global scale, the broader sociopolitical perceptions of the general public about democratic politics and its institutions. In this direction, the analysis of the mobilizations (by way of formal scholarly research as well as other forms of investigation)²⁹ has often registered change of perceptions of the protestors and meaningful changes of lifestyles and courses of sociopolitical involvement more broadly, essentially confirming old lessons in movement research that activism ‘does indeed have the potential to trigger a process of alternation that can affect many aspects of the participants’ lives’ (McAdam 1989: 758). Accordingly, the upsurge of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations in 2010-2011 stirred vivid discussions about the nature and consequences of contentious politics in general, as well as its specific character in the era of the crisis. The tone of these discussions, however, was predominantly given by the features of exceptional heterogeneity of the protestors and the exceptional intensity of the protests, that encouraged analyses drawing on the theme of ‘newness’ and

²⁹ see for example the documentary produced by social movement scholars and activists, Jerome Roos, Leonidas Oikonomakis, Andrés Cornejo about the movement politics of the crisis and the mobilizations of the Aganaktismenoi in Greece, ‘Utopia on the Horizon. A documentary for those who struggle’. Accessible online at: <https://roarmag.org/films/utopia-on-the-horizon/>

highlighting the unprecedented and far reaching character of the global wave of mobilizations (on this point see also Flesher Fominaya 2015).

In social movement research, 'newness' is not a new theme. Quite the contrary, the scholarly analysis of the 1960s and the 1970s has been strongly marked by the idea of 'the new' in sociopolitical contestation, as it was appropriately highlighting a double shift, in social movement activity and social movement research. On the one hand, the 'new' was accurately delineating the emergence of the New Social Movements of the 1970s that marked a radical shift from 'old' (predominantly labour) movements to new post-materialist movements (feminist movements, LGBT movement, indigenous movements, environmental movements etc), standing at the margins of old conventional politics and engaging new agendas in the broader spectrum of a 'politics of signification' (see Hall 1982) or else 'politics of social identity' (see Kitschelt 1993). On the other hand, the 'new' was circumscribing the concomitant shift of movement research from traditional, structuralist explanations towards explanations attuned to the macro-historical construction of collective identities (see della Porta and Diani 1999; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Smith and Fetner 2007) and to 'the ways in which social movements seek to achieve change in cultural, symbolic and subcultural domains, sometimes collectively but also sometimes by way of self-change' (Crossley 2002: 152). The theme of 'newness', therefore, can be understood as a theme not only familiar for social movement research, but also as a theme with great analytical and explanatory potentials, as it has been found to be relevant for galvanizing collective action (Polletta 1998), for allowing actors to circumscribe new collective identities, to engage in synchronization of old and new identities (Tejerina and Perugorria 2012), or to simply distance themselves from the failures of the past (see Flesher Fominaya 2015).

At the same time, however, emphasis on 'newness' is suggested to have blinded movement research to less tangible aspects of movement activism that are better highlighted by a broadened perspective that sees not only 'linearity'

but also ‘fluidity’ in social movements (Gusfield 1981). Fluidity, according to Gusfield, is the feature that allows to approach better non-public or less public actions that ‘have little impact on the state, nor do they seek it’ (Gusfield 1994: 65). The logic of ‘fluidity’ can be understood as referencing the imperative of the New Left Movements that the ‘personal is political’. Accordingly, ‘fluidity’, as opposed to ‘newness’, allows to highlight a set of issues that have to do with the potentials for action beyond traditional forms of resistance focusing on the state (see Shukaitis 2012), as well as issues of continuity through periods of abeyance (see Taylor 1989) or more simply ‘carry-overs and carry-ons’ between movements (Gusfield 1981: 324). Ultimately, the type of movement politics that the theme of ‘fluidity’ invokes resembles what Papadopoulos et.al. describe as ‘imperceptible politics’: ‘a form of politics which employs modes of resistance that are already materialising in our current post liberal sovereign conditions... we use the term imperceptible politics to designate everyday cultural and practical practices of escape’ (2008: 72).

The idea of ‘imperceptibility’ is pivotal for the analysis of the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations because it facilitates a more complete understanding of the protests, as parts of a chain of actions of resistance spreading over time; rather than as the result of some sort of ‘immaculate conception’ here and now. Furthermore, given the trigger of the protests -i.e. the crisis, emphasis on the ideas of ‘fluidity’ and ‘imperceptibility’ becomes critical, for the theme of ‘the crisis’ offers itself for employing narratives of rupture that fail to see continuity and fail to trace ‘history’ in movement activism for social change. Contemporary movement politics cannot be properly explored on the basis of narratives of rupture and discontinuity with past movement politics for social change, the same way that the current crisis cannot be properly explored on the basis of narratives of rupture and discontinuity with neoliberal politics. To deal with the current crisis, or as Flesher Fominaya (2017) puts it ‘twin crises’, as an unprecedented and historically isolated event, means to fail to acknowledge the series of crises that have unfolded over the past two decades worldwide (see Önis and Guven 2010)

and, ultimately, to fail one of the most fundamental lessons of historical capitalism: that is, capitalism is ‘being characterized by recurrent dynamics, including the continual re-creation of contradictions’ (Silver 2003: 2). In a very similar fashion, to deal with the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations as an unprecedented instance of global, massive sociopolitical contestation, means to fail to acknowledge the history (even the very recent one) of grassroots movement resistance to neoliberalism.

Following the above, I argue that to properly grasp the dynamics of the wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2010-2011 it is necessary to contextualize them by exploring the activist tradition they belong to. Accordingly, if the stake of the previous part of the research was to contextualize the Greek and Spanish movements by exploring the national political cultures of Greece and Spain respectively, then this part of the research constitutes an attempt to contextualize the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations in terms of the activist tradition that informs them. Task of this part, therefore, is to tracing lines of continuity between previous movement politics of the crisis and the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, and then to examine the ways in which the Greek and Spanish chapters of the wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations processed the values and organizing principles of this previous movement politics in the anti-neoliberal resistance of 2010-2011.

2. Movement politics of the crisis as resistance to neoliberalism and domination: the autonomous impulse of the Global Justice Movement

It cannot be emphasized enough that contemporary movement politics of the crisis do not stand in isolation from previous moments of contestation of neoliberal capitalism and its specific expressions in the domains of economy and politics. Looking back at the recent history of movement activism, the Global Justice Movement (GJM) at the turn of the century is identified as one of the most critical instances of transnational and massive protests, mobilizing increasingly heterogeneous constituencies in the cause of resisting neoliberalism and acting up for social change (see della Porta 2007; 2009b; Flesher Fominaya 2014). If the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations is to be approached as a response to the double crisis of neoliberal capitalism, then it certainly needs to be acknowledged that the GJM came first in responding to the ‘twin crises’: first, by paving the path towards the articulation of a broad critique that embedded a firm understanding of the inextricable relation of economic and political crisis and, second, by communicating this understanding to wide and increasingly heterogeneous audiences.

Elements that can be easily traced without even going in depth in the discourse and practices of the global wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations -such as the contestation of democratic representation, the indictment of economic and political elites and alternatively the embeddedness of horizontal structures of participation, the emphasis on directness in participation and the attachment to deliberative decision-making processes- have been altogether key discursive formulations and practices of the GJM. The same way, however, that this is to say that the alternative forms of sociopolitical organization advocated and practiced in 2010-2011 are not a novelty of the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations,

it is necessary to acknowledge that they have not been a novelty of the GJM either. The conceptual keystone around which such discourses and practices have been historically developed is the ‘rejection of a politics which appeals to governments to modify their behaviour’ (Graeber 2002: 62). This is a type of politics traditionally associated with autonomous movements, seeking to challenge the oligarchic character of the neoliberal state, dedicated to destroying the grid of power relations that sustain it and devoted to searching through the ‘fractal complexities’ of the State to create TAZs (Temporary Autonomous Zones):

The TAZ is like an uprising which does not engaged directly with the State, a guerrilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves itself to re-form elsewhere/elsewhen, before the State can crush it... As soon as the TAZ is named (represented, mediated), it must vanish, it will vanish, leaving behind it an empty husk, only to spring up again somewhere else, once again invisible because undefinable in terms of the Spectacle. The TAZ is thus a perfect tactic for an era in which the State is omnipresent and all-powerful and yet simultaneously riddled with cracks and vacancies (Bey 1985: 128).

The GJM, therefore, was certainly not the first instance in the history of movement politics to embrace these principles and practices and cannot be treated as a historically isolated moment of anti-neoliberal contestation -pretty much the same way that this holds true for the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations. In this sense, alongside the value of ‘newness’ for the analysis of the GJM, as it managed to set in circulation ideas that were previously confined to restricted audiences, ‘fluidity’ and ‘continuity’ re-emerge here as key elements for fathoming its contribution and the way that it put ‘old wine in new bottles’, so to say. For that matter, the scholarly literature registers the GJM as the movement of the ‘new anarchists’ (Graeber 2002), denoting, thus, the large-scale revival of essentially long-standing,

historical imperatives of the anarchist/autonomous tradition. The recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations constitutes a similar point of revival of these imperatives. Accordingly, the scholarly literature registers the radical comeback of these ideas and practices in 2010-2011 by addressing the wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations as a wave of resistance to neoliberal capitalism and state power, animated by ‘the anarchist spirit’ (Sitrin 2015).

Following all the above, it becomes clear, therefore, that the key to exploring the discursive and practical practices of the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests, if nowhere else, lies in their contextualization: that is, the examination of the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations requires us to examine first, even if briefly, fundamental conceptions and practices that have been previously revived by the GJM and altogether belong to the autonomous tradition. The rest of this chapter follows in this direction, exploring the basic conceptions of horizontality and deliberation, which appear to delineate the discursive and practical practices of the mobilizations of 2010-2011, and in any case circumscribe the autonomous tendency of the GJM and resonate the prefigurative imperative of the autonomous tradition more broadly: that is, the imperative to interrupt the purview of hegemonic politics in ways that re-establish political autonomy (see Day 2005; Rothschild and Whitt 1986), thus foreshadowing the ‘microcosm of that “anarchist dream” of a free culture... while at the same time experiencing some of its benefits here and now’ (Bey 1985: 128).

‘Horizontality’ in the autonomous tradition and the GJM

The first emergence of the term ‘horizontality’ coincides with the Argentinian crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s, being used to describe the appeal for a type of emancipatory organization from below (see Sitrin 2006).

Today, in a process of blending the communitarian tradition of Latin America with the European political tradition, horizontality has come to commonly denote direct participation and to represent ‘an integral part of creating direct democracy’ (Sitrin and Azzellini 2014: 22). The concept and the practice of horizontality, however, extends far beyond the Argentinian anti-austerity movement and is tightly linked to anarchist/autonomous movements. Constituting component feature of the anarchist/autonomous philosophy more broadly, horizontality refers not only to processes of non-conventional organization from below, but also to the broader effort such processes denote for ‘dissolving the structures of authority’ (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 16).

On the one hand, as a concrete organizational practice, horizontality delineates the realization of directness and equality in political participation: that is, it advocates the embeddedness of structures of equality, collectively participated and collectively managed by individuals that stand as equals vis-à-vis one another, equally participating in the processes of decision-making (see Seidman 2000). The agrarian collectives and the collectivization of factories during the Spanish Civil War are among the most characteristic historical examples devoted to negate hierarchical patterns of domination and submission in social organization by practicing horizontality (Ackelsberg 1993). On the other hand, as a political logic, horizontality is found largely animated by post-New Left movements that profoundly changed the societies in which they emerged, forging new social identities of international solidarity, self-management, self-determination, egalitarian humanism and cooperation (Katsiaficas 2006: 1). Approached as such, as a logic of contestation and resistance, horizontality cannot be properly understood without the notion of ‘socialization’. Carole Pateman explains that ‘socialization’ is the key for understanding that social change is essentially a process predicated upon a kind of social training that ‘must take place in other spheres (than the national level) in order that the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed’ (1970: 42). Accordingly, movements inspired by the autonomous tradition, attuned to horizontal forms of contestation and

creation, more often than not emphasize the notion of ‘social rather than political revolution’ (Day 2005: 15), thus highlighting demands for the radical subversion of the very notion of ‘change’ itself.

Insurrection, subversion, spontaneity

Defined in line with the imperatives of the autonomous tradition, social change presupposes a profound appreciation of the spirit of ‘insurrection’ (as opposed to the Marxist-Leninist ‘revolution’), which is considered to resemble an open process that seeks to liberate society from power; rather than conquest power in the form of the State (see Katsiaficas 2006; Bey 1985; Ward 1996; Gordon 2007; 2008; Papadopoulos et.al. 2008; de Souza 2012; 2014). The key to theorizing insurrection, as The Invisible Committee posits, is the liberation of social forces currently confined in a non-creative normality: ‘The interruption of the flow of commodities, the suspense of normality.. and police control liberate potentialities for self-organization unthinkable in other circumstances’ (2009: 119). Insurrection, therefore, it is suggested, is not merely the best, but the only possible way to effect social change because it evades ‘the expected curve, the consensus-approved trajectory: revolution, reaction, betrayal, the founding of a stronger and even more oppressive State - the turning of the wheel, the return of history again and again to its highest form’ (Bey 1985: 126). Horizontality, then, is the name given to insurrectional processes of collective (rather than individual) emancipation, processes of liberating geographical, social, cultural and imaginal spaces of existence (Bey 1985) and, finally, processes that ‘shift the sites for the contestation of power by social movements from politics to everyday life’ (Katsiaficas 2006: 6). In short, then, horizontality is properly understood as a concept and a practice with organic connection to the autonomous call for liberation, appealing to insurrection in order to embed decentralized and participatory modes of both thinking and acting (see Gordon 2008).

Typical historical example of this double effort for the liberation of the mind and the body and the ‘decolonization of everyday life’ (Katsiaficas 2006), through the transformation of social institutions into participatory domains free from domination and submission, constitutes the practice of collectivization and horizontal management of factories, largely representing the ‘material process’ of restructuring in advanced capitalism (see also Nunes 2005). In this direction, in Argentina of the early 21st century, for example, we find ‘horizontalidad’ synonymous with a subversive politics attuned to negate traditional, closed off systems of resistance on the one hand, and on the other with the emergence of a national wave of factories’ occupations and self-management projects (Hernández 2013) that set as their purpose to actualize social emancipation, and, ultimately, realize a participatory polity that reaches far beyond industry. In the words of Eduardo Murúa, President of the National Movement of Recovered Companies of Argentina:

Our premise is more difficult to digest and embed. We say that it is not achieved only with [resolving the issue of] work, we say that we don’t have a decent future if we don’t defeat the system that oppresses us, that the struggle doesn’t end with the recovered companies, that this is only the beginning (Murúa 2009).

In the recent history of grassroots anti-neoliberal resistance, the GJM constitutes the most prominent example of an elaborate and systematic search for horizontality, directness and decentralization in movement activism. The scholarly analyses of the GJM -its discursive and organizational principles, collective action frames, collective identities or even its national branches and their particularities- abound and it is beyond the point (if not impossible) to try and summarize this vast literature here (see della Porta 2005; 2007; 2009a; 2009b; della Porta and Rucht 2013; Flesher Fominaya 2007; 2014a; Maeckelberg 2012; Steger and Wilson 2012; Jiménez and Calle 2007a; 2007b). What is worth noting, however, is that this rich scholarly literature on the GJM

commonly recognizes that if the anti-globalization movement represents a fascinating instance of a globally shared appreciation of horizontality (as both subversion and creation), at the same time it represents an instance of efforts that flourished and efforts that failed, an instance, that is, of experimentation, of ‘trial and error’. The reason is that, even when the embrace of horizontality is given, the quest for self-determination and egalitarianism is taken forward through structures of organization that automatically invoke problems of informal power structures, serving to domesticate dissent and maintain firm, even if subtle, leaders (della Porta and Rucht 2013: 5).

In her early ‘70s research on the women’s liberation movement, Jo Freeman demonstrated that totally absent or loosely defined structures are deeply problematic as they undermine the very demand for horizontality. The reason for this is that such structures essentially prepare a fertile ground for the flourishing of ‘invisible oligarchs’ who assume control and exercise authority over the collective. The ‘tyranny of structurelessness’, however, is not only a theme of social movement research, but also a basic conception of the theory of organizational democracy more broadly. Robert Michels (2001[1915]) leads this debate with his well-known critique of the ‘iron law of oligarchy’, dictating that no matter what buffers are provided, organization exhibits an inherent inclination to hierarchical structures, so much so that she ‘who says organization, says oligarchy’ (Michels 2001: 241). In the field of movement analysis, therefore, alongside movements that oppose democratic values and naturally tend to hierarchical and authoritative organizational forms, movements that embrace democratic values are often similarly found to reproduce a ‘Bonapartist ideology’ that (re)introduces authority relations by virtue of (re)instating informal channels of control and (re)establishing ‘invisible’ leaders, as the accurate and ‘permanent expression of the collective will’ (Mouzelis 1967: 29).

The GJM did not escape this predicament of movement politics seeking decentralization and embracing horizontality. Certainly, it has been intensely animated by the autonomous spirit and has made an indisputably great

contribution to the socialization of insurrectional and subversive politics and the embeddedness of a culture of self-organization, innovating on the ways of coming-together (Trigona 2006; 2009; Maeckelbergh 2012; Graber 2013). Nevertheless, it did not manage to avoid completely the emergence of informal power structures (see Caruso 2004). Commenting on the existence of meaningful differences between the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations from its historical precursor, Raimundo Viejo Viñas has provided us with an eloquent description of the organizational model of the GJM:

The antiglobalization movement was the first step on the road. Back then our model was to attack the system like a pack of wolves. There was an alpha male, a wolf who led the pack, and those who followed behind. Now the model has evolved. Today we are one big swarm of people (Viejo Viñas, quoted at Adbusters 2011).

To better understand this precept, it is necessary to consider that the GJM has been deeply, but not exclusively, marked by the spirit of horizontality: that is to say that the GJM, essentially a plurality of movements, was afflicted by internal debates between its components (the ‘horizontals’ and the ‘verticals’) that were pulling apart in respect to the values they espoused and the organizational priorities they set (see Routledge and Cumbers 2009). A superficial reading of the internal tensions of the GJM explains its insurrectional orientation, autonomous outlook and the prioritization of horizontality as incomplete at best: it seems to be self-evident that ‘a movement of movements’ set up by competing traditions (the autonomous tradition, on the one hand, and the tradition of the Institutional Left, on the other) has not made great steps forward in the direction of embedding insurrectional, autonomous and horizontal forms of theorizing and acting as the *modus operandi* of contemporary anti-neoliberal resistance. The assumption that leads this reading is that horizontality is a closed-off project of

institution, not an open-ended process of transformation. Accordingly, its ‘success’ or its ‘failure’ is statically defined as presence or absence of concrete and public results. Horizontality, however, as a process of creative transformation cannot be exposed to failure (or success) defined as such, because its presupposition is ‘trial and error’: an open-ended development of ideas and practices that admits to ‘proceed by experimental investigation to work out the answer’ (Cadogan 1962: 68).

Following the above, it becomes apparent that horizontality, as a subversive politics, resonates the view that change is a process, not a result, a verb not an adjective, so that ultimately what we are dealing with is horizontality for change but actually horizontality *as* change (see also Blee 2012). The added value of this reading of horizontality is double. First, horizontality as a *subversive* politics is creating domains and modes of resistance outside conventional understandings of politics and organization. Second, horizontally as a *process* of creation invokes the prefigurative precept of change as an ever-continuous process, not a ‘linear march towards some professed end of history’ (Nunes 2005). These lessons are crucial for two reasons. First, they are important lessons helping to put the GJM in perspective: i.e. on the one hand, to read it as a moment of contestation introducing successfully different tools of resistance and repertoires of action with lasting historical effects, and on the other hand to critically appreciate both its ‘failure’ to completely eradicate hierarchies and the concomitant patterns of domination and submission, and its ‘success’ to place in circulation and systematic experimentation a culture of resistance with which large segments of the global population had not been familiar before. Second, they are critical lessons for rendering intelligible the fundamental prefigurative imperative of the autonomous tradition at large, on which draws not only the GJM but also the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations that succeeded it.

Horizontality understood as a subversive politics that seeks to dissolve structures of authority and control, extends also to dissolving conventional

understandings of resistance and contestation that emphasize on formal and typical modes of organization. The framework in which we find animated the type of alternative forms of open-ended organizational processes that accompany the politics of horizontality is given by the 'theory of spontaneous order'. In the words of Colin Ward, 'the theory that, given a common need, a collection of people will, by trial and error, by improvisation and experiment, evolve order out of the situation - this order being more durable and more closely related to their needs than any kind of externally imposed authority could provide' (Ward 1996: 31). European autonomous movements of the 1970s have strongly developed around this precept. Highlighting the tense relation between autonomous and party-oriented Marxist-Leninist groups in Germany, Katsiaficas, for example, has pointed out the value of 'conscious spontaneity' in the development of popular, insurrectional, autonomous forms of resistance challenging traditional notions of organization (2006: 8). In the GJM the concept of spontaneity has been of key value for the analysis of the discourses, practices and repertoires of what resembled a carnival resistance determined to 'make revolution irresistible' (Notes from Nowhere 2003a). Finally, in the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations 'spontaneity' has been often used to denote the vividness of the protests and their tendency to improvise on the ways of coming together to resist.

'Spontaneity', similar to 'newness', is not a concept foreign to social movement analysis and has been variously used not only to acclaim the organizational vivacity of autonomous movement politics, but often also to stigmatize this vivacity as confusion, disorganization and chaos. The movements of the New Left during the 1960s and 1970s, for example, or more specifically as Polletta (1998) demonstrated in her study of the US student sit-ins of the 1960s, have often become a contested domain for analyses emphasizing on narratives of spontaneity in order to (negatively) explain their diverse and unpredictable modes of organization. Later on, the post-New Left movements of the 1980s and the 1990s were approached as belonging to the same genealogy of movement politics of antiauthoritarianism, decentralization

and emancipation, but at the same time as being significantly more spontaneous -this being conflated with less organization and more unpredictability (see Katsiaficas 2006). The GJM has not escaped this kind of stigmatization of its practices and carnival repertoires of actions, which were often explained away as violent and chaotic forms of challenging the institution of capital; albeit, as Graeber notes, in reality the greatest challenge in understanding the GJM is to fathom ‘not the “violence” of the movement but its relative lack of it; governments simply do not know how to deal with an overtly revolutionary movement that refuses to fall into familiar patterns of armed resistance’ (2002: 66). More recently, analyses of the global wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilization have followed in the same direction. Espinosa Pino, for example, records interpretations of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, by a Right leaning public discourse, as ‘a discontent and reactive multitude that has apparently found new way to express their dissent, but in the end they are victims of their own spontaneity and disorganization’ (2013: 231).

Spontaneity, however, cannot occur without organization. Contrary to the commonly held view that spontaneity precludes the hard work of premeditation and forethought, in reality, spontaneous actions are possible only on the basis of early on preparation. Gramsci made the point clear by underlining that ““pure” spontaneity does not exist in history: it would come to the same thing as “pure” mechanicity. In the “most spontaneous” movement it is simply the case that the elements of “conscious leadership” cannot be checked, have left no reliable document’ (1971: 196). For the GJM at the turn of the century, therefore, spontaneity can be used to indicate no less than a set of suddenly erupting responses and repertoires of resistance, which appear foreign, unexpected and unpredictable only if we fail to follow the emergence of informal structures of leadership, or what Viejo Viñas (2011) identified as ‘an alpha male, a wold who led the pack’, but most importantly if we fail to follow closely the ‘stunning amount of preparation, interconnection, and flow of communication that is already in place’ (Notes from Nowhere 2003a: 68).

Accordingly, scholarly analyses of the autonomous spirit of contemporary anti-neoliberal resistance admit to spontaneity being a critical element of this insurrectional type of movement politics. The assumption that leads this reading, however, is that spontaneity does not negate the presence of ‘long-lasting solidarities’ (Dalakoglou and Vradis 2011), the existence of ‘webs of social networks -both physical and virtual- which facilitate the articulation of organized protest’ (Subirats 2016: 22) or ‘consciousness and awareness of the grassroots when spontaneously mobilizing’ (Leontidou 2012: 300).

Scholarly analyses of movement politics adopt a variety of approaches to the contested relation between spontaneity and organization. Katsiaficas (2006) proposes the merger of ‘conscious spontaneity’, Leontidou (2012) challenges altogether the current value of a Gramscian understanding of spontaneity as invisible, non-recorded leadership, while Dalakoglou admits to the tactical and organizational value of Gramscian spontaneity but posits that ‘post-spontaneity’ constitutes the central challenge of contemporary movement politics: that is, the ‘metamorphosis of spontaneity into a new radical, self-organized and antagonistic political economy of everyday life’ (2012: 537). In all these instances, whether efforts are put in the direction of building conceptual bridges between spontaneity and organization or arguing for new theorizations of spontaneity altogether, common premise is the assumption of an organic tension that needs to be addressed. Flesher Fominaya, finally, explains the tension of the dichotomy of spontaneity/non-spontaneity as a paradox specific to the autonomous tradition, in the sense that autonomous movements consciously avoid recognizable organizational frameworks, thus, making their collective identities and networks ‘invisible’ and their activism susceptible to spontaneity narratives (2015: 143). This explanation not only helps understand why spontaneity is an ever-present theme in the analysis of autonomous movements, but it also helps delineate the framework in which it can be dealt with when examining autonomous movements (be these anarchist/autonomous movements typically defined or movements strongly inspired by the autonomous tradition, such as the GJM at

the turn of the century and the global wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations more recently):

There is no need to choose between the fetishism of spontaneity and organizational control; between the “come one, come all” of activist networks and the discipline of hierarchy... To organize is not to give a structure to weakness. It is above all to form bonds -bonds that are by no means neutral- terrible bonds. The degree of organization is measured by the intensity of sharing -material *and* spiritual... Here lies the truly revolutionary potentiality of the present. The increasingly frequent skirmishes have this formidable quality: that they are always an occasion for complicities of this type, sometimes ephemeral, but sometimes also unbetrayable (The Invisible Committee 2009: 14-5; original emphasis).

Finally, along such lines, behind the insurrectional, subversive and spontaneous type of politics traditionally associated with movements strongly influenced by the autonomous spirit -such as the GJM- we consistently come down to the widely appreciated notion of ‘direct-action’. Direct action, is commonly conflated with the notion of civil disobedience as a way of interrupting the purview of extant organizational systems and reigning institutions. The tendency of the autonomous tradition, however, to favour direct action in particular, is symptomatic of a sharp analytical and practical distinction between the two notions. If civil disobedience is to be understood as a potentially transformative process, the problem identified with it is that the confrontation it professes is rhetorical, ultimately ‘reinforcing rather than challenging the status quo of society’s basic relations and institutions’ (Gordon 2008: 18). Direct action, by contrast, is favored because it substantiates a subversive politics, a transformative process that takes place against embedded relations of domination and against the centrality of the state. In summary, thus, if horizontality is to be understood as a politics of transformation and change inspired by the autonomous philosophy, then it can be said that its goal

is subversion, its method insurrection, its tactic direct action and its expression spontaneity. Altogether, that is, horizontality is the name given to a cohesive project that sees social change as a process of destroying reigning institutions of domination and creating autonomous institutions of solidity, egalitarianism and cooperation. Representing a ‘politics of signification’ (Hall 1982), however, horizontality (and the autonomous call for liberation more broadly) cannot be properly grasped without also understanding the cognitive ways in which hierarchies are destroyed and horizontal networks are created. In this direction, the following section explores the autonomous call for deliberation, as an exercise in rationality that seeks to remake old aims and habits (Dewey 1922: 198).

‘Deliberation’ in the autonomous tradition and the GJM

Deliberation constitutes the most widely employed practice of movements that are inspired by the autonomous tradition and negate domination in the processes of decision-making. At the same time, however, deliberation, loosely defined as a process of decision-making that proceeds through reason and justification (see Kadlec and Friedman 2007), is admitted to constitute the cornerstone of democratic politics more broadly (see Manin 1997; Fishkin and Laslett 2003; Fishkin 1995; Mansbridge 2007; Mansbridge et.al. 2010).³⁰ In order to single out those distinctive feature of deliberation as it is defined in the autonomous tradition and has been embraced by the GJM, therefore, it is crucial to briefly explore the two basic frameworks of analysis by which the theory of democratic politics explains deliberation: *democratic deliberation* and *deliberative democracy* (see Mansbridge 2007).

³⁰ Of course deliberation is not unanimously celebrated in the scholarly literature. It is worth noting that instead the debate is often marked by reservation ranging from dismissive approaches that suggest deliberation to entail no more than the meaningless noise of politics, see for example Lippman, W. (1998[1922]). *Public Opinion*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, or propose that it merely constitutes “an imaginary projection of calculating politicians and imaginative political theorists”, see Welsh, S. (2013). *The Rhetorical Surface of Democracy*. UK: Lexington Books, p. 2.

Democratic deliberation, on the one hand, describes conditions of transparency that allow the counterbalancing of power relations, as opposed to decision-making processes that are based on voting for example, whereby power relations remain hidden in the ballot cabin or the showing of hands (Steiner 2012). This framework of analysis explains deliberation as a method of decision-making, serving to expose the manipulation of power, to advance dialogue on the basis of rational argumentation and to arrive to decisions through reasoned justification; as opposed to decisions made in a preemptory or arbitrary fashion (Gutmann and Thompson 2004). Deliberative democracy, on the other hand, describes a quintessentially democratic process of organizing, built on counteracting, rather than provisionally counterbalancing, power relations (Mansbridge 2007). In this framework, deliberation seeks not only to dissolve power, but also to interrupt those relations of domination (even if subtle) under the influence of which clashes of opinions are resolved (see Rosenberg 2007). In sum, thus, drawing a sharp distinction between democratic deliberation and deliberative democracy we arrive at the following dichotomy: democratic deliberation, on the one hand, locates the problem of *power in the procedures* of decision-making and conceptualizes deliberation as a method that guarantees transparency and reduces arbitrariness (Steiner 2012). Deliberative democracy, on the other hand, locates the problem of *power in embedded social relations* of domination and conceptualizes deliberation as a process that continually challenges domination and submission, while creating solidarity and cooperation.

Following through this distinction between the two frameworks of deliberation, we arrive to a fundamental distinction between procedural definitions of sociopolitical organization on the one hand, and the prioritization of social relations on the other. Accordingly, we find democratic deliberation struggling to find the right mix of methods to channel power relations through various control channels (Steiner 2012), and deliberative democracy striving to counteract social relations of domination and submission. Deliberation, thus, on the one hand is reduced to a type of

strategic bargaining where decision-making resembles a ‘private act of consumption’ (Ackerman and Fishkin 2002: 143), and on the other it references the building of new social relations of solidarity and cooperation where decision-making resembles a ‘collective act of power’ (Ackerman and Fishkin 2002: 143), searching for the individual interest through the collective interest (Mansbridge et.al. 2010: 64-8; Cohen 1989).³¹ The autonomous tradition clearly favours those qualities that the framework of deliberative democracy contains, positing that along with participation, transparency and democracy, deliberation is ‘essential to the transformative power of autonomy’ (Notes from Everywhere 2003b: 115).

Overall, autonomous collective action that seeks to dissolve hegemonic relations, when it comes to decision-making, traditionally assumes as its *modus operandi* ‘deliberation’ as communication of opinions, not the confrontation of dogmatic beliefs, and as careful consideration of counterarguments, not as manipulation and bargaining (see della Porta 2013). Accordingly, social movements inspired by the autonomous tradition are altogether guided by the premise that yielding to competing arguments is in fact an element that advances new social relations based on cooperation, rather than an expression of defeat (Young 1996; della Porta 2005). In this sense, then, deliberation in the autonomous tradition can be understood as the name given to those processes of building new social relationships and of exploring together the ways by which to dissolve authority. The GJM, like its precursor movements of antiauthoritarianism and decentralization, adopted deliberation as a critical part of its identity that became crystallized in the triptych ‘participation, deliberation, consensus’. Finally, the same can be said to hold true also for the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations that are connected to the GJM through lines of continuity in the

³¹ Jane Mansbridge speaks of *self-interest* in particular, which she suggests holds claims for individual interests being distinct but in all instances being inevitably included in the collective interest; by contrast to the *private interest* which is as such conceptualized outside the collective interest and thus it is per force opposed to it.

appreciation of deliberative practices (Maeckelbergh 2012; Flesher Fominaya 2014; Subirats 2016).

The deliberative practices of the GJM have been examined in the relevant scholarly research on a number of dimensions, such as power -to reference the ‘nature of the “arguments” that produce consensus’, preferences -to reference opinions and positions on issues, and values -to denote beliefs central in individuals’ belief systems (Andretta 2013: 98). These examinations found that, similar to the implementation of horizontality, the quest of deliberation in the GJM has registered both ‘successes’ and ‘failures’, by virtue of arising conflicts between the competing traditions of the ‘horizontals’ and the ‘verticals’ (see also Flesher Fominaya 2007), but also by virtue of emergent intragroup controversies (Rucht 2013). In this direction, research on deliberation in the GJM has shown that major analytical necessity for understanding deliberative practices in autonomous movements is to explore also the modes of differential participation in deliberation: that is, alongside the implementation of deliberative practice, it is crucial to account for the quality and performance of deliberation in participatory and deliberative movements (Giugni and Nai 2013). For an autonomous-leaning understanding of the process of building new social relations, key element in this direction is the feature of ‘rationality’, holding the potential to guarantee ‘coercionless’ decisions (Ritter 1980: 147).

Rationality is a key issue for the conceptualization of deliberation broadly speaking (see Habermas 1981). In this sense, the distinction drawn between democratic deliberation and deliberative democracy can be recast to reference a type of ‘irrational’ and ‘rational’ deliberation, respectively. Dewey explains how these parallels work:

Deliberation is irrational in the degree in which an end is so fixed, a passion or interest so absorbing, that the foresight of consequences is warped to include only what furthers execution of its predetermined bias. Deliberation is rational in the degree in which *forethought flexibly*

remakes old aims and habits, institutes perception and love of new ends and acts (Dewey 1922: 198; added emphasis).

The autonomous understanding of deliberation, favouring ‘rationality’, essentially favours a ‘dramatic rehearsal (in imagination)’ (Dewey 1922: 190) that requires intense cognitive involvement not only for finding solutions, for investigating experimentally acts’ merits, but also for investigating the ways by which decisions about acts are being made (see also Ritter 1980). Deliberation, it follows, for the autonomous tradition, constitutes not only the terrain of engaging new ideas but also a process that aspires to dissolve structures of authoritative thinking alongside structures of authoritative acting. To put it again in the words of Dewey:

It is a great error to suppose that we have no preferences until there is a choice. We are always biased beings, tending in one direction rather than another. The occasion of deliberation is an *excess* of preferences, not natural apathy or an absence of likings. [...] All deliberation is a search for a *way* to act, not for a final terminus. Its office is to facilitate stimulation. (Dewey 1922: 192-3; original emphasis).

Along these lines, finally, deliberation for movements inspired by the autonomous tradition, represents a cognitive task of expanding ways of thinking, rather than strictly a method of decision-making. More precisely put: for movements attuned to dissolve authoritative structures altogether -that is, structures of both acting and thinking- deliberation is the relentless work of an experiment in *metacognition*. This has been also the case for the GJM that posited to *work out* the answers to the crisis of democratic legitimacy: that is, rather than present solutions as part of fixed, closed-off systems of interpretation, the GJM effectively contributed to prefiguring alternatives through physical and cognitive intervention (Graeber 2002). In order to render wholly intelligible the GJM, therefore, and in this sense acquire a sense

of proportion of the way in which the values it espoused (i.e the values of horizontality *and* deliberation) are intertwined together in a cohesive system of interpretation, identity and action, it is necessary to address their common prefigurative tendency. It is, finally, the prefigurative imperative of the autonomous tradition that connects and keeps together the elements of horizontality and deliberation in insurrectional and subversive politics like this of the GJM, in turn shedding light on the politics of the more recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations.

The prefigurative imperative of the autonomous tradition

Prefigurative politics is used to denote a logic of sociopolitical contestation, resistance and creation that foreshadows alternatives of the future in the here and now (Bey 1985), by favoring intervention against state power (Graeber 2002), with the purpose to disrupt hegemonic politics and establish political autonomy (Day 2005). Historically, prefigurative politics has been associated with the tradition of autonomous movements, as opposed to the instrumental politics of the Institutional Left. Accordingly, prefiguration is largely understood as referencing the autonomous appeal for a ‘decentralized popular-control model’, by contrast to instrumentality that is considered to reference the Left appeal for a ‘central-management model of socialism’ (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 16). The relevant literature explains this tension between prefiguration on the one hand and instrumentality on the other, as the most basic challenge of the radical tradition altogether: that is, as the challenge to ‘give a *political form* to the theoretically-prescribed goals of human liberation’ (Boggs 1977: 359; original emphasis). The assumption that leads this argumentation is that ideas and practices are inevitably disconnected and, accordingly the task of radical movement politics is to repair this connection by bridging instrumentality and prefiguration. Finally, along such lines, more often than not, in the theoretical debate and in

movement activism alike, we find prefigurative politics sidelined (in favour of instrumentality), as a non-strategic, in instances even counter-strategic, movement politics and as a challenge to political efficacy in movement activism (Epstein 1991).

The new social movements of the 1960s and the 1970s, which favored participatory and deliberative forms of governance, largely espoused prefiguration as the embrace of radicalization. The scholarly literature traces a ‘stable prefigurative tendency’ in a variety of NSMs from environmental and peace to indigenous rights and feminist movements (Leach 2013: 1005). In a universe of firm distinctions, however, between discipline and freedom, effectiveness and self-expression, a variety of the movements of the New Left typified prefiguration as synonymous to ineffectiveness and instead identified efficacy with instrumentality -even if it was understood to impose also regrettable concessions and the trading of the ‘revolution’ for ‘reform’: ‘their dilemma -and it was a dilemma, not a mistake- was that they wanted to effect political change without reproducing the structures that they opposed. To be ‘strategic’ was to privilege organization over personhood and political reform over radical change, and this they would not do’ (Polletta 2000: 6). At the same time though, in the nineteenth and twentieth century history of movement politics, we find prefiguration posing as a critical precept of a series of movements identifying with the autonomous tradition —from the Paris Commune in 1871 and the council communism of the 1920s (with notable examples the Italian Biennio Rosso in 1918-1920 and the German factory councils in 1917-1919) to the anarchist and autonomous collectives of the Spanish Civil War, the world changing May 1968, the notable national liberation movement of the Zapatistas in Mexico (EZLN) or the GJM at the turn of the century (see Boggs 1977; Leach 2013; Maeckelbergh 2011). In all these instances, critical element for fathoming the value of prefigurative politics for the autonomous tradition has been a firm belief opposing the common ‘ends justify means’ precept (see Rothschild and Whitt 1986): this is the belief that ‘the ends a social movement achieves are fundamentally shaped

by the means it employs' (Leach 2013: 1004), and it is of exceptional value for rendering intelligible prefigurative politics and for exploring the basic axes around which it builds.

Prefiguration as strategy

The kernel of prefiguration is the admission of an inextricable relation between the means and the ends of action, which renders distinctions between effectiveness and expression irrelevant. Prefigurative politics, thus, search efficacy not in the means employed, but in the connection of employed means and prescribed ends —i.e. in *consistency in praxis* (Gunn 2014; Wilding 2014). This is the first basic axis of prefiguration, as a politics that not only is strategic, but actually substantiates 'the best strategy because it is based in practice, *in doing*' (Maeckelbergh 2011: 13; original emphasis). Put in different words, the strategic value of prefiguration is that it alters radically the very notion of change itself: it undermines the primacy of means, it invests in the congruence of means and ends and, thus, next to (the means of) resistance it embeds firmly the notion of creation (of exploring, experimenting and devising ends anew) as integral component of anti-neoliberal contestation. The basic assumption that leads this reading of prefigurative politics, as the best strategy, is that prefiguration is fundamentally subversive as it uses direct action to 'shift the sites for the contestation of power by social movements from politics to everyday life' (Katsiaficas 2006: 6).

The feminist movements of the 1970s and the 1980s played a critical role in embedding this lesson. For these movements, direct action for women's emancipation meant to expose the concept of gender as 'the pillar of women's oppression' in its own right (Jasper 2007: 68), not only in order to expose the subtle mechanisms of oppression in everyday life, but also in order to counteract them by establishing in their place a consistent everyday-life politics, systematically oriented at making authoritative ways of both thinking and acting irrelevant (Reed 2005). The example of the feminist movements, in

this sense, is valuable for understanding prefiguration as spearheading a struggle with three edges: prefiguration denotes a struggle against capitalist and patriarchal modes of relation, while at the same time it signifies a struggle against the ‘authoritarian residuals’ of the radical tradition itself (de Souza 2014: 105-6; 111), parallel to invoking a critical reading of contestation (resistance and creation) that highlights ‘the importance of *political* choice, as opposed to simply *moral or heroic* choice, and of movements as constructed, rather than automatic’ (Cox and Flesher Fominaya 2013: 11).

The GJM is a critical example of sociopolitical contestation that followed the prefigurative precept of the autonomous tradition, using direct action in order to resist neoliberalism *and* foreshadow an alternative politics based on solidarity, egalitarianism, cooperation and self-determination. Scholars have variously commented on the prefigurative spirit of the GJM by emphasizing on the role of prefiguration in the network structures of the ‘movement of movements’ (Maeckelbergh 2009; 2011; Juris 2008), and finding these to be emblematic of ‘a kind of activism that prefigures and embodies a wholly different kind of politics, a politics of “everyday life”, one that seeks to transform the way we envisage power and relate to it’ (Tormey 2005: 345). The basic feature that led the GJM’s quest to transform society may be understood to have been defiance of the pervasiveness of economic relations in advanced capitalism and a deep appreciation of the fact that non-commodified spaces -of ‘mutual-aid, reciprocity, cooperation and inclusion’ for example, are ‘at the core (rather than the margins) of even the “advanced”, and “commodified” economies’ (White and Williams 2012: 1632). Accordingly, the declared aim of the ‘movement of movements’ has been to work out the potentials of human liberation by seeking to protect and liberate such spaces of existence in the cracks of capitalist integration. Its strategy has been prefiguration, in the sense of a systematic effort to destroy hierarchies, domination and exploitation and create networks of solidarity and self-determination through direct action in the here and now: ‘We learn to work together, we become better at being humans, and we are able to live prefiguratively, in the most radical of all

carnivals -a world which will not wait for the future, a world which embraces diversity, a world which contains many worlds' (Notes from Nowhere 2003c: 183).

Prefiguration as reconceptualization of 'history'

Basic challenge of prefigurative politics, it is suggested, is to find ways to sustain the struggle to render domination into anachronism and to work out alternatives of a liberated future in the here and now, while being confronted with Michel's 'iron law of oligarchy' and, by extension, with the problem of recasting radical change into mere reform and management. It is often proposed that the reason for this is that autonomous movements that seek to achieve social change 'have *yet* to supplant mainstream institutions' (Leach 2013: 1005; my emphasis), and are thus susceptible to either marginalization or co-optation by them. Katsiaficas comments on this reading as being a common observation suggesting that autonomous movements are of little interest or relevance. As he explains, however, 'the assumption contained in such a view is that power -not its disintegration- should constitute the goal of social movement' (Katsiaficas 2006: 5). Prefigurative politics, by contrast, rather than being challenged by marginalization and inefficacy, effectively challenge the very assumptions that accompany the notion of sociopolitical relevance and efficacy. In this direction, autonomous movements espousing prefiguration highlight that goal of movement politics is to disintegrate power, not only in organizational structures but also in cognitive structures, to bring 'hidden structures to consciousness' and thus to 'make long-standing categories of domination into anachronisms' (Katsiaficas 1997: 251). Critical part of this process for autonomous movements is the challenging of the sovereign political order of the state, as the ultimate (material and cognitive) representation of centralized power demanding obedience (Sheehan 2003: 25-32).

The radical tradition has been historically confined by the institution of the state as the material manifestation of sociopolitical organization and the conquest of state power as the key to effecting change: 'Change the world through the state: this is the paradigm that has dominated revolutionary thought for more than a century...On the one hand reform, on the other side revolution.. the intensity of the disagreements concealed a basic point of agreement: both approaches focus on the state as the vantage point from which society can be changed. Despite all their differences, both aim at the winning of state power' (Holloway 2002: 11). In historical terms, the centrality of the state as a 'sovereign order that claims and demands obedience, and if necessary the lives of its subjects' (Sheehan 2003: 26) is confirmed by the institution of 'bureaucratic party-states (classical Leninism, the Soviet model)' to the movement politics' 'assimilation into existing bourgeois institutions (Social Democratic and Communist parties in advanced capitalist societies)' (Boggs 1977: 359). Following the historical examples of reproduction of authority relations in the form of the state, we consistently arrive at a basic almost invincible fascination with centralized power (see Williams and Lee 2012). The scholarly literature explains this fascination to be symptomatic of limited political imagination:

We simply seem to lack the intellectual resources necessary to conceive of a political order beyond or without the state, since the state has been present for long enough for the concept to confine out political imagination. Thus, what might lurk beyond it is not simply unknown to us, but also effectively hidden by our statist intellectual predispositions (Bartelson 2001: 1-2).

In contrast to the above, the prefigurative politics of the autonomous tradition encourages the demystification of domination in the form of the state and is consistently attuned at dispelling the myth of domination and submission as a natural expectation of sociopolitical thinking and acting.

Accordingly, autonomous movements ‘reject the form of imposed, centralized authority enshrined and made material by the state’ (Sheehan 2003: 26). Scholars have often read this rejection as denoting a retreat from politics, suggesting that the radical tradition, ‘in its fear of the “external element” (leadership and organization), in its retreat into extreme manifestations of subjectivism, and in its uncompromising abstentionism, it never realized its transformative potential’ (Boggs 1977: 386). Alternative explanations propose, however, that to grasp the transformative potential of autonomous anti-statism and antiauthoritarianism it is essential to draw a distinction between ‘*the government*, referring to the state, and *government*, referring to the administration of a political system’ (Sheehan 2003: 25; original emphasis). Accordingly, then, it is necessary to become attuned to the difference between seeking to seize power and to become the government, and seeking to recuperate government in the form of actively practicing participatory and deliberative alternatives in the here and now.

To the predicament of the radical tradition, recurrently captivated by the ‘state’ (as a material and cognitive limit to liberation), strategic prefiguration responds by employing an understanding of subversive politics as *imagination* and *ideation*: a process of shaping ideas and concepts, rather than of pursuing predetermined political plans in arenas conventionally considered political (see Katsiaficas 2006; Maeckelbergh 2011). There are two basic assumptions behind this interpretation of subversive politics. The first assumption is characteristically summarized in the well-known precept of the national liberation movement of the Zapatistas: ‘caminando preguntamos’ (ask while walking) —‘but walking, not standing still.. better to step out in what may be the wrong direction and to go creating the path, rather than stay and pore over a map that does not exist’ (Holloway 2010: 13). The second assumption that essentially brings together all points raised above, is that once all automatisms have been dispelled —the progressive historical automatism of the nineteenth century and the automatism of despair of the twentieth century alike— history can be finally reconceptualized and understood not as a ‘linear march towards

its end' but as an ever-developing, open-ended process (see also Cox and Flesher Fominaya 2013; Cox 2013; Traverso 2016):

One of the central problems of Western thought from the Enlightenment to today is that of the 'next revolution'. The first was the one that created the conditions for what we have today: the nation-state, property relations and liberal democracy. Identifying the point of the next one, the one that would change this particular configuration, has been the problem ever since. In this period, the linear solution -the one that identified one point as the end, and identifies this end with itself- has been largely discredited because all 'ends of history' always had to be enforced, and history stubbornly went on (Nunes 2005: 314).

The GJM confronted the problems and the limitations of prefigurative politics in respect to reconfiguring the concept and the practice of a strategic politics, re-appreciating the notion of political choice and the centrality of the state in anti-neoliberal resistance and, finally, reconceptualizing history as an open-ended process of transformation. It certainly did not resolve all problems and it did not manage to overcome all limitations. Its exceptional value, however, is that it affirmed their problematic nature and it set off to tackle them head on (see Epstein 2001; Graeber 2002; Maeckelbergh 2009; Juris 2008; della Porta and Rucht 2013). The added value of this is that in attempting to tackle such problems and limitations, the GJM introduced new repertoires of resistance, thus contributing in creating contested domains outside the conventional definitions of politics and contestation. Social contestation, it is suggested, takes place in cycles of protesting, connected with one another through mechanisms of brokerage (McAdam et.al. 2001; Koopmans 2004; Kriesi 2004). Accordingly, contentious politics evolves by making connections and by generating new understandings and identities (Smith 2004), which, given their successful introduction, can have a long-lasting historical effect (see Tilly 1978). Movements, in this sense, represent

the result of ‘cognitive, organizational, cultural, and tactical effects of ‘early risers’, the influential movements that emerge first in the cycle, on later movements’ (Whittier 2004: 533). Finally, following these lessons of movement research, the GJM can be accurately read as belonging to a cycle of historical struggles of anti-neoliberal resistance closely associated with the autonomous tradition and, at the same time, as a broker of prefigurative politics and of the autonomous impulse to tackle the limitations imposed on anti-neoliberal resistance, for movements that emerged later in the historical cycle of anti-neoliberal contestation —such as the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations that concerns the present research.

Conclusions

The assumption that led the examination of this chapter is that social movements are appropriately examined by a broadened perspective that appreciates ‘fluidity’ in the ways in which discursive and practical practices are embraced by them, thus, forming lines of continuity with other movements belonging in the same tradition. In this direction, it has been argued that the concept of ‘fluidity’ allows to highlight ‘carry-overs and carry-ons’ between autonomous movements (Gusfield 1981: 324), thus bringing to consciousness the ‘imperceptible politics’ (Papadopoulos et.al. 2008) of reconfiguring domains of contestation and of shifting contestation in arenas traditionally considered non-political (Katsiaficas 2006). In this direction the task of this chapter has been the tracing of lines of continuity in movements inspired by the autonomous tradition, espousing prefiguration and embracing horizontal and deliberative practices. The aim of tracing such lines of continuity has been to provide a nuanced understanding of the broader context of movement politics in which the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations is embedded. The key, finally, for contextualizing the recent wave of anti-neoliberal resistance has been the movement politics of the GJM at the turn of the century, as a momentous instance of large-scale,

heterogeneous movement: ‘a movement of movements’ that shaped contemporary autonomous movement politics by virtue of the intensity of its demands, the intensity of the way in which it set off to tackle head on problems and limitations in grassroots resistance and, finally, by virtue of the successful way in which it introduced new repertoires of resistance with long-lasting historical effects.

The autonomous impulse of the GJM has been examined by closely exploring central values and organizing principles of the autonomous tradition: horizontality, deliberation, prefiguration. Horizontality, on the one hand, has been explored as an organizational practice, advocating for structures of equality, horizontally and directly participated. Further, it has been examined as an organizational logic, seeking to rearrange conventional conceptions of politics. The notions of socialization, insurrection, subversion, direct action and spontaneity have been accordingly discussed, as critical elements of a cohesive project of creative transformation that seeks to dissolve material and cognitive structures of authority and control. Overall, the discussion of the notion of horizontality demonstrated a very basic point: the embrace of horizontal practices in autonomous movements and movements inspired by the autonomous tradition—from the early twentieth century politics of the anarchist/autonomous movement in the Spanish Civil War to the NSMs of the 1960s and the 1970s, to the post-New Left movements of the 1980s and the GJM at the end of the century—has consistently represented an unyielding desire to transform social antagonism altogether and to delineate a new political economy of resistance, by devising anew ways of thinking and acting.

Deliberation, on the other hand, has been explored through the two basic frameworks of democratic deliberation and deliberative democracy, and it has been demonstrated that it is the latter framework that has critical importance for rendering intelligible deliberation as defined by the autonomous tradition and as practiced by the movements espousing its values. By contrast to deliberation understood as a method for counterbalancing

power in the procedures of decision-making, trying to channel power relations through control channels and, eventually, reducing deliberation to strategic bargaining, it has been demonstrated that an autonomous-leaning understanding of deliberation advocates instead: deliberation as a process of dissolving power and counteracting relations of domination, by means of creating structures and practices of solidarity and cooperation, where decision-making recuperates its collective dimension and transformative power. The notion of rationality has been, finally, singled out as invoking the autonomous call to dissolve structures of authoritative thinking, alongside structures of authoritative acting. Thus, deliberation has been demonstrated to constitute a hard work in metacognition: a critical intervention in the structures of cognition that allows to remake old aims and habits.

Last, prefiguration has been briefly discussed as representing the basic strategy of the autonomous tradition more broadly and the GJM in particular - as a broker of the autonomous impulse to foreshadow alternatives, by intervening against state power and disrupting hegemonic modes of acting, thinking and relating. Accordingly, the basic assumption of systematic congruence of means and ends has been discussed, alongside two basic prefigurative precepts: first, the understanding that transformative politics takes place by making choices that are essentially political, as opposed to moral or heroic choices, and, second, that transformative politics denotes creating contested domains of resistance outside conventionally defined political arenas. Altogether, the discussion of prefiguration arrived at a very basic point: subversive autonomous politics seeking to disrupt the purview of hegemonic ways of thinking and acting is first and foremost a politics that radically re-appreciates the very notion of 'history' itself, as a contested process of open-ended and virtually eternal transformation, rather than a linear progression toward an end —whichever this end might be posited to be.

Overall, the examination of this chapter has summarized and put in perspective the precepts of the autonomous tradition that inform the discursive and practical practices of historical and contemporary grassroots

anti-neoliberal resistance. In this sense, rather than arriving at novel findings, it has mainly demonstrated the connection between the autonomous call for liberation and autonomous-leaning movements, such as the GJM. By extension, it has demonstrated the relevance of the autonomous imperatives of horizontality, deliberation and prefiguration also for movements that arrived later in the cycle of grassroots anti-neoliberal resistance, such as the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2010-2011. The scholarly literature has shown that opposition to neoliberalism has taken different forms in the GJM and the recent global wave of resistance (see for example Brissette 2013). Despite these differences, however, the relevant literature has also multiply confirmed that there are indisputable lines of continuity between the two moments of resistance that have to do with the values and principles informing their quest to effect change and with the common embrace of horizontal, transparent, participatory and deliberative structures (Flesher Fominaya 2014; Subirats 2016). This is critical for it allows to understand clearer how the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations has been shaped as a constellation of collectives (similarly to the GJM that emerged as a ‘movement of movements’), deploying ‘a conception of collective performative politics as (direct) “action” rather than structured movement’ (Astrinaki 2009: 100). If the examination of this chapter, however, with the help of the relevant scholarly literature, has traced lines of continuity between the autonomous spirit of historical movements of resistance and the GJM more recently, the way to proceed in examining the discursive and practical practices of the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations that concerns this research has to be the empirical investigation of the way in which autonomous values, principles and repertoires of action have been espoused by them.

The shape of social movements, even those which come later in a cycle of contention and are largely informed by the organizational and cognitive effects of previous movements, it is suggested, depends ‘on the pre-existing structural asymmetries that lead to the action each time, on the human subjects involved

and of course on the physical/material framework of each occasion' (Dalakoglou 2012: 537). I argue that to the above needs to be added also the cultural framework of each case, so that the tracing of lines of continuity between previous movement politics of the crisis and the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, needs to be further accompanied by tracing the ways in which also *national cultures of resistance* have shaped them. The following chapter undertakes this task and attempts to examine the ways in which the Greek and Spanish mobilizations of 2010-2011 have effectively filtered the autonomous values and principles they 'inherited' through the lens of their distinct cultures of resistance singled out earlier.

3. Anti-neoliberal resistance in Greece and Spain: the autonomous impulse of 2008 and the logic of contestation in the mobilizations of 2010-2011

It has been emphasized earlier that social movements emerge as the result of ‘cognitive, organizational, cultural, and tactical effects of ‘early risers’, the influential movements that emerge first in the cycle, on later movements’ (Whittier 2004: 533). In this direction, it has been argued that the autonomous impulse of the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations can be indirectly explored in the cognitive and organizational practices of earlier autonomous movements, such as the GJM. This has been deemed meaningful as part of a macro-level understanding of the way in which the GJM has successfully introduced new repertoires of resistance with historical effects for movements emerging later in the cycle of anti-neoliberal contestation on a global scale. For a meso-level analysis of the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, however, necessary is deemed instead the exploration of similar meso-level movements that have emerged as ‘early risers’ of contemporary anti-neoliberal resistance at the national level. Tracing lines of continuity between the GJM and the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, meant sketching parallels between the autonomous impulse of the GJM and the autonomous impulse of contemporary contestation on a global scale. Similarly, tracing lines of continuity between early risers in the contestation of the current crisis and the anti-austerity mobilizations of 2010-2011, at the national level, helps to sketch parallels that connect tightly contemporary anti-neoliberal contestation within specific national and cultural contexts.

The usefulness of drawing the connecting lines between different instances of movements politics within the country cases examined, is double: first, it helps to render the country cases wholly intelligible on their own right,

as a cohesive universe of movement politics of anti-neoliberal resistance. Second, it helps to establish a system of examination that makes later cross-national comparisons more interesting and potentially more fertile. In this direction, and in accordance to the central argument of this research —i.e. that historically shaped national political cultures constitute critical aspect for the development of contemporary movement politics— I argue that the logic of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of Greece and Spain is better understood by examining nation-specific movements functioning as brokers of the universal, autonomous lessons of horizontality, deliberation and prefiguration. I identify the revolt of December 2008 in Greece and the anti-Bologna mobilizations of 2008 in Spain as such movements translating virtually universal values and beliefs of anti-neoliberal resistance in the nation-specific political culture idioms of Greece and Spain.

The sweeping mobilizations and the vehement riots of December 2008 in Greece are relevant for grasping the way in which basic elements of contemporary anti-neoliberal resistance have been developed in the country since the early outbreak of the crisis (Kallianos 2013; Leontidou 2012; Douzinas 2010; Vradis and Dalakoglou 2011), so much so that the peak of anti-neoliberal resistance in the mobilizations of 2010-2011 can be understood as a reverberation of the critique and advocacy expressed in 2008: a demand for radical social change (see also Sotiris 2010), largely exposing and challenging the notion of ‘Metapolitefsi’ —strictly referring to the transition to the democratic rule of law, but effectively condensing the narratives of democratic consolidation that have shaped the political culture of the country since the mid-1970s. Similarly, I argue that the anti-Bologna mobilizations of 2008 in Spain can be understood as the prelude to the critique and advocacy expressed in the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2010-2011, and as mobilizations subscribing to a critical reading and contestation of the conception of democracy in Spain; albeit questioning mainly the notion of trustworthiness of the political personnel in contemporary democratic Spain, rather than directly the idea of democratic consolidation in the country.

Following in this direction, this chapter briefly explores the way in which autonomous values and beliefs have been processed by the mobilizations of 2008 in Greece and Spain, as mobilizations condensing the movement cultures of resistance of each country respectively, and as early risers of contemporary anti-neoliberal contestation that effectively got named after the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of the *Aganaktismenoi* in Greece and the *Indignados* in Spain. Finally, then the specific logic of contestation in the early anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2010 is examined, as a logic of resistance inspired by the autonomous spirit of early risers but effectively informed by the distinct national political cultures of Greece and Spain.

Early rises of contemporary anti-neoliberal contestation and brokers of the spirit of autonomy in the national context

The revolt of December 2008 in Greece

In December 2008, the assassination of the 15-year old Alexandros Grigoropoulos by a police special guard in central Athens triggered sweeping mobilizations across Greece. Starting from Exarcheia, the Athenian district where Grigoropoulos was killed, demonstrations immediately took over all major urban areas of the country with vehement riots unfolding without interruption for three consecutive days, practically paralyzing the country (see Vradis 2009). The events of December 2008 have been largely approached as the result of a generalized sense of disappointment and frustration of a whole generation that was becoming aware that its future would be actually worse than that of its parents (Hatzistefanou 2014). At the same time, however, more often than not, they have been further understood also as a large scale reaction to the long-established domestic sociopolitical trajectories of repression that have historically shaped domestic social antagonism: ‘The politics of the governments that had dominated the country after the collapse of the dictatorship had just set the center of Athens on fire, but no one dared

send them the bill' (Hatzistefanou 2009; see also Kremmydas 2010; Psimitis 2011).³² Accordingly, observers of December 2008 read the mobilizations as a revolt that substantiated a deeply insurrectional and transformative spirit, successfully combining the rejection of the idea of property³³ and capitalist domination altogether with the rejection of the authority of the state (expressed in violent clashes with the forces of the police) (Hadziiosif 2010).³ At the same time, observers read December 2008 as the expression of anti-neoliberal resistance through nation-specific discourses. Critical aspect in this respect is the symbolic parallels drawn between December 2008 and the collective memory of the Polytechnic uprising in 1973 (see Kremmydas 2010; Hadziiosif 2010; Vradis 2009; Matalas 2010; Rudig and Karyotis 2014).

Following the above, December of 2008 is understood not only as an 'early riser' to contemporary anti-neoliberal resistance, but also as a 'broker' that translated into the national idiom a type of sociopolitical analysis that challenges historically recurrent crises of democratic legitimacy in the country and created new lines of communication and exchange of this critique. Accordingly the revolt of 2008 appears to be susceptible to a double reading. On the one hand, December of 2008 can be discussed by using narratives of continuity that read it as the material and cognitive expression of anti-neoliberal resistance, put in perspective in the broader domestic context of the post-transition and drawing on the symbolic memory of 'historical struggles, which gradually stretched the boundaries of the permissible expression of social demands through protests in a way that undermined state authority and

³² Hatzistefanou, A. (2009). "The soundtrack of a revolt", 06.12.2012, accessible online at, <http://info-war.gr/to-soundtrack-mias-εξέγερσης/>

³³ According to the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the cost of the damages provoked during the riots in December 2008 reached the €50m in Athens alone, see http://www.acci.gr/acci/Home/EBEA_Announcements/tabid/441/ItemID/22/View/Details/language/el-GR/Default.aspx Antonis Vradis, reports that €200m has been the total estimation of the cost of damages according to the Greek Commerce Federation, see Vradis, A. (2009). "Greece's winter of discontent", in *City: Analysis of urban trends, culture, theory, policy, action*, 13(1): 146-9, p. 146.

³⁴ In fact, the 'insurrectional' (or not) character of 'December' divided also public opinion. According to a small scale survey of the polling company Public Issue, conducted in 2009 in a sample of 510 people from 18years old and above, 'December' was read as a true insurrection by the 52% of the respondents, while another 45% read 'December' only as an outburst of the youth with no real insurrectional characteristics. see Public Issue, 6.12.2009, "December 2008 -a year later: Anatomy of an event". The analysis of the survey data is accessible online at: <http://www.publicissue.gr/1358/decemb/>

glorified resistance to government policies' (Rudig and Karyotis 2014: 3). On the other hand, December of 2008 can be discussed by using narratives of a symbolic transition in domestic social antagonism, from the dynamics of 'Metapolitefsi' to a new phase in the crisis of neoliberal capitalism and, by extension therefore, it can be read also as the emergence of renewed, radicalized readings of anti-neoliberal resistance in the contemporary sociohistorical phase of antagonism: 'It was.. the general sense of the movements' failure to express themselves on the institutional level, achieving meaningful reformist changes, that opened the way to a more general anti-systemic logic. An anti-systemic logic, which we saw and heard being expressed that December and which certainly marked (or maybe it even concluded) the history of post-transition social/class struggles in Greece' (S.KY.A. 2010: 56).

Merging the two reading of the events of December, a more comprehensive view, I believe also a more accurate view, of the revolt of 2008 is sketched: the revolt of December substantiated a nation-specific type of anti-neoliberal resistance that followed closely the dynamics of post-transition in Greece, exposing already existing strengths and weaknesses, while at the same time it rearranged the boundaries of contestation, thus, highlighting also new potentials and new limitations in the current sociohistorical phase of antagonism in the country. The revolt of December, in this sense, is best approached neither as a break nor as continuity, but more accurately as a 'break within continuity':

There are moments in the flow of social antagonism that can be classified as historical in the full meaning of the word. Such a historical moment was the revolt of December [...] We need to always keep in mind that on the side of the antagonistic movement, December was a 'break' within 'continuity'. As a matter of continuity, it amplified, like a magnifying glass, already existing potentials, but also weaknesses. As a matter of continuity, the causes of December should be searched for in the specific so-

ciohistorical phase of antagonism in which we find ourselves. At the same time, however, as a matter of a break it highlighted new potentials, it posed new problems, it laid the ground for the challenging of established conceptions and political attitudes (S.KY.A. 2010: 53).

Along these lines, the revolt of December can be examined on a variety of aspects: its contribution in re-shaping the field of information, delegitimizing the eminence of mainstream media (Hatzistefanou 2013); the re-emergence of a radical critique of ‘social order’ as the main ideological mechanism of social control and a ‘broadened attack and depreciation of the ideology of security.. a critique of commodified relations and critique to the form of money.. a critique of the separated politics (separation of the political and the social field) and a critique of the form of the state’ (S.KY.A. 2010: 55-7); the strengthening of lines of continuity with past struggles and the creation of a ‘privileged public space and time’ in which new social relations of solidity, cooperation and self-determination were created (S.KY.A 2013: 8); the critique of the historical concessions of the Left (highlighted in parallels drawn between December 1944 and December 2008)³⁵ and a radical understanding of the mobilized as contenders of history ready for the ‘appropriation and diversion of the past as fait accompli’ - ‘*End of Varkiza. Class War*’ (Appendix E, Picture 21)- and ready to ‘correct history’ and to ‘present historical events as they “should” have happened’ (Kornetis 2014) -‘*In these Dekemvriana it will be us to win*’ (Appendix E, Picture 22); finally, the intense invoking of social insecurity, economic and political frustrations, and a generalized and indeterminate fear that guaranteed inordinate support of the mobilizations

³⁵ The events of December 1944 represent of the most critical conflicts in the country before the Civil War in 1946 and refer to the series of armed conflicts in the city of Athens between the resistance forces of EAM-ELAS and the Government forces and the British tools of the Allies of WWII. The stake of the conflicts was the resistance of left-wing EAM (National Liberation Front) to the disarmament of its military arm ELAS (Greek People’s Liberation Army). The conflict was concluded with the Treaty of Varkiza, signed by EAM that conceded to the disarmament of ELAS. The extent of repression and the intensity of violence during ‘Dekemvriana’ and the symbolic violence that the disarmament of ELAS effectively represented (affirming not only the defeat but also the vilification of the Left for the resistance during WWII), equated the Treaty of Varkiza in public memory with the unconditional surrender of the movement.

and accordingly mobilized an increasingly heterogenous constituency of 'students and university students, precarious workers and 'secured' workers, locals and immigrants, unemployed and lumpen, politicized and non-politicized' (S.KY.A. 2010: 57). Common premise detected in the examination of these dimensions of December of 2008 is the element of violence: physical and symbolic resistance of the protests against the state's physical violence and the delimitation of the boundaries of social expression.

Violence is an important element for grasping the dynamics of the revolt of December, translating the autonomous call for liberation in the nation-specific language of resistance, but also for understanding the inordinate support it received from large section of the population, as well as its vilification as 'primitive leftism' and 'adolescent radicalism' (Kalyvas 2013; see also Kalyvas 2008; 2009). The basic assumption that leads the discussion of violence in anti-neoliberal resistance is the organic connection between the delegitimization of state institutions and the challenging of the state monopoly of violence. Mpelantis explains eloquently how this organic connection worked in the Greek mobilizations of 2008:

When conditions of political crisis arise (as in the revolt of December 2008 in Greece), the question of violence becomes more central and acquires pivotal character. In an instance in which, a) the youth as an inter-class category is experiencing repressive brutality, b) the section of working and unemployed youth experiences the peak of the systems' attack for some time now (unemployment, flexibility, precarity, abolition of insurance rights) and c) the mechanisms of Justice constantly legitimate state brutality, it is absolutely normal for the youth and a section of the marginalized working youth to react on terms of material violence. The delegitimization of the state institutions (police, Justice, education) leads to an immediate challenging of the state monopoly of violence and to a social explosion. This is the moment at which the crisis of legality of the institutions transforms into a crisis of legitimacy, and the moment when the

existing legality is denounced, by a section of the society, as shrinking its rights, as “aggressive violence” and as “morally unlawful” (Mpelantis 2009)

Examined along these lines, physical violence in December 2008 can be appropriately understood in terms of what Katsiaficas describes as ‘civil Ludism’ seeking ‘to break the engines of everyday life’ and effectively rendering ‘the revolt “other” in unexpected ways’ (2006: 5). Symbolic violence on the other hand, can be understood in terms of a fundamentally subversive politics that seeks to profoundly challenge and accordingly interrupt the purview of hegemonic policies and of democratic legitimacy. Altogether, therefore, December of 2008, as a broker of the autonomous call for anti-neoliberal resistance in the contemporary phase of sociohistorical antagonism in Greece, urges the appreciation of violence and radical confrontation as critical elements, component features of sociopolitical contestation in the country.

The anti-Bologna mobilizations of 2008 in Spain

The summit of Bologna in 1999 secured a series of agreements between European governments with the purpose to achieve educational integration in Europe. In Spain, the measures announced by the Spanish government in accordance to the agreements of the ‘Bologna Process’ were the occasion for the spreading of an intense critique that saw the ‘Bologna Process’ as a process of commodification of education. In the years that followed, the critical influence of the GJM and its critique of neoliberal globalization helped spread the critique of the ‘Bologna Process’ across networks of activists, which finally climaxed in 2008 with the emergence of a large wave of demonstrations and occupations in Spanish universities that became known as the anti-Bologna mobilizations (see Fernández González 2014). Critical feature for grasping the relevance of the anti-Bologna mobilizations as broker of the autonomous critique of neoliberalism in Spain, is their characteristic non nation-specific discourse. While the trigger for the early critique behind the anti-Bologna

mobilizations has been the measures taken by the Spanish government, the essence of this critique extended beyond the national context and it eventually arrived in 2008 as a critique of EU policies altogether. The scholarly literature explains this feature of the Spanish anti-Bologna mobilizations as ‘the heritage of previous experiences (the critique of supranational protocols dictating commodification, privatization and neoliberalisation was one of the core elements of the Global Justice Movements)’ (Zamponi and Fernández González 2016: 5).

The scholarly examination of the student movement in Spain suggests that the historical evolution of the movement’s repertoires of action is connected with previous experiences of mobilization in terms of participants, formed collective identities and the responses of governments (Fernández González 2014: 74). In the case of the anti-Bologna mobilization of 2008 such lines of continuity are characteristically traced with the identities shaped by the GJM at the turn of the century and introduced in Spain by the Spanish chapter of the anti-globalization movement. The Spanish chapter of the GJM functioned as the broker of the precepts of anti-neoliberal resistance in the country and largely shaped contemporary understandings of the sociopolitical contestation by means of introducing a broad, extended critique of neoliberalisation beyond national confines. The early critique against the ‘Bologna Process’ has been accordingly processed in parallel with discourses creating contested domains beyond national politics. In this direction the anti-Bologna protests of 2008 were inherited with a broadened perspective of anti-neoliberal resistance and basic assumptions about the organic interconnection of sites of contestation outside the national context and a concomitant appreciation of the radical character of shifting attention to political arenas at the supranational level. The anti-Bologna mobilizations of 2008, in this sense, can be understood as a characteristic example highlighting the strong supranational edge of the nation-specific idiom of anti-neoliberal resistance in Spain. This feature of the anti-Bologna protests highlights a further aspect of

the Spanish logic of sociopolitical contestation: the feature of uninterrupted contestation and interconnectedness.

The cycle of student mobilizations that marked the Spanish grassroots contestation of 2008-2009 is followed by a complex system of virtually uninterrupted and connected moments of resistance. Along this continuum, that appears to be systematically oriented to the production of counter-narratives to neoliberalism, we find mobilizations about housing rights in 2006 with V for Vivienda and later on with PAH in 2009 (see Haro Barba and Sampedro Blanco 2012), mobilizations on issues of culture production, knowledge production and information circulation in 2010 with the Anonymous, and later on with the Free Culture and Digital Commons Movements (see Fuster Morell 2012). In all these instances there are consistently traced lines of continuity in terms of network infrastructures, participants and resources as well as repertoires of action, demonstrating that Spanish sociopolitical contestation develops as a tight grid of activist relations. Critical aspect of this type of development of movement activism in Spain is the creation of 'platforms', as opposed to 'organizations'. Platforms can be understood as functional to the autonomous call for horizontal and deliberative practices, and critical for understanding the nation-specific idiom of sociopolitical contestation in Spain: i.e. the network-based character of movement interconnectedness.

The contribution of platforms in establishing lines of communication and exchange in Spanish movement activism against neoliberalization, from the anti-Bologna mobilizations of 2008 to the anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests of 2010-2011, can be demonstrated by the role played by the platform Juventud Sin Futuro (JSF) (Youth without Future): a post-student movement that followed the anti-Bologna mobilizations in terms of discourses and participants and was instrumental for the emergence of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2010-2011 (see Zamponi and Fernández González 2016: 6-7), effectively mobilizing new identities configured around the crisis and raising demands against unjust policies and

political elites (see for example JSF Facebook page, 'About' section).³ Alongside all the above, another common feature of the universe of interconnected movements since the late 2000s in Spain is that they are movements of resistance engaging critical discourses but an effectively non subversive type of movement politics. This is typically manifested in that the demands of these movements address the state and its institutions not as physical and symbolic forms of domination to be destroyed, but to be primarily reformed. In this direction, more often than not, the state (as the highest discursive and organizational form embodying domination and submission) is sidelined and targets become elected governments, government policies and political elites, to whom pressure is exercised with the purpose to become 'more accountable to the public' (Norris 1999: 3).

The relevant scholarly literature explains the centrality of the institutional politics in Spain by employing the logic of 'buenismo' or 'goodism', as a logic that leads an effectively neutralized contestation and seeks to deactivate the necessity of politics altogether (Puig 2005). The Secretary General of the Group of Strategic Studies (GEES), Florentino Portero, explains buenismo as 'a "realist analysis that paradoxically concludes the negation of "realism"', by admitting 'peace as a right' and 'dialogue as an alternative' (2005: 42-47), while Miquel Porta proposes buenismo to be the counterweight to the critical discourse that has historically captured the imaginary of autonomous movements professing to 'put an end to what is called "System"' and as a critique that assumes 'dialogue' as the modus operandi of social change and seeks 'agreement':

And there is the problem. To put it without any circumlocutions: when speaking about dialogue it is necessary to specify dialogue with whom, unders what conditions and until what point. Or what is actually the same, agreement is not always possible or desirable. And that is not

³⁶ https://www.facebook.com/pg/juventudsinfuturo/about/?ref=page_internal

accepted by 'buenismo' - the authentic unique thought really existing today in Spain - for which dialogue has no frontiers (Porta 2005: 26).

Examined along these lines, contemporary movements of anti-neoliberal resistance in Spain appear to be drawing on lessons that favour a type of anti-neoliberal resistance that disavows confrontations and the disruption of civil peace. Altogether, therefore, the emerging picture for contemporary Greek and Spanish movements of anti-neoliberal resistance, highlights critical differences in the way in which common autonomous precepts are translated in each case. The effect such different translations have in the production of movement identities and practices and in particular in the recent anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of Greece and Spain is more systematically examined in the following section.

Contemporary sociopolitical contestation in Greece and Spain: interpretations of orientations and meanings in collective action

Social indignation burst out in Greece and Spain in rather similar ways in 2010, in view of the implementation of strict austerity measures that affected profoundly the socioeconomic stability of the general population. In both cases the response was given through calls for what in both instances proved to be massively participated general strikes. However, despite the similar paths along which social indignation was provoked in the Greek and the Spanish cases, paving the way for the general strikes of 2010, the specific logic of social confrontation that informed them appears to have been different.

On the one hand, the mobilizations in Greece prominently highlighted elements of critique of traditional syndicalism, especially in regards to domestic interests. Indeed, the analysis of the protests of 2010 in the Greek context needs to take into account internal confrontations between the different progressive forces of social antagonism. Such confrontations can be

detected characteristically in the discord between the analyses of the syndicalist bodies on the one hand and the analyses of the grassroots components of the broader antagonistic movement on the other. These are analyses built on different standards for assessing the expressions of public resentment. So, when assessing the mass General Strike of 5 May 2010, the traditional syndicalist bodies spoke of a big moment of coming together under the same demand to actually put an end to austerity and of a generalized protest in which the broader society was accurately represented. In that period, GSEE reported that participation in the General Strike reached a full 100% in various branches of the private sector (GSEE 2010). In the analyses engaged by various grassroots components of the broader antagonistic movement, however, the interpretations of the General Strikes of 2010 appear to be different. They appear to disprove the optimistic estimates of syndicalist bodies and labour unions and focus instead on the rather low 'typical' participation of workers in the strike (Psarrou 2010; 2012). In particular, they often appear as assessing the protesting of 2010 as a 'facade' of social indignation, contending that social contestation was effectively halted by the generalized fear of layoffs imposed by the tight monitoring tactics of big business, which remained largely uncontrolled by bureaucratic syndicalism (see S.KY.A. 2013).

In Spain, on the other hand, a less confrontational approach to the reconfiguration of labour relations, and to social relations more generally, was adopted. The Spanish approach had the characteristics of an internationally oriented critique of the neoliberal politics of European governments at large (see CCOO, BE. 01.10.2010). The Spanish General Strike of 2010 appears to be different from that of Greece, in the sense that it represented an instance of resistance with a certain national but also international edge at the same time. On the one hand it pounced on the increasing deterioration of the Spanish economy and the feelings of intense economic insecurity specific to the Spanish context. In this sense it had the character of a direct response to

domestic developments (see for example Zapatero's labour reform).³⁷ On the other hand it employed a more open framework that underlined the international character of the economic recession. The decision that the General Strike be organized as part of a larger European mobilization against austerity is indicative in this direction, conveying the message that the Spanish anti-austerity critique extended beyond national specificities. In this sense, social indignation expressed in the Spanish 'traditional mobilizations' of 2011 appears to have formed part of a broader agenda of indignation, so to put it, calling attention to the regressive character of European politics more broadly,³⁸ and accordingly suggesting that 'future trade union action should include a European component' (CCOO, BE. 01.10.2010).

Following the above, we find different patterns of the development of the anti-neoliberal critique in the early anti-austerity protest of 2010 in Greece and Spain. While the Greek mobilizations placed emphasis on the domestic environment and highlighted the presence and intensification of significant internal divides between the various components of the antagonistic front, the Spanish mobilizations emphasized the broader European environment and highlighted the reconfiguration of social confrontation on the basis of a more inclusive and unifying discourse. So, the tensions in the first phase of traditional protest in 2010, in Greece, can be understood to reflect a strong resentment against syndicalist bodies, for having failed to actually represent the interests and needs of workers and employees, and for actually being themselves part of the larger problem of neoliberal (re)configurations in labour

³⁷ see RDL (9542 Real Decreto-ley) 10/2010, de 16 de junio, de medidas urgentes para la reform del mercado de trabajo [9542 Royal Decree-Law 10/2010, 16 June, on urgent measures for the reform of the labour market]. Boletín Oficial del Estado, Núm. 147, 17.06.2010, Sec. I. Pág. 51662, accessible at: <https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2010/06/17/pdfs/BOE-A-2010-9542.pdf>

³⁸ On the loss of trust in the European Union, see also Armingeon, K., Ceka, B. (2013) "The loss of trust in the European Union during the great recession since 2007: The role of heuristics from the national political system", *European Union Politics* 0(0): 1-26.

relations.³⁹ This resentment can be explained as the result of a long acknowledged complex of syndicalist bureaucracy, which had maintained only nominal or even non-existent relations with the vast majority of the workers. On this basis, grassroots components of the broader antagonistic movement argue that, in the contemporary sociohistorical phase of capitalist development, it is established as common knowledge in the Greek antagonistic movement that the traditional structures of syndicalism no longer constitute a point of reference for social contestation (an understanding that was initially manifested around 2010, but appears to have retained its leverage also during the mobilizations of 2011, when, next to their aversion to political parties, the *Aganaktismenoi* similarly objected the presence of labour unions in the mobilizations):

We believe that traditional syndicalism fails or faces extreme difficulties to mediate these struggles in this given phase [...]

Nobody has seen them standing next to him or defending him, while even their clientele function is collapsing since, as the capitalist crisis deepens, syndicalist mediation becomes all the more useless for the bosses. In the private sector and especially the field of precarity, where the new subjects often carry with them the experiences of the student movement, of December, and of the squares, syndicalist bureaucracy is not only deprecated but it's also politically rejected. (S.KY.A. 2013: 9).

By contrast, the Spanish case presents greater smoothness in the relations between the various components of the broader antagonistic movement, in which the place of the unions was not contested. In general terms, tensions were recorded in Spain too, in many instances around the General Strike of 29S and the broader protests of 2010. Nevertheless, in most instances they are recorded mainly as problems specific to external interference (e.g. distortions

³⁹ In this climate, the president of GSEE attempting to give a speech at the site of the demonstrations on the 5th of May, was denounced by the protestors, jeered, and eventually beaten up, see ENET (2010), "Επίθεση εναντίον του προέδρου της ΓΣΕΕ" (Επίθεση εναντίον του προέδρου της ΓΣΕΕ), 5 March. [enet.gr](http://www.enet.gr). Accessible at: <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=138442>

by the mass media and right-wing media representations) which is, however, suggested to have had only a rather limited influence on the resonance of the strike's message with the general public (CCOO, BE, 2010). Thus, labour confederations and unions in Spain appear as having retained their leverage in the processes of social indignation. In contrast to the strong rejection of traditional syndicalism in Greece, social antagonism in the early phase of the anti-austerity movement in Spain took the form of a more focused rejection of government policies, in which traditional syndicalist forces were deemed to be still relevant. It is in this direction, and inspired by the high participation levels on 29S, that the Secretary General of CCOO, Ignacio Fernández Toxo, appeared to speak on behalf of the Spanish people, stating:

The Government cannot ignore this *mass response by workers*. It will have to rectify because it is on a suicidal track. It has to listen to the *democratic clamour expressed by Spanish citizens* on 29-S (CCOO, BE, 2010; added emphasis).

The developments around the juncture of 2010 in Greece and Spain, briefly seen here, speak of relative tensions in anti-austerity contestation in Greece, characterized by a more confrontational outlook, and relative smoothness and absence of confrontations in anti-austerity contestation in Spain. I propose to examine these different styles of sociopolitical contestation as manifestations of distinct patterns of interpretation of orientations and meanings in collective action: a pattern of interpretations that foster confrontational and conflict-oriented approaches to collective action in Greece, and a pattern of interpretations that foster consensus and unity-oriented approaches to collective action in Spain. In what follows I turn to examine these patterns of interpretation more systematically by delineating the specific logic that informs them —what I term the logic of the ‘Big Night’, informing interpretations in collective action in Greece, and the logic of the ‘Long Days’, informing interpretations in collective action in Spain.

The logic of the ‘Big Night’ in Greece

The logic of the ‘Big Night’ is understood here as a time-honoured logic of social contestation: one that essentially perceives social change as a snapshot, a momentary result of a single moment of ultimate resistance. In regards to Greek movement politics in particular, the ‘Big Night’ may be understood as a powerful political logic that has effectively shaped the limits of the collective imaginary during the period of the post-transition. A long standing participant of the broader antagonistic movement in Greece, and systematic participant of the first, the second and the third phase of the anti-austerity mobilizations in Athens, summarizes the point as follows:

Since the 1960s, in all tendencies of radical ideology —left, anarchist etc— there has been an understanding of the ‘revolution’ as a coup, as a ‘Big Night’ in which we are all organized and we are in the right positions and we give to the coup the colour we want and we take power (Aiki)

In regards to its analytical ramifications, I understand the ‘Big Night’ as propelling relatively abstract schemes of interpretation of neoliberal capitalism, and thus by extension fuelling more elusive visions of social change. In particular, it can be understood as guiding a displaced understanding of capitalism, which becomes intelligible as a set of specific and isolated consequences on the social, political and economic fields. However, failing to grasp the interrelatedness of these experiences in the complexity of capitalist development, the logic of the ‘Big Night’ results in essentially losing control of the capacity to readjust the focus of the struggle in different instances. There are mainly two reasons for this. First, it disengages the conception of social change from the individual experiences of capitalist development, which thus emerge as isolated. Second, it re-engages, so to put it, the notion of change to grand instances of intense confrontation, which are inevitably loaded with high expectations for abrupt change, but fall short of specifying the contents of this change. In a nutshell, then, the ‘Big Night’ can

be understood as amounting to the generation of expectations that are bound to be dramatically frustrated (as a result of the partiality and incompleteness of the analysis on the basis of which they become possible in the first place), thus leading to phenomena of deep and collective demoralization (see also S.KY.A. 2013; Sfika 2013b). The traditional protests of the first phase of the anti-austerity mobilizations in Greece can be in fact understood within this context: that is, as mobilizations that have been largely guided by incomplete analyses generating the diffused feel of a final battle, about to end the crisis altogether and bring about a new start. The same can be also said for the second phase of the mobilizations starting around 2011 with the emergence of the *Aganaktismenoi*. The grassroots movement group S.KY.A (Assembly for the Circulation of Struggles), based in Athens, notes in its assessment of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011:

[T]he largest part of the people was expecting, explicitly or implicitly, that with its mass and combative presence on the street it would topple the measures or the government itself. The symbolisms were omnipresent. The helicopters that would help the MPs escape, the rigged gallows (in case they didn't manage to leave), the 'memories of Argentina', the 'all of them must go'. This is finally the common component of the experiences of the people who came massively on the streets in that period: a Big Night that would bring a New Day (S.KY.A. 2013: 8).

The fact that, despite the generalized public resentment, the austerity measures of 2010 were ultimately approved for implementation, indeed counted as a significant blow for the General Strike of 5May, and further

caused a strong sense of frustration to spread widely across society.⁴⁰ In this direction by the end of the mobilizations, the expectations of a big victory were confronted with the reality of a big failure, causing a dramatic disappointment to be collectively experienced. I contend that this is more than an exception of the 5May. Instead it can be understood better as manifestation of the high relevance of the logic of the ‘Big Night’ in the interpretation of orientations and meanings in collective action in Greece: that is, a logic relevant not only for understanding the early anti-austerity protests of 2010, but for a more nuanced examination of the discursive practices and the collective identification of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011.

The logic of the ‘Long Days’ in Spain

The logic of the ‘Long Days’ is understood here as a similarly time-honoured logic of social contestation: one that essentially perceives social change as the result of slowly evolving but continuous and virtually uninterrupted struggles. In regards to Spanish movement politics of the crisis, the ‘Long Days’ may be understood as the basic logic informing interpretations of orientation and meaning in collective action:

Let’s go slowly and we’ll go far (Acampada Sol, 23 October 2011).⁴¹

In regards to its analytical ramifications, I understand the ‘Long Days’ as propelling an interpretation of social contestation closely resembling what Marcuse saw as the only effective way —i.e. Dutschke’s famous *long march through the institutions*:

⁴⁰ The generalized feeling of frustration and disappointment is to be understood also in relation to the dramatic turn that the mobilizations took when in an instance of absolute turmoil in the streets a bank department in central Athens was set on fire, resulting in the death of three employees who remained trapped in the building, see Eleftheros Typos (2016), “5 Μαΐου 2010: Όταν η Marfin σόκαρε το πανελλήνιο” (5 Μαΐου 2010: Όταν η Marfin σόκαρε το πανελλήνιο), 5 May, [eleftherostypos.gr](http://www.eleftherostypos.gr/istories/3534-5-maiou-2010-otan-i-marfin-sokare-to-panellinio/). Accessible at: <http://www.eleftherostypos.gr/istories/3534-5-maiou-2010-otan-i-marfin-sokare-to-panellinio/> This was an incident which has been registered by the movement as a black-page in early anti-austerity protest in 2010.

⁴¹ <https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/10/23/comunicado-sobre-el-partido-del-movimiento-15m/>

To extend the base of the student movement, Rudi Dutschke has proposed the strategy of the long march through the institutions: working against the established institutions while working in them, but not simply by ‘boring from within’, rather by ‘doing the job’, learning... and at the same time preserving one’s own consciousness in working with the others (Marcuse 1972: 55).

In this direction, the ‘Long Days’ can be further understood as signaling a certain attachment to institutional politics, so that social contestation tends to fall short of a radical reconceptualization of basic notions of justice in contemporary societies —or their specific institutional expressions such as the ‘welfare state system’ for example. In this sense, then, the logic of the ‘Long Days’ can be understood as fostering dependency on hierarchical forms of administering well-being. In short, it can be understood as a logic that fosters attachment to ‘idealist’ interpretations of the social order, thus, resulting in losing sight of the emancipatory potential of social contestation. Žižek notes in respect to this:

The main, moronic idea here involves a return to the authentic Welfare State: we need a new political party that will return to the good old principles abandoned under neoliberal pressure; we need to regulate the banks and control financial excesses, guarantee free universal health care and education, and so on. What is wrong with this? Everything.

Such an approach is *stricto sensu* idealist, that is, it opposes its own idealized ideological supplement to the existing deadlock. Recall what Marx wrote about Plato’s *Republic*: the problem is not that it is ‘too utopian’, but, on the contrary, that it remains the ideal image of the existing politico-economic order.

Mutatis mutandis, we should read the ongoing dismantling of the Welfare State not as the betrayal of a noble idea, but as a failure that retroactively

enables us to discern a fatal flaw of the very notion of the Welfare State. The lesson is that if we want to save the emancipatory kernel of the notion, we will have to change the terrain and rethink its most basic implications (such as the long-term viability of a ‘social market economy,’ that is, of a socially responsible capitalism) (Žižek 2012: 15)

Alongside weakness in the logic of the ‘Long Days’, however, its strengths also need to be acknowledged. In this direction, the logic of the ‘Long Days’ can be also understood as delineating a type of social contestation that (although tending to political moderation) expands in space and time by means of introducing the notion of antagonism on multiple sites of social life. In this sense, it can be understood also as a logic of social contestation that propels the continuous production of counter-narratives, as it helps sustain across time complex systems of interconnectedness of the struggles for social change. In Spain, systems of interconnectedness have been traced earlier by means of following the thread that connects cycles of struggle, on a large variety of issues, in a virtually uninterrupted continuum since the early 2000s: student struggles in the early 2000s and the anti-Bologna protests of 2008 (see Zamponi and Fernández González 2016), struggles for housing rights starting in 2006 with V for Vivienda and continuing in 2009 with PAH (see Haro Barba and Sampedro Blanco 2012), struggles that set bridges of communication between the youth and the general society from the emergence of Juventud Sin Futuro (JSF) in early 2011 to its important role in the subsequent emergence of 15M, or struggles about cultural production, knowledge production and information circulation, gaining momentum in 2010 with Anonymous and transfiguring then into a variety of movements under the larger Free Culture and Digital Commons Movement (see Fuster Morell 2012). Accordingly, then, the logic of the ‘Long Days’ in Spain, like the logic of the ‘Big Night’ in Greece, can be understood as a logic relevant for explaining the type of social relationships reflected in the collective identifications of the Indignados. It can be further understood as a logic relevant for explaining the emergence of a

certain attachment to correcting ‘bad institutions’ in order to serve ‘good citizens’ and the production of narratives that emphasize ‘fixing the system from within’.

Conclusions

The examination of this chapter has been guided by the assumption that nation-specific movements inspired by the autonomous lessons of earlier cycles of anti-neoliberal contestation can be understood as having functioned themselves as early risers in the recent anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2010-2011, but also as brokers of the autonomous precepts of resistance in the national context. Accordingly, it was suggested that tracing lines of continuity between early risers in the contestant of the current crisis and the anti-austerity mobilizations of 2010-2011, at the national level, can help highlight parallels that connect tightly contemporary anti-neoliberal contestation within specific national and cultural contexts and render the country cases wholly intelligible on their own right. In this direction, the revolt of December 2008 in Greece and the anti-Bologna mobilizations of 2008 in Spain were identified as movements translating virtually universal values and beliefs of anti-neoliberal resistance in the nation-specific political culture idioms of Greece and Spain.

The examination of the movements of 2008 in Greece and Spain largely confirmed the initial hypothesis, as it demonstrated different patterns of anti-neoliberal contestation in contemporary movement politics in the two countries. In the case of Greece, the examination of the revolt of 2008 revealed the prominence of confrontational practices. These practices were found to be deeply subversive in the sense that they assumed the state and its institutions (as discursive and practical forms embodying domination) as their target and their radical destruction as their aim. The subversive spirit of the revolt of 2008 was further traced in the way in which history itself was approached as a contested domain and, accordingly, the way in which the mobilizations emerged as a radical contender ready to correct the wrongs of historical social

antagonisms in Greece. In the case of Spain, the examination of the anti-Bologna mobilizations of 2008 revealed a paradoxical supranational orientation, alongside the prominence of movement interconnectedness, as characteristics of the movement culture of Spain. In this direction, the brief examination of movement activity in Spain since the late 2000s revealed systems of virtually uninterrupted and systematically connected struggles, by virtue of network infrastructures, participants, resources and repertoires of action. Last, the absence of a confrontational and subversive logic of contestation was detected. In place of a radical challenging of the state and its institutions, it was found that the political culture of Spain can be better approached by using the notion of 'buenismo', denoting appreciation of dialogue and civil peace.

The second part of this chapter examined further contemporary movement politics in the two countries, by focusing on the early anti-austerity mobilizations of 2010. The aim of this examination was to see the relevance of nation-specific movement cultures of anti-neoliberal contestation for the recent wave of South-European anti-austerity mobilizations. The assumption that led this examination—in accordance to the central argument of this research that historically shaped national political culture constitute critical aspect for the development of contemporary movement politics—was that the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of Greece and Spain can be better understood as expressions of nation-specific interpretations of orientations and meanings in collective action. The brief examination of the early anti-austerity mobilizations of 2010 confirmed the hypothesis. More specifically, the examination of the Greek anti-austerity protests and General Strikes of 2010 delineated a logic of sociopolitical contestation characterized by a confrontational and divisive outlook. Conversely, the examination of the Spanish anti-austerity protests and General Strikes of 2010 delineated a logic of sociopolitical contestation characterized by a consensual outlook and by the appreciation of unity in collective action.

Approaching the two logics of contestation in terms of the broader understanding they denote about the ways in which social change is effected, I termed 'Big Night' the logic of contemporary sociopolitical contestation in Greece, thus referencing the particular interpretations of social change it fosters: a momentary result of a single moment of ultimate resistance. More specifically, the logic of the 'Big Night' was found to delineate a type of contestation largely failing to grasp the interrelatedness of the various expressions of capitalist restructuring and thus to be losing control of the capacity to readjust the focus of the struggle in different instances. In a nutshell, it was circumscribed as a logic of sociopolitical contestation that appears to reference (an almost acute) political radicalization in the interpretation of orientations and meanings in collective action, followed by demoralization and withdrawal on account of frustrated expectations. By contrast, I termed 'Long Days' the logic of contemporary sociopolitical contestation in Spain, thus referencing its specific understanding of social change: a slowly evolving struggle on multiple fronts, closely resembling Dutschke's famous 'long march through the institutions'. More specifically, the logic of the 'Big Night' was found to guide a type of sociopolitical contestation, which exhibits strong attachment to institutional politics and thus risks falling short of a radical (re)conceptualization of basic notions of social justice. In a nutshell, it was circumscribed as a logic of sociopolitical contestation that appears to reference political moderation in the interpretation of orientations and meanings in collective action, facilitating thus a 'long march through the institutions'.

Overall, the examination of this chapter focused on rendering intelligible the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2010-2011 in Greece and Spain on their own right: that is, as integrated systems of interpretations of orientations and meanings in collective action, and as independent units of analysis of contemporary anti-neoliberal contestation. In this sense, the examination of this chapter served to conclude the overall examination of the first two parts of this research, which effectively put the movements of Greece

and Spain in perspective: by examining first the socioeconomic and sociopolitical geographies of Greece and Spain, thus, acquiring a sense of proportion of the similarities and differences of the country cases they belong to (chapter 1), by examining the autonomous spirit that characterizes the broader wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations they belong to (chapter 2) and, finally, contemporary movements of Greece and Spain were put in perspective in terms of the nation-specific movement culture that informs them (chapter 3). The rest of the research is devoted to cross-national comparisons of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2010-2011, and focuses on examining more systematically the discursive and practical practices of contemporary anti-neoliberal resistance in Greece and Spain, the collective identities of the large-scale mobilizations of the *Aganaktismenoi* and the *Indignados* in 2011 and, finally, the organizational responses that the ‘movements of the squares’ inherited to the third cycle of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations in the two countries between 2012-2014.

Part III - DISCURSIVE MOVEMENT POLITICS OF THE CRISIS IN GREECE AND SPAIN

The global appeal of democracy, as a political logic and as a system of government organization, constitutes a prominent thesis in the relevant scholarly debate, and is reinforced by empirical findings of a steady increase in democratic freedoms and civil liberties around the world. According to reports by the Freedom House, political and economic freedom, political rights and civil liberties appear to have been following an upward trend since the mid-1970s worldwide (see also Welzel and Alvarez 2014; Diamond 2015), while Western Europe in particular is proposed as constituting the preserve of democracy in the world (Freedom House 2000; 2013).⁴² Along these lines the scholarly literature on democracy has often similarly concluded that today ‘democracy is “the only game in town”’ (Linz and Stepan 1996: 15; see also Inglehart and Norris 2003; Dalton 2004; Norris 2011; Dahlberg e.al. 2013).

The outbreak of the contemporary crisis in 2008, however, has challenged the thesis of uncontested democratic stability. In the wake of the crisis, protests and demonstrations progressively became part of a daily routine around the world, indicating that the economic and financial crisis of 2008 was emblematic of a larger problem with political implications. The peak of social indignation in 2011 came to confirm this thesis, rendering ‘democracy’ the most widely contested concept worldwide since the beginning of the century. The most singular element of this development, however, is that the *demands for* democracy in Greece and Spain actually emerged in already

⁴² The most recent report on ‘Freedom in the World 2017’, despite significant advances of nationalist forces in democratic states, records a significant 45% of the 195 countries assessed as ‘free’, among which are included Greece and Spain scoring 84/100 and 94/100, respectively, see Freedom House (2017). “Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy”, accessible online at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017>

democratic contexts, thus making the anti-austerity protests' discursive frames appear counterintuitive: what does the demand for democracy, voiced during the anti-austerity mobilizations of 2011, mean when it is raised in already democratic contexts? Finally, then, what does the protests' demand for real/direct democracy practically imply?

Conservative analyses have engaged a range of approaches, from treating the protests' demand for democracy as a practically irrelevant demand, to degrading it to a spurious claim or simply denouncing it as a pretext to veil the actually anti-democratic sentiments of the protestors (Mandravelis 2012; Marantzidis 2012). At the same time, however, more systematic approaches to the analysis of the global wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations have engaged a closer appreciation of the demand for democracy. Such analyses have stressed that the protests essentially constituted a deeply democratic call in response to the contemporary crisis, and have suggested that they actually represented the outcry of citizens worldwide wanting to (re)establish 'the people' as a sovereign political agent that takes part in political decision-making (Sitrin and Azzellini 2014; della Porta and Mattoni 2014; Flesher Fominaya and Cox 2013; Flesher Fominaya 2014a). The present research follows these analyses and seeks to examine further the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests' framing of the contemporary crisis. In this direction, this part of the research seeks to map the elements which comprise 'the struggle over the production of mobilizing and counter mobilizing ideas and meanings' (Benford and Snow 2000: 613) in the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations.

To this effect, the first chapter is devoted to the first task of this investigation (diagnostic framing) and focuses on examining the ways in which the Greek *Aganaktismenoi* and the Spanish *Indignados* read and analysed the situation of the crisis. What is the negotiated understanding of the contemporary crisis that the anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests of 2011

generated? Which are the specific conditions that the protestors identified as in need of change? What is the problem they identified and whom did they identify as responsible for it? Chapter 1 develops in this direction to examine the diagnostic frames of the protests by means of examining the arguments developed in the discursive formulations of the protests in regards to the *identification of problems* and the *attribution of responsibility* (see also Benford and Snow 2000). The second chapter is devoted to the second task of this investigation (prognostic framing) and focuses on examining the ways in which the Greek Aganaktismenoi and the Spanish Indignados sought the furtherance of the struggle for democratization by means of proposing solutions to the identified problems. What is the solution proposed by the anti-austerity protests? What is the alternative set of practices advocated? Chapter 2 develops in this direction to examine the prognostic frames of the protests by means of examining the strategies, plans and routes of action developed by the protestors. The analysis draws on documents produced by the Greek Aganaktismenoi and the Spanish Indignados (manifestos, statements, decrees etc) and further relies on interviews with key informants with systematic participation in the mobilizations of 2011. Parallel to this, slogans, chants and banners used in the protests of 2011, as well as messages expressed in graffiti activity of the crisis period, are included in the analysis as they provide succinct summaries of the protestors' messages.

4. The political critique: diagnostic frames of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations in Greece and Spain

To determine what the demand of the anti-austerity protests for democracy means requires to examine the interpretive frames of the mobilizations. The scholarly literature suggests that movements' interpretive frames imply 'agency and contention at the level of reality construction' (Benford and Snow 2000: 614) and are produced as 'negotiated shared meanings'; rather than as a mere aggregation of individual cognitive schemata (Gamson 1992: 111). In this sense, when examining interpretive frames of collective action, the analysis focuses on *contentious* and *interactive* frames, which essentially represent 'a broader interpretive answer or definition to "what is going on"' (Benford and Snow 2000: 614). There are two important points detected in this premise. First, the interpretive frames of the anti-austerity protests represent contentious processes of reality construction and, second, they produce essentially broad and potentially encompassing frames of reality. The second element is of great interest considering the highly heterogeneous character of the Greek and the Spanish mobilizations of 2011. To begin here with the analysis of their diagnostic frames, however, it is instead the contentious character of collective action frames that is of key importance.

Social movements, examined from the perspective of cultural sociology, are understood to engage 'dominant culture in contention over signs, significations, and material conditions' (Earl 2004: 519). Starting from this premise, whether contention may represent an outright challenge to dominant narratives and their legitimacy (see Koopmans 2004) or a smoother process of creating alternative frames (see Kriesi 2004), in all instances movements engaged in the 'politics of signification' are essentially *receiving and re-making* meaning (Benford and Snow 2000). In this sense movements, as

signifying agents, engage in processes of reality *re*-construction, which involve the *contestation* of the assumptions on which dominant significations are predicated (Hall 1982: 65). Along these lines, in what follows in this chapter (devoted to examining the negotiated understanding of the contemporary crisis that the anti-austerity protests of 2011 generated — diagnostic frames) I turn first to explore the assumptions on which dominant significations of democracy are predicated, and then to examine the way these assumptions have been contested in the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations and to single out the basic elements of their diagnostic framings (i.e. problem identification and responsibility attribution).

Significations of democracy

Over recent decades the scholarly work on democracy has experienced a great proliferation and today it is indeed indisputably rich in its analyses. Yet, the concept of democracy is exceptionally broad and in virtually all instances it appears to be escaping commonly agreed categorizations (see Sartori 1962; 1987; Touraine 1997; Dahl 1989; 2000; Tilly 2007). Carl Schmitt provides a rather schematic definition, which is indicative of the complications in defining democracy. According to him democracy represents a ‘string of identities’ shaped differently in different contexts, in such a fashion that ‘a democracy can be militarist or pacifist, absolutist or liberal, centralized or decentralized, progressive or reactionary and again different at different times without ceasing to be a democracy’ (Schmitt 1985: 25). To find the way out of this labyrinth of definitions of democracy I turn to one of the most basic analytical distinctions engaged with in the relevant scholarship. This distinction is found in the work of Alexis de Tocqueville (2010[1840/1990]), influenced by the historical processes of political liberalization during the 19th century. Tocqueville suggests that the attempt to understand democracy urges us to go back to the most fundamental division of human societies — that between the people and the ruling class — which is further reflected in the most basic dipole of political organization: democracy - aristocracy

(Tocqueville 2010 [1840/1990]). The contemporary scholarship appears to largely admit to this thesis, for as Edmund Morgan explains ‘the Fiction that replaced the divine right of kings is our fiction, and it accordingly seems less fictional to us. Only the cynical among us will scoff at Lincoln’s dedication to “government of the people, by the people, and for the people” (1988: 38). Thus, despite the many different definitions of democracy offered, in virtually all instances democratic political organization is conceptualized around what appears to be a *sine qua non* element for any discussion on democracy: the *sovereignty of the people* (see Canovan 1999; 2002; Mény and Surel 2002; Papadopoulos 2002; Crouch 2004; Mudde 2004; Pasquino 2008; Kriesi 2013). This preliminary observation serves here as the basis in order to examine the significations of democracy, as a concept, and the significations of contemporary democracies, as systems of political organization, and subsequently their contestation in the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations.

To speak about the sovereignty of the people is to speak about the people as the principle subject of the sociopolitical order, and to explore the concept of ‘people’s sovereignty’ is to explore the ways in which the people do (or do not) *take part* in the processes of establishing the sociopolitical order. *Political participation*, in other words, constitutes the material manifestation of the basic democratic element of ‘the sovereignty of the people’, and therefore to examine the latter means to examine the terms on the basis of which political participation takes place (or not) (Pasquino 2008). It is most obvious that complete exclusion from the processes of decision-making is a *de facto* failure to realize democratic participation, because under conditions of complete exclusion there is actually no participation at all. At the same time, however, counterintuitive as it may seem, the reverse does not follow (or at least not in all instances). That is, it is not always obvious that complete inclusion in the processes of decision-making means the *de facto* realization of *democratic participation*. Norberto Bobbio, for example, suggests that schemes of integral

political participation have an ambivalent relation to democratic systems because they essentially draw parallels to a ‘totalitarian’ interpretation of the sociopolitical order in which the political effectively dominates all human life:

The total citizen and the total state are two sides of the same coin, because they have in common.. the same principle: that everything is political, in other words the reduction of all human interests to the interests of the polis, the integral politicization of humanity, the total transformation of human beings into citizens (Bobbio 1987: 44).

Bobbio’s argument here can be seen to reflect a rather specific conceptualization of the sociopolitical order, one which rests on the basic *separation* of the political and the socioeconomic sphere as a remedy for ‘integral politicization’ (see also Moore 1957). The basic relation remedied by this separation, however, is not the contested relation between democracy and politicization because, in principle at least, democracy implies politicization rather than opposes it. Critical approaches to the political organization of contemporary capitalist societies suggest that it is instead the tense relation between democracy and capitalist development that is remedied by the ‘structural separation’ of the political and the socioeconomic interest (Meiksins Wood 1995; 1981). Along such lines, more critical analyses of contemporary capitalist democracies are now tending to read the relation between democracy and capitalism as the black box, so to say, of the contemporary crisis, which they explain as a crisis of democratic legitimacy of the capitalist system (Wagner 2011; Streeck 2014). Here, I propose that this relation can be taken to effectively summarize the most basic significations of contemporary democracy that were contested in the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011. Before proceeding to examine this contestation in the protests’ diagnostic frames, in what follows I turn first to briefly outline this relation between democracy and capitalism as well as the place that the notions of participation and politicization have in it.

The advent of democracy and the legitimacy problems of late capitalism

The historical experience of 19th century Europe, which honoured the promise of ‘liberty’ with the end of the Napoleonic Wars, essentially showed that capitalist development can actually exist without democracy (Wagner 2011: 13). In fact, it is suggested that during that period “[d]emocracy” was a much-disliked word, which had not yet been permanently coupled and made synonymous with “liberty”, as it would be in the era of anti-communist propaganda’ (Canfora 2006: 54-57). The historical advent of democracy, as a widely embraced system of sociopolitical organization that guarantees participation, is instead found in the more recent history of the 20th century, and especially in the aftermath of WWII and the defeat of fascism. It is throughout the Cold War period, during the most recent historical struggle against communism, in a bipolar international system under the influence of the USA (which spearheaded political liberalism) and the USSR, that the world witnessed the strong identification of democracy and democratic participation with liberal politics and unobstructed capitalist development. Ultimately, it is during this period that democracy became transformed into an indeed widely-embraced concept. Margaret Thatcher’s infamous TINA doctrine polished throughout the 1980s the conviction that indeed ‘there is no alternative’ to the capitalist market economy, and the post-1989 marginalization of communism with the collapse of the Soviet Union came to recast this thesis into a conviction that essentially there is *no alternative to democracy* (Wagner 2011: 14; see also Brown 2011); in fact to the extent that it consolidated a reverse representation of the anti-communist propaganda of the period as a struggle in defense of democratic values against ‘the communist assault on democracy’ (Dalton and Shin 2014: 92). Altogether, by the end of the 20th century and in any case after the defeat of both fascism and communism, liberalism was not only strongly identified with democracy and democratic participation but finally appeared as the only remaining ideology, leading

Francis Fukuyama (1992) to declare the ‘end of history’ (see also Welzel and Alvarez 2014; Diamond 2015).

The re-conceptualization of the historically contested relation between democracy and capitalism as an inevitable co-existence has indisputably marked contemporary politics since the end of WWII. Nevertheless, it did not effectively solve the legitimacy problems of late capitalism. Instead a history of ‘governability crisis’ unfolded parallel to the advent of democracy, rather briefly sketched above. This is the history of the late 1960s and the 1970s, when the democratic legitimacy of capitalist sociopolitical organization was questioned in ‘the students’ revolt of 1968; the return of spontaneous and large-scale working-class action in 1968 and 1969’, and which included developments such as ‘the first general recession of the so-called advanced industrial economies since the end of the Second World War in 1974/5 and the rising doubts about the effectiveness of Keynesian demand management’ (Wagner 2011: 18). These events represent different expressions of the democratic crisis of late capitalism, to which the historical answer, ultimately summarized in the neo-liberal politics of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, has been radical monetarism and a decisive ‘escape from the reach of democratically voiced demands’ (Wagner 2011: 19). The structural separation of political and socioeconomic interests, seen earlier, has been the means of this escape.

In historical terms, the political imaginary of modern western democracies has been strongly dominated by the inevitability of the liberal separation, which has been empirically manifested in the decisive recasting of ‘essentially political issues -struggles over domination and exploitation which have in the past been inextricably bound up with political power- into distinctively “economic” issues’ (Meiksins Wood 1995: 20). In this direction, the liberal separation has helped impose a silent but steady depoliticization of socioeconomic interests (Moore 1957). This appears to have been historically ‘the most effective defense mechanism available to capital’ (Meiksins Wood

1981: 67). Today, this separation continues to dominate the political practice of western liberal democracies, which are defined mainly in procedural terms as systems of ‘competitive multiparty elections’ and ‘constitutional frameworks that guarantee individual rights’ (Fukuyama 2001; 2008). Its stability, however, appears to be increasingly challenged, as the recent crisis of 2008 irreparably exposed the historical failure of this ‘splitting of democracy from capitalism through the splitting of the economy from democracy’ (Streeck 2014: 4-5), and subsequently called into question the *modus operandi* of neo-liberal capitalism (i.e. depoliticization that enforces the attenuation of the importance of political participation).

The significant rise of the extreme right in contemporary Europe and the rising popularity of fascist and neo-nazi parties are part of the augmenting disaffection with neo-liberal capitalism (see Mudde 2011; 2016; Rooduijn 2015), and have recently animated a widespread concern for the populist challenge (Kriesi 2014; Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Mudde 2016). Alongside the extreme-right opposition to neo-liberal capitalism, however, the re-appraisal of the embrace of liberal values and their political implications appears to be a necessity (see Thomassen 2007; see also Hill 1992), affirmed also in the recent anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011, which stirred up the democratic imperative of political participation (Dunn 2014: 17-9; see also Gagnon 2014) with their demands for ‘Real/Direct Democracy’. These are demands that indeed put issues of political participation under the spotlight, drew attention to the notion of inclusion in political decision-making and reexamined concerns about what appears to be an integral politicization of human life and ‘total transformation of human beings into citizens’ (Bobbio 1987: 44). Against this background, the rest of this chapter examines the diagnostic frames of these mobilizations by looking at the specific aspects of contemporary liberal democracies that they identified as in need of change.

‘In need of change’: framing of the legitimacy crisis of neo-liberal capitalist democracies

Why do you give so much importance to something that’s not important? What is important is that Spain has 5 million unemployed people, 45% of the youth is without a job, but this will not be resolved by occupying the squares but with making different politics... *Spain is not Egypt, it is a developed society, a consolidated democracy* (Aznar 2011; added emphasis).

In 2011, interviewed in view of the augmenting disaffection of the Spanish population with the crisis, the former prime minister of Spain, José María Aznar, dismissed the anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests that were taking over the country by assuming democratic consolidation as an indisputable feature of the Spanish polity, and thus claiming that the protests’ demands for democracy were incompatible with the Spanish political reality. To this and similar claims that challenged the democratic character and the legitimacy of the protests (see for example Savater 2011), the protestors responded *‘They call it democracy, but it is not’* (Appendix B, Picture 1). And before the demand for ‘Real Democracy’ was thoroughly processed in the Spanish context, a rumour on Greek social media —a banner had allegedly appeared in Puerta del Sol reading: ‘Shhh.. keep it quiet, we might wake up the Greeks’ (see Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos 2013; Sotirakopoulos and Ntalaka 2016)— sparked the beginning of mass mobilizations in Greece.

Following on what appears to have been a commonly held assertion in the Spanish and the Greek mobilizations: *‘Error 404: Democracy not found’* (Appendix B, Picture 2a;2b), the Greek Aganaktismenoi essentially contested democratic consolidation in the country with banners in the occupied Syntagma Square reading: *‘Bread, Education, Freedom. The junta did not end in ’73. We will bury it in this square’* (Appendix B, Picture 3). And, not very different from the Spanish mobilizations, the Greek Aganaktismenoi were also disparaged in the public discourse as an apolitical reaction generated

by the citizenry's 'affected pride' (Mandravelis 2012). In fact, to a large extent they are still being disqualified today as they are interpreted, in hindsight, as having been partisan fantasies of the left and a 'party army' of the left-wing SYRIZA that is 'today appointed in the public sector...The Aganaktismenoi are now devouring [public resources]. When they stop devouring they will rebel again' (Georgiadis 2017).

Dismissive analyses aside, the mobilizations of the Greek Aganaktismenoi and the Spanish Indignados have been extensively covered in the scholarly literature in a number of critical analyses (Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos 2013; Douzinas 2011a; 2012; Fregonese 2012; Mavrommatis 2015) in regards to their organizational forms and their communication strategies (Luengo and Marín 2016), repertoires of action (Maeckelberg 2012; Sergi and Vogiatzoglou 2013), processes of collective learning (Romanos 2013), as well as their relation to globalization and anti-austerity struggles (Flesher Fominaya and Cox 2013; Flesher Fominaya 2013; 2014a; 2015) and their broader relation to the crisis of neoliberal capitalism (della Porta and Mattoni 2014). For what concerns the present examination, what these analyses have rendered clear is that beyond the variously expressed dislikes and dismissals of the protests in the public discourse, 2011 in Greece and Spain essentially marked the beginning of a mass popular and public contestation of the dominant significations of democracy: a contestation which in both cases unfolded around a basic diagnosis of a *non-democratic polity*. Here I try to enrich this basic formulation by mapping the specific elements of contemporary democracies that were contested in 2011 and by tracing the rationale on the basis of which they were contested.

Problem identification: the crisis of representation - 'It's not a crisis. It's the system'

In overall terms, the many chants and the protest art (e.g. banners, slogan boards, graffiti etc) of the mass mobilizations of 2011 in Greece and Spain demonstrate an abrupt political awakening of the public on account of the

contemporary crisis. In the manifesto issued by the platform Democracia Real Ya! (one of the main networks behind the mass mobilizations of 2011 in Spain) the Spanish Indignados denounced political corruption and the shutting down of the voice of the people as the central problem of contemporary liberal democracies in need of change:

...we are all concerned and angry about the political, economic, and social outlook which we see around us: corruption among politicians, businessmen, bankers, leaving us helpless, *without a voice*. This situation has become normal, a daily suffering, without hope...*It's time to change things*, time to build a better society together (DRY, Manifesto; emphasis added).

Along similar lines the Declaration of Principles of the Acampada Barcelona stated:

They thought we were asleep. They thought they could carry on cutting our rights without finding any resistance. *But they were wrong: we are fighting* – peacefully, but with determination – for the life we deserve (Acampada BCN, Declaration of Principles).

The message of this strong awakening, effectively conveyed in the various discourses of the protests, is characteristically captured in a banner of the Spanish Indignados reading: *Now there are no rebels without a cause, there are causes to rebel* (Appendix B, Picture 4). In Greece the first decree issued by the popular assembly of the Aganaktismenoi in Athens accordingly identified the exclusion of citizens from consequential political decision-making as the root of all problems:

For a long time now *decisions are being taken for us without us*. We call all Athenians, workers, unemployed, and the youth, to Syntagma, and the whole society to fill the squares, and *to take life in their hands* (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Decree 26 May 2011; emphasis added).

The thread of argumentation of the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests starts practically from the same point: in contemporary democracies the people are excluded from political decision-making and their voice is silenced.

In the relevant scholarly literature the silencing of popular demands is explained as the result of the structural separation of political and socioeconomic interests (Moore 1957; Meiksins Wood 1981; 1995). This separation is further understood to represent the essence of western capitalist democracies (see Castoriadis 2012; Meiksins Wood 1981), fueled by a fundamental historical re-configuration. This re-configuration takes place around the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, in view of the Industrial Revolution, and consists in the embeddedness of the market economy as a ‘new domain of truth’ (see Foucault 2008). Under the conditions established by the ‘Great Transformation’ (Polanyi 2001[1944]) the people become progressively constrained by the imperatives of the market economy, while the significations of popular sovereignty are accordingly re-arranged: that is, the people from a sovereign political body are recast into a multiplicity of private individuals decisively bound in a system of given unpredictability, and are ultimately transformed from *citizens* into *consumers* (see Castoriadis 2012).

The silencing of the voice of the people, which was denounced by the anti-austerity protests in Greece and Spain, constitutes the outcome of the above re-configuration, because it is actually under these conditions that the real potential to do politics is wholly abolished and the people are practically annulled as a sovereign collective body —despite a relatively steady flourishing of civil liberties. Jodi Dean demonstrates the point eloquently:

The sovereignty that liberalism (and, later, neoliberalism) hollows out is the sovereignty of the people - not the people as individuals, who are included as agents in civil society who buy, sell and contract, but the

people as a collective body with the capacity for domination (Dean 2014: 81).

The declaration of the Greek Aganaktismenoi, on the one hand, that ‘decisions are being taken *for us without us*’ can be understood as demonstrating a solid understanding of the liberal hollowing of people’s sovereignty. The cry of the Spanish Indignados, on the other hand, that the people are left ‘*without a voice*’ can be similarly understood as demonstrating an acute awareness of the constraints imposed on popular demands in contemporary democracies, in which politicization and participation is exchanged for the liberal ‘peaceful enjoyment of private independence’ (Canfora 2006: 64).

Further to the above, it is worth taking into account that the transformation of the market economy into a ‘new domain of truth’ did not simply imply the annulment of popular sovereignty. The ‘great transformation’ of the early 19th century meant that people lost the capacity for ‘domination’, not that domination as such was abolished. In this sense, the exclusion of the people from political decision-making does not imply the annulment of the political as such, but actually the *substitution* of the people as a sovereign political body by the forces of market economy. At this point we can see clearer how ‘integral politicization’, perceived as being equivalent to a virtually totalitarian order of human existence (see Bobbio 1987), has historically sustained the liberal separation of the political and the socioeconomic sphere (see Moore 1957), as an ‘effective defense mechanism’ of capitalism (Meiksins Wood 1981: 67) —in fact, one that has been taken forward through ‘the splitting of the economy from democracy’ (Streeck 2014: 5). The Greek Aganaktismenoi appear to reflect a solid understanding of the liberal substitution of the people by the forces of market economy in their discourse. On the one hand they appear to have a clear understanding of the exclusion of the people from politics. The first decree of the popular assembly of Athens notes in this respect that the responsibility of debt does not lie with the

politically sidelined people, but with the national and international political and economic class that dominate politics:

We will not leave the squares until *those who brought us to this situation* leave: *Governments, Troika, Banks, Memoranda*, and all *those who exploit us*. We send them a message that *the debt is not ours* (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Decree 26 May 2011; emphasis added).

On the other hand they demonstrate a clear understanding of the prominence of the interests of political and economic elites vis-à-vis popular decision-making. In fact, they claim that this prominence has not only been understood but that it has also been delegitimized ‘in the consciousness of the public’. The Aganaktismenoi of Thessaloniki note in this respect:

The politics of the past years that our governments have followed, *being commissioned by economic interests which are leading a global barbaric economic system*, and the lack of will in the political parties of the opposition, have led us to a stalemate. [...] The government and *the way in which decisions are being made in the official political scene has been delegitimized in the consciousness of the public* (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Decree 8 July 2011; emphasis added).

The Spanish Indignados are no less perceptive of the substitution of the popular will by vested economic interests and in this respect they denounce ‘the politicians and *the financial elites they serve*’ (DRY, BCN, 15 October 2011). In this direction, the manifesto of DRY, which is shared by the Indignados of Madrid and Barcelona, brings ‘politicians, businessmen, bankers’ into question for leading a system which is ‘placing money above human beings’:

Politicians... get rich and prosper at our expense, *attending only* to the *dictatorship of major economic powers* and holding them in power

through a bipartidism headed by the immovable acronym PP & PSOE (DRY, Manifesto; emphasis added).

In the scholarly literature it is suggested that the substitution of the popular will by economic interests can be well captured in ‘Benjamin Constant’s liberal embrace of private wealth over Rousseau’s general will’ (Dean 2014: 81). Constant himself notes in regard of this substitution:

Money is the most effective curb on despotism... Force is useless against it: money conceals itself or flees... Among the ancients, credit did not have the importance that it has for us today. Their governments were more powerful than private individuals. Today, by contrast, private individuals are everywhere stronger than political power. Wealth is a force that is more readily exerted on all interests, and consequently it is far more real and more readily obeyed. Power threatens; wealth rewards. Power can be eased by deceiving it, but to obtain favours from wealth it is necessary to serve it. In the end, it will gain ascendancy (Constant 1874; cited in Canfora 2006: 64).

Contemporary neo-liberal capitalism is predicated on a faithful representation of this relation between power and wealth, with political power being decisively set in the service of economic power (Castoriadis 2012: 13). The Spanish Indignados echo this assertion by interpreting the subservience of the political class to the interests of economic elites as a condition which essentially ‘fuels the social machinery in a growing spiral that consumes itself by enriching a few and sends into poverty the rest’ (DRY, Manifesto). Along these lines they tell the story of a political system which is attuned to the accumulation of capital, and in which individual citizens feel stepped over as they are essentially reduced to mere ‘gears of the machine’, a necessary dependency of capitalist development:

The will and purpose of the current system is the accumulation of money, not regarding efficiency and the welfare of society [...] Citizens are the gears of a *machine designed to enrich a minority which does not regard our needs* (DRY, Manifesto).

We want a new society which prioritizes life above economic and political interests. We feel trampled by the capitalist economy, and *we feel excluded by the current political system* (Acampada BCN, Declaration of Principles).

The Greek Aganaktismenoi similarly frame this system as a system of exploitation and ‘looting of public wealth’: a system that is essentially functioning in the interest of a minority elite, at the expense of the people:

We condemn the selling and the dismantling of social services (education, health, social insurance)... The measures that are stealing away our present and future must be taken back. We demand *the wealth that we produce and they steal from us* (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, General Assembly 30 May 2011; emphasis added).

We won’t allow the *looting of public wealth*, we won’t tolerate the *impoverishment of the many to secure the profits of the few* (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Decree of the People’s Assembly of Syntagma Square for the Mid-term Agreement, 22 June 2011; emphasis added).

In the individual accounts of the Greek protestors the exploitative functioning of the system is often interpreted along the lines of a consistent class analysis. In these accounts the primacy of the interests of economic elites against the interests of the people is understood to actually constitute a structural constraint of capitalist democracies:

The basic issue today, which is actually confirmed in a tragic fashion in our days, is that our society is not a society of citizens but a society of

classes. *In this societal structure there is a rather specific order of affairs which dictates that the will of those above, the will of the capitalists, is imposed on those below* (Giannis).

Accordingly, the weakening of political power and the strengthening of the power of wealth is claimed to denote the de-democratization of the system, and the despotism of ‘money’ is claimed to be the key to rendering this process intelligible —altogether, a process that lies at the heart of the current crisis and essentially shows it to be a crisis predicated on the very functioning of the system itself:

This crisis highlighted very important issues. It is a *crisis of over-accumulation*. That is, the dynamics of economy dictate that money is gathered in the hands of the few and that institutions serve this end by intervening to stop distribution. But, as long as *money* is accumulated in the hands of the few democracy is shrinking, because *when the economy is controlled only by few it acquires great power*. Therefore, it can decide the political situation and it can cast its net over society. Over its potentials. (Ilias)

The theme of unremitting accumulation is central in the analyses of the individual participants of the Indignados’ mobilizations as well, who further explain contemporary capitalist democracies as systems of *active* de-democratization effected through institutionalized training in consumerism and ideological submissiveness:

This is a *system of accumulation*. Its gains every year have to overtake those of the previous one. It is directed to infinite development. And this is impossible because things are finite. Simple as that [...] Education is one of the instruments of this system. To make citizens ready to serve and to consume; to consume materially, and to serve the ‘democratic’ system.

To prepare them ideologically, to become well adapted to a repressive system (Pablo)

In all the above the thread that runs through the discourse of the Spanish and the Greek mobilizations similarly unfolds to detect the silencing of the voice of the people, the sidelining of popular demands, the weakening of political power, the ascendancy of vested economic interests, and the de-democratization of political processes. Altogether, it runs to addressing processes which in both instances are claimed to be expressions of contemporary democracies driven by the precept of capitalist accumulation that is sustained by the liberal separation of the political and the socioeconomic sphere. Behind these processes, the Spanish mobilizations detect and denounce the apparent manipulation of ‘inalienable truths’ which, as they suggest, are distorted in order to serve capitalist accumulation:

The priorities of any advanced society must be equality, progress, solidarity, freedom of culture, sustainability and development, welfare and people’s happiness. These are *inalienable truths* that we should abide by in our society: the right to housing, employment, culture, health, education, *political participation*, free personal development, and consumer rights for a healthy and happy life. The current status of our government and economic system *does not take care of these rights*, and in many ways is *an obstacle to human progress*. [...] *Lust for power and its accumulation by only a few* create inequality, tension and injustice (DRY, Manifesto; emphasis added).

In short, the Spanish mobilizations appear to identify and denounce oligarchic tendencies, which they conclude are transforming the people into accessories of capitalist accumulation — a result that they clearly denounce:

We are not commodities in the hands of politicians and bankers (Appendix B, Picture 7).

The Greek mobilizations, on the other hand, detect and denounce the apparent denial of human dignity which, as they similarly suggest, is violated in favour of capitalist accumulation:

We are citizens, indignant with the current social, political and economic system, which daily *destroys every possibility for dignified living* [...] We came to the squares because we realized that *our life is gradually heading to a quagmire*. We oppose the selloff of our rights, we oppose the selloff of public property. We want to change the world which is dominated by politicians' *hypocrisy* and the *lust for money*. A world where *the few live at the expense of the many* (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Decree 08 July 2011; emphasis added).

In short, the Greek mobilizations appear to identify and denounce the interests that the capitalist system serves –*'this system is not a democracy. These are the interests of the bourgeoisie'* (Marios)- and the way it essentially works –*'Nothing has changed since elementary school. Class against class'* (Appendix B, Picture 20).

Put together, the concerns captured in all the above demonstrate part of the crux of the argumentation of both the Greek Aganaktismenoi and the Spanish Indignados, and essentially delineate part of the mobilizations' diagnosis: the contemporary crisis is a crisis of neo-liberal capitalist democracies, sustained through the liberal separation of the political and the socioeconomic sphere, predicated on the precept of capitalist accumulation, fostered through the predominance of the interests of economic elites, served by the political class, and expressed in the regrettable disappearance of the people from contemporary politics (silencing of popular voices and disregard of popular demands). The Spanish Indignados have indeed offered the most concise summary of this diagnosis: *'It's not a crisis. It's the system'* (Appendix B, Picture 5).

Attribution of responsibility A -‘They don’t represent us’: the failure of incumbents

The political model with which contemporary capitalist democracies are organized is the model of *representation*. This model has effectively dominated capitalist modernity and throughout the late 20th century it has been identified as a quintessentially democratic model of political organization,⁴³ ‘despite the fact that political representation is not associated exclusively with democracy (it predates modern democratic states and exists in states that are not democratic); in fact, its relation to democracy is permanently subject to debate’ (Urbinati 2006: 17). In what constitutes one of the most straightforward definitions of representation Hannah Pitkin suggests that ‘representation means the making present of something which is nevertheless not literally present’ (Pitkin 1967: 144). Following this premise, if the goal of *democratic* representation in particular is to make present the sovereign agent of politics (i.e. the people), the anti-austerity protests of 2011 outrightly concluded that democratic representation in modern liberal democracies has actually failed. It is a representation which has made present the interests of actors variously addressed as political and economic elites, financial elites, or the capital, but certainly not the interests of the people: ‘*They don’t represent us*’ (Appendix B, Picture 6). The Spanish Indignados coupled this precept, in the manifesto issued by DRY, with a brief explanation of what democratic representation should actually mean:

Democracy *belongs to the people* (demos = people, krátos = government) which means that *government is made of every one of us*. However, in Spain most of the political class does not even listen to us. Politicians should be *bringing our voice to the institutions*, facilitating the *political participation of citizens through direct channels* that provide the greatest benefit to the wider society (DRY, Manifesto).

⁴³ In regards to the contested democratic legitimacy of contemporary representative democracies see also in this chapter the section on “The advent of democracy and the legitimacy problems of late capitalism”, pp. 32-34.

The Greek Aganaktismenoi held a similar understanding of democratic politics, highlighting that politics needs to be re-appropriated by the people and that the people need to have direct involvement in the formulation of policies, because it is actually the people to whom politics essentially belongs:

Their Democracy does not guarantee either equality or justice.. We need to start formulating our demands. To change politics, to overthrow the government, to formulate our own propositions.. Democracy was born here, in Athens. Politics is not something bad. For the betterment of our lives, we need to take it again into our own hands (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, General Assembly 25 May 2011).

This understanding, however, which is common to the Greek and the Spanish mobilizations and proposes that democratic representation implies the creation of ‘direct channels of participation’, is challenged by theories of democracy which underscore that there is a consequential incompatibility between the principle of integral, direct participation and the conditions of modern societies. Schattschneider, for example, in his seminal work on the *Semi-sovereign People* explains that ‘the problem is not how 180 million Aristotles can run a democracy, but how we can organize a political community of 180 million ordinary people so that it remains sensitive to their needs’ (1960: 135). According to him, this organization cannot be envisioned as an organization of integral, direct participation, since this could be achieved only by enforcing a ‘compulsive omniscience’ of the ordinary people, which would consequently impose the ‘*reductio ad absurdum* of democratic theory’. In his words, participation of that sort would only reflect the ‘unforgivable sin of democratic politics to dissipate the power of the public by putting it to trivial uses’ (Schattschneider 1975: 137; original emphasis).

This conceptualization of democratic politics puts once again the notion of ‘integral politicization’ under the spotlight as it essentially proposes that political participation as a matter of full inclusion of the ordinary people

constitutes an untenable premise. Altogether it can be understood as echoing Schumpeter's proposition that the democratic legitimacy of modern political organization is inferred by the fact that the power of politicians to represent the people is acquired *under democratic conditions* and *through democratic processes*:

The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote (Schumpeter 2003[1943]: 269).

In other words, thus, it is not the participation of the people in the making of decisions that establishes the democratic character of the political organization, but the fact that political power is essentially *delegated by the people themselves*, rather than usurped. This precept constitutes one of the most central admissions of the relevant literature on democratic political organization, which can be summarized in that 'all governments are of the people, that all profess to be for the people, and that none can literally be by the people' (Morgan 1988: 38). In the context of such analyses democratic political organization finally appears to be a matter of *entrusting power* to representatives in order 'to act with a certain independence in the name of and on behalf of those represented' (Bobbio 1987: 47). The Greek and the Spanish protests of 2011, however, appear to have an opposing interpretation of democratic political organization, which translates into one facilitating the people's participation in decision-making through 'direct channels'. However, the discursive formulations of the protests are ambiguous in regards to the attribution of responsibility for the failures of representation and the subsequent exclusion of the people from political decision-making.

The momentous chant '*They don't represent us*' can be interpreted as a demand to effect actual, *real representation* of the people's interests. The scholarly literature on system analysis offers clues in that direction. Proposing

a distinction between citizens' support for the democratic *system* (diffuse political support) on the one hand, and citizens' support for the *performance* of the system (specific political support) on the other (Easton 1975), the relevant literature suggests that the two can vary independently (at least up to a certain extent) (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Dalton 2004; Dahlberg et.al. 2013). In this sense, support for the democratic *system* and dissatisfaction with system *performance* can be simultaneously present (see Norris 1999; 2011). The outcome of the mismatch between diffuse and specific support is empirically captured in the generation of 'dissatisfied democrats' (Klingemann 1999; 2014) or else 'critical citizens' (Norris 1999; 2011) who 'adhere strongly to democratic values but who find the existing structures of representative government.. to be wanting' (Norris 1999: 3). By approaching the assertion '*They don't represent us*' from this perspective, the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011 can be explained as the mobilizations of deeply dissatisfied democrats who were actually building up pressure 'for structural reforms, to make elected governments more accountable to the public' (Norris 1999: 3).

A critical part of such an analysis of the Greek and the Spanish mobilizations (as expressions of popular indictment of a failed representation) should be to detect what exactly the target of contestation is. In other words, to single out the 'attributional component' which attends to 'focusing blame or responsibility' (Benford and Snow 2000: 616). In this sense, alongside the identification of problems in representation, the diagnostic frames of the 'dissatisfied democrats' are also expected to contain attribution of responsibility for the failures of representation. In the framework of system analysis, however, this responsibility is not to be sought in the method of representation as such, but rather in its secondary elements -i.e. the politicians. In this respect Huntington proposes:

Western democratic systems are less dependent on performance legitimacy than authoritarian systems because failure is blamed on the

incumbents instead of the system, and the ouster and replacement of the incumbents help to renew the system (Huntington 1991: 27).

The discourse of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests of 2011 can be seen to confirm such a proposition. The Spanish Indignados speak of ‘*politicians... who get rich and prosper at our expense*’ (DRY, Manifesto); if not all of them, at least ‘*most of the political class does not even listen to us*’ (DRY, Manifesto). The chants and banners of the mobilizations point in the same direction, further confirming that indeed incumbents are the most critical targets of the protestors’ critique:

We are not commodities *in the hands of politicians* and bankers
(Appendix B, Picture 7).

The centrality of political incumbents in the protests’ critique is explained by the critical role that the political elites play during periods of democratic crises, because it is actually these political elites that constitute the ‘crucial personae during the breakdown period’ (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 19), and thus they are the first to be held accountable. The social contestation of 2011 in Spain followed this pattern, the discourse of the mobilizations taking the characteristics of a powerful indictment of political elites for engaging in corrupt political activities:

We are all concerned and angry about the political, economic, and social outlook which we see around us: *corruption among politicians* (DRY, Manifesto).

At the same time their discourse took characteristics of indictment of political elites for eliciting profits of predatory dimensions at the expense of the larger population:

There's no bread for so many thieves [‘No hay pan para tango chorizo’],⁴⁴ (Appendix B, Picture 8).

The Greek Aganaktismenoi similarly placed politicians at the centre of their critique and similarly hinted at the belief that even if it is not all politicians that are failing the people, there are those who do and these politicians are the first to be held accountable and to be punished:

Any politician doing an injustice, any politician who does not respect the popular mandate, should go home or to prison (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of General Assembly 25 May 2011).

The majority of chants of the protests have worked in the same direction targeting mainly politicians and addressing them variably as ‘crooks’ and ‘traitors’ that deserve to be punished: ‘*You’ve deprived us of money, you’ve deprived us of education. We will deprive you of freedom*’; ‘*You are traitors, you are scum, only few days remain until we set up the gallows*’; ‘*Pity politicians we have not “eaten” them together*’;⁴⁵ ‘*Bums, ruffians, politicians*’.⁴⁶ In sum, it appears that the performance of political incumbents has held a central place in the discursive formulations of the Greek Aganaktismenoi and the Spanish Indignados, who questioned them for disservice, corruption and misappropriation of public money. In fact, in an expression of complete identification of the critique of the Greek with that of

⁴⁴ The literal translation of the slogan reads: ‘*There is no bread for so much sausage*’. However, in Spanish slang ‘chorizo’ means ‘thief’. Under this light, the underlying message of the caption is that there is not enough money to be spent on public needs and the sustenance of integral social services, for the number of thieves/politicians preying on the country’s social resources. In this sense, it can be understood as a protest-phrase against the numerous incidents of corruption witnessed in the country’s political scene.

⁴⁵ A reference is made to the statement of the vice-president of the Papandreou government, Theodoros Pangalos, who claimed in 2010 in a plenary session of the Parliament that ‘We ‘ate’ them together’, thus suggesting that public money was appropriated by politicians and the people together in an orchestrated fashion.

⁴⁶ A reference is made to the timeless slogan ‘Bums, ruffians, journalists’, which is invariably heard at demonstrations with the purpose to denounce biased coverage and skewed journalistic analyses of social and political contestation.

the Spanish mobilizations, a banner appeared in Madrid denouncing political elites as ‘thieves’ in both languages:

“Κλέφτες, Ladrones” (Appendix B, Picture 9).

Using the framework of system analysis, the indictment of political incumbents can be interpreted as a call to reform the institutions of representation and ‘to widen citizen involvement in governance, with the evolution of new channels to link citizens and the state’ (Norris 1999: 3). In fact, though the protestors may have denounced politicians, at the same time they may well have kept their support for modern democracy high and stable. Yet, the fact that the Spanish protestors at the same time claim the involvement of ‘*businessmen, bankers*’ (DRY, Manifesto) in shaping the current social, political and economic order, the fact that they contend not to be commodities in the hands of ‘*politicians and bankers*’ (see Appendix B, Picture 7), as well as the fact that next to political incumbents more often than not they also denounce the ‘dictatorship of major economic powers’ (DRY, Manifesto), all indicates that delegitimated individual politicians are only a part of a larger problem identified. In the manifesto of DRY this problem is suggested to be manifesting itself variably in the ‘*lust for power and its accumulation by only a few*’, in the creation of ‘*inequality, tension and injustice*’ or in the creation of ‘*unemployment and unhappy consumers*’. Altogether, it is a problem that comprehensively manifests itself in the debasing of citizens as ‘the gears of a machine designed to enrich *a minority which does not regard out needs*’ (DRY, Manifesto).

The Greek protestors on the other hand, apart from holding politicians responsible for disservice, further urged people ‘*to change politics*’ and to take politics ‘*again in our hands*’. Contending that ‘the solutions to our problems can come *only from us*’ (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Decree 26 May 2011). So, similarly to the Spanish protestors, they actually indicated in their discursive

formulations that there is a problem broader than the failures of individual representatives. In this sense, the assertion that *'They don't represent us'* needs to be further examined. In fact, failures of representation (of all sorts — representation as a system of political organization, as much as representation as the performance of individual incumbents) cannot be comprehensively understood outside the context of the given system of modern democracies and its logic. Schattschneider explains that all forms of political organization - democratic representation included- 'have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias' (1975: 69). In this sense, the protests' identification of problems with democratic representation (through the indictment of political incumbents) can be further understood in view of the specific biases mobilized in modern representative democracies. Nadia Urbinati proposes for that matter that 'although we call contemporary Western governments democratic, *their institutions* were designed to contain rather than to encourage democracy' (2006: 1; my emphasis), thus reinforcing the thesis that indeed there are elements in democratic representation that need to be further explored. Following this, alongside the performance of individual representatives, I examine further the momentous chant 'They don't represent us' as a potentially outright denouncing of the democratic legitimacy of representation as a system of political organization.

Attribution of responsibility B - 'They don't represent us': the failure of representation

One of the most troubling aspects of representation as a method of democratic political organization is that it requires us to specify with precision the sort of actions that the representatives are required to take. That is, representation needs us to specify what politicians are expected to do exactly. Pitkin proposes that this necessity is summarized in a very basic dilemma:

Should (must) a representative do what his constituents want, and be bound by mandates or institutions from them; or should (must) he be free to act as seems best to him in pursuit of their welfare? (Pitkin 1967: 145).

The scholarship recasts this dilemma variously and offers different responses to it. I single out here Peter Mair's (re)conceptualization of the task of representation as a double task, essentially divided between 'giving voice to the citizenry' and 'giving coherence to the institutions of government'. According to Mair these two (opposing) obligations of representation constitute the most troubling dilemma of democratic governments, which always 'have had to maintain a balance between democracy and efficiency' (Mair 2009: 10). In modern democracies, however, he concludes that the delicate balance between *responsive* and *responsible* representation has been irredeemably lost: 'parties have moved from representing interests of the citizens to the state to representing interests of the state to the citizens' (Mair 2009: 6).

The discourse of the Spanish protests of 2011 contained elements of such an understanding of contemporary representation, which had already been highlighted in precursor mobilizations (see also Flesher Fominaya 2014a; 2015). The campaign NoLesVotes at the beginning of 2011, for example, emerged along the lines of such an analysis, suggesting that political parties consistently ignore popular demands and therefore need to be punished 'in what hurts them the most: in the vote' (NoLesVotes, Wiki Portal):

Nolesvotes is not a campaign in favour of any party, but precisely the opposite: a campaign to make citizens aware of the power of their vote and why they must not turn it over to *parties that subsequently use it against their wishes and interests*' (Dans 2011; added emphasis).⁴⁷

⁴⁷ see Dans, E. (2011). "Nolesvotes como movimiento ciudadano". Accessible online at: <https://www.enriquedans.com/2011/02/nolesvotes-como-movimiento-ciudadano.html>

The Greek Aganaktismenoi similarly rejected political parties in 2011, while the protestors were even forbidding party representatives to attend the mobilizations and were taking the floor from anyone who tried to make reference to political parties in the popular assemblies of the occupied squares:

The moment someone would mention the name of a political party, people would boo them. Ordinary people, they were shouting we don't want to hear about parties (Ioanna).

Characteristic in this respect is the emphasis that the protestors put on precluding political parties from being represented in the mobilizations, as well as on precluding any reference to forms of representations in general -e.g. through reference and acceptance of unions, party or union flags, signatures etc:

[We need] to change the call of 'Aganaktismenoi' which mentions that 'We call all workers and their unions, without parties, who are going to strike in the coming period, to end their demonstrating and stay at Lefkos Pyrgos', and replace it by the following sentence: 'We call all the workers to get together with our struggle and to participate in our democratic procedures, *with unsigned banners, without flags and parties* (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 1 June 2011; added emphasis).

Altogether, the way in which incumbents and political parties were confronted by the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011 indicates a larger legitimacy crisis, not merely of political representatives, but of representation as such. Individual protestors of the Spanish mobilizations provide a detailed explanation of this by claiming that political parties may retain certain subtle differences in regards to their positioning on the political compass, but altogether they are aligned to a type of politics that invariably serves the contemporary neo-liberal capitalist system. The real dilemma,

therefore, is not so much a dilemma between the different political parties and the sort of (possibly *responsive*) representation they could offer, but a dilemma between abstention from the processes of representation altogether, which, however, seems like resignation, or alternatively participation in the system of representation, which, however, regrettably recharges the capitalist system:

The ‘correct’ party does not exist. They are all more or less in agreement. Well, not everything is the same. It’s not the same to be governed by a savage Right and to have things managed by the Left... But what happens with this approach is that eventually you have to decide, either it is better to leave everything and everything is left to rot, or to continue to participate in this ‘game of democracy’. I believe it’s better not to participate. Because to participate then is also to continue to feed the ‘game of democracy’. Even if you don’t vote for the Right, your participation means that you are in agreement with the parliament, the senate, the system of justice, the system of education... (Pablo)

In interviews with individual Greek protestors of 2011, the legitimacy crisis of representation is similarly understood as a problem of the capitalist system, which practically necessitates representation, essentially shapes it after its own image and finally uses it as a method to serve its own interests:

Listen, in general lines I would say that it’s not a democracy.. it’s a ‘class’ question. When we say that it’s a bourgeois democracy, [we mean] it’s a democracy that serves the bourgeoisie. Whatever is in the interest of the ruling class —domestic and foreign—, this is what they follow. It is the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Maybe they call it democracy, but in reality what is it? When someone decides in cold blood to raise taxes, to raise everything, to cut down wages and pensions by force, what is this? Is this democracy? We are playing with words. That is, we are fooling ourselves even by saying that these [political elites] are democratic and democratically elected to represent us —the frauds there are a whole

different discussion. Look at the way this system works, and the political class that it serves... this system is not a democracy (Marios)

The diagnosis hidden in these narratives is the diagnosis of deep pathogenies of the system of democratic representation, which are deemed to overshadow the people and sideline their interests per force. Cornelius Castoriadis explains that this is essentially a ‘system of bureaucratic capitalism with political regimes of liberal oligarchies [...] then they tell the tale that this is democracy. Representative’ (2012: 12). In this direction, following more critical analyses of democratic representation, the conundrum of the legitimacy crisis of representation, which is hidden in the discursive formulations of the Greek and the Spanish protests, is rendered intelligible under a different light. The key factor which such analyses underscore is the very act of *speaking in the name of*: that is, an act of division decisively inappropriate, in order to actually make present something that is not, because, as Pitkin suggests (1967), eventually it enchains society to hegemonic relations and it stands for nothing but the alienation of the people. Susan Buck-Morss summarizes the point:

When democratic sovereignty *confronts* the people with all the violence that it monopolizes as the legitimate embodiment *of* the people, it is in fact attesting to its *nonidentity* with the people (2002: 7; original emphasis).

The slogan of the Spanish Indignados that ‘*Our dreams don’t fit in your ballot boxes*’ (Appendix B, Picture 19) can be read as an accurate reflection of this precept. The ‘ballot boxes’ here can be understood as referencing the system of representation that is failing the popular wishes, which are referenced in turn by the formulation of dreams -elusive yet upstanding in character. In sum, it is a slogan which can be read to state that democratic representation and popular will are made of different materials, so to put it,

and thus popular wishes *are not and cannot* be included among the priorities of democratic representation, no matter who the representative is. The discursive formulations of the Greek protests of 2011 echo similar interpretations, although these become clearer in the individual participants' accounts that allude to an effectively antagonistic relation between representatives and the people:

In this societal structure there is a rather *specific order of affairs* which dictates that the will of those above, the will of the capitalists, is imposed on those below (Giannis)

It is the *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie* (Marios)

Along the lines of a consistent class analysis, the scholarly literature suggests that representation is failing the democratic idea of popular sovereignty by way of necessity, because the class struggle predicated in capitalist democracies implies essentially antagonistic interests between the people and the government. Slavoj Žižek writes in this respect:

Class struggle cannot be reduced to a conflict between particular agents within social reality; it is not a difference between agents (which can be described by means of a detailed social analysis), but an antagonism ("struggle") which constitutes these agents (Žižek 2011: 201).

A reading of the relation between representatives and the people under this light suggests, therefore, that the governors and the governed are not 'innocent' categories of organized politics bound together within the framework of the state, but expressions of the immanent antagonistic relations that constitute society itself in the formation of the state. It follows, therefore, that representation can never effect the declared goal to make present the will of the people, and that in any case the conditions and processes under which power is delegated to the representatives (see Schumpeter 2003[1943]) are

effectively inconsequential, because ‘no matter how popular the sovereign, the people and the government are not present at the same time’ (Dean 2014: 83). Re-reading the legendary slogan ‘*They don’t represent us*’ within this framework, the protests of 2011 can be finally interpreted not so much as the call of ‘critical citizens’ seeking responsive representation, ‘to make elected governments more accountable to the public’ (Norris 1999: 3), but as the call of effectively disillusioned citizens exhibiting deep awareness that ‘the very medium of political and social representation has been irredeemably broken down’. Saul Newman provides us with an accurate summary of this disillusionment:

It is at once a cry of indignation against a political system that no longer represents the interests of ordinary people; it is also a refusal of representation altogether, a refusal to be spoken for, be interpreted (and inevitably betrayed) by politicians. It is as if the denizens of the squares were saying, “You do not represent us and you *can never represent us!*” (Newman 2014: 99; original emphasis).

In this sense it can be finally concluded that the protests of 2011 in Greece and Spain were essentially protests with a two-pronged understanding of the identified problem (i.e. the capitalist system of democratic representation), presenting therefore two corresponding narratives of responsibility attribution: a) to political representatives and b) to ‘representation’, as a system of sociopolitical organization aspiring to secure democratic government.

Conclusions

The analysis of this chapter found that two different pictures emerge about the diagnostic framings of the Greek and the Spanish protests of 2011, which allow two different preliminary answers to be given to the question that concerns the first part of this research: What does the demand for democracy

mean, when it is raised in already democratic contexts? The starting point is that the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011 have hidden at their core an apparent rejection of the precepts of neo-liberal capitalism, which they summarized as the impulse for capital accumulation served by the systematic and silent decoupling of the economy from democracy: *'It's not a crisis. It's the system'* (Appendix B, Picture 5). The discursive formulations of the protests, however, hint at two different courses for the attribution of responsibility for the identified problem, and therefore to the presence of two different diagnostic framings when we come to see together problem identification and responsibility attribution.

On the one hand, examined from the perspective of system analysis, the mobilizations of 2011 appear to have been mobilizations of disillusionment with democratic performance broadly speaking, disaffection with democratic representation in particular, and dissatisfaction with political incumbents even more specifically. Altogether, it appears that the Spanish and the Greek protests of 2011 have been the protests of what Klingemann (1999) calls 'dissatisfied democrats', who stand firmly in support of contemporary representative democracies, who are definitely dissatisfied with the way these democracies are functioning, who blame the political incumbents for this. In short, they can be read as protests whose diagnosis rests on identifying problems in contemporary capitalist democracies -summarized in the exclusion of the people, the silencing of their voices and the sidelining of their demands- that are to be blamed on the disservice of the political class.

On the other hand, examined from the perspective of more critical approaches to democratic representation, the mobilizations of 2011 appear to have been mobilizations of some sort of popular awakening broadly speaking, which led to a questioning of the premises of neoliberal capitalist democracies and ultimately to challenging the democratic legitimacy of representation as such. Altogether, it appears that the Spanish and the Greek protests of 2011

have been protests animated by the desire of the people to recover their political power, that is, protests in which ‘hierarchy and representational democracy are being rejected, ideologically and *by default*’ (Sitrin and Azzellini 2014: 5; added emphasis). In short, then, they can be read as protests whose diagnosis rests on identifying problems in contemporary capitalist democracies -summarized as the exclusion of the people, the silencing of their voices and the sidelining of their demands- that are to be blamed on the system of representation itself.

What these two diagnostic framings have in common is that in both of them the same problem is singled out —i.e it’s not a crisis, it’s the system— and therefore there is consensus on the identification of the problematic situation —i.e. failure of representation in the liberal democracies of the capitalist system. What differentiates them, however, is the different ways in which they approach the identified problem and the different conclusions that appear to be drawn in each case, in regards to the source of the problem: a) the failure of political incumbents to democratically represent the people *or* b) the de facto failure and ‘impossibility’ of democratic representation as such. There is, in short, an apparent lack of ‘attribution consensus’ between them (see Snow and Benford 1988; 1992). According to the scholarly literature on social movement studies, a discord of that sort in movement framing processes (between identification consensus and attributional consensus) can be explained as a problem of ‘boundary framing’ (Hunt et.al. 1994). Boundary framing is an attributional component of diagnostic framing that has to do with attribution of responsibility and focusing of blame. In effect, boundary framing denotes processes by which boundaries are defined in regards to who are the movement’s *protagonists and antagonists* (Benford and Snow 2000: 616).

In overall terms, boundary framing constitutes a critical component of movement framing processes because the direction of movement actions is largely dependent on these boundaries. Yet, as research has shown, boundary framing is often a difficult task for social movements because in reality

‘consensus regarding the source of the problem does not follow automatically from agreement regarding the nature of the problem’ (Benford and Snow 2000: 616). The reason for this is that the grievances that are mobilized in collective action are essentially subjected to ‘differential interpretations’ by the protestors (Snow et.al. 1986). The diagnostic framings of movements, therefore, more than a matter of mobilizing grievances, are especially a matter of ‘the manner in which grievances are interpreted and the generation and diffusion of those interpretations’ (ibid.: 466). The two stories that the discursive formulations of the Greek and the Spanish mobilizations tell are a precise manifestation of this precept. The mobilized grievances of the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity protests have been interpreted, and subsequently distilled in the protests’ discursive formulations, in ways that allow two different diagnostic framings to be identified —indeed characterized by certain agreement on the nature of the problem (i.e. a system of failing representation of the popular interests), but at the same time failing to reach consensus in regards to the source of the problem: a) political incumbents; b) system of representation as such. I suggest, however, that both of these diagnoses represent valid collective action framings of the Greek and the Spanish protests of 2011.

In their highly expedient elaboration of the theory of frame analysis, Snow and Benford (1988; 1992) introduce the concept of ‘master frames’ as a conceptual tool appropriately capturing the dynamics of framing processes in large scale mobilizations and movements with broad and varied constituencies. In instances such as these, ‘when there is heterogeneity among the groups and interests targeted for mobilization’, master frames are suggested to have greater functionality, compared to movement-specific collective action frames (Snow 2004: 390), because they are broad and inclusive enough and thus their ‘punctuations, attributions, articulations may colour and constrain those of any number of movement organizations’ (Snow and Benford 1992: 138). The Greek and the Spanish protests of 2011 fit

precisely the model of such large-scale and heterogeneous mobilizations. Indeed, in both cases, the anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests of 2011 have been mass protests of a population exceptionally heterogeneous in regards to its socioeconomic and political characteristics (see Sergi and Vogiatzoglou 2013; Flesher Fominaya 2014a; Sitrin and Azzellini 2014), and therefore protests in which master frames have indeed greater functionality. This suggests that in mass mobilizations such as those of the Greek Aganaktismenoi and the Spanish Indignados diagnostic frames can indeed be broad enough to encompass a variety of narratives. The reason, however, for which I propose both diagnostic framings identified in this analysis to be equally valid depictions of the protests' diagnosis, has to do with a further specification on the functioning of master frames. I single out variations that concern their 'articulation function' in particular.

According to Snow and Benford, the articulation function of master frames urges a basic distinction between *restricted master frames* on the one hand, which represent closed and 'exclusive ideational systems', and *elaborated master frames* on the other hand, which represent open and flexible systems of interpretation and allow, by contrast, 'extensive ideational amplification and extension' (1992: 139-40). The two diagnostic framings of the Greek and the Spanish protests of 2011, found in the analysis of this chapter, can be accurately explained along these lines. The consensus on problem identification -i.e. 'a system of failing representation'- corresponds to the elaborated master frame of the mobilizations, which is indeed generic, open, and flexible enough to constrain the attributions of a highly heterogeneous constituency. But problem identification, combined with responsibility attribution that focuses blame on political incumbents on the one hand, and on representation as such on the other hand, produces two restricted master frames that are indeed more difficult to 'lend themselves to amplification or extension' (Snow and Benford 1992: 140), and thus can be expected to be restricted to specific subgroups of the heterogenous

constituency of the protests. To render such frames wholly intelligible requires a closer examination of the differential interpretations involved in each case. The scholarly literature suggests a variety of aspects that can lead this examination and which can be largely grouped into two broad sets of concerns: ‘structural strains’ (see Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977) on the one hand, and issues of ‘ideological consideration’ (see Snow and Benford 1988) on the other. In both instances, however, the principle requirement is a closer appreciation of the ‘social subject’ of the Greek and Spanish protests and its divisions. I save this examination for later,⁴⁸ and instead I conclude the examination of this chapter by drawing attention to the possibly different prognoses hidden in the two restricted diagnostic frames of the protests.

Research in collective action has shown that the tasks of diagnostic and prognostic framing are closely connected and that the boundaries between the two are effectively blurred (see Nepstad 1997; Snow and Benford 1988). The diagnostic framings of the Greek and the Spanish mobilizations examined here demonstrate the point, as their restricted frames not only identify a problem (i.e. representation has failed the popular interests) but also appear to contain elements of the solution to that problem. On the one hand, the restricted diagnostic frame attributing responsibility to political incumbents, appears to conceal a promise to maintain and emend democratic representation. The demand for democracy, in this sense, could mean a demand for structural reforms as Norris (1999) suggests, and could be thus understood as applauding what Rosanvallon (2008) calls ‘counter-democracy’: ‘a form of democracy that reinforces the usual electoral democracy as a kind of buttress, a democracy of indirect powers disseminated throughout society—in other words, a durable democracy of distrust, which complements the episodic democracy of the usual electoral-representative system’ (Rosanvallon 2008: 8). On the other hand, the restricted diagnostic frame, attributing responsibility to the system of representation as such, could conceal a promise to change the representational

⁴⁸ see Part III of this research.

organization of contemporary liberal democracies. The demand for democracy, in this sense, could mean a demand to radically change the political organization altogether, and to be understood as reflecting the precept of prefigurative politics that ‘the world we want to transform has already been worked on by history and is largely hollow. We must nevertheless be inventive enough to change it and build a new world’ (Subcomandante Marcos 2000). Altogether, it can be said that by following inductive reasoning, the restricted diagnostic frames of the Greek and the Spanish protests of 2011 could be seen as hinting at their prognostic framings (i.e. amend democratic representation or change the political organization). Nevertheless, the question to which prognostic framings essentially correspond, that is, the question of where do we go from here, *what is to be done*, always and in all instances remains an empirical question (see Benford and Snow 2000), and as such it deserves to be examined in itself and in detail. The second part of this research is devoted to this examination.

5. The political advocacy: prognostic frames of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations in Greece and Spain

The first chapter examined the diagnostic framings of the Greek and the Spanish mobilizations of 2011 and found that the protestors advanced two restricted diagnostic frames, each one focusing blame on different aspects of the situation. Diagnostic framing, however, is only the first task of the framing processes of collective action. Once the problematic situation has been identified and responsibility has been attributed, collective action further seeks to address also the ‘Leninesque question of *what is to be done*’ (Benford and Snow 2000: 616; added emphasis). This second task of collective action framings is the development of prognostic frames, which actually represent the ‘proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done’ (Snow and Benford 1988: 1992). Prognostic framings, plainly put, constitute solutions that usually follow the diagnostic framings of collective action and propose alternative courses of action. The relevant literature on frame analysis, however, proposes that there is an intimate relation between diagnostic and prognostic framings of collective action, because in reality ‘the solutions for the problems and the demands are defined in both frames. The solutions are, in principle, the reversal of the defined problems and causes’ (Gerhards and Rucht 1992: 582). In this sense, it is suggested that the diagnostic and the prognostic frames of collective action effectively represent the two sides of the same story, and therefore a certain correspondence between the two is to be expected (see Snow and Benford 1988).

Building on this, if the first chapter of this research examined the diagnostic framings of the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests in an attempt to answer the question what does the demand for democracy mean, when it is voiced in already democratic contexts,

the second part of this research explores the other side of the story. Recasting the question by using the protests' main prognostic formulation, the second part of this research is dedicated to finding the answer to the question: *what does the protests' demand for real/direct democracy practically imply?* Following in this direction, this part (devoted to examining the prognostic framings of the Greek Aganaktismenoi and the Spanish Indignados) seeks to find answers to questions such as: what is the solution proposed by the anti-austerity protests? or what is the alternative set of practices advocated? This chapter explores the prognosis of the protests and in particular the specific ways in which it was actually developed. Indeed, prognostic framings, rather than being only generic propositions about what needs to be done, further identify 'strategies, tactics, and targets' in order to address the problematic situation (Snow and Benford 1988: 201). In other words, prognostic frames include not only proposals for alternative courses of action, but further specify what these courses of action consist in. On the basis of all the above, the second chapter of this research explores the hypothesis of two prognostic frames appearing in the protests (in correspondence to the two restricted diagnostic frames identified in the first part of the research), and examines empirically the ways in which these were actually specified in 2011. In this direction, this chapter seeks to examine the special weight of the two alternative prognostic frames that appear to be referenced in the protests' diagnosis, and their relevance for a comprehensive account of the collective action frames of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests of 2011.

The Greek and the Spanish protests of 2011 came to identify problems of democratic legitimacy in the sociopolitical organization of contemporary neo-liberal capitalist societies: problems which they summarized as the result of the impulse for capital accumulation that is served by the systematic and silent decoupling of the economy from democracy, thus setting up political systems of failing representation. In short, they have proposed that the political organization of neo-liberal capitalist systems has failed to effectively and

democratically express popular interests over vested economic interests. The response of the protests to what can be described in short as the ‘failure of the democratic promise’ has been prefigured in the generic demand with which they became largely identified: namely, real/direct democracy. More specifically, the Spanish Indignados on the one hand became identified with the call for *Real Democracy Now*, the name of the biggest platform involved in the organization of the protests (DRY-Democracia Real Ya!), while the call for *Direct Democracy Now* represented the signature of the Greek Aganaktismenoi, who closed all their releases (statements, decrees etc) with this demand. In this sense, the Greek and the Spanish protests of 2011 appear to fit the expectations of diagnostic-prognostic frame correspondence (see Snow and Benford 1988; Gerhards and Rucht 1992), as their diagnosis (failure of the democratic promise in the capitalist system) and their prognosis (succinctly summarized in the call for democracy) in fact correspond to one another. The restricted diagnostic frames of the protests, however, tell two stories about what is the problem and who is responsible for it. By extension, and following the diagnostic-prognostic frames correspondence, these two diagnoses are also expected to tell two different stories about what is actually to be done: that is, they are expected to be followed by two prognoses. In what follows here, I proceed first to explore the two prognostic narratives which are hypothesized in reference to the two restricted diagnostic framings of the protests.

The demand for democracy as a prognosis to fortify representation

In the early 1960s Almond and Verba (1963) marked the debate on system analysis by suggesting that a positive regard by citizens for the institutions of representation is key to the unobstructed functioning of democracy. Drawing a distinction between the Western world, preeminently represented by the US and the UK, and Third World nations, the model of civic culture put forward by Almond and Verba suggested that while in the latter

case citizens are guided by parochial orientations and limited political awareness, in the first case citizens' civic culture consists of a mix of awareness, involvement and, most importantly, trust in the institutions of government. Altogether, this is a civic culture that serves democratic consolidation and helps fortify democracy against authoritarian setbacks (see also Dalton and Shin 2014). Nevertheless, by understanding democratic support as consisting of a strong support for democratic principles and for democratic performance at the same time, the 'allegiance model' of Almond and Verba's civic culture essentially tied citizens' perceptions of the democraticness, so to put it, of society to democratic consolidation. By extension, then, the 'allegiance model' allowed limited space for any expression of disaffection with the functioning of democratic institutions in consolidated democracies, in the sense that expressions of public disaffection —such as those that accompanied the governability crisis of the early 1970s for example — could practically emerge only as an outlier, suggesting bad news for democracy in the Western world (O'Donnell et.al. 1986; Crozier et.al. 1975). Today, in a similar fashion, the contemporary crisis of democratic legitimacy is accompanied by the emergence of challenging readings of the situation and by the transformation of the public debate on democracy, which in turn is marked by the augmenting disaffection of citizens who are contemporarily 'less allegiant and more willing to pursue contentious courses of political action' (Dalton and Shin 2014: 117).

In overall terms, the scholarly literature does not stand in unison in the face of this development and in particular in regards to whether citizens' growing disaffection is actually 'a blessing or a bliss for democracy' (Klingemann 2014: 117; see also Norris 1999; 2011; Muller et.al. 1982). Nevertheless, by revisiting aspects of the basic framework of system analysis, the literature today provides us with a scheme of analysis that is particularly relevant for understanding here the prognosis of the Greek and the Spanish protests as a demand for the fortifying of democratic representation. The key is to be found

in Easton's work (1965; 1975) and in particular in the consequential distinction he underlines between two different types of political support for democracy. These are, namely, a type of *diffuse political support*, which references support for democratic principles and values, and a type of *specific political support*, which references support for the specific performance of democratic institutions (see Easton 1975). A key feature of this distinction is that it grants elasticity to the basic scheme of system analysis, as it essentially decouples the two types of support and therefore allows specific political support to be seen independently (at least to a certain extent) from diffuse political support. In other words, it allows democratic disaffection to be seen independently from the 'democraticness' of citizens' civic culture (see Inglehart and Norris 2003; Dalton 2004; Dahlberg et.al. 2013). More specifically, citizens' disaffection under this light is viewed as a not necessarily threatening development for contemporary democracies, for it is suggested as growing against (mainly corrupt) political elites and their (non)democratic performance in particular, rather than against democratic government as such.

Following the above, the distinction between diffuse and specific support can be read as an analytical exercise that grants flexibility in the conceptualization of popular disaffection with democracy and thus allows empirical investigation to examine contentious political action in terms of an unequivocally democratic narrative. The concept in which we find solidified the idea of a democratic civic culture, beyond disaffection with democratic performance, is developed in Norris' (1999) seminal work on *Critical Citizens*. Democratic disaffection in liberal democracies, according to Norris, constitutes the result of an increasingly critical assessment of democratic performance in contemporary societies, which is predicated on a meaningful transformation of the civic culture. Social modernization and globalization are suggested as being the main forces of this transformation (Dalton and Shin 2014: 95). What is of key interest, however, is that these forces are suggested to have actually transformed contemporary political culture by means of instilling in citizens

an ‘emancipatory spirit’ that is conflated with the embrace of the liberal values of equality and freedom (see Welzel and Alvarez 2014). Thus, democratic disaffection in contemporary democracies is permanently embedded in a *liberal* democratic narrative in which citizens’ demands have internalized a corrective, rather than a disruptive, function for liberal democracy. These are the demands of ‘critical citizens’, who exhibit simultaneously attachment to the institution of representation and a distancing from the structures of representative government (Norris 1999). Klingemann, reflecting the measurement instrument in the concept (see Klingemann 2014: 116), speaks of ‘dissatisfied democrats’ more specifically, thus clarifying that ‘disaffection does not imply danger to the persistence or furtherance of democracy... The dissatisfied democrats can be viewed as less a threat to, than a force for, reform and improvement of democratic processes and structures’ (Klingemann 1999: 31).

Finally, Welzel and Dalton, based on Almond and Verba’s attempt to address augmenting dissatisfaction with democracy in *Civic Culture Revisited* (1980), provide us with a comprehensive framework of analysis in which we see ‘dissatisfied democrats epitomize the new style of assertive citizenship’ (Welzel and Dalton 2014: 287). To this effect, they propose a model of ‘assertive civic culture’, which contains the challenges of post-industrial societies for political support and conceives of a new type of civic engagement (see Welzel and Dalton 2014: 282-306). The dissatisfied democrats of contemporary societies ‘are less deferential to political elites and more willing to use elite-challenging forms of political participation’ (Dalton and Shin 2014: 95), but in this challenging they are informed by the liberal version of the ‘emancipative values’ of equality and freedom, which are understood to reference ‘individual liberties’ and ‘equal opportunities’ (Welzel and Dalton 2014: 291), and which are finally suggested to have a double ‘enlightenment effect’:

This emancipatory transformation can be characterized as an “enlightenment effect” in a double way. For it couples people’s democratic desires with (1) a more liberal understanding of what democracy means and (2) a more critical assessment of how democratic their society actually is (Welzel and Alvarez 2014: 59).

Eventually such values, it is suggested, ‘make people sensitive of their rights and those of others’ and create ‘an urge to voice their indignation through collective action’ (Welzel and Dalton 2014: 291). The assertive model proposes that this urge is developed under the people’s claim ‘for control over their lives’ (exactly as we see it in the Greek and the Spanish mobilizations of 2011), but emphatically concludes:

[T]he erosion of allegiant cultures and the parallel emergence of assertive cultures should not be worrisome developments as regards the societies’ governance performance. Instead, in terms of both accountability and effective governance, the cultural change has positive consequences [...] A more assertive public places new demands on the political process. A more assertive public also produces more contention and conflict... Eventually, however, rising assertive cultures bring us closer to realizing democracy’s key inspirational promise: empowering people to make their own decisions and to make their preferences heard and counted in politics (Welzel and Dalton 2014: 305; 306).

In the Greek and the Spanish protests of 2011 the idea of problems with performance legitimacy has been present in the discursive formulations of the protestors, who raised a strong critique about the functioning of contemporary representation. The attribution of responsibility to (mainly corrupt) political incumbents effectively reflects the precept of the assertive model: that dissatisfied democrats do not necessarily raise questions about the democratic legitimacy of representation as such, but instead they put pressure on ‘office

holders to improve on meeting democratic standards in daily political practice’ (Klingemann 2014: 117). The Spanish Indignados could be seen as confirming this point in their famous motto:

We are not anti-system, the system is against (anti-) us (Appendix B, Picture 10a;10b).

To this end, they declared a) that indeed *‘politicians should be bringing our voice to the institutions’*, b) that democratic societies need in fact to be guided by the ‘inalienable truths’ of *‘equality, progress, solidarity, freedom of culture, sustainability and development, welfare and people’s happiness’*, and c) that, unlike its current functioning, democracy needs to be altogether directed to *‘efficiency and the welfare of society’* (DRY Manifesto). The demand for emending representation then could be found hidden in their declaration that *‘You do not decide who decides for you’* (Appendix B, Picture 11), which essentially denounces shortcomings in the way that representative democracy works: limiting the involvement of the people. Finally, the demand to enhance democratic accountability in representation could be detected in calls for *‘Electoral law reform now!’* (Appendix B, Picture 12) and calls to *‘Eliminate the privileges of the political class’*, among which we find proposals for:

Strict control of absenteeism of elected officials from their respective posts. Specific sanctions for abandonment of duties.

Withdrawal of privileges in the payment of taxes, the years of contribution and the size of pensions. Equalization of the salaries of elected representatives to the average Spanish salary, plus the allowances necessary for performing their duties.

Elimination of the immunity associated with the position. Abolition of statutes of limitation for corruption offenses.

Obligatory publication of the assets of all public offices.

Reduction of numbers of officials without proper appointment
(Acampada BCN, Objectives).

In a similar vein, the Greek Aganaktismenoi expressed their critique of the political class that failed to contain the economic crisis and guarantee the welfare of the citizens. Further, they made direct references to the Argentinian crisis and the Argentinian people's indictment of the government of Fernando de la Rúa, proposing that the fate of the Greek politicians should be similar to his: '*A magical night like in Argentina, let's see who gets in the helicopter first*'.⁴⁹ In a humorous twist the chant was often changed to frame explicitly then Prime Minister Giorgos Papandreou and his government: '*The helicopter is expensive, get on your bike and get out of here*'.⁵⁰ Indeed, as discussed earlier, a large part of the chants of the Greek protests were directed at politicians⁵¹ who were held accountable for disservice and for abusing public money—in short, for being conclusively unreliable in their politics:

We don't believe in the memoranda *in opposition to what the politicians say* (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 03 June 2011).

At the same time, the protestors denounced politicians not only for their handling of the contemporary crisis but also for having in general wrecked the country throughout the period of the post-transition, pushing the general population into misery:

⁴⁹ see https://twitter.com/aganaktismenoi_/status/74872506548371456; and https://twitter.com/aganaktismenoi_/status/74898468967170049

⁵⁰ see https://twitter.com/aganaktismenoi_/status/74895959326326784

⁵¹ 'You've deprived us of money, you've deprived us of education. We will deprive you of freedom'; 'You are traitors, you are scum, only a few days remain until we set up the gallows'; 'Pity politicians we have not 'eaten' them together'; 'Bums, ruffians, politicians'. See also Chapter 1 in this research, section on 'Attribution of responsibility A-They don't represent us': the failure of incumbents', in particular pp. 43-45.

The governments since '74 have wrecked the country, the first of the hardships they caused being poverty (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Peoples' Assembly 11 July 2011).

Finally, the attachment to the cause of emending representation can be seen indirectly reflected in the decrees and the minutes of the popular assemblies of Syntagma Square and Lefkos Pyrgos, in which the protestors often advocated the ousting of corrupt politicians as the first step to be taken in the direction of finding solutions for fixing the shortcomings of democratic representation:

They have transformed current parliamentary democracy into party-ocracy.. We cannot ask anything from those elected -those who are sold off to interests. They have to leave first. Then we can see how we will continue (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 28 May 2011).

They have also clearly advocated the enhancement of democratic representation by establishing direct channels of participation:

Let's create a system which involves more direct-democratic processes (e.g. referenda). Let's make a political system which gives power to the people (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 8 June 2011).

Altogether, then, this can be understood as being an advocacy that in both instances, of the Greek and the Spanish protests, closely references a 'liberal distrust' of democratic politics and in fact appears to be calling for the embeddedness of a 'counter-democracy' that can function to 'complement the episodic democracy of the usual electoral-representative system' (Rosanvallon 2008: 8).

The demand for democracy as a prognosis for participatory and deliberative democracy

Seeking to explore the broader narrative within which the demand for democracy can be comprehensively understood as a prognosis for participatory and deliberative democracy, I single out here the concept of autonomy. This concept is in correspondence with the diagnosis of the failure of representation as such, as it effectively refutes the organizational values of modern democracies (i.e. procedural legitimacy and democratic representation) and their immediate consequences (i.e. the hollowing out of the sovereignty of the people). By contrast to such systems of organization, autonomy rests on a critical epistemology that reads society as a *relational process*, rather than as a straightforward system (see also Cook 2005: 16-26), and claims democratic legitimacy in the rule of equal and free people. Altogether, as a logic and a process of sociopolitical organization, autonomy rests on the basic democratic principle of the sovereignty of the ('autonomous') people. As a political logic in particular, in Western philosophy at least (see also Katsiaficas 2006: 6), it references the famous Kantian thesis that 'the touchstone of whatever can be decided upon as law for the people lies in the question: whether the people would impose such a law upon themselves' (Kant 1996[1784]). As a political process, on the other hand, it is accurately summarized in the Rousseauian precept that 'men are to be ruled by the logic of the operation of the political situation that they had themselves created and that this situation was such that the possibility of the rule of individual men was "automatically" precluded' (Pateman 1970: 23). The concept of autonomy suggests, then, that it is indeed all members of society (equally and freely) that actually institute society, and that they do so in ways that do not go against society itself:

I wouldn't call autonomous those who simply satisfy their desires without any barrier and without any control, who believe that law is to do whatever pops into their mind at any instance. The same is true for society. There cannot be social and collective life without organization and without a minimum of common rules. There cannot be social and collective life without a minimum of values and goals. I mean values and

goals that all members of the society share, or at least don't fight against in such a fashion that they prefer society to be destroyed, rather than to see these values and goals actualized (Castoriadis 2001: 49).

Autonomy, then, is read as a broad narrative in which the claim for social change is expressed as a claim for the radical reconceptualization of democratic organization in terms of a '*permanent and explicit self-institution of society*' (Castoriadis 1997: 30; original emphasis), where we can find preserved what Katsiaficas describes as 'the original Kantian kernel of autonomy within an enlarged meaning and collective context' (2006: 8). In sum, autonomy constitutes an advocacy for the dissolution of extant heteronomous structures and is a concept that captures the promise of the radical reconfiguration of social relations as referenced in the participatory and deliberative theory of sociopolitical organization. The most basic precept of participatory and deliberative theory, moreover, found behind the idea of political autonomy as a logic and a process of sociopolitical organization, is the precept of equality. The very centrality of this precept urges the radical re-examination of the way in which equality is commonly conceptualized in extant liberal models of sociopolitical organization. With regards to participatory theory, the basic formulation examined is the 'equality of opportunity'. Equality of opportunity is a model of social and political organization in which 'the assignment of individuals to places in the social hierarchy is determined by some form of competitive process, and all members of society are eligible to compete on equal terms' (Arneson 2015). Along these lines, equality of opportunity finds its democratic legitimacy in procedural aspects of sociopolitical organization, as it may be 'opposed to caste hierarchy but not to hierarchy *per se*' (Arneson 2015; original emphasis). Equality of opportunity, in this sense, is the logic of sociopolitical organization that fits precisely with the model of contemporary liberal representative democracies, which are instituted as hierarchical systems (see Schattschneider 1975) and are

predicated on a Schumpeterian understanding of democratic legitimacy as being procedurally defined.

Participatory theory, by contrast to the above, invokes critical approaches to equality that draw attention to the existence of deeply embedded inequalities, which are concealed in the hierarchical structures of contemporary societies and ‘shape’ the members of the society (along with their abilities to compete equally for places in the social hierarchy) in a decisive manner (Castoriadis 2005). Along these lines, it is suggested that equality of opportunity in liberal democratic organization is practically an oxymoron. The reason for this is that in liberal democracies income and social position can effectively place individuals below a certain threshold, under which even the most basic liberal right to the individualistic pursuit of private interests ‘loses its meaning’ (Manin et.al. 1987: 339). To claim equality of opportunity in social hierarchies, thereafter, means merely avoiding confronting the fact that structural inequalities have completely and permanently cancelled the premise of competition (of any sort) on equal terms:

Unless we create an environment where everyone is guaranteed some minimum capabilities through some guarantee of minimum income, education, and healthcare, we cannot say that we have fair competition. When some people have to run a 100 meter race with sandbags on their legs, the fact that no one is allowed to have a head start does not make the race fair (Ha-Joon Chang 2010: 220).

Critical approaches to equality that are fostered by participatory theory draw further attention to the specific functioning of contemporary democracies that the protests of 2011 questioned: functioning through the ‘splitting of economy from democracy’ (Streeck 2014: 5). In particular they suggest that by means of this separation the link between political power and wealth is greatly strengthened (see Castoriadis 2012: 13), so that the possibility of equality is finally permanently precluded. Equality, therefore, in liberal democracies is

comparable to an Orwellian equality, according to which all members of society are equal to participate in sociopolitical processes, but some are unfailingly more equal than others. Put differently, equality of opportunity establishes an order of equality in apparent defiance of the ‘egalitarian implications’ of the ideal of democratic order, which dictates that:

Opportunities and power must be independent of economic or social position -the political liberties must have a fair value- and the fact that they are independent must be more or less evident to citizens (Cohen 1989: 18).

Following in this direction participatory theory proposes equality as substantially, rather than procedurally defined: meaning an *equality of conditions* that is predicated on the radical dissolution of hierarchical structures of organization and on the redistribution of power. In sum, it advocates a type of sociopolitical organization that guarantees ‘equality of power in determining the outcome of decisions’ (Pateman 1970: 43).

With regards to deliberative theory, equality is radically re-conceptualized vis-à-vis hierarchical structures of knowledge in particular, and vis-à-vis the generation of consensus more specifically. Thus, in deliberative theory we see emphasis being placed on a problem that seems to remain somehow concealed in what the broader critique to liberal democratic organization defines as the people’s ‘lost capacity for domination’ (Dean 2014: 81). More specifically, the capacity for domination is reexamined also as a matter of ‘intellectual competence’, and the problem that deliberation singles out can be understood as being the problem of the all too common distinction between a knowledge based on experience and habit on the one hand, and an informed type of knowledge based on science on the other. The source of this distinction is suggested as being that powerful ‘pedagogical myth’ that assumes a fundamental distinction between an intelligence guided by *habit*, and an intelligence led by *reason*:

[T]he former registers perceptions by chance, retains them, interprets and repeats them empirically, within the closed circle of habit and need. This is the intelligence of the young child and the common man. The superior intelligence knows things by reason, proceeds by method, from the simple to the complex, from the part to the whole (Rancière 1991: 7).

Transferred to the field of sociopolitical organization, it is suggested that this 'pedagogical myth' is effectively recast as a technocratic myth, according to which sociopolitical development emerges as a matter of expertise (see Rich 2004). The 'powerful' and the 'powerless', in this sense, are substituted by the 'knowledgeable' and the 'ignorant', who eventually come into being as individuals who are consequentially enacting knowledge and ignorance. If, under the weight of the 'pedagogical myth', interaction between intelligence of habit and intelligence of reason exposes individuals in a cognitive adventure whereby all efforts for explication essentially 'progress towards stultification' (Rancière 1991: 8), under the weight of the technocratic myth interaction between the knowledgeable and the ignorant exposes them in a sociopolitical adventure whereby all efforts for explication effectively progress towards intellectual impairment and sociopolitical exclusion. In other words, common citizens in their interaction with experts, politicians and technocrats, are effectively interpellated into a symbolic order of knowledge as heteronomous individuals who 'cannot think by themselves, apart from the completely trivial and secondary issues. They cannot control their behaviour. They cannot tell what is good and what is bad, what is just and what is unjust, what is true and what is false' (Castoriadis 2001: 70). The idea that non-qualified citizens *do not but also cannot* understand delicate issues of politics and economy is the conclusion of this adventure, which embeds technocratic politics as an inevitability of contemporary democracies (see also Rich 2004).

By contrast to all the above, deliberative theory engages a radical reconceptualization of deliberation in terms of a basic embrace of

enlightenment philosophical traditions, which put emphasis on conditions of freedom and responsibility in intellectual development. Kant's aphorism *sapere aude*, is the most accurate summary of their premise: 'Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage... *sapere aude!*' "Have courage to use your own reason!" -that is the motto of enlightenment' (Kant 1996[1784]). For the broader theory of autonomy, the intellectual sovereignty that is proposed in the enlightenment tradition constitutes an expression of *freedom* in consequential decision-making:

Is there human freedom and what does it consist in? Freedom does not mean to do whatever pops into our head, neither as some philosophers thought, to act without motives. Freedom first of all means *to have clarity over what we think and what we do*. Can we be free, however, when we live in a society and under the social rule? I will formulate the answer as follows: I can be free, inasmuch as *I participate in the configuration of this rule*, inasmuch as *I decide equally along with others on the creation of this rule*, and finally, inasmuch as *I am in accordance with the way this rule was instituted* (Castoriadis 2001: 69-70; added emphasis).

Reflecting such concerns, deliberative theory singles out three basic qualities for democratic decision-making. These are, namely, *rationality*, as 'forethought flexibility' (Dewey 1922: 198; Habermas 1984), *equality*, as freedom from coercion in political decision-making (Habermas 2005), and finally *consensus*, for arriving at political decisions (Habermas 1996; Cohen 1989). First, rationality as a key issue for the conceptualization of deliberation proposes a basic distinction between two types of deliberation:

Deliberation is irrational in the degree in which an end is so fixed, a passion or interest so absorbing, that the foresight of consequences is warped to include only what furthers execution of its predetermined bias. Deliberation is rational in the degree in which *forethought flexibly*

remakes old aims and habits, institutes perception and love of new ends and acts (Dewey 1922: 198; added emphasis).

Rationality, in this sense, contains claims in regards to the participants' willingness to yield to competing arguments (see also Blee 2012). Second, equality in deliberation is conceptualized as an equality in the development of ideas and the making of decisions guaranteed by the absence of all sorts of domination, coercion, or force, 'with the exception of the "forceless force of the better argument"' (Habermas 2005: 384). Consensus, finally, is described as being the cornerstone of the ideal model of deliberation guided by rationality and based on equality, so that 'only those statuses may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent (Zustimmung) of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted' (Habermas 1996: 110; see also Manin et.al. 1987).

Altogether, it is suggested that the elements of rationality, equality and freedom constitute part of what appears to be an 'intuitive knowledge of how to argue' that is developed through practice (Habermas 2005: 385). In reality, however, these elements constitute the result of a certain effort put into the cultivation of cognitive abilities and social attitudes quite different to the extant ways of thinking and relating. The reason is that deliberation, defined as an exercise in rationality, equality and consensus means a systematic involvement in the remaking of aims and habits in such a manner that deliberation, more than a cognitive task, becomes an experiment in metacognition:

It is a great error to suppose that we have no preferences until there is a choice. We are always biased beings, tending in one direction rather than another. The occasion of deliberation is an excess of preferences, not natural apathy or an absence of likings. [...] All deliberation is a search for a *way* to act, not for a final terminus. Its office is to facilitate stimulation. (Dewey 1922: 192-3; original emphasis).

In this sense, deliberation involves not only the radical reconfiguration of social relations, but also the radical reconceptualization of the ‘self’ and the courageous and unsparing approval of self-reflection that can help achieve the professed rationality, equality of power and consensus in decision-making.

In all the above, the participatory and deliberative claims of democratic organization are seen to reference issues of a horizontal and equal engagement in sociopolitical organization, on the basis of responsibility and reflectivity. Altogether, these are critical issues consistent with the broader framework of autonomy as an advocacy for the ‘*permanent and explicit self-institution of society*’ (Castoriadis 1997: 30; original emphasis). In the Greek and the Spanish protests of 2011 we find such concerns reflected in a firm understanding that direct engagement is the only possible way for solving the problems that extant democracies fail to address:

It is not enough to be indignant. *You have to engage* (DRY, Toma La Calle)

Critique is good, *participation is better* (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 8 June 2011)

This often is seen to be coupled with a firm understanding that the institution of society is a responsibility that lies first and foremost with the citizens themselves:

Direct democracy has *to come from us first. We are the example*, first it’s us (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 8 June 2011).

The reason, as inferred from the discursive formulations of the protestors, is that it is finally they who are the basic driving force of society at large:

Without us none of this would exist, because we move the world (DRY, Manifesto).

In this direction, finally, I propose that the prognosis of the Greek and the Spanish *acampadas* for democracy could also be examined as a prognosis for participatory and deliberative democracy: a system of political organization that opposes the organizational presuppositions of extant liberal democratic systems of representation and instead underscores horizontality and deliberation in political engagement. Having explored thus far the potential validity of two different theoretical schemes for examining the prognostic frames of the *Aganaktismenoi* and the *Indignados*, in what follows I turn to explore how the specifications of their prognostic frames can be best approached and then I continue to examine them more systematically.

Specifications of prognostic frames: the ‘spaces’ of prognoses

In order to examine the prognostic framings of collective action, it is crucial to look where such framings are being actually developed. The many analyses that the scholarly literature has provided for the anti-austerity protests of 2011 is of significant help in this task. In overall terms, the relevant literature on the global wave of anti-austerity protests that started in late 2010 and reached their peak with the massively participated demonstrations of 2011 has highlighted many different aspects of interest for a thorough understanding. The specific links to the crisis of neoliberal capitalism (della Porta and Mattoni 2014), the transnational ideational and practical diffusions and links to the momentous GJM (Flesher Fominaya and Cox 2013), the ‘politicization of civil society’ (Flesher Fominaya 2014a: 192), the re-emergence of the notion of democracy (Díez García 2014), or the use of social media and the emergence of new communication strategies (Gerbaudo 2012; Luengo and Marín 2016) are only some of them. From them, I single out here issues relevant to the repertoire of action of these protests (see for example Sergi and

Vogiatzoglou 2013) and in particular the tactic of encampment in public squares (Dhaliwal 2012; Maeckelbergh 2012).

In broad terms, the relevant literature suggests that the square occupations, with which the protests of 2011 have been largely identified, have actually constituted the *physical manifestation of coming together* against neoliberal capitalism. In particular, it is suggested that the encampments have functioned to ‘physically harvest’ the dispersed indignation, thus giving it a name⁵² and, most importantly, ‘a physical centre, an anchoring point in public space’ (Gerbaudo 2012: 95). The emphasis of such examinations is largely placed on the element of *visibility*, as they often highlight that, by providing a ‘physical centre’ to indignation, the encampments actually functioned as a means of pulling the citizens and their demands out of ‘invisibility’ (Douzinas 2011a; 2011b). This appears to be an element of key importance for the individual participants of the protests as well, who often discuss visibility as an advantageous aspect of the square encampments, although in a counterintuitive combination with the idea of ‘anonymity’: ‘And *the square is also an open space*. It’s a passage. *We were there to be seen, but we can come “by chance”*, we can even lie about coming, to our friend, to our employer, our husband even, if you know what I mean.’ (Ilias).

Next to the ‘physical’ element of the encampments there is also a symbolic element that is of great value for examining the specifications of the protests’ prognostic framings. Individual protestors, as shown in the following remark, often trace the symbolic function of the encampments in the *return of the ‘public’*:

⁵² Indeed, the global wave of anti-austerity protests of 2011 has been referred to as the ‘activism of the square’, see Pearce, J. (2013). “Power and the Twenty-first Century Activist: From the Neighborhood to the Square”, *Development and Change*, 44(3): 639-663, while the Spanish and the Greek protests of 2011 more specifically have been variably addressed as the ‘movements of the squares’, and the ‘squares movements’, see Gerbaudo, P. (2016). “The indignant citizen: anti-austerity movements in southern Europe and the anti-oligarchic reclaiming of citizenship”, *Social Movement Studies. Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest*, 16(1): 1-15; see Sitrin, M. (2015). “The Anarchist Spirit”, *Dissent*, 62(4): 84-86; Prentoulis, M., Thomassen, L. (2013). “Political theory in the square: Protest, representation and subjectification”, *Contemporary Political Theory*, 12(3): 166-184.

The “public” returns... And of course it has new symbols (Ilias).

In the scholarly examination the symbolic function of the encampments is more specifically explained as a matter of symbolic re-appropriation of the public space and as a matter of embedding processes of ‘subverting the social relations of acting in the space’ (Kallianos 2013: 549). The key element singled out in such examinations is the role that the encampments played in *reshaping social relations and political reasoning* on terms that resembled a *modern agora* (Leontidou 2012: 306). With the exception of political parties, which were straightforwardly identified as the antagonists of the protests, participation in the popular assembly of the squares, which essentially constituted the heart and the mind of the mobilizations, was virtually unconditional. The public space in 2011 was essentially transformed into an open assembly, in which ideational comings and goings were taking place on new, more inclusive terms. In this sense the square encampments of the global wave of anti-austerity protests have been not only a physical, but most importantly a symbolic space, in which the protagonists of the protests could *practise new forms of engaging in creative processes of generating, developing, and communicating new ideas*.

In May 2011, under the proposition ‘Take the Streets’, the platform Democracia Real Ya!, in Spain called for a demonstration on the 15th of the month in response to the deteriorating socioeconomic situation of the country and its political causes. The motivational call was given under the motto *‘I think I can change it. I think I can help. I know that together we can. Come out with us. It’s your right’* (DRY! Madrid, Manifesto; DRY BCN, Manifesto). The resonance of the call with the larger population was exceptionally high and the protests of 15May, which later came to be identified as the protests of the Indignados, were indeed massively participated. Almost immediately the protestors employed as part of their repertoire the occupation of public

squares across the country, which soon transformed into points of reference giving form to the diffuse indignation:

Thus began a camp where came up many proposals and ideas and many working groups that have *turned outrage into action* [...] Placa Catalunya became a *true agora where people could channel their anger and were able to dream of a better future* (#15MPedia, Acampada BCN -Historia; added emphasis).

In the days that followed, the occupations were progressively transformed into organized encampments that functioned as open public spaces for collecting, exchanging, and disseminating information on the political and socioeconomic situation:

The first days of Acampada Sol were days of great influx of people and were *enormously informative* [...] The days were beginning with groups and commissions *working to organize information*, they were continuing with *advanced informative actions* for those that were passing by the squares, they were arriving at night with mass protests and they were ending with silence, putting order and cleaning the encampment in a climate of uncertainty about the possible burdens of each night (#15MPedia, Acampada Sol - Historia).

Along such lines, rather than spaces of random assembling, the encampments of the Spanish Indignados were systematically organized through a large set of commissions and working groups responsible for undertaking an equally large set of diverse tasks regarding the organization and functioning of the encampments, but also regarding the informed development of specific alternative solutions to the identified problems. At least 27 such commissions are listed as having been linked to the encampment of Barcelona in Placa Catalunya, and 13 to the encampment of Madrid in Puerta del Sol (along with at least 33 working groups, 19 out of which are claimed to be still active) working under broad thematics such as economy and

politics (with their respective sub-divisions), or more specific thematics on education, health, the right to housing, feminism and cultural issues, among others (#15MPedia).⁵³ The prognosis of the protests that branded contemporary resistance to austerity in Spain was actually compounded in these encampments, which essentially developed to resemble ‘miniatures’ of an alternative paradigm of sociopolitical organization. The ‘prognostic experiment’ of the protests lasted for 28 days in Madrid and 45 days in Barcelona (#15MPedia) and by the end of June 2011 it was dismantled under the premise *‘we will not go, we will expand’* (#15MPedia, Acampada Sol - Historia).⁵⁴ This message has its own special value in view of the grassroots ecosystem of resistance that flourished after 2011 in Spain, but for what concerns this examination here, it is its presuppositions that are of greatest interest. That is, by the end of June 2011 the experiment of the encampments was reaching a moment of expansion of its ideas and of further development of its propositions, this being predicated on the fact that the protests of the Indignados were not merely an enterprise of denouncing, but rather a project of building solutions. As a banner placed by the protestors in Puerta del Sol characteristically read:

Here we build, we don’t destroy (Appendix B, Picture 8).

While the anti-austerity protests were in progress in Spain, in Greece a rumour circulated on social media that the Spanish Indignados had raised a banner in Puerta del Sol reading ‘Shhh.. keep it quiet, we might wake up the Greeks’ (see Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos 2013; Sotirakopoulos and Ntalaka 2016). On account of this rumour, the motivational call was given also

⁵³ More analytically, for the list of commissions of Acampada Sol, see https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Lista_de_comisiones_de_Acampada_Sol; for the list of commissions of Acampada Barcelona, see https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Lista_de_comisiones_de_Acampada_Barcelona; for the list of working groups, see https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Lista_de_grupos_de_trabajo; Information can also be found at the blog of Acampada Barcelona at: <https://acampadabcn.wordpress.com/2011/05/17/ens-repar-tim-la-feina/> and <https://acampadabcn.wordpress.com/2011/05/19/acta-18-de-maig/>

⁵⁴ https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Acampada_Sol#Historia

in Greece and in late May 2011 a facebook page was created named ‘Aganaktismenoi at Syntagma’⁵⁵ urging people to take the streets in a protest against the deteriorating socioeconomic situation of the country. Similarly to the Spanish case, the call had great resonance with the larger population and on 25 May it brought to the streets more than sixty thousand people in Athens and more than thirty thousand in Thessaloniki (Eleftherotypia 2011). The tone of what soon developed into the largest, most heterogeneous and nonpartisan protests in the recent post-transition history of the country was set by a banner spread in front of the Parliament, at Syntagma Square in Athens, reading in Spanish (thus making a reference to the alleged banner of the Spanish Indignados): ‘We are awake! What time is it? It’s time for them to leave!’ (Appendix B, Picture 15), referring to ‘those who brought us at this situation..: ‘Governments, Troika, Banks, Memoranda, and all those who exploit us’ (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Decree 26 May 2011; emphasis added). The success of the protests of the first day, in terms of participation numbers and spirit, led to a similar gathering the next day. In this process the Spanish Indignados were indeed an inspiration for the Greek protestors:

The Spanish gave us the idea and the trigger. Let’s coordinate with the rest, the heavily indebted South, let’s mobilize. The Spanish showed us the way (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the General Assembly 25 May 2011).

Soon after, encampments similar to the Spanish acampadas were set up in the central squares of various cities around Greece. In Athens an encampment was set up in one of the most historical squares of the country, Syntagma Square, and in Thessaloniki an encampment was set up around Lefkos Pyrgos at the centre of the city. The two Greek acampadas of Athens and Thessaloniki functioned in a similar fashion to those of Spain, essentially establishing a modern agora in the centre of the two biggest cities of the

⁵⁵ The relevant page on facebook was ‘Aganatkismenoi sto Syntagma’ [Aganaktismenoi at Syntagma], but the account has been closed and the page is not longer available.

country, in which the people were coming together not only to denounce a problematic situation, but also to specify their demands, propose solutions and develop alternatives:

We are here because we know that the *solutions to our problems can come only from us... There in the squares we will shape together all our requests and our demands* (Facebook page, Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Information).

Following on the steps of the Spanish Indignados, the Greek encampments became similarly organized through thematic groups working on a series of issues relevant to the economy and politics, such as unemployment, education and health, as well as working groups relevant to the organization of the encampments in particular, covering issues from cleaning, security and overnight stay, to issues of internet and press coverage, legal issues, translations etc (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos 2011).⁵⁶ In all instances, however, the premise was common —i.e. in the processes of working out solutions against the exclusion of the people from social and political organization, inclusiveness should be the most critical aspect of the prognosis and it was sought for on every possible level:

There were working groups for communication, for people with disabilities —we wanted to take care of that too, *because it's a big problem and we wanted everybody to be able to participate*— for cleaning, for propagation, there were so many groups, I can't even remember all of them now.. (Ilias).

The experiment of the Greek encampments in creating new ways of coming together, was to reach a milestone well into the summer of 2011. June of 2011 in Greece was a month of intense discussions for the enactment of the

⁵⁶ See, Working groups and thematic groups, 29. 05. 2011 http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.de/2011/05/blog-post_7962.html; Working groups - debate groups, 19. 07. 2011 http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.gr/2011/07/blog-post_6141.html

Midterm Fiscal Strategy Framework 2012-2015.⁵⁷ In view of the vote on this on 29 June, the protests that had been in progress since late May intensified and, next to the containment of austerity measures, they set as their declared goal to stop the vote on the bill in the parliament. Part of the strategic intensification of this struggle was a 48hour general strike (28-29 June), announced by the highest-level labour unions of the country GSEE and ADEDY, which practically paralysed the country, as it secured the participation of secondary trade unions and associations of critical sectors (associations of all different means of public transportation, air traffic controllers etc).⁵⁸ The state's response to this intensification was a crackdown of exceptional violence on the encampment of Syntagma Square, which started on the 28th and continued until late at night on the 29th June. On the one hand the violent clashes, which caught the protestors unprepared and left behind hundreds of injured, and on the other hand the fact that the midterm agreement was finally approved by the parliament that day, made a dramatic combination that counted as a significant blow to the morale of the protests. Yet, the response of the protestors was immediate and firm: categorical in regards to the attempted evacuation of Syntagma, straightforward about the protests' diagnosis, and assertive about their plan. The Greek Aganaktismenoi were struggling for the *regeneration of democracy*; their prognosis was being worked out in the occupied squares and they were determined to go ahead with it:

We denounce the organized plan of evacuation of Syntagma Square by the government, which has been set in motion the past two days. Today the orgy of violence and repression reached its peak with unjustified and unprovoked assaults... injuring more than 500 protestors. [...] We hold the government accountable for today's barbaric attack in the centre of

⁵⁷ For a succinct overview of the development of fiscal agreements and austerity policies since the country resorted to the 'Troika' of the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), see Dinas, E., Rori, L. (2013), 'The 2012 Greek Parliamentary Elections: Fear and Loathing in the Polls', in *West European Politics*, 36(1): 270-82.

⁵⁸ see, <http://www.apergia.gr/index.php/calendar2/all.html?start=400>

Athens, an example of the “*steel democracy*” of the memorandum, the midterm fiscal strategy and the troika. We hold it solely responsible for what happens from now on during the night [...]

For our lives however it is us that are responsible! Us, the thousands of people, who are still in the streets, who are still resisting, *who continue our struggle. Us who have not left anyone to destroy the real democracy and freedom we are regenerating daily, for 36 days now in all the squares of the country* (Media Centre of the Syntagma assembly, 29.06.2011).

The protests of the Aganaktismenoi, similarly to those of the Indignados, lasted only a few months and the encampments were eventually dismantled, not to be set up again, thus leading some to speak about a movement which disappeared ‘as strangely as it started’ (Mandravelis 2012). The scholarly literature has examined the square occupations of 2011 from similar perspectives, at times detecting a certain infatuation with the tactic of square occupations, which at times is suggested to have led to the ‘reification’ of the encampments as such (Smith and Glidden 2012: 288). However, approaching the experience of the squares from the perspective of a ‘politics of space’, the story is indeed rather different. Lefebvre provides us with the basic premise of this perspective:

Could space be nothing more than the passive locus of social relations, the milieu in which their combination takes on body, or the aggregate of the procedures employed in their removal? The answer must be no (Lefebvre 1991[1974]: 11).

From this perspective, which highlights a direct link between social space and social relations, the encampments of 2011 can be indeed read as instances of a radical ‘production of space’. In other words, they can be understood as instances of critical intervention, transformation and, ultimately, creation of *new social relations* (Dhaliwal 2012). Along these lines, the end of the

encampments, in Greece, as much as in Spain or the rest of the world, has represented, rather than the end of a physically confined indignation, a moment of expansion of *new ways of relating in the social space*. As Graeber's (2013) famous aphorism goes, 'You can't evict an idea whose time has come', and the Greek Aganaktismenoi, like the Spanish Indignados, proved the point as they 'disassembled' to spread everywhere the seeds of their idea and the social relations it signified.

The connection between social space and social relations, as the politics of space tells us, is mutually reinforcing so that the one cannot be considered separately from the other. It is suggested, therefore, that 'when we evoke "space", we must immediately indicate what occupies that space and how it does so: the deployment of energy in relation to "points" and within a time frame' (Lefebvre 1991[1974]: 12). The Spanish and the Greek protests of 2011 developed in already structured 'spaces' of social relations, configured in reference to the contemporary paradigm of social, economic, and political organization: that is, 'spaces' of neoliberal capitalism with their specific model of organization being democratic representation. The concept that can appropriately describe the relations which occupy this 'space' is the concept of hegemony, in the Gramscian use of the word, as the type of cultural domination 'which the dominant group exercises throughout society' (Gramsci 1971: 12). In other words, the 'space' within and against which the protests of 2011 grew is a 'space' of *hegemonic relations*. The contribution of the global wave of anti-austerity protests, then, -reading the protests by means of using the framework of 'politics of space'- has been to set in motion the reconfiguration of these relations in reference to an alternative paradigm of social organization. In the Spanish and the Greek protests examined in this research, this 'new' model is announced in their generic demand for real/direct democracy and is evidenced in the practices they employed in the square encampments. These are practices drawing on the tradition of participatory and deliberative democracy (see also Dhaliwal 2012) as it was earlier examined

in detail. In what follows I turn to examine closer the specifications of the prognostic frames of the protests, by examining these practices.

Prognostic framing in the squares: new social relations in progress

The Spanish Indignados and the Greek Aganaktismenoi count as characteristic examples of mass and highly heterogeneous protests assuming horizontality as their logic of organization, and deliberation as their specific organizational value. In fact, they count as two of the most recent examples to essentially advance the cause of changing social relations and of embedding inclusive and participatory structures of deliberative decision-making. First, they put exceptional emphasis on the value of deliberation, when they are compared to previous instances of collective action oriented towards the dissolution of authority relations. Second, they ‘innovated’ on the ways in which horizontality is practised, when they are compared to the peer mobilizations of the GJM that had first reintroduced the spirit of horizontality in the 21st century. The GJM, as an instance of social contestation with exceptionally high participation rates, was a movement clearly set apart from previous instances of similar mass mobilizations⁵⁹, among other reasons for the fact that it set to work out one of the biggest concerns of the New Social Movements of the 1960s and the 1970s. That is, it set in motion processes of re-configuration of the basic organizational proposition that social antagonism inevitably passes through hierarchical structures.⁶⁰ It is largely in this sense that the conception of horizontality, traditionally figuring as organization principle of anarchist movements in particular, made a radical comeback through the GJM (see Graeber 2002; Sitrin 2015; Flesher Fominaya 2007;

⁵⁹ See for example the Civil Rights Movement demanding freedom and using tactics of direct action, when during the March on Washington alone an estimated 250.000 people participated, see Hansen, D. D. (2003). *The Dream: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Speech that Inspired a Nation*. New York: Harper Collins, p. 177.

⁶⁰ In regards to the ‘battle’ between hierarchical structures and horizontal ways of organizing in the New Social Movements of the ‘60s, see Polletta, F. (2006). *It was like a fever. Storytelling in protest and politics*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

2014a). Along similar lines, the recent global wave of anti-austerity protests - and in particular the Spanish Indignados and the Greek Aganaktismenoi that are examined here- effected further innovations on the way horizontality was received at the beginning of the 21st century, by means of proposing a radical reconceptualization of the basic organizational proposition of leadership. Raimundo Viejo Viñas has provided one of the most accurate descriptions of that process:

The antiglobalization movement was the first step on the road. Back then our model was to attack the system like a pack of wolves. There was an alpha male, a wolf who led the pack, and those who followed behind. Now the model has evolved. Today we are one big swarm of people (Viejo Viñas, quoted at Adbusters 2011).

If the GJM, then, was the first instance in recent history of collective action to set off processes of horizontality in the struggle against neoliberal capitalism in the 21st century, the Spanish Indignados and the Greek Aganaktismenoi can be understood as representing the instance at which collective action revisited horizontality in a more systematic fashion, in the direction of producing alternative sets of relations against the hegemonic narratives of domination in social and political organization.

Next to innovating on the ways in which horizontality is practised, the protests of the Spanish Indignados and the Greek Aganktismenoi advanced further also in respect to the organizational value of deliberation. More specifically, the radical dissolution of hierarchical forms of organizing and the transformation into a 'big swarm of people' came along with the dissolution of further hierarchies in administering *knowledge* and *ideological* resources, with immediate consequences for the way in which deliberation for decision-making was practised. On the one hand, horizontality in knowledge was expressed through the abolition of atypical hierarchies of knowledge and of the subsequent all too common divisions between knowledgeable committees and

the ignorant masses. The immediate result of this was that the deliberative processes of the assemblies set up in the square encampments were participated in on terms of equality of knowledge (Castañeda 2012; Glasius and Pleyers 2013). On the other hand, horizontality in ideology was expressed through the abolition of atypical hierarchies of ideology, commonly expressed in perceptions of greater or lesser sociopolitical radicality, and, by extension, a greater or lesser right to engagement in collective action for social change. This helped the embeddedness of vanguard-less deliberative processes in the squares' assemblies, which were expressed through aversion to strong ideological considerations, coming either from participants in their role as individuals or from individual representatives of political parties and trade unions (Leontidou 2012). Along these lines, the Spanish Indignados and the Greek Aganaktismenoi can be seen further as instances at which collective action revisited aspects of leadership in decision-making processes, helping produce relations freer of domination on the basis either of expertise or ideological radicality.

The Indignados

The most characteristic practice in the direction of effecting social change by means of shaping conditions of a participatory organization has been the embeddedness of the *popular assembly* as the heart and the mind of the Indignados' 'participatory prognosis':

Assembly as a means under construction in order to exercise a direct democracy that allows the horizontality of the processes.

Asamblearismo as a means of recuperation of spaces, as the creation of collective proposals and decision-making. As a means for its own development as power and source of responsible collaboration that promotes horizontality and seeks real unitary representation.

Asamblearismo as an engine of social and individual development (15MPedia, Asamblea).⁶¹

First, as a means to effect direct participatory processes, the assembly of the Spanish Indignados represented an *organizational body*. In the protests of 2011 the assembly was the critical organizational body of the acampadas of the 15M in general (e.g. general assembly of acampada Sol, general assembly of acampada Barcelona etc), as well as the main organizational body of the various working groups and commissions of each acampada in particular (e.g. assemblies of the working groups and commissions of acampada Sol, assemblies of the commissions of acampada Barcelona etc.). At the same time, however, apart from being the organizational body of the protests, the assembly was developed as a tool for the larger social organization at the level of the city. It was modeled on the classic administrative divisions commonly used (such as divisions into districts, localities, neighbourhoods etc), which helped to establish routes for expansion of the experiment of the Spanish acampadas into the local spaces of sociopolitical creation —in fact in a coordinated way that allowed the different assemblies to remain connected:

What types of assembly do we employ to date? Assemblies of working groups, assemblies of commissions, neighbourhood assemblies (each neighbourhood, town, localities) general assemblies based in acampadasol and general assemblies based in Madrid (acampadasol + neighbourhoods, towns and localities). These (general ones) are the ultimate deliberative instance, from which flows the final consensus in order to articulate the distinct lines of joint action of the 15M Movement of each city (TomaLaPlaza, #AcampadaSol 31.05.2011).⁶²

⁶¹ see <https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Asamblea>

⁶² <https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/05/31/guia-rapida-para-la-dinamizacion-de-asambleas-populares/>

In all instances, however, the formation of the assembly as a model of general organization was conceptualized as a *'free association'*:

The assembly is based on *free association*: if you do not agree with what has been decided you are not obliged to do it. Every person is free to do what they want (TomaLaPlaza, #AcampadaSol; added emphasis).⁶³

In this way the assembly guaranteed conditions in which dissent could be expressed and practised (by non participation in the implementation of the decisions made), while also helping 'necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities' to be developed (Pateman 1970: 42), as it was underpinned by individual commitment, rather than enforced participation in the processes of generating new ideas. At the same time, in all instances, the formation of the assembly was conceptualized as a process of *collective responsibility* for communicating and developing new ideas:

The assembly seeks to *generate collective intelligence, common lines of thought and action. Promotes dialogue*, let's get to know each other. (TomaLaPlaza, #AcampadaSol; added emphasis).⁶⁴

In this way the assembly served a double purpose. On the one hand, it allowed people to delineate individual responsibility against free riding in collective action: that is, it mitigated against individual members benefiting from the efforts of other members (see Olson 1971). On the other hand, it helped set barriers to the assumption of leadership by individual members, thus precluding what Pateman describes as the domination of 'the individual men' (1970: 23).

⁶³ <https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/05/31/guia-rapida-para-la-dinamizacion-de-asambleas-populares/>

⁶⁴ <https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/05/31/guia-rapida-para-la-dinamizacion-de-asambleas-populares/>

Second, as a means of recuperation of space —what the encyclopedia of the 15M refers to as *asamblearismo* (15MPedia, Asamblea)⁶⁵— the assembly of the Spanish Indignados represented an example of *direct action for reshaping social relations* in line with the principle of horizontality. There are two main critical aspects that show this reshaping as an act that negates the elements of heteronomy in social relations, and of domination in social organization. First, the assembly is conceptualized to function on terms of *inclusive and direct participation* of each individual member in the processes of management and decision-making, rather than representation through closed management boards, executive boards etc. Second, the assembly is conceptualized as an organ of decision-making that arrives at decisions through *deliberation that seeks consensus* and essentially allows the bringing together of the differing opinions that emerge, rather than through majoritarian decision-making based on voting, which often places differing opinions in confrontation:

What is a popular assembly? It is a *participatory decision-making body that seeks consensus*. It seeks the best arguments in order to make decisions more in line with the different opinions, not opposing positions, like it happens when you vote. (TomaLaPlaza, #AcampadaSol; added emphasis).⁶⁶

Altogether, the *asamblearismo* of the Spanish Indignados can be seen to represent an elaborate model of organization that accurately reflects the different aspects of participatory democracy, such as inclusiveness, directness, deliberation, and consensus:

Asamblearismo is a fully-democratic system of making decisions and reaching agreement. It is called direct or participatory democracy. The

⁶⁵ <https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Asamblea>

⁶⁶ <https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/05/31/guia-rapida-para-la-dinamizacion-de-asambleas-populares/>

15M has organized through this horizontal system which gives voice and space to all people and ideas. (15MPedia, Asamblearismo).⁶⁷

Yet, asamblearismo, as a model of broader social organization at the level of the city, constitutes a complex scheme with certain difficulties in its application:

It is not easy to implement it because it is *very slow and it has very little dynamism* (15MPedia, Asamblearismo; added emphasis).⁶⁸

There are two main reasons identified here. First, asamblearismo has a holistic character in the sense that it assumes different parts (specifically, the different local assemblies) to be intimately connected and essentially made intelligible by reference to the city's General Popular Assembly (see Figure 1). The process by which this is achieved -in a way that guarantees the close connection of the local assemblies to the General Popular Assembly, but also allows them to retain their autonomy - involves a series of assembly meetings at the local level and assembly sessions at the city level. These guarantee the circulation of information, the qualification of the proposals, and the solving of doubts and/or practical problems, but effectively slow down the process of decision-making. Further, as a model of organization in terms of inclusiveness and directness, it assumes as its immediate constituency a highly heterogeneous population with varying degrees of familiarity with (and by extension commitment to) such processes. In this sense, as well as a complex and slow model of organization, it is also a model that requires continuous reinvigoration.

⁶⁷ <https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Asamblearismo>

⁶⁸ <https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Asamblearismo>




Figure 1: Methodology to agree on concrete actions, of global character in the name of Popular Assembly of Madrid. Source: Toma los barrios, Asamblea Popular de Madrid. Accessible online at: <http://madrid.tomalosbarrios.net/metodologia-asamblearia/>

The Spanish Indignados established structures in charge of disseminating information in order to facilitate the organizational tasks of the various assemblies -such as the Commission for the Dissemination of Proposals for Assembly Structures and Decision Making of Acampada Sol, in Madrid-, as well as Commissions of Assemblies' Facilitation (Comisiones de Dinamización de Asambleas) whose responsibility was to 'facilitate the assemblies of the squares and the neighbourhoods throughout the country' (see 15MPedia, Asamblearismo).⁶⁹ Nevertheless, in all instances, abiding by the principle of horizontality and negating domination and heteronomy in the creative generation of new ideas, the commissions of facilitation, rather than assuming

⁶⁹ <https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Asamblearismo>

leadership in the organization of assemblies, functioned only to provide working models, calling instead those interested to assume collectively the responsibility of setting up assemblies in their spaces of interaction and to implement the assembly method:

Also to clarify in this document that the acampada Sol, in spite of the great symbolism that is attributed to it, represents and decides freely and independently about the acampada Sol, that it does not pretend to represent anybody else, and that it encourages all those who wish to decide about their workplaces, neighbourhoods, municipalities or buildings, to organize in an assembly and to decide themselves about their lives. The most we can do from here is to offer a working model built on practice, and to affirm that it has been operative in assemblies of between 20 and 3000 participants (Comisión de Dinamización de Asambleas de Acampada Sol, sin fecha conocida).⁷⁰

The assemblies of the complex organizational scheme of the 15M were essentially developed to reflect the specific (local, but not only local) concerns of their members, thus assuming as a prerequisite direct participation in the processes of communicating ideas and proposals, and ultimately in the processes of generating solutions for the identified problems. In other words, the *asamblearismo* of the Spanish Indignados was shaped on the premise that the people are to delineate their immediate social environment themselves and to be themselves responsible for managing it, through identifying problems and finding solutions. In short, they were predicated on the *autonomous premise of self-institution and self-management of social structures*. An important aspect of *asamblearismo* as a model of organization in this respect was the prefigurative consistency between means and ends. Indeed, if self-institution and self-management are to be considered the ends of the

⁷⁰ The document is uploaded online by the working groups and is accessible at: <https://www.scribd.-com/document/56322883/Dinamizacion-de-las-Asambleas>

transformative experiment of the Spanish Indignados, the means to these ends were in fact carefully chosen and systematically developed.

Despite the relative autonomy of the various assemblies, the basic operative principles of decision-making processes were commonly shared. Indicative examples are the development of techniques that would allow the highest inclusion possible in the processes of decision-making (e.g. through the continuous development of signs of communication), and the development of specific provisions for cases of adhesion and intense dissent, or even for the case of emergencies, in order to arrive at decisions in the least arbitrary way possible:

Adhesion and dissent: if the dissent is greater than 20 people, a working group is formed by these people on this dissent. If it does not reach this number, it will be approved by unanimous consensus.

Emergency decisions: when a commission proposes a decision necessary for the smooth progressing of the movement, the security of the encampment etc, it will open a protocol of decision that will make it possible to take a decision that very day. There will be a round of evaluations and nuances, but it will be taken by a visible majority of two thirds of the assembly (TomaLaPlaza, #AcampadaSol).⁷¹

Another characteristic is the special emphasis put on the use of positive and inclusive language that guarantees constructive dialogue, advances the debate, and can warranty a spirit of inclusiveness:

We will employ ‘positive language’, avoiding negative statements that close the possibility to continue debating constructively. It is a form of communication less aggressive and more conciliatory. It is convenient to debate starting from the points that unite before supporting the intervention of points that differentiate. Examples: 1.- ‘Do not touch this

⁷¹ see <https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/06/05/dinamizacion-de-asambleaspropuestas-de-incorporacion-metodologicas-para-la-asamblea-general/>

dog or it will bite you’ can be expressed as ‘Pay attention to this dog because it could bite you, and none of us wants this’. 2.- ‘If we don’t arrive at consensus on this point, everything will get wasted’ can be expressed as ‘It is important to arrive at consensus on this point or we could lose strength as a group and this is not in the interest of anybody’.

We will employ an ‘inclusive language’ that does not make gender differences. It is clear that customs play tricks but it is convenient that among all (people) we help each other in remembering this aspect (TomaLaPlaza, #AcampadaSol).⁷²

Altogether, the techniques covered in the guidelines of the Spanish Indignados for promoting popular assemblies are referencing the basic principles of deliberative theory, such as decision-making based on reasoning, on argumentation, on the respectful consideration of opinions, on the collective shaping of ideas, and ultimately through consensus. In this direction, special emphasis is put on providing detailed clarifications about consensus, by means of providing comprehensive descriptions:

What is a consensus? It is the form of the final decision of the assemblies on each concrete proposal that is shared. The proposal can be presented by a commission, by a working group or by an individual person. The consensus is reached when the assembly DOES NOT have any position strongly against the presented proposal. Every proposal should meet this formula: 1. - What is proposed? / 2. What is it proposed for? / 3. How would this proposal be developed if it would reach consensus?. In sum: What?/ What for?/ How? (TomaLaPlaza, #AcampadaSol; original emphasis).⁷³

⁷² <https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/05/31/guia-rapida-para-la-dinamizacion-de-asambleas-populares/>

⁷³ <https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/05/31/guia-rapida-para-la-dinamizacion-de-asambleas-populares/>

Or emphasis is put on setting clear terms in which dissent is expressed, and on shaping conditions that allow the individual participants to yield to competing arguments and consensus to be ultimately reached:

The person who expressed dissent expresses it with a what, a why, a for what and a how. They submit it to the assembly. After taking turns to speak space should be opened to facilitate consensus, to ‘give in’ (TomaLaPlaza, #AcampadaSol).⁷⁴

Further even, there is careful consideration of affective aspects of verbal communication that could compromise the cause of consensus:

It is important to keep gestural calm in order not to transmit to the assembly personal feelings or affections, to be always reminded of the value of a smile at moments of tension or blockage. Hurry and fatigue are the enemies of consensus (TomaLaPlaza, #AcampadaSol).⁷⁵

The firm attachment to horizontality, through the adoption and extensive use of *asamblearismo*, and the strong emphasis on making provisions for different issues in deliberative processes and on the reaching of consensus, finally completes the picture of the Spanish Indignados’ dedication to effecting social change by working out new types of social relations: consistent with participatory and deliberative theory, as examined earlier, and thus the autonomous promise for the ‘*permanent and explicit self-institution of society*’ (Castoriadis 1997: 30; original emphasis).

The Aganaktismenoi

The embeddedness of the popular assembly as the core of the ‘participatory prognosis’ of the protests of 2011, similarly to the Indignados, constitutes a defining characteristic of the Aganaktismenoi as well. In this

⁷⁴ <https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/06/05/dinamizacion-de-asambleaspropuestas-de-incorporacion-metodologicas-para-la-asamblea-general/>

⁷⁵ <https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/05/31/guia-rapida-para-la-dinamizacion-de-asambleas-populares/>

direction, the assembly of the Aganaktismenoi is seen to have represented a call for taking back responsibility for ‘our lives’:

...we flooded Syntagma and its *popular assembly as a call to take back our lives in our own hands*, as an invitation to freedom, equality, justice, dignity and solidarity (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Consensual Decree of the Popular Assembly of Syntagma Square for Dimitris Christoulas 8 April 2012).

In a Panhellenic meeting for the assessment of the protests that took place in Athens, the Aganaktismenoi of Greece asserted that the encampments in public squares around the country essentially represented the most critical instance of a radical reclaiming of history on behalf of the people:

For 40 days now we are on the streets and the squares and we are writing one of the brighter pages of the history of our country! (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Panhellenic account and planning of next steps 9-10 July 2011).

Functioning to serve this purpose, the assemblies of the Aganaktismenoi have represented an organizational body which brought together a series of working groups and thematic groups responsible for coordinating the various activities of the protestors. Among these groups are recorded working groups on ‘cleaning, [encampment’s] safeguarding, construction and heavy equipment, internet (press/digital photographs/electronic infrastructure), translations, organization of discussions, playgrounds, legal and economic issues, supply and inventory, artistic production, secretarial issues’ (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, 29 May 2011), as well as thematic groups focusing on ‘unemployment and limited contracts, health, education, general proposals, people with disabilities’ (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, 29 May 2011). Further to this, similar to the case of the Indignados, the assemblies of the Aganaktismenoi were predicated on a set of principles summarized in the triptych:

Mode of decision-making, personal responsibility, volunteering (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 28 May 2011).

In particular, it was agreed that ‘each assembly is successive to the other’ (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 28 May 2011), with the purpose of embedding a sense of continuity in the assembly process in terms of the themes discussed, the decisions made and the actions undertaken (such as demonstrations, strikes, cultural activities, or antifascist actions for example). Further to this, in all instances it is suggested that the basic assembly principle was the abolition of hierarchies of knowledge, while deliberation is suggested to have been behind all processes of decision-making:

We don’t need experts among us... we decide always through deliberation (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 28 May 2011).

Further to this, in all instances the Aganaktismenoi appear to have consistently asserted that it is not the encampments as such that are to be extolled, rather it is the act of coming together and of forging new sets of relations that represents the most critical aspect of the mobilizations:

The tents are not a fetish, *the assembly is everything* (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Peoples’ Assembly 11 July 2011).

Accordingly, and with the purpose of embedding the message that the general assembly goes further than the physical harvesting of indignation, the protestors called for the firm embedding of the conceptions of ‘volatility’ and ‘liquidity’ in the organizational structures of the Aganaktismenoi, by creating flexible structures —‘to create a mobile popular assembly’ (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Peoples’ Assembly 11 July 2011)—, that would use

Syntagma as the operation centre for coordination: ‘to make Syntagma the assembly of assemblies’ (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Peoples’ Assembly 11 July 2011). Thus the assemblies of the Aganaktismenoi appear to have a symbolic value that is detected in issues that go beyond the physical manifestation of square encampments and their impressive impromptu organization through working groups and thematic commissions:

It is beautiful what we are doing here, and dangerous because it reminds us of Democracy (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 28 May 2011).

And it is finally in this direction that the Aganaktismenoi of Syntagma declared in late June 2011 that the mass and persistent presence of the people in the streets essentially denoted that there are no barriers to the democratic restructuring of society at large:

For over a month now we are proving that *there are no dead-ends*, that *we have the power to mark a new path for society*. Now is the time to make the next big step’ (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Decree of the People’s Assembly of Syntagma Square for the Mid-term Agreement, 22 June 2011).

In the accounts of the individual participants of the protests we find the new social relationships forged specified as relationships of an incipient liberation from relations of domination:

Whether I call it fair distribution of power, or abolition of domination as it is, or abolition of exploitation of one human by another, in essence I’m describing the same thing with different words —depending on what tradition one comes from.

What’s looked for is the autonomy of the people. That is, to create their laws on their own, for themselves —they themselves, for themselves—, and to make themselves the decisions that concern them (Petros)

Accordingly, the vast majority of the individual participants of the Aganaktismenoi that have been interviewed for this research suggest that the defining characteristic of the protests has been the processes of getting to learn alternative ways of relating, which essentially render obsolete the familiar patterns of power relations:

My intention should be neither to dominate, nor to be dominated by someone else of course. It is extremely important for someone to have this clear at the back of their mind, and therefore to be a conscious state of mind and not just a statement (Natalia).

A key feature in these processes is suggested to have been the ‘ideal of self-organization’, as a matter of overcoming the shortcomings of the contemporary crisis of the political, but also as a matter of overcoming the heteronomy of modern democracies broadly speaking, and the hollowing effect of representational forms of democratic organization that establish hierarchies and effect exclusions:

We stand for the ideal of self-organization, not only as a means to an end but also as a worldview, and we try to promote it in every possible way. In such a struggle we stand in solidarity, and we tried to promote the logic of self-organization. That is, the non-delegation to and non-representation from -especially from- hierarchical institutions.

We believe that only with such foundations it is possible to move on to a progressive situation in any social field (Petros)

By contrast to the Indignados, the Aganaktismenoi do not offer detailed accounts of the specific functioning of the square encampments, while the facebook pages and the designated websites of the movement have been shut down and very little material is saved from the popular assemblies of the biggest encampments of Athens and Thessaloniki, which could have registered

the rather specific ways in which the encampments actually functioned. It is, however, through the accounts of individual participants that we get information about the ways in which the Greek acampadas and the popular assemblies functioned to embed new sets of relations. In these accounts, it is mainly the idea of direct participation in political decision-making that is emphasized, but as a matter of direct involvement in a whole set of processes, from decision-making to the implementation of the decisions reached:

Because direct democracy is not only democracy, it is also direct. Direct means also direct involvement in action, in implementation (Alikí)

The feature of collective action most characteristically underscored in these narratives is the feature of ‘direct-action’, as a matter of direct intervention and commitment to ‘undermine the discursive frameworks that manufacture consent and legitimate authority’ (Buechler 2000: 207). The experiment of the square encampments is understood to have worked along these lines, as an experiment in confronting collective ‘fears’ about undertaking direct action, and if not overcoming them at least helping to take the skeleton out of the closet:

There is a widespread fear, which we didn’t manage to confront. But as humans in general we suffer from fears. Fears that we are not capable of managing the consequences of our actions, so we prefer not to even act. But people saw and understood that the stake now is this: How we won’t succumb to intimidation. Because all this is an attempt to intimidate society. To keep silent, to quit, not to do anything (Alikí)

In this direction, the individual participants interviewed for this research often noted that ‘commitment’ to direct participation has been one of the greatest stakes of the Aganaktismenoi: that is, the stake to put forward an altered mindset which can re-approach the idea of political participation as a ‘virtue’:

This indicates a person who may not have been part of a political party or the anarchist scene or the movements of the Left, but shows tremendous maturity in decision-making. A political virtue, so to say (Petros)

At the same time, however, it is suggested that ‘commitment’ to direct participation has been also understood as a basic organizational feature of collective action. In fact, individual participants often suggested that this is how ‘commitment’ in collective action needs to be actually treated: that is, ‘commitment’ as an integral part of the organizational structures built around the constant comings and goings of the broader struggle for social change, thus securing consistency and effectiveness against what often appears to be only a tactic of ‘activist tourism’. A participant of the Aganaktismenoi of Syntagma, at the same time participant of the ongoing struggle against the privatization of the water company of Athens, proposes that such a logic essentially saves the broader struggle for democratic change —by means of effectively saving the concrete instances of localized and quotidian contestation— from what the relevant literature refers to as ‘free riding’ (see also Olson 1971), and further gives a sense of efficacy to the participants of collective action who *decide* and *do* at the same time:

At some point, one of the participants introduced a word for all this, which is do-ocracy, and it means that the one who does things is the one who decides.

In my opinion, this throws out all these ‘activist tourists’, who spend their time like this, going to various assemblies, because it’s a lifestyle that they enjoy (Leyteris)

The conclusions of the individual participants about the success of the Aganaktismenoi in embedding such an altered understanding of political participation, as a matter of direct involvement in decision-making and decision implementation, past ‘activist tourism’ or fears of failure and tactics of intimidation that foster stagnation, appear to move in more or less the same

direction. That is, the direction of delineating the Aganaktismenoi as an experiment in embedding a new set of social relations along the lines of participation and commitment to direct involvement —although this experiment is often assessed as having been defeated by habitual attachment to forms of delegative organization:

The spirit of direct democracy was defeated and the only thing left was delegation. But they [the squares] did not give birth to delegation by any means. They did not even reproduce delegation. They just didn't manage to overcome it (Petros)

It has been often suggested by the individual participants of the Aganaktismenoi of Athens and Thessaloniki alike that, while in the encampments we can see new ways of relating through horizontal, leaderless and deliberative forms of sociopolitical organization, the squares of 2011 in Greece can be actually better understood as a 'preparatory lesson' in new relations (and more specifically in relations of direct democracy), rather than as an instance of an actual direct democratic organization:

It was a form of inspiration about what will come. A lesson about how we could function in a future society, but not in the given society now (Eleni)

This is further confirmed in the discursive formulations of the squares, where often the experience of the Aganaktismenoi was compared to the first step in a rather long process of embedding alternative forms of sociopolitical organization:

Even a trip of 1000km starts with one step. This is what we have done here (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 28 May 2011).

Thus, despite what the individual participants of the Aganaktismenoi register as a defeat of the spirit of direct democracy on account of an overwhelming attachment to delegation, it is the persistent devotion to the

principle of horizontality, as a process of radical transformation of social relations, that confirms the commitment of the protestors to effecting radical social change. If we can understand direct action as a mode of horizontally oriented collective action, its specific method is the method of *trial and error* (see Ward 1996), representing a process of ‘experimental investigation to work out the answer’ (Cadogan 1962: 68). In this context it is not merely success but, most importantly, failure that pushes organizational practices forward in the direction of creating inclusive, participatory and horizontal structures. Accordingly, the Aganaktismenoi can be understood as having indeed functioned to embed the habit of being ‘prepared to live responsibly in a free society’ (Wieck 1962: 96), by means of working out new types of social relations. In this sense, despite these new types of relations being often understood as not having been wholly implemented, the Aganaktismenoi, similar to the Indignados, appear to remain consistent with the precepts of participatory and deliberative theory, as examined earlier, and thus the autonomous promise for the ‘*permanent and explicit self-institution of society*’ (Castoriadis 1997: 30; original emphasis).

Conclusions

The analysis of this chapter focused on the prognostic framings of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados, in an attempt to provide some answers to the question as to what the protests’ demand for real/direct democracy practically implies. The literature on social movement studies, and in particular on frame analysis, suggests that prognostic framings of collective action essentially follow, in fact closely, diagnostic framings, as a reversal of the problems identified in them (Gerhards and Rucht 1992). In this direction, and following the thesis of the correspondence of diagnostic and prognostic frames (see also Snow and Benford 1988; Nepstad 1997), this chapter explored the hypothesis of two different prognostic framings in the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados, as following closely their diagnostic frames, which were

discerned in the previous chapter. On the one hand there was the prognosis of emending democratic representation through the ousting of corrupt politicians and the imposition of strict control over the privileges of the political class (responding to the restricted diagnostic frame of failure of the democratic promise on account of failed political incumbents). On the other hand there was the prognosis of radically changing the system of democratic representation by replacing it with a system of participatory and deliberative sociopolitical organization (responding to the restricted diagnostic frame of failure of the democratic promise on account of the failed representational system). These prognostic frames were briefly explored in regards to their theoretical premises at the beginning of the chapter: the first one with the help of the theory of system analysis, and in particular issues in political support, political engagement and civic culture. The second one was explored with the help of the theory of autonomy, referencing basic issues of participatory theory and of the theory of deliberative democracy, such as horizontality and deliberation.

Prognostic framings, however, rather than generic propositions about what needs to be done, further identify ‘strategies, tactics, and targets’ in order to address the problematic situation (Snow and Benford 1988: 201). Alongside general proposals for alternative courses of action, therefore, prognostic frames further specify what these courses of action consist in. Answering, thus, the basic question of collection action -what is to be done?- movements develop strategies and specific plans of action (i.e. specifications of prognostic frames). Examining, then, the prognostic framings of the *Aganaktismenoi* and the *Indignados*, with the aim to provide some answers to the question as to what the protests’ demand for real/direct democracy practically implies, this chapter put emphasis on singling out the protests’ strategies, tactics and specific plans of actions. Unfolding in this direction, the empirical analysis of this chapter found a strong commitment by the *Aganaktismenoi* and the *Indignados* to actually one prognosis: commitment to the principles of

horizontality and deliberation and to the actual practice of horizontal and deliberative forms of organization, as an alternative to the hierarchical, representational form of modern democracies.

More specifically, the necessary specifications about where to examine empirically the prognostic frames of the mobilizations of 2011 led to a closer inspection of the specific tactic of encampment in the public squares (Dhaliwal 2012; Maeckelbergh 2012). The square encampments have constituted a defining feature of the global wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations (see Flesher Fominaya 2014a), and accordingly they have been a defining feature also of the Greek and the Spanish mobilizations of 2011 examined in this research. In this direction, by focusing on the tactic of square encampments, as a key to locating the space where the prognostic framings of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados were developed, a set of issues were identified about the role of the encampments. These issues have to do with the role that the encampments had in ‘physically harvesting’ the dispersed indignation (Gerbaudo 2012), the role they had in pulling the demand for real/direct democracy out of invisibility (Douzinas 2011a; 2011b), but most importantly their symbolic role in effectively ‘subverting the social relations of acting in the space’ (Kallianos 2013: 549). From the perspective of a radical theory of the politics of space (Lefebvre 1991[1974]) then, the square encampments were examined in symbolic terms as constituting the feature of greatest importance, in order to systematically explore the prognostic framings of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados. It is in this direction that the square encampments were found to actually constitute the ‘spaces’ of prognostic framing of the Greek and the Spanish protests of 2011, and their prognosis was found to be the continuous experimentation of the protestors in the ‘social space’ —i.e. experimentation with *new ways of relating*.

The Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados proposed solutions to what they identified as problems of exclusion, silencing of the people and sidelining of popular demands, by means of actually *practising* the change they wanted to

see. More specifically, the empirical examination of this chapter found that the prognosis of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados is summarized as a continuous process of reshaping social relations and political reasoning, through experimentation with horizontal and deliberative structures of organization. This practising of new forms of political engagement took place in the square encampments through the embeddedness of popular assemblies, as the main organizational body of the dispersed protestors, the basic organizational values of which were those of horizontal organization, direct participation and deliberative decision-making based on consensus. In this direction, the square encampments were revealed as open ‘spaces’ of a *continuous* experimentation with and engagement in creative processes of generating, developing and communicating new ideas. Although there are proposals for more specific solutions, especially in the case of the Indignados, which mainly have to do with the elimination of the privileges of the political class, in overall terms, both the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados appear to have advanced their prognostic framing prefiguratively -i.e. *in practice*- rather than in fixed solutions clearly registered in documents and decrees.

In sum, although two prognostic frames were expected to follow the two restricted diagnostic frames of the mobilizations, and although both were found to be indeed plausible, the empirical analysis revealed only one prognostic frame as holding a central place in both the Greek and the Spanish movement: that is, the prognosis of experimenting with new ways of relating in order to effectively replace extant forms of sociopolitical organization. This finding appears to contradict the thesis of diagnostic-prognostic frames’ correspondence, and in the cases of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados more specifically, to disprove the concomitant expectation of two prognostic frames corresponding to their two diagnoses: a) the diagnosis of failure of the democratic promise on account of failed political incumbents, followed by the prognosis of emending democratic representation, through the ousting of corrupt politicians and the imposition of strict control of the privileges of the

political class and b) the diagnosis of failure of the democratic promise on account of the failed representational system, followed by the prognosis of radically changing this system and the social relations it implies and replacing it with a system of participatory and deliberative sociopolitical organization: that is, a system where relations of freedom, equality, directness in participation, openness to yield to competing arguments and consensual decision-making can flourish. I propose that the reason for the initial appearance of two prognostic frames is the exceptional heterogeneity of the anti-austerity and the pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011 and, accordingly, the reason for the eventual mismatch between diagnoses and prognosis (i.e. two diagnostic frames and one prevalent prognostic frame) has to do with the skewed dynamics that characterized the heterogeneous constituency of these mobilizations.

The Greek and the Spanish protests of 2011 were both instances of large-scale and heterogeneous mobilizations for which elaborated master frames, representing open and flexible systems of interpretation, appear to have greater functionality (Snow and Benford 1992). Of course this does not preclude actually finding restricted master frames in their discourse —even if these imply more closed and ‘exclusive ideational systems’ (Snow and Benford 1992: 139-40). The finding of two restricted diagnostic frames in the examination of the previous chapter confirms the point. However, while diagnostic frames (being of a more abstract and rhetorical character) allow ambivalence or divisions to be expressed through the production of different restricted framings, prognostic frames (by virtue of their more applied, so to put it, or else practice-oriented character) demand higher levels of consistency in regards to the proposed solutions, which can prove difficult to achieve in highly heterogeneous movements if there is not one prognosis that prevails or if the movement does not disband. Given the prolonged presence of the heterogeneous constituencies of the *Aganaktismenoi* and the *Indignados* in the squares of Greece and Spain, therefore inferring that indeed it took them long

to disband (and also factoring in that actually the Aganaktismenoi in particular did not disband: rather they were evicted after the police forces' crackdown on the acampadas), what remains to be explained is what is the basis on which the prevalent prognosis (i.e. the prognosis of experimenting with new ways of relating) actually gained ascendancy. In other words, it remains to be shown why the second and not the first prognostic frame prevailed (i.e. that of emending democratic representation by means of structural reforms to make politicians more accountable to the people).

In the case of highly heterogeneous movements, such as the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados, where more than one restricted diagnostic frames can be detected, the eventual prevalence of one prognostic frame can be explained by taking into account the skewed dynamics that possibly characterize the heterogeneous constituency of the movement. These dynamics may have to do with an array of factors, such as the leverage (in organizational and/or ideological terms) of the movement organizations represented, the strength of ideational interpretations they involve, the relevance of these ideational interpretations to the problematic situation or their resonance with the general society among others. In all instances, however, to render such dynamics intelligible requires a closer examination of the 'social subject' of the movement. In order then to shed light on the possibly skewed dynamics of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados and determine the basis on which one prognostic frame gained ascendancy and not the other, requires a closer examination of the collective body and mind behind the call for real/direct democracy. The third part of this research is devoted to this examination.

Part IV - COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES OF THE CRISIS IN GREECE & SPAIN

In broad terms, the examination of collective action can be understood as a call for understanding the interrelation of a series of factors that either critically affect or simply inform, but in all instances indisputably influence and eventually shape its emergence, diffusion, and development—at instances also its disappearance or its course through ‘abeyance structures’ (see Taylor 1989). The structuralist legacy of the scholarship has for a long time guided movement analysis to a systematic pursuit of a standardized understanding of collective action (Smith and Fetner 2007), and has accordingly oriented research towards the analysis of mainly structural forces in collective action (see Kriesi 2004). In one of its most basic formulations, social movement theory proposes that social movements are contingent on the mobilization of grievances, which are largely understood to be generated by various types of ‘strains’ (see Smelser 1962). Further to this, in its various versions this formulation tends to strongly reference in particular what Jenkins calls the “‘structural strains’ of rapid social change’ (Jenkins 1983: 528; see also McCarthy and Zald 1977), or what Snow and Benford describe as ‘a kind of immanent awakening that expresses the conditions of or divisions within a population’s material situation’ (1988: 197-8). The emergence of the New Social Movements (NSM) of the New Left (NL) during the late 1960s and the early 1970s, however, challenged this orientation and pushed social movement research towards a closer exploration also of ‘the ways in which social movements seek to achieve change in cultural, symbolic and subcultural domains’ (Crossley 2002: 152). Thus we find a large part of the scholarship suggesting that social movements are also explained as contingent on the ‘differential interpretation’ of seemingly immutable conditions. Differently put,

we find movements explained in terms of the macrohistorical construction of collective identities (see della Porta and Diani 1999; Edelman 2001), and altogether in terms of a wide set of concerns that reference 'ideational elements' in collective action (see Snow and Benford 1988; Snow and Benford 1992).

In broad terms, collective identities can be understood as one crucial element of collective action, standing between structure and meaning and effectively linking the parallel sets of explanations of 'objective' conditions and 'subjective' motives (see Melucci 1995; Polletta and Jasper 2001). In this direction, it is suggested that collective identities essentially confront movement research with the challenge to 'identify the circumstances in which different relations between interest and identity, strategy and identity, and politics and identity operate, circumstances that include cultural processes as well as structural ones' (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 285). In all these instances, however, collective identity, rather than a given, is approached through the lens of a constructivist approach. In other words, the collective actors are not understood to exist in themselves as 'ontological essences' (Melucci 1995: 42). Instead, their collective identity is understood processually as the outcome of a *negotiated production of meaning* that finally constructs them as a collective. Two notes are important here.

First, the constructivist view of collective action that is implied in the processual character of collective identities is not a radical constructivism that effectively destroys the relational dimension of collective action. Instead, collective action is approached as a 'constructive process within a field of possibilities and limits recognized by the actors' (Melucci 1995: 61). Second, it follows, the constructivist view of collective action implied in the processual character of collective identities is not a radical constructivism that effectively negates agency and intentions in the relation between structure and identity. Instead, collective action is seen as involving the negotiation and renegotiation of definitions of its basic 'orders of orientation'. These orders have to do with

the ends of action -i.e. 'the sense the action has for the actor'- the means of action -i.e. 'the possibilities and the limits of the action'-, and the field of action -i.e. 'the field in which the action takes place' (Melucci 1995: 44). These definitions, however, reference the 'individual's cognitive, moral and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution' (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 285), and in this sense they can be different, and at instances even contradictory. The construction of collective identity, finally, involves the integration of these various (and potentially contradictory) definitions. Following all the above, collective identities come to represent a continuous process of confrontation (between the collective actors' definitions of the basic elements of collective action, on account of the possibilities and limits that they recognize), which tends to proceed towards the integration of definitions, ultimately constructing the collective actors as a collective. In short, collective identities are 'interactive and shared definitions', which are commonly expressed in the 'we' that describes the protagonists of collective action, and as such they constitute the *result* of collective action. In the words of Melucci, 'The question How is a collective actor formed? at this point assumes a decisive theoretical importance: what was formerly considered a datum (the existence of the movement) is precisely what needs to be explained' (Melucci 1995: 44).

Along these lines, in this part of the research we find the previous scheme of examination of the Greek and the Spanish protests reversed. That is, having identified what the demands of the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests of 2011 mean (examination of diagnostic framings) and what they imply for sociopolitical organization (examination of prognostic framings), here focus is placed on examining what type of 'construct' the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests represent. Put differently, attention is shifted to exploring here how the actors of the Greek and the Spanish protests have been actually 'constructed': *Who are the 'Aganaktismenoi' and the 'Indignados' of 2011? Through what processes have*

they been ‘constructed’ as a collective and what type of ‘construct’ do they actually represent? The third part of this research is dedicated to this examination, and thus it focuses on delineating the interactions and the relationships on the basis of which the collective identity of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ was constructed in 2011. It unfolds in two steps: first, in chapter 3, through observation of general ‘societal macroprocesses’ that affect collective action, and second, in chapter 4, through the examination of the participants’ perceptions and representations (see also Melucci 1995: 56-7). The aim is to collect information on the social profile of the Greek Aganaktismenoi and the Spanish Indignados on the one hand, and, on the other, to find out how the individuals themselves have discovered ‘preexisting bonds, interests and boundaries’ (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 298). Ultimately then, the aim is to shed some light on the ‘subject’ of the Greek and the Spanish protests, in order to finally put together the pieces of the puzzle: diagnoses - prognosis - identities of the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011. Put simply: to comprehensively understand who is actually speaking, identifying problems and proposing solutions.

6. The tense unity of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ -(A)

Collective identities are a crucial element of collective action, generally speaking. Given the interactive character of their processual construction, however, collective identities emerge as an especially critical aspect of social movements of a ‘composite nature’ in particular (see della Porta and Diani 1999). The reason for this is that in instances of highly heterogeneous movements we are essentially confronted with high *ideational heterogeneity* (Diani 1992; see also Snow and Benford 1992), which by extension involves more complex acts of ‘perception and construction’ of boundaries (see Polletta and Jasper 2001). More analytically, the increased heterogeneity of ideas and orientations implies a greater variety of definitions in regards to the ends, the means, and the field of action, so that we finally come across greater differences in regards to what the action means for the individual actors or what sort of possibilities and limits they perceive. Therefore, the construction of collective identities passes through more complex processes of integration of definitions, and in this sense the examination of collective identities in highly heterogeneous movements turns out to be an increasingly challenging task. In what regards the two instances of mass and large-scale collective action in Greece and Spain in 2011, the challenging nature of this examination is further confirmed by the previous identification of two diagnostic narratives in the discursive formulations of the Greek and the Spanish protests and yet one prognostic frame in their practices. I contend that this mismatch hints at more than the existence of transient tensions in the processes of negotiation and renegotiation of different and contradicting definitions. Rather, it can be understood as revealing the existence of unresolved tensions, in the sense of a permanent non-integration of certain definitions behind the construction of the collective identity of the Greek and the Spanish movements. In this direction, this mismatch can be understood as alluding to the existence of

different sociopolitical logics and ideational engagements in collective action and, thus, as revealing a *constitutive tension* in the construction of the collective identity of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ respectively. Put simply, it can be understood as revealing, in each case, the existence of one ‘subject’ with two ‘souls’ (see also Taibo 2012).

Following the above, I argue that the ‘subject’ of the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests of 2011 can be better understood as being (analytically) constructed in two phases: in each of which different elements are at play, but both of which are crucial in order to render the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ wholly intelligible as ‘constructs’ of *tense unity*. In this chapter, I focus on examining the unity of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ as the (analytically speaking) first phase in the construction of the collective identity of the Greek and the Spanish movements. In this direction, I follow general ‘societal macroprocesses’ in the Greek and the Spanish societies, with increasing relevance for collective action, and I single out *de-classing* as a key element that allows us to delineate the social profile of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ at this phase. In particular, I examine the processes of an accelerated de-classing, in both Greece and Spain, in respect to their role for bringing together a widely heterogeneous constituency and I hypothesize that on account of a commonly felt dissatisfaction with these processes, the heterogeneous constituency of the Greek and the Spanish protests constructed its collective identity in relative unity, which can be already detected in the common employment of an inclusive, yet indeterminate, ‘we - the people - the 99%’.

Unity through de-classing: the construction of the ‘precari-us’

In this first phase of the examination of the collective identity of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’, attention is placed on general ‘societal macroprocesses’, which can help delineate in general terms the social profile of the ‘subject’ of the Greek and the Spanish protests. These processes are directly

relevant to the extant model of societal organization (socioeconomic and sociopolitical organization alike) and in this sense they reference directly the processes of contemporary capitalist restructuring. One of the most basic concepts that the relevant literature singles out as appropriate to summarize and explain these processes is the concept of *precarity* (see Vercellone 2004; Lazzarato 2004; Hardt and Negri 2004; Ettlinger 2007; Boumaza and Pierru 2007; Neilson and Rossiter 2008; Lucarelli and Fumagalli 2008). Indeed, precarity is a basic concept in the examination of capitalist modernity, and it is generally suggested to underscore the contemporary societal conditions of ‘vulnerability relative to contingency and the inability to predict’ (Ettlinger 2007: 320).

In broad terms, ‘precarity’ is understood as a reflection of the post-Fordist model of production and in this direction it was initially theorized in ‘an attempt to identify or imagine precarious, contingent or flexible workers as a new kind of political subject, replete with their own forms of collective organization and modes of expression’ (Neilson and Rossiter 2008: 52). In this sense, succeeding the ‘sans’ [‘without’] of the ‘90s, the emergence of the ‘precarious’ in the early 2000s is understood to reflect the evolution of the theoretical frameworks of collective action (Boumaza and Pierru 2007: 8). Mapping empirically the contemporary processes of capitalist restructuring, ‘precarity’ is suggested as being expressive of a ‘new accumulation paradigm’, which rests on connecting diversified modes of production through the transformation of the material working process that now extends to include symbolic interaction alongside the ‘machine system’: ‘because labor activity takes place, now, *next to* the system of machines, with tasks of regulation, surveillance and coordination. But above all because the process of production uses as its “raw materials” knowledge, information, culture and social relations’ (Virno 2001: 181; original emphasis).

Following in this direction, and describing the dynamics of capitalist development in western societies, the relevant literature extends traditional

Marxist categories of analysis to identify the emergence of a new ‘cognitive division of labor’, which effects ‘a new polarization that is particularly marked by everything that is related to knowledge-intensive activities’ (Vercellone 2004: 68). This shift towards a division of labour based on knowledge is proposed as referencing a shift to what is described as ‘cognitive capitalism’ (Lucarelli and Fumagalli 2008). Here ‘precarity’ reflects the ‘demise of the political scheme born of the socialist and communist tradition’, so that collective action is predicated on the ‘post-identitarian identities’ of social modernity (Lazzarato 2004). In this context, ‘precarity’ is proposed as extending beyond a strict ‘economistic logic’ in which social (and political) organization is directly determined by the modes of production, and is instead suggested as being ‘located in the microspaces of everyday life’ (Ettlinger 2007: 320). It is along such lines that Hardt and Negri argue that labour today is ‘*biopolitical* in that it is oriented towards the creation of forms of social life; such labor, then, tends no longer to be limited to the economic but also becomes immediately a social, cultural, and political force’ (Hardt and Negri 2004: 66; original emphasis).

In what regards collective action more specifically, the emergence of ‘precarity’ is suggested as denoting the substitution of old forms of political action by new forms of ‘coordination’ —the case of the Coordination of the Intermittent and Precarious Workers of the Ile de France (CIPD-IDF) is discussed as one of the most characteristic instances of this (see Sinigaglia 2007). These new forms of collective action are explained as shifting away from the creation of a common collective identity towards the creation of an ‘unstable, networked, patchwork-loving multiplicity’ (Lazzarato 2004). Hardt and Negri describe this multiplicity as the only basis for any political action that is directed to social change in contemporary capitalist societies, and maintain that by contrast to classic formulations of ‘the people’ or ‘the proletarians’, ‘the multitude is an internally different, multiple social subject’ that can be effectively described by what it has in common (Hardt and Negri

2004: 100). Accordingly, ‘precarity’ can be understood as a ‘general existential state’ of contemporary capitalism, in which collective action incorporates *unity* and *confrontation* as parts of the same narrative. I suggest that this ‘unity’ can be understood, as does Mouffe, as a unity against politics: that is, as an ‘ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organize human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of “the political”’ (Mouffe 2000: 101). Then, the ‘confrontational’ constitution of the ‘subject’ of social change (i.e. the historical actor) can be understood as permanently incorporating ‘the political’, which is the most basic ‘dimension of antagonism inherent in human relations’ (Mouffe 2000: 101).

Putting together all the above, the construction of identities in collective action under the contemporary conditions of capitalist restructuring can be understood as indeed a two phase construction. In the words of Lazzarato:

On the first level, the struggle is represented as a flight away from institutions and the rules of politics. People quite simply escape – they walk away as the “peoples of the East” walked away from real socialism, crossing the borders or staying in situ to recite Bartleby’s formula: “I would prefer not to”. On the second level, the individual and collective singularities that make up the movement deploy a process of subjectivation, which involves both a composition of common platforms (collective rights) and the differential assertion of a multiplicity of practices for expression and for living (Lazzarato 2004).

In the (analytically speaking) first phase of the construction of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’, we can see ‘unity’ expressed in a common ‘escape’ from the processes of precariatization, so to put it. In both Greece and Spain, a commonly felt disaffection with the socioeconomic conditions imposed by modern capitalist development can be seen to have brought together large parts of the Greek and the Spanish populations.

Precarity is the name that summarizes the result of these ‘societal macroprocesses’, by means of which the social profile of this population can be understood more thoroughly. The basic mechanism by which the identity of this population becomes established in relative unity is an incipient ‘de-classing’ that destroys previous socioeconomic boundaries and classifications and rearranges the societal organization in new terms —i.e. in terms of an encompassing ‘precari-us’ identity (see Figure 2).


		Socioeconomic Characteristics	
		Working Class	Middle Class
Ideological Characteristics	Anti-capitalist discourse	(de-classing) 	
	Anti-memorandum Discourse (GR)		
	Citizenist discourse (ES)		
		‘Precari-us’	

Figure 2: De-classing as a mechanism producing ‘unity’ in the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ of Greece and the ‘Indignados’ of Spain

The ‘Aganaktismenoi’

The dominant narrative about the Greek debt crisis, early on during the submission of the country to the so called ‘Troika’ of the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has highlighted a generally frivolous socioeconomic profile for Greece. According to this narrative, this frivolous profile is delineated by excessive public borrowing and spending, due to easy access to

financing at low interest rates, which practically ‘pushed the economy well beyond its potential, leading to wage increases beyond productivity growth’ (IMF 2012: 4). This framing of the Greek economy has been based on the detection of some ‘deep-rooted vulnerabilities’ related to ‘high fiscal deficits and dependency on foreign borrowing fueled demand’, to ‘high aging and entitlement costs’, and to ‘weak competitiveness, limited supply capacity, and a poor business environment’ (IMF 2010: 4). Altogether, the idea of tackling such ‘vulnerabilities’ through what the hegemonic narrative frames as a ‘bold and correct decision to appeal for help’ from the EC, the ECB, and the IMF (see Catsambas 2016: 57), has been used to justify a series of austerity measures and structural reforms since the country resorted to the mechanisms of financial support.

At the same time, however, this framing of the Greek debt crisis has been also ‘instrumental in creating a sense of collective guilt in Greek society’ (Sakellariopoulos and Sotiris 2014: 262). Part of this second function has been a typical silence about the structural features that effectively delineate the developmental paradigm of Greek capitalism. Among the most important such features are to be included the lax taxation of Greek capital (essentially leaving households as the most important source of revenue for the country), the overpricing of public works and services and the politically motivated military spending. In terms of the political discourse, this silence about the deep deficits of the developmental paradigm of Greek capitalism can be found expressed in the statement of the vice-president of the former Papandreou government, Theodoros Pangalos, who claimed in 2010 in a plenary session of the parliament that ‘*We “ate” them together*’, suggesting that public money was appropriated by politicians and the people together in an orchestrated fashion, and therefore sharing the ‘guilt’ of the unsustainable debt with Greek society. Sakellariopoulos and Sotiris explain that the ‘conscious tolerance’ of these features of Greek capitalism (with some of the most scandalous examples found in the lax taxation of the country’s shipping industry and the spending of public money on buying fighter planes, frigates

and inoperable submarines, even during the recession) has been part of a prolonged building of (national and international) class alliances between the government, small capitalists and the petit bourgeois strata (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2014: 262). Following in this direction, they argue that the Greek debt crisis needs to be understood as more than a ‘simple local manifestation of the global capitalist crisis. It also reflected a deeper crisis of the whole “developmental paradigm” of Greek capitalism’ (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2014: 262), which has been largely based on ‘low labor cost, the exploitation of immigrant labor, the use of European funds and increased household consumption fueled by debt’ (ibid. 2014: 262).

Against this background, the introduction of Greece into the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 2001 can be understood as the introduction of a permanent threat at the very foundations of Greek capitalism and essentially as the first step towards the current destruction of productive forces in the country. This is because the EMU was essentially built on the structural contradictions between the European North and the European South, and that it effectively accentuated extant problems caused by differences in competitiveness and productivity. Put simply, the EMU was built on a double standard of ‘currency *devaluation* for higher productivity and competitive export countries and a currency *overvaluation* for lower productivity import countries’ (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2014: 263). This double standard made the contradictions of competitiveness and productivity between the European North and the European South more obvious. In times of growth this structural imbalance, however, was endorsed, as it represented ‘something like an “iron cage” of capitalist modernization’ and therefore functioned to strengthen pressures for capitalist restructuring (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2014: 263). Part of these pressures have been the low interest rates that the Greek bourgeoisie enjoyed immediately after the introduction of the country to

the EMU.⁷⁶ The low interest rates for Greek businesses subsequently meant high growth rates for the Greek economy, and lead to a rapid increase in aggregate consumption (see Catsambas 2016: 59). Yet, despite a relative increase in productivity rates since 1995 and at least until 2009 (INE-GSEE 2010), the sharp increase in aggregate consumption after 2001 was actually unsustainable as it represented also the silent but rapid increase of (public and private) debt (see Kaplanis 2011).

Against this background the outbreak of the crisis in 2008 meant a profound shock for the Greek economy, as it highlighted the deep deficits of the development of Greek capitalism. Indeed during the period of the recession it became obvious that the pressures of capitalist modernization had actually surpassed by far the limit of restructuring, thus accentuating further the structural imbalances between the European North and the European South. The submission of Greece to the Troika of the EC, the ECB, and the IMF, essentially represents a desperate attempt to restrain the consequences of these imbalances: yet, not in the direction of a controlled default by Greece on its external debts (see Roos 2016), but in the direction of structural adjustments, which, however, rather than pushing for fiscal integration in Europe (see Zahariadis 2010), effectively led to the destruction of productive forces in Greece (see Sakellariopoulos and Sotiris 2014: 263). On account of a 15.4% deficit and a hardly sustainable debt (see Dinas and Rori 2013), Greece proceeded early on to the adoption of two packages of austerity measures (Eleftherotypia 2010), which essentially worsened the already difficult

⁷⁶ With the introduction of Greece to the European Monetary Union in 2011, credit interest rates fell from 14.1% and 13%, for short-term and long-term credit respectively, in January 2000, to 9.40% and 9.12% in January 2001, decreasing up to 7.70% and 7.76% by December the same year, see Bank of Greece, Historical data 1951-2002 http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/el/Statistics/rates_markets/deposits.aspx

situation of the country.⁷⁷ In total, the measures of the early period of the crisis amount to a reduction by 50% of the aggregate increase in wages that had been achieved over a decade from 1999 to 2009, to the explosion of unemployment rates, higher than the post-transition historical peak of 12% in 1999, and to the loss of 1/4 of the progress that had been achieved in regards to the creation of jobs over 17 years since 1991: all this during the period 2008-2010 alone. (INE-GSEE 2011: 230-1).

In March 2010, these measures were followed by the first bailout package (that came to be known as the Memorandum) and were effectively succeeded by new sets of austerity measures. Part of these measures was a sharp reduction of wages in both the public and the private sector, leading accordingly to the sharp reduction of the purchasing power of average wage earners (INE-GSEE 2011); the rise of VAT and of indirect taxes, which progressively lead to the closing of many small and medium-size businesses (see Stamati and Kousta 2012); the abolition of collective labour agreements, leading to increased precarity in the workplace; the easing of restrictions on mass lay-offs that reinforced ‘workplace despotism’ (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2014: 266); budget cuts in public health, education and transportation that led to a sharp decrease in the services’ quality and finally, the actuation of a large wave of privatizations (among which main ports, airports and the water companies of the biggest cities of Athens and Thessaloniki), leading to the commercialization of access to basic services (see Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2014; Stamati and Kousta 2012). The overall deterioration of the Greek economy was further expressed in the increase in youth unemployment by at

⁷⁷ The reduction of earnings in the public sector up to 5.5%, the increase of VAT in key services of wide consumption (such as medical and hospital care, public transportation, electricity, water, and gas bills etc) by 8%, and the imposition of luxury coefficients in various products between 10% and 30% are among the measures which contributed to the aggravation of the socioeconomic situation of the country, see Kostarelou, E. (2010). “Barí plígma sta xamilá kai mesaía eisodímata me eláxisti epivárynsi echónton (kyríos misthotón). Axéchasti (!) kai dysoíoni i zi Martíou” [“Βαρύ πλήγμα στα χαμηλά και μεσαία εισοδήματα με ελάχιστη επιβάρυνση εχόντων (κυρίως μισθωτών). Αξέχαστη (!) και δυσοίωνα η 3η Μαρτίου”], 04 March. Accessible at: <http://www.enet.gr/?i=issue.el.home&date=04/03/2010&id=137789>. For detailed information on the economic reforms and austerity measures of 2010 in Greece, see the Update of the Hellenic Stability and Growth Programme 2010, accessible online at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/20_scps/2009-10/01_programme/el_2010-01-15_sp_en.pdf

least 64% during the first trimester of 2011, the rise of overall unemployment to 15.6% during the same period (INE-GSEE 2011), and to at least 17.7% by the third trimester of 2011 (ELSTAT 2011).

The processes of capitalist restructuring briefly summarized above, accordingly influenced social stratification in Greece, indeed in a dramatic fashion. The most critical aspect of the far-reaching restructuring of Greek capitalism has been the effective destruction of the middle class of the country. As an intermediary class dominated by the upper class but at the same time striving to become fully included in it, at the economic level, the Greek middle class has been essentially the most basic support for the structures of social exploitation set by the bourgeoisie, while in ideological terms it has significantly contributed to the reproduction of representations of exploitation in social organization (see Sakellaropoulos 2010). However, the series of austerity measures implemented early on from the outburst of the crisis in 2008 and later on by means of structural adjustments put forward since 2010, have resulted in the dramatic compression of the Greek middle class. By extension, they have accentuated also its ambivalent political position — traditionally standing between building alliances with the upper class (as an ideological ally) or with the working class to which it is connected through relations of domination, but to which it comes closer in terms of its material conditions during periods of recession. In this sense, the political position of the Greek middle class during the period of the crisis can be understood as a precise depiction of what Bourdieu describes as a dilemma: ‘to emphasize either the complicities which unite them in hostility or the hostilities which separate them in complicity’ (Bourdieu 1984: 316).

In overall terms, the severe compression that the Greek middle class has experienced since the beginning of the crisis is visible in its progressive exclusion from basic social services (health services and so on), as well as in the sharp increase of its monthly liabilities and the simultaneous decrease of its monthly earnings, which in overall terms signaled an acute increase of private debt. These developments briefly summarize an incipient ‘de-classing’

in the sense that the middle class faced the rapid worsening of its situation, first in terms of its position in the social division of labour in Greek society, and second, in terms of the specific manner of income acquisition and the amount of income acquired. This sort of rapid rearranging of the system of social stratification in the country can be understood to have effectively created a new class: that of the ‘new poor’. The term is mainly employed in media analyses of the destruction of the Greek middle class,⁷⁸ but analytically speaking the ‘new poor’ remains today undocumented and there are only few references to it in relevant scholarly analyses (see Angelaki 2013). I argue here that in a first tentative appreciation of its meaning the ‘new poor’ can be understood as the result of the far-reaching effects of capitalist restructuring and the imposition of precarious conditions in the social existence of the middle class. In the account of a long-standing activist of the broader social antagonistic movement in Greece, occasional participant of the *Aganaktismenoi* of Syntagma and systematic participant of the *Aganaktismenoi* of Lefkos Pyrgos in 2011, we find a succinct summary of the impact that the reconfiguration of the relations of production had, in terms of a continuing impoverishment of the overall population, but mainly in terms of a first time impoverishment of the Greek middle class, which essentially constitutes the basis of the ‘new poor’:

History shows that the petty bourgeois is a character ‘constructed’ from its social position and its position in the division of labour —this today is the same thing as it was in 1870 France for example: you shouldn’t think it’s something different. What I mean is that if the petty bourgeois today, or maybe 5 years ago, had a flat LCD TV screen and the proletarian was demanding to reach that level of ‘material existence’, the same sort of enjoyments and separations we can see also in 1870. Then the petty bourgeois would live on the first floor for example, or maybe the second,

⁷⁸ see, <http://www.tovima.gr/finance/article/?aid=429733>; http://www.ethnos.gr/oikonomia/arthro/783_000_neoptoxoi_ellines_h_klironomia_ton_mnimonion-64897880/; <http://www.efsyn.gr/arthro/oi-neoptohoi-tis-anaptyxis>

and on the fifth or the sixth floor would live the poor proletarian, because there they had no elevator or water. The analogy is the same. In the Paris Commune parts of the lower middle class participated too, because they similarly saw their own interests being affected by capital.

Accordingly, what we see today, those people who find themselves in debt, incapable to make ends meet, but who were not in this position before, they are the result of the restructuring of capitalism.

I was poor also before, I am poor also now. I was getting 800 Euros and I always had debt, I couldn't pay a bill, in order to have food instead or to be able to buy something for myself. Now my salary is cut by half. I get 400 Euros per month and I have a debt of three bills instead of one. But let's say I'm somehow used to that and I know how to 'move'. You know what happened to the petty bourgeois? His kid is not going to learn piano! His kid is not going to study in Switzerland or London or somewhere else. By losing his 'given rights' he felt for the first time that he is impoverished, like I am.

So, the petit bourgeoisie at this period faces a big dilemma. Either they will become 'cannibals' in order to maintain their position in the division of labour or they will come on our side in order to change the society (Ilias)

Accordingly, the 'new poor' can be understood as a classification appropriate in order to describe the progressive 'de-classing' of the Greek middle class: not as a matter of 'proletarianization' (see also Taibo 2012; Trenkle 2006), but as a matter of its social existence being placed under increasingly precarious conditions. It is essentially these transformations that make possible the relative unity of the 'Aganaktismenoi'. If the 'new poor' references the transformation of the middle class (in terms of the conditions of its socioeconomic production and reproduction becoming precarious), the

relative unity of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ is detected in the commonly held identification of the heterogeneous constituency of the movement as being *all together precarious* under the current conditions of capitalist development. In this sense, in the classification of the ‘precarious’ we find grouped together otherwise distinct socioeconomic groups of Greek society, among which a large part of university educated youth, the unemployed in general, the low-wage earners, the ‘fired’,⁷⁹ the ‘contracted’,⁸⁰ the ‘non-appointed’⁸¹ etc. While in instances of relative economic stability the aforementioned categories could be seen to reference a diverse population in regards to its socioeconomic profile (see employment, income, education, even social status etc), in the period of the recession they are all together reduced to representing a productive but essentially decommissioned and thus progressively impoverished section of the population, commonly sharing precarious conditions in respect to its socioeconomic production and reproduction. In this sense, the ‘precarious’ is understood here as ‘*precari-us*’, that is, as an overlapping of ‘temporary positions’, rather than as the coming together of stable identities (see also Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos 2013: 449-50), which include of course the impoverished working classes, but mainly the de-classed middle classes, or the ‘new poor’:

Look, here in the squares... well, someone said, when the bourgeois middle classes are compressed -and there has been a tremendous

⁷⁹ The ‘fired’ is the term commonly used in the public discourse to reference a rather vulnerable part of the population which has lost its employment, while being over 40years old, and thus while it is too young for retirement it is considered less competitive compared to the youth, and by extension faces great difficulties in finding new employment.

⁸⁰ The ‘contracted’ is the term commonly used in the public discourse to reference the part of population, which rather than holding permanent positions or open-ended contracts, is contracted though renewable limited term contracts in either the public or the private sector (in particular contracts that end before labour rights are established and thus expire at around 10 or 11 months each time they are renewed).

⁸¹ The ‘non-appointed’ is the term commonly used in the public discourse to reference the part of the population, which has received formal education and training, and which remains in reserve for staffing public services while being employed or seeking employment in the black market (e.g. small businesses in the catering sector). Usually health care professional (e.g. nursing staff awaiting state announcements of vacancy notices for public hospital), or teachers of secondary education awaiting their appointment.

compression of the middle class the last three years in Greece- they ‘shriek’ very loudly. This is what happened. Even though it sounds like we’re joking now, these [in the squares’ movement] were mainly the screams of the middles class. In the squares came people who demanded to go back, to how things were for them a year ago (Giannis)

The largest part of these people were from the petty bourgeois strata, which were destroyed by the crisis and went.. a bit stiff (Eleni)

In general terms, the observation of societal macroprocesses discloses the rapid debasement of the Greek middle class, while the concomitant emergence of the ‘new poor’ in most instances is understood, by the individual participants of the protests themselves, as a basic condition for the relative unity of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ under the identity of the ‘precari-us’. Yet, there is practically no consensus in their accounts about the limits and the potentials of this improbable coexistence. In other words, even if there is a common agreement that indeed the contemporary restructuring of capitalism, or more precisely of biopolitical capitalism, has effectively produced a new subject (see also Douzinas 2012: 136), this agreement stops when it comes to discussing the role of this subject as a historical actor —i.e. its role in the processes of social antagonism and the struggle for social change. On the one hand, there is detected a more receptive perspective, so to put it. This perspective emphasizes the fact that the ‘new subject’ of capitalist restructuring is a phenomenon of a global transformation of social antagonism, rather than a national peculiarity of the restructuring of Greek capitalism in particular, and that it has new elements that we should take the time to examine, before arriving at conclusions about its future role in the overall struggle for social change:

I’ll tell you about it in another way; I see it differently. I see it somewhat more concrete. What is the movement of the squares? It is not a Greek phenomenon. It is a global phenomenon. That is, also in the U.S. and in

Russia, and everywhere there are such outbursts. Up to the point of becoming uprisings, moving forward, changing regimes —like in North-African countries. For sure it is not a Greek phenomenon. It is global and we have to see what similarities there are, in order to understand what exactly it is. It has ‘productive’ similarities. No, better put, [similarities] in regards to the relations of production.

Today we don’t have a structured/constituted proletariat and this became visible, not only in the massiveness [of the movement] but also in regards to who took the initiative. While in all countries there exists the historical labour movement, the squares were not made by it. It is [the squares’ movement] the result of the social configurations of the last 20-30 years that labour ceases to be stable and we cease to have stable social references.

There are only some left overs and a very rigid bureaucracy of the labour movement. But we, the new employed, we are not like that. That is, we don’t ‘communicate’ with the ‘class’. In an organized, structured fashion. We are more diffuse. Identities are broken. And also the internet helped us in that. These are the decisive elements. That is, the new labour relations —and the internet helped as well— brought a new ‘subject’ in the squares. This [subject] has also new symbols.

We are in the phase of a new subject being born, which has different characteristics. Of course at its core it has the poor. The poor is the heart. Not the proletarian! It is the poor, the bankrupt, the one who’s dependent on the bank, who doesn’t know what will happen tomorrow, who is precarious and who is anxious. This [subject] has new elements. Let’s wait. The movement deflated somehow, but this deflation may be time for gaining consciousness. To organize our thoughts -everybody!- and our experiences. I think this gets expressed as a micro-experiment in other ‘spaces’ of life. But, let’s not hurry to say what it will be (Ilias)

On the other hand, there can be detected a less receptive perspective, so to put it, which emphasizes the fact that this ‘new subject’ of capitalist restructuring became essentially expressed through an aversion to partisan politics that was rather elusive in regards to its actual meaning. In general terms, the mobilizations of the Greek Aganaktismenoi have been registered by the collective imaginary as a leaderless instance of collective action and, for that matter, the participants of the protests often appear to have welcomed with relief the news that this struggle was nonpartisan (see also Oikonomakis and Roos 2013), in the sense that it was organized from ‘below’:

Because it wasn’t a call from a specific political party, I thought that maybe there’s something happening here, from the people. That’s why I participated. I have participated in demonstrations, in strikes etc. I did all this, but it was always under someone’s flag. Now it wasn’t. (Dimitris, Utopia on the Horizon 2012).

In this respect, the leaderless character of the Aganaktismenoi is commonly used to reference the *nonpartisan* character of the protests and the complete absence of political party organizations from all the different aspects of this cycle of protesting (i.e. from the initial call to protest, to the decisions about setting encampments in the squares, the organization of these encampments or the way general assemblies were held in the squares). This nonpartisan profile of the protests, however, in many instances has been interpreted as the adoption of an *apolitical* stance by the protestors, in the sense of not taking a clear position towards the actuality of capitalist restructuring. It is because of this that in the general assemblies of the Aganaktismenoi we often find more or less direct calls for a clear identification of capitalism as the basic problem behind the increasing impoverishment of the overall population, but also behind the processes of de-classing:

I come here since the beginning and I hear a lot of things, but nothing about the essence. For all this misery capitalism is responsible. Down with capitalism! It is capitalism that has to be overthrown in all countries of the world. This is our duty (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Peoples' Assembly 11 July 2011).

We have arrived at WWII. The poor of the world have to be united, but against capitalism (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Peoples' Assembly 11 July 2011).

Indeed, in overall terms, the two concepts of 'nonpartisanship' and 'apolitical' appear to be often conflated in the Greek experience (see also Sergi and Vogiatzoglou 2013: 225-6), thus creating a particular complex of interpretations. For a section of the participants of the Aganaktismenoi, this conflation is interpreted not as failure in conceptualization, but as a purposeful corruption of meanings, which in 2011 took the form of a radical aversion to partisan identities. More specifically, individual participants of the 'Aganaktismenoi' suggest that while the nonpartisan disposition of the protests appeared to delegitimize extant political structures (by means of rejecting old political parties for the ways in which they had handled the crisis), the refusal to admit partisan identities essentially fomented a certain reluctance to take clear political positions, thus legitimizing an 'apolitical' version of politics, which, nevertheless, in all instances remains deeply political:

..non-partisan? how is it possible for the movement to be non-partisan? Marx says the refusal of a thesis is a thesis in itself. Here the refusal to take a position, is a position in favour of the established order, the status quo, the existing situation. Who is non-partisan? Aren't these people citizens? Don't they vote? All these years they were voting ND and PASOK, and now they are non-partisan. They were saying we won't bring party politics in here. But really, who is nonpartisan? Just because they don't actively participate in a political party? Well, they vote for one, and

by doing so they are active citizens, they do belong in a specific political relation and a political space and they feel ‘covered’ by the theory and the specific tactics of the party that expresses this space. To say they are nonpartisan is analogous to speaking about a ‘nonpartisan’ socialist realism in art, or the ‘nonpartisan’ art of Hollywood. It’s a joke!

Is it possible to have a nonpartisan, in the sense of apolitical, position? It is not. You always imply something, you communicate meanings to the people. These meanings are situated in an ideology and a particular way of thinking. This kind of arguments, like the ‘nonpartisan’, are the arguments of the ‘established order’. Not in the sense that Bodosakis⁸² came to tell you that you’re nonpartisan and you believed it. But as a matter of the hegemonic culture being absorbed by the people. The question is to identify what is the politics you stand for. Because the politics comes before the party. The party is created only to fight for the interests represented in a specific type of politics. When you say you reject the political parties, don’t imply you’re free from taking a clear political position. You are political and you have to say where you stand (Eleni)

This interpretation of the rejection of partisan identities can be effectively understood as a problem of throwing the baby out with the bathwater: in other words, a problem of effectively negating the political itself while negating political parties. In other accounts of the individual participants of the *Aganaktismenoi* interviewed for this research, this rejection is directly explained as a condition of struggle imposed by the middle class in particular, which refused to take a clear position in regards to its political alliances. While being decisively present in the mobilizations of 2011, in demand of a change of its socioeconomic situation, it is suggested that it pushed for the adoption of a ‘cloudy’ discourse with the capacity to fit its own ideological and distinct political interests. More specifically, it is suggested that by refusing to allow the

⁸² A prominent figure in the industrial history of Greece during the 1930s and 1940s, involved in the creation of an industrial empire of chemical industries, mines, plants, etc.

clear expression of Left partisan identities or the presence of structures with a decisive role in social antagonism (such as labour unions), the middle class tried to refuse any political radicalization of the protests' discourse:

This political position which suggested 'off with them' [political parties] had essentially petty-bourgeois characteristics, which had dominated the [protests'] discourse. Or 'off with the unions' for example. The unions - why? And I mean the unions, not the chairman of the union for example who has been 'sold out' to serve different interests etc. Well, this is essentially hypocritical. It means that I have an opinion and my opinion is that political parties shouldn't be present -obviously we are speaking about the parties of the Left, because PASOK or ND wouldn't come to take the floor anyway- and this suits my interests because it creates something blurry, which I can direct wherever I want, which I can control, and which I can canalize. Because at the end of the day, this thing [the 'Aganaktismenoi'] was supported by many, completely different components, so that you could see sections of the anti-authoritarian 'space', the anarchist 'space', the 'space' of SYRIZA, the 'space' of Golden Dawn even. Indeed, there was someone who was repeatedly coming to the square, he was carrying a gun and he had close relations to GD. And these people who were speaking about nonpartisanship, later, in the name of 'direct democracy', they even attempted to bring MPs of LAOS to speak at the assemblies.

So, I insist. It is a critical point, and we shouldn't hide. The perspective which suggests that we shouldn't allow partisanship in the squares, because we won't allow political parties in general, actually speaks about the rejection of a radical Left politics in particular and it is hypocritical (Giannis)

It is important to note here that in general terms, what this approach to the 'precarious Aganaktismenoi' identifies as the problem of a blurry discourse, is essentially an approach in which we find combined sociological

and political categories of analysis. That is, the middle class is understood here as the main driving force for the establishing of a blurred discourse: not as a matter of its socioeconomic position as such, but rather as a matter of the distinct politico-ideological references that this position (and most important its rectification) entails. In this sense, what we see here being discredited is not the middle class as a first time impoverished and for that matter outraged section of the population, or else the middle class as precarious (in regards to its socioeconomic profile). Rather, it is the middle class as an ideological ally of interests distinct from the interests of the social antagonistic movement. In overall terms, therefore, the dissension between these two perspectives described here (the more and the less receptive), in regards to the potential role of the new 'subject' of the 'Aganaktismenoi' as a historical actor, can be explained as a problem of greater or lesser far-reaching expectations about a certain alignment in the political and the ideological considerations of the 'precari-us'. Put differently, if the presence of the 'new poor' in the squares can be understood as the suspended political pitch of the middle class (propelled by a radical change in its socioeconomic profile), the conclusions drawn about its ideological pitch don't appear to be unanimous. In the first instance, the more receptive stance towards the possibility of 'unity' in the struggle is expressed in what is suggested to be a process of 'gaining consciousness: to organize our thoughts -everybody!- and our experiences' (Ilias). In the general assemblies of the Aganktismenoi we find similar expectations of unity, in calls to seek what the 'precarious' have in common, and in calls to endorse in this process also those sections of the population that have been traditionally absent from the grassroots struggles of social antagonism:

Here we are from anarchists to the far-right. Let's not seek what separates us. Let's find what unites us (Agaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 6 June 2011).

The Greek society gathered here, which is not the ‘usual suspects’, it is not exclusively the extra-parliamentary left. From my side I want also the NDemocrat. I don’t want the fascist (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Peoples’ Assembly 11 July 2011).

Similarly, in the accounts of individual participants adopting this approach, such a unity is suggested to be the only way forward for the struggle for social change. On the one hand, as a matter of commitment to plurality in socioeconomic profiles and politico-ideological references, and as a matter of responsibility to tolerate political differences and to preserve social alliances:

We have some wonderful NDemocrats, who blocked the cathedral on a Sunday. The church!, with a banner.. Yes, on Sunday morning at mass, the NDemocrats, the right-wingers, these people blocked the entrance of the church with a banner... And for their ‘co-christians’ to get inside the church, they had to remove the banner, but you had to take a manifesto that was declaring the abominations of the Church.

There came [in the rally] common people, and some of them happened to be NDemocrats. If I had urged these people to leave, who am I really? These people actually confronted their ‘God’ to be there (Alekos).

On the other hand, as a matter of an honest and open recognition that the ultimate struggle against capitalism involves society as whole, above claims of ‘purity’ in the struggle for social change:

..this is healthy. Because it means that your father and my father will come, that we don’t have them in here.

So, this state, these institutions and people.. we have to change them. It’s not going to be the elite that will change them, the vanguard. The people will do it, *all the people*, and it is also the one using political favouritism, the unemployed, the pensioner, the right-winger, maybe even the far

right-winger, who is now of the far right but two years ago was not identifying as far right-winger although he would still say ‘well, I don’t really want the immigrants’. These are the people with whom we have to co-exist and build our future. Who are the ‘pure’ and the ‘clean’ after all?’ (Nikitas)

In the second instance, the more reserved approach in regards to the potential of ‘unity’ in the struggle for social change is summarized in what is described as an explicit disposition of the middle class to escape its ‘temporary’ misfortune and rather than change the sociopolitical organization, merely strive ‘to go back, to how things were for them a year ago’ (Giannis). In the general assemblies of the Aganaktismenoi we find a certain hesitation about the prospects of ‘unity’ expressed indirectly through systematic calls for the intensification of the struggle. On the one hand, this is as a matter of an overall change of mindsets:

If tomorrow our stance towards life has changed, only then Syntagma will have succeeded. By proposing the collective before the individual (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the General Assembly 3 July 2011).

On the other hand, it is as a matter of finally deepening the political choices of the movement, radicalizing the discourse of the struggle, and creating new structures capable of supporting the struggle:

People are afraid of repression coming from their bosses, and they are afraid to strike. There are people who find refuge in the assembly. We have to make new unions for the people to be able to support the strikes. So, we all need to get politicized, not only to say that the Memorandum is a choice from those above, but to move on from saying ‘Thieves-Thieves’, to a lasting struggle and to radicalize our discourse (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the People’s Assembly 3 July 2011).

A cycle of confrontation is coming to an end, and a new one is about to begin. We need to deepen the political and practical choices of the square. The new cycle is bigger and includes new battles to fight (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the People's Assembly 3 July 2011)

Finally, it is as a matter of drawing a clear distinction between merely substituting the 'structures of the system', and actually building alternative structures of sociopolitical organization, distinct from micro-political tactics and the liberal approach to societal coexistence:

If the General Assembly does not wish to substitute with its actions the structures of the system, but to replace the structures of capitalism, which is falling apart, it needs to continue resisting it by building anti-structures of solidarity, which must have nothing to do with micro-political tactics, alms, charities and NGOs (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Decrees-Minutes of the People's Assembly 8 January 2012).

From all the above, what concerns us here the most is that, as much in the less reserved approach as in the more reserved perspective, we find politico-ideological considerations decisively brought into the analysis of the 'unity' of the 'Aganaktismenoi'. Indeed, in all instances there is a common acknowledgement (expressed in both the discursive formulations of the 'Aganaktismenoi', and the accounts of the individual participants interviewed for this research) that although the improbable coexistence of different socioeconomic interests (through processes of de-classing) is a basic point of consideration, the identifications of the Aganaktismenoi cannot be wholly understood without a close appreciation of the politico-ideological references of the 'precari-us'. In other words, what is highlighted is that the plurality of the new 'subject' essentially leaves open the question of 'unity', as it confronts us with the problem of ideological heterogeneity in the struggle for social

change: a heterogeneity which highlights that the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ may have been a ‘construct’ of unity, but this unity has been only relative.

The ‘Indignados’

Starting from around the mid-1990s and all the way through the 2000s, with the public finances of Spain on a track of sustainability and a relatively steady growth of the country’s economy, the Spanish population had been set on the Western European dream of prosperity. Housing conditions can be considered as a critical aspect against which this dream is measured in Spain (see Colau and Alemany 2012). Indeed, house ownership has been historically translated in the country as equivalent to ‘deproletarianization’, and has been one of the basic pillars that has guided housing policies in the country since the first minister of housing of the francoist dictatorship declared his intention to create ‘a country of owners, not proletarians’ [‘un país de propietarios, no de proletarios’]” (Observatorio Metropolitano 2011: 72). Historically speaking, owning a house in Spain became practically synonymous with ‘a deposit of family wealth’ (ibid. 2011). In the more recent history of Spain, and in particular throughout the early 2000s, the increase in house ownership embedded in Spanish society ‘the almost uncontested idea, in the order of majority consensus, that our society is a society of middle classes’ (Observatorio Metropolitano 2011: 71). On the side of the economy, in the period of the early 2000s, and in particular between 2000 and 2006, Spain is reported to have experienced an increase in construction from 7.5% to 10.8% of the GDP (see Weisbrot and Montecino 2010). Accordingly, a rather broad base of property owners was progressively built in the country during the same period. This picture is confirmed in the results of the first wave of the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey, using 2010 as a reference year. Spain, according to the report of the HFCN, among the 15 euro area countries included in the survey,⁸³ ranked second with an 82.7% of

⁸³ The 15 euro area countries that the survey included are: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Finland.

Spanish households being actually property owners (of which 55.9% are reported to have outright ownership and 26.8% ownership with mortgage) (HFCN 2013: 13).

This impressive enlargement of the base of property owners in Spain, however, brought along with it some significant transformations in the economy of the Spanish housing market, and in particular the pricing cycle in the real estate market, which appears to have followed a steady upward trend. Indeed, throughout the early 2000s Spain experienced a rapid growth in house prices, with the general price starting from around 956€/m² in 2001 and reaching a peak of 2.246€/m² by the end of 2007, with Spanish capitals and big cities reaching up to 2.418€/m² (see Tinsa Index; LaVanguardia 2015). This growth in house prices served to sustain the cycle of the Spanish economy, and thus fanned the flames of a powerful fiction of generalized upward social mobility. Yet, in doing so it essentially concealed the progressive embeddedness of conditions of socioeconomic precarity, pushed further by the degradation of the welfare state (see also INE 2009). In reality, that is, while the cycle of the real estate market involved the vast majority of the population, it was only a small part of it that entered the cycle on the side of investment. The greatest part of the population, instead, had actually entered ‘from the side of necessity (and of debt)’ (Observatorio Metropolitano 2011: 73). In between 2005 and 2007, following the sharp increase in housing prices, housing mortgages accordingly increased by 50% (Observatorio DESC and PAH 2013: 101). Under these conditions, when the Spanish housing bubble collapsed in 2007, it officially threw the Spanish economy into a dramatic cycle of recession (see Weisbrot and Montecino 2010), and, most importantly, it led a significant part of the Spanish population to start drifting downstream. The rapidly enlarged Spanish middle class, which was mainly sustained through real estate growth, entered processes of polarization. The outburst of the crisis in 2008 came only to further deepen such polarization. In this direction, today, a declaration of belonging to the middle class in Spain effectively constitutes

merely ‘a declaration of intention’ that ‘obeys a desire for inclusion and for social belonging that tries to hide, with all the modesty appropriate to “respectable” society, positions of strong precariousness and exploitation’ (Observatoria Metropolitano 2011: 72).

According to the National Institute of Statistics (INE) of Spain, in collaboration with the Active Population Survey (EPA), since the dramatic downturn of the Spanish economy in 2007, the overall unemployment rates in the country have been following an increasingly upward trend. Starting from a historical low of 7.93% in 2007, overall unemployment in Spain rose to 22.56% by the end of 2011. Thereafter it only continued its upward trend, so that by the beginning of 2013 unemployment in Spain had reached a historical peak of 26.94%, which represents the highest unemployment rates recorded in the country since 1982; in fact higher than the previous peak of 24.55% in early 1993 (INE-EPA 2010a; 2010b). Against this background, the already dramatic increase in housing mortgages, from 2005 to 2007, became highly unsustainable. At the level of collective action, this difficult combination, indicative of the increasing compression of the Spanish middle class, led in 2006 to the emergence of the grassroots online platform *V de Vivienda* (H for Housing). Organizing protests and rallies all over the country and demanding dignity and the right to housing, the message of *V de Vivienda* resonated with the general Spanish society and further constituted part of the prelude to the mobilizations of 2011 that were to follow (see Haro Barba and Sampedro Blanco 2012). In fact, it continued that way in the years that followed, since after the collapse of the housing bubble in 2007 the capacity of the Spanish population to pay for already contracted housing mortgages sank further. It is in this direction that by 2013 we find about 37% of the overall population with mortgages declaring difficulties in paying their mortgage, and at least 40% declaring that difficulties had resulted in the delay of more than three installments. Unemployment was steadily reported by 70.4% of the population with housing mortgages as the main cause of facing difficulties and/or failing

to repay their mortgages, with 32.8% reporting the increase in bank installments as the main cause, and 21.3% the contracting of other debts parallel to housing mortgages (Observatorio DESC and PAH 2013: 107).

The collapse of the Spanish housing bubble in 2007 effectively brought along with it the collapse of the Spanish dream of prosperity, and revealed instead the weaknesses of Spanish capitalism and of the accelerated enlargement of the Spanish middle class since the early 2000s. Next to this, a critical moment for class recomposition in the country was the parallel collapse of the enormous Spanish stock market bubble in 2007, which quickly turned the country's economic surplus into a deficit and led to a significant contraction in economic growth (see Weisbrot and Montecino 2010). From that moment onwards, within broader processes of rationalization of the organizational core of the state apparatus, Spain undertook the implementation of a series of austerity measures,⁸⁴ which, however, further plunged the economy into recession. In June 2010 the labour reform⁸⁵ of the Zapatero government converted the widespread public fear about the worsening of the socioeconomic situation into a reality of increased labour flexibility and economic insecurity. The reaction of the labour unions was immediate, with a series of nationwide stoppages throughout 2010 (El País 2010b), which reached a turning point in the General Strike of the 29th September, called in unison by the main Spanish trade unions CCOO and UGT. The General Strike of the 29th September was supported by more than 70% of the workers and employees of various sectors (from industry, such as steel and infrastructure, to services, such as garbage collection or cleaning) (see CCOO

⁸⁴ The proposed structural reforms were accompanied by a series of austerity measures outlined in the Central Government Budget 2010, which among other clauses included a 2% increase in VAT, 5% cuts in public sector salaries, freeze in public sector payments, freeze in pension payments, and €1.2b cuts on the costs of regional and local governments, see Stability Programme Update 2009-2013, accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/20_scps/2009-10/01_programme/es_2010-02-01_sp_en.pdf

⁸⁵ see RDL (9542 Real Decreto-ley) 10/2010, de 16 de junio, de medidas urgentes para la reform del mercado de trabajo [9542 Royal Decree-Law 10/2010, 16 June, on urgent measures for the reform of the labour market]. Boletín Oficial del Estado, Núm. 147, 17.06.2010, Sec. I. Pág. 51662, accessible at: <https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2010/06/17/pdfs/BOE-A-2010-9542.pdf>

2010a; 2010b; UGT 2010), and effectively sealed the deal: if with the collapse of the housing bubble in 2007 Spain witnessed the rapid debasement of its middle class, the parallel collapse of the Spanish stock market bubble in the same year, the outburst of the crisis in 2008, and the subsequent implementation of austerity policies throughout 2009-2010, accentuated the deep polarization of the overall society, bringing the Spanish middle class to the verge of disintegration.

Against this background the ‘subject’ of the Spanish protests of 2011 can be understood, similarly to the case of ‘Aganaktismenoi’, as representing an improbable combination of a working class with a mainly middle class constituency, which ‘through joblessness and insecurity has experienced an incipient process of de-classing (not so much of proletarianization)’ (Taibo 2012: 156). Paolo Gerbaudo (2016) has recently proposed that the discourse of the mass protests of 2011 in Spain (as well as in Greece) emphasized a set of ideas that actually prevent us from framing the protests in economic terms. According to him, the large base of the Indignados was comprised by the combination of what he calls the ‘worker subject’ (traditionally associated with materialist interests) and the ‘consumer subject’ (which he frames as associated with post-materialist values), under the broader idea of ‘citizenship’: citizenship, moreover, ‘as a self-definition, in contrast to class-based identities’ (Gerbaudo 2016: 4). Indeed, it could be said that economic framing (in its strict sense as a matter of positions in the division of labour) of the protests is insufficient for the task of describing the ‘subject’ of the 15M, because there too we find identifications that exceed the limits of a strict socioeconomic profiling of the protestors. However, the broader idea of ‘citizenship’, as a source of collective identification to explain the ‘Indignados’ as a whole, needs to be suspended. I will return to this point later.

In the accounts of individual participants of the 15M interviewed for this research there is indeed a discursive shift away from the classic division between social classes and their further connection to the traditional labour

movement, the post-materialist movements of the left or even the popular right. In other words, there is detected an overall distancing from both a ‘neoliberalized left and a neoliberal and conservative right’, which was mainly expressed as ‘discontent with mainstream politicians’ more broadly (Castañeda 2012: 310). The early 2011 emergence of the NoLesVotes (Don’t Vote For Them) campaign counts as a concrete expression of this aversion to old political structures and, most prominently, to political parties, and was in operation already before the emergence of the 15M (see also Castañeda 2014). In this context, we can indeed see a progressive shift from the traditional divisions of classes to a yet fairly obscure distinction between ‘the politician’ and ‘the citizen’, which was expressed through the identification of ‘*the politicians... who seek to reduce the choices of the citizen*’ (Dans 2011).⁸⁶ In this sense, it is a distinction through which ‘the citizen’ is ‘constructed’ relationally vis-à-vis the political class, and is expressed through a movement which itself is similarly ‘constructed’ in relational terms vis-à-vis the formal electoral campaign, and, moreover, in negative terms. That is, not as a campaign itself, but as an *anti-campaign*:

This is not a campaign, it is precisely the opposite: as the electoral campaign advances and the majoritarian parties get distressed asking for your vote, this page will remind you of the reasons why you should not vote for them. [...] This is not a campaign of any party, or anything that would like to look like one. We have experienced some of the so-called *grassroots campaigns*: well, this is a *grassroots anti-campaign* (Dans 2011; original emphasis).⁸⁷

In the discursive formulations of the Indignados, this new non class-referencing distinction was expressed in the drawing of a ‘thin’ division

⁸⁶ see Dans, E. (2011). “Nolesvotes como movimiento ciudadano”. Accessible online at: <https://www.enriquedans.com/2011/02/nolesvotes-como-movimiento-ciudadano.html>

⁸⁷ see Dans, E. (2011). “Nolesvotes como movimiento ciudadano”. Accessible online at: <https://www.enriquedans.com/2011/02/nolesvotes-como-movimiento-ciudadano.html>

between ‘us’ -‘*we are the ordinary people*’ (DRY, Manifesto)- and ‘them’, that is, ‘*our government and economic system*’, ‘*the political class*’, ‘*the dictatorship of major economic powers*’ (DRY, Manifesto). Well into the cycle of protests of the 15M, we find this division reformulated to reference those ‘from below’ and those ‘from above’, and finally to reference the recently rather common division between the 99% and the 1%. This distinction is accordingly confirmed in the accounts of the individual participants of the protests interviewed for this research, who propose that the ‘99% V. 1%’ distinction is an expression of a new typology of struggle compared to traditional class categories. In fact, it is a typology that was only very reluctantly welcomed by certain components of the broader antagonistic movement, and especially the traditional Left, precisely for the fact that it implies a flight from class categorizations and their concomitant socioeconomic and ideological references:

When the movement said we’re neither of the Left nor of the Right, or the centre, what did the movement actually say? It said that the difference between the Left and the Right is everyday lesser and lesser and in this sense it was a critique to the parties and mainly of the Left. But it said also something else, that now we have become ‘those from below’ versus ‘those from above’.

The traditional Left didn’t like this, because to them it seemed reactionary. But the majority of the people in the movement understood it differently. It was not reactionary in this sense. It was to signal that the traditional Left-Right, and everything in between, today, are not points of reference. That today socioeconomic references have changed, and we have become ‘those from below’ and ‘those from above’, or else we are all together the 99% etc. Although it irritated many people, mainly from the Left, this is actually an expression of something new that is coming (Santiago)

It is important to stress here that indeed, in the Spanish case too, the main driving force behind the substitution of class categorizations by the '99% V. 1%' division, is the increasing precariousness experienced by the Spanish population, which effectively rearranged previously relatively stable socioeconomic references. At the same time, however, it is important to note that precarity essentially constitutes only a name to describe the very relation of dependency for production and reproduction, in capitalist economies. Capital is precarious itself and in this sense 'precarity is and has always been the standard experience of work in capitalism' (Mitropoulos 2005). What is currently seen, then, as a widely experienced precarity, is merely the expression of an otherwise given of capitalist development among previously 'privileged workers' in regards to the conditions of their production and reproduction. In this sense, it can be said that indeed the increasing precarity experienced by Spanish society (as a matter of a far-reaching class recomposition) is a feature relevant to an understanding of how the unity of the 'Indignados' became effectively established in the subject referenced here as the 'precari-us'. However, it is not enough for an understanding of what type of 'construct' the 'Indgnados' represent.

More specifically, if the improbable combination of working and middle classes behind the 'Indignados' could suggest a certain inappropriateness of strictly economic approaches to the analysis of the 'subject' of the 15M, it is not to say that the Marxist precepts of sociopolitical analysis are altogether redundant. That is, the objective opposition between capital and labour, as categorical functions of capitalism itself, were relevant before and still remain relevant today in the sense of a conflict 'impossible to overcome as long as the capitalist mode of production, which is based on the valorization of value as a self-propelling end in itself, continues to exist' (Trenkle 2006: 202). Accordingly, the subjective form of this conflict also remains relevant, as it is no less of 'an immanent conflict between social and economic interests internal to capitalism' (ibid. 2006: 203). It is, however, only some certain

changes in the relation between capital and labour that have effectively given more prominence to the subjective level of this conflict (or else the level of consciousness) (see Trenkle 2006). Among them, those that concern us here are changes in the functional categories of capitalism, which become increasingly precarious, thus making significant sections of the population incapable of clinging onto them. De-classing effectively describes this processes of ‘falling through the grid of the functional categories’, indeed without being proletarianized (see Taibo 2012), but rather being rendered ‘superfluous in the capitalist sense’. In other words:

The trend is clear and unambiguous: across the world a growing segment of new underclasses has emerged, which have nothing to do with the old proletariat and which neither objectively (by their function or position within the process of production) nor subjectively (by virtue of their consciousness) constitute a new social collective (something like a ‘precariat’). Their relationship to the capitalist process of valorization is in the first instance a purely negative one: they are no longer required. But this forces us to formulate anew the question of the possible constitution of new emancipatory social movements (Trenkle 2006: 206).

It is, therefore, elsewhere that we need to search in order to understand what type of ‘construct’ the ‘precarious’ Indignados represent. The ‘Indignados’, as the coming together of an increasingly heterogeneous constituency, represent an inconveniently open question in regards to the constitution of a new historical actor. And yet, the ‘construction’ of this subject (on account of changing forms of class composition due to changes in the functional categories of capitalism), does not interrupt the structuralist understanding of the production and reproduction of *hierarchies of values* in capitalist societies. Instead: ‘like all assertions, it is not simply the declaration that one has discovered the path to a different future in an existing identity that remains questionable. More problematically, such declarations are invariably the

expression and reproduction of a hierarchy of value in relation to others' (Mitropoulos 2005; see also Dumm 1999). It is in this sense that, more than a 'precarious' subject, the 'Indignados', similarly to the 'Aganaktismenoi', represent a 'precari-us' subject, in which we can see a bifurcation of interpretations that challenges the 'unity' of pluralistic approaches. In the accounts of the individual participants of the Indignados interviewed for this research this bifurcation is approached in a twofold manner, which, similarly to the case of the 'Aganaktismenoi', references both a more and a lesser receptive take on the 'unity' of the movement.

On the one hand, the 'Indignados' are celebrated as the manifestation of a hoped-for unity in the struggle for social change. In this direction de-classing, as the mechanism behind precarity, is compared to a 'blow' progressively changing the social compass and accordingly the forms of collective action. In fact, in potentially positive ways, as it allows the communication of politico-ideological interests that previously remained isolated behind strict class references:

It was awesome, in the sense that if it was a Spanish revolution, it was a different revolution. In some way, what is happening [to the society] is like a blow that grows step by step and changes the form of what we know and how we think. In the squares it manifested as a mixture of everything and most important of *everybody*. We had the acampadas, and at the same time we had the neighbourhood assemblies, at the same time we had PAH, and the people were coming and going. Because now there was 'space' for all different interests and all different perspectives that before didn't 'speak' [to one another]. You could see that there was finally some communication between these different perspectives (Fabiana)

On the other hand, a more reluctant take on the unity of the 'Indignados' proposes that it remains an open question whether the multitude of the squares, maintaining its singularities, has actually found in common more

than its precariousness, or else, whether it represents an identity built on little more than contingency in capitalist development:

There is an informal separation that you haven't instituted, you haven't delineated, but still it defines you (Amelia).

In overall terms, for collective action oriented towards radical social change, the reconceptualization of social identity remains always the question, as a matter of the potential to actually effect 'a collective intensification of bodies, minds and desires' (Newman 2014: 96). In the accounts of the individual participants of the 15M, however, concerns about the meaning of class recomposition were raised more often than not: not only as a matter of some intangible forces, so to put it, which are constantly at play, as seen above, but also as a matter of a far-reaching disintegration of the capacities to withstand capitalist development as such, and therefore to actively take part in the fundamental conflict of capitalism, in its objective but also in its subjective form:

Life has toughened very much. Everyday life is getting increasingly difficult for the people. Now it occupies more of their time. And they lose their spirit as well. Things are very bad in this neighbourhood, and the people are getting also mentally affected.. How are they going to come to fight? (Santiago)

Ultimately, then, class recomposition is approached as a matter of a compilation of forces, which in fact tend to create a new subject that appears to stand in unity, but which nevertheless says nothing about the specific (ideological) role of this subject as a concrete historical actor. These concerns, it is suggested however, pass unnoticed by the romantics of the struggle, so to put it, who tend to be carried away by a merely temporary unity produced by temporary positions. At the same time, they are described as concerns that are emphatically absent from the reckonings of a large part of the 'united' subject,

which is fascinated by the potential of ‘unity’ in its discourse and jumps quickly to conclusions about an almost accomplished social change:

Listen, the profile of the person of the 15M. What things are common most frequently? It is a salaried person that has entered unemployment. Above all this is it. In general, it is a person with a certain cultural level. Not very high. But who has read a bit.. -in general I don’t want to touch cultural because it is dangerous, but anyway. It is a person who has read something, who has a critical sense of things, who has certain values like for example that TV sucks, who doesn’t watch TV series, who is not a fanatic of any football club. In addition it is an austere person. Out of necessity, but also because it is not a person hungry for money. It’s a series of such things. But above all, it is a person who was settled before and now is unemployed.

Now, the people, take those who live here for example, in Raval, and who were coming to the protests. They are ‘old’ people and families living here for years. I know them. They are very poor economically and culturally. They are not at all this profile, they clearly belong to the working class and the way they think is also unchanged.

So, my question is who are the ‘sensible people’ that put together one discourse and that will then make the changes that we’d like to see? It is still very few. I would like to be proven wrong, but when I see comrades getting enthusiastic I tell them, well it’s a good start, but don’t lose contact with the floor. Don’t levitate. Touch! Touch! Because there will come the disappointment.

One of the bad things that the 15M did is that many people floated like that. They favoured this type of discourse that was saying ‘No one is going to get us! Never! Never! From now on we are one and the world is different’. How can you say this? But, it was like that for the middle classes mainly. In reality, nothing has changed. Or it’s only slightly

different. And it is only now that we start seeing what we could possibly *do together* (Pablo)

Altogether, whether more credulous or more skeptical about the meaning of ‘unity’ for the ‘Indignados’, the individual participants of the 15M interviewed for this research essentially confirm that indeed de-classing, as a mechanism of change for class composition in Spanish society, effectively brought to the streets a ‘subject’ more heterogenous and more improbable than would have been expected some decades ago. In this sense, if in reference to the famous hashtag -#Spanishrevolution- the 15M accounts as a revolution indeed, this has mainly been a ‘revolution’ in the way Spain was introduced to a new (essentially global) scheme of collective identification in large-scale collective action. We can understand this new process of identification as one which, for the first time in the short history of the 21st century, essentially breaks away from references to the Fordist model, and instead follows expressions of the post-Fordist example, in the field of political action in particular:

Post-Fordism dreams of the global community of “human capital”, where differences are either marketable or reckoned as impediments to the free flow of “humanity” as, or rather for, capital. In short, political pluralism is the idealized version of the post-Fordist market (Mitropoulos 2005).

The question that this ascertainment urges, then, is a question about the role of political plurality in contemporary collective action: a question about the idea that plurality is endowed with the capacity to automatically contain anti-pluralist discourses, in the sense that:

The procedures established for interaction and the presentation of any resulting “unity” are so habitual that they recede beyond view. Those who raise problems with them therefore tend to be regarded as the sources of

conflict if not the architects of a fatal disunity of the class (Mitropoulos 2005).

Finally, it is in this sense that I argue here that the discourse of citizenship that Gerbaudo sees as ‘a source of collective identification’ for the Indignados, and as a means of constructing ‘an inclusive “popular identity”, appealing to diverse demographics affected by the economic crisis and by austerity policies’ (Gerbaudo 2016: 7), needs to be re-examined as a matter of possibly more constricted identifications within the larger heterogeneous subject of the ‘Indignados’. To the extent that indeed, ‘names confer identity as if positing an unconditional presupposition’ (Mitropoulos 2005), it is important to keep note of the hierarchical character of these identities at all instances, and therefore, also of the fact that here too, the Spanish subject, pretty much in the same way as for the Greek ‘Aganaktismenoi’, cannot be adequately handled without a closer appreciation of the constricted identities it conceals in view of the politico-ideological heterogeneity of the ‘precari-us’. Finally, then, the identifications of the Spanish ‘subject’, too, cannot be wholly understood without examining the implied divisions that essentially ‘construct’ the Indignados in tense unity: as indeed one movement, but essentially with ‘two souls’.

Conclusions

With the intention to provide some answers to the question *who are the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ of 2011?*, this chapter has provided a first appreciation of the subject of the Greek and the Spanish protests: in particular, an examination of what I have called (analytically speaking) the first phase in the construction of the collective identity of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’. In this examination it has been found that the subject of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests of 2011 is essentially constructed in relative *unity*, in the sense that, in both cases, the protestors

were found to exhibit a certain proximity, so to put it, in regards to their socioeconomic conditions. This has been possible, on the one hand, through the observation of some key societal macroprocesses in Greece and Spain, relevant to the developmental paradigm of Greek capitalism, and of the intensification of its deficits after the outburst of the crisis in 2008. On the other hand processes were observed relevant to the developmental paradigm of Spanish capitalism and the crisis it experienced already in 2007, on account of the collapse of its inflated housing market and stock market bubbles. The brief examination of these processes established the socioeconomic background against which the protests of 2011 emerged. At the same time, it helped to explore more closely some basic transformations in the class composition of the Greek and the Spanish societies, and therefore to delineate in a more refined way the socioeconomic profile of the protestors of 2011. The key in this examination has been the concept of de-classing, as an indirect result of contemporary capitalist restructuring.

De-classing has been understood here as a result of changes in the functional categories of post-Fordist capitalism, which effectively push increasingly larger parts of the population to fall through the grid of socioeconomic relations (see Trenkle 2006). In this sense, the processes of de-classing in this chapter were understood not as processes of proletarianization in the traditional sense (see Trenkle 2006; Taibo 2012), but as processes of debasement, so to put it, that have radically shaken previously relatively stable socioeconomic references. Of course, these processes are understood neither as being national particularities of either Greece or Spain, nor as contingent upon the contemporary crisis that erupted in 2008. Rather, they are acknowledged as processes of a global restructuring of capitalism that starts already in the late 20th century with post-Fordist capitalism. They are, nevertheless, processes which have been intensified under the current conditions of crisis, or, better put, processes that have been effectively revealed to broader constituencies after the outburst of the crisis in 2008. This is then an

intensification in the sense that the fundamental conflict (between capital and labour) of capitalist socioeconomic organization has extended to include on a rather large-scale those previously 'immunized' groups of the population. In the words of Mitropoulos:

The "lower end" of the (global) labour market and division of labour impoverishment, destitution or a privatized precariousness were accounted for, as an inherent attribute of skin colour and sex, as natural. In many respects, then, what is registered as the recent rise of precarity is actually its discovery among those who had not expected it by virtue of the apparently inherent and eternal (perhaps biological) relation between the characteristics of their bodies and their possible monetary valuation, a sense of worth verified by the demarcations of the wage (paid and unpaid) and in the stratification of wage levels (Mitropoulos 2005).

The examination of the expressions of de-classing in Greece and Spain revealed the construction of new subjects, which in both cases have similarly drawn from a largely heterogeneous constituency. Indeed, in both Greece and Spain, the 'subject' of the protests was found to represent a subject united under commonly shared experiences of joblessness and insecurity. The 'Aganaktismenoi' and the 'Indignados' are, in this sense, the 'precarious' of contemporary capitalist restructuring. Biopolitical capitalism, however, as a matter of an extension of the fundamental conflict between capital and labour into new 'spaces', essentially represents the transferring of this conflict beyond the walls of the factory, and into the different microspaces of social existence. It is also in this sense that the contemporary restructuring of capitalism gives certain prominence to the subjective form of the basic conflict between capital and labour (i.e. expressed at the level of consciousness). By extension, then, if the 'Aganaktismenoi' and the 'Indignados' represent an expression of the 'precarious' of capitalist restructuring in its objective form (as the redundant of the modern processes of production), the matter of their collective

identification in reference to the subjective form of the basic conflict of capitalism remains an open question. It is in this respect, then, that they are understood here as ‘precari-us’ (see Mitropoulos 2005). The bifurcation of ‘worlds and the way these are created’ (Lazzarato 2004) that is implied in the ‘precari-us’, is in fact present in both cases of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’. The analysis of this chapter found that in both instances, there is a simultaneous presence of different ideational schemes. In this direction the individual participants of the protests have confirmed the presence of differential interpretations of the struggle for social change, and they have further disclosed divisions in their assessments of this coexistence (in regards to its limitations and its potentials).

In the relevant literature, and in particular in Hard and Negri’s seminal conceptualization of the ‘multitude’, we similarly find a straightforward acknowledgment of such bifurcations in the struggle for social change through the preservation of singularities in the multitude; although the multitude is ultimately understood as a social body which produces *in common*, and although it is observed that ‘that common we share serves as the basis for future production, in a spiral, expansive relationship’ (Hardt and Negri 2004: 197). If, however, this common production is the production of the multitude as a ‘living flesh’ or even more so as a ‘*new social flesh*’ (ibid. 2004: 159; my emphasis), it is critical to see the contents of the common production of the multitude also as a *new social mind*. It is at this point that perhaps complications arise, for indeed production in common, to begin with, appears to be predicated on the basis of what we have in common. In the words of Hardt and Negri ‘[t]his is perhaps most easily understood in terms of the example of communication as production: we can communicate *only on the basis of languages, symbols, ideas, and relationships we share in common*, and in turn the results of our communication are new common languages, symbols, ideas, and relationships’ (ibid. 2004: 197; my emphasis). For what concerns the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’, therefore, in order to

thoroughly grasp the capacity (i.e. the limits and potentials) of the ‘*precari-us*’, it is of critical importance to examine further the basis of languages, symbols, ideas, and relationships beneath its construction. In other words, we need to try to shed some light on what ‘us’ represents: the bodies of languages, symbols, ideas we find in this construct. The next chapter is devoted to this examination.

7. The tense unity of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ -(B)

The marked heterogeneity of the Spanish protests of 2011 is largely acknowledged as one of the most remarkable aspects of the Indignados. The relevant literature stresses that student movements and youth organizations, in particular, such as the Juventud Sin Futuro (JSF), had a special contribution in the mobilizations of the 15M. The presence of a core of young activists is often understood as a feature of compelling interest for understanding the Indignados, and research has also focused on exploring issues in regards to the grassroots student and youth movement networks connected to them as early risers and brokers (see Zamponi and Fernández González 2016). Yet, in virtually all instances, the Indignados are celebrated as a critical instance of mass contestation that effectively eluded generational classifications (see della Porta 2012; della Porta and Mattoni 2014; Zamponi and Fernández González 2016; Flesher Fominaya 2015). In fact, it was a type of contestation that ‘managed to spread beyond the initial core of mostly young demonstrators to encompass wide sectors of the Spanish civil society’ (Flesher Fominaya 2014a: 166). Framing the connection between political and economic elites and the people as effectively broken, the Indignados essentially came together to represent Spanish civil society at large under the encompassing motto ‘We are the 99%’, and finally to emphatically suggest that ‘*together* we can’ (DRY, Manifesto). Similarly, the Greek Aganaktismenoi are acknowledged as one of the most heterogeneous instances of collective action in the recent post-transition history of the country. The influence of the youth is acknowledged, as in the case of Spain (see Douzinas 2012), but here too the protests have been celebrated as being an unexpected compilation of generational profiles; and at the same time of diverse socioeconomic backgrounds and political discourses (see Gourgouris 2011; della Porta 2012; Dalakoglou 2012; Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos 2013). We see, thus, that the Aganaktismenoi themselves have

actually put emphasis on referencing the whole of society, on calling for ‘*All of Greece at Syntagma* in order to stop the Midterm Agreement... It’s either *us or them!*’ (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Decree of the People’s Assembly of Syntagma Square for the Mid-term Agreement, 22 June 2011).

Large-scale collective action, which as in the cases of Greece and Spain asserts the most basic division of social organization at large, between ‘*us or them*’ (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Decree of the People’s Assembly of Syntagma Square for the Mid-term Agreement, 22 June 2011), while at the same time calling for unity by suggesting ‘I know that *together* we can’ (DRY, Manifesto), can be understood to establish two parallel strings of identities. These strings of identities perform a double function. First, they draw a rough division in the broader society between the political/economic class and the people. Second, in practical terms they frame each of these categories as relatively united —i.e. ‘us - the people - the 99%’ V. ‘them - the political and economic elites - the 1%’. In all instances, however, the unity of ‘us-the 99%’, which is of our immediate interest here, is a negative-value unity in the sense that it is constructed in opposition to ‘them-the 1%’, and thus it has the capacity to encompass a heterogeneous constituency distinguished by differential interpretations of the basic orders of collective action (i.e. means, ends, field of action) (see also Melucci 1995). In this sense, it is a ‘unity’ that can be understood to represent the basic ‘precondition for opening up to a becoming, to a bifurcation of worlds and to the way these are created, in a confrontational manner, not a unifying one’ (Lazzarato 2004). Indeed, the key for understanding political action, broadly speaking, lies in this bifurcation, because, as the relevant literature explains, the body of ‘the people’ is effectively marked by a set of deep seated cleavages (see Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Mouffe 2000; Žižek 2011).

In the literature of social and political sciences ‘the people’, from which large-scale collective action for social change essentially derives its constituency, is suggested to be deeply divided (see also Buck-Morss 2002;

Rancière 2011; Dean 2014; Newman 2014). In this direction, in most analyses, we come across a commonly held understanding that ‘the people’ (a representation of the 99%) as a historical actor is largely constituted by a set of conflicting identities and a series of divisions, which are internal and permanent, so that the encompassing identity of ‘the people’ always represents only a ‘partial linkage’ to one’s personal identity (Rancière 2011: 14). It is also along such lines that the ‘subject’ of the Greek and the Spanish protests of 2011 can be understood to bring together different ‘generations of contestation’, so to put it: ‘generations’ in the sense of clusters, a combination of structural and cultural characteristics, which reference issues of ‘class’ and of the socioeconomic diversity of the constituency of collective action (as discussed in the previous chapter under the concept of the ‘precarious’), as well as issues of a meaningful *ideational heterogeneity* of this constituency (that can be understood then as the ‘precari-us’).

As has been acknowledged earlier, traditionally, the structuralist legacy of the scholarship of social movement studies has directed attention to structural characteristics and organizational cleavages in collective action, and it is essentially from the late 1970s onwards that we see a shift of attention towards cultural attributes and non-organizational cleavages in collective action (see Benford 1997). In this direction, we find examinations of the increasing relevance of consciousness in collective action (see Fantasia 1988), of the processes of boundary negotiation in identity building (see Gamson 1997), of the role of ‘cultural synapses’ and framing contradictions (Nepstad 1997), and altogether closer examinations of the previously disregarded continuities between structural attributes and identity construction (see Polletta 1997; 2002). The common premise of these examinations is that essentially ‘protest movements experience the same principles of classification as the societies from which they come, even if they are seeking to transform them’ (Fillieule and Blanchard 2013: 80). In this direction, this body of research is accounted as having highlighted that the examination of social movements is actually a

matter of examining the interaction between politics, strategies, interests *and ideational elements* in collective action (see Polletta and Jasper 2001; Benford and Snow 2000).

Following along this point, in the examination of the instances of large-scale collective action of 2011 in Greece and Spain, I argue that alongside the diversity of material attributes, it is important to examine also the role of heterogeneity of ideological identities in ‘constructing’ the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’. In the previous chapter the material diversity of the constituency was addressed, as reflected in ‘class’, and was examined through processes of increasing ‘de-classing’ imposed by contemporary capitalist restructuring. This examination disclosed the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ as a ‘construct’ of *unity*; yet, a relative one in the sense that de-classing is a term that references directly the objective form of the basic conflict between capital and labour, but as such it does not allow definitive claims about the way this conflict expresses itself on the subjective level (consciousness). In this chapter, I turn to examine the collective identifications of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ in view of this concern, and I focus on exploring closer the ideational elements of the heterogeneous constituency of the protests. More specifically, I proceed here to examine more closely the (analytically speaking) second phase of the construction of the collective identity of the Greek and the Spanish movements, in *tense* unity. In this direction I single out two basic frameworks of analysis of constitutive divisions in the social and political body of ‘the people’, which fit the examination of the ‘subject’ of the mass mobilizations of 2011. The first is the framework of populist reasoning, and the second the framework of analysis of critical theory. In what follows I examine each one in turn.

Understanding the ‘precari-us’

The framework of analysis of populist reason explains instances of coming together by means of underlining the presence of ‘equilavential chains’ of

demands that cut across larger heterogeneous communities and essentially recast ‘the people’ into a virtually homogenous category vis-à-vis political elites (Laclau 2005: 76). Identities in this framework are worked out in reference to two basic premises. First, a frontier is set, which separates the antagonists (political elites) from the protagonists (the people) of political action. Second, the demands of the protagonists are linked together, thus creating a broad social subject (‘popular demands’), which comes ‘at a very incipient level, to constitute “the people” as a potential historical actor’ (Laclau 2005: 74). The considerations behind this chain of popular demands are explained as vaguely developed anti status-quo demands. As such, however, it is accordingly suggested that they ‘have a different role from the actual material contents of the demands at stake’, and therefore it is difficult for them to achieve consistency in their demands (ibid.: 76). On the other hand there is the framework of analysis of orthodox Marxist theories, which explains instances of coming together by means of underlining constitutive divisions along material elements. These divisions are suggested to cut vertically through larger heterogeneous communities, so that identities are constituted antagonistically through a permanent reference to the material conditions of antagonism in the different sociohistorical phases of capitalist development (Žižek 2011). The separation between antagonists and protagonists becomes here a separation that references different ‘social classes’ (defined in economic terms and in terms of the relation to the means of production and the position in the division of labour), and thus the demands of the protagonists, rather than equivalentially articulated popular demands, are essentially the commonly articulated demands of the ‘revolutionary’ class in particular. Last, the generic formulation of ‘the people’, is here recast to reference ‘the people as the rest of us’, meaning ‘those of us who are proletarianized by capitalism, the people produced through the exploitation, extraction, and expropriation of our practical and communicative activities’ (Dean 2014: 79-84).

The above distinction between ‘the people’ of populist reasoning and ‘the proletarianized people’ of orthodox Marxist analyses, gets more complex if we take into account also the concerns raised in post-Marxist theories. In these frameworks, emphasis is put on constitutive divisions in the social body along post-material lines, which also cut across larger heterogeneous communities. However, they do so neither in the sense of producing a virtually homogenous category of ‘the people’, nor in the sense of referencing an antagonistically constituted category of ‘the proletarianized people’; but rather, in the sense of producing antagonistically constituted categories of ‘identity classes’, so to put it. The ‘identity classes’ of post-Marxist theories are defined neither in terms of a pure anti status-quo discourse (as in populist reasoning), nor in absolute economic terms and in reference to positions in the division of labour (as in orthodox Marxist analyses), but in the sense of post-modern classifications (see for example divisions along the lines of gender, race, ethnicity, religion and so on). Although orthodox Marxist and post-Marxist frameworks have common origins and similarly stand opposite to the framework of populist reasoning, the relevant literature often regards concerns of distribution (with identities defined in economic terms —‘class politics’) and recognition (with identities defined in post-structural terms —‘identity politics’) as antagonistic to one another. In what regards gender issues, for example, in a characteristically straightforward manner, Judith Butler sets clear the ways in which issues of distribution and issues of recognition more often than not are analytically examined in confrontation with one another (see for example Butler 1998). In the present study, rather than separating the two sets of concerns as antagonistic to one another (i.e. ‘social classes’ V. ‘identity classes’), I follow instead Fraser’s conceptualization of issues of redistribution and issues of recognition as inextricably intertwined within the framework of a critical theory of social justice. That is, a theory ‘which identifies and defends only those versions of the cultural politics of difference that can be coherently combined with the social politics of equality’ (Fraser 1995: 69); and especially so in the contemporary sociohistorical phase of capitalist restructuring

whereby ‘misrecognition and maldistribution are not fully mutually convertible’ (Fraser 1998: 142).

Thus, I make use here of the framework of populist reasoning on the one hand, explaining the construction of collective identities in large-scale movements as described above, and on the other hand I make use of the framework of a critical theory informed by Marxist *and* post-Marxist theory. For this framework the relevance of anarchist and post-anarchist theory needs to be also acknowledged (see Gordon 2007; Newman 2007) for it is in fact anarchist theories in combination with Marxist theories that together constitute par excellence the theories of a radical critique to capitalism in view of radical social change (see Chrysis 2016). Finally, then, material and post-material elements (as approached in Marxist, post-Marxist, anarchist, and post-anarchist theory) are coherently combined in the construction of collective identity in large-scale collective action, so that the basic formulation of ‘the people as the rest of us’ is extended to include concerns of both distribution and recognition. In this form, the historical actor, or else the ‘subject’ of collective action, rather than a virtually homogeneous social subject (as in populist reasoning), is a heterogeneous patchwork of singularities (see Hardt and Negri 2004), in which we find some differential ‘cognitive, moral and emotional connections’ (see Polletta and Jasper 2001: 285). Its demands are not articulated equivalentially, but antagonistically, and they are kept together not through ‘empty signifiers’ (see Laclau 2005), but by their common antagonistically constructed content (and in this we find material and post-material concerns combined).

The ‘precari-us’ as ‘the people’: popular demands in the protests of 2011

In overall terms, the Greek and the Spanish protests of 2011 appear to have built their collective identities by means of putting great emphasis on cutting across the larger heterogeneous community of the Greek and the Spanish populations and thus drawing firm distinctions between political elites

and ‘the people’, broadly defined. Evidence for this is found in the way in which the protestors emphasized the equivalential articulation of demands beyond the specific material or ideological content of these demands. In this direction, the Spanish protestors appear to have delineated ‘the people’ as an inclusive community in which ‘*ordinary people, like you*’ find their place:

We are *ordinary people*. We are *like you*: people, who get up every morning to study, work or find a job, people who have family and friends. People, who work hard every day to provide a better future for those around us. *Some of us consider ourselves progressive, others conservative. Some of us are believers, some not. Some of us have clearly defined ideologies, others are apolitical, but we are all concerned and angry* about the political, economic, and social outlook which we see around us (DRY, Manifesto).

Accordingly, in the discursive formulations of the Indignados examined in this research, evidence is found as to the construction of inclusive narratives, in which a) popular demands are connected together beyond partisan identities:

It is a *nonpartisan* meeting. *We do not want to position ourselves on any side, we only think in common*’ (Acampada BCN, 20 May 2011).

But also, evidence is found as to the construction of inclusive narratives in which b) the protestors come together under more generic premises -such as that of ‘dignity’- with the capacity to effectively unite everybody:

This movement includes *anyone who wants to defend their dignity* (Acampada BCN, 16 May 2011).⁸⁸

⁸⁸ <https://acampadabcn.wordpress.com/2011/05/16/acampadabcn/>

Finally, evidence of the most clear manifestations of non-partisanship and of the equivalential positioning of the protestors vis-à-vis one another, and altogether as a unified body separated from the political class, is found in the Spanish Indignados' famous declaration:

We are neither politicians nor unions. We are citizens. Indignant (Appendix B, Picture 16).

In a rather similar manner, in the discourse of the Greek Aganaktismenoi emphasis is put on referencing society as a whole in a final battle between 'the people' and the political class:

'All of Greece at Syntagma in order to stop the Midterm Agreement.. It's either us or them!' (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Decree of the People's Assembly of Syntagma Square for the Mid-term Agreement, 22 June 2011).

Along such lines, 'unity' more often than not is found a) to have been underscored as an inevitable necessity of the struggle for social change at large:

In this struggle *we are all necessary*. Politically integrated or not. Pensioners, employed and unemployed alike. In this struggle *no one can be left out* (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of General Assembly 3 July 2011).

But it is also found b) to have been celebrated as a breakthrough in collective action: that is, as a form of collective action that steps beyond politico-ideological divisions and beyond the traditional 'usual suspects' of collective action for social change:

It was a challenge to unite the upper with the lower square, because it is one thing for someone to vote for PASOK and it is another thing to behave

in support of the regime (which is the [party of] PASOK). *But the whole Greek society gathered, who are not the ‘usual suspects’, it is not only the extra-parliamentary left. All of us who are different start to speak* (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of Peoples’ Assembly 11 July 2011).

Finally, in rapid assessments of the protests’ development, the protestors are found to underscore ‘unity’, under generic and equivalentially articulated demands, as an indeed critical feature of the mobilizations of the Aganaktismenoi:

What the movement has achieved is to put forward *generic demands (the troika and the memorandum to leave)*, which got accepted by the majority of the population.. *Everybody fits* the popular assembly (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of General Assembly 29 August 2011).

The intense emphasis put on the unity of ‘the people’ can be further read as a strategic choice of the protestors. In the Greek Aganaktismenoi we find evidence for this in the way ‘unity’ was employed, in recognition of apparent differences, as a strategic obligation (‘we have to’) in order for the protestors to be able to oppose the political class of the country as an indeed united body:

We have to be united in spite of our background (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of General Assembly 10 July 2011).

We have to be united in order to be against them and in order to demand (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of General Assembly 20 June 2011).

In the Spanish Indignados we find similar evidence that ‘unity’ was in fact employed as a strategic choice, effecting a steady coalescing that would in turn reveal that society as a whole is finally the historical actor of social change:

And, above all, we aim at keeping society as the sole driver of this transformation (Acampada BCN, 19 May 2011).⁸⁹

In this sense, the equivalential positioning of the protestors is read here as a strategic choice in order to emphasize a broad social alliance against a broad social and political apparatus (in which the political class holds prominent position, but does not constitute the only antagonist). This broad social and political apparatus, it is suggested, opposes the protests, manipulates information and ultimately frames them in unfavourable ways, with the aim of effecting their disintegration. In other words, in this context, ‘unity’ is more specifically understood as a strategic choice in order to shield the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados against orchestrated symbolic attacks.

In Spain, indicative in this direction is the Acampada Sol ‘*Communique on the characterization of persons detained after police charges in front of the Ministry of Interior*’.⁹⁰ Here, ‘unity’ is discursively built on two levels. At the first level it is built through the identification and denouncing of unfavourable framing, and through the attribution of responsibility for this framing to government officials and to the police, attempting to disintegrate the mobilizations:

Ms. Dolores Carrión, government delegate in Madrid stated in the press that three of the people arrested after police charges last Thursday have a criminal record. She forgot to mention that also six people were detained without a criminal record, one of them a journalist doing their work with accreditation. In addition, police sources have reported that among them there was an Argentinian, a Honduran, and a Portuguese. They forgot to mention that there were also several Spaniards. *We ask what is the reason for referring to this data?*

⁸⁹ <https://acampadabcn.wordpress.com/documents/declaracion-de-principios/>

⁹⁰ <https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/08/07/comunicado-sobre-la-caracterizacion-de-las-personas-detenidas-tras-las-cargas-policiales-ante-el-ministerio-del-interior/>

Does Ms. Carrión mean that those who have served a sentence have no right to participate in citizen movements? Or to circulate in public? Do the police forces want to establish a relationship between being foreigner and being delinquent? We ask, in summary, what does Ms. Carrión think of *reintegration* (one of the principles of Spanish criminal law), and what do the police sources think of *multicultural coexistence*?

The communication of these data by the competent authorities has resulted in the publication of numerous articles in certain tabloids. In some of them it is stated that several of the detainees are the instigators of the 15M Movement on social networks. With this *they demonstrate, once again, their absolute ignorance about what constitutes a horizontal, assembleary and spontaneous movement that lacks leaders. They demonstrate, once again, their absolute incomprehension of the form in which the 15M makes collective decisions and disseminates them on the internet and other networks in a decentralized and rhizomatic way. And they demonstrate, also, their eagerness to manipulate what is happening* (Acampada Sol, 7 August 2011).

At the second level unity is discursively built through calls to defy the social differences upon which state officials and the police try to capitalize, in order to interpellate the protestors into the symbolic order as delinquents, and on this basis to progressively bring about disintegration:

The commission of Dissemination of Acampada Sol *continues to function in an open and horizontal way*, spreading through social networks and web pages the calls that are decided in the assemblies of Sol and the information that is generated by the commissions and working groups. Its next assembly is on Wednesday 10 August at 20:00 o'clock at Puerta del Sol. *To attend you don't need to present a passport or a criminal record*

(as in any other of the assemblies or actions of this movement)
(Acampada Sol, 7 August 2011).⁹¹

In Greece, the same was found in the 24 July press release of the Aganaktismenoi of Lefkos Pyrgos, in which ‘unity’ is similarly employed strategically to denote alliance against a broader apparatus that antagonizes the protests. Here too, ‘unity’ is discursively built on two levels. First, this is done by exposing instances of unfavourable/unjust framing of the protestors as criminals and of the site of the encampment as a site of criminal activity, as well as through attributing responsibility for this to the media and the state leadership. Responsibility was attributed also to a segment of the citizenry that represented an ‘internal enemy’, in its functioning to support the interests of the polity at large (including, but not only, the government), rather than the interests of the protestors:

The squares have been full of *people with more differences rather than similarities...* Among us there are also drug users and people who are in the phase of reintegration or detoxification and rehabilitation. This social group participates in our movement with whatever strength it has. Due to the presence of these social groups in the square the *Aganaktismenoi have been charged as fostering criminal activities* at Lefkos Pyrgos.

On this matter we state the following: *The state leadership slanders our movement.* It is orchestrating the police, the media, the drug dealers and their ‘parrots’ around the neighbourhoods in order to show that our square is a site of criminality. *They pursue the disintegration of the square and [the disintegration] of a determined, tenacious, collective and majoritarian challenging of the permanent exploitation and repression they prepare for us [...]* The drug dealers that approach the square are

⁹¹ <https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/08/07/comunicado-sobre-la-caracterizacion-de-las-personas-detenidas-tras-las-cargas-policiales-ante-el-ministerio-del-interior/>

unwanted and we will take measures to secure the square and to obstruct their action. (Communique - Press release, Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos 24 July 2011).⁹²

On a second level, similarly to the Spanish case, unity was built through calls to defy the social differences exploited by forces opposing the protests and trying to interpellate the Aganaktismenoi into the symbolic order as criminals, to bring about their dissolution:

We ask the Aganaktismenoi drug users to actively participate in the movement.. To be a living part of the movement.. *Vulnerable social groups, as well as every citizen, are welcome to the square*, and they are necessary for our victory [...] *Our characteristic is not crime, but struggle against the government measures* (Communique - Press release, Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos 24 July 2011).⁹³

In all the above, we see that in fact the basic framework of populism can be used in order to explain the equivalential articulation of ‘popular demands’, which at an incipient level brought ‘the people’ together as a historical actor, defined through an anti-status quo discourse that highlighted the orchestrated opposition of the broader social and political apparatus (including the media, police forces, individual state officials and the state leadership more generally). In this sense, the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ can be, indeed, on a preliminary level, described as the subject of a populist politics, in which the very basic relationships of populist reasoning are essentially satisfied —i.e. division between the people (‘us’) and the political class (‘them’), unity of the people against the political class (‘us V. them’). This is with the exception of one condition: that is, in both cases of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados

⁹² http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.de/2011/07/blog-post_24.html

⁹³ http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.de/2011/07/blog-post_24.html

we have an apparent lack of what seems to be a basic feature of populist politics: the charismatic leader.

The theory of populist reasoning proposes that among other elements of populist politics, it is the figure of the leader that holds a central place. In particular, it is suggested that leadership, in regards to its capacity to keep society together, stands in an inversely proportional relation with the existence of differential mechanisms. In other words, the less the society depends on such mechanisms, 'the more it depends, for its coherence, on this transcendent, singular moment. But the extreme form of singularity is an individuality. In this way, almost imperceptibly, the equivalential logic leads to singularity, and singularity to identification of the unity of the group with the name of the leader' (Laclau 2005: 100). It is in this direction that the presence of a leader represents a key feature of populist politics. More specifically it is suggested that the leader is set in direct contact with the unified group, and makes use of her clientelist base in order to prevail over other types of politics (see Laclau 1977: 143-198). By contrast to this precept, however, the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011 have been essentially registered by the collective imaginary as leaderless mobilizations, and as instances in which we can indeed see a leaderless 'intensification of bodies, minds and desires' (Newman 2014: 96; see also Viejo Viñas 2011). This has been the case for Greece and Spain, with both the *Aganaktismenoi* and the *Indignados* emphatically rejecting leaderships of all kinds (see also Oikonomakis and Roos 2013; Sergi and Vogiatzoglou 2013; Romanos 2013).

In Greece the protestors denounced political leaders for betraying the people and asserted that their time had finally come to put forward their own demands through a type of leaderless and bottom-up organization:

Now it is our time, now it's us who speaks!' (*Aganaktismenoi Syntagma*, Decree of the People's Assembly of Syntagma Square for the Mid-term Agreement, 22 June 2011).

Direct democracy, non-partisan, non-manipulated. We do not accept guidance (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 2 June 2011).

By contrast to what the theory of populist reasoning suggests, what we find in the discourse of the Aganaktismenoi is a characteristic defense of its leaderless and nonpartisan character as being essentially the most critical mechanism of unity:

I supported, I support, and I will support the movement. I was here since the first moment. Since the beginning, this was *on account of the movement's nonpartisan and peaceful character* (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Peoples' Assembly 11 July 2011).

Similarly, in Spain the first mobilizations of 15 May were assessed as successful on account of their leaderless, non-partisan and non-syndicalist character (DRY, Press Release 17 May 2011),⁹⁴ while in different instances the protestors further assessed the experience of 2011 as a unique and authentic expression of the desires of *ordinary citizens*, who received no centralized political guidance of any sort:

We do not represent any political party and they do not represent us (Acampada BCN, 19 May 2011).⁹⁵

In this direction, the Spanish movement has tirelessly underscored the claim that it has been and it will remain a leaderless one, and it effectively appears to have stayed that way in the years that followed, still declaring:

⁹⁴ see <http://madrid.democraciarealya.es/2011/05/17/comunicado-de-democracia-real-ya-despues-del-15-de-mayo/>

⁹⁵ see <https://acampadabcn.wordpress.com/documents/declaracion-de-principios/>

We are those from below, and we go after those who are above (DRY, Communique 7 May 2016).⁹⁶

Finally, the picture of a leaderless organization is confirmed in the accounts of those individual participants of the 15M with militant presence in broader struggles for social change, who highlight the absence of political guidance as an authentically fascinating feature of the protests of 2011:

At a certain point there were massive assemblies and the people actively participating, so speaking in the assemblies, were not the social activists. They were ordinary people, people that previously were not involved in movements. In Madrid, I remember that people, that we have met several years ago, from different movements, from different political organizations, we were looking at it like it was a theatre. What's going on with these people! We were really impressed! We were really happy. But come on, this was not controlled by anyone. There was no effort or a conscious strategy that we had planned from before and this was its result. (Felipe).

Altogether, both the Greek and the Spanish protests appear to have been predicated on a characteristic aversion to political leadership, as traditionally exercised through political parties, labour unions and syndicalist associations. And yet, the theory of populist politics suggests that populism is intimately connected with the 'recognized authority', and that especially in those instances in which appeal is made to the 'united people', this vision of unity actually tends to 'encourage support for strong leadership where a charismatic individual is available to personify the interests of the nation' (Canovan 1999: 5). What appears here to constitute a mismatch, between the central place of the 'leader' in the theory of populist reason and the celebrated absence of

⁹⁶ 5years assessment, see <http://www.democraciarealya.es/blog/2016/05/07/5-anos-de-luchas-y-seguimos-a-las-plazas/>

leadership in the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados, can be explained as an expression of an increasing disenchantment of the wider society with political parties. As both the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados declared '*They don't represent us*'. This feature, however, in reality confirms rather than disproves the thesis that populist reasoning was employed in the protests of 2011. Peter Mair explains the point succinctly:

Populist anti-party sentiments may be at least partly fueled by a sense that political leaders and their parties are enjoying an increasingly privileged status at the same time as their partisan relevance is seen to be in decline. As party leaderships become increasingly remote from the wider society, and as they also appear increasingly similar to one another in ideological or policy terms, it simply becomes that much easier for populist protestors to rally against the supposed privileges of an undifferentiated political class. As party democracy weakens, therefore, the opportunities for populist protest clearly increase (Mair 2000: 8).

To make the above clearer, it should be of help to draw here a distinction between three types of populist discourses, distinguished by the specific conceptualizations of 'the people' that they put forward. These can be alternatively understood as orders of classification that speak about the 'united people', about 'our people', and finally about the 'ordinary people' (see Canovan 1999). It is the last one that concerns this analysis. The 'united people' can be understood to reference the most basic form of populism, in which the generalized popular disaffection with party politics essentially bestows on a charismatic leader the possibility to effectively represent in her person the interests of the whole society. 'Our people' closely follows this type of populist discourse, but it further introduces the figure of the 'internal enemy'. That is, it puts forward the notion of 'ethnic kith and kin'; it makes divisive invocations, which distinguish those who belong and those who are essentially unwanted (Canovan 1999: 5). This is a type of right-wing populism

in which national identities assume an unchallenged status that effectively furnishes hierarchies of existence in the social space, and more often than not uses notions such as ‘nationality’ or ‘citizenship’ as key conceptions to effect, or rather postpone, identifications. Historically, in fact, this is ‘one of the most directly murderous aspects of the process of identification’ (Holloway 2002: 73). Finally, the classification of ‘ordinary people’ departs from the second type in particular in that it makes use of integrative invocations, and from the second and the first type together in that it overcomes the centrality of charismatic leadership. This type of populist discourse is the type that concerns us the most here, since in it we find reflected all the basic elements that are detected in the discourse of both the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’: in short, a faithful representation of the “silent majority” of “ordinary, decent people”, whose interests and opinions are (they claim) regularly overridden by arrogant elites, corrupt politicians and strident minorities’ (Canovan 1999: 5).

In the populism of the ‘ordinary people’, high disaffection with the political class, for its bowing to ‘the dictatorship of major economic powers’ (DRY, Manifesto), and identifying it as invariably consisting of ‘bums, ruffians, politicians’ (Aganaktismenoi chant), indeed constitute the conditions for a yet deeper incision of the fundamental division between ‘the people’ and ‘political leadership’, thus giving rise to a type of leaderless, bottom-up populism. This can be understood as a type of populism that discursively expresses itself in referencing mainly the ‘*ordinary* people’, while practically it translates the deep deficiencies of party democracy into drastic and dramatic changes in the geography of the party scene (see Kriesi 2014; Kriesi and Pappas 2015). Electoral results are the key to tracking such changes.

In the case of Greece we can find the most emphatic confirmation of this thesis, with exceptional changes manifesting themselves in the first round of elections in May 2012: on the one hand, with the dramatic fall of the two major political parties, with the right-wing ND arriving only at a meagre 18.85% (14.62% decrease from the 2009 elections), and the socialist PASOK

witnessing a historical low, arriving only at 13.18% (30.74% decrease from the 2009 elections). On the other hand there was the equally staggering increase of the left-wing SYRIZA to 16.78% (12,18% increase from the 2009 elections),⁹⁷ and the first time entry of the neo-nazi Golden Dawn in the parliament (and accordingly in the geography of Greek party politics) with 6.97%. The only exception was the Communist Party KKE, which had a slight increase from 7.54% to 8.48%, but was to follow the same trend in the second round of June 2012 elections when it fell to 4.50%; the lowest it has ever been in the past 15years (YPES, National Election Results).

In the case of Spain, by contrast, we see only slight changes of no particular importance in the elections of 2011, when the major political parties appear to have retained their previous strength with the right-wing PP reaching 41.89% (2.03% increase from the 2008 elections) and the socialist PSOE arriving at 25.23% (12.4% decrease from the 2008 elections), while the left-wing IU marked an increase of about 3%, arriving at 7.02% (Congreso, General Election Results). The general pattern, however, is the same here too, although we have to wait until the elections of 2015, in order to witness some significant changes. These changes were manifested in the significant fall of the right-wing PP to 26.85%, the historical low of the PSOE at 18.92% and the impressive first time participation in general elections and direct entry into the parliament of the political party Podemos, with 12.69% (Congreso, General Election Results). In fact, this was a party formed in the aftermath of the Indignados, with claims to fight against unemployment and inequality, and to represent the ‘decent, ordinary people’ (see Flesher Fominaya 2014b), with its leadership declaring in this direction:

⁹⁷ For an analysis of the links between the Aganaktismenoi as a protest movement and electoral politics, and in particular anti-austerity politics and the eventual rise of SYRIZA to power, see Karyotis, G., Rüdiger, W. (2017). The Three Waves of Anti-Austerity protest in Greece, 2010-2015, in *Political Studies Review*, pp.1-12.

The problem of this country goes further than the ideological label of the left and the right (PODEMOS @ahorapodemoss 6 February 2014).⁹⁸

There are three important points here. The first is to acknowledge that indeed Podemos is not 15M. At the same time, however, we must acknowledge that we cannot really understand Podemos without understanding 15M (see also Flesher Fominaya 2014b). Finally, the differences between the cases of Greece and Spain (first in terms of a delayed transformation of the geography of the party scene in Spain, and second in terms of the emergence of a new populist party in Spain with organizational claims of horizontality and deliberation, and an ideational orientation closely resembling that of the 15M) have their own special meaning. Nevertheless, this is a meaning that speaks about the increasing relevance of the national context in the analysis, rather than one which dismisses the relevance of populist reasoning in the examination of the collective identifications of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’. Having briefly examined here the identifications of the Greek and the Spanish protests through the lens of the theory of populism, in what follows I turn to explore alternatively the ‘subject’ of the Greek and the Spanish protests, using the framework of a critical theory of social justice.

The ‘precari-us’ as ‘the people as the rest of us’:⁹⁹ material and post-material demands in the protests of 2011

The basic scheme of unity under the classification of ‘the people’ can be re-examined also in terms of a more critical approach to the identifications of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011. The discursive formulations of both the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ allow us to move in that direction in the sense that in both cases we find indications that their discourse is also moving towards specifically identifying what are the

⁹⁸ <https://twitter.com/ahorapodemoss/status/431465987360030720>

⁹⁹ see also Dean, J. (2014). “Sovereignty of the People”, in Kioupkiolis, A., Katsambekis, G. (eds.), *Radical Democracy and Collective Movements Today. The Biopolitics of the Multitude versus the Hegemony of the People*. UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited (pp. 73-91); pp. 73; 74; 90.

commonly embraced contents of what otherwise appear to be equivalentially articulated demands. In this sense, it reveals itself as a discourse that breaks away from the construction of identities as ‘empty signifiers’ (see Laclau 2007: 36-46). More analytically, in the case of populist reasoning we see that the totality of the ‘subject’ is essentially a ‘failed totality’, in the sense that it is ‘both impossible and necessary. Impossible, because the tension between equivalence and difference is ultimately insurmountable; necessary, because without some kind of closure, however precarious it might be, there would be no signification and no identity’ (Laclau 2005: 70; see also Laclau 1992). The identity of the embodied totality (i.e. the result of an incommensurable universal identification) is then disclosed as an empty signifier, which becomes essentially emptier (in the sense that it gets increasingly detached from its particularistic demands) the more the equivalential chain extends (see Laclau 2005: 96). Directly contrasting this precept, the identifications of the embodied totality of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ are found to become also effectively attached to particularistic demands of a specific material and post-material character. In the Greek case we find such indications in that the discourse of the Aganaktismenoi, especially after the first puzzlement receded, often includes calls (more or less direct) to acknowledge that, next to common problems, there are also some common demands:

Let’s not get anxious, because some of us -during the first days especially- came here to tell their own problems. This is necessary, it helps. Now we understand that not only our common problems unite us. *But also some common demands* (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Peoples’ Assembly 11 July 2011).

These are calls that are invariably followed by a systematic urging to finally name these demands, to define what the protestors have in common in clear,

propositional terms, and thus ‘to set goals, directly realizable’ (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Peoples’ Assembly 11 July 2011):

The victory of Syntagma is the victory of politics. I agree with the attitude of impeachment, but let’s be careful. If we want to have resonance *denouncing is not enough* (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Popular Assembly 3 July 2011).

Whatever discussion takes place has to take place with the perspective of victory. We’ve been discussing since Thursday if we have won or not. We don’t need defeatism. We haven’t won, but we haven’t lost. It would be a big victory if this government would ‘fall’ and if the midterm had not passed. But we have to continue. *We have to put forward political demands* (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the General Assembly 3 July 2011).

We have to put forward proposals, so that we have oriented and specific discussions about various subjects. For health, education etc. As in: these are the problems, these are the solutions (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Peoples’ Assembly 11 July 2011).

Thus, in the discourse of the squares we find particularistic interests behind the demand for democracy, which are connected to material considerations that have to do with employment, health care, education, pensions etc, as well to post-material considerations that generally have to do with the ‘quality of life’ (read: ‘happiness’, ‘hope’, ‘trust’, ‘compassion’, ‘respect’ etc):

Concepts like *justice, respect for other people, for the environment, finally real democracy, are common for all of us* (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 28 May 2011).

I want *happiness, peace, hope, education, trust, compassion, courage, respect. Us to think positively*, and to do good deeds (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, General assembly 29 May 2011).

In a decree of the Aganaktismenoi of Syntagma dating 2012, we finally find the particular material and post-material contents of the generic demand for democratic social change summarized all together, through a string of oppositional classifications, which clarify the protestors' specific demands against the current situation:

Today, in the name of Democracy are committed the worst crimes against humanity. It's time to turn the page and pass on to a new historical phase where there prevails:

- *Work for everybody as a means of creation and offering to society*, instead of slavery and waged exploitation.
- *Social empathy and solidarity*, instead of charity and alms.
- *Respect for every human being and for nature*, instead of depreciation and destruction.
- *Collective processes where individuality is maintained*, instead of representation and living a private life.

Direct Democracy ensures the above (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Decrees-Minutes of the People's Assembly 4 January 2012).

What makes a critical theory of social justice relevant here is the fact that the material and post-material demands that we find in the discourse of the Aganaktismenoi are often coupled with direct calls for a radical struggle that seems to combine 'class struggle' with the notion of 'cultural politics':

We need class struggle, a state guaranteed education, health, protection of public wealth [...] but *we also need to fight for more than that*, we want life (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, General assembly 29 May 2011).

These are calls for the overthrowing of capitalism and for a unity, effectively built against capitalism, which indeed appear to be consistently coupled with the notion of ‘social justice’:

Notions like justice, respect, real democracy are common for all of us (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of General Assembly 28 May 2011)

We flooded Syntagma and we set up the popular assembly as a call to take our lives in our hands, a call for freedom, equality, justice, dignity and solidarity (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Consensual Decree of the Popular Assembly of Syntagma Square for Dimitris Christoulas 8 April 2012)

Finally, what we find in the discourse of the individual participants of the protests to be a call for doing away with ‘the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie’ (Marios), for overthrowing the ‘mob of capitalist interests’ (Giannis) and establishing a ‘workers’ democracy’ (Eleni), we find it coupled in the discourse of the protests of 2011 with a call for changing mindsets and ways of relating:

If tomorrow our stance towards life has changed, only then Syntagma will have succeeded (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the General Assembly 3 July 2011).

In the case of the Indignados, by contrast to the Aganaktismenoi, we do not come across so many calls for articulating demands in propositional terms, although here too we do find particularistic attachments in the demands of the

protestors. Yet, first we find calls that unify the various demands of the movement as demands of an altogether ‘suffering’ population:

...but we are all concerned and angry....This situation has become normal, a daily suffering, without hope [...] If as a society we learn not to trust our future to an abstract economy, which never returns benefits for the most, we can eliminate the abuse that we are all suffering. (DRY, Manifesto)

Thereafter we also see these demands further specified to reference a set of emphatically disregarded, yet ‘inalienable truths’. It is in these truths that now, similarly to the case of the *Aganaktismenoi*, we find the more particularistic attachments of the *Indignados*, which in turn speak for material concerns that have to do with employment, access to housing, health care or education etc, and post-material considerations that have to do with culture, personal development, happiness etc:

...the right to housing, employment, culture, health, education, political participation, free personal development, and consumer rights for a healthy and happy life [...] equality, progress, solidarity, freedom of culture, sustainability and development, welfare, and people’s happiness (DRY, Manifesto).

What is the most critical feature in regards to these material and post-material issues is that essentially they reflect concerns for *redistribution* and *recognition*. On the one hand there is ‘redistribution’ that guarantees equality, housing, employment, healthcare, education, the welfare etc. On the other hand there is ‘recognition’ expressed as equal access to all material expressions of social existence, as political inclusion and as actual political participation. In the Declaration of Principles of *Acampada Barcelona*, finally, we come across the notion of ‘inequality’ as the thread that runs to connect these issues in a comprehensive struggle guided by the desire for radical social change:

We are united in our rage, our discomfort, our precarious life which is derived by inequality but, above all, what keeps us together is our will for change. We are here because we want a new society that puts our life on top of any political or economic interest. We feel crushed by the capitalist economy, we feel excluded from the present political system which does not represent us. *We are striking for a radical change in society* (Acampada BCN, 19 May 2011)¹⁰⁰

Along the same lines we find Acampada Barcelona also speaking of *Measures for a dignified life*, noting that the struggle of the movement is a united struggle against increasing precarity and the ‘deterioration of living conditions’, a situation in which capitalist exploitation is the sole driving force:

A cry of rage and indignation unites us in front of *precariatization and deterioration of the living conditions in all areas, caused by capitalism*, which is incapable to resolve its own internal contradictions and in addition increases the potential for its own destruction (Acampada BCN, ‘Primeres mesures per a una vida digna’, 20 June 2011).¹⁰¹

Altogether, that is, this appears to be a movement whose collective identifications cannot be understood outside the identifications of previous struggles for *redistribution* (such as labour struggles) and *recognition* (such as struggles about gender and origin) against the ‘irremediable barbarity’ of capitalism:

¹⁰⁰ <https://acampadabcn.wordpress.com/documents/declaracion-de-principios/>

¹⁰¹ in Catalan: https://acampadabcn.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/primeres-mesures-per-a-una-vida-digna_2006011.pdf

in Castellano: https://acampadabcn.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/primeras-medidas-para-una-vida-digna_20060111.pdf

Original post: <https://acampadabcn.wordpress.com/principis-per-laccio/>

The scandal in view of such a situation, which if it does not change leads irretrievably to barbarity, pushes us to unite with other forces and *make ours the demands of their struggles (struggles of workers, students, struggles about gender, origin, alter-globalization struggles, struggles of self-determination of the people...)* (Acampada BCN, ‘Primeres mesures per a una vida digna’, 20 June 2011).¹⁰²

In all the above, we find the confirmation that the discourse of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ can be also understood as an anti-capitalist discourse, and accordingly their collective identifications can be explored also through the lens of a critical theory of social justice. In sum, therefore, it is the case that in both Greece and Spain the united ‘precari-us’ are essentially appealing for a double reading. In what follows I proceed to examine more closely the collective identifications of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’, exploring the political logic and the ideological references behind them, in order to render intelligible this bifurcation of the ‘social subject’: a subject of a populist politics and a subject of an anti-capitalist politics.

Tensions in ideological interpretations: the two ‘souls’ of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados

Social movements are not unified actors, in the sense that they represent a set of social relationships that are often conflictual. Melucci explains:

What empirically is called a “social movement” is a system of action, connecting plural orientations and meanings. A single collective action or protest event, moreover, contains different kinds of behavior and the

¹⁰² in Catalan: https://acampadabcn.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/primeres-mesures-per-a-una-vida-digna_20060111.pdf

in Castellano: https://acampadabcn.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/primeras-medidas-para-una-vida-digna_20060111.pdf

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analysis has to break its apparent unity and to find out the various elements converging in it and possibly having different outcomes (Melucci 1984: 825).

In this direction, an analysis of the collective identifications of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados, rather than trying to discover a 'deep mind' in the protests (Melucci 1984: 825) needs to actually explore the social relationships that the protests represented. I single out here two social relationships, the elements of which can help explore tensions in the collective identifications of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados respectively.

In the case of the Aganaktismenoi, I single out the basic social relationship between anarchist/autonomous/anti-authoritarian/radical left movements¹⁰³ on the one hand, and on the other, the social base of an indeterminate Centre/Left. This is the relationship of an ever present confrontation between two 'subjects': a) the 'subject' of radical sociopolitical analyses, expressed through anti-capitalist discourses and b) the 'subject' of moderate sociopolitical analyses, expressed through a variety of discourses with certain prevailing themes, such as those of 'structural reform', 'political consolidation' and 'national sovereignty'. In the case of the Indignados, I single out the basic social relationship summarized in the distinction between autonomous/libertarian movements on the one hand and the movements of the institutional Left, but also a neoliberalized Left, on the other hand. This is the relationship of ever present tensions between two 'subjects' referencing different systems of interpretation in regards to orientations and meanings in collective action: a) the 'subject' of radical sociopolitical analyses, expressed through anti-capitalist discourses and b) the 'subject' of moderate sociopolitical analyses, expressed through a variety of discourses with certain

¹⁰³ For reasons of parsimony, in the rest of the chapter I shall be referring to them as anarchists/left-ists.

prevailing themes, such as those of ‘political negotiation’ and ‘defense of representative models’ (see also Flesher Fominaya 2007).

Finally, it should be noted that the basic elements of these two relationships (i.e. anarchists/leftists — indeterminate Centre/Left in Greece, and autonomous/libertarians — institutional/neoliberalized Left in Spain) do not describe in absolute terms the two ‘souls’ of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados respectively. Nevertheless, they can be understood as sketching with relative fidelity basic tensions in the development of contemporary collective action in Greece and Spain, and by extension as helping depict in an accurate manner the basic bifurcation of politico-ideological attachments behind the otherwise ‘unified subject’ of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy protests of 2011 (see Figure 3).

		Socioeconomic Characteristics		
		Working Class	Middle Class	
Ideological Characteristics	Anti-capitalist discourse	↔		Anarchist/leftist (GR) — Autonomous/libertarian (ES)
	Anti-memorandum Discourse (GR)	↔		Indeterminate ‘center’ (GR)
	Citizenist discourse (ES)	↔		‘Young Indignados’ (ES)
		‘Precari-us’		

Figure 3: Tensions of ideological characteristics in the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ of Greece and the ‘Indignados’ of Spain

The ‘Aganaktismenoi’: anarchists/leftists and the indeterminate Centre/Left

In the larger wave of widespread opposition to austerity policies in Greece,¹⁰⁴ the Aganaktismenoi of 2011 represent the second phase of mobilizations (see Sergi and Vogiatzoglou 2013; Diani and Kousis 2014; Karyotis and Rüdig 2017), a cycle of contention in which we characteristically see the intensification of conflict across the social system, but also a basic alteration of its characteristics as a matter of ‘innovation in the forms of contention employed’ (Tarrow 2011[1994]: 199). On the one hand, we see a rapid expansion of the initial core of activists with protest experience (i.e. of the ‘traditional mobilizations’ of 2010) to include quite large segments of the population in 2011 (see Sergi and Vogiatzoglou 2013; Karyotis and Rüdig 2017). On the other hand, we see a rapid shift to peaceful demonstrations and abstention from all sorts of violence (see Sergi and Vogiatzoglou 2013); even though this did not stop increasing police brutality against the protestors and did not save them from violent crackdowns on the squares’ encampments. When it comes to the ‘creation of new or transformed collective action frames’ (Tarrow 2011[1994]: 199), however, the Aganaktismenoi pose certain difficulties. Similarly to all cycles of contention they are ‘remembered for big, bold, and system-threatening claims’ (Tarrow 2011[1994]: 202). The demands on the basis of which these claims emerged, however, are bifurcated in regards to their particularistic, or not, attachments and, rather than the creation of

¹⁰⁴ The relevant literature registers the unfolding of the Greek anti-austerity protests through three phases of mobilization. The first phase is accounted to have started early on in 2010 with ‘traditional mobilizations’ in which the repertoires of action followed the mobilizations of the past (Sergi and Vogiatzoglou 2013), the second phase is accounted as the phase of intensification and expansion in 2011 with the emergence of the ‘Aganaktismenoi’, and finally the third phase is suggested to have followed from the mid-2010 onwards with ‘large-scale contention in the fall’ (Diani and Kousis 2014: 393) and a ‘partial shift of focus from the streets to the electoral arena’ (Karyotis and Rüdig 2017: 2). See, Sergi, V., Vogiatzoglou, M. (2013). “Think globally, act locally? Symbolic memory and global repertoires in the Tunisian uprising and the Greek anti-austerity mobilizations”, in Fominaya, C.F., Cox, L. (eds.) *Understanding European Movements. New social movements, global justice struggles, anti-austerity protest*. New York: Routledge, pp. 220-35; Diani, M., Kousis, M. (2014). “The Duality of Claims and Events: The Greek Campaign against the Troika’s Memoranda and Austerity, 2010-2012”, in *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 19(4): 387-404; Karyotis, G., Rüdig, W. (2017). “The Three Waves of Anti-Austerity Protest in Greece, 2010-2015”, in *Political Studies Review*, pp. 1-12.

some new and commonly shared collective action frames, they denote a rather precarious closure behind which we can see persistent discursive divisions.

Trying to understand the cycle of contention of 2011 in Greece, Rüdig and Karyotis propose that, practically, orientations and meanings can be discovered by focusing on the historical struggles that have effectively set the boundaries of Greek protest culture in a way that ‘undermined state authority and glorified resistance to government policies’ (Rüdig and Karyotis 2014: 489). In this direction they propose the critical juncture to be found at the ‘student opposition against the military junta that ruled between 1967 and 1974’ (ibid. 2014: 489). However, protest culture, as a name to describe a set of macro-social relationships and the macrohistorical construction of identifications in collective action, implies taking into account more extended periods of contention. The impact of the resistance to the military dictatorship, in terms of helping delineate the contemporary culture of resistance in Greece is beyond doubt, while the Polytechnic Uprising in particular can be seen to condense a ‘tradition of uprising’, which until today remains alive and kicking (see Kremmydas 2010; Hadziiosif 2010; Matalas 2010). Nevertheless, claiming the Polytechnic Uprising as a historical juncture capable of explaining the protest culture of contemporary opposition to austerity policies (i.e. as a culture of resistance to government policies), risks missing a significant part of contemporary Greek protest culture, that is not accurately mirrored in the insurrectional representations of the Polytechnic. By extension then, it is to miss out on social relationships possibly important for shaping contemporary protest culture.

In this direction it can be said that the tense unity of the *Aganaktismenoi* cannot be understood isolated from the basic tense social relationship that has been represented in collective action during the broader period of

Metapolitefsi.¹⁰⁵ This is a relationship that can be briefly and accurately summarized as the confrontation between the forces of radical Left/anarchist movements on the one hand, and the forces of an indeterminate Centre/Left on the other. The relationship between these two forces reveals the demand for sociopolitical change as being perennially bifurcated to represent: on the one hand a culture of resistance, against neoliberal government policies, informed by the anti-capitalist discourse of radical Left/anarchist movements, and on the other hand a culture of tacit acceptance of government policies and calls for structural amendments, rather than radical change, informed by the moderate political discourse of an indeterminate Centre/Left.

One of the key features that helps trace such a bifurcation of orientations and meanings behind the collective identification of the Aganaktismenoi is the spatial particularity of the acampadas of the Greek mobilizations, and mainly those of Athens (see also Kousis 2016). By contrast to the spatially united Aganaktismenoi of Lefkos Pyrgos in Thessaloniki, Syntagma Square in Athens presents a certain particularity in the way space is actually administered in two separate squares —upper and lower Syntagma. In 2011 this functioned to highlight the strong presence of two sets of discourses in tension. Of course the presence of these tensely related discourses has not been the result of the spatial layout of Syntagma Square. It is, rather, the spatial layout of Syntagma Square that has helped make visible in spatial terms the existence of two tensely related discourses —as opposed to the case of Thessaloniki, for example, in which discursive divisions were essentially hidden in the composition of an otherwise ‘unified’ crowd present all around Lefkos Pyrgos. What concerns us here, however, is that in both instances of Athens and Thessaloniki the Greek Aganaktismenoi similarly grew divided between a) a radical anti-capitalist discourse traditionally expressed by radical Left/

¹⁰⁵ Strictly speaking, metapolitefsi refers to the period of the post-transition that started in 1974 with the first elections under a democratic rule of law and the rise of Karamanlis in power. However, more than a temporal marker, ‘Metapolitefsi’ is mostly used as a cultural marker to signify the sociopolitical experiences of the long democratization of the 1980s and the 1990s (see Kornetis 2013).

anarchist movements on the one hand, and b) a moderate political discourse with strong nationalist nuances expressed by the indeterminate Centre/Left on the other. In regards to the spatially divided acampada of Athens these two discourses can be seen expressed in lower and upper Syntagma respectively.

> The radical Left/anarchist component: antagonism and anti-capitalism

Social antagonism is the specific feature of social existence under conditions of capitalist sociopolitical and economic organization. Key to its understanding is the conception of ‘class’, understood to represent the specific ways of unfolding of social relations. Its *modus operandi*, so to put it, is class struggle, as we find it described in orthodox Marxist theory (see Marx and Engels 2010 [1847]), in post-Marxist theory (Castoriadis 1975), in anarchist theory (see Gordon 2007; 2008) and post-anarchist theory (see Newman 2000; Franks 2000; Call 2000; White and Williams 2012). Speaking about social antagonism, in this sense, means to speak about a set of conflictual social relationships predicated on the fundamental conflict of capitalism: the conflict between capital and labour (see Prentoulis and Thomassen 2014; Trenkle 2016). In fact, it is a set of relationships that appear to be increasingly reflected in the rhetoric and the practices of new social movements (see Day 2005; de Souza 2012; 2014). Along such lines we find the logic of antagonism firmly embedded in the demands for social change expressed by the radical Left/anarchists *Aganaktismenoi*. In the discourse of the squares we don’t really find any straightforward self-identification of the movement with radical Left/anarchist movements. We can detect the strong presence of such identifications, however, indirectly. On the one hand, we detect them in the movement’s expressed embrace of the variety of identifications of the protestors, among which radical leftists/anarchists are systematically included:

Among us there are people who believe in direct democracy, anti-authoritarian socialism, democratic centralization, the dictatorship of

the proletariat, libertarian communism, even in national sovereignty (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Peoples' Assembly 11 July 2011).

On the other hand, we detect the strong presence of radical leftist/anarchist discourses in the Aganaktismenoi through the strong embrace of a radical anti-capitalist critique expressed in calls to clearly identify capitalism and the interests of the ruling class as the source of all sociopolitical malaise:

We want life... collectivity. *Not the Troika and western capitalism* (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, Minutes of the General Assembly 29 May 2011).

The purpose of capitalism is to suck workers' blood. Long before they [political class] say anything, *the problem is in this very system*, in its inhumane nature (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Peoples' Assembly 11 July 2011).

In due time we have to think of how we will attack *the enemy, the banks, the ruling class... Our enemy is in the 'banks'* (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Minutes of the Peoples' Assembly 11 July 2011).

In overall terms, however, it is in the accounts of the individual participants of the protests that we find a fully-fledged anti-capitalist discourse being systematically represented, invariably expressed in calls to do away with 'the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie' (Marios), and to overthrow the 'mob of capitalist interests' (Giannis):

...because if this is not overthrown, and even if another government will come -take the tragic example of Chile and Allende- through electoral processes, which will be accepted by the bourgeoisie and the mob of capitalist interests, when we will come down to affect the basic and given interests of local and of foreign monopolies, bankers etc then there will be

a direct intervention. And this direct intervention is not arguments or elections, or a way for the people to speak. It is open terrorism and the imposition of a dictatorship that serves capitalism -the assassination of Allende I believe confirms this in the most tragic manner (Giannis)

Along these lines, in the accounts of individual participants we also find calls for a fight against the extant model of bourgeois democracy in view of replacing it with the communist model of a ‘worker’s democracy’:

That is, passing on the means of production in the hands of the workers themselves. Therefore [passing on] to another situation, to another order of things. Within bourgeois democracy, within this framework, you cannot do this thing. Because you do not control the means of production. [...] Essentially we are speaking about a communist model. If we won’t pass on at this level, I don’t believe anything could change (Eleni)

Next to all the above, we find also calls for a critical analysis of capitalism that can shed light on the recent rise of the neo-nazi Golden Dawn as a phenomenon with direct reference to the contemporary model of capitalist economic production and reproduction. In other words, calls for a critical analysis of capitalism in order to account also for the development of reactionary social forces under the current sociohistorical phase of capitalist development, in the sense that ‘you cannot speak about fascism without speaking about capitalism’ (Andreas). Finally, anti-capitalist claims behind the demand for social change are detected in the accounts of individual participants who emphasize a model of development antithetical to the model of capitalist accumulation and unbridled growth:

There is a central concept which runs through all our positions and our goals. This is degrowth. All our proposals and the solutions we propose are governed by the principles of degrowth. Essentially a response to the continuous growth that capitalism imposes on us (Alik)

At the same time, however, that the strong presence of the anti-capitalist discourse of radical Left/anarchist movements is detected in the protests of 2011, this is found to be approached with hesitation in regards to the potential of an actual communication of interests in the protests. In other words, there are detected concerns about non-communication between the strong anti-capitalist discourse of the radical leftists/anarchists Aganaktismenoi and the other ‘subject’ of the acampadas that expressed mainly a rather specific anti-memorandum discourse:

We demand direct democracy. We declare the debt is not ours. But there is no point of agreement and consensus for anything else [...]

We shouldn't rest on the idea of elections. This is not democracy, this is oligarchy. So, what is democracy? I come from the Left, and *I see that there is no consensus here on anything else other than doing away with the memorandum* (Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, 8 June 2011).

In this direction, individual participants of the protests interpret the achieved ‘unity’ of the Aganaktismenoi as representing no more than a discursive ‘concession’ that tended to marginalize the critical anti-capitalist discourse of the protests in favour of a limited anti-memorandum discourse:

We need a different design, a more ‘aggressive’ politics on our side, which is nowhere to be seen so far. We only run to catch up with the attacks we received from the other side —to me, the other side is this government and its specific politics.

But, let's not forget: the movement of the Aganaktismenoi may have started autonomously, but in the end the slogan that prevailed was *‘take the memoranda and go. Ust!’*. Finally, in the consciousness of those who

participated and got ‘politicized’ through it, this is the only thing that’s left. This ‘Ust’ (Zoe).¹⁰⁶

This prevalence of the anti-memorandum discourse is further understood to be codified in constricted interpretations of politics. These are, it is suggested, interpretations replete with what the ‘radical narrative’ of the protests identifies as a problem of *delegation*: that is, a problem of permanently postponing direct participation in sociopolitical organization at large. Put differently, this is a problem that the squares set out to address in the anti-capitalist critique of the radical leftists/anarchists Aganaktismenoi, but did not effectively solve on account of the prevalence of a ‘systemic narrative’, traditionally putting emphasis on representation and on concession to delegate the responsibility of politics to a (closely monitored) political class instead:

The biggest problem of politicization, that the squares did not manage to exterminate or let’s say to eliminate, is the issue of delegation.

There was some fermentation, but it did not produce the desired outcome. It radicalized some people and it politicized some people, but.. the spirit of direct democracy was defeated and its defeat allowed the people to sit back again and be again complacent about delegation (Petros).

In overall terms, this understanding, of a tense relation between the radical anti-capitalist critique of the radical leftists/anarchists Aganaktismenoi and the more moderate and constricted critique of the crisis represented in the mobilizations, appears to be commonly shared by the radical leftist/anarchist interviewees of this research. There is no common understanding, however, in regards to the potential to diminish such tensions. Instead, in the accounts of the individual participants we come across a bifurcation of interpretations about the potentials and limitations in the coexistence of the radical leftist/anarchist component and the component of the indeterminate Centre/Left. On

¹⁰⁶ Ust is a colloquial expression in Greek, the equivalent of the English ‘beat it’, that became characteristic of the relevant chant.

the one hand we come across those who speak of the necessity of a vanguardist approach to the struggle. More specifically, we come across the advocacy of ‘vanguardism’ as a necessity for any revolutionary politics that seeks to be efficacious, and, moreover, a necessity imposed by the low quality political debate engaged by the large social base of the indeterminate Centre/Left:

Of course don’t think that there will come a moment when thousands upon thousands will participate. No. There will always be a ‘vanguard’, or those who want to be called vanguard, in such endeavours [...]

The aim of the Left is not to do the rebellion. That’s not the purpose. The actual goal is, when there are such processes, to actively participate. Because I believe that finally in the capitalist system, even if there are rebellions, like in the squares, if the radical Left in all its expressions didn’t intervene, there would be nothing, even the minimum that there was. The level of thinking is very low. Our goal, thus, is to intervene in these movements and to give them an outlet. If you don’t give them an outlet, if you don’t give them goals, if you don’t convince them of this, then there’s no point. Don’t participate at all.

They say we should let the people ‘move’... who forbids them to ‘move’? They took the squares, by imitating.. Let them imitate. Besides in Europe we have revolutions from one country to another, by adopting the same tactics and the same practices. It’s not bad. Take the streets, why shouldn’t you? They took the squares as well. But if the radical Left wouldn’t intervene, this story would have ended in just a few days. You’re not going for the fiesta. You’re not going for a stroll. That’s how most people think. I don’t degrade those ‘ordinary citizens’, but we know what the level of the debate is (Eleni)

On the other hand, we come across those who underline the need for ‘social address’: that is, the need to build bridges of communication with the large social base of the indeterminate Centre/Left, in the sense that the struggle for

radical social change needs to start from embedding social relations of equality, beyond vanguardist approaches, which, they claim, actually reestablish hierarchies and exploitations. Accordingly, it is suggested, it should be seen as consisting a critical goal of the radical Left/anarchist component to unsettle the structures of knowledge that prevail in the struggle for social change, and by extension to escape extant vanguardist approaches (that constitute part of the problem) about how to effect social change:

You ought to talk with the people, but at the same time you have to give them ‘content’ for work. To tell them, come and act. If you tell them, come and listen, then indeed you become a ‘vanguard’ and ‘a leader’. You don’t change anything. If, however, you tell them come and act, and they have a task for work, and they become active.. Well, there you’re not a vanguard anymore. You are an equal member next to those people. That’s the point (Natasa).

In overall terms, the different approaches to the limits in the coexistence of the two ‘souls’ of the Aganaktismenoi can be understood as a matter of different interpretations of the limits of antagonism and the limits of ‘production in common’ through an indeed ‘spiral, expansive relationship’ (see also Hardt and Negri 2004: 197). On the one hand, we find claims that the hoped-for plurality of identities raises almost unavoidably problems of ‘discursive unity’, that is, a unity rarely achieved in real life. It is instead argued that more often than not such a unity constitutes a mere rhetoric:

Well, unity is something very abstract. Many speak about it. The far right-wingers also speak about it.. the government supporters speak about it.. United and united! United under what? (Ioanna)

In fact, ‘unity’ is described as a rhetoric which can be encompassing in its vagueness, but essentially remains dramatically incomplete in regards to the political values it sustains. Conversely, then, it can be only a virtually

unconditional unity or alternatively, once the conditions of the struggle are clearly set, no unity at all:

It's one thing to go together and it's another thing to go *all together*. Together means that those who agree will be together. All together means that you have to open up and include... well, everything! You say anti-memorandum politics and you include everyone, to be all together, like you were saying anti-dictatorial struggle, to be all together. But it's not like that.

There are conditions in being together. When you set the conditions, then we won't be all together any more. Some will leave. They leave by themselves. But we have to set the conditions (Eleni)

On the other hand, we find claims suggesting that the plurality of identities actually raises further concerns, also on a second level. At the first level, concerns are raised in regards to establishing 'discursive unity' between the radical Left/anarchist component of the Aganaktismenoi (and its anti-capitalist discourse) and the component of the indeterminate Centre/Left Aganaktismenoi (and its strictly anti-memorandum discourse). At the second level, however, concerns are raised also in regards to establishing 'discursive unity' in the radical Left/anarchist component *itself*. In overall terms, differences between anarchist and radical Left/Marxist segments of the broader antagonistic movement are understood as 'epiphenomena of somewhat different ontological ramifications for transformative action and revolutionary praxis' (Wigger 2016: 3). While this in itself is not necessarily bad news, negligence about how such differences are reflected in the method of the struggle and in the prescriptions of the revolutionary project (see also Boggs 1977), seems to reaffirm them in the most hopeless way, through exclusions and incorporations on the level of the actual struggle. Ultimately, then, the problem of 'production in common' discloses a parallel set of

historical ‘discursive disunities’ —this time, embedded within the radical tradition itself.

The accounts of the individual participants of the radical Left/anarchist component of the Aganaktismenoi are replete with references to such internal conflicts —although, they explain, the full magnitude of such conflicts was effectively disclosed in the neighbourhood assemblies of the third wave of the anti-austerity mobilizations after 2011. I take this to be important information for understanding better the broader development of the movement politics of the crisis in Greece, but I save its examination for later.¹⁰⁷ For what concerns here the examination of the radical Left/anarchist ‘soul’ of the Aganaktismenoi as a fairly united representation of interests (against the indeterminate Centre/Left Aganaktismenoi), I focus instead on the fact that (so much in the discursive formulations of the protestors in 2011 as much as in the accounts of the interviewees of this research): a) the precept of antagonism figures as integral part of the interpretations of the crisis of the Aganaktismenoi, as a systemic crisis, and b) the discourse with which these interpretations are coupled systematically appears to be a radical anti-capitalist discourse:

Our objection was that today -as the political situation has been shaped, but also the social and economic situation, as the system at large has been shaped- anything you pursue actually impinges on the wall of systemic crisis. Because this is clearly a systemic crisis. Personally, I don’t believe that if this movement would become massive it would be able to change the situation as it is now, only by means of resisting the crisis. What it could offer is the consciousness, the realization that if the workers, the unemployed etc. won’t work together against the existing system, won’t antagonize it and won’t come into conflict with it -not merely resist it- they will not resolve anything. In any case the point is the same: fighting capitalism, we have to radicalize our discourse but also our practices (Eleni)

¹⁰⁷ see Part IV of this research; Chapter 6.

Finally, then, despite the detected ambivalence in regards to establishing ‘discursive unity’ with the indeterminate Center/Left and despite concerns about internal disunities and conflicts in the radical component of the movement, the radical Left/anarchist ‘soul’ of the Aganaktismenoi is understood here: a) as being unequivocally guided by a strong anti-capitalist critique and, accordingly, b) as placing the notion of antagonism at the centre of its analysis, as a key for unlocking the struggle for social change.

> The indeterminate Centre/Left component: anti-memorandum discourse and national liberation

The anti-austerity mobilizations in Greece are acknowledged in the relevant scholarly literature to represent instances of intense resistance to the politics of the memoranda. This is so, as much for the first phase of the mobilizations during 2010, when opposition was expressed against the first memorandum, as for the second phase of the Aganaktismenoi in 2011, when opposition was expressed against the Midterm Fiscal Strategy Framework 2012-2015 and the second memorandum (see Diani and Kousis 2014: 393). It is in this direction that the discourse of the Aganaktismenoi has been highlighted as an intensely anti-memorandum discourse with multiple references to distrust for the domestic political class and for the Troika’s ‘communication manoeuvres’, which tried to invest the memoranda with legitimacy as the only viable solution to the economic impasse of the country:

We don’t believe in the memoranda, contrary to what politicians say
(Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, 3 June 2011)

Some things are absolute for all of us —opposition to the memorandum
(Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos, 8 June 2011)

The communication manoeuvres, the fraudulent government reshuffling, and the blackmailing of the government, IMF, EU, are not deceiving us.

Now we know that the dilemma is not memoranda or bankruptcy, because the memoranda lead with mathematical precision to the bankruptcy of society (Aganaktismenoi Syntagma, Decree of the People's Assembly of Syntagma Square for the Mid-term Agreement, 22 June 2011)

While, however, opposition to the memorandum has been a common premise of the mobilizations, the constricted anti-memorandum discourse largely represented the discourse of the second 'soul' of the Aganaktismenoi. This is the Aganaktismenoi of an indeterminate Centre/Left, who coupled the anti-memorandum advocacy with claims of national liberation and sovereignty (as opposed to the radical anti-capitalist demands of the radical Left/anarchist Aganaktismenoi). In the Athenian mobilizations such claims were expressed by the large crowd of upper Syntagma, engaging a set of discursive practices such as the use of the national flag and the national anthem, that can be understood as clear indications in this direction. The reason is that these symbols, in the Greek context, represent a taboo for radical sociopolitical contestation as they have been historically associated with the conservative patriotic Right. It is in this direction that, in fact, they have been 'absent from the movement repertoire for more than three decades, due to their strong association with the right-wing, nationalist regime which has triumphed in the Greek civil war (1946-1949)' (Sergi and Vogiatzoglou 2013: 228). Given the strong sociopolitical representations of the national flag in Greece, its first appearance in the mobilizations of 2011 was received with strong reservation by the radical Left/anarchist component of the Aganaktismenoi. This reservation was further legitimated when the presence of conservative forces in the mobilizations was confirmed and when some interventions were attempted by far-right and neo-nazi protestors. In overall terms, tensions arising from the presence of reactionary social forces subsided effectively, by virtue of the quick reflexes of 'anarchist and antifascist militia-like squads' (Sergi and

Vogiatzoglou 2013: 228). This was so, as much for the Aganaktismenoi of Athens, as for the Aganaktismenoi of Thessaloniki, where individual participants claim that far-right and neo-nazi protestor attempted to intervene in the acampada of Lefkos Pyrgos, but were quickly stopped:

Let's not forget Golden Dawn.. during the 'Aganaktismenoi' they tried to a great extent to get involved and 'take over' every effort and every collective. There, I believe, it was extremely important the contribution of many of us, who had the reflexes to respond quickly, compared to 'ordinary people' who didn't always understand what it was all about (Zoe)

In some instances, it is suggested that the tensions caused on account of the presence of the national flag declined over the days, on the basis of a widespread realization that the protestors (flag-holders or not) were actually struggling for the same goals (see Sergi and Vogiatzoglou 2013). In the accounts of the individual participants, however, it is suggested that the discursive tensions remained on account of the different interpretations of the struggle for social change that were hidden behind the symbolic value of using national symbols to denounce the political crisis. In these accounts the national flag is considered to have occasionally indicated the presence of right-wing and neo-nazi protestors, but mainly it is suggested as having signaled the re-appearance of the 'threatened middle-class on the streets of Greece' (Sergi and Vogiatzoglou 2013: 229):

We begin by searching for who were the people who made this happen. In large part it was a mass. The 'crowd'. It included those employed, unemployed, students, university students, pensioners, but mainly the middle-class who would still endure and the middle-class who was brought down by the crisis (Ilias)

Of course there were many [people] coming out [on the streets]. All those who were destroyed by the crisis. Mostly the middle-classes. There were also the unemployed and the workers. But who came out on the streets were all these who were now afflicted by the crisis (Eleni)

Here, then, the use of national symbols can be possibly understood as a spontaneous response by a set of politicized and non-politicized sections of the population to the question ‘who are we finally, us here’ (S.KY.A. 2011b: 4). It is the political logic (and its ideological references) underlying such a response, however, that affirms the discursive distancing of this second ‘soul’ of the *Aganaktismenoi* from the anti-capitalist discourse of the radical Left/anarchist component of the protests. This is a political logic that indeed references the large social base of an indeterminate Centre/Left, which has been essentially nurtured ‘with the anti-imperialist and patriotic rhetoric of the postwar Left, which deals with the crisis as a national phenomenon, that some bad foreigners imposed on Greece’ (S.KY.A. 2011b: 4). In this sense, it can be understood as a logic of social antagonism that effectively transposes the antagonistic constitution of interests from the field of capitalist exploitation to the field of national sovereignty. It is along such lines, then, that we can find the opposition to the memorandum coupled with calls for national liberation in the discourse of the indeterminate Centre/Left *Aganaktismenoi*, who ‘perceived that their class interest lay in national solutions of the crisis’ (S.KY.A. 2011b: 4). Nevertheless, these are solutions that, more often than not, it is suggested, were sidelined in favour of politico-ideological interpretations, thus failing the notion of unity for finding solutions to a ‘national problem’. This is suggested to have happened in two different ways. On the one hand, in the accounts of individual participants of the component of the indeterminate Centre/Left *Aganaktismenoi*, we come across the following explanation: the anti-memorandum discourse was characteristic of a popular confrontation with genuinely popular demands, but it was tainted by

the presence of politico-ideological interpretations that reduced the struggle for national solutions to a mere contest of partisan interests:

In the squares we had this problem: the participation of many people in the assemblies, who were coming from political parties -it's their right, of course- but they were bringing into the assembly, or at least they were trying to bring, the positions of their party as solutions to the problems of our country (Nikitas)

On the other hand, we come across the following explanation: the anti-memorandum discourse was characteristic of a popular confrontation with genuinely popular demands, but it was tainted by the presence of radical leftists/anarchists in the mobilizations, who attempted to marginalize more moderate political dispositions and often intimidated rhetorically the protestors:

I mean there were ideological groups. And they got conspicuous by their reactionary attitude, these small leftist, and anarchist or let's say anti-authoritarian groups. Although the intervention from the anarchist, anti-authoritarian side was not that intense. It was minimum. But there was the extra-parliamentary left, which... I even wrote a manifesto that period and I distributed it there [in the square] and I criticized them for their stance, which was the stance of a 'teacher'.

So think now of a leftist or any other ideological group, structured for many years, in which everybody has taught each other how to function, they have the courage, they have the experience, they know, they have been exposed many times, and they go there to compete, to antagonize - because, what are they doing after all?- the people who after all this time finally decided to come out. And they didn't come out because of the call of these ideological groups! (Serafeim)

Along similar lines, we also come across an intense critique of the communication tactics of protestors identified with the radical Left/anarchist component of the *Aganaktismenoi* because, it is suggested, they were disrupting the popular procedures:

There came an instance, when we were 400 people in the square and there comes a parasite of the extraparlimentary left and a parasite of anarchy, and disregarding totally the procedures, they stood up and started speaking for half an hour and forty minutes each. As a result the whole process was stigmatized, and in less than a quarter of an hour the people started to draw away, to leave.

It caused great losses this thing, and this is why I'm convinced that it's enough with the groups or the monsters of the left and of anarchy, of the first, second, third, and fourth international, who believe they know [what is] right and they must give me the whole 'package' like that. To come and guide me, to manipulate me. Enough! It's harmful! (Alekos).

At the same time, however, we also come across a milder perspective, which acknowledges the problem of 'discursive disunity' in the anti-austerity protests of 2011, but suggests that it is basically magnified on account of state sponsored attempts to disintegrate unified popular opposition to austerity policies:

Look we have a recent example. The events at the national parade of the 28th October [...]

This was spontaneous. Why spontaneous? Because it was no party mechanisms that called for it, but it happened that moment because the people expressed their dissatisfaction that moment. Of course here [in Thessaloniki] was worse because also the President of the Republic was here and they didn't like this happening in front of him. But there were heterogeneous groups, each one for their own purpose. There were the

classic leftist groups, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, there were groups of the far-right as well.

But this scares them. The State. Like it happened in one big demonstration of the Aganaktismenoi in which I participated, a very big demonstration, there were also various groups in it. The ordinary people, who don't want to be separated according to their political beliefs. And this scared them. This is what they want to destroy, and of course they have the means. They know how to 'divide and conquer' and this is our problem basically. That we don't stick to those 5 things that unite us, that we all have in common, like it was in the squares with the memorandum, and instead we grumble about the rest. All those secondary things that separate us (Nikitas)

Finally, then, despite the ambivalence in regards to establishing 'discursive unity' with the radical Left/anarchist component of the movement and the different explanations offered for this, the indeterminate Centre/Left 'soul' of the Aganaktismenoi is understood here: a) as being strongly guided by a constricted anti-memorandum discourse and b) as placing the notions of 'national sovereignty' and 'national solutions' at the centre of its analysis, as the key for unlocking the struggle for social change.

The 'Indignados': autonomous/libertarians and 'young Indignados'

In the early 2000s the momentous GJM changed the form of collective action, bringing together an exceptionally heterogeneous constituency to resist globalized neoliberal capitalism. For the plurality of movement organizations it involved, social movement scholars have called it the 'movement of movements' (see Mertes 2004; della Porta 2007). A critical feature of this picture has been also the discursive and organizational plurality of the GJM, where under a relatively coherent idea of 'justice globalism' (see Steger and Wilson 2012) different values, norms and ideological considerations more broadly were employed (see della Porta 2005). The Spanish movement

networks account for increased levels of participation in the anti-globalization networks of the beginning of the century (see Jiménez, M. and Calle, A. 2007a), and the scholarly literature records the tense co-existence of two discursive and organizational approaches in them. On the one hand there were approaches associated with the institutional Left that were mainly represented by closed party organizations defending ‘a representative model, with vertical structures, decision-making through a voting system or through negotiations between representatives, and a clear division of labour’ (Flesher Fominaya 2007: 337). On the other hand there were approaches associated with autonomous movements traditionally ‘organized in a horizontal network fashion and underlain by the principles of self-organization, direct/participatory democracy, autonomy, diversity and direct action’ (Flesher Fominaya 2007: 336; see also Katsiaficas 1997). Finally, the tension between these two approaches of sociopolitical organization can be summarized in terms of their analytical implications for collective action and social change. On the one side was a certain understanding of individuals as dispensable and organizational structures as a permanent necessity, in movements of the institutional Left. On the other side was a certain understanding of institutions as dispensable, as only a contingent element of organization structures, in autonomous movements (see Flesher Fominaya 2007).

Separating analytically the discursive and the organizational features of the Spanish GJM, the tension produced by the co-existence of autonomous and institutional Left movements is revealed more clearly. While the emphatic rejection of the established models of political organization, together with the search for embedding alternative models of doing politics, shows the ‘discursive dominance’ of the autonomous component of the Spanish GJM, the firm insistence on clear declarations of political objectives at the same time hints at the ‘organizational dominance’ of the institutional Left —the provision of crucial resources (e.g. legal, financial etc) is further evidence of this (Flesher Fominaya 2007: 343). Altogether, it can be thus said that the Spanish

GJM actually involved tensions between its two ‘souls’ by an atypical ‘division of labour’, in which autonomous movements set the discursive frame -as the spirit of the ‘new anarchists’ (see Graeber 2002)- and the institutional Left set the organizational guidelines (see Flesher Fominaya 2007). These tensions, however, were effectively contained within a broader discursive shift towards a ‘global critique’ of capitalism (see Jiménez, M. and Calle, A. 2007b). The equivocal relationship of anarchist/autonomous and orthodox Marxist/Leninist movements in this sense was calmed through the diffused association of the Spanish networks under the theme of ‘anti-capitalism’. In fact, the national networks of the GJM in Spain, as much as the GJM as a whole of movements, introduced opposition to neoliberal capitalist globalization as the big stake of collective action for social change in the 21st century.

In the Spanish protests of 2011 we are actually confronted with a similar division of ideological discourses, which produced a movement with two ‘souls’. The Spanish Indignados, as much as the highly heterogeneous Spanish anti-globalization networks, account for an ideologically two-pronged instance of collective action. On the one hand, the Indignados are characterized by a remarkably wide embrace of principles and forms of practices traditionally associated with anarchist/autonomous movements. What the relevant literature registers as the ‘spirit of Sol’ (Marzolf and Ganuza 2016), essentially reflects what in explicit ideological terms is identified as ‘the anarchist spirit’ (Sitrin 2015), and corresponds to the spirit of the ‘new anarchists’ (Graeber 2002) who represented also the autonomous component of the Spanish GJM. Taibo suggests that this ‘soul’ of the 15M effectively comprises of ‘alternative social movements’, which represent the whole body of struggles taking place on fronts as varied as feminism, environmentalism, pacifism or alternative unionism and are connected to the experience of the GJM. Furthermore, these are understood as being movements deeply connected to one another on account of their common resistance to being ‘integrated into the system’. This first ‘soul’ of the Indignados, on account of

their ‘declared commitment to grassroots democracy and self-management’, can be described as the *libertarians* (Taibo 2012: 155). On the other hand, the Indignados are characterized by a powerful emphasis on *ciudadanismo* (citizenism), as a ‘project of a popular reclaiming of citizenship’ (Gerbaudo 2016: 2). Here it seems that no correspondence is found with the internal disunities of Spanish GJM, as this ‘soul’ of the Indignados seems to bring new elements in the struggle for social change. Taibo proposes this second ‘soul’ of the Indignados to be effectively delineated as the ‘young Indignados’, that is, ‘young people who in many cases have mobilized themselves for the first time in their lives in an act of protest. In fact, many of these young people have known nothing other than a permanent state of crisis’ (Taibo 2012: 156).

In overall terms the distinction between the two ‘souls’ of the 15M is not to be drawn in terms of age. Indeed, just as the ‘alternative movements’ of the libertarians involve a mix of people of all ages, so in the ‘young Indignados’ are to be included older people next to the first-time-mobilized young. Age, in other words, can be understood here only as a preliminary category for the description of the ‘young Indignados’ in particular. It is rather the different political logic (and ideological references) of the libertarians and the ‘young Indignados’ that distinguishes them: more specifically, the logic of political antagonism that informs the anticapitalist discourse of the first, and the logic of ‘buenismo’ that informs the citizenist discourse of the second.

> The libertarians: antagonism and anti-capitalism

Antagonism is a conception well known to social and political analysis, put forward as a theoretical and empirical precept in the famous reference to ‘social classes’ in the opening of the Communist Manifesto: ‘The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’ (Marx and Engels 2010 [1847]: 14). The Marxist and neo-Marxist scholarly literature as well as the anarchist scholarship have offered a series of compelling explanations of the theoretical and the empirical premises of antagonism (see for example Castoriadis 1992; 2000; Sheehan 2003; Graeber 2013), and it would be

unnecessary to try to summarize them here. For the purpose of this analysis, however, it is worth underscoring the intimate relation of antagonism with capitalist development. Class struggle is in fact the ‘appearance of the fundamental antagonism in capitalism’ (Prentoulis and Thomassen 2014: 217), to which the history of radical politics has responded in the name of Marxist (orthodox and neo-Marxist) and anarchist (classic, autonomous, and post-anarchist) approaches —both of which set at the core of their practical critique the precepts of capitalist organization and the institutions of capitalist democracies. Along such lines, as in the discourse of the radical leftists/anarchists *Agantkismenoi*, we find here the logic of political antagonism deeply rooted in the systems of thinking and acting of the libertarian *Indignados*, according to which they voiced a discourse with strong anti-capitalist characteristics. The 15M slogans ‘To rage is not enough’ and ‘Organize your rage’ (Appendix B, Picture 13) are the most characteristic indication of the presence of demands -albeit indirect- for a more critical acclaim of the basic problems of the contemporary system of sociopolitical organization. In fact, they are a testimony to the call for political action beyond mere denouncing. In the accounts of individual participants of the protests, the call for a critical re-assessment of the contemporary struggle (as going beyond denouncing institutional failures and demanding the fortification of the institutions of government against such failures) is described as passing through a critical re-assessment of the institutions of government themselves as essentially capitalist institutions:

I think that for the people participating in the anti-austerity protests — this is a common reflection for many people, maybe not all the people, but for many people— this idea is very important: that nowadays even if you have massive demonstrations, massive protests, the institutions are not forced, they don’t feel obliged to respond to the demands of the people. The power of the institutions is totally disconnected from political reactions on the streets. So we need to challenge this elite, to challenge

the political institutions and the people who are in control of these institutions. Ok. But that's not enough in order to change things. We also need a political alternative. To acquire institutional power is one thing. Then we also need to transform the institutions, because they are not our institutions. These institutions are created for capitalist domination (Filomena)

In this direction, the relation between the notions of 'power', challenging 'the power' and ultimately getting '*in power*' is often underscored as the key to the struggle for social change:

The struggle depends on the orientation you have to power. I think it's normal that there are differences in the orientation to power. People that reject participating or getting in power and people who think that in order to change things we need to be in power. The problem is that no one knows where power is. It is one thing to be in the government, and it is another thing to be in power. People think that if you are in government, you are closer to power. Maybe. There are different levels of power. But you are not *in power* (Octavio)

Finally, at instances, it is suggested that the critical re-appreciation of the basic features of contemporary sociopolitical organization can take place only through the final overcoming of the memories of previous victories and losses, which more often than not pose as obstacles to a clear understanding of the challenge: that the possibility of social change today remains intimately linked with the straightforward opposition to capitalism:

There is a problem when we speak about capitalism. Spanish capitalism was very late. It started with plans for stabilization [of the economy], with plans to modernize the country, but it had great problems in dealing with labour strikes. The labour movement wanted better conditions of life and in this sense it was very combative. There were also many leaders who

had really a revolutionary consciousness and what they wanted was a government that would do away with capitalism. But this never happened and people tend to forget this. What we have in Spain today is capitalism. Still. (Pablo)

In the same vein, next to the accounts of individual participants, the messages of the discursive formations of the protests confirm the presence of a strong anticapitalist critique in the 15M, expressed both directly and indirectly. It was expressed directly in banners condemning the system for its capitalist, patriarchal, and racist character and declaring a combative fight against it:

Of course: ANTI -Capitalist, Patriarchal, Racist, System.

Struggle -Joyful, Combative, Dignified, Collective (Appendix B, Picture 17).

The relevant literature similarly accounts for banners making their appearance in the protests of the 15M with messages directly invoking social antagonism -‘It will end, it will end, social peace will end’- next to banners with clearly anticapitalist messages reading ‘Capitalism shouldn’t be reformed: it should be destroyed’, at the end of the march on 19 June in Santiago de Compostela (Taibo 2012: 156-7). Indirectly, the social antagonistic and anticapitalist spirit of the Indignados was expressed in their critical acclaim for the fact that the struggle for social change was being carried out in the public spaces of social relations rather than in the confined spaces of democratic representation:

The struggle is in the streets, not in the ballot boxes (Appendix B, 18).

Alongside the above, it is worth noting that part of the anti-capitalist import of the libertarian Indignados to the 15M was also a large variety of projects around the Spanish cities that were essentially introduced for the first time to the wide constituency of the acampadas. Among such projects are to be accounted occupied social centres, popular kitchens, alternative economies of

exchange and sharing, urban gardens etc., which are altogether a testimony to the anti-capitalist interpretations of the struggle for social change that were put forward by the libertarian Indignados.

In line with a strictly economistic logic of sociopolitical confrontation, the radical character of these projects would not be enough to justify their anti-capitalist outlook. That is, leaving the element of production outside the equation of social confrontation, the large majority of these projects, and accordingly the logic behind them, would fail to classify as clearly anti-capitalist. It is, however, from the perspective of anarchist and post-anarchist philosophy, which next to condemnation of capitalist exploitation in economic production takes issue also with the reproduction of hierarchies, exclusions and inequality in the terrain of social relations, that these projects and their logic are essentially understood as anti-capitalist. In general terms, they can be understood as projects propelled by the precept that capitalist reproduction takes place also outside the 'factory walls': a precept that we find developed in the notion of resistance to biopolitical capitalism (see Hardt and Negri 2004), but primarily theorized in Foucault's idea of biopolitics:

Biopolitics' last domain is, finally... control over relations between the human race, or human beings insofar as they are a species, insofar as they are living beings, and their environment, the milieu in which they live. This includes [...] also the problem of the environment to the extent that it is not a natural environment, that it has been created by the population and therefore has effects on that population. This is, essentially, the urban problem (Foucault 2003: 244-5).

Finally, then, the message of reclaiming the public space and the projects creating spaces of alternative social relations come to complete the profile of the libertarian 'soul' of the 15M: as being guided by a solid anti-capitalist discourse, built on the precept of antagonism.

> **The ‘young Indignados’: buenismo and ciudadanismo**

The second ‘soul’ of the 15M is distanced from the logic of antagonism and the anti-capitalist discourse of the libertarian Indignados. Behind the ‘young Indignados’ we find instead the logic of ‘buenismo’, which guides their citizenist discourse. ‘Buenismo’ or ‘goodism’ is a term with very little acknowledgment in the relevant scholarly literature. It is, nevertheless, a scheme of thought and action that is increasingly taking over contemporary large-scale collective action, and as such it is therefore a tool of increasing relevance for the study of contemporary social movements. In overall terms, ‘buenismo’, as a system of ideas and beliefs, rests on principles of political correctness and is guided by convictions of dialogue and tolerance. In one of the currently few analyses of ‘buenismo’, Valentí Puig explains its origins in institutional politics and more specifically in the introduction of pacifist nuances in international relations, in the praise of humanitarian intervention as a response to socioeconomic destruction, in the celebration of tolerance as key to multiculturalism, in the domestication of the ‘savage subject’ in education, and finally in the exaltation of ‘dialogue as a panacea’ —altogether, applications of ‘buenismo’ which he suggests ‘correspond in many aspects to the necessity to do mass politics outside the dialectic that belongs to political life itself and outside the notion of conflict’ (Puig 2005: 11).

In what regards political action, however, ‘buenismo’ is more often than not found to be applied as a criticism, rather than as a matter self-denomination. In this direction there are practically no instances of collective action found (at least not currently or not than I am aware of) that are self-characterized as ‘buenista’. This holds true for the Spanish 15M as well. And yet, the ‘young Indignados’ of 2011 can be essentially understood as representing the first instance of the appearance of ‘buenismo’, beyond institutional politics and right at the heart of large-scale collective action. In fact, even if ‘buenismo’ was not celebrated as such in the Spanish

mobilizations, it made its presence clear by means of effecting a powerful discursive shift towards new frames of sociopolitical analysis. The discourse in which the 'buenismo' of the 'young Indignados' came to present itself is the 'citizenist' (ciudadanista) discourse, which largely overtook the theme of radical opposition to political institutions of representation and emphasized instead on reducing conflict and establishing channels of dialogue with the governing bodies, with the aim to modify political attitudes and strengthen democratic representation and political accountability. In collective action that engages the dominant culture in contention (see Hall 2005 [1982]; Earl 2004), citizenism tends to take the form of mass mobilizations with increased heterogeneity, in which structural classifications are set aside (Delgado 2011), in favour of the most basic formulations of populist reasoning. Citizenism, that is, re-introduces the populist elements of 'division' and 'unity' (see Laclau 2005), but compared to classic populism (such as the left-wing populism of Latin America or the European right-wing populism), it recasts the main categories of classification, to reference the 'bad political class' and the 'good citizens', rather than just 'the people' or the 'ordinary people' (see Canovan 1999).

Throughout the 20th century, and even the beginning of the 21st century, populist reasoning has been effectively reserved for traditional institutional politics, with political parties and charismatic politicians holding the reins of 'division'-'unity'. Accordingly, and on account of 'populism' being long synonymous with a type of 'bad politics', the scholarship on social movement studies has maintained a characteristic reservation about involving concerns of populist politics in the study of social movements. The emergence of the mass mobilizations of 2011, however, can be understood as marking a radical break with previously held assumptions in this regard. The reason is that the movements of the global wave of protests in 2011, largely 'tried to recuperate the populist idea that wasn't present before in protest movements' thus producing a new kind of 'populism of the citizens' (Gerbaudo 2017).

Citizenism, in this sense, can be understood as defining a new bottom-up populism, which is drawing on a model of sociopolitical organization that focuses attention on a general 'division' between 'the political class' and the 'good citizens', but also makes efforts to reunite them. It does so by putting emphasis on strengthening participatory channels that connect the 'good citizens' with the government, in order thus to reduce the distance between them. In the same direction, it also puts emphasis on basic issues of social welfare, as a means to effectively protect 'good citizens', with the help of the government, from the consequences of contemporary capitalist restructuring.

Following the classical scheme of populist reasoning, the element of 'division' is highlighted in the discursive formulations of the Indignados. In the analysis of the diagnostic frames of the protests we have already found evidence in this direction, with the political class being framed as corrupt, guided by the *'lust for power and its accumulation in only a few'*, merely *'a minority which does not regard our needs'* (DRY, Manifesto). In a similar fashion, in the accounts of individual participants we come across the same interpretations, that is, of a political class that is foreign to the sociopolitical system in which 'the citizens' are produced and reproduced. Ultimately, politicians are viewed as a social category that has radically departed from all notions of society, and effectively stands diametrically opposite to the citizenry at large, as something completely foreign to it:

But, what's going on now, is that we have a political class which decides for everybody and this political class which decides is something different and consists of people with privileges. They are not workers, they are not immigrants, they are not prostitutes, they are not... nothing that all these groups represent, and I seriously wonder.... If you hear what kind of stupidities they are saying, the kind of foolish things that come out of their mouths.. I say that they can't be living here. It's not possible. They are coming from a different world (Fabiana)

In the earlier examination of this chapter we found evidence of an equivalential articulation of demands by the Indignados appearing to stand in ‘unity’ against the political class, but demands that were empty of ideological content. The opening lines of the Manifesto of DRY, common for the different acampadas of the 15M, is the most characteristic evidence:

We are *ordinary people*. We are *like you* [...] Some of us consider ourselves progressive, others conservative. Some of us are believers, some not. Some of us have clearly defined ideologies, others are apolitical, *but we are all concerned and angry* about the political, economic, and social outlook which we see around us (DRY, Manifesto).

In the same direction, in the accounts of individual participants of the 15M we come across a more dilute sociopolitical critique, which passes through modest approaches in regards to antagonism, and more ‘innocent’ perspectives about ‘unity’ in the struggle for social change, despite the objective differences of the singularities of the social body (whether in socioeconomic terms or ideological considerations). What is critical, however, is that these perspectives of ‘unity’ appear to be embedded on the idea of common inclusion to the Spanish ‘citizenry’:

Now this is what we have. Diversity, too, is interesting. Diversity of the people. Ok, if the people are very diverse, then they see that coexistence is super difficult, exactly because they are very different, but if they organize... I don’t say it will be easy! Every social group, every community holds completely different interests for its life. It’s normal. But all citizens are in the same situation and if they organize amongst themselves, I believe they can arrive to the point (Alba)

In summary, in all the above, we come to see the second ‘soul’ of the 15M, the ‘young Indignados’, as being informed by the logic of ‘buenismo’ (i.e. a logic of doing politics without conflict) and as being expressed through a

citizenist discourse, which draws strong parallels with the way populist reasoning works and stands in opposition to the antagonistic perspective and anti-capitalist discourse of the libertarian Indignados. Altogether, that is, as in the case of the Greek Aganaktismenoi, we see the Indignados delineated here as one movement with two ‘souls’, engaging different interpretations of orientations and meanings in collective action for social change.

Conclusions

The analysis of this chapter, trying to shed some light on the relations behind the ‘construction’ of the ‘subject’ of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados, found ideological considerations to be a key element in delineating the ways in which interests and boundaries were (re)established in the Greek and the Spanish mobilizations. In particular, different politico-ideological interpretations of the struggle for social change (in terms of its ends and its means), in both Greece and Spain, were found as highlighting certain divisions in the body of the protestors. More specifically, then, on account of different and contradictory politico-ideological approaches, the collective identities of both the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’ were found to have been ‘constructed’ in *tense* unity, revealing thus the presence of one ‘subject’ with two ‘souls’. This tension was detected in the existence of two competing sets of discourses corresponding to two ‘pairs of souls’, so to put it, in the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’: a) in Greece, an anti-capitalist discourse represented by the radical Left/anarchist component of the Aganaktismenoi and an anti-memorandum discourse represented by the indeterminate Centre/Left component of the Aganaktismenoi and b) in Spain, an anti-capitalist discourse represented by the libertarian Indignados and a citizenist discourse represented by the ‘young Indignados’.

At the same time, the analysis of this chapter found two different types of relationships in the ‘construction’ of this tense unity in the two movements. On the one hand, the relation between the two ‘souls’ of the Aganaktismenoi was

found to be confrontational, while the anti-capitalist discourse of the radical Left/anarchist component of the movement can be understood as having gained ascendancy, when compared to the anti-memorandum discourse of the indeterminate Centre/Left component of the *Aganaktismenoi* that largely marked the mobilizations. On the other hand, the relation between the two ‘souls’ of the *Indignados* was found to be smooth in overall terms, characterized by no great conflicts. Finally, then, neither of the discourses corresponding to the two ‘souls’ of the movement can be understood as having gained ascendancy over the other —although it can be said that the spirit of the movement is best captured in the citizenist discourse of the ‘young *Indignados*’: guided by a logic that focuses on reducing conflict in politics and emphasizing cooperation and cross-fertilization of ideas and practices. This difference in the type of relationships we find delineated, and the intensity by which interpretative disunities were experienced in each case, can be understood as a meaningful one in regards to understanding better the mismatch between diagnostic and prognostic frames that was identified earlier in this research.

It was argued earlier¹⁰⁸ that the mismatch between two equally represented restricted diagnostic frames and one prevalent prognostic frame can be reasoned by taking into account the skewed dynamics that characterized the heterogeneous constituency of the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy movements. In view of the findings of this chapter’s examination, then, the strong prevalence of one prognostic frame in both movements could be understood differently for each one of them. On the one hand, the strong prevalence of the prognosis of changing the ways of relating in the social space, through experimentation with direct democratic, participatory, horizontal and deliberative structures of sociopolitical organization, could be understood as a direct result of the relative predominance of the radical Left/anarchist component of the *Aganaktismenoi*,

¹⁰⁸ see Conclusions of Chapter 2

and in particular its greater leverage in ideological terms —thus entangling the movement in more radical specifications of its prognostic framings. On the other hand, it could be understood as the result of the non-conflictual politics that characterize the citizenist spirit of the Spanish Indignados —thus entangling the movement in a more cooperative logic, so to put it, in regards to the specifications of its prognostic framings, allowing different political priorities to be reflected in otherwise commonly decided strategies, plans and routes of action. Alongside this interpretation, the different type of relationships we find delineated in the movements' collective identifications (and the intensity by which interpretative disunities were experienced in each case) can be also seen as a meaningful difference in regards to understanding the two movements comparatively. I argue, however, that this difference is not contingent on the second phase of the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity mobilizations that has been examined so far.

The Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados represent two prominent instances of the European —for that matter also Southern European— wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, connected through diffusion of tactics and repertoires of action (see also Oikonomakis and Roos 2013), but also, as this research has shown, through the development of similar diagnostic frames, similar specifications of prognostic frames and even similar processes of identification (relative *unity*). If this is so, then the different type of social relationships they appear to delineate effectively calls for attention to be given to a *different set of concerns* in order to render them wholly intelligible comparatively. I contend that such concerns have to do with the role of history -in particular political history- in the development of collective action.

In this direction, I start from the premise that both the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados represent instances of collective action that indisputably belong to the global -European and even more specifically Southern European-wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of late 2010 and 2011. I argue, however, that they can be properly understood and explained by being

contextualized. In this direction, then, to understand the Greek and the Spanish movement politics of the crisis requires us to examine the political histories that inform these cycles of sociopolitical contestation by means of shaping expectations, orientations and meanings in collective action oriented to effect social change: that is, by means of shaping broader cultures of resistance to capitalist restructuring. The next part of this research is devoted to this examination.

Part V - ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS IN GREECE & SPAIN

The relevant literature records the development of the anti-austerity mobilizations in Greece as having taken place in three phases. These are, namely, a first phase of ‘traditional mobilizations’ (such as demonstrations and strikes) that started early on during 2010; a second phase of expansion and intensification of the mobilizations, marked by the emergence of the *Aganaktismenoi* of 2011; and a third phase, with the large-scale mobilizations of the *Aganaktismenoi* settling down and with social contestation spreading throughout the spaces of work and the microspaces of daily interaction (see Sergi and Vogiatzoglou 2013; Diani and Kousis 2014; Karyotis and Rüdig 2017). A similar three-phase approach is appropriate to capture the development of the Spanish anti-austerity movement too: that is, a movement that started early on with similar ‘traditional mobilizations’ during 2010 (including demonstrations, strikes etc), climaxed with the protests of the *Indignados* in 2011 (similarly marking the expansion and the intensification of social contestation during the crisis), and continued into its third phase with the 15M, as a living cell of resistance, spreading ‘the spirit of Sol’ to a variety of grassroots movements.

The examination of the previous parts of the research has shown that so much in the early anti-austerity protests of 2010 (first cycle) as much as in the large-scale anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2011 (second cycle), the Greek and the Spanish movements developed under similar umbrella demands against neoliberalisation and for democratization, but effectively grew apart in regards to the specific expression of these demands, the specific ways in which their discursive and practical advocacies were thought through and practiced and the specific identities they produced. It is a

task of empirical investigation to examine cross-nationally also the third phase of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, in regards to the specific organizational responses to the crisis that the Greek and the Spanish movements employed, after the ceasing down of the large-scale mobilizations of 2011 and the end of the square occupations. This part of the research is devoted to this task with the aim to single out the specific features of late anti-neoliberal contestation in Greece and Spain respectively.

The basic assumption that leads this investigation is that in the third phase of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations too, the Greek and the Spanish movements can be understood as representing different understandings of sociopolitical contestation that can be appropriately explained by employing the frame of the two distinct logics of contestation identified earlier: the logic of the 'Big Night' in Greece and the logic of the 'Long Days' in Spain. It is further assumed that difference in respect to the logic of contestation in Greece and Spain can be more consistently traced in the third phase of the mobilizations: first, because the mobilizations of the third phase are mostly small-scale mobilizations that facilitate the closer examination of interpretations of orientations and meanings in collective action. Second, because the mobilizations of the third phase are expected to be more systematically oriented at practicing the precepts of the large-scale protests of the *Aganaktismenoi* and the *Indignados*. In reference to the US mobilizations of 2011, Slavoj Žižek addressed the crowd of OWS (Occupy Wall Street), underlining that 'what matters is the day after, when we will have to return to normal lives' (Žižek 2011). Following on this comments, the last part of this research unfolds as an attempt to provide some provisional answers to the question what happened to the 'Aganaktismenoi' and the 'Indignados' the 'day after'.

8. Patterns of contestation in the third phase of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations in Greece and Spain

Based on the findings of an exhaustive examination of movements politics of the crisis in Greece and Spain, this chapter unfolds to examine at last the third phases of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations. The purpose of this final examination is double: first, it aims to detect the way in which Greek and Spanish movements of the crisis processed and practiced the lessons of the large-scale mobilizations of 2011. Second, it aims to detect the way in which they Greek and Spanish movements of the crisis affirmed the relevance of nation-specific culture of anti-neoliberal contestation.

The logic of the ‘Big Night’ in Greece: acute radicalization, division, conflict and demoralization

The third phase of anti-austerity mobilizations in Greece is considered to be the phase of a progressive settling down of the large scale sociopolitical contestation of the crisis (see Diani and Kousis 2014; Karyotis and Rüdig 2017). In contrast, the first and second phase of anti-austerity contestation are recorded as having been characterized by large scale mobilizations and increasing numbers of participation. In particular, participation in protest events during the first three years of the crisis, from 2010 to 2012, is recorded as ranging between 5.000 to 500.000 participants (Kousis 2014: 10). If a time marker could be established, then, between the second and third phase of mobilizations, in which we can trace some meaningful changes in the dynamic of anti-austerity contestation, this should be around 2012. The demonstration of 12 February 2012 can be actually understood as such a marker.

Preceded by a 24-hour General Strike, the demonstration of 12 February is estimated to have reached great participation levels, with more than 500.000

people taking the streets of Athens against a new round of austerity measures negotiated by the provisional government of Lucas Papademos (Psarrou 2012). In this sense, 12th February represents a good example of large-scale, in fact powerful, social contestation similar to those of the first and second phase of anti-austerity mobilizations. At the same time, however, it also represents a turning point at which we see the pattern of increasing participation become reversed —entering thus the third phase of mobilizations. It is characteristic, though, that in the demonstration of 12February we come across a pattern of sociopolitical contestation that appears virtually unchanged since the first phase of anti-austerity protesting —in particular, a pattern rather similar to that of the large-scale and powerful contestation of the General Strike of 5May 2010: a strong sense of frustration, expressed in a large-scale mobilization but largely propelled by constricted analyses in regards to the interpretation of orientations and meanings in collective action. Finally, then, a pattern of sociopolitical contestation that seems as if tending to forget that ‘the transformation and dissolution of a major social formation such as capitalism simply takes rather longer’ (Streeck 2014: 1).

Following in this direction, 12th February can be then understood as an accurate depiction of a type of sociopolitical contestation informed by the logic of the ‘Big Night’: fuelling visions of change as the result of a single moment of ultimate resistance. Indeed, for a large section of the antagonistic movement, 12th February represented such a sublime moment of contestation during the crisis, condensing in it the strongest desires of Greek society to see an actual change of politics:

12th of February in 2012, is a key date comparable to December, a great insurrectional event (Petros)

At the same time, however, the demonstration of 12February was addressed with increased levels of violence by the police, leaving behind significantly high numbers of injured protestors. The chaotic picture sketched on 12February

included low-intensity warfare with the police, spreading throughout the centre of Athens, with at least 45 buildings, in the centre of the city, reportedly having been set on fire during that day (To Vima 2012a). In this sense, if the demonstration of 12February condensed in it the strongest desires of Greek society for change, it can be said that its severe repression by police forces actually represented the symbolic repression of these desires. Alongside marches and street battles, 12February unfolded also as a 'political thriller' in parliament when, after long negotiations, the second memorandum was finally voted —with 199 MPs voting in favour and 74 MPs voting against it (43 of whom were subsequently dismissed) (To Vima 2012b). In this sense, finally, if in the demonstration of 12February we can find codified the ambition to see actual social change here and now, the fact that it did not manage to stop the vote on the memorandum in the parliament, can be understood as having actually resulted in suspending this ambition indefinitely:

After the mobilizations of 2012 we see a characteristic de-mobilization, even though the measures being voted are harsher than before. A critical reason for this is that there was indignation that brought people onto the streets, but there were also illusions —then with SYRIZA they became also electoral illusions and subsequently resulted in a progressive shift towards right-wing politics (Giannis)

Of course the repression of the demonstration of 12February has been significantly high and in this sense it should be factored in when examining how 12February has been registered in collective memory as a turning point for de-mobilization. The disillusionment that followed it, however, was much greater than that. In fact, the vote on the memorandum can be understood to have had such a great impact on the movement that 12February is even accounted as representing the 'final defeat' of anti-austerity contestation:

From this point onward we can speak about ‘defeat’. We can say that this was the final defeat [of the movement] or the pyrrhic victory of the regime, against the forces that were opposing it (Petros)

Along these lines, finally, 12February can be understood as ‘defeat’ on account of a rather specific logic of sociopolitical contestation that ties great expectations about social change to constricted expressions of capitalist restructuring, which are in any case treated as isolated instances. In other words, then, it can be understood as referencing a rather specific pattern of large-scale collective action, being consistently informed by the logic of the ‘Big Night’ and consistently producing similar results, as much in the first as in the third phase of anti-austerity mobilizations in Greece: ‘every time that the measures were being voted, the clock of social disaffection was ticking backwards’ (see S.KY.A. 2013: 8). Well into the third phase of anti-austerity mobilizations, disillusionment with the efficacy of sociopolitical contestation can be seen as having resulted in characteristic expressions of the logic of the ‘Big Night’ in small-scale collective action. The general pattern is the pattern of a progressive de-mobilization and decreasing participation in anti-austerity contestation. A map of participation in the grassroots ecosystem of the third phase of mobilizations in Greece, from 2012 to 2014, confirms this pattern of decreasing involvement rates.

The information on the basis of which this map was created has been collected through interviews with key informants of 11 different neighbourhood assemblies in Athens and Thessaloniki, conducted in the summer of 2013 and throughout 2014. Information has been specifically collected about: participation in decision-making processes (assembly meetings); participation in the organization of events (informative events, protests, disruptive actions etc); participation in the sustenance of alternative structures of solidarity (solidarity kitchens, no-intermediary markets etc). Overall, the number of assemblies included in this attempt to map participation rates in social contestation after the Aganaktismenoi is

significantly small, given the remarkable number of neighbourhood assemblies that flourished in Greece after 2011. However, it provides us with an indicative picture of what the interviewees of this research have consistently reported as a ‘steady decrease in participation’. This can be best described in a model of concentric circles, with open boundaries but relatively stable bodies, whereby each circle represents different types of political involvement and different levels of intensity of involvement (see Figure 5).




Figure 5: Participation in localized and quotidian social contestation in the third phase of anti-austerity mobilizations in Greece

When asked to discern the defining characteristic of this pattern of decreasing participation, the interviewees, in their majority, distinguished between a type of low-cost and a type of high-cost action—in terms of time, energy and resources. Along these lines, I have singled out two types of participation: participation in ‘hard-politics’ and participation in ‘soft-politics’. Participation in ‘hard-politics’ is understood as direct involvement in tasks

such as: analysis of the current sociopolitical situation; keeping track of institutional advances and/or assessing the disposition of institutional actors; devising alternatives (projects/structures); organizing alternatives (projects/structures); sustaining bottom-up structures; maintaining the interconnectedness of struggles. Participation in 'soft-politics', conversely, is understood as indirect/peripheral involvement: receiving newsletters; providing indirect support and legitimacy to grassroots movement actions in the form of a) attendance of organized events (e.g. talks, panel discussions, local protests etc), b) trusting the quality and making use of the services provided by alternative bottom-up structures (e.g. time-exchange systems, no-intermediary markets etc), c) engaging in the loose propagation of grassroots movement actions and bottom-up structures (i.e. 'spreading the word').

The map of participation that has been documented on the basis of this information, exhibits: a) a core circle, a small group of a few active participants involved in 'hard-politics' (ranging from 4 to 14 members), b) a middle circle, an extended group of members occasionally involved in assembly meetings and/or organizational tasks (ranging from 15 to 25 members) and c) a large circle, a large group of supporters and 'friends', peripherally associated with the actions of the movement groups (ranging from 180 to 350 members). The circles of involvement are recorded as having open boundaries in the sense of allowing (even promoting) mobility between different levels of involvement. Three parameters have been found to make this possible: a) open circulation of information about actions, plans and processes, b) absence of membership status for participation in decision-making in assemblies and c) absence of sanctions for intermittent participation in assemblies or actions. The bodies of each group, however, appear to be relatively stable with only minor mobility across levels of participation. More specifically, involvement appears to be decreasing, the more intense movement actions become, while larger audiences appear to be readier to become involved in low-cost movement actions.

In general terms, this pattern of demobilization is explained in the interviewees' discourse as a problem of conflict-oriented attitudes in regards to the ideational heterogeneity of radical social movements. In this direction, the third phase of anti-austerity mobilizations in Greece can be indeed understood as representing the affirmation of some deeply incised divisions that were only temporarily set aside in 2011 and were effectively re-energized thereafter:

The point is that there were attempts to create popular assemblies and coordination committees after the squares. This was not possible for two reasons. First, many anarchists, many anti-authoritarian groups were not ready to get rid of their ideological weight and were asking for guarantees of 'purity'. They had no tolerance for things with which they would disagree —such as the patriotic or the petty bourgeois discourse. They had no patience to work with these people. They had zero tolerance and they wanted everybody to become anarchists, all of a sudden, in order to participate in an assembly. Second, there was the petty-politics attitude of the Left. They became involved only to the extent that they believed these procedures would be beneficial for them —electorally. This is why the popular assemblies that were created, degenerated into groups more or less closed, and the attempts to coordinate them, failed (Petros)

The veracity of deeply incised divisions in the constituency of the grassroots ecosystem of contestation after 2011 has been repeatedly confirmed in the individual accounts of the interviewees. In particular, two themes are commonly detected in their narratives about the third phase of the anti-austerity movement: a) the problem of ideological rigidities, enforcing sectarian seclusions (mainly associated, in the interviewees' discourse, with the anarchist movement) and b) the problem of instrumentality, reproducing heteronomous relations and enforcing 'co-optations' (mainly associated, in the interviewees' discourse, with the movements of the Left):

Basically they [anarchists] are ‘affinity’ groups. With local action and everything, but always on issues that they decide themselves. Not on issues that are decided bottom-up, so to say.

They have their own analysis: they [the people of the neighbourhood] are petty-bourgeois, they are ‘sold out’, they are deranged. We [anarchists] are the ‘anti-culture’, we are the rebellion. So, we don’t consort with them (Iakovos)

In the assembly a conflict started between the radical anarchists, who were representing a type of an ‘old analysis’ and ‘old ideology’, and the leftists. But, to be honest, they [the leftists] approached the whole experience instrumentally: they wanted to become involved only in order to ‘attract’ people. For example, they introduced the problem of electricity taxation in terms of representation —i.e. ‘come with us because *we* have lawyers’. They didn’t introduce it in terms of movement activity —i.e. ‘come with us in order to create a bottom-up structure all together’ (Iakovos)

The presence of strong internal divisions in the broader antagonistic movement appears to have effectively tainted the third phase of anti-austerity mobilizations in Greece. In this direction the discourse of the vast majority of the interviewees is replete with references to confrontations, fights and brawls between the components of the broader antagonistic movement, in grassroots assemblies. These confrontations, however, they argue, apart from compromising the ‘unity’ of the broader antagonistic movement, have also resulted in the anti-austerity struggle becoming understood as the struggle of only a few, radicalized sections of society, thus excluding less-politicized audiences:

Listen, people pass by and they see us, in here, and they think: ‘It’s these weirdoes, hanging out together, doing nothing but smoking, and drinking beers and quarreling...’

We may think that they are conservatives or idiots because they are indifferent about what is going on, they don’t join us. Well, of course! If they see us like that, why should they come? In reality [the problem] is *us*. We don’t care to bring the people here. We are indifferent (Gerasimos)

A common theme emerging in these narratives is the theme of ‘elitism’ in communication. According to the interviewees, communication manoeuvres in the political discourse of the radical components of the movement and confrontations in respect to their ‘ideological merits’, function to ‘domesticate’ power relations in quotidian social contestation: they do so in the sense that they re-establish hierarchies of knowledge in structures, which are actually trying to address problems of hierarchical organization in doing politics. The result, they claim, is the creation of a ‘hostile’ environment that furthers the estrangement of the radical components of the struggle from the general society:

There is a deficit. We have a problem —those of us who have participated in movements before, who participate in political parties etc: How is it possible for someone to come with us, when he doesn’t know how to speak with Marxist terminology? Instead he speaks with the terminology of the market. He is a professional, he pays taxes and he is used to this type of communication: saying things as they are.

He is not the problem. We are. We don’t know how to speak with such a person and this is a deficit of the people who come from the anarchist movement and the movements of the Left and participate in the neighbourhood assemblies (Andreas)

We drove people away ourselves, with our tactics. We drove them away with ‘wooden’ utterances, ‘wooden’ political language and long discussions (Zoe)

Along similar lines, the vast majority of the interviewees —all of them participants of neighbourhood assemblies of the third phase of anti-austerity mobilizations— report that deeply incised divisions in the body of radical movements and the choice of confrontational tactics in order to resolve them, have resulted in the isolation of the movement and the withdrawal of ‘ordinary participants’:

In the beginning, right after the mobilizations [of *Aganaktismenoi*] there was increased participation. However, for one reason or another, this didn’t last. Because the people became ‘detached’ and chose to ‘let someone else do the dirty work’. But mostly because of the mistakes made in the assemblies —i.e. the wrong handling of confrontations. But the result is the same: the people who arrived [from the squares] to the neighborhood assemblies, eventually retreated (Natasa)

In all the above, examining the pattern of development of anti-austerity contestation in the third phase of mobilizations, we are confronted with the problem of confrontational attitudes and the embeddedness of disunities in collective action. The interviewees of this research have largely explained these problems to be the result of micro-political dispositions of movement groups, ‘elitism’ in communication or even the desire to affirm the radicality and correctness of one’s analysis. In all instances, however, they are problems that were understood as representing pathogenies of social movements and collective action itself. In rarest cases we also come across a more intriguing explanation of these confrontational and divisive attitudes, as epiphenomena of the pathogenies of contemporary heteronomous societies more broadly. In this direction, some interviewees explain demoralization, isolation and

withdrawal from social contestation as powerful expressions of alienation in modern societies, so that resolving conflict and disunity in collective action perforce implies a radical shift of mindsets attuned to grasping the distortions of capitalist modernity:

I believe that the basic mistake we make is that we bring into our movements the heteronomy we experience in society in general.

A very big part of our communication is unspoken. It exceeds the limits of what I can describe in regards to what we are doing here. This is why I believe that an essential characteristic of our communication is 'intention'.

I cannot describe what 'intention' is, but in it we can see how the alienated society interacts with the movement: that is, how the 'diseases' of our society enter the movement and get reproduced. This is a huge challenge for all of us and we have to address it (Natalia)

Following this lead and trying to grasp the analytical ramifications of such an understanding of conflict-oriented approaches to collective action, the logic of the 'Big Night' appears to be again relevant. More specifically, it can be said that visions of social change as the result of a single moment of ultimate resistance are fostered by the logic of the 'Big Night,' on the basis of incomplete sociopolitical analyses, tending to remain oblivious to the subtle reproduction of heteronomy and domination in movement struggles. In small-scale collective action, then, the result appears to be the production and reproduction of social relationships that affirm divisions and legitimate exclusions. In short, then, the logic of the 'Big Night' in small-scale collective action can be understood to foster a type of sociopolitical contestation that, in its arsenal for undermining the discursive frameworks that 'manufacture consent and legitimate authority' (Buechler 2000: 207), keeps only the halo of radicality and correctness of those involved. The imprint of this logic on the third phase of anti-austerity mobilizations in Greece has been detected in the affirmation of consequential divisions and conflicts in sociopolitical

contestation. In the words of a key informant with systematic presence in both the second and the third phase of the mobilizations:

Now of course, in the current juncture, there is again a ‘closing’. If you look at what is going on now, you will see that there is a great ‘deflation’ [of the movement]. The majority has returned to doing what they know to do best.

‘Being together’ requires patience. Not all people have patience. The climate now is gloomy (Iakovos)

In summary, the interpretation of orientations and meanings in collective action in Greece can be understood to delineate a type of contestation consistently informed by the logic of the ‘Big Night’, which is differently manifested on different levels of collective action: in large-scale action it manifests itself in what resembles an acute radicalization, followed by demoralization and withdrawal, while in small-scale action it manifests itself through the establishing of divisions and the creation of conflicts, similarly followed by withdrawal. In both instances, however, the denominator appears to be common: ‘deflation’ of movement activity, as expression of a deeper disillusionment in regards to the efficacy of sociopolitical contestation.

The logic of the ‘Long Days’ in Spain: unity, institutional politics and political moderation

The experience of the Indignados in Spain can be largely understood as combining two basic elements: a) the wide embrace of the ‘anarchist spirit’ (Sitrin 2015) of the libertarian Indignados, and accordingly the rejection of hierarchical structures of organization and b) the ‘return’ of institutional politics in the citizenist discourse of the ‘young Indignados’ that largely resembled a call to ‘change the system from within’. Accordingly, if it could be said that in organizational terms 15M was dominated by the horizontal and deliberative advocacy of the libertarian Indignados, then it can be said that in discursive terms the citizenist discourse of the ‘young Indignados’ took the

lead by renouncing ‘old’ party politics. It is important then to note that the Indignados appear to have effectively denounced ‘old’ party politics in particular, rather than party politics in general. In this direction, the widespread disillusionment with the way institutional politics work became translated, in 15M, into calls for reconfiguring institutional structures and reconceptualizing priorities in doing politics. This call becomes characteristically shaped in the third phase of the Spanish anti-austerity mobilizations, when the rejection of ‘old’ party politics effectively becomes translated into a more systematic experimentation with ‘new’ party politics that combine elements of the political critique of both ‘souls’ of the Indignados: a) the embrace of institutional politics as viable routes for the expression of sociopolitical contestation (relevant in the citizenist discourse of the ‘young Indignados’) but also b) the embrace of horizontal organizational structures and deliberative decision-making process as exemplary configurations of an actually democratic politics (associated with the political priorities of the libertarian Indignados).

Following closely all the above, we see that the general pattern of sociopolitical contestation that marked the third phase of anti-austerity mobilizations in Spain was actually a pattern of contestation guided by the logic of the ‘Long Days’: that is, a type of contestation that eventuates in the creation of a system of virtually uninterrupted and interconnected struggles, where ideational interpretations of orientations and meanings in collective action are actually mixed together —rather than confronted with one another and brought into conflict. In this direction, finally, the grassroots ecosystem of movement politics, in Spain, after 2011, can be understood as being actually guided by a logic of contestation consistently oriented towards producing ‘consensus’ and ‘unity’ in collective action, which now takes it to the institutions. The emergence of Partido X in 2012 and later on the emergence of Podemos in 2013-2014 are the most characteristic examples in this direction.

The emergence of Partido X in 2012 can be understood as representing a good example of the legitimacy that institutional politics in general continued

to enjoy after the Indignados. Nevertheless, it is suggested, Partido X cannot be properly understood without properly understanding the Indignados' demand for an actually democratic restructuring of institutional politics:

Most of the people, though by no means all, belonging to the Citizens' Network X Party actively participate or feel part of the 15-M movement.

15-M movement represents a collective expression of rejection of the functioning of our public institutions and political parties, which have forgotten citizens' real sovereignty.

Many different instruments have emerged from the spirit of 15-M to cover multiple fronts. The X Party is one of them. Through this instrument we want to participate in the electoral arena for those who, like us, believe this is a battle worth fighting for.

Let's make a 15-M movement in the electoral scenario! (Partido X, FAQs #Is this the 15-M movement's official Party?).¹⁰⁹

Altogether, organized around four basic pillars —'transparency in public management', 'right to real and permanent vote', 'binding referendum processes', 'governmental and legislative power to the citizens' (wikigobierno and wikilegislación)¹¹⁰— Partido X introduced itself as a 'method' to 'radically change the channels through which democracy works and the role of what, until now, has been called 'political parties' (Partido X, Methodo de Partido X):¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ <https://partidox.org/faqs/>

¹¹⁰ The programme of Partido X is accessible online at: <https://partidox.org/programa-x/>

¹¹¹ <https://partidox.org/method/>

Citizens' Network X Party is a minimum non-ideological cross-border pact among citizens on the basis of a common roadmap and working method.

X stands for an unknown variable. It represents the individual or group of individuals working to fully change the current political party concept in a way that a true democracy can be established. Will any party do it? No? Then X represents the people, a citizens' network that uproots them from their seats.

It is a successful citizens' network because it carries out a programme to establish a real democracy that allows people to protect their own interests (Partido X, What is it?).¹¹²

In this direction, Partido X appears to be closely linked to the overall sociopolitical production of 15M, while in the Wiki formatted encyclopedia of 15M, 15Mpedia, it is actually registered as the 'party of the future':¹¹³ that is, a political party organized around the basic principles that informed the Indignados, such as horizontality, deliberation and absence of leaders. However, it seems that it has not found fertile ground for building alliances with the forces of the established political system that remain firmly attached, as Partido X claims, to 'old' politics:

We have withdrawn from various collaborations in the past months, projects that were not able to defend themselves against the vice of traditional politics and political forces that prefer to dynamitize any project that does not allow them to impose their interests or to impose an illusion of a new, but 'bogus' 2.0 participation, which is actually nothing more than usual politics; albeit with keyboard (El Diario 2015).

¹¹² <https://partidox.org/what-is/>

¹¹³ https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Partido_X,_Partido_del_Futuro

Following all the above, Partido X can be understood as representing commitment to shaping a concrete political expression of the Indignados' critique of institutional politics and, thus, an attempt to re-configure the system of 'old politics' by means of introducing new types of political intervention that have at their heart the notion of the citizenry. Partido X, however, is merely one characteristic example of the sociopolitical production of the grassroots ecosystem of the third phase of mobilizations in Spain. The emergence of the Spanish 'mareas' is another example in the same direction: holding at its core the notion of an inclusive civil society, while leaning towards an understanding of politics as being permanently fixed within the established system of government. Following the mobilizations of the Indignados, the 'mareas', distinguished by different colours, emerged to lead antagonism on multiple social fronts. The white tide emerged first, against the reduction of public spending for health services: 'the risks of a private healthcare in the US are a clear example of what can happen in Spain. The good news is that you have a voice: Defend Public Health!'.¹¹⁴ The green tide followed, populated mainly by primary and secondary school teachers, defending public education against cuts in public spending: 'We defend the public school and quality public services for everyone'.¹¹⁵ The yellow tide stood in defense of public libraries.¹¹⁶ The orange tide took the lead in defending social services and social cohesion.¹¹⁷ The blue tide took the lead opposing the privatization of

¹¹⁴ Marea Blanca (2012), "¡Sin Sanidad Pública, tu Salud Está en Peligro!" ("Without Public Health, your Health is in Danger"), 16 February. Accessible at: <http://mareablan-casalud.blogspot.fr/2012/12/sin-sanidad-publica-tu-salud-esta-en.html#links>

¹¹⁵ Marea Verde, see <http://mareaverdemadrid.blogspot.fr/p/quienes-somos.html>

¹¹⁶ Marea Amarilla, see <http://noalprestamodepago.org/marea-amarilla/>

¹¹⁷ Marea Naranja, see https://www.cgtrabajosocial.es/consejo/Marea_Naranja

¹¹⁸ Marea Azul, see <http://mareaazuldearagon.blogspot.fr/>

¹¹⁹ Marea Violeta, see <http://mareavioleta.blogspot.fr/>

water companies.¹¹⁸ The violet tide emerged in defense of gender equality.¹¹ Finally, the red tide emerged in defense of the unemployed.¹²⁰

The example of the ‘mareas’ is characteristic of the analytical implications of the logic of the ‘Long Days’ for the development of quotidian sociopolitical contestation in the third phase of the Spanish anti-austerity mobilizations: that is, generation of continuous, interconnected and virtually uninterrupted struggles that respond to the politics of the crisis (e.g. privatizations etc) by combining priorities that have been all together represented in the collective identifications of the Indignados —i.e. demands for democratization (e.g. opposition to privatization etc), demands for reconfiguring organizational structures (e.g. horizontal participation in political decision-making) and demands for reconfiguring institutional politics in ways that give voice to the citizenry. In short, then, the ‘mareas’ can be understood as an acclaimed example of contestation in the third phase of anti-austerity mobilizations in Spain properly guided by the logic of the ‘Long Days’, as they principally emphasize claims for structural changes to governments. Finally, the emergence of Podemos in 2014 can be understood as one of the most critical expressions of a negotiated understanding of social change -similarly drawing on the premises of 15M-, but also as a critical node of efficacious contestation in the context of the crisis:

Since that moment, [2011], social movements in general —the movements of the Left and so on— underwent some kind of restructuring. This lasted until the moment, at the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014, Podemos was formed.

Podemos actually crystallizes all the struggles of all the movements that fought against the politics of austerity (Irene)

¹²⁰ Marea Roja, see <https://marearoja9.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/marearoja/>

In overall terms, Podemos and 15M are not the same and it seems that this cannot be emphasized enough. The reason is that, in reality, Podemos remains totally unintelligible outside its relation to 15M and the spirit of a new way of doing politics that it fostered (see also Flesher Fominaya 2014b):

When in 2014 Podemos was formed, we checked it out very well. Because Podemos emerged from this movement. There is no doubt that in some way it got consolidated out of 15M. At least one part -a very big part- of this movement of indignation made room for Podemos (Ernesto)

Accordingly, Podemos can be understood as being a political expression launched in the specific discursive context that was set up by 15M (one of its basic parameters being the diminished credibility of political parties and institutions) and as representing one of the most concrete manifestations of change, in the coordinates of political action, propelled by 15M (Toret Medina 2015: 125-6). Of course, Podemos is not the only political expression of the spirit of democratization fostered in 15M. New parties such as Partido X, Partido Pirata or the Escaños en Blanco¹²¹ belong to the same class of political expressions: guided by the autonomous spirit of horizontal and deliberative politics, although establishing a good rapport with institutional politics. In fact, in all instances, these are parties properly understood as political expressions that were ‘designed quite explicitly to take advantage of a moment of political crisis to advance a particular set of issues such as disillusionment with politicians’ (Tormey and Feenstra 2015: 597). Podemos is no exception to this pattern, as it essentially represents the Spanish reconceptualization of the notion of ‘the political’, on account of the ‘exhaustion’ of the years long ‘political and cultural model’ of the country:

The second of our key ideas includes a proposition and a diagnosis about Spain: this is what we describe as ‘crisis of the regime’. It implies that we are not only confronted with a set of dispersed social protests, neither the

¹²¹ see <http://partidopirata.es/> and <http://escanos.org/>

better nor the worse results of bipartisanship in the elections. Rather, we are facing the end of a political cycle, the exhaustion of a political and cultural model (Errejon Galván 2014: 23).

If, however, Partido X in late 2012 represented the ‘horizontal wing of 15M’ (Tormey and Feenstra 2015: 595), Podemos represents a distinctively institutionally-oriented approach to political efficacy —albeit with characteristics of bottom-up politics. In particular, Podemos appears to represent the ‘pragmatic instrumentalization of the party form itself’ (Tormey and Feenstra 2015: 599), with all that this entails. On the one hand, to a large extent, Podemos contained recurrent tensions between autonomous movements and the movement of the Left, by systematically connecting concerns about embedding coherent alternative forms of doing bottom-up politics with concerns about remaining attuned to institutional politics and the existing system of government:

In Spain there has been an evolution of the protest. The third phase was the ‘electoral phase’, ‘taking it to the institutions’, constructing political alternatives.

At some point we realized that there was a ‘closure’ of the institutions, a ‘closure from above’. We realized that despite massive assemblies, massive protests and so on, we don’t achieve anything on the political level. There were no reactions, by the institutions, in view of the massive protests and the austerity measures were being implemented. So, there was a ‘reflection’, even among the autonomous movements: we need to do something (Felipe)

On the other hand, however, Podemos appears to have revived strong fears of co-optation of radical political activity by the institutions of government. The reason for this is that Podemos was set up as an indeed bottom-up party organization, with horizontal structures of participation and deliberative

processes of decision making. In this sense, then, it was effectively set up as a ‘new’ party in which a significantly large part of the Spanish Indignados saw themselves reflected. In this sense, Podemos has been bound up with great expectations of efficacy in sociopolitical contestation and actual sociopolitical change, the frustration of which could in fact mean a moment of great, deep and consequential disillusionment. The interpretations of the interviewees of this research —assessing Podemos as the most typical example of the Spanish movement politics of the crisis, revolutionizing ‘old’ party forms and instrumentalizing a ‘new’ party form— have unfailingly pointed in this direction. In fact, in all instances they did so not on account of some personal dislike for the party, but on account of their declared sympathy for it:

With it [Podemos] people took ‘participation’ in their hands. They prefer models of direct participation, instead of traditional parties. After all, it [Podemos] is a ‘reflection’ of the movement [15M].

Of course I don’t say that our goals have been achieved in absolute terms. But we have some new expressions [of doing politics]. In my opinion it is necessary to achieve changes in the mindset of the public, but this cannot be rapidly achieved.

So, I believe that in Spain we have some new expressions, some examples, but they are very particular examples. Now it is necessary to widen these processes and to make these schemes more profound, if don’t want in some years to be saying that the system has co-opted us (Ernesto)

Along such lines, the critical appraisal of Podemos in the interviewees’ analyses often hints at the necessity of firmly embedding a comprehensive system of ‘checks and balances’, functioning to preserve the hope for change, while ensuring that the large constituency of the party does not become a mere accessory to the system. In other words, these are calls that can be largely understood as being guided by strong commitment to ensure that the ‘new’

party form does not betray the organizational and political priorities of 15M and in this sense it does not betray the hope for actual social change:

It has been said that Podemos is the political expression of 15M. It is true, to an extent. It is the result of the political evolution of the movement and many people who participated in 15M decided to support Podemos. But the organizational structure of Podemos is becoming increasingly disconnected from the organizational ideas of 15M. It is becoming quite hierarchical and centralized.

On the political level, we can see great moderation. There is great moderation in the political programme of Podemos and its relation with the movement is not very clear. It is quite controversial actually.

There is also a problem with the idea of populism that informs Podemos. There is a tendency for doing personalized politics, but the presence of a charismatic leader contradicts the ideas of 15M. Maybe it is necessary in politics after all. But, to me at least, it is something that doesn't fit in with the movements. We have to take care of that (Arturo)

Finally, then, it seems that the instrumentalization of the 'new party form', characteristically represented by Podemos in the third phase of anti-austerity mobilizations in Spain, is understood in a double way. On the one hand, it is understood as a moment of celebration of the way in which alternative visions of (democratic) politics managed to make room for themselves in the radical imaginary, the general public discourse and the institutions of representation. On the other hand, it is understood as a moment of reflection on issues that have to do with one of the most common problems of institutionalized politics in general: that is, reflection in regards to preventing 'the effective stoppage of the movement's inherent fluidity in order to adapt it to rationalised structures, losing the advantages of high connectivity and rapid action afforded by decentralised, networked forms of organisation' (Gordon 2008: 64).

In summary, in all the above we see that the interpretation of orientations and meanings in collective action in Spain can be understood to delineate a type of contestation consistently informed by the logic of the ‘Long Days’. First, this is confirmed in regards to the development of a ‘new’ type of institutional politics —preeminently represented by the early emergence of Partido X in 2012 and the subsequent emergence of Podemos in 2014— oriented towards actually making Dutschke’s long march through the institutions (see Marcuse 1972), on account of a professed conviction that such a possibility in fact exists: ‘there exist possibilities to give voice to a large part of the social sectors that are discontented, exist possibilities to effect political transformation. We are ready to give the political fight on different terms, than those by which the political elites maintain hegemony’ (Errejón Galván 2014: 25). Second, it is confirmed in regards to the development of a type of quotidian grassroots contestation that is attuned to making claims for structural changes to governments, as the Spanish ‘mareas’ have shown. Altogether, these are developments similarly hinting at the increasing relevance of the logic of the ‘Long Days’ in the development of patterns of sociopolitical contestation that appear to be steadily oriented to the building of ‘consensus’ and the creation of ‘unity’ —albeit, more often than not, risking political moderation.

Conclusions

This chapter examined contemporary movement expressions of what was identified earlier as distinct interpretations of sociopolitical contestation in Greece and Spain: dissensual, conflict-oriented interpretations of contestation in Greece and consensual, unity-oriented interpretations of contestation in Spain. The aim of this chapter was to examine patterns of sociopolitical contestation in the third phase of the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations under the light of the previous findings of this research. In this direction, the specific logics of sociopolitical

contestation, which were detected in reference to the first phase of mobilizations (i.e. the logic of the ‘Big Night’ and the logic of the ‘Long Days’), were used as a guideline in the examination of the third phase of anti-austerity mobilizations in Greece and Spain.

Accordingly, the examination of this chapter found that the anti-austerity mobilizations of the third phase in Greece condense within themselves a basic pattern of sociopolitical contestation that can be understood as shaping contemporary Greek movement politics of the crisis more generally. This is a pattern of contestation shaped around some sort of acute radicalization, dissent and conflict. Furthermore, it was found that this pattern of contestation is expressed differently at different levels of collective action. In large-scale collective action, sociopolitical contestation is guided by strong desires for social change here and now, bound to be dramatically frustrated in view of the rapid and unstoppable advancement of austerity policies. The result is the generation of phenomena of deep demoralization and disillusionment in regards to the efficacy of sociopolitical contestation. In small-scale collective action, such as the quotidian and localized collective action of neighbourhood assemblies after 2011, contestation is expressed through relationships systematically guided by ‘mindsets of dissent’ and confrontational attitudes for resolving problems of ideational heterogeneity. In this direction, the grassroots ecosystem of anti-austerity movements after 2011 was found to be marked by some firmly embedded divisions between its radical components —in particular between participants identifying with anarchist movements and participants identifying with movements of the radical Left. The result of such divisions was found to be the creation of regrettable conflicts, compromising the unity of the radical component of social antagonism (i.e. anarchist movements and movements of the radical Left) on the one hand, and on the other functioning to create conditions of exclusion of the non radically-politicized wider public. The ultimate result of these processes then, as with the case of large-scale collective action, is the

generation of disillusionment in regards to the efficacy of collective action and accordingly withdrawal from it.

The anti-austerity mobilizations of the third phase in Spain were similarly found to condense within themselves a basic pattern of sociopolitical contestation that can be understood as shaping contemporary Spanish movement politics of the crisis more generally. This is a pattern of contestation guided by commitment to the premises of consensus and unity. In this direction sociopolitical contestation of the crisis was found to be shaped by the simultaneous embrace of the political priorities of the different components of the anti-austerity movement: on the one hand the embrace of horizontal, non-hierarchical and deliberative organizational structures (largely identified with the libertarian Indignados of the second phase of anti-austerity mobilizations); on the other hand a strong attachment to institutional politics, alongside the demand to reshape it by embedding 'the citizenry' at its heart (largely identified with the 'young Indignados' of the second phase of anti-austerity mobilizations). In large-scale collective action, more specifically, sociopolitical contestation was found to be centred on the rejection of 'old' party politics and the advocacy for a 'new' politics on the basis of this double embrace. The result was found to be the emergence of an indeed 'new' party politics characterized by bottom-up political parties, attuned to the creation of horizontal, deliberative and leaderless structures. The emergence of Partido X in 2012 and the emergence of Podemos in 2014 are the most characteristic examples of large-scale movement politics of the crisis in Spain. In small-scale collective action the pattern of sociopolitical contestation was found to be similar: shaped by the simultaneous embrace of institutional politics, as viable routes of political activity, and of horizontal structures of interconnected struggles, as representations of an actually democratic politics. The emergence of the 'mareas' is the most characteristic such example of small-scale movement politics of the crisis in Spain.

Altogether, the analysis of this chapter detected, in the Greek and Spanish movements of the crisis, patterns of sociopolitical contestation that

render intelligible the anti-austerity mobilizations in the two countries as comprehensive wholes, but then also comparatively. In regards to this, the Greek and Spanish movement politics of the crisis were found to represent two significantly different cases of contestation of the crisis, albeit belonging to the same wave of South European anti-neoliberal contestation. In particular they were found to subscribe to decisively different logics of contestation (i.e. the logic of the 'Big Night' in Greece and the logic of the 'Long Days' in Spain) and accordingly to present different patterns of interpretation of orientations and meanings in collective action (i.e. guided by acute radicalization, dissent and conflict in Greece, and political moderation, consensus and unity in Spain): patterns that shaped two different examples of movement politics of the crisis: movement politics of the crisis as a politics of radical outbreaks in Greece, and movement politics of the crisis as a politics of moderate continuities in Spain.

Conclusions

The recent global wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of late 2010-2011 captivated public audiences around the world, as it engaged a type of sociopolitical contestation far removed from the politics-as-usual type of protesting and managed to surpass the expectations of the national governments it protested against. At the core of these mobilizations we find intense demands for democratization and people's political empowerment raised around the world in a similar fashion: through large-scale, highly heterogeneous mobilizations that became marked by the occupation of public squares. The characteristically heterogeneous constituency of these mobilizations and the characteristically broad demand (in analytical terms) for democratization highlighted a central puzzle with two angles behind this global wave of protesting: who is demanding democracy so intensely and what do they mean by it? Narrowing the focus on the European wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, which unfolded in contexts of sociopolitical systems of consolidated democracies, a third angle is added to the puzzle: who is demanding democracy so intensely, in already democratic systems, and what do they mean by it? The present research, focusing on the European wave of mobilizations, singled out the South European cases of Greek and Spanish mobilizations (commonly known as the mobilizations of the 'Aganaktismenoi' in Greece and the mobilizations of the 'Indignados' in Spain) and sought to find answers to a set of three questions: What does the demand of the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations mean, when it is raised in already democratic contexts? What does the mobilizations' demand for (real/direct) democracy practically imply? Who are the 'Aganaktismenoi' and the 'Indignados'?

The puzzling configuration of the European wave of mobilizations, out of which these questions were raised, constitutes a configuration with exceptional

interest for social movement analysis. The reason is that it essentially highlights fundamental concerns of the relevant scholarship—in fact, concerns for which social movement research provides some valuable frameworks of analysis. These are the framework of analysis of collective action frames and the framework of analysis of collective identities. The first helps address questions that have to do with the identification of problems and the attribution of responsibility on the one hand (diagnostic frames of collective action), and on the other questions that have to do with the proposing of solutions and the specification of strategies, plans and routes of action (prognostic frames of collective action). The framework of analysis of collective identities helps address questions that have to do with the ‘construction’ of social movements’ identities. The present research, placing itself within the scholarship of social movement studies, singled out these frameworks of analysis as theoretical tools to guide the search for answers to the set of three questions described above: that is, to seek answers to ‘the what?’, to ‘the how?’ and to ‘the who?’ of the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity mobilizations.

The premise of this research is that the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations are in fact integral parts of the European wave of mobilizations of late 2010-2011. The central argument of the research, however, is that the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, rather than a comprehensive whole, indicative of movement politics of the crisis in Europe -or for that matter Southern Europe-, are actually characterized by some basic differences in regards to the interpretation of orientations and meanings in sociopolitical contestation. Accordingly, behind the set of three question examined, the central query of the research has been to explain differences between the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations: if the objective of the research was to search for answers to the puzzle ‘what-how-who’ behind the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations, this was with the aim to render them intelligible as comprehensive wholes of sociopolitical

contestation in order to achieve the goal of explaining cross-national differences in contemporary sociopolitical contestation.

The central hypothesis of the research has been that these differences are essentially produced on account of different cultures of sociopolitical contestation (shaped by the influence of national political cultures of contestation) expressing themselves by circumscribing different social relationships and producing different patterns of collective action. Such different relationships and patterns of interpretation are actually present, albeit at times inconspicuous, throughout all (three) phases of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations in Greece and Spain. Following all the above, the present research was designed as a comparative analysis along the lines of the most-similar system design: that is, a research design taking advantage of similarities between two cases of analysis in order to discover the crucial difference that explains ‘what one wants to explain’ (Przeworski 1995: 17). The present research took advantage of similarities on two levels (between movement cases and country cases): first the similarities between the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity mobilizations (belonging together in the European wave of mobilizations and accordingly exhibiting some useful commonalities in regards to the emergence of the large-scale mobilizations of the *Aganaktismenoi* and the *Indignados* during the second phase of protesting in 2011) and between Greece and Spain (subscribing to a common democratic framework, as ‘Third Wave Democracies’ and in particular ‘difficult democracies’) (see Huntington 1991; 1992; Pridham 1984).

In accordance with the hypothesis of the research -i.e. there exist meaningful differences between the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity mobilizations, which have to do with the existence of different cultures of sociopolitical contestation (shaped by the influence of national political cultures of contestation)- the logic that informs these different types of social relationships was examined. In this direction, Greece and Spain were examined in historical perspective, while their socioeconomic and political transformations since the 1950s were briefly delineated in order to acquire a

sense of proportion as to the similarities and differences between them. Finally then, their democratic transitions were examined: representing their virtually simultaneous entry into a lasting struggle for the consolidation of democratic rule of law in the mid-1970s, and thus the critical moment after which cultures of sociopolitical contestation become progressively established within the politically favourable environment of post-transition (chapter 1). The comparative examination of Greece and Spain in this respect revealed two diametrically opposed political cultures. On the one hand there is the Greek political culture, intensely marked by disenchantment with the processes of democratization and failed 'de-Juntification' and followed by strong desire for redemption during the first years after the transition: altogether, that is, a political culture impelling the radicalization of sociopolitical contestation as an act of public expiation and a way to right the wrongs. On the other hand there is the Spanish political culture, steadily guided by the fear of new conflicts, the advocacy of consensus politics and the encouragement for leaving the past behind: altogether, that is, a political culture fostering moderation in sociopolitical contestation as an act of condoning unity and halting polarizations that could eventuate to conflicts and confrontations.

The political cultures of Greece and Spain were examined in regards to their expressions in sociopolitical contestation of anarchist and Marxist movements and organizations, as inevitable points of reference for any type of collective action aiming at radical social change. Although the examination of anarchist movements did not provide much information —on account of scarce bibliographical references to the Spanish anarchist movement (which is only marginally relevant in political terms during the post-transition) and the Greek anarchist movement (which is regrettably absent from systematic analyses of post-transition contestation)—, a brief examination of the post-transition development of the communist parties of Greece and Spain, as preeminent proponents of the broader political Left (at least during the first decades after the transition), confirmed two diametrically opposed cultures of sociopolitical contestation: that is, it confirmed the trend toward dissensual, conflict-

oriented interpretations of social contestation in Greece and toward consensual, unity-oriented interpretations of social contestation in Spain.

The second part of the research focused on contextualizing the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations within in the broader field of movement politics and in particular in a lineage of movements inspired by the autonomous call for liberation and resistance to neoliberalization. In this direction, the characteristics of sociopolitical contestation were examined in anti-neoliberal movements inspired by the autonomous tradition, while the role of the Global Justice Movement (GJM) was emphasized in particular, in order to acquire a sense of proportion and most importantly in order to trace lines of continuity between the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations and mobilizations that came earlier in the historic cycle of anti-neoliberal contestation worldwide. Accordingly, then, movement politics of the crisis were examined as resistance to neoliberalism and domination, while the principles and values of the autonomous tradition were explored as key features of grassroots anti-neoliberal resistance from the new social movements of the 1960s and the 1970s and the movements of the post-New Left of the 1980s to the momentous GJM at the turn of the century and the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of late 2010-2011 (chapter 2). The examination of the autonomous tradition as a coherent system of interpretations and meanings in collective action oriented at effecting radical social change took place by means of exploring the concepts and practices of horizontality and deliberation: as organizing principles of autonomous movements but also as social/political values and logics informing grassroots movements of resistance to neoliberalisation.

On the one hand, the examination of the logic of horizontality as a quest to rearrange conventional conceptions of politics, highlighted the notions of socialization, insurrection, subversion, direct action and spontaneity as critical elements of a cohesive project of creative transformation that seeks to dissolve material and cognitive structures of authority and control. On the other hand, the examination of deliberation as a process of dissolving power and

domination, highlighted the notion of rationality as key to dissolving structures of authoritative thinking, alongside structures of authoritative acting, and ultimately highlighted the practice of deliberation itself as a work in metacognition. Altogether, the two concepts were shown to represent the unyielding desire to transform structures and expressions of social antagonism on the one hand and on the other the desire to transform interpretations and deeply rooted understandings of social antagonism, and were finally brought together under the broader prefigurative imperative of the autonomous tradition. Prefiguration was examined in two respects: first it was examined as strategy of social change, dictating the congruence of means and ends in collective action resisting neoliberalism, placing emphasis on the role of political choices for the liberation of everyday life and the creation of contested arenas beyond what is commonly considered to be political. Second, prefiguration was examined as radical reconceptualization of 'history', representing an ever developing, open-ended process of transformation, rather than a linear progression toward an end. Ultimately, the connection between the autonomous call for liberation and autonomous-leaning movements was demonstrated and the relevance of the autonomous imperatives of horizontality, deliberation and prefiguration for the recent wave of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of 2010-2011 was highlighted.

Following this examination, trends of anti-neoliberal resistance inspired by the autonomous tradition and filtered through the distinct cultures of sociopolitical contestation of Greece and Spain were further examined in reference to contemporary movement politics of the crisis in the two countries (chapter 3). The brief examination of contemporary sociopolitical contestation in Greece and Spain revealed the existence to two distinct interpretations informed by two different logics. These logics, termed the logic of the 'Big Night' and the logic of the 'Long Days', were delineated in reference to the outlook of contestation during the first phase of mobilizations, were found to be following closely the models of political culture of Greece and Spain and were finally specified as follows: the logic of the 'Big Night', explaining

sociopolitical contestation in Greece, propels interpretations of contestation as a moment of ultimate resistance, tends to fail to recognize the interrelatedness of the various expressions of capitalist restructuring and becomes expressed through acute political radicalization that is followed by demoralization and withdrawal on account of frustrated expectations. The logic of the 'Long Days', explaining sociopolitical contestation in Spain, propels interpretations of contestation as a slow and continuous evolution of virtually uninterrupted struggles, tends to exhibit strong attachment to institutional politics and becomes expressed through political moderation that risks falling short of a radical (re)conceptualization of basic notions of social justice. In short, then, the hypothesis that different cultures of sociopolitical contestation (shaped by the influence of national political cultures of contestation) in Greece and Spain inform contemporary movement politics of the crisis in the two countries, thus producing different social relationships and patterns of action, was confirmed.

The third, fourth and fifth part of the research were devoted to systematic cross-national comparisons of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of Greece and Spain, focusing on the discursive and practical practices of contemporary anti-neoliberal resistance in 2011 (third part), the collective identities of the large-scale mobilizations of the *Aganaktismenoi* and the *Indignados* in 2011 (fourth part) and, finally, the organizational response that the 'movements of the squares' inherited to the third cycle of anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations in the two countries between 2012-2014 (fifth part). In particular, the analysis of the third part of the research found a set of similarities between the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of the second phase of protesting on a set of concerns examined -in regards to the diagnostic and prognostic frames of the mobilizations, as well as in regards to their collective identification. The most critical similarity detected between the *Aganaktismenoi* and the *Indignados* is that both movements exhibit bifurcations in their discursive formulations, in fact on all levels that they were examined (diagnoses, prognoses, identities), thus urging the conclusion that

they are both movements of tense unity: that is, both movements were configured on the basis of bringing together two 'souls'. Furthermore, the bifurcations on the basis of which these two 'souls' are delineated, as much in the Aganaktismenoi as in the Indignados, are rather similar and in both movements tend to delineate the presence of two similarly radical and similarly moderate political discourses, practices and 'subjects'.

The examination of the diagnostic frames of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados revealed two restricted diagnostic frames in the discourses of both movements (chapter 4). The first diagnostic frame identifies the failure of democratic representation in capitalist systems as the problem to be redressed, and attributes responsibility for it to corrupt political incumbents who fail to represent the interests of the people. The second diagnostic frame identifies the failure of democratic representation in capitalist systems as the problem to be redressed and attributes responsibility for it to the system of representation itself, as a system of organization destined to fail the interests of the people in all instances and under all circumstances. Similarly, the examination of the prognostic frames of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados revealed two prognostic frames delineated in their discursive formulations, but the prevalence of only one of them in regards to specified routes of action (chapter 5). The first prognostic frame (following closely the first diagnostic frame) consists in proposals for the ousting of corrupt politicians and the imposing of strict control of the privileges of the political class. The second (and in both movements prevalent) prognostic frame consists in proposals for replacing systems of representation by systems of participatory and deliberative sociopolitical organization, built on the basis of horizontal, non-hierarchical structures of participation and knowledge, and on the basis of processes of deliberative decision-making oriented to consensus. Interpretation of the generic demand of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados for direct/real democracy, in light of the findings of this third part of the analysis, urges the conclusion that European movement politics of the crisis confront us with a double political critique and a double political advocacy. In this direction, two

answers can be given to the questions: What does the demand of the Greek and the Spanish anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations mean, when it is raised in already democratic contexts? What does the mobilizations' demand for (real/direct) democracy practically imply?

On the one hand, the demand of the Greek and Spanish mobilizations represents the critique and proposal of what the relevant literature records as 'dissatisfied democrats' (Klingemann 1999; 2014) or else 'critical citizens' (Norris 1999; 2011), who adhere to democratic values but are disaffected by the functioning of established political institutions. In this direction, we see the political critique of the Greek and Spanish movements being powerfully raised against political institutions and corrupt politicians, and being coupled with the commitment to emend democratic representation. This commitment is further clarified in the proposals for ousting failed political incumbents and the calls for structural reforms. In this direction, then, the movement politics of the crisis represents a call with a double edge. First, it is a call for *strengthening representation vis-a-vis the people*. Focus is placed on the 'representative side' of representative democracies and in particular its electoral character. Accordingly emphasis is put on actually making the elected representatives 'more accountable to the public' (Norris 1999: 3). Second, it is a call for *strengthening the people vis-a-vis the system of representation*. Focus is placed on the 'democratic side' of representative democracies and in particular the role of the citizens. Accordingly emphasis is put on the development and embeddedness of 'indirect powers disseminated throughout society' (Rosanvallon 2008: 8).

On the other hand, the demand of the Greek and Spanish mobilizations represents the critique and proposal commonly represented in progressive radical social movements, such as anarchist movements and movements of the political Left, which are critical of neo-liberal capitalism and its various expressions in the sociopolitical organization of modern societies. In this direction, we see the political critique of the Greek and the Spanish movements being powerfully raised against political institutions and corrupt politicians,

coupled with the commitment to change the system of political representation. This commitment is further clarified in the proposals for embedding alternative structures and forms of organization. In this direction, then, the movement politics of the crisis represents a call with a double edge. First, it is a call for *embedding participatory systems of representation*. Focus is placed on the hierarchical organization of contemporary representative democracies. Accordingly emphasis is put on embedding horizontal structures of organization, as a quintessential democratic element of sociopolitical organization, as an ‘integral part of creating direct democracy’ (Sitrin and Azzellini 2014: 22), and finally as a crucial advancement towards ‘dissolving the structures of authority’ in political participation (Rothschild and Whitt 1986: 16). Second, it is a call for *embedding deliberative systems of organization*. Focus here is placed on the majoritarian character of representative democracies and the incorporations and exclusions it enforces. Accordingly emphasis is put on embedding deliberative processes of decision-making, as prototypically democratic processes (Mansbridge 2007; Mansbridge et.al.2010) where ‘forethought flexibly remakes old aims and habits, institutes perception and love of new ends and acts’ (Dewey 1922: 198).

In the fourth part of the research, in addition to the similar bifurcations revealed by the analysis of the movements’ diagnostic and prognostic frames, the examination of the collective identifications of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados revealed both of them to have been ‘constructed’ along similar lines. The mechanism for the ‘construction’ of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados as unified movements of anti-neoliberal contestation is the de-classing of the middle-classes (chapter 6), urging the conclusion that the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados altogether constitute the precarious of an accelerated restructuring of capitalism: i.e all those who, more than being exploited and alienated, are essentially rendered ‘superfluous in the capitalist sense’ as they fall through the grid of socioeconomic relations at an unimpeded pace (Trenkle 2006: 206). Further examination of their collective identification, however, revealed that both movements are essentially divided

between two ‘souls’ that can be described along ideational interpretations of the struggle for social change (chapter 7), urging thus the conclusion that the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados are essentially the ‘precari-us’ of contemporary restructuring of capitalism: that is, a community of political pluralism as ‘the idealized version of the post-Fordist market’ (Mitropoulos 2005). In this direction, the answer to the question Who are the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ and the ‘Indignados’?, is that they essentially represent ‘constructions’ of *tense unity*, where two ‘subjects’ become expressed through different narratives and tensely related interpretations of orientations and meanings in collective action.

The two ‘souls’ of the Greek Aganaktismenoi are represented by a radical Left/anarchist component and an indeterminate Centre/Left component. The two ‘souls’ of the Spanish Indignados are represented by the libertarian Indignados and the ‘young Indignados’. Altogether, the two ‘souls’ are tensely related as they represent different interpretations of orientations and meanings in collective action. The radical Left/anarchist ‘soul’ of the Aganaktismenoi and the ‘soul’ of the libertarian Indignados similarly fuel a strong anti-capitalist critique, while antagonism is similarly placed at the centre of their interpretations of orientations and meanings in collective action, as a key to the struggle for social change. The component of the indeterminate Centre/Left Aganaktismenoi fuels a strong anti-memorandum critique and places at the centre of its analysis the national interest. When compared to the radical Left/anarchist Aganaktismenoi, the indeterminate Centre/Left ‘soul’ of the movement is accurately understood as transposing the antagonistic constitution of interests from the field of capitalist exploitation to the field of national sovereignty, translating the ‘political problem’ into ‘national problem’ and ultimately interpreting the call for social change into a call for national liberation and sovereignty. The component of the ‘young Indignados’ expresses itself through ‘buenismo’, as an embrace of political correctness, dialogue and tolerance and places at the centre of its analysis the interests of the citizens. When compared to the libertarian Indignados, the

‘young Indignados’ are accurately understood as striving for a type of politics that is free from antagonism, develops ‘outside the dialectic that belongs to political life’ (Puig 2005: 11) and is ultimately liberated from ‘the political’ itself. Alongside the different representations in the second ‘soul’ of the Aganaktismenoi and the Indignados, the analysis further revealed different types of relationships developed in view of ideational heterogeneity: deeply incised divisions and confrontational relationships between the two ‘souls’ of the Aganaktismenoi on the one hand, and on the other smooth encounters between discourses with diversity of content in the Indignados.

In the fifth part of the research, these trends of sociopolitical contestation were further examined in reference to the most recent expressions of the anti-austerity and pro-democracy impulse of the grassroots in Greece and Spain. Accordingly, the third phase of the mobilizations was examined, when anti-austerity and pro-democracy collective action settles down in Greece and spreads to the micro-spaces of social life, producing a grassroots ecosystem of anti-austerity movements -neighborhood assemblies being the most notable among them-, while in Spain anti-austerity collective action closely connected to 15M (i.e. the mobilizations of the Indignados) similarly spreads the seeds of anti-neoliberal contestation through a variety of movements (chapter 8). The hypothesis on the basis of which this examination took place was that the basic differences in regards to interpretation of orientations and meanings in collective action, in Greece and Spain -that are initially delineated in the first phase and become perceptible during the second phase-, are more intensely highlighted in the third phase of anti-austerity mobilizations when the precepts of the large-scale protests of 2011 are diffused in small-scale mobilizations more systematically oriented to resist neoliberalisation by effecting the ‘decolonization of everyday life’ (see Katsiaficas 2006).

In this direction, the different logics of contestation in Greece (i.e. the ‘Big Night’) and Spain (i.e. the ‘Long Days’) were examined in reference to the development of the Greek and Spanish anti-austerity movement in the phase of mobilizations starting around 2012 and up until 2014, when the time-line of

this research stops. This examination found that anti-austerity and pro-democracy mobilizations of the third phase in Greece epitomize a set of relationships and interpretations in collective action that are systematically explained by the logic of the 'Big Night'. Large-scale collective action is steered by intense desires for social change here and now, which are accordingly frustrated in view of the advancement of austerity policies, resulting thus in phenomena of demoralization and disillusionment in regards to the efficacy of contestation. Small-scale collective action is guided by confrontational attitudes, in view of ideational heterogeneity, which (re)affirm divisions between its radical components and engender the exclusion of wider audiences that are not radically-politicized.

In contrast, the anti-austerity mobilizations of the third phase in Spain epitomize a set of relationships and interpretations in collective action that are systematically explained by the logic of the 'Long Days'. Sociopolitical contestation is accordingly guided by commitment to the premises of consensus and unity, reflecting thus the main political priorities of both 'souls' of the Indignados —i.e. the horizontal and deliberative organizational structures of the libertarian Indignados, and the demand to reshape institutional politics and make them 'our own', largely identified with the 'young Indignados'. Along these lines, large-scale collective action is characteristically captured in the emergence of 'new' political parties, organized bottom-up and attuned to create horizontal, deliberative and leaderless structures, such as Partido X in 2012 and Podemos in 2014. Small-scale collective action is expressed through the emergence of horizontal structures of interconnected struggles taking place on a variety of fronts from education and health, to unemployment and gender equality. The Spanish 'mareas' (i.e. tides of change) are the most characteristic example of this. In short, then, the premise of the central argument of the research was again found to be solid, as different relationships and interpretations of orientations and meanings in collective action were also detected in the brief comparative examination of the third phase of mobilizations in Greece and Spain. Overall,

these are differences systematically found in the broader cycle of Greek and Spanish anti-austerity mobilizations -in the briefly examined first phase of mobilizations where they are initially delineated; in the second phase of mobilizations when they become perceptible in the different types of social relationships developed in the *Aganaktismenoi* and the *Indignados*; in the third phase of mobilizations, finally, when they become more clearly underlined. Altogether, then, they are differences that urge the conclusion that movement politics of the crisis in Greece and Spain are shaped as distinct examples of contestation: movement politics of the crisis as politics of radical outbreaks in Greece, and movement politics of the crisis as a politics of moderate continuities in Spain.

In summary, following on the central hypothesis that collective action reflects patterns of sociopolitical contestation that are shaped in reference to broader national political cultures, this research found that indeed: contemporary movement politics of the crisis in Greece and Spain are essentially examples of sociopolitical contestation, comprehensively understood when they are examined in reference to national political cultures. In other words, the mobilizations' commonly raised demands for democratization and commonly advanced advocacy for the embeddedness of real/direct democracy are effectively filtered through the lens of nationally-specific cultures of contestation. This is a finding with a double edge in regards to the overall contribution of this research, on a contingent and on a theoretical level. On the contingent level the conclusion we draw is that contemporary anti-neoliberal contestation of the European wave of mobilizations in late 2010 is essentially a cluster of distinct models of contestation, which cannot be comprehensively understood on the basis of some sort of European -or for that matter a more restricted Southern European- sameness. On the theoretical level the conclusion we draw is that contemporary anti-neoliberal contestation essentially urges the re-appreciation of the relevance of national political cultures in collective action and therefore demands that we bring 'history' into the analysis of social

movements. In other words, it calls for a shift of priorities in research by becoming attuned to the undiminished relevance of the national context in contemporary contestation that aspires to achieve social change at the European level.

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Appendix A: Interviews

CODING	INTERVIEWEE	CITY	DATE OF INTERVIEW
GT201301	Nikitas	Thessaloniki	September 2013
GT201302	Giannis	Thessaloniki	September 2013
GT201303	Zoe	Thessaloniki	September 2013
GT201304	Eleni	Thessaloniki	September 2013
GT201305	Alekos	Thessaloniki	September 2013
GT201306	Ioanna	Thessaloniki	September 2013
GT201307	Marios	Thessaloniki	September 2013
GT201308	Ilias	Thessaloniki	September 2013
GT201309	Natasa	Thessaloniki	September 2013
GT201310	Gerasimos	Thessaloniki	September 2013
GT201311	Serafeim	Thessaloniki	September 2013
CODING	INTERVIEWEE	CITY	DATE OF INTERVIEW
GA201412	Iakovos	Athens	May 2014
GA201413	Natalia	Athens	May 2014
GA201414	Petros	Athens	May 2014
GA201415	Leyteris	Athens	May 2014
GA201416	Aliki	Athens	May 2014
GA201417	Andreas	Athens	May 2014
GA201418	Ermioni	Athens	May 2014
GA201419	Karolos	Athens	May 2014
CODING	INTERVIEWEE	CITY	DATE OF INTERVIEW
SB201301	Gabriel	Barcelona	June 2013
SB201302	Octavio	Barcelona	June 2013
SB201303	Santiago	Barcelona	June 2013
SB201304	Alba	Barcelona	June 2013
SB201305	Pablo	Barcelona	June 2013
SB201306	Fabiana	Barcelona	June 2013
SB201307	Berta	Barcelona	June 2013
CODING	INTERVIEWEE	CITY	DATE OF INTERVIEW
SM201308	Ernesto	Madrid	June 2013
SM201309	Felipe	Madrid	June 2013
SM201310	Arturo	Madrid	June 2013
SM201511	Irene	Madrid	October 2015
SM201512	Filomena	Madrid	October 2015
SM201513	Amelia	Madrid	October 2015

Table 1: Interviews conducted per city/per date

Appendix B: Interviewees' sample

Total sample: GREECE & SPAIN							
GENDER	% (Abs.Numb.)	AGE	% (Abs.Numb.)	EDUCATION	% (Abs.Numb.)	OCCUPATION	% (Abs.Numb.)
Male	59.5% (19)	18-35	31% (10)	Higher	62% (20)	Civil servant	6% (2)
Female	40.5% (13)	36-55	59.5% (19)	Secondary	19% (6)	Private sector	15% (5)
missing	—	56+	9.5% (3)	missing	19% (6)	Unemployed	9.5% (3)
		missing	—			Precarious	25% (8)
						Student	9.5% (3)
						Pensioner	6% (2)
						missing	28% (9)
Total	100% (32)		100% (32)		100% (32)		100% (32)

Table 2: General demographic characteristics of the sample of interviewee partners in Greece and Spain.

Total sample: GREECE & SPAIN					
MOVEMENT PARTICIPATION	% (Abs.Numb.)	POLITICAL AFFILIATION	% (Abs.Numb.)	MOVEMENT GROUP	% (Abs.Numb.)
Systematic participation	56% (18)	Left	37.5% (12)	Neighborhood assembly	69% (22)
Regular participation	34.5% (11)	Right	3% (1)	Other	31% (10)
First time participation	9.5% (3)	A/A	28% (9)		—
missing	—	No affiliation	31.5% (10)		
		missing	—		
Total	100% (32)		100% (32)		100% (32)

Table 3: Movement related features of the sample of interviewee partners in Greece and Spain.

		Interviewees per country/ per city:			
		Greece		Spain	
Interviewees per:		% (Abs.Numb.)		% (Abs.Numb.)	
Gender	Male	63% (12)		54% (7)	
	Female	37% (7)		46% (6)	
Total interviewees:		100% (19)		100% (13)	
		Thessaloniki	Athens	Barcelona	Madrid
Interviewees per:		% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)
Gender	Male	58% (7)	42% (5)	57% (4)	43% (3)
	Female	57% (4)	43% (3)	50% (3)	50% (3)
Total interviewees:		58% (11)	42% (8)	54% (7)	46% (6)

Table 4: Interview partners of the research, classified by gender, per country, per city.

		Interviewees per country/ per city:			
		Greece		Spain	
Interviewees per:		% (Abs.Numb.)		% (Abs.Numb.)	
Age	18-35	21% (4)		46% (6)	
	36-55	74% (14)		39% (5)	
	56+	5% (1)		15% (2)	
Total interviewees:		100% (19)		100% (13)	
		Thessaloniki	Athens	Barcelona	Madrid
Interviewees per:		% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)
Age	18-35	18% (2)	25% (2)	28,5% (2)	67% (4)
	36-55	73% (8)	75% (6)	43% (3)	33% (2)
	56+	9% (1)		28,5% (2)	
Total interviewees:		100% (11)	100% (8)	100% (7)	100% (6)

Table 5: Interview partners of the research, classified by age group, per country, per city.

		Interviewees per country/ per city:			
		Greece		Spain	
Interviewees per:		% (Abs.Numb.)		% (Abs.Numb.)	
Education	Higher	63% (12)		62% (8)	
	Secondary	21% (4)		15% (2)	
	<i>missing</i>	16% (3)		23% (3)	
Total interviewees:		100% (19)		100% (13)	
		Thessaloniki	Athens	Barcelona	Madrid
Interviewees per:		% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)
Education	Higher	64% (7)	62,5% (3)	57% (4)	67% (4)
	Secondary	18% (2)	25% (2)	29% (2)	—
	<i>missing</i>	18% (2)	12,5% (1)	14% (1)	33% (2)
Total interviewees:		100% (11)	100% (8)	100% (7)	100% (6)

Table 6: Interview partners of the research, classified by educational background, per country, per city.

		Interviewees per country/ per city:			
		Greece		Spain	
Interviewees per:		% (Abs.Numb.)		% (Abs.Numb.)	
Main occupation	Civil servant	5% (1)		8% (1)	
	Private sector	26,5% (5)		—	
	Unemployed	11% (2)		8% (1)	
	Precarious	26,5% (5)		23% (3)	
	Student	5% (1)		15% (2)	
	Pensioner	5% (1)		8% (1)	
	<i>missing</i>	21% (4)		38% (5)	
Total interviewees:		100% (19)		100% (13)	
		Thessaloniki	Athens	Barcelona	Madrid
Interviewees per:		% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)
Main occupation	Civil servant	9% (1)	—	14% (1)	—
	Private sector	18,5% (2)	37,5% (3)	—	—
	Unemployed	9% (1)	12,5% (1)	14% (1)	—
	Precarious	27% (3)	25% (2)	29% (2)	17% (1)
	Student	9% (1)	—	—	33% (2)
	Pensioner	9% (1)	—	14% (1)	—
	<i>missing</i>	18,5% (2)	25% (2)	29% (2)	50% (3)
Total interviewees:		100% (11)	100% (8)	100% (7)	100% (6)

Table 7: Interview partners of the research, classified by occupational background, per country, per city.

		Interviewees per country/ per city:			
		Greece		Spain	
Interviewees per:		% (Abs.Numb.)		% (Abs.Numb.)	
Movement participation	Systematic participation	53% (10)		62% (8)	
	Regular participation	31% (6)		38% (5)	
	First time participation	16% (3)		—	
Total interviewees:		100% (19)		100% (13)	
		Thessaloniki	Athens	Barcelona	Madrid
Interviewees per:		% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)
Movement participation	Systematic participation	36,5% (4)	75% (6)	71% (5)	50% (3)
	Regular participation	36,5% (4)	25% (2)	29% (2)	50% (3)
	First time participation	27% (3)			
Total interviewees:		100% (11)	100% (8)	100% (7)	100% (6)

Table 8: Interview partners of the research, classified by movement participation, per country, per city.

		Interviewees per country/ per city:			
		Greece		Spain	
Interviewees per:		% (Abs.Numb.)		% (Abs.Numb.)	
Political affiliation	Left	42% (8)		31% (4)	
	Right	5% (1)		—	
	A/A	26,5% (5)		31% (4)	
	No affiliation	26,5% (5)		38% (5)	
Total interviewees:		100% (19)		100% (13)	
		Thessaloniki	Athens	Barcelona	Madrid
Interviewees per:		% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)
Political affiliation	Left-wing	55% (6)	25% (2)	14,5% (1)	50% (3)
	Right-wing	9% (1)	—	—	—
	A/A	9% (1)	50% (4)	57% (4)	—
	No affiliation	27% (3)	25% (2)	28,5% (2)	50% (3)
Total interviewees:		100% (11)	100% (8)	100% (7)	100% (6)

Table 9: Interview partners of the research, classified by political affiliation, per country, per city.

		Interviewees per country/ per city:			
		Greece		Spain	
Interviewees per:		% (Abs.Numb.)		% (Abs.Numb.)	
Movement group	Neighborhood assembly	79% (15)		54% (7)	
	Other	21% (4)		46% (6)	
Total interviewees:		100% (19)		100% (13)	
		Thessaloniki	Athens	Barcelona	Madrid
Interviewees per:		% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)	% (Abs.Numb.)
Movement group	Neighborhood assembly	100%	50% (4)	57% (4)	50% (3)
	Other	--	50% (4)	43% (3)	50% (3)
Total interviewees:		100% (11)	100% (8)	100% (7)	100% (6)

Table 10: Interview partners of the research, classified by movement group, per country, per city.

Appendix C: List of assemblies/events

		Greece		Spain	
		Thessaloniki	Athens	Barcelona	Madrid
Assemblies	Neighborhood assemblies	6 ¹	1 ²	3	—
	Organisational assemblies/ Other movement groups	—	3	1	—
Total		6	4	4	—
Events	Thematic talks ³	2	2	2	—
	Conferences/ Meetings ⁴	1	—	1	—
	Local events ⁵	2	1	—	—
	Demonstrations ⁶	1	—	1	—
	Referendum ⁷	1	—	—	—
Total		7	3	4	—
Total per per city		13	7	8	—
<p>1. The information collected from one neighborhood assembly has been used to enhance my overall understanding of the movement politics of the crisis, but it has not been included as such in the analysis, after the request of the participants of the movement group.</p> <p>2. Access for participation in the assembly was not granted. The information collected comes from a pre-assembly process, it is partial and its use for the analysis has been limited.</p> <p>3. Thessaloniki: two thematic talks on evictions and the housing situation during the crisis Athens: one thematic talk on real democracy and political participation; one thematic talk on political crisis, international relations and international solidarity with grassroots resistance Barcelona: one thematic talk on politics of the crisis, urban development and gentrification; one debate on grassroots activism and police repression.</p> <p>4. Thessaloniki: movement conference on international actions against the privatisation of water companies, examples from Latin America</p> <p>5. Thessaloniki: two local events focusing on the organisation of no-intermediary open markets Athens: local event focusing on the organisation of local-level actions and the creation of defense groups safeguarding the spaces of grassroots local action.</p> <p>6. Thessaloniki: demonstration against the closing of the Public Broadcast Company (ERT) followed by statements of local actors (movement groups and neighborhood assemblies) on the crisis and the central political scene Barcelona: demonstration against gentrification and the implementation of the Plan de Usos in the city of Barcelona.</p> <p>7. Local referendum, initiated by movement groups against the privatisation of the water company (EYATH) of Thessaloniki, designed to take place the same day as the Municipal Elections on 18.05.2014. The referendum took place in 181 polling stations over the city of Thessaloniki with the participation of 218.002 citizens and resulted in a deafening 98% against the privatization of EYATH.</p>					

Table 11: List of assemblies and events of participant observation per country/per city.

Appendix D: List of documents

DATE	CITY	MOVEMENT GROUPS I SOURCE	TITLE (original language)	TITLE (translation)	URL	Last accessed
22. 06. 2011	Athens	Λαϊκή συνέλευση πλατείας Συντάγματος	Ψήφισμα της Λαϊκής Συνέλευσης της Πλατείας Συντάγματος για το Μεσοπρόθεσμο	Decree of the People's Assembly of Syntagma Square for the Mid-term Agreement	https://realdemocracygr.wordpress.com/2011/06/24/%CF%88%CE%AE%CF%86%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%BC%CE%B1-%CF%84%CE%B7%CF%82-%CE%BB%CE%B1%CF%8A%CE%BA%CE%AE%CF%82-%CF%83%CF%85%CE%BD%CE%AD%CE%BB%CE%B5%CF%85%CF%83%CE%B7%CF%82-%CF%84%CE%B7%CF%82-%CF%80%CE%BB%CE%B1/	11. 03. 2018
29. 06. 2011	Athens	Media Center της Συνέλευσης της πλατείας Συντάγματος	Δεν μας τρομάζετε...Μας ξεσηκώνετε!	You don't scare us., you	https://realdemocracygr.wordpress.com/2011/06/30/%CE%B4%CE%B5%CE%BD-%CE%BC%CE%B1%CF%82-%CF%84%CF%81%CF%BF%CE%BC%CE%AC%CE%B6%CE%B5%CF%84%CE%B5-%CE%BC%CE%B1%CF%82-%CE%BE%CE%B5%CF%83%CE%B7%CE%BA%CF%8E%CE%BD%CE%B5%CF%84%CE%B5/	11. 03. 2018
03. 07. 2011	Athens	Λαϊκή συνέλευση πλατείας Συντάγματος	Πρακτικά Λαϊκής Συνέλευσης	Minutes of People's Assembly	https://realdemocracygr.wordpress.com/2011/07/04/%CF%80%CF%81%CE%B1%CE%BA%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AC-%CE%BB%CE%B1%CF%8A%CE%BA%CE%AE%CF%82-%CF%83%CF%85%CE%BD%CE%AD%CE%BB%CE%B5%CF%85%CF%83%CE%B7%CF%82/	11. 03. 2018
05. 07. 2011	Athens	Λαϊκή συνέλευση πλατείας Συντάγματος	9-10 Ιουλίου στο Σύνταγμα Πανελλαδικός απολογισμός και σχεδιασμός των επόμενων βημάτων	9-10 July at Syntagma, Panhellenic Account and planning of next steps	https://realdemocracygr.wordpress.com/2011/07/05/9-10-%CE%B9%CE%BF%CF%85%CE%BB%CE%AF%CE%BF%CF%85-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%BF-%CF%83%CF%8D%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%B1%CE%B3%CE%BC%CE%B1-%CF%80%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%B1%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%BA%CF%8C%CF%82-%CE%B1/	11. 03. 2018
11. 07. 2011	Athens	Λαϊκή συνέλευση πλατείας Συντάγματος	Πρακτικά Λαϊκής Συνέλευσης Πλατείας Συντάγματος	Minutes of People's Assembly Syntagma Square	https://realdemocracygr.wordpress.com/2011/07/12/11072011-%CF%80%CF%81%CE%B1%CE%BA%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AC-%CE%BB%CE%B1%CF%8A%CE%BA%CE%AE%CF%82-%CF%83%CF%85%CE%BD%CE%AD%CE%BB%CE%B5%CF%85%CF%83%CE%B7%CF%82-%CF%80%CE%BB%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B5%CE%AF%CE%B1/	11. 03. 2018
04. 01. 2012	Athens	Λαϊκή συνέλευση πλατείας Συντάγματος	Ψηφίσματα-πρακτικά Λαϊκής Συνέλευσης Πλατείας Συντάγματος	Decrees-Minutes of People's Assembly Syntagma Square	https://realdemocracygr.wordpress.com/2012/01/04/%CF%88%CE%B7%CF%86%CE%AF%CF%83%CE%BC%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B1-%CF%80%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%BA%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AC-%CE%BB%CE%B1%CF%8A%CE%BA%CE%AE%CF%82-%CF%83%CF%85%CE%BD%CE%AD%CE%BB%CE%B5%CF%85%CF%83%CE%B7/	11. 03. 2018

08. 01. 2012	Athens	Λαϊκή συνέλευση πλατείας Συντάγματος	Ψηφίσματα-πρακτικά Λαϊκής Συνέλευσης Πλατείας Συντάγματος	Decrees-Minutes of People's Assembly Syntagma Square	https://realdemocracygr.wordpress.com/2012/01/08/%CF%88%CE%B7%CF%86%CE%AF%CF%83%CE%BC%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B1-%CF%80%CF%81%CE%B1%CE%BA%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AC-%CE%BB%CE%B1%CF%8A%CE%BA%CE%AE%CF%82-%CF%83%CF%85%CE%BD%CE%AD%CE%BB%CE%B5%CF%85%CF%83%CE%B7-2/	11. 03. 2018
08. 04. 2012	Athens	Λαϊκή συνέλευση πλατείας Συντάγματος	Ομόφωνο Ψήφισμα Α.Σ. Πλατείας Συντάγματος για τον Δημήτρη Χριστούλα	Consensual Decree of People's Assembly of Syntagma Square for Dimitris Christoulas	https://realdemocracygr.wordpress.com/2012/04/09/%CE%BF%CE%BC%CF%8C%CF%86%CF%89%CE%BD%CE%BF-%CF%88%CE%AE%CF%86%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%BC%CE%B1-%CE%BB-%CF%83-%CF%80%CE%BB%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B5%CE%AF%CE%B1%CF%82-%CF%83%CF%85%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%AC%CE%B3%CE%BC%CE%B1/	11. 03. 2018
28. 05. 2011	Thessaloniki	Γενική συνέλευση Λευκού Πύργου	Πρακτικά Γενικής Συνέλευσης Αγανακτισμένων Λευκού Πύργου	Minutes of General Assembly Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos	https://docs.google.com/document/pub?id=1ipN7UY88ddVrHXNt42WM1dvSUCuNhQdpLjTzEId3E	11. 03. 2018
29. 05. 2011	Thessaloniki	Γενική συνέλευση Λευκού Πύργου	Πρακτικά Γενικής Συνέλευσης Αγανακτισμένων Λευκού Πύργου	Minutes of General Assembly Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos	https://docs.google.com/document/pub?id=1B7Hb2M3BC3j3lhdxFs-pOtpohT6iyOqG34_z-SBCv1Q	11. 03. 2018
30. 05. 2011	Thessaloniki	Γενική συνέλευση Λευκού Πύργου	Ψήφισμα της Συνέλευσης του Λευκού Πύργου	Decree of General Assembly Lefkos Pyrgos	http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.gr/2011/05/3005.html	11. 03. 2018
01. 06. 2011	Thessaloniki	Γενική συνέλευση Λευκού Πύργου	Ψηφοφορία - Αποφάσεις	Voting - Decisions	https://docs.google.com/document/d/1WroLrUwLMFCTk4viRXFKjNcLhcUkGSZq9FkKjboBs/edit?hl=en_US & http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.de/2011/06/1-2011.html	11. 03. 2018
02. 06. 2011	Thessaloniki	Γενική συνέλευση Λευκού Πύργου	Πρακτικά Γενικής Συνέλευσης Αγανακτισμένων Λευκού Πύργου	Minutes of General Assembly Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos	https://docs.google.com/document/pub?id=1TG4Yzs21D5VKT_lYtmNioq4NuomVILCxiVKNAbqLk	11. 03. 2018
03. 06. 2011	Thessaloniki	Γενική συνέλευση Λευκού Πύργου	Πρακτικά Γενικής Συνέλευσης Αγανακτισμένων Λευκού Πύργου	Minutes of General Assembly Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos	https://docs.google.com/document/pub?id=1CEY1qi7m3F1MZwWkgIOZhZvbotiJj7Reup02fCOYoIM & http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.gr/2011/06/362011.html	11. 03. 2018
06. 06. 2011	Thessaloniki	Γενική συνέλευση Λευκού Πύργου	Πρακτικά Γενικής Συνέλευσης Αγανακτισμένων Λευκού Πύργου	Minutes of General Assembly Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos	https://docs.google.com/document/pub?id=14d9YRSDyUuj5fDc6iAdxfW-r16lxHSL-YiNqaVzYUbm & http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.de/2011/06/662011.html	11. 03. 2018

08. 06. 2011	Thessaloniki	Γενική συνέλευση Λευκού Πύργου	Πρακτικά Γενικής Συνέλευσης Αγανακτισμένων Λευκού Πύργου	Minutes of General Assembly Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos	https://docs.google.com/document/pub?id=15ha2Ta-aRKHTXL418pkW-B_PrtNj4BFNo4SFuapNxKI & http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.de/2011/06/1.html	11. 03. 2018
20. 06. 2011	Thessaloniki	Γενική συνέλευση Λευκού Πύργου	Πρακτικά Γενικής Συνέλευσης Αγανακτισμένων Λευκού Πύργου	Minutes of General Assembly Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos	https://docs.google.com/document/pub?id=1nnFkH8CIDSS3VdVboV3D9ph-y3cjHy9jWFn_06qCs & http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.gr/2011/06/206.html	11. 03. 2018
08. 07. 2011	Thessaloniki	Γενική συνέλευση Λευκού Πύργου	Ψήφισμα των αγανακτισμένων Λευκού Πύργου	Decree of Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos	http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.gr/2011/07/872011.html	11. 03. 2018
24. 07. 2011	Thessaloniki	Γενική συνέλευση Λευκού Πύργου	Ενημέρωση - Δελτίο Τύπου Αγανακτισμένων Λευκού Πύργου	Communique - Press release of Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos	http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.gr/2011/07/blog-post_24.html	11. 03. 2018
29. 08. 2011	Thessaloniki	Γενική συνέλευση Λευκού Πύργου	Πρακτικά Γενικής Συνέλευσης Αγανακτισμένων Λευκού Πύργου	Minutes of General Assembly Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos	http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.de/2011/08/29-2011.html#more	11. 03. 2018
29. 08. 2011	Thessaloniki	Γενική συνέλευση Λευκού Πύργου	Πρακτικά Γενικής Συνέλευσης Αγανακτισμένων Λευκού Πύργου	Minutes of General Assembly Aganaktismenoi Lefkos Pyrgos	http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.de/2011/08/29-2011.html#more	11. 03. 2018
No Date	Madrid	DRY! Madrid	Manifiesto	Manifiesto	(non accessible)	07.2017
No Date	Madrid	Toma los barrios Asamblea Popular de Madrid (APM)	Metodología asamblearia. Propuesta de la Comisión de Barrios para unas asamblea saludables	Assembly methodology. Proposal by the Neighborhood Commission for a healthy assembly	http://madrid.tomalosbarrios.net/metodologia-asamblearia/	11.03.2018
07.05.2016	Madrid	DRY	Comunicado: 5 años de luchas y seguimos a las plazas	Communique: 5 years of struggles and we continue in the squares	http://www.democraciarealya.es/blog/2016/05/07/5-anos-de-luchas-y-seguimos-a-las-plazas/	11.03.2018
31.05.2011	Madrid	TomaLaPlaza, #AcampadaSol	Guía rápida para la dinamización de asambleas populares	Quick guide for the facilitation of popular assemblies	https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/05/31/guia-rapida-para-la-dinamizacion-de-asambleas-populares/	11.03.2018
05.06.2011	Madrid	TomaLaPlaza, #AcampadaSol	Dinamización de asambleas: propuestas de incorporación metodológicas para la asamblea general	Facilitation of assemblies: proposals for methodological incorporation for the general assembly	https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/06/05/dinamizacion-de-asambleaspropuestas-de-incorporacion-metodologicas-para-la-asamblea-general/	11.03.2018

07.08.2011	Madrid	AcampadaSol	Comunicado sobre la caracterización de las personas detenidas tras las cargas policiales ante el ministerio del interior	Communique on the characterization of persons detained after police charges in front of the Ministry of Interior	https://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2011/08/07/comunicado-sobre-la-caracterizacion-de-las-personas-detenido-tras-las-cargas-policiales-ante-el-ministerio-del-interior/	11.03.2018
No Date	Madrid	Comisión de Dinamización de Asambleas de Acampada Sol, sin fecha conocida	Este es un documento elaborado por la Comisión de dinamización de asambleas de la acampada de Sol con unadoble finalidad	This is a document prepared by the Commission of facilitation of assemblies of acampada Sol with a double purpose:	https://www.scribd.com/document/56322883/Dinamizacion-de-las-Asambleas	11.03.2018
No Date	Madrid	#15MPedia	Lista de comisiones de Acampada Sol	List of commissions of Acampada Sol	https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Lista_de_comisiones_de_Acampada_Sol	11.03.2018
No Date	Madrid	#15MPedia	Acampada Sol, Historia	Acampada Sol, History	https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Acampada_Sol#Historia	11.03.2018
No Date	Barcelona	Acampada BCN	Objectius	Objectives	https://democraciarealjabarcelona.blogspot.gr/p/propuestas.html	11.03.2018
No Date	Barcelona	DRY BCN	Manifest	Manifiesto	https://democraciarealjabarcelona.blogspot.gr/p/manifest-cat.html	11.03.2018
No Date	Barcelona	#15MPedia	Lista de comisiones de Acampada Barcelona	List of commissions of Acampada Barcelona	https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Lista_de_comisiones_de_Acampada_Barcelona	11.03.2018
No Date	Barcelona	#15MPedia	Acampada BCN, Historia	Acampada BCN, History	https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Acampada_Barcelona#Historia	11.03.2018
05.2011	Barcelona	Acampada BCN	Guia informativa	Informative guide	https://acampadabcn.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/guia-informativa-acampada-plac3a7a-catalunya.pdf	11.03.2018
16.05.2011	Barcelona	Acampada BCN	Acampada BCN	Acampada BCN	https://acampadabcn.wordpress.com/2011/05/16/acampadabcn/	11.03.2018
17.05.2011	Barcelona	Acampada BCN	Ens repartim la feina	We disturb work	https://acampadabcn.wordpress.com/2011/05/17/ens-repartim-la-feina/	11.03.2018
19.05.2011	Barcelona	Acampada BCN	Declaració: Qui som a l'Acampada de Barcelona?	Statement: Who are we at the Acampada of Barcelona?	https://acampadabcn.wordpress.com/documents/declaracion-de-principios/	11.03.2018
19.05.2011	Barcelona	Acampada BCN	Acta 18 de Maig	Minutes May 18	https://acampadabcn.wordpress.com/2011/05/19/acta-18-de-maig/	11.03.2018

20.06.2011	Barcelona	Acampada BCN	Primeres mesures per a una vida digna	First steps for a dignified life	https://acampadabcn.wordpress.com/principis-per-laccio/ (Original post) https://acampadabcn.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/primeres-mesures-per-a-una-vida-digna_2006011.pdf (Catalan) https://acampadabcn.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/primeras-medidas-para-una-vida-digna_20060111.pdf (Castellano)	11.03.2018
No Date	Spanish Campaign	DRY	Manifiesto	Manifiesto	(non accessible)	07.2017
No Date	Spanish Campaign	#15MPedia	Asamblea	Assembly	https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Asamblea	11.03.2018
No Date	Spanish Campaign	#15MPedia	Asamblearismo	Assemblearism	https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Asamblearismo	11.03.2018
No Date	Spanish Campaign	#15MPedia	Partido X, Partido del Futuro	X Party, Party of the Future	https://15mpedia.org/wiki/Partido_X_Partido_del_Futuro	11.03.2018
06.02.2014	Spanish Campaign	Podemos @ahorapodem os	El problema de este país va más allá de la etiqueta ideológica de la izquierda y la derecha	The problem of this country goes beyond the ideological label of the left and the right	https://twitter.com/ahorapodem os/status/431465987360030720	11.03.2018
No Date	Spanish Campaign	Partido X	FAQs #Is this the 15-M movement's official Party?	FAQs #Is this the 15-M movement's official Party?	https://partidox.org/faqs/	11.03.2018
No Date	Spanish Campaign	Partido X	Democracia y punto: Wikigobierno	Democracy: Wikigovernance	https://partidox.org/democracia-y-punto-version-reducida/	11.03.2018
No Date	Spanish Campaign	Partido X	Democracia y punto: Wikilegislación	Democracy y punto: Wikilegislation	https://partidox.org/democracia-y-punto-version-reducida/	11.03.2018
No Date	Spanish Campaign	Partido X	X Party's method	X Party's method	https://partidox.org/method/	11.03.2018
No Date	Spanish Campaign	Partido X	What is it	What is it	https://partidox.org/what-is/	11.03.2018
16.02.2012	Spanish Campaign	Marea Blanca	"¿Sin Sanidad Pública, tu Salud Está en Peligro?"	"Without Public Health, your Health is in Danger"	http://mareablancasalud.blogspot.fr/2012/12/sin-sanidad-publica-tu-salud-esta-en.html#links	11.03.2018
No Date	Spanish Campaign	Marea Verde	HomePage	HomePage	http://mareaverdemadrid.blogspot.fr/p/quienes-somos.html	11.03.2018
No Date	Spanish Campaign	Marea Amarilla	HomePage	HomePage	http://noalprestamodopago.org/marea-amarilla/	11.03.2018
No Date	Spanish Campaign	Marea Naranja	HomePage	HomePage	https://www.cgtrabajosocial.es/consejo/Marea_Naranja	11.03.2018
No Date	Spanish Campaign	Marea Azul	HomePage	HomePage	http://mareazuldearagon.blogspot.fr/	11.03.2018
No Date	Spanish Campaign	Marea Violeta	HomePage	HomePage	http://mareavioleta.blogspot.fr/	11.03.2018
No Date	Spanish Campaign	Marea Roja	HomePage	HomePage	https://marearoja9.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/marearoja/	11.03.2018

Table 12: List of documents consulted

Appendix E: Visual material



Picture 1: Spain - 'They call it democracy, but it is not'. Archivo 15M. CC




Picture 2a: Spain - 'Error 404: Democracy not found'. Archivo 15M. CC.



Picture 2b: Greece -‘Error 404: Democracy not found’.



Picture 3: “Bread, Education, Freedom. The junta did not end in ’73. We will bury it in this square”.




Picture 4: Spain -‘Now there are no rebels without a cause, there are cause to rebel’. Archivo 15M. CC.



Picture 5. Spain -‘It’s not a crisis. It’s the system’. 15M Banner.



Picture 6. Spain -‘They don’t represent us’. Archivo 15M. CC.




Picture 7: Spain -‘We are not commodities in the hands of politicians and bankers’. Archivo 15M. CC.

**No hay
pan para
tanto
chorizo**

Creative Commons (CC BY-SA) 2011.



Picture 8. Spain - 'There's no bread for so many thieves'. 15M poster. Retrieved from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Occupy_Wall_Street_Poster,_15-M,_Indignados,_No_hay_pan_para_tanto_chorizo.png



Picture 9: Thieves in Greek and Spanish. Archivo 15M. CC.




Picture 10a: 'We are not anti-system, the system is anti-us'. Archivo 15M. CC.




Picture 10b: 'We are not anti-system, the system is anti-us'. Archivo 15M. CC.



Picture 11. Spain -‘You do not decide who decides for you’. Archivo 15M. CC.



Picture 12. Spain -‘Electoral law reform now!’. Archivo 15M. CC.



Picture 13. Spain -‘Organize your rage’. Archivo 15M. CC.



Picture 14. Spain -‘Here we build, we don’t destroy’. Archivo 15M. CC.



Picture 15: Greece -“We are awake! What time is it? It’s time for them to leave!”




Picture 16: Spain -‘We are neither politicians nor unions. We are citizens. Indignant’. Archivo 15M. CC.



Picture 17: Spain -‘Of course: ANTI -Capitalist, Patriarchal, Racist, System. Struggle -Joyful, Combative, Dignified, Collective’. Archivo 15M. CC.



Picture 18: Spain -‘The struggle is in the streets, not in the ballot boxes’. Archivo 15M. CC.



Picture 19: Spain - 'Our dreams don't fit in your ballot boxes'. Archivo 15M. CC.



Picture 20: Greece - 'Nothing has changed since elementary school. Class against class'.



Picture 21: Greece - 'End of Varkiza. Class War'.



Picture 22: Greece - 'In this Dekemvriana it will be us to win'