Populist Radical Right Parties and EU Policies: How coherent are their claims?

Gerda Falkner and Georg Plattner
Populist Radical Right Parties and EU Policies:
How coherent are their claims?

Gerda Falkner and Georg Plattner

EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2018/38
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, created in 1992 and currently directed by Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st century global politics.

The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world.

For more information: http://eui.eu/rscas
Abstract

In recent national elections and in those to the European Parliament, populist radical right parties (PRRP) have gained many more votes than in previous decades. What could that mean, at least in the longer run, for EU activities in such areas as e.g. the Internal Market, social or environmental regulation, migration management, and defence? Beyond these parties’ general attitude of Euro-scepticism, we know close to nothing about their views regarding specific EU policies. Therefore, we have recently assembled and analysed a novel dataset of programmatic statements. In this paper, we discuss how (in-)coherent the policy-specific demands of different PRRPs within the European Union actually are. How much do they agree or disagree when it comes to reforming EU policies?

Keywords

Populist Radical Right Parties, EU Policies, European Parliament, Political Groups, EU Reform
1. State of the Art and Research Question

Much has been written about the rise of the populist radical right\(^1\) in elections on both the national\(^2\) and the EU-level\(^3\). By 2018, European governments are led much more often by representatives of the political right than left, and of the eight populist parties in government, either alone or as coalition partners, six are what is in the literature called a populist radical right party (PRRP; see definition below):

\[\text{Table 1: Leading Parties in Government (EU 28, by 13 June 2018)}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governments</th>
<th>Left-wing populist led coalition</th>
<th>Social democratic or socialist</th>
<th>Social democratic or socialist-led coalition</th>
<th>Liberal governments or liberal-led coalition</th>
<th>Centrist Populist or centrist populist-led coalition</th>
<th>Conservative governments</th>
<th>Conservative-led coalition</th>
<th>Populist Radical Right</th>
<th>Populist Radical Right-led coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rome</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Czechia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own compilation

---

\(^*\) Thanks for excellent research support to Olof Karlsson and Florian Sowa. Helpful suggestions during Gerda Falkner’s stay at the EUI’s Robert Schuman Centre are gratefully acknowledged: thanks to its Director Brigid Laffan and to Stefano Bartolini, Henrik Enderlein, Philipp Genschel, Adrienne Héritier, Hanspeter Kriesi, Kalypso Nicolaides, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Milada Vachudova). Some of them have triggered ideas for specialised follow-up work. The authors are responsible for any remaining flaws.

\(^1\) We agree with various commentators that defining this group of parties is a challenge. For our own, literature-based and by necessity pragmatic approach, see Section 2 below.

\(^2\) Abou-Chadi (2016); Akkerman (2012); Albertazzi et al. (2011); Arter (2010); Arzheimer and Carter (2006); Fallend and Heinisch (2016); Goodliffe (2012); Rydgren (2004); Van der Brug et al. (2012).

\(^3\) Almeida (2010); Benedetto (2008); Brack (2013); FitzGibbon (2016); Kriesi (2015); Lefkofridi and Casado-Asensio (2013); Meijers (2015); Taggart and Szczepański (2013); Vasilopoulou (2011); Wolfreys (2013).

\(^4\) By the time of writing, Slovenia is facing coalition negotiations.

\(^5\) The M5S (Movimento 5 Stelle / Five Star Movement), the winner of the Italian elections of May 2018, is usually considered to be ‘populist’ or ‘centrist populist’. Their hybrid ideology does not allow placing them either on the left or right of the political spectrum (for more detail see, e.g. Bordignon and Ceccarini 2015; Gilles et al. 2017).
Table 2: Populist Parties in Government (EU28, by 13 June 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Left-wing Populist Parties</th>
<th>Centrist Populist Parties</th>
<th>Populist Radical Right Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governing alone</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poland (PiS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leading a coalition</strong></td>
<td>Greece (Syriza)</td>
<td>Czech Republic (ANO)</td>
<td>Hungary (Fidesz)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy (M5S)</td>
<td>Austria (FPO)(CON led)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Latvia (NA)(CON led)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Slovakia (SNS)(SD led)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bulgaria (ATAKA)(CON led)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy (Lega6)(POP led)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In a coalition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own compilation (CON = conservative, SD = social democrat, POP = populist). See Appendix for list of party names and abbreviations.

Tables 1 and 2 above corroborate that PRRPs are no longer fringe parties only and suggest that an impact on policies, including on the EU level, is imminent. At the same time, there is a gap in relevant political science research: Speculations about election campaigns and voter motives abound⁷ and there is in-depth research on the relevant parties⁸ and party families⁹. By contrast, we know little about what these developments could bring about for the EU’s policies, in particular if we refrain from wrongly considering European integration as a uni-dimensional enterprise that could only be pressed towards either increased or reduced intensity. In actual fact, the EU in its daily workings consists of different policies with specific actors, procedures, and basic rationales. Enquiring into the various parties’ ideas for their reform or demise seems an urgent matter, first, to fill an empirical gap of knowledge in contemporary political party research¹⁰; and second, to lay the foundation for an educated debate in the future about how the surge of populist radical right parties could actually impact on the EU’s policy output.¹¹

In principle, PRRPs may influence policy outcomes both directly (via increased presence and voice) and indirectly (via nudging other parties to take on board their preferred topics and/or

---

⁶ The party’s federal secretary Matteo Salvini announced that the party will drop the geographical ‘Nord’ from the party name in the run-up to the Italian elections 2018 but it was still the ‘Lega Nord’ during the timeframe of our study.

⁷ Aichholzer et al. (2014); Arzheimer and Carter (2006); Gómez-Reino and Llamazares (2013); Heinisch (2004); Hobolt (2016); Lefkofridi et al. (2014); Norris (2005); Spierings and Zaslove (2017); Van der Brug et al. (2012); Zaslove (2008); Zhirkov (2014).

⁸ Albertazzi et al. (2011); Arter (2010); de Lange and Art (2011); Fallend and Heinisch (2016); Goodliffe (2012); Jungar and Jupskas (2014); Pankowski (2010); Rosenfelder (2017); Zaslove (2011).

⁹ Art (2013); Betz (1994); Carter (2005); Eatwell (2000); Hainsworth (2008); Harrison and Bruter (2011); Ignazi (2003); Kitschelt and McGann (1997); Mannone et al. (2013); Mudde (2007, 2017); Norris (2005); Rydgren (2005); Taggart (1995); von Beyme (1988).

¹⁰ The interesting study by Braun et al. (2016) fills an important gap in the literature since it systematically differentiates between polity and policy issues in EP elections. In contrast to our quest, however, it focuses not on the (in-)coherence of the policy claims but on issues of salience.

¹¹ To be sure, many other factors come into play, as well, as discussed in the conclusions.
positions). In the case of the EU, the direct voice will be used in the relevant decision-making institutions according to the weight of PRRPs in elections on both the national and the EU levels. National election results are, however, largely filtered through the process of government formation since only parties in government have a direct voice in the Council of Ministers (and can usually appoint Commissioners): The governments are the crucial transmission belt of national party preferences into the EU’s policy-making system. The elections to the European Parliament (EP) are a second major route towards potential influence for PRRPs. However, its informal grand coalitions system has – at least, until recently – usually side-lined more extreme positions. A change could be impending and would be facilitated if the PRRPs performed in a coherent manner:

It seems reasonable to expect that the rise of the PRRPs has rather more policy impact if they are coherent in their desires. By contrast, if they are pulling in opposite directions, their claims could more easily balance each other out in various fora, including the Council and the EP, and hence stay without major effect. From the perspective of other parties, incoherence of the PRRP would seem good news since there is a higher chance to split them up, e.g. to form issue-specific coalitions. It is a matter of current debate that the PRRPs could possibly form a single party group after the next EP elections. Even if that were for purely strategic reasons, such as being eligible for additional funds, the issue of policy coherence will matter since it has been shown to be related to the stability and longevity of political groups in the European Parliament. So far, the PRRPs have usually been considered a bloc by political scientists because of their relative coherence in choices regarding national policies and because of their general (but unspecific) EU scepticism. This study aims to fill a gap in existing research by comparing these parties’ programmes where they target specific EU policies: Are they a harmonious cluster or is there disagreement, at a closer look?

Our basic research question is therefore: Do the PRRPs’ programmatic documents expose a coherent overall vision for (any of) the EU’s policies?

Our analysis is hence sector-specific and on the European level as it considers the relevant parties’ ideas and propositions for the EU’s competition policy, environmental policy, migration policy, etc. Within each policy, individual issues shall be coded and later compared. For example, regarding the issue of asylum regulation, which is a part of the broader field of EU migration policy, trial analysis has revealed that there is no coherence between the EP party group ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists Group, see below) and its Finnish and Danish member parties since the former suggests extending the EU’s instruments and the latter aim to dismiss them and renationalise the matter.

The 38 programmatic documents to be compared for that purpose encompass both programmes of the EU-level party federations and relevant materials of these federations’ national affiliates:

- First, the latest pre-2016 election manifestos of the EP’s relevant party groups, which are listed in the next section;
- Second, the official party programmes of all relevant national parties as in force by the end of 2016; or, in the absence of such a document, the latest election programmes for pre-2016 national elections;

12 At least, on the policy level; that may yet be different on the level of political styles and campaigning.
13 Parties select their groups according to policy coherence, and decide to leave them if incoherence becomes too strong (see i.a. McElroy and Benoit 2010: 396). On the importance of policy coherence for the formation and stability of political groups in general, see McElroy and Benoit (2007, 2010), Whitaker and Lynch (2013) and Bressanelli (2012).
14 All policy areas mentioned more than once in the relevant materials shall be included in the project, at large.
15 All documents in other languages were translated into English by experts supervised by Georg Plattner at EIF.
16 These need to include at least two PRRPs, since we aim to enquire issues of overlap and that cannot be done without comparing at least two units.
• Third, relevant policy documents which outline in-depth the specific claims of any party described above with regard to a specific EU policy.  

2. ‘Populist Radical Right Parties’ (PRRPs): What and Who Are They?

Our research question asks if the PRRPs’ programmatic documents expose a coherent vision regarding the reform of EU policies. Answering it requires a laborious enquiry which, in turn, makes it indispensable to build on established knowledge to determine the parties to be included in our analysis. Therefore, this project uses a literature-based approach relying on the rich political science scholarship specialising in the analysis of political parties. In other words, it is not the aim of our study to establish which ones out of the universe of parties in the EU could or should actually be labelled ‘populist radical right’ or have any one of the three characteristics without necessarily showing the others. Without confirming or disconfirming our specialist colleagues’ judgments (which would be impossible in the frame of our project) we work with what the mainstream of that literature concludes to be parties belonging to the group they label ‘PRRPs’ (see already Mudde 2007).

The relevant literature specifies that parties that are identified as ‘populist radical right’ are

• ‘populist’ in that they present themselves as the sole legitimate representatives of ‘the pure people’ whilst the other parties are regarded as part of ‘the corrupt elite’ (Mudde 2007: 23); in other words, these parties ‘mobilize in the name of “the people”’ (Kriesi 2018: 10)

• ‘radical’ in their ‘opposition to some key features of liberal democracy, most notably pluralism and the constitutional protection of minorities’ (Mudde 2007: 25), and

• ‘right’ in that they believe ‘the main inequalities between people to be natural and outside the purview of the state’ (Mudde 2007: 26).

It needs mentioning that the state-of-the-art literature is neither unanimously using the same definitions nor coming to the very same conclusions regarding which specific party actually is how populist, radical or right. However, there is a mainstream consensus regarding a cluster of parties that are labelled ‘Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs)’18. This includes three political groups in the European Parliament in its 8th term (2014-19) and 14 of their affiliated national parties. Furthermore, we included the two PRRPs that currently do not belong to any political group in the EP to establish their (in-)coherence with the rest. Together, the three groups and sixteen parties constitute the starting point of our study.

---

17 The manifestos for the European elections 2014 have by courtesy been shared with the researchers by the Euromanifestos Project 2014 conducted at the University of Mannheim. Other documents have been retrieved from the parties’ websites and through a search of the sources mentioned in secondary literature. The party programs have been collected on the parties’ websites.

18 Not all parties have been covered by Cas Mudde, or have existed then, and some have transformed into PRRPs only after he wrote the standard reference book ‘Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe’ (2007). Cas Mudde defined the Austrian FPÖ, the Belgian VB, the Danish DF, the Italian LN, the Swedish SD and the French FN as PRRP in that book (Mudde 2007). In 2016, he also included the Hungarian Jobbik, the German AfD and the Dutch PVV in this party cluster (Mudde 2016: 43 ff.; 2017: 15 ff.). Auers and Kasekamp (2013) argue that the Latvian NA fits Mudde’s framework. The Polish parties have been covered more recently by Rafal Pankowski, as the PiS was a different party in 2007 but transformed into a PRRP recently (Pankowski 2010). The Finnish PS has been studied in-depth by David Arter, who identifies it as a PRRP (Arter 2010). UKIP has transformed into a populist radical right party only recently, as Goodwin and Dennison (2018) show. Finally, not much literature is available on the Lithuanian PTT, but Van der Brug et al. (2012) state that it can be defined as PRRP.
Table 3: Populist Radical Right Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), in Populist Radical Right EP Groups\(^\text{19}\) or Non-Attached (172 of 751 MEPs, i.e. 22.9\%) Included in our Study\(^\text{20}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EP group (total no. of seats)</th>
<th>PRR Members</th>
<th>Members’ no. of EP Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECR - European Conservatives and Reformists (71)</strong></td>
<td>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Poland)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti (DF, Denmark)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perussuomalaiset (PS, Finland)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nacionālā apvienība &quot;Visu Latvijai!&quot;-&quot;Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK&quot; (NA, Latvia)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EFDD - Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (41)</strong></td>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP, UK)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sverigedemokraterna (SD, Sweden)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Germany)](^\text{21})</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partija Tvarka ir teisingumas (PTT, Lithuania)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[KORWiN (Poland)](^\text{22})</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{19}\) Note that the project covers only EP groups with more than one PRR party since our main goal is to study issues of coherence. The Hungarian governing party Fidesz is therefore not included in this study. It should also be mentioned that Fidesz has in recent years not published any party programme (since 2007) or EP election manifesto (since 2009).

\(^{20}\) Not mentioned here or anywhere else in our study are three (former) members of the ENF whose ‘parties’ however published no programme (at least, not before this project’s cut-off date by the end of 2016): one of ENF’s founding MEPs; Janice Atkinson (UK), an Independent Romanian MEP; and the MEP from the French Rassemblement Bleu Marine. The first got elected into the EP as a member of UKIP (see http://www.janiceatkinson.co.uk/about/, 26.3.2018). The second, Laurenţiu Rebega, was elected as a member of the Romanian Conservative Party, but defected in 2015 to join the ENF (see https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/news/extreme-right-group-poaches-s-d-mep/, 26.3.2018). He has left the ENF again in March 2018 to become an independent MEP (see https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/movers-and-shakers-12-march-2018, 26.3.2018). The third is a single MEP who is formally independent from the Front National, but his party (Rassemblement Bleu Marine) is a party alliance created in order to support Marine Le Pen in the 2012 legislative elections (see http://jeanlucschaffhauser.eu/allemand/, 26.3.2018).

\(^{21}\) AfD members are actually represented in two political groups (EFDD and ENF). In our analysis, the party shall be included in the ENF because by the time of our project’s start in autumn 2016, AfD was in two EP groups but more active in ENF. As a culmination of the party’s activity, then national party leader, Frauke Petry, represented the AfD at this EP group’s 2017 Koblenz conference, which was organised and hosted by the German party, and paid for by the ENF (see http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-01/enf-koblenz-marine-le-pen-frauke-petry-rechtspopulismus, 20.3.2018).

\(^{22}\) The KORWiN party is represented in the EFDD and its founder and leader Janusz Korwin-Mikke as a non-attached member. Since the party is a leader-centred party, KORWiN is overall considered as non-attached in our analysis. In January 2018, Korwin-Mikke announced to intend to withdraw from the European Parliament but by 1\(^{st}\) March 2018, it is not clear yet who will take his seat.
3. Research Design

The project establishes potential common ground and dissonances on different levels. In this paper, we focus on coherence between the PRRP groups in the 8th term of the EP (2014-19), between each PRR national member party and their PRR EU-level group, between the PRR national members of any one such EU-level group, and finally on coherence between all national PRR members of any of the EU-level groups—considering that they might well, after the forthcoming 2019 EP elections, strive to form one EU-level group.

The specific propositions of PRRPs with regard to the reform of EU policies have not been studied in-depth, so far. Related scholarly work\(^{23}\) and media reports\(^{24}\) hold that PRRPs are Eurosceptical and may try to end European integration or, at least, stop the workings of the EU as known to date. Our project aims to take a closer look at what these parties indeed say about specific EU policies. This could challenge established assumptions in so far as there may be hitherto undetected contradictions between such parties.

More specifically, there are at least three potential scenarios that would hint at various degrees of policy (in-)stability in case such parties would come into many more offices: Their programmatic ideas could reach

\(a\) in different directions (i.e., these parties would tend to block each other in specific policy-making processes);

\(b\) in the same basic direction but with differing degrees of intensity (i.e., these parties would have to negotiate intensely to agree on the specifics of any reforms);

\(c\) in the same direction and with the same/a similar intensity. Only this last option would mean that— as commonly assumed—it should be rather easy for a sufficiently large number of such parties to agree on policy reform matters.

To establish how coherent or incoherent the PRRPs’ policy ideas are, we use the method of content analysis (e.g. Krippendorff 2004) for the 38 party documents outlined in the introduction. Party manifestos and programs are a promising source for extracting a party’s policy position because they embody a common denominator, regardless of the party’s internal structure. While expert interviews and surveys (see e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2017) offer valuable but secondary assessments, and campaign statements as reported in the media (see e.g. Hutter et al. 2018) may include more recent but

\(^{23}\) Almeida (2010); Benedetto (2008); Brack (2013); FitzGibbon (2016); Gómez-Reino and Llamazares (2013); Maurits Meijers and Rauh (2016); Meijers (2015); Szcerbiak and Taggart (2008).

\(^{24}\) Traynor (2011, 2013); Willsher and Traynor (2014); Wintour and Watt (2014).
also ad-hoc policy demands, the party documents – while admittedly having their own shortcomings (see our conclusions) – can be expected to be somewhat more impartial and as close as we can get to these parties’ common guidelines of will and intent (see Laver et al. 2003: 311). Therefore, party programmes are a prime basis for both citizens and experts to try to hold parties accountable, including on the EU level (regarding accountability beyond the nation state, see Curtin et al. (2010)), which is indispensable if the EU wants to counter the impact of its recent multiple crisis on its ‘fractured polity’ with ‘fractious politics’ (Laffan 2018).  

Our coding units are all specific statements (over 500 claims) contained in these texts that regard any EU policy or any item that falls within a specific EU policy. The statements are then compared to the EU’s policy goals and instruments, as extracted from the EU’s primary law (Treaty on European Union/TEU, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union/TFEU, Charter of Fundamental Rights, etc.) as well as the relevant secondary law documents (Directives, Regulations, etc.). Each code is assigned to one specific goal, instrument or setting of the relevant policy.

To map the direction and depth of suggested policy reform, we draw on well-established concepts of the policy analysis literature. Regarding, first, direction we follow, albeit in a simplified manner, Michael Bauer and Christoph Knill (Bauer and Knill 2012, 2014) in their quest for increased or decreased governmental commitment in specific sectors. ‘Policy dismantling’ (their primary research interest) occurs when the number of policy instruments or the intensity of their settings are lowered; the status quo scenario results in no changes or a number of changes leading to the rather same status if balanced out across the policy area; and policy expansion is an increase in the number of policy instruments or the intensity of their settings. Regarding, second, the intensity of suggested policy change, we follow Peter Hall’s (Hall 1993) concept, again in a rather simple version: 1st order change refers to new settings of existing instruments; 2nd order change to new instruments or fewer instruments than before; and 3rd order change to new (ordering of) goals of the policy or cancellation of previous goals.

In short, the coding includes both the direction and the depth of any specific policy claim contained in the PRRPs’ documents studied. ‘Double claims’ are not counted where they are coherent with each other but we cover them individually where they are contradictory. Our findings are aggregated on the level of policy items and later of entire EU policies.

Regarding the coherence on the level of policy, we distinguish between ‘absolute coherence’ and ‘goal coherence’. ‘Absolute coherence’ is achieved if there are no inconsistencies on any level of claimed policy change. ‘Goal coherence’ means coherence regarding the proposed change on the level of goals.

Can we formulate any educated expectations with regards to the findings? According to the relevant political science literature, the characteristic features of PRRP are their nationalist orientation

---

25 Kostadinova and Giurcanu even rely on arguments in the direction of transnational commitment, and of linkage between party programme and policy being at the core of a mandate theory of democracy. Their study also uses (EU-level) party programmes but the focus is not on coherence between parties, but on overlap with ensuing Commission priorities (Kostadinova and Giurcanu 2018: 3, with further references).

26 Excluding double claims with essentially identical content, the dataset consists of 366 claims.

27 For a more complex version, see (Daigneault 2014).

28 Trying to measure the intensity of specific preferences is not part of our study.

29 I.e., all want the same direction of change (status quo or extension or dismantling) regarding goals and instruments and settings in the policy.

30 In our research design, we agreed that the picture on the level of instruments or settings could be comparatively more varied and still warrant a qualification of coherence: If there is goal coherence, the overall picture can be considered ‘rather coherent’ if at least 75+ per cent of the issues show coherence, and ‘rather incoherent’ if 25+ per cent do not. As the concluding section outlines, this showed to be irrelevant for lack of goal coherence.
and their positioning against liberal values on Hooghe/Marks’ GAL/TAN\textsuperscript{31} dimension of the political space. By contrast, they have no characteristic signature with regard to the ‘old’ left versus right cleavage that focuses on more or less state intervention in more or less ‘free’ markets (Mudde 2007: 25). There is rich confirming evidence for this at the national level but we lack systematic knowledge regarding EU policies – a gap we aim to fill. Drawing on characteristics highlighted for the national parties in the state-of-the-art literature and extending that logic to the realm of EU policies, PRRPs could reasonably be expected to

1. opt against any additional shifts of competences to the EU level, regardless of the policy, based on their – assumed – principled nationalism (Hypothesis 1),
2. voice consistent views regarding a dismantling of policies that are associated with the new politics dimension on the GAL/TAN axis such as fighting discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual or queer persons or promoting their family rights (Hypothesis 2), and
3. hold incongruent views on political issues located on the economic left/right dimension such as, most importantly, more or less free trade (Hypothesis 3).

The rest of this paper tests these literature-based expectations and presents a selective, first evaluation of claims in the PRRPs’ programmatic documents (preliminary, as available by May 2018).

4. PRRPs’ Policy Claims for EU Reform

Our database covers all statements the 16 PRRPs and 3 party groups made in the 36 programmatic documents evaluated, in total just above 500. This paper focuses on the findings regarding foreign, security and defence issues (4.1 below), anti-discrimination policies (4.2), and policies regarding the single market (4.3). The policies were selected to represent (in the order they were just mentioned above) what can be seen as different clusters of EU policies covering what has been called the core state powers (see Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013), the ‘new politics’ dimension of the political space where the GAL/TAN split is expected to feature most clearly, and finally the economic dimension which is commonly assumed to be less significant for the PRRPs’ identity.

4.1 CFSP and CSDP

Issues of foreign policy, security or defence were not initially part of the European Communities as established in the 1950s. Only in later Treaty reforms did these matters appear on the agenda of what should later become the European Union. It is hence for historical reasons that the relevant EU policies now have their somewhat complex names and acronyms: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

CFSP is the older of the two policies. The European Community started discussing the possibility of harmonising foreign policy in the late 1960s. At the Hague Summit in December 1969, the European leaders ‘instructed their foreign ministers to examine the feasibility of closer integration in the political domain’ (Lindstrom 2015: 16). This process resulted in the incorporation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, as the second of the three EU pillars. Already in 1993, the CFSP included a vision of a common defence policy\textsuperscript{32}, but the goal remained mere ambition until the late 1990s. The Balkan wars revealed the inability of the EU to act decisively in matters of defence and security, even in its direct neighbourhood: The United States of America and NATO had to intervene twice on behalf of their European allies. In the aftermath, the EU decided to

\textsuperscript{31} GAL stands for green, alternative and liberal; TAN for traditional, authoritarian and nationalist (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe et al. 2002).

\textsuperscript{32} Article J(4): CFSP includes ‘all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.’
develop an independent military capability to react to crises in the European periphery and the world. The result was the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which included a commitment to the so-called Petersberg Tasks. In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam further consolidated and upgraded CFSP, and Javier Solana was appointed as the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (which was still a much more limited role than after the Lisbon Treaty). In the same year, the Helsinki Headline Goal envisioned the build-up of a ‘European Rapid Reaction Force’ until 2003 (Gordon 2000: 12), i.e. a single common military force with the ability of performing the Petersberg Tasks (and reference to this is often made as evidence for the goal of a common EU army). In 2003, the European Security Strategy was written as the basic policy document to guide the EU’s foreign and security policy and the first joint security strategy.

In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon consolidated the EU’s goal of a common defence and security policy. It also upgraded the commitment regarding a common foreign policy by establishing the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the European External Action Service (EEAS). For the first time, a Treaty also elaborated on the goals and instruments regarding a common defence policy. The provisions regarding CSDP include three basic goals: a common defence policy, enhancement of military capabilities, and a defence commitment.

Regarding Goal 1 (a Common Union Defence Policy), the TEU states that the ‘common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy’ (Art. 42.2 TEU). Among three instruments, two are explicitly mentioned: Missions (Art. 42.1, specified in 43.1 TEU) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO, Art 42.6, specified in Art.46 and Protocol No.10). The missions that the EU common defence policy aims to cover are an extension of the Petersberg Tasks. By March 2018, 16 operations and missions take place under the authority of the EU (6 military, 10 civilian) and 18 operations and missions have been completed. The Permanent Structured Cooperation, PESCO, ‘is a specific CSDP flexibility mechanism introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. It is aimed at allowing Member States with the necessary military capabilities and who “have made more binding commitments to one another”, to increase their defence cooperation’ (Anghel and Bacian 2016: 3). Cooperation is supposed to take place in four core areas that are also referenced in Protocol No 10: financing, equipment, operational capabilities, and defence industry. In November 2017, the ministers of 23 member states signed a joint notification on PESCO.

By contrast, an EU Army is not specifically mentioned in the Treaty. It nevertheless represents a possible upcoming instrument of CSDP and is as such discussed in EU military circles. The parties included in our analysis react to this, often in a negative way. As an EU army is at this point only an

33 The Petersberg Tasks (named after the meeting’s location close to Bonn in Germany) were introduced in 1992. They cover a range of possible military missions that the EU should be able to fulfil on its own. Among others, these include: Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and crisis management tasks of combat forces, including peacemaking (see Lindstrom 2015: 17).
34 The European Security Strategy was replaced by the EU Global Strategy in 2016.
35 They now comprise, in addition to the original tasks, ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation’ (Article 43(1) TEU).
36 Andersson et al. (2016) discuss five possible futures for European defence, and the fifth scenario is that of a ‘European army’. They argue that ‘with national budgets under strain, it is increasingly accepted that intensified military integration is the only way forward if Europe is to play a meaningful military role in its own immediate neighbourhood, let alone on the global stage’ (31). Roderich Kiesewetter (foreign affairs representative of the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union parliamentary group in the German Bundestag) also stresses the importance of a European army on Carnegie Europe’s ‘Strategic Europe’ (Kiesewetter 2016): ‘The creation of a common European army is a long way off, but it is a strategic necessity to start paving the way toward it now.’ Furthermore, politicians such as Jean-Claude Juncker (Sparrow 2015), Emmanuel Macron (Kentish 2017) and Ursula von der Leyen (Jungholt 2016) have repeatedly talked of the necessity to work towards a European army.
37 In which not necessarily all member states would have to participate equally, particularly the (still) ‘neutral’ ones.
instrument to be used in the future, statements against it shall be coded as a claim for ‘dismantling’ of a prospective policy instrument.\textsuperscript{38}

Goal 2 involves the enhancement of capabilities for security and defence purposes. According to Article 42.3.2 TEU ‘Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities.’ Relevant instruments are specified in Article 45.1 TEU and include the harmonisation of operational needs, joint defence technology research, the strengthening of the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.\textsuperscript{39}

As Goal 3 we can finally consider a specific EU defence commitment since Article 42.7 TEU specifies that, if ‘a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.’\textsuperscript{40} The ‘mutual assistance clause’ was invoked for the first time by France in the aftermath of the Paris terrorist attacks on the 13\textsuperscript{th} of November 2015.

In the area of foreign policy, Goal 1 is the implementation of a common foreign and security policy\textsuperscript{41}. The first instrument considered for this goal is the European External Action Service (EEAS): ‘This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States’ (Art. 27.3 TEU). The EEAS is an important tool for the implementation of the CFSP, as it prepares acts to be adopted in the area of CFSP. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Instrument 2\textsuperscript{42}) is heading the service and acts as the face of the EU in its foreign relations. The EEAS is also in charge of EU diplomatic missions (Instrument 3)\textsuperscript{43}.

Against the status quo of the two EU policies as summarized above we shall now pitch the claims that PRRPs make in their programmatic documents.

4.1.1 Claims regarding CFSP and CSDP

Common Security and Defence Policy is the EU policy with the greatest number of claims (46) in our database. Taken together, CSDP and Common Foreign and Security Policy receive 59 claims. However, it needs mentioning that only one of the three PRR EP party groups (ECR) has officially taken a position. All other claims in these areas come from national PRRPs.

\textsuperscript{38} This seems requisite since, otherwise, a large number of claims would not show among our results.

\textsuperscript{39} For the latest state of this goal, see the EDA’s homepage (https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities, 4.3.2018).

\textsuperscript{40} Article 51 of the UN Charta speaks about the right to collective self-defence.

\textsuperscript{41} ‘Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States’ actions’ (Art. 24.2 TEU).

\textsuperscript{42} ‘The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s position in international organisations and at international conferences’ (Art. 27.2 TEU).

\textsuperscript{43} ‘The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Union delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organisations, shall cooperate in ensuring that decisions defining Union positions and actions adopted pursuant to this Chapter are complied with and implemented’ (Art. 35 TEU).
Populist Radical Right Parties and EU Policies: How coherent are their claims?

4.1.1.1 European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)

Goal coherence\(^{44}\) is visible for these PRRPs in the wider area of CFSP and CSDP since all actors speak out against the basic goals of these policies and hence opt for dismantling. This applies to the EP group and to its members Danish People’s Party (DF), Finns Party (PS) regarding CSDP, and to the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) and the Latvian NA, for CFSP. No claim in the entire foreign and security policy area demands an extension on any level at all.

However, there are a few commitments to the status quo regarding instruments of these policies such as anti-terror missions and Eastern Partnership (ECR party group and Latvian NA) and PESCO (by the Polish PiS). The Finnish PS voices criticism vis-à-vis missions in general\(^{45}\), whereas the Latvian NA wants to build up military structures with neighbouring countries to participate in missions on the NATO, UN and EU levels\(^{46}\), which can be considered a call for an extension of this instrument. Furthermore, the PS is against harmonisation in the field of military procurement, and the Danish DF is against the potential instrument of an EU army.

Considering all levels of the two policies, the resulting impression is therefore rather incoherent\(^{47}\). This is due to differences on the level of instruments used or to be used to make foreign or defence policy on the EU level.

---

\(^{44}\) ‘Goal coherence’ is if the claims regarding goals are coherent; at the same time, the results on the levels of instruments or settings may be more varied.

\(^{45}\) They state to be ‘sceptical of EU policies’ (Perussuomalaiset 2015: 3).

\(^{46}\) ‘The Baltic states will create common armed forces, in order to take part in NATO, EU and in any future military structures of the UN’ (Nacionālā apvienība "Visu Latvijai"-”Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK” 2012: 30).

\(^{47}\) Under the condition that there is ‘goal coherence’, a policy is ‘rather coherent’ in overall terms if at least 75+ per cent of the issues show coherence and ‘rather incoherent’ if 25+ per cent do not.
4.1.1.2 Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)

This EP party group does not state any claim in the wider area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

On the level of goals, only two statements exist by member parties of EFDD. The Lithuanian Law and Order Party PTT commits to the principles of CFSP as agreed in the Treaty of Maastricht (Partija Tvarka ir Teisingumasis 2014: 7) and the Sweden Democrats SD implicitly opts against a common defence policy while calling for a ‘Nordic defence alliance’. The party otherwise states that the main principle for Swedish defence has to be ‘(…) freedom of alliance in peace, meaning neutrality in conflict’ (Sverigedemokraterna 2011: 39).

On the level of goals, only two statements exist by member parties of EFDD. The Lithuanian Law and Order Party PTT commits to the principles of CFSP as agreed in the Treaty of Maastricht (Partija Tvarka ir Teisingumasis 2014: 7) and the Sweden Democrats SD implicitly opts against a common defence policy while calling for a ‘Nordic defence alliance’. The party otherwise states that the main principle for Swedish defence has to be ‘(…) freedom of alliance in peace, meaning neutrality in conflict’ (Sverigedemokraterna 2011: 39).

On the level of policy instruments, both the Swedish and UK member parties agree against a prospective common EU army. Regarding joint missions, the Lithuanian PTT speaks out in favour of counterterrorism activities whilst UKIP ‘will not tolerate British groups operating under European command, on British soil or elsewhere’ (United Kingdom Independence Party 2015: 65).

Overall, the claims rather favour dismantling CFSP and CSDP, but nonetheless two of six confirm the status quo (common foreign policy development goal) or even want to go beyond it (missions against terrorism). This qualifies as rather incoherent performance.

4.1.1.3 Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF)

The ENF group shows a clear difference between foreign and security policies. Within CSDP, there is no goal coherence since all members except the Austrian strive for dismantling (German AfD, Polish KNP, Italian LN, French FN, Dutch PVV, Belgian VB). The Austrian FPÖ, however, opts for rather more common defence and security policies with ‘an EU defence architecture that is independent from NATO and the US’ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 2013: 2). The ENF itself refrains from making any claim regarding CSDP.

Considering instruments in CSDP, again only member parties speak up. All three claims concerning a (prospective) EU army want to dismantle that option (German AfD, Dutch PVV and Belgian VB). Missions are more controversial: the German AfD wants to upgrade them with regards to terrorism and the Italian LN also ‘stresses the opportunity of weighing the installation of a new instrument of military cooperation which surpasses NATO, with the exclusive goal of mutual defence and deterrence to the outside [footnote: for example, in reference to clandestine immigration or Islamic terrorism]’ (Lega Nord 2016a: 5). By contrast, the Austrian FPÖ and the Dutch PVV argue against ‘armed European missions’ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 2013: 2; Partij voor de Vrijheid 2012: 17). Finally, common military procurement is a topic of dissent between the Italian LN and the Belgian VB. The Lega Nord is in favour of commonly developed weapons systems ‘made in Europe’, while the VB stresses the need from freedom of choice in the procurement of weapons. On the issue level, there is hence strong incoherence regarding two out of three issues.

Overall, 13 of 17 claims opt for dismantling goals or instruments of CSDP. Since there is not even goal coherence, however, this cannot pass as a ‘rather coherent’ performance.

Studying now the statements for CFSP, we find a picture of absolute coherence among those five national members of the ENF that speak out (all except the Austrian FPÖ and Belgian VB). Every single policy claim (5 regarding goals, 4 regarding instruments) favours dismantling based on the reasoning of considerations of nationalism.

48 Under the condition that there is ‘goal coherence’, a policy is ‘rather incoherent’ if 25+ per cent of the issues show incoherence.
4.1.2 Comparative Analysis for CFSP and CSDP

Since no more than one EP group speaks out, an analysis of EP group coherence is not possible. The coherence within each group has been discussed above. Let us now turn to coherence between all national parties that belong to any PRRP party group in the EP:

Looking at CSDP, there would actually be goal coherence if the Austrian FPÖ did not opt for rather more common defence policy. In other words, eight PRRPs call for dismantling of CSDP while one seems to suggest rather extending it. On the level of policy instruments in CSDP, the picture is quite mixed. All six claims regarding an EU army (a prospective instrument) are made to abolish the option. Regarding missions, three parties opt for extending the counterterrorism activities of the EU (Italian LN, Lithuanian PTT, German AfD), one calls for a regional cooperation in order to enable participation in missions (Latvian NA) and four call for dismantling of all missions (Austrian FPÖ, the Finnish PS, the Dutch PVV and British UKIP). On the issue of joint procurement, there is also strong incoherence: two parties are against any harmonization (Finnish PS, Belgian VB) while the Italian LN strives to extend this instrument.

Regarding CFSP, there would be absolute coherence towards dismantling goals and instruments if the Lithuanian PTT did not support the CFSP in rather general terms and if the ECR group and Latvian NA did not support the Eastern Partnership. Dismantling is claimed seven times regarding the goal of developing a common foreign policy (German AfD, French FN, Polish KNP, Italian LN, Dutch PVV, Polish PiS, Latvian NA) and four times regarding instruments (EEAS: German AfD, Italian LN, Belgian VB; embassies: Dutch PVV).

4.1.3 Claims concerning Geopolitical Orientation

One further issue deserves our attention here which is usually connected to the foreign and security policy realm but which is neither a ‘goal’ nor an ‘instrument’ and cannot hence be coded like the claims discussed above. Nevertheless, geopolitical orientation is a crucial factor to understand the general directions of external policies.

In a bottom-up process, we deduced the following dimensions of potential EU alliances: pro/against NATO, pro/against USA, and pro/against Russia. It is crucial to note that on all three accounts, the PRRP studied disagree on the basic direction of their external options.

Regarding NATO, two parties are explicitly critical of a pro-NATO orientation (Hungarian Jobbik and Austrian FPÖ) whilst five PRR parties declare pro-NATO (EP group ECR, Polish PiS, Latvian NA, German AfD, Italian LN and Dutch PVV).

Toward the US, only two parties claim a pro or contra position: The Austrian FPÖ voices a preference against too close a defence relation with the US and the German AfD, by contrast, one pro-US: ’Us Freedomites would welcome it if the EU strived for an autonomous defence architecture that is independent of NATO and the USA, and which is characterised by solidarity between the Member States’ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 2013: 2). ‘NATO is and remains the glue that keeps the transatlantic defence architecture together, and its deciding anchor is the alliance with the USA’ (Alternative für Deutschland 2014: 11).

Vis-à-vis Russia, there are two claims pro and three contra a reinforced orientation in that direction. The French FN and Italian LN speak out pro-Russia. The EP group ECR, the Latvian NA and Lithuanian PTT make anti-Russian claims.

---

49 ‘We propose (…) the advent of a Europe of Nations, the exit from the integrated command structure of NATO and the offer to Russia for an advanced strategic alliance, founded on a military and energetic, profound partnership, the refusal of interventionist wars and the support for international law’ (Front National 2011: 50).
Interesting is, however, not only the clear general trend of incoherence regarding geopolitical strategic orientations in existing statements but also the lack of explicit positions by a number of parties. For example, the German AfD is consistently pro-Russia in the domestic political discourse (see e.g. Amann and Lokshin 2016; Blau 2017) but the party programme is explicitly pro-NATO and pro-USA. Similarly, the Austrian FPÖ lacks any pro-Russia statements in their relevant official documents despite their official cooperation agreement with Putin’s party ‘United Russia’ (see Smale 2016). Nevertheless, our overview table 6 (below) includes only the statements found in the programmatic documents since this is the basis of our own empirical research.

Table 6: Claims regarding Geopolitical Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pro</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EP Group ECR Polish PiS Latvian NA Dutch PVV German AfD Latvian NA</td>
<td>German AfD</td>
<td>French FN Italian LN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>Austrian FPÖ Hungarian Jobbik</td>
<td>Austrian FPÖ</td>
<td>EP group ECR Latvian NA Lithuanian PTT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering the global constellation of alliances, Table 6 above seems to suggest a default line cutting through the PRRPs. One camp is rather pro-NATO/pro-USA/anti-Russia. It includes the EP group ECR and four national parties: Lithuanian PTT, German AfD (with a question mark, however), Polish PiS and Dutch PVV. Another group’s leaning is rather anti-NATO/anti-US/pro Russia. This camp includes four national parties: the Austrian FPÖ, Hungarian Jobbik, French FN and Italian LN. In other words: of eight national PRRPs that speak out regarding their preferred geopolitical orientation, an equal number falls in two opposing camps (although the German AfD may be misrepresented by their own claim).

4.1.4 Conclusions arising from the Area of CSDP and CFSP

Two major findings deserve highlighting:

- Already the first area studied indicates that what was taken from the literature to appear here as hypothesis 1 does not hold: those who assume that PRRPs are never tempted to ask for increased

(Contd.)

50 ‘[I]n perfect alignment with the history of our Movement, we have decided without hesitation to lend our support to Putin’s Russia which is, differently from all other powers, operating to cauterize the Syrian haemorrhage from which gushes the tragedy of parts of the migrational influx that concerns Europe and Italy. Besides the problem of immigration, we cannot forget the economic damage that the sanctions against Moscow have caused to our economy’ (Lega Nord 2016a: 4).

51 ‘The current conflict in Ukraine, and Russia's role in it, has forced the EU to reappraise its relations with Moscow. Our members are actively working with the countries of the Eastern Partnership (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) in order to bring them closer to the EU (…)’ (European Conservatives and Reformists Group 2015b).

52 ‘The effectiveness of our foreign policy is very limited because of several conditions. The main obstacle is the big influence of Russia on the politics and the economy of Latvia, as well as the statements by the Russian-speaking organisations that go against the national Latvian character, and also the attempts of the Moscow-parties to steer this part of our society, by talking about language acquisition, citizenship and nationality’ (Nacionālā apvienība "Visu Latvijai!"- "Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK" 2012: 34).

53 ‘We will try to affect the strategic direction and the program of economic cooperation with the Russian Federation in the EU Common Foreign Policy. We will try so that Lithuania, which has one of the longest external borders of the European Union, will not be left alone in solving the problems with the neighbouring states’ (Partija Tvarda ir Teisingumas 2014: 7).
supranational cooperation are wrong. Principled nationalism is at best promoted by many, but not all, members of that party family. At least the Austrian FPÖ is rather positive regarding the goal of specifying a common defence policy, and specific instruments of that policy are promoted by several parties studied. Missions are seen positively by the German AFD and the Italian LN, and the Lithuanian PTT favours missions to counter-terrorism. Regarding common military procurement, the Italian LN asks for a policy extension. It will be interesting to see if that is similar for other EU policies or if defence for some reason represents a special case.

- A rather basic and highly significant split is manifest regarding geopolitical orientation: some PRRPs favour a closer relationship with Russia whilst others prefer the US and NATO as allies. It is true that the times of the ‘cold war’ are held to be over, but nevertheless this is a dramatic cleavage in what is usually seen as the most basic choice in the field of external relations.

4.2 Anti-Discrimination Policies

Social issues were secondary in the original EU Treaties since establishing a common market was key and the anti-interventionist camp won over those who called for minimum harmonization of social standards to prevent ‘social dumping’. Only much later, the so-called ‘social dimension’ of European integration was developed. Some first stepping stones were a few concessions granted by the liberal ‘marketeers’ in the Treaty negotiations, most importantly the provision on equal pay for equal work for women and men (in Article 119 EEC Treaty), and the so-called subsidiary competence provisions (in Articles 100 and 245 EEC Treaty) which allow the European Economic Community to act whenever required for the good functioning of the common market, even if there was no explicit competence to do so. Starting with the Single European Act in 1987, all major EU Treaty reforms included new provisions also in the field of social policy, at large.

By the time of writing, the EU has an elaborate set of norms and activities to fight various kinds of discrimination. The EU Charter on Fundamental Rights provides that any ‘discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited’ (Art. 21 CFREU). The EU’s anti-discrimination policies started out in the mid-1970s in the limited area of gender equality, when most governments had still not acted to indeed secure equal pay for both sexes and relevant cases started coming up to the European Court of Justice (see Falkner 1994). This made the European Commission propose a set of Directives that were adopted in the Council of Ministers on equal pay for work of equal value (1975), on equal treatment at work (1976), on social security (1979), on access to goods and services (2004); and on issues like parental leave (1996) and the burden of proof in sex discrimination law suits (1997), among others.55

In 2000, the Employment Equality Directive56 and the Racial Equality Directive57 extended the protection against discrimination provided under EU law beyond matters of gender by prohibiting discrimination in employment on the grounds of religion or belief, age, disability and sexual

---

54 For a historical analysis, see e.g. Falkner (1998), or chapter 2 on social policy from Messina to Maastricht (Falkner 1994).
Gerda Falkner and Georg Plattner

orientation. These instruments specified the goals set out in the EU’s Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU)\(^{58}\) and established minimum standards.

The core goals in the field of EU anti-discrimination policy (and, where extant, their specific instruments) can be summarized in six points:

- **Equality between women and men** (Article 8 TFEU\(^{59}\), Article 19 TFEU\(^{60}\), Article 10 TFEU\(^{61}\), Article 157 TFEU, Art.23 CFREU\(^{62}\); next to various EU Directives as mentioned above, also Gender Mainstreaming has been used as an instrument to that effect (i.e. paying attention to potential discrimination also in all other EU policies\(^{63}\))

- **Non-Discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual or queer persons** - LGBTQ (Article 10 TFEU\(^{64}\), Article 19 TFEU\(^{65}\), Article 21 CFREU\(^{66}\))

- **The Right to Found a Family** (and respect for family life\(^{67}\)): Although ‘(a)ny (!) discrimination based on any ground such as sex (…) or sexual orientation shall be prohibited’ according to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art. 21, emphasis added)\(^{68}\). Article 9 of the same Charter mentions that the ‘right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights.’ The reference to member state regulations means that a variety of approaches is indeed still possible. We leave it to specialized lawyers to debate if the right to found a family is indeed appropriately located among the policy goals of the EU. In any case, similar to the field of defence policy (where an EU army is an impending instrument, not an existing one), it makes more sense also here to include an additional, at least potential, goal of the EU than to exclude it – since, otherwise, the interesting statements of the PRRPs in that area would go unnoticed in our coding of political claims.

- **Non-Discrimination against Ethnic Minorities** (Article 10 TFEU\(^{69}\), Article 19 TFEU\(^{70}\), Article 21 CFREU\(^{71}\))

---

59 ‘In all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women.’
60 ‘Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex (…).’
61 ‘In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex (…).’
62 ‘The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex.’
64 ‘In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on (…) sexual orientation (…).’
65 ‘Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on (…) sexual orientation.’
66 ‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as (…) sexual orientation shall be prohibited.’
67 Article 7 CFREU: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.’
68 It should also be mentioned that Article 19 TFEU stipulates that the Council may take action to combat discrimination based on sexual orientation: ‘Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on (…) sexual orientation.’
69 ‘In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on (…) racial or ethnic origin, (…).’
• Non-Discrimination on grounds of religion or belief (Article 10 TFEU\textsuperscript{72}, Article 19 TFEU\textsuperscript{73}), and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights even stipulates a right to ‘Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion’ (Article 10.1 CFREU\textsuperscript{74})

• Right to Life: according to Article 2 CFREU, everyone has the right to life and no one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed.

Against the canvas of present-day EU goals and instruments, as summarized above, we discuss the claims that PRRPs made in their programmatic documents in the following sections.

4.2.1 Claims regarding Policies Against Various Forms of Discrimination

30 claims have been analysed that deal with the topics of equality between men and women, the right to life, the right to found a family, and non-discrimination based on sexual orientation, ethnic origin, or religion and belief. Only one out of three EP party groups speaks out in this area, the other pledges stem from 15 national PRR parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Number of Claims (with double claims)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal: Right to Life</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal: Right to Found a Family</td>
<td>5 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal: Equality Between Men and Women</td>
<td>4 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal: Non-Discrimination: Ethnic Minorities</td>
<td>4 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal: Non-Discrimination: LGBTQ</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal: Freedom of Religion or Belief</td>
<td>10 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>30 (42)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.1.1 European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)

The EP group itself does not voice any claim on these topics. There seems to be absolute coherence of the national parties in striving to dismantle the goals of this dimension. But statements are made across four different issues, with no more than one party voicing a claim on each of the issues. The Polish PiS opts implicitly against measures that work towards the goal of equality between men and women, as well as against the goal of non-discrimination against LGBTQ\textsuperscript{75}. The Danish DF implicitly pledges

\textsuperscript{70}‘Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on (…) racial or ethnic origin (…).’

\textsuperscript{71}‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.’

\textsuperscript{72}‘In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on (…) religion or belief, (…).’

\textsuperscript{73}‘Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on (…) religion or belief, (…).’

\textsuperscript{74}‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.’

\textsuperscript{75}The party condemns ‘administrative actions and criminal reprisals’ that are held to impose ‘aggressive political correctness’ (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 2014: 13), which is implicitly directed against the EU’s goals of fighting
contra the fight against discrimination based on religious beliefs as they prioritize the ‘Christian core’ of Danish culture, while protecting their own ‘culturally determined beliefs, norms, traditions or values’ (Dansk Folkeparti 2014: 17 and 27). Furthermore, the DF also holds against the goal of non-discrimination of ethnic minorities. By declaring a ‘background’ of a person sufficient to threaten Denmark, DF is not only discriminating against one religion and its followers, but also against persons who are not actual believers but only ethnically related to members of a certain religion, thereby ‘ethnicizing’ a religious group.

4.2.1.2 Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)

The EFDD group does not claim any preference in the socio-cultural dimension. The members of the group exhibit absolute coherence in favour of dismantling the goals of the policies. Three parties are against the goal of fighting discrimination based on religion or belief, namely the Lithuanian PTT, the Swedish SD (Sverigedemokraterna 2014: 27) and the British UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party 2015: 61). The PTT furthermore rejects the notion of LGBTQ relations as ‘families’ and is also implicitly against putting LGBTQ partnerships on a more equal footing with traditional models of partnership (Partija Tvarka ir Teisingumas 2014: 4).

4.2.1.3 Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF)

In the ENF group, there is no absolute coherence and no goal coherence because of two conflicts revolving around, first, the death penalty and, second, heteronormativity.

ENF is the only EP party group that formulates claims in the field of anti-discrimination policies. In coherence with the German AfD, the Austrian FPÖ and the Italian LN, the ENF group is against the recognition of LGBTQ couples as families, against the notion that the ‘family’ can be anything other than man, woman, and child. This claim is formulated either implicitly, by calling for a commitment to the ‘traditional family’, or explicitly, by defining the family in a heteronormative way. The LN is also

(Contd.)

antidiscrimination. Moreover, the term ‘political correctness’ is frequently used as a code meant to criticize the fight for gender equality and LGBTQ rights.

See (Dansk Folkeparti 2014: 21).

‘It has been proven especially difficult to integrate refugees and immigrants with Muslim background. There is no society in the world, where a peaceful integration of Muslims in another culture has been possible, and it is irresponsible to bring about a clash of cultures in Denmark, which risks leading to serious consequences’ (Dansk Folkeparti 2014: 21).

‘The concept “ethnicization” indicates dynamic processes that serve to put people into one ‘ethnic’ group or another on the basis of assumptions about culture, national origin, or language. Because the terms racialize and ethnicize emphasize processes it becomes easier to see that people who are considered to belong to the same ethnicized group do not necessarily share the same social characteristics. Nor are they necessarily different from people who are considered to belong to other ethnicized groups’ (Lewis and Phoenix 2004: 125). Ethnicization is ‘a dialectical process by which meaning is attributed to socio-cultural signifiers of human beings, as a result of which individuals may be assigned to a general category of persons which reproduces itself biologically, culturally, and economically. Where biological and/or somatic features (real or imagined) are signified we speak of racialization as a specific modality of ethnicisation’ (Miles and Brown 2004: 99).

They want to establish Christianity as an ‘all-encompassing moral criterion’ for the European democracy, and through this statement they prioritize one religion over all others (Partija Tvarka ir Teisingumas 2014: 4).

‘Heteronormativity designates a regime that organizes sex, gender and sexuality in order to match heterosexual norms. It denotes a rigid sexual binary of bodily morphology that is supported by gender and sexual identities. (…) It demands a coherence of idealized morphologies, presumptive heterosexual desire and a thoroughly constructed gender binary. As a category of critical social analysis, heteronormativity also draws attention to the ways sexuality – in complex interplay with other categories of social differentiation – functions as a social institution. It influences and becomes effective in all kinds of socio-structural and macro-political processes’ (do Mar Castro Varela et al. 2012: 11 f.).
against the more general goal of LGBTQ non-discrimination\textsuperscript{81}. In this regard, there is direct conflict with the Dutch PVV\textsuperscript{82}.

Regarding religion, the ENF group is entirely on the same page: there seems to be total coherence regarding a dismantling of the goal of fighting against discrimination based on religion or belief. All six parties and the political group seem to lean towards discriminating against at least one religion (Islam)\textsuperscript{83}.

The main disagreement in the statements of the group members arises on the question of the right to life. While the French FN and the Polish KNP are in favour of reinstating the death penalty, the Austrian FPÖ categorically opposes this.

Overall, a number of cleavages are visible between the groups within ENF, when it comes to various anti-discrimination policies, although their rejection of Islam is rather uniform.

4.2.2 Comparative Analysis for Anti-Discrimination Policies

Since no more than one group speaks out, an analysis of EP party group coherence is not possible. The coherence within each group has been discussed above. Let us now turn to coherence between all national parties that belong to any PRR party group in the EP:

Three national parties are standing in the way of absolute coherence of the populist radical right parties regarding policies against various forms of discrimination. One is the Austrian FPÖ, which, as discussed above, is the only party positioning itself against the reintroduction of the death penalty, whereas three parties are in favour of it (French FN, Polish KNP and Polish KORWiN). But 11 of the 16 national parties and all three of the political groups do not speak about this issue in their programmatic documents. The second is the Dutch PVV’s ‘support’ for LGBTQ non-discrimination. Although this claim has been voiced in the context of anti-Muslim agitation (‘Gay emancipation: We defend our homosexuals against the advancing Islam’ (Partij voor de Vrijheid 2012: 45)), the well-known Dutch culture of liberalism regarding sexual orientation suggests that there may indeed be intra-group divergence.

Third, the position of the Hungarian Jobbik on the issue of non-discrimination against ethnic minorities deserves particular scrutiny. It is the third obstacle to absolute coherence: This party is very vocal about their support of the Hungarian minorities in other EU countries, a topic that comes up several times throughout the analysed documents. While they are not the only party to speak about the issue of national minorities abroad\textsuperscript{84}, they are the only party that specifically demands the EU take action regarding their own national minority\textsuperscript{85}. This constitutes a call for extension of the policy of

\textsuperscript{81} ‘Under the pretext of not discriminating against LGBTI (acronym used to refer to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersexual people) we have arrived at the madness which would want to ‘educate’ children with appropriate programs, starting at the end of their childhood [understand as: when hitting puberty], to search for their ‘true sexuality [understand as: sexual orientation].’ On this very delicate topic we obviously are in strong opposition and fight to reaffirm the values of the Judeo-Christian tradition on which our society was founded’ (Lega Nord 2014: 30).

\textsuperscript{82} However, the context of the pro-LGPTQ statement made by the PVV needs to be taken into account – the claim is a tool to ask for discrimination against Muslims: ‘Gay emancipation: We defend our homosexuals against the advancing Islam’ (Partij voor de Vrijheid 2012: 45).

\textsuperscript{83} For example, the German AfD states that ‘Islam does not belong to Germany’ (Alternative für Deutschland 2016: 49). The French FN wants to inscribe in the French Constitution that ‘the Republic does not recognize any community’ (Front National 2011: 12), thereby ending all protection for any religion, as well as ethnic minorities. The Dutch PVV calls Islam ‘not a religion but a totalitarian ideology’ (Partij voor de Vrijheid 2012: 37).

\textsuperscript{84} The Austrian FPÖ frequently talks about the ‘old Austrian and German minorities’ in South Tyrol (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 2013: 2).

\textsuperscript{85} ‘The cause of Hungarian minorities has to become a subject debated on EU political forums on a daily basis, since Hungarians are the biggest disenfranchised minority of the EU. We have to achieve that Hungarian communities living
non-discrimination, even though Jobbik only promotes improvements for one specific minority (their own ethnos abroad) and therefore prioritizes this group over all other ethnic groups.

Besides these three claims all 27 statements regarding EU anti-discrimination policies call for the dismantling of the six identified goals of relevant EU policy.

4.2.3 Conclusions arising from the Area of Anti-Discrimination Policies

In short, the 42 pledges (including double claims) in the field of anti-discriminatory EU policies are partly quite coherent and otherwise not so, which is quite telling. Most claims target the freedom of religion or belief and they all pledge against the EU’s standing. The PRRPs who spoke out are also in unison for a dismantling when it comes to either the right to found a family (5 different claims) or equality between women and men (4 different claims). The right to life is an interesting case of conflict since three parties opt pro death penalty and one defends its prohibition, i.e. the status quo in the EU. Non-discrimination of LGBTQ is another case where we see disunity between the PRRPs studied. In particular, the longstanding liberal history of the Netherlands seems to make the Dutch PVV resistant against Polish and Italian pledges of a heteronormative kind. Finally, also non-discrimination against ethnic minorities seems under fire with not only the French Front National but also the Danish PVV speaking out against it. The Hungarian Jobbik may strive in the opposite direction, but since they favour not all minorities in the EU but only Hungarians abroad, this is not really incoherent, at a closer look.

4.3 The EU’s Single Market

It was the crucial goal of the 1957 European Economic Community to establish a common market. In 1985, the Commission’s White Paper on a ‘Single Market Programme’ was adopted to revive EU market-making and complete what was called the ‘internal market’ after the 1987 Single European Act. As Article 26/2 TFEU defines, ‘the internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.’ According to Article 27 TFEU, any ‘derogations (…) must be of a temporary nature and must cause the least possible disturbance to the functioning of the internal market.’

The EU’s major instruments to realise the internal market are what is called the ‘four freedoms’, i.e. the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital (see Art. 26 TFEU). Additional instruments are, most importantly, the right of establishment (Article 50.2.d TFEU); the EU customs union (Article 30 TFEU); the EU’s supranational competition policy with special powers for the European Commission (Article 101.1 TFEU); and finally the regulation of Services of General Economic Interest (Article 106.2 TFEU) which may touch upon issues of public or private ownership of enterprises and are hence particularly sensitive.

In addition, a functioning energy market can also be seen as a relevant EU goal in the area discussed here. The PRRPs’ statements regarding the energy market analysed below predominantly deal with questions of state intervention vis-à-vis ‘free markets.’ Article 194.1 TFEU provides that, in ‘the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to ensure the functioning of the energy market; ensure security of energy supply in the Union; promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and promote the interconnection of energy networks’.

(Contd.)

on the territories lost after WWI gain autonomy and we have to stop the legal, political and also physical atrocities directed against them. We have to achieve that the Slovakian Language Act and the Beneš decrees that defy all kinds of fundamental rights are repealed’ (Jobbik Magyarországt Mozgalom 2014a: 48).
4.3.1 Claims regarding the EU’s Single Market

This cluster includes topics that are concerned with the single market of the European Union. 30 claims have been analysed that deal with various aspects of the internal market for goods, services, persons and capital, as well as an internal energy market.

Table 8: Overview: Single Market Claims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Number of Claims (with double claims)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal: Common Market without Internal Frontiers</td>
<td>11 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal: Functioning Energy Market</td>
<td>5 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument: Supranational EU Competition Policy</td>
<td>7 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument: Right of Establishment</td>
<td>4 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument: Regulation of Services of General Economic Interest</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30 (48)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.1.1 European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)

The ECR political group is very vocal about its claims regarding the single market. The group claims to be a staunch supporter of the completion of the common market without internal frontiers, as well as a functioning energy market. The Latvian NA is also in favour of the ‘completely open internal market for goods’ (Nacionālā apvienība “Visu Latvijai!”-“Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK” 2014: 2). The party supports, in addition, a functioning energy market, arguing that Latvian energy-independence from Russia can only be achieved by further integration into the European energy market (cf. ibid.: 1).

In complete opposition to the group’s goal of completing the internal market, the national member party DF of Denmark is postulating that the standards of the EU should only represent ‘minimal standards, which the nations can freely improve’ (Dansk Folkeparti 2014: 94). This would imply that the governments could, whenever they feel that it is in their interest, not continue with mutual recognition of product standards but pull up barriers and restrict the goal of a common market. For the same reason, the DF wants to establish protectionist measures against a supranational EU competition policy (ibid.). The argument used against free competition and the internal market by the DF is the high standards in Denmark regarding consumer rights, liability or animal protection. The Finnish member party PS is ambiguous towards the goal of a common market without internal frontiers, claiming to support the removal of trade barriers, but tying it to the independence of member states, what could be held to be somewhat contradictory (Perussuomalaiset 2014: 2). The Polish member party PiS, on the other hand, is against the right of establishment with regards to agricultural land. They want to keep foreign nationals from buying Polish land. The Latvian NA, by contrast, is content with the status quo regarding the right of establishment.

Altogether, the ECR group is extremely incoherent regarding the single market, with three claims for dismantling and three for extension.

---

86 ECR claims that ‘ECR MEPs support the development of liberalised markets and believe that competition will drive down energy prices, benefiting households and also European industry, particularly those sectors exposed to carbon leakage’ (European Conservatives and Reformists Group 2015a). Regarding the establishment of an internal market, the group is supportive of its completion: ‘We believe that future action should prioritise reducing the burdens on businesses, modernising the European economy, creating a digital single market, and putting in place a framework that does not frustrate business success. (…) We believe that the Single Market can be a powerful tool for facilitating trade and economic growth. However, it is still not complete, for example in services. The ECR makes its completion a major priority, not to deliver more EU integration, but to provide businesses with tools that they need to access a wider marketplace without impediment’ (European Conservatives and Reformists Group 2016: 12 f.).
4.3.1.2 Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)

The EFDD does not voice any claims regarding the single market, and only one national member voices a policy claim. The Swedish SD are implicitly against the completion of a common market without internal frontiers, as they voice a similar claim to that of the Danish DF, namely that the EU should formulate at most minimum standards, which the member states should be able to adapt upwards— a concept well known from, e.g., EU labour law, which is, however, much more difficult to apply in areas such as the free movement of goods where it could lead to de facto closure of specific product markets. Their argument is, however, not a general one but refers specifically to ‘goods which have been produced by subjecting animals for extensive and unnecessary suffering’ (Sverigedemokraterna 2011: 31).

4.3.1.3 Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF)

The ENF group itself has one claim regarding the single market, voiced by Marine Le Pen, leader of the French FN, in the group’s publication ‘Beyond Brussels’ (Atkinson 2016). In there, Ms Le Pen once again stresses the group’s opposition to globalization, international economic competition and the completion of a common market without internal frontiers87. The member parties and the group do not achieve goal coherence regarding the dismantling of the internal market and they are also split regarding the EU’s goal of striving for a functioning energy market. Three parties and the group itself speak out against the completion of the common market, calling instead for national regulations and the protection of strategic economic sectors. In contrast to those claims, the Polish KNP claims that they ‘will allow companies to operate without the permits, licenses, concessions required in the current situation’ (Kongres Nowej Prawicy 2015), which seems to show a strong support for an open market. Regarding the energy market, only two parties voice claims. The Italian LN is in favour of completing a European energy market88, while the Belgium VB is in favour of national authority over the energy sector (Vlaams Belang 2014: 14). Overall, the ENF does not show goal coherence, neither regarding the internal nor the energy market.

Regarding instruments, only the German AfD is in favour of extending supranational EU competition policy in the European internal market. In their European election program, they call for the EU competition authorities to ‘remove unjustified competition constraints’ (Alternative für Deutschland 2014: 12 f.). This policy claim is opposed by the Italian LN, French FN and in the article written by Marine Le Pen in the group’s publication ‘Beyond Brussels’ (Front National 2011: 72; Le Pen 2016: 23; Lega Nord 2016b: 4). The Front National is particularly vocal about its opposition towards the common market without internal frontiers, advocating for protectionism instead, aiming at strengthening their national economy. Both the French FN and German AfD are critical towards liberalising services of general interest. But while the FN calls for a halt to the process of liberalisation itself, the AfD ties the process to direct democracy and favours the decision to be made in referenda (Alternative für Deutschland 2016: 69; Front National 2011: 20). The Italian LN is against the right of establishment, an important instrument of EU single market policy.

4.3.2 Comparative Analysis for the Single Market

On the level of EP groups, the two groups who voice claims (ECR and ENF) are directly contradicting each other. While the ECR is in favour of completing the common market without internal frontiers and the functioning energy market, the ENF group (via Marine Le Pen) is opposed to a European

87 ‘The relocation of economies, streamlined protectionism and intelligent [sic!]…, the return of preferential trade policy and customs union, attachment to structures of life on a human scale, are the rationale of our project which is based on natural communities such as the family, the city or village, the nation...’ (Le Pen 2016: 23)

88 After formulating the problem that ‘the EU has the most expensive energy in the world’, the party goes on by offering a variety of solutions, including ‘(…) complete the internal market for energy rapidly’ (Lega Nord 2014: 37)
common market. Generally, the ECR group is pro single market in every coded statement, whereas the ENF group is opposed to it, favouring national models.

The only non-attached PRRP that states claims on the single market is the Hungarian Jobbik party. They are in favour of dismantling both the common market without internal frontiers and the functioning energy market. Furthermore they are against a supranational competition policy as an instrument of the internal market, and are especially vocal about their opposition to the right of establishment.

With the exception of the ECR group, the Latvian NA, and the Polish KNP, all parties and the ENF group are opposed to the goal of establishing a common market without internal frontiers. Eight parties voice a claim towards dismantling the common market. Regarding the functioning energy market, again it is the ECR group that is in favour of the EU energy market, together with its member NA from Latvia, and the Italian LN (ENF). Three national parties put forward claims against the goal of a functioning energy market.

On the level of instruments, the ECR group is in favour of liberalisation in the area of services of general interest, which throws it at odds with the German AfD and the French FN (both ENF). The AfD itself is in favour of extending the goal of a supranational EU competition policy, which puts the party in conflict with its own political group ENF, as well as fellow members French FN, Italian LN and the Danish DF from the ECR group and non-attached Jobbik. The Polish PiS (ECR), Italian LN and Hungarian Jobbik (n.a.) are against the right of establishment when it comes to the purchase of agricultural land. The Latvian NA is in favour of the status quo.

Overall, of the 30 claims voiced by the PRRPs on the single market, eight are calling for an extension of a policy goal or instrument, whereas 20 call for dismantling, and two are in line with the status quo. While the overall number of statements shows tendencies towards dismantling, the greatly differing positions on the level of goals do not allow for an assessment as rather coherent. The differences between the parties that prefer protectionist, national economic change and those who are generally in favour of unrestricted competition are clearly visible when it comes to the question of a single market.

5. Conclusions

This paper presented Europe’s Populist Radical Right Parties’ programmatic claims for the reform of the EU in three specific fields: external and defence, anti-discrimination, and Single Market policies. All parties whose programmatic texts were studied here have been classified PRRPs by earlier authors cited in section 2 and it was therefore of urgent empirical interest from an EU studies perspective if they do indeed form a harmonious chorus when it comes to their claims regarding these important fields of EU activity. What are the findings?

Regarding EU foreign and defence policy issues, these parties’ claims do not represent a coherent vision that could easily be translated into joint action to indeed bring about reforms. This is true for specific goals and instruments of EU foreign, security and defence policy (such as discussed in section 4.1 above), but it is even more striking with regard to who should be the main ally of the EU, as Table 9 indicates:

---

89 In total, seven statements by Jobbik that deal with the issue have been coded. All of them call for an extension of the moratorium on land sales that was agreed between Hungary and the EU as part of the country’s accession to the European Union (see e.g. Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom 2014b: 81)
Table 9: PRRP Claims regarding the EU’s Geopolitical Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRO-NATO, OR PRO-USA, OR ANTI-RUSSIA (6)</th>
<th>PRO-RUSSIA, OR ANTI-NATO, OR ANTI-US (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EP Group ECR</td>
<td>French FN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish PiS</td>
<td>Italian LN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch PVV</td>
<td>Austrian FPÖ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP group ECR</td>
<td>Hungarian Jobbik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian PTT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consider also the variety of options regarding goals and instruments in the areas of foreign, security and defence policies, with even a few demands asking for a policy extension, e.g. of EU missions or common military procurement (section 4.2.2, above).

Based on those findings, we make two points rather forcefully: the PRRPs are not all heading in one direction, and they are not, as a matter of principle, so strongly nationalist that they would not ever pledge to have more EU-level policies (and that is even true for policies related to core state powers). This means that the first hypothesis derived from the literature (due to principled nationalism, these parties might opt against any additional EU competences) does not resonate with the existing programmatic claims.

The second major area of EU policy included in our study is action against various forms of discrimination. That area forms part of the cultural dimension where the PRRPs are generally expected to be against liberal policies, from the perspective of the new ‘transnational cleavage’ literature. Indeed, we found significantly less incoherence than regarding EU foreign and defence policies, at large. And that does not bode well for principles such as freedom of religion, in particular from the position of persons (perceived to be) of Muslim faith.

However, there are at least two interesting conflicts showing in our data (for details, see section 4.2 above) which stand in the way of a confirmation of hypothesis 2 (which expects consistent TAN options). They regard conflicting positions regarding the death penalty versus the EU’s right-to-life-guarantee, on the one hand, and non-discrimination of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual and queer persons, on the other. These findings call for in-depth case studies that should check, for example, if historical institutionalist predictions hold true that longstanding cultural practice in a country might actually impact the policy ideals of even a populist radical right-wing party – such as seemingly in the Dutch case of a claim for the protection of gay persons.

Turning, finally, to the third area studied, incoherence prevails again – which stood to be expected according to our hypothesis 3. The EU’s major policy initiative of all, the Internal Market without barriers for goods, persons, services, and capital, is indeed not uniformly accepted by the PRRPs. Quite to the contrary, strong defenders of nationalization of product standards and competition rules such as the Danish Dansk Folkeparti or the French Front National oppose marketeers like the Polish KNP – although the first camp is in overall terms larger. Among the controversial items are not only the often desired freedom to alter norms and standards at free will and the end of supranational competition policy, but also the EU’s freedom of establishment and the regulation of services of general public interest. If the PRRPs continue their electoral success, difficult times will hence come along for the Internal Market as the – hitherto – core of European integration.

By the time of writing, PRRPs are scattered across several Party Groups in the European Parliament, three of which count more than one PRRP party as a member.\(^{90}\) More specifically, by the

\(^{90}\) The Hungarian Fidesz is a member of the European People’s Party and not included in our analysis (note that it has not published any party or election programme since 2010).
end of 201691, the Europe of Nations and Freedom/ENF had 38 PRR MEPS, the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy/EFD 25, the European Conservatives and Reformists/ECR 20. In addition, our analysis covers the Hungarian Jobbik (3 MEPs) and the Polish KORWiN party (1 MEP) that were non-attached in the EP (‘n.a.’).

All in all, the PRRPs’ programmatic claims in three crucial EU policy areas indicate that the first of the three scenarios mentioned in our research design (section 3) seems most realistic: the PRRPs might hence frequently block each other when it comes to specific policy reform processes, at least if they wish to adopt policy reform proposals unanimously in the future.92 However, some areas are characterised by relatively more harmonious claims with only fewer outliers (anti-discrimination policies) than others (in particular, geopolitical orientation and internal market).

Regarding the depth of the debate about EU policies in the party programmes, it seems striking that no party speaks about fine-tuning existing instruments in any of the three policies discussed here. The claims target mainly the level of goals of EU policies, or of instruments. In other words, the occupation with EU policies seems not very specific yet. It remains to be seen if that will change once more PRRPs hold EU-related offices and get involved into the workings of the EU institutions more thoroughly. So far, in any case, fine-grained evaluations of EU policies that would suggest what Peter Hall called 14th order changes are rare in PRR party programmes.

Overall, it needs stressing that there are many more claims asking for EU policy dismantling in our three areas (77 per cent) than for policy extension (14 per cent) or the status quo (9 per cent). This confirms the general wisdom that these parties’ attitudes are rather EU-hostile. From the perspective of the EU institutions, that is a dire outlook – but remember that, as already mentioned, most of the 16 parties and 3 party groups studied do indeed call for extending at least one, if not more, EU policies (more specifically, 11 national parties and 1 EP group do so). This suggests that most of the parties studied here might be ready to discuss not only ‘more or less Europe’ but ‘which Europe’ (Börzel and Risse 2018: 100).

One quest of our research was to make an educated guess as to the prospects of a single unified PRR EP party group after the European elections of May 2019. Taking into consideration that a coherent party grouping would need to build on (at least, essentially93) harmonious policy ambitions to stand good chances of stability (McElroy and Benoit 2010: 381), what can we learn from the current 2014-19 EP? We see little prospect, if any, for a unification of all PRRPs studied here, except if it were without sincere regard to the contents of the party programs. For example, those two EP groups who speak out regarding the EU’s liberalised market are directly contradicting each other: ECR consistently speaks pro - Internal Market but ENF against.94 This does not imply that the PRRPs cannot pose a viable threat to the stability of the European Union – cooperation on specific issues or coalition building with other parties, for example, might still happen regardless of overall cohesion. But the quest for a unified right in the European Union appears to be a complicated one.

Finally, let us discuss implications for the future and remaining research desiderata. Having highlighted the main finding of our empirical study, i.e. considerable incoherence of the PRRPs’

---

91 The cut-off-date for our database.
92 This is not meant to imply that these parties should be seen as non-hazardous to the acquis communautaire – consider the different pathways of potential impact outlined in the introduction.
93 Or, as Edoardo Bressanelli puts it: ‘(…) political groups are aggregations of like-minded parties, sharing – at least – similar policy objectives’ (Bressanelli 2012: 751)
94 Admittedly, the existing groups are all but systematically outspoken regarding their reform desires for EU policies. In the foreign, security and defence areas, for example, only one EP party group voices claims at all (ECR, see section 4.1 above), and exactly the same is true for the EU’s anti-discrimination policies. Against this background, one could before our empirical research still possibly have expected them to actually not be incoherent, which our study of their member parties’ individual pledges however now forbids.
programmatic ideas for EU policy reforms, it bears mentioning again that programmatic statements of political parties are clearly only one among many important factors shaping the future and that they cannot be expected to mechanically determine the outcome of policy-making processes. Further crucial influences will come, for example,

- from individual political leaders, whose opinions will in the specific group of parties studied tend to be even more unstable than usually;
- from their interactions with the party apparatus, with the party membership, with each other, and with the media;
- and from the resulting dynamics as this may play out in interaction between many countries and levels of governance in Europe.

To be sure, party research suggests that populist parties stand to be expected to act rather less programme-based and even more volatile than traditional parties. However, it remains to be seen if, or which, PRRPs will appear rather more ‘populist’ or more ‘radical right’ with regard to the ‘stickiness’ of their party programmes. Crucially, we need to see in the longer run how stable the PRRPs’ claims will be, regarding not only general EU scepticism but, more specifically, concrete EU policies.

In any case, potential volatility does not mean that these parties’ programmes should not be paid any attention to. In fact, they are the major reference point against which both researchers and electorates are and will be able to measure the PRRPs’ actions if they gain offices in the European Parliament, the (European) Council, and the European Commission. All other conditions being equal, we expect that if these parties’ claims regarding changes of EU policies are coherent, their pressure for relevant EU policy reform will be more powerful. By contrast, where the policy recommendations of the PRRPs have little or no overlap, one can reasonably expect a somewhat comparatively lower degree of challenge to the current state of European Integration stemming from that group of parties (but see the introduction on different pathways towards change).

At this point, it remains a research desideratum to put the findings of this study in a comparative perspective. Existing earlier research had not filled the lacuna we target, but important related work exists.95 In future work we plan to contrast our data with the insights offered in other studies, which are usually based on different kinds of information about PRRPs. Quite obviously, all available types of data have their specific pros and cons. Party programmes seem the comparatively most obliging and least volatile claims parties make – as little as that may mean in case of populist parties in contemporary politics. Compared to expert surveys on similar issues, which are also a tremendously useful tool for research, the programmatic documents studied here present a direct voice of their authors without interpretation by anyone other than, by necessity, our research team classifying all claims in an identical manner. Claims voiced by party representatives in election campaigns, in turn, have the advantage of being decidedly more numerous than the material included in our database, and they are more up to date than party programmes or expert surveys – but also more ad-hoc. Finally, there are now also voting advice application data96 that could be compared to ours. Therefore, it certainly appears promising to contrast programme-based findings with those of other approaches97.

95 In addition to the citations in our introduction there is a most recent study of voting behaviour in the previous EP (2009–2014) which confirms our finding in the economic policy area that PRRPs do not appear to be ‘a consolidated party family’ (Cavallaro et al. 2018: 340). We like to stress that it is interesting to see how these parties voted on partly nitty gritty issues a while ago, but that our findings are of even ampler importance for they present what these parties consider worthy enough to deserve an explicit claim in their programmatic documents.

96 For example, ‘euandi’ coded party positions on 30 issues for over 240 parties to ‘allow its users to match their policy positions with those of the political parties running for the 2014 EP elections in the 28 Member States’ (Cedroni and Garzia 2010; Garzia et al. 2015). The dataset also includes opinions of 400,000 users, see Trechsel et al. (2015).

97 Further work is forthcoming.
Nonetheless, studying programmatic documents represents one crucial step to improve our understanding of what the coming into power of ever more Populist Radical Right Parties might actually mean in terms of the EU’s various policies and their reform.
## Appendix: Group and Party names and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party or Group Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name National Language</th>
<th>Full Name English</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfD</td>
<td>Alternative für Deutschland</td>
<td>Alternative for Germany</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANO</td>
<td>Akce nespokojených občanů</td>
<td>Action of Dissatisfied Citizens</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATAKA</td>
<td>ATAKA</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti</td>
<td>Danish People’s Party</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>European Conservatives and Reformists</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFDD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Europe of Nations and Freedom</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>Magyar Polgári Szövetség</td>
<td>Hungarian Civic Alliance</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National</td>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPO</td>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</td>
<td>Austrian Freedom Party</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom</td>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNP</td>
<td>Kongres Nowej Prawicy</td>
<td>Congress of the New Right</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KORWiN</td>
<td>KORWiN</td>
<td>KORWiN</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>Lega Nord per l’Indipendenza della Padania</td>
<td>Northern League</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5S</td>
<td>Movimento 5 Stelle</td>
<td>Five Star Movement</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Nacionālā apvienība &quot;Visu Latvijai&quot;-&quot;Tēvzemei un Brivibai/LNNK“</td>
<td>National Alliance</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</td>
<td>Law and Justice</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Perussuomalaiset</td>
<td>The Finns</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTT</td>
<td>Partija tvarka ir teisingumas</td>
<td>Order and Justice</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Partij voor de Vrijheid</td>
<td>Party for Freedom</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Sverigedemokraterna</td>
<td>Sweden Democrats</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Slovenská národná strana</td>
<td>Slovak National Party</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syriza</td>
<td>Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras</td>
<td>Coalition of the Radical Left</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Vlaams Belang</td>
<td>Flemish Interest</td>
<td>VB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Andersson, Jan Joel; Biscop, Sven; Giegerich, Bastian; Mölling, Christian, and Tardy, Thierry, 2016. 'Envisioning European defence. Five futures', *Chaillot Papers* 137 (March 2016), Brussels: EU Institute for Security Studies <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/envisioning-european-defence-%E2%80%93-five-futures> [5.3.2018].


Populist Radical Right Parties and EU Policies: How coherent are their claims?


European University Institute
35


Author contacts:

Gerda Falkner

Head, Institute for European Integration Research – EIF
University of Vienna
Apostelgasse 23
1030 Vienna
Email: gerda.falkner@univie.ac.at
(Robert Schuman Fellow March and April 2018)

Georg Plattner

Pre-doctoral Researcher,
Institute for European Integration Research – EIF
University of Vienna
Apostelgasse 23
1030 Vienna
Email: georg_plattner@univie.ac.at