Bureaucrats, Generals, and the Domestic Use of Military Troops:
Patterns of Civil-Military Co-operation concerning Maintenance of Public
Order in French and Prussian Industrial Areas, 1889-1914.

by Anja Johansen

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Abstract


The purpose of the thesis is to understand the role of the army in the management of civil conflicts within the 'democratic' republican system in France and the 'semi-absolutist' and 'militaristic' Prussian system. In both countries, existing interpretations of the domestic role of the army focus on legal-constitutional perspectives, governmental and parliamentary policy making, and social conflicts, and are often normative. However, the lack of a cross-national comparative perspective has led to a series of conclusions that are called into question when the French and Prussian cases are compared. The thesis seeks to answer the question why the authorities in French and Prussian industrial areas, when confronted with similar challenges from mass protest movements between 1889 and 1914, adopted strategies that involved very dissimilar roles for the army in maintaining public order.

On the basis of empirical observations of the process of bureaucratic decision making and inter-institutional co-operation between the state administration and the military authorities in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the analysis was established using a 'historical institutionalist' framework of interpretation. The thesis puts forward two main arguments: that the strategies adopted by the French and Prussian authorities in the early 1890s that involved very dissimilar roles for the army in domestic peacekeeping were linked to dissimilar perceptions of the threat to the regime. The French Republic, despite its democratic and civilian ideals, made extensive use of the army because the fragility of the regime meant that it could not afford the danger that public unrest might get out of control. Conversely, the Prussian authorities considered their regime to be sufficiently stable to experiment with strategies to deal with public unrest that did not imply military intervention, even if these strategies provided a much lower degree of control over public unrest. The other main conclusion of the study is that the repeated implementation in the French case of strategies that involved mobilisation of the army and the implementation in the Prussian case of strategies that drew upon civil forces alone, led to different strategies, organisations and uses of forces available. Hence, very dissimilar patterns of inter-institutional co-operation developed between the state administration and the military authorities in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais.
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Abstract

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Introduction

The thesis presents a comparative analysis of the co-operation in the maintenance of public order with military assistance between civil and military authorities in the Prussian province of Westphalia and the French region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais between 1889 and 1914. In most Western European states, responsibility for the management of public order was gradually taken over by civil forces during the late nineteenth century, thus leaving the army to intervene only in emergency situations. From the late 1880s onwards, the civil authorities in both France and Prussia were repeatedly confronted with the problem of larger-scale cases of popular unrest. For this reason, they occasionally had to seek military assistance. However, whereas in Prussia, the practice of calling upon the army became a measure that was only implemented very occasionally, in France, the frequency of military intervention in domestic conflicts increased markedly during the 1890s and reached an unprecedented level during the first decade of the twentieth century.

Among historians and political scientists working on civil-military relations or on the maintenance of public order in the nineteenth century, there is a tendency to link a state’s use of troops for internal peacekeeping to the position of the military authorities in the organisation of that state. Thus, historians have attributed very different roles to the military authorities in the French Third Republic and Imperial Germany, especially within the confines of Prussia. Whereas the role of French military commanders is generally downplayed because of the dominant position of the civilian authorities, interpretations of the Prussian system strongly stress, and sometimes tend to overestimate, the influence of military leaders in civil matters.

The assumption that Prussian military commanders had a powerful influence on civil matters at the regional and local level is based on three factors. In the first place, the formal distribution of powers between civil and military authorities gave the military commander a powerful and independent position. Secondly, because of both the strong anti-Social Democrat attitude of certain general commanders and the high degree of
involvement of the military elite in Berlin in domestic and foreign politics, it has been assumed that military commanders were also inclined to participate actively in controlling social and political unrest at the regional and local level. Finally, those historians who stress the importance of the persistence of traditional elites also argue that one of the key features of the Prussian ‘peculiarity’ was close co-operation between the military elite and the state bureaucracy in defending their common interests against challenges from emerging social and political movements.

In contrast, interpretations regarding French military commanders point out their accommodation with the republicanism, their declared political neutrality, and the refusal of generals to interfere in political decision making or civilian conflicts. All of these factors appear to support the assumption of a high degree of involvement of Prussian military commanders in the physical repression of public unrest compared to the role of the military elite in more socially and politically ‘advanced’ state systems - in particular, Great Britain or France during the Third Republic.

_The central problematic of the thesis._

Given the literature on the role of the army, the observation that it was French military commanders who were, comparatively speaking, far more involved in the preparation and management of measures to deal with civilian conflicts than their Prussian counterparts is something of a paradox. It is a finding that needs to be explained and forms the key question of the present study. Thus the thesis seeks to explain why the Prussian and French systems, when confronted with similar problems of mass unrest in the 1890s onwards, adopted very dissimilar strategies, policies which, moreover, went counter to what one might otherwise have expected, knowing the political profiles of the two regimes.

_Comparative observations on the domestic role of the army in France and Prussia_

In order to understand the dissimilar policies pursued towards maintenance of public order, the study examined the question of who took the decision to call upon the army to maintain public order when domestic unrest occurred, and what were the means of influence of various groups affected by the strategies implemented. Looking at the two
most turbulent industrial areas in France and Prussia during the period from 1889 to 1914 - the Westphalian districts around the River Ruhr and the French Region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais - the first significant observation is that, in both areas after 1889, decision making was increasingly concentrated around the senior civil servants and senior military commanders at the regional level, with very few means of influence for local authorities or industrial interests. At the same time, after the great strike wave of the years 1889-1893, very dissimilar practices of civil-military co-operation developed in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. As a result of these observations, it proved necessary to analyse the structures of decision making in the light of the bureaucratic logic that existed within each system. The main argument put forward therefore focuses on the importance of the respective patterns of administrative practice and the dissimilar structures of civil-military co-operation in the cases of France and Prussia. The aim of the study is to explain why these dissimilar patterns developed and to determine their impact on the evolution of the strategies concerning the use of troops in the two systems.

Several aspects of the patterns and strategies of intervention are analysed. In the first place, the concepts behind the domestic role of the army developed in different directions within the French and Prussian administrations. The notion of 'extreme urgency,' which justified a military intervention, came to be interpreted very differently by the authorities in Westphalia and in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Similarly, the number of soldiers which was thought to be appropriate for certain types of conflict, differed significantly between the French and Prussian cases. Moreover, an administrative procedure developed in France whereby military troops could be mobilised preventively for certain types of conflict, whereas in Prussia, troops were not mobilised unless riots or violent actions had already taken place. Secondly, the inter-institutional relationship between the civil administration and the military authorities became far more intense in France than it ever was in Prussia. The degree of exchange of information and the level of co-operation between the civilian authorities and military commanders became very high in the French case, whereas the relationship at all levels between the Prussian army and the civil administration constituted of two bodies isolated from each other and having only limited interaction. Finally, being specialists
in the management of violence, French military commanders were constantly being drawn into the process of planning and preparing measures against greater public unrest. Through this institutional practice, French army corps commanders acquired direct influence in issues such as domestic conflict from which they were formally excluded.

In contrast, due to the lack of inter-institutional co-operation, although Prussian commanders were powerful in formal terms, in practice they were increasingly marginalised in questions concerning the maintenance of public order. The authority of military commanders was also restricted by the fact that they were unprepared for this type of task. They did not possess detailed information about the demographic and industrial conditions that would enable them to develop detailed plans independently of the civil authorities. Military preparations for domestic intervention remained limited to very general instructions that were issued to the local commanders; these concerned questions such as how to deal with public gatherings or directives regarding the suppression of an uprising with military means, instructions that proved to be inapplicable to the types of conflict that actually occurred. Moreover, the preparations made by the military commanders for domestic intervention were not co-ordinated with those of the civil authorities. As a consequence, Prussian military commanders depended upon the experience and detailed knowledge of civilian authorities which they had acquired through dealing continuously with maintaining order. Military commanders were therefore, in practice, generally obliged to follow the indications and instructions issued by the civilian authorities. Similarly, notwithstanding the very close social connections between the bureaucratic elites in the Prussian state administration and army, their professional exchanges became far more limited than was the case in France. This was despite the potentially conflictual relationships that existed between the French military establishment and representatives of the republican regime.

Not withstanding the differences in the formal distribution of powers between civil and military authorities or the dissimilar political profile of each regime, the study shows that a set of institutional norms developed in each country that defined rules for what was perceived as an appropriate response to deal with the problem of public disorder.
The state administrators and military commanders operated within this system, and it was therefore difficult for the politicians governing the central executive to break with these practices in order to change their respective strategies towards public disorder.

Framework of analysis and structure of the argument

In order to analyse the dissimilar bureaucratic procedures which developed in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais between 1889 and 1914, an historical institutionalist framework of interpretation was adopted. This model of interpretation was adopted because it allows conclusions to be drawn on three key aspects. In the first place, it aids an analysis of the administrative background of the development of dissimilar strategies to deal with a similar problem. Secondly, it draws attention to decision-making procedures linked to the adoption by the early 1890s of particular strategies which were then repeatedly implemented over the following twenty-five years examined. Finally, it allows conclusions to be made about the interior dynamics of the procedures and organisation developed around the particular strategy adopted within each system.

The argument is organised in three parts. The first part sets out the basis of comparison of the two cases, and looks at three aspects which have previously been used to explain the development of the use of military troops for internal peacekeeping in France and Prussia respectively. It will compare the size of the challenge presented to the public authorities in terms of the extent of the conflicts occurring and in terms of civil forces available to deal with large-scale unrest (Chapter Two). Then an analysis will be undertaken into the formal constitutional organisation of civil-military authorities in France and Prussia and the significance of the distribution of powers within the two state systems for the dissimilar functioning of civil-military co-operation in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais (Chapter Three). Finally, an investigation is made into the relationship between the senior civil bureaucrats and military commanders at the regional level, as well as their connections to the local society in which they served (Chapter Four). The main point of this part is to demonstrate that, in a comparative perspective, neither the size of the challenge, nor the formal institutional organisation of civil-military relations, or the patterns of local powers and
co-operation of elites, can explain the development of dissimilar strategies in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais.

The second part is an analysis of political discussions in France and Prussia about whether or not to use military troops for internal peacekeeping. It will show that both in France and Prussia, similar arguments were put forward against the domestic use of the national army (Chapter Five). In Chapter Six and Seven, the various priorities of key authorities within the French and Prussian systems will be analysed in order to show that, in both countries, the issue of the domestic role of the army remained largely unsettled right until the outbreak of the First World War, with powerful forces continuously calling for a radical change of strategy. It also demonstrates why different strategies were adopted by the French and Prussian ministries of the interior and followed by their respective state administrations.

Part three consists of two chapters, and analyses in detail the administrative procedures and organisation that grew up in both countries around the particular strategy adopted. In Chapter Eight, the interior dynamics of the French system is analysed in order to show the elements that facilitated the mobilisation of military troops in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and the factors that made a change of strategy increasingly difficult to undertake. Conversely, in the case of Westphalia, Chapter Nine analyses the organisation of strategies for public order that were based exclusively on civil forces, and shows the difficulties in terms of organisation and lines of authority linked to any inter-institutional co-operation between the state administration in Westphalia and the Prussian army.

In the conclusion, two main factors are pointed out as an explanation for why dissimilar strategies to deal with public unrest were adopted and pursued in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. The first is linked to the degree to which the decision makers in charge of maintenance of order were willing to adopt measures that implied a risk of losing control over a situation. The second main factor points to the bureaucratic organisation and procedures in order to explain the perpetuation of the particular strategies adopted in the two countries.
Chapter One. The study of maintenance of public order in nineteenth century Germany and France

The army is a potentially significant element in the functioning of any civil society, and this study started with an interest in the role of a military organisation in the peacetime management of a civil society. The investigations into a particular case study began with the discovery that, in France and Prussia between 1871 and 1914, very senior generals, who had previously occupied the most powerful position in the central military institutions, spent years outside the capital as commanders of large military regions. Given the very dissimilar position of the army within the Prussian system and the French Third Republic, the question then arose concerning the relationship between these powerful commanders and the civil authorities at the regional level. This was particularly relevant with regard to the role performed by the army as a force of order during the great social and political conflicts that took place within both countries during the decades preceding the outbreak of the First World War.

No detailed study appeared to exist on the internal role of the army for either of the two countries, and nothing substantial seemed to have been written on the relationship between civil and military authorities outside Paris or Berlin. The literature on the French Third Republic never paid much attention to the military authorities in cases of domestic intervention, assuming that the army blindly obeyed detailed orders from the governmental authorities. By contrast, the literature on Imperial Germany simply assumed that the army functioned as a highly interventionist force, largely uncontrolled by the civil authorities, and always prepared to repress any opposition to the existing social and political order through military means.

Two case studies were chosen: the Westphalian districts around the River Ruhr and the French region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, both turbulent industrial areas where similar problems of public disorder existed. The investigations into the domestic role of the French and Prussian armies in these two regions came out with two very surprising findings. The first was that between 1889 and 1914, French military troops participated
with increasing frequency in the maintenance of public order, whilst the Prussian army, over the same years, became largely released from its traditional role as a force for internal peacekeeping. Secondly, the close examination of the decision-making process concerning military intervention in civilian conflicts showed that, in France, the civil and military authorities worked closely together on the issue of maintaining public order. In contrast, in Prussia, the civil and military branches of the state formed two highly separated entities with little mutual connection even at the occasions went military troops were called to perform as a force of internal order.

The thesis therefore seeks to explain why the Prussian and French systems, when confronted with similar problems of mass unrest in the period between 1889 and 1914, adopted very dissimilar strategies, policies which attributed a highly dissimilar role to the army.

Given that the findings of the study run counter to the logic of all the interpretational models which have been applied to the domestic role of the French and Prussian army respectively, the challenge of the case study was to find a framework of interpretation that could analyse and explain this apparent paradox. Observing that decisions about calling for military assistance in both areas were taken almost exclusively by the senior state administrators, and that a strong pattern of continuity could be discerned in the strategies implemented over the entire period, this led to focusing on the decision-making process within the French and Prussian bureaucracy, and on the institutional patterns behind the inter-institutional co-operation with the army. A 'historical institutionalist' approach was therefore adopted as a framework of interpretation in order to explain why the state administration in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Westphalia developed and pursued such dissimilar responses to public unrest, which furthermore run counter to what might otherwise be expected on the basis of the political profile of the two regimes.

The chapter begins by setting out the literature on the relevant aspects around this issue: policing and maintenance of order in France and Prussia, the constitutional position of the army in the two countries, the involvement of the military elite in
politics, social structures of French and Prussian bureaucratic and military elites, and the professionalisation of the army in each country (1.1). It then sets out the analytical approach followed to explain the findings (1.2), before turning to the choice of case studies (1.3), methodology, sources and limits of the study (1.4), and finally summary the structure of the thesis (1.5).

1.1. The army and maintenance of order in nineteenth-century France and Germany: gaps and shortcomings of the existing interpretations

The literature on politics and society of the French Third Republic and on Imperial Germany has said little about the question of domestic mobilisation of the army, except for a couple of notorious cases of military intervention. In the research on policing and social control in Prussia and Germany, the specific role of the army has only been treated briefly as a minor subject. The general lack of interest may be explained by the

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1 In the Prussian case, the great Westphalian miners' strikes of 1889, 1899, 1905 and 1912, are the cases of reference in which the army played a part by being called upon, or, as in the case of the 1905, by not being called upon. In France, the cases generally mentioned in the literature are the shooting of fourteen striking workers at Fourmies (département Nord) on May Day 1891, and the revolt of wine growers in the South of France during the summer 1907.

2 During the 1980s and 1990s, a vast body of literature on police and state enforcement of discipline has appeared. Alf Lüdtke's works on maintenance of public order are concerned both with the police and the army. However, Lüdtke's works are focused mainly on the period before 1848, and do not treat the Imperial period. (Alf Lüdtke "'Gemeinwohl', Polizei und 'Festungspraxis'. Staatsliche Gewaltssamkeit und innere Verwaltung in Preussen, 1815-1850' Göttingen, 1982; ‘The Role of State Violence in the Period of Transition to Industrial Capitalism: the Example of Prussia from 1815 to 1848’ in Social History No.4, 1979 pp.175-221; ‘Praxis und Funktion staatlicher Repression: Preussen 1815-1850’ in Geschichte und Gesellschaft No.3, 1977, pp.190-211). Albrecht Funk makes some interesting points about the 'de-militarisation' of the maintenance of public order after 1870, but does not enter into an analysis of the role of the army as a force of domestic peacekeeping. (Albrecht Funk 'Polizei und Rechtsstaat: Die Entstehung des Staatsrechtlichen Gewaltsmopol in Preussen, 1848-1918' Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1986). The works of Ralph Jessen (‘Polizei im Industrierevier’ Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991; ‘Unternehmerherrschaft und staatliches Gewaltmonopol. Hüttenpoliziten und Zechenvehren im Ruhrgebiet 1870-1914’ in ‘Sicherheit und Wohlfart: Polizei, Gesellschaft und Herrschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert’ (ed. Alf Lüdtke), Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992) specifically deal with the problem of maintenance of public order in the Ruhr area between 1848 and 1914. However, Jessen's research is focused on policing and police institutions, and only mention the role of the army in relation to the general policy of 'de-militarisation' of the internal peacekeeping. Harald Klückmann deals specifically with the question of use of military troops for internal peacekeeping, but, his analysis mainly focuses on the legal-constitutional aspect with little attention to the practical functioning of these institutions. Harald Klückmann ‘Requisition und Einsatz bewaffneter Macht in der deutschen Verfassungs- und Militärsgeschichte’ in Militärgeschichtlichen Mitteilung No.1 1978 pp.7-50. The role of army in domestic peacekeeping is treated in detail in the works of Elaine Glovka Spencer (‘Management and Labor in Imperial Germany. Ruhr Industrialistas as Employers, 1896-1914’ New Brauswick, New
fact that the relatively few cases of intervention did not attract the attention of scholars. In contrast, it is surprising that the increasing frequency of military intervention after 1890 has not drawn much analysis. The phenomenon is often mentioned in the recent literature on policing, but is rarely dealt with as a significant problem in itself. The study of Georges Carrot on maintenance of order in France 1789-1968, and two articles by Jean-Charles Jauffret and by Patrick Bruneteaux about the French debate on establishment of special troops for internal peacekeeping, are exceptions to this rule. Otherwise, the role of the army of the French Republic or of Imperial Germany is occasionally treated in relation to research on strike movements and ‘collective actions’ with analysis of individual cases where troops were used. As a comparative problem, the dissimilar policies pursued in France and in Germany seem to be generally ignored.


Carrot (1984); Jauffret (1983); Brunetaux (1993).
Due to the lack of detailed studies of the domestic role of the French and Prussian army of the second half of the nineteenth century, the interpretations have been subject to general assumptions mainly based on a series of plans developed in the French and Prussian war ministry, and, in the Prussian case, on the declarations of intent expressed by members of the military establishment. As a consequence of the generally sympathetic historical judgement of the French Third Republic, and the contrasting negative appreciation of the Imperial German system, the use of troops for internal peacekeeping between 1890 and 1914 has been the subject of very dissimilar interpretations. In contemporary historiography on the German Empire, there has been a general tendency to consider each case of domestic military intervention as yet another example of the military predominance of civilian life in Prussia, and in the German Empire. The causal link seems obvious when considering the extended powers of the military command and the numerous declarations of many Prussian generals stating their intentions to launch a crack down on the Social Democrats. In the influential Sonderweg-thesis, with its emphasis on the dominance of traditional forces in the German Empire, the use of the army in civil conflicts has been seen as the determination of traditional elites - *in casu* the military and the state bureaucracy - to defend their position against ‘unwanted’ social and political movements, through all available means. 

The idea that the Prussian State and the German Empire was being ruled by a trust of 'traditional elites' with the tacit agreement of a submissive bourgeoisie was challenged in the 1980s by Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn, followed by Richard Evans, who all pointed to the problems of the German-Prussian system in adapting itself to the challenges of a society undergoing rapid social and economic change. Evans also challenged the idea of the Germans being particularly disciplined by the state authorities. Recent research on German police of the nineteenth century has sustained this point of view by showing the problems of permanently understaffed police forces, incapable of dealing efficiently with violence and crime arising from a society in a process of rapid industrialisation.

Analyses of the difficult establishment of the Third Republic in France have presented a description of the issue as complex and politically very sensitive. This is particularly true for the period after the turn of the century, when successive Radical-Socialist government and their officials at the regional level made extensive use of the army during strikes and other types of social and political unrest. Two major camps of historians can be distinguished concerning the interpretation of the role of the army of the Third Republic. On one side, there are historians studying the workers and the developing labour movement. Here, the predominant interpretation is that of a conspiracy of conservative bourgeois forces working through the Republican
institutions and supported by the army leaders to repress labour actions. Historians whose sympathies towards the working class and the Communist C.G.T. trade union are less pronounced, strongly emphasise that the frequent military interventions in strikes and political demonstrations were politically very controversial. On the other hand, specialists of policing and maintenance of order commonly point to the ‘structural constraints’ around the public forces of order, and see the extended use of the army as a direct result of inadequate municipal police and the problems of adapting the police and *gendarmerie* to the needs of a modern industrial society. Jauffret and Carrot see these problems as resulting from an inability to reach a political compromise in the National Assembly about creating a serious alternative to the army as an internal force, whilst Berlière and Bruneteaux also consider the cases of mass unrest with which the French authorities were confronted, in particular during the decade 1900-1910, as a serious challenge. Whilst subscribing to the interpretation of ‘structural constraints,’ military historians also strongly emphasise the reluctance of the military establishment to perform as a force of internal order. Thus, the use of troops against civilians is often argued to have presented a problem of professional conscience for the officers. Similarly, the use of the ‘army of the nation’ against citizens, and the mobilisation of conscript soldiers recruited among the workers and peasants to fight against their own families, is interpreted as giving rise to serious problems in the army of loyalty and legitimacy.

The role of the army as a force of internal order has thus only been treated as a very marginal aspect in the French and German historiography, and no attempts have been made so far to consider the domestic use of troops from a comparative perspective. On

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the other hand, much has been said about civil-military relations in Imperial Germany and in France during the early Third Republic. Interpretations have revolved around four main themes. In the historical literature, one theme has been the constitutional position of the army within the state, and formal organisation of civil and military authorities. A second aspect has been the role of the military elite in domestic and foreign politics. Thirdly, recent research has been preoccupied by the importance of social relationships between the military establishment and other leading groups of the French and German society. Finally, sociologists and political scientists working on civil-military relations have seen a direct link between the degree of professionalisation of an officer corps and the willingness of the army to intervene in domestic conflicts.

The paradox about the domestic use of troops is that a comparison of the French and Prussian cases contradicts all the main conclusions drawn by studies focusing on these four aspects. Therefore each of these approaches is briefly analysed and the central contentions most relevant to the present study are set out. For each approach, the ways in which the findings of the present study conflict with these contentions are summarised.

1.1.1. Interpretations of the constitutional position of the Prussian-German army and the army of the French Third Republic

In terms of the constitutional position of the French and Prussian army of the late nineteenth century, there is general agreement that, because of its extra-constitutional position, especially its exemption from any parliamentary control, the Prussian army within the German Empire was a legacy of the absolutist era. The civil-military relationship of the German Empire has thus become the archetype of a politically ‘backward’ system compared to the more ‘advanced’ systems of the second half of the nineteenth century, such as the US, Great Britain and the French Third Republic.13

13 Samuel Huntington, in his theorising on the relationship between civil political and military institutions, explicitly refers to the nineteenth-century Prussian experience as the archetype of a system with a high degree of military independence from civilian command and control. (Samuel Huntington ‘The Soldier and the State’ Harvard University Press, 1957).
In the historical debate about the Imperial German system, there is little disagreement with this fundamental viewpoint, since the officer corps was not subject to the constitution, the military organisation was exempt from parliamentary control, and in questions of command the army was directly under the Emperor in his capacity as Supreme Warlord with no need for a counter signature from a minister who was politically responsible to the Reichstag.\(^{14}\) Whilst there is a general agreement about the 'semi-absolutist' and strongly 'militaristic' nature of the Prussian-German system of civil-military relations, historical discussions revolve around the question of the ability of the Imperial system to reform itself and, in particular, the issue of whether the Prussian-German system would eventually have moved towards constitutional arrangements involving military submission to parliamentary control and command, had it survived the First World War. The adherents of the hypothesis of structural continuity from 1848 to 1945 point to the formal organisation of the system as the core of the problem.\(^{15}\) These critics of the Imperial system describe it not only as authoritarian, but also as fundamentally arbitrary and incompatible with the principles of a state under the rule of law.\(^{16}\) At the other end of the spectrum stand Gerhard Ritter and more recently Wolfgang Mommsen and Thomas Nipperdey, who argue that despite the restrictions placed on the executive by the constitutional arrangements of Imperial Germany, the system, in particular after the turn of the century, showed


\(^{15}\) In the 1980s and early 1990s, a long debate took place about this interpretation between adherents of the Sonderweg-thesis (Wehler, Berghahn, Puhle, Stürmer) and its German critics, in particular Wolfgang Mommsen ('Der autoritäre Nationalstaat: Verfassung, Gesellschaft und Kultur im deutschen Kaiserreich' Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1992) and Thomas Nipperdey ('Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918: Machtstaat vor der Demokratie' Munich: Beck, 1992), who rejected the normative judgments of the Sonderweg historians and argued in favour of simply considering society and politics of the Imperial period in its own right with no consideration for the later development of Nazism. In this discussion, Mommsen and Nipperdey joined the critique of Blackbourn, Eley and Evans, although the intention of these latter scholars was simply to reduce the most gross exaggeration of the Sonderweg interpretation rather than doing away altogether with the idea of a structural continuity.

\(^{16}\) The argument about 'Cesarism' and 'Charismatic Führertum' is a fundamental element in the Sonderweg argument, that sees the Imperial tradition of 'militaristic semi-absolutism' as the ideological condition for the later establishment of the Nazi regime. Sauer (1966); Stürmer (1970); Wehler (1973; 1995); Puhle (1980); Berghahn (1982; 1994).
evidence of changes towards the formal recognition of civilian supremacy.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, Nipperdey argues that the Prussian army could only get its way in so far as its actions were supported by silent acceptance by important parts of civil society, and that the actions of the army were confined to what civilian elites would allow the military authority to get away with.\textsuperscript{18} In this interpretation, Nipperdey take up some of the key point of the critique coming from a number of Anglo-Saxon historians challenging the Sonderweg interpretation of the relationship between the formal organisation and the functioning in practice of the German-Prussian system.\textsuperscript{19}

In contrast to the Prussian system, the constitutional position of the French army under the Third Republic has been interpreted as politically 'advanced' due to the clear placing of the armed forces under civilian authority and control.\textsuperscript{20} However, if the constitutional arrangements were quite clear about the submission of the military organisation to civilian authorities, the political reality behind the civil-military relations was a delicate balance between the Republican regime and its army. Thus, the literature on the relationship of the Third Republic and its army revolves mainly around the establishment of the key institutions of the military,\textsuperscript{21} and around the various crises between the army and the Republican regime (the 'seize mai' 1877; the Boulanger crisis; the Dreyfus Affair; military opposition to anti-Catholic legislation). The main debate concerns the degree to which the regime was under threat from a military elite

\textsuperscript{17} Ritter (1965); Mommsen (1992); Nipperdey (1992).
\textsuperscript{18} Nipperdey (1992) pp.234-235
\textsuperscript{19} David Schoenbaum 'Zabern 1913: Consensus politics in Imperial Germany' London: Allen & Unwin, 1982; Eley & Balckburn (1984); Eley (1986); Blackbourn (1993; 1997); Evans (1987);
\textsuperscript{21} Numerous political analyses have been undertaken on various aspects of the reorganisation and the reforms of the army during the period 1871-1914. The Jean Monteilhet's 'Les Institutions militaires de la France (1814-1932)' Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1932, must now be considered too general and out of date, whereas David B.Ralston's 'The army of the Republic: the place of the military in the political evolution of France, 1871-1914' Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967, remains the main standard work on French military institutions. Of more recent date, and with a most limited scope, are the works of Allan Mitchell ('A Situation of Inferiority: French Military Reorganization after the defeat of 1870' in the American Historical Review No.86 (1981), pp.49-62; 'The Freycinet Reforms and the French Army, 1888-1893' in Journal of Strategic Studies No.4 (1981) pp.19-28), and the study of Jean-Charles Jauffret on the professional army ('Parlement, Gouvernement, Commandement: l'armée de métier sous la 11e république' Vincennes: Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, 1987).
that was potentially hostile to the Republican institutions, and the various factors that allowed a reconciliation to take place between the army and the Republican regime between the end of the Dreyfus Affair and the outbreak of the First World War.

In comparison with the constitutional question being a key issue in the German historiography, it is interesting to notice that, although the literature does points out lacunae in the French legislation where the army was not placed under any civilian control, and that these questions often remained unsettled because they were too politically sensitive, these elements never, as in the German debate, provoked any unfavourable historical judgement on the French Republican constitution. Similarly, it is interesting to note how little attention the literature pays to the fact that the French officers did not swear formal loyalty to the constitutional laws. The French officers' formal loyalty to the Constitution has been considered of minor importance as long as officers were legally bound through the hierarchical subordination to politically responsible authorities. In contrast, the fact that the Prussian officers were not formally obliged to respect the Imperial constitution has been a key example of the extra-constitutional and uncontrolled position of the officer corps in the German historiography. In contrast to the German historiography, the scholars on the French Third Republic do not make it an object of historical judgement over the regime that there were political limits to the ability of the civilian institutions to assert control over the army.

Thus the present study's findings of a considerable involvement of the French army in civilian conflicts until the outbreak of the First World War, in contrast to significant decrease of military involvement in domestic peacekeeping of the Prussian-German army compared with the period previous to 1889 runs counter to the assumptions

22 The creation of very powerful posts such as the chief of the general staff or as army corps commander are considered as reluctant concessions by the political power to the military leaders. Ralston (1967) particularly points to a number of important aspects which fell outside civilian control, and stress the very powerful and independent position of French military commanders until after the Dreyfus Affair. These point is also stressed by William Serman in 'Les elite militaires francaises et la politique, 1871-1914' in Eliten in Deutschland und Frankreich, XIX. und XX. Jahrhundert Munich: Oldenburg Verlag, 1994.
23 Both Girardet (1953), Ralston (1967), and Serman (1982) mention the absence of a formal oath to the Republican Constitution, but all refrain from passing any judgement about the nature of the regime on this basis.
based upon the constitutional arrangements of the French and Prussian army. It indicates that a strong constitutional position of the military authorities was not directly linked to a high degree of military involvement in domestic conflicts.

1.1.2. Interpretations of the political role of the Prussian and French army

Much attention has been paid to the extra-constitutional status of the Prussian army both because of the question of the constitutional definition of powers, and also because of its importance in the long struggle between the Kaiser and the Reichstag. Particularly during the early Wilhelminian period, when the threat of an Imperial coup was ever present, senior generals openly declared their loyalty to the Emperor against the Reichstag. The argument about the predominance of the officer corps - especially its elite - within the German Imperial system has almost become a truism and has been linked to the idea of the German-Prussian system as ‘militaristic’. \(^2\)

\(^2\) The literature on German-Prussian ‘militarism’ is vast, and covers a series of different political, institutional, social and cultural aspects. The term ‘militarism,’ used to describe the Prussian system of the second half of the nineteenth century, was already adopted by contemporary observers. ‘Militarism’ was introduced as a concept in the academic debate by the writings of Eckert Kehr ‘Zur Genesis des Königlich Preussischen Reserveoffizierskorps’ (1931) followed by Alfred Vagts ‘A History of Militarism’ New York, 1937; Gerhard Ritter ‘Das Problem des Militarismus in Deutschland’ in Historische Zeitschrift No.177, 1954 pp.21-48; Volker R. Berghahn ‘Militarism. The History of an International Debate, 1861-1979’ Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1981.

In its purely political sense, ‘militarism’ has been used to describe a system with military supremacy to political authority (Huntington (1957); Morris Janowitz ‘The Military in the Political Development of New Nations’ University of Chicago Press, 1964) and the role of military officers in domestic and foreign politics (Craig (1955); Ritter (1965)). More recently Stig Foerster (‘Der doppelte Militarismus’ Stuttgart: Franz Sterner, 1985) has argued for what he describes as the pressure towards militarisation of the German foreign policy: a state-militarism from above and a civilian popular militarism from below.

In a broader sense ‘militarism’ has been used to describe the ideological and cultural influence of military values on civil society. In Eckert Kehr’s definition ‘militarism is the state of mind of the civilian’ (‘The Genesis of the Prussian Bureaucracy and the Rechtsstaat’ in Economic interest, militarism and foreign policy, University of California Press, 1977). According to this definition, a series of social and cultural phenomena of the Imperial period has been treated under the heading of ‘militarism’. The discussion in German historiography of social militarisation - particularly during the Wilhelminian period - is connected to the wider argument about the ‘feudalisation’ of the bourgeois elites. Various aspects, such as the reserve officer corps, the veteran clubs and warrior associations, and certain social practices such as duelling, have been seen as indicators of the predominance of the military in the mind of civilians. Recent literature, however, has challenged the argument about duelling and integration of civilians in the army through the reserve officer corps as solely an indicator of the predominance of the military in the mind of the civilians, and has viewed it rather as a very civilian and bourgeois interpretation of military values.
To contemporary observers and in the early historiography, it seemed obvious that the Prussian officer corps had remained unaffected by the social and political currents of the nineteenth century. However, according to the now classic thesis of Karl Demeter, this was rather a illusionary self-perception among Prussian officers, and indeed the more perceptive minds within the military establishment by the end of the nineteenth century did not believe it.25 At the same time, the officer corps managed to convince wider German society and foreign observers that the army was still led by the old Prussian Junker families and that it remained the stronghold of traditional social order and pre-democratic values. On the basis of similar observations, Martin Kitchen develops the opposite argument, namely the increasing gap between civil society and the officer corps, and the impossibility of the military establishment of accommodating to a society in change26. Although Kitchen is more limited in his conclusions about the impact of the 'backward' ethos of the officer corps for the later political development of twentieth century Germany, his interpretations follow the same lines as Eckert Kehr's interpretations of the Prussian officer corps as a closed caste, which was not only unaffected by mainstream democratic views, but which also managed to transfer its pre-democratic and 'feudal' values to civic society during the period from the 1848 revolution, until the unification in the Imperial era.27 Kehr's argument about the importance of 'pre-democratic' and 'pseudo-feudal' attitudes from the military realm to civil society was later taken up by the Sonderweg historians. The political role of the army elite thereby became an integrated part of the general interpretation of the political and social mis-development of Imperial Germany. In addition, a series of major works on the army concentrate on the influence of the military elite on political decisions leading to the out-break of the First World War.28

The active role of the Prussian military elite in foreign and domestic policy-making has therefore been at the centre of attention not only of historians but also of political scientists working on the relationship between military organisations and involvement in politics. Morris Janowitz refers directly to the Prussian case as the classic example of ‘designed militarism’, defined as 'the positive and premeditated intent to intervene in domestic politics' and which involves ‘modification and destruction of civilian institutions by military leaders acting directly and premeditately through the state and other institutions.’ In contrast to Prussia, Janowitz, like Huntington, sees the French Third Republic as one of the main examples of the principle of military submission to political institutions.

Indeed, compared to the central position of the German-Prussian army, the role of the military in French history does not occupy a similar central role in the general interpretations of political development during the nineteenth century. French historiography tends to attribute a rather marginal role to the army in politics. The influence of the French military elite on the political development of the Third Republic is so discreet that many general descriptions of the origins of the Third Republic pass over the army with little or no comment. Despite debates about the details, the


30 Huntington (1957).

31 A comparison of the general works of the establishment of the Third Republic is significant at this point: Jean-Pierre Azéma & Michel Winock ‘La Troisième République’ Paris: Hachette, 1970; Georges Duby et al. ‘Histoire de la France: de 1852 à nos jours’ Paris: Larousse, 1973; Jean-Marie Mayeur ‘Les débuts de la République, 1871-1898’ Paris: Le Seuil 1973; Serge Berstein & Pierre Milza ‘Histoire de la France au XXe Siècle, 1900-1930’ Ed.Complexe, 1990. In these works, the army only appears in relation to the Dreyfus Affair, the Boulanger movement, and military intervention in various cases of popular uprising. These descriptions of the army are purely functional and do not mention the military authorities at all. In contrast, Maurice Agulhon (‘La Troisième République, 1889-1932’ Paris: Hachette, 1990) mentions the army in connection with the so-called ‘Fusillade de Fournies’, but has no analysis of the military as such. Madeleine Rebérioux (‘La République Radicale?’ Paris: Le Seuil, 1973) discusses the military commanders only in relation to the Dreyfus Affair. It is also significant that the recent large-scale project on the army within the French society, ‘Histoire Militaire de la France’, deals with the role of the military command in relation to the political debate about the reorganisation and the development of the army in nine pages out of 474 (with two full pages of illustrations), and analyses the delicate question of use of troops to maintain
literature generally agrees that the French military establishment was not strongly involved in conspiracies against the Republic and that the Boulanger movement was a predominantly civilian phenomenon.32 Recent historical interpretations of the role of the French military elite have generally abandoned the ‘conspiracy theories’ and insist on the de facto submission, or rather lack of revolt, of the French military elite during the decades preceding the outbreak of the First World War, and the generally loyal and conformist attitude among French officers, in particular after the Dreyfus Affair.33

The evidence of the present work that the French military authorities between 1890 and 1914 were far more involved in the management of social and political unrest than were their Prussian counterparts thus runs counter to the many studies showing a highly politicised Prussian military elite and a comparatively a-political and introvertal French military establishment.

1.1.3. The social and political significance of the elite structures in France and Prussia

In both the French and the Prussian cases, detailed studies of the social and professional profile of the military elite of the late nineteenth century have been undertaken,34 and it is one of the areas where direct comparison between the French public order in only three pages. (Guy Pedroncini (ed.)'Histoire Militaire de la France de 1871 à 1940' vol.3 Paris: PUF, 1992).

32 Girardet (1953) seems to be the first to stress this point. Recent French interpretations underline the lack of connection between the military establishment and far right political movements. Zeev Sternhell in his work on 'La France Révolutionnaire' Paris: Le Le Seuil, 1978 affirms that it is impossible to establish any direct connection between groups like 'Action Francaise' or 'La Ligue des Patriotes' and prominent officers. Similarly, there seems to be a general agreement that the menace from the military establishment against the Republic during the Dreyfus Affair was more limited than has been believed. Paul de la Gorce goes as far as stating that the underlying significance of the Dreyfus affair was precisely that it did not lead the military to challenge the Republican institutions. Paul de la Gorce 'The French Army: A Military-Political History' London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1963.

33 This point is commonly stressed by the specialised literature as well as the general literature of all political sympathies: Ralston (1967); Azéma & Winock (1970); Serman (1982); Jauffret (1983); Hélie (1994); Azéma & Winock (1970); Agulhon (1990).

34 The most thorough investigations are Daniel Hughes 'The King's Finest: a Social and Bureaucratic Profile of Prussia's General Officers, 1871-1914' New York, 1987, and Walter S. Barge 'The Generals of the Republic: the Corporate personality of high military rank in France, 1889-1914' (unpublished Ph.D.Dissertation) University of North Carolina, 1982. These studies cover the most important biographical aspects of the military elite. They also define the most important lacunae in the existing documentation about these groups. Certain interesting studies with a narrower scope help to specify particular aspects of the social profile of the military elites. (Nicolai von Preradovich 'Die

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and Prussian military elites has been attempted. These studies draw two types of conclusion: The studies on the Prussian officer corps stress the high recruitment from the nobility as well as the social, cultural and political cohesion of the military elite, despite serious modifications of the idea of the Prussian military elite as exclusively - or even predominantly - a noble corps. Although the French military elite was socially less uniform than their Prussian counterparts, it was nevertheless still a stronghold for men with family ties to the landed nobility. Moreover, in contrast to the unquestioned commitment of the Prussian military elite to the monarchy and existing social order, the majority of French officers, in particular the senior officers, were politically indifferent or potentially unsympathetic to the Republic.

Whilst the analysis of the social and professional profile of the French and Prussian military elite appears rather straightforward, the interpretation of the significance of these structures is not. The second element of the analysis of social structures concerns their importance for the professional performance of the military elite, and in particular its relationship with the state bureaucracy. One of the fundamental assumptions about
elite structures is that close social ties between two elite groups (through family, geographic origin, or religious affiliation) should further co-operation in promoting their common goals. All studies of the social profile of the senior civil servants and the general corps in Prussia and France show that in Prussia these bureaucratic elites were socially closely connected, whereas the French military elite and the prefects of this period were recruited among quite distinct social groups. The close social connection between Prussian civil servants and military elite has sustained another key argument of the Sonderweg thesis, namely the assumption of traditional elites working closely together in maintaining their predominance over the state apparatus against the influence of the bourgeoisie and, in particular, the emerging working class. According to a similar logic, French historiography generally assumes that co-operation between the prefects and the senior commanders was characterised by a high degree of conflict and military obstruction against initiatives coming from the state administration.

Contrary to these assumptions about the functioning of civil-military relations in Prussia and France, the findings of this study show that the French civil and military authorities worked closely and continuously together to maintain public order, whilst the Prussian authorities in Westphalia did not. The assumption about a direct relationship between close social ties and professional co-operation therefore did not apply to the policy of maintaining public order in cases of labour conflicts or political unrest.


41 Wehler (1973; 1995); Berghahn (1982; 1994); Stürmer (1970); Puhle (1980).

42 This point is commonly stressed by scholars working on the public forces and on the French army: Ralston (1967); Serman (1982); Carrot (1984); Bruneteaux (1993; 1996).
1.1.4. Professionalisation of the military elite

Finally, some attention had been paid to the professional profile of the military elite in the two countries and its process of bureaucratisation. This aspect has been connected to the general issue of exchange between different elite groups, and the integration of new social groups in elites via the army. From a political-constitutional point of view, the professionalisation of the officer corps and the army elite is linked to the argument, originally formulated by Huntington, of a connection between high degree of professionalisation of the military elite, and a professionally justified submission of military authority to civilian political supremacy.\(^4\)

The link between the increasing formal professionalisation of the French officer corps after 1870 and the silent acceptance of the Third Republic among the majority of French officers is often drawn. However, such a causal relationship cannot be established in the Prussian case, since the Prussian military elite was the most professionalised in Europe, but, throughout the Imperial period rejected any submission to civilian supremacy. Huntington’s link between professional profile and professional behaviour has not been followed by detailed historical investigations, and both Barge and Hughes have refrained from drawing conclusions about these two factors.\(^4\)

However, the present case study will show that the French senior generals who became strongly involved in the process of maintaining public order were highly professionalised officers. Similarly, the Prussian senior generals, although belonging to the most professionalised army elite of the time, did not refrain from developing plans for domestic intervention and from claiming in public the readiness to intervene against any opposition to existing social and political order. In a comparative perspective, the degree of professionalisation of the French and Prussian military elite is therefore not sustainable as an explanation for the dissimilar patterns of civil-military co-operation in Prussia and France.


\(^{44}\) Barge (1982); Daniel Hugues (1987).
1.2. Framework of interpretation and lines of argument

The interpretation of the use of troops against public disorder could have been approached from at least four perspectives. In the first place, it could have been analysed in relation to the challenges arising from the type of conflict. This approach would have sought to either confirm or reject the idea of a direct causal relationship between the type of challenge and the response to the degree of unrest. Since the comparison of the French and Prussian cases show that the dissimilar responses to unrest in the two areas were not due to different types of challenge, this approach was not seen as fruitful.

Secondly, the issue could have been seen in relation to wider governmental politics, in particular industrial, labour market, and social policies in the two countries. Given the observation that the strategies developed and implemented by the state administration at the regional level were largely detached from the general policies pursued by succeeding governments, the possible outcome of this approach would be to focus attention of the fact that in both countries the use of troops for internal peacekeeping went counter to the political line followed by the central power.

In the third place, the question of use of troops could have been seen in the light of centre-periphery relations and the ways in which the central power acted in local conflicts. This might have led to two main conclusion, namely that, in both France and Prussia, senior civil servants enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from interference by the central power to develop and implement measures to deal with public disorder. Moreover, in relation to local authorities, it would conclude that senior civil servants were capable of imposing their measures with little regard to the wishes of local authorities.

All three approaches, however, still leave the question open as to why the Prussian and French systems pursued markedly dissimilar strategies to deal with public unrest in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. In order to answer this particular question, the interpretation focuses on the process bureaucratic decision making and inter-
institutional co-operation between the senior civil servants at the regional level and the military authority.

The approach used some key elements of ‘historical institutionalism’ models of the functioning of administrative policy making.45 Historical institutionalists observe that the same strategies are often implemented again and again over a protracted timeframe, even when measures which were perfectly appropriate at one stage have become quite inappropriate decades later. They focus on the dynamics of administrative policy making in order to understand why strong patterns of continuity exist in the strategies implemented by public authorities. They suggest that, due to repeated implementation of a certain set of procedures and strategies, the measures taken at one time tend to become determinants for decisions taken in later periods - so-called ‘path-dependency’.

There are three reasons for this phenomenon. In the first place, the organisation of responses to a problem strongly depends on past experiences with similar cases. The more a system has organised and planned its response to a problem in a particular way, the more difficult becomes a radical change of strategy. Secondly, due to the repeated implementation of one particular type of strategy, a set of standard operating procedures tend to develop that facilitate the bureaucratic processes linked to that particular strategy because, at all levels, the bureaucrats know exactly how they are supposed to proceed. At the same time, a change of strategy would create a high degree of uncertainty. Bureaucrats, it is argued, tend to implement the same strategies

again and again because these provide the highest degree of security and predictability. Thirdly, historical institutionalists argue that bureaucratic decision making is often linked to rules of appropriateness and codes of conduct. This is based on the observation that bureaucrats often make their choices from a rather limited range of option, whilst other measures and strategies are never considered. This helps to explain why decision makers seemed to refrain from certain measures which they were formally empowered to implement.

The historical institutionalist approach was adopted in this thesis, not in order to prove the general appropriateness of this theory, but because it provides a useful framework of interpretation in which to consider the central problematic. The framework allows analysis of policies and strategies developed over a long period of time. Hence, arguments can be put forward that generalise beyond individual cases whilst still being focused on patterns of response to a particular problem. The study focuses on the inner logic of the process of administrative policy making within each of the two systems as the main factor to explain why dissimilar strategies were developed in the French and Prussian case.

This does not suggest that the dissimilar social structures, wider political culture, and the formal institutional organisation were of no significance. Whilst accepting that France and Prussia were two quite distinct societies with very dissimilar relationship between the regime and the army, the study argues that within a given context of social structures, wider political culture and formal institutional organisation, there was room for a series of very dissimilar policies to develop. However, once one way of dealing with a particular problem was adopted, this became a determining factor for the ways in which similar situations were handled in the future.
1.3. Case study: state bureaucrats and military commanders in two industrial areas, 1889-1914

To analyse the importance of institutional organisation in the role of military authorities in domestic peacekeeping, this investigation is based on a case cross-national comparative study, which in turn allows an analysis to be made of how bureaucrats and military commanders operated within the two systems. The case study concentrates on co-operation at the regional level between Prussian military commanders and the senior civilian authority, the Prussian province governors (Oberpräsidenten) and district governors (Regierungspräsidenten), on the one hand, and the French prefects and the general commander of the military region, the army corps commander, on the other. These regional authorities occupied a central position because they were the main institutional link between the various civil and military authorities that existed below central governmental level.

The investigation focuses on two industrial areas; in Prussia, the seventh military region is chosen, which covered the province of Westphalia and the district of Düsseldorf, thus comprising all of the industrial districts around the River Ruhr. In France, the study concentrates on the first military region that covered the départements of Nord and Pas-de-Calais. These two regions represent the most turbulent areas of large scale labour unrest during the years 1889 to 1914. From a militarily strategic point of view, peacekeeping in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais was of particular significance because not only were they frontier areas, but they were also vital in regard to national coal supplies. The regions were chosen to compare the areas where military intervention was most likely to occur in each country and, additionally, to see where the military authorities had a particular interest in considering civil unrest as a strategic issue.

The timeframe for these two investigations starts with the great Westphalian miners’ strike in 1889, followed by the international strike wave of the years 1889-1893, and

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46 Although the district of Düsseldorf was administratively speaking, a part of the Rhineland, it belonged to the seventh military region. In all situations when troops were needed to assist civil forces, the district governor co-operated with the civil and military authorities in Westphalia.

47 This strike wave has been documented for both France and Germany by Charles and Richard Tilly in Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly & Richard Tilly 'The rebellious Century 1830-1930' Harvard University
ending with the outbreak of the First World War. The study concentrates exclusively on the internal role of the army in peace-time. In time of war, formal relationships between the civil and military authorities undergo important changes; therefore they ought to be the subject of a different study.

1.4. Methodology, sources, and limits of the study

1.4.1. Methods applied and the problems of methodology

Quantitative investigations have been made to establish a basis for comparison between the two industrial areas tested. It was essential to demonstrate in simple terms that the frequency of domestic military intervention was, in fact, much higher in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and in France in general, than it was in Westphalia or Prussia as a whole.48 Secondly, in order to show that the dissimilar use of military troops was a question of political choices, it was demonstrated that there was no direct relationship between the size of a conflict (that is, the number of persons actually or potentially involved) and the use of military troops; indeed, neither was there a direct relationship between the size of the civil forces available (that is, the state police, municipal police, gendarmerie) and the use of military troops.

Then, in demonstrating that the dissimilar policies that were being implemented in France and Prussia were primarily a question of policy making, a qualitative analysis was undertaken into the decision-making processes using documentary evidence from three sets of sources, namely each state's administration at the regional and local level, the senior commanders at the regional level, and the war and interior ministries. The aim was to define exactly who took the decisions about mobilising the army and how these decisions were implemented.


48 For a more detailed description of the methodological problems of estimating the frequency of domestic military intervention, see Chapter Two.
The study has been confronted with two significant methodological problems. On the one hand, there is the question of the influence exercised by local pressure groups over the measures implemented. Since the existing documentation almost exclusively derives from state administrations and the military authorities, evidence of influence from other actors - in particular from local pressure groups - is virtually absent. From a methodological point of view, this issue is difficult to handle. However, a series of significant indicators have been traced in the course of the research which point to the conclusion that, from the early 1890 onwards, local pressure groups - in Westphalia as well as in Nord-Pas-de-Calais - had very few means of asserting much influence over the decisions taken by the state administrations or military authorities.

The second methodological problem follows on from the first; even if local pressure groups had at their disposal some means of influencing the policies pursued by the state administration and the army, a logical question arises: did these authorities not tend to pursue the interests of those groups in local society calling for heavy-handed measures to be taken against public disorder because they themselves belonged to the local establishment? Inevitably, to some extent, they did. However, an analysis of the social profile and geographical origins of the senior civil servants and the commanding generals (the army corps commanders) in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais between 1889 and 1914 reveals that, in both the French and Prussian cases, the senior civil servants and the army corps commanders were always outsiders to local society. They were meant to represent the interests of the state. Moreover, the analysis of the social profile of senior civil servants and army corps commanders demonstrated that the patterns of civil-military co-operation in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais actually run counter to the assumption that close social ties between two bureaucratic elites would lead to close professional connections. In Prussia, where the majority of senior bureaucrats and military commanders were recruited within a very limited number of Prussian noble families, the level of inter-institutional co-operation was lower than in France where the elites of the state administration and the army were recruited among quite dissimilar social groups.
1.4.2. Documentation and selection of sources

The central bulk of information comes from each state’s administration at the regional level (province and district governors in Westphalia, prefects in Nord-Pas-de-Calais) and, to lesser extent, from state representatives at the local level (local governors in Westphalia and sub-prefects in Nord-Pas-de-Calais). The documents from the state administration at the local level are not particularly informative about relationships with the army, but decisions concerning the army were rarely taken at that level. This is even more true for the documents left behind by the municipalities, since the papers at this level contain almost no documentary evidence related to cases of major conflict involving the army. The most interesting sources of information involving municipal authorities appear among the state administration papers where there is occasional correspondence with the municipal authorities or the local police.

The destruction in 1945 of the central Prussian military archive left posterity with almost no documentation from the offices of the army corps commanders in any of the Prussian provinces. The documents from the army corps command in Münster therefore mainly appear in their correspondence with the state administration at the provincial level and with the war ministry, as well as among the personal papers that have been left behind by some of the generals. In contrast with the problems of documentation from the army corps commanders in Münster, the military sources that have survived from the army corps commander’s office in Lille are both excellent and abundant. Thus, this research faced a situation in which not only are there more cases of military intervention on the French side, but also that these cases are also far better documented from the side of the military authorities. The asymmetrical nature of the documents in itself gives an impression that there was a higher frequency of military

49 Nordrhein-Westfälisches Staatsarchiv Münster (HaStA Münster); Departmental Archives, Lille; Departmental Archives, Arras.
50 Only the documents from the thirteenth army corps covering the Württemberg military region, deposited in the central archive in Stuttgart, survived the Second World War. They provide an impression of the internal functioning of a Prussian army corps. Since the Württemberg kingdom was a rather peaceful area, these documents contain little information about the mobilisation of military troops to maintain public order. Similarly, the central archive in Munich (Abteilung IV - Militärarchiv) contains the documents from the Bavarian army corps in Munich and in Würzburg. It contains reports of domestic military intervention in the years between 1870 and 1890, as well as information on the preparations for mobilisation on for the occasion of 1 May 1895. However, no documents can be found which are related to the period after the turn of the century.
51 Military Archive, Vincennes, papers from the First Army Corps (1.A.C.).
intervention and of civil-military correspondence in the case of Nord-Pas-de-Calais. It was therefore found necessary to provide a series of independent indicators in order to sustain both the argument that military intervention was more frequent in the case of Nord-Pas-de-Calais when compared to the case of Westphalia (Chapter Two) and the argument about higher intensity of civil-military correspondence (Chapters Eight and Nine).

In relation to the question of the functioning of civil-military co-operation in France, the Department of General Security within the French Ministry of the Interior has left a great deal of documentation linked to the problems of maintaining public order. The army played an integral part in the development of strategies for dealing with public unrest, and therefore this series is highly relevant for an analysis of civil-military co-operation at the ministerial level, as well as for the correspondence between the Ministry of the Interior and the prefects. In the Prussian case too, the papers from the ministry of the interior are a major source of information concerning the policies developed in order to deal with problems of great unrest. Since the ministry of the interior was the only institutional link between the state administration at the provincial level and the war ministry, both the instances of actual military intervention and those where military requisition was only discussed, are well documented. In turn, these papers provide documentation related to the policy of 'de-militarisation' of internal peacekeeping. In particular, they give an insight into the perceptions of state administrators at the ministerial and provincial level about how far they could pursue 'de-militarisation', as well as information concerning the moment when the requisition of military troops was considered appropriate.

As for the Prussian war ministry's documents related to the issue of domestic military intervention, the only available material is the collection entitled 'Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von Unruhen, 1889-1914' as it survived the

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53 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, 1.H.A. - Rep.77. In addition, the Central Archive Potsdam (III) contains the papers from the Imperial ministry of the interior, and has some documents of general interest. In contrast, the material in the Bundesarchiv - Koblenz proved of little interest for this question.
war-time bombing of the Prussian military archive.\textsuperscript{54} This collection, which is comprised of little more than two hundred pages, gives a very incomplete idea regarding the individual cases of military intervention or the policies pursued by the war ministry. On the other hand, it appears that this collection is not a random compilation of what happened to survive the archive's destruction in 1945, because it was gathered as an entity throughout the Imperial period up to 1918. Thus it contains what was perceived at that time to be the most significant documents concerning cases of domestic military intervention. In France, the relevant documents from the war ministry mainly derive from the general staff, and primarily contain legal texts, decrees, and copies of the protection plans for the case of internal unrest, which were elaborated between 1897 and 1913.\textsuperscript{55} A great deal of the ministerial documents were deliberately destroyed during the First World War because of fears that they might fall into the hands of the Germans.\textsuperscript{56}

Unfortunately, the memoirs and correspondence left behind by Prussian senior state administrators are not very informative on the question of domestic military intervention.\textsuperscript{57} The relationship of these administrations with the local commanders seems to have occupied an insignificant part of their time, even when they subsequently give accounts of the great crises in which the army was involved. The military authorities - if cited at all - are mentioned in passing as 'the army' without further specification.

In contrast to these senior civil servants, the memoirs and papers from the Prussian generals are far more informative. A senior commander of the early Imperial period, General von Alvensleben, is quoted as declaring that: 'A Prussian general dies, but

\textsuperscript{54} The collection is now in the military archive in the Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /14.
\textsuperscript{55} Military Archive, Vincennes, Series 7.N. The Series 5.N, covering the ministerial correspondence, does not contain significant material concerning this issue.
\textsuperscript{57} Hans von Berlepsch 'Sozialpolitische Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen' München-Gladbach: Volksvereins-Verlag, 1925; Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, Persönliche Nachlässe Konrad von Studt. Papers from the province governors in Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.I. - Rep.89 - No.13723 'Die Oberpräsidenten der Provinz Westphalen 1825-1918.' Papers from the province governors in HaStA Münster, PA Oberpräsidium or Regierung Münster.
leaves no memoirs behind. This textual austerity fortunately does not apply to the generation of generals promoted during the Wilhelminian period, men who possessed a higher intellectual training and who were more politicised than the generals of the Bismarck era. Moreover, the end of the Empire and defeat in the First World War removed a great deal of inhibition; indeed, many former senior generals were extremely verbose in recording their accounts for posterity. In most cases, these accounts about their time as army corps commanders only constitute a couple of pages. However, generally speaking, these pages are very revealing because of their perceptions of the senior state representatives and of wider local society. Secondly, a number of former army corps commanders also left their personal papers behind them, documents which reveal their connections with the province in which they served. Finally, some of the books written contemporaneously about individual senior generals, although often poorly written hagiographies, sometimes provide useful information about their position in local society and details of the generals' social acquaintances.

58 Demeter (1965) p.168.
60 The former army corps commanders' personal papers in the military archive in Freiburg include Otto von Below; Berthold von Deimling; von Eichhorn; Karl von Einem; Herman von Francois; August von Goeben; Colmar von der Goltz; Paul von Hindenburg; Alexander von Kluck; Bruno von Mudra; and Sigismund von Schlichting. The private papers of Alfred von Waldsee are in the Geheimess Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem.
A similar pattern can be observed on the French side, where the main descriptions of civil-military relations come almost exclusively from the viewpoints of officers. The memoirs of politicians and prefects pay little attention to the relationship between the prefectoral and military authorities. French senior officers were apparently less inclined to write their memoirs or to leave personal papers behind than were their Prussian counterparts. In addition, the memoirs of French generals which are in print make little mention on the issue of domestic military intervention; indeed they are mostly preoccupied in affirming their excellent relations with a particular politician or in declaring their commitment to the Republican regime. In contrast, the French general commanders who left their memoirs behind in the form of unpublished manuscripts tend to be franker in their negative descriptions of their relations with the civil administration. Similarly, generals still in active service tended to be very discrete, whereas retired generals allowed themselves to be openly critical towards the use - or misuse - of military troops in performing as the extended arm of the political executive.

The attempts made by local pressure groups to influence the measures taken to maintain or restore public order are difficult to trace except for what appears among the collections of documents mentioned above. Nevertheless, an examination of the minutes from most important elected bodies at the regional level (the General Council of the département Nord and the Provincial Diet of Westphalia) was carried out in

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62 The personal papers of these prefects contain little information related to the instances of military intervention as the issue was very likely considered either too unimportant to be mentioned or too politically sensitive for the prefect to want to leave this kind of information lying about. Paul Cambon 'Correspondance' (1870-1924) Vols 1-3, Paris, 1940-1948; Archives départementales de Lille, the personal files of the prefects of Nord, M 6 19-20; Archives Nationales, AP 269 Trépont.

63 Louis André 'Cinq ans de ministère' Paris: Louis Michaud, 1906; Raoul-Marie Donop 'Lettres d'un vieux cavalier, 1870-1907' 1906; Gaston Gallifet 'Souvenirs' in Le Journal des Débats August 1902; Général Zédé 'Souvenirs de ma vie' published in Le carnets de la sabretache (1933-1936); Emile Zurlinden 'Mes Souvenirs depuis la guerre, 1871-1901' Paris 1913.

64 Henri Brugière 'Mes mémoires' (1841-1914) (unpublished manuscript), Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 K 160 / 1 Kmi 46; Emile Jourdy 'Mémoires' (unpublished manuscript ca.1913), Military Archive, Vincennes, 392/GD/3; Hubert Lyautey 'Choix de lettres' (1882-1919) Paris 1924; Hubert Lyautey 'Paroles d'action, Madagascar, Sud-Oranais, Oran-Maroc' (1900-1926) Paris: Armand Colin, 1948; Charles Millet 'Souvenirs' (unpublished manuscript circa 1913), Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 K mi 9. The personnel files of the general corps contain some documents linked to the command in the main garrisons but are generally not very useful. In the National Archives in Paris, the private papers of General Antoine Chanzy and of Marchal Hubert Lyautey.
order to see whether the question of military intervention appeared on their agendas.\textsuperscript{65} It appears that these elected bodies were only very occasionally concerned with the question of military intervention and that their decisions usually only amounted to a statement in principle which had little significance for the policies that were being pursued by the state authorities.

An analysis of the local press was also undertaken at an early stage of this study because it was felt that by scrutinising this source, evidence pointing to the frequency of use of troops in the two regions could be established. This procedure, however, soon proved to be inconclusive because, very often, the press did not make any distinction between the \textit{gendarmerie} and regular troops; in addition, due to the political sensitivity of the issue, the press sometimes mistakenly refers to the presence of troops when in fact only the \textit{gendarmerie} or municipal police were present.

\textbf{1.4.3. The limits of the study}

The study does not consider normative issues concerning political decision making in Prussia, and therefore avoids concepts and debates over the degree to which the Prussian system was 'semi-absolutistic', 'militaristic' or 'politically backwards'. Similarly, the thesis is not concerned with questions such as whether the actions of the bureaucrats and military commanders were 'feudal', authoritarian, or undemocratic, or whether the use of troops was the response of a 'bourgeois capitalist' system against the emerging labour movement. Secondly, the study seeks to explain overall patterns of civil-military relations rather than why the army was mobilised to individual cases of conflict. In the third place, this is not a study of social conflicts. Such investigations have already been undertaken both from the perspective of emerging political and social movements, and from the perspective of 'collective actions'. Similarly, this thesis is not concerned with the questions of policing and social control or with the public forces in the actual theatres of conflict and their relationship with strikers and demonstrators. Finally, the response from wider civil society to domestic military

\textsuperscript{65} 'Délibérations du Conseil Général du Nord, 1887-1914', in Archives départementales de Lille, I.N.131-160 and the minutes from the Provincial Diet (\textit{Provinziallandtag}) of Westphalia in Münster HaStA respectively.
intervention is not examined. Investigations on the reactions appearing in the local press were initiated at an early stage of this research. These were abandoned because the information contained within turned out to be of little interest because it failed to explain the differences in the strategies adopted in the two industrial areas. In particular, similar arguments were raised in public about the domestic use of troops; indeed, there was greater public criticism in France of military intervention than in Prussia. Hence such public criticisms did not lead to any clearer understanding of why the patterns in the use of troops were so different in the two countries.

1.5. The structure of the thesis

The thesis is organised in three parts. The first part establishes the elements to be compared, by analysing the three sets of alternative explanations indicated above: the relationship between the challenge in terms of public unrest compared to the available forces of order, the legal-institutional framework of civil-military co-operation, and the elite structures in the local society, in particular the social affiliations between the senior civil servants and military commanders, as well as their acquaintance with local elite groups.

Chapter Two provides the elements of comparison used in analysing the problems of maintaining public order in the industrial areas of Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. The analysis involves a comparison between the size and development of the working population in both regions between 1889 and 1914, the type of industries, and the extent of the labour conflicts. In turn, it also compares the numbers of civil forces (police and gendarmerie) in the two regions. Two important points are being made here. In the first place, the size of the working population and extent of the labour conflicts were greater in Westphalia than in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Moreover, despite serious attempts in Prussia to develop police and gendarmerie forces, so that they could manage the challenges of policing an industrialising area alone, the ratio of civil forces compared to the population did not change markedly between 1890 and 1914, due to constant increases in population. Thus, the dissimilar use of troops between
Chapter Three analyses the formal institutional framework and the distribution of powers between the civil and military authorities at the regional level. The main point is that the formal distribution of powers provided a much higher degree of authority to the Prussian military commander compared to his French counterparts. Nevertheless, the formal authority of the Prussian commanders to intervene in civil conflicts without being formally requested by a civil authorities or the right to refuse requisitions of the were of little consequence for the actual functioning of civil-military co-operation. Only once in during the Imperial era did a Prussian military commander intervene without being formally requested, thus creating a public outcry that forced the war ministry to abolish the right to independent military intervention.66 Similarly, no example has been found where a request from the civil authorities was refused, and when requested military commanders generally followed the wishes of the civil authorities.

In Chapter Four, the means of influence of the different authorities at the regional level in questions concerning the use of troops are examined. Two crucial points are made in this chapter. The first one concerns changes in decision-making procedures that saw power moving from the local to the regional level. This development took place in both the French and Prussian cases. The result was that locally-elected authorities, although formally entitled to call for military assistance, were virtually excluded from such decisions. Similarly, the industrialists interested in the intervention of military troops had limited opportunities to put forward their interests through locally-elected bodies; additionally they had almost no social contact with, or access to, senior officials or military commanders. With decision-making structures concentrated at the regional level, the relationship between the senior state administrator and the army corps commander becomes crucial. However, the second central point of this fourth chapter is that, despite the close social ties between the senior members of the Prussian

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66 For an account on the Zabern affair, see Chapter Three.
state administration and the higher ranking officers, their professional interchange was
limited. Conversely, despite the notoriously tense relationship that existed between the
French military commanders and the representatives of the Republican regime, these
two groups enjoyed continuous professional co-operation. Thus, the mere frequency of
military intervention in the French and Prussian cases strongly contradicts the
assumption that close social ties should in turn lead to close professional co-operation.

Part II of this thesis is entitled *Debates, priorities and policies implemented*; it is
comprised of three chapters. Chapter Five looks at the arguments put forward in
France and Prussia for and against the use of military troops in internal peacekeeping
and compares their political implications in the two systems. Chapters Six and Seven
then analyse the policies pursued by the central power both in Berlin and Paris, and the
inconsistent and contradictory priorities of the different branches of the two central
governments. They also examine the alliances that grew up between different groups
within the French and Prussian systems amongst those supporting the peacekeeping
strategy and those by the civil and military institutions in Paris and Berlin who opposed
it. In both countries, the authorities had to strike a balance between, on the one hand,
the need to keep situations of unrest under control - thus avoiding a major uprising -
and, on the other hand, the wish to keep the army out of domestic conflicts. At the end
of the day, the decisions about when, where and how was to be used the army were
taken by the senior state administrators in the two countries.

The central point in understanding the dissimilar policies implemented in Westphalia
and in Nord-Pas-de-Calais is that the French and Prussian civil and military authorities
at the regional level had a series of reasons for preferring intervention or non-
intervention of military troops. In the Prussian case, both the civil administration and
the military command agreed to leave the management of conflicts to the local
authorities, without interference with state forces, at least until quite a late stage; in
practice, this meant calling for military assistance only when violence and riots went
out of control. On the French side, however, both the prefects and the army corps
commanders knew that their own positions, and in a wider sense the existing social and
political order, depended on the strict and rapid control of any unrest, even at the local
level. They therefore tended to be far more interventionist than their Prussian counterparts. In both cases, it was important that the civil and military authorities at the regional level supported each other and that they defended the measures chosen before the Ministry of the Interior and the War ministry respectively.

Part III, entitled *The institutionalisation of the strategies adopted and the diverging trajectories of administrative practice*, is composed of the Chapters Eight and Nine. They analyse the administrative lines of civil-military co-operation and decision making as these developed between the early 1890s and the outbreak of the First World War. The crucial point is that, in the French case, the very fact of working closely together made the mobilisation of troops increasingly convenient; the authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais therefore tended to take the option of calling out the army whenever there was the slightest risk of a situation getting out of control. Conversely, due to the increasingly low frequency of military interventions in the Westphalian part of the Ruhr district, the civil and military authorities lost the habit of co-operating. The mobilisation of troops for internal purposes became an increasingly complicated measure to implement, since the lines of communication and authority, as well as the number of troops to be mobilised and the points to be protected, had to be established *ad hoc*, whilst the crisis was taking place. Thus a self-perpetuating dynamic in administrative procedures can be observed, that shaped the tendency either towards the choice of mobilising troops or the option of avoiding military intervention.

In the conclusion, two main factors are used to explain the diverging trajectories of policy towards maintenance of public order in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. First of all, the reason for adopting dissimilar policies in the early 1890s seemed to have been linked, above all, to the degree of confidence in the stability of the regime and its capacity to survive a situation of open revolt. In both Prussia and France, successive governments, as well as their civil and military representatives at the regional level, were constantly expecting a revolution to break out. However, the Prussian authorities in Westphalia had sufficient confidence in the stability of their regime and the capacity of the army to put down any revolt, if necessary. Additionally, the political consequences of violent confrontations between public forces and
population did not have the same devastating effect on the legitimacy of the regime in Prussia as it had in France. The Prussian ministry of the interior and the state administration at the regional and local level could therefore afford to undertake a policy of ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping, even if this was connected with a considerable degree of risk of losing control.

In contrast, the French Republican system was a fragile construction. Government ministers, as well as the prefects and military commanders, knew that the existing social and political order could easily be reversed by a popular uprising, as had happened four times since 1789. The Republican regime could not allow any instances of unrest to get out of control, because violent confrontations between public forces and citizens always had a devastating effect on the legitimacy of the regime and how it was perceived by wide sections of the population. The strategies implemented in a turbulent area like Nord-Pas-de-Calais were a reflection of this, and the mobilisation of large numbers of soldiers was one way of avoiding a situation from getting out of control, and preventing violent confrontations.

The second main factor, which in turn explains the diverging trajectories of the strategies is the dissimilar degree of inter-institutional connection and co-operation between the state administration and the respective military authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Westphalia. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the development of detailed plans and procedures around the mobilisation of military troops made the use of troops increasingly convenient and effective. This explains why calling upon the army - a measure which might be considered appropriate for situations of major crises - was also implemented for very minor incidents. It also explains why the French army was sometimes used to perform ordinary crowd management when a large number of people were expected to gather. Conversely, the lack of inter-institutional connections in Westphalia between the state administration and the military authorities made calling for military assistance an increasingly complicated procedure, and a strategy which implied many unforeseeable elements. Accordingly, the state administration in Westphalia increasingly refrained from this option, which they could not control. At
the same time, the Prussian state administration became increasingly confident of its own capacity of managing even large-scale cases of conflict with civil forces alone.

The main implication of this study is that the outcome of administrative policy making cannot simply be deduced from the wider social and political context, but has to be studied in its own right. The development in France of policies that strongly implied the army and in Prussia a rather successful policy of ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping took place despite strong social and political forces opposing this strategy towards public disorder.
Part I. Context of Military Intervention in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais

Chapter Two. The domestic use or troops: challenges and responses

The use of the Prussian army for internal peacekeeping during the Imperial period has not been the object of much detailed research. In particular, issues of the importance of the Imperial army as a force of law and order during the great labour conflicts have been based on assumptions rather than on empirical evidence.1 Interpretations of the domestic role of the army have been based partly on detailed analysis of isolated cases, partly on the principle declarations of intent from individual general commanders. In addition, interpretations are usually confined to the analysis the War Ministry’s policy with little attention paid to how that policy was implemented.2 Above all, general interpretations of the political development of Imperial Germany, aiming at stressing the authoritarian nature of the system, have led to a series of strictly inaccurate estimates concerning the importance of military involvement in labour conflicts.

Martin Kitchen vastly overestimates the frequency and importance of military involvement in internal conflicts, claiming that calls for military troops to put down strikes happened ‘quite often’;3 meanwhile, Messerschmidt describes the requisitioning of military assistance as a measure which was almost automatically implemented in the case of labour conflicts.4 Despite Wehler’s famous designation of the Prussian army as

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1 Lüdtke’s research only deals with the first half of the nineteenth century; Klückmann (1978) just considers the legal-constitutional aspect of domestic military intervention, while Funk (1986) focuses on the changes in the legal definitions of the state’s monopoly in coercion. As with Funk, Jessen (1991; 1992) is mainly preoccupied with the ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping in the light of the development of civil police forces. Given the declining importance of the army, the few cases of domestic military intervention which took place have not been considered relevant for detailed investigations.

2 Craig (1955); Kitchen (1968); Messerschmidt (1970; 1979; 1980); Deist (1991); Berghahn (1982; 1994).

3 Martin Kitchen (1968) p.163.

an instrument for internal repression (*Kampfinstrument nach Innen*),\(^5\) he admits in his more recent works that after 1889, military commanders in situations of labour conflict maintained a pragmatic wait-and-see attitude which often resulted in non-intervention.\(^6\)

In contrast, recent literature, focusing on policing, social control, and the maintenance of public order, seriously modifies the idea of the army as an important actor in domestic peacekeeping during the Wilhelminian period; it also stresses important changes in the use of the army for internal purposes during the Imperial period.\(^7\)

Similarly, despite important methodological difficulties linked to Richard Tilly’s quantitative research into violent incidents appearing in the German press, it is important to notice that his figures of military involvement point towards the same conclusion.\(^8\)

Within French historiography, the increasing frequency of domestic military intervention - particularly during the first decade of the twentieth century - is a well known phenomenon which is mentioned by historians working on the French army,\(^9\) and by scholars working on policing and the maintenance of public order,\(^10\) as well as by the historians working on French labour movements,\(^11\) and in the general literature on the French Third Republic.\(^12\) Except for Perrot’s estimates of military interventions in labour conflicts through the years 1870-1890,\(^13\) none of these works attempt to provide a more precise estimate of the figures behind this term ‘high frequency.’ As a comparative problem, however, it should be noted that the paradox of increasing frequency of military interventions in France has been largely ignored. Only Samuel Huntington has made any mention the high degree of involvement of the French

\(^5\) This expression was first used by Wehler (1973) pp.159-160.
\(^12\) Rebérioux (1975) 78-79 & 89, Azéma & Winock (1970) only mention the army in its external role or as the 'school of the nation'. Agulhon (1990), pp.100-101, only mentions the incidents at Fourmies in 1891.
\(^13\) Perrot’s quantitative estimates are only comprised of instances of labour conflict; her figures for military intervention involves both the cases where regular troops were mobilised and cases where only the *gaardmerie* intervened. Perrot (1975) p.195.
military establishment in civilian affairs compared to Prussia, although he explains it away by arguing that it all stemmed from the higher level of professionalisation of Prussian officers when compared to the French.\textsuperscript{14}

In this chapter, some elements are presented which allow quantitative comparison to be made between the two cases. In the first place, a comparative analysis will be undertaken regarding the challenge presented to the authorities in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais in terms of the size of the working population, the increase in population, the degree of labour organisation and the potential for violence linked to instances of public disorder. The findings show that the size of great labour conflicts, both in terms of the actual number participants, as well as the extent of the working population as a whole, was significantly higher in Westphalia than it was in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. (1.1.)

Secondly, it is important to stress that dissimilarities in the use of military troops were not due to differences in the development of civil forces either. Although the Prussian authorities put significant efforts into extending their civil forces in the period between 1889 and 1913, these attempts were largely neutralised by the rapid population growth in the industrial areas of Westphalia. Conversely, despite a reputation that the French countryside was badly policed right up until after the First World War, the density of policing in Nord-Pas-de-Calais - and also in France as a whole - was actually slightly higher here than it was in Westphalia throughout the period examined (2.2).

Third, a series of indicators are presented in order to show that, between 1890 and 1914, the number of military interventions in Nord-Pas-de-Calais was actually much higher than was the case either in Westphalia or in Imperial Germany as a whole. The documents concerning maintenance of public order left behind by the Prussian Ministries of War and of the Interior are quite substantial and do not suffer from important gaps. Although there might be instances of military intervention in Prussia which do not appear in these ministerial documents, the finding of only three cases of military intervention in Westphalia whilst seventy-eight cases were traced in Nord-Pas-

\textsuperscript{14} Huntington (1957) pp.49-53; 70-79.
de-Calais indicates dissimilarities which do not seem to be linked to lack of documentation. Moreover, the Prussian documents refer to these three cases in a way that indicate that these were indeed the only cases of military intervention in Westphalia between 1889 and 1914 (2.3).

Finally, not only did the authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais call for military assistance more frequently than did their Westphalian counterparts, but the authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais also tended to send a significantly higher number of men - both civil and military - to deal with instances of unrest which were comprised of much lower numbers of actual or potential participants. Similarly, while the total number of days the army was mobilised in Prussia went down between 1889 and 1912, the periods of mobilisation in Nord-Pas-de-Calais were longer than they ever were in Prussia during the Imperial era.(2.4).
2.1. The challenges faced by the French and Prussian authorities in the two industrial areas

One fundamental question that appears when considering the domestic use of the army in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais would be the degree to which the French and Prussian administrations in the two industrial areas faced comparable challenges. The following analysis looks at the material conditions under which the civil authorities in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais had to operate. It examines the size and the development of the working population in the two areas, the number of participants in the conflicts occurring, the degree of labour organisation and the potential for violence linked to labour conflicts in the two areas. A second key factor for comparison concerns the size of the civil forces in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais, in order to see whether there was a significant structural difference within the two systems, that is whether the Prussian authorities had a serious alternative to the military that the French authorities had not in terms of a greater number of civil forces. The comparison of these factors show that the size of the great strikes occurring in Westphalia actually involved a larger number of people than even the greatest confrontations that took place in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Similarly, the figures for available civil forces clearly indicates that despite significant increase in the Prussian civil forces after 1889, their number in relation to the population always remained lower in Westphalia than in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.

2.1.1. The two regions and their populations

The two regions differed by virtue of their size, because the Westphalian entity was considerably larger than the region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais. The province of Westphalia covered 20,214 square kilometres, with a population which increased rapidly from 1,760,000 in 1870\(^{15}\) to a 4,125,096 in 1910.\(^{16}\) In comparison, the territory of the region Nord-Pas-de-Calais, with its 12,414 square kilometres, was only two-thirds of Westphalia. Similarly, the population was smaller and the demographic increase during the second half of the nineteenth century was less dramatic than that which occurred in

Westphalia. The population of the département Nord increased from 1,158,885 in 1851 to 1,867,408 by 1901 and 1,962,155 in 1911. During the same period, the demographic structure of Pas-de-Calais underwent important changes due to the opening of important coal mines in a traditionally agrarian region. The majority of miners were recruited in the rural areas of Pas-de-Calais, but the new activities were also followed by influx of workers from other areas of France and from the neighbouring Belgium. Accordingly, the population in Pas-de-Calais increased from 694,294 in 1851 to 1,013,492 in 1906.\textsuperscript{17}

The dissimilar response to labour conflicts in the two areas is all the more striking since the working population, and thereby the potential for challenges to the authorities, was considerably greater in Westphalia compared to Nord-Pas-de-Calais. The three main industrial sectors in the industrial areas of Westphalia\textsuperscript{18} were its mining industry, its metal industry, and its textile industry. From the mid-nineteenth century, the mining population grew from fewer than 50,000 to 117,000 by 1882 and to 342,000 by 1907.\textsuperscript{19} Similarly impressive were the figures for the workers employed in the metal industry which increased from fewer than 17,000 in 1882 to 111,000 by 1907. During the same period, the textile sector increased from 19,000 employees to 43,700.

Although the industrial boom of the second half of the nineteenth century also brought about an important growth in the number of industrial workers in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the working population was still significantly smaller than it was in Westphalia. The mining sector employed 45,000 people in 1879.\textsuperscript{20} This number increased to 87,000 by 1901,\textsuperscript{21} and exceeded 100,000 employees by 1906. Given that the labour conflicts in Nord-Pas-de-Calais tended to spread to other professional categories, it is relevant to consider at the total number of striking workers in all professional categories in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Looking at the most turbulent years that is 1902, 1906, 1909, 1910, 1912, and 1913, the annual strike statistics provide the figure of the total number of

\textsuperscript{17} Trempé (1995) p.235.
\textsuperscript{18} Comprising the districts of Dortmund, Bochum, Essen, Duisburg and Recklinghausen.
\textsuperscript{19} Tenfelde (1990) pp.148-149.
\textsuperscript{20} Sorlin (1966) p.290.
strikers for each département throughout the year. For the entire year of 1902, there were 87,815 striking workers in all professional categories in the two départements Nord and Pas-de-Calais. In 1906, when the entire region was struck by the general strikes in several professional branches, 92,191 workers were reported as strikers during the entire year. In 1909, there were 33,680 strikers and 43,717 in 1910, whereas in 1912 and 1913 there were respectively 97,724 and 89,643 strikers annually.

The total figure for striking workers in Nord-Pas-de-Calais - even in the most turbulent years - thus remained far behind the number of workers which were mobilised among the miners during the great Westphalian strikes of 1889 (90,000 miners), 1905 (more than 200,000) and 1912 (100,000-150,000). It was only quite late in the period investigated (1906, 1912 and 1913) that the annual figure for strikers in Nord-Pas-de-Calais came close to that of the number of miners who could be mobilised in Westphalia as early as 1889.

2.1.2. The levels of violence linked to the conflicts occurring in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais.

One of the most persistant arguments regarding Germans in the Imperial period is the idea of lawabiding and docile subjects, imbued with a 'spirit of submission' (Untertanengeist). Accordingly, there is a tendency among historians to explain away the decline in the use of the army as being the result of a lack of serious protests; even in cases when protests did occur, it is held that they took place peacefully under the discipline of the Social Democratic organisation. Conversely, in interpretations of

22 'Statistique des grèves' 1893-1913.
24 This is due to mainly to two factors. Firstly, as a consequence of the strong emphasis on the authoritarian nature of the Prussian regime, any confrontation between public forces and protesters is seen as the violent attack of an oppressive state against peaceful citizens. Recognising that the protesters were not always peaceful would be an implicit retreat from the position that state interventions were by definition repressive and unjustified. Secondly, there is a tendency among scholars of the working class movement to consider the Social Democracy as the only true working class organisation and to emphasise the discipline among the workers participating in labour actions organised by the Social Democratic trade unions.
public protest in France, there is a tendency to assume that all of the protest movements which took place were connected with a high degree of violence.\textsuperscript{25}

There can be little doubt that the culture of protest was markedly dissimilar in France and Prussia. Similarly, the public authorities' expectations of riots and violent actions, as well as their perception of the seriousness of public unrest, were closely linked to the dissimilar experiences of revolts and revolutions in France and Prussia during the course of the nineteenth century. The findings of Charles and Richard Tilly on the French and German cases respectively confirms this: Between 1882 and 1913, Charles Tilly found between 520 and 525 incidents in France where a group of at least fifty people were involved in a protest action during which some persons or objects were either damaged or seized.\textsuperscript{26} During the same period, Richard Tilly counted only 203 violent incidents taking place within the German Empire.\textsuperscript{27}

Although the number of incidents taking place in France was higher, there were still 203 cases of violent incidents occurring within the German Empire. Similarly, recent research has started to question the idea of the docile Germans, particularly in the Westphalian industrial areas.\textsuperscript{28} Everyday life was tough and violent. In the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War, six people on average were killed in accidents every day (Sundays and holidays included) in the German mining industry.\textsuperscript{29} During the industrial boom, more than half of the newcomers were young single men, originating from the rural areas in the East, who were also badly integrated in the local society. Moreover, the Westphalian workforce contained a strong proportion of migrant workers who mainly came from the Eastern provinces, particularly a large

\textsuperscript{25} Protest movements in France, even when involving a high degree of violence, are often described as the justified reaction against an unfair system from groups which were excluded from equal participation in social and political life. Similarly, there is a tendency of stressing the 'revolutionary tradition' by which the 'French people' fought for their right by undertaking demonstrations, riots, or sabotage.

\textsuperscript{26} Tilly, Tilly & Tilly (1975) p.57. Unfortunately Charles Tilly does not provide the exact numbers, but a careful reading of his graphs leads to this figure.

\textsuperscript{27} Tilly, Tilly & Tilly (1975) p.227.


\textsuperscript{29} According to Hobsbawn (1987; p.306), on average 1,430 British miners were killed every year (almost four a day) between 1910 and 1914, while 165,000 were reported injured. The casualties in Britain, however, were only two thirds the rate of persons killed and injured in the German mining sector.
proportion of Poles. These were mostly young single men, who were employed as unskilled workers in the mining sector or in heavy industry. The Polish workers - both as an ethnical minority group and as Catholics - were particularly badly integrated, and openly discriminated against by the Prussian authorities, who kept a close eye on their cultural and religious activities.

It is therefore hardly surprising that mining towns, like for instance Hamborn, were simply 'no-go areas' for the police. The 'forcible release of prisoners' from police stations was one of the most common offences in the Westphalian industrial area. Many foremen carried revolvers, even in times of peace and quiet, and guns were common among the workers as well. It was said at the time that the first thing a young miner would buy for himself was a watch, the second a revolver. Subsequent reports about people shooting from windows frequently appeared during the confrontations with public forces.\(^{30}\) The findings of this study reveals a similar picture, with many reports - even if exaggerated - of miners shooting at the police and army during the great labour confrontations. Reports of strikers throwing stones and bottles at the public forces thus belonged to the more innocent incidents. Violence against workers who continued working was an inevitable part of a strike movement, in Westphalia as well as in Nord-Pas-de-Calais,\(^ {31}\) and the assaults on strike breakers seem to have been as violent in Westphalia as they were in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, with serious bodily harm regularly occurring, along with occasional casualties.

Any comparison between the degree of violence linked to labour confrontations in France and Prussia presents some obvious methodological problems. However, the number of people killed in confrontations between the crowds and the public forces gives some idea of the level of violence that occurred in the confrontations between these two groups. The most bloody confrontation in Prussia between a crowd and the public forces took place during the Westphalian miners' strike of 1889, when at least

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\(^{31}\) Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, VII - 14 Vol.1/32-1 'Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912.' Letter from the district governor in Münster to the minister of the interior of 20 May 1912. The district governor reported after the end of the 1912 strike that although there had been no attack on the mining installations, many strike breakers were assaulted in their homes or on their way to work. Moreover, the police had been powerless in the face of the riots taking place in the towns when thousands of people were gathered.
eleven people were killed during the month of May. On the French side, the shooting of fourteen striking workers at Fourmies on May-day 1891 was the most violent confrontation that took place between the the time of the *Commune* and the outbreak of the First World War. Thus the labour conflicts in the Westphalian industrial area were often linked to a degree of violence that was no less serious that the incidents taking place in France.

2.1.3. The level of labour organisation in Westphalia

A second aspect linked to the challenge coming from the workers is the frequency of labour conflicts. All of studies comparing labour conflicts in France and the German Empire show that, after 1889 and particularly after the turn of the century, the German workforce was just as willing to go on strike as were the French workers. This was both in terms of the number of strikes, the figures for workers participating, and the number of working days lost as a result of these conflicts.  

In relation to the strike movements, the question arises whether the decline in the use of troops in Prussia reflects the fact that the German workforce the best organised in Europe. In contrast to some of the French trade unions, the Social Democratic trade unions strongly discouraged their members from undertaking violent action during strikes, because it would in turn provide the authorities with an excuse to launch a crackdown against the strikers. On the other hand, a disciplined and orderly strike was a way of gaining sympathy from wider society, thereby putting increased pressure on the employers' organisations. The importance of this non-violence policy of the Social Democratic organisation can hardly be underestimated, since it justified the state administration's policy of 'de-militarisation,' while giving the Ministry of the Interior the self-confidence to pursue this policy, despite the obvious inadequacies of the civil forces to manage crowds during mass action. On the other hand, the Social Democratic trade unions did not control the majority of the labour force, and they were in competition with other types of trade unions.  

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33 In 1913, the Social Democratic Free Unions organised no more than thirteen per cent of the employees in the mining sector, thirty-one per cent in the building sector, twenty-four per cent of the
the chemical, iron and steel industries - were very effective in their attempts to split the workforce through the establishment of 'yellow unions' and various forms of blacklistings or privileges for sections of their employees. They thereby created a great basis for frustration and discontent among those who were excluded, and who did not have much to lose through violent actions.

In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the rapid growth of industrial sectors with poor conditions in the workplace and in the crowded living quarters brought about problems of violence and crime. The industrial population, in particular in the mining sector, was difficult to control, because of its various groups of socially maladjusted and poorly integrated workforce. The workforce was characterised by a large turnover of workers and an uncontrollable migration from the countryside to the cities, as well as between cities and even between factories. Many of the industrial workers coming from neighbouring rural areas had difficulties in adapting themselves to the conditions of modern industry. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, there was also a substantial group of young single men, with a high degree of mobility, migrating at the local, as well as at a transnational, scale. Many of these came from other French regions, from Belgium or Italy. Until 1911, the département Nord was the area with the highest proportion of foreign workers, mostly Belgians and Italians. As a result of this, the different social groups that constituted the working population thus lacked homogeneity and stability.

Due to these difficulties of adaptation for a large group of the population, larger labour conflicts - in particular those occurring in the mining sector - in both Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais were connected with a high potential of violence. At the same time, the civil authorities in both areas were aware of the powerlessness of the civil forces if a strike developed into riots or into a general uprising. The different type of strategy adopted by the French and Prussian administration therefore have to be linked to other factors than to dissimilar challenge presented by the workers in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais.

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2.2. The army as the ultimate force? a comparison of the civil forces

During the period 1890-1914, the inconvenience of using military troops and conscript soldiers against social and political unrest was recognised by the civil and the military authorities in both countries. The most obvious alternative to the mobilisation of military troops was to increase and improve the civil forces. Accordingly, the number of civil forces increased markedly in both countries during the period between 1890 and 1914.

In the literature on German policing, the enlargement of the civil forces is generally pointed out as a major factor in explaining the 'de-militarisation' of internal peacekeeping in Prussia during the second half of the nineteenth century. The argument goes that the development of civil forces after 1889 allowed the civil authorities to manage internal peacekeeping on their own and that the extension of the municipal police and private security corps in most cases made the call for military assistance unnecessary. Lüdtke and Funk in their works on policing and administration in Prussia describe the gradual 'de-militarisation' of internal peacekeeping as the result of a process of modernisation in both the mentalities of Prussian bureaucrats and the instruments in the hands of the civil authorities. Jessen takes up, and then develops, these two points. He particularly stresses the importance of the extension of the civil forces after 1889, arguing that this was the key factor that allowed the army to become of secondary importance in internal peacekeeping. However, while Tenfelde and Saul see requisitions for the Prussian army during the miners' strikes of 1899, and again in 1912, as an unnecessarily authoritarian measure indicating an attempt to provoke a violent confrontation with the labour movement, Jessen, Henning, and Spencer all admit that Prussian administrators made serious attempts to avoid involving the army. Thus they see the military interventions on these occasions as marking the limits to how far it was possible to 'de-militarise' internal peacekeeping.

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37 See below Chapter Five.
If historians dealing with Prussian policing tend to regard the extension of civil forces during the Imperial period as being sufficient in providing for the need to maintain public order, this point of view was not shared by the contemporary civil authorities. The conflict of 1905 made the civil authorities stress the insufficiency of their available forces. However, the demand by the province governor in 1906 for at least 1,250 designated *gendarmes* for Westphalia was not met; in 1912, due to the rapid growth of population in the Westphalian industrial areas, the civil forces were yet again hopelessly inadequate numerically to deal with instances of unrest of any size.  

In comparison with the use of troops in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the question whether the measures taken by the Prussian administration in 1899 and in 1912 were necessary or an overreaction appears in a different light. In the French literature, the frequent use of the French army is explained partly as a structural problem, partly as a political problem. As a structural problem, it was the poor state of the civil forces and the insufficient number of personnel, in particular outside Paris, that made the military presence necessary. As a political problem, the frequent intervention of the army is seen as a result of frustrated attempts in the National Assembly to reach a compromise regarding the organisation of a civil force to deal with greater cases of internal unrest. The causal link between the size of the civil forces and a decrease in military interventions appears obvious, but does not explain the dissimilar use of the military intervention in the two cases. Indeed, if Prussian civil forces did increase during this period, the density of policing remained lower in Prussia than in France throughout the period. Similarly, despite the development of the existing civil forces in France, the army was called out regularly even in very minor conflicts.

42 During the conflict of March 1912, there were in the county of Lüdinghausen, where 2,000 miners out of 2,800 went on strike, a total number of eighteen *gendarmes* and policemen, including those mobilised from other provinces. In the county of Recklinghausen, one of the great centres of the mining industry with a population including 44,000-46,000 miners and a strike rate at 21,000-24,000, there were less than one hundred men to keep order at twenty-eight mines. In a report from the 14 March 1912, the district governor in Münster told the minister of the interior that until the military requisition of two days before, the six local policemen faced the impossible task of maintaining order during a demonstration in which 8,000-10,000 people had participated. Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster VII-14 vol.3.


2.2.1. The development of available civil forces, 1889-1914

The civil forces both in France and Prussia consisted in a series of different organisations: these included the state police and the *gendarmerie*, the municipal police forces, and - in the Prussian case - private security corps. The following section provides a brief look at the developments within each force.

The state police in Prussia was created during the reform era in order to watch over the capital; the corps was directly under the authority of the Berlin police commissioner. Very early on, this corps of Royal Guards (*königliche Schutzmänner*) was extended from the capital to other German cities.

In 1882, seventeen larger towns were being watched over by the Royal Guards, which by 1908 had been extended to twenty cities. Meanwhile, the number of Royal Guards had increased from 5,444 men in 1889 to 10,507 by 1900 and then to 16,501 by 1913. In case of major unrest, the Prussian Royal Guards also provided a mobile supplementary force which could operate anywhere within Prussian territory.

The development of state police in France was a slower process than in Prussia. The French state police corps was originally conceived in order to guard Paris and was directly under the authority of a police prefect. From 1851, the police at Lyons also obtained the status of a state corps, while the prefect of the *département* Rhône obtained the same powers as those of the Paris police prefect. By 1907, the state police in Paris and Lyons together comprised 9,755 policemen; when the Marseilles police corps was turned into a state force in 1908, the total number of state police was in turn increased to 10,610 policemen.

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45 These cities were Danzig, Schönberg, Rixdorf, Charlottenburg, Stettin, Posen, Magdeburg, Hannover, Kiel, Wiesbaden, Frankfurt-am-Main, Fulda, Hanau, Kassel, Cologne, Coblenz, and Aachen. (Jessen (1991) p.357). In France, state police forces were only organised in Paris and Lyons, as well as in Marseilles from 1908.

46 Funk (1986) p.213. There is a slight degree of incongruity between the figure for 1913 provided by Funk and the number provided by Jessen, who sets the number of Royal Guards at 16,801 in 1913. (1991, p.359).
The majority of these - 83 per cent - belonged to the Parisian police but in contrast to the Prussian Royal Guards, the French state police organisations were permanently based in a town, and did not operate outside of Paris, Lyons or Marseilles. However, if the size of the state police in France was slightly lower than that of the Prussian Royal Guards, the number of municipal policemen in the former was higher than in Prussia.

In France, every town with more than 5,000 inhabitants was obliged by law to organise and finance a municipal police corps. Although, in many towns the municipal police corps only comprised one or two policemen, by the end of the Second Empire there were already more than 12,000 municipal policemen in France.

In Prussia, the conditions in which the municipal police forces operated were first described in the *Allgemeine Landrecht* of 1794 and further elaborated in the *Städteordnung* of 1808. However, until the Imperial period, the policing of Prussian provinces was still primarily ensured by corps of night watchmen and by the *gendarmerie*. Thus, in 1889, the number of municipal policemen in Prussia was as low as 2,393 a figure which had increased to more than 17,000 policemen by 1910. 

The generally dissimilar density of policing in French and Prussian urban areas appears clearly when the number of inhabitants per policeman in the larger Prussian towns are compared with the equivalent figures for the twelve largest towns in France. By 1888, the density of policemen in larger French towns was generally higher than that of the Prussian cities. During the following two decades, the number of French policemen increased less dramatically than was the case in Prussia, but due to their uneven starting points, the density of policing both in the French and Prussian cases still came out at the same level by 1908.

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48 Law of 28 Pluviôse in Year VIII (1800).
49 Haupt (1986) p.244.
### Number of inhabitants per royal guard in the great Prussian cities and per policeman in the twelve largest towns in France\(^3\)

<table>
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<th>1888</th>
<th>1908</th>
<th>1889</th>
<th>1907</th>
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<td>575</td>
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<td>520</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In contrast to the figures for the larger towns, a comparison of the developments in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais suffers from a lack of comprehensive data. However, a comparison of how the police density developed in the main industrial towns shows a similar pattern to that of the large cities. In 1889, there was a higher density of policing in the main towns in Nord-Pas-de-Calais when compared to the figures for the Westphalian towns. By 1907-1908 the figure for the number of inhabitants per policeman in the Westphalian towns were brought down to a level equal to that of the towns of Nord-Pas-de-Calais in 1888. By that time, however, the rate of police density in the main industrial towns of Nord-Pas-de-Calais had improved markedly since 1888.

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### Number of inhabitants per municipal policeman in the main towns in Westphalia and in Nord-Pas-de-Calais

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Westphalia 1889/1890</th>
<th>1907-1910</th>
<th>Nord-Pas-de-Calais</th>
<th>1889</th>
<th>1907</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Düsseldorf</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>Lille</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dortmund</td>
<td>1,333</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>Roubaix</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>Calais</td>
<td>1154</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bochum</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>Tourcoing</td>
<td>1380</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberhausen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,630</td>
<td>Boulogne</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hagen</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>Dunkerque</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelsenkirchen</td>
<td>3,225</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>Douai</td>
<td>1363</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recklinghausen</td>
<td>2,272</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>Armentières</td>
<td>1473</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Valenciennes</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arras</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cambrai</td>
<td>1405</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,949</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,024</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1189</strong></td>
<td><strong>736</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Behind this reduction in the Prussian towns regarding the number of inhabitants per policeman, there was a constant struggle to keep pace with the demographic growth of the industrial towns. Whilst the police forces in main towns grew with several hundred per cent 1889 and 1909, so did the population. Compared with the growth in the population of Nord-Pas-de-Calais which never exceeded one hundred per cent, it appears that the development of municipal police forces in Westphalia took place under particularly difficult conditions. Whereas

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*The growth of policemen and inhabitants of main towns in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of policemen in 1889</th>
<th>Number of policemen in 1909</th>
<th>Increase in policemen (per cent)</th>
<th>Population in 1886-89</th>
<th>Population in 1908-11</th>
<th>Growth in population (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Westphalia</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>3,741</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>4,125,000</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dortmund</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>87,700</td>
<td>202,248</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>295,000</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bochum</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>45,725</td>
<td>130,807</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hagen</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>33,090</td>
<td>83,948</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelsenkirchen</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lille</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>188,000</td>
<td>218,000</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roubaix</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>123,000</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourcoing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calais</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boulogne</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunkerque</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douai</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valenciennes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lens</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armentières</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambrai</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the constantly higher levels of police density in Nord-Pas-de-Calais compared to Westphalia has to be seen as the result of two factors. In the first place, already by 1889, the density of policing was higher in French towns than in the larger Prussian towns. Secondly, the important increases in the Prussian municipal police forces after 1889 managed to reduce the difference, even if these achievements in Westphalia were constantly neutralised by the rapid growth in population. Thus, by 1907, the main industrial towns in Nord-Pas-de-Calais were still, generally speaking, more densely policed than were their industrial counterparts in Westphalia.

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2.2.2. The gendarmerie in the two industrial regions

The traditionally higher level of police density in France, compared to that of Prussia, was equally remarkable for the gendarmerie, which was the main force of order in the rural communities. The gendarmerie, although technically a military arm, was created to undertake policing in rural areas. The corps was under the command of the civil authorities, and is therefore to be regarded as a civil force on equal terms with those of the other police forces. Already by 1872, this force was comprised of over 18,000 gendarmerie officers, organised into units of five and placed in rural communities all over the national territory. By the turn of the century, this force had exceeded 20,000 officers, and by 1907 it was comprised of more than 26,000 officers, thus constituting the single most important force directly under civil authority. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, despite the growth of population, the number of local gendarmes did not increase significantly throughout the period. In 1901, the first military legion, covering the départements of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, were comprised of 397 mounted gendarmes and 449 footmen.

The first Prussian gendarmerie force was established in 1812, and throughout the century, rural communities were mainly policed by this force just as in France. However, compared to the French gendarmerie, the Prussian force was and remained one of modest size. Between 1873 and 1882, the number of Prussian gendarmes was merely 3,500. From 1889 to 1913, the number of gendarmes increased from 4,698 to 5,802 officers, thus remaining in number only a fifth of the size of their French equivalent. Compared to the 846 gendarmes in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, with a population of less than three million, the presence by 1913 of 544 Prussian gendarmes in Westphalia, with a population of over four million, was hardly an impressive number.

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57 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12780, '4e Bureau de la Sûreté Générale: Grève générale des mineurs'. The first plans from 1901 concerning a potential nationwide strike in the mining sector operated with a gendarmerie force of 20,849 officers.
60 As was the case in the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Italy, the gendarmerie, as an institution, had been brought to Prussia with the French occupation during the Napoleonic wars.
Together with the 534 Royal Guards permanently stationed in Westphalia,\(^6^3\) the Prussian state forces present in the region outnumbered the state forces stationed in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, in all 850 *gendarmes*. In relative terms, however, differences in the number of state forces per inhabitant were almost insignificant: one Royal Guard or *gendarme* to 3,827 inhabitants in Westphalia by 1913, as opposed to one *gendarme* per 3,389 inhabitants in Nord-Pas-de-Calais by 1901.

2.2.3. The civil forces designated to be mobilised to the industrial areas in case of conflict

In addition to the police and *gendarmerie* officers who were already present in the industrial areas, both the French and Prussian system functioned with forces that were designated to be called upon from other provinces in case of unrest.

Whereas the French designation lists were organised as one big force in which all of the designated officers could be sent to any part of the country, the Prussian designation lists determined a particular supplementary force of *gendarmes* and of Royal Guards who were to be sent to a particular province or district. In the wake of the great miners’ strike of 1889, the number of designated *gendarmes* who could be sent to the Westphalian mining areas in case of unrest increased from 170 to 227 in 1893,\(^6^4\) before rising to 493 in 1906.\(^6^5\) Similarly the number of external policemen who were to be sent to the Westphalian province if major unrest broke out, had only increased from 205 reserves in 1889 to 255 by 1905. This was changed after the great miners’ strike of 1905, so that the designated external police forces increased to 1,051 in 1906.\(^6^6\) In 1911, the Ministry of the Interior operated with an external force of 1,167 *gendarmes*, Royal Guards and municipal policemen, who could be sent to Westphalia in case of major unrest. Together with a force of 2,155 *gendarmes*, Royal Guards and municipal policemen from the province of Westphalia who were designated to mobilise


\(^6^4\) Münster HaStA, Kreis Lüdinghausen, Regierungsbezirk Arnsberg /389; Münster HaStA, Münster Regierung, VII - 57 Vol.1.

\(^6^5\) Münster HaStA, Münster Regierung, VII - 57 Vol.4 (documents 23-34).

to the industrial areas in case of major unrest, this brought the maximum available civil force to 3,322 men.67

In comparison, the French authorities operated with two lists of the number of gendarmes within each military region who could be mobilised to other regions in case of major unrest. In 1901, the list of gendarmes who could be transferred to other regions without disrupting the regular service comprised 1,819 footmen and 1,850 horsemen. In the case of urgent need, a total force at 6,300 gendarmes could be gathered from the entire country.68 In principle, such a drain on the forces from other regions was supposed last for no longer than ten to twelve days. On several occasions, however, the number of mobilised forces went beyond the 6,300 and were sometimes in place for months.69 Similarly to the Prussian case, there was a lack of correlation between the designated forces and the number of men who were actually called upon in the great cases of unrest. The reason for this was that the number of gendarmes actually available varied enormously; thus, the local civil authorities could never count upon a full force of external gendarmes. Given that the number of French gendarmes only increased by 6,000 men from 1901 to 1913, the distribution of these gendarmes became increasingly ill-adapted to the needs of the civil authorities when several greater conflicts were taking place simultaneously in different regions.

2.2.4. Private security corps

A final important element among the Prussian civilian forces were the private security forces (Zechenwehre and Hüttenwehre) established by the mining companies and factories. No comparable force existed in France, where the idea of breaking with the state’s monopoly on violence was never popular with the state administration or in the political executive.

69 After the strike in Montceau-les-Mines in October 1901, the last external gendarmes were only demobilised in June 1902. Similarly, after the great uprising in Southern France during the summer of 1907, vast contingents of gendarmes from all over the country remained in place until October.
Previously during the nineteenth century, there had been a significant element of privatisation of the civil forces in Westphalia, for instance private companies paying for municipal policemen or even a *gendarme* whose main task would then be to ensure order at the plant in case of trouble, but otherwise he was at the disposition of the local authorities. This practice was stopped during the 1880s, but the idea of some privatisation of forces of order reappeared in the 1890s when the Westphalian state authorities began encourage private companies - particularly the mining companies - to organise private security corps conferred with a certain degree of police authority. The intention was that these private security corps could take an important part of the burden away from the municipal police and *gendarmerie* forces during labour conflicts.

Their task was to function within a mine or factory as a bulwark to protect strike breakers or in order to prevent sabotage of mining installations or other property. In 1904, there were forty-three corps with more than 1,000 members; during the mining strike of 1905, this number increased to 2,562 security guards in 117 mining companies, thus with 22 guards on the average per mining company. In number, these men were not sufficient to compensate for the serious problems of understaffed police forces. On the other hand, the private security corps were an indispensable element in the attempts by the Prussian state administration to manage larger cases of conflict without military intervention.

It therefore appears that, when confronted with situations of major unrest, the authorities in Westphalia faced challenges which were no less serious that those occurring in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. At the same time, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais - and in
France on the whole - there were more civil forces available to deal with problems of public disorder than was ever the case in Westphalia. This was the situation in 1889 and this remained the case by 1914. This was inspite of the various initiatives in Westphalia to strengthen the corps of Royal Guards, the *gendarmerie*, and the municipal police as well as the existance in Westphalia of private security corps which could take over some of the tasks which would otherwise fall on the municipal police.

2.3. The frequency of domestic military intervention in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais

Compared to the authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the authorities in Westphalia faced more potential of unrest due to the larger working population. Moreover, the Westphalian authorities had less civil forces available to deal with problems of public disorder that had their French counterparts. It is on this background that the significantly higher frequency of domestic military interventions in Nord-Pas-de-Calais compared to Westphalia has to be seen.

2.3.1. Methodological problems in estimating frequency

No attempt has been made thus far to describe more precisely the changes that took place in the frequency of military intervention. This may be explained, however, by the methodological difficulties which are linked to such an estimate. First of all, no statistical material on the use of military troops seems to exist in either of the two countries. Accordingly, this thesis can only operate with the cases which appear in the documents from the Ministry of the Interior and the War Ministry, in the bureaucratic correspondence from the state administration at the regional and local levels, and from what remains from the offices of the army corps commanders. A issue such as the extent to which these documents reflect the majority of the actual cases that took place cannot be tested. Therefore, particularly in context of the French case, this study has to operate within the limits of the recorded cases as a research level minimum, whereas the actual number is likely to have been a great deal higher.
Secondly, it can also be difficult to isolate the cases where military troops were used from those in which only civil forces (the police, *gendarmes*, or the Royal Guards in Prussia) were mobilised. Often, very general terms being used in the documentation such as ‘*la force de l’ordre*’ or ‘*die Ordnungsgewalt*’. There is also some confusion in relation to the use of the words ‘troops’ and ‘military’ because these terms refer just as easily to the *gendarmes* as they do to soldiers. Due to the potential political significance of sending in the army to deal with a conflict, rumours sometimes appeared in the press about the military’s presence in cases where documents from the civil and military authorities clearly state that no troops had been requested.\(^7\)\(^4\) Finally, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between cases where troops were only kept in a state of preparedness, but never called out, and actual instances of military intervention.

In the French case, moreover, a quantitative evaluation is complicated by the immense frequency of the phenomenon. No comprehensive record was made when troops were actually requested, and no statistical material was ever established, as was the case for strikes in general. Another problem in stating the frequency of requisitions is the fact that the larger instances of military intervention usually consisted of a series of smaller requisitions. Similarly to the larger conflicts that took place in Westphalia, troops were generally moved around within a large territory in order to assist at various local confrontation. However, whereas the presence of military troops in Westphalia were clearly limited in duration, military interventions in Nord-Pas-de-Calais tended to be prolonged. Indeed, during very turbulent periods, a strike in one professional branch could easily develop to strikes in other branches, so that several independent strike movements might be linked together. As a consequence of this, the French troops requested for one conflict were often directly transferred to another once when the former strike appeared to be over. The military authorities could therefore have troops designated to peacekeeping and law enforcement activities for weeks or months on end and for a series of strikes. Thus, it is very difficult to state exactly how many requisitions took place and at what moment an individual requisition ceased. In some

\(^7\)\(^4\) This is the main reason why the figures provided by Charles and Richard Tilly (1975) for ‘military interventions’ as they appeared in the French and German press, cannot be considered as being entirely reliable.
of these cases, material exists which provides comprehensive figures and descriptions of the conflict, as well as the measures taken; for others, only minimum numbers can be established on the basis of incomplete material.

It is equally difficult to trace instances of troops being requisitioned among the documents left behind by the state administrations. No particular collection of documents concerning this question has been left from either of the French ministries in charge of maintenance of public order. The correspondence between the prefects in the départements Nord and Pas-de-Calais and the army corps commander in Lille must be traced throughout a variety of papers concerning each individual case of strike, political unrest, or public event. The most substantial and continuous collection of documents is the papers from the office of the general commanders responsible for the first military region covering the départements Nord and Pas-de-Calais. However, this series in itself presents problems. The boxes entitled ‘Strikes’ or ‘Requisition of Military Troops by the Civil Authorities’ can in no way be regarded as reflecting all of the cases which took place or even a majority of cases. Moreover, the distribution of documents is unchronological and disorderly, with documents related to the same instance to be found under many different headings.

An estimate of the frequency of military intervention during the years 1889 to 1914 must therefore be established on the basis of a series of indicators, none of which actually presents a comprehensive picture. However, these indicators unequivocally point to a very dissimilar development in the use of troops in France and Prussian between 1890 and the outbreak of the First World War, whereby the frequency of military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais increased markedly whereas mobilisation of troops became a very unusual measure in Westphalia.

2.3.2. Domestic military intervention during the nineteenth century: developments in Prussia and Westphalia

In France and Prussia, internal peacekeeping was one of the regular tasks undertaken by the army until the second half of the nineteenth century. From the late eighteenth
century onwards, different types of civil corps were organised in urban communities, resulting in a multitude of municipal police corps and night watchmen, as well as the civic guards made up by volunteer citizens. At the national level, two types of corps existed. The *gendarmerie* was a branch of the regular army charged with the particular task of policing rural areas. In both Prussia and France, the capital and a number of larger cities were policed by a state police force. However, the gradual establishment of civil forces such as these during the nineteenth century moved at a slow pace. During the first half of that century, the army was, in many cases, the only public force present in towns. In the French and Prussian garrison towns - which constituted practically all the towns of some importance - the army continued to assume the responsibility of keeping public order right up until after 1848.

In the case of Prussia, the intervention of the military troops in civil conflicts was the general rule until the middle of the nineteenth century. In the rural areas, the Prussian *gendarmerie* were so dispersed and as a force so understaffed that trouble of any importance required the assistance of the nearest garrison. The municipal police forces - even with help of the *gendarmerie* from the neighbouring countryside - were too weak and ineffective to withstand turbulence or to control gatherings which comprised more than a couple of hundred participants. Out of 323 incidents of public unrest registered in Prussia between 1816 and 1847, the military intervened in 178 of these reported incidents. Similarly, the repression of opposition movements rallying against the Hohenzollern regime during the years 1848 to 1850 was characterised by the extensive use of military troops. However, while the number of cases of collective action fell during the second half of the nineteenth century, the number of cases in which the Prussian army intervened seemed to have further declined. Between 1851 and 1882, the number of cases where military troops were involved - at least in the cases recorded by the press - dropped to 130; indeed, between 1882 and 1913, this figure fell to thirty-three cases.

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77 The average number of cases per year fell from 10.4 between 1816 and 1847 to 7.5 cases per year between 1851 and 1882, and to seven between 1883 and 1913. Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly (1975) p.210.
Despite the methodological difficulties which are connected with the figures provided by Richard Tilly, this number appears to be quite consistent with the number of cases arising in the ministerial records. The collection of documents left by the Prussian War Ministry concerning the domestic use of troops contains twenty-five cases covering the period 1889-1913. These twenty-five recorded cases refer both to instances where the troops were mobilised and to cases where the troops were only raised to a state of preparedness but where they never left the garrison. Out of these particular twenty-five cases, five concerned disorder in Westphalia (May 1889, January 1891, April 1893, June 1899, and March 1912); indeed, only in three of these cases were the troops actually mobilised (May 1889, June 1899, and March 1912). It appears from the handwritten index to the collection that these documents have been carefully selected and that they were put together concurrently during the period 1889 to 1918. Indeed, they do not represent a casual collection of documents which happened to survive the destruction of the Prussian military archives in 1945.

A question remains about the degree to which the cases recorded in these documents cover the entire number of cases in which the troops were mobilised. However, the documents remaining from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior - although these comprise very substantial collections of the documents that survived the Second World War as an entity - do not reveal additional cases of military requisition to those recorded in the War Ministry, either for Westphalia or for any other area.

For the cases occurring in Westphalia, other indicators suggest that the three cases of military intervention recorded were the only instances which took place during this period. In the first place, the documents from the Westphalian administration at the

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79 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /14, 'Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von Unruhen 1889-1914.'
80 Certain changes in the handwriting of the index - such as the modernisation of the orthography and the way of recording dates - indicates that the index to this dossier was established at three stages during the period: 1889 to 1899, 1902 to 1912, and, finally the notes on the Zabem affair and the remaining papers covering the period from January until November 1918.
81 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.1.- Rep.77 - title 2513 /1 'Die Entsendung von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke' (this also contains the cases of military intervention due to political unrest); Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.1. - Rep.77 - Titel 2523 'Die Arbeitseinstellung in den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westfalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen in den Jahren 1889-1912'.

69
provincial and local level indicate that the cases of military intervention, which appear
for that region in the papers from the War Ministry and the ministry of interior are
referred to as the only incidents of this kind. During the crisis of March 1912, the
Westphalian civil administration refers to the military interventions of 1889 and 1899,
as well as to the experiences of 1905, when a general miners’ strike was managed
without any assistance from military troops. Moreover, a systematic scrutiny of the
monthly reports, both from the district governor of the Arnsberg area and from the
local governors in the counties of Gelsenkirchen and Recklinghausen for the period
1893-1905 does not reveal any other case of military intervention, even in these very
turbulent areas.

Finally, from the correspondence between the state administrators at the regional and
local level, it appears that requisition of military troops was an uncommon event. In
periods of crisis, the province governor received many letters from subordinate civil
servants asking questions about the procedure in case such a requisition should prove
to be necessary. There seemed to have been a widespread uncertainty about the most
basic formal definitions concerning civil-military co-operation, even among
administrators who had occupied their post for many years. From the viewpoint of the
military authority the impression is the same. General von Einem, who held the post as
army corps commander of the seventh military region between 1909 and 1914,
described the mining strike of 1912 as the only case during his tenure in which he was
requested to provide troops to support civil forces.

Even if there were isolated cases that do not appear in the documents from either the
state administration or the military authorities, it is reasonable to conclude that the
number of cases in the years between 1889 and 1914 where the Prussian army was
either requested to intervene in a civilian conflict or asked to keep troops prepared for

domestic intervention is probably not much higher than the twenty-seven instances recorded in the ministerial documents. Similarly, it seems that military interventions in Westphalia only occurred on three occasions, that is, in May 1889, in June 1899, and again in March 1912. This is sufficient evidence to conclude that the frequency of domestic military intervention in Westphalia was significantly lower than in Nord-Pas-de-Calais where the number of recorded cases between 1890 and 1914 reached a level that had not been seen in Prussia since the period between 1848 and 1850.

2.3.3. Estimates of the frequency of military interventions in France

Until the mid-nineteenth century, the pattern of domestic military intervention in France seems to share the features of the situation in Prussia, with the army intervening whenever several hundred people assembled. The incidents were occasional and geographically isolated, and the measures to control or disperse the crowd were dealt with between local authorities and local garrison commanders. In France, as in Prussia, the municipal police forces in the towns and the gendarmerie in the rural areas were understaffed, badly trained, and often powerless when confronted with assemblies of any size.\(^{85}\) No figures have been established for the number of military interventions, but given that military troops were called out to virtually any case of unrest of importance, the number of violent incidents with at least fifty participants established by Charles Tilly can reasonably be considered as a minimum figure.\(^{86}\) Charles Tilly enumerates 258 such incidents for the decade 1830-1839 and 293 for the following decade 1840-1848. This is a very rough figure with enormous variations depending on the year and covers no less than three revolutions.\(^{87}\)

The turbulent years of 1848-1851 were a particularly busy period for the armed forces. The revolutions of 1848-1849 were followed in France by the establishment of the Second Empire with extensive assistance from the army. At that time, however, the majority of public demonstrations were comprised of fewer than one hundred participants. Most of the cases of popular disorder were dealt with by the gendarmerie

\(^{86}\) Tilly, Tilly & Tilly (1975) p.57.
\(^{87}\) Tilly, Tilly & Tilly (1975) p.69.
and the national guard, and, apart from a series of bloody interventions during the strikewave of 1866-1869, the French army did not play a major role in the maintenance of order during the 1850s and 1860s. Not counting the events of May 1871, when the French army was used on a massive scale to launch a crack down on the Commune, military interventions in France were very occasional. Michelle Perrot, in her work on labour conflicts during the years 1870-1890, estimates a rate of military intervention (including cases where only the gendarmerie intervened) at approximately thirteen cases of public disorder in every thousand in 1872, whereafter it fell to three cases in every thousand by 1882. With the military intervention in Decazeville in 1886 and following turbulence surrounding the political campaign of General Boulanger during the same year, the rate of military interventions increased on a national scale from ten out of one thousand cases of public unrest in 1886 to fifteen in every thousand by 1890.

If an estimate of the frequency of the use of military troops in Westphalia between 1889 and 1914 constitutes certain methodical problems, these are next to nothing compared with the problems one faces when trying to get an idea of the use of troops in France during the same years. One general pattern, however, is too obvious to overlook. The number of domestic military interventions of the first two decades of the Third Republic - even when the repression of the Parisian Commune in 1871 is excluded - significantly increased when compared to previous periods during the nineteenth century; after the turn of the century, it reached levels that had not previously been seen in peacetime.

The French Third Republic was born with a major military intervention against the Paris Commune, which verged on civil war. After the rather calm years of the 1870s and early 1880s, the strike wave of 1889-1893 introduced, for the first time, the problem of nationwide mass actions. After a couple of years of moderate activity, the second strikewave, between 1899 and 1902, was followed by years of general unrest - politically and socially - against which unprecedented military forces were mobilised.

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90 Tilly, Tilly & Tilly (1975) p.28.
Up until after the end of the First World War, the army remained an important instrument of a Republican regime which was struggling to control social protest movements, violent political actions, and increasingly organised labour conflicts. Only in Paris was there a certain decline in the frequency of military interventions, primarily due to the expansion of the Parisian state police corps after Lepine took over as police prefect in 1893.\textsuperscript{91}

The documents from the garrison in Lille - which are the only documents left from any of the regional military commands in all of France’s main garrisons - provides excellent material concerning the question of military intervention in domestic conflicts for a region, notoriously the most turbulent area outside of Paris. The region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais undoubtedly had the highest frequency of military intervention of all French provinces. The annual statistics on labour conflicts published by the French labour ministry since 1893\textsuperscript{92} show that among the French provinces, the départements of Nord and Pas-de-Calais had by a long way the highest number of strikes and strikers. The combination of mining areas, the textile industry, and three important ports (Dunkerque, Calais, and Boulogne-sur-Mer) made this region particularly turbulent even when compared to other industrial regions, such as Le Creusot, Saint Etienne, and the area of Longwy, or to the main cities, Paris, Lyons and Marseilles. The frequency of military intervention in this region must therefore be considered as the maximum level for a military region. However, the documents left by the Ministry of the Interior indicate that the requisitioning of military assistance also happened frequently in the Paris area, and in the industrial centres of Le Creusot and Longwy, as well as in the main province towns (Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Saint Etienne).

Although it is not possible to provide a complete list of cases, it is possible to demonstrate a pattern of extremely frequent military mobilisation for the years 1886 to 1888 and 1900 to 1903. A complete record of the confidential correspondence to and from the army corps commander in Lille, covering the years 1880 to 1888, allows a close examination to be made into the pattern of military intervention during the years

\textsuperscript{91} Berlière (1993) p.9.
\textsuperscript{92} 'Statistique des greves' Annual publication from the labour ministry, (1893-1913).
which preceded the first important strike wave of 1889 to 1893.\textsuperscript{93} These copy books are a complete and continuous record of the commanding general's reports to the ministry and his orders to the commanding generals under his own command. They should therefore provide a valid impression of the cases which landed on an army corps commanders' desk. It is not possible to verify whether all cases that took place would actually appear in the confidential correspondence of the army corps commander since some cases might have been dealt with at the local level between the civil authorities and the commander of the nearest garrison. Whilst taking all of these qualifications into consideration, the confidential correspondence still provides a minimum rate of the frequency of these requisitions.

The letters from the early years point to the fact that the involvement of the military was a rather unusual event. In a letter from 1880, for example, when there was talk about a possible requisition for military assistance,\textsuperscript{94} it appears from the army corps commanders' instructions to the general of the first division that the formal rules concerning requisition were not consulted on a regular basis.\textsuperscript{95} Between 1880 and 1885, there were few cases of military intervention apart from one big case in 1880 when 35,000-42,000 textile workers went on strike in Tourcoing, Roubaix and Armentière, and another in February-April 1884 with the great miners' strike in Anzin.\textsuperscript{96} This all changed in 1886, when army was requested no less than ten times.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{93} The strike wave of 1889-1893 has been documented for all of France by Tilly, Tilly & Tilly (1975) p.57 & 73; Perrot (1975) p.51.
\textsuperscript{94} Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C./2.1.2., 'Correspondance générale confidentielle 1880-1888' March 1880-December 1884 (document 25).
\textsuperscript{95} Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C./2.1.2. 'Correspondance générale confidentielle 1880-1888' March 1880 - December 1884 (document 24): "Les grèves, qui se sont déclarées sur certains points de la région du Nord et qui malheureusement tendent à se prolonger, peuvent faire craindre que les autorités civiles aient à faire appel au concours de la force armée. Je tiens essentiellement à ce que, si cette éventualité vient à se produire, l'on se conforme strictement aux règles posées par les lois du 10 juillet 1791 et du 3 août 1791 et autres instructions sur la matière. Toutes ces règles ont été réunies et résumées dans une brochure que le Ministère de la Guerre a fait paraître en 1874 sous le titre de 'Instructions en cas de troubles' d'après les lois et règlements."
\textsuperscript{96} Otherwise the army was only contacted on the occasion of a textile strike in March 1883, but the troops were not mobilised; during the general elections of 1885, trouble was also expected to take place in Roubaix.
\textsuperscript{97} Twice that year (March-April and again in October) the prefect in Lille requested the army to patrol the frontier because of major strikes and other trouble in Belgium. During the summer and autumn small units were called out to Fourmies (June 7), to Lille (June 11), to Hesdin (June 11), to Armentière (August 1), to Roubaix (August 1-11), to Lille again (August 14), and to Calais (October 7). In November, 250 infantry soldiers were requested to ensure public order during the visit of a
The following year was rather uneventful until the Boulanger crises broke out. That December, 600 infantry soldiers were sent to Paris, but in 1888 the Boulanger crisis moved directly to the region when General Boulanger presented himself as a candidate for the département Nord. During that year, troops were mobilised three times due to danger of political unrest, while on another occasion they were kept in a state of preparedness due to a minor strike by three hundred textile workers.

Unfortunately, the years between 1888 and 1901 are not well covered in the documents available. Only the largest conflicts of the strikewave of 1889-1893 are documented individual cases. It is therefore not possible to get an idea of the frequency of domestic military interventions during this decade. Only for the period after the turn of the century is material available which shows a pattern of military requisition which was similar to that of the years 1886 and 1888. A collection of telegrams covering the period from September 1900 until September 1903, provides a more precise idea of the extent of the phenomenon, with similar qualifications, as were stated previously that this only comprises the cases which actually arrived on the army corps commander's desk. Compared to the cases appearing in the 1880s, it appears that, after the turn of the century, the cases of large labour conflicts increased and that the contingency of military forces being sent to manage these crises was generally more important after the turn of the century compared to the 1880s:

- 6 September 1900: an unspecified number of cavalry officers sent to a strike among dock workers in Dunkerque.
- 30 April 1901: one cavalry squadron (80-100 men) is made ready to leave for Valenciennes if the May-day demonstrations should develop into disorder.
- 21 July 1901: two cavalry squadrons were in a state of preparedness in Roubaix because of the general elections.
- 27-29 July 1901: the garrison at Lille was in a state of preparedness because of the elections.
- October-November 1901: troops from the entire military region were mobilised because of the general miners' strike.

Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C. /2.1.83, 'Péluries de la correspondance expédiée par le commandant du corps d'armée 1900-1903.'
- March 1902: all garrisons in the industrial areas were in a state of preparedness, due to rumours about a new general strike among the miners, together with unrest among the dockers in Calais and Dunkerque, and rumours about a general strike among railworkers. No troops were called out.
- 30 July 1902: strike in Vieux Condé (Nord), with the subsequent requisition of one cavalry squadron.
- October-November 1902: troops from the entire military region, as well as supplementary troops from the neighbouring regions are mobilised because of a general strike among the miners.
- April-July 1903: cavalry and infantry are mobilised to a major strike among textile workers in Estaire-La Gorgue (Nord).
- 1 June 1903: two cavalry squadrons (160-200 men) are called out in Dunkerque on the occasion of a religious ceremony, in which it was thought that a demonstration against the government's politics towards the Catholic Church might have developed.
- 27 June 1903: an unknown number of cavalry are requested to maintain order during renewed unrest among the Catholics in Dunkerque.
- 14-15 August 1903: the cavalry was requested to ensure public order during a procession in Dunkerque, on the occasion of the feast of the Holy Virgin.
- 6 September 1903: the cavalry was in a state of preparedness during a strike among spinners in Baroeul.
- 10 September 1903: the infantry of the garrison in Boulogne-sur-Mer was in a state of preparedness because of the forced closure of a religious order.

The number of requisitions did not decline during the following years. In December 1904, for example, the army corps commander reported to the prefect of the département Nord that, over the preceding twelve months, there had been no moment in which troops were not mobilised somewhere in the department. Similarly, the years 1906, 1907 and 1909 seem to have been marked by the uninterrupted presence of military troops at some place within the first military region.

Altogether, the documents from the first military region, for the years 1889-1914, reveal no less than seventy-eight cases in Nord-Pas-de-Calais alone where the regular army was contacted in relation to problems of maintaining public order, - whether mobilised or just kept in a state of preparedness. Fifty-nine of these cases came after 1900. This figure should be considered as a minimum rate, because the sources

consulted only provide a very incomplete picture. The relevant documents are concentrated around the years 1901-1907, with 1890s and the years after 1907 less represented. It was not possible from the material still available to state whether this indicates an actual decline in the frequency of cases of requisition or whether it is due to the random way in which the documents from the first military region have been passed down. The documents left by the prefecture in Lille and Arras, as well as by the Ministry of the Interior, only mentions the cases which are also found among the papers from the military authorities. In addition to the great conflicts that are so well documented, an unknown number of smaller requisitions took place. These only occasionally appear in the available documents. The frequency of these smaller cases of requisition is almost impossible to state.

2.3.4. Comparisons of frequency and the cases referred to in this thesis

However incomplete the list of recorded cases may be, it clearly indicates the great difference between the French and the Prussian cases. Moreover, a clear continuity in the patterns in the two industrial areas can be discerned. The Prussian army played a certain role in the policy of maintaining a political and social status quo during the first two decades of the Imperial era, but the number of internal military operations seemed to have decreased significantly during the 1890s. After the great Westphalian miners' strike in 1889 and the turbulent labour conflicts of the years 1890-1893 in France, one can observe two markedly different developments in the use of military troops with an increasing frequency of military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais - and in France as a whole - and a comparatively low number of instances where the Prussian army was called to assist the civil forces in maintaining and restoring public order. Thus, while the requisitioning of military troops to help the civil forces became a rather rare phenomenon in Prussia after 1889, this remained extremely frequent in France with an ever more increasing intensity after the turn of the century.

In contrast, in Westphalia the number of requisitions was reduced to a very limited number of cases. This thesis has therefore concentrated on the three cases in which the troops were actually mobilised (May 1889, June 1899, and March 1912) and the three
cases when troops were kept in a state of preparedness (January 1890, April 1891, and January 1893). The cases where the army was kept in a state of preparedness, but never mobilised, are not well documented and are of minor significance for the purpose here. In contrast, the great miners’ strike of January 1905 is of particular interest precisely because the military authorities were never contacted, despite the great sensitivity of the conflict. This incident reflects some important fault lines separating the state administration and groups in local society which were calling for military intervention. It also clearly shows how the Prussian administration preferred to navigate its own way through situations whereas the French authorities Nord-Pas-de-Calais would have called for military assistance.

Indeed, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the pattern from the 1880s was that the army was called upon in quite minor instances of trouble or for ordinary tasks of crowd management. This pattern continued throughout the period investigated. The seventy-eight cases traced in the documents - although not a comprehensive list of cases - reflect the variety of types of conflicts for which troops were requested; thus, it constitute a sufficient sample. The study, however, pays particular attention to a limited number of conflicts which were significant for the development of a specific pattern of administrative response to public disorder. Hence, references will therefore be made to the three great strikes which occurred in the mining sector of Nord-Pas-de-Calais during October-November 1889, November 1891, and September through to November 1893. Reference will also be made to the violent incidents which took place at Fourmies (département Nord) on May-day 1891, when fourteen workers were killed in confrontations with military troops. This incident is particularly important because it was a point of reference in the debate concerning the domestic use of the army up until the outbreak of the First World War.

During the years following the strike wave of 1889-1893, no significant changes appeared in the measures against public unrest until the Ministry of the Interior took the initiative in 1897 of establishing plans in case of a nationwide strike among railworkers. Similarly, the nationwide strikes in the mining and transport sectors, of October 1901 and of October-November 1902, were of particular significance in the
consolidation of these measures conceived and developed after the strike wave of the early 1890s. The following years of 1903, 1904 and, in particular, the spring of 1906 were characterised by a very large number of greater and smaller instances of strikes and politically-motivated conflicts. There is no point in treating the cases occurring during these years individually; it is better to view them as a series of events in which the strategies developed by the French authorities were consolidated and institutionalised because of their repeated implementation. Finally, reference will be made to the nationwide strikes of 1907-1910 among public employees (postal and telegraph workers) and in the private companies providing public utilities (the railways, gas and electricity as well as public transport), when the French army performed a strictly non-military role.

2.4. Patterns of response: when and how to use military assistance

2.4.1. Types of conflict in which troops were called upon

The troops in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, and in France generally, were called more frequently to assist the civil forces than was the case in Westphalia. Moreover there were three other significant differences which can be discerned in the patterns of intervention:

- the size of the conflicts in which troops were called to assist were greater in Westphalia than in Nord-Pas-de-Calais;
- the number of troops mobilised was significantly higher in Nord-Pas-de-Calais; and
- in the French case, troops were mobilised for longer periods than in Westphalia.

Looking at the cases of military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais during the years 1880-1888, it appears that - apart from the great textile strike in 1880 and the miners’ strike in Anzin 1884 - the conflicts were normally only comprised of a couple of hundred persons; they were also limited to one town, without ever usually spreading to the neighbouring areas. Compared to the number of forces mobilised for serious unrest, these small cases of mobilisation usually only involved between 100 and 600 men, mostly from the cavalry, and the reasons for mobilisation are difficult to distinguish
from ordinary police tasks of crowd management.\footnote{Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C. /2.1.2., 'Correspondance générale confidentielle 1880-1888.' 4 June 1886: one cavalry squadron (one hundred men) was kept ready to intervene in Fourmies, an industrial town with less than 20,000 inhabitants. 11 June 1886: a cavalry squadron was kept ready to intervene in Lille. 26 June 1886: twenty-five cavalry officers were sent to Hesdin. 11 July 1886: a cavalry squadron and two-hundred infantry soldiers were sent to Armentières, an industrial town with 28,000 inhabitants. 1 August 1886: fifty cavalry officers were kept ready to intervene in Armentière. 7 October 1886: one battalion of cavalry (500-600 men) was sent to the port of Calais. 6 November 1886: 250 soldiers from the infantry and artillery were mobilised for Douai, a town of 30,000 inhabitants, to maintain order during a visit by the minister of education. 26 March 1887: an unknown number of troops was mobilised to maintain order during a public celebration in Saint-Omer, a town of less than 20,000 inhabitants. 12 May 1888, an unknown number of troops was mobilised to Lille and Douai on the occasion of political meetings in which General Boulanger was participating. 12 August 1888: a cavalry squadron and two companies infantry (in all 300 men) were kept in a state of preparedness due to a strike among 300 textile workers in Neuvilly.} By looking at the cases appearing in the collection of telegrammes covering the years 1900 to 1903, it is clear that this type of smaller requisition was still frequent. It appears that until the eve of the First World War, this use of troops for smaller cases of unrest and ordinary crowd management was still quite common.\footnote{National Archives, Paris, F.7.12722, 'Police générale, pouvoirs des préfets en matière de police municipale, 1902-1916. Emploi de la troupe pour le maintien de l’ordre.' Two telegrammes of 21 March and 21 December 1911 from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects in ‘Loiret’ and ‘Alpes maritimes’ forbade the requisitioning of military troops to maintain public order during horse races at the local hippodrome, by making reference to an instruction of 23 August 1910 from the war minister.}

In at least twenty-six per cent of the cases recorded in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, troops were called to assist in a situation of strike where the maximum number of potential participants could not be higher that one thousand persons. In nine of the seventy-eight recorded cases in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, troops were requested or kept in a state of preparedness because the authorities feared non-authorised assemblies or spontaneous gatherings (for instance, this happened in politically sensitive situations like the Boulanger candidature in the département Nord, or also on the occasion of an election).\footnote{In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, no case of requisitioning the army related to the Dreyfus affair can be found. This may be explained by the fact that the documents from the years 1888-1901 are much less substantial than for the previous and following periods, as well as the fact that instances may not have been recorded. There is, however, reason to believe that the army was not used much to restore order during the Dreyfus affair because the Nord-Pas-de-Calais was a region where it only made insignificant impression. Moreover, the civil authorities may have been more hesitant about calling the army, than it was for other types of conflict.} In some cases when a significant number of people was expected to gather at a public event, troops were called out to undertake ordinary police tasks which, for instance, involved the security of VIPs (such as the passage of foreign sovereigns, a visit by the president of the Republic or a government minister, et cetera), or isolated
events such as a public execution, or celebration of the Bastille Day, when the army was involved both in the parades and in the management of crowds. In contrast, the Prussian army had a purely ceremonial role during public events, while the streets and squares were watched by the civil forces. Thus, from the late 1880s onwards, right until the eve of the First World War, the cases of military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais were comprised of both situations involving greater unrest, such as labour conflicts or political manifestations, and ordinary police tasks, such as management of crowds or the security of VIPs. Moreover, after the turn of the century, the army was also used to fulfil strictly non-military functions.

During the period previous to 1889, the military authorities in Westphalia - just as in the case of Nord-Pas-de-Calais - were requested to provide troops in a variety of situations of greater or smaller unrest. These included social protest movements, local riots, smaller strikes in all types of industry, and also religious conflicts linked to the Kulturkampf - the trial of strength which took place between the Prussian state and the Catholic Church. After the great Westphalian miners’ strike of 1889, all of the cases of military intervention in Westphalia were linked to conflicts in the mining sector. This, however, does not appear to be the result of any particular policy by the state administration. Indeed among the cases of military intervention in the German Empire, there were others related to strikes in other professional sectors, and also incidents that had no connection to labour conflicts. In contrast to the example of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, military intervention by the Prussian army was a measure implemented ad hoc with no preconceived planning. This was the case in 1889 and it was still the case at the outset of the First World War. The main reason for all the cases in Westphalia being linked to the mining industry must be explained primarily by the size of those

103 Out of the twenty-seven cases from the entire German Empire (excluding Bavaria) where the army was mobilised or kept in a state of preparedness, ten were linked to conflicts in the mining sector. Four incidents were linked to other professional categories (construction workers, electricians, and factory workers), while one incident talks of ‘unrest among workers’ without being more specific. On three occasions, troops were mobilised to patrol the national borders when conflicts were taking place in a neighbouring country (the Habsburgian Empire, Russia, and France), and the troops were also mobilised to prevent strikers from crossing the border and drawing the workers on the German side into the conflict. Four cases were linked to political demonstrations, another four incidents were related to unspecified public disorder (Krawall), and in one case the nature of the conflict is not stated.
conflicts and, secondly by the potential of violence which was linked to labour conflicts in this particular professional category.

It is important to note that the conflicts in which the Prussian army was called upon or kept in a state of preparedness, were all significantly larger than the cases which triggered a military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.\textsuperscript{104} Similarly, certain incidents of mass demonstration or large strikes occurred in Prussia which were comprised of a significant number of participants without triggering a military intervention.\textsuperscript{105} This experience was very different to the French case, where assemblies involving a significant number of people would almost certainly be followed by the mobilisation of military troops, at least for areas outside Paris.

2.4.2. Responses to challenge: the numbers of men requested

Given the strong tendency of historians to stress the authoritarian nature of the Prussian system, it is worth noting that, in all the cases investigated in which troops were called upon, the Westphalian authorities mobilised significantly fewer civil forces and soldiers when relative to the numbers of strikers than did the authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais under similar circumstances. Despite the fact that the overall challenge in Westphalia in absolute numbers was greater than in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, a comparison of the forces used during the most significant confrontations shows that the French

\textsuperscript{104} The great strike of 1889 was comprised of approximately 90,000 miners in Westphalia and, together with the conflicts in the other great mining areas in Saarland and Silesia, the number of miners of participants is estimated to have been close to 150,000. (Spencer (1992) pp.86-87). In April 1891, 12,000 miners were on strike in Westphalia and, in January 1893, the Westphalian authorities expected a strike of a similar size as that in 1889 to break out. The unrest among young Polish miners in June 1899 remained within a geographically limited area around the mining town of Herne; it involved 6,000 out of the 18,000 workers in the local mines. During the miners' strike of 1905, more than 200,000 miners out of 260,000 went on strike. In 1912, the number of strikers was again around 200,000 but, due to expansions in the mining sector, the number of workers employed in the Westphalian mines had by that time been extended to 320,000 men.

\textsuperscript{105} During the two month strike among 33,000 dock-workers in Hamburg from November 1896 to January 1897, the military authorities were never contacted. Similarly during the Westphalian miners' strike of January 1905, when 200,000 miners went on strike. In March 1906, during the nationwide Social Democratic demonstrations for a revision of the franchise to the Prussian Diet, no troops were called upon either. During the so-called Moabitter unrest in Berlin of March 1910, which was comprised of more than 150,000 demonstrators before ending in violent confrontations with the public forces, the whole episode was entirely dealt with by the civil forces; indeed, no evidence has been found of contacts being made with the military authorities on that occasion.
authorities mobilised a larger number of civil forces and soldiers than did their Prussian counterpart.\textsuperscript{106}

In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the most extended conflicts of the 1890s were the three great miners' strikes which occurred in 1889, 1891, and respectively 1893. During the strike of October-November 1889, more than 13,000 miners went on strike.\textsuperscript{107} The total number of forces mobilised is not stated, however, the presence of troops comprising more than 1,600 men can be documented,\textsuperscript{108} as well as an unknown number of gendarmes.\textsuperscript{109} The strike of September-November 1891 involved approximately 15,000 miners from the main mines in the area of Douai (Pas-de-Calais). In this conflict, 180 gendarmes and 1,987 soldiers and officers were mobilised.\textsuperscript{110} Two years later, in the autumn of 1893, a strike broke out among the miners from the same mines around Lens, Liévin and Courrières. It soon developed into a strike comprising over 40,000 miners from all over Nord and Pas-de-Calais.\textsuperscript{111} For this conflict, troops were requested from the neighbouring regions. Given that the first military region was capable of providing 6,000-7,000 soldiers and officers from its own forces, the fact of requisitioning the assistance of other military regions indicates that the total number of mobilised forces exceeded this particular figure.

During the general strike of 1901, between 6,000 and 8,000 soldiers were mobilised in Nord-Pas-de-Calais,\textsuperscript{112} as well as at least 344 gendarmes.\textsuperscript{113} No documentation has

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\textsuperscript{106} The number of strikers mentioned are the official figures for the number of workers not appearing on the morning. The figures must only be seen as a basis for comparison with the Westphalian case and are used in order to provide an idea about the extent of these conflicts. The actual number of persons involved in the marches and gatherings occurring during the strikes is significantly higher, since these events mobilised entire families and sympathisers with no direct connection to any of the individual conflicts concerned.

\textsuperscript{107} Departmental Archives, Arras, M.1231, 'Grève générale dans le bassin houiller, 1889. Documents divers.' Report of 10 December 1889 from the chief mining engineer in the département Pas-de-Calais to the ministry of public works.

\textsuperscript{108} 1,310 infantry soldiers, 245 men from the engineers and artillery, and a cavalry squadron (100 men).

\textsuperscript{109} Departmental Archives, Arras, M.1231, 'Grève générale dans le bassin houiller, 1889. Documents divers'.

\textsuperscript{110} Departmental Archives, Arras, M.2284, 'Grèves, émeutes, manifestations, 1885-1914.'

\textsuperscript{111} Departmental Archives, Arras, M.4864, 'Grève générale dans le bassin houiller 1893. Correspondance avec les autorités administratives et militaires.' Report of 18 September 1893 from the gendarmerie of Lens.

\textsuperscript{112} This entailed 61½ infantry companies and 21 cavalry squadrons. The exact number of men mobilised is impossible to deduce from these figures because the squadrons and companies during
been found that provides the exact number of striking miners in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. However, according to the official strike statistics, only 19,454 miners went on strike in all of France in 1901; in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the total number of strikers in all categories during 1901 was 14,709. The mobilisation of such a large number of military forces seems to have been out of proportion when compared to the number of strikers. It can only be understood in the light of the strategy that was being developed by the French administration during the summer of 1901 which was to mobilise forces, not according to the number of actual strikers, but according to the number of potential strikers, that is to a total mining population of 87,000 in Nord and Pas-de-Calais. This logic helps to understand the surprisingly large numbers of troops which were mobilised during the conflicts that were to occur over the following years.

The nationwide miners' strike of October to November 1902 was comprised of around 100,000 miners from all the French mining areas. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 71,000 out of 87,000 miners went on strike. In addition, 4,000-5,000 dockers from Dunkerque also went on strike during the same weeks. From 5 October to 19 December no less than 16,715 soldiers and officers were mobilised within the area of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, which represents one soldier for every five striker. The arrondissement of Valenciennes, which had 18,000 miners, saw the presence of eighteen cavalry squadrons (1,350-1,800 men); that meant one cavalry soldier for every ten or thirteen miners, strikers and non-strikers. To this figure has to be added 736 local and external gendarmes, as well as an unknown number of municipal policemen.

these years were comprised of only 75 men instead of one hundred. National Archives, Paris, F.7.12779, ‘4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Grève générale des mineurs, 1901-1914’. Letter of 25 October 1901 from the prefects of the département Nord to the minister of the interior.


‘Statistique des grèves’ (1901).

No exact figure has been found, but, according to the official ‘Statistique des grèves’ (1902), there were fifteen strikes registered in the mining sector which comprised a total of 119,000 striking miners.


This made a total of 7,708 soldiers and 367 officers being sent to the département Nord and 8,240 soldiers and 400 officers to Pas-de-Calais. Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C./2.1.326, ‘Grèves, renseignements sur les troupes détachées aux grèves, 1901-1902’.


The strike wave in the spring of 1906, however, beats all previous records in the number of forces called out to maintain public order. In March of that year, a catastrophe in one of the mines at Courrières (Pas-de-Calais) causing hundreds of casualties gave rise to spontaneous strikes among miners throughout the entire region against poor working conditions. The strikes spread to other professional categories and developed into the greatest strike movement in Nord-Pas-de-Calais between 1889 and 1914. Due to the large number of individual strikes in many different branches, it is difficult to give an estimate for the number of workers participating in the movement. The total number of strikers in the two départements for the entire year of 1906 amounted to 92,191 people; accordingly, the number of strikers during the spring must have been lower.\textsuperscript{120} The forces called to the region, however, amounted to an unprecedented level. In Lens, on the 20 April, a force of 20,000 troops was mobilised.\textsuperscript{121} As for the whole region, the military documents reveal a figure of more than 35,000 soldiers and officers.\textsuperscript{122} In addition, at least 591 gendarmes were called out to the département Nord;\textsuperscript{123} probably a comparable number was mobilised to Pas-de-Calais, to which one must add an unknown number of municipal policemen. During the discussions which followed in the Ministry of the Interior, a total figure of 52,000 men is mentioned.\textsuperscript{124} This is a very high number of forces given that the number of strikers could not have been higher than 92,000, even when taking into account the fact that the number of people involved in the conflict went far beyond the number of recorded strikers, and comprised entire families, villages, or local areas.

\textsuperscript{120} 'Statistique des grèves' (1906).
\textsuperscript{121} This figure appears in an anonymous front page article of La France Militaire from 28 April 1906 entitled 'Faiblesse et énergie.' The number would appear unlikely if it was not sustained by the figures from the military authorities.
\textsuperscript{122} A report of 10 October 1907 from the Ministry of the Interior mentions that 129 infantry companies and 45 cavalry squadrons were mobilised to the département Nord, while 176½ infantry companies and 37 cavalry squadrons were called out to Pas-de-Calais. Depending on the size of these units, this brings the number of soldiers and officers to somewhere between 30,000 and 38,000 troops.
\textsuperscript{123} Departmental Archives, Lille, M.626 /60, 'Réquisitions de l’armée. Protection du travail des chemins de fer 1906'. An undated statement of mobilised troops, from around May 1906.
\textsuperscript{124} National Archives, Paris, F.7.12913, 'Commissions et sous-commissions instituées en vue d’examiner les mesures à prendre en cas de grève, 1908-1909'.
That the authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais tended to mobilise very high numbers of soldiers for every potential person involved in a conflict becomes obvious when looking at the figures for the troops requested in relation to the implementation of the law of 9 December 1905 (*Les Inventaires*). During the first attempts in March 1906 to establish inventories of the possessions in parish churches, military troops were used on a massive scale. In larger and middle-sized towns such as Roubaix (121,017 inhabitants) and Wattrelos (27,000 inhabitants), more than 1,000 infantry soldiers and cavalry officers participated. Again, in November 1906, when the inventories were to be finished, a similarly impressive military force was displayed; no risks were being taken. In the arrondissement of Lille, 1,708 soldiers and officers were mobilised on 20 November, 754 soldiers and officers were mobilised the next day, some 1,668 on the 22 November, and 1,370 on the last day of the campaign. Similarly, villages with a total population of 1,000-3,000 inhabitants received a military presence around their local church of 150-200 infantry soldiers, 25-50 cavalry officers and 25-40 gendarmes.

In comparison, the forces mobilised in Westphalia appear almost modest. During the great Westphalian miners' strike of 1889, with 90,000 striking workers out of a mining population of 104,000, the Prussian authorities called out ten battalions of infantry - between 6,000 and 10,000 soldiers - and 8 squadrons (1,600-2,000 cavalry officers). In 1893, General von Albedyll kept a similar force of 6,800-8,000 infantry soldiers, 800 cavalry officers and 250 hunters in a state of preparedness, when a strike

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126 Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C./2.I.335, 'Inventaires des Eglises 1906'. Report from the General Staff of the garrison at Lille.
127 The estimate of the number of soldiers is complicated by the fact that the military authorities often only refer to the number of military units (squadrons, companies, and battalions), without mentioning the number of men per unit. A Prussian battalion was comprised of between 600 and 1,000 infantry soldiers, whereas a French battalion only comprised 400-500 men. During the period 1901-1914, when the French army was particularly busy delivering forces for domestic peacekeeping the effective of a French battalion was reduced to 375 men, while squadrons were reduced from one hundred to eighty.
of a similar extent as that of 1889 threatened to break out. During the miners' strike of 1905, with more than 200,000 participants, troops were not mobilised at all, and the Westphalian mining district was guarded by 1,220 gendarmes, 2,313 policemen, and 2,562 private security guards (Zeichenwehrleute). Similarly, in 1912, the last great labour conflict in the mining industry before the war involved 160,000 strikers out of a total mining population at more than 300,000. The civil force mobilised consisted of 5,658 men (policemen and gendarmes) while the army mobilised 5,000 soldiers and officers from the infantry and cavalry; in addition, 2,000-3,000 private security guards were involved.

Only during the riots in Herne of 1899 did the Prussian authorities respond to the challenge by mobilising a very large number of men compared to the number of strikers and rioters involved. In Herne, a strike among young Polish miners in eleven large mines developed into a strike comprising approximately 6,000 of the 18,000 miners employed in these eleven mining companies. The conflict developed into riots and violence and a military force was mobilised that consisted of three battalions (1,800-3,000 infantry soldiers) and 100 cavalry soldiers. It thus appears that, when military troops were requested in Westphalia, the number of troops mobilised, compared to the size of the conflict - that is, the recorded number of people involved - was significantly lower than for cases of a similar size that occurred in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.

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2.4.3. Response to the challenge: the duration of mobilisation

A final significant difference in the ways in which the troops were used in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais was the number of days of mobilisation. During the great cases of unrest in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the troops tended to be mobilised for slightly shorter periods when compared to the instances of military intervention in Westphalia. Moreover, the number of days where troops were mobilised during the major conflicts shows that, while the periods of mobilisation became longer in the French case, at least until after 1906, the number of days of military mobilisation in Westphalia decreased.

The military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais during the great strikes lasted, in 1889, for twenty days, in 1891, for twenty-two days, and, in 1893, again for twenty days. The great conflicts of the first decade of the twentieth century lasted for significantly longer. In 1901, troops were mobilised for at least forty-four days, in 1902 for fifty days, and, in the conflict during the spring of 1906, the army was mobilised for forty-seven days. Conversely, in the Prussian case. During the conflict of 1889, troops were mobilised for eighteen days in Westphalia and for sixteen days in the Saarland. In 1899, during the Polish riots in Herne, troops were mobilised for thirteen days, and in March 1912 the military intervention lasted for only seven days. The only break with this pattern, among the cases of military intervention occurring in Prussia between 1889 and 1914, was the intervention in the Mansfeld coal areas in October-November 1909 which lasted for twenty-six days.

These dissimilar patterns do not reflect a situation whereby the conflicts in Westphalia were generally shorter than in France. It was first and foremost the result of the different ways in which troops were being used in the two areas. In France, mobilisation took place from the moment a strike broke out, sometimes even at the moment that it was declared. Similarly, the troops were not sent back until complete calm had been restored. In Westphalia, the actual period of conflict was considerably longer than the time in which the troops were mobilised. The army was called upon only when the province or district governor considered that the civil forces could no

133 The figures provided by Boll on the length of strikes in Germany, France, and England 1870-1913 indicates that strikes in Germany tended to last longer than those in France. Boll (1992) p.115.
longer manage on their own. This decision only arrived when a conflict had been going on for some time. Similarly, Prussian troops were sent back to their garrisons the moment that the authorities believed that the situation was sufficiently calm for the civil forces to handle the conflict on their own.

Thus, according to several measures, there is a clear pattern in Nord-Pas-de-Calais in which a larger military presence in civilian conflicts was displayed than was the case in Westphalia. This pattern cannot be explained away simply by the size of the conflicts, since the number of people involved in the great Westphalian strikes was significantly higher than the strikes occurring in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Moreover, many of the cases in Nord-Pas-de-Calais where the army was present had little potential for violence because often the troops were there in order to prevent any remote possibility of riots and violent actions taking place.
2.5. Conclusion: the lack of direct connection between challenge and response

In this chapter, three comparative observations have been made on maintenance of order in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais:

- that the dissimilar use of military troops in the two areas was not due to the extent of the challenge, since the conflicts occurring in Westphalia implied a significantly higher number of people than did the conflicts occurring in Nord-Pas-de-Calais;
- that the dissimilar use of the army was not due either to the size of the available civil forces, since there were slightly more police and gendarmerie forces compared to the population in Nord-Pas-de-Calais than there was in Westphalia;
- that after 1889, the frequency of military intervention became significantly higher in Nord-Pas-de-Calais than in Westphalia, and that whilst the number of military interventions became increasingly rare in the case of Westphalia, the number of instances almost exploded in the decade 1900-1910;
- that both in terms of the number of forces mobilised and the duration of mobilisation of troops, the authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais displayed a significantly more forceful response to instances of public unrest than did their Westphalian counterparts.

The comparison of the conditions surrounding the problem of maintenance of order in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais leads to three significant observations. The first observation is that the authorities in Westphalia faced challenges in terms of labour conflict that were no less serious than the ones occurring in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. In both cases, the problem of internal unrest could be met by two strategies. One was to improve and strengthen the civil forces; the other was to rely upon the army. The first strategy was adopted both in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Due to the demographic development in Westphalia, the outcome was the same, namely that the civil forces remained equally insufficient to guarantee the full control over the course of events. The question was then how to manage greater instances of public unrest with a permanently undermanned civil force. This was the key issue that the responsible authorities in both countries had to resolve.
A second observation is that, in both of the cases examined, there seems to be a clear pattern of continuity in the strategies adopted. The French authorities used the army not only for labour conflicts, but for public events where the disturbance of the public order was only potential (demonstrations, elections) and for the simple task of managing larger gatherings, such as sports events, big markets and fairs, or the protection of VIPs. Moreover, the French authorities not only used the army much more frequently than did their Prussian counterparts, but they also mobilised significantly more manpower to maintain and restore situations of trouble than did the authorities of the Prussian administration. In contrast, the Prussian authorities, while recognising the insufficiency of their available civil forces, decided that, in the majority of cases, they would just have to take their chances rather than calling for military assistance.

Thirdly, a pattern of strong military involvement developed in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais, despite the fact that the number of potential participants in the collective actions here was lower than in Westphalia. Therefore, no direct line can be established between the size of the challenge and the magnitude of the response, and the dissimilar use of military troops cannot be justified by referring to the extent or to the type of the challenge. Nor can it be explained in terms of the size of the civil forces.

This leads back to the fundamental problem of this thesis: Since the cases of public unrest occurring in Westphalia were no less serious than those taking place in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, and since the state of the available civil forces in Nord-Pas-de-Calais was no worse than in Westphalia, why did the administration in the two countries solve the problem of maintaining order in such dissimilar ways? This is all the more surprising since the strategies adopted both by the Prussian and the French administration run counter to what has generally been assumed on the basis of the formal position of the army within the French and Prussian state organisation, and on the basis of the dissimilar political profile of the two regimes.
In the following chapters Three and Four, two other sets of explanatory factors will be analysed, which have been used to explain the development in France and Prussia separately. The one concerns the constitutional arrangements regarding civil-military relations in Imperial Germany and Republican France; the other concerns the relationship between the representatives of the central power at the regional level and the local authorities and elite groups who were concerned with the protection of the local society in case of public disorder.
Chapter Three. The institutional framework and the allocation of powers between civil and military authorities

This chapter analyses the institutional organisation and the formal distribution of powers between French and Prussian civil and military authorities concerning the requisition of military troops for internal peacekeeping. This chapter sets out the formal framework for the role of the army in internal peacekeeping in France and Prussia. It distinguishes different levels of decision making. It therefore looks at different levels within the civil and military authorities. It deals with three aspects: formal organisation of civil and military authorities at the regional and local level; institutional linkages between the army and the state administration at the ministerial, regional and local level; and formal powers of French and Prussian military commanders.

The purpose is to establish common institutional points between the French and Prussian systems in terms of institutional arrangements and basic principles concerning military participation in maintenance of public order. The chapter sets out which formal institutional differences did and which did not affect the role of the army in the two countries and why, thus creating the basis for the analysis of subsequent chapters about the discrepancy between formal attribution of powers and functioning in practice.

Three conclusions are reached in this chapter which concerns both the elements of similarity and of difference between the French and Prussian legislation on civil-military co-operation. The first is that, in terms of similarities, both the French and Prussian systems were based on three principles: 1) that military troops could only be mobilised on the written request of a civil authority; 2) that maintenance of public order was primarily the responsibility of the civil authorities (the state administration and municipal authorities); and accordingly 3) that the army should only be called upon in situations of ‘extreme urgency’.
In terms of institutional links between the state administration and the army, the French civil authorities were in a more favourable position compared to their Prussian counterpart to initiate and pursue contracts to the military authorities both at the ministerial and the regional levels. However, the formal difference in the position of the Ministry of the Interior in relation to the War Ministry is not in itself sufficient to explain the development of close civil-military co-operation in France, or to explain why a similar development did not take place in Prussia. Following chapters will show how the formal links between civil and military authorities in France were strengthened through informal bureaucratic practices.

In terms of the military commanders’ powers, there were considerable differences between the French and Prussian systems. However, these formal differences were largely neutralised by two factors. Due to the inter-institutional co-operation between civil and military authorities in France, the senior commanders gained informal influence over issues concerning maintenance of public order from which they were formally excluded. Secondly, in Prussia, the special powers of the senior military commanders (to refuse a requisition from a civil authority, to intervene in cases of public unrest without being requested by a civil authority, and the right to declare a provisional state of siege) were almost never used in practice and were thus insignificant for the functioning in practice.

Following chapters will show how, over a passage of time, repeated administrative practice led to certain of these differences becoming entrenched. Other practices overcame formal institutional arrangements over time and produced patterns of policy making in practice that differed from those one might expect from looking at formal institutional arrangements and occasionally were the contrary to those laid down formally. Similarly, the formally influential position of the Prussian commanders was largely neutralised by the fact that the particular powers attributed to the Prussian commanders which the French counterpart had not, were almost never put into practice.
Chapter consists of four parts. First, it sets out the organisation of the state administration and the military authorities as the representatives of the central power at the regional and local level (3.1). In the second section, a description will be made of the connections between the state administration and the army at the ministerial level in Paris and Berlin. (3.2). This aim is to describe the ways in which civil and military authorities at the regional level could assert influence and be influenced through their respective ministries. The French and Prussian legislation concerning requisition of troops was based on three similar principles: that troops should only be mobilised on the requisition of a competent civil authority; that the right to requisition of troops was given to both the civilian state representatives at the regional and local levels (province, district, and local governors in Prussia; prefects and sub-prefects in France) as well as to local authorities (mayors and municipal police authorities), and that troops should only be called upon in situations of extreme urgency. However, these principles were challenged in various ways by the powers of the senior military commanders. An analysis will therefore be provided of the French rules and regulations concerning the position of military commanders in maintenance of public order (3.3). The limitations put on the powers of the French military commanders will then be compared with the powers of the Prussian military commanders in order to establish the importance of the special powers attributed to Prussian military commanders (3.4.)

In the following, a distinction will be made between four levels of decision making. The ‘national level’ refers to the central civil and military authorities in Paris and Berlin. The ‘regional level’ refers, both in the French and the Prussian cases, to the army corps commanders and to the senior civil servants who were in direct communication with the central power - in Prussia, this meant the province governors (Oberpräsidenten) and district governors (Regierungspräsidenten), and in France, the prefects. Third, the term ‘state representatives at the local level’ refers to the local governors (Landräte) in Westphalia and to the sub-prefects in France. Finally, the term ‘local authorities’ is used in contrast to the ‘state authorities’ and refers to mayors and to municipal police authorities.
3.1. The organisation of civil and military authorities at the regional and local levels in Prussia and France

3.1.1. Westphalia within the German Empire and the Prussian Kingdom

The German Empire was a federal state that only functioned as an entity on matters such as foreign policy and defence, tolls and foreign trade, currency, and communication and transport infrastructure. The internal administration was organised at the level of federal states. Westphalia, as a part of the Prussian kingdom, was therefore governed by the Prussian state bureaucracy under the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, while the Imperial Ministry of the Interior (Reichsamt des Innen) was not in charge of maintenance of order in local communities.

A similar situation existed for the military authorities. The Imperial army actually consisted of the Prussian and the Bavarian army, but these were two independent organisations with no institutional linkage other than through the German Emperor in his capacity of Supreme Commander. The armies of the kingdoms of Saxony, Württemberg and Baden were integrated in the Prussian army as army corps but directly under the Prussian War Ministry. The army in Westphalia was therefore the Royal Prussian army and not the Imperial German army. In the following, reference to William II will therefore be made in his capacity of King of Prussia, and not as German Emperor, unless this is explicitly stated. In relation to the senior military commanders, William II’s position as Prussian King was also considered more important than his capacity as German Emperor, since all traditional military privileges dated from the period before 1871 and were linked to the Prussian King.

After its defeat by Napoleonic France in 1807, Prussia adopted the centralised Napoleonic model for its state administration as well as for its army. In this reorganisation, the Prussian territory was divided into six provinces. These were both administrative units, presided over by a province governor, and military regions, each

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1 There was no Imperial War Ministry and the War Minister of the Reich was the Prussian War Minister who was politically responsible to the Prussian Diet, but not to the Reichstag.
under the command and supervision of an army corps commander. During the wars of unification in the 1860s, which saw the expansion of Prussian territory, five new provinces and military regions were created. Among them was the seventh military region covering Westphalia with headquarters in Münster. The army corps commanders were thus conceived as the military counterpart to the province governors at the provincial level. Although the number of German army corps increased during the period 1866 to 1914, the parallel organisation of military regions and administrative provinces remained the same within the Prussian territory.

Prussian provinces were divided into administrative districts (Regierungsbezirke), presided over by a district governor (Regierungspräsident). The thirty-four districts were organised into 490 counties (Kreise), presided over by local governors (Landräte). All these civil servants were appointed by the king and under the authority of the Prussian minister of the interior. Communications from the local governor with the Ministry would normally pass through the province governor or the district governor, whereas both province governors and district governors were in direct communication with the minister of the interior. The allocation of powers between the province and the district governor in terms of maintenance of public order was unclear. In principle, it was the district governors who were responsible for the implementation of measures against public disorder, whilst the province governor was

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2 These were the province of East Prussia (also the first military region centred in Königsberg), the province of West Prussia - Pommerania (also the second military region in Stettin), the province of Brandenburg (the third military region in Berlin), the province of Prussian Saxony (the forth military region centred in Magdeburg) the province of Posen (the fifth military region), and the province of Silesia (the sixth military region centred in Breslau).

3 The other regions created were the Rhine Province (eighth military region with Coblenz as the main town), the province of Schleswig-Holstein (the ninth military region with military head quarters in Altona right outside Hamburg). The tenth military region covered the former kingdom of Hannover, and the eleventh military region based in Kassel covered the territory of Hessen-Nassau. With the establishment of the German Empire, when the kingdoms of Saxony, Württemberg and Baden were linked to the Prussian army through individual defence treaties, the national armies of these individual kingdoms became contingents to the Imperial army as the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth army corps respectively, and were submitted to Prussian organisation and command. The fifteenth military region covered Alsace-Lorraine which had a particular status within the German Empire. As a result of the general rearmament of the Williamian period, another six army corps were subsequently established: the sixteenth in Metz, the seventeenth in Danzig (1890), the eighteenth in Frankfurt am Main, and the nineteenth army corps was based in Leipzig (1899). Finally, on the eve of the First World War, the twentieth army corps at Allenstein and the twenty-first at Saarbrücken were created.

the representative of the minister of the interior at the provincial level and was supposed to function as a supervisor of the administration at all levels. In reality, the province governors and district governors worked together in organising the management of large-scale unrest by co-ordinating the strategies and various civil forces within the entire province. The linkage with the military authorities, however, mainly passed through the province governor.

During the Imperial period, the province governor and the army corps commander were located in the same town in eleven out of the fourteen Prussian provinces. The post of army corps commander in the Imperial German army was among the ten highest positions within the military organisation. The post was reserved for generals with the rank of General-Feldmarschall, General, General-Leutnant, or General-Oberst, who held a position second only to the King in his capacity as 'supreme warlord' (Oberster Kriegsherr). Within his military region, each army corps commander was highly independent in the performance of his duties; indeed, in most cases, he had no military equal. Ever since the Boyen reforms of the 1820s, the army corps commander enjoyed a higher rank in the official hierarchy of authorities at the provincial level than that of the province governor. The main task of the army corps commanders was the organisation and training of troops as well as supervision of conscription. However, no formal description of duties seems to have existed for Prussian army corps commanders, and it is often said that the position allowed a high degree of freedom for the individual commander.

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5 The only exception was in the province of Schleswig-Holstein, where the province governor was in Schleswig whereas the army corps commander was placed in Altona. Similarly, two new army corps which were situated next to the eastern border (Danzig and Allenstein) were placed in the town of a district governor.

6 In Berlin and the capitals of five non-Prussian states, the army corps commander was placed in the same town as the general military inspector. According to Waldersee, who was army corps inspector in Hannover from 1898 to 1900, the presence in Hannover of both the army corps commander and the army inspector did occasionally create some tension. General von Waldersee 'Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred von Waldersee' vols.1-3 (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 1922, p.415. In the capitals of the non-Prussian states, the sphere of action of the Prussian army corps commander was also moderated by the presence of a local war minister, who was the official responsible for the use of troops for internal peacekeeping.

Contacts with the civilian authorities were limited. Before the first Prussian Constitution of 1850, the civil and military representatives at the regional level were two branches of the same source of monarchical authority. When the Constitution separated the state administration from direct monarchical control and placed it under a politically responsible minister, the military commander remained the only direct representative of the monarch at the regional and local level. The Prussian organisation of the civil administration and the army at the regional level was based on the strict separation of the military organisation from civilian influence. In situations where troops were needed to assist the civil forces, the civil authorities could only invite the military commander to mobilised troop, but the military commander was not obliged to follow such a requisition. At the regional and local level, the military organisation and the civil administration constituted two insulated bodies with no formal institutional connection and no formal definition concerning their mutual relationship with the powers of each. As a consequence of this, any decision to use troops to restore public order was based on informal contacts and required a mutual consensus between the civil and military authorities.

3.1.2. Prussian military organisation within the French Republican system

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the French state administration was organised according to the centralised Napoleonic model. Prefects were the representatives of the central government at the eighty-nine départements and the sub-prefects at the level of arrondissements. The prefects and sub-prefects were given the executive authority of the government at the local and regional level where they had supreme authority both in relation to the local authorities and to the military authorities.

The French army of the Third Republic was organised according to the fundamental principles of the Prussian army, with eighteen permanent army corps spread over the national territory, as well as the introduction of universal male conscription. The adoption of the Prussian model of military organisation was a direct consequence of

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8 Law of 24 July 1873, Article VIII.
the French defeat by the Prussians in the 1870-1871 war, when the Prussian military model had proved to be superior to the French in terms of leadership, efficiency, and numbers. As was the case in Prussia, the eighteen military regions were under the command of army corps commanders, who were the highest military authorities outside of Paris. The size of the French military regions was comparable to that of Prussia; however, the French army corps commander worked with a civil administration which was organised into smaller units than was the case in Prussia. Due to the incompatibility of eighteen or twenty-one military regions fitting into eighty-nine départements, a French military region would cover between two and four départements. In co-operating with the senior civil authority at the regional level, an army corps commander had therefore to work with several prefects within his military region.

In the military region, the French army corps commanders were individually defined as the délégué du ministre, in questions concerning administration, and as the délégué du gouvernement, in questions concerning commands.9 They had a larger territory under their authority than did the prefects, and until 1907, were superior to the prefects in the official hierarchy.10 Moreover, these generals belonged to the groups of the French establishment that Christophe Charle has defined as an elite not only in professional, but also in social, terms.11 Despite this outstanding position of the army corps commanders, the prefects - as the representatives of the executive at the departmental level - had ultimate authority over the army corps commander at the departmental level.12

As a consequence of the attempt to prevent army corps commanders from becoming too powerful within their regions, their maximum length of service was set at three years, a period which could be prolonged by the war minister. The practice of a six

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9 Law of 24 July 1873, section II, Article III, title 2.
10 In the Napoleonic organisation of formal ranks of ‘Honour and Rank’ senior military commanders were placed at number six, whereas a prefect occupied rank number twelve (Decree of 24 Messidor Year XII). Through a revision of the official ranks from 20 June 1907, a prefect then occupied the highest rank at the départemental level, whereas an army corps commander was downgraded to rank number four.
11 Charle (1987) p.167
12 Law of 27 July - 3 August 1791; Decree of 4 October 1891 Articles 17-18.
month extension to the initial three years of service became so customary that dismissal without the addition of a couple of extra months came be considered a sign of disgrace. On the other hand, the three years was the entire period in which a senior officer could hold a post as commander, with no regard taken of whether the army corps commander had served as commander of several different corps during that period. Due to the frequent replacements between different army corps, a commander often stayed in the same army corps for less than one year.\textsuperscript{13} This meant that the average length of service of French generals was significantly lower than in Prussia, where the average length of service during the Imperial period was normally from three to five years, but where twenty-one per cent of the Prussian army corps commanders stayed in service for more than six years. Due to the limits on the periods of command in France, the total number of generals reaching the highest position in the French army organisation was significantly higher than in the Prussia.

Due to the organisation of the Prussian state administration on the French Napoleonic model and the organisation of the French army of the Third Republic on the Prussian military model, there were significant similarities between the institutional organisation French and Prussian state administration at the regional and local level, as well as the military organisation as a parallel institution.

However, the allocation of powers between civil and military authorities differed significantly in the French and Prussian systems: the formal position of the French army corps commanders in relation to the civil authorities was far more modest than the position of the Prussian commander. The formal position of the French army corps commanders, however, does not reflect their real weight and authority, either in their relationship with the prefects or in their relationship with the War Minister. This becomes clear when examining the problem of supreme military authority in the French Republican system.

\textsuperscript{13} This is evident from the list of army corps commander in the annual publication from the French War Ministry, *L'année militaire* (1875-1913).
3.2. Civil-military linkages at the ministerial level

3.2.1. The supreme authority and the position of the French war minister as highest commander

In the French Third Republic, supreme authority over the armed forces was distributed amongst several bodies. By the terms of Article 3 of the constitutional law of 25 February 1875, the President of the Republic had the armed forces at his disposition, but could not personally command the troops. His use of the army was restricted by constitutional laws, according to which he could do nothing against the will of the National Assembly; indeed, each of his actions had to have the countersignature of a politically responsible minister.\(^{14}\) The role of the president as the highest military commander soon came to have only symbolic meaning; thus, Ralston is probably right when he states that after Mac Mahon, no president of the Third Republic could be considered as being the real commander-in-chief.\(^{15}\) Supreme authority over the armed forces was thus vested in the Council of Ministers and in Parliament, which had both executive and controlling functions.

Within the government, the French War Ministry was directly exposed to the influence of the Ministry of the Interior, since in most governments of the Third Republic, the minister of the interior was also head of the cabinet. Although the War Ministry was given a high degree of autonomy,\(^{16}\) it was more integrated in the government than was the Prussian War Ministry. Hence, the French Ministry of the Interior was in a more favourable position than its Prussian counterpart to establish inter-ministerial contacts to the War Ministry. The main problem for civil-military co-operation was not at the ministerial level but in the relationship between the war minister and the army corps commanders.

Formally, the war minister, rather than the President of the Republic, was considered the leader of the army and held the highest authority of command and the powers to

\(^{14}\) Constitutional law of 25 February 1875, Article 3 § 4.
\(^{15}\) Ralston (1967) pp.146-147.
\(^{16}\) Ralston (1967) pp.141-143.
dismiss and replace commanders.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, in formal terms, the French war minister occupied a powerful position in relation to the military commanders. However, this position in relation to the army corps commanders, in questions concerning the domestic use of troops, presents difficulties of interpretation. Two aspects need to be taken into consideration, both of which modified the importance of the minister. The first concerns the respect and authority of the post, and the second aspect is related to the relationship between the War Ministry and other sections of the French state.

The position of successive French war ministers in relation to the army corps commanders was influenced by the uneasy relationship which existed between the Republican regime and the military establishment. As a member of government, the position of the war minister was often affected by the general tendency of Republican representatives to avoid conflict with military leaders.\textsuperscript{18} In general, the prestige of the war minister within the military establishment was low. Nine out of the thirty-nine war ministers in charge during the period between 1870 and 1920 did not themselves belong to the military establishment, which made striking the balance between the designs of political leaders and opposition from the military establishment a very sensitive matter. In addition, an examination of the seniority of war ministers compared to army corps commanders makes it evident that the position as army corps commander, particularly in one of the prestigious corps (such as the seventh in Besancon, the eighth in Châlon-sur-Marne, or the fourteenth in Lyons), was more attractive to top generals than was the post of war minister. Many of the generals who served as war ministers, such as Thibaudin (1883) or Boulanger (1886-1887), occupied an inferior position in terms of seniority when compared to the army corps commanders.\textsuperscript{19}

According to Jauffret, respect within the army for the post of war minister was further lessened after 1888, when the military establishment no longer retained its privilege to propose candidates for war minister.\textsuperscript{20} After this date, a good war minister was one

\textsuperscript{17} Craig (1955) p.230; Ralston (1967) p.161.
\textsuperscript{18} This is the basic argument of Ralston (1967) which is also taken up by Serman (1994, p.214), and by Jauffret (1987).
\textsuperscript{19} Ralston (1967) p.164.
who could defend his budget in parliament, ensure good relations with the political executive, and be the voice of the military establishment within the political executive.\textsuperscript{21} As for the general functioning of military institutions, the minister often had difficulty in exercising his authority.\textsuperscript{22} With the creation in 1899 of the posts Chief of the General Staff and Vice-President of the \textit{Conseil Supérieure de la Guerre}, the prestige of the war minister was further lessened. Jean Estèbe tends to consider the holders of these two new offices to be the real leaders of the army after the turn of the century, whereas within the military establishment the war minister was considered inferior to them.\textsuperscript{23} In a period with a strong minister such as Gallifet, and even Freycinet, the minister could make full use of his powers to nominate, dismiss and replace army corps commanders. At other periods, for example during the period when Miribel was Chief of the General Staff, administrative affairs, including personnel politics, were mainly decided by the chief of the General Staff together with the Vice-President of the War Minister's Cabinet, whereas the role of the war minister was reduced to ensure contact with the political executive and parliament.\textsuperscript{24} As in Prussia, the general commanders considered the role of war ministers to be first and foremost an administrator.\textsuperscript{25}

Thus, the post of war minister was not in itself very prestigious and, indeed, his authority of command was \textit{de facto} limited in case of opposition from the military establishment. As a consequence, the degree of influence that the war minister had on the internal functioning of the military institutions varied greatly depending on the personal prestige of the person holding the office. In contrast to the weak position of the war minister, Ralston stresses the particularly strong position that was held by army corps commanders within their own military regions.\textsuperscript{26} Given that the position of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Estèbe (1994) p.38; Serman (1994) p.213.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Estèbe (1994) p.38.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Estèbe (1994) p.38; Serman (1994) p.213.
\item \textsuperscript{25} "Au moment de la guerre, le chef suprême de l'armée, c'est le Président de la République et ses lieutenants, les généraux en chef de divers groupes d'armée. Le ministre de la guerre reste le chef de l'administration de l'armée, le grand pourvoyeur de l'arrière des armées en hommes, en munitions et en vivres; mais il n'est pas le chef suprême, c'est le Président de la République, et c'est pour cela que sa maison militaire lui est nécessaire." Général Brugère \textit{'Mes mémoires, 1841-1914'} (unpublished manuscript), vol.5, p.2649, Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 K 160 / 1 Kmi 46.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ralston (1967) pp.146-147.
\end{itemize}
French war ministers in relation to the army corps commanders was relatively weak, the initiatives between the Ministry of the Interior and the War Ministry to undertake inter-institutional co-operation between civil and military authorities could not have been established without basic agreement from the French army corps commanders. A similar problem between the war ministry and the army corps commanders can be observed in Prussia.

3.2.2. Connections with the central power in Berlin: supreme command and problematic ministerial authority

After 1850, the Prussian state was - as Nipperdey has recently described it - an organisation with two peaks.27 The two were connected only in the person of the monarch, in his capacity as 'supreme warlord' and as head of the executive. At the governmental level, there was also a formal linkage between the War Ministry and the other ministries including the Ministry of the Interior. However, within government, the war ministry constituted a position apart, with little connection to other ministries. Moreover, as the only minister, the War Minister had direct access to the King and was thus equal to the prime minister.

According to the Prussian and Imperial Constitutions, the monarch had the right to command without consulting the executive, that is without any countersignature from a responsible minister and without being responsible to the Reichstag or the Prussian Diet himself.28 The degree to which the King interfered and issued orders seems to have differed between the different instances, but until the reign of William II, authority over decision making in questions concerning the use of troops for internal peacekeeping was mostly delegated to army corps commanders.

The army corps commanders also enjoyed the right direct access (Immediatsstellung) to the King, which was one of the most important privileges linked to the post. Army corps commanders were nominated and dismissed by the monarch and were responsible to him alone in questions concerning the command and use of their troops.

28 Prussian Constitution 4 February 1850 Article 46 and the Imperial Constitution of 1871 Article 64.
This gave the commanding general an almost untouchable position as he retained the monarch's support, but, at the same time, he was also totally dependent on the King's goodwill. This strong position of the army corps commanders was originally conceived to counterbalance monarchical authority. However, during the reign of William II and because of the army's shared drive to avoid constitutional control and limitations of their spheres of action, the King and his commanders constituted a strong entity, which thus united them in a common front against the governmental executive and the Reichstag. This alliance between the King and his commanders existed on most questions involving the army, including foreign policy issues. However, as the following chapters will show, the King and individual army corps commanders were split over the question of the role of the army in controlling and repressing internal disturbance.29

In contrast to the strong and independent position that the King had as 'supreme warlord', the authority of the war minister was particularly weak. As a member of the executive, the war minister was politically responsible to the Prussian Diet and was the only officer of the Prussian army who was bound by an oath to the Constitution. Both Bismarck, and later William II, thought that a politically responsible war minister being the functional chief of the army - as in the French Republican system - was pernicious for the independence of the army, and, additionally, was an intrusion into the monarch's right to dispose freely over the armed forces. Through an administrative reform in 1883, the influence of the Prussian war minister was considerably limited, and thereafter it was confined to administrative matters.30 There have been some discussions about the weight of the War Ministry after 1883. According to Craig, the war ministers of the period after this administrative reform did little to regain the powers which had been lost in 1883.31 In particular, von Gossler (1896-1903) seemed to have attempted to abolish what was left of ministerial authority. The position of the Prussian war minister was therefore particularly weak in relation to the army corps commanders. In effect, he possessed no authority of command and, after the restriction

29 See Chapters Six and Nine.
30 On the undermining of the war minister's position, see Craig (1955) pp.227-230; and H.O.Meisner 'Der Kriegsminister, 1814-1914: ein Beitrag zur militärischen Verfassungsgeschichte' Berlin, 1940.
31 Craig (1955) p.231.
of the his role, he did not even have a formal right to information concerning the command and use of troops and relied on the pieces of information which the army corps commanders deliberately chose to give to the Ministry.

Inter-ministerial co-operation between the War Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior was made difficult by two factors: the absence of direct linkages between the minister of the interior and the war ministry and the lack of authority of the war ministry in relation to the army corps commanders. Under normal circumstances, internal peacekeeping was the responsibility of the minister of the interior. In the case of conflict between the civilian regional authorities and an army corps commander, a minister of interior who wanted to support his subordinate official could act through the prime minister, who had direct access to the monarch. In terms of the institutional organisation, the minister of the interior could also pass through his governmental colleague in the War Ministry, who also enjoyed direct access to the King. Indeed, as a part of the military establishment, the war minister’s attempts to influence the monarch over issuing orders to an army corps commander concerning the intervention or withdrawal of troops was of greater weight than those of a civilian prime minister.

On the other hand, the War Ministry within government constituted a ministry apart, with few connections to the civil branches of government. Moreover, war ministers tended to be very jealous about their particular relationship with the King, very secretive about their initiatives and generally very reluctant to enter into co-operation with the minister of the interior. Moreover, in relation to the army corps commanders, the war minister’s authority to influence decisions taken by these powerful commanders, who were most often senior to the general holding the post of war minister, was insignificant. The war minister was most often regarded with contempt by other generals because of his submission to the Constitution and to the Prussian Diet. Although the War Ministry was often informed about important decisions taken concerning the use of troops, the ministry functioned as a forum of discussion between the senior generals rather than as a source of authority, as shown by the collection of

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documents which is left behind from the War Ministry entitled ‘Eingreifen der Bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von Unruhen, 1889-1914’.33

Thus, although the state bureaucracy and the military authority were formally linked at the governmental level, this connection was made ineffective partly by the reluctance of the War Ministry to co-operate with the civilian sections of the executive, partly by the problems of the war minister to asserting influence on the army corps commanders. The connections at the national level between the state administration and the army were very indirect. On the one hand, there was the King and his military commanders, on the other, there was the politically responsible executive which had direct authority over the state administration, but no authority of command over the army. The war minister occupied a position between the military establishment and government, without being really integrated in any of them.

3.2.3. Comparison of the access of the state administration to the army corps commander within the French and Prussian system

Within the French and Prussian systems, the two war ministries performed this task under very different conditions. In Prussia, the King was the main institutional link between the military commanders and the war ministry. The War Ministry was linked to the Ministry of the Interior through government, but exchange between the two was limited. Since the Ministry of the Interior had only access to the King though the prime minister, the linkages between the state administration and the army corps commanders through the authorities in Berlin went though a chain of authorities (from the Ministry of the Interior, through the prime minister or the war minister to the King, and then to the army corps commanders).

In the Prussian system, strong institutional connections existed between the monarch as highest commander and the army corps commanders, whereas there were no means of direct influence given to the political executive. Since internal peacekeeping was primarily under the authority of the minister of the interior - who was not

33 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2/14.
institutionally closely connected to the monarch - the Prussian war minister was the closest institutional connection between the executive and the supreme commander. In practice, however, the War Ministry had little connection to the Ministry of the Interior, and the war minister’s means of influence on the army corps commanders were very limited.

At the regional and local levels, linkages between the state administration and the military commanders were not formalised and depended largely on the personal relationship between the persons holding the posts as province or district governor and as army corps commander. The civil authorities at the regional level could only express reach the military authorities through the Ministry of the Interior which had no direct linkage to the King, and given that the different sections of the Prussian civil service and military establishment were highly disconnected, the process of inter-institutional co-operation has to pass through many authorities from the state administration at the regional level to the army corps commanders.

Unlike the Prussian case, the formal connections between French civil authorities and the military commanders were much closer, both at the ministerial level and all the way down the civil and military hierarchies. Although French war minister, like his Prussian counterpart, had often difficulties asserting his influence over senior military commanders, the French War Ministry was much more closely linked to the rest of government than was the case in Prussia. Moreover, most French governments were headed by the minister of the interior as head of the cabinet. This gave the minister of the interior an excellent position for mediating between the civilian and military branches of the state organisation which his Prussian colleague had not. At the same time, the French prefects and sub-prefects could address themselves directly to a local military commander through formal institutional channels.

The French system functioned on the basis of a subtle balance between several sets of authorities, with the war minister as the primary military authority. The right to request military assistance was distributed among a series of bodies. The civil authorities at the regional level could themselves issue independent requests for military assistance that
the military commander was then obliged to obey. In principle, the civil authorities therefore had no need to appeal to the ministerial authority in case of requisitioning military assistance. Thus in terms of institutional organisation, the military commander was incontestably the weaker part.

Thus, in France, the ministry of the interior was in a more favourable position to establish contacts to the war ministry than was the case in Prussia. However, this organisational difference was not enough to ensure effective civil-military co-operation at the regional level, since the French war minister, like his Prussian counterpart, had difficulties imposing his authority over the army corps commanders. In neither of the countries could close co-operation with the state administration in maintenance of order take place without the willing collaboration from the army corps commanders. In the following chapters, analyses will be undertaken of how and why French army corps commanders accepted participating in inter-institutional co-operation with the state administration at the regional level, whilst conversely in the Prussian case, such co-operation proved to be impossible.

3.3. Civil-military co-operation at the regional: laws and regulations concerning the requisitioning and command of troops in internal peacekeeping

The first French and Prussian legislation concerning the use of troops in internal peacekeeping appeared in the 1790s.34 It defined the maintenance of public order as one of the main tasks of the armed forces. It was also stipulated that troops could only be mobilised for domestic conflicts at the explicit request of a competent civil authority. However, the background to this principle in the Prussian and the French cases appears to have been very different in the two countries: the French law

34 The Prussian law of 30 December 1798 'Zirkularverordnung über militärisches Eingreifen bei Tumulten und Aufläufen auf Requisition der Zivilbehörden.' French law of 8-10 July 1791 'Décret concernant la conservation et le classement des places de guerre' and law of 26 July-3 August 1791 'Décret relatif à la réquisition et à l'action de la force publique contre les attouvements.'
concerning the civil requisition of troops from 1791 pointed to a limitation of arbitrary monarchical and military intervention in civilian conflicts, by giving authority over the use of troops to local and regional authorities. In contrast, the Prussian law 1798 concerning the use of military forces against riots and disturbance should be seen rather as allowing certain civilian authorities at the regional and local level to call for military assistance without involving the monarch. The insistence on the need for a public authority to request military assistance was meant to exclude private persons from calling upon the army, rather than an attempt to limit the ability of the military authorities to take independent steps.

In France, legislation in this field developed throughout the nineteenth century. In part it was shaped by the practical needs for effective co-operation between civil and military authorities. It was also influenced by the balance of power between groups of legislators who favoured civilian supremacy and those who wanted to maintain a high degree of independence for the military institutions from civilian interference and control. During the nineteenth century, the French legislation on domestic mobilisation of troops became increasingly dense and detailed in its definition and distribution of powers between the civil authorities and the army. Due to the formal obligations of co-operation between the two authorities, and to civilian penetration into areas which were formally defined as a matter for the military authorities, the fields of authority sometimes overlapped. Problems of overlapping authorities were often solved in

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35 Law of 26 July/3 August 1791 'Sur la réquisition et l'action de la force publique' Articles 1 and 20.
37 Law of 30 December 1798 'Zirkularvorordnung über Militärische Eingreifen bei Tumulte und Aufläufe auf Requisition der Zivilbehörden.' Article 6. It is stated in Article 6 that the troops had to be requested by a public authority. This is at least how the law of 30 December 1798 was interpreted when the Cabinet Order of 17 October 1820 'Mitwirkung der Militärbehörden zur Herstellung der Ordnung, wenn die öffentliche Ruhe durch excesse gestört wird' stipulated the right of the military commander to intervene without a requisition from a competent civil authority.
38 Under the Third Republic, French legislation on the use of military assistance to restore public order rested on the following laws and decrees:
   - Law of 8-10 July 1791 'La conservation des places de guerre';
   - Law of 27 July-3 August 1791 'Sur la réquisition et l'action de la force publique';
   - Law of 7 June 1848 'Sur les attouements';
   - Decree of 4 October 1891 'Sur le service des places de guerre et de villes ouvertes';
   - Decree of 20 October 1899 'Sur les mouvements des troupes à l'intérieur';
   - Instructions of 24 June 1903 'Sur la participation de l'armée au maintien de l'ordre public';
   - Instructions of 20-31 August 1907 'Sur la participation de l'armée au maintien de l'ordre.'
practice by the governmental authorities asking the prefects and the army corps commander to take decisions jointly.39

In contrast, Prussian legislation was less detailed, and often new laws and regulations were enforced without the formal abolition of the previous legislation, thus important areas of the law were left open to interpretation, since recent instructions could be contradicted or even invalidated by reference to previous orders and instructions which had never been formally abolished.40 During the Imperial period, the entire body of laws and decrees concerning military involvement in internal peacekeeping, dated from the period prior to 1871, with the Imperial Constitution as the latest contribution. However, in contrast to the French case, there was a strict separation of civilian and military institutions at the regional and local levels, and the formal relationship of supremacy between civil and military authorities was clearly advantageous to the latter.

The laws of 8-10 July 1791 and of 27 July-3 August 1791 established a series of formalities for the requisition of armed forces. During the nineteenth century, with the increasing gradual take over of internal peacekeeping by civilian authorities, it was recognised by both civil and military authorities that, in principle, troops should be mobilised for internal purposes only in cases of 'extreme urgency'.41 It was essentially the competent civil authorities (prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors) who decided when

39 A further analysis of 'joint decision making' in Nord-Pas-de-Calais will be presented in Chapter Nine.

40 The legislation concerning domestic military intervention mostly dated from the period before the establishment of the German Empire in 1871. The service regulation concerning the army's use of weapons and its participation in repression of internal unrest, (Dienstvorschrift über den Waffengebrauch des Militärs und seine Mitwirkung zur Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen) of 23 March 1899 refers to the following laws and regulations:
  
  Cabinet Order of 17 October 1820 'Mitwirkung der Militärbehörden zur Herstellung der Ordnung, wenn die öffentliche Ruhe durch excesse gestört wird';
  Regulation of 17 August 1835 concerning maintenance of public order 'Verordnung zur Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Ordnung und der dem Gesetz schuldigen Achtung';
  Law of 20 March 1837 on military use of weapons 'Gesetz über den Waffengebrauch des Militärs';
  Law of 4 June 1851 concerning states of siege 'Gesetz über den Belagerungszustand';
  The Imperial Constitution of 16 April 1871.

In the aftermath of the Zabern affair, the service regulation on the military's use of weapons from 1899 was replaced by a new service regulation of 19 March 1914.

41 Serman (1982) pp.60-62. See also Chapter Five.
they considered that this extra force was indispensable and, in most relevant situations, that it was possible legally to justify the call for military troops.

The laws of 1791 only referred to military assistance to apprehend criminals or to protect persons and property against a rioting crowd. With the law on crowds of 1848, however, a simple gathering in a public place was criminalised and could at any time be dispersed.\(^{42}\) When the decree of 4 October 1891 stated that the army was essentially the guardian of public order, the role of troops was no longer confined to the restoration of order but also to the maintenance of public order when a public authority considered that it was being threatened.\(^{43}\) Moreover, the law on crowds was also extensively used to intervene against demonstrations. The right to demonstrate in public was not recognised by French legislation until 1935.\(^{44}\) With the Waldeck-Rousseau administration in 1899, organised marches and gatherings were increasingly tolerated, although the 1848 law on crowds was still frequently used to prevent unwanted demonstrations. Although public gathering and marches were tolerated, though not legally recognised, troops were frequently called out during strikes, even if these were in fact recognised by law.\(^{45}\) Article 414 of the Penal Code, allowing the organisation of workers in trade unions, also forbade hindering the free exercise of a profession, thereby criminalising any attempts to prevent strikebreakers from working. The Article 414 was also used as the most common justification for calling out for troops during strikes, together with the arguments for defending persons and private or public property - *in casu* factories, mines or port facilities. The law of 26 July-3 August 1791 stipulates that the army could also be used to ensure the respect of law and the implementation of the government’s policies. During the first decades of the Third Republic, this was particularly relevant for the disturbances caused by the implementation of the legislation against Catholic Institutions.\(^{46}\) In most situation, if

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\(^{42}\) Law of 7 June 1848 on crowding *Sur les attroupements*.

\(^{43}\) Decree of 4 October 1891 *Portant règlement sur le service des places de guerre et de villes ouvertes*, Article 63: “Les chefs de poste ne doivent pas perdre de vue que la force armée est essentiellement protectrice de l’ordre public, des personnes et de la propriété.”

\(^{44}\) Law decree of 23 October 1935 abolishing the Article 6 of the ‘Naquet Law.’

\(^{45}\) Since 25 March 1868, the French law recognised the citizens’ right to establish non-political organisations, although it was only with the ‘Naquet Law’ of 30 June 1881 that the freedom of assembly was extended to political organisations and trade unions.

\(^{46}\) Law of 29 March 1880 on illegal religious orders, and the legislation 1902 to 1905 on the separation of the French State and the Catholic Church.
the civil authorities wanted to call for military assistance, it would be possible to find a legal justification to do so.

The fundamental principles for the requisition of troops in Prussia were similar to those in the French legislation in terms of the legal justification for domestic military intervention and the distribution of the powers to call upon the army between a variety of civil authorities at the regional and local levels. The major dissimilarities concerned the powers of the French and Prussian military commanders. The two last sections will therefore concentrate first on the limitations put upon the French military commanders (3.3). Then an analysis will be undertaken on the particular powers attributed to the Prussian military commander which their French had not (3.4). In both the French and Prussian case, a significant incongruity can be observed between the formal powers of the military commanders and the position in practice of these commanders.

3.3.1. French army corps commanders: legal definition of the post

In the French system, as in the Prussian, the right to command troops was traditionally that of the military commander, and this remained the principle throughout the period examined. However, two important differences can be pointed out between the powers of French and Prussian military commanders: the means of civilian authorities to intervene in military commands, and the role attributed to the military authorities in the cases when weapons were used against civilians.

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47 Circular decree of 30 December 1798 on ‘Zirkularverordnung über militärisches Eingreifen bei Tumulaten und Aufläufen auf Requisition der Zivilbehörden’; Cabinet Order of 17 October 1820 on ‘Mitwirkung der Militärbehörden zur Herstellung der Ordnung, wenn die öffentliche Ruhe durch Excesse gestört wird’; Decree of 17 August 1835 on ‘Verordnung zur Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen ordnung und der dem Gesetz schuldigen Achtung’.

48 The principle of civil requisition was stated in the Prussian Constitution of 31 January-6 February 1850, Article 36 ‘Die bewaffnete Macht kann zur Unterdrückung inerer Unruhen und zur Ausführung der Gesetze nur in den vom Gesetz bestimmten Fällen und Formen und auf Requisition der Civilbehörde verwendet werden’.

The right was granted to the province, district and local governors as the representatives of the state at the regional and local level. Among local authorities, right to requisition was granted to the mayors and to municipal police authorities. Law of 11 March 1850 ‘Gesetz betreffend die Verpflichtigung der Gemeinde zum Ersatz des bei öffentlichen Aufläufen verursachten Schadens’. Decree of 31 December 1872 ‘Kreisordnung’. Decree of 31 July 1886 ‘Kreisordnung’.
3.3.2. Limitations imposed on the French commander's right to command

In questions of command, the French military commander faced a series of limitations which did not exist in the Prussian system. In the first place, it was the civil authorities who decided when the troops should be sent home, whereas in the Prussian system it was the military commander who decided when to send the troops back to the garrison. In cases of domestic military intervention, the French military commander was, in principle at least, empowered to decide the means by which public order should be maintained or restored, and the army corps commander had to formally approve the measures taken by subordinate commanders. In any case, the prefect and ultimately the ministry of interior had the last word. With the instructions of 1907, the French commander's authority to approve and suggest measures was also limited by the fact that the civil power could at any moment intervene and invalidate his decisions through a revised requisition.

Similarly, and in contrast to his Prussian counterpart, the French army corps commander did not possess the right to issue orders to subordinate commanders which went against the word or the spirit of a requisition issued by a civil authority. The French army corps commander thus had no formal way of asserting any direct influence over the maintenance of order undertaken at a lower level, whereas his civilian counterpart, the prefect, could intervene and impose his will on subordinate civil servants. As a result, whilst the Prussian system had lines of command which went vertically down the military hierarchy, the French channels of command went horizontally from the civilian authority, which had asked for the requisition, directly to the military commander in charge.

This means that the formal powers of the French army corps commander in an incident depended on whether a requisition had been made directly to him or whether requisitions had been made to one of his subordinate commanders. In this light, and in

49 Law of 26 July-3 August 1791 Article 23; the decree of 4 October 1891, Article 167, stipulates the authority of the military commander to choose the means, but also stresses his responsibility. In the Instruction of 20-31 August 1907 Article 18, military responsibility was replaced by the demand for civil-military co-operation.

50 Instructions of 20-31 August 1907 Article 9.

51 Instructions of 20-31 August 1907 Article 22.
order to understand the actual position of the French army corps commanders, it is important to underline two elements. The first is a detail in the lines of authority within the military hierarchy as described in the most important military instruction on the use of troops for internal peacekeeping. It was issued in 1893 by the army corps commander in Lille,\textsuperscript{52} and was used by all the army corps until 1905, with several reprints.\textsuperscript{53} In these instructions, General de France emphasises that requisitioning should be made through the army corps commander and only in cases of immediate urgency through commanders of a lower rank.\textsuperscript{54} This was very important because the army corps commander could not issue orders to subordinate commanders unless he had been directly requested by a civilian authority. His involvement and his power of command therefore largely depended on whether a request had been directly made to him or not. Secondly, with the increasing practice that decisions concerning requisition of military assistance were taken by the prefectoral authority, the instructions meant that the requisitions would, in the majority of cases, be issued directly to the army corps commander thus providing him with the full authority of command. Thus, through bureaucratic co-operation with the prefect, the army corps commander could obtain influence on questions concerning the management of domestic conflict, from which he was formally excluded.

\textbf{3.3.3. Military use of weapons between civilian control and demands for effective responses}

In the French system as in Prussia, the military was entitled to use its weapons to defend its posts as well as to defend military buildings and materials.\textsuperscript{55} However, in contrast to the Prussian system, where troops could make use of force whenever the commanding officer thought that this was appropriate and where the presence of a representative from a civilian authority was not formally required,\textsuperscript{56} it was a well-
established principle in the French system after 1848 that troops could not make use of force without the presence of a representative from the civilian authorities. Already since the Second Republic, it was stipulated that no officer could act without the presence of a representative of the civilian authority.\textsuperscript{57} However, after the turn of the century, with the increasing problems of mass unrest, French legislation makes certain concessions on this point, by introducing a legal basis for military commanders to use weapons in self-defence, without observing the procedure prescribed by the law of 1848. In the 1891 decree it was still emphasised that:

\begin{quote}
En cas de troubles (...) dans lesquelles les troupes sont l'objet d'une agression et doivent se défendre par tous les moyens possibles, elles ne peuvent faire usage de leurs armes pour le rétablissement de l'ordre que dans les conditions ci-après déterminées par la loi du 7 juin 1848.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

In the 1903 regulations, however, an article appears which enables the military to make use of their weapons in self-defence, even without the presence of a civilian representative.

\begin{quote}
Mais si la force armée, en présence de l'attouagement, se trouve dans l'un des deux premiers cas prévus (1. si des violences ou voies de fait sont exercées contre elles; 2. si elles ne peuvent défendre autrement le terrain qu'elles occupent ou les postes dont elles sont chargées.), elle fera usage de ses armes encore bien que les formes prescrites par l'art. 3 de la loi du 7 juin 1848 n'aient pu être observées.\textsuperscript{59}
\end{quote}

In the 1907 Instructions, two months after the great riots which took place in South France, this paragraph was still maintained as a footnote.\textsuperscript{60} The existence of this article seems to indicate three things. Firstly, it shows how French legislation changed to accommodate to the increasing problems of mass unrest and attacks on public forces. Despite the continuous sense of suspicion of the representatives of the Republic was present. According to the report this was entirely compatible with existing rules. Central Archive, Potsdam III, R43, film signature 11971-11972, (documents 60-61). 'Bericht des Sekundlieutenants von Stralendorff über des Einschreiten mit der Schusswaffe am 7. Mai 1889' addressed to the minister of the interior.

\textsuperscript{57} Law of 26 July-3 August 1791; and the law of 7 July 1848.
\textsuperscript{58} Decree of 4 October 1891 Article 169.
\textsuperscript{59} Instructions of 24 June 1903 Article 19.
\textsuperscript{60} Instructions of 20-31 August 1907 Article 23.
towards the army, it seems that the degree of violence linked to popular unrest during the Third Republic made it imperative to allow legal military action to take place in cases of emergency. Secondly, the existence of this article may also indicate that the Republican regime in 1907 felt sufficiently self-confident to make certain concessions to the military authorities. Thirdly, it indicates that the French legislators by 1907 did not consider the prospect of the misuse of weapons by the army to be a major problem, and that the fact that military commanders were covered by the criminal code was a sufficient means of control.

After 1907, therefore, a partial elimination took place of the legal differences between the French and Prussian system concerning the authorisation of military commanders to use weapons independently from civilian authorities, in self defence or while performing their ordinary duties. Thus, thereafter, the biggest difference between French and Prussian legislation on this point was no longer whether the military commander could use weapons when he felt that his troops were being attacked, but that the French military commanders were professionally responsible, and that they could be prosecuted under the criminal code if they were found guilty of transgressing the limits of their authority.

3.3.4. Initiatives concerning the elaboration of plans for protection

In both nations, it was a part of the army corps commander's professional duties to develop plans for protection for internal peacekeeping. General Staff studies for domestic military action and plans for protection in the event of major popular unrest appeared in both France and Prussia during the 1890s. However, after the turn of the century, the number of French plans increased and these plans comprised greater areas and use of ever more armed force.

Since the maintenance of order was primarily the responsibility of the civilian authorities, the French Ministry of the Interior developed a series of plans for protection. All the French civilian plans for protection operated with the possibility of military involvement in large-scale unrest. Since the Ministry of the Interior could not
allow the military to be unprepared for large-scale intervention, the co-ordination of civilian and military measures became an obligation with reference to the demand for civil-military co-operation as stated in the 1791 legislation. During the first decade of the twentieth century, the detailed definition of power between civil and military authorities was combined with an increasing number of obligations to co-operate. The French decree of 1891, which describes duties and obligations of military commanders in seventy-four pages, had only a few articles concerning civil-military co-operation. In contrast, the instructions concerning military participation in the maintenance of order from 1903 and 1907 repeat and increase the demand for co-operation: ten out of the twenty-seven articles stress the obligation of mutual information, particularly, in the field of the preparation of measures against possible cases of popular unrest.

In the French legislation, the efforts to gain control over the activities of the military authorities through co-operation with civilian authorities corresponded with the need for effective responses to large-scale internal disorder. The opposite occurred in the Prussian case, where the military authority and civilian authorities could not work together on this issue, because such co-operation would have interfered with the military authority's absolute right to develop and implement measures. On the other hand, this also meant that the Prussian commanders had much less influence than their French counterpart over the measures which were actually implemented against public disorder. Thus, in the French system, the formal powers the army corps commanders to assert influence on questions concerning maintenance of public order were strictly limited compared to the powers of the Prussian commanders. However, the administrative practice in France granted the army corps commanders with a high degree of informal influence on matters from which he was formally excluded.

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61 Law of 8-10 July 1791 Article 9 title III and Article 16.
62 Duvergier's Law Collections XCI pp.182-256.
3.4. Prussian peculiarities: requisition of military assistance in the light of civil-military antagonism

The differences between the formal powers of French and Prussian military commanders were considerable. In contrast to the formal placing of the French military authority under civilian supremacy, the Prussian system provided the commanding general with four powers which gave him almost unlimited freedom of action in questions concerning internal peacekeeping:

- the right to mobilise military troops against civilians without being formally requested by the civilian authorities. Although the legal validity of this prerogative, dating from 1820, was highly questionable, it figured in all military service regulations until March 1914;
- the right to refuse to assist civilian forces when requested;
- in the case of troops being requisitioned, the military commander held full authority of command over both civil and military forces, implying the right to maintain or dismiss troops at any moment; and
- the right to declare a provisional state of siege without consulting the civilian authorities.

However, in Prussia, like in France, important incongruities can be observed between the army corps commanders' formal position and their actual influence over measures and strategies concerning the maintenance of internal order. It is therefore important to distinguish between the formal powers of the Prussian army corps commanders to intervene in civilian conflicts and the ways in which these powers were used. In this section attention will therefore be paid to three central aspects that were particular to the Prussian commanders' rights in relation to the civil authorities: 1) their right to refuse to provide troops when requested by a civil authority; 2) their right to intervene against civilians without being formally requested by a competent civil authority and 3) their right to declare a provisional military state of siege without consulting the civil authorities. The main point made here is that, although the army was very careful about maintaining these powers, they were, as far as this study can observe, never used during the entire period studied.
3.4.1. Prussian commanders' right to refuse requisitions from the civil authorities

In Prussia, the principle of civilian requisition was clearly expressed in Article 36 of the Prussian Constitution of 1850. However, for a long time it remained uncertain which civilian authority was supposed to be the principal contact with the military. Under normal circumstances, the maintenance of public order fell under the authority of the province or district governor. As early as 1825, a cabinet order declared that the requisition of troops was supposed to pass to the military authorities only through the province governor; he alone was to decide whether and when the military should be called upon and he was supposed to be the direct link with the army corps commander. Similarly, whenever civil authorities requested assistance from military troops, the order was to go directly to the army corps commander, to whom the royal authority of command was delegated.

During the first half of the century, it was generally the local governor who requested troops directly from the nearest garrison depending on the seriousness and the extent of the case. In the case of an immediate alert, the chief of a local police force could also ask for military assistance, even without formal approval from the administrative authorities. This procedure was only changed in 1906, in the aftermath of the 1905 strikes, when the local authorities' right to requisition troops had been a serious impediment to the coherent management of the large number of strikes. It was therefore emphasised again by the Ministry of the Interior that requisitions should be issued only through province or district governors. However, the legal recognition of the provincial or district governor as the supreme authority over the military commander could not be established in the Prussian system, because it would have been an intrusion into the military commander's authority and it would have been incompatible with the monarch's position as supreme commander.

Thus, troops could only be provided for domestic purposes only through the army corps commander, as the monarch's representative at the regional level. In this

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63 Instructions to the province governors of 31 December 1825. For an analysis of this instruction and its application later in the nineteenth century see Messerschmidt (1979) p.339.
64 Messerschmidt (1979) p.339.
context, the Prussian commander's right to refuse to send troops was an important feature, because it meant that a civil request for military assistance did not constitute an order, as was the French case. It is important to note that no example has been found in the entire period investigated in which an army corps commander made any use of his right to refuse a requisition from the senior state administration.

3.4.2. The Zabern-Affair, 1913: the principle of civilian requisition contested

Despite the fact that Article 36 of the Prussian Constitution stipulated that troops could be used only on the explicit demand of civilian authorities, the principle of civilian requisition was not finally settled until the eve of the First World War. As late as 1913, the principle that troops could only intervene against civilians at the explicit request of civilian authorities was placed in serious doubt during the infamous Zabern affair.

In November 1913, the population in a small Alsacian town began to demonstrate outside the local garrison after it became publicly known that a young lieutenant, while instructing newcoming recruits, had declared that he would reward any of his soldiers who was prepared to shoot an Alsacian. When the local population gathered in protest outside the garrison, and the local authorities did not provide sufficient police to disperse the demonstration, the local commander, Colonel Reuter, sent in troops without any civil requisition, before proceeding to imprison civilians. The independent military intervention against civilians raised a storm of protest that reached Berlin within days.

The fact that the Colonel was able to show that he was formally empowered to take these steps, did not help to appease the public uproar since it threw doubt on the validity of the whole legal framework regarding the principle of civil requisition for the previous period. Attempts to grant military commanders the right to use troops on their own initiative had been made several times during the Imperial period. In the first draft of the military law of 1874, Bismarck tried to attribute powers to military commanders which would have allowed them to send in troops without a civil
requisition.67 This proposal was rejected by the Reichstag. However, in the military regulation issued by the Prussian War Ministry in 1899, 'Dienstvorschrift über Waffengebrauch des Militärs', military commanders were given the right to send in troops if they thought that the civilian authorities were hesitating too long before issuing a military requisition.68 This right was given to the military commander on the legal basis of a Prussian cabinet order from 1820. This indicates the ambiguity of the definition of powers in co-operation for internal peacekeeping, as the fundamental principle of civil requisition could be contradicted by pre-constitutional laws and regulations which had never been formally abolished. After the regulations concerning 'Military Use of Weapons' were made public, legal specialists agreed that these provisions could not be considered legally valid since Article 36 of the Prussian Constitution of 1851 and a Prussian cabinet order from 1820 could not be enforced in Alsace-Lorraine, since this region did not belong to the Prussian territory.69

The existence of these provisions, as well as the fact that Colonel Reuter went free of charge on the grounds that it was not the job of an officer to test the legal validity of the provisions in his service regulations, has been interpreted by Wehler as the ultimate proof of the powerlessness of Prussian civil authorities in relation to the army.70 To contemporary German and foreign observers it was obvious that behind the civil and constitutional facade, the army was still in charge in the German Kaiserreich.71 In an historical perspective, the Zabern affair has been described as the last chapter in the long history of frustrated attempts to bring the Imperial German army under constitutional rule and control.72 However, the indignation in the Reichstag and German public opinion was so violent that William II was forced to issue new service regulations wherein this article was abolished. The fate of this unfortunate Article II3a. indicates that the army was not in charge and could not operate against massive civilian protest according to its own self-defined rules. Although the responsible officer,

68 'Dienstvorschrift über den Waffengebrauch des Militärs' (1899) Article II3a.
70 This is the main argument in his analysis of the Zabern affair. Wehler (1970) pp.78-80.
72 Wehler is very clear on this point; Nipperdey describes the concessions from the King and the military establishment as only a half-victory for a constitutional submission of the army to civilian control. Wehler (1970) pp.78-79; Nipperdey (1992) p.204.
Colonel Reuter, went free of charge, hereafter, no commander could justify using troops without civil requisition.

The 'Service Regulation about Military Use of Weapons' (1899) makes rather depressing reading, however; the arrogant tone with which it describes the obligations and limitations on powers of the civil authority leaves no doubt as to how the officials in the War Ministry still in 1899 saw the relationship between civil and military authorities. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that Colonel Reuter in Zabern thought that he was within his rights when he sent in troops without civilian requisition and when he ordered his soldiers to proceed to imprisonment of civilian demonstrators. With reference to a cabinet order from 17 October 1820, the Article III3a states that:

"Zur Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen und zur Ausführung der Gesetze sind aber die Militärbefehlshaber auch ohne Anforderung der Civilbehörde selbständig einzuschreiten befugt und verpflichtet...wenn der Militärbefehlshaber nach Pflicht und Gewissen findet, dass die Civilbehörde mit der Anforderung um Militär-Beistand zu lange zögert."73

Three comments need to be made in relation to the importance of this article, by which military commanders were empowered - legally sustainable or not - to send in troops if they considered it appropriate. It should first be noted that this paragraph was apparently only used once, namely in Zabern in November 1913.74 Given the interest of this study in the nature of the co-operation between civil and military authorities, it is therefore important that the civil authorities apparently ignored the provisions in the military regulation and operated with the principle of civilian request as the only legal basis for the army action. Thus, for fourteen years, the civil and military authorities had apparently operated on dissimilar legal bases. The fact that this had not been clear before allows two possible conclusions. Either the civil and military authorities operated with such a degree of mutual agreement that it was rare for a military commander to have to impose his will. Alternatively, it may also indicate that military commanders, in general, followed the will of civilian authorities and interfered little in the realm of the civilian authority.

73 'Dienstvorschrift über den Waffengebrauch des Militärs' (1899) § II,3 a.
The second observation is that the indignation and violent reaction of the Reichstag and the public were strong enough to force the King to issue new service regulations in which this unfortunate paragraph was abolished. The fact that this ‘right’ could not survive public knowledge - and therefore only existed as long as it was not put into practice - implies that it would be wrong to attribute to it great practical importance. Finally, the public reaction to the transgressions of the military authority indicates, more generally, how well-established the principle of civil requisition was in German society by 1913. Similarly, concerning the position of the military in the German state system it indicates that although, the Zabern affair did not bring about a constitutional limitation on military authority - and in this respect it was a defeat for the attempts to impose civilian supremacy - it did, however, show the limits on what the military authority could do by the end eve of the First World War.

3.4.3. The right to declare a state of siege: a resource for the military commander?

A third important aspect of the powers of military commanders was their right to declare a state of siege. Interpretations of the German Imperial system have focused on the right of military commanders at all levels to declare a provisional state of siege independently of the civil authorities. As such, the declaration of a state of siege in cases of domestic unrest was not a specific Prussian or German phenomenon. In France as well, the possibility existed, and would have led to the subordination of civil forces of order to the military commander, although the French army corps commander would then himself be subject to the prefect. However, since a declaration of state of siege could only be decided by law, and was thus beyond the powers of regional and local civil and military authorities, the question of state of siege did not in any way affect the relationship of French military commanders with the prefectural authority.

76 This is the conclusion that Schoenbaum draws on the basis of the Zabern affair. Schoenbaum (1982) p.184.
77 Delaperrière (1902) vol.II p.404.
78 French law of 3 April 1878.
In Prussia, by contrast, the question of a declaration of state of siege must be considered an important power resource for the military commander, even when it was not used in practice. In principle, the declaration of a state of siege had to be issued by the Prussian king. After 1871, Article 68 of the Imperial Constitution gave the Kaiser a similar right to declare a state of siege for the entire empire or for parts of it. However, according to the law of 4 July 1851, the declaration of a provisional state of siege could - in cases of immediate urgency - also be made by a local military commander. Such a declaration would afterwards have to be confirmed by the Prussian State Ministry and the king. In the Imperial Constitution of 1871, it is stated that the Prussian law concerning states of siege was going to be replaced by new legislation. This new legislation was never passed, however. Hence, the Prussian law from 1851, which granted extended powers to the military commander, stayed in force until 1918.

In domestic politics, particularly during the early Wilhelminian era, there were constant threats from the King and leading generals to declare a state of siege and close the Reichtag and other constitutional institutions. However, in reality, William II always refrained from declaring a state of siege. Similarly, no example exists where a military commander declared a provisional state of siege without being explicitly asked to do so by civilian authorities. A provisional state of siege was declared only twice in the entire period from 1871-1914, and in both cases at the request of the local civil authorities. Thus, the declaration of a state of siege in the two cases where it was used indicates civil-military co-operation on the basis of civilian initiative rather than an enforcement of military supremacy. The fact no military commander ever made use of his rights to declare a state of siege independently from the civil authorities is all the more surprising given that the war minister, von Verdy, after the abrogation of the anti-Social Democratic laws in 1890, directly invited the army corps commanders to

79 The question of the Kaiser's right to declare a state of siege in non-Prussian areas was not settled until the eve of the First World War, when a constitutional specialist pointed out that a general state of siege for the entire German Empire could not be considered as legal unless it implied the formal acceptance of the kings of the non-Prussian states of the Empire. Chancellor von Bülow therefore took initiative, in 1908, to ask the monarchs of the non-Prussian states to provide a permanent formal acceptance of the declaration of a state of siege. Central Archive, Potsdam III, R 15.01/ 12215, 'Der Kriegeszustand 1910-1913'
80 Königshütten 1871 and Bielefeld 20 March to 4 April 1885. (Messerschmidt (1979) p.346).
make use of this right in order to continue the official fight against Social Democratic activities.81

The Imperial German system has been described as a military state,82 with reference to three crucial areas: the extra-constitutional position of the army; important questions which proved to be difficult or impossible to regulate by updated legislation;83 and, finally, the exemption from accountability for the actions of military commanders towards the civilians. It should, nevertheless, be emphasised that despite the extended powers of the military commanders and the difficulties of making the military establishment admit when officers had transgressed their powers and thus undertake appropriate prosecutions, the actions of the military were formally covered by law. Without entering into the debate about the Prussian state as a Rechtstaat84 in relation to the military, it is important to stress that the army was not in a position to act arbitrarily. Although Prussian commanders often expressed contempt for the formal limits around their sphere of action, and sometimes displayed a basic ignorance of the most basic legal principles, military commanders were still expected to justify their actions by reference to formal powers.85

83 The difficulties concerning the new legislation on the formalities around states of siege and the long bargaining process concerning the implementation of a new military penal code around the turn of the century, are well-known examples of this phenomenon.
84 The fundamental argument in Huber’s legal history (1963-1969) is that the Imperial system, with its fundamental basis as a Rechtstaat, could eventually have developed into a modern system with checks and balances between the different political institutions and with civilian control over the army. These considerations, however, go beyond the scope of this thesis.
85 The ignorance of the military commander about the legal boundaries around their actions came out quite clearly during the Zabern Affair.
3.5. Concluding remarks: Similarities and differences in the French and Prussian legislation concerning domestic military intervention

In a comparative interpretation of the legal framework of requisition troops to assist civilian forces, three basic principles can be pointed out which were common to the French and Prussian cases, and which were increasingly important for comparing the legislation from the early nineteenth century with the decrees and regulations from the period preceding the First World War.

The first principle - which was formulated by the early laws of the 1790s - was that military troops could only be used for domestic peacekeeping on an explicit request from a civilian authority. Bismarck’s attempts to give military commanders the legal rights to intervene without civilian requisition went unheeded. Similarly, the provisions of the 1899 Service Regulations, which granted this right to the military commanders, could not be considered as legally valid. Ultimately a Prussian commander could declare a provisional state of siege and thereby take over the authority of maintaining order, even without consulting civilian authorities. However, the only two examples of the use of the right to declare a provisional state of siege took place at the explicit request of the civil authorities. During the early Wilhelminian period, certain commanding generals waited for a state of siege to be declared by the King, but refrained from taking this step by themselves.

The second principle, which appeared in both the Prussian and the French legislation after 1848, was the fundamental principle that military troops should only be requested in cases of 'extreme urgency.'\(^{86}\) However, the legislation was ambiguous. The French decree of 1891 as well as the instructions of 1903 and 1907 emphasised that the military should be as separate as possible from civilian affairs, but, at the same time, underlined the obligation of the armed forces to ensure internal order and defend the

\(^{86}\) Article 36 of the Prussian Constitution 1851. This was still the attitude expressed by the Prussian ministry of interior and the War Ministry after the great miner strike in Westphalia 1889. Saul (1974, p.274). Similarly, the French legislation from the late nineteenth century keeps repeating that the use of troops should be avoided.
Republican institutions, whenever requested to do so. The Prussian regulations of 1899 underline the obligation of officers to ensure internal order, but at the same time stress that military troops should not be misused by civil authorities as an extended police force.

The third principle was that the maintenance of public order was primarily the responsibility of the civil authorities and that contacts with the army should pass through the senior civil servants at the regional level (province governors in Prussia; prefects in France). According to the formal definitions in both the French and Prussian legislation, senior civil servants and military commanders were supposed to co-operate in the maintenance of order. The principle of co-operation, however, was carried into practice in two very dissimilar ways within the French and Prussian system. In the French case, the prefect was the key figure and authority responsible in the process of maintaining public order, whereas the legislators of the Third Republic refrained from granting the army corps commanders a formally predominant role. On the other hand, through this co-operation, the French army corps commanders acquired informal influence on maintenance of public order, from which they were formally excluded, and became far more involved in these matters than were their formally powerful Prussian counterparts. In Prussia, by contrast, the civil and military authorities faced a strict allocation of tasks and both was to take their responsibilities. The Prussian formal organisation increasingly affirms the position of the province governor as the main authority in the maintenance of public order. However, since the prerogatives of the Prussian army corps commander remained unchanged from the pre-constitutional period, the predominance of the provincial governor was only valid as long as troops were not requested, after which moment all authority over civil and military forces went over to the military authorities.

In terms of the organisational structures and allocation of powers, two main conclusions can be drawn. First, the institutional position of the French Ministry of the Interior and state administration placed these authorities in a significantly better...

87 Decree of 4 October 1891 'Sur le service des places de guerre et de villes ouvertes'; Instructions of 24 June 1903 'Relative à la participation de l'armée au maintien de l'ordre public'; Instructions of 20 August 1907 'Relative à la participation de l'armée au maintien de l'ordre public.'
position than their Prussian counterparts to undertake contacts to the military authorities at the governmental and regional levels. However, the formally strong position of the French Ministry of the Interior was not in itself sufficient to ensure the co-operation from the senior commanders, since the war minister who mediated the inter-ministerial communication held a rather weak position in relation to the army corps commanders. These senior commanders held a significant potential of obstruction to the functioning of civil-military co-operation at the regional level. Therefore, the high degree of inter-institutional co-operation between the French state administration and army corps commanders was not only a result of formal institutional arrangements. Similarly important were the bureaucratic practices which grew up around the civil-military co-operation through the repeated implementation of strategies to deal with public unrest that strongly involved the army.

Secondly, the findings of this section suggest that the dissimilarities between the French and Prussian case in the formal distribution of powers between civil and military authorities was of secondary importance in the functioning of civil-military co-operation at the regional level, since a series of factors tended to modify the importance of the differences in the formal position of the French and Prussian military commanders. Certainly, Prussian military commanders were empowered with rights that their French counterpart had not (rights to refuse a requisition, rights to declare a state of siege, rights to intervene without requisition from the civil authorities). However, these particular resources were almost never used, and it is worth noting that once called upon to assist civilian forces, Prussian commanders generally followed the wishes of the civil authorities as did their French counterparts: they sent troops when requested and called them back when the civilian authorities thought that it was time to do so. Accordingly, in Prussia, as in France, the military commanders in situations of domestic military intervention *de facto* occupied the role of junior partner in relation to the civilian authorities.
Chapter Four. Power constellations at the regional level: local elites, state administrators, and military commanders

In the literature on the German Empire, one of the fundamental assumptions is that close social ties between the members of the state bureaucracy and the military elite were of major importance for the internal role of the army and for the continued existence and operation of archaic social and political structures. Conversely, the literature on the French Republican system commonly emphasises the lack of cohesion between the two social groups which comprised the French state administration and officer corps, as one of the basic features for potential conflict within the French Republic. In French and German historiography, interpretations of the rise of the working class movement see the use of troops as ultimate evidence of the readiness of the civil and military elites governing the state apparatus to maintain their predominance over the emerging working class movement.

In Prussia, close social ties between the senior members of the state administration and the military elite seem obvious since the same family names appear frequently among senior civil servants as well as among the senior generals. Moreover, many civil servants and military officers came from families which had been linked to the Prussian state for generations; either through the state administration or the army. Despite this apparent social closeness, recent research questions the degree to which these two bureaucratic elites were actually interlinked and suggests that behind the seemingly

1 This point has been particularly emphasised by the adherents of the Sonderweg thesis. Wehler (1973) p.237, ibid. (1995) pp.823-825, Stürmer (1970), and Berghahn (1994) p.257-258. This fundamental assumption can also be discerned, explicit or implicit, behind most of the interpretations of the German-Prussian system. Craig (1955), Messerschmidt (1979; 1980; 1994), Deist (1991), Lüdtke (1982), and Funk (1986).
3 Agulhon (1990); Rebérioux (1975); Trempe (1995).
4 Family names such as von Armin, von Below, von Bonin, Bronsart von Schellendorff, von Bülow, von Horn, von Kleist, von Manteuffel, von Massow, von Moltke, von Schlichting, von Schlieffen, von Wether, von Winterfeld, and von Wolff appear frequently among senior officers, as well as civil servants.
5 These patterns are demonstrated by Preradovich (1955) for the senior civil servants and by Hughes (1987) concerning the general corps.
close affiliations between the East Elbian landed nobility and the elites in the state administration and the army lay very complex elite structures with strong patterns of mutual exclusion. In fact, many of the civil servants and army officers who carried the same name belonged to different branches of large noble dynasties of which one section was linked to the state administration and another to the army, with little social connection between the two.

There can be no doubt about the commitment of civil servants and military commanders alike to defend the existing social and political order. It is also worth noting, however, that, even if the senior civil servants and the army corps commanders shared their commitment to the defence of the existing order against the contesting social and political movements, they did not enter into much practical co-operation. In fact, civil-military relations in Westphalia were characterised by a remarkable lack of co-operation. As representatives of the Prussian state in Westphalia that had only been integrated in Prussia by the beginning of the nineteenth century after centuries of independence, the senior civil servants and the military commanders belonged to the same social milieu in the local community. The met at private parties and were often on friendly terms with each other. However, the social acquaintance between successive province governors and army corps commanders did not manifest itself in much professional co-operation.

It is equally remarkable to observe that in France, there was a pattern of close co-operation between the state administration and the army. This is surprising, given the fact that between senior civil servants and military commanders, there were few social connections, and, furthermore, the members of these bureaucratic elites were also split in their political sympathies and their commitment to the Republican regime. Given the lack of social link between senior civil servants and army corps commanders in France, as well as the latent conflicts between representatives of the state administration and the military establishment, one might expect a low degree of practical interaction to have existed between the two. However, the frequent use of troops in Nord-Pas-de-Calais - and France generally - compared to the increasingly rare use of troops in

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*6 See Chapter Nine.*
Prussia, indicates that the argument of a direct relationship between social affiliation and professional behaviour cannot be sustained.

Scholars working on social conflicts and labour movements tend to see the senior state administrators and military commanders as simply belonging to the groups opposed to challenges to the existing social, political and economic order, thus including industrial elites and their political representatives at the local and national levels. The argument that the policies implemented by the state administrators were biased towards the interests of the industrial elites is true in the sense that any state intervention with state forces in labour conflicts was an advantage for the employers against labour movements, no matter how much the state authorities claimed to be a neutral agency solely concerned with defending public order. A similar logic applies to any state intervention in local protest movements which were turned against the elites traditionally in charge of local political institutions. However, impossible as it is to separate the state's actions from the interests of the local elites - whether political or industrial - it is nevertheless important to raise the question of the extent to which the state actions were the result of pressure from these local elites.

This issue is by its very nature difficult to handle, because pressure on state representatives by these local elites does not necessarily appear in bureaucratic files, personal papers, or published memoirs. There are, however, a series of strong indicators, both in the cases of Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais, that point to the conclusion that, in both industrial areas, the state administrations had a rather wide sphere of discretion and were capable of implementing their policies of using or not using military assistance with little consideration to the wishes of local pressure groups. Although the policies pursued by the state representatives mostly supported the interests of local elites rather than those of the protest movements, it is important to note that the decisions taken by the civil servants seemed to be primarily guided by considerations of the interest of the state. In cases where these did not coincide with

the wishes of local pressure groups, there were few means for the latter to influence the state administrators into taking a different course of action.

This fourth chapter aims to separate the influence of local pressure groups (private companies, elected authorities and deputies) from the policies pursued by the state's representatives at the local level (civil servants and military commanders). This analysis leads to three conclusions.

- The first is that the local authorities, in Prussia as well as in France, were almost entirely excluded from the question of use of troops for internal peacekeeping. This was a matter dealt with almost entirely by the senior state administrators in cooperation with the military authorities.

- The second point is that there were almost no direct links between the local industrial elites and the military commanders. All practical connections between local elites and the military authorities went through the state administration.

- The third conclusion of this chapter is that, when looking at inter-institutional cooperation, there appears to have been no direct correlation between, the social connections between the civil servants and the military commanders, on the one hand, and their ability to undertake practical co-operation, on the other.
4.1. Elite co-operation in Westphalia?

The issue of elite structures and their impact on the state's involvement in local conflicts has both social and political aspects. From the point of view of appointments, the question is whether the senior representatives of the central power were supposed to integrate the industrial elites of the Ruhr area into the nation. In the process of national integration, one of the functions of the representatives of the central power at the regional level was to mediate between Berlin and local forces. In this process, the social and geographic origins, as well as the religious affiliations of the representatives provide some indication of the degree to which the authorities in Berlin wanted their representatives to accommodate to local elites. By sending a certain type of civil servant to a certain area, the central authorities could either indicate their particular attention to a specific elite group in the province or, conversely, by sending an outsider, they could in turn emphasise the independence of the state representative from local influence.

The administrative integration of the territories that came to constitute the province of Westphalia into the Prussian kingdom was a relatively recent development that had taken place after 1815. The province was predominantly Catholic, although there was a considerable proportion of Protestants particularly among the urban middle class and upper bourgeoisie. In contrast, the socially exclusive Westphalian nobility was predominantly Catholic. Westphalia, as with the Rhineland, was a stronghold of the Catholic Centre Party, and had been particularly targeted by the anti-Catholic legislation of the years of the Kulturkampf. Due to the reluctant acceptance by the Western provinces of Berlin's hegemony, the relationship with the central power was potentially conflictual.

From this point of view, it is important in the first place to analyse whether the civil and military representatives of the central power were themselves part of local society or whether they were outsiders. Secondly, linked to the question of the independence

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8 Forty-five per cent of the population in 1871. Flora (1975).
9 Reif (1979).
10 Blackbourn (1993) p.84.
of state representatives from the industrial elites, is the question of the degree to which the state representatives were supposed to match that particular social group.

4.1.1. The social and professional profile of senior state representatives in Westphalia

Before addressing the question of whether the province governors were appointed with specific regard to their social profile, it is important to stress that, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Prussian state administration was a highly professionalised corps and that prominent social status was not in itself a key to senior posts in the state bureaucracy. Three out of the five civil servants who held the post of province governor in Westphalia between 1871 and 1914, were commoners by birth, whereas the last two province governors of the pre-war period belonged to the highest levels of the aristocracy. The civil servants holding the post of province governor in Westphalia all held doctorates in law and pursued long periods of professional training and administrative careers before attaining this post. On the other hand, qualities such as the ability to establish a fruitful relationship with the local elites is often mentioned in the biographies and memoirs of civil servants as one of the reasons for their promotion.

Looking at the social and geographic origins, as well as the religious affiliations, of Westphalian province governors, it is not possible to single out any particular appointment policy. If efforts were made to match the social and religious profile of the civil servant to particular elite groups, this priority appears to have changed over time. All province governors had close links to the Prussian central authorities in Berlin. The first three province governors were the sons of Prussian civil servants, and thus belonged to families which were linked for generations to the Prussian state. Province Governor von der Recke von der Horst was a former Prussian government

11 Province Governor von Kühlwetter (1871-1882) was ennobled in 1866; similarly, his successors, von Hagenmeister (1882-1889) and von Studt (1889-1899) were both commoners by birth, and the latter only obtained Prussian nobility in 1906 after having served six years as minister for ecclesiastical affairs and public instruction.

12 Baron von der Recke von der Horst was of ancient Westphalian nobility. Similarly, the last province governor before the war, Prince von Ratibor und Corvey, belonged to a royal dynasty and was linked by family to the Reichs Chancellor, Chlodowig, Prince of Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst.
minister and thereby closely linked to the authorities in Berlin, whilst the Province Governor von Ratibor und Corvey was linked by family ties to the Reichs Chancellor Prince von Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst.

The first province governor, von Kühlwetter (1871-1882) was the only one who came close to the profile of the industrial bourgeoisie. He was born in Düsseldorf, the son of a minor civil servant, and was a commoner by birth. He was a Catholic and spent almost all his career in Westphalia.\(^\text{13}\) As a local and a Catholic, it is most likely that he was originally chosen for the post in an attempt to mediate between the authorities in Berlin and the Westphalian Catholics. How effective this mediation was is difficult to say. However, the very fact that he could remain at this post throughout the decade of the *Kulturkampf* - when many other senior civil servants of Catholic confession were sacked because of their reluctant implementation of anti-Catholic legislation\(^\text{14}\) - indicates that Kühlwetter belonged to the group of Catholic civil servants who were so zealous in showing their loyalty to the government in Berlin that they were prepared to estrange themselves from local society. At any rate, the policy of appointing a Catholic to Westphalia was abandoned thereafter, since all the province governors of Westphalia between 1882 and 1911 were Protestants.

The two following province governors, von Hagenmeister (1883-1889) and von Studt (1889-1899), were obviously not meant to fit into any of the local elite groups. Both were from the Eastern provinces, born into families traditionally employed in the civil service, and their entire previous careers had been pursued in the Eastern provinces. They therefore had no immediate affiliation with the Westphalian industrial bourgeoisie.\(^\text{15}\) Moreover, being both Protestants and commoners by birth, von Hagenmeister and Studt were not of a social profile that would particularly ease relations with the socially-exclusive Westphalian nobility, although at least Studt was

\(^{13}\) Wegmann (1969) ‘Kühlwetter’.

\(^{14}\) The district governor of Arnsberg was obliged to resign in 1875 whilst ten out of eighteen Catholic local governors were sacked during the *Kulturkampf*. Blackbourn (1993) p.261.

on very friendly terms with some of the most distinguished members of the Westphalian nobility.16

What the three first province governors lacked in terms of social standing, the last two province governors had in abundance. Baron von der Recke von der Horst (1899-1911), a former Prussian minister of the interior, although a Protestant, belonged to the highest Westphalian aristocracy. Similarly, von Ratibor und Corvey, Prince of Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst (1911-1918), was a Catholic and came from the western state of Baden; in terms of social standing, he was hardly inferior even to the most exclusive local nobility.17 It was, these two highly aristocratic province governors who were most responsible for implementing the policy of 'de-militarising' internal peacekeeping, and thus undertook close co-operation with local authorities in co-ordinating the municipal police and civil state forces, in order to reduce the need for military assistance.

On the basis of the social profile of the province governors serving in Westphalia between 1871 and 1914, it appears that, after von Kühlwetter's death in 1882, there was little attempt to match the province governor socially with the Westphalian elites. The province governor was intended to be an outsider to local society and thereby an independent representative of the central power. After Kühlwetter, only von der Recke von der Horst originated from Westphalia, but he was also a former Prussian government minister and, thus, was closely connected to Berlin. The appointment of Baron von der Recke von der Horst and Prince von Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst as province governor in Westphalia might have been an attempt to ease the relationships with the Westphalian nobility. However, it appears that there was no attempt by the central government to shape the social profile of senior state administration to fit in with that of the industrial magnates of the Ruhr area.

16 Konrad Studt (only ennobled in 1906) participated in the hunting parties of the most distinguished members of the Westphalian nobility and was a private friend of Baron von Landsberg-Velen. Both have left evidence of their private correspondence. Münster HaStA: Nachlass Landsberg-Velen; Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin - Dahlem : Persönliche Nachlässe : Konrad von Studt 1838-1921 (8) 'Wirken als Oberpräsident in Münster 1889-1899' and (10) 'Ernennung zum Kultusminister: Glückwünsche, Herbst 1899'.

4.1.2. The social profile of the army corps commanders compared to local elite groups

Having observed that the senior civil servants had no social similarities with the industrial magnates, in terms of social and geographical origins or religious affiliations, it is not surprising that this was even less the case for senior military commanders. Like their civil counterparts, they were outsiders in Westphalia. Among the army corps commanders serving in Westphalia between 1871 and 1914, none of them originated from the province itself and, although the post was the last promotion before retirement, General von Einem was the only one who settled in Westphalia after his retirement. Conversely, General von Kluck, who originated from Münster, became the army corps commander in Posen and later in Königsberg. A similar picture existed for religious affiliations. The only Catholic army corps commander in Westphalia was Count zu Stolberg-Wernigerode (1871-1882) who, like the Catholic province governor von Kühlwetter, served during the decade of unification and Kulturkampf.

All following army corps commanders in Westphalia were Lutherans.

As for the noble profile of the army corps commanders, it is worth noting that during the Wilhelminian period a significant number of the generals reaching this post were commoners by birth, although the members of the old Prussian nobility remained the single most important group. Among the army corps commanders serving in Westphalia, both General von Mikusch and General von Bernhardi were commoners by birth while General von Einem was of recent nobility. There does therefore not

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18 General von Witzendorff (1882-1888) was born in Lüneburg and died in Göttingen; von Albedyll (1888-1893) was born in Brandenburg and retired to Potsdam; von Goetze (1893-1898) originated from Posen and retired to Hannover; von Mikusch-Buchberg (1898-1900) also originated from Posen but retired to Baden; General von Bülow (1900-1901) was born in and retired to Hannover; von Bissing (1901-1907) originated from Silesia; Friedrich von Bernhardi (1907-1909), who spend his childhood in Russia, retired to Silesia. Only General von Einem (1909-1913) who originated from Braunschweig retired to Westphalia.

19 That they both concluded service in 1882 is a coincidence, as von Kühlwetter died in office.

20 Among the 137 army corps commanders who served between 1871 and 1914, at least twenty were commoners by birth: Friedrich von Bernhardi (ennobled in 1901), Karl von Blume (1881), Bethold von Deimling (1905), Herman von Eichhorn (1856), Karl von Elsa (1893), Otto von Emmich (1912), Eduard von Fransecky and Max von Goetze (1843), Karl von Hänisch (1871), Alesander von Kluck (1909), August von Lenzte, Victor von Lignitz, von Linde, August von Mackensen (1899), Victor Mikusch-Buchberg (1869), Bruno von Mudra (1913), Reinhard von Scheffer-Boyadel, Friedrich von Scholtz, August Wilhelm Julius von Seebeck (1871), and Louis Stoetzer (who remained a commoner). Another twenty-one were of recent nobility.
seem to have been attempts by the Military Cabinet to appoint the most senior representative of the army who were socially similar to the exclusive Westphalian nobility.

After the failed policy of integration of the 1870 and 1880s, the Prussian military authorities seem to have given up any attempt to appoint general commanders according to the local elites. The army corps commanders were very senior bureaucrats who obtained this post at the very end of their careers, after having already occupied the most influential positions in the central institutions. Particularly under William II, the appointments of army corps commanders seem to have been conducted primarily with consideration to professional qualifications, or as a way of getting senior generals out of leading posts in the central institutions in such a way that it would look like promotion. This was particularly clear during the attempts by the young William II in 1888-1890 to rejuvenate the corps of generals who were occupying the leading military posts in Berlin. Thus, General von Albedyll, then head of the military cabinet, was 'promoted' to army corps commander in 1889 in order to clear the way for the King's candidate General von Hahnke.

Thus, both the senior members of the state administration and the army constituted a group of outsiders in the local society in which they were positioned. Similarly, the appointment of senior generals to a particular area appears to have been the result of political horse-trading among the military leaders in Berlin, rather than due to consideration for their possible future relations with the local elites in the province to which they were sent.

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21 General von Albedyll became army corps commander in 1889 after having occupied the post as chief of the military cabinet. General von Waldersee had been chief of the General Staff before being - unwillingly - promoted to the garrison in Altona 1892. Paul Bronsart von Schellendorff and Karl von Einem were promoted to army corps commander after having served for years as war minister. Moreover, nine of the army corps commanders serving between 1871 and 1914 belonged to the royal dynasties.

22 The appointment of von Kluck to Posen and Königsberg can only be seen as an instance of this.

23 At least, this is how the transfer of General von Albedyll to Münster was perceived by some of his colleagues. "Aus dem Briefwechsel des General-Feldmarschalls von Waldersee" 1.vol. (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, 1927 pp.229-230. Letter of 3 March 1889 from General von Loë to General von Waldersee. This was also how General von Waldersee saw his own transfer in 1892 from chief of the general staff to his new post as army corps commander in Altona. ("Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls von Waldersee" (ed.H.O.Meisner) 1922. vol.2 1888-1900; p.177. Diary of 26 January 1891.
4.2. The exclusion of local authorities

The implementation in Prussia of the policy of 'de-militarisation' of internal peacekeeping is in itself a strong indicator that the policy of maintaining public order was not primarily shaped according to the needs of the employers. This was despite the fact that the state administrators were up against quite powerful forces. The interests of heavy industry - in particular coal, iron and steel - were represented by the very powerful Central Association of German Manufacturers. These national associations of employers, established because of the impact of the industrial crisis 1873-1896, were otherwise very successful in their lobbying efforts for state subventions and the construction of tariff barriers. Indeed, from the 1880s, they came to play a key role in the economic policies of the German Empire. On the other hand, they were not very successful in asserting influence over questions concerning the mobilisation of military troops in case of major labour conflicts. During the 1889 strike, the powerful employers' association appealed in vain to the government to declare a state of siege, although many of the strikebound mines - particularly those in the Saarland - were owned and run by the state.

At the same time, individual mining companies addressed requests to the government describing in detail the type of military protection that they considered appropriate. After a meeting with representatives from the mining companies, von Baltz, the local governor in Gelsenkirchen, sent a letter to the minister of the interior forwarding the wishes of the mining companies about changing the previous military dispositions in order to obtain permanent military guards at the plants as well as frequent military

24 The Centralverband deutscher Industrieller was founded in 1876. It grew out of a number of smaller employers' associations such as the Union of German Iron and Steel Industrialists (Verein Deutscher Eisen- und Stahlindustrieller) founded in 1874, the Union of Mining Interests (Verein für die Bergbaulichen Interessen) founded in 1856, the Bochum Union (Der Bochumer Verein) founded in 1874, the Coal Union of the Rhineland and Westphalia (Das Rheinisch-Westfälische Kohlen syndikat) founded in 1893, and the Union for the Protection of Common Interests in the Rhineland and Westphalia (Verein für die Wahrung der gemeinschaftlichen Interessen in Rheinland und Westfalen).

25 Between 1875 and 1914, the number of employers' associations and cartels increased from eight to more than seven hundred. Wehler (1995) pp.632-633.


patrols. Nothing, however, came of this. Similarly, in 1905 and again in 1912, the mining companies appealed to the province governor of Westphalia and directly to the government to provide an impressive show of military force. Their requests were not fulfilled despite their attempts to present the problem of strikes in the mining sector as involving the interests and responsibility of the state.

4.2.1. Senior civil servants’ perceptions of local industrialists

Why did the industrial pressure groups have so little success in their attempts to persuade the province and district governors of needs to accommodate the wishes of heavy industry? In the first place it is important to note that the members of the Prussian administration generally showed a very self-assertive attitude towards local elites and locally elected authorities, particularly when these were bourgeois rather

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28 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2513, 1) Beiheft 2, 'Die auf die Arbeitseinstellungen eingegangenen Telegramme, 1889.' Letter of 13 May 1889 from the local governor in Gelsenkirchen to the minister of the interior: "Schliesslich bitten die Anwesenden auf eine Abänderung der bisherigen militärischen Disposition dahin hinzuwirken, dass die einzelnen Zechen ständige Wachen erhalten und die Zugangswege der Arbeiter durch häufige Patrouillen gesichert werden, da die Art des bisher gewährten militärischen Schutzes zur Sicherung der zur Arbeit bereiten Bergleute nachweislich nicht genügt. Die Zechen sind bereit, die Kosten der Quartierung für die ihnen zugewiesenen militärischen Wachen zu übernehmen."


than traditional landed nobility. As civil servants appointed by the minister of the interior and only responsible to the government in Berlin, Prussian civil servants were generally very conscious and jealous in guarding their positions and wished to demonstrate that they were independent from private, and in particular, capital interests. Thus senior civil servants usually showed a reluctant attitude towards direct pressure from business and industrial elites or from local authorities controlled by these notables.

Moreover, when comparing the attitude of the senior civil servants of the years before the great miners’ strike of 1889 with the attitude of bureaucrats from the period after the turn of the century, it appears that the state administration tended to increasingly distinguish its views from the claims of industrialists. In 1889, the predominant attitude among the civil servants was that strikes were unacceptable and that a forceful response to any form of public disturbance was the only appropriate way of dealing with them. On the other hand, the 1889 strike was also the first conflict in which certain civil servants began to doubt the justification of the employers’ continued refusal to negotiate with workers. For instance, the district governor in Düsseldorf, von Berlepsch, expressed his frustration about the intransigent attitude of mine-owners, even if such civil servants constituted a minority among the Westphalian senior civil servants. It was not that the rejection of anything that smacked of Social Democratism or even unionisation became less vigorous. It was rather that an element of criticism developed of the private companies for being irresponsible in their provocation of labour confrontations. Similarly, a certain bitterness can be discerned in von Berlepsch’s account of private companies and their pursuit of particular interests that put public order at risk and exposed the entire community to the threat of violent clashes.

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31 Bom talks about the professional arrogance of the state bureaucrats, who served the king compared to self-interested ‘merchants’. Bom (1957) p.82.
32 About the self-perception of the Prussian civil servants, see Bom (1957) p.82-84 and Henning (1987) p.141-144.
34 Dr. Hans Freiherr von Berlepsch ‘Sozialpolitische Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen’ München-Gladbach: Volksvereins-Verlag, 1925, p.25.
Similar considerations emerged on the occasion of the miners’ strike of 1905, when reports from the province and district governors to the Ministry of the Interior showed the exasperation with companies whose actions deliberately obstructed the police measures that were being taken by the state administration. Confronted with demands for military intervention in 1905, the state administration was not impressed, and decided that it intended to keep the use of troops under its strict control. In their justifications to the Ministry of the Interior for not yielding to the pressure from the mining companies, senior civil servants indicated that they were not duped about the motives behind the descriptions of widespread violence and riots put forward by the mining companies. Moreover, the state administrators bluntly described the claims of


the mining companies as irresponsible and their demands for forces as highly unrealistic. At the same time, senior civil servants, in contrast to the mining companies, accepted the authority of the trade unions over workers and the possibility that the strike could pass without incidents of serious unrest.

The state administrators had several reasons for ensuring a certain distance between themselves and the pressures by the industrialists and their associations for crackdowns on workers whenever they went on strike. A certain sympathy and understanding of the workers’ complaints can be traced in the correspondence between the state administrators and the Ministry of the Interior. The claims of workers were sometimes recognised as reasonable and justified, despite the strong aversion of the state administration to the Social Democratic movement. Similarly, a certain recognition of workers’ organisations developed, especially of those who held a mandate from workers to negotiate on their behalf. At the same time, the state administration once again insisted that it was primarily the responsibility of the private companies to finance private security forces and to pay for expenses in the case of a military intervention.


It is important to emphasise that, no matter how inclined the state authorities were to support the interests of the employers against the workers, the state administration saw itself as a neutral force in labour disputes. Similarly, in order to perform a role as arbitrator between the employers and employees, it was crucial that the state administration appeared as a relatively neutral force to the workers and not the instrument of capital.\textsuperscript{41}

4.2.2. The administrative abolition of the local authorities' right to requisition

Prussian civil servants, as well as their French counterparts, had a tradition of underlining their independence from the military authorities. During the reform era at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Prussian state administration had claimed its independence by contesting military commanders’ right to interfere in civilian affairs.\textsuperscript{42} Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the state administration complained that the military authorities were functioning as a co-executive (Mitregiment).\textsuperscript{43} The tendency of the military to interfere in civilian matters changed during the Imperial period as the army became increasingly isolationist and the distinction between the civil and military administrations became more clear-cut and respected by both sides.

From the point of view of the military commanders, relationships with the state administration had two main features. On the one hand, the attitude of the military commanders towards the state administrators at the lower ranks was arrogant and dismissive, in particular when it came to demands concerning military assistance.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41} For a further analysis of the attempted neutrality of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and state administration during the 1905 strike, see Born (1957) pp.184-185.
\textsuperscript{42} Funk (1986) p.30.
\textsuperscript{44} During the great miners’ strike 1889, General von Albedyll wrote to Waldersee: "In Berlin müssen sich durch das Geschrei der zum grossen Teil elenden Zivilbehörden und der Industriellen Auffassungen zur Geltung gebracht haben, die in der Tat nur der Angst der Betreffenden, keineswegs aber der wirklichen Sachlage entsprechen. Ich bekomme fast alle zehn Minuten ein Telegramm, worin der Umsturz aller Dinge erklärt wird, wenn nicht sofort militärische Hilfe komme, und es ist noch absolut gar nichts geschehen, was einer Eigentumsbeschädigung auch nur ähnlich sähe.(...) Wohl aber habe ich einen Landrat in Gelsenkirchen gesehen, der ein solches Rindvieh ist, dass er allein eine Revolution herbeiführen kann.(...) Ich kann allerdings nicht jedem Regierungspräsidenten
Military commanders typically complained that the civil authorities were too soft, obsessed with concerns for citizens' rights and inhibited by questions of the legality of their actions. Although the requisitions were grudgingly followed, the remarks from the military commanders were often that the state administration exaggerated problems and that there was no real threat of serious trouble.

The province and district governors never succeeded in obtaining formal recognition that requisitions for military assistance were to pass through them. However, if the state administration in Westphalia failed in its attempt to formally concentrate decision making at the regional level, the military authority did the job. During the conflicts of the 1890s, there are still examples of mayors addressing their requisitions directly to a local commander instead of passing through the province or district governor. This procedure was effectively stopped by army corps commanders who increasingly insisted on their authority to command, and forbade their subordinate commanders from mobilising troops without an explicit order from a higher military authority.

45 Thus, General von Deimling, in his justification of the Zabern affair in 1913, also refers to the incompetence and lack of energy of the state administration in Zabern, since they failed to provide sufficient police and gendarmerie to deal with the anti-military demonstrations. Berthold von Deimling 'Aus der Alten in die neue Zeit' Berlin: Im Verlag Ullstein, 1930 p.147. The word 'energetic' was a favourite term in the military correspondence and is closely linked to the importance of impressing and asserting respect for the public authorities and for the army in particular.

46 Moreover, certain generals expressed very little respect for the legal distribution of authority between the state administration and military authorities. Most famously, General von Waldersee, in his capacity as army corps commander in Altona, declared his willingness to take action against the Social Democrats into his own hands, with or without the consent of the Hamburg civil administration: “Ich will mich nunmehr gründlicher mit dem Treiben der Sozialdemokratie befassen. Wie mir scheint, macht es den Zivilbehörden wenig Freude, wenn der Kommandierende General sich um so etwas kümmert. Es soll mir dies aber gleichgültig sein, ich tue meine Pflicht. Wird es Ernst, so liegt doch alles in meiner Hand…” ‘Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls von Waldersee’ (ed. H.O.Meisner) vol.2, 1922. p.200. Diary of 15 March 1891. Similarly, the Zabern affair of 1913 demonstrated several examples of the complete disregard shown by certain officers to the civil authorities. (See Chapter Three). The tense relationship between the army and the local administration in Alsace-Lorraine, however, was notorious and cannot be taken as being representative of civil-military relations within the Prussian territory.

47 On the occasion of the May Day demonstrations in 1890, General von Loë, army corps commander in Koblenz and thus responsible for parts of the industrial area around the River Ruhr, complained to General Waldersee about being misused by the state administration and by the mayors of the larger cities, who all requested military protection. Letter of 24 April 1890 ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel des General-Feldmarschalls von Waldersee’ vol.1 (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, 1927 pp.367-368.

If the state administration and the military command did agree about one thing, it was to keep the locally elected authorities out of matters concerning the use of military troops. Both General von Albedyll and, in particular, General von Bissing, were disinclined to let local police commissioners have access to requisition of military troops. In a letter to General von Waldersee during the miners’ strike of 1889, General von Albedyll repeatedly expressed his doubts about the ability of the local authorities to judge the seriousness of a situation, and complained about the inaccurate and exaggerated descriptions he received from anxious mayors and police masters.

General von Bissing also made this point when, in 1904, the province governor suggested they should decide in advance to which garrison commander a local governor or police chief should address his requisitions in the case of an extreme urgency. General von Bissing objected that allowing local authorities to address requisition directly to a garrison commander was a blow to the authority of the army corps commander. It became then the general procedure that, if a local military commander received a requisition from a local authority, he then needed to ask the army corps commander for permission to mobilise. The army corps commander would then contact the province governor to check the seriousness of the case and the appropriateness of intervening with military troops.

The second aspect of the administrative exclusion of local authorities was through the definition of powers. Although the elected mayors and local police authorities had previously been considered legally empowered to issue a requisition, these rights became the object of some discussion within the state administration in 1904-1905. The argument put forward was that the local authorities could not be trusted to call for military assistance, because it was feared that in a situation where many strikes broke


50 See Chapter Nine.

out in different localities, such a procedure of requisitioning could only lead to chaos. Thus, requisitions needed to be co-ordinated by higher authorities. Accordingly, the municipal police authorities were stripped of their right to call for troops, by defining the 'county police authorities' (Kreispolizeibehörden) not as the individual police organisation but as their superior authority, that is either a mayor or the local governor.\footnote{Münster HaStA, OP 6896. Letter of 4 October 1904 from the district governor in Arnsberg to the province governor in Münster (documents 46-50): "...unter dem Ausdrucke 'die einzelnen Kreispolizei-behörden' nicht die einzelnen Polizeibehörden der Kreise, sondern die Landräte und die Bürgermeister zu verstehen"} Furthermore, this interpretation also stated that the right of mayors and local governors to call for troops would have to be restricted to cases of extreme urgency.\footnote{Münster HaStA, OP 6896. Letter of 4 October 1904 from the district governor in Arnsberg to the province governor in Münster (documents 46-50): "Aber auch das Recht der Landräte und der Bürgermeister der Stadtkreise auf selbständige Requisition muss auf den Fall der äussersten Not beschränkt bleiben."} In this view, the state administration was fully supported by the military authorities.\footnote{Münster HaStA, OP 6095, 'Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929.' Letter of 6 April 1906 from General von Bissing to the province governor in Münster.}

The result of these administrative adjustments was a \textit{de facto} transfer of authority from the local to the regional level. Only during the short periods when there was a general mobilisation of troops within a county or district was there direct communication between the local authorities and the military commander sent to the area. Increasingly after the turn of the century, communication between the civil authorities at all levels and the military authorities went through the province governor and the senior military commander.

\textbf{4.2.3. The question of financial responsibility}

During the first half of the century, when local authorities were most often under the control of the same notables who were object of popular protest movements, this had a significant influence on the measures taken against public disorder, including the requisition of military troops.\footnote{Lüdtke (1982) p.285, Spencer (1985) pp.305-306.} Until the early 1890s, there was strong pressure from local authorities and private citizens to call for military assistance in order to put down...
strikes and public disorder. However, when labour conflicts became more extended, more organised and more effective, the pressure on the state administration and the military authorities to provide a significant display of force against strikers and public unrest became much less direct. The most obvious reason for this change was the question of financing military interventions.

In principle, the expenses of a military intervention were to be covered by the local community or private person who had asked for protection. Of course, the management of a factory or a mining company could not itself issue a requisition, but, when asking any authority to call for police or military forces from outside the local community, the private company took upon itself the responsibility for covering the expenses incurred. In times when instances of public disorder could be managed with a limited number of men mobilised for a few days, these calls for military assistance were still within the financial reach of smaller communities, as well as of small and medium-sized industries. However, as labour conflicts became more extended and thus required a considerable number of forces for a conflict that could last for weeks or months, costs could soon exceed the financial capacities of smaller and medium-sized industries. Therefore, after 1889, the call for military intervention was seldom directly expressed by private companies, except for industries supported by financially powerful organisations, such as mining and heavy industry. Smaller private companies generally addressed their demands for protection to local authorities without specifying the type of force that they needed, whilst stressing that the potential for violence among the strikers was great and that the situation was uncontrollable, thus trying to influence the local authority to request military assistance at its own expense.

The local authorities were in a similar situation. If they issued a requisition, the community would then have to carry the costs of military intervention. Any mayor who wanted to be re-elected would think twice before taking a step that would weigh heavily on the municipal budget for years to come, especially if it was only an issue that concerned a minority of the electorate. If, on the other hand, a requisition for military intervention was finally issued by the state administration, there was always the possibility of negotiating for the state to take over at least some of the costs. As an
alternative to military intervention, the municipal police forces were extended at the expense of the local communities, whilst private companies built up their own security corps to protect material against attacks in case of a strike.\textsuperscript{56} However, as shown above, the civil forces were permanently understaffed and faced difficulties of preventing violent actions and attacks on material to take place.

For the state administration, this meant that, after 1889, requisitions from private companies and local authorities for it to call for military intervention became less frequent, and generally more hesitant than they had been previously.\textsuperscript{57} Pressure remained, however, for military intervention in conflicts in the mining industry, partly because it was the sector with the greatest potential for violence, partly because the mining industry was in a position to carry the costs - if necessary - of a longer military intervention.

4.3. The social acquaintances of senior administrators and military commanders and the exclusion of industrial magnates

4.3.1. Who associated with whom? Patterns of social acquaintance

In addition to the prejudices of civil servants against private companies, industrialists seemed to have had little informal access to senior civil servants or to senior military commanders. The question of informal connections between senior civil servants and industrial elites is difficult to demonstrate. However, within local society, the province and district governors, just like the senior military commanders, belonged to a social milieu from which the industrial bourgeoisie was virtually excluded. At the same time, studies of Rhineland-Westphalian industrialists all emphasise the social separation of

\textsuperscript{56} See Chapter Two.

\textsuperscript{57} On 12 March 1912, the day before the military intervention, the Westphalian Diet, under the presidency of Frhr. von Landsberg-Velen, sent a petition to the minister of the interior, urging the government to intervene in order to protect employers and employees from being threatened to stop working. However, instead of directly mentioning military intervention, the Diet simply asked that all necessary measures were taken to protect the strike breakers. The hint was hardly to be misunderstood. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.1 - Rep.77 - Titel 2523, 1), 'Die Arbeitseinstellung in den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen in dem Jahren 1889-1912' vol.17 (document 14).

Kaudelka-Hanisch's recent study reaches the same conclusion in relation to businessmen holding a semi-official status.\footnote{Kaudelka-Hanisch (1993) pp.89-90.} Apart from the Krupp family, hardly any of the heavy industrialists of the Rhineland-Westphalia area enjoyed personal friendships with civil servants or military officers.\footnote{Augustine (1993) p.69.} A similar degree of separation appears to have existed between the industrialists and the landed nobility,\footnote{The other munitions manufacturing magnat, Heinrich Ehrhardt, received frequent visits from the Duke of Saxe-Coburg Gotha, but such social contacts with the landed nobility were highly exceptional among the Rheinish-Westphalian heavy industrialists. (Augustine (1993) p.72). Members of the Rhineland nobility was often invited by the Krupps to the balls at Villa Hügel, but such invitations were normally declined. Augustine (1993) p.69.} whereas among themselves businessmen and industrialists seemed to have very close social ties.\footnote{Kaudelka-Hanisch (1993) p.89; Augustine (1993) p.69.}

In principle, the province governor belonged to the stratum where senior state officials, members of the royal houses and the noble elites could all meet at dinner parties, private balls and other celebrations.\footnote{Province or district governors and army corps commanders - by virtue of their capacity as representatives of the Prussian state in the province - were considered to be socially appropriate acquaintances for even the highest local nobility, and, if relevant, for social interchange with members of the minor royal houses. The degree to which this was accepted by the local noble families seem to have varied greatly from one province to another. The distinction was particularly significant between the nobility in the Eastern and Western provinces, and even varying between the Westphalian nobility and the noble elites of the neighbour provinces. Nevertheless, guest lists, table plans, and congratulation cards show that even in areas with the most socially exclusive local nobility, there was some degree of social interchange between the province governor, the army corps commander and the members of the local aristocracy. A particularly illustrating example of social acceptance by an otherwise exclusive noble elite is the well documented case of General von Kluck, during his command in the Eastern provinces of Silesia (Breslau), Posen and East-Prussia (Königsberg). Even before being ennobled, General (von) Kluck frequented the houses of the Prince of Saxe-Meiningen, with whom he used to play whist. He joined in the private birthday parties of members of the Silesian noble class and, in Königsberg, he received guests such as Prince Dohna, Count Dönhoff-Friedrichstein and Count Dohna-Waldburg. Among the guests at the same dinner parties also appear the senior members of the state administration. Alexander von Kluck 'Wanderjahre - Kriege - Gestalten' Berlin: Verlag R. Eisenschmidt 1929 p.105; Dr. Eugen Wolbe 'Alexander von Kluck' Verlag Otto Spamer, Leipzig 1917; pp.71-72. Military Archive, Freiburg, N/550, Personal Papers of General von Kluck.} On the basis of the available memoirs on these milieus, it is easier to define who was considered an appropriate social acquaintance

for military commanders, than it is for senior civil servants, who were supposed to have professional contact with several important groups. However, the social boundaries around military commanders give a good indication of the inclusion and exclusion of social groups within these particular milieus at the provincial level.

4.3.2. Military commanders and the local ‘milieus’

Like the state administration, the military authorities - not surprisingly given the general condescending attitude of the Prussian officer corps towards civilians - displayed a dismissive attitude towards the interests of local authorities and industrialists as a ‘bunch of bourgeois merchants’. The military commanders tended to be isolationists in the local community. In particular, the generals of the older generation who served under William I were very reluctant about appearing in public, or even addressing, a non-military public, although conventions obliged the general commander to participate in the public celebrations of the regime, as the representative of the army and of the monarch.

In principle, the general commanders were given - or at least took upon themselves - the task of making contact with local elites and other influential groups in order to persuade these groups to accept the Imperial regime. Many army corps commanders seemed to attribute a great deal of importance to the so-called ‘cultural mission’ which was being pursued with different degrees of success from the foundation of the German Empire up to the out-break of the First World War. Thus, relations with local elites are a general theme in the memoirs and biographies of general commanders. Similar attempts can be observed in the case of Westphalia.

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64 Demeter (1965) p.168.
65 At the King’s birthday and at the Sedan Day, the general commander would appear in public together with the other representatives of the state and of the local authorities (the province governor, the senior magistrate, the mayor).
66 This also relates to General von Kluck when he was promoted to headmaster at the Military Academy in Baden in 1888. “Dieser neuen Anstalt konnte er den Stempel seines Geistes aufdrücken. ‘Sie haben eine Kulturaufgabe zu lösen’, so hatte der ritterliche Grossherzog Friedrich I von Baden bei einer ihm in Karlsruhe gewährten Vorstellung die Bedeutung dieses neuen Amtes gekennzeichnet. In der Tat: die Anstalt sollte inmitten einer vielfach noch französisch denkenden und französisch empfindenden Bevölkerung einen Hort des Deutschtums darstellen.” Similarly, when he was moved to Ostmark in 1898. “Hier wie dort (Baden) galt es, eine Kulturmission zu erfüllen: der Offizier, zumal der Kommandeur eines Regiments, bedeutet in der Ostmark einen Bannträger des Deutschtums inmitten einer Bevölkerung vielfach slavischen Stammens.” Dr.Eugen Wolbe
In 1889, General von Albedyll, who had just been moved to the post of army corps commander in Münster, endeavoured to create a good relationship with the predominantly Catholic nobility in Westphalia, whose enthusiasm for the Prussians was particularly limited. On the other hand, he saw the industrial magnates as people who were to be carefully watched and tamed. Later, General von Bernhardi\(^6\) and General von Einem indicated similar patterns of social links in Münster.\(^6\)

The ‘cultural mission’ and ‘duty of military representation’ could only take place within the boundaries of strong conventions surrounding the social acquaintance of a senior military commander and the strict rules for appropriate behaviour in public.\(^7\)

From the descriptions in the generals’ memoirs, it appears that the groups which the military commanders perceived as the ‘local elites’ and who were appropriate for his acquaintance, primarily consisted of three categories. In the first place, social acquaintances with the province governor were almost compulsory and were attributed

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a great deal of importance. Similarly, the military commanders of the smaller garrisons were expected to have social links with the senior civil servant in the area. In the memoirs and biographies of former army corps commanders, the excellent relationship with the province governor is a theme which is very often dwelt upon. The province governor, who is almost invariably described as an excellent and highly cultivated man, is often the only member of the local community who enjoys a separate mention in the generals’ autobiographies.

In the wider circle of acquaintances figured the most important members of the local nobility, and - if relevant - members of the royal dynasties. At the same level,
although depending upon the personal inclination of the individual army corps commander, ranked social relations with senior members of the clergy - both Protestant and Catholic. In the widest circle of acquaintances came senior members of the magistrature and university professors, as well as representatives of locally elected bodies (city mayors, members of the upper chamber of the Prussian Diet, and perhaps certain distinguished members of the local assembly).

A feature which appears quite clearly from the generals’ memoirs is that the industrial and business elites were not a part of this milieu. One notorious exception, which in itself was significant, was the Krupp family. Alfred and Fritz Krupp enjoyed privileged relations with several senior commanders, as well as with the King, who were all private guests at the Krupp residence ‘Villa Hügel’ in Essen. However, the direct access of Krupp to the military leaders was - as General von Deimling explained in his


76 The local representatives appear on table plans only for larger banquets held by the army corps commander, generally those comprising above seventy-five guests.

memoirs - entirely due to Krupp being the main provider of modern weaponry to the army.78 Nevertheless, despite the direct access of the Krupps to top generals and to senior civil servants such as the province governor von Studt,79 and despite the Krupp firm financing six local gendarmes between 1870 and 1910,80 their industry never obtained military protection during labour conflicts.

4.4. Patterns of co-operation and exclusion concerning maintenance of public order in Westphalia

It is important to note that it was the Prussian local authorities who were in charge of the maintenance of public order through the municipal police forces. The state administration’s role was to co-ordinate the different municipal police organisations within a larger territory, in co-operation with the local authorities. Secondly, the state authorities were in charge of co-ordinating the state forces (Royal Guards and the gendarmerie). The co-operation that took place between the district governor and local authorities on the issue of maintenance of order allowed the state administration to influence the strategies applied by the municipal police forces, but without making the state the financially responsible. On the other hand, co-operation between the state administration and the local authorities in maintenance of public order did not cover the question of military involvement. With the effective exclusion of the local authorities from the issue of military intervention, this latter question became a matter entirely dealt with between province or district governors and the army corps commanders.

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80 Jessen (1991) p.120.
4.5. The policy of using of troops in Nord-Pas-de-Calais: the prefects and pressure from local society

4.5.1. Mayors and the problems of requisitioning military assistance

In 1891, in the wake of the bloody incidents at Fourmies, Henri Vel-Durand, prefect of département Nord, argued that the responsibilities of the mayors and the prefects in terms of maintenance of public order were becoming increasingly difficult, since they were constantly being exposed to criticism from local society.81

In comparison with Westphalia, the position of the prefect differed from that of the Prussian senior civil servants in two significant ways. First, the Westphalian province and district governors could acquire a significant degree of influence over the measures used against public unrest by organising close co-operation between the various municipal police organisations. This was possible in Prussia because all the local authorities - as a result of the three-class voting system - were controlled by the wealthy middle class whose basic attitude and interests in matters of maintenance of order were the same in all the local communities.82 In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, it was not possible to establish an organisation at the departmental level of all the municipal police forces because policies towards public disorder varied from one municipality to another, depending on the political composition of each community.

The second problem was that, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the mayors with their different policies and sympathies were mutually divided over the issue of military presence. In October 1902, for instance, when the miners from the entire region went on strike, the mayor of Bethune and the surrounding suburban municipalities urged the prefect of Pas-de-Calais to request military assistance. On the other hand, the mayor of Avion,

81 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12525, 'Événements de Fourmies.' Report of 6 May 1891 from the prefect of département Nord to the Ministry of the Interior: "Il faut considérer que le rôle de l'administration, maires et fonctionnaires, s’est singulièrement modifié depuis quelque temps. Il ne suffit plus d’être intelligent et bon administrateur; il faut être prêt à tous les dangers, de quelque nature qu’ils soient, les prévenir, si possible, être la première victime pour qu’on vous pardonne de vous défendre."

who was from the French Labour Party, as well as the Socialist mayors of Lens and Denain, protested vigorously against the idea of military intervention and threatened to resign if troops were called upon.\textsuperscript{83} For the prefects, it was the mayors who sympathised with the striking workers who caused problems for the coherent management of order in the region. The immediate solution to the problem was to strip the mayors of their authority over the municipal police while a major conflict was taking place.\textsuperscript{84}

Within their constituencies, the mayors were in a particularly difficult position. No matter what decision a mayor might take, the municipality risked ending up with a huge bill. The 1884 law on local government made the communities financially responsible for damage to public and private property if the local authorities had not used all their legal resources to ensure the maintenance of public order.\textsuperscript{85} On the other hand, the expense of a requisition for supplementary \textit{gendarmerie} forces or military troops would also fall upon the local community unless these were explicitly sent for on the prefect's initiative.\textsuperscript{86} There are many examples where mayors complained about bearing expenses for forces that they had not called for.\textsuperscript{87} Similarly, one mayor called for supplementary forces only at the moment when he knew that the prefect could hardly spare any more \textit{gendarmes}. The reason for this was bluntly admitted. By taking

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{83} Cooper-Richet (1987) p.409.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Haupt (1986) p.246; Cooper-Richet (1987) p.409.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Law of 5 April 1884 on municipal powers, Articles 106 and 108.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Berlière (1996) p.83.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Departmental Archives, Arras, M.4865, 'Grève générale dans le bassin houillers 1891. Documents divers.' Minutes from the session of 20 November 1891 of the municipal council of Beuvry: "Considérant que les troupes cantonnées à Beuvry (100 chasseurs à cheval et 4 officiers) n'ont pas été demandées par le maire pour le maintien de l'ordre; Que par suite, il paraît légitime et équitable que la commune de Beuvry ne subisse aucune charge à propos de la présence de ces troupes; Qu'enfin la présence de ces militaires à Beuvry paraît inutile; Décide à l'unanimité, que dans le cas où ce retrait serait jugé impossible par l'autorité supérieure, la commune ne soit, en aucune manière, obligé de supporter la moindre part des frais du cantonnement, et que les habitants où sont logés les militaires soient indemnisés de leurs frais et débours et pertes occasionnés par la présence des militaires dans leur habitation." Similarly, a letter of 22 November 1891 from the mayor Avion to the prefect of Pas-de-Calais,
\item Departmental Archives, Arras, M.4865 'Grève générale dans le bassin houillers 1891. Documents divers', and a letter of 13 September 1893 from the mayor of Lens to the prefect of Pas-de-Calais, Departmental Archives, Arras, M.4862 'Grève générale dans le bassin houiller 1893. Renseignements, Instructions, correspondance'. The question over the financial responsibility became a way of sustaining politically motivated protests against the presence of military troops. Departmental Archives, Lille, M.625 /9, 'Grèves de textiles: Armentières, requisition de troupes, 1903.' Letter of 8 October 1903 from the mayor of Houpline to the prefect of \textit{département} Nord.
\end{itemize}
this step and calculating that the prefect would refuse, the local community was discharged from its financial responsibility for private property damaged by rioters or striking workers.\(^{88}\) Politically, mayors often faced strong pressures from mine and factory owners to call for larger military forces. The mayors were also constantly at risk of facing criticism for not having done enough if a situation went out of control.\(^ {89}\) At the same time, striking workers, as well as the groups who were not involved in the conflict, would complain about the expense of troops and consider this to be a costly and exaggerated measure.

During the early days of a conflict, both the local military commanders and the sub-prefects and prefects would receive a large number of requisitions issued by the municipalities, some of which were meant to be taken seriously, often followed by vastly exaggerated descriptions of the situation in the local area, and others which were merely issued in order to discharge the municipality from its legal obligations. This provided a very unclear picture of the seriousness of events and made it very difficult to co-ordinate the management of public order. Moreover, a miners’ strike or a major strike in the textile industry would cover a great number of companies or factories within a wide territory covering several municipalities, many of which were not directly affected by the strike. Groups of striking workers would often move from one area to another trying to make the workers of other mines or factories join the conflict. A major strike would therefore directly or indirectly affect the majority of municipalities within the district.

It is within this patchwork of administrative units, with opposing sympathies towards labour conflicts and dissimilar policies towards public unrest, that one has to understand the impossibility of relying heavily on municipal police forces in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. It also explains why the prefects were not immediately vulnerable to pressures from local groups. From the early 1890s, when conflicts became more

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\(^{88}\) Departmental Archives, Arras, M.1231 ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houillers 1889. Documents divers’. Letter of 8 November 1889 from the mayor in Leforest in the arrondissement of Béthune, to the prefect of Pas-de-Calais.

\(^{89}\) In 1903, a textile factory in Armentières considered taking legal action against the municipality that it accused of not taking all the measures necessary to prevent violent attacks on private property. Departmental Archives, Lille, M.625/4 ‘Grèves de textiles de 1903 - correspondance du préfet avec le ministre.’ Letter of 3 December 1903 from the minister of the interior to the prefect in Lille.
extended and the political make-ups between the municipalities became increasingly complicated, the only way of ensuring coherent management of a major conflict was for the prefect to take over responsibility from the local authorities.

4.5.2. The prefectoral take-over of control

Examination of the degree to which the policies pursued by the prefects were influenced by pressure from local groups or individuals is very difficult to handle, since such issues are likely not to appear among the official documents. Only occasionally does evidence appear among the prefectoral correspondence of attempts to persuade the prefect either to call upon the army or to refrain from doing so. It is also impossible to demonstrate the extent to which this type of pressure actually shaped a prefect's decisions. It is well known that the prefects of the early Third Republic were exposed to pressure from local representatives: deputies, senators, mayors, and members of the regional council, (conseillers généraux). In order to perform efficiently as the government's executive representative in a département, it was essential for the prefect to have a reasonable degree of goodwill among the members of locally elected bodies. Moreover, due to governmental instability of the Third Republic and because of the ever-changing and fragile alliances in the National Assembly, the deputies - who were often also mayors in the most important towns - sometimes put pressure on prefects by threatening to withdraw their support for the government. There are,

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91 There does not seem to have been any direct interference by the conseil général in the policy of mobilising the army for internal peacekeeping. The minutes from the Conseil Général in Lille show that the issue was only raised three times between 1891 and 1913, and that the complaints from the elected representatives attracted little interest and had scarcely any effect. In 1893, when three members proposed a resolution inviting the government to refrain from mobilising the army for labour conflicts, the prefect simply asked the council not to discuss an issue which fell outside its competence. "M. le Préfet: - J'ai le regret d'avoir à demander au Conseil Général de vouloir bien écarter par la question préalable le voeu qui vient d'être déposé par M. Carette. Il me paraît que la discussion d'un voeu semblable - qui ne pourrait d'ailleurs, j'en suis convaincu, aboutir qu'à un rejet, - pourrait avoir de graves conséquences. Il se rapporte à une question de politique et échappe à la compétence du Conseil Général." (Session of 11 April 1893). A similar resolution was presented to the Conseil Général in April 1904 and again in May 1905. These resolutions were briefly discussed, one motion failed, the other passed. However, this resolution from the Conseil Général was of no political consequence. Departmental Archives, Lille, 1.N.135-158, ‘Délibérations du Conseil Général,1891-1913’.  
however, three indicators that point against the idea of public order policy being strongly shaped by pressure from local representatives.

In the first place, if the posts of prefect in the two départements of Nord and Pas-de-Calais were put at stake over the issue of the policy towards public unrest, this should be discernible through a high degree of prefectoral instability. This, however, was not the case. The départements Nord and Pas-de-Calais had, together with the département Seine, the highest degree of prefectoral stability between 1877 and 1958. Despite a national average of fewer than four years in service for prefects in the period 1876-1918, of the prefects who served in Pas-de-Calais between 1883 and 1918, all but one served seven years or more. Apart from the years 1897-1899, a similar pattern of prefectoral stability can be observed in the département Nord. Moreover, one can observe that the same prefects served first in Pas-de-Calais and were then promoted to the particularly difficult département Nord. Thus, Vel-Durand served fourteen years altogether in the region, Alapetite and Trépont served for a total of ten years each, and Louis Vincent remained prefect in Nord during the twelve most turbulent years of the recent history of this département between 1899 and 1911. The remarkable degree of prefectoral stability indicates that successive ministers of the interior were more inclined to maintain a strong prefect, someone who could impose himself in a difficult region, rather than to sacrifice him for the sake of political alliances in the National Assembly.

Secondly, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the political make-ups were polarised between traditionally strong groups of conservatives, supported by the industrial elites, and an increasingly influential group of Radicals and Socialists, supported by the increasing

93 The départements Nord and Pas-de-Calais had respectively eighteen and nineteen prefects between 1877 and 1958. This had to be compared to an average number of prefects in a French département at 30.6. The most unstable départements (Corse and Tarn) both had 45 prefects between 1877 and 1958. Siwek-Poudesseau (1969) pp.60-64.
94 Vel-Durand (1883-1890), Alapetite (1890-1900), Duréault (1900-1907), Trépont (1907-1910), and Briens (1911-1918).
95 Vel-Durand (1890-1897), Lauranceau (1897-1898), Vatin (1898-1899), Vincent (1899-1911), and Trépont (1911-1918).
96 Vincent Wright observes a similar pattern of 'îles de stabilité' in relation to the difficult post of prefect of the Seine, which was occupied for fifteen years between 1896 and 1911 by Justin de Selves, and the post of police prefect of Paris, held by Louis Lépine from 1899 to 1913. Wright (1994) p.299.
number of industrial workers. Accordingly, the potential pressure from local mayors and deputies would have been divided between those in favour and those against military intervention. If the policy towards public unrest were heavily influenced by pressure from local representatives, one would expect a pattern where the measures which were implemented changed significantly from one conflict to another, depending on the strength of the government and the political alliances within the National Assembly. This was not the case. On the contrary, a highly stable pattern in the policy pursued can be observed over the entire period.

Thirdly, the number of military interventions virtually exploded under the Waldeck-Rousseau, Combes and Clemenceau administrations. These governments depended more than any previous government on the support of political groups who were the most likely to oppose military intervention. This indicates that in questions concerning the maintenance of public order, the policies pursued by the prefects were not a reflection of horse-trading in regard to national politics, but that the prefects had the power to impose their policies with little regard to local pressure groups or individuals.

While the municipal authorities pulled in opposite directions, depending on the political majority within each community, the only way of avoiding total chaos when a conflict was extended over several municipalities was for the prefect to take charge of all the measures to be implemented. Increasingly, therefore, decisions about maintenance of order were moved from the municipal to the prefectoral level, thus marginalising local authorities. In cases where the military was asked to intervene, requisitions would come to the army corps commander through the prefect, who had received information about the situation on the spot from sources independent of the local authorities: the sub-prefect, the gendarmerie or the agent of the state rail-police (commissaire spécial).

97 These definitions were used by François Goguel 'Géographie des élections françaises sous la Troisième et Quatrième République' Paris: Armand Colin, 1970.
4.5.3. The attitude of prefects towards local authorities and private companies

Within the state administration, there was also a considerable degree of suspicion regarding the willingness and capacity of the municipal authorities to fulfil their responsibilities in maintaining public order.98 Prefects and military authorities alike had many prejudices against the municipal police and the capacity of these local forces to perform adequately in sensitive situations. Municipal police organisations remained notoriously understaffed in many areas. The policemen were badly trained and lacked authority with the local population.99 Moreover, the prefects did not trust the neutrality of the local authorities and suspected the mayors of being either too repressive or too indulgent, depending on their political sympathies.100

Like the Prussian state administration, the prefects were hardly fooled by the fact that the municipal police were the extended arm of the industrialists in local communities dominated by a wealthy middle class. Prefects had no illusions about the attempts by private companies to exaggerate the descriptions of violence and riots in order to make the mayor or prefect provide the maximum display of force. In this respect, the self-perception of prefects as neutral arbitrators should not be underestimated. Like in Westphalia, it was of major importance for the prefect to appear disinterested and not a prisoner of the interests of the mine and factory owners, in order to be a credible arbitrator in labour conflicts. In the early 1890s, the prefects in Lille often complained about companies who seemed to regard the public forces - including the army - as their private security service.101 The irritation of the prefects over private companies was

101 In the early 1890s it was not uncommon for mining companies to send requests to the prefect stating how many soldiers they needed for the protection of their plants. The requests from the miners' strike of September 1893 were numerous and the demand for soldiers abundant. "Comme vous le savez, une grève est imminente pour le 16 courant, la lettre du syndicat ne permettant pas aux compagnies d'y donner une réponse favorable. Voici à peu près les postes que je vous serai obligé de faire garder par la troupe: 1) La fosse No.1 où 30 hommes d'infanterie pourraient être logé et 20 cavaliers; 2) Ateliers Centraux, ancienne fosse No.2. 50 hommes; 3) Salle de gymnastique, co-operative; 50 hommes avec logement; 4) Fosse No.3; 60 hommes d'infanterie et 15 cavaliers; 5) Fosse No.4; 100 hommes et 30 cavaliers; 6) Fosse No.5; 150 hommes; 7) Bureau généraux; 21 hommes. On peut y loger une centaine au besoin." Departmental Archives, Arras, M.4862 'Grève générale dans le bassin houiller 1893. Renseignements, Instructions, Correspondance'. Letter of 13 Setember 1893 from the director of the 'Mines de Bruay' to the preferct of Pas-de-Calais. Similar requests were sent to the prefect of Pas-de-Calais from the company 'Vicoigne & Noeux' (Letter of 17 September 1893), from the mining company 'Vendin-Lez-Béthune' (Letter of 17 September 1893), and from 'La
reinforced by frequent battles over bills, and the problems of making the private companies, who claimed that their property had been insufficiently protected, cover their share of expenses.102

The suspicion and irritation of the prefects over local industrialists using the public forces for their own particular interests emerge quite strongly in the accounts provided to the Ministry of the Interior about the events at Fourmies in 1891, when fourteen striking workers were killed by military troops. In a report from the special commission that had been investigating the incident for the Ministry of the Interior, accusations against the local authorities and the industrialists were numerous.103 The blame for the disorder that had broken out during the May Day demonstrations was, according to the special commission, caused by the intransigent attitude of local industrialists towards their employees.104 Secondly, the mayor and local counsellors - most of whom were mine or factory owners - were criticised for using public forces to ensure their own property, while displaying only a semblance of consideration for the maintenance of public order within the rest of the community.105

102 Departmental Archives, Arras, M.1231 'Grève générale dans le bassin houiller 1889. Documents divers'. Letter of 22 October 1889 from the prefect of Pas-de-Calais to the senior manager of 'La Compagnies de Béthune': "Sans discuter plus que vous les causes de la grève, je ne puis accepter le reproche que contient, à l'adresse de l'Autorité, la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire. Il me suffit de constater que, depuis le 16 de ce mois, des patrouilles ont été faites, à l'heure de la descente, autour de vos fosses les plus voisines du terrain de la grève, par dix-huit gendarmes à cheval et que, dès le 18 sur votre demande, un détachement de 220 hommes du génie a été mis à votre disposition pour la garde de vos fosses et la protection des ouvriers qui auraient désiré continuer le travail. L'autorité militaire à qui depuis les réquisitions que je lui ai adressées, incombe le soin de maintenir l'ordre, d'assurer la liberté du travail et la sécurité des biens et des personnes déclare, qu'étant données les circonstances, aucune disposition plus favorable ne pouvait être prise."


104 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12527, ‘4e Bureau de la Sûreté Générale: Événements de Fourmies le 1er mai 1891.’ Report of 14 June 1891 by the Commission spéciale adjointe to the Ministry of the Interior: ‘Les patrons n'ont rien fait pour calmer les esprits et en étudiant leur conduite on est porté à croire qu'ils cherchaient à provoquer la grève... Ils disaient à qui voulait l'entendre: 'Quand les ouvriers auront faim ils reviendront, nous ne sommes pas pressés et nous serions bien bons de ne pas profiter de la circonstance qui met tous les atouts dans notre jeu'. Ces paroles m'ont été dites textuellement par M. Hiroux, grand industriel et maire de Sains-du-Nord.... Dès le premier mai les six patrons avaient pris l'engagement d'honneur de ne reprendre le travail qu'aux anciennes conditions; ils refusaient même de recevoir les délégués ouvriers et ne voulaient entendre parler d'aucune revendication sous prétexte 'qu'ils sont maîtres chez nous'...”

A similar account was given by the prefect of dépuitement Nord, Vel-Durand, who saw the call for troops and the escalation of an otherwise peaceful demonstration into violent encounters between the armed forces and the strikers as the result of pressure from local industrialists to protect their particular interests.106 To the sub-prefect, he stressed that demands for protection coming from private companies were often exaggerated.107 In his report to the ministry concerning the incidents, Vel-Durand was obviously keen to persuade his superiors in Paris that he had no hand in the matter and that the unfortunate incident was the result of irresponsible local authorities and an inexperienced sub-prefect.108 Apparently, he managed to avoid responsibility, because he remained in office until 1897. However, prefects in subsequent periods in the départements Nord and Pas-de-Calais were generally very keen on remaining in charge of the maintenance of public order when military troops were involved and, indeed, sought to closely supervise the requisitions issued by mayors and sub-prefects.

If the prefects became increasingly suspicious about the neutrality of the mayors who were closely connected to mine and factory owners, a similar attitude was apparent in relation to mayors whose sympathies lay with the labour movement. Among

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106 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12525, 'Evénements de Fourmies'. Report of 6 May 1891 by the prefect of dépuitement Nord: "...je ne pressentais pas de désordre sérieux et (estimais) que le concours de la gendarmerie serait probablement suffisant pour le maintien de l'ordre. Cependant le sous-préfet pressé par le maire et les industriels, notamment par M. Boussus, grand industriel à Wignehies, conseiller général, M. Bélin, président de l'association industrielle, tous deux républicains, me demanda de vouloir bien solliciter, pour le 1er mai, l'envoi dans les environs de la ville d'un escadron de cavalerie.(...) Le 28, (le sous-préfet) me transmettait le voeu des industriels plus inquiets, qu'une manifestation militaire eût lieu le matin même du 1er mai. Sans partager leur avis, il me faisait connaître qu'à défaut de cavalerie, il (le sous-préfet) dirigerait dès le matin des compagnies d'infanterie."

107 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12525, 'Evénements de Fourmies'. Report of 6 May 1891 by the prefect of dépuitement Nord: "Il faut considérer que la force publique ne doit être employée qu'au maintien et au rétablissement de l'ordre s'il est menacé et non à des manifesterations qui passeraient à bon droit pour puériles et abusives; qu'elle doit dans tous les cas être mise à la disposition du maire sur une demande écrite et non à celle des industriels qui sont souvent portés à réclamer une garnison à leur profit personnel."

108 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12525, 'Evénements de Fourmies'. Report of 6 May 1891 by the prefect of dépuitement Nord to the Ministry of the Interior: "Je ne pouvais d'ailleurs m'opposer aux mesures d'ordre que le sous-préfet pouvait juger nécessaires, et c'est dans ces conditions que, dès le matin du 1er mai, deux compagnies d'infanterie étaient envoyées à Fourmies."
administrators, there was little sympathy for trade unionism, which was about to establish itself outside the control of the politicians in the National Assembly. In particular, the communist *Confédération Générale du Travail*, with its revolutionary tendencies, was considered with much suspicion. The prefects therefore saw attempts by Socialist mayors to protect strikers from police intervention - and ultimately from military intervention - as an irresponsible policy that put public order seriously at risk.

4.5.4. The prefects and local authorities: patterns of co-operation and exclusion

As was the case in Westphalia, decision making concerning the use of military troops in Nord-Pas-de-Calais was moved from the local to the regional level. There were still cases in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the First World War of mayors requesting troops directly by the local military authorities. This, however, was only in minor cases, such as maintaining order for visits of VIPs or during peaceful gatherings of large numbers of people. In these cases, a local commander would be directly requested by a mayor or - in the case of Dunkerque - by the civil governor. In these minor cases, the local commander would order his troops to mobilise, and only afterwards inform the army corps commander through the ordinary bureaucratic channels. It normally took four days for such a message to pass from a local commander through the commander of the section, the commander of the sub-division, and the division commander, before it landed on the army corps commander's desk in Lille. If the local commander was uncertain about the measures to be taken or about the potential for trouble, he sometimes warned the army corps commander by telegram in order to obtain his informal approval.

However, these local requisitions always took place under close supervision from the prefectural authority. No decision could be taken without the prefect's knowledge.

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110 This became particularly apparent during the turbulent spring of 1906, when Socialist mayors - in particular Basly, mayor of Lens - joined the demonstrations against the military intervention. Wormser (1961) p.210-214; Rebérioux (1975) p.113. Similarly, the trouble South France over the summer 1907, showed the opposition from mayors who were sympathetic to the protest movement of the wine growers, and who resigned in great numbers in protest against the military intervention.
Thus, directly or indirectly, the prefect was always in charge of the conflicts involving the army. During the years between 1890 and 1914, the prefect became the single most important authority of any decision concerning the use of troops within his département. The moment a conflict became slightly controversial, prefects preferred to take over its management themselves, thus bypassing attempts by local groups in favour or against the measures implemented.

In Westphalia, where the state administration entered into close co-operation with the local authorities in organising independent municipal police forces, the Prussian state administration gained some degree of control over this organisation without assuming financial responsibilities. The French prefects, in contrast, wanted to remain entirely in charge and accepted the financial responsibility that followed from this control. The result was that municipal forces were not included in plans for protection and remained on the sidelines. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, there was no coherent planning for municipal police forces. In cases of major unrest, their use was decided on the spot, depending on the situation. As for the gendarmerie, like the army, there were detailed plans for their distribution and their subsequent tasks in this type of situation. Thus, the mayor of the main towns of Nord-Pas-de-Calais never played a key role in the process of managing larger cases of unrest.

In Westphalia, the mayors, in particular those in the larger towns such as Dortmund, Essen, and Düsseldorf, became very important figures in the process of maintaining public order as long as military troops were not called upon. Since the strategies developed by the state authorities mainly relied on civil forces - in particular municipal police forces - the chief mayor of the major cities played a key role in the preparation and execution of measures to maintain order, before troops were called for. As for questions concerning requisition of military troops, the local authorities of the main towns in Westphalia became as marginalised in decision making as were the local authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.
Prefects and army corps commanders: Co-operation and conflicts

4.6.1. Attitudes of military commanders towards local authorities and industrialists

In their prejudices against both Conservative and Socialist mayors, the prefects were joined by the military authorities, who, in turn, did not think much of the municipal police forces' capacity to deal with unrest of any significance.\(^{111}\) The military's prejudices became all the stronger when it came to the industrialists and their claims for protection. Their attitude towards private companies is another element that changed radically between 1890 and 1914. During the labour confrontations of the 1880s, the private companies treated the public forces - including the army - as their private agents, and simply expected them to perform according to the needs and wishes of the factory and mine owners. As in Prussia, there were many of examples of private companies suggesting to pay extra bonuses for the *gendarmes* or soldiers mobilised.\(^{112}\) The military authorities were increasingly irritated about the exaggerated reports emanating from the private companies, and felt particularly abused when rushing to communities where private companies had described widespread violence and riots and found the situation much calmer than described.\(^{113}\)

More seriously, the military authorities, were reluctant to become an extended police force. They were therefore very careful not to perform as a private security force for local industrialists.\(^{114}\) After the military interventions in Anzin in 1880 and again in 1884, the mining companies were supposed to pay for the expenses incurred, such as

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\(^{111}\) Bruneteaux (1996) pp.45-47. See also Chapter Five.

\(^{112}\) This was a widespread phenomenon during the mining conflicts of the 1880s and early 1890s. See note 105.

\(^{113}\) Departmental Archives, Arras, M.1231, 'Grève générale dans le bassin houillers 1889. Documents divers'. Letter of 25 October 1889 from the general commander in Lens to the prefect of Pas-de-Calais. "J'ai demandé à général division l'envoi de deux compagnies à Bruay, mais je vous demande instamment de calmer le maire qui me semble ne pas se rendre compte des forces mises déjà à la disposition du commandant des troupes dans sa commune." Particularly during the great miners' strike of 1901, complaints were expressed through the War Ministry about exaggerated use of military troops long time after the strike had officially ended. Archives Nationales, F.7.12779, '4ème Bureau de la sûreté générale: Grève générale des mineurs 1901-1914' Letters of 11 January and 16 May 1902 from the war minister to the minister of the interior. Similarly, the letter of 20 June 1902 from the General Staff to the minister of the interior.

\(^{114}\) This point was made particularly clear by General de France in his instructions of 15 February 1893 to the first army corps 'Instruction en cas de grève ou de troubles.'
accommodation, food and supplies for officers, soldiers and horses. However, the military authorities vigorously refused the idea that a supplementary payment to the officers and soldiers should be paid by the private companies, thus employing the troops virtually like a private security corps.115

Similarly, in the few cases in which mining companies addressed their plea for military protection directly to the army corps commander, the request was returned to the civil administration which had been bypassed.116 Apart from the slightly derogative tone with which the general refers to 'un sieur Portier', thus indicating that no previous connections had existed between the mining director and the military commander, General Jamont preferred to send the question to be investigated by the prefect in whose judgement he obviously had more confidence.

Finally, throughout the period examined, the military authorities constantly complained about the private companies not providing appropriate accommodation and food for the men and horses mobilised.117 This type of deliberate obstruction happened fairly often. In general, it was a protest aimed at the prefectoral authority rather than turned

115 Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C./2.I.331, 'Intervention militaire aux grèves'. Letter of 28 October 1880 from the division commander to the army corps commander: "Les (compagnies minières) d'ordinaires sont très riches. Elles peuvent et doivent supporter toutes les augmentations de pain et de légumes données aux hommes. Quant aux officiers, il me paraît peu convenable qu'ils vivent complètement aux frais de la Compagnie. C'est une affaire de dignité, si je peux m'exprimer ainsi. Ils ont d'ailleurs des allocations accordées par le Ministre."

Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C./2.I.331, 'Intervention militaire aux grèves'. Letter of 11 April 1884 from the army corps commander in Lille to the commander of the first division: "D'autre part, il est un point qui fait l'objet de mes préoccupations et qui a sans doute aussi attiré votre attention dans cette question de l'installation des troupes...C'est qu'il importe essentiellement que l'autorité militaire conserve la plus stricte neutralité et n'accepte le concours matériel de la compagnie des mines que dans la limite des droits conférés par la loi sur les réquisitions. Si donc il y avait lieu de faire des réquisitions, celle-ci devraient être adressées aux municipalités, qui demanderaient désormais le concours de la Compagnies."

116 Departmental Archives, Arras, M.1231, 'Grève générale dans le bassin houiller 1889'. Letter of 16 October 1889 from the army corps commander in Lille to the prefect of Nord-Pas-de-Calais: "Je reçois d'un sieur Portier, directeur des Mines de Courrières, une dépêche (...) me disant que les troupes qui y sont envoyées sont insuffisantes et me priant avec instance d'envoyer des renforts qu'il me dit très urgents. Je télégraphie au général Mathelin de se concerter avec vous pour les mesures qu'il aura à prendre."

117 The mayor of Hazebrouck - who was against military intervention to enforce the anti-Catholic legislation in March 1906 and again in November the same year - used the question of provisions and accommodation for the troops mobilised as a way of demonstrating his discontent. Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C./2.I.335, 'Inventaires des Eglises, 1906.' Similar obstructions was shown by Socialist mayors protesting against the prefect sending troops into their municipalities during labour conflicts.
against the army. However, it just added to the annoyance of the military authorities against local authorities and private companies. In the years following the great strikes of the spring of 1906, the military authorities complained particularly about the companies being unwilling to follow the suggestions made jointly by the prefect and the general staff about how to make their factory or mine easier to protect during strikes. In subsequent years, the military authorities repeatedly complained that the private companies had done nothing to make their sites less exposed to invasion or sabotage from striking workers. The private companies, on their part, claimed that the improvements demanded by the state authorities were too costly.

4.6.2. French military commanders in the garrison towns

If contacts between the army corps commanders and the local authorities in Westphalia went through the senior state administration, this was even truer in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. As a result of a deliberate appointments policy, the French military commanders were almost always outsiders in the region in which they served. Moreover, the French military elite was to a large degree separated from local society and the informal rules of appropriate social acquaintance in the garrison town were extremely strict. In Paris, where the restrictions on the social acquaintances of senior military officers seem to have been less tight, a senior general could get away with having

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118 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12912, 'Rapport de la commission chargée d’étudier la révision de l’exercice du droit de réquisition de la force armée par les autorités civiles et du plan de protection établi pour le cas de grèves dans les départements' 10 October 1907. In contrast to the previous protection plans elaborated by an inter-ministerial commission since 1901, the 1907 plan has a whole section entitled 'Rôle des compagnies industrielles ou minières' suggesting the construction of walls around the plant or factory, investments in electric lighting during the night, and the organisation of private security corps to ensure entry to the site and the protection of strikebreakers. These provisions were later repeated in a secret circular letter of 20 July 1909 from the Ministry of the Interior. National Archives, Paris, F.7.12779, '4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Grève générale des mineurs 1901-1914.' Circular letter of 26 July 1909 from the minister of the interior on strikes in the mining sector. National Archives, Paris, F.7.12912, 'Projets de lois: Mesures de protection 1884-1907'.


120 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12779, '4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Grève générale des mineurs, 1901-1914.' This dossier contains several complaints from the mining companies about costs imposed on them by the prefect’s suggestions in 1909 to improve their measures of defence.

121 General Billot was born in Corrèze; General Jamont in Loire-Inférieure while General de France was from Indre-et-Loire; General Jeannerod was born in Doubs; General Crémer in Moselle, and the Generals Loizillon, Lebon and Davignon were all from Paris.
social acquaintances with politicians and political salons which were not in favour of the Republican system.122

In small provincial towns, however, the political and religious sympathies of senior military commanders were under constant scrutiny from all sides. In principle, self-imposed social isolation was well regarded and, after the Affaire des Fiches of 1904, considered as the only safe way to avoid trouble. Thus, even for the most senior commanders, there were considerable restrictions concerning appropriate social acquaintances, who comprised primarily the other members of the officer corps and their families.123 A certain degree of social relationship with the prefect was almost compulsory, but the degree to which it was actually kept up depended on the individual general officer.124 Depending on the position of power of an individual general, he could allow himself acquaintances who carried some degree of political sensitivity, in particular connections with the senior clergy of the Catholic Church.125 To pay one's respects to the local bishop was just about acceptable, but to accept a dinner invitation from the bishop was controversial. Formally, all public appearances had to be approved by the prefect, but this does not appear to have led to significant problems.

For Nord-Pas-de-Calais, a collection of correspondence between the army corps commander in Lille with the prefects and mayors gives an insight into the type of social

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122 General Brugière, who was a very moderate Republican, undertook private encounters with far-right political movements where he met Deroulède, while he was at the same time chief of the military staff at the Elysée Palais under Jules Grévy.

123 Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C./2.I.333 'Grèves des Chemins de Fer 1910.' Report of 12 June 1910 from General Bixard, commandant in Cambrai, to the army corps commander. After being accused of being indiscreet in his acquaintances, General Bixard declared: "...En ce qui me concerne personnellement, je ne vois ici absolument personne; en dehors de mon service, de mes promenades à cheval, je vais de temps à autre au cercle militaire, où je ne parle qu’à des officiers..."


125 General Millet, commander in Orléans, speaks of his excellent relationship with the local bishop. (Archives de Vincennes: 1 K mi 9/ General Millet 'Souvenirs' unpublished memoirs; ca.1912-1913). Being a Protestant, his acquaintance with the Catholic clergy did not immediately expose him to accusations of being 'clérical.'
event which was considered appropriate for a senior commander. As the head of the local military organisation, the army corps commanders were involved in a considerable number of associations with some links to the military, mainly charitable societies, sports clubs, or veterans’ associations. In contrast, members of the officer corps were formally prohibited from participating in civil organisations and private clubs, but could - if invited - attend at certain local events such as music associations, cultural societies, or charity organisations. A certain degree of co-operation with the local university could also involve the army corps commander as the authority who allowed officers to give public lectures on topics such as natural science or geography. More surprisingly, the senior commanders often accepted invitations to preside over the distribution of school prizes at the local lycée. This probably has to be seen as a way of demonstrating their sympathy for the Republican school system. On the other hand, a military officer would be strongly criticised, and even risked ruining his career, if he accepted an invitation to preside over a similar event in a Catholic educational institution.

In general, invitations to preside over civil associations or events of commercial or industrial interest were politely refused by referring to the impossibility of a military commander being publicly involved in non-military business. Even very senior commanders had to be extremely careful about not being seen with local industrialists, because this would put them under immediate suspicion of favouring private interests, something which was incompatible with the demands for political neutrality from a military commander. Army corps commanders occasionally accepted the distribution of the official Médaille Agricole. This seemed to be acceptable as long as the medal was issued by a state agency and not by a private society. At any rate, the correspondence of army corps commanders shows very few direct links with locals involved in business or industry.

4.6.3. Civil and military authorities: the potential for conflict

Given the frequent mobilisation of military troops for internal purposes in France, as well as the professional contacts which this inevitably created between senior civil servants and military commanders, it is worth noting that the members of these two bureaucratic corps were not socially closely linked. The two groups were even strongly opposed in terms of their commitment to the Republican regime, as well as their affiliations with the Catholic Church.

In contrast to the prefectoral corps of the Imperial era from 1852 to 1870, the families of the prefects serving between 1890 and 1914 hardly ever overlapped with those of the senior military commanders. A scrutiny of Barge ton's biographical dictionary of French prefects shows that, among 224 prefects serving between 1890 and 1914, only thirteen had a father in the army or the navy. Among the 1,985 prefects who comprise Bargeton's biographical reference book, only one case of family relations with the generals who served as army corps commanders between 1871 and 1914 can be established. The only family appearing among both prefects and army corps commanders were the Jeannerods. Among the sample of 224 prefects serving between 1890 and 1914, the largest group were those with a father in the civil service or the liberal professions (lawyers, doctors, university professors). A significant number had a very humble background, with fathers who were peasants, shopkeepers, craftsmen, coachmen, or even labourers.

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127 Out of the 220 prefects who served under the Second Empire, more than one in five had a father serving in the army: fifteen general officers, twenty-four lower ranking officers, five employed in the military administration, and two senior gendarmerie officers. Le Clére & Wright (1973) pp.315-334.

128 This meant six senior officers and six lower ranking officers, out of whom four came from the artillery and the engineers and one from the navy. One prefect had a father in the gendarmerie.

129 A comparison between the biographical data of the prefects provided by Bargeton and the generals' dossiers show that no close family relation can be established. Most of the twenty-seven names appearing for both prefects and army corps commanders are indeed very common surnames: Amade, Colomb, Decharme, Douay, Dubois, Dumont, Fabre, Ferron, Garnier, Grasset, Jeannerod, Kessler, Lacroux, Lallemand, Lefebvre, Lefort, Legrand, Meunier, Michel, Pelletier, Peloux, Picquart, Renouard, Robert, Thomassin, Tournier and Wolff.

130 Father Claude Charles Georges Jeannerod (1832-1879) left the army with the rank of captain in 1868 and joined the civil service. He was one of the seven prefects between 1870 and 1918 whose professional background was the army. Siwek-Pouydesseau (1969) p.33. Both his sons, Francois Alexandre and Gaspard, became division generals.
Although the proportion of nobles among the general corps declined markedly from thirty-seven per cent in 1870\textsuperscript{131} to twenty-five and thirteen per cent in 1895 and 1909 respectively,\textsuperscript{132} almost forty per cent of generals were recruited from among the families who were linked to the army or to the landed elites - either noble or non-noble. Twenty-one per cent of generals had a father in the army, whilst more than eighteen per cent of generals had a father who was a large landowner.\textsuperscript{133} If not born into these groups, one could of course always marry. Accordingly, almost half of the generals - forty-nine per cent - married a woman whose father was either in the army or a landowner.\textsuperscript{134} In comparison, only ten per cent of the French generals (forty-three out of 427) had a father who was a public employee with no further specification of function.\textsuperscript{135} Similarly, only fifteen per cent married a woman whose father was a public employee.\textsuperscript{136}

Thus, from a purely professional definition of social affiliations, the majority of generals were recruited from groups which were not closely linked to the state administration. Moreover, military officers were often recruited from traditionally Catholic milieus, although any precise evidence of proportions is difficult to establish.\textsuperscript{137} Without the French officer corps being ever characterised by their religious zeal, the profession of Catholic sympathies nevertheless became a widespread political statement among military officers and one of the clearest divisions that existed between the army and the other branches of the French state.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{131} Serman (1970) p.1325.
\textsuperscript{133} Barge (1982) p.51.
\textsuperscript{134} Barge (1982) p.263.
\textsuperscript{135} Twenty-one working for local government, nineteen for the national government, and three were employed by a departmental government. Barge (1982) p.51.
\textsuperscript{136} Seven per cent of the generals' wives had a father working for the national government, less than six per cent were employed by local government, and hardly two per cent of the generals' wives had a father employed by a departmental government. Barge (1982) p.263.
\textsuperscript{137} Barge notices a disproportionate attendance of generals at the Catholic secondary schools when compared to the entire proportions of pupils attending secondary schools. However, this disproportion may also have been influenced by the fact that two thirds of generals were recruited from small towns and rural areas, where Catholic educational institutions were often the only secondary schools available. (1982 p.41).
As was the case with the prefects, the army corps commanders were outsiders to local society, but, in contrast to the Westphalian case, this seemed to be the result of a deliberate appointments policy. The French army corps commanders tended to stay in their posts for a much shorter period than did their Prussian counterparts, in many cases only for one year. Accordingly, there were little opportunity to become an integrated part of local society. It is worth noting, however, that the post as army corps commanders of the first military region, covering Nord-Pas-de-Calais, tended to be rather more stable, with commanders usually remaining in office for three years or more. This stability, as was the case with the prefectoral stability, appears to have been due to the needs of the central authorities to have representatives who were well acquainted with the particular difficulties linked to the region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais.

4.6.4. The difficult relationship between the military elite and prefectoral authorities

After 1871, the relationship between the French officer corps and the Republic rested on a fragile mutual acceptance. With the Dreyfus affair and the following electoral victory of the Bloc des Gauches, the relationship between the army and the Republican regime was as bad as ever. By taking over the War Ministry in the middle of the Dreyfus affair, General Galliffet put all his enormous prestige within the military establishment behind a reconciliation of the officer corps with the Republic, and once again, repeated the obligation of military commanders to co-operate with the state administration. However, if the army began to reconcile itself with the Republic under the Waldeck-Rousseau administration (1899-1902), suspicion remained manifest...
on both sides. Ralston puts it very well when he talks of the impossibility of the officer corps to be reconciled with anxious governments committed to breaking the autonomy of the army.\footnote{Ralston (1967) pp.250-251.} Within the army organisation, it was well known that successive war ministers attempted to promote Republican officers and to pass over officers who were considered politically suspect or who appeared to be affiliated with the Catholic Church. Similarly, many officers complained about being under observation by the prefectoral and sub-prefectoral authorities who would take note of their appearances in public and their social acquaintances.

In November 1904, it became publicly known that the war minister, General André, one of the few fervent Republicans amongst senior generals, had built up secret files comprising data about thousands of military officers, stating their presumed political sympathies, their religious practices, as well as those of their close families. In his attempt to Republicanise the army elite, these pieces of information were to be used as the basis for promoting politically reliable officers, while ‘suspect’ officers were to be passed by. General André himself claimed that the information came primarily from civil servants,\footnote{General André 'Cinq ans de ministère' Paris: Louis Michaud, 1906 p.311.} and, indeed, certain prefects and sub-prefects had been involved as informers in their capacity as freemasons. The affair obviously had a very negative impact on relations between members of the state administration and the military officers, who saw that their suspicions towards the representatives of the Republican regime were being confirmed. The secret files of General André were destroyed and the government was forced to refrain from this type of informing on the officer corps.

However, the idea of using the prefects and sub-prefects as informers concerning the actions and acquaintances of army personnel was not entirely abandoned. As late as 1911, War Minister Messimy issued a circular to the prefects in which he asked them to establish a report twice a year with information about the officers in the main garrisons of the département who had shown themselves openly disloyal to the regime.\footnote{Military Archive, Vincennes, S.N.6, ‘Cabinet du Ministre, Bureau de la Correspondance Générale 1905-1906; troisième bureau, 1886-1914’. Circular letter of 11 December 1911: ‘...un rapport circonstancié sur les officiers en garnison dans votre département qui, par des actes publics ou une}
officer corps were abolished by Messimy’s successor, Millerand, with the argument that the prefects already had another task of informing the minister of the interior about cases where any public official displayed a lack of loyalty.\textsuperscript{145} No matter the degree to which civil servants were actually involved in reporting about the army officers, there can be little doubt that many members of the military establishment regarded the prefects with a great deal of suspicion.

The generally tense relationship between the military establishment and the Republican regime, as well as the bitter feeling among military officers of not being sufficiently recognised by the state, were further confirmed by the revision in 1907 of the official protocol for honours and ranks. The Napoleonic rules for ‘\textit{Honneurs et Préséances}’ from 24 Messidor Year XII were replaced with a new official ranking in which the military commanders and the clergy were significantly downgraded, while the representatives of the political institutions of the state and elected representatives at all levels were upgraded.\textsuperscript{146} Given that French army corps commanders were high-ranking officers at the end of a very successful career - in several cases former war ministers\textsuperscript{147} - their rank in the revised official protocol was perceived as an intolerable degradation for them as officers, and as a general attack on the prestige of the army within wider society. Gone were the days when a prefect could be forced to leave his post after having committed the blunder of stepping out in front of a division commander.\textsuperscript{148} The

\textsuperscript{145} Military Archive, Vincennes, s.n.6, ‘Cabinet du Ministre, Bureau de la Correspondance Générale 1905-1906; troisième bureau 1886-1914.’ Letter of 25 January 1912 from the war minister Millerand to the prefects.

\textsuperscript{146} According to former rules, the army corps commanders were placed at number six, only preceded by the President of the Republic, the cardinals, the ministers, the field marshals and admirals, and by the state counsellors. Division generals were placed at number eleven and the prefects were only at number twelve. According to the 1907 revision, the general governor of Paris was moved to rank number seventeen, after the prefect who was at number fifteen. At the departmental level, the prefect occupied the highest rank, followed by senators, deputies and members of the local government (\textit{conseillers généraux}). The general army inspectors and the army corps commanders were placed at ranks four and five, and division commanders at number eight. In addition, the formerly public ceremony which was linked to the entry of a military commander in his office, was reduced to a purely military ceremony that took place discretely within the garrison.

\textsuperscript{147} General Billot was war minister 1882-1883, army corps commander 1884-1888. General Zurlinden, who was war minister in 1895 only became army corps commander in 1896. Similarly, General Lewal was war minister in 1885, and was only promoted to army corps commander ten years after he had been war minister. Boulanger was war minister 1886-1887, and was then promoted to army corps commander when he became politically too controversial.

\textsuperscript{148} Le Clère & Wright (1973) p.88.
revised official protocol was received with a great deal of resentment in the military establishment. General Jourdy probably spoke for many of his peers when he bitterly noted his inferior status when compared to a young prefect ‘owing his position to the favours of some politician in Paris.’

In addition to the bitterness about political interference in promotions within the military hierarchy, the governments under Combes (1902-1905) and his successors Rouvier (1905-1906) and Clemenceau (1906-1909) all pursued policies which were bound to annoy the military establishment. During the years 1902-1906, the military establishment was repeatedly involved in the implementation of the laws concerning the separation of the French state from the Catholic Church, all of which provoked nation-wide demonstrations. The army was called upon to put down demonstrations, to expel monks from illegal religious orders, or to break their way through barricaded church doors. In particular, military assistance in the establishment of inventories for the property of the Catholic Church was unpopular among army officers. Some local commanders tried to obstruct the requisitions issued by the civil administration by making difficulties out of details in the formalities, or by following the requests with the minimum degree of enthusiasm and efficiency. Criticism of the role of the army during the implementation of the anti-Catholic legislation clearly reveals the potential for conflict within the military establishment against the government and the bitterness with which senior commanders perceived the prefectural authority as the executive representatives of the government’s policy.

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149 Général Jourdy ‘Mes Souvenirs’ (unpublished manuscript, ca.1913). Military Archive, Vincennes, 392/GD/3 pp.607-608. Complaints about the new status of the military commanders was a frequent topic in the pro-military press and literature right up until the outbreak of the First World War. Several episodes were reported in *La France militaire* concerning the embarrassing position of senior generals and about the devastating impact that this was having on the authority of army commanders in the eyes of their subordinate officers and soldiers, as well as the prestige of the army in wider society. Similarly, Thilo gives a series of examples about the resentment in the army against the revised official protocol. Lucien Thilo *Pouvoir civil et pouvoir militaire* Paris: Rousseau, mars 1914 pp.148-149.

150 Law of 9 December 1905.

151 For a more thorough analysis of these events, see Chapters Seven and Eight.

152 Even a Protestant general commander such as General Millet took it out on the prefect when he was accused in the local press of being pro-Catholic: “Cette fois je me fâchai et après une explication assez chaude avec le préfet et le député Rabier dont ce journal était l’organe, je m’adressai directement par la voie du Ministre de la Guerre André au Président du Conseil Combes et je demandai une enquête sur mon cléricalisme et mon bonapartisme. Ces messieurs avaient mal choisi leur terrain, car j’étais absolument sûr et maître du rien étant complètement insouciable sur la
On this background, it is remarkable to note that the dissimilar social attachments and political sympathies of the French state administrators and senior officers, as well as the mutual irritation and suspicion which existed between the two groups, did not prevent the prefects and the army corps commanders from undertaking close practical co-operation concerning control of public disorder. In principle, strong and conflicting interests were at stake for the prefects and the military commanders concerning this issue. At the same time, protests were frequently made by individual officers against the use of the army as an extended police force. The opposition of individual officers during the implementation the anti-Catholic laws (1902-1906) is only the most notorious example of this.

Yet, looking specifically at the prefectoral and the military authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, it appears that co-operation concerning the maintenance of public order was not turned into a battlefield between the two groups. Civil-military co-operation was not restricted to the army corps commanders following the letter of a requisition from the civil authorities because they were obliged to do so. In fact, senior military commanders - in particular those in charge of Nord-Pas-de-Calais - participated very actively in the development, improvement and implementation of strategies that greatly involved the army. Nor does the practical civil-military co-operation seem to be characterised by suspicion or fears of usurpation. Despite the constant rumours in Paris about a military conspiracy against the Republic, added to the occasional demands from Paris for the prefects to provide information about the loyalty of the military officers in their départements, the prefects in Lille and Arras were not apparently worried about granting the military authorities a significant degree of influence in decisions over public order, matters from which they were formally excluded.

faute qu'on me reprochait." Similarly, when he protested against the use of troops to break into churches in February-March 1906: "J'allai trouver le Préfet, M. Trépont, et je lui déclarai que si, comme il en avait le droit, il requerrait les troupes pour maintenir l'ordre dans la rue, je donnerais les ordres en conséquence, mais que l'armée n'était pas faite pour crocheter des portes, même d'églises et que par conséquent je le priais de faire faire cette besogne par les électeurs, les radicaux-socialistes ne manquaient pas à Orléans." General Millet 'Souvenirs' unpublished manuscript circa 1913. Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 K mi 9.

153 See Chapter Five.
154 See Chapter Eight.
The paradox of civil-military co-operation concerning maintaining public order in Nord-Pas-de-Calais is precisely that it runs counter to expectations that one might otherwise have in the light of the wider social and political context of the relationship between civil and military elites in Prussia and France.
4.7. Conclusion: Elite co-operation or exclusion in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais?

The analysis in this chapter offers two main conclusions. Firstly, in both Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais, a transfer of authority and influence from the local to the regional level can be observed. In the case of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, as in Westphalia, the senior state administrators appear to have occupied a position which was largely independent from local pressures to call for military assistance, or not. Similarly, from the early 1890s, both the French and Prussian state administrations, together with their respective military counterparts, increasingly excluded local authorities (mayors and municipal police authorities) from using their formal right to request military assistance. By this concentration of authority, all decisions concerning the mobilisation of troops were exclusively dealt with by the senior state administrators (the prefect in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and the province and district governors in Westphalia) and the army corps commander.

The second main point of this chapter is that, despite the apparently close social ties and the amicable informal acquaintances between the senior civil servants and army corps commanders in Westphalia, and despite their common unqualified commitment to the existing regime, their degree of practical co-operation in maintaining public order was quite limited. Conversely, in spite of the high potential for conflict between French civil servants and military commanders, and despite the fact that the majority of senior commanders had little sympathy with the Republican regime, civil-military co-operation regarding maintaining public order was greatly intensified between the early 1890s and the outbreak of the First World War.

Seen from the perspective of the emerging working class movement as well as from the Socialist or Social Democrat opposition which was most often the target of state interventions, there was indeed a certain degree of co-operation between the local elites controlling the industries - and sometimes the local authorities too - and the state administration and army that intervened against any protest movement. However, to understand how the two systems worked and why remarkably dissimilar policies were
pursued to deal with similar problems of public disorder, it is important to stress that the decisions taken by the state administration and the army were not aimed at favouring the interests of the local notables or industrialists.

The findings presented in this first part of thesis indicate that the three main explanatory frameworks which have previously been put forward (dissimilar challenges in the two countries, dissimilar institutional organisations of civil-military relation, and dissimilar elite structures) have to be moved to a secondary level in the causal hierarchy. It was the perception of threat, rather than the actual challenge from public unrest, that made the French authorities - civil and military - develop a more forceful response to public unrest compared to the policies pursued by their Prussian counterparts. It was the Prussian military commanders' right to refuse to provide military assistance, rather than his actual use of this right, which made the Prussian administration more cautious about depending upon assistance from the army than were their French counterparts. Finally, the socially and politically closely connected civil servants and military commanders in Prussia undertook less professional co-operated than did their French counterparts.
Part II. The debates, the priorities and the policies implemented in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais concerning the role of the army in domestic peacekeeping

The measures taken in response to mass unrest in Westphalia and in Nord-Pas-de-Calais were developed on the basis of a series of strategies adopted by the central power in Berlin and Paris in the 1890s. The strategies adopted emerged out of a series of different forces within and outside the state apparatus, some of which pointed towards the 'de-militarisation' of the internal peacekeeping, whilst others envisaged solving imminent problems of disorder by making extensive use of military force. In the literature on the growth of civil policing, there is a tendency to consider 'de-militarisation' as a logical consequence of modernising forces within the state bureaucracy as well as in the officer corps. It is therefore important to stress that in neither of the countries could developments towards one of the two types of response be regarded as straight forward, and instead the path taken went through many twists and turns. In a second but similar approach of 'modernisation', historians have claimed that the 'de-militarisation' of internal peacekeeping was due to increasing problems of legitimising domestic military intervention. However, the policies pursued in Prussia and France between 1889 and 1914 clearly show that these considerations are not sufficient as an explanation of policies aiming at the 'de-militarisation' of the maintenance of public order, since they do not explain why the French bureaucrats and ministers failed to leave the soldiers in their barracks.

1 Lüdike (1982), Funk (1986) and Jessen (1991) pp.21-25. Behind the argument in the French literature of a structural problem of 'de-militarising' the internal peacekeeping, there is a similar rationale that such a development ought to have taken place along with the process of democratisation of the political institutions. Serman (1982) pp.58-63, Berlière (1996) pp.17-18, and Brunetiaux (1993) p.32 ibid. (1996) pp.21-22. Although, Jauffret (1983) and Carrot (1984) p.653 see the problem as a predominantly political issue, their attempt to rationalise this development is also based on the assumption that the increasing frequency of domestic military interventions was an 'abnormal' development in a modernising political system.

2 Hobsbawn 'The Age of Empire' (1987) p.305 "Governments, especially those which had to worry about public opinion and their electors, were usually careful about facing troops with the risk of shooting down their fellow citizens: the political consequences of soldiers firing on civilians were apt to be bad, and those of their refusal to be do so were apt to be worse, as demonstrated in Petrograd in 1917."
The second part of this thesis will show that the policies adopted by the French and Prussian Ministries of the Interior and their respective administrations to deal with public unrest were linked to a series of considerations among which the arguments about the pernicious effects of domestic military intervention were of minor importance.

The main point of chapter five is that, when the problem of mass protest movements arose in France and Prussia, similar arguments were put forward in both countries for and against the continuous use of military troops for internal purposes. However, although the same options existed, very different strategies were adopted in the early 1890s, and came to dominate the area of maintenance of internal order until the First World War. In chapter six, an analysis will be undertaken to explain why the policy of ‘de-militarisation’ was adopted in Prussia and came to prevail after 1889, despite attempts from powerful forces within the military establishment, who, with support from the King, endeavoured to provide the army with a more active role in the struggle against the Social Democracy. Chapter Seven is an analysis of how the French authorities involved in the maintenance of order - the Ministry of the Interior, the ministry of war, the prefectural and sub-prefectural authorities and the army corps commanders progressively from the early 1890s onwards - reached a basic agreement about the necessity of extended use of troops particular in turbulent areas, such as Nord-Pas-de-Calais.

Three key factors can be pointed out in order to explain why the Prussian and the French authorities came to adopt very dissimilar policies towards public disorder. One was a dissimilar degree of acceptance by the French and Prussian state administrations of getting involved in local disputes. The second was linked to dissimilar expectations as to the potential of violence, and to a different degree of trust in the capacity of the army to ultimately put down major unrest. The third was that in both Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the policy adopted by the civil administration was to a large degree accepted and sometimes actively supported by the army corps commanders at the regional level.
The main conclusion of this second part is that in both France and Prussia, the Ministry of the Interior, the state administration at the regional level, and the army corps commanders in charge over this period had similar priorities in terms of maintenance of internal order. Together they were capable of withstanding forces working towards different solutions to the problem of greater internal unrest.
Chapter five. The debate about the 'de-militarisation' of internal peacekeeping in Prussia and France

As shown in chapter three, internal peacekeeping was a traditional part of the tasks of the military organisation. It was only during the 1870s that a debate started, in both Prussia and France, about the future role of the national army. The discussions, which took place at the ministerial level, in legislative assemblies, as well as in the press, involved three main issues. In the first place, there was the question of the role of the army as the defender of the existing social, political and economic order. Secondly the debate touched upon the issue of the relationship between the state and society, fundamentally addressing the question as to whether the national army could be turned against the nation, or at least groups within the nation. Finally, a series of objections of a practical and professional nature was raised against the domestic use of troops, from the side of the military establishment and from groups closely connected to the army.

In the following a comparative analysis will be undertaken on three aspects:
- the public debate in France and Prussia after 1871 over the role of the army; (5.2);
- the debate concerning the relationship between 'the army of the nation' and French and Prussian citizens (5.3);
- the military objections in Prussia and France to the use of troops for maintenance of public order (5.4).

The purpose of the chapter is to point out the similarities between the arguments raised in the French and Prussian debates. The main argument is that the objections raised in the debate cannot in themselves explain why the French and Prussian systems adopted strategies in which the army played a very dissimilar role.

5.1. Existing explanations

Two types of interpretations have been put forward to explain the move in Prussia towards 'de-militarisation' of the internal peacekeeping. In the first place, scholars on
the policing and policy of enforcement of discipline in Prussia have limited themselves to the arguments raised in these debates in explaining why the Prussian state administration after 1889 pursued - and carried through - its policy of 'de-militarising' internal peacekeeping.¹ This argument, however, is unsatisfactory, given that the same arguments were put forward in France with no particular consequence for the policies pursued by the state administration, since the French Ministry of the Interior, in contrast to their Prussian counterparts, still adopted strategies that relied heavily on military assistance. This also raises the question how the Prussian administration could be persuaded to pursue a policy of 'de-militarisation' of the internal peacekeeping, if the same arguments could not make the French administration refrain from calling upon the army. Moreover, in both systems, whilst legislation stipulated the right of the administration to call for military assistance, the main recommendation from the Ministry of the Interior was to use the army only in cases of extreme necessity.² However, the law as well as the notion of 'extreme urgency' were interpreted in quite dissimilar ways. Accordingly, between 1890 and 1914, the concept of 'necessity' came to mean something very different within the French and Prussian system.

In addition to the argument that 'de-militarisation' of the internal peacekeeping in Prussia was a direct consequence of the arguments raised in the Prussian debate, there is the observation that members of the Prussian military establishment began argue that maintenance of public order was not the task of the army. This change of attitude has been linked to the increasingly degree of professionalisation of Prussian officers. There can be little doubt that the rise of the idea after 1870 that the army was an organisation exclusively aimed at foreign defence was linked to the increasing professionalisation of the officer corps with its more narrow definition of the role of the army.³ In a

² National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, 'Instructions ministérielles; plans de protection; jurisprudence; emploi des troupes; usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914' Confidential circular letter of 27 February 1884 from Waldeck-Rousseau, minister of the interior to the prefects. Similar principles were repeatedly stated in the instructions from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior after 1889. Henning (1987).
³ This is Huntington's fundamental thesis, with particular reference to the Prussian general corps of the Imperial period (1957) pp.98-139. This thesis constitutes a central element in his argument about the development of civilian supremacy in Western European states. The argument is shared by scholars working the military professionals in twentieth century third world countries. Janowitz (1975) p.3, Abrahamsson (1972) p.41. Despite his critique of Huntington's use of the notion of
comparative perspective, however, the dissimilar degree of professionalisation is difficult to apply as an explanation for the attitude of French and Prussian military commanders towards using their troops for internal purposes: among both military elites there was an increasing aversion against the use of troops for internal peacekeeping, while at the same time there was a clear readiness, if necessary, to defend the existing social and political order through military means. The disagreement between these two attitudes can be observed among Prussian and French senior commanders alike. These attitudes not only opposed the generals to one another, but appear as a fundamental dilemma within individual generals.

5.2. The role of the army as defender of the existing order.

After the Revolution of 1848, the Prussian army was seen by Liberal constitutionalists as the key instrument used by traditional forces to maintain their own position. Similarly in France, the spectre of the army as a politicised Praetorian guard haunted the Liberals and the Republicans after the end of the Second Republic. Detaching the army from domestic conflicts was hoped to be a way of 'domesticating' the anti-Republican forces within the army. In both countries, the removal of the army from the realm of domestic peacekeeping was thus closely connected to the idea of establishing a truly civil parliamentary system. Unsurprisingly, the wish to avoid using the army against strikers or demonstrators was also advanced by politicians supporting the cause of the workers and who protested against the repression conducted by the 'ruling classes' against strikers and demonstrators. In Prussian, the critique of the army not only came from the Social Democrats, but also from other groups who saw themselves as being bullied by the Prussian authorities.

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professionalisation, Finer admits the seeming link between professionalisation of officer corps in Western European states and their involvement in domestic politics. Finer (1988) pp.21-22.


6 This was particularly true for the German Catholics during the Kulturkampf of the 1870s. Blackbourn (1993; 1997) provides many examples of the Catholic critique of the military response to peaceful gatherings in Marpingen 1876-1877. Similarly in Alsace-Lorraine, there were continuous complaints about the behaviour of the military commander and individual officers throughout the period.
At the other end of the political spectrum, people with conservative and traditionalist political views tended to perceive the requisition of troops as a necessary show of force to defend the existing social, political and economic order. Pressure for the efficient defence of persons and private property against criminality and public unrest continued throughout the period in France as well as in Prussia. At the same time, however, the prestige of the army increased within these conservative groups. With rising national competition between the European states, broad groups in both France and Germany with political sympathies towards patriotic conservatism came to adopt the point of view that national independence and expansion could only be ensured by allowing the army to devote its attention exclusively to the defence of the national borders and to the protection of the interests and the prestige of the nation at the international level. From this opposite starting point, even conservative groups joined those in favour of 'de-militarisation' of the internal peacekeeping.

5.3. The problem of the Army of the Nation versus the Nation

If a certain degree of consensus existed between various groups concerning the advantages of the 'de-militarisation' of internal peacekeeping, then politically opposing groups could also join the principle of the army as 'the nation in arms.' The idea of the army as an organisation comprising all male citizens of the nation and exclusively committed to the defence of the national borders originated from the French Revolution, but was taken up by Gneisenau and Scharnhorst in their reorganisation of

8 In Prussia as in France, there was a considerable split on the political Left between those who saw the Nation in Armes as a way of achieving some degree of popular control over the armed forces, and those who saw the abolition of the permanent army organisation as the only way to prevent the 'ruling classes' from using armed forces against popular protest. Krumeich 1994 pp.142-143. Typical of that attitude was the declaration of Jaurès: "Tant qu'il y aura une armée, ce sera un crime contre le génie de la France et contre l'armée elle-même de la séparer de la nation." Jaurès (1915). A similar opposition can be observed among the German Social Democrats of the early days of the Imperial era, which grew to a strong anti-militarist tendency by the eve of the First World War. Krumeich (1980) p.135. In France, Radical and Socialist politicians also saw universal military service as a way of imposing equal duties on all French men, with no regards to their social origin or status. Challener (1955) pp.141-150, Krumeich (1980) p.142.
9 Montheillet (1932); Challenger (1955).
the Prussian army 1807-1815 and towards the end of the century further developed by
the influential work of General von der Goltz.\textsuperscript{10}

However, certain conservative and liberal voices expressed doubts about the rationality
of legitimising the army on the basis of the idea of the nation. There were both
practical and ideological reasons for this. In the first place, both liberals and
conservatives, fearing an armed revolt, felt uncomfortable about the idea of training
peasants and workers in the use of weapons and military operations.\textsuperscript{11} After the French
\textit{Commune}, the National Guard had been dissolved for the very same reasons.\textsuperscript{12} The
other main argument against the principle of the Nation in Arms addressed the problem
of justifying military interventions in domestic conflicts, that is to sent the ‘Army of the
Nation’ against the ‘Nation’, or at least groups belonging to the ‘Nation.’\textsuperscript{13}

These considerations were raised in the Prussian as well as in the French debate.\textsuperscript{14} The
implications, however, of continuous requisition of military troops were far more
damaging in France than in Prussia. During the French Third Republic, the problem of
mobilising military troops against French citizens contained the potentially dangerous
element of undermining the legitimacy of the regime. Thus the aversion to military
involvement in civil conflicts was felt even by Republicans with very little sympathy for
striking workers or political demonstrators. The army was also supposed to be one of
the main integrational institutions of citizens into the Republic. However, this project
was damaged by frequent confrontations between the army and groups of citizens. In
particular, events such as the \textit{Commune}, or the shooting at Fourmies in 1891 of
fourteen striking workers, hindered the national unity that the army was supposed to
provide. The debate in the wake of the events at Fourmies showed that the Republican
regime could not allow such violent confrontations to take place between the Army of
the Nation and French citizens. Finally, many leading French social groups feared that

\textsuperscript{10} Colmar von der Goltz ‘\textit{Das Volk im Waffen. Ein buch über das Heerwesen}’ Berlin: E.S.Mittler &
Sohn, 1890
\textsuperscript{11} This was also the main objection from Thiers during the debate about the reorganisation of the
\textsuperscript{13} Jauffret (1983) p.100; Bruneteaux (1996) p.32.
\textsuperscript{14} Krumeich (1980) 134-135.
the workers in uniform might turn their weapons against the established authorities and join an armed conflict.15

Thus, in France, the requisition of military troops was an instrument to be handled with care. The measures implemented towards public unrest was a balance between the need to control unrest, and, on the other hand, the risk that these means of control could escalate confrontations with strikers or demonstrators. The army was an instrument by which the authorities could control a situation up to a certain point, but the presence of military troops could also trigger a revolt that could ultimately threaten the regime.

Although, in Prussia, similar arguments were put forward about the devastating effect that a violent confrontation between the army and civilians could have on the prestige of the army and the loyalty of the conscript soldiers, the problem was less serious here than in France. The Prussian army was committed to the defence of the Prussian State and of the territory under the rule of the Prussian king and to the defence of public order. Since any disturbance of the public order could be defined as a rebellion against the public authorities, the fact of sending the army against individuals who challenged the existing social and political order did not constitute any ideological problem for the Prussian authorities. Thus, a violent confrontation between public forces and civilians did not in itself damage the legitimacy of the regime.

Furthermore, the role of the Imperial army as an integrational institution was not damaged to the same degree as the French army by violent confrontations with

15 During these decades, there were several infamous incidents of soldiers refusing to obey when ordered to use weapon against strikers and demonstrators. The earliest cases of refusal appeared in the press in relation to the incidents at Fourmies on the May Day of 1891, when it was reported in the press that a soldier had refused to shoot on the grounds that he was himself from Fourmies. (Agulhon (1990) pp.100-101 and Bruneteaux (1996) p.35) Most famous are the mutiny among conscript soldiers, during the great strikes and demonstrations taking place during the spring 1906. In Langres, a battalion of the 21 infantry allegedly refused to mobilise to Paris to maintain public order on May Day. Officers responsible for the maintenance of order after the mining catastrophe at Courrières in March 1906 reported a mutiny about to break out. Most famously, during the revolts in the South of France over the summer of 1907, there were two cases of soldiers from the 17th and the 100th infantry regiments refusing to use force against demonstrators. There were similar incidents in Nancy in June 1907, and in Dunkerque on the May Day of 1908. (Bruneteaux (1996) p.36). Reports of such incidents were obviously popular in the socialist press, although the incidents reported often appear as rumours and anecdotes.
civilians. Whereas the French army was supposed to act as an integrational institution for all citizens, the Prussian army was deliberately very selective in its administration of general conscription. Even the recruitment of rank-and-file soldiers was restricted to 'safe and trustworthy' social groups, including the middle class and the Germans from the rural areas east of the river Elbe, whilst excluding more dubious elements such as Catholics and Jews, non-Germans and, in particular, industrial workers.

Thus, the advantages and the problems linked to the domestic use of troops were equally acknowledged in France and Prussia. In France, however, the political implications of domestic military intervention were considerably more serious than in Prussia.

5.4. Military resistance to the domestic use of troops

In addition to the public debate on the issue, it is worthwhile to examine the views expressed by members of the French and Prussian military establishment, in order to show that the dissimilar policies adopted were not primarily linked to very dissimilar attitudes among military officers to the domestic role of the army. There are two reasons for this: in both countries, the wish for 'de-militarisation' of the internal peacekeeping was shared by many members of the military establishment, while on the other hand there was also a strong commitment among both French and Prussian officers to defend the existing social and political order against a 'social revolution'. Similarly, it is very difficult to link the arguments put forward by members of the French and Prussian military establishment to a dissimilar degree of professionalisation of the two officers corps.

5.4.1. The official ambiguity of the Prussian military establishment

The Prussian generals did not take part in any public debate about the domestic role of the army, since this would be an unacceptable attack on the monarch's authority of command. From the 1890s, however, Prussian generals were increasingly clear that the
task of the army should be the foreign defence of the interests of the nation, and not policing striking workers or disorderly mobs.

Officially, the attitude of the Prussian military establishment was ambiguous. From the 1890s to the Zabern Affair, successive war ministers repeated that the mobilisation of troops for internal purposes was a disagreeable duty. In 1898, when, in the Reichstag, Bebel sharply criticised the decree of 20 March 1890 which had been leaked to the press, the war minister, Bronsart von Schellendorff immediately replied that the army would prefer to leave the burdensome task of fighting with workers in the street to the police. In 1910, a General Staff study on repression of internal unrest with military means became public, as well as an order from the army corps commander in Westphalia, General von Bissing, that violated several principles of basic citizens' rights. These internal military instructions raised serious protests in the Reichstag. However, these were met by a declaration by the war minister that the army had no taste for domestic intervention. Despite these public declarations, military leaders kept affirming their readiness to intervene with military force, if the Social Democratic activities 'made such a step necessary.' As late as 1914, in the wake of the Zabern affair, the war minister, General von Falkenheyn, declared in the Reichstag that the role of the army was 'the secure defence of peace at home and abroad.'

18 The General Staff Study and the order from General von Bissing will be further analysed in Chapters Six and Nine.
20 Craig (1955) p.254.
In Prussia, there seemed to be a clear inconsistency between, on the one hand, the role attributed to the army at the drawing-board in the War Ministry, the General Staff and the regional general commands, and, on the other hand, the inclination of the army corps commanders not to get involved in concrete cases of unrest. Due to the fundamental ambiguity in the military's attitude, even those who tended to be 'hawks' when occupying leading positions by the central military institutions had no problem in accommodating to the policy of 'de-militarisation' of the internal peacekeeping pursued by the state administration, once they performed as commanding generals.21

5.4.2. The French military debate

A similar ambiguous attitude towards the domestic role of the army can be observed among French officers at all levels. On the one hand, the issue was the object of a long on-going debate within the French military establishment, and many were the reasons for senior commanders to prefer withdrawing from civilian conflicts and concentrate on the defence of the national borders. On the other hand, open protests against interfering in domestic conflicts were never made by the War Ministry, and when confronted with actual cases of internal disorder, French commanders tended to accommodate to this policy of intervention, and enter into efficient co-operation with the civil authorities.

From the early days of the Third Republic, senior members of the officer corps participated in the debate about the future role of the national army. During the debate about the reorganisation of the French army after 1871, no fewer than three different projects were written by senior officers - one by General Faidherbe, another by

21 General von Albedyll, a former chief of the Military Cabinet and a commander of the old school who had no professional or ethical inhibitions about domestic military intervention, was nevertheless the first commander to point out, during the great Westphalian strike of 1889, that it was not the role of the army to settle conflicts between employers and employees. General von Waldersee, a former chief of the General Staff who was a strong supporter of the idea of a military coup against the Reichstag and the establishment of direct rule of William II. As army corps commander responsible during the great strike among Hamburg dock workers 1896-1897, he was very reluctant about military intervention. General von Einem, known as a 'hawk' when he served as war minister between 1903 and 1909, was quite keen on limiting the military intervention when in 1912 he was the army corps commander responsible in Westphalia.
General Charenton, and a third by General Davout, duke of Auerstædt. Although suggesting various solutions to the problem of public forces ensuring the internal order of the Republic, the common aim of these projects was to detach the regular army from its traditional role in domestic peacekeeping. Serious criticisms of the domestic role of the army re-appeared during the 1890s, particularly in the wake of the killing of fourteen demonstrators in Fourmies (département Nord) on May Day 1891. A former war minister, General Lewal clearly expressed the view that, although the army was responsible for domestic order as well as for national security, the current conflicts between employers and employees were not matters for the armed forces to be drawn into. Apart this clear statement from General Lewal, critical voices mainly came from officers at the lower level of the military hierarchy, namely those in command in the actual situation of disorder. In particular, the famous article of the later Marshal Lyautey argued strongly in favour of concentrating the attention of the military on the defence of the French borders.

Similarly, during the 1890s, different branches of the military apparatus put a great deal of effort into developing reorganisation projects of the public forces, and in particular the creation of a mobile force of gendarmes. Despite these efforts, there was still much disagreement within the military establishment about the domestic role of the army. The General Staff, the cavalry department, the general commander, and individual officers were split between the supporters of various projects of a mobile

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22 General Failherbe, 'Bases d'un projet de réorganisation d'une armée nationale', (1871); General Charenton, 'Projet motivé de réorganisation de l'état militaire de la France', (1871); General Davout, Duc d'Auerstædt, 'Projet de réorganisation militaire', (1871).
25 Hubert Lyautey 'Le rôle social de l'officier' in Revue des Deux Mondes March 1891.
force of gendarmes, and those in favour of a status quo with the army as a central factor in the maintenance of public order. The latter pointed out that the municipal police forces were in general unfit and too understaffed to undertake the task of crowd management, even with the help from a mobile gendarmerie force. The result of these internal conflicts and the mutually competing projects was that the lobbying from various sections within the War Ministry against the domestic use of troops was weak and ineffective.

Individual officers also made suggestions for reforms that would allow the army to withdraw from internal peacekeeping. Between 1899 and 1906 no fewer than twenty-two articles were published in La France Militaire on the maintenance of order and the question concerning a mobile force to relief the army from this task. Given that La France Militaire was the semi-official mouthpiece of the War Ministry, this also shows how unsettled the issue was within the military establishment, as Bruneteaux very rightly points out.

The most common military arguments against the domestic use of troops were that frequent use of the army broke up the military schedule and damaged the training of the recruits. Secondly, there was great concern for the negative effects of long-lasting mobilisations on the discipline and health of soldiers and horses. These problems became particularly serious after 1905, when the period of military service was reduced from three to two years. Protests reached an unprecedented level during the enforcement of the laws separating the French state and the Catholic Church during the years 1902 to 1906. In February-March 1906, the reluctance of individual officers and local commanders was so manifest that it developed into serious problems of military discipline. At this occasion, General Lamiraux, a retired commanding officer,

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27 Within the War Ministry, the General Staff and the cavalry department, formally in charge of the gendarmerie, had internal conflicts on the question, because the cavalry department was not inclined to hand over the command of a part of the gendarmerie. The cavalry was the arm most heavily charged with the task of maintaining internal order, but at the same time striving to legitimise its existence in front of a General Staff that considered the cavalry to be an outdated arm unfit for modern warfare. Jauffret 1983 p.130-131.
30 Bruneteaux (1996) p.48
engaged in the debate against the administrators’ use of military assistance. However, General Lamiraux did not argue against the principle of army’s involvement in domestic conflict as such, but complained that the military commander was not allowed to use his troops as a military force and respond vigorously to the attacks from the demonstrators.

It is, however, important to distinguish between the on-going debates in *La France Militaire*, pleading against the principle of using the army for internal purposes, and the professional performance of the general commanders who were responsible for the maintenance of internal order. The opinions expressed in *La France Militaire*, a newspaper with close links to - and sometimes the mouthpiece of - the War Ministry, were generally liberal and Republican when compared to the major part of the military establishment. Thus, to plead against the internal use of the military troops with reference to the bad image it created of the army and the damage it did to the relationship between the nation and its army can be regarded as the ‘politically correct’ attitude within the army establishment that was not being an official opposition against the administrative practice of the Ministry of the Interior and the civil administration.

What the officers in favour of serious reforms lacked was a clear military point of view. The officer corps and the military elite were very split in their opinion about whether the solution was a reorganisation of the civil forces, or whether, confronted with mass protest movements only the army was capable of facing the challenge of crisis management. During the parliamentary debates on the projects for a mobile force of *gendarmes*, the military establishment had used all the well-known arguments as to why the army should not be involved in maintenance of order. Detaching the army from internal peacekeeping was arguably the long-term wish of the military

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31 *La France Militaire*, 12 May 1906, front page article ‘L’armée contre l’anarchie’.
32 The same complaint was put forward in an anonymous front page article in *La Franc Militaire* of 28 April 1906: “Maintenant que l’émeute a pris fin dans le Nord et que le calme sinon le travail paraissent renaître, nous pouvons en pleine liberté juger les événements qui viennent de s’accomplir et en particulier les moyens qui ont été employés pour reprimer le desordre. Disons tout d’abord que ceux-ci ont été détestables. S’ils ont permis d’admirer le sang-froid de la troupe, son impassibilité d’en face des attaques dont elle a été l’objet, son abnégation, ils ont, par contre, démontré jusqu’à l’évidence que l’hésitation et la faiblesse devant l’émeute rendent celle-ci plus violente et plus audacieuse et font plus de victimes qu’une répression énergique”.
establishment. A united military statement in favour of a reform of the policy on internal peace keeping that would allow the requisition of the military troops to become the *ultima ratio* solution, might have forced the government to look seriously for alternative forces, or to reconsider the whole concept of defending public order. In this situation, however, where the military establishment was unclear about its position, the administrative procedures and the repeated implementation of the same measures became all the more important.

5.4.3. Impact of rising professionalisation, a valid explanation?

The protests put forward by the military establishment have been linked to the increasing professionalisation of the officer corps. Professionalisation, as defined by Huntington, is a combination of two elements: the level of education and the degree to which the generals were full-time officers with a long, progressive career in the professional hierarchy; the professional ethic within the corps, characterised by political neutrality, implying total submission to the will of the political executive.34

Although the level of professional training at the Prussian *Kriegsakademie* was superior to that obtained at the French *Ecole supérieure de guerre*, it would be inappropriate to suggest that the French general commanders were more prepared to use the army for internal purposes than their Prussian counterparts because of this dissimilar level of professional training. Like their Prussian counterparts, the French commanding generals of the late nineteenth century were full time career officers, with a highly specialised formal education. As for professional ethics, the French generals were more politically neutral and inclined to submit under the political executive than were the Prussian commanders, who were often very politicised.35 In that respect, the French military could be said to display a more professional attitude than did their Prussian counterparts. Linked to the notion of 'professional ethos' is also the idea that

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35 The a-political nature of the French military elite is generally seen as one of its main features, in particular for the Republican period. Girardet (1953) 252-256; Serman (1982; 1994 p.212); Hélie (1994) p.242. Conversely, the Prussian senior commanders were notoriously involved in political issues concerning the interests of the army as well as in foreign policy. Craig (1965); Ritter (1965); Deist (1990).
‘professionalism’ should dispose the officer corps to be reluctant in intervening with military force against unarmed protesters in street fights. Indeed, the argument was put forward in France, as well as in Prussia, that officers preferred a noble combat against another army, estimating this the only type of encounter appropriate for a military officer.36 Similarly, the French literature often talks about the domestic military intervention constituting a problem of professional conscience for the French officers.37

Neither of these two elements of professionalisation, however, are very useful in explaining the attitudes among French and Prussian generals, or to rationalise the development of dissimilar strategies within the two systems. Reluctance towards the internal mobilisation of troops is an element that can be found equally in France and Prussia, with varying intensity depending on the individual general. In addition, the military commanders in both countries were also prepared at any moment to use their troops to defend the regime as well as the existing social and economic order. A particular problem with the notion of ‘professionalism’ is that arguments about ‘professionalism’ were also put forward to justify an interventionist attitude. If officers protested in the name of their professional pride against the use of the army in labour conflicts and political demonstrations, they also insisted that the defence of public order and the apprehension of disturbers and criminals were integrated parts of their professional duties.38 In France, moreover, military officers would claim that their

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professional ethos forced them to follow blindly the requisitions from the civil authorities. It was therefore also in the name of professionalism that the French army became increasingly involved in the maintenance of public order.

Although, in a very general sense, there seems to be a connection between professionalisation of the officer corps and the attitude of the military leaders towards use of troops against internal conflicts, this tendency is too vague to be considered the key element shaping the policy of the military establishment. Factors such as codes of honour, or the practical elements of training programs were only one reason for the attitudes expressed by the military establishment. Moreover, the arguments which were made in the name of professionalism did not lead unequivocally to military opposition to the internal mobilisation of troops. The arguments made in the name of professionalisation could thus be used to justify both a non-interventionist policy and a highly interventionist strategy. It is therefore difficult to argue that the degree of professionalisation as such explains much about the dissimilar degree of domestic military intervention in France and Prussia. The notion of professionalism can, at most, serve as a rationalisation of the views expressed by French and Prussian officers, but cannot in itself explain the difference between the policies pursued in the two countries.

The comparison of the arguments put forward in France and Prussia for and against the use of military troops in domestic peacekeeping shows a remarkable degree of similarity, not only in the arguments put forward, but also the ways in which these arguments were linked to particular groups. The similarities of the debate seriously call into question the causal relationship between the arguments put forward against the internal use of troops in the two countries, and the policies pursued. The arguments had little effect unless these were sustained by a serious determination within the state apparatus actually to change their strategies to deal with public unrest.
5.5. Concluding remarks: similar arguments, dissimilar outcomes

In a comparative perspective, it is difficult to draw a direct link between the objections raised in the public debates and within the military establishment against the use of military troops to maintain public order and the specific strategy adopted by the French and Prussian system to deal with greater unrest with or without military assistance.

The findings of the present study point to two main conclusions. First, that the same arguments were raised in the France and Prussia against the use of troops for domestic peacekeeping, and in both countries specific arguments were linked to similar political or professional groups. Secondly, that the pernicious effect of continuous use of military troops was potentially more damaging for the French Republican regime than it was for the Prussian. This, however, was not sufficient argument to persuade the French Ministry of the Interior and state administration to refrain from extended use of military troops to control instances of public unrest.
Chapter six. The Prussian ‘Kampfinstrument nach Innen’ revised: The successful implementation of the ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping

Even if the policy by the Prussian Ministry of the Interior concerning ‘de-militarisation’ of the internal peacekeeping was sustained by the arguments described above, these arguments are insufficient on their own to explain the policy pursued by the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. This chapter sets out the initial formation of strategies in Prussia in the 1890s. Two aspects will be analysed linked to the adoption of the police of ‘de-militarisation’ of the internal peacekeeping. In the first place, recognising that the available civil forces remained too weak to deal with riots and violent actions of any significance, the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and the state administration, right up till the eve of the First World War, kept operating with the idea of military assistance, although this step was very rarely taken. Secondly, it is important to stress that the policy of ‘de-militarisation’ was implemented by the Ministry of the Interior against powerful forces within the military establishment - supported by the King - who worked towards attributing a more active internal role to the army.

The function of the chapter is

- to set out the powerful forces within the Prussian system that worked for greater use of the army to deal with public unrest and control of ‘subversive elements’;
- to indicate the gap between the rhetoric and the bureaucratic practices;
- to show which groups within the Prussian state opposed the use of military troops and begin to explain why and how these views were followed in practice;

Within the German historiography, both general interpretations of various tendencies1 as well as the military historians2 stress the commitment of the Prussia War Ministry, the General Staff and the individual commanders to the struggle against the Social Democrats. Among the military historians, only Deist argues along the same lines as

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the recent research on Prussian policing, pointing to the discrepancy between the initiatives from the central military institutions and the general commands, and the measures implemented in concrete cases of strikes and unrest.3

Looking at ministerial initiatives, circulars, and memoirs of generals, the declarations show clear intentions to launch a military crack-down on anything that smacked of Social Democratism, trade unionism, or other types of organised labour activities. On the other hand, the authoritarian surface is deceptive. In fact, the issue about the domestic role of the army remained in dispute throughout the Imperial period in the sense that the Prussian state did not operate as a coherent entity, and spoke with many voices.

The successful implementation of the ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping therefore has to be seen against the forces that endeavoured to attribute a more active role to the army against the forces in the German society striving for social and political change. On the one hand there was the strategies adopted and pursued by the Ministry of the Interior and the senior state administrators at the regional after 1889 towards strengthening the civil forces and waiting as long as possible before calling in military troops. On the other hand, there were the highly interventionist strategies developed by the War Ministry and the General Staff, which were strongly supported by the King, whenever he was in that frame of mind.

Within the two groups, however, there seems to be a split between the central, the regional and the local authorities over the strategies to be implemented in order to deal with public disturbance in particular during strikes. Within the state administration, there was a split between the regional and the local level. In contrast to the province and district governors, the local governors, being closer to the conflicts taking place, were more ready to prefer the highest degree of security. Within the military establishment, there appears to be a certain opposition between the initiatives from the central military authorities in Berlin, and the army corps commanders who tended to be

more hesitant towards military involvement in local conflicts. The policy of 'de-militarisation' was therefore often supported by the army corps commanders.

This chapter shows that the Prussian state was not monolithic but was characterised by important divisions between the different sections of the state, both between the civil and military branches of the state, and within the military establishment itself.
6.1. Attempts by the central military authorities to provide the army with a more active domestic role

Knowledge about the details of the policy of the central military institutions - War Ministry and General Staff - towards the internal role of the army is limited due to the destruction of the military archive in Berlin in 1945. Despite these difficulties, three important features can be discerned from the projects and decrees emanating over the years 1890-1914.

- In the 1890s after the abolishment of the anti-Socialist legislation, the War Ministry attempted to give the army a more active role in the control and repression of Social Democratic activities, both within the army and in wider local society.
- The role attributed to the army in 1890 as a key actor in the struggle against the Social Democracy continued to be the basis of the policies pursued in the War Ministry as is evidenced as late as 1912.
- The plans developed in the War Ministry were not concerned with the type of labour conflicts and political demonstrations which actually took place, but deal only with hypothetical situations of open revolt and street fights. The plans which were established and recommended by the War Ministry therefore had no relation to the actual problems of maintaining public order.

Analysis of the policy of the Prussian War Ministry must rely on the decrees and projects which emanated or were recommended by the War Ministry during this period. After the Westphalian strike, the first important initiative from the War Ministry was the ministerial decree of 20 March 1890. It was inspired partly by the great Westphalian miners' strike of 1889, and partly by the abolition of the Anti-Socialist laws in the spring of 1890. The aim of the decree was to strengthen the role of the army in the repression of internal disorder in general, and against Social Democratic activities in particular.

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4 Central Archive, Potsdam III, R.43 film signature 12425-12426 'Militärische Massnahmen im Fall von Unruhen. Belagerungszustand, 1890-1918' or Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2/466, 'Bekämpfung socialdemokratischer Bestrebungen, 1890-1892: Verbot und Bestrafung der Teilnahme an geheimen Verbindungen, öffentlichen Versammlungen und politischen Vereinen zur Zeit des Sozialistengesetzes'
The war minister Verdy du Vemois made it quite explicit that in the future the general commanders bore the burdensome responsibility of the maintenance of domestic order. His definition of that duty comprised five main points: First, the general commander in each military region was supposed to inform himself currently about the organisation, publications, activities and leaders of the Social Democratic party in his region and report back to the King.\(^5\) Secondly, the army corps commander, having formal powers to declare a military state of siege, was directly invited to make use of this resource, if he considered this appropriate. The declaration of a state of siege would mean that the provisions in the Prussian Constitution concerning fundamental civil rights were suspended, as well as the limitations on the authority of the military commander, and it was understood that the military commanders were supposed to use this freedom to launch a crack down on suspect persons and organisations. This becomes obvious, with the third key element of the decree, which ordered the arrest of all the leaders of the Social Democracy, including members of the *Reichstag* with no regard to their parliamentary immunity, as well as confiscation of dangerous publications. Fourth, the general commanders were supposed to prepare his troops for this type of action,\(^6\) and to make sure that any revolt was stopped whilst still in its embryonic stages through a convincing display of force.\(^7\) Finally, Verdy du Vemois informed the minister of the interior that each general commander was held responsible for ensuring that Social Democrats did not enter the army as reservists or conscript soldiers.\(^8\) This was not only a measure to keep the Social Democratic ‘poison’ away from the ranks, but, as Deist rightly points out, must also be seen as a preparation of the army for repressive actions internally, for which loyal recruits were an absolute necessity.\(^9\) The provisions

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\(^5\) Decree of 20 March 1890 “Das Generalkommando selbst muss über die bezeichneten Verhältnisse des gesammten Korpsbezirks orientiert sein”, “dauernd auf dem laufenden.”

\(^6\) Decree of 20 March 1890 “Neben den Vorbereitungen für lokale und polizeiliche Massnahmen, haben die Generalkommandos ein etwa erforderliches Einschreiten der Truppe dahin vorzubereiten...”

\(^7\) Decree of 20 March 1890 “... dass durch genügende Kraft-Entfaltung und energisches Auftreten jeder Aufruhr im Keime erstickt wird. Wird hierbei von der Waffe Gebrauch gemacht, so erwarten Seine Majestät der Kaiser, dass dieser Gebrauch ein dem Ernst der Lage entsprechender ist.”

\(^8\) Decree of 31 March 1890 from the minister of the interior to the province govenors. Ref.Deist (1991) p.34.

from this decree kept haunting the imagination of succeeding war ministers, and recommendations to implement these measures can be found as late as 1912.¹⁰

The determination of the War Ministry to use the army actively in the repression of the Social Democracy also emerges clearly in the service regulation of the military use of weapons from 1899, issued by the War Ministry. The first chapter concerned the situation in which a soldier or an officer had an absolute duty to intervene, with no consideration to whether they had been formally requested from a civil authority (pp.1-7). These provisions could easily be applied to strikes and demonstrations, when stone throwing and armed attacks were not uncommon. The second chapter (pp.7-15) established the conditions under which military troops could be requested, stipulating that military troops could only be requested when order could no longer be ensured with the available civil force. The third and largest chapter concerned the conditions under which a military state of siege could be declared (pp.15-27).

In comparison with previous summaries of the existing rules, which were mainly concerned with the description of the limitations surrounding the use of weapons,¹¹ it is worth noting the emphasis placed in the 1899 Service Regulations on two particular elements. One is the absolute duty of the soldier to intervene with weapons when being attacked by armed civilians. The second key element is the attention paid to the rights of the military commander to take over supreme authority, even without consulting the civil authorities. As was the case with the decree of 20 March 1890, the service regulations of 1899 constituted the basis of the official policy of the War Ministry, and was constantly referred to in recommendations to the general commanders right up until the eve of the First World War.¹²

¹⁰ Münster HaStA, OP 6095 (documents 206-215), instructions from the war minister to the commanding generals of 8 February 1912. Similary, Bayerische HStA Abt.IV-Kriegsarchiv, MKR 2497. Decree of 9 November 1908.


In addition to the decrees and service regulations emanating directly from the War Ministry, three other studies were recommended by the War Ministry as examples to be followed. The General Staff study from 1907 entitled ‘Fighting in Insurgent Towns’ provided the guiding principles of how to repress armed revolts in urban areas. The study was sent to all the regional general commanders. During the following years, the suggestions of the General Staff study were taken up and developed by at least two army corps commanders: General von Bissing, army corps commander in Westphalia, issued an order to his subordinate commanders entitled 'Conduct in case of internal unrest,' whilst General von Hindenburg, army corps commander in Magdeburg, developed a series of instructions which were implemented during the Mansfelder strike of 1909.

The decrees and recommendations from the War Ministry leave little doubt about the continuous attempts to use the army to repress social unrest and political opposition with military means. Due to the public consternation in November 1910 when Bissing’s order became publicly known, the War Ministry formally dissociated itself from these instructions. However, the General Staff study from 1907 remained the basis of the War Ministry’s policy. Less than one month before the last great Westphalian miners’ strike, the war minister, von Heering, issued a decree to the army corps commander which again referred to this General Staff study as well as Hindenburg’s instructions as examples to be followed.

With direct reference to the decree of 20 March 1890, von Heeringen yet again advised the general commanders to prepare themselves for internal mobilisation and to

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14 Bayerische HStA Abteilung IV-Kriegsarchiv, MKR 2497. Order of 4 February 1908 ‘Bestimmungen über die Verwendung von Truppen zur Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen.’
15 Military Archive, Freiburg, K 02-5/2. (Ref. Deist (1991) p.26). Decree of 17 November 1910 from the War Ministry to the commanding generals.
16 Münster HaStA, OP 6095 (documents 206-215). Instructions of 8 February 1912 from the war minister to the commanding generals, ‘Verwendung von Truppen zur Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen.’: “Es darf hierbei auf die während des Mansfelder Aussstandes erprobten und auf Grund der damaligen Erfahrungen ergänzten ‘Bestimmungen über die Verwendung von Truppen zur Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen’ des IV Armeekorps und die Generalstabsstudie aus dem Jahre 1907 ‘Der Kampf in insurgierten Städten’ hingewiesen werden”
get detailed information about the growth of the working population in the industrial areas, their political sympathies as well as keeping an eye on the Social Democratic activities in the area. The aim was to provide an immediate and forceful repression of disorder.\textsuperscript{17} In this decree von Heeringen recognised the policy of the Ministry of the Interior, and clearly stated that it was in the interests of the army to avoid intervention.\textsuperscript{18} It is worth noting, however, that in contrast to the civil authorities who only talked about military intervention in relation to major strikes in the mining sector, the war minister operated with such undefined terms as ‘innerer Unruhen’, ‘Ruhestörungen’ or ‘Störung der öffentlichen Sicherheit,’ a wording applicable to even the smallest instance of unrest. In the light of the increasing political influence of the Social Democracy, it was hardly unintentional that such wide wording was used, leaving plenty of discretion for the army to be used in many other situations than strikes in the mining sector.

The projects and decrees from the War Ministry thus continued to attribute an active role to the army, not only to maintain and restore public order, but also to provide information and to establish plans for protection independently from the civil authorities. By 1912, the War Ministry still saw the army as an instrument for internal warfare, irrespective of the policy of ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping that had been pursued by the Ministry of the Interior for more than two decades.

\textit{6.2. The army corps commanders: Lions in Speech, Lambs in Action}

Whilst the War Ministry pursued a policy of using the army as an ‘instrument for internal warfare’, developments outside the walls of the War Ministry and the General Staff moved in a different direction. Not only did war ministers seem to become

\textsuperscript{17} Münster HaStA, OP 6095 (documents 206-215), instructions from the war minister to the commanding generals of February 8 1912, ‘Verwendung von Truppen zur Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen’: “Sofortiges Eingreifen mit hinreichenden Kräften kann für die schnelle und erfolgreich Unterdrückung von Ruhestörungen entscheidend sein.”

\textsuperscript{18} Münster HaStA, OP 6095 (documents 206-215), instructions of 8 February 1912 from the war minister to the commanding generals, ‘Verwendung von Truppen zur Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen’: “Für die Zivilbehörden wird bei Truppenanforderungen der Standpunkt des Ministers des Innen massgebend sein...Auch nach diesseitigem Erachten muss das Heranziehen der Truppe im Interesse der Armee nach Möglichkeit vermieden werden.”
increasingly isolated within government\textsuperscript{19} but the attitude of the army corps commanders, although in principle in favour of repressive measures against Social Democratic activities, proved to be reluctant to military intervention when it came to concrete instances of strike or demonstration. Thus the gap between the instructions from the War Ministry and the Great General Staff, and the actual course of the military interventions at the regional level, more than anything shows the disparity between, on the one hand, the political designs of the military establishment, as developed in the Great General Staff and professed by the War Ministry, and, on the other hand, the rationale of general commanders facing concrete situations of unrest to which they needed to find appropriate responses.

During the major strikes in Westphalia, the state administration's attempts to avoid military intervention were supported by the army corps commanders. The commanding generals referred to the interests of the army organisation, and claimed that the problem of maintaining internal order was the responsibility of the civil authorities, at least until a very advanced stage of the conflict when riots and violent actions became too widespread for the civil forces to control\textsuperscript{20}. At the same time, given that the civil administration made serious efforts to manage the situations with their own forces, the general commanders rarely questioned the need for military assistance if eventually military troops were requested. Moreover, in pursuing their inclinations to moderate any military engagement, the general commanders had no qualms about by-passing the recommendations from the War Ministry as well as the orders issued by the King. In concrete cases of unrest, the general commanders always chose to follow strictly the instructions from the civil authorities.

The gap between the rhetoric and reality of military intervention can be seen by looking at the decisions of five prominent commanders, three of whom served in Westphalia. In 1889, from the very beginning of the military intervention in the great Westphalian miners' strike, the army corps commander, General von Albedyll,

\textsuperscript{19} Henning (1987) p.160.
complained about the requisitions from the civil authorities demanding protection from important contingents of soldiers. This brought him into opposition, not only with the civil administration, but also with the War Ministry and the King.21 Although he described the reaction of the civil authorities as wildly exaggerated,22 he did not deny the appropriateness of military intervention. His objection to the mobilisation of 10,000 soldiers was that he could deal with the problem with many fewer men, if only he had his hands free to repress the disturbance with traditional military means.23 Realising that he would not be allowed to implement such measures, he became a vigorous supporter of ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping. In his account to the King after the end of the strike, Albedyll expressed his deepest concern about the prospect of frequent military assistance to the civil forces in the future, unless the police and the gendarmerie forces were strengthened significantly.24


24 Münster HaStA, OP 2847b, ‘Berichte des Generalkommandos des VII Armeekorps betreffs den Bergarbeiterstreik, 1889; 1897’ (documents 7-9), letter of 11 June 1889 from general von Albedyll to the King: “Das aber spreche ich mit Bestimmtheit aus, dass es in der bisherigen Weise nicht fortgehen kann, wenn nicht viel ernstere Gefahren eintreten sollen, wie es die gegenwärtige war, und wenn nicht ins besondere die bisjetzt noch gut gesinnte und zuverlässige Mehrzahl der Bergleute immer mehr dem sozialdemokratischen Gift zugängig werden soll. Ich glaube nur das hervorhaben zu müssen, dass ein sehr häufiges und wiederholtes Einschreiten mit dem Militär hier eine sehr bedenkliche Massnahme sein würde, und dass es mir dringend erforderlich erscheint, bei den zu treffenden Einrichtungen als einen wesentlichen Punkt festzuhalten, dass die Aufsichtsbehörden über
It is important to stress that Albedyll was not opposed to the idea of domestic military intervention as such, but that he wanted to be in charge of when and how the troops were used. A similar attitude can be found by other general commanders. In 1890, General Loë declared to Waldese that he tried to prevent the civil authorities from calling for military assistance for the occasion of the May Day. Similarly, Waldese declared in 1897 in an account to the King of the Hamburg dockers’ strike, that it was best to postpone the military repression of the workers’ movements. Interfering in a great strike would be a way of letting the Social Democracy decide the time and place for the big battle. Instead it was better to take action against the Social Democrats when the workers were not already mobilised for a strike movement.

Like Albedyll, General von Bissing had no taste for getting involved in domestic conflicts, unless it was an open revolt against which a state of siege could be declared, thus allowing him to repress any resistance with military means. His infamous order of 1907 leaves little doubt about his readiness to repress internal unrest with military means. However, in his correspondence with the civil authorities during his service as army corps commander in Münster, he showed very little inclination to co-operate with the civil authorities, and insisted on his own authority to take all relevant decisions concerning military intervention.
As a war minister (1903-1909), General von Einem was perceived as a hard-liner, a reputation due above all to his recommendation of the General Staff study entitled ‘Fighting in Insurgent Towns’ and the Hindenburg instructions. However, later in his capacity as army corps commander in Westphalia during the 1912 strike, he showed himself rather co-operative and attentive to the wishes of the civil authorities. In his account of the events written in 1927, he insists on his right and duty to interfere in strikes and to provide a forceful response. The tone is meant to impress, but it appears from the correspondence from the district governors in Münster and Arnsberg that the military authorities implemented only what the civil authorities asked them to do. It is remarkable to see how both Bissing and Einem, like Albedyll previously, lost their taste for active military intervention once they occupied the post of army corps commander. As general commanders in Münster, both showed themselves rather prudent when it came to sending troops to ordinary labour conflicts, and in the cases where troops were in fact mobilised, they very carefully followed the wishes of the civil authorities, about when to send troops, where and how many. It was not that the Prussian generals - as the professionalisation theory suggests - were too professionalised to be involved in politics. Prussian generals were very politicised, both when it came to foreign and domestic issues. But in practice they found that the Social Democratic movement and other types of protest movements were unsuitable for suppression by military means.


29 Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, VII-14 vol.1 /32-1, ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912’ (document 5-10): Report of 20 May 1912 from the district governor of Münster county to the minister of the interior. “...Das Zusammenwirken zwischen Militär- und Zivilbehörden vollzog sich glatt. Gesetzlich stand zwar die Leistung den Militärbehörden zu, in Wirklichkeit geschah sie durch die Polizei-Behörden. Den Militär-Patrouillen war vielfach zur örtlichen Führung ein Gendarm oder Polizeibeamter beigegeben, was sich als sehr zweckmäßig erwies.” Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, VII-14 Vol.3 /37-1, ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912’ (documents 102-103): Letter of 14 March 1912 from the district governor of Münster not only indicates in details where to send the troops, but also how many. Similarly, for the county of Arnsberg, Münster HaStA, Regierung Arnsberg, 14325, ‘Bergarbeiterausstand im Ruhrkohlenrevier 1912.’
6.3. The marginalisation of the supreme commander

The position of the army corps commanders is central in understanding the contrast between the declarations of the ‘Supreme Commander’ and the measures implemented in situations of major unrest. After a brief period of liberalism in 1889, the King adopted Bismarck’s view that the struggle against the Social Democracy was not a question of legal measures, but of warfare.\(^{30}\) Throughout the rest of his reign, the King showed a readiness to launch a crack down with military assistance on any social or political unrest. In 1891, he famously declared to a group of recruits that he might ask them to shoot on their parents and brothers,\(^{31}\) and throughout his reign, William II became known for his forceful declarations of intent.\(^{32}\) Accordingly, the orders coming from the King, as the head of the executive, were unequivocally in favour of a coercive policy towards any political or social opposition threatening the existing order.

However, the influence of the King on the domestic use of troops - in particular the cases in Westphalia - was limited in practice. There were two reasons for this. In the first place, all questions concerning when and how to use troops were determined at the regional level, with the King’s approval being merely a rubber-stamp. In 1889 during the great Westphalian miners’ strike, General von Albedyll informed the King


\(^{32}\) The examples are many. In 1903, the King began to talk about the forceful repression of the Social Democrats in terms of a ‘revenge’ for the Revolution of 1848. Berghahn (1994) p.255. Similarly, Waldsee reports several strong declarations of William II. In 1896, the King asked Waldsee to intervene with military troops in the strike among Hamburg dock workers, even without being requested from the Hamburg Senat: ‘Sehr viel wurde von dem unlängst hier ausgebrochenen Ausstand der Hafenarbeiter gesprochen. Der Kaiser wünscht energisches Einschreiten, es ist dazu aber nicht die geringste Gelegenheit, da die Leute sich völlig ruhig verhalten. Noch auf dem Bahnhofe beim Abschied sagte er mir: ‘Fassen Sie nur ordentlich zu, und auch ohne anzufragen.’’ Legal and constitutional details were not one of William’s preoccupations. Waldsee also reports that, at this particular occasion, William was about to commit a blunder because, at his arrival in Hamburg, he had forgot that Hamburg was a sovereign state within the German Empire and not a part of Prussia. Alfred Graf von Waldsee 'Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred von Waldsee' Vol.2 (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 1922. Diary 29 November 1896. In 1905, William II shocked the Reich Chancellor von Bülow by declaring: ‘First shoot, behead and get rid of the Social Democrats, by a bloodbath if need be, and then fight a war outside...’ von Bülow ‘Denkwürdigkeiten’ II, p.198. (cit. Kitchen (1968) p.162)
on 5 May that he had already sent troops to Gelsenkirchen. In his reply, the King ordered Albedyll to use all troops available. The King’s instructions were not followed, since General von Albedyll never mobilised his full potential of manpower and, moreover, tried to limit the number of forces. However, at no moment did the King intervene to enforce his initial order, and the final decision about the size of the military intervention was therefore left to Albedyll’s discretion. A similar procedure can be observed in 1896 during the Hamburger dock workers’ strike, when Waldersee refrained from military intervention against the explicit orders from the King. Although known as a hard-liner, in particular concerning measures against the labour movement, General von Waldersee replied to the King that a military intervention was not possible since no unrest had taken place.

In his papers left in the military archive in Freiburg, General von Einem has left the formal order from the King to intervene with military troops in the miners’ strike of March 1912. The King’s order was to repress any resistance with the most radical measures possible. As was the case with Waldersee in 1896, general von Einem later openly and clearly distances himself from the measures proposed by the King. In a hand-written note on the reverse side of the telegram, he indicates his caution over the wording of this telegram, and in the account in his memoirs, he declares with pride that no violent confrontations took place.

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34 Letter from the war minister to the army corps commander in Westphalen May 5 1889 ‘Seine Majestät der Kaiser und König befehlen jedoch, dass, falls die Beilegung der Sache nicht in Aussicht stehen sollte, Eure Excellenz sofort unter grösstmöglicher Enthaltung von Truppen weiterem Umgreifen der Bewegung und Excesse Vorbeugen.’ Potsdam III R 43 Filmsignature 11971-11972 ‘Handel und Gewerbe: Arbeitseinstellung’
35 See footnote 32.
Not only did army corps commanders turn down explicit orders from the King, but it appears from all the cases of mobilisation of troops in Westphalia that the original initiative for the intervention did not come from Berlin, but followed action by the senior state administrators and the army corps commander. By the 1889 intervention, the King was informed on the 6 May that troops had been mobilised the day before.\footnote{This appears from a telegram sent from the Military Cabinet to the War Ministry on 6 May 1889. Central Archive, Potsdam III, R 43, film signature 11971-11972, ‘Arbeitseinstellung 1889-1896 in der Rheinprovinz, Westfalen und Schlesien’ (document 2).}

In Herne 1899, it was the army corps commander, von Mikusch Buckberg, who in the early hours of 28 June, informed the King by telegram about the riots in Herne and that, on the request of the province governor, he had sent one battalion infantry to the town.\footnote{‘In Herne, Kreis Bochum, sind grobe Ausschreitungen von streikenden Bergleuten vorgekommen...Auf Ansuchen der Oberpräsidenten habe ich soeben ein Bataillon angewiesen sofort mit Eisenbahn nach Herne zu fahren, um erforderlichenfalls zur Aufrechterhaltung der Ruhe und Ordnung einzuschreiten.’ Telegramme of June 28 1899 from general von Mikusch-Buchberg to William II. Freiburg PH2 /14 ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Mach bei Unterdrückung von Unruhen 1889-1914’ document 188-189.}

It was only after having received the news about troops having been sent to Herne, that William replied by an order in his usual dramatic style by which he made the commanding general personally responsible for the re-establishment of order.\footnote{Telegramme from William II to general von Mikusch ‘Ich befehle Sie (...) dass die Ordnung energisch und gründlich von Ihnen sofort wiederhergestellt wird. Meldung vom wesentlichsten an mich.’; Telegramme from William II to the military Cabinet ‘Ich habe auf die Meldung von den Bergarbeiter-ausschreitungen in Herne in Westfalen, zu deren Unterdrückung Polizei nicht ausreichte und ein Bataillon requiriert war, den kommandierende General von Mikusch persönlich für die sofortige, energische, gründliche Wiederherstellung der Ordnung verantwortlich gemacht.’ Freiburg PH2 /14 ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Mach bei Unterdrückung von Unruhen 1889-1914.’ document 185 and 187.}

During the strike of 1912, civil servants at all levels declared for several days that they would do their best to manage without military assistance.\footnote{Münster HaStA, Regierungsbezirk Arnsberg, 14325, ‘Bergarbeiterausstand im Ruhrkohlenrevier 1912’ Telegrammes from the local governors and municipal police officers to the district governor in Arnsberg, 10-13 March 1912.} Only after a few days did they begin seriously to discuss the possibility of military intervention. When the military authorities were contacted, the procedure was the same as in 1889 and 1899: in the evening of 13 March, the province governor requested military assistance directly from the army corps commander, who gave the order to mobilise the troops, and only afterwards, at 11 p.m., did he inform the King of the intervention. But it was
only the following morning at 8.25 a.m. that General von Einem received the formal ‘order’ from His Majesty.\(^{43}\)

6.4. The Prussian Ministry of the Interior and state administration: new challenges, new policies

In contrast to the official policy of the War Ministry, the predominant policy of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior after 1889 was to avoid military involvement in domestic conflicts, and to make the civil administration manage mass protest movements with their own forces.\(^{44}\) On the other hand, the idea of calling for military intervention remained very present in the calculations of Prussian bureaucrats right until the end of the Imperial period, with constant references made to the possible declaration of a state of siege being continuously discussed.\(^{45}\) The transition from procedures that still rested heavily on military assistance to a ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping took place over a long period of time. Attempts to ‘de-militarise’ the internal peacekeeping began already in the early years of the Imperial period,\(^{46}\) however, in the 1870s, this was to be considered as a declaration of intent rather than as an actual policy to be implemented immediately. Thus, during the years 1870-1889, the Prussian army - like the French - was still involved in maintenance of order whenever gatherings took place that involved a significant number of participants - several hundreds or thousands.

During the 1889 strike and immediately after, two strategies were developed over how to use the army in domestic conflicts. One supported by certain senior state administrators and military commanders was to reinforce civil forces and limit the role of the army to extreme situations when the civil forces had lost control over a situation deteriorating into riot and violence.\(^{47}\) The other strategy was developed during the

\(^{43}\) Military Archive, Freiburg, N 324 /64 Personal Papers of General von Einem.
\(^{45}\) Funk (1986) p.351.
\(^{46}\) Funk (1986) p.155.
\(^{47}\) See Chapter Two.
1889 crisis by the local governor in Gelsenkirchen.48 He defined the function of the military troops as consisting of three elements:

- An important number of soldiers were to be present at the place of disorder to discourage people from violent actions, and in the case of labour conflicts, to ensure, by their mere presence, that strikebreakers were not prevented from going to work.
- The main function of the troops was to cover the rear of the civil forces. Only the police and gendarmerie should be in the front line, in direct contact with the demonstrators.
- The troops should stand by, ready to intervene in the event of riots or violent actions taking place.

During the 1890s, the first strategy was adopted by the Prussian authorities, whilst the French authorities adopted a strategy very close to that developed by the local governor in Gelsenkirchen.

How did the policy of developing civil forces instead of military intervention come to prevail in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior? Reading the main analyses of the policy towards internal disturbance, one might have the impression that the policy of removing the army from internal peacekeeping was a settled and continuous policy after 1889.49 However, rather than renouncing the access to military assistance, the 'de-militarisation' of the internal peacekeeping took place as a continuous process whereby the progressive strengthening of the civil forces allowed the civil authorities increasingly to delay the moment when military assistance was requested. On the other hand, whilst recommending that public disturbance was dealt with by the available civil forces, the possibility of requesting military troops remained explicit in the correspondence of the Ministry of the Interior throughout the period.50

50 Münster Ha.St.A, Regierung Münster VII - 57 Bd.1 1890-1905. Letter of 31 August 1904 From the minister of the interior to the province governor of Westphalia, (document 197). Similarly the debate between the ministry of the interior and the province governors of Westphalia and the Rhine Province about establishing protection plans in co-operation with the military authorities. Münster HaStA, OP 6095 'Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929' (documents 37; 41-49). See also below chapter 7. Münster HaStA, OP 6889
Moreover, the dominant approach followed by the Ministry of the Interior after 1889 was restricted by influential forces within the government, in particular the War Ministry, that preferred a hard line against social and political agitation. Similarly, the line of the Ministry of the Interior was not totally clear-cut. One of the joint initiatives of the King and the Ministry of the Interior from the 1890s was the idea of emergency power legislation. Believing that the existing criminal laws and the legislation on high treason were not sufficiently efficient to break the backbone of the Social Democracy in a situation of revolt, they wanted to provide the army with legal means to undertake searches, confiscations and imprisonments in the case of a general revolt.51

After 1889, the minister of Trade and Commerce from 1890 to 1896, von Berlepsch, was the most prominent member of government in favour of social welfare programmes. However, within the Prussian government, there was conflict between von Berlepsch, who was in favour of social reforms to meet the challenge from Social Democracy, and the ministers of the interior von Kölle (1894-1895) and von der Recke (1895-1899), who had a more confrontational attitude towards the working-class movement, wanting to attack it through legislation. With the departure of von Berlepsch in 1897, his social welfare programme was abandoned, and a more confrontational line was adopted by the Prussian government.52 K.E.Bom sees the changes in the Prussian government in 1896-1897, with the dismissal of von Berlepsch and the appointment of hard-liners such as Count Posadowsky-Wehner to the Interior, von Bülow to the Foreign Affairs and von Miquel as deputy prime minister and minister of finance, as influenced by the attempts of the war minister von Gossler to pursue a more confrontational policy towards Social Democracy, a policy that greatly involved the army.53 Nevertheless, if this change of direction within the government had a devastating effect on social reforms, it had no apparent influence on the policy of

52 K.E.Bom (1957) p.141.
53 K.E.Bom (1957) p.140.
the Ministry of the Interior in matters of management of public unrest - it remained in favour of the 'de-militarisation' of internal peacekeeping.

One of the main reasons was probably the difficulties of co-operating with the War Ministry. In general, the Ministry of the Interior and the state administration at the regional level were suspicious of the army which they feared was prepared to take steps independent of them and thereby thwart the more forthcoming policy pursued by the Ministry of the Interior towards the workers. 54 Another important factor, which made the Ministry of the Interior want to take over all responsibility for the maintenance of order, was that the War Ministry was not a very reliable partner, because it lacked authority within the military establishment. This was vital since the military establishment was split over the domestic role of the army, and hence agreements between the two ministries were likely to run into opposition from other branches of the military, and so the War Ministry might face difficulties forcing through unpopular measures. 55

In this light, it is hardly surprising that the Ministry of the Interior continuously made recommendations to the state administration to manage unrest for as long as it could without calling for military troops. Forced to concentrate on the management of public unrest with the forces under civil command, the Ministry of the Interior asked the state administration to enter into close co-operation with the local authorities and municipal police forces. The aim was to improve the efficiency of the civil forces by elaborating detailed plans as to how to move the municipal police forces from calm areas to the points of turbulence, as well as deciding the distribution of the local *gendarmes* in case of major labour conflicts. 56 This type of co-operation, initiated immediately after the events of 1889, resulted in nation-wide designation lists which were regularly updated throughout the later period until the end of the Imperial era.

55 For the rivalries between the central military institutions, see Craig (1955) p.230ff.
A second significant change in the role of the Ministry of the Interior after 1889 was the increasing involvement of the state administration in the negotiations of labour conflicts. The Prussian state administrators thereby functioned both as arbitrators between the employers and employees and as responsible for the public order.\footnote{See Chapter Four.} To appear credible as an arbitrator, the state administration also had to control the forces of order. Given that the Ministry of the Interior could not prevent the military authorities from taking independent steps once the army had been involved, attempts by the state administration to end the conflicts through negotiations were at risk of being destroyed by the actions of the military authorities.

The successful handling of the Westphalian miners' strike of 1905 with civil forces alone seems to have had important effects on the policy of 'de-militarising' internal peacekeeping. In the first place, it confirmed the policy of the Ministry of the Interior, in the sense that it proved that even a situation with very large mass gatherings could be managed without military assistance. It gave the state administration a great deal of confidence in its capacity to handle this type of conflict with its own forces. Given the uneasiness of working with a strong-headed military commander, this option seemed attractive. Indeed, shortly afterwards, the Prussian government adopted the strategy of the Ministry of the Interior. Thus, in January 1906, when the Social Democrats announced nation-wide demonstrations in favour of a reform of the electoral system to the Prussian Diet, the government stressed that troops were not to be mobilised except for the case of extreme urgency.\footnote{Minutes from a meeting in the Prussian State Ministry on the 8 January 1906. Cit.Henning (1987) p.171} In all larger towns, the troops were kept in their garrisons ready to intervene,\footnote{Military Archive, Freiburg, N 87/43. General Otto von Below Unpublished memoirs, pp.507-508.} but despite the great tension and clashes between the local police and demonstrators in many towns, no example has been found of mobilisation of troops. Thus, between 1905 and the outbreak of the First World War, there are only seven recorded incidents of domestic military intervention throughout the entire Empire, and these were only to restore order rather than prevent riots and violent actions from taking place.\footnote{Worms, Brandenburg (June 1909); Karlsruhe, Baden (August 1909); Mansfelder coal area near Magdeburg (October-November 1909); Neumünster (February 1910); Schwents near Danzig and Mariewerder (January 1912); Westphalia (March 1912); Zabern, Alcase (November 1913).}
6.5. The Westphalian state administration and the new responses to mass unrest after 1889

The success of the policy pursued by the Ministry of the Interior depended greatly on the support of the governors at the provincial and district level, and their capacity to withstand pressure from the local authorities to provide a powerful show of force against disturbers of public order.

At the local level, one of the most important fault lines lay within the state administration, between the higher authorities - province and district governors - who became increasingly reluctant to involve the army, and the local governors, who were more inclined to call for military assistance. Funk stresses that the reluctance of the senior administrators was financial as well as political. In his analysis of the recommendations from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and the attempts made by the senior state administrators to calm local officials, mayors and employers, Hansjoachim Henning argues against the claims put forward by Klaus Saul and K.E. Born that the main objective for the civil authorities was to support the employers by putting down strikes with all available means. Similarly, he considers Tenfelde’s description of the army as the willing instrument of coercion in the hands of the capital interests as misunderstood and lacking empirical evidence.

These points of criticism seem justified, given that at no time did the army appear to have played a decisive role in the outcome of any of the Westphalian miners’ strikes. Ever since 1872, the use of public forces in situations of labour conflicts was, from the viewpoint of the Ministry of the Interior, considered as an issue to be resolved between the employers and the employees. The role of the state was originally only to interfere in case of violations of the law. Similarly, if the presence of troops could be seen as a step in favour of the interests of the mining companies, this was not intended by the

military commanders who would at any moment have refused to see themselves as instruments of private capital.

It is necessary to distinguish between the attempts of the Prussian state to encourage and sustain the interests of the heavy industries in the Ruhr, and the question of maintenance of order. The Prussian state, to a greater degree than the French state, could permit itself to discriminate between the conflicts in which it wanted to interfere, and the conflicts that it preferred not to get involved in and in which the Prussian state did not guarantee the safety of the property of its citizens. The conflicts between employers and employees were considered as a private matter, unless and until the state administration believed that it directly concerned the State. Similarly, unrest and riots during labour conflicts were primarily private matters, that only concerned the state when they extended beyond a local community and began to threaten the public order of wider areas. The continuous semi-privatisation of problems concerning security and maintenance of order in Prussia should be seen in this light.65

The district governor in Düsseldorf, von Berlepsch, who, in 1889, led the negotiations between employers and employees, wrote many years later in his memoirs about how these events convinced him that labour conflicts could no longer be repressed with force but had to be solved through negotiations.66 In his own district, he managed the situation with municipal police forces and gendarmerie, without requisitioning military assistance. When 7,000 coal miners went on strike the 15 May 1889, von Berlepsch as well as the district governor in Aachen were the only district governors who had no troops mobilise in their district.67 Von Berlepsch asked the local military authorities to prepare themselves for a requisition, but kept hesitating about calling in the army, so that the crisis eventually passed without further steps being necessary. It emerges from his correspondence with the Ministry of the Interior, both during the crisis and afterwards, that he was very proud of his own manoeuvres.68

65 See Chapter Two.
68 Similarly, von Berlepsch was strongly opposed to the idea of declaring a state of siege during the great Westphalian miners’ strike of 1889. Central Archive, Potsdam III, R 43, film signature 11971-11972 ‘Handel und Gewerbe: Arbeitseinstellung 1889-1896 in der Rheinprovinz, Westfalen und
The aftermath of the crisis similarly shows that the governmental authorities in Berlin appreciated von Berlepsch' dexterity, and his attempts to integrate the working population through social reform rather than through repression. The Westphalian province governor, von Hagenmeister, who was responsible for military intervention and persistently worked for a declaration of a state of siege, was sacked in the middle of the crisis. In contrast, von Berlepsch was promoted province governor of the Rhineland less than six months after the strike and was then called to Berlin four months later to occupy the newly established post as minister of Trade and Industry. The documents examined do not reveal whether the different use of force was the reason for these reshufflings among the senior civil servants, but it may have been understood as a lesson for others.

As was the case for the Ministry of the Interior, the 1905 strike was a turning point for the civil administration in Westphalia because it confirmed that it was possible to avoid military assistance even to a miners' strike with over 200,000 participants. However there was a price. The first was to operate with a degree of risk that the crisis might get out of control and degenerate into violence and riots. Secondly, to avoid the military intervention, the civil authorities had to modify their security objectives. Realising that they could not ensure the security of the strikebreakers against attacks from individual strikers, the civil forces were to deal only with actions committed by the strikers collectively, but not the confrontations between individuals.69

In 1905, it was the senior civil servants who refused to call for military assistance, although a good number of the local governors as well as mayors and the local police authorities claimed that their forces were largely insufficient to ensure the public order. The policy of the senior state administrators to avoid military involvement became more pronounced as they became increasingly confident in their own ability to deal

with major unrest and, during later periods, the measures taken in 1905 were cited as the example to follow.\textsuperscript{70}

The policy of avoiding a military intervention remained throughout the period examined. However, the correspondence from the Prussian civil administrators show that the state administrators were painfully aware of the dangers linked to their insistence on mobilising civil forces only, since these were hopelessly inadequate to deal with serious confrontations.\textsuperscript{71} In 1912, when the military authorities carefully followed the instructions from the civil authorities, the strategy remained very much similar to that of 1889: small contingents of soldiers compared to the number of strikers, measures taken \textit{ad hoc}, and a lack of overall co-ordination of the movements of the troops within the area. The events of March 1912 indicated the limit to how far the Prussian authorities thought they could go before calling the army.\textsuperscript{72} Jessen and Funk sustain the view that the military intervention of March 1912 was a reasonable response to a conflict with a high potential of violence, and note the reluctant attitude of the civil authorities towards requisition of military assistance.\textsuperscript{73}

Whilst in 1889 the response in Westphalia was quite similar to that in Nord-Pas-de-Calais during the early 1890s, the French authorities during the following decades adapted their response to the size of the challenge. In Prussia, the insufficiency of the civil forces remained. The successful 'de-militarisation' of the maintenance of order in


\textsuperscript{71} This was made clear by local police authorities as well as the province and district governors of all the areas concerned, even if there was also general agreement about avoiding military assistance. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, Rep.77, Titel 2523, Nr.1 anhang 1. vol.20 'Die Erfahrungen aus den Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrgebiet im März 1912.' Minutes from a meeting by the local governor in Essen, 1 June 1912.

\textsuperscript{72} Henning (1987) pp.139-141.

Prussia has to be seen against the background that the Prussian civil administration took great risks in operating with largely insufficient forces. Inevitably, the civil authorities at the local level felt uncomfortable about this policy, which operated with forces that were obviously inadequate to handle a situation developing into riots and violence.\footnote{Henning (1987) p.158.} The general attitude among civil administrators in Westphalia seemed to be to live with the risk, to wait and see - and only in the event of the civil forces losing control, to believe that troops should be requested.

### 6.6. Concluding remarks: alliances of forces against the domestic use of troops

The Prussian civil administration never gave up their right to request military troops, but became increasingly confident of the capacity of the civil forces to deal with the management of order insofar as violence and riots did not get out of control. Due to this wait-and-see attitude during the 1890s, the civil administration became surer of its capacity to manage without military troops. On their side, the policy of the trade unions and the Social Democrats to ensure that strikers were disciplined increased the likelihood of major strikes taking place without military intervention, as happened in Hamburg 1896-1897 and in Westphalia in 1905.

On the other hand, the military authorities never gave up the idea of ultimately launching a forceful crack down on the Social Democrats. However, whilst the military authorities elaborated wild plans for a military coup or civil war, they were unprepared for the type of conflicts which actually occurred. As Sauer and Deist both point out,\footnote{Sauer (1970) p.433 and Deist (1991) p.26.} there was a vast grey zone between a situation of great strike and a civil war. As long as a conflict could not clearly be defined as a revolt, the military commanders preferred leaving responsibility for dealing with it to the civil authorities.

Whilst both civil and military authorities waited for a major conflict to break out, the civil administration increasingly managed to deal with minor conflicts, and to delay the
moment when a military intervention became necessary. During each situation of great tension, the senior state administrators and the army corps commander closely observed the development of the crisis, whilst trying to appease the forces within the military establishment and in the local communities calling for a military intervention.

The success of the policy of 'de-militarisation' of the internal peacekeeping must therefore be seen as the result of the Ministry of the Interior and the senior state administrators and on the other hand individual military commanders working persistently - though not jointly - in the same direction. Given that, within the boundaries of the law and with the support from the King, the military authorities had plenty of opportunities to operate coercively against internal unrest, the implementation of a non-military response to strikes and public disorder was strongly influenced by the reluctant attitude of the army corps commanders, once they faced concrete situations of unrest. Against the tacit coalition favouring the use of civil forces rather than military intervention, the attempts by the military authorities in Berlin and the occasional initiatives from the King to display significant military force against public unrest had little impact.
Chapter seven. The French army and public unrest: changes of policy

If the policy of not calling upon the army was successfully implemented in Prussia, why did a similar development not take place in France, where the regime, based as it was on Republican ideal of government being legitimised and reflecting the ‘French Nation’, had all the more reason to avoid sending the Army of the Nation against groups that belonged to the ‘Nation’? In this chapter, two factors will be analysed that were central to the choices made by successive French ministers of the interior of dealing with public unrest by calling upon the army. The first was linked to the types of strategies adopted in the 1890s to deal with crowds and public disorder. The second factor was a fundamental consensus of successive government, the prefectoral authorities and military commanders about the necessity of responding to mass protest movements by mobilising a high number of soldiers in order to avoid a conflict of deteriorating into violence and riots.

As shown in Chapter Six, the Prussian authorities by the early 1890s adopted the policy of ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping, whilst turning down the suggestions from the local governor in Recklinghausen of solving the problem of internal unrest by a tactical and conscious use of the army. During the same years, the French authorities were about the make the choice between two similar strategies. The option which fitted Republican ideals was to strengthen and improving the civil forces, thereby allowing the army to intervene only in situations of extreme urgency. The other strategy was to improve the efficiency of military intervention and integrate the army within the measures to be implemented to deal with at least certain types of disorder. In France, a combination of the two strategies was adopted in practice. Projects to strengthen the civil forces were presented and discussed in the National Assembly, whilst measures involving the army were developed in the Ministry of the Interior in close co-operation with the War Ministry and with the civil and military authorities at the regional level. Thus, the civil forces were reinforced, but the result was not a decrease in the frequency of the military interventions, on the contrary: Whilst the
number of policemen and gendarmerie officers increased, the army also became increasingly integrated in the task of maintaining public order.

From the 1890s, three features emerged which became predominant in the management of mass mobilisation after 1901. In the first place, in many cases, calling for military assistance in many cases became an administrative practice rather than a political choice. Within the government it was decided that certain types of conflict would lead to the mobilisation of troops, no matter whether the conflicts were of a violent character or not. Secondly, the requisition of the army moved from being a repressive measure to a preventive one. Thirdly, it became the practice to mobilise a significant number of men compared to the potential number of protesters.

Chapter Seven constitutes of three parts. The purpose of section 7.1. is to set out the development of policies in the 1890s (7.1.1), to look at attempts to alter these away from the use of the army (7.1.2), and to look at why these attempts failed by examining the plans and strategies behind the use of troops for larger instances of unrest (7.1.3). The sections 7.2. analyse the position of prefects in order to show why the policy of successive ministers of the interior was adopted by prefects, and the section (7.3). analyses the position of the army corps commanders in order to show that these, to a large extent supported the use of military troops as a means of preventing instances of public unrest to develop into riots or revolt. It ends with a comparative analysis of the political and social background against which the French and Prussian systems adopted dissimilar strategies.
7.1. Governmental policies toward the use of troops after 1890

7.1.1. The rise of new strategies: the preventive mobilisation of troops.

As in Prussia, where the miners’ strike of 1889 marked the break through in the recognition of labour claims as an essential item on the governmental agenda, the miners' strikes in Anzin (1884) and in Decazeville (1886) sharpened the sensitivity of leading politicians such as Freycinet and Waldeck-Rousseau towards the issues affecting industrial workers. After the strike in Anzin, Waldeck-Rousseau supported legislation that recognised the right of workers to organise themselves in trade unions. In 1901, as prime minister, Waldeck-Rousseau made similar efforts to liberalise the legislation and to allow workers to form labour actions.

In terms of the maintenance of order, however, the increasing organisation of the labour movements in the 1890s and the rise of predictable conflicts made ministerial executive change strategy. Thus, the engagement of Freycinet and of Waldeck-Rousseau in reforming the conditions for labour action was paralleled by measures to maintain public order, so that the control of the state over civil unrest was greatly strengthened. In 1886, as head of the Cabinet, Freycinet was responsible for the requisition of troops to the strike in Décazeville. As war minister, between 1888 and 1893, he was responsible for the security measures taken during the Boulanger crisis, and from 1890, he developed the strategies to deal with May Day demonstrations.

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1 "Un autre point sur lequel j'insistais (1886), parce qu'il n'avait pas cessé de me préoccuper, est celui des conflits du travail avec le capital. Les grèves de Decazeville, notamment, s'étaient à plusieurs reprises imposées à mes réflexions: Les conditions du travail, dis-je, se sont modifiées. Nous ne sommes plus dans l'état où nous nous trouvions il y a un demi-siècle. Il faut que la République étudie les moyens de rendre moins précaire le sort des ouvriers et de faire cesser cet antagonisme qui n'est autre chose que le sentiment inconscient, mais profond, d'un problème non encore résolu." Charles de Freycinet ‘Souvenirs’ vol.II (1878-1893) Paris Ch. Delagrave, 1913 p.355

(Waldeck-Rousseau 1884) "Le facteur le plus important de la prospérité du travail, s'est la paix sociale, le respect de tous les intérêts": "La majorité des travailleurs est intéressée à l'ordre, parce que, étant partie intégrante de la société, elle est nécessairement intéressée à sa conservation" cit. Pierre Sorlin ‘Waldeck-Rousseau’ Paris: Armand Colin, 1966 p.264.

2 Law of 21 March 1884.

Whereas in Prussia, the measures involving the army were taken entirely by civil and military authorities at the regional level, in France, the initiative to use such measures often came directly from the government. In France, this nation-wide preparation for military intervention was a break with previous practice and was closely linked to the increasing organisation of labour action. Since many labour actions were no longer spontaneous, but declared in advance, Freycinet turned to implement preventive measures by keeping the troops in a state of preparedness, ready to intervene at short notice. A similar development can be seen in relation to potential political unrest, in particular to electoral campaigns or political meetings.

In the first place, it was merely a question of keeping the troops ready to intervene, without actually mobilising them. This was the strategy adopted for the May Day celebrations in 1890 when this occasion was celebrated for the first time. The requisition of troops to Fourmies on May Day 1891 was not only the overreaction of a local mayor in panic and a young incompetent sub-prefect. The call for troops also has to be seen in relation to the fact that troops were kept in a state of preparedness in their garrisons all over France, and that mayors and prefects had carte blanche from Paris to call for troops when they considered this necessary. Despite the protests against the use of troops after Fourmies, Freycinet showed no intention of changing this strategy. In November 1891, during a strike among the gas workers in Le Havre, the minister of the interior asked the war minister Freycinet whether the military authorities could be contacted, just to prepare themselves for the possible outbreak of a strike. The war minister answered in the affirmative. In his reply to the minister of the interior, Freycinet stressed that the troops were not to be called out before the

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4 See Chapter Four.
5 In April 1891, Freycinet, war minister and head of Cabinet, asked the commanding generals to make preparations for military mobilisation at any location within the national territory. Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C./2.1.328, 'Grèves, rassemblement de la troupe, 1906-1909.' For each of the following years, the preventive measures for the 1st May were discussed between the government and the prefectoral and military authorities. Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C./2.1.331, 'Grèves: Intervention des militaires suite aux grèves.'
7National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, 'Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; emploi des trouper, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914'. Letter of 9 November 1891 from the war minister Freycinet to the minister of the interior.
strike had actually broken out. He seemed to make a delicate distinction between the declaration of a strike, and the moment when the workers stopped turning up at work. The fact that, until the outbreak of the First World War, military troops were kept in a state of preparedness every year for the occasion of May Day similarly indicates that Freycinet and succeeding ministers of the interior had no intention of changing this strategy, despite the incidents at Fourmies.

As a response to the criticism of the use of the army after the incidents at Fourmies, Freycinet presented a project in November 1891 suggesting the organisation of a mobile force of gendarmes, with the specific task of ensuring public order. Jauffret probably has a point when he expresses doubts about how seriously Freycinet considered 'de-militarising' internal peacekeeping. Given the number of men who had previously been mobilised to assist at larger strikes, Freycinet’s suggestion to ensure public order of the entire French territory with a force of one hundred mounted gendarmes was not realistic. Moreover, in November 1891, whilst presenting to the National Assembly this project, which was supposed to allow local authorities to deal with public unrest without calling for military assistance, he was also busy assuring the prefect of Pas-de-Calais that there would be no restriction on the right of the prefects and sub-prefects to request military troops. The Freycinet project was never realised,
and no other governmental initiative was taken on the subject until after the turn of the century.

Apart from the strategy of keeping troops in a state of preparedness, a second key element in the policy developed under Freycinet was the mobilisation of a significant number of men compared to the number of protesters. Although the French authorities had previously mobilised considerable number of men for particularly sensitive conflicts, this strategy also became generalised during the 1890s. In the public debate, one of the key arguments about ‘what went wrong at Fourmies’ was that the problem was the presence of military troops. The opposite lesson was drawn by the responsible authorities - Freycinet as war minister and head of Cabinet, the prefect Vel-Durand, and the army corps commander General Loizillon: if troops were to be called, they had to appear in great number because insufficient military force might provoke the population to violent attacks whilst the troops would unable to prevent violent actions from taking place. The instructions from Freycinet from the years following Fourmies clearly stress this point. The conflicts that Freycinet referred to only involved a couple of thousand demonstrators. In the 1880s, the rate of soldiers per striker would normally be between one soldier per ten or fifteen actual participants in the protest movement. During the 1890s, the rate of what was considered a sufficient number of soldiers for internal conflicts went up markedly, to reach a number of one soldier per six or eight protesters. The first plans for protection from 1897 operated with 8,000 soldiers to be mobilised in case of a general strike among the rail personnel, which was about one soldier for every ten employees in the rail companies.


13 Calculations based on the figures from the miners’ strikes in Nord-Pas-de-Calais 1889, 1891, and 1893.

14 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, ‘Grèves: Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de fer’. The plans operates with 80 companies. In principle, a company comprised 100 men, however, between 1903 and 1909, the size of a company was reduced to 75 men and in the winter term to 38.
Under Waldeck-Rousseau, 1899-1902, the strategies initiated by Freycinet were developed and formalised in terms of detailed plans of protection to be implemented in case of certain types of strike. The strategy of keeping the troops in a state of preparedness when unrest was expected, was eventually developed into the preventive mobilisation of troops to ensure the security of persons and property during labour conflicts. Similarly, the requisition of a very large number of men was formalised under Waldeck-Rousseau, most significantly through the increase in the contingents to be mobilised in case of certain types of strike. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais alone, the number of troops designated to be mobilised in case of a nation-wide strike among the rail personnel were increased from 10½ companies in the plans of 1897, to 27 in the revision from 1902, or from 1,000 to 2,700 soldiers.

The development of Waldeck-Rousseau's policy merits attention. In terms of maintenance of order, Waldeck-Rousseau started with the best intentions. In February 1884, as minister of the interior during the miners' strike in Anzin, he stressed, in a circular letter to the prefects, that no troops were to be mobilised unless violence or riots had actually taken place. Eventually, troops were called to restore order in Anzin, but only after more than one month of strike, at a moment when serious riots were about to break out. Later that year, Waldeck-Rousseau repeated this principle and added that troops were only to be used in case of extreme urgency. However, the expression 'extreme urgency' that Waldeck-Rousseau used in 1884 in his recommendations to the prefects had undergone a certain transformation when this wording reappeared in the ministerial correspondence in 1893. By then, it was only in cases of extreme urgency that troops were to be requested directly from a local

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The companies of the plans from 1898, however, operated with 100 men per company which therefore consisted of 8,000 soldiers in total.

15 A further analysis of the plans for protection will be undertaken in Chapter Eight.


17 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, ‘Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914’. Confidential circular of 27 February 1884 from Waldeck-Rousseau, minister of the interior, to the prefects.

18 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C./2.1.331, ‘Intervention militaire aux grèves’ Note of 28 October 1884 concerning the strikes taking place in Anzin: “Le 27 février, une nouvelle requisition (pour gendarmes) du Préfet du Nord, qui a recu du gouvernement l’ordre de ne requérir la troupe qu’à la dernière extrémité.”
garrison, otherwise the requisitions were supposed to pass through the prefect to the army corps commander.\textsuperscript{19} Hence, the question was no longer whether troops could be used, but rather an attempt to control this use.

A further move towards the extensive use of troops took place during the great miners’ strike of 1901. In his biography on Waldeck-Rousseau, Pierre Sorlin describes the attitude of Waldeck-Rousseau towards this nation-wide miners’ strike in 1901 as far more liberal and relaxed compared to his handling of the miners’ strike in Anzin 1884. If Waldeck-Rousseau in 1901 had become more confident as to the possibility of negotiating social peace with the representatives of the labour organisations, it is difficult to accept Pierre Sorlin’s description of him becoming less alarmist in his handling of internal peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{20}

In contrast to the reluctance shown in 1884 towards the question of military presence in Anzin, the Waldeck-Rousseau administration in 1901 took the initiative to prepare a forceful response when rumours began to circulate in June 1901 that a nation-wide strike in the mining sector was about to break out.\textsuperscript{21} In early October 1901, Waldeck-Rousseau told the prefect in Macon not to request the troops until violent action had actually taken place.\textsuperscript{22} However, his attitude changed with the development of the crisis. By the beginning of November, the prefect of Pas-de-Calais was severely criticised for hesitating about calling for troops. The message was clear: if miners did not turn up at work, it was time to call the army.\textsuperscript{23} Similar instructions were given to the prefects in the other departments affected by the miners’ strike.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{19} National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, ‘Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914’. Letter of 1 September 1893 from the minister of the interior to the prefects.

\textsuperscript{20} Sorlin (1966) p.473.


\textsuperscript{22} National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves’. Telegram of 1.October 1901 from the minister of the interior, Waldeck-Rousseau, to the prefect in Macon. “J’estime qu’il est excessif d’appeler de la troupe à Montceau-les-Mines sans qu’aucun incident se soit produit.(...) Quant aux troupes, elles viennent d’être placées à portée, aussi loin que possible cependant de Montceau.”

National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves’. Letter of 5 November 1901 from the minister of the interior to the prefect in Saint Etienne. “En l’état d’incertitude dans lequel nous nous trouvons sur le point de savoir et si la grève éclatera et dans ce cas à quelle date, j’estime qu’il est prématuré de donner des instructions fermes pour faire réunir les troupes à Saint Etienne dimanche prochain.”

\textsuperscript{23} National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves’. Letter of 9 November 1901 from the minister of the interior to the prefect of Pas-de-Calais: “Je ne comprends pas vos hésitations. Vous avez des
Not only did the Waldeck-Rousseau administration sanction the preventive use of troops, a certain degree of automatically was also introduced in handling of the maintenance of order during labour conflicts. In the plans for protection which were developed by the Waldeck-Rousseau administration, the measures to be implemented were linked to the nature of the strike (strike among rail workers, miners, dock workers) rather than to considerations of the degree of violence, real or expected: If a local strike was declared or broke out spontaneously, local police would be send, if it prolonged and spread to other professions or areas, the gendarmerie would be send. If a strike was organised that was expected to comprise a significant number of people over a widespread territory, the army would be contacted.

Whereas the use of troops in Prussia was increasingly restricted to situations in which violence or riots had already taken place, the preventive calling for troops in France became one of the key feature of the strategies implemented after 1901, and the qualifications expressed by Waldeck-Rousseau in 1884 and by Freycinet in 1891 about not calling troops preventively were sacrificed in the name of efficiency and security.

7.1.2. The ‘Bloc des Gauches’ and attempts to change strategies

Following the great electoral victory of the Bloc des Gauches in July 1902, there were expectations of a change of strategy towards labour conflicts, not least to a refrain from the extensive use of military troops. Indeed, the new government under Combes was in favour of avoiding displays of military force. However, the first months of this government were marked by a miners’ strike in Nord-Pas-de-Calais of unprecedented size. Over the entire year of 1901, the strikes in the mining sector - including the great strike in October-November - had only mobilised 19,454 miners on a national scale. In

instructions précises. Toutes les réquisitions à l’autorité militaire lui étant remises, elle doit les exécuter sur dépêche de vous, sans me consulter. Vous devez donc réaliser partout où un commencement de grève se manifeste toutes les mesures arrêtées d’avance. En pareil cas, il n’y a pas une minute à perdre. Si le mouvement paraît se généraliser, vous devez exécuter le plan arrêté pour tout votre département.”

24 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves’. Letter of 9 November 1901 from the minister of the interior to the prefects: “En cas de grève partielle, vous devez réaliser les dispositions concernant l’exploitation intérieur sans me consulter. Si vous avez des raisons de penser que la grève peut se généraliser dans votre département, vous devez du moins réaliser tout l’ensemble du plan arrêté.”

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contrast, during the 1902 strike movement more than 119,000 workers went on strike all over France.\textsuperscript{25}

In 1907, Combes described the measures implemented in October 1901 by Waldeck-Rousseau as vastly exaggerated.\textsuperscript{26} However, confronted with the over 100,000 striking miners in October 1902, Combes' original intentions of avoiding military requisition came to nothing. In his political speeches, as well as in his memoirs written in 1907, Combes plays down the display of force during these strikes.

(In October 1902) Cette agitation s'étant localisée à certaines régions, nous n'utilisâmes le plan que là et seulement dans la mesure qui nous sembla nécessaire. Sauf un meutre accidentel dans la Loire, la grève se passa partout sans accidents fâcheux ou peu s'en faut. Le gouvernement put maintenir l'ordre sans se livrer à des rigueurs et même sans opérer un très notable déploiement des forces.\textsuperscript{27}

To describe the measures implemented during the miners' strike of October 1902 as not being an important display of forces is sadly contradicted by the figures of forces mobilised: in addition to the police and gendarmerie forces, 15,948 soldiers and 767 officers were mobilised in Nord-Pas-de-Calais alone. Given that the number of registered miners in Nord-Pas-de-Calais in 1901 was 87,000 this makes one soldier for every seven potential strikers.\textsuperscript{28}

In 1904, in a circular to the French prefects, Combes repeated the principle of avoiding call outs of public forces at all in labour conflicts.\textsuperscript{29} The letter states that it was the primary duty of the departmental administration to avoid labour conflicts degenerating to a point where repressive intervention became necessary. The occasion of the

\textsuperscript{25} Statistique des Grèves 1901 & 1902.
\textsuperscript{26} "En prévision de ce très dangereux conflit, Waldeck-Rousseau, qui n'avait rien voulu négliger pour y parer, avait concu, d'accord avec l'autorité militaire, un plan complet de mobilisation, qui descendait dans les moindres détails. Le plan surabondait même en précautions. Il mettait en mouvement des forces si formidables qu'il nous parut à mon fils et à moi dépasser démesurément les besoins à pourvoir." Emile Combes '\textit{Mon Ministère, Mémoires 1902-1905}' Paris: Plon, 1956 p.56-57.
\textsuperscript{28} Figure provided by Cooper-Richet (1987) p.402. See also figures of the mining population in Nord-Pas-de-Calais in Chapter Two.
\textsuperscript{29} National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, 'Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection; jurisprudence; emploi des troupes; usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914'. Governmental Circular of 4 August 1904.
circular was serious strikes among agricultural workers in the South of France. At first, Combes famously declared before the National Assembly that this movement was a role model for a social protest. However, only a few weeks later he asked the prefects in the départements concerned to make all preparations for a military intervention. The situation seemed to get out of control, and the administrative-military apparatus was there ready to ensure that the public order would be maintained.

A similar retreat from previous declarations to avoid military intervention took place under Clemenceau. Historians and admirers of Clemenceau have had great difficulties explaining why he developed from being a life-long Radical opponent of military intervention in strikes before entering the Ministry of the Interior, into one of the most notorious users of the military apparatus in his struggle against the trade unions. In March 1906, Clemenceau, as the newly appointed minister of the interior, made a promise in front of 33,000 striking miners in Lens to refrain from sending the army if they avoided riots and violence.

"Je vous assure qu'à place Beauvau je m'efforcerai d'appliquer ce que j'ai préconisé dans le journal. Je suis et je reste contre l'envoi préventif des soldats dans les grèves. J'espère que les socialistes auront à coeur de faciliter ma tâche pacificatrice." 

"La grève est un droit, nous n'entendons pas vous le contester, mais aussi nous vous demandons de ne pas oublier vos devoirs...Je m'engage à ne pas mettre la troupe en contact avec les grévistes...Montrez-vous dignes de cette mesure qui est pour la première fois appliquée."

By addressing the miners in these terms, Clemenceau put the responsibility for military intervention on those leaders of the strike who were in favour of 'direct action' as a

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30 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, 'Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914'. Intervention before the National Assembly of 11 July 1904.
31 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, 'Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection; jurisprudence; emploi des troupes; usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914'. Governmental Circular of 4 August 1904.
32 Clemenceau's biographers - Wormser (1961), Erlanger (1968), Monnerville (1968) - all spend much time explaining the necessity of his political turns. Even a hard-core Marxist such as Maurice Agulhon tries to rehabilitate his hero. Agulhon (1990) pp.217-219. In contrast, Azéma and Winock argue that the Republic was never really threatened from the left, since the political branch of S.F.I.O. and the trade union C.G.T. were in permanent mutual conflict. Azéma & Winock (1970) pp.167-168.
means to obtain reforms. However, by doing so, he also committed the government to send in troops if the violent faction among the leaders of the strike took over. Between the 17 and the 19 March 1906, Basly, Socialist deputy and mayor of Lens, lost control over the strikers and on the 20 March troops were mobilised to an extent never previously seen in France. The figure mentioned in the secondary literature is 20,000 in Lens on the 20 March, whereas the ministerial documents mention that, at the peak of the crisis, 52,000 soldiers were mobilised in the region, whilst the military records from the commandature in Lille reach a figure of over 38,000.\(^{35}\) While this strike in Nord-Pas-de-Calais was still in full swing, measures were taken to ensure order in Paris on May Day 1906, involving the mobilisation of 45,000 soldiers from the whole of France.\(^{36}\)

At first, Clemenceau was reluctant about involving the army and, in April 1906, he sent a circular letter to the prefects in which he explicitly forbade them to use troops preventively and to mobilise soldiers on the simple grounds of a declaration of strike.\(^{37}\) If Clemenceau, in the spring of 1906 declared himself against the preventive mobilisation of troops, he had lost these inhibitions by the end of the year. In relation to the problems of enforcing the legislation concerning the separation of the French state from the Catholic Church, Clemenceau declared that it was essential for the government to enforce respect of the law, and made it clear to the prefects that they had the authority to use military force if there was no other way of forcing through the policy of the government.\(^{38}\) The crisis of the spring of 1906 was followed by a major strike among Parisian electricians in March 1907, and later the same year, the revolt among wine growers in the South, as well as the first joint strike of postal workers and rail personnel. The government's response to these conflicts was equally forceful, and

\(^{35}\) See Chapter Two.
\(^{36}\) Monnerville (1968) p.296.
\(^{37}\) National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, 'Instructions ministérielles; plans de protection; jurisprudence; emploi des troupes; usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves 1849-1914'. Circular of 16 April 1906 from Clemenceau, minister of the interior, to the prefects.
\(^{38}\) National Archives, Paris, F.7.12399, 'Culte Catholique: Inventaires 1905-1907'. Letter of 11 November 1906 from Clemenceau, minister of the interior, to the prefects: "Si l'exécution de la loi vous impose de recourir à la force publique, vous en ferez usage en conformant votre conduite à mes instructions sur l'emploi de la force armée dans les grèves. Ce n'est qu'après avoir épuisé toutes les mesures dictées par le souci d'éviter les conflits, et si l'ordre est troublé, que les troupes seront mises en action.(...) Autant vous vous serez montré prudent et conciliant, autant devant l'insuccès de vos efforts, vous aurez le devoir d'agir avec fermeté."
Clemenceau made no bones about excusing his extensive use of the army to maintain public order. Famously declaring himself to be ‘le premier flic de France’, Clemenceau made no other justification for his extensive use of military troops other than referring to the necessity to defend the Republic against elements in the French society who attempted to overthrow the existing regime.

Not only did Combes and Clemenceau make extensive use of the army in politically tense situations, but they also seem to continue the refusal of Freycinet and Waldeck-Rousseau to establish a police or *gendarmerie* force that could take over the task of ensuring internal order. Confronted with initiatives and projects developed by deputies or senators or by different sections of the War Ministry, the successive government reacted by anticipating them with their own projects, only to shelve them and eventually to forget them.\(^3\) Between 1902 and 1907, a series of projects was presented to the National Assembly by Senator de Montfort concerning a mobile force of state police comprising 2,000-3,000 specially trained policemen. In 1905, when he tried a second time to push forward his project, Senator de Montfort was anticipated by a governmental initiative on the same issue. The government’s project did not result in any organisation of the existing civil forces, and during the following years they were only called into memory by the opposition, who still waited for the government to take action.\(^4\)

The Sarrien cabinet, which came to power in the middle of the mass strike of the spring 1906, immediately took the initiative to establish a mobile force of *gendarmes*. The force was supposed to ensure public order during mass gatherings, strikes, and ‘the application of certain laws’ - no doubt with reference to the confrontation which had taken place only three months before over the establishment of inventories of the possessions of the Catholic institutions in French territory. One might suspect - as does Jauffret - that the Clemenceau project of April 1906 was merely a manoeuvre to anticipate the ‘Montfort project’, with the intention of shelving further initiatives.\(^5\)

\(^{3}\) This is the main argument in Jauffret’s article on the debate about special troops for maintenance of public order between 1870 and 1919. Jauffret (1983).


After February 1907, there was no more talk about organising a mobile force of gendarmes to take over the responsibility for the maintenance of internal order. Jauffret does not venture any explanation as to the reason why the 'Montfort project' was discretely shelved by the government, nor why the Sarrien administration abandoned the project which it enthusiastically defended in April 1906. However, comparing at the various plans concerning a mobile force of gendarmes with the existing plans for protection with military assistance, it becomes obvious how unattractive the gendarmerie alternative was, both because such a force would be quite expensive and because the degree of security it could possibly provide was much lower than the military solution.

7.1.3. Reasons for the government’s policy

If the disparity between words and action in the case of Freycinet and Waldeck-Rousseau can be explained by the impossibility of admitting in public the Realpolitik of the government beneath the surface of declarations and rhetoric, the inconsistencies of Combes and Clemenceau call for an explanation. Both had spent their entire political careers arguing against the use of troops, and both changed their mind strikingly quickly after having resumed at the Ministry of the Interior. One obvious explanation which is often put forward is political necessity, in a situation where the government was pressed from extreme left-wing groups, both within and outside parliament. Moreover, the fact that the Communist C.G.T. trade union advocated 'direct action' during labour conflicts - that is sabotage of material and physical obstruction in order to prevent strikebreakers from entering a mine or a factory - and 'Revolutionary Socialism', seems to justify the measures taken by government. On the other hand, the C.G.T. only adopted its revolutionary programme by the Congress in Amiens in October 1906. Moreover, the majority of strikes to which the army was called were not organised by the C.G.T. and had no particular aims of overthrowing the Republican regime.

It seems that both Combes and Clemenceau, when taking over the post as minister of the interior, imagined that the policy of using the army was a purely political matter that could be changed by simply not calling for military troops. However, a new minister of the interior faced a system in which the maintenance of order for years had relied heavily on military assistance, and a change in this strategy would have required a complete rethinking and restructuring of the forces involved in the maintenance of public order. When Clemenceau in Lens promised that troops would not be mobilised if the strikers refrained from violent action, the army had already been in a general state of preparedness for more than a week. It was only a matter of a telegram, and the entire area could be under strict military control. Faced with a tense political situation that was at risk of getting out of control, a change of strategy would probably not be at the top of the agenda of a new minister.

In order to understand the measures implemented during the first turbulent decade of the century, it is important to note that the ministers and the prefects operated within a system in which the requisition of troops was an integrated part of the strategies available immediately. During these years, the strategies which were originally developed in order to deal with a possible situation of nation-wide strike within certain professions had proved to be extremely efficient when applied to other types of internal unrest. It was therefore difficult to abandon these strategies, in particular during periods of high political tension. On the other hand, the plans for protection were not very flexible when it came to adapting their measures to conflicts of various sizes. In order effectively to prevent a conflict from deteriorating into violence and riots, troops had to be mobilised preventively, or at least at a very early stage of the conflict, and soldiers could only be mobilised in great numbers.

The great efficiency of the strategy of requesting military troops was another reason why successive governments, right until the end of the First World War, were very reluctant about reforming policy towards internal unrest.43 Given the fragile position of governments in conflicts with labour movements and political opponents, it becomes

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43 A radical change of the policies towards public disorder was only undertaken in the early 1920s.
understandable why successive governments were not keen on ‘de-militarising’ internal peacekeeping.

If the regular army were really to be detached from domestic peacekeeping, this would have meant abandoning a set of strategies that allowed the state administration and Ministry of the Interior to remain in control of almost any instance of public disorder. To replace the military organisation with a force of a couple of thousand men would have required a reconsideration of the degree to which the state could protect individuals and private property against attacks during social or political protest movements. Given the fragile political compromise upon which the Third Republic was created, it was essential for the regime to show the influential groups who feared a social revolution that the Republican regime was capable of repressing threatening forces and guaranteeing law and order. In this political context, there was little room for experiments which were at risk of allowing situations to get out of control.

The secondary literature is split between the biographies on Waldeck-Rousseau and Clemenceau, who defend the measures taken by referring to the necessity of a forceful response to the challenge from the increasingly revolutionary unions, and the more general interpretations which often dismiss the government’s policy by suggesting that Waldeck-Rousseau was insincere, that Combes was slightly stupid and that Clemenceau was corrupted by power. However, it is important to note that, as ministers of the interior, Waldeck-Rousseau as well as Combes and Clemenceau, operated within a system in which the use of troops since the early 1890s was a widespread and increasing practice, and in which the majority of requisitions did not involve the government, because they were a matter dealt with entirely at the regional level - and sometimes even at the local level. Moreover, for cases of a size that involved the central power, the administrative machinery was geared to mobilise a vast number of soldiers quickly and efficiently. After the elaboration in 1901 of plans for

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45 This view seems to lie behind the analysis of scholars as different as Rebérioux (1975) and Trempe (1995) who support the thesis of exaggerated and unreasonable measures against the workers’ justified protests, and Serman (1982), Jauffret (1983), and Berlière (1993) who analyse the issue from the perspective of the problems presented for the forces of order by the strategies enforced by Waldeck-Rousseau, Combes and Clemenceau.
protection in case of a nation-wide miners' strike, it would have required a complete rethinking of the civil-military planning in order to send smaller contingents and to use military forces only at the location where violence or riots were actually taking place.

In addition, a series of political reasons can be identified to explain why French governments, despite a certain goodwill towards the workers' complaints, put on such enormous amounts of force during labour conflicts. The Radical and Socialist members of government after 1899 distrusted the trade unions, and knew that they had no way of influencing the course of labour movements. The government could lead negotiations between the employers and the employees, but they could not prevent the trade unions from turning the blame for a failure onto the government, and accusing the government of taking the side of capital. At the same time, the workers were one of the main constituencies of the parliamentary majority supporting the government. The attacks from the trade unions were politically damaging, and there was always the risk of the workers turning their backs on their representatives in parliament and moving towards revolutionary and anarchist movements on the extreme left of the political spectrum.

With the establishment of the Waldeck-Rousseau government in 1899 and the victory of the Bloc des Gauches in 1902, there were great expectations from the workers of a change in the balance of power in labour conflicts now that the government was on the side of the workers. With increasingly radical demands from the trade unions and these expectations of a change in social policy, Waldeck-Rousseau as well as Combes and Clemenceau were bound to disappoint the workers. At the same time, confronted with opposition from the right, the governments after 1899 had to prove that they were not under the influence of the trade unions, as claimed the Conservative press. In the wake of the Dreyfus affair, it was obvious that a government had to reassure potentially anti-Republican forces about its capacity to defend effectively the existing social and economic order against the pressure from the extreme left within and outside parliament. From a political point of view, the main priorities were to make

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sure that the government at no moment lost control over the situation. A badly managed crisis would allow the political right to describe the Republic as anarchy by pointing to the government's lack of authority and will to defend the existing social order. Similarly, a loss of control over the maintenance of order in a situation of crisis could be fatal to the government's authority in the eyes of the workers, and strengthen the position of extra-parliamentary movements at the extreme left.

Finally, a Republican regime could not allow major violent confrontations to take place. The Commune and the more recent events at Fourmies in 1891 were still fresh in the collective memory, and another violent confrontation would risk adding fuel to the fire that might destroy the fragile consensus among the different groups supporting the Republican institutions. Against the background of the strikewave of 1899-1901, the expectations of the workers and the reluctant acceptance of the Republic by important groups within the French society, the main priority of successive ministers of the interior was to keep protest actions under strict control. If public order was to be ensured effectively, the army was the only organisation that had sufficient resources to provide a reassuring response to the challenge. Notwithstanding the arguments that could be made against the use of troops against French citizens, and in spite of the criticisms from the left-wing opposition in the National Assembly against the government's use of troops, this was a lesser evil than the prospect of losing control over these often very sensitive conflicts.

7.2. Prefectoral authority: prudence and control

As shown above, the correspondence from the years 1899-1901 between Waldeck-Rousseau, as minister of the interior and the prefects still shows some hesitation by the prefects about whether to use troops. The message from Waldeck-Rousseau, on the contrary, was clear: not to take any chances, to use the troops preventively and to mobilise a sufficient number of soldiers to be sure to keep events under control. At the same time, despite the many negative effects which were linked to frequent
mobilisations of troops, a series of factors existed that made the French senior civil servants more inclined to call for military troops than were their Prussian counterparts.

The French prefects of the early Third Republic were in a very delicate position and always at risk of being dismissed from their post. As long as a prefect was backed by the ministry of interior, he was not at the immediate risk of being criticised for the excessive use of troops, whereas bad management of a crisis with insufficient forces which ended in riots or bloody confrontations could easily cost the prefect his post. The primary interest of a French prefect was therefore to ensure that any disturbance of the public order was kept under strict control. Moreover, experience showed that a preventive display of significant force was less damaging than a bloody confrontation when a situation had gone out of control. The prefects, in particular those administering turbulent industrial areas, were therefore inclined to call for military assistance whenever there was the slightest risk of a conflict deteriorating into riots or violence, with no regard to the wider political reasons speaking against the use of troops.

Secondly, it was very difficult for the French administration not to get involved in local conflicts. The French state made several guarantees towards its citizens which were not always compatible. On the one hand, the state guaranteed the protection of persons and property. In labour conflicts, this meant protecting strikebreakers as well as plants and other types of material belonging to the mine or factory concerned. In the light of the national compromise on which the Third Republic was built, it was essential to show that the Republic was capable of ensuring the protection of private property. On the other hand, the law guaranteed the rights of the workers to strike and to organise in trade unions. From 1893 onwards, French prefects became increasingly involved both in the negotiations between employers and employees - with a rate of interventions from the side of the prefects and the sub-prefects as arbitrators surpassing thirty per cent between 1890 and 1914.\textsuperscript{48} Given that the local police authorities were often controlled by local notables, in particular before the turn of the

\textsuperscript{48} Tilly & Shorter (1974) p.41. In comparison, the rate of involvement of the French government in labour conflicts never went beyond five per cent between 1890 and 1914. (ibid. p.41).
century, the municipal police was generally seen as supporting the interests of the employers and of the local notables. The attempts of the state administration to function as an arbitrator in labour conflicts could be stifled by clumsy actions of municipal police forces. The prefects therefore often also took over the responsibility for the maintenance of order, whereby they acquired a double task of presiding over the negotiations between employers and employees and of managing measures to maintain public order. Because the prefect had to appear credible, both in the eyes of the employers and the workers, it was important to keep incidents of disorder under strict control with a minimum of violent confrontation between strikers and public forces.

In the light of the strong need to keep disturbance of public order under strict control, the requisition of military troops was an effective solution, since the army could provide a very large number of men who could be quickly mobilised from a local garrison. Moreover, mobilisation of a significant number of soldiers was a relatively cheap solution compared to a major mobilisation of gendarmes. The long-term damages to the reputation of the army in wider society or the problems of training and discipline among recruits were mainly a concern for the military establishment, but not for the prefect.

It is important to note, however, that there appeared to be a basic understanding between the civil and military authorities on the question of maintenance of order. As noted above, for the military authorities, internal peacekeeping was a disagreeable,

49 The costs connected with the call for gendarmes from other regions was greater than calling out a couple of hundred soldiers. Rank-and-file soldiers would not receive extra pay during periods of mobilisation, so only the commanding officers would require extra pay. In 1906 the extra pay would be 5 Francs per day for officers below the rank of colonel, and 7 Francs for senior officers. The price for a gendarme was 2.5 Francs aday and 3 Francs for a commander (Maréchal des logis). When troops were called out, only a limited number of officers would be needed, approximately one for every unit of twenty-five soldiers, whereas all of the gendarmes had to be paid extra, and if they were mobilised from other areas, there would also be transport costs. When mobilising many men, the difference could be considerable. For instance, in the law of finances of 1907, the War Ministry received an extra sum of 645,000 Francs to cover the expenses from the turbulent year of 1906. In comparison, a sum of 1,125,000 Francs were allocated to the gendarmerie to cover the supplementary expenses linked to the many transfers of gendarmes to locations of conflict during 1906. (Journal Officiel' 1907, session of 7 March 1907). The extra pay to the gendarmerie was almost twice the sum allocated to cover the supplementary expenses of the army, despite the fact that the number of gendarmes present at the scene of conflict was only a tenth of the number of troops.

50 See Chapter Five.
time consuming and costly task, that broke up the training of recruits. On the other hand, looking at the military documents, it is clear that, in the majority of cases, the predominantly conservative-minded officer corps was inclined to agree with the government and the state administration about the serious challenge presented by public unrest and the necessity in certain situations for the state to maintain control of the situation at any price. One major reason for the acceptance by the French military authorities of the need for occasional requests for the army must be linked to the higher degree of alarmism among French authorities, military as well as civil, compared to their Prussian counterparts. French political history during the nineteenth century had shown that the army was not always capable of putting down a full-scale revolt with military force. The military authorities therefore recognised that even small cases of public unrest constituted a potential threat to the existing social and political order. Given the difficult balance between peaceful control and violent coercion, the French general commanders seemed ready to accept the argument of the necessity of mobilising troops preventively and in great numbers, rather than having to repress a revolt later through military means.

Confronted with similar issues concerning measures to maintain and restore public order, the Prussian province and district governors were in a stronger position than their French counterparts. In the first place, the Prussian state administrators could better allow a situation to deteriorate up to a certain point, before mobilising all available forces to restore order. In contrast to the French Republic, the Prussian state did not guarantee the security of persons and property, and could leave minor cases to be private or local conflicts. Labour disputes and unrest were basically considered private and local matters until they reached a size that these senior civil servants saw as threatening the interests of the state or the existing social and political order. The Prussian district or province governor could therefore allow himself to maintain a wait-and-see-attitude for much longer than the French prefect. If a situation developed into riots and violence, the Prussian authorities could respond with heavy measures. Secondly, in contrast to the French authorities, the Prussian authorities in the 1890 still had absolute confidence in the capacity of the army to put down a revolt. In Prussia, the strikers and demonstrators knew that the public forces - the military troops as well
as the police - were prepared to use weapons. Strikers and demonstrators knew that that a violent response from the public forces could come without warning. This turned the army into an unspoken, but permanently present, threat.

7.3. French army corps commanders: consensus or submission ?

In the literature on the French army, two aspects are generally underlined to explain how it was possible for the Republican prefects to use - or misuse - the national army to such an extent without a major confrontation with the military establishment.

In the first place, the attitude of the French military establishment towards the domestic role of the army is commonly described as 'submission under protest.' The rationalisation of the attitude of the French military elite, as described by Girardet, relied on two fundamental principles: the complete subordination of military power to the authority of legal government, and, the principle that the army must never interfere in politics. This was the principle, as described in legal-administrative interpretations as well as in the text books used at the military academy. However, the reference to a principle - which was undoubtedly strong throughout the nineteenth century - is a rationalisation rather than an explanation, and it leaves unanswered the question why these principles became increasingly predominant among the senior officers during the Third Republic, despite widespread lack of sympathy towards the Republican institutions.

Another factor is the balance of power between the civil and the military branches of the state apparatus. During the years when the domestic use of the army reached its

53 J.de Soto 'Pouvoir civil et pouvoir militaire' in La Défense nationale, Centre de Sciences Politiques de l’Institut d’Etudes juridiques de Nice (Paris 1958) “The military must be a passive tool in the hands of government. The latter can only fulfill its mission if it has the military completely at its disposal, so that the government may use it as an unconscious material force. This excludes all possibility of military leaders in any way refusing to comply with governmental orders... The State would no longer exist if military leaders were allowed to question its order. The ideal armed force would be one that government could activate simply by pressing a button.” Cit. Girardet (1962) p.121.
peak, the position of the military establishment was particularly weak after the Dreyfus affair, and the army had little moral authority to oppose the civil institutions. Thus, in contrast to the situation in Prussia, where one of the driving forces in the policy of the Ministry of the Interior and the state administration was the urge to distinguish itself from a powerful army, the constellation of power in France was inverted.

These factors are often given as sufficient justification for the loyalty of the military leaders to the civil government. However, the emphasis on the sullen, but professional submission of the army to the civil authorities, fails to recognise the potential of the military leaders to obstruct the effective use of the army, and to stifle the strategies adopted by the civil authorities through bureaucratic resistance. In order to understand the development of the domestic role of the French army, it is important to recognise the willingness with which many senior commanders co-operated with the civil authorities on ensuring public order. As Carrot rightly points out, the legislation and formal definition of powers left plenty of issues open to discussion and thus to potential conflicts between civil and military authorities. Thus, the low degree of conflict between the prefectural authority and the senior commanders indicates more a positive accommodation from the side of the military commanders than simply 'submission under protest.'

Looking at the accounts written by senior commanders, there is no doubt that they were perfectly aware of their potential to create nuisance, and confident that the civil authorities heavily depended on the general commanders being well disposed to them. The remark by General Millet about the relationship between authorities is revealing in this respect: "Un ordre à un subordonné est un ordre. Un ordre à un pair est une négociation." Moreover, the not very respectful description provided as late as 1913 by General Jourdy of the civil authorities indicates that the submission of French generals was a highly delicate matter, resting more on the individual commander than

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56 General Millet 'Souvenirs' unpublished manuscript (ca.1913), no pagination. Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 K mi 9.
on legal-constitutional arrangements or text-book definitions of the obligation of the officer to submit to civil authorities.\textsuperscript{57}

Despite the widespread lack of mutual goodwill between the military commanders and the representatives of the Republican administration, and despite justified suspicion by the military commanders towards the new administration after 1902,\textsuperscript{58} the documents from Nord-Pas-de-Calais show a remarkably low degree of conflict on practical matters, and a generally good understanding between the prefects and the army corps commander about the need for efficient responses to public disorder.

That the principal attitude among many officers was unfavourable towards the task of keeping order and enforcing the law is too obvious to be overlooked. On the other hand, senior officers also tended to be politically conservative and highly unsympathetic to social unrest. Given the frequent cases of major unrest, it is hardly surprising that the senior commanders in many situations agreed with the civil authorities about the appropriateness of providing military assistance to defend the existing political and social order.\textsuperscript{59} In the period before 1899, when the civil institutions were led by moderate Republicans with views on the French society which were not entirely different to those of the military leaders, the accommodation to the demands for protection issued by the civil authorities did not seem to present any problem by the military commanders. Accordingly, General Brugière, military governor in Paris 1898-1900, expressed no qualms about co-operating with police prefect Lepine to deal with demonstrations and far right extremists during the Dreyfus affair. Like other moderately Republican generals of the time, Brugière also insists very strongly on his commitments to the defence of the existing social and political order. If the senior commanders in many situations agreed with the civil administration about the deplorable necessity of mobilising troops, this was also due to the strong prejudice among the military leaders against the municipal police forces.\textsuperscript{60} They considered that these forces were incompetent, violent and lacked neutrality in politically sensitive

\textsuperscript{57} General Emile Jourdy 'Souvenirs' unpublished memoirs (ca.1913), no pagination. Military Archive, Vincennes, 392/GD/3.
\textsuperscript{58} See Chapter Four.
\textsuperscript{59} Bruneteaux (1996) p.45.
\textsuperscript{60} Bruneteaux (1996) pp.45-46.
situations, the *gendarmerie* and ultimately the army were the only forces that could effectively ensure the social peace without triggering a popular revolt.

Moreover, despite the more tense relationship between the Republic and the military establishment of the years after 1899, it is important to stress that the civil authorities could hardly have developed and implemented measures that depended so heavily on the army, during the decades between 1890 and 1914, without a significant degree of acceptance and co-operation from the side of the senior commanders responsible. As we shall see later, the commanding generals did not contravene the policies of the civil authorities by insisting on their formal right to determine the number of men to be mobilised or the strategies to be used when the army was involved. On the contrary, the senior military commanders participated in the detailed planning that determined the types of conflicts in which the army was to be used as well as the number of men to be mobilised.\(^\text{61}\) The administrative correspondence, the plans and the minutes from the meetings between civil and military authorities at the ministerial level and in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, show that the commanding generals were prepared to co-operate with the civil authorities in the planning of measures and the execution of military interventions. This was done in the name of professionalism, efficiency and military discipline. Moreover, after the 1890s, the general commanders were involved in the developing the idea initiated by the Ministry of the Interior of using conscript soldiers to undertake strike-bound work in sectors which were seen as essential for the functioning of wider society.\(^\text{62}\)

It is similarly important to note that the military obstruction in February-March 1906 to deliver protection against demonstrations at the occasion of the establishment of inventories of the possessions of Catholic institutions was exceptional to the way in which the army otherwise followed the requisition from the civil authorities. The army had participated in the implementation of anti-Catholic laws before, most famously in 1880, when the government closed down mainly Jesuit institutions.\(^\text{63}\) The crisis around

\(^{61}\) See Chapter Eight.

\(^{62}\) The first plans concerned the use of soldiers whose civil profession was baker for a possible situation of a general strike among bakers. Between 1900 and 1910, similar lists were established of conscript soldiers whose civil professions were electrician, telegraphist, rail worker, or dock worker.

\(^{63}\) Military Archive, Vincennes, MR 2172 or REC 2172 'Application des lois des congrégations'.

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the establishment the Catholic Church inventories in February-March 1906 shows a
generalised exasperated reaction from the military establishment towards their role as
executors of policies to which many officers were strongly opposed. At the same time,
the incidents indicate another important aspect about the relationship between the civil
authorities and the military establishment, namely the capacity of the army to obstruct
requisitions from the civil authorities. Indeed, if the full potential of blocking was not
put into practice, this was because of a division within the military hierarchy, as the
obstructions came from officers and commanders at the lower level of the military
hierarchy who were not backed by the senior commanders. Most general commanders
were undoubtfully sympathetic to the resentment of the officers against the task with
which they had been charged, as the rather mild disciplinary sanctions enforced by the
military courts indicate. However, the senior commanders were above all concerned
with the problem of keeping discipline among the officers and of avoiding giving the
impression to the French public and the foreign powers that the French army was
about to disintegrate under weak leadership. When the inventories were ultimately
accomplished in November 1906, again with military troops being mobilised to prevent
obstruction, the army corps commanders in all French military regions were informed
in advance, and asked for their advice on how to use troops most effectively.64

The main concern for the French general commanders in internal peacekeeping appears
to be the question of discipline. The successive army corps commanders repeated again
and again to their subordinate commanders, officers and soldiers that the decrees and
service regulations65 were to be strictly observed.66 Jauffret probably has a point when
he argues that, to some officers, the turbulence of the first decade of the century was
merely a situation of crisis that would cease after a couple of years, and that it was

64 Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C./2.I.335, ‘Inventaires des Eglises 1906’ Requisitions and
correspondence between the prefect and the army corps commander in Lille, 11-18 November 1906.
The inventories were completed in the days between 20 and 22 November 1906 without further
65 Law of 27 July - 3 August 1791 ‘sur la réquisition et l’action de la force publique’. Decree of 4
October 1891 ‘sur le service des places de guerre et de villes ouvertes’. Instructions of 24 June 1903
‘relative à la participation de l’armée au maintien de l’ordre public’. Instructions of 20 August 1907
‘relative à la participation de l’armée au maintien de l’ordre public’.
66 Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C./2.I.328, Order of 18 September 1903 from general Jeannerod.
better to live with the difficult situation rather than reforming the military organisation.  

On the whole, the efficiency of civil-military co-operation during the entire period is a valid indicator of a high degree of consensus among the responsible commanders about the appropriateness of mobilising the army, at least in the majority of cases. The documents from the army corps commander in Lille - which is for the most part internal military correspondence - suggest that the conflicts with the civil authorities were rare and all concerned minor issues. The most salient type of conflict is commanders complaining about the poor quality of the accommodation and food supply provided by local communities during a period of mobilisation.

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Conclusions of Part II

Why did ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping not occur in France? Attempts to limit the internal role of the army failed at three levels: in the National Assembly, in the government, and at the departmental level, where the prefects continued to call for troops, with little regard to the desires from many sides to change strategy.

Despite criticisms of the use of the army, and despite the attempts of several ministers of the interior to limit the use of troops for internal peacekeeping, at least during their first weeks on that post, the path taken in the 1890s continued throughout the period. After 1900, three observations can be made:

- successive ministers (Waldeck-Rousseau, Combes, Clemenceau), although trying to limit the use of military troops, soon renounced their initial intentions;
- the prefects in the turbulent areas questioned the absolute necessity to call for military assistance if the public order were to be ensured, even less than the ministers of the interior;
- finally, although many officers felt unhappy about the extensive use of the army, the general commanders did not reject the need mobilise the army in the majority of situations which occurred.

To return to the fundamental problematic of this thesis: how can one explain the development of dissimilar policies towards public unrest in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais between the early 1890s and the outbreak of the First World War? It is often argued that the mere presence of military troops - because perceived by strikers or demonstrators as a provocation from the side of the authorities - would escalate the potential of violence and thereby increase the likelihood of bloodshed. This argument was put forward by the French opposition, as well as by the Prussian state administration, to justify their policy of ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping. However, there was another logic of simple crowd management, which was equally common among both French and Prussian administrators, namely that, confronted with thousands of demonstrators, the only way to avoid violent confrontations was to meet the crowd with sufficient forces to prevent attacks on persons and property effectively.
Given the permanent understaffing of the police and gendarmerie forces in Prussia as well as in France, there was only one force capable of providing the number of forces required to implement this type of strategy, and that was the army.

In the interpretation of the use of troops towards collective action, a second general assumption follows from the first, namely that the tendency of governments to use military troops in civilian conflicts was linked to the degree of stability of the regime, so that the governments who worried most about public opinion would be more disinclined to mobilise military troops against civilians. The present study indicates that there was indeed a connection between the stability of the regime and the tendency of adopting measures that implied the army to control public disorder. However, the connection in the case of France and Prussia appears to be the opposite to that generally assumed. It was the liberal but unstable French Third Republic that developed a strong tendency to mobilise the army for crowd management, whereas the reputedly authoritarian and militaristic Prussian system made increasingly seldom use of the army for internal peacekeeping. The reasons for which the general assumption of the importance of public opinion proves to be inaccurate are not difficult to trace from the French and Prussian examples.

The Republican regime in France - being established on fragile popular consensus - could hardly afford violent confrontations to take place, or to lose control over a minor conflict that might easily deteriorate into a revolt. For the French authorities the choice of strategy towards public disorder was a question of the lesser evil. Mobilising the army would upset public opinion, but provided a high degree of security against losing control over a sensitive situation. Avoiding military intervention would please public opinion in the first place, but at the serious risk of upsetting public opinion when - as was probable - the police and gendarmerie forces lost control and began to shoot in desperation or self-defence. In fact, in both France and Prussia, incidents of people being killed during confrontations with public forces most often took place when policemen or soldiers felt they were losing control. Accordingly, the French Ministry of the Interior persistently pursued strategies that implied the mobilisation of military troops, despite widespread protests from the opposition and sometimes also from the
army. Some attempts were made - particularly by Combes and Clemenceau - to change this policy. However, successive governments' public declarations of 'de-militarising' the internal peacekeeping, were never seriously followed up.

The Prussian authorities were aware of the inability of the civil forces to deal with situations which degenerated into violence or riots of any significance. However, the Prussian administration could better afford to adopt measures that implied a higher degree of risk and a lower degree of control, than the French administration. There were two reasons for this. In the first place, the legitimisation of the Prussian regime was not based on popular consent, but on the authority of established state institutions. Rebelling against the established order gave the state sufficient legitimate reasons to launch a major crack-down, and a substantial part of the authority of the Prussian state derived precisely from its self-created image of being tough on any opposition to the existing order. The political implications of a violent encounter between the army and the civil population did not have the same devastating consequences for the Prussian regime as it would have for the French Republican regime. Secondly, the Prussian state administration and military elite believed that the army was still capable of putting down a popular revolt by military means. The Prussian authorities could therefore leave the police and the gendarmerie to deal with even very sensitive conflicts with a high potential of violence. In contrast, in France, the experience since 1789 indicated the opposite.

In both countries, one can observe that the army corps commanders to a large degree supported the policy pursued by the Ministry of the Interior and the state administration, and together these three groups were capable of opposing other powerful forces working for a change in policy. To understand the lack of opposition from the side of the army corps commanders in both France and Prussia, and their de facto support of the civil authorities when these called for military assistance, it is important to stress the ambivalent attitude of many senior commanders over using their power to defend efficiently the existing social and political order. In the French case, it is obvious that the senior commanders found the role of the army as a force for internal peacekeeping burdensome, and were seriously concerned about the damaging long-
term effects on the training and discipline of the soldiers and officers. On the other hand, the majority of French senior commanders, as with their Prussian counterparts, saw the existing social and political order as being seriously threatened by labour movements and by groups politically opposing the regime. Thus, when called upon, the army corps commanders in both countries loyally fulfilled their task. This degree of acceptance of the policies pursued by the French and Prussian state administrations by the military commanders was only possible because both the policy of ‘de-militarisation’ of the internal peacekeeping and requests for military assistance could be justified professionally in the eyes of the military commanders. Thus, in Prussia, the military commanders - content with being left out of civil disturbance - refrained from pursuing their own strategies in their military region. In France, the army corps commanders - recognising the incapacity of the civil forces to deal with serious cases of unrest - accepted participation in the development of strategies that attributed a central role to the army.

These political factors seem in themselves reasonable as explanations for the dissimilar response provided by the French and Prussian administration. However, looking closely at the decision-making process around the mobilisation of military troops, and the functioning of the civil-military co-operation in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais, it is clear that a large part of the explanation for the dissimilar policies is also linked to other pragmatic factors, notably the organisation of the forces available and the strategies developed by the administration to deal with greater unrest. The organisational aspect helps to understand the remarkable persistence in both France and Prussia of the policies adopted in the early 1890s. It also provides significant indicators as to why it proved so difficult in France to change the strategies, despite pressure and good intentions at least from some key figures in charge of the Ministry of the Interior between 1899 and 1914. The third part of this thesis will therefore go into the analysis of the organisation and functioning of civil-military co-operation linked to the issue of maintaining public order.
Part III. Institutionalisation of the strategies adopted in France and Prussia, and the diverging trajectories of administrative practice

How do we explain that two dissimilar policies were pursued with remarkable consistency within each system during the period 1890-1914? In the following two chapters, the analysis of the dissimilar strategies adopted will focus on the decision-making process, on the administrative procedures for the requisition of troops, and the pattern of inter-institutional civil-military co-operation. This part of the thesis argues that the dissimilar ways in which troops were used in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais largely derived from the different administrative procedures and practical organisation of civil-military co-operation that developed within the French and Prussian systems between 1890 and 1914.

Different unwritten rules and administrative procedures brought about dissimilar responses to the problem using military assistance to maintain public order in the two countries. In the first place, it is important to note that French and Prussian decision makers operated within two different types of bureaucratic mind-sets. Bureaucratic decision makers had to be confident that their superiors would consider their strategy appropriate. Efficient co-operation with the senior military commander was also of major importance for the successful management of a crisis with military assistance. This was most easily done by implementing the same measures that the military authorities had previously agreed to.

At the ministerial and regional levels, significant differences can be observed within the bureaucratic mind-sets of the French and Prussian systems. The main argument of this part of the thesis is that these dissimilarities - in terms of the expectations and the unwritten rules for appropriate professional behaviour of the bureaucrats - provided a strong tendency in the French system towards inter-institutional co-operation between the state bureaucracy and the army whilst in Prussia, the expectations and unwritten
rules for appropriate behaviour pointed towards the lowest possible degree of inter-institutional co-operation between civil and military authorities.

Secondly, as a result of successful co-operation between civil and military authorities in France, the strategies adopted to deal with internal unrest increasingly involved the army. Conversely, in Prussia, the lack of inter-institutional connections between the state administration and the army forced the civil authorities to establish protection plans and to elaborate strategies that vised only civil forces. With increasing challenges from mass movements, planning and preparation for situations of major unrest became almost a precondition for successful management of a conflict. Thus the strategies implemented in practice were closely connected to the plans established in advance for major unrest. In France these plans implied the army, in the Prussian case, they did not. Moreover, due to organisational factors, it became increasingly difficult to implement policies radically different from those taken previously and planned for in case of future public order problems.

Thirdly, by successfully implementing a particular set of measures, the likelihood increased that the same strategy would be adopted the next time a similar problem arose. In the present case, the Prussian administration discovered that it could manage even major cases of unrest with a significant potential for violence without calling for military assistance. In contrast, the French administration drew the lesson that civil-military co-operation functioned very well and that a military presence guaranteed controlling the situation, which the authorities responsible could not be sure of if they only mobilised police and gendarmerie forces.

In dealing with the problem of mass protest movements repeatedly, the question whether to call for military assistance moved increasingly away from being a political question to become predominantly an administrative question, so that it was the type of conflict that defined whether the military authorities would be asked to intervene, rather than the events of the individual conflict. Certain elements in the administrative procedures in the two countries thus appear to have had a self-sustaining dynamic,
which strongly limited the number of options that the senior civil servants and the military commanders were likely to consider.

In the first place, the dissimilar administrative procedures helped to strengthen and perpetuate the policies adopted in the 1890s, even when the challenge of public unrest had changed markedly after the turn of the century. In the case of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, this led to increasingly frequent use of military intervention. Conversely, in the case of Westphalia, the administrative procedures made the mobilisation of military troops an increasingly difficult procedure which carried politically unforeseeable implications.

In Chapter Eight, three factors will be analysed that appear to have particular relevance for the present case in order to understand the development in the French system of a particularly strong tendency towards opting for strategies that involved the army. The elements of particular relevance are:

- the formalisation of strategies implying use of the army through the establishment of plans for protection and the development of standard operating procedures for calling for military assistance;
- the institutionalised integration of the military authorities into the planning of measures to manage public unrest and the establishment of day-to-day streams of information about the state of affairs in local communities;
- thirdly, the organisational linkage between the civil and military forces which made the state administration strongly depend on the army.

This led to the continuous and increasing use of strategies relying on the army, for military and non-military purposes. The crucial point in this development is the observation that the path taken after 1890 - in particular around 1901-1902 - became a determining one for the strategies implemented for the rest of the period until the outbreak of the First World War.

In Chapter Nine, an analysis will be undertaken of the significance in Prussia of the absence of a basis for close continuous inter-institutional co-operation between the state administration and the army. The central argument is that the policy of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to 'de-militarise' the internal peacekeeping was
sustained by the inability of the state administration and the military authorities to enter into inter-institutional co-operation. Thus, the success of the policy of 'demilitarisation' of the internal peacekeeping was due in part to these institutional and organisational circumstances. At the same time, the lack of inter-institutional connections was a serious impediment to the attempts made by powerful forces within the Prussian system to provide the army with a more active internal role against organised labour movements and political opposition.
Chapter Eight. The administrative procedures shaping institutional co-operation in Nord-Pas-de-Calais

8.1. Changes in the standard operating procedures, 1889-1914

The cases of mobilisation of military troops in Nord-Pas-de-Calais in the 1880s and the early 1890s show that the requisition and intervention of the army were characterised by the lack of a coherent strategy.\(^1\) The measures to be implemented (the role of the army, the locations to be protected, the number of soldiers to be mobilised) were established on the spot whilst the conflict developed. There was considerable confusion about the formal rules, and the strategies proposed to deal with problems were sometimes at the edge of legality or far beyond it.\(^2\) Conflicts were dealt with at the municipal level between mayors, local police authorities, and the commander of the nearest garrison. Even when sub-prefects and prefects were involved, operations took place independently within the municipalities concerned with little coherent management. Finally, there was a clear distinction between the civil and military authorities. As mentioned above, the civil authorities were empowered to request military assistance and to determine the end of the requisition, whereas the military commander alone determined the means and measures whenever troops were involved. Both civil and military authorities strongly insisted on their respective spheres of authority. Nevertheless, many details concerning the distribution of powers were ambiguous and open to interpretation, thus constituting areas of negotiation and potential conflict.

Comparing these patterns from the period 1880s-1890s, with the standard operating procedures in practice during the numerous cases of military intervention of the years

\(^1\) The description here is based on the cases appearing in the confidential correspondence of the army corps commander 1880-1888; and on the cases of intervention appearing during the strike wave 1889-1893. Departmental Archives, Lille, M 626/18 'Grève de Mineurs: Aniche, Vicoigne 1889'.

\(^2\) A similar confusion can be observed in Saône-et-Loire where the most notorious military interventions took place in the late 1860s and during the first decades of the Third Republic. In 1882, during the great miners’ strike in Montceau-les-Mines, the prefect suggested that the local authorities should organise patrols which were entitled to interrogate suspects, to undertake searches in the homes of the strikers, and to arrest suspected leaders for twenty-four hours. National Archives, Paris, F.7.12526, ‘4e Sûreté générale. Événements de Montceau-les Mines, 1882-1883’. Letter of 14 October 1882 from the Prefect of Saône-et-Loire to the minister of the interior.
between 1901 and 1914, four significant changes appear: As previously shown, the level of decision making moved from the municipal level to the senior authorities at the regional level (the prefect and the army corps commander). In the vast majority of cases, instead of requesting the troops directly, the local authorities went to the sub-prefect and asked him to urge the prefect to call for military assistance. In some of the cases where there was a possibility of a major strike, the invitation to call for military assistance came to the prefects from the government. In the majority of cases, the formal requisition would therefore pass from the prefect to the army corps commander. Right until 1914, however, a certain number of ‘panic’ requisitions were still issued by sub-prefects or the mayors of the main towns where smaller incidents of unrest were frequent. In these cases, the sub-prefect played the executive role, together with the local general commander or military governor. Due to the frequency of intervention in these towns, the procedures for mobilising the army were laid out in detail, leaving few questions open for decision. Moreover, the behaviour of the sub-prefects and senior commanders on the spot were subject to close supervision by the prefect and the army corps commander. The role of local authorities after the turn of the century was therefore rather restricted compared to their relatively extended freedom of action during the previous decade.

In addition, there was a change in the timing and the justification for military intervention. During the early 1890s, troops were only asked to intervene in a conflict at the moment when the civil forces could no longer maintain control with the available civil forces. Thus, the decision as to whether to call for troops was appropriate was taken on the basis of the development of the individual conflict - as was always the case in Prussia. However, after the turn of the century, the justification for the presence of military troops no longer depended on the course of the particular conflict, but on whether that conflict belonged to a category that was defined by the administration as appropriate for military involvement (particularly, strikes in the mining or transport sectors). In the case of a major strike comprising several

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3 See Chapters Two and Four.
4 Most frequently in the ports of Dunkerque and Calais, but isolated cases were found where this type of requisition was undertaken by the local authorities of the main industrial towns such as Roubaix, Douai, Valenciennes, and Maubeuge.
Professional branches, the requisition of troops became a standard strategy to be implemented the moment the strike broke out. Similarly, in situations of possible unrest, such as the visit of a VIP or an election troops were routinely called out. In such situations, the administrative response would also be to ensure public order by calling for military assistance. Thus, apart from the cases of panic requisition, troops were most often called out preventively with no regard to whether riots and violence had taken place.

Thirdly, in contrast to the cases occurring in the 1880s and the early 1890s, a high degree of consistency can be observed after the turn of the century in the procedures followed and the strategies implemented. Each time troops were requested for a specific type of conflict in a particular area where this type of conflict had previously taken place (for instance, a miners’ strike in the industrial basin of Douai, a textile strike in Roubaix, or a dockers’ strike in Dunkerque), the same measures were implemented as had been used before (for instance, the role of the troops, the number of soldiers mobilised, their transport, the locations to be protected, the provision of food and accommodation).

Finally, the distinction between the realms of the civil and military authorities, which was strongly emphasised in the earlier period, became less clear-cut after the turn of the century. This was due to three factors: a) the integration of the military authorities into the development of strategies; b) the increasing number of significant decisions which were to be taken jointly by the prefect and the army corps commander; and c) the penetration of the military organisation into the realm of ordinary police tasks or strictly non-military functions. Together, these standard operating procedures facilitated the process of civil-military co-operation, and thereby strongly influenced the strategies used to deal with public disorder towards closer integration of the army.
8.1.1 Formalisation of strategies implying the army: The establishment of plans for protection

What was behind these changes in the procedures for the requisition of military assistance? The first significant factor behind the development of these standard operating procedures was the establishment, from 1897 onwards, of nation-wide plans for protection. Between 1901 and 1914, these plans constituted the cornerstone of the French strategies to deal with major internal unrest. These plans were based on the participation of the army, and thereby significantly contributed to an increasing military involvement in the process of maintaining public order.

There are three reasons why the plans for protection were of particular significance for the frequent use of the army. In the first place, the plans formalised an already existing practice. Secondly, the plans defined certain types of conflicts for which it was recognised appropriate to call the army. Thirdly, the plans set a standard for the number of troops to be mobilised to maintain internal order. The planning thus helped to establish a set of standard operating procedures for the requisition of military troops by defining in detail the lines of communication and authority at each step of the crises, by settling certain points of uncertainty, whereby they restricted the potential for misunderstanding and conflict. This was useful not only for the cases explicitly covered by the plans but also for any situations of civil-military co-operation in the maintenance of order. The provisions stated in the plans thus made the requisition and mobilisation of troops a far more efficient measure to implement than had previously been the case.

In a wider sense, the planning was important because of the integration into the decision-making process of the army corps commanders and other representatives from the military establishment. The meetings between the representatives from various Ministries both in Paris and at the départemental level provided the senior commanders with an opportunity to express their concerns and to negotiate directly with the representatives from the Ministry of the Interior about their particular problems and the needs of the troops mobilised for this purpose. The process of developing plans for protection also provided a forum of informal discussions between the civil and military authorities involved, both at the ministerial and the regional level.
Finally, by establishing strategies for cases of internal unrest which assumed a military presence from the very beginning of a conflict, the civil authorities came to depend heavily on the army. Henceforth, for organisational reasons, it became difficult to break away from previous strategies because this would have required a complete rethinking of the existing strategies and a total re-organisation of the forces available.

These were the conditions behind the policies implemented by Combes and Clémenceau. Both men may have promised - and even wished - to avoid military intervention in labour conflicts. However, as ministers responsible for the internal security, they did not possess serious alternatives to the military option that had been developed and refined since 1897.

8.1.2. The early plans of 1897-1898: content and intentions

The first step towards the co-ordination of the civil and military strategies was to determine the military commander to whom each civil authority was to address a requisition in cases of immediate crisis. Demands for the formalisation of this issue appeared for the first time in 1893. The second step was to determine, for each potentially troubled area, the locations to be protected and the number of solders to be mobilised, as well as defining the role of the troops. This step was developed in the first plans for protection from 1897-1898, concerning a possible nation-wide strike among rail workers.

The idea of elaborating specific plans for labour conflicts within this professional sector emerged in the Ministry of the Interior. Initially, the reason given for the state interfering in labour issues between private rail companies and their employees, was the importance of the railway system for national defence. This was clearly stated in the first communication from the War Ministry to the army corps commanders which

5 Military Archive, Vincennes, S N S, 'Cabinet du Ministre: Correspondance Générale, 1878-1914'. Letter of 18 February 1893 from the minister of the interior to the prefects, and the letter of 23 February from the war minister to the army corps commanders. "Dans tous les cas où l'extrême urgence ne rendra pas la chose impossible, les préfets se concertent au préalable avec les commandants des corps d'armée, lorsqu'il y a lieu de faire des réquisitions de troupes, afin de déterminer l'arme à laquelle on devra faire appel."
described the devastating effects such a strike could have for national defence. The first draft, elaborated by the War Ministry, was a list of locations which were particularly vulnerable to sabotage in the case of a serious conflict between the rail workers and the rail companies. By June-July 1897, the prefects and the army corps commanders were asked by their respective Ministries to make contact with one another, and with the chief engineer in the département as well as with representatives from the rail companies present in their region. The aim was to study the requirements for protection of the rail system within each département. These meetings between the prefects and the army corps commanders resulted in the first nation-wide plans.

The increasing unrest among rail workers in 1897-1898 gave rise to a great deal of reflection in the Ministry of the Interior. The main problem in 1898 was not so much the maintenance of order or national defence, but the question of ensuring the continued functioning of rail services and main communication systems. The military authorities were therefore contacted again in order to determine how the rail personnel, if necessary, could be replaced by soldiers from the engineering corps. The provisions from these nation-wide plans were carried out for the first time during the major strike among rail personnel in October 1898. The implementation of the plans was described by the civil and military authorities as a great success.

Three years later, in July 1901, the first signs appeared of a possible nation-wide strike in the French mining industry. With reference to the successful management of the rail

6 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, ‘Grèves : Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de fer’. Circular letter of 3 June 1897 from the war minister to the army corps commanders. “Le gouvernement a le devoir de se préoccuper de la possibilité de voir se produire des grèves partielles ou même une grève générale des ouvriers et employés des chemins de fer. (...) Si la mobilisation survenait à ce moment, les transports prévus se trouveraient donc compromis ou tout au moins retardés. Il appartient aux pouvoirs publics de chercher à s’opposer par tous les moyens légaux à des événements qui pourraient porter une aussi grave atteinte à la sécurité et à la défense du pays.”

7 Departmental Archives, Lille, M.622 /1 ‘Grèves des Chemins de Fer. Circularies et instructions, 1898-1901’. Letter of 25 July 1897 from the minister of the interior to the prefects.

8 A copy of this plan is to be found among the papers from the Ministry of the Interior. National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, ‘Grèves : Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de fer’.


10 Departmental Archives, Lille, M.622 /2 ‘Grèves des Chemins de Fer. Révision du plan de protection en cas de grève, 1901-1907’. Letter of 12 December 1898 from the minister of the interior to the prefects.
strike in 1898, the minister of the interior, Waldeck-Rousseau, and the war minister. General André, took the initiative to revise the plans concerning the rail workers and to establish similar plans for the mining industry. In contrast to the previous plans, these new plans were concerned primarily with the issue of maintenance of order. Moreover, these plans for protection of individuals and material had no military justification. The plans were soon implemented in the first nation-wide strike in the mining sector of October-November 1901. When confronted with the prospect of renewed trouble in March 1902, the governmental authorities took the initiative to improve the plans which had been put into practice only six months before. This time, the plans also covered a possible strike among the dock workers in all the main ports. Although these plans were developed with particular professional sectors in mind, it soon became clear that they were also applicable to strikes in other industrial branches, such as the metal or textile industries.

After 1901-1902, these plans for protection were updated and improved several times. The updating in 1907 was particularly detailed, due to the unprecedented strikes during the spring of 1906 and the revolt among wine growers in the South of France over the summer of 1907. Moreover, the two-year conscription laws of 1905


13 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves: mesures à prendre en cas de grève générale des mineurs’. Letter of 5 March 1902 from the minister of the interior Waldeck-Rousseau to the prefects of Moulins, Rody, Nièmes, Grenoble, Saint Etienne, Le Puy, Lille, Arras, Clermont-Ferrand, Mâcon, Albi. "...si une grève partielle de mineurs et de métallurgistes se déclarait sur un point quelconque de votre département, vous réalisez tout de suite, dans tout votre département et sans attendre l’avis télégraphique (unreadable), toutes les mesures arrêtées en vue de la grève générale."

14 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, ‘Grèves: Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de fer’ Confidential Instruction of 18 October 1907 concerning security plans and the maintenance of domestic order in the rail system, the main ports, the mining districts and the industrial centres.
significantly reduced the number of soldiers available and thus made a revision of the previous plans necessary. In the 1909 revision, a fifth professional group was added, namely the postal and telegraph workers. In the last revisions in 1911, 1913 and 1914, the plans for particular professional groups were integrated into general plans for internal unrest and could be applied to strikes in any professional branch or any organised disturbance of public order.

In the turbulent area of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, civil-military correspondence about these formal plans was particularly intense. In the wake of each of the major strike movements, discussions took place between the civil administration and the military authority about the experiences gained and how to improve the measures to be taken for similar crises in the future. The civil-military correspondence - both at the ministerial level and in Nord-Pas-de-Calais - reveals the clear intentions of the prefects, as well as the military commanders involved, to improve and intensify the use of the army for these types of conflict. Thus, for example, rather than trying to restrict the domestic role of the army or questioning the justification for future requisitions, the report from general Lebon, army corps commander in Lille, after the mass strikes of March-May 1906, clearly reveals his concern for a more efficient management of the troops. In the 1907 revision of the plans for a major strike among rail workers, the government asked the regional authorities to limit the number of troops to be

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15 During the 1908 revision of the plans, the participants discussed elaborating plans for protection particularly for the case of major strikes among metal or textile workers, which were among the most turbulent sectors. Eventually, the idea of formal planning was abandoned with the argument that it was too difficult to predict the course of this type of strike due to the large number of companies which could be involved and due to the extension of the areas which would need protection in such a conflict. National Archives, Paris, F.7.12913, 'Commissions et sous-commissions instituées en vue d'examiner les mesures à prendre en cas de grèves 1908-1909'.

16 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7.N.115 'EMA: plan de protection en cas de grèves'. 1 February 1911. 'Instruction de 1913 sur les plans de protection et les mesures à prendre en cas de grèves', 27 June 1913.

17 Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C./2.I.333 'Grèves. Industrie textile, ouvriers détacheurs, électriciens, papetiers, terrassiers, chemin de fer. 1903-1910'; I.A.C./2.I.334 'Grèves. Bassin houillers, briquetiers, dockers, charretiers, gagiers, 1910-1912'. These collections contain many documents on these discussions. Similarly the report from general Lebon, army corps commander in Lille, after the mass strikes of March-May 1906 entitled 'Note concernant des questions ne se rattachant qu'indirectement à l'organisation des bassins industriels, mais réclamant une solution immédiate.'

18 Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C./2.I.149. Report of 4 October 1906. 'Note concernant des questions ne se rattachant qu'indirectement à l'organisation des bassins industriels, mais réclamant une solution immédiate'.

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mobilised. This was particularly urgent because of the reduction in the effective of the army after the introduction of two year military service instead of three year service. After having conferred with the rail authorities of ‘Compagnie du Nord’, the prefect of département Nord followed the wishes of the rail company and wrote to the minister of the interior that it was impossible to make any reductions in the posts to be protected or in the number of troops to be mobilised. In a letter to the army corps commander, the prefect expressed his regret that he was unable to reduce the number of troops to be mobilised, but he could not take the responsibility for the maintenance of order with a reduced number of soldiers. Accordingly, the number of troops which figures in the plans from 1902 remained the same in all later revisions, despite the fact that labour actions, and thereby the challenge in terms of potential of violence, changed significantly between 1902 and 1914.

8.1.3. The role attributed to the army in the plans of protection

The aim of the planning, as expressed by Waldeck-Rousseau in 1901, was not to influence the outcome of labour disputes through intimidating the strikers. Similarly, in the first plans, the intervention of the public forces was not justified by the need to defend the right to accept or reject paid labour (la liberté du travail). The role of the army in the first protection plans was to protect the communication systems, (telephone and telegraphs, as well as rail services), and to ensure the basic functioning of these services. As such, the purpose was clearly related to national defence. Only in the plans of 1901 did the authorities being to define the purpose of military troops in terms of the protection of private property, (i.e. preventing sabotage of material), and of people (i.e. ensuring the security of strikebreakers).

With the revision of 1907, the role of the army was slightly extended. The new justification of its role in the protection plans was to prevent a general strike in vital

19 Departmental Archives, Lille, M 622 /2 ‘Grèves des Chemins de Fer. Révision du plan de protection en case de grève, 1901-1907’. Letter of 6 September 1907 from the prefect of the North to the minister of the interior.
professions from affecting wider society. This meant the defence of the import of foreign coal to ensure the continuous functioning of other industrial sectors.\textsuperscript{22} It also meant ensuring basic provisions for ordinary people (dairies, water supply, electricity) when the personnel of vital sectors went on strike.

The revised plans of 1913 described their main objectives as the protection of the liberty of professions: 'to ensure the circulation and communication,' 'to protect persons and goods,' and 'to protect the equipment of the public utilities'.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, the mobilisation of the army in labour conflicts was justified not only with reference to the interests of national defence, but also in terms of the protection of the interests of wider society.

The move from an entirely military-strategic justification of these plans of protection towards arguments concerning the protection of the interests of wider society is of particular importance. During the following decade, this became the justification for the increasing use of the army both when called upon to undertake ordinary crowd management and when soldiers were mobilised in order to perform strictly non-military functions. The result was that the army, whilst remaining essentially an organisation of national defence, also turned into a public service that fulfilled strictly non-military functions.

8.1.4. The formalisation of the measures implemented

The development of detailed strategies in the plans for protection was particularly significant because the plans thereby formalised at least two key existing practices. The first was the preventive use of troops, that is mobilisation of soldiers at the beginning of a conflict in order to prevent riots and violent actions from taking place. The other

\textsuperscript{22} Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 100, 'Au sujet des mesures à prendre en cas de grève 1901' Note from the General Staff of the War Ministry of 27 July 1901 concerning the measures to be taken in case of a general strike in the mining sector. Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 115, 'EMA'. Circular letter from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 1 February 1911.

\textsuperscript{23} Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 115 'Instructions de 1913 sur les plans de protection et les mesures à prendre en cas de grèves'. 27 June 1913: "Le premier devoir du Gouvernement en cas de grève est de garantir contre les entreprises des agitateurs et des saboteurs la liberté du travail, celle de la circulation et des communications, la sécurité des personnes et des biens, la sauvegarde du matériel d'exploitation des services public et des industries privées. C'est l'objet des plans de protection."
was the determination of the number of forces which were to be mobilised for various types of conflict.

The question of whether troops could be requested preventively remained unsettled throughout the 1890s. In the early 1890s, there was a strong reluctance both by the military authorities and by the government to allow the civil authorities at the regional and local level to call for troops preventively. Particularly in the debate following the bloody incidents at Fourmies in 1891, it was argued that it was the military presence that provoked the violent confrontation between the demonstrators and the public forces. The plans elaborated by various branches of the War Ministry during the early 1890s, aimed at allowing the mobilisation of troops only at a late stage when civil forces lost control of over a situation.24 Similarly, in 1901, before the establishment of the plans for protection in case of a miners' strike, the war minister, General André, preferred to operate with a graduated mobilisation. Minor measures were to be taken at the moment of the declaration of a strike. The further measures to be implemented should thereafter depend on the course of the conflict.25

In contrast, the prefects - sometimes backed by the Ministry of the Interior - preferred a mobilisation of significant military forces from the very beginning of a conflict in order to prevent any trouble from taking place. In the decade between 1890 and 1900, only a few isolated examples of preventive mobilisation have been found.26 However, already the first plans concerning a nation-wide strike among rail workers were based on a strategy whereby troops were mobilised preventively. Therefore, the role of the army became to prevent riots and violence from taking place rather than restoring public order.27 In 1901-1902, this practice became the standard procedure. In the

24 See Chapter Six.
25 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 100, ‘EMA’. Letter from General André to the army corps commanders of 3 August 1901.
26 In 1900, the measures taken in Dunkerque were preventive rather than repressive, and it was only on the 11 September when ‘complete calm’ was reported for several days that the two squadrons mobilised (200 cavalry officers) were withdrawn, whilst the two bataillons infantry were maintained as guards until the 31 October.
general strike of October 1901, Waldeck-Rousseau was very clear about his priorities, and this principle was followed again in March 1902, when Waldeck-Rousseau asked his prefects to call for military assistance from the very moment of declaration of a general strike. The strategy of all later plans for protection was based on the preventive mobilisation of troops. This meant a formalisation of a practice which was soon seen as a fully appropriate response to potential threats to public order.

Likewise, the protection plans set a standard for the number of soldiers considered appropriate to mobilise for various types of conflict. The mobilisation of very large numbers of troops to deal with great strikes had been standard practice since the late 1880s-early 1890s. The military plans for cases of major unrest - elaborated by General de France in April 1891 - operated with a force of 8,900 men and 1,538 horses to be sent to the industrial areas and main towns.

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28 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778. ‘Grèves : Mesures à prendre en cas de grève générale des mineurs.’ Circular letter from the minister of the interior to the prefects of 16 October 1901: “Il y a de graves inconvénients à prévoir deux sortes de mesures: celles qui devront être mises à l’exécution dès que la grève générale éclatera et celles qui ne devront être appliquées que dans le cas où viendraient à se produire des complications. Il est indispensable de réunir dans toutes les régions intéressées, et cela dès le début, les forces nécessaires pour faire face à toutes les éventualités.”

29 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves : Mesures à prendre en cas de grève générale des mineurs’. Letter of 5 March 1902 from the minister of the interior Waldeck-Rousseau to the prefects of Moulines, Rody, Nîmes, Grenoble, Saint Etienne, Le Puy, Lille, Arras, Clermont-Ferrand, Mâcon, Albi. “...Le congrès des mineurs vient de voter par 124 voix contre 105 la grève générale immédiate des mineurs. Bien qu’il ne s’agit que d’un vote de peuple, j’estime qu’il y a lieu de prendre dès à présent les mesures prévues en octobre dernier en vue d’une semblable éventualité.”

- National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves: Mesures à prendre en cas de grève générale des mineurs.’ Letter of 6 March 1902 from the minister of the interior to the prefects of Moulines, Rodez, Nîmes, Grenoble, Saint Etienne, Le Puy, Lille, Arras, Clermont-Ferrand, Mâcon, Albi. “... Vous auriez à réaliser immédiatement les mesures prévues dans le plan de protection, non seulement si une grève partielle de mineurs ou de métallurgistes éclatait effectivement sur un point quelconque de votre département, mais même dans le cas où il se manifesterait des symptômes pouvant faire prévoir l’imminence d’un semblable mouvement gréviste, c’est-à-dire que si des renseignements sérieux vous permettent de croire qu’une grève va éclater, vous faites occuper, dans tout votre département, les points à garder sans attendre que la grève se soit produite.”

30 Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C./2.I.325 ‘Grèves 1902-1909’. Report of 23 April 1891 from the general commander in Lille entitled ‘Temps nécessaire pour réunir le matériel dans les lieux de garnison’. This report was sent to the local rail company as explains in details the amount of men, horses and material to be transported by train into the industrial basins and main towns.
The first plans for a nation-wide strike among the rail personnel operated with the
mobilisation of 10½ companies (1,050 soldiers)\textsuperscript{1} to Nord-Pas-de-Calais out of the
12,400 soldiers which were to be mobilised in the whole of France.\textsuperscript{2} The plans from
1901-1902 significantly increased this number to twenty companies (2,000 soldiers) for
Nord-Pas-de-Calais,\textsuperscript{3} out of the 260 companies (26,000 soldiers) that were to be
mobilised within the entire French territory in case of a general strike among rail
personnel.\textsuperscript{4} Despite the attempts in 1907 to bring down this number, there was only a
reduction of ½ a company from 260 to 259½ companies in the entire plan.\textsuperscript{5} In the
1910 revision, the number of companies foreseen for the region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais
remained the same as in 1902.\textsuperscript{6} With an estimated 250,000 to 300,000 rail employees
around the turn of the century,\textsuperscript{7} this means that one soldier was to be deployed for
every ten to twelve rail workers, strikers or non-strikers. The rate of soldiers per
potential striker is rather similar to the number of soldiers foreseen in the plans
elaborated for the main ports. The plans of 1901 specified a force of 1,600 infantry and
artillery soldiers, 400 mounted men, and 266-320 gendarmes for the protection of the
port of Dunkerque.\textsuperscript{8} Compared to the 4,500-5,000 dock workers employed in the
port, this was almost one soldier for every two potential strikers. The provisions for
other main ports show similar proportions.\textsuperscript{9} A comparison with the figures from the

\textsuperscript{1} It appears from the figures that the planning operated with companies of 100 men. The number of
men per company could be reduced depending on the seriousness of the particular case of conflict.
The figures are therefore a maximum estimation of the number of soldiers needed.

\textsuperscript{2} National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774 'Grèves. Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de
fer' Figures stated in a General Staff report entitled 'Révision 1902 du plan de protection des voies
ferrées en cas de grève des employés des chemins de fer.'

\textsuperscript{3} The number of troops for Nord-Pas-de-Calais are the third highest after the Parisian region (4,600
soldiers) and the industrial basin around Lyons and Saint Etienne (2,700)

\textsuperscript{4} National Archives, Paris, F.7.12912 'Statistiques. Projets de lois. Mesures de protection 1884-
1907'. Report of 15 May 1908 entitled 'Modifications portées au plan de protection des voies ferrées
approuvé en 1902 en cas de grève des employés des chemins de fer'.

\textsuperscript{5} National Archives, Paris, F.7.12912 'Statistiques. Projets de lois. Mesures de protection 1884-
1907'. Report of 15 May 1908 entitled 'Modifications portées au plan de protection des voies ferrées
approuvé en 1902 en cas de grève des employés des chemins de fer'.

\textsuperscript{6} National Archives, Paris, F.7.12776, 'Grèves'. Revisions from June 1910 for each département
foresee fifteen companies for the département Nord and five for Pas-de-Calais.

\textsuperscript{7} Desveaux (1899) p.100.

\textsuperscript{8} Departmental Archives, Lille, M 624 /7, 'Ouvriers du port de Dunkerque. Réquisitions militaires,
1901-1902'. Letter of 12 October 1901 from the prefect in Lille to the minister of the interior.
National Archives, Paris, F.7.12777, 'Plans de protection des ports en cas de grève des dockers ou des
mineurs'. Note from the minister of the interior, dated October 1901.

\textsuperscript{9} In Calais, the forces amounted to 939 infantry soldiers and 92 gendarmes. For the Port of Rouen
the plans foresaw a force of 1075 men infantry and cavalry and thirty-five gendarmes. In addition, a
1909 revision shows that only insignificant changes had been made compared to the forces designated in 1901.40

Thus, for both the rail workers and the dock workers, the plans of protection operated with the mobilisation of a rather high number of soldiers compared to the number of potential strikers. It was, nevertheless, made clear from the beginning, that the figures stated in the plans were only to be considered a minimum that could always be increased depending on the circumstances.41 It is therefore not surprising that the number of soldiers mobilised during the greatest conflicts of the period (the great strikes of the spring 1906 and the wine growers revolt in the South of France during the summer 1907) mounted to almost astronomic figures. However, the designation of very large forces only formalised what was already practice, and in reality the provisions of the plans always lagged behind the actual state of affairs. Nevertheless, the existence of these plans, which had been negotiated between the civil and military authorities concerned, made it very difficult for the military authorities - when confronted with concrete cases of unrest - to question the appropriateness of these large numbers. Once settled, it also became extremely difficult to step down and change the practice of preventive mobilisation or to reduce the number of soldiers. The plans themselves were a recognition by both the civil and military authorities of the potential threat presented by popular unrest. Moreover, the plans created the basis for very specific expectations of the degree of security provided by the army.

reserve of the same size was provided in case of need. The port of Marseilles would be guarded by 1,500-2,000 infantry soldiers and 300 gendarmes in case of a general strike.


41 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, 'Grèves. Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de fer'. Letter of 3 June 1897 from the war minister to the army corps commanders "La liste que je vousadresse ne doit pas être considérée comme limitative, ni en ce qui concerne les points à garder, ni en ce qui concerne la force des détachements: c'est un minimum auquel il vous appartiendra de faire les additions qui vous paraîtraient nécessaires..."
8.2. Towards integration of the military authorities in the decision-making process

8.2.1. Constitution of the inter-ministerial commissions in charge of planning

From their beginning, the plans for protection were an inter-ministerial initiative between the Ministry of the Interior and the War Ministry. Throughout the period, these two Ministries remained the key actors who took initiatives, organised the meetings in the Ministry of the Interior, and co-ordinated the reports from the départements into national plans for protection. Between the first plans of 1897-1898 and the extended plans of 1901, the relationship between the War Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior underwent important changes. This was above all due to the Dreyfus affair and to the establishment of successive governments after 1899 led by Radicals and Socialists. Thus, the plans for protection established between 1901 and 1909 were elaborated during the years when the relationship between the government and the army was at its lowest point and at a time when the position of the military establishment was as weak as ever before. When, in 1901, the plans were extended beyond the railway sector, the Ministry of Public Works was involved (represented by the head of the department in the Ministry of Public Works responsible for the rail service along with their representatives at the départemental level, the regional chief inspector of mines).\(^\text{42}\) Between 1907 and 1913, the planning commissions comprised representatives from no less than five Ministries: The Ministry of the Interior, the War Ministry, the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Justice (responsible for the legal procedures against disturbers and rioters), and the Ministry of Finance (responsible for the supplementary expenses linked to major intervention of civil and military forces).

Accordingly, the meetings in the Ministry of the Interior involved an increasing number of representatives from various branches of the state. In the early meetings of October

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\(^\text{42}\) National Archives, Paris, F.7.12779, ‘4e bureau de la Sûrété Générale. Grève générale des mineurs 1901-1914’. Letter from the prefect of the North to the minister of the interior, 28 September 1901 “...j'ai l'honneur de vous informer qu'au cours de plusieurs réunions auxquelles ont pris part les représentants de l'autorité militaire, M. l'Ingénieur en chef des mines et M. le Commandant de Gendarmerie....”
1901, the inter-ministerial commission was comprised of only nine members. In 1907, the number of members of the ministerial commission had increased to twenty-three. The 1907 protection plan initiated a standing inter-ministerial commission, with a series of sub-commissions, which also became deeply involved in the revision of the requisition laws later in 1907. Fifteen of the twenty-three members of the 1907 commission were still in the commission in 1909. Two other important developments can be noted between the composition of the ministerial commission of 1901 and the standing commission of 1907. In the latter there was direct participation by the regional authorities from the most turbulent areas: the prefects of the départements Nord, Pas-de-Calais, and Rhône. For the military authorities, the War Ministry in 1901 was represented by a lieutenant colonel and a commanding officer from the General Staff. In 1907, the military members comprised two senior generals who were also members of the Conseil supérieur de la guerre. This indicates the increasing

43 Apart from Waldeck-Rousseau, in his capacity as head of the government, there were two representatives from the General Security department of the Ministry of the Interior, two from the War Ministry, three chief engineers from the Ministry of Public Works, and one representative from the Ministry of naval affairs.

44 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12913, 'Commissions et sous-commissions instituées en vue d'examiner les mesures à prendre en cas de grèves 1907-1909'. Minutes from the meeting in the Ministry of the Interior the 5 February 1907. The Ministry of the Interior was represented by Hennion, head of the Department for General Security: by Lepine, police prefect of Paris; by Vincent, prefect of département Nord; Trépont, prefect of Pas-de-Calais; Luteaud, prefect of the département Rhône; and two deputy directors from the Ministry of the Interior. The military authorities were represented by General Lebon, army corps commander in Lille and member of the Conseil supérieur de la guerre; by General Desoille, senior commander and military governor in Reims; two lieutenant colonels, one from the General Staff of the War Ministry and one from the department of the engineers, together with a senior administrator. From the Ministry of Public Works, there were three chief engineers responsible for the mining inspection and for the rail service. The Ministry of Naval Affairs was represented by a vice-admiral, a naval captain, and two senior administrators from the Ministry. Finally, the Ministry of Justice was represented by Coulon, vice-president of the State Council, together with a head of department from the Ministry and an attorney general from the Supreme Court of Appeal.

45 For the 1907 Instructions concerning requisition of the army for maintenance of public order, see Chapter Three.

46 Coulon, vice-president of the State Council; the General-Attorney Manoël-Saumane; the prefects Vincent, Trépont and Luteaud from the départements Nord, Pas-de-Calais, and Rhône. Hennion, head of the department of General Security of the Ministry of the Interior; police prefect Lepine; Grumbach and Capot, senior officials in the Ministry of the Interior; the Generals Lebon and Desoille; Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard and commander Fabia from the War Ministry; and two chief engineers from the Ministry of Public Works.

47 That some senior commanders through the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre, obtained a particular role in the development of policies towards internal unrest was already mentioned by contemporary observers in the 1890s. (Anonymous 'L'armée sous le régime civil et les questions militaires pendantes' Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1894, pp.84-85). This influence only increased with the establishment in 1907 of the inter-ministerial commission in charge of protection planning. A person such as General Lebon, who was at the same time army corps commander in Lille, member of the
importance paid by the military authorities to this planning, and meant that the military representatives were equal in rank to the representatives sent by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice.

8.2.2. Civil-military co-operation at the departmental level

Behind the meetings in the Ministry of the Interior was the information gathered from each département about the forces needed in a situation of crisis and the main locations to be protected. Already when establishing the first plans from 1897-1898 concerning a nation-wide strike among rail workers, the Ministries of the Interior and of War had asked their representatives at the regional level - prefects and army corps commanders - to hold meetings with the chief mining engineer who represented the Ministry of Public Works at the regional level. This procedure was repeated and developed in the 1901 plans.48 In 1901, the aim of the talks between the prefects and the army corps commanders was a general discussion about how the mines and the shafts could be maintained during a long interruption of work and what could be done in order to defend the mines from sabotage. This was followed by a circular from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects inviting them to contact the regional military authorities in order to determine precisely the locations to be protected and the forces to be used.49

The plans for protection stressed the regional level as being the centre of gravity in decision making about internal peacekeeping. Accordingly, actors were involved at three levels. In the first place, there were the representatives directly involved in the elaboration of the protection plans, participating in the meetings in the Ministry of the Interior. These were all, in some form or other, representing a state body. Secondly, at the departmental level, a standing commission was in charge of establishing and regularly revising the list of locations to be protected and the number of troops to be mobilised in cases of conflict. The prefect and the army corps commanders were

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permanent members of these commissions, which would also comprise other state representatives (the senior gendarmerie commander, the mining inspector, the rail inspector, the port inspector) depending on the type of plan. At a third level, mayors, local police authorities and representatives from industrial organisations were indirectly involved through the information they provided about social, economic and topographic conditions within the local communities. However, these local authorities were not members of the planning commission and therefore never became directly involved in the elaboration of the plans.

In 1911, the minister of the interior suggested that these local representatives could be allowed into the departmental commission. However, nothing came out of this, and the 1914 edition of the instructions concerning the participation of the army in the maintenance of public order repeated the wording from the 1907 instructions that the locations to be occupied and the number of troops to be mobilised were to be determined jointly between the prefect and the army corps commander.

8.2.3. The commission for the revision of the 1907 Instructions on requisition of military assistance

There is a remarkable similarity between the committee that elaborated 1907 plans for protection and the committee responsible for the revision of the law texts from 1791 concerning the requisition of military troops for maintenance of public order. What is also striking about this inter-ministerial group is that is comprised several military members. The commission was chaired by General Lebon, who also participated in the establishment of protection plans in his capacity as army corps commander in Lille.

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51 Military Archive, Vincennes, 6 N 146, 'Instruction du 18 octobre (mise à jour à la date du 15 avril 1914) relative à l’emploi des troupes réquisitionnés pour le maintien de l’ordre public'.

52 Three out of the ten members of ‘La commission chargée d’étudier la revision de l’exercice du droit de réquisition de la force armée par les autorités civiles et du plan de protection établi pour le cas de grèves dans les départements’ were senior commanders.
The military establishment thus had direct influence on the new formal rules defining its own sphere of action in relation to the civil authorities. The strong military participation in this commission might be explained by the fact that by integrating senior commanders in the establishment of the text was a way of binding the military establishment to the new legislation.

The instructions of 20 August 1907 reaffirmed the principle of civil supremacy by stating which civil authorities were entitled to call for military assistance (Articles 2-6). Article 8 very briefly states that the civil authority alone was to determine the moment of intervention. However, five substantial paragraphs (Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14) that followed demanded civil-military co-operation. Article 18 repeated the right of the military authorities to determine the measures to be implemented, but the following Articles 19-22 made it clear that any important measure was to be taken in agreement with the civil authorities, thus leaving little room for independent military decision making.

It thus appears that, despite the formal insistence on a strict separation of the civil and military authorities, the reality was a very powerful demand for mutual agreement and a continuous exchange of information. Similarly, the ministerial circular letter concerning the application of the 1907 instructions does not emphasise civilian supremacy over the military, but rather concentrated on stressing the importance of joint decision making between civil and military authorities. In contrast to the official text, the circular letter directly invited the military authorities to take the initiative of contacting the civil authorities and preparing themselves for intervention.

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53 “L’autorité civile est seule juge du moment où la force armée doit être requise” (article 8).
54 The war ministerial comment on the Article 21 about the obligation of the prefect and the army corps commander to meet and determine together the execution of the measures: “Je ne saurais trop insister sur les prescriptions de cet article. Il faut qu’à tous les degrés de la hiérarchie, chacun s’inspire du but à atteindre et qu’il y contribue de toutes ses forces en mettant de côté toute question d’amour-propre.” Military Archive, Vincennes, 5 N 6, ‘Cabinet du ministre, bureau de la Correspondance Générale, 1905-1906; troisième bureau 1886-1914’. Circular of 31 August 1907 entitled ‘Circulaire pour l’application de l’instruction du 20 août 1907 relative à la participation de l’armée au maintien de l’ordre public’.
The 1907 instructions made some important adjustments to the legislation from 1791. These included transforming the former right of the military commander to determine all military measures\textsuperscript{56} into a new duty of the military authorities to prepare for the execution of the measures decided together with the civil authorities.\textsuperscript{57} General Lebon had ample opportunity to influence the legislation and plans for protection. However, the minutes from the meetings in the Ministry of the Interior reveal that General Lebon and the other military member of the commission, Lieutenant-Colonel Bernhard were very keen on increasing the efficiency of military actions and at no time did they express any wish to limit the engagement of the army in the settlement of labour disputes or other types of public disorder.\textsuperscript{58}

The planning and development of strategies to deal with public unrest was a \textit{de facto} integration of the civil authorities into what had formerly been an entirely military matter. At the same time, the integration of important contingents from each army corps into a nation-wide organisation of civil and military forces provided the civil authorities with a continuous insight into the functioning of the army at the regional and local level. How significant this insight was as a form of 'civilian control' is difficult to know. However, being linked to the civil state administration at the central, regional, and local levels made it impossible for the French army to become a closed and self-sufficient entity within the state - as became the case in Prussia.

As for the acceptance and co-operation by the military authorities, the importance of pre-established plans can hardly be underestimated. Since these plans established the

\textsuperscript{56} Law of 26 July - 3 August 1791. Article 23.

\textsuperscript{57} National Archives, Paris, F.7.12913, ‘Commissions et sous-commissions instituées en vue d'examiner les mesures à prendre en cas de grèves 1908-1909’. Minutes from a meeting of 13 April 1907 in the ‘Commission pour révision de l'instruction relative à la participation de l'armée au maintien de l'ordre public’: "L'autorité militaire prépare les mesures d'exécution qui sont la conséquence de ces communications (avec l'autorité civile)."

\textsuperscript{58} National Archives, Paris, F.7.12913, ‘Commissions et sous-commissions instituées en vue d'examiner les mesures à prendre en cas de grèves 1908-1909’. Minutes from the meetings of the ‘Commission pour la révision de l'instruction relative à la participation de l'armée au maintien de l'ordre public’ on 13 April, 8 June, 11 June, 22 June, and 30 October 1907; 3 June 1908 and 27 February 1909.
entire concept of military participation in dealing with internal disorder, the integration of senior military commanders in the elaboration of measures against internal unrest was an effective way of ensuring the consent and willing co-operation of the army. The minutes show that the military representatives, in particular General Lebon, participated actively in the discussions of how to respond efficiently to public disorder. Although he had frequent opportunities to object to the use of military troops, there did not seem to be any attempt on his part to reduce the involvement of the army in internal peacekeeping.

Through civil-military co-operation, the senior commanders acquired a degree of informal influence over issues such as the moment and the conditions for the mobilisation of troops, questions from which they were formally excluded. Given the important areas which were jointly determined by civil and military authorities, civilian supremacy was transformed more into a leading role in an inter-institutional relationship, where both the civil and military authorities were bound to operate within a sphere of mutual agreement. The ministerial plans for protection must therefore be seen not only as the practical organisation of available forces, but also as a form of agreement whereby the military leaders committed themselves to deliver troops for certain pre-defined types of conflict.

8.2.4. Towards a redistribution of powers and responsibilities: joint, inter-penetrating, or separate

One of the few analyses of the civil-military relations during military interventions of the beginning of the century insists on the importance of the military authorities being allowed to determine the means and measures in dealing with public unrest. This was certainly the principle as stated in the legislation. However, study the ministerial instructions from the first decade of the century and at the administrative practice, it shows that the functioning of civil-military relations at the regional level was not characterised by this strict separation of the civil and military authorities. During the decade between 1900 and 1910, when the army was increasingly integrated into the

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planning of measures against public disorder, a general move can be observed from strict separation of powers and responsibilities to an increasing fusion between the civil and the military authorities. Through protection planning, the military authorities acquired influence over decisions reserved for the civil authorities (i.e. deciding which conflicts required military intervention, the time of requisition as well as the ending of a requisition). At the same time, the civil authorities obtained influence over decisions formally reserved for military commanders. Gradually, the barriers which were established to ensure the separation of the military and civil authorities were overcome in the name of efficient co-operation.

The demand for joint decision making in the plans for protection appeared in the early 1890s. With direct reference to the strike wave of the 1892 and early 1893, the minister of the interior and the war minister instructed their respective authorities at the regional level, that the prefects and the army corps commanders were to communicate as early as possible in the course of a conflict about the possible requisition of military troops. During the following years, it became a requirement that the prefect and the army corps commander reached an agreement (se concéter) about all important decisions. At first, the idea of joint decision making faced stubborn resistance from military commanders who insisted on the right of the military authorities to determine means and measures whenever troops were involved. General de France in 1893 stressed the principle enshrined in legislation and in the decree of 4 October 1891 was that when requested by a competent civil authority, the military authority alone determined the means and measures needed to maintain public order. However, the ministerial instructions concerning the first protection plans from 1898

60 Military Archive, Vincennes, 5 N 5, 'Cabinet du Ministre: Correspondance Générale, 1878-1914'. Letter of 18 February 1893 from the minister of the interior to the prefects, and the letter of 23 February from the war minister to the army corps commanders: "Dans tous les cas où l'extrême urgence ne rendra pas la chose impossible, les préfets se concertent au préalable avec les commandants des corps d'armée, lorsqu'il y a lieu de faire des réquisitions de troupes, afin de déterminer l'arme à laquelle on devra faire appel."

61 Decree of 4 October 1891 'Portant règlement sur le service des places de guerre et de villes ouvertes' Article 167 : "Le choix et l'exécution des mesures à prendre appartient exclusivement à l'autorité militaire, dont la responsabilité à cet égard reste entière." Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C.".L330, 'Grèves diverses': 'Instructions en cas de grèves ou de troubles' from General de France, army corps commander in Lille of 15 February 1893 "Le commandement des troupes sera toujours réglé et assuré par l'autorité militaire."
offered a new emphasis. On the one hand, it was again made clear that the military authority alone determined means and measures. On the other hand, the instructions insisted that the military authority determined these only in so far as they were agreed with the civil administration. It was thus declared that all military measures were to be undertaken by mutual agreement between the army corps commander and the prefectoral authority, so that the military right to determine means and measures no longer held in practice.

That Waldeck-Rousseau thought of the plans for protection as a way of limiting the military commanders' freedom of action appears clearly in his answer to some of his prefects who, in October 1901, wondered whether it was necessary to follow all the prescriptions of the protection plans:

"Les règlements en vigueur portent qu'une fois requisitionnés les chefs militaires sont seuls juges des mesures à employer et de ordres à donner en cas de contact de la troupe avec les attrouppements. C'est pour éviter qu'il en soit ainsi que j'ai fait cette réserve (to ask the prefects to implement all provisions from the moment of the declaration of the general miners' strike.)" 

In December 1902, the war minister wrote to the army corps commander in Lille. The letter concerned the ending of the military intervention after the great miners' strike and the strike among the dock workers in Dunkerque and Calais, and stated that this

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62 Departmental Archives, Lille, M 622/2, 'Grèves des Chemins de Fer. Révision du plan de protection en cas de grève, 1901-1907'. Instructions of 12 December 1898 from the minister of the interior to the prefects.

63 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774 'Grèves: Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de fer'. Circular letter of November 1898 from the war minister to the army corps commanders. "Il appartient à l'autorité militaire de fixer les effectifs suivant l'objet des réquisitions qui lui sont adressées. Les autorités civiles ne peuvent qu'indiquer à titre de désideratum, la force qui paraît nécessaire; mais elles ne sauraient réclamer l'envoi d'un détachement ou l'établissement d'un poste présentant un effectif déterminé, l'autorité militaire étant seule juge de l'emploi des moyens dont elle dispose, sous la réserve de satisfaire rapidement et aussi complètement que possible aux demandes qui lui sont adressées." The only point where the military authorities in 1898 accepted joint decision making was the question of ending the military engagement. Departmental Archives, Lille, M 622/1, 'Grèves des Chemins de Fer. Circulaires et instructions, 1898-1901'. Circular letter of 6 July 1898 from the war minister to the army corps commanders: "Il doit être bien entendu, toutefois, que d'accord avec l'autorité civile, il appartient à l'autorité militaire de retirer les troupes des points désignés, dès que les circonstances le permettent, pour les reporter, s'il y a lieu, sur d'autres points menacés ou les faire rentrer dans leur garnisons. Je vous rappelle que vous avez d'ailleurs toute latitude et toute initiative pour faire, après entente avec l'autorité militaire, les additions qui seraient jugées nécessaires à la liste des points à garder."

64 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, 'Grèves'. Notes from the minister of the interior, 5 October 1901.
decision was to be taken jointly by the army corps commander and the prefect. It was not only the war minister who allowed his general commander to participate in such decisions. The message from the Ministry of the Interior was the same: co-operation, joint decision-making between the prefects and the military commander, and a demand for a continuous exchange of information. In the 1907 revision of the formal rules for military participation in internal peace keeping, the text strongly insisted on joint decision making, in contrast to the former laws of 1791 which only stressed the separation of civil and military authorities. The practice, which had gradually built up since the early 1890s, was thereby formalised.

Another step towards closer civil-military co-operation at the regional level was the repeated demands from Paris that the prefect and the army corps commanders should solve the question of mobilisation of troops without passing through the authorities in Paris. The prefect’s involvement of the central authorities in questions of military intervention seems to be a new phenomenon that appeared in the general miners’ strike of 1893. During the large miners’ strikes of 1889 and 1891 the troops were still requested and mobilised within rather restricted local areas. With strike movements tending to extend over several administrative units and involving an unprecedented number of forces, the prefects began to appeal to Paris for instructions with increasing frequency. The result was that in the nation-wide unrest of 1893, the mobilisation of troops became a decision made by the minister of the interior and the war minister. The reaction from Paris was to encourage the prefects and the army corps commanders to sort out these questions between themselves, a demand that was repeated many times during the following two decades.


67 There are several examples among the papers from the Ministry of the Interior (National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773-12794) where prefects addressing themselves to the minister with suggestions or questions involving the army received a sharp answer from Paris to settle these issues together with the army corps commander. The demand for decision making at the regional level by the prefectural authority and the army corps commander was finally formalised in the Instructions of 20 August 1907 concerning the participation of the army in maintenance of public order: “Article 10: Afin d’éviter tout retard ou confusion, l’autorité civile ne fait connaître ses besoins qu’aux autorités militaires dénommées dans l’article 7. Elle ne doit s’adresser au ministre de la Guerre ni directement, ni par
The pressure from Paris for closer integration of the civil and military authorities at the regional level was carried even further by the Clémenceau administration. In 1909, an initiative was taken by Clémenceau to put into practice an old project of granting one prefect in each French region extended powers in case of major internal unrest or a break in communications with Paris. This project again insisted on co-operation between a series of state authorities at the regional level, of whom the army corps commander was the first to be mentioned. Moreover, the description of the role of the military authorities in this type of situation again stressed the principle of joint decision making between civil and military authorities in all important questions concerning the maintenance of order. It is important to note that this was not the civil authorities simply giving their orders to the military authority, rather it was a close integration of civil and military decision making that broke down the formal barrier between the two authorities. In April 1909 Clémenceau sent a circular letter to the prefects inviting them to act in the name of the minister in close co-operation with the military authorities. The project of establishing regional prefects was abandoned, but in terms of maintenance of order, one trace of it remained: in the inter-ministerial instructions of 1913 close co-operation between the prefects and the army corps

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68 The first project to establish regional prefects dates from 1815. It was taken up again in 1872, but rejected by the National Assembly.

69 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 115, 'EMA'. Project of Regional Prefects (April 1909) "Lorsque les communications normales entre le Gouvernement et les Préfets sont entravées du fait d'une agitation intérieure, un agent régional doit pouvoir centraliser les relations avec le Gouvernement et coordonner (...) les mesures nécessaires pour le maintien de l'ordre public, le rétablissement des communications et la solution des affaires administratives d'une urgence absolue qui sont réservées habituellement à la décision des Ministres."

70 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 115, 'EMA'. Project of Regional Prefects (April 1909) "Le préfet régional aura près de lui pour l'assister: Le général commandant le corps d'armée dont la résidence est la même ville que la sienne; Le Procureur Général près la Cour d'Appel; Le Trésorier-Payeur Général; Le Directeur des Postes et Télégraphes.(...) Ainsi, les trois autorités: administrative, militaire et judiciaire, se trouveront groupées en un même point, avec la plénitude de leurs moyens d'action et dans les conditions les plus favorables pour faire face aux exigences de la situation."

71 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 115, 'EMA'. Project of Regional Prefects (April 1909) "Les Commandants de Corps d'Armée ont été invités, par le Ministre de la Guerre, à collaborer étroitement avec les Préfets régionaux au maintien de l'ordre public. (...) Le Ministre de la Guerre ne devra pas être consulté durant la crise sur les applications de leur action concertée."

commander to ensure the efficient maintenance of order in the event of general strikes within the transport and communication sectors was emphasised again.\textsuperscript{73}

The deliberate overlapping and joint decision making concerning matters involving both the state administration and the military authority are in stark contrast to the situation in Prussia. Here such questions were often passed from one authority to another, and frequently both civil and military authorities appeared unwilling to make a decision, fearing an intrusion into the field of authority of the other.

Given the mutually suspicious relationship between civil and military authorities after the Dreyfus affair and the \textit{Affaire des Fiches} of 1904,\textsuperscript{74} the move towards negotiated plans and joint decision making on all important issues can hardly be underestimated. For the efficient execution of the governmental policies - in France generally and in the region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais in particular - it was of major importance that politically sensitive decisions were taken jointly by the prefect and the army corps commander. This integration of the general commanders into the decision making process, one in which they had no formal right to participate, was an effective way of obviating opposition from the military establishment. On the other side, the military commanders involved in this process had a good reason for not opposing the close integration of the military organisation into the problems of maintaining internal order since it provided them with direct influence over matters from which they were formally excluded.

\textsuperscript{73} Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 115 'EMA'. 'Instruction Inter-ministerielle sur les plans de protection et les mesures à prendre en cas de grève' (1913) "(Dans le cas d'une grève des services postaux et télégraphiques coïncidant avec une grève des chemins de fer) les Préfets des départements compris dans la portion du territoire isolée, se tiendraient en contact permanent les uns avec les autres ainsi qu'avec le Général commandant le corps d'armée de façon à permettre la coordination des efforts destinés à assurer le maintien des communications entre eux, la défense de l'ordre public ainsi qu'une utilisation méthode et adéquate des réserves de troupes dont dispose le Commandant de corps d'armée." (Article 65).

\textsuperscript{74} See Chapter Four.
8.3. The functioning of civil-military co-operation at the regional level

8.3.1. Lines of communication and exchange of information between the prefects and the army corps commander

Formally, the demand for co-operation between civil and military authorities was stated in the legislation regarding the participation of the armed forces in maintaining public order. The nature of co-operation was not defined, but one of the cornerstones from the 1890s onwards was the mutual exchange of information between the civil and military authorities at the regional and local levels. Within the Ministry of the Interior as well as the War Ministry, the prefects and army corps commanders were asked to communicate with each other rather than address themselves to their respective Ministries.

In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, it became standard procedure for the prefects and the army corps commander to send a copy of their correspondences to each other, when relevant. This provided both groups with an insight into the problems and complaints which were objects of communication between the authorities at the local level and their superiors within the other organisation. In addition to the direct communications between civil and military authorities, they shared an institutionalised source of information, namely the daily reports from the local gendarmerie units. These reports were sent simultaneously to the prefect, to the army corps commander, and to their respective Ministries, thus ensuring a regular flow of information about the state of affairs in local communities. By this means, the army corps commander was constantly informed of problems of public security, and was warned at an early stage about the possible outbreak of trouble. Arguably, this day-to-day stream of information - rather than the sporadic information about isolated cases of trouble - helped to make the military authorities more susceptible to the needs of the civil authorities for military assistance.

76 Military Archive, Vincennes, S N 5 'Cabinet du Ministre: Correspondance Générale 1878-1914.' Circular of 15 May 1878 entitled 'Communication entre les autorités militaires et les autorités préfectorales et municipales.' Letter of 29 January 1883 from the war minister to the army corps commanders.
In addition to day-to-day information, the establishment and up-dating every two or three years between 1897 and 1914 of the protection plans required the prefects and the army corps commanders in each military region to work closely together in making their recommendations to the inter-ministerial commission about the problems of unrest and the troops available. This was a major administrative operation that allowed informal exchange views and facts on the organisation and needs of all forces within the region. It also provided mutual insight into the needs and intentions of the other authority. Arguably, the high degree of openness between the civil and military authorities limited mutual suspicion and the potential for conflict, although it is impossible to get an idea of exactly how significant this regular interaction and equal access to information were in the establishment of mutual trust.

At the local level, similar patterns of co-operation took place between the representatives of state authorities. In the ports of Dunkerque, Calais and Saint Pol, the local military governor or garrison commander was in continuous communication with the sub-prefect, the head of the maritime authorities, and with the chief engineer. These local state officials were the first to recommend smaller changes or adjustments of the existing protection plans. More importantly, on the basis of the plans for major unrest, the state representatives on the spot developed measures to be implemented in case of smaller conflicts, so that when one-hundred dock workers or sailors went on strike in Dunkerque, a pre-defined number of soldiers could be called to prevent sabotage of the most vulnerable parts of the port installations. When it came to protecting material against sabotage, it was never foreseen that the gendarmerie should perform such a task. The role of the gendarmerie was to police the individuals, but not to protect plants or port installations. Accordingly, the gendarmerie authorities were not involved in planning how to protect material from sabotage.

At the local level, examples from Dunkerque, Valencienne, Maubeuge and Cambrai show a similar co-operation between different civil and military authorities. The examples of significant co-operation between the military authorities and various civilian bodies were particularly frequent for Dunkerque, where the military governor
and the sub-prefect frequently exchanged information concerning the movements of
dock workers in the three main ports: Dunkerque, Calais and Boulogne-sur-Mer. In
1902, during the major strike among the dock workers of Dunkerque and Calais, the
division commander and the prefect of Pas-de-Calais asked their subordinates in Calais
to develop a set of measures to ensure public order. On the 23 October 1902, the sub­
prefect of the arrondissement of Boulogne-sur-Mer and the state police commissioner
gathered at the garrison with the local commander to decide the measures to be
implemented.77 These examples of local integration of the military authorities into the
planning process were not confined to the ports ports. In June 1910, when the first
rumours arose about a possible general strike among the rail workers, the commander
of the garrison in Cambrai arranged a meeting in the local military headquarters with
the deputy head of the sub-prefectural offices of Cambrai (Chef des Bureaux de la
Sous-Prefecture) and the local state inspector of the railways.78 Similarly, in August
1911, when the authorities feared large demonstrations against price increased, a
meeting was held between the military governor of Maubeuge, the sub-prefect of
Avesnes and the deputy mayor of Maubeuge at the office of the military governor.79
The purpose was to decide the exact measures to be taken in case of mass
demonstrations. These lines of communications can be seen in the voluminous
correspondence between the different branches of the state at the regional and local
level.80

Thus, lines of intense communication and co-operation existed both at the ministerial
level, at the regional level between the prefects and the army corps commander, and at
the local level between local commanders, the prefectural and sub-prefectural
authorities, and a variety of specialists representatives various ministries. If the army
was indeed under the control and authority of the prefects and the civilian government,
the military authorities nevertheless had informal influence over matters that concerned

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77 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C./2.I.326, 'Grèves, renseignements sur les troupes détachées
aux grèves, 1901-1902'. Report of 24 October 1902 from the commander of Calais.
1910 from the military commander in Cambrai to the army corps commander in Lille.
1911 from the military governor of Maubeuge to the army corps commander in Lille.
80 Departmental Archives, Lille, M 624 /7 'Ouvriers du port de Dunkerque. Réquisitions militaires,
1901-1902'.
the army. In addition, they were regularly informed about the state of affairs in local communities through the same type of information as was provided to the prefect. It is therefore not surprising that the military view of the seriousness of a particular situation was quite close to that of the civil administration in the majority of cases.

8.3.2. Knowledge and consensus about the formal and informal rules for procedures and appropriate bureaucratic behaviour

The standard operating procedures that arose from the protection plans and from the frequent implementation of the same measures brought about a particular bureaucratic mind-set that was shared by the successive prefects and military commanders. This bureaucratic mind-set consisted of the common acceptance of the strategies adopted, the notions of appropriate response to public unrest, and the distribution of powers and responsibilities between the two institutions. These norms and expectations established strong limits on the professional behaviour of senior military commanders, since any deviation from the standard operating procedures would need to be justified.\textsuperscript{81} It was also difficult for the army corps commander to withdraw from the implementation of plans that he himself or his predecessor had negotiated with the civil administration.

This helps to explain why military commanders actively participated in the implementation of policies that many of them were likely to strongly disapprove of. This is particularly relevant to military participation in the implementation of the anti-Catholic legislation of the years 1902 to 1906. It also helps to explain how military commanders could co-operate effectively with representatives of governments that apparently were attempting to break the power and the social standing of the army elite. It also helps to explain how a high degree of mutual confidence on matters concerning maintenance of order could exist between the prefects and the army corps commander in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, despite the generally suspicious relationship

\textsuperscript{81} This seems clear when, shortly after the establishment of the first protection plans for the port of Dunkerque, the prefect in Lille complained to the minister of the interior about not having been informed about some minor changes made by the army corps commander: "J'ai demandé au Général Jeannerod (army corps commander in Lille) de vouloir bien, pour l'avenir, m'informer des modifications qu'il croirait devoir apporter à un travail concerté, et que l'administration préfectorale a le plus grand intérêt à ne pas l'ignorer." Departmental Archives, Lille, M.624 /7, 'Ouvriers du port de Dunkerque. Réquisitions militaires, 1901-1902' Letter of 10 October 1901.
between the Republican regime and the French army. In particular, Louis Vincent, prefect in Lille 1899-1911, developed a self-assured but very courteous relationship with the successive army corps commander during his twelve years of service.82

Similarly, the fact that both civil and military authorities knew about and submitted to a set of standard operating procedures surrounding civil-military co-operation strongly limited the potential for conflict and misunderstandings. It is significant that among the mass of documentation on military interventions in France, the cases of conflict are quite rare, and those which have been found all fall into one of three categories: a) they occurred in the period previous to 1900 before the procedures for civil-military co-operation were not properly settled; b) conflicts and misunderstandings occurred in areas where military intervention only took place very seldom; c) the interference of persons who were not acquainted with the bureaucratic procedures linked to the requisition of troops.

Most of the cases of uncertainty or open conflict occurred during the 1880s and 1890s before the standard operating procedures were properly established, known, and recognised by all the parts involved.83 In the early 1890s, much uncertainty existed

82 In particular, Louis Vincent made a virtue of informing the army corps commander about the intentions of his administration. Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C/2.1.325, ‘Grèves. Dispositions à prendre, 1902-1909’ Letter of 28 October 1903 from the prefect of département Nord to the army corps commander. To his subordinate sub-prefects, he also insisted on the importance of always issuing formally correct requisitions so that the military commander could proceed with no risk of being accused afterwards for acting illegally. Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C/2.1.325, ‘Grèves. Dispositions à prendre, 1902-1909.’ Similarly, Louis Vincent was very keen on paying his respects to the officers and soldiers after the end of major cases of unrest, which gave him a reputation in the local press for making the army the auxiliary arm of his administration. Departmental Archives, Lille, M.6/20, Papiers personnels de Louis Vincent (1899-1911). His dossier contains a number of newspaper cuts on this subjects.

83 Departmental Archives, Arras, M.1641, ‘Rapports avec les autorités judiciaires, militaires, les élus, les administrés, les municipalités, 1878-1913’. Letter of 4 December 1880 from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects. “M. le Ministre de la guerre vient d’appeler mon attention sur certaines irrégularités constatées dans la forme des réquisitions adressées aux autorités militaires et à la gendarmerie, à l’occasion de l’exécution des décrets du 29 mars 1880, et que je crois devoir vous signaler à mon tour. Dans un grand nombre de cas la forme de cette réquisition qui a été fixée par l’article 22 de la loi du 3 août 1791 et par l’article 96 du décret du 1er mars 1854 a été modifiée. Tantôt on ‘invite’ au lieu de ‘réquérir’, tantôt au lieu des expressions de ‘commander’ et de se ‘transporter’ on a employé celle de ‘mettre à notre disposition’ qui impliquerait de la part de l’administration une immixtion dans les mesures à prendre qui est contraire aux articles 17 de la loi du 10 juillet 1791, art.23 de la loi du 3 août 1791 et art.115 du décret du 1er mars 1854. Dans certains cas la réquisition a contrairement à l’article 17 de la loi du 10 juillet 1791 déterminé soit le nombre des hommes requis, soit le lieu où leur présence était nécessaire, soit le nombre des sentinelles et la nature de leur consigne. Parfois aussi l’objet de la réquisition qui doit toujours être clairement indiqué
among the prefects in Lille and Arras about financial responsibility, which sometimes made prefects hesitate with their requisition until this question was settled. Until 1893, financial responsibility was determined for each case individually, but a decision of the State Council of July 1893 stated that for case mobilisation of military troops for

était exprimé par une indication vague telle que celle-ci "pour concourir à l’exécution des décrets". En fin, bien que l’article 98 du décret du 1er mars 1854 décide que la gendarmerie ne doit être employée que pour assister l’autorité dans l’exécution d’un acte et pour assurer l’effet de la réquisition, elle a été dans quelques cas requise de procéder elle même, et sans la présence d’une autorité civile, à l’exécution complète des décrets, sommation, bris de portes, expulsions, etc. Ces irrégularités proviennent, je n’en doute pas, de ce que les fonctionnaires de l’administration n’avaient pas sous les yeux lors de l’application des décrets les textes qui régissent la matière. J’ai en conséquence, l’honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint, sous forme d’annexe un résumé des dispositions législatives ou réglementaires concernant la forme des réquisitions adressées à l’autorité militaire."


Similarly, there was a case in 1893 when the prefect of Allier complained about a division commander who had told his subordinate commanders not to mobilise troops until they had a formal order from himself. The prefect made clear that this order was against the prescriptions of the law and unacceptable, although, as he admitted, the general had acted from the best of intentions to avoid abuse of the army by local mayors. National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773: ‘Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914’. Letter of 22 February 1893 from the prefect in Allier to the minister of the interior. “...je vous signale les embarras où j ’aurais pu être, au 1er mai 1890, par les instructions que M. le Général du Bessol, qui commandait alors en chef à Clermont Ferrand, avait adressées aux officiers placés à la tête des troupes du corps d’armée. Cet officier supérieur, dans un but assurément excellent, et pour éviter les moyens de répartir les troupes d’après les réquisitions diverses qu’il pouvait recevoir, avait ordonné au Général de Brigade, commandant la subdivision de Moulins, de ne mobiliser aucune portion de l’effectif qu’après en avoir obtenu de lui l’autorisation préalable. Ce système aurait, dans un cas urgent, exigu de longs délais, et occasionné des retard préjudiciables à l’ordre public: Réquisition du Préfet au général de brigade, échange de télégramme entre le général de brigade et le général commandant en chef. Les précautions prises par M. le Général du Bessol, excellentes, je le répète, dans un but assurément excellent, et pour éviter les moyens de répartir les troupes d’après les réquisitions diverses qu’il pouvait recevoir, avait ordonné au Général de Brigade, commandant la subdivision de Moulins, de ne mobiliser aucune portion de l’effectif qu’après en avoir obtenu de lui l’autorisation préalable. Ce système aurait, dans un cas urgent, exigu de longs délais, et occasionné des retard préjudiciables à l’ordre public: Réquisition du Préfet au général de brigade, échange de télégramme entre le général de brigade et le général commandant en chef. Les précautions prises par M. le Général du Bessol, excellentes, je le répète, au point de vue de la répartition des forces, pouvaient devenir dangereuses à cause du caractère absolu des ordres donnés. Toutes les fois qu’ils croient en avoir le temps, il est fort naturel que les Préfets se concertent avec les commandants de corps d’armée. Mais il doit rester parfaitement entendu que lorsqu’ils en voient la nécessité, les préfets peuvent requérir directement, et immédiatement, les troupes qu’ils trouvent à leur portée. Les instructions que le Commandant de Corps d’Armée adresse aux officiers sous leur ordre ne peuvent évidemment pas supprimer ou restreindre le droit de réquisition directe que les Préfets tiennent de la loi. Afin d’éviter en toute éventualité des conflits, il serait, à mon sens, utile que l’attention de M. le Ministre de la Guerre soit appelée sur ce point.”

The uncertainties about the procedures and the legal boundaries for the State actions to maintain public order were not restricted to co-operation with the army. In 1882, the prefect of Saône-et-Loire suggested measures to prevent striking miners from organising themselves, which clearly went beyond the powers of the prefect, such as allowing searches and preventive apprehension of suspected leaders. National Archives, Paris, F.7.12526, ‘4e Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Evenements de Montceau-les Mines 1882-1883’. Such suggestions were unthinkable after the turn of the century when the prefects were generally much more aware of the limits of their competence.
internal purposes, the state was financially responsible.\footnote{National Archives, Paris, F.7 /12773: 'Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914'. Decision from the State Council announced to the Ministry of the Interior 18 July 1893. "Le Conseil d'Etat saisi de la question de savoir si les dépenses militaires effectuées à l'occasion des grèves incombent aux communes sur les territoires desquelles les grèves ont éclaté, vient dans sa séance du 6 juillet 1893, de se prononcer pour la négative. Le Conseiller d'Etat, Directeur de l'Administration Départementale et Communale, a l'honneur d'en informer Monsieur le Directeur de la Sûreté Générale suivant sa demande des 25 février 1892 et 25 avril 1893 et de lui transmettre ci-joint copie de l'avis de la haute assemblée qui tranche définitivement les difficultés à l'occasion des affaires de Revin et de Roanne."} The settlement of this question helped to strengthen confidence among the prefects in using this measure. They could now be sure that a military intervention would not be followed by months of problematic negotiations with local communities and private companies who refused to pay and complaints from impatient military authorities who were eager to have their expenses covered.

A second category were misunderstandings. These also occurred quite frequently before the turn of the century and continued to appear in areas where little unrest took place. Since requisition for military assistance only took place very occasionally, prefects and army corps commanders remained uncertain about the exact procedures to be followed as well as the legal definitions of civil and military authority.\footnote{In the first implementation in 1897 of the provisions of a protection plan, the minister of the interior complained that some of the prefects had issued requisitions with a signature but without date and indication of number of troops. The intention was that the military commander could fill out these details when necessary. This procedure was immediately banned by the Ministry of the Interior (National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774 'Grèves'. Note from the minister of the interior of 24 August 1897). Similarly, in 1898, many prefects addressed themselves to the Ministry because they were uncertain about how to procede when calling for military assistance. Worst of all, the prefect of the Eastern Pyrenees addressed his requisition to the War Ministry. (National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774 'Grèves' Letter of 10 November 1898 from the war minister to the minister of the interior).} In 1901 there was a great deal of hesitation among the prefects about the timing and the conditions for military intervention.\footnote{National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, 'Grèves'. Notes to Waldeck-Rousseau the minister of the interior, 5 October 1901. "Est-il absolument indispensable que, la grève générale sera déclarée, tous les préfets des départements mineurs - sauf le Gard - prennent toutes les mesures prescrites ? Un certain nombre de préfets voient de sérieux inconvénients à procéder de cette façon et demandent à être autorisés à n'adresser leurs réquisitions aux autorités militaires qu'au moment où les événements le nécessitent pour leur département. D'autres préfets demandent la latitude de ne pas envoyer de troupes sur certains points, la grève ne devant pas toucher ces points."} Similarly during the spring of 1906 and during the wine growers' revolt in the South of France over the summer of 1907, the hesitations about the standard operating procedures occurred mainly in areas without a
history of public disorder where the prefects and army corps commanders only entered into practical co-operation very few times during their careers.87

The third category comprises cases when un-authorised individuals addressed themselves directly to the military commander, a step that was followed by increasingly severe criticism from the Ministry of the Interior and the War Ministry.88 It is important to note that all these faux pas were committed by people who were not ordinarily involved in the requisition of military troops, whereas the prefects and military commanders who were heavily involved in the maintenance of order never seemed to commit these types of errors.

In a region like Nord-Pas-de-Calais where requisitions for military assistance happened more frequently than in most other areas, it is notable how the uncertainty with which prefects proceeded in the 1890s changed after the turn of the century, when the prefects had become increasingly confident about implementing these measures. The change in the self-confidence of the prefects in Nord-Pas-de-Calais between the early 1890s and the first decade of this century is remarkable. A letter of 27 June 1891 from the prefect of département Nord to the minister of the interior shows the uncertainty

87 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12399 'Culte Catholique: Inventaires, 1905-1907' Letter of 4 March from the war minister to the minister of the interior: “J'ai reçu depuis quelques jours, à maintes reprises, des télégrammes de Préfets me demandant soit des troupes, soit des gendarmes pour assurer dans leur département le service d'ordre nécessité par les opérations des inventaires. J'ai l'honneur de vous prier de vouloir bien rappeler à ces hauts fonctionnaires que l'article 4 de l'Instruction du 24 juin 1903 énumère les autorités militaires auxquelles les réquisitions peuvent être adressées et spécifie, dans chaque cas particulier, celle de ces autorités à laquelle incombe le soin de leur donner satisfaction. D'autre part, afin de me permettre d'exercer éventuellement des prélèvements sur les gendarmes d'une région pour les diriger sur d'autres, je vous serais obligé de me faire connaître quels sont les départements où les inventaires des églises ont pris fin, au fur et à mesure de l'achèvement de ces opérations.”

88 In 1911, the minister of public works addressed a requisition directly to the War Ministry when the building workers at a public site went on strike. Since the Ministry of Public Works was not normally involved in questions of maintenance of order, the minister did not know that he had no authority to request military assistance. The reaction from the minister of the interior was immediate and severe. National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, 'Grèves' Letter of 16 May 1911 from the minister of the interior to the minister of public works. “J'appelle votre sérieuse attention sur la nécessité que s'impose à toutes les administrations de ne pas requérir de troupes en cas de grève sans passer par l'intermédiaire, soit du ministère de l'intérieur, soit des fonctionnaires responsables de l'ordre public et qui ont seuls qualité pour adresser ces réquisitions. En dehors de l'illegalité du procédé, l'appel direct à l'autorité militaire peut avoir les plus graves inconvénients. Je suis surpris de n'avoir pas été averti des réquisitions de troupes, d'ailleurs irrégulières, que vous avez faites par dépêche d'hier et je vous prie de me fournir, sans retard, les explications qui me manquent.”
which characterised the decisions of the prefects in the early 1890s. This uncertainty, which in the early 1890s sometimes inhibited the prefects from calling for military assistance, seemed to disappear during the following decade. Due to frequent mobilisations, the civil authorities had a clearer idea about the conflicts in which their superior in the Ministry of the Interior would consider a call for military assistance appropriate. Moreover, given the high number of cases where troops were requested, a prefect who was criticised for his judgement in a particular situation would almost always be able to point to recent similar cases of unrest where identical measures had been implemented.

A break from the standard operating procedures would most often be commented on, but it seldom had practical consequences. Military commanders sometimes frowned if a requisition mentioned that the troops were 'at the disposition' of the civil authorities. It would then be made clear by the army corps commander that the army could not legally be 'at the disposition' but could only 'deliver assistance' to the civil authorities. Similar corrections might be made if a civil authority had been too explicit in its demands for troops, thus hurting the sensitivities of the military commander. In practice however, these details of formulation had no consequences for the implementation of requisitions. Although the military commanders were obsessed with legality to cover their own backs, they tended to follow even slightly incorrectly formulated requisitions, as long as they could do so without compromising themselves. Only after the end of the mobilisation would the military commander concerned address a formal protest to the prefect that the standard procedures had not been

89 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12527 '4e Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Evénement de Fourmies le 1er Mai 1891'. "Je ne me dissimule pas que si les troupes sont retirées sans l’assentiment des autorités locales et qu’à un moment ou à un autre des troubles viennent à éclater, la municipalité ne manquera pas de jeter la pierre à l’administration et de rappeler ses instances pour le maintien de la force armée. C’est pourquoi, Monsieur le Ministre, j’ai tenu à vous soumettre cette question. Vous m’obligez en me faisant connaître si les principes que j’expose ont votre approbation."

90 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C. /2.I.335, 'Inventaires des biens des Eglises, 1906'. Letter of 13 March 1906 from the division commander General Chômer to the army corps commander General Lebon. "En exécution des prescriptions de votre lettre du 10 mars courant, j’ai l’honneur de vous rendre compte que l’expression "ils seront à la disposition de l’autorité civile" concernant les 4 militaires serruriers mentionnés dans mon télégramme du 9 mars a été employée à tort. La réquisition du Préfet du Pas-de-Calais en date du 9 mars indiquait que ces militaires isolés seraient placés sous les ordres du commandant de la gendarmerie, conformément aux ordres que j’ai adressés, le 28 février 1906, à tous les commandants d’armes du département du Pas-de-Calais, ordres dont je vous ai envoyé copie le même jour ainsi qu’à M. le Préfet du Pas-de-Calais."
observed, and the authority that issued the requisition would then be urged to do it correctly next time. Only on a few occasions were questions of formality used to obstruct requisitions for military assistance. A notorious exception to this rule were the problems during the establishment of inventories over the possession of the Catholic Church in January-March 1906, when several local military commanders who were strongly opposed to the governmental policy used issues of formalities as a means of obstructing their participation.

The civil-military confrontations on that occasion also indicate the importance of the pre-established consensus and mutual confidence. Normally, in politically sensitive situations when disorder was to be expected, contacts were made with the military authorities weeks or even months before the actual conflict broke out. This was possible when a major strike was announced. It was also possible at occasions such as the annual May Day celebrations, general elections, or political meetings. The importance of the previous contacts between prefects and senior commanders becomes clear when looking at the problems which arose in January-March 1906, during the implementation of the law concerning the separation of the French state and the Catholic Church.

The establishment of inventories over the possessions within local churches triggered vigorous opposition from many Catholics. Since a large proportion of officers came from families with strong connections to the Catholic Church, their participation in the enforcement of the anti-Catholic legislation was particularly disagreeable. A certain number of individual officers attempted actions of disobedience or broke their military career over the issue. However, it was not the first time military troops had to help the civil authorities enforce laws against Catholic institutions, and on previous occasions

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91 Examples have been found during the miners' strikes in 1901 and 1902, when certain senior commanders complained about the number of troops demanded by certain prefects, and used small errors in the requisition to hinder mobilisation of additional troops. Similarly, in 1891, General Loizillon had no qualms about openly protesting when he thought that it was time to withdraw the troops from Fourmies two months after the bloody incidents on May Day incidents. (National Archives, Paris, F.7.12527, '4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Événements de Fourmies le 1er Mai 1891').

92 The military troops were involved in the implementation of the anti-Catholic legislation at three previous occasions during the early Third Republic: the closing of illegal congregations March 1880; the closing of illegal congregations after the restricted legislation of 1903.
the fact that many officers were also devout Catholics did not present major problems.93

The difference, however, is interesting when comparing the events of January-March 1906 with the other occasions where military troops were involved in the execution of the laws against the Catholic Church. On the other three occasions, the measures foreseen to maintain public order in the case of demonstrations involved the military authorities from the beginning. During the implementation of the laws against illegal religious orders, in March 1880 and again in 1902-1903, the army corps commanders received instructions from the Ministry of War about the possibility of requisitions from the civil authorities.94 The army corps commanders had therefore instructed the local commanders about their duty to obey if a civil authority requested assistance. These ‘instructions’ was in fact to be considered as an order from a military superior. Thus, when the army corps commander had issued an informal order concerning the specific problem of enforcing the laws on illegal congregations, it was almost impossible for a local military commander to find an excuse for refusing a request from the civil authorities.

The closing of illegal religious orders in 1902-1903 was, in fact, a far more controversial issue than the establishment of inventories of the possessions of the Catholic Church in 1906. The opposition from individual officers in January-March 1906, and the following crisis of discipline within the army, therefore, took both the civil administration and the senior commanders by surprise. The civil authorities had not expected such strong reactions from the Catholics and had not prepared the

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93 Military Archive, Vincennes, MR 2172 or REC 2172 ‘Application des lois des congrégations’. Letter of 17 November 1880 from army corps commander General Gallifet to the prefects of the départements of Indre-et-Loire, Indre, La Vienne, Les Deux-Sèvres, and Maine-et-Loire. In his account to the prefects within the ninth army corps, General Gallifet, as responsible commander admitted that there had been a few incidents during the expulsion of Jesuits, but these were due to misunderstandings between the civil and military authorities and the inexperience of implementing a requisition of troops.

military authorities for a possible requisition of troops.95 When troops were requested in a panic, the requisitions came from the local civil authorities and went directly to the local garrisons, and not, as was usually the case, as an order from the division general or the army corps commander. As a result, a certain number of local commanders found an occasion to be difficult about the formalities in the requisitions, thus postponing or impeding the mobilisation of troops. Discipline was restored when the senior commanders turned the requisition into military orders. However, the general governor of Paris, General Davignon, had difficulties making his subordinate officers obey. Other generals like Brugière and Jourdy - though resentful against the government for requesting the soldiers to perform the role as simple labourers,96 - were above all horrified by the lack of discipline among the lower ranking officers.97

95 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12399, ‘Culte Catholique: Inventaires, 1905-1907.’ No mention of military requisition occurs in the instructions from the minister of the interior to the prefects until February 1906, after several violent confrontations in January between demonstrators and public forces. In a ministerial circular from 25 February 1906, the minister of the interior for the first time recommended the use of military troops in order to accomplish the inventories.

96 “En quittant l’Elysée, je vais au ministère de la guerre et je parle au ministre des incidents de Saint-Servain. Je lui dis que je ne comprends pas qu’on se serve de l’armée pour enfoncer les portes des églises, que ce travail doit être fait par des ouvriers payés et que l’armée doit seulement les protéger.” General Brugière “Mes mémoires, 1841-1914” vol.6 (no pagination) unpublished memoirs. Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 K 160 / 1 Kmi 46.

97 “En tout cas, il est inadmissible qu’un officier général ne puisse pas se faire obéir par trois de ses subordonnés. Le général Davignon aurait dû donner lui-même l’ordre aux sapeurs d’exécuter le travail prescrit et faire comprendre au préfet et au sous-préfet qu’il ne fallait pas recommencer cette affaire.” General Brugière ‘Mes mémoires, 1841-1914’ vol.6 (no pagination) unpublished memoirs. Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 K 160 / 1 Kmi 46.
General Millet - himself a Protestant - accepted the disobedience from the local commanders on the grounds of professional honour.98

Confronted with important demonstrations and with these obstructions from local military commanders and individual officers, the government had to give up the inventories, at least for some months. Eight months later, from the 19-23 November 1906, the inventories were accomplished. Again this took place with a massive display of military force. However, this time, the campaign was carefully planned in cooperation with the army corps commanders. A circular from the War Ministry informed the army corps commanders already on the 15 November about the forthcoming action.99 The requisitions sent from the prefects were pre-printed so that no doubt could arise about their legality, about the role of the military troops, or about the number of soldiers to be mobilised. The inventories were carried out within only four days, early in the morning, so that there was no time for demonstrators to mobilise significant opposition. Similarly, due to the involvement of the army corps commanders in the procedure of requisition, this time there were no problems of obstruction from local commanders or individual officers.

8.3.3. Organisational dependence on the army organisation and increasing dynamics in bureaucratic procedures

From the turn of the century onwards, the civil administration came to rely increasingly on assistance from the military organisation in situations of great and minor unrest. This was not only because the army was an indispensable part of the strategies elaborated in the plans for protection. Between the late 1890s and the outbreak of the First World War, the French army became an indispensable factor in the


99 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C./2.I.335, 'Inventaires des Eglises 1906.' Letter of 15 November 1906 from the war minister to the army corps commanders.
implementation of the governmental policies by performing a variety of functions, both military and non-military.

In situations when strikes threatened to paralyse the entire society or impede the continuous work in the wider industrial sector, the army was used to fulfil non-military tasks thus ensuring the continuous functioning of public utilities and industries that were not involved in the conflict. Therefore, it became increasingly difficult to distance the army from the management of internal crisis. During the process of continuous cooperation, a series of formal barriers which should have ensured the separation of the military organisation from the civilian sectors of the state were transformed or undermined for the sake of efficient co-operation. Similarly, certain measures conceived for a state of emergency were kept in force for years in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, thus installing a permanent state of semi-military rule.

8.3.4. The break-down of formal barriers between the civil and military branches of the state

After the turn of the century, certain aspects of the army was even adjusted to fit its internal functions rather than pointed towards the defence of the national borders. This too was a new development. In 1898, the War Ministry had vigorously rejected suggestions from the civil administration that it should establish permanent military posts in certain turbulent areas in order to ensure efficient military assistance in urgent need.100 The argument by the war minister was that garrisons were to be established solely according to the strategic needs of the defence of the national borders. Thus, garrisons could not be established with considerations for the needs of the civil authorities for efficient assistance. Nevertheless, five years later, in 1903, a new garrison was established in the industrial area of the département Nord. This time, the

100 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, ‘Grèves: Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de fer’. Letter of 10 November 1898 from the war minister to the minister of the interior concerning a suggestion from the prefect of the Eastern Pyrenees.
minister of the interior and the prefect openly admitted that the location of the garrison was primarily due to considerations of military assistance in cases of strikes.\textsuperscript{101}

In addition to the practical dependence of the civil administration on the army, it is worthwhile to look at how the institutional demarcation between the realms of the civil administration and the military was gradually perforated between 1900 and 1914 for the sake of efficient co-operation. This was particularly relevant in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, but was in fact a phenomenon taking place in many areas of France. Ralston mentions that in the French state during the Third Republic, the army and the civilian sectors of the state had their particular spheres of competence, which were respected by the other.\textsuperscript{102} This could be said about the civil-military relations in many Western states, including the German Empire. Nevertheless, between 1890 and 1914 in France the separation of the 'civil' and the 'military' realms became significantly less clear-cut than it was in Prussia. Although the French army was left with a high degree of autonomy when it came to strictly technical military issues,\textsuperscript{103} the successive governments respected increasingly less the particular nature of the army as a separate institution primarily responsible for the sole task of defending the national territory against an exterior enemy.

There were a series of aspects to the perforation of the line of demarcation between the realm of the civil and the military. One of the key elements, as we have seen, was a slight change in decision making between the civil and military authorities, so that civil authorities had influence over the means and measures implemented by the army when called upon for internal peacekeeping, whilst the military authorities obtained influence over decisions about the conditions under which troops could be requested by the civil authorities. Thus, joint decision making gave influence to both civil and military authorities on matters from which they were formally excluded.

\textsuperscript{101} National Archives, Paris, F.7.12780, '4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Grève générale des mineurs'. Letter from the Prefect of the North to the minister of the interior, Combes, of 20 March 1903.
\textsuperscript{103} This is Ralston's main conclusion. Ralston (1967) p.373.
On the other hand, one can observe an increasing tendency by the civil authorities to leave powers and decision making to the military commander, a move that was not foreseen in the formal distribution of powers. Similarly, the instructions concerning the requisition of military assistance formulated in 1903, 1905 and 1907 broke down a series of formal barriers that were meant to confine the army within strict institutional boundaries. In the first place, the procedures were simplified so that the military commander could start mobilising the troops as soon as he received the telegram requesting this from a civil authority. The simplification of the procedures around the requisition of the army and the increasingly easy access to military assistance that followed were all undertaken for the sake of ‘efficiency’.

Another most significant example of the breakdown of institutional barriers was the elimination - in part at least - of the distinction between a ‘state of normality’ and a ‘state of emergency’ through the permanent opening of the right to so-called ‘military requisition.’ Not to be confused with the right of the civil authorities to request military assistance, the ‘military requisition’ was the military authorities’ right to demand food supplies and accommodation from the local population during periods of mobilisation. This right was to be ‘opened’ by the war minister, either for the entire national territory or for particular départements, arrondissements or municipalities. In principle, the right to military requisition was supposed to be opened only in the case of a general mobilisation.

During the strike wave in Nord-Pas-de-Calais of the early 1890s, with troubles taking place in various local communities over a vast territory, military troops had to be moved around quickly according to the development of the crisis. In this situation, the formal opening of the right to military requisition was a serious practical problem that could delay the quick installation of soldiers. During the long miners’ strikes of 1891 and 1893, the right to ‘military requisition’ was granted exceptionally to the troops

106 This was defined by the law of July 3 1877 on military requisition.
which were called out in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.\textsuperscript{107} By the turn of the century, use of the right to military requisition during operation within the national territory was already a well-established procedure. It had become customary, to provide the right to military requisition for several \textit{arrondissements} or the entire \textit{département}. Thus, the plans for protection from 1901 operated with military requisition as the basis for accommodation and provisions for men and horses. During the miners' strikes of 1901 and 1902, the right to military requisition was first opened for a period of two weeks, and was then supposed to be prolonged by the war minister if the conflict continued.\textsuperscript{108} After the general miners' strike of 1902, the minister of war, General André, recognised that the formal procedures regarding military requisitions still impeded the efficient mobilisation and installation of troops. He therefore sent pre-printed forms, with his signature, to the commanding generals of all the divisions as well as to the commanders of the sub-divisions and the garrisons.\textsuperscript{109} Thereafter, it was up to the local commanders to insert the date if there was a need to prolong the right to military requisition. This step was taken for purely practical reasons, and with the full blessing of the civil authorities and the Ministry of the Interior.

However, the third and final step in the break down of the formal distinction between a 'state of normality' and a 'state of emergency' was yet to come. In December 1904, the army corps commander in Lille reported to the prefect of the \textit{département} Nord that there had been no occasion to formally end the right to military requisition which had been opened for the entire \textit{département} on the 12 February 1904 and then prolonged throughout the year. However, by each prolongation of the right to requisition this had to be publically announced in all municipalities concerned. This practice was becoming annoying. General Laplace therefore suggested to the prefect that the right to military requisition should be opened permanently for the entire region.

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\bibitem{107} Departmental Archives, Arras, M.4865, 'Grève générale dans le bassin houillers 1891. Documents divers'. Letter of 18 November 1891 War Minister Freycinet to the army corps commander in Lille.
\bibitem{108} Departmental Archives, Arras, M.4862, 'Grève générale dans le bassin houiller 1893. Renseignements, Instructions, correspondance.' Letter of 18 September 1893 from the prefect of Pas-de-Calais to the minister of the interior.
\bibitem{109} National Archives, Paris, F.7.12780, '4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale: Grève générale des mineurs'.
\bibitem{109} Copies of these can be found in the Departmental Archives, Lille, M.626 /43, 'Réquisitions militaires, 1902'.
\end{thebibliography}
of Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Given the high frequency of mobilisation of troops in the region, together with the nuisance and delay that this formality caused to an efficient and quick mobilisation of troops, the prefect of the département Nord agreed with the army corps commander to ask their respective ministers to allow a permanent opening of the military right to requisition. This was granted by the government without further comment, so for the following years, each 1 January, the war minister formally opened the right to military requisition for the entire year. Similar provisions were made for the département Pas-de-Calais after the great strikes in the spring of 1906. By a ministerial decree of 17 December 1910, this practice was extended to the all French départements. Thus for year after year, the entire region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, and after 1910 all French départements, were - with respect to this particular aspect - in a permanent state of emergency.

8.3.5. The non-military functions of the army

Another significant example of the inter-penetration between the realms of the civil authorities and the military within the French system was that the army performed a series of non-military functions, in particular the use of soldiers to undertake strikebound work. The idea of using soldiers for such purposes had already arisen in the 1870s, when the war minister allowed conscript soldiers, who were bakers in their civil lives, to be ordered to provide the bread necessary in the event of a strike among

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112 Archives de Vincennes : 1.A.C./2.I.325, ‘Grèves. Dispositions à prendre, 1902-1909’ Letter of 30 October 1906 to the army corps commander in Lille. “Pour éviter, à l'avenir, ces difficultés (je) vous demande qu'il soit pris pour le Pas-de-Calais une décision identique à celle du 28 décembre 1904 précité et que le droit de réquisition ouvert pour ce département le 18 Mars 1906 ne soit pas fermé”

113 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 115, ‘Mesures à prendre en vue d'assurer le maintien de l'ordre public notamment en cas de grève 1893-1918’. Note of 12 April 1912 from the General Staff of the War Ministry “D'après la circulaire du 17 Décembre 1910, le Ministre signe chaque année au mois de Décembre un arrêté ouvrant le droit de réquisition dans chaque corps d'armée.”
the bakers in Paris. The aim was to ward off the most detrimental effects of strikes in the most essential professions. Several examples of this use of soldiers to undertake strikebound work were justified with reference to the interests of wider society.

However, once a precedent had been made for this use of soldiers, the same justification was all too easy to apply to the conflicts where the object was not so much to defend the interests of wider society, but to the interests of the state as an employer during labour conflicts which public employees, or when specific skills were needed to enforce the policies of the government.

The most inventive use of the army organisation occurred in October 1910, when rail workers from entire France went on strike. Instead of sending soldiers from the engineers to ensure basic services, as had been done by the rail strike of 1898, the legislation on military service was used to prevent at least some of the rail employees from going on strike. Rail workers who were placed in the reserve of the army were called upon for military service, only to be sent back to work in order to ensure the basic functioning of the railway service. By this procedure, the rail workers were placed under military legislation which meant that they could be court-martialed, if they failed to turn up for work. This type of measure had already been suggested in the first major strike among rail workers twelve years earlier. In 1898, there had been discussions both within government and among legal specialists about the possibility of

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114 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, "Instructions ministérielles; plans de protection, jurisprudence; emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914". Letter of 8 May 1876 from war minister General Cissey to the army corps commanders.

115 In 1889, soldiers were used during a strike among bakers in Marseilles; In 1891, the soldiers were called to substitute for gas workers in a factory in Le Havre; In December 1903, soldiers and military ovens were used when the bakers in Lille went on strike the day before Christmas. Military Archive, Vincennes, I.A.C./2.1.331. On the 8 March 1907, a general strike among electricians made the Parisians experience an evening without light. When the electricians wanted to repeat the success in October 1910, the authorities had long prepared themselves for this eventuality, and called out the engineers to ensure the continuous functioning of the Parisian power stations. (Rolande Trempé (1995) p.323).

116 The plans from 1897 concerning a nation-wide strike of the rail personnel were primarily aimed to protect the railways and to ensure the basic service with soldiers from the engineers. Similarly, in May 1899, during the first major strike among post employees, soldiers were used to distribute the mail. The same measures were implemented during the strike among postal workers in 1906 and in March and May 1909. (Rolande Trempé (1995) p.323).

117 During the establishment in 1906 of the inventories over the possessions of the Catholic Church, conscript soldiers who were locksmiths in their civil life were used to give access to the churches which were being locked by the local clergy.
breaking a rail strike through use of the military legislation, and the ways in which such a measure could be implemented within the boundaries of the recruitment laws of 15 July 1889.\textsuperscript{118} Although there were still doubts in 1910 about the legal validity of such a procedure, this measure was now used without further discussion.

As these examples show, the use of the French army went far beyond simple requisition of troops in cases of urgent need to restore order. The army increasingly became an integrated part of the strategies that the government or the prefectoral authority could use to implement their policies. The procedures of co-operation with the military authorities were characterised by a high degree of institutional formalisation and practical organisation. This made the functioning of military assistance extremely efficient. On the other hand, it bound the civil administration to strategies that relied on the army since all existing plans for internal conflicts operated with military assistance from the very beginning of a conflict.

8.4. Concluding remarks: The consequences of the institutionalisation of administrative procedures governing the civil-military co-operation

The use of the army to help the civil forces maintain public order in France was, particularly for the major conflicts of the first decade of the twentieth century, argued to be justified by the number of people involved and the great potential for violence. However, the move towards the use of the army to deal with labour conflicts had already been begun in the early 1890s, when the size of the conflicts - both in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and in generally in France - did not require such measures.

The plans for protection created the basis for efficient civil-military co-operation in internal peacekeeping by 1) defining the types of conflicts to which the army could or would be called; 2) setting standards for the number of troops agreed to be an appropriate reply for major conflicts; and 3) creating a permanent forum where the prefects, the Ministries, and other bodies concerned could meet with the relevant military commanders in informal discussions about their problems and needs in a situation of crisis. When the first plans for protection were established in 1897, the aim was not maintenance of order, but defence of a communication and transport system which was of clear military interest. However, by the first large-scale strikes in France between 1900 and 1902, there was already a strong precedent for calling out the army and thus decision makers considered that military involvement was an appropriate response to internal unrest. At the same time, there was a well-developed organisation and civil-military co-operation that made the requisition of military troops an easy, efficient, and relatively cheap measure to implement.

Parallel to this, and partly as a consequence of the intensified exchange between civil and military authorities, the border between the realm of civil and military affairs was slightly modified towards to make non-military use of the army easier. The result was significantly closer co-operation between the civil and the military authorities. Both the increasingly frequent calls upon the army and the use of troops for even minor cases of potential unrest, as well as the use of soldiers to perform non-military tasks must be seen as a result of this well functioning inter-institutional co-operation. The French
authorities thus seemed to be stuck in what in organisational theory is known as a competency trap.\textsuperscript{119} The highly sensitive political and social situation in France during the first decade of the century left little space for experiments to be made in terms of crisis management. At the same time, the effectiveness of the civil-military cooperation made it difficult and dangerous to change the policy and adopt strategies that involved a high risk of losing control.

In relation to the military leaders, the issue of maintenance of public order allowed the general commanders influence over matters that concerned them directly. The pre-established agreements also prevented obstruction by military commanders against the frequent use of the army by integrating them into the decision-making process. On the other hand, once a military commander had agreed to the basic principles in the plans of protection, it became more difficult for his successors to break this pattern, even if they might have thought in individual cases that military assistance was not strictly necessary.

Moreover, the co-operation in plans for protection linked the military establishment more closely to other sectors of the state. Civil-military co-operation on the issue of maintenance of public order thereby helped to re-integrate the army into the state after the disruption created by the Dreyfus affair. Despite protests from various parts of the military complex and from individual officers, one cannot overlook the willing cooperation by the general commanders involved in the planning and execution of domestic military interventions. Maintenance of public order was a practical issue on which a fundamental consensus could be established between civil servants and military commanders. Despite their dissimilar commitments to the Republican regime, both groups were determined to defend the existing social and political order against challenge from revolutionary or socialist movements.

\textsuperscript{119} March & Olsen (1989) p.63.
Chapter Nine. Civil-military relations in Westphalia: Two mutually separated bodies.

In his article on the attitude of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior towards the domestic use of troops, Hansjoachim Henning stresses two features which were central to the relationship between the Ministry of the Interior and the senior military commanders after 1889.1 The first, as we have seen, was the determination of the civil administration to take over all responsibility for internal peacekeeping and the following exclusion of the army from this type of issue. The second feature was the lack of appropriate preparation by the army authorities for a mass strike and inability of the relevant military commanders to respond adequately to this type of challenge.

The features described by Henning concerning the 1889 strike were equally characteristic of the military intervention in the general miners' strike of 1912. In order to understand the move in Prussia towards 'de-militarisation' of internal peacekeeping, it is important to pay attention to the relationship between the civil administration and the military authorities and especially the commitment of the former to detach themselves from dependence on military assistance. It also helps to explain why the Prussian military authorities - unlike their French counterparts - did not adapt themselves to the challenges of large-scale unrest, but were equally unprepared and inadequate in 1912 as they had been in 1889.

In comparison with Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the case of Westphalia reveals that, contrary to what happened in France, the Prussian system did not develop strong inter-institutional links between the state administration and the army organisation. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, a set of informal rules was established for civil-military co-operation in the maintenance of public order, in the case of Westphalia these factors were lacking.

1 Hansjoachim Henning (1987) pp.140-145
This chapter presents an analysis of the relations between the state administration and the army corps commanders in Westphalia. It will point out a series of features that characterised the civil-military relations:

- the infrequent and slow communication between the state administration and the military authorities (9.1);
- the tendency of civil-military co-operation to develop into strict distribution of tasks (9.2);
- the lack of co-operated planning or co-ordination of civil and military plans (9.3); and
- the general unhelpfulness of the military authorities towards the needs of the state administration (9.4).

The chapter argues that, in comparison with the case of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the inter-institutional exchange between the state administration and the army corps commanders was a slow and difficult process. This had two consequences which will be analysed in the section 9.5. In the first place, due to infrequent implementation of measures that involved the army, the procedures used in one military intervention would not create a precedent for later cases. During their entire period in office, the majority of the senior civil servants and army corps commanders only experienced co-operation with their counterpart once, if at all. Accordingly, no precedents developed defining the details of the procedure and the distribution of duties and responsibilities between the civil and the military authorities.

Secondly, the Prussian civil and military authorities did not co-operate in establishing plans of protection for situations of major unrest. In France, the plans for protection formalised a series of details concerning procedures, distribution of powers, and the strategies to be implemented. No equivalent existed in Prussia. Each time the army was called upon, the details of the civil-military relationship had to be negotiated whilst the crisis was developing. Equally, there was general confusion about lines of communication and authority, and most of all financial responsibility for a military intervention had to be negotiated on each occasion. As a result of these factors, calling
for the army in Prussian implied a significant degree of uncertainty for state administrators as well as for military commanders.

The chapter concludes that, although the civil-military co-operation during the three cases of intervention in 1889, in 1899, and in 1912 did not give rise to important conflicts between the civil and military authorities and that in general the military authorities closely followed the wishes of the civil administration, the state administration in Westphalia could not rely upon the support and good-will of the military establishment. Given that the call for military assistance was connected with a significant degree of uncertainty and factors that the state administration could no control, it preferred to deal with public unrest, even with a significant potential for violence and riots, without calling for military assistance.

9.1. Lines of communication: the low level of civil-military correspondence and co-operation

9.1.1. The demands for civil-military co-operation

Like their French counterparts, the Prussian authorities were supposed to work together, and sustain each other in order to safeguard the interests of the state in terms of keeping internal peace, and providing the military with a good base in local society for its needs in terms of recruits, food and material. The principle of mutual support, stated in the Cabinet Orders of October 29 1819 and October 17 1820, was often mentioned by War Minister Verdy du Vernois in his instructions to the army corps commanders,2 in the service regulations of 1899 issued from the War Ministry,3 and

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3 ‘Dienstvorschrift über den Waffengebrauch des Militärs’ (1899) (II,1) “Die Allerhöchsten Ordres vom 29 Oktober 1819 und 17.Oktober 1820 schreiben vor, dass Militär- und Civilbehörden sich gegenseitig Mittheilungen in erheblichen polizeilichen Angelegenheiten zu machen haben. Wenn also Verhältnisse und Vorgänge eintreten, welche die öffentliche Ruhe bedrohende Auftritte vorausschen lassen, so sind die Truppenbefehlshaber, insbesondere die Festungskommandanten und der älteste kommandierende Offizier im Orte verpflichtet, den Gang der Ereignisse scharf zu beobachten und die nöthigen Vorbereitungen zu treffen. Es kommt hierbei vor Allem darauf an, die Organisation der Auführer kennen zu lernen und die Namen der Führer festzustellen.”
again by war minister von Heeringen in 1910. The Prussian legislation also defined a series of situations in which the armed forces could be requested by the civil authorities to perform a series non-military functions, in case of natural disaster (flood, fire, hurricane) or to assist in the search for missing persons (victims of accidents or crime, or escaped criminals), - duties that were not essentially different from those defined by the French legislation.

Despite these repeated demands for co-operation and exchange of relevant information, the state administration and the military authorities in Westphalia showed a much lower degree of inter-institutional connection than was the case in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. The strict separation of the civil and military authorities was equally rooted in the formal distribution of powers. The very same paragraph that pleaded for exchange of information also stated that the civil authorities alone were in charge of all questions concerning maintenance of order until the moment of requisition of troops. After this point in time, the military authorities would be in charge of all relevant decisions. This was essentially not different from the provisions in French legislation until the 1907. However, the difference lay in the practical functioning of civil-military co-operation in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and in Westphalia: in particular that the Prussian authorities - both the civil and the military - were very concerned with maintaining the integrity of their authority. Moreover, there was not, as in France, a strong interministerial linkage at the governmental level that could impose practical co-operation from above.

4 Münster HaStA: OP 6095 ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hilfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 103) Circular of 24 May 1910 from the war minister to the army corps commanders.
6 Decree of 4 October 1891 ‘Portant règlement sur le service des places de guerre et de villes ouvertes.’ Article 63.
7 'Dienstvorschrift über den Waffengebrauch des Militärs' (1899) (II,1) Again with reference to the Cabinet Orders of 29 October 1819 and of 17 October 1820 the service regulations state “Es bleibt jedoch zunächst die Pflicht der Civilbehörde, mit ihr zu Gebote stehenden Polizeikräften solche Unordnungen in ihrem Entstehen zu unterdrücken und die Ruhe zu erhalten, und so lange steht auch ihr allein die Anordnung und Leitung der Massregeln zu.”
Accordingly, whilst inter-institutional correspondence in the French system went in 'circular' lines between the French central and regional authorities (the French minister of the interior communicated continuously with the War Ministry and with the prefects, and both these authorities communicated regularly with the army corps commander), the lines of communications within the Prussian system primarily took place separately within each bureaucratic organisation: The Ministry of the Interior corresponded with the province and district governors, the War Ministry communicated with the army corps commanders, but little correspondence was exchanged between the two ministries.

9.1.2. Low levels of exchange of information between civil and military authorities

At the governmental level, the exchange of information between the Ministry of the Interior and the War Ministry was occasional. Most of the communications were issued by the Ministry of the Interior informing the War Ministry about activities that might concern the army. The War Ministry was given information mainly to prevent it from being obstructive. The minister of the interior was not in a position of authority in relation to the war minister, and the War Ministry was very jealous of its prominent position within government, insisting on the secret nature of most of its activities.8 Within the Prussian government, neither the minister of the interior nor the Ministerpräsident were in a position to force the War Ministry to participate in inter-ministerial co-operation.

At the regional level, the exchange of information between the prefects and the army corps commander was occasional and slow. The low degree of day-to-day information from the civil authorities to the military authorities about the problems of maintenance of order in the industrial areas was an important factor because the army corps commander in Münster was already much less informed than was his counterpart in Lille; in contrast to the French military commander, the Prussian army corps

8 Several examples of this attitude exists on issues such as the revision of the legislation applying to military officers, the question of political responsibility of the War Ministry, and the parallel diplomacy of the military attachés. Craig (1955) pp.241-250, Deist (1991) pp.20-24.
commander did not get day-to-day information through the gendarmerie about the state of affairs in his military region, since the Prussian gendarmerie only reported to the civil authorities and to the War Ministry. The army corps commander's main source of information about the state of affairs in local communities within his military region was provided by the garrison commanders. However, garrisons were deliberately placed in rural areas, so that, for instance, there was no permanent military unit in the entire district of Arnsberg, which was traditionally one of the main centres of labour unrest in the Ruhr area. The army corps commander of Westphalia was himself based very far from the industrial centres in a very quiet provincial town surrounded by rural areas. He could therefore easily ignore the minor and medium-sized conflicts that took place in the industrial areas around the River Ruhr.

When it came to exchanges of information between the state administration and the military authorities about their professional activities, a pattern of mutual exclusion can be observed. The civil administration was not informed about military preparations and seemed not to know whether military plans existed at all. In the cases where the civil administration was informed about the existence of decrees from the War Ministry to the army corps commanders, the military authorities would insist on the secret nature of these communications and could be very reluctant about providing details to the civil administration.

For their part, the state administration excluded the military authorities from information about the protection plans elaborated in co-operation with local authorities. The province governor of the Rhine Province even forbade his subordinates to provide information to the military authorities about the details of civil

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9 The development of detailed plans for the case of domestic military intervention entirely depended on the initiative of the individual army corps commander and his general staff, and it seems that the majority of army corps did not have any plans. Even for an area such as Westphalia with a high potential of extended labour conflicts, the only formal military planning until 1907 seem to be the instructions and the very general plans developed by General von Albedyll during the 1889 strike.

10 This was the case with the circular letter of 8 February 1912 from the war minister to the army corps commanders entitled Verwendung von Truppen zur Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen. Copies of these recommandations about the role of the army in case of greater unrest were only given to the Ministry of the Interior in June 1913. Münster HaStA: OP 6095/‘Notstandsmaßnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 204; 206-213).
planning.11 In questions concerning the management of public order, the normal procedure was that whenever dealing with issues that would involve the army, issues would first be discussed at length between the Ministry of the Interior and the province and district governors.12 They would then - if relevant - be presented to administrative and police authorities at the local level. Only when all details were settled between the various civil authorities would the army corps commander be contacted.13

9.1.3. The slow pace of civil-military correspondence

The low degree of civil-military interchange becomes clear when considering the time it took for correspondence to move from the left wing of the Münster castle, which housed the offices of the province governor, to the right wing of the castle, where the army corps commander was based. In July 1904, six months before the outbreak of the miners' strike of 1905, a meeting was held by the district governor in Düsseldorf. Present at the meeting were the local governors within the Düsseldorf district and the city mayors from Mülheim-an-der-Ruhr and from Oberhausen. The meeting was concerned with the measures to be taken in case of a major miners' strike, and one of the items on the agenda was the issue of to whom each local authority was to address its requisition in the case an immediate call for military assistance became necessary.14

After the meeting, the district governor in Düsseldorf presented the matter to the minister of the interior. His suggestions were then sent from the Ministry of the Interior to the province governor of Westphalia on the 31 August 1904,15 who also

12 For instance, the military authorities to whom requisitions were to be addressed; accommodation for soldiers and horses in case of requisition of troops; use of military horses for external police officers and gendarmes called to the area in case of great unrest; details concerning the persons to be arrested and the publishers houses to be closed by the army in case of a declaration of state of siege.
13 In the wake of the 1889 strikes the discussions about how to organise accommodation and provisions for soldiers and horses during future requisition of military troops took place between the province and district governors with the Ministry of the Interior. The issue was discussed at length between the civil authorities before presented to the military commanders in Westphalia and the Rhine Province. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, HA1 - Rep.77 - Title 2513,1) Beiheft 5 'Die Entsendung von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1890'. (documents 90-104).
received a communication concerning the same issue from his colleague in the Rhine Province, the province to which the Düsseldorf district belonged. The recommendation from the minister was that the two province governors should contact the military authorities within their respective province. Instead, the province governor of the Rhine Province advised his colleague to discuss these suggestions with the district governors of his province, and not to contact the military authorities until the issue was fully negotiated between the different sections of the state administration.

From September 1904 onwards, there was a substantial correspondence between the province governor of Westphalia debating the issue with the district governors in Arnsberg and Münster, as well as with the local governors in the industrial areas. By the end of December 1904, the civil authorities in the Rhine Province had reached an agreement and developed a plan deciding the military commanders to whom the local authorities were supposed to address their requisitions in case of extreme urgency. It was now ready to be presented to the army corps commander in Coblenz.

Matters did not even move that quickly in Westphalia, where the district governor in Arnsberg, in particular, had problems in administratively confirming the right of the local authorities to address requisitions to the nearest garrison. Then came the great

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18 Between the 5 and the 15 October 1904, the issue was thoroughly debated with the local authorities of the counties of Bechem, Borken, Coesfeld, Lüdinghausen, Münster, Recklinghausen, Steinfurt, Tecklenburg, Warendorf. Münster Ha.StA, Regierung Münster, VII-52 Vol. 1/ 39-2, ‘Arbeitsausstellung und Streiks 1904-1911’ (documents 87-97).


miners’ strike in January 1905, which made the province governor reconsider whether it would be wise to recommend requisition at the local level. Whilst still pondering this question, the province governor of the Rhine Province recommended to his colleague in Münster not to present the issue to the military authorities until the civil administration in both provinces had reached a final decision.21 Towards the end of the year 1905, the province governor of the Rhine Province contacted his colleague again, and declared that he had now informed the army corps commander in Coblenz and invited the Westphalian province governor to do likewise.22

The issue of determining to whom local authorities were to address their requisitions in case of immediate urgency had now been the object of intensive correspondence among the different sections of the state administration in two provinces for more than sixteen months. Nevertheless, the military commander in Münster was not contacted until the end of March 1906,23 after the province governor of the Rhine Province had once again asked his colleague to present the issue to the commander of the seventh military region.24 Twenty months had passed since the minister of the interior had asked the two province governors to contact their respective army corps commanders on this matter.

It would have saved a great deal of time and ink, had the Westphalian province governor contacted the army corps commander at an earlier stage, for it turned out that General von Bissing shared the viewpoint of Province Governor von der Recke that requisitions were not supposed to be issued at all by local authorities to local commanders. General von Bissing, who insisted on his own right to command was

21 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, 'Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929' (document 63). Letter of 20 April 1905 from the province governor of the Rhine Province to the province governor of Westphalia.
24 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, 'Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929'. Letter of 7 March 1906 from the province governor of the Rhine Province to the province governor of Westphalia.
strongly opposed to the idea that troops could be moved unless on his explicit order.\textsuperscript{25} However, the discussion continued. Over the summer of 1906, the province governor of Westphalia corresponded with the minister of the interior explaining that he and General von Bissing agreed that requisitions should only pass to the army corps commander through the province governor.\textsuperscript{26} Only in October 1906 did the province governor inform General von Bissing of the response from the minister of the interior: hence, there would be no question of formally deciding the lines of communication between civil and military authorities at the local level, even for the case of emergency.\textsuperscript{27} It was now more than two years after the issue had first been raised by the district governor in Düsseldorf.

This correspondence is interesting because it shows how a relatively minor issue could be discussed over a very long time, and indicates the heaviness and complications linked to the inter-institutional co-operation between the state administration and the military command. What is surprising is the lack of bureaucratic exchange of information, when one considers that the province governor of Westphalia and the army corps commander resided in the left and the right wing of the Münster castle respectively. Moreover, this correspondence took place before, during and after the great miners' strike of January 1905 when requisition of military troops was extensively discussed within the state administration. Even this important event did not seem to hurry the correspondence about making civil-military co-operation more effective.

This example of slow correspondence was not uncommon. Nor does it seem to be specific to the area of Westphalia, since examples of infrequent communication even on important matters have been found in other provinces.\textsuperscript{28} Even information about the

\textsuperscript{25} Münster HaStA, OP 6095, 'Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929' (document 71). Letter of 6 April 1906 from general von Bissing, commander in Münster, to the province governor of Westphalia.
\textsuperscript{26} Münster HaStA, OP 6095 'Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929' (document 75-79).
\textsuperscript{27} Münster HaStA, OP 6095, 'Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929' (document 80). Letter of 16 October 1906 from the army corps commander in Münster General von Bissing to the province governor.
\textsuperscript{28} In October 1903, the local governor in Welten, near Potsdam, asked the local garrison commander to keep troops in a state of preparedness for the case of a local strike deteriorating into riots. Without
most important measures taken within the military organisation could take a significant
time before reaching the relevant civil authorities. The decree of War Minister von
Heeringen of 8 February 1912\(^9\) - one of the few guidelines defining the army's role in
domestic peacekeeping - was only released to the Ministry of the Interior in June 1913,
fifteen months after it had been presented to the army corps commanders.\(^{30}\) Not only
did the state administration not know the details of military planning, but in most cases
they even failed to know whether the military authorities had made any plans or
preparation at all for the case of a military intervention in a situation of greater unrest.
When the instructions developed by General von Bissing for military intervention in the
industrial areas of Westphalia became public in 1910, the existence of these plans was
as much a surprise to the state administration as to the wider public.\(^{31}\)

9.2. Elements of civil-military communication

If the civil and military authorities only communicated occasionally, what did they
communicate and co-operate about? Apart from a few practical issues of the police
forces and *gendarmerie* officers borrowing equipment from the local garrison,\(^{32}\) the
main topic of civil-military correspondence was the measures to be taken against

informing the civil authorities, the military commander requested a train from the local rail company maintained with steam power (*unter dampf*) to be ready day and night to transport the troops. Only after one month did the military authorities ask the local governor whether he still needed troops to be held in a state of preparedness. The local governor had apparently forgot that he had asked for troops to be held in a state of preparedness and ignored that a train had been under steam day and night for more than a month. The final row arose when the rail company sent a bill at 1,200 Mark that both the military and the civil authorities refused to pay. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin - Dahlem, H.A.1. - Rep.77. Titel 251,1) Beiheft 9, 'Die Entsendung von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1901-1905' (documents 63-73).

\(^9\) Münster HaStA, OP 6095, 'Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hilfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929' (document 206-213). Decree of 8 February 1912 entitled 'Verwendung von Truppen zur Unterdrückung innere Unruhen'.

\(^{30}\) Münster HaStA, OP 6095, 'Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hilfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929' (document 204). Letter of 28 June 1913 from the Ministry of the Interior to the province governors.

\(^{31}\) Central Archive, Potsdam III, R.43, film signature 12425-12426, 'Militärische massnahmen im Falle von Unruhen. Belagerungszustand 1890-1918.' It appears from the correspondence between the province governors and the chancellor on this issue that such military instructions were not known to the civil administration.

\(^{32}\) This correspondence concerned demands for allowing the local police to use military material - everything from horses to chloroform or electric lamps in case of interruption of street light during a night operation. This type of correspondence - mostly from after the turn of the century - was quite random and required nothing from the army corps commander except his formal acceptance.
subversive elements such as Social Democrats, Anarchists, and other politically suspect individuals or organisations.

9.2.1. The control of Social Democratic activities

A clear gap can be observed between the demands for civil-military co-operation as expressed by war minister Verdy du Vernois in 1890, and the actual division of labour between the state administration and the military authorities at the provincial level. Deist argues that the instructions from the War Minister Verdy du Vernois after the abolition of the laws against the Social Democracy in 1890 provided the general commanders with a role in domestic politics that they had never had before. However, even these measures against the Social Democrats, which were supposed to be an object of close civil-military co-operation, soon saw a strict distribution of tasks: whilst the civil authorities dealt with everything involving watching over the organisation and activities of the Social Democratic party, the military authorities were only concerned with the influence of Social Democratic ideas among recruits and reservists in the army.

Not only did the army corps commanders not participate in controlling the activities of the Social Democratic organisation in the local society, they also seemed to become less enthusiastic when it came to controlling and preventing the Social Democratic influence on the recruits and reservists. Year after year, the army corps commanders declared in their annual report to the War Ministry that they had not noticed any significant impact of Socialist ideas among the recruits and reservists. Only in 1910 did the commanders of the most industrialised areas admit that the influence of Social

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33 Instructions to the army corps commanders of March 22 1890. Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /466 'Bekämpfung socialdemokratischer Bestrebungen, 1890-1892 : Verbot und Bestrafung der Teilnahme an geheimen Verbindungen, öffentlichen Versammlungen und politischen Vereinen z.Z. des Sozialistengesetzes' or Central Archive, Potsdam III, R.43, film signature 12425-12426.
35 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /467-470, 'Bekämpfung socialdemokratischer und pazifistischer Bestrebungen, 1900-1912' mainly contains the yearly report from the army corps commanders. There are one or two pages for each army corps explaining in general terms that the men are motivated and that no strong sympathies for the social democracy can be traced.
Democratic ideas had become significant.36 It was as late as 1911 when the war minister informed the general commanders that for the first time, a significant influence of Socialist idea had been noticed among recruits and reservists.37

Even when army corps commanders began to note an increase in the Social Democratic sympathies among recruits and reservists and admitted that the attempts from the army to immunise and isolate the soldiers from Social Democratic agitation had been unsuccessful,38 several senior commanders began to argue that there was no reason for excluding these men from the military service since they most often proved loyal and disciplined soldiers.39 General von Haenisch, the commander of the fourth military region, went as far as to argue that the strong discipline among the members of the Social Democratic party actually made them very good soldiers.40 Even a hardliner such as von Waldersee did not consider the influx of Social Democrats into the army as being a problem for the time being, but he insisted on his right to discriminate between recruits and eliminate the few that he considered to be a potential problem.41

36 The third army corps (Berlin), sixth army corps (Silesia), seventh and eighth army corps (Westphalia and the Rhine Province), eleventh army corps (Kassel), and the eighteenth army corps (Frankfurt).
38 Since 1891 soldiers were forbidden to frequent certain shops and taverns because the shop-owner or inn keeper was known or suspected to have Social Democratic sympathies and to serve suspect customers. Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /467, 'Bekämpfung socialdemokratischer und pazifistischer Bestrebungen, 1900-1906'. The attempts in 1905 from General Eichhorn, army corps commander in Frankfurt, to expose the recruits to anti-Social Democrat propaganda were recognised in the following years as having little effect and might even have been counter-productive. Deist (1991) p.36; Messerschmidt (1980) p.70; Demeter (1965) p.172.
9.2.2. Establishment of lists of suspected subversive elements

The decree of war minister Verdy du Vernois also urged the commanding generals to remain continuously informed about politically suspect organisations, their local leaders, and their press.\textsuperscript{42} This information was supposed to be provided by the state administration which established lists of potentially subversive elements in the civil society, including lists of persons to be arrested and newspapers to be closed in case of a declaration of a state of siege. It appears, however, that these lists were not followed by an important amount of correspondence. Moreover, already by the turn of the century, the general commander was involved neither in the establishment of these ‘black-lists’, nor in the preparation of the measures to be implemented against these subversive elements in case of a situation of war. The ‘black-lists’ were elaborated by the police authorities, revised every six month, and sent by the province governor to the army corps commander.

In November 1912, the minister of the interior asked the province governor in Münster to make contact with the military authorities to establish lists of people to be arrested and publishing houses to be closed in case of a declaration of a state of siege due to general strikes. This was a significant extension of the system of ‘black-listing’ since the previous lists had only been concerned with people who would be ‘suspect’ in a situation of a general mobilisation in case of war.\textsuperscript{43} However, nothing came of this initiative because the military authorities were not interested in dealing with such a matter. The army corps commander in Münster, General von Einem, sent a quick reply to the province governor saying that it was unnecessary and a waste of time to send these lists of Social Democratic leaders and Anarchists to the military authorities. In case of a declaration of a state of siege due to internal unrest, it would be sufficient if these lists were made available by the local police authorities to the military


\textsuperscript{43} Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hilfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 190). Letter of 27 November 1912 from the minister of the interior to the province governor of Westphalia.
commanders. A similar wish was expressed by the army corps commander in Frankfurt when he was faced by the initiative from the ministry of the interior.

9.2.3. The detachment of the military from civilian matters

The increasing lack of interest of the military commanders in dealing with Social Democrats and other ‘subversive’ elements was linked to a wider attitude of detachment from dealing with day-to-day control of internal enemies of the Prussian state, and their desire to focus exclusively on foreign affairs and defence of the national borders. It is in this light that one has to see the dismissive attitude of General von Bissing towards the attempts from the civil administration to improve civil-military cooperation, notably in trying to determine the lines of communication between civil and military authorities at the local level. It was not that General von Bissing refused to imagine that the army could be engaged in civil conflicts: his instructions from 1907 shows that he saw this as a likely possibility. It was rather that he was unwilling to commit the army to enter into continuous relations with the state administration on any matter. The attitude of General von Bissing seems to be characteristic of the army corps commanders of the younger generation. Certainly, the helpfulness and attentiveness towards the civil administration varied depending on the army corps commander, and General von Bissing was known to be particularly difficult. General von Einem - a former war minister and far more politically minded than his predecessor - seemed to have a more courteous relationship with the province governor.


45 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, 'Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929' (document 187). Letter of 18 January 1913 from the province governor of Westphalia to the army corps commander in Frankfurt.

46 See Chapter Four.
However, the degree of civil-military co-operation and exchange of information was equally low under General von Einem as it had been under very detached commanders such as General von Bissing or General von Albedyll.

In addition to the low degree of co-operation and exchange of information with the civil authorities the military commanders adapted an attitude of strictly observing the borderline between the sphere of civil and military authorities. Early in March 1912, General von Einem sent a message to the province governor asking him how many copies of the ‘black-lists’ were available from the local police authorities in the province. Interestingly, General von Einem makes clear that the question was posed for purely military considerations for the hypothetical case of a declaration of war, and had no relation to the on-going labour dispute in the mining sector. The reason for General von Einem to emphasise the last point may have been to avoid his letter being considered an invitation to the civil authorities to call for military assistance. It may also have been a way of making clear that he was not trying to interfere or influence the province governor in his handling of the on-going general miners’ strike. This courteous avoidance of even touching upon the question of possible military intervention in an on-going labour dispute took place seven days before troops were mobilised for the most extended military intervention since 1889.

The comment also indicates that, even when major unrest was about to break out, communication between the civil and military authorities about possible military intervention was only initiated at the very moment when the civil forces had to give up attempts to operate alone and call for military assistance. It should also be noted that


48 The general strike only broke out on the 10 March, but a major labour dispute with a high degree of potential violence had been on its way since January.

49 Similarly, as late as two days before the intervention, the daily report of 11 March 1912 from the local governor in Lüdinghausen to the district governor in Münster reveals that among the various measures to be taken in this county, no provisions have been made for the possibility of a military intervention. Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, VII-14 Vol.5/ 37-3 ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912. Tagesberichte der Unterbehörden.’ (document 22).
this avoidance of touching upon the question of possible co-operation took place between a province governor and an army corps commander who otherwise claimed to have an excellent professional and personal relationship. This underlines the contrast with the practice of the French prefects of informing the military authorities weeks before a potential situation of tension.

Compared with the intensive exchange of information on the French side and the degree of practical co-operation about planning for the case of major strikes in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the slow and inefficient progress of discussions of the question concerning civil-military co-operation through the Prussian administrative machinery gives a very good impression of the difficulty of making the civil and military branches of the Prussian state work together at the regional level. Whereas there was intense exchange of views and information between the prefects and the army corps commander in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the lines of communication between these authorities were both slower and less direct in Prussia. Issues were first discussed at different levels within the state administration, and then only presented to the army corps commander at a very late stage. Whereas the civil and military authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais exchanged ideas and minor suggestions with each other, the suggestions presented by the civil administration in Westphalia to the military commander were generally substantial and very elaborate. The result was a much less frequent exchange of views and information than was the case in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.

9.3. Examples of lack of civil-military communication: Planning for major unrest

The pattern of mutual exclusion which can be observed for general types of civil-military communication becomes all the more obvious when looking at the process of
establishing plans for protection in the event of major unrest. In the case of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, much of the communication and exchange of information between civil and military authorities was linked to the establishment and up-dating of plans for protection. In Prussia, by contrast, the documents left behind by the Ministry of the Interior and the War Ministry which deal with plans for protection do not provide any evidence of civil-military co-operation on this issue. This also has to be seen in relation to the abundant documentation from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior concerning the establishment of nation-wide plans for distribution of available police and gendarmerie forces.51

For the Westphalian area, two types of plans existed for possible major unrest in the industrial area. First, there were the civil plans established by the province and district governors in co-operation with mayors and local police authorities. Second, there were the plans established by the general staff of the army corps commander. Before 1889, when most decisions concerning requisition of troops were taken between local authorities and local garrison commanders, the civil and military representatives would often meet to discuss the measures to be implemented and to address themselves jointly to the authorities in Berlin. As late as 1885, when a state of siege was declared in Bielefeld, the district governor had a meeting with the local garrison commander, the public prosecutor, and the city mayor of Bielefeld. It was these authorities who jointly decided to take the unusual step of declaring a state of siege.52


A completely different pattern appeared four years later during the great Westphalian miners' strike. The most important meeting was held in Dortmund on the 10 May 1889, five days after the military intervention. Practically all the authorities concerned with the maintenance of order were present at the meeting: the minister of the interior, von Herrfurth, the province governor of Westphalia, von Hagenmeister, the district governors of the three districts concerned (Münster, Arnsberg and Dortmund), the mining inspector, the city mayor of Dortmund, five local governors from the counties most concerned (Dortmund, Essen, Gelsenkirchen, Hörde, and Bochum), and finally the public prosecutors of Recklinghausen and Bochum. Despite the fact that the army was already involved and had taken supreme authority over the civil forces as well as the over military forces involved, and in spite of fact that the prospect of declaring a state of siege was discussed at length, there were no military representative at the meeting. The commanding general, von Albedyll, had handed over a copy of his instructions to the military commanders, mainly so that the civil authorities could know what the military would not do and expected the civil forces to deal with.

Right after the end of the strike, in July 1889, a second meeting was held in Essen in order to draw lessons from the crisis. Various representatives of the central government as well as municipal authorities participated. However, there was no representative from the army. Close co-operation between various civil authorities about planning and preparation of measures against internal unrest took place right up till 1914. Between 1889 and 1912 at least four conferences were held in the Ministry of the Interior at which the province governors discussed the organisation and distribution of the gendarmerie forces and the Royal Guards in case of major unrest in

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56 Under the presidency of von Berlepsch, governor of the Düsseldorf district, there were two local governors, the city mayor of Essen, and six counsellors from the mountain municipalities, and the assistant of the district governor.
the most turbulent areas. The nation-wide designation lists resulting from this inter-provincial co-operation were regularly updated and revised.\(^{57}\) Although the issues concerning the when and how to call for military troops in cases of major unrest, there was military participation by these meetings either.

Similarly, meetings were organised by the province or district governors with the participation of a series of local authorities. In the attempt to ‘de-militarise’ the task of internal peacekeeping, the state administration drew heavily upon the municipal police forces, which consisted of between a third and a half of the civil forces available. Accordingly, the mayors and local police authorities occupied a key role in the coordination of the different police organisations with the gendarmerie and the Royal Guards. In contrast to the case of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Westphalian municipal authorities were integrated into the negotiations to draw up protection plans for entire districts or provinces. Civil planning saw coordination of the civil forces available at the district as well as the provincial and national levels. The civil forces from an entire province might sent to the area of trouble, and plans existed at the national level whereby gendarmes and Royal Guards from the entire country could be moved to a district where major unrest was taking place.

Despite the commitment of the Prussian state administration to avoid requisition of troops, the complete exclusion of representatives from the military authorities is surprising since the idea of military intervention was never absent.\(^{58}\) At the meeting in Düsseldorf, in July 1904, two of the six points on the agenda concerned conditions for calling upon military assistance.\(^{59}\) Moreover, the items on the agenda reveal the

\(^{57}\) In July 1904, the district governor of Düsseldorf organised a similar meeting in order to determine the measures to be taken in case of a greater strike among the miners in this area which was the most important of the mining districts. Representatives from nearly all the interested authorities were present at the meeting: The district governor; the local governors of the county Ruhr; of Mülheim; of Mors and of Essen; The city mayor of Mülheim and the city mayor of Oberhausen as well as the chairman of the city council of Essen. Report of the meeting July 7 1904. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.1. - Rep.77 - Titel 2513, 1) Beiheft 9, 'Die Entsendung von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1901-1905' (documents 124-130). Similarly, after the military intervention in March 1912, two meetings were held between all the relevant civil authorities, but without any representative from the army.

\(^{58}\) See Chapter Six.

\(^{59}\) Minutes from the meeting: Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.1. - Rep.77 - Titel 2513, 1) Beiheft 9 'Die Entsendung von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1901-1905' (documents 124-130)
uncertainty about the whole procedure of requesting military assistance: Item 1 - In the case of a greater strike, would it be advisable to call for military assistance from the moment of the declaration or should the civil authorities endeavour to manage the crisis with police and *gendarmerie* forces? Item 4 - If a military requisition became inevitable, to which authority should the civil authorities address its 'suggestions' concerning where to send troops? Furthermore, should it be recommended to establish a plan over the locations to be protected and the number of troop needed at each point?

On the first issue, the participants in the meeting unanimously declared that it was preferable to try to manage even major strikes with civil forces and that the army should only be called in if the civil forces were incapable of preventing violence and riots. It is interesting to observe that the representatives of the civil authorities did not recommend the establishment of a general plan determining the places to be protected and the type and number of troops needed. On the other hand, it was decided to invite the minister of the interior to ask the minister to ask the army corps commander to define who should be contacted by the civil authorities at the local level. The discussions at this meeting reveal that it was easiest to leave these questions to be decided by the military authorities. It also shows that the most efficient way to contact the army corps commander was through the minister of the interior, and not through the province governor.

In contrast to the detailed civil planning for cases of major unrest, the military preparations were strikingly under-developed. In Westphalia, the plans established by General von Albedyll during the 1889 strike seems to have remained the only military plans for a situation of major unrest until General von Bissing's instructions of 1907.60 The military plans suffered from a series of defects. In the first place, the plans elaborated by General von Albedyll, as well as the instructions from General von Bissing, were a series of indications rather than detailed plans. All information about the topographical, demographical and industrial conditions in the industrial areas would have to be provided by the local authorities when needed.

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60 They were still referred to during the 1905 strike.
Secondly, military planning existed only at the level of military regions, but was not co-ordinated at the national level. As late as 1912, a suggestion from the Ministry of the Interior to undertake a nation-wide co-ordination of the military forces, was rejected by the War Minister von Heeringen as completely unnecessary. He pointed to the paragraph in the military service regulations of 1899 that insisted on the independence of military preparations.61

The most serious problem, however, was that the military plans were not co-ordinated with the civil plans. As a result of this, there was a gap between the two types of plans. The civil planning foresaw all possible situations that might occur, right up to the moment when a situation would require military assistance. This was where the civil plans stopped and the military planning was supposed to take over. However, the military plans started from the assumption that a military state of siege had been declared. Such a situation never occurred in the period between 1889 and 1914, which means that in all cases of domestic military intervention, the authorities operated in a vacuum which neither the civil nor the military authorities had foreseen.

Finally, the lack of co-ordination was a serious problem because, in the case of a military intervention, the army corps commander would become responsible for the organisation and command of all the forces within the military region, civil as well as military. However, the military plans only covered the military troops, and made no provisions for the role of the civil forces under the army’s command. Moreover, the military authorities had no detailed knowledge of the size and organisation of the civil forces that would come under its command. Conversely, the military planning was - unsurprisingly - a military secret. Because the civil authorities had no access to the military plans, they could not inform the chiefs of the numerous police corps of their role in the case of a military intervention, and the policemen and gendarmerie officers had no idea about how the military authorities would use them in case of a major conflict.

61Instructions from the War Ministry to the general commanders of February 8 1912. Münster HaStA, OP 6095, (documents 206-215): "Neben den auf Seite 26 der 'Vorschrift über den Waffengebrauch des Militärs' vorgesehenen Vorbereitungen sind von den meisten Kommandostellen weitgehende Anforderungen getroffen".
9.4. Military obstruction to co-operation with the civil administration

In contrast to the situation in France, where the army organisation was increasingly used for non-military purposes, the separation in Prussia between the realms of the civil administration and the army remained very clear and became increasingly strict by the eve of the First World War. This is the reverse side of the ‘militarisation’ of Prussian society which seemed to take place during the same decades.62 Whereas important aspects of civil society acquired military features, the Prussian army did not, as was the case in France, turn into an extension of the civilian police. On the contrary, the Prussian military authorities consciously prevented the army from organising and proceeding according to the needs of the civil administration. By the turn of the century, the army became less of an extended police force than it had ever been previously in the nineteenth century.

9.4.1. The question of the preventive mobilisation of troops

This development becomes clear when considering the question of whether the Prussian army could be mobilised preventively to hinder violent actions from taking place. Preventive mobilisation of troops to defend public order was not incompatible with existing Prussian legislation. Moreover, such measures were not uncommon during the 1870s and 1880s.63 After 1889, however, this procedure was increasingly

62 The ‘militarisation’ of the German society during the Imperial period, has been noted by contemporary observers as well as historians of the period. It consists in a series of phenomena both in politics and in wider society. At the political level in terms of aggressive foreign policy and societal preparation for war (Alfred Vagts (1959) "A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military" London: Allen & Unwin; Manfred Messerschmidt (1979) "Militärgeschichte im 19.Jahrhundert 1814-1890" in Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648-1939 vol.2 Part. IV/1 (ed. Hans Meier-Welcker) Oldenburg: Munich; Volker R.Berghahn “Militarism: the history of an international debate 1861-1979” 1981; Förstner, Stig (1985) “Der doppelte Militarismus: die deutsche Heeresrüstungspolitik zwischen Status-quosicherung und Aggression, 1890-1913” Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag). At the societal level, it has been linked to phenomena such as the large number of civilians joining the reserve officer corps and the numerous soldiers’ associations, thus linking a large part of the male population to the army throughout most of their lifetime. Similarly, it has been observed that the German civil society adopted many military symbols (uniforms for civil servants, military titles, stylistic features in art and music) as well as alleged military ethos (in particular values, codes of honour and modes of asserting male self-esteem).

63 Blackbourn (1993) brilliantly describes the difficulties of the Prussian authorities on several occasions during the Kulturkampf to explain how Catholic pilgrims could be considered a threat to public order and thus justify the presence of military troops. Similarly, in the 1880s military troops were sometimes called upon at a simple gathering of more than one hundred persons in a public place.
rejected by senior military commanders. Thus in Westphalia 1889, General von Albedyll saw little reason for a military presence unless violence had actually taken place. After nine days of intervention, Albedyll refused to deliver more troops and justified his decision by explaining to the minister of the interior that there was no reason to mobilise troops when the area was peaceful and quiet. Similar views were expressed by General von Loë during the first May Day demonstrations in Coblenz, and by Waldersee during the Hamburg dock workers’ strike 1896-1897. Thus, the message from senior military commanders was clear: no troops would be mobilised unless actual violence had taken place. After the turn of the century, no examples of preventive mobilisation of troops have been found, although the military authorities were occasionally asked to keep troops in a state of readiness.

From the point of view of civil rights, this development could hardly be criticised. From the point of view of preventing a tense situation deteriorating into uncontrolled

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riots and violence, the military's refusal to provide assistance in a way that would meet the need for an appropriate response to situations of major crises, forced the civil authorities to abandon certain aims, such as protecting private property (officially declared impossible in the 1912 plans) and made it more difficult to prevent violent clashes between demonstrators and public forces. Despite great improvement in the size and organisation of the police and *gendarmerie* forces, the civil administration, by the crises of 1905 and 1912, were painfully aware of its inadequate forces, if widespread riots and violent confrontations developed. It knew that the only alternative to the strategies developed for relatively peaceful mass-demonstrations, was a civil-war-like military intervention over which they would have no influence or control.

9.4.2. Establishment of military garrisons

A similar development can be discerned concerning the location of garrisons. Traditionally, garrisons were placed within the main towns, with the specific intention of performing police tasks. This too changed in the 1890s, partly because the large cities, in particular industrial cities, were considered to have a negative influence on the conscript soldiers and officers. However, there was also a conscious choice by the military authorities to avoid being drawn into civilian conflicts. Confronted with the first May Day demonstrations in 1890, General Loë expressed himself in very clear terms in a letter to Waldersee: he argued that if local communities wanted protection, they should organise a sufficient police force and pay for it.68 A similar response was given to the province governor of Silesia immediately after the end of the miners' strike of 1889, when he suggested that a military garrison ought to be established in the Waldenburg coal mining area.69 This request was refused from the


War Ministry on the grounds that the military authorities saw no need for a military post in the Waldenburg coal mining district.\footnote{Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.1. - Rep.77 - Titel 2513,1) Beiheft 5 'Die Entsendung von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1890'. (documents 19-20). Letter of 9 January 1890 from the war minister to the Ministry of the Interior.}

Thus, after 1889, garrisons were placed solely according to strategic and military considerations. Accordingly, there was no garrison in the entire district of Arnsberg, which was one of the most turbulent areas in the entire German Empire and included all the main industrial towns north of the River Ruhr (Dortmund, Essen, Bochum, Rechlinghausen, Gelsenkirchen, and Herne). In cases of requisition of troops, soldiers had to be mobilised from the neighbouring district of Düsseldorf. In contrast, the important Münster garrison was placed in a small provincial town in the rural part of Westphalia. This was very different from Nord-Pas-de-Calais, where several garrisons established in the years between 1890 and 1914 were placed in industrial areas with the explicit purpose of meeting the needs of maintaining order - sometimes even on the initiative of the military authorities.\footnote{See Chapter Eight.}

9.4.3. The use of military status and legislation

As shown in Chapter Eight, in France, civilians conscripts in the army or soldiers of the reserve could be ordered to perform non-military functions because of their military status (in particular, when the legislation on military service was used to force striking rail personnel back to work, and when conscript soldiers were ordered to undertake strikebound work in the conflicts between the French state and the public employees). Similarly, the civilian members of semi-military organisations (i.e. members of the voluntary fire-brigade, customs officers, pupils in the military academies, and even members of a military orchestra) were occasionally requested to participate in the maintenance of public order.

In Prussia, by contrast, it seems that formal military status could be used to refuse assistance to the civil administration. A particularly illustrating example is the request made in December 1910 by the district governor in Düsseldorf to the local automobile
association - *Das freiwilligen Automobilkorps* - to borrow their cars to transport police units in case of a situation of major unrest. That request was made in similar terms to the automobile association’s obligation to transport military troops in case of a general mobilisation. The refusal from the president of the association was categorical and based on the particular status of the association as a military corps. Given the military status of the association in the case of a general mobilisation, the use of their cars was only possible as part of a requisition of military troops. Furthermore, the members of the association who were to drive the cars would be covered by military legislation and would have to drive their cars themselves, in military uniform.72

The association’s argument was difficult to sustain since they would only obtain military status in case of a general mobilisation and the requests from the state administration was made to the association as a civil organisation. However, it seems to have been sufficient to avoid further approaches from the state administration. The district governor immediately stated that it would not be worthwhilsst to address the request to the War Ministry, and suggested instead to his colleague that they obtained the cars from private companies.73

The request from the war minister in 1911 not to use soldiers for ordinary crowd management on the occasion of an air display was similarly symptomatic of the increasingly sharp distinction between the realms of civil society and the army. Despite the fact that aviation associations of the time were semi-military corps - as the automobile associations - and the aerodromes were usually in military fields, the soldiers would only be used if there were a military or strategic justification.74 One can

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72 Münster HaStA, Münster Regierung, VII - 52 a. (document 22). Letter of 15 January 1911 from the district governor in Düsseldorf to the district governor in Münster. "...Es steht dem entgegen, dass das freiwillige Automobilkorps als eine militärische Truppe anzusehen ist, seine Verwendung also der Heranziehung von Militär gleich zu erachten wäre, ferner dass sich seine Mitglieder lediglich für den Mobilmachungsfall zur Verfügung gestellt habe und sie demnach nicht ohne weiteres bei inneren Unruhen herangezogen werden können."


74 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 122). Letter of 16 April 1911 from the minister of the interior to the Prussian district governors. ‘Nach einer Mitteilung des Herrn Kriegsministers ist die Verwendung von Militärmannschaften zu Absperrungszwecken bei Wettflügen
therefore conclude that even with smaller questions linked to the wider issue of maintaining public order, the military status could be - and indeed was - used to avoid providing assistance to the civil administration.

9.4.4. The use of soldiers for non-military purposes

Given the unwillingness of the military authorities to meet the needs of the civil administration in questions linked to the maintenance of order, it is hardly surprising that there was even more reluctance over soldiers performing strictly non-military functions. Although sanctioned by law, the use of military troops for non-military purposes appears to have been a very rare event. For the Province of Westphalia only one case has been found between 1880 and 1914. This is also true for the use of soldiers to undertake strikebound work. For the entire German Empire, there seem to be only two recorded cases of this type.

One of these cases took place in 1896, on the occasion of a strike among tin-men in Königsberg. Eleven soldiers from the engineers were sent to do the work. When called to explain in the Reichstag how soldiers could be used to undertake strikebound work,


75 Münster HaStA, OP 685, ‘Einsatz von Militär zur Unterdrückung beziehungsweise Verhinderung von Unruhen, 1848-1852, 1880-1881’. Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hilfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929.’ In June 1880 fifty hunters were called to help the civil authorities in the search for a body in a murder case. That this type of requisition did not happen every other day may be explained by the fact that this was a very costly affair. In the present case, the provincial authorities of Westphalia had to pay the considerable sum of 5,902 Marks.

76 Martin Kitchen, in his work on the Prussian officer corps (1968) pp.161-165, quite mistakenly describes the role of the army as strike-breakers - both by forcing the strikers back to work and the actual undertaking of strikebound work - as a frequent incident that the army was more than willing to perform. His only concrete example of this use is the 1905 strike among the electricians of the AEG.

- In June-July 1918, after repeated strikes in the armament industry, the province governor of Westphalia and the deputy army corps commander discussed whether they should send soldiers to undertake the work or whether it was possible to submit the striking workers to military rule. It appears from the correspondence that this was not measures previously implemented. Münster HaStA, Münster Regierung, VII - 52 a. (documents 58-59). Report of 27 June 1918 Massnahmen für den Fall grösserer Arbeitseinstellungen in den Rüstungsbetrieben der Korpsbezirke.
the war minister, Walther Bronsart von Schellendorf, made it clear that, in principle, the use of soldiers for such purposes was not allowed. His justification for this exceptional use of soldiers was that, in this case, the strikers were actually working on barracks, and that the use of troops was not an attempt to favour the employer against the employees, but rather the need for the army to have the work done immediately. Bronsart von Schellendorf mentioned that soldiers could be used only for military purposes or if the financial interests of the state were at stake.

Accordingly, in 1904, Prussian military authorities accepted that, in case of a strike among the rail personnel, soldiers could be sent to ensure basic service on the public and private railway lines. This was justified, as in France, by referring to the strategic importance of the railway system. However, in Prussia, military intervention in strikes among rail workers differed from the French case in three significant ways. In the first place, the use of soldiers was limited to lines of actual strategic significance, and it was the military authorities who determined whether and which lines were to be kept going. Secondly, the military assistance was only meant to ensure the rail service, but did not imply the defence of the rail lines, which remained a task for the civil forces. Finally, in contrast to French case, the military-strategic justification never developed into an argument for military defence of the interests of wider civil society. If a rail strike paralysed the transport of persons and goods or if it obstructed industrial production and foreign trade, this was not a concern of the army. The measures in the event of a strike among rail workers were never implemented but troops were used on one occasion to defend the interests of wider society. This was in October 1905 when there was a strike among electricians of the AEG company. Confronted with the possibility

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77 Minutes from the Reichstag of 19 February 1896: "Nun, meine Herren, ich möchte vorausschicken: in der Armee ist es grundsätzlich untersagt, dass die Truppen sich einmischen in Lohnstreitigkeiten, dergestalt, dass dem Arbeitgeber als Ersatz für streikende Arbeiter Soldaten zur Verfügung gestellt werden."

78 Minutes from the Reichstag of 19 February 1896: "Ausnahmen sind allerdings gemacht, wenn die Staatskasse oder das militärische Interesse dabei geschädigt werden. Ein solcher Fall lag in Königsberg vor; es handelte sich darum, dass der von Ihnen uns bewilligte Neubau der Pionierkasernen zum 1.Oktober fertig gestellt werden sollte."

79 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, 'Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hilfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929' (documents 34-37). Regulations of June 1904 'Gestellung militärischer Hilfe im Falle von Arbeitseinstellung der Eisenbahn-bedingsten einschliesslich des Personals des amtlichen Bahnspediteure.'
of Berlin being cut off from electricity, workers from the rail troops were sent to ensure the most basic service.\footnote{Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2/14 'Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von Unruhen 1889-1914'. (documents 216-221).}

Despite these isolated cases of military defence of the interest of wider society, in the light of the insistence by the military authorities on their independence from the civil administration and their unwillingness to provide even minor practical assistance, it is hardly surprising that, when confronted with problems of internal unrest, the state administration preferred to co-operate with local police authorities and to spend significant resources in order to avoid dependence on military assistance. In contrast to Nord-Pas-de-Calais, where the state administration was preoccupied by intensifying and improving co-operation with the army, the Westphalian civil authorities after each major crisis were only concerned with improving the organisation and efficiency of the civil forces, in order to keep the army out of internal order issues. Accordingly, whilst strategies developed in France that increasingly depended on military assistance, the strategies developed by the Prussian state authorities in co-operation with local authorities did not rely upon the army, either to provide manpower, or to provide material.

\textbf{9.5. Consequences of the civil-military separation for co-operation concerning maintenance of order}

It is striking how, after each case of military intervention in Westphalia, both civil and military authorities praised their excellent mutual relationship. In the intervention in Herne of June 1899, the military commander on the spot, as well as the various branches of the state administration, praised the excellent civil-military relationship during the crises.\footnote{Münster HaStA, Regierung Arnsberg, 14321, ‘Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrkohlengebiet 1899’ Correspondence between the commanding colonel Taubert and the senior state administrators in Arnsberg ad Bochum, 10-13 July 1899; Report of 17 July 1899 from the district governor of Arnsberg ‘Zusammenfassender Bericht der Ereignisse im Herner Bergarbeiterausstande’: ‘Zum Schlusse darf ich mit Befriedigung und Genugthuung hervorheben, dass das gegenseitige Verhältniss des} Similarly, the civil-military co-operation by the intervention in March 1912 was described as a success by both civil and military authorities.\footnote{Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2/14 'Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von Unruhen 1889-1914'. (documents 216-221).}
The background to this praise, however, seems to be that both authorities expected co-operation to be extremely difficult. Because of the low frequency of military intervention and the low degree of communication and co-ordination of plans, practical co-operation between civil and military authorities in case of major unrest was constrained by three elements that characterised the inter-institutional relationship between the state administration and the army. In the first place, where was a lack of mutual trust, since neither the civil nor the military authorities were entirely certain about the intentions of the other, and each suspected it would be trapped in activities it would rather avoid. The second element was a simple lack of knowledge about procedures and legal definitions, since a commander or civil servant would normally only be involved in practical co-operation with the other once in his time in service. Following the latter problem, there was also a lack of consensus about the procedures to be followed and the strategies to be implemented. These elements of uncertainty and points of potential conflict were as the heart of the relationship between the civil and military authorities in Westphalia.


- Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, VII-14 Vol.1/ 32-1, ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912’ (documents 5-10). Report of 20 May 1912 from the district governor in Münster to the minister of the interior. ‘Der diesjährige Bergarbeiterausstand im Ruhrrevier stellte an die für die Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Sicherheit, Ruhe und Ordnung verantwortlichen Behörden wesentlich schwierigere Aufgaben, als das bei früheren Bergarbeiterstreiks der Fall gewesen ist. (...) Das Zusammenwirken zwischen Militär- und Zivilbehörden vollzog sich glatt.”
9.5.1. The lack of mutual trust

Hesitations about military involvement in public order greatest for the civil authorities. The mobilisation of military troops always implied a certain risk of the civil authorities losing control over the actions of the army. Since military intervention was not surrounded by shared norms for appropriate behaviour towards provocation and obstruction from a protest movement, there was always a risk that a local commander might take independent initiatives against the wishes of the civil administration. Given that the military establishment was extremely sensitive to criticism of its members, it would be very difficult to prevent the commanders from making independent steps, or to hold the officers responsible afterwards.\footnote{The Zabern affair is only one of many examples of how the entire military establishment were prepared to defend at any prize the inappropriate behaviour of a first lieutenant, going as far as the war minister defending this member of the army before the \textit{Reichstag}. Similarly, the army was impervious to criticism concerning the behaviour of the military troops (i.e. during the intervention in Marpingen in 1876, or the episodes of shooting during the 1889 strike). Even the very numerous cases where conscript soldiers were beaten, crippled or even mistreated with fatal consequences by their superior officers, were dismissed by the military establishment.} Although the actual cases of mobilisation of troops in Westphalia were characterised by little conflict between the civil and military authorities, and despite the fact that the military authorities tended to follow the wishes and instruction from the civil authorities, province governors could never be sure that this would be the case on future occasions.

If the military authorities in 1899 and in 1912 proved prepared to accommodate the wishes of the civil administration, this was not least because the military authorities themselves had no serious alternatives to the suggestions from the civil administration. In 1899 and in 1912, the military authorities were just as unprepared as they had been during the 1889 strike for intervention in domestic conflicts in which a state of siege had not been declared, since neither the plans established by the civil authorities nor the different military strategies developed by the military authorities operated with this possibility. Being unprepared, decisions had to be taken \textit{ad hoc} at the moment when the crisis had already developed into a serious threat. In 1912, this left the army corps commander, General von Einem, with two options. He could either, as Albedyll did in 1889, insist on his right of command and restore order with coercive military measures with no regards to the wishes of the civil administration. The other option was to
recognise that the civil authorities had both the detailed knowledge and the experience of dealing with labour conflicts.

In his memoirs, General von Einem insists that he alone was in charge of the handling of the measures implemented.84 The description in the reports from the civil authorities after the end of the strike provides a slightly different view, according to which it was the civil authorities who in fact guided the military troops.85 Given that, in their requisition, the district governors had to provide the necessary detailed information about the number of policemen already in the area, the number of workers employed there, the geographical position of the mine shafts, as well as the locations most exposed to sabotage and bullying against strike-breakers, it is not surprising that they also provided recommendations as to how many soldiers were needed and where to send them.86 The later report from the district governor in Münster also indicates that, as a general rule, the military authorities followed the recommendations of the civil administration.87 It also appears quite unequivocally from the telegrams and letters

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87 Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, VII-14 Vol.1 /32-1, 'Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912' (documents 5-10). Report of 20 May 1912 from the district governor in Münster to the minister of the interior. "...die Militärbehörde zeigte dabei das grösste Entgegenkommen indem sie auch die erforderliche Rüstung zur Verfügung stellte."
during the intervention that the General von Einem did little but closely follow the indications from the civil authorities.

Thus, in the 1912 strike in Westphalia, the military authorities seemed very attentive to the needs and recommendation of the senior state administrators. Nevertheless, despite the uncomplicated relationship with the military authorities during the actual cases of military intervention, the degree to which the civil administration was allowed to determine these essential points entirely depended on the individual army corps commander. The Prussian officers and general commanders were known for their strong declarations of intent, and the state administrators could never be sure what the army might do - with or without requisition from the civil authorities. Similarly, it appears from the correspondence in 1903-1904 between the district governor in Potsdam and the minister of the interior concerning the independent military initiative in Welten that the civil servants perceived the military authorities as a difficult, unreliable and often irresponsible partner for co-operation. Similarly, even a 'good' relationship with the military authorities was too frail to be seriously counted upon.

88 Hindenburg in 1909 clearly insisted on determining all relevant details, independently from the civil authorities. Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2/14 'Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von Unruhen 1889-1914.' (documents 246-248; 250-252). Hindenburg's reports to the Emperor of 23 and 28 October 1909. Similarly, the general staff study of 1907 or the recommendations from General von Bissing do not count upon the civilian authorities at all. General von Bissing's order of 30 April 1907 simply states that the moment military assistance becomes necessary is the moment to declare a state of siege - and thus charge the military authorities with all decision making. "Sobald die Polizei der Bewegung der Massen nicht mehr Herr werden kann und diese den Organen der Sicherheit und Ordnung gegenüber eine drohende Haltung einnehmen, ist der Augenblick gekommen über den rebellierenden Bezirk den Belagerungszustand zu verhängen." Bundesarchiv Abteilung Potsdam (III): R 43 Film signaturee 12425-12426 'Militärische Massnahmen im Falle von Unruhen. Belagerungszustand 1890-1918' (documents 47-50).

89 Waldersee in 1896-1897 openly and often expressed his intention to make moves independently of the civil administration if he saw this appropriate (in the case of the Hamburg strike he did not). As late as 1913, the Zabem-Affair indicated with all possible clarity that anything could be expected from the side of the Prussian army.

90 See above note 28.


It is therefore hardly surprising that the state administration considered any practical co-operation with the military authorities as a potential source of trouble. It carried dangers that the military authorities might take independent initiatives, or obstruction to the needs of the state administration. Similarly, with the military authorities' inability to recognise errors - however gross - or assume financial responsibility for errors committed by any military officer, there were many reasons for the state administrators to consider the army to be a difficult and unpredictable partner for co-operation, no matter how good their experiences had been during actual cases of military intervention.

9.5.2. Lack of knowledge about formal rules for civil-military co-operation

In addition to the lack of trust and reluctance by the civil administration towards the idea of depending on the assistance and good-will of the army, there was also a series of practical problems resulting from the low frequency of military intervention. During the Imperial period, the frequency of military intervention in Westphalia was never sufficiently high for standard operating procedures to develop concerning civil-military relationship, as they did in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. As a result, during the military interventions in 1889, in 1899 and again in 1912, there was much confusion by the authorities, both civil and military, about the formal distribution of powers between the

January 1904 from the district governor in Potsdam to the minister of the interior. "Diesen Offizier wird die Militärverwaltung zweifellos mit allem Nachdruck zu schützen suchen und alle bezüglichen Verhandlungen einschliesslich des Prozesses würden deshalb zweifellos dem guten Einvernehmen zwischen den Militär- und Civilbehörden Eintrag tun; sie würden vielleicht sogar einen ungünstigen Einfluss auf die bisherige dankenswerte Bereitwilligkeit der Militärbehörden militärische Hülfe zu gewähren, haben."

93 The well documented and analysed cases of the military intervention in Marpingen in 1876 and in Zabern 1913 show how it was equally impossible for the military authorities to admit any error or responsibility by the eve of the First World War as it had been almost forty years earlier during the Kulturkampf.

94 In 1904, all province and district governors were informed by the Ministry of the Interior about the incident from East Prussia where a local military commander kept a special train ready for mobilisation for three weeks without informing the civil administration. (see note 28). The problem was not only the independent military initiative but also the refusal from the War Ministry to pay the bill presented by the private rail company. Eventually the Ministry of the Interior reluctantly accepted the financial responsibility. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.1. - Rep.77 - Titel 2513 1) Beiheft 9, ‘Die Entsendung von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1901-1905’ Letter of 24 Mai 1904 from the minister of the interior to the province and district governors.
state administration and the army. The commanding officers were often ignorant of
the legal definitions, particularly those concerning the rights of strikers. The formal
rules only stated that the senior military commander acquired ‘full authority of
command,’ but this still left many questions open as to how a civil administration was
supposed to operate in practice. Moreover, since the transfer of the ultimate authority
to the military power was necessarily a sensitive question, the senior civil and military
authorities had never tried to reach a final agreement about the exact definition of this
point. The practical relationship between civil and military authorities therefore had to
be negotiated between authorities at all levels each time the military troops were
mobilised.

Another significant element of uncertainty arose from the question of financial
responsibility. The law stated that it was the requesting authority who has the financial
responsibility. During the nineteenth century, when interventions were mostly local and
isolated, it was possible to point out the private person or local representative who had
solicited the state administration to call for military assistance, and thus where to place
financial responsibility. However, the 1889 intervention was extended over so many
administrative units, and the military intervention had been solicited partly by local
authorities, and local governors, and partly by private companies, but was formally
issued by the district and province governors. The financial cost of 366,345 Mark and

95After the 1912 intervention, General von Einem complained about widespread ignorance among the
civil servants about the legal definitions of authority in the case of a military intervention without a
declaration of state of siege. Münster HaStA, OP 6095, (document 177). Letter of 28 August 1912
from General von Einem to the province governor of Westphalia.
96Münster HaStA, VII-14 Vol.1/ 32-1, 'Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912' or Geheimes
dem Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrgebiet im März 1912', 'Niederschrift über die Besprechung am 1.Juni
1912 im Königlichen Landratsamt in Essen über die beim letzten Bergarbeiterstreik gemachten
Erfahrungen': "Regierungspräsident Dr.Kruse, Düsseldorf: Die Heranziehung des Militärs müsse
unter allen Umständen die ultima ratio bleiben. In seiner Heranziehung liege eine grosse Gefahr.
Wenn die Truppe kommt, gehe nach den gesetzlichen Bestimmungen die Kommandogewalt auf den
Befehlshaber über; die Zivilbehörden gäben dann ihre Gewalt aus der Hand; die Offiziere aber
kennten die Verhältnisse und vielfach auch die in Betracht kommenden gesetzlichen Bestimmungen
nicht, sodass leicht Fehlgriffe vorkommen könnten. Er erinnerte an den beim letzten Streik
vorgekommenen Fall, in welchen ein Leutnant ein Versammlung aufgelöst habe weil er irrtümlich
verstanden habe, er solle die Versammlungen statt die Ansammlungen verstreuen. Es hätten daraus
sehr schlimme Folgen entstehen können, da eine grosse Zahl von Personen aus den Fenstern
gesprungen sei."
97 After the military intervention in Marpingen 1876, the expenses of the military and police
intervention amounted to 4,000 Marks. Because these were solicited by the local mayor, the
75 Pfennig for the intervention by military troops and *gendarmes* in four military regions was almost impossible to place, and eventually the government accepted to pay the bill.\(^{98}\) In France, the state accepted to cover the costs of military interventions in labour conflicts as early as 1893.\(^{99}\) In contrast in Prussia, even if the state assumed the financial responsibility after the 1889 strike, this was to be considered an isolated and exceptional case. The question remained unsettled. Whenever the possibility of a military intervention became an object of discussion, there was general confusion amongst the civil servants responsible about who was to carry the significant costs.\(^{100}\) In all the cases of intervention in Westphalia, the Ministry of the Interior eventually assumed the financial responsibility, but only after months of discussion.\(^{101}\) This uncertainty was a serious reason for province and district governors to hesitate about calling upon the army.

Factors such as the lack of military preparedness, confusion about the details of the rules defining the distribution of powers, financial responsibility and the strategies to be implemented can be seen as both the result of the low frequency of military intervention, and as a reason for further decreases in the number of military interventions.


\(^{100}\) In relation to the case from Welten, near Potsdam, in October 1903, when a local garrison commander, without informing the state administration, had solicited a steam train from the local rail company, it was suggested by the war minister that the bill should be paid by the municipality of Welten. The Ministry of the Interior refused with the argument that this would be a way of punishing the citizens of Welten who had behaved in a way so that the troops were not called upon. The Ministry of the Interior finally accepted to pay the bill. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin - Dahlem: H.A.1. - Rep.77. Titel 251,1) Beiheft 9 ‘Die Ensendung von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1901-1905’ (documents 63-73).

\(^{101}\) After the intervention in June 1899, the issue was settled in December, and after the 1912 intervention, the debate went on from March to November, and was only finally settled when the state accepted the financial responsibility.
9.5.3. Lack of civil-military agreements and lack of formalised procedures

The absence of standard operating procedures around the civil-military co-operation also left many important issues open to potential conflict, and the civil authorities, when calling for the army, had to operate with a high number of unknown factors. Within the French system, the insistence on consensus between the civil and military authorities and the demand for joint decision making, provided a certain degree of mutual confidence. The civil administration acquired influence over the measures implemented by the military authorities, and, when occasionally a sensitive situation went badly wrong, the military commander would be much less exposed to criticisms concerning the measures implemented. In Prussia, throughout the Imperial period, both the King and the military commanders insisted strongly on the integrity of their powers. The military authorities were concerned with keeping up their image of an army entirely in charge of legitimate violence in the eyes of the civil administration and in wider society.

The functioning in practice of the civil-military co-operation differed from this image. In 1889 as in 1899 and 1912, the pattern of requisition was the same: the civil authorities addressed the army corps commander who mobilised the troops, and only then informed the King about the issue. The King still insisted on his authority of

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102 In 1889, General von Albedyll made clear that his provision of a military unit according to the wishes of the province governor was to be considered as an exceptional concession to the civil administration. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.1 - Rep.77 - Titel 2513, 1) Beiheft 2, 'Die auf die Arbeitseinstellungen eingegangenen Telegramme, 1889' (documents 50-53). Telegram of 13 May 1889 from von Hagenmeister, Province Governor of Westphalia, to the Emperor. "...Dankbar anerkenne ich, dass kommandierender General heute auf mein Ersuchen ausnahmsweise gestattet hat, zum Schutze der Gruben Maria-Anna und Steinbank in Hontrop bei Bochum eine Militärabteilung zu stationieren...".

Similarly in his instructions to the civil authorities and the military commanders entitled Gesichtspunkte für die Verwendung der in die Kohlenbergwerks-Gebiete entsendeten Truppen, General von Albedyll begins by stressing the independence of the military commander. "Des ausgedehnte Gebiet wird in einzelne Abschnitte getheilt in deren jedem ein Kommandeur, welchem einige Bataillone und Eskadrons unterstellt sind, die allgemeinen Anordnungen für die Aufstellung und Verwendung der Truppen selbständig zu treffen hat. (...) Die Abschnitts-Commandeure sind lediglich und ausschliesslich dem General-Kommando unterstellt (underlined in the original)" There is no other mentioning of the relations the military commander should have to the civil authorities.


command, but this appears to be rather a matter of form. In 1899, the King made the
commanding general personally responsible for restoring order,104 and in 1912, the
orders from the supreme commander were to use force recklessly against any
opposition.105 Thus from the side of the supreme commander, the army corps
commander had both legal authority and orders to implement whatever measures he
considered appropriate, with no regard to the wishes of the civil administration.
Nevertheless, in 1899, General Mikusch did not make much use of his right to
independent decision-making. In all his telegrams he emphasised that for all the
important decisions concerning when to mobilise, where to intervene, and when to
send back the troops, he closely followed the wishes of the province governor.106 He
thus detached himself from the responsibility which the King had placed upon him. Similarly in 1912, when General von Einem sent troops into the Westphalian mining areas, he strongly emphasised that he mobilised troops at the explicit request of the civil authorities.\textsuperscript{107}

With incidents such as a general strike in the mining sector becoming increasingly politically sensitive, the position of the general commander also became more difficult, since it was not obvious what the King would perceive as a successful military intervention. Both a heavy handed and a smoother intervention might go badly wrong, - with people killed and damage to the prestige and standing of the army amongst traditionally supportive groups. In these sensitive situations, even an army corps commander needed to cover his back, and the insistence of General von Mikusch - and later of General von Einem - on the consensus with the civil administration seems to have been a way of detaching themselves from a disagreeable responsibility.\textsuperscript{108} Thus, there were powerful reasons for the commander responsible to follow closely the instructions of the province governor.


\textsuperscript{108} Similarly, during the Zabern Affair, General von Deimling tried to justify the incidents by insisting again on the right to independent military decision making. However, the whole affair made the army look embarassingly ridiculous. General von Deimling therefore attempted to put the blame on the civil administration, as indicated by the inconsistencies between the printed version of his memoirs and the unprinted manuscript. Berthold von Deimling '\textit{Aus der Alten in die neue Zeit}' Berlin : Im Verlag Ullstein, 1930 pp.146-148, and his private papers Military Archive, Freiburg, N 559.
9.6. Concluding remarks: the refrain from the state administration to call for military assistance

Seen from the state administration's perspective, it could not rely on such a degree of co-operation by the army corps commanders. Until the end of the Empire, there were still strong headed military commanders of the old school, such as von Albedyll, von Waldersee, or von Bissing, who had no qualms about implementing military measures with no regard to the wishes of the civil administration. Between 1889 and 1914, although the Prussian civil service developed an ability to deal with domestic conflicts through a careful balance of negotiation and display of force, senior civil servants were highly aware of the political implications of violent clashes between public forces and contesting movements. They also suspected that the military commanders might stick to their own ideas about a necessary display of force, and that the military authorities were out of touch with the needs for political flexibility in sensitive situations such as major strikes.

When calling for military assistance the Prussian state administrators had to operate with a high degree of uncertainty about the implications of a military intervention. They did not know which measures which were going to be taken and the degree to which the army was simply going to stand by or whether it would actively repress the unrest. They could not foresee the reactions from the strikers or demonstrators nor public reactions to violent confrontations between civilians and the army. This was the background against which the state administration in Westphalia developed and pursued its policy of 'de-militarisation' of internal peacekeeping.
Chapter Ten. General Conclusion and Wider Perspectives

The central questions of the thesis have been: Why did the French and Prussian systems adopt such markedly dissimilar strategies towards public disorder after 1890? Why did strong patterns of continuity develop in the strategies implemented towards public disorder in each country? And, lastly, why did the policies adopted in the early 1890s continued and indeed became more pronounced during the following decades, that is right until the First World War? During the course of the previous chapters, three main observations have been made:

• that the dissimilar strategies developed and implemented were not directly linked to the size of the public order challenge faced or to the number of the civil forces available to deal with it;

• that after 1889, a strong pattern of continuity can be observed in Westphalia, as well as in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, concerning the strategies developed and implemented to deal with major cases of unrest; and

• that in both areas, the strategies to deal with major cases of unrest were developed and implemented by the senior state administration at the regional level and by the ministry of the interior, policies which were, to a large degree, supported by the senior military commanders concerned.

10.1. Findings of the study and the challenge of existing interpretations

The findings of this thesis challenge a series of main interpretations concerning the use of troops for maintenance of order in Imperial Germany and Republican France respectively. In the first place, the argument that the 'de-militarisation' of internal peacekeeping in Westphalia, and in Germany in general, was due to the increase in number of civil forces after 1889 is challenged by the findings presented in Chapter Two which show that the Westphalian industrial areas remained badly policed despite the extension of the civil forces between 1889 and 1913.1 The finding that Nord-Pas-
de-Calais was and remained better policed than the Westphalian industrial areas also challenge the argument put forward in France that the frequent use of troops was due to inadequate civil forces. Secondly, the findings also indicate that in terms of the size of conflicts and potential for violence, the authorities in Westphalia faced challenges which were no less serious than those presented to the authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Finally, the cases appearing in Nord-Pas-de-Calais show that military troops were often mobilised to conflicts where the threat to public order was only potential.

The findings that troops were used more frequently in Republican France than they were in Prussia and that the French military elite was more actively involved in managing internal crises than were their Prussian counterparts contradicts the idea of a direct linkage between the constitutional position of the army within the two systems and the domestic role of the army. As shown in Chapter Three, a discrepancy can be discerned both in the case of France and Prussia between the formal rights of the military commanders and their use of these powers to assert influence on the strategies and measures developed to deal with public disorder.

The findings of Chapter Four question the idea of the use of the army as a result of co-operation between various elites to repress emerging social and political protest movements. Even if senior officials, military commanders and local elites were all keen on defending the existing social and political order against a social revolution, the three groups did not work closely together. In both Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais, local authorities and industrial elites were excluded from asserting influence on decisions concerning the use of military troops. Secondly, in Westphalia, the state administration and the army avoided close co-operation, despite their common commitment to the existing regime. In France, by contrast, despite the potential conflicts between the state administration and the army and in spite of many military commanders’ lack of sympathy for the Republican regime, the two bureaucratic elites were capable of co-operating efficiently about maintaining public order with use of the army.

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Finally, in Chapter Five the comparison of the French and Prussian case also challenges the arguments put forward that the ‘de-militarisation’ of the internal peacekeeping in Prussia was a direct consequence of the arguments put forward in the debate about the disadvantages of using troops to maintain public order. Since the same arguments were put forward in France, where the negative effects for the legitimisation of the regime were potentially more damaging than in Prussia, the continuous use of troops in France indicate that these considerations were of secondary importance of the development of the dissimilar use of military troops. Similarly, the argument that the military commanders’ acceptance of the domestic role of the army should be linked to their degree of professionalisation and their self-perception as ‘professional’ officers, cannot be used as an explanation for the dissimilar development in France and Prussia, since both the French and Prussian elites were highly professionalised corps. Moreover, the Prussian military elite, although reluctant to becoming involved in labour conflicts and repression of political protest movements, was highly politicised and involved in national politics and foreign affairs.

10.2. Main findings of the investigations: dissimilar strategies leading to diverging administrative practice

On the basis of the comparative analysis of the strategies developed in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the present study proposes a model of interpretation that focuses on the bureaucratic procedures within each system in order to explain why the policies adopted by the French and Prussian authorities in the early 1890s were persistently pursued until the outbreak of the First World War.

Two aspects are central concerning the findings of dissimilar policies in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Firstly, there is the question of why dissimilar solutions were adopted in order to solve similar problems, especially when the role attributed to the army within each system ran counter to what might otherwise have been expected

5 Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1964), and Abrahamsson (1974).
given the political profile of the two regimes? Secondly, there is the question why the
dissimilar strategies adopted in the early 1890s, in both regions, were persistently
pursued right up until the outbreak of the First World War.

10.2.1. The dissimilar policies adopted in the 1890s

It has been argued that the inclination of a bureaucratic system to use military troops
for domestic purposes is linked to the degree of stability of the regime.6 It has thus
been claimed that regimes that feared being overthrown by social or political
revolution would tend to refrain from confrontations between the army and civilians.
The findings of this study, however, indicate the opposite conclusion, namely that
when the problem of mass protest movements arose in the the early 1890s, the
strategies adopted depended on the degree to which the political executive and its
representatives at the regional level had sufficient confidence in the stability of the
regime to undertake a policy of ‘de-militarisation’ of the internal peacekeeping.

The policy of calling upon the army in France took place within a political and social
context, in which the Republican regime survived on the basis of a fragile consensus
between various forces, many of which were potentially hostile to the existing regime.
Knowing that public unrest could lead to the overthrow of the regime, and doubting
the army’s capacity to put down an armed revolt, French prefects tended to be very
concerned with carefully controlling public gatherings of any significance. Although
many senior commanders were not sympathetic to the Republican institutions, they
shared the belief that public disorder could easily develop into the subversion of
existing social and political order. Moreover, the French state authorities knew that the
regime could not politically survive bloody confrontations between public forces and
citizens. It was therefore essential to control even smaller instances of unrest in order
to prevent these from escalating into riots and violence.

In contrast, by 1890 the Prussian authorities strongly believed in the army’s capacity to
put down any armed revolt through military means. Furthermore, if violent

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6 Hobsbawm (1997).
confrontations between public forces and protest movements were to occur, they did not have the same devastating political significance as in France, since the Prussian regime never pretended to tolerate any opposition. When the problem of mass protest movements reared up in Westphalia during the strike wave of 1889-1893, the authorities could afford to experiment with strategies that did not involve the mobilisation of military troops, knowing that if these measures failed the army could always be called upon to settle any conflict. It was therefore possible for the voices within the Prussian state administration and the army who were in favour of leaving internal peacekeeping to the civil police to justify their policy of 'de-militarisation.'

Thus, the strategies adopted by the two systems were due, firstly, to dissimilar perceptions of the challenge presented by public unrest, and, secondly, to a different degree of self-confidence within the regime.

10.2.2. Institutionalisation of policy priorities through their frequent implementation

The policies adopted in France and Prussia concerning the use of troops for domestic purposes were, in the early 1890s, a set of priorities however at first there remained possibilities for a change of strategy in both countries. The attempts in Westphalia to strengthen the civil forces did not immediately constitute an obstacle to the continued use of the army, but simply delayed the moment of military intervention. Similarly, the arrangements made between the civil administration and military command in Nord-Pas-de-Calais did not, at first, constitute a practical or institutional barrier to adopting other strategies that were less dependent on assistance from military troops. However, each time a conflict was successfully managed by implementing the strategy of calling or not calling upon military assistance, the civil servants and military commanders involved regarded this as a confirmation of the appropriateness and necessity of the strategy chosen. Rather than creating practical and formal obstacles to a change of policy, each type of measure, once adopted, tended to acquire strong elements of self-perpetuation simply by being repeatedly implemented. Accordingly, the voices within the French and Prussian system which supported a change of strategy, found
themselves confronted with bureaucrats who were increasingly convinced about the appropriateness and necessity of the particular strategy they had previously adopted and successfully implemented.

10.2.3. The development or absence of standard operating procedures

The repeated implementation of the strategy of calling for military assistance led to the development of a series of unwritten rules that defined the type and size of conflict for which it was considered appropriate to call for military assistance. Moreover, standards developed concerning the time at which it was considered appropriate to issue a requisition and about how many men to mobilise. Furthermore, a series of standard operating procedures developed around the civil-military co-operation that established in detail the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the civil servants and military commanders involved. In practical terms, this meant that civil servants and military commanders at all levels knew exactly whom they should address and what they were supposed to do in any given circumstances, thus eliminating a large number of uncertainties.

In France, military participation in planning for situations of major unrest directly linked the army authorities to the state administration’s policies. Behind these plans, there was an implicit recognition that the army had an essential role to play in the management of public order. The military members of the planning commission, in adopting a strategy of preventive mobilisation of troops, also accepted that, even in cases where there was only a potential threat to public order, it was appropriate to call on military troops to watch over locations which might constitute an object of violent attack. Having accepted this way of thinking, it became, in turn, difficult to draw a clear line between ‘serious’ and ‘not very serious’ instances which potentially threatened public order. Accordingly, it became extremely difficult in individual cases, for an army corps commander to enter into a discussion with the prefectural authorities about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of mobilising military troops.
Conversely, due to the low frequency of military interventions in Westphalia, no standard operating procedures developed concerning civil-military co-operation. Thus, any measure to be implemented by military troops had to be established on the spot by the military commander in charge. Given the increasing political sensitivity of labour conflicts and protest movements, this *ad-hoc* procedure was hardly reassuring. The uncertainties concerning the details of the practical implementation of domestic military intervention as well as the unforeseeable political consequences of implementing this unusual step made the Prussian senior civil servants increasingly reluctant to call for military assistance.

10.2.4. Plans of protection and organisational dependence

In the 1890s, the measures to be implemented to deal with public disorder were established during cases of unrest. However, around the turn of the century, and under the pressure of increasingly large-scale cases of mass protest, the authorities in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais began to develop detailed plans for dealing with future possible major unrest in industrial areas. With the formal planning for such an eventuality in place, the dissimilar strategies adopted in the early 1890s became institutionalised, partly through practical organisation and preparations, partly through the administrative practices that developed around the implementation of measures.

In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the integration of the military authorities into the planning of measures to deal with public disorder created the background necessary for the later perpetuation and intensification of the strategy of military intervention in civil conflicts. In particular, three factors can be pointed out which helped to perpetuate the strategy of military involvement in domestic conflicts. In the first place, the use of the army for internal purposes was formalised by the inter-ministerial plans for protection of the public order, established during the years 1897 to 1913. The participation of the military commander in the development of these strategies increased the stream of information flowing to the army corps commander about the strength and organisation of the forces of order in the local communities, the current state of affairs in industrial areas, and the local conflicts taking place or about to break out. This continuous flow
of information to the military authorities about public order in local communities, kept the army in a permanent state of readiness for local intervention. The preventive mobilisation of troops was a key element in the move towards frequent military intervention because the plans for protection operated on the basis of potential rather than actual disturbances of public order. Thus, any gathering of a certain size might be met by intervention of military troops due to the fear of its escalation into major unrest. Secondly, since the strategies adopted implied the mobilisation of military troops at a very early stage of a conflict, it became increasingly difficult to manage a crisis without military intervention because no plans existed for managing public unrest with civil forces alone. Thirdly, the plans developed in the event of nation-wide strikes in specific professional branches (the mining, transport, and communication sectors) could easily be applied to smaller local cases too, as well as to other types of conflict. Finally, the plans overcame a series of institutional and organisational barriers between the civil and military spheres. This was done for the sake of efficient co-operation but, at the same time, it cleared the way for the extensive use of military intervention both in small local conflicts and also increasingly for non-military purposes.

In contrast to the increasing dependence of the French administration on assistance from the army, the Prussian state administration remained independent of the army in organisational terms. As a result of the continuous insistence of the Prussian military commanders on their right both to determine all details concerning military intervention and to keep their plans secret from the state administration, military intervention remained a measure which was external to civil planning. This meant that the civil forces in Prussia were organised to deal with larger conflicts than were the French civil forces, whilst a requisition of military troops completely involved reversing the existing plans, both those elaborated by the civil authorities and those established by the army corps commanders. Similarly, the institutional boundaries between the civil and military authorities remained and, in practice, the separation of the two seemed to widen. As a consequence calling for military assistance became an increasingly complicated procedure to undertake.
During the first decade of the twentieth century, the strategies adopted in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais in the early 1890s were formalised through a series of plans for protection and linked to detailed practical organisation and procedures. Accordingly, the plans established in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais to deal with large-scale unrest led to the reinforcement of diverging trajectories within each country. It therefore became increasingly complicated and politically dangerous to undertake a radical change in policy towards major internal unrest.

10.2.5. Diverging trajectories in administrative practice

Whilst increasingly close civil-military co-operation took place in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the opposite development can be observed in Westphalia. The Prussian civil and military authorities were, by 1889, already rather estranged from one another. Thereafter, they maintained their mutual isolation. Increasingly, the practical and organisational constraints on mobilising military troops for domestic conflicts prevented the supporters of a greater military presence in domestic conflicts from providing the army with a more active role.

In France, in the early 1890s, there was a great deal of uncertainty concerning a series of issues such as the distribution of authority, legal arrangements, standard operating procedures, and financial responsibility. These points were eventually settled through the frequent use of troops, thus creating strong precedents around the administrative procedures. Both the civil and military authorities became well acquainted with the details of their powers, duties and responsibilities, as well as the procedures to be followed. Uncertainties which occurred were cleared up for future occasions by the central government or the state council. The French authorities were very concerned with overall planning and formalisation of their policy. Given the sensitive and fragile alliance that existed between the major groups in France (the Republican regime, the army, the industrial bourgeoisie, and the workers), it was the formalisation of sensitive issues through negotiated plans that aided the functioning of the French administrative and political system.
In Prussia, by contrast, uncertainties surrounding the co-operation between civil and military authorities were numerous but were never settled. The Prussian state administration and the army constituted an apparently obvious coalition against disturbers of public order. However, this 'natural' alliance did not manifest itself in concrete strategies because conflicting interests between these bureaucratic elites could not be settled. The formal definitions that existed in the legal framework were open to further interpretation, which could not be settled since civil servants and military commanders alike insisted on the integrity of their sphere of authority. This also led to authorities overlapping in some fields and other areas that neither authority wanted to deal with, arguing that this was the responsibility of the other. At the same time, civil and military authorities were usually very careful not to offend the other institution by intruding into its realm of competence. This made inter-institutional co-operation very complicated and, indeed, a civil servant or military commander who attempted to approach the other was at risk of violating the unwritten rule of conduct which demanded the strict respect for the integrity of the other's field of competence and authority.

Therefore, in each individual requisition, the Prussian civil and military authorities had to reach agreements on the distribution of powers, standard operating procedures, and division of political and financial responsibilities. This type of 'gentlemen's agreement' upon which other questions of civil-military relations were settled in Prussia was insufficient to be a basis for practical co-operation and decision making on such sensitive matters as military intervention. Seen from the point of view of the Prussian state administration, the military authorities were not only difficult to control, but was also an entirely unpredictable factor. In the first place, civil servants could not simply assume that military commanders would support their plans. Secondly, there was no way of preventing the military authorities from implementing measures against the will of the civil authorities. In contrast to the increasing integration of the military commander into the decision making process in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, senior civil servants and army corps commander in Westphalia remained estranged at the professional level, even if their social contacts were more frequent and intense than was the case for their French counterparts.
10.2.6. The outcomes: dissimilar management of smaller instances of unrest

The strategies developed within the French administrative system seemed to be an adequate response to major disturbances of public order. However, at the level of administrative practice, the smooth functioning of the plans and procedures developed for larger instances of unrest seemed to have a contagious effect on the use of troops for small conflicts. Excellent civil-military co-operation led the prefectoral authorities increasingly to draw upon the army organisation to perform a series of non-military functions. As a consequence of the increasing practical dependence of the state administration on assistance from the army, the voices within and outside the military establishment who argued against the use of military troops - at least for smaller situations of unrest or strictly non-military functions - faced a significant problem because the military presence had over time lost a great deal of its significance. Between 1890 and 1914, the French army thus developed characteristics of ordinary public service and the domestic mobilisation of military troops was no longer in itself an indicator of serious conflict.

Conversely, in Prussia, the mobilisation of the army increasingly became an indicator that a really serious conflict was in the offing. Calling for military troops was in itself a measure that had great political significance, a factor which the Prussian authorities had to take seriously into consideration before taking this step. Moreover, in sensitive conflicts, involving the army could have a very pernicious effect on the development of a crisis. Due to these difficulties, the state authorities in Westphalia were increasingly hesitant in calling for military assistance, and only requested the army in situations of absolute necessity. During this process of trying to manage very serious crises without military interference, the Prussian administration experienced the full extent of the capacities of the civil forces. There seems to have been a self-sustaining dynamic between the strengthening of the various civil forces (the state police, the gendarmerie, and the municipal police forces) and the successful handling of larger instances of unrest, which then in turn led to improvements in the organisation of the civil forces that prepared them for dealing with even large-scale cases of unrest without military assistance.
If it was possible in Westphalia to develop strategies to deal with major situations of unrest by drawing solely upon the civil forces, this was not only because of the number of available civil forces, but largely because of organisation and experience. In contrast, the civil forces in Nord-Pas-de-Calais never reached such a level of efficiency. They remained mutually un-co-ordinated, and only the gendarmerie had real experience of management of crowds.

10.3. Theoretical and interpretational implications of the case study

We will now turn to the wider implications for the theoretical and interpretational debates relevant for the case study examined: 1) the importance of bureaucratic procedures for the strategies developed and the policies pursued; 2) the implications for the theoretical concepts around civil-military relations; 3) the implications for the idea of elite-co-operation; 4) the implications for the relationship between central power and local authorities.

10.3.1. Historical institutionalism

At the theoretical level, the thesis sustains the institutionalist argument that outcomes of administrative policy making can be closely linked to a particular bureaucratic mindset and to institutional logics developed within each administrative system.\(^7\) Thus, the main theoretical implication of this study has been to point to informal institutional patterns as the central explanatory factors in the persistent and different policies pursued in Prussia and France. Accordingly, the factors linked to the wider social and political context are not used as main explanatory factors, instead their place appears to lie further down the causal chain. This is not to pretend that the decision-making process should be detached from the wider social and political context. Rather, it is a way of stressing that within a given context of formal institutional organisation, wider political culture and social structures, there was space for various policies to develop. Thus, the outcome of bureaucratic policy making cannot be deduced from studying the

wider social and political context, but has to be studied through close analysis of the decision-making process.

The case study also breaks with the idea of a direct relationship between individual instances of conflict and the responses to them. Instead, it points to the need to consider a state's response to public unrest in relation to a general policy established over a period of time. This, of course, is not a way of arguing that there was no correlation at all between challenge and response, but rather that the mobilisation of troops was not primarily related to the process of bargaining between authorities and protest movements in each individual conflict, as it is sometimes assumed.8

Similarly, the findings of the thesis suggest that the origins of the dissimilar policies pursued, as well as the standard operating procedures developed, were not closely linked to the institutional organisation and the formal distribution of powers between civil and military authorities. Within the existing formal institutional framework, there was apparently plenty of space for various types of civil-military relations to develop. The dysfunctional nature of civil-military co-operation in Westphalia was principally due to the uncertainties that existed in the formal definition of authorities and the failure to settle these points of ambiguity. Therefore, paradoxically, it was the Prussian system, in which the army was formally not excluded from interfering in civilian matters, that brought about a much higher degree of separation of the army from civil institutions than was the case in the French system where the formal definitions strongly emphasised the submission of the army under civilian authority and the separation of the military authorities from influence on civilian matters.

10.3.2. Reconsideration of the theoretical concepts around civil-military relations

The dissimilar functioning of inter-institutional co-operation within the French and Prussian system raises a series of further issues concerning civil-military relations. In-so-far as the civil-military relations observed in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais are representative of the features of the French and Prussian systems, it calls into question

the traditional linkage between the separation of the civil and military realms and the extent of 'modern' or 'democratic' structures of civil-military relations. In the light of normative interpretations - particularly those put forward in the *Sonderweg* thesis - which regard the Prussian regime as authoritarian and politically 'backward', as opposed to the 'advanced' democratic regime of the French Third Republic, the findings of this study seriously question a previously accepted dichotomy. It thereby supports the voices in the recent debate on civil-military relations calling for abandonment of the conceptual definition of the civilian state and the military organisation as strictly separated entities.9

Arguably, the Prussian and wider German society of the Imperial era contained very significant features involving the militarisation of civil society. On the other hand, it is also important to note that the boundaries in France between the civil and the military were very fluid, albeit in a different way. Whereas in Germany it was civilian society that was influenced by military standards, in France it was the army that was being used increasingly for non-military purposes. In this respect, the findings of the study question the very nature of 'civil supremacy'. The high degree of integration of French senior military commanders into the decision-making process on non-military matters makes it very difficult to define exactly where and when 'civilian supremacy' existed in cases of domestic military interventions. Conversely, in the Prussian case, there were strict limits as to what the Prussian military authorities could get away with. When it came to the measures and strategies implemented during major unrest, the actual influence of the Prussian military authorities was much less significant than that enjoyed by their French counterparts.

When comparing Prussian military authority in 1913 with that of the French, Schoenbaum adopts Ralston's point of view that the French and Prussian armies were considerably closer than might at first be imagined.10 Just like Ralston, he stresses the

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elements of military autonomy within the French system, pointing out that, in questions such as recruitment and promotion policy, leadership, and internal organisation, the French army - not unlike the Prussian - enjoyed a high degree of self-determination on the eve of the First World War. What distinguishes the French and Prussian systems is not so much civilian interference in technical military matters, as the management of the grey zone between the realm of civil and military authority. The findings of this study indicate that whereas the French authorities tended to undertake inter-institutional co-operation to reach a solution that both civil and military authorities could accept, the civil and military authorities in Westphalia were not very keen to co-operate and avoided conflicts by avoiding the sphere of authority of the other. As the Prussian protection plans show, the result was that there were important areas of decision making in the maintenance of order which were not dealt with and which remained unsettled.

10.3.3. Co-operation and non-co-operation of elites

The study also leads to the reconsideration of the idea that the measures implemented against public unrest were the result of close co-operation between the state bureaucracy and local elites against emerging social and political movements. Both in the case of Westphalia and of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the findings run counter to the idea that social linkages between two bureaucratic elites determined their ability to establish efficient co-operation. The lack of linkage at the top of the Prussian-German system has already been pointed out\(^{11}\) - strangely enough sometimes by historians who also stress the importance of elite co-operation for the continuation of the Prussian-German system of privileges and preservation of the 'traditional elites.'\(^{12}\) The findings of this study sustain the idea that the Prussian state was ruled by a series of mutually estranged functional elites. Accordingly, it points to the necessity of considering the Prussian state as a divided one rather than as a monolithic entity.

In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, on the contrary, the civil and military authorities were capable of establishing a basis of co-operation against what they perceived as a threat to the

\(^{11}\) Nipperdey (1992), Mommsen (1992).
\(^{12}\) Wehler (1985) pp.244-245; Berghahn (1982) p.ix
existing order, although the bureaucratic and military elites in France were neither connected in social terms nor in terms of their commitment to the Republican regime. The findings indicate some patterns of cohesion and stability within the French state, which historians have tended to overlook because they run counter to some obvious features of conflict and instability. This helps to understand the striking accommodation of the French military establishment to the Republican system, despite the Dreyfus affair and the policies of successive governments after 1899. It inevitably leads to the question whether the French system was generally more capable of mediating and organising co-operation between the various branches of the state than was the Prussian system, where such attempts could be impeded by strong conflicting interests within the various branches of the state.

10.3.4. Questioning the relationship between central and local authorities
Finally, in relation to the local elites, the investigations show that in both France and Prussia it was possible for the state representatives to impose their measures on a local society. Despite the tradition in Westphalia of strong local powers and autonomy in relation to the Prussian state, it was equally difficult for Westphalian local authorities as for the local authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais to influence effectively the policies concerning local conflicts of the central power and state administration towards local conflicts. This breaks with the assumption that, within the Prussian system, with its strong features of local powers, the central government was less capable of imposing its policies on local society than was the centralised French state. The issue of military intervention in civilian conflict thus seems to be an exception to the general pattern of centre-periphery relations, since state authorities, with their monopoly of legitimised use of coercion, could ignore demands from local authorities.

10.4. Concluding comments
The thesis therefore concludes that different patterns of military involvement existed in the main French and Prussian industrial areas, the Westphalian Ruhr district and the French region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais between 1890 and 1914. These different patterns
run counter to what has previously been assumed about the role of the French and Prussian army in political and social conflicts, claims which have been based on the constitutional position of the French and Prussian army within the state organisation and with respect to the involvement of the French and Prussian military elite in policy making in Paris and Berlin. By focusing on the bureaucratic procedures linked to the decision making and implementation of measures to deal with major public unrest, the study has shown how self-perpetuating administrative procedures helped creating and sustaining these dissimilar patterns.
1. Appendix: Terms and their translations

Army corps: the military unit organised within a military region. In the reorganisation between 1873 and 1876, eighteen French army corps were established; this number had increased to twenty by the outbreak of the First World War. The Imperial German Army at the beginning of the Imperial era consisted of eleven Prussian, one Saxon, one Württemberg, and one Badish army corps, as well as one army corps in the newly acquired region of Alsace-Lorraine; by 1912, these fifteen army corps had become twenty-five.

Army corps commander (*Commandant de corps d'armée* and *Kommandierender General*): the most senior general commanding a military region.

*Arrondissement*: the French administrative sub-division of a *département* presided over by a sub-prefect. technically, it was the counterpart to a Prussian sub-district.

Civil authorities: this term covers both the state administration and mayors, as well as the chiefs of the municipal police corps, all of whom were formally entitled to request military assistance.

Civil forces: the three sets of forces under direct civil command: the municipal police, the state police and the *gendarmerie*.

*Département*: the French administrative unit presided over by a prefect.

District (*Regierungsbezirk*): the Prussian administrative unit presided over by a district governor (*Regierungspräsident*).

District governor (*Regierungspräsident*): a Prussian civil servant governing a district (*Regierungsbezirk*). Technically speaking, this person held a position parallel to that of a French prefect.
Division / sub-division: the largest sub-units of a military region.

**Gendarmerie**: a force under civil command; technically, however, it was a military corps constituted specifically for internal peace-keeping.

**Local governor (Landrat)**: a Prussian civil servant governing a county (*Kreis*); technically speaking, this person held a position parallel to that of a French sub-prefect.

**Military region**: the largest territorial unit in the military organisation at the provincial level. The Prussian seventh military region covered the three districts of the province of Westphalia as well as the district of Düsseldorf; the French first military region covered the *départements* of Nord and Pas-de-Calais.

**Prefect**: a French civil servant presiding over a *département*. Technically speaking, this person held a position parallel to that of a Prussian district governor.

**Province (Provinz)**: the Prussian administrative unit presided over by a province governor. Technically, it was an area comparable to a French region although a French region did not constitute an administrative unit.

**Province governor (Oberpräsident)**: a Prussian civil servant presiding over a province.

**Public forces**: comprising all the civil forces and military troops.

**Royal Guards (königliche Schutzmänner)**: Prussian state police in the larger towns.

**Sub-district (Kreis)**: the Prussian administrative unit presided over by a local governor (*Landrat*). Technically, it was the counterpart to a French *arrondissement*.

**Sub-prefect**: a French civil servant presiding over an *arrondissement*; technically speaking, the counterpart to a Prussian local governor.
2. Appendix: Cases in Westphalia and Prussia, 1889-1913

1) 1889, 5-31 May,
Westphalian miners' strike. The first meetings took place in the week 22-29 April 1889, and the strike broke out on the 3 May 1889. At its peak, more than 90,000 miners out of 104,000 were on strike in Westphalia, and together with the miners in the Saarland and Selisian coal areas, estimated 150,000 miners participated in the strike movement. Military troops were mobilised on the 5 May 1889, comprising ten infantry battalions (8,000-10,000 men) and eight cavalry squadrons (800-1,200 men). The last troops were sent back to their garrison on the 30 of May 1889.

2) 1889, from 16 May - 4 June,
Waldenburg, Silesia. Following the strike among Westphalia coal miners, an unknown number of miners went on strike in the Silesian mining areas. 15 infantry companies (1500-3750 men) and two cavalry squadrons (200-500 men) were mobilised.

3) 1889, 19 May-4 June 1889,
Saarland coal areas. Following the Westphalian miners' strike, an unknown number of miners went on strike in the Saar. Four infantry companies (800-1,000 men) and one squadron cavalry (150 men) were mobilised. Two infantry battalions (1,600-2,000 men) and four squadrons cavalry (600 men) were kept in a state of preparedness, but not mobilised.

4) 1889, 24 October-6 November,
Saarland. An unknown number of miners went on strike in Saarland. Four infantry battalions (3,600-4,000 men) and two squadrons cavalry (300 men) were mobilised.

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1 Twenty-seven cases where troops were either mobilised or kept in a state of preparedness.
*) indicates the incidents referred to where no contacts were made from the civil authorities to the army.
italic refers to incidents taking place outside Westphalia.
5) 1890, January,
Westphalian miners’ strike. Eight infantry battalions (6,400-8,000 men), six squadrons cavalry (900 men), and one company of hunters were kept in a state of preparedness, but not mobilised.

6) 1890, March,
Waldenburg, Silesia. Strike among coal miners. One infantry battalion (800-1,000 men) was kept in a state of preparedness, but not mobilised.

7) 1890, 21-22 March,
Köpenick, Brandenburg. Public unrest. One infantry company (200-250 men) mobilised. One infantry battalion (800-1,000 men) was kept in a state of preparedness, but not mobilised.

8) 1890, 18-23 April,
One cavalry squadron (150 men) mobilised to the Austrian border by Petrzniowitz because of a great strike at the other side of the border.

9) 1890, 20 April-6 May,
Saarland. Strike among 8,000 factory workers in Mülhausen. One infantry company (200-250 men) and two squadrons cavalry (300 men) mobilised.

10) 1890, 1 May,
Labour unrest in Danzig. Two infantry companies (400-500 men) mobilised. In all larger towns, troops kept in a state of preparedness.

11) 1890, August,
Berlin. Riots. Two infantry battalions (1,600-2,000 men) in a state of preparedness.

12) 1891, April,
Westphalia. Unrest among 12,000 coal miners. All troops in the military region kept in a state of preparedness, but not mobilised.
13) 1893, 10-23 January, Westphalia. Unrest in the mining sector. Eight infantry battalions (6,400-8,000 men), eight squadrons cavalry (1,200 men) kept in a state of preparedness, but not mobilised.

14) 1893, 12 June, Clausthal. Social Democrat demonstrations. One company infantry (200-250 men) kept in a state of preparedness.

* 1896, December - 1897, February. Strike among 30,000 dock workers in Hamburg. General von Waldersee suggested calling a battle ship to the Hamburg port, but the Hamburg Senate never contacted the military authorities about assistance to the civil forces.

15) 1899, June-July, Herne, Westphalia. On 22 June unrest began among 3,500 young Polish workers at eleven mines employing 18,000 miners. Between 28 June and 10 July, three battalion infantry (3,000 men) and one squadron cavalry (150 men) were mobilised.

* 1903, October-November, Wilms, Brandenburg. Strike among factory workers. Military authorities contacted by the local governor about the possibility of requesting military assistance. On independent military initiative a train was kept in ready to transport troops to the area, but these were never requested from the side of the civil authorities.

16) 1905, 1 February. Troops called to guard the Russian border by Schopponitz because of a strike on the Russian side.

* 1905, January, Westphalia. Miners' strike with participation of more than 200,000 out of 264,000 workers. The military authorities were not requested.
17) 1905, October, Berlin.
Lock-out of 33,000 electricians at the AEG company. 700 infantry soldiers were kept in a state of preparedness to protect forty men from the engineers who ensured the basic service. Eventually, no troops were mobilised.

18) 1906, 20-23 January,
Berlin. Military troops kept in a state of preparedness in many larger cities due to Social Democrat demonstrations for revision of the Prussian electoral system. In Berlin at least 4450 infantry soldiers were kept ready to intervene, but they were never mobilised.

19) 1908, 19 September, Berlin.
Troops were kept in a state of preparedness due to large-scale political demonstrations, but not mobilised.

20) 1909, 18 June,
Worms. Strike among construction workers. One battalion infantry (800-1000 men) were mobilised.

21) 1909, 13-16 August,
Karlsruhe, Baden. Strike among factory workers and followed by Social Democrat demonstrations. One company infantry (200-250 men) mobilised armed with two machine guns.

22) 1909, 22 October-16 November.
Strike among 16,000 miners in the Mansfelder area near Magdeburg. Eight infantry companies (1,600 men) and one squadron cavalry (150 men) mobilised, and three companies hunters (750 men).
23) 1910, February,
*Neumünster*. Social Democrat demonstration. One infantry company (200-250 men) mobilised.

24) 1910, March.
*Troops kept in a state of preparedness in many large cities due to Social Democrat demonstrations. No reports of troops actually mobilised.*

25) 1912, 26 January,
*Schwertz and Mariewerder*. Unrest in the wake of the Social Democrat's electoral victory. One company (200-250 men) mobilised.

26) 1912 March,
*Westphalia*. Miners' strike with participation of at least 190,000 miners. Unrest began by the 4 March, and the strike broke out on the 10 March. On the 14 March, troops were mobilised to the area. The strike ended on the 18 March. In all 5,000 soldiers were called out between the 14 and the 22 March 1912.

27) 1913, November,
*Zabern in Alsace*. Military intervention against the local population despite lack of request by civil authority.
3. Appendix : Cases of domestic military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 1889-1914

1) 1889, 10 March-April,
Strike among spinners in Lille and Armentières with more than 7,000 strikers out of 50,000. An unknown number of troops were mobilised.

2) 1889, 9-30 October,
13,000 miners' went on strike in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. At least 1,665 soldiers from the infantry, cavalry and engineers were mobilised.

3) 1891, 1 May,
'La Fusillade de Fourmies'. Fourteen striking workers killed during a May Day demonstration. 400-500 soldiers were mobilised in Nord-Pas-de-Calais for May Day.

4) 1891, 17 May,
Textile strike in Roubaix and Lille. Two Squadrons in a state of preparedness.

5) 1891, 15 June,
Riots in Fourmies. 25 gendarmes and one cavalry squadron mobilised.

6) 1891, November,
Miners' strike in Lens, Billy-Montigny, Liévin and Courrières (Pas-de-Calais). Approximately 13,000-15,000 miners participated. 16 companies (1,907 soldiers and 80 officers) and 180 gendarmes were mobilised.

7) 1893, 18 September-9 November,
A miners' strike developed into strikes in a series of professional categories. The number of strikers was estimated to 42,000. Troop from the entire first military region (6,000-7,000) were mobilised, together with infantry and cavalry from neighbouring military regions. Local as well as external gendarmes were called to the region.
8) 1898, October,
Nation-wide strike among rail workers. Troops were kept in a state of preparedness from 13 to 17 October, but were not mobilised.

9) 1900, August-September,
Strike among 2,000 dock workers in Dunkerque. An unknown number of troops were mobilised.

10) 1900 6 September,
One cavalry squadron mobilised to maintain order in Dunkerque. Reason not stated.

11) 1901, February,
An unknown number of troops mobilised to Dunkerque due to a strike among the dock workers.

12) 1901, 1 May,
Troops mobilised to all the larger ports including Dunkerque. The same day, troops from the entire first military region were kept in a state of preparedness due to May Day demonstrations.

13) 1901, 21-29 July,
Elections in Roubaix. One squadron of hunters were mobilised while another two squadrons were kept in a state of preparedness in the garrison in Lille.

14) 1901, 27-29 July,
All troops from the garrison in Lille were kept in a state of preparedness due to elections.

15) 1901, 15-25 September,
Troop were mobilised to ensure the security due to an official visit by the Russian Czarina.
16) 1901, October - December,
Nation-wide strikes in the mining sector touching all the mining areas of Nord-Pas-de-Calais. 24 companies infantry (2,400 soldiers) and 15 cavalry squadrons (1,500 mounted men) were mobilised in département Nord while 37½ companies (more than 3,500 soldiers) and 6 squadrons (600 men) were mobilised to Pas-de-Calais. The number of strikers is not stated, but the annual 'Statistique des grèves' registered 10,844 strikers in département Nord for the entire year of 1901, and only 3,865 striker were registered in Pas-de-Calais that year.

17) 1902, March,
All troops in the first military region kept in their garrisons due to rumours about a major miners' strike about to break out.

18) 1902, July-August,
Strike among workers in Vieux-Condé. The troops were prepared to mobilise according to the plans for protection. One cavalry squadron mobilised to Vieux-Condé.

19) 1902, 8-11 August,
1,529 miners out of 3,246 went on strike in Anzin. 156 infantry soldiers and 130 cavalry soldiers were mobilised together with 70 gendarmes.

20) 1902, 1 October - 19 December,
Nation-wide miners' strike which was joined by 71,000 out of the 87,000 miners' registered in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. 7,708 soldiers and 367 officers were mobilised in the département Nord and 8,240 soldiers and 400 officers were mobilised in Pas-de-Calais. In all 16,715 soldiers together with an unknown number of gendarmes.

21) 1902, October-November,
Strike among 4,000-5,000 dock workers in Dunkerque. 3 companies infantry (250-300 solciers) were mobilised together with 73 gendarmes.
22) 1903, 9 January,
Mobilisation of two companies infantry (200 soldiers) and two units cavalry (number not stated) to maintain public order in Lille during a public execution.

23) 1903, May-June,
Troops mobilised at various locations to assist municipal police forces to maintain public order during the implementation of the anti-Catholic legislation.

24) 1903, 28 April-24 July,
Major strike among spinners in La Gorgue-Estaire (département Nord). An unknown number of cavalry and infantry troops were mobilised between 23 April and 23 July to protect eleven factories.

25) 1903, 1 June,
Two cavalry squadrons (160-200 cavalry officers) mobilised to maintain public order in Dunkerque during a religious ceremony.

26) 1903, 27 June,
Cavalry mobilised to Dunkerque again at the occasion of a religious ceremony.

27) 1903, 14-15 August,
Cavalry mobilised to Dunkerque to maintain public order during a religious ceremony.

28) 1903, 15 August,
Troops mobilised in Saint-Pol-sur-Mer to maintain public order during a religious ceremony.

29) 1903, 6 September,
Strike among spinners in Baroeul. Cavalry were kept in a state of preparedness but not mobilised.
30) 1903, 10 September,
Troops were mobilised to Boulogne-sur-Mer to maintain public order at the occasion of closing of an illegal religious order.

31) 1903, 27 September - 14 November,
After a long period of unrest during since the spring 1903, a new strike broke out among textile workers. On 13 October 1903, a force of 10,000 infantry soldiers and 2,600 cavalry soldiers were mobilised in Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing, Armentières, and Quesnay. In addition there were 580 gendarmes. The same day, the number of strikers was estimated to be at 50,000.

32) 1903, October-November,
Major strike among textile workers in Hallouin (département Nord). An unknown number of troops were mobilised for weeks.

33) 1903, 22 October - November,
Troops mobilised at various locations to maintain public order during the closing of a series of illegal religious orders.

34) 7 December 1903 - 14 April 1904,
Strike among 15,000 textile workers in Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing. Troops were kept in a state of preparedness from 31 January 1904, but only mobilised in March. By 18 March thirteen battalions (at least 5,600 infantry soldiers) and eleven squadron cavalry (880-1,100 men) were mobilised in Roubaix and Tourcoing together with 330 gendarmes.

35) 1904, 29-31 July,
One battalion infantry and two squadrons cavalry in a state of preparedness in Dunkerque in order to prevent unrest during an elections.
36) 1904, August-December,
From June 1904, a nationwide strike was expected to break out among the sailors and
dock workers. From 28 July smaller military units were kept in a state of preparedness.
A strike among sailors broke out in August and reached Dunkerque by the 29 August.
By 7 September, it was considered that the strike was over but on 15 October a new
strike broke out that lasted until December. Troops were mobilised on the 29 October
and only sent back by 12 December.

37) 1905, 6 February,
Soldiers from the engineers called out to undertake strike bound work during a strike
among electricians.

38) 1905, 4 March,
One company infantry (80-100 men) mobilised in Calais at the occasion of a visit of the
Czarina of Russia.

39) 1905, March,
4,000 dock workers on strike in Dunkerque. One battalion infantry (ca.375 men) and
four squadrons cavalry (400 men) were requested on 28 March.

40) 1905, 10 June,
Four infantry companies of 310 men, and six squadrons cavalry (600 men) mobilised in
Calais at the occasion of the Spanish king passing through the town on his way to
England.

41) 1905, 3-6 September,
Mobilisation of one battalion infantry (375 men) to a strike among 350 dock workers
in the port of Boulogne-sur-Mer.

42) 1906, late January - 14 March,
Military troops mobilised in the entire region at the occasion of the implementation of
the laws on separation of the French state and the Catholic Church.
43) 1906, 10 March - 27 April,
Troops mobilised on the 10 March to maintain order after a major catastrophe in a mine at Courrière. This developed into demonstrations and strikes against poor working conditions in the mines, that spread to other professional categories and lasted until May. The number of registered strikers in the départements Nord and Pas-de-Calais for 1906 did not exceed 90,000, however the number of troops mobilised to the region between March and May exceeded 38,000, a ministerial source even mentions a number as high as 52,000.

44) 1906, 15 October,
Confrontations in Nord and Pas-de-Calais between military troops and an unknown number of strikers.

45) 1906, 19-23 November,
The army requested to protect the state functionaries in their task to finish the inventories over the possession of the Catholic Church.

46) 1907, 9 February,
Two companies infantry mobilised to Calais to maintain public order at the occasion of King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra passing through the town on their way back to Britain.

47) 1907, March,
Troops in a state of preparedness due to a strike at the ship building yard ‘Chantier de France’ in Dunkerque.

48) 1907, May,
The mayor of Valenciennes requested troops to maintain public order during a religious procession.
49) 1907, 31 May - 7 June,
Strike among 625 seamen in Dunkerque. The conflict had been under way since the 6 April. When the strike was finally declared on the 31 May, an unknown number of infantry soldiers were mobilised in order to protect the installations in the port against sabotage.

50) 1907, June,
Strike among an unknown number of workers in a paper factory in La Vallée de l’Aa. One squadron cavalry and one company infantry, altogether 104 men, were kept in a state of preparedness from the 3 June and mobilised between the 5-12 June.

51) 1908, 17 April,
One company infantry mobilised in Calais at the occasion of King Edward VII passing through the town.

52) 1908, 18 April,
On company infantry mobilised at the occasion of the Czarina of Russia passing through Dunkerque.

53) 1908, 4 May,
The troops in the entire region kept in a state of preparedness due to general elections.

54) 1908, 4 May,
125 infantry soldiers mobilised to Calais at the occasion of King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra passing through the town on their way back to Britain.

55) 1909, 13-25 March,
Nationwide strike among postal workers. In the entire region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais troops are kept in a state of preparedness until 23 March.
56) 1909, May,
Again nationwide strikes among postal workers. The troops in the entire region in a state of preparedness but not mobilised.

57) 1909, 11 October - December,
Strike among textile workers in Lille. The strike was declared on 11 October and the 12 October the army was prepared for intervention. The 13 October 2,400 textile workers were on strike but no incident had happened. On 16 October, the prefect requested four infantry companies (320-400 men) and a squadron cavalry (100 men) to maintain public order in Lille, if it happened to be disturbed. The troops were sent home by 28 October but the strike continued until 24 December.

58) 1909, 15 December - 1910, 12 May,
Strike among tile workers at Ruyoulcourt. The strike broke out on 8 November, but the infantry company was only mobilised 15 December.

59) 1910, 12 February,
One day requisition of a unit of less than one hundred infantry soldiers at the occasion of a strike among Icelandic sailors haboured in Dunkerque.

60) 1910, 1-5 March,
Great unrest in Hallouin on 1 March. 1-5 March, 893 soldiers, 37 officers and 153 gendarmes were mobilised to this town.

61) 1910, 24 March - 26 May,
Strike among construction workers and 4,000 dock workers in Dunkerque. From 31 March, the port in Dunkerque was occupied by three companies infantry (260-300 men) to prevent sabotage on the installations of the port, while more than 1,000 soldiers were mobilised to Dunkerque. By 8 April the number of troops exceeded 3,000, and at the peak of the conflict around 5 May, 5,700 soldiers and 220 gendarmes were mobilised to Dunkerque. The last troops were sent back to the garrison on the 26 May.
62) 1910, 8-9 May,
Troops from the entire region in a state of preparedness at the occasion of general elections to the National Assembly.

63) 1910, 27 July - 3 August,
Lievin (Pas-de-Calais) 3,000-5,000 strikers out of 8,000. The strike broke out on 14 June, but troops (four officers and 106 infantry soldiers) were only mobilised 27 July and were sent back on 3 August.

64) 1910, 24 August,
The mayor of Maubeuge requests an unknown number of troops for the day at the occasion of a political demonstration.

65) 1910, October-November,
Nationwide strikes among rail workers with 15,809 striking workers out of 37,123. The exact number of striking railworkers in Nord-Pas-de-Calais is unknown, but violent clashes took place between strikers and the public forces, during which a commanding officer was killed. At the same occasion, strikers were called upon in their capacity as military reservists, and thus forces back to work under military legislation.

66) 1910, 15-20 October,
Miners' strike at Billy-Montigny (Pas-de-Calais) with participation of 1,600 out of 9,500. An unknown number of troops mobilised.

67) 1910, 5 December,
Two battalions infantry (500 men) and four squadrons cavalry (400 men) kept in a state of preparedness close to Dunkerque after rumours about a 24 hours strike on this day.
68) 1910, 24-26 December,
1,500 out of 3,800 dock workers in Dunkerque on strike. an unknown number of troops mobilised.

69) 1911, 9-14 February,
Strike among textile workers in Hallouin. Cavalry mobilised 4-11 February.

70) 1911, August-September,
Bread riots in the entire region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais. No information has been found stating the exact number of troops mobilised. However, troops participated from all the garrisons within the first military region as well as from the second, third, fourth, sixth, ninth, tenth and eleventh army corps.

71) 1911, September-October,
Strike among dock workers in Calais. Two squadrons cavalry mobilised the 24 and 25 October.

72) 1911, October,
Strike among dustmen in Lille. Soldiers were called out to take away the dirt that was considered pernicious for the hygienic standards.

73) 1911, 8-29 December,
Strike among the workers at the municipal gas station in Tourcoing. Two officers and seventy soldiers were called out to maintain public order and to ensure the basic service at the gas station.

74) 1912, 11-25 March,
Strike among 5,800 miners out of 26,000 département Nord and 36,000 strikers in Pas-de-Calais out of 50,000. An unknown number of troops in a state of preparedness but never mobilised.
75) 1912, 26 April,
Troops requested to Dunkerque at the occasion of an official visit of the Czarina of Russia.

76) 1912, 9-20 July,
4,000 dock workers in Dunkerque on strike. More than 2,000-2,300 infantry soldiers and cavalry called to Dunkerque.

77) 1913 November,
73,000 miners out of 92,000 on strike. 1,759 gendarmes mobilised and all the troops foreseen in the protection plans kept in a state of preparedness.

78) 1914, 31 July,
Six Battalions infantry (2,525 men) and a cavalry squadron mobilised to Dunkerque at the occasion of a visit from the president of the Republic.
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Maifeier 1890-1911

Maifeier: Die Sammlung der Regierungsberichte auf die Zirkular-Verfügung vom 18. Februar 1890, betreffs die für den 1. Mai 1890 zu Gunsten des 8-stündigen Arbeitstages in Aussicht genommene sozialdemokratische Demonstration

Die Maifeier: Die Stellung der Polizeibehörden zu sozialdemokratischen Massendemonstrationen, insbesondere der Maifeier-Veranstaltungen 1910

Die Errichtung von Sicherheits-Korps gegen Unruhen der Arbeiter in den Bergwerken (Grubenwehren) desgleichen die Anstellung von Hilfspolizeibeamten bei grösseren Arbeiterbewegungen, 1872-1914

Polizeiabteilung H.A.1 - Rep.77 - Titel 2523 'Arbeitseinstellung, Westfalen'

Die Arbeitseinstellung in den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen in den Jahren 1889-1912

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Die Arbeitseinstellung in den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen in den Jahren 1889-1912

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'Die Erfahrungen aus dem Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrgebiet, 1912'

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3/Adhang 1 'Streik und Aussperrungen der Metallarbeiter in Minden, Kreis Iserlohn, August 1912/März 1913'

Polizeiabteilung H.A.1- Rep.77 - Titel 2525 'Arbeitseinstellung Rheinprovinz'
1/1 'Arbeitseinstellungen in den Bergwerksbezirken der Rheinprovinz' (1892-1905)
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3/Adhang 3 'Bergarbeiterbewegung im Saarrevier' (December 1912-January 1913)

H.A.1 - Rep.89 - Geheimes Zivilkabinett
2.2.1. No 13717-13738 'Inneres : Westfalen 1808-1918 - Verwaltung'
2.2.1. No 13723 'Akta des Oberpräsidenten der Provinz Westfalen 1825-1918'
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H.A.1 - Rep.90 - U.II.1 Preussisches Staatsministerium: 'Sicherheitspolizei - Schutz der öffentlichen Ordnung'
1 'Massregeln zur Aufrechterhaltung der allgemeinen Sicherheit und öffentlichen Ordnung gegen Aufruhr, Ruhestörungen ff., 1798-1848'
2/1 'Bestimmungen über die Verhängung des Kriegs- und Belagerungszustandes, 1848-1914'
3/1 'Verfügung des (Belagerungszustandes) Ausnahmezustandes, 1848-1888'
3/2 'Verfügung des (Belagerungszustandes) Ausnahmezustandes, 1889-1919'
7/1 'Verpflichtung der Gemeinden zum Ersatz des bei öffentlichen Aufläufen verursachten Schadens,1848-1920'

HAI - Rep.92 Personal papers
- Emil von Albedy (1824-1897)
- Friedrich von Kühlwetter (1809-1882)
- Konrad von Studt (1838-1921)
- Alfred von Waldersee (1832-1904)
1.2. Zentrales Staatsarchiv (Bundesarchiv Abteilung Potsdam III)
Reichsamt/ Reichsministerium des Innern
R 15.01/ 12215 'Der Kriegszustand 1910-1915'
R 15.01/ 12451 'Das Kriegsministerium 1867-1920'
R 15.01/ 12900 'Der Kriegszustand Februar 1872-November 1918'
R 15.01/ 12901 'Der Belagerungszustand in Elsass-Lothringen Juni 1891-Mai 1892'
R 15.01/ 12902 'Der Kriegszustand in fremden Staaten 1899-1905'
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R 43 Film signature 12425-12426:
'Militärische Massnahmen im Falle von Unruhen, 1890-1918'
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'Angelegenheiten höhere Militärpersonen 1879-1900'
R 43 Film signature 12449-12450:
'Kommandierende Generale 1901-1917; Kommandoangelegenheiten'
R 43 Film signature 12453:
'Drückvorschriften usw. 1900-1916'

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'Arbeitseinstellung in Westfalen, Rheinland und Schlesien 1889-1896'
R 43 Film signature 12029-12030:
'Arbeiterstatistik 1904-1913'

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'Massnahmen betreffs die militärische und politische Sicherheit des Reichslandes, 1900-1918'
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'Unruhen in Zabern'
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PH2 - Papers from the Prussian war ministry

On the maintenance of order and measures against the Social Democracy

PH2 /14 'Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von Unruhen, 1889-1914'

PH2 /15 'Die sozialdemokratischen Bestrebungen 1905-1907'

PH2 /16 'Deutschfeindliche Bestrebungen, Januar-September 1913'

PH2 /361-368 'Bekämpfung sozialdemokratischer Bestrebungen, 1877-1911'

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Correspondence, issues of competence, laws and decrees

PH2 /370 'Reichtagsmaterial' (1861-1914)

PH2 /385-398 Index of the correspondence of the war ministry "Journal der Postein- und -ausgänge, mit Angaben zum Inhalt, 1888-1913"

PH2 /433 'Auseinandersetzungen über die Zusammenarbeit zwischen zentralen und kommunalen Behörden 1907'

PH2 /455 'Verzeichnis der gesammelten AKO, Gesetze, Urkunden, Ordnungen'

PH2 /639 'Verhalten gegenüber der Sozialdemokratie, 1878-1912'

On wage administration and financial responsibility

PH2 /7 'Besoldungsvorschrift für das Preussische Heer im Frieden vom 26. Oktober 1911'

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PH2 /258 'Katastrophenhilfe durch das Militär. Schreiben an das Justizministerium. 21. März 1889'

PH 6 General Command, 1867-1919

PH6. 1 /83 'Über die Dienstpflicht 1905-1909' by General Eichhorn, army corps commander of the XVIII military region (Frankfurt)

PH6. 1 /97 'Dienstanweisung für den Kommandanten des Hauptquartiers, 1910'

PH6. 1 /261 'Taktische Aufgaben und Besprechungen des Kommandierenden Generals des XVI AK Graf von Haeseler' (ca.1891)
Personal papers
General Otto von Below N 87
General Berthold von Deimling N 559
General von Eichhorn N 513.
General Karl von Einem N 324
General Herman von Francois N 274
General August von Goeben N 188
General Colmar von der Goltz N 80
General Paul von Hindenburg N 429
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General Bruno von Mudra N 80
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1.4. Münster Hauptstaatsarchiv (HaStA)
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OP 684 ‘Ausschreitungen, Einsatz von Militär, Stimmungsberichte, 1848’
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OP 688 ‘Politische Unruhen, Einsatz von Militär, 1849-1850, 1874’
OP 653 ‘Einsatz von Militär zur Wiederherstellung von Ruhe und Ordnung’
(1822-1848)
OP 686 ‘Politische Unruhen, Ausschreitungen, Einsatz von Militär 1848-1850’
OP 685 ‘Einsatz von Militär zur Unterdrückung bzw. Verhinderung von
Unruhen enthält 1848-1852, 1880-1881’
OP 6095 ‘Notstandsmassnahmen 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’
OP 6681 ‘Verstärkerung der Polizei im Ruhrgebiet bei Arbeiterunruhen’
(1906-1911)
OP 6889 ‘Verstärkerung der Polizei im Ruhrgebiet bei Arbeiterunruhen’
(1912-1919)

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OP 2847b ‘Berichte des Generalkommandos des VII Armeekorps betreffs den
Bergarbeiterstreik’ (1889; 1897)
OP 2849,7 ‘Bergarbeiterstreik 1905: Lageberichte; Zusammenstellung der
polizeilichen Massnahmen in den Regierungsbezirken Arnsberg und
Münster, 1904-05’
OP 2832,1 ‘Verstärkung der Gendarmerie und Polizei bei Arbeiterunruhen im
Ruhrggebiet, 1889’
OP 2832.3 'Verstärkung der Gendarmerie und Polizei bei Arbeiterunruhen im Ruhrgebiet, 1890-1894'  
OP 2832.5 'Verstärkung der Gendarmerie und Polizei bei Arbeiterunruhen im Ruhrgebiet, 1895-1905'  
OP 2832a 'Zusammenstellung der Bestimmungen betrifs Verstärkung der Gendarmerie bei Arbeiterbewegungen im Ruhrgebiet'  
OP 2832b 'Plan zur Verstärkung der Gendarmerie bei Arbeiterunruhen in den Regierungsbezirken Arnsberg und Münster, 1899-1900'  
OP 2832c 'Plan zur Verstärkung der Gendarmerie bei Arbeiterunruhen in den Regierungsbezirken Arnsberg und Münster, 1905'  
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OP 2832e 'Plan zur Verstärkung der Gendarmerie bei Arbeiterunruhen in den Regierungsbezirken Münster, 1899-1900'  

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OP 2934 'Zeitungs- und Verwaltungsberichte: Erstattung der Zeitungsberichte' (1860-1891; 1903-18)  
OP 1407 'Zeitungs- und Verwaltungsberichte der Regierung Arnsberg' (1903-1913)  
OP 1406 'Zeitungs- und Verwaltungsberichte der Regierung Münster' (1873-1893)  
OP 1408 'Zeitungs- und Verwaltungsberichte der Regierungen Arnsberg, Minden, Münster' (1914-1918)  
OP 7029 'Instruktion für den Oberpräsidenten 1825-1888; 1900-1913'  

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I Pa /232 'Einsatz von Militär bei Unruhen: Instruktion über Waffengebrauch des Militärs 1851' (1840-1851)  
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I Pa /14320 'Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrkohlengebiet 1893'  

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M 1-1 'Constituierung des Militär- und Civil-Gouvernements für die Königlich-Westphälischen Provinzen und des General-Commandos, 1813-1921'
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VII-14-1/32-1 'Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912'
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VII-52-1/39-2 'Arbeitseinstellung und Streiks 1904-1911'
VII-52-2/39-2 'Arbeitseinstellung und Streiks 1899-1916'
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VII-52-a/31-1 'Massnahmen beim Bergarbeiterstreik 1910-1918'

VII-57-1/40-1 'Das Verfahren bei Bekämpfung von Arbeiterunruhen, insbesondere Heranziehung von Gendarmen. 1890-1905'
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Recklinghausen /75 'Streiks, Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1890-1893'
Recklinghausen /78 'Streiks, Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1893'
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Recklinghausen /80 'Streiks, Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1896-1897'
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Steinfurt /15 'Volksversammlungen, politische Vereine, Anarchistische Umtriebe, politische Stimmung der Bewohner, 1848-1878'
Steinfurt /822 'Politische Verbrecher, Socialdemokratische Bestrebungen, öffentliche Versammlungen und Vorträge, 1888-1921'
Steinfurt /970 'Übertreten der Vorschriften gegen Tumult und Aufruhr, 1843-1924'

1.5. Archives Nationales

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F 7 13321 'Anniversaire de Draveil 1909-1912'
F 7 12399-12404 'Culte Catholique : Inventaires 1905-1907'
F 7 12526 'Événements de Montceau-les Mines 1882-1883'
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F 7 12722 'Police générale, pouvoirs des préfets en matière de police municipale. Emploi de la troupe pour le maintien de l'ordre, 1902-1916'
F.7 12773 'Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves 1849-1914'
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Papers from the French ministry of the interior: Administration of the départements
F.2.2595 'Nord, recettes et dépenses diverses, 1889-1939'
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F.2.2624-2625 'Pas-de-Calais, Finances départementales, 1909-1940'
F.30.431-432 'Correspondance du ministère des finances avec le ministère de la guerre, 1878-1910'

Personal papers Série AP
General Antoine Chanzy. Personal papers, AP 270
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5.N.2 'Cabinet du Ministre : documents de principe et réglementation, 1890-1895'
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| 2.I.326 | 'Grèves, dockers de Dunkerque, mars-avril 1910' |
| 2.I.326 | 'Grèves, renseignements sur les troupes détachés aux grèves, 1901-1902' |
| 2.I.327 | 'Grèves, 1903, 1904, 1906' |
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2.1.282 'Soldes et indemnités, correspondance ministerielles, 1889-1899; 1904-1912'
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Général Emile Jourdy  392/GD/3

**Série k: Personal papers**

Général Henri Brugiére  1k 160 / 1 Kmi 46
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2 Z 119-627 Sous-préfecture d’Avènes: ‘Correspondance des communes de l’arrondissement avec la sous-préfecture d’Avènes’

5 Z 920-1009 Sous-préfecture de Dunkerque: ‘Affaires Militaires’
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| M 4864 | Grève générale dans le bassin houiller, 1893. Correspondance avec les autorités administrative et militaires' |
| M 1231 | Grève générale dans le bassin houiller, 1889. Documents divers' |
| M 4865 | Grève générale dans le bassin houiller, 1891. Documents divers' |
| M 4868 | Grève générale dans le bassin houiller, 1893. Provocations, réquisitions' |
| M 4863 | Grèves diverses, 1887-1896' |
| M 1793 | Tentative de grève générale et partielle des mineurs' (1900) |
| M 1794 | Grève générale des mineurs' (1900-1901) |
| M 1795+2439 | Grève générale des mineurs' (1902) |
| M 1799 | Grève générale des mineurs' (1900-1903) |
| M 1800 | Grève générale des mineurs' (1908) |
| M 1810+1796 | Grève générale des mineurs' (1906) |
| M 1797 | Grève générale des mineurs' (1906) |
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| M 1785 | Calais. Grèves ouvriers' (1890-1907) |
| M 2111 | Calais. Grèves tuiliers' (1898) |
| M 1733 | Calais. Grèves tuiliers' (1890-1898) |
| M 1735-1736 | Calais. Grèves tuiliers' (1900) |
| M 1783 | Calais. Grèves tuiliers' (1909) |
| M 1798 | Calais. Grèves des dockers' (1911) |
M 1787  ‘Calais. Grèves des dockers’ (1900-1908)
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4 Z 660  ‘Grèves Saint Omer. Emploi de troupes réquisitionnées pour le maintien de l’ordre public’ (1904; 1921)
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**France**
- Decree of 28 February 1790 ‘Sur la constitution de l’armée’
- Constitutional law of 3 September 1791 restricting the king’s right to mobilise the army
- Constitutional law of 24 June 1793 subordinating military troops to the civil authorities
- Constitutional law of 25 February 1875 subordinating armed forces to the President of the Republic

**Prussia - Germany**
- Decree of 30 April 1815 on the organisation of the state administration
- The Prussian Constitution of 31 January - 6 February 1850
- Decree of 11 - 27 March 1850 on the organisation of the state administration ‘Kreis-Bezirks- und Provinzial-Ordnung für den Preussischen Staat’
- The Imperial Constitution of 16 April 1871
- Law of 2 May 1874 ‘Reichsmilitärgesetz’
- Law of 26 July 1880 ‘über Organisation der allgemeinen Landesverwaltung’
- Law of 30 July 1883 ‘über die allgemeine Landesverwaltung’

3.2. On public disorder and the domestic role of the army

**French legislation**
- Law of 6 - 12 December 1790 ‘concernant l’organisation de la force publique’
- Law of 8 - 10 July 1791 ‘concernant la conversation des places de guerre’
- Law of 27 July - 3 August 1791 ‘sur la réquisition et l’action de la force publique’
- Law of 7 June 1848 on crowdings ‘Sur les attroupements’.
- Law of 9 August 1849 on military states of siege
- Law of 3 July 1877 on military requisitions
- Law of 3 April 1878 on military states of siege
- Decree of 4 October 1891 ‘Sur le service des places de guerre et de villes ouvertes’
- Instructions of 24 June 1903 ‘Relative à la participation de l’armée au maintien de l’ordre public’
- Instructions of 20 August 1907 ‘Relative à la participation de l’armée au maintien de l’ordre public’
- Instruction of October 1913 ‘Sur les pouvoirs de police de l’autorité militaire sur le territoire national en état de siège’

**The Prussian-German legislation**
- Circular decree of 30 December 1798 on ‘Zirkularverordnung über militärisches Eingreifen bei Tumulten und Aufläufen auf Requisition der Zivilbehörden’
- Cabinet Order of 17 October 1820 on ‘Mitwirkung der Militärbehörden zur Herstellung der Ordnung, wenn die öffentliche Ruhe durch Excesse gestört wird’
- Instruction of 31 December 1825 to the province governors
- Decree of 17 August 1835 on ‘Verordnung zur Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Ordnung und der dem Gesetz schuldigen Achtung’
3.3. On municipal powers and policing

**French legislation**
- Decree of 19 Vendémiaire Year IV (1795) on municipal police
- Law of 28 Germinal Year VI (1798) on the organisation of the gendarmerie
- Law of 28 Pluviôse Year VIII (1800) on municipal police
- Law of 5 April 1884 on municipal powers
- Decree of 20 May 1903 on the requisitioning of the gendarmerie

**The Prussian legislation**
- Law of 5 February 1794 on 'Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten'
- Decree of 11 November 1808 'Für sämtliche Städte der Preussischen Monarchie'
- Edict of 30 July 1812 on the gendarmerie
- Decree of 17 August 1835 'Verordnung zur Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Ordnung und der dem Gesetze schuldigen Achtung bei Aufläufen und Tumulten'
- Law of 11 March 1850 'Gesetz betreffend die Verpflichtung der Gemeinde zum Ersatz des bei öffentlichen Aufläufen verursachten Schadens'
- Decree of 31 December 1872 'Kreisordnung' on municipal powers
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3.4. On labour organisation, strikes, and public demonstrations

**French legislation**
- Law of 25 May 1864 legalising strikes and labour organisations
- Law of 25 March 1868 legalising non-political assemblies
- Law of 30 June 1881 on assemblies
- Law of 21 March 1884 legalising trade unions

**Prussian-German legislation**
- Law of 1869 abolishing the prohibition of strikes and labour organisations
- The Anti-Socialist Laws of 19 October 1878
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3.5. French legislation on honours and rank.
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- Law of 15 - 20 June 1907 on honours and rank
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