The Crisis of Goa between Lisbon, Rio de Janeiro, and New Delhi (1947-1961): The Transnational Destiny of an Empire

Luís Miguel Costa Serra Coelho

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization
of the European University Institute

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Department of History and Civilization

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

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A note on Portuguese India

Officially referred to as the *Estado Português da Índia* [Portuguese State of India], Portuguese India was a group of territories in the Indian subcontinent that had been under Portuguese colonial rule since the sixteenth century. Located on the western coast of India, it was subdivided into three geographically distinct districts: Goa, Daman, and Diu. Of these districts, Goa was the largest (approximately three times the size of Greater London), and the most populated, being the political-administrative center of the colony (the Governor-General's office was located in the city of Panjim – or *Pangim*). Daman was the second district, which included two enclaves (Dadra and Nagar-Haveli), followed by Diu. In the narrative that follows, 'Goa' is mostly used as a synonym for the *Estado Português da Índia* or *Índia Portuguesa.* 'Goan' and its plural are used to refer to the people of these territories (including the districts of Daman and Diu).

A note on the political geography of Brazil

Until 1960, Brazil's national capital was the city of Rio de Janeiro. Located in the southeastern part of the country and surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean, Rio de Janeiro was at that time the political, administrative, and cultural center of Brazil. In 1960, under the leadership of president Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira, the capital was moved from Rio de Janeiro to the purposely-built city of Brasília. Situated in the central plateau of Brazil (within the state of Goiás), this new location fulfilled several objectives. Amongst these was a desire to decentralize power (which had been concentrated in Rio de Janeiro ever since the colonial period) and to occupy the interior of the nation. Although the official transition of Brazil's capital from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília occurred on April 20, the transfer of the federal government was made at a far slow pace than had initially been envisioned. Therefore, the apparatus of government was for some years geographically separated between the new and the old *Distrito Federal* (Federal District). While both the official residence and workplace of the president, for instance, were immediately relocated to the new capital, other ministries, including the *Ministério das Relações Exteriores* (Ministry of External Relations, or *Itamaraty*), kept their offices in Rio de Janeiro.

Abbreviations

AHDMNE – Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (Portugal)

AHI – Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty (Brazil)

AMRE – Arquivo do Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brazil)

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

DOPS – Departamento de Ordem Política e Social

ECM – European Common Market

FRUS – Foreign Relations of the United States

MEA – Ministry of External Affairs (India)

MNE – Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (Portugal)

MRE – Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brazil)

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAI – National Archives of India

NMML – Nehru Memorial Museum and Library

OAS – Organization of American States

PIDE – Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado

SEATO – South East Asia Treaty Organization

UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

UN – United Nations

UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

US – United States of America

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Introduction

This thesis is about the crisis of Goa, a protracted dispute between Portugal and India over the sovereign rights of the *Estado Português da Índia* – a group of territories in the Indian subcontinent which had been under Portuguese colonial rule since the sixteenth century – which developed between 1947 and 1961. Although its origins dated back to (at least) the 1920s,[1] and its repercussions were still being felt as late as 1974[2], the dispute came to a height in August 1947, when India finally became a sovereign state after approximately two centuries under British rule. The new leaders of India believed that the territories of Goa, Daman, and Diu were (and had always been) an integral part of the nation, and, therefore, that they should be liberated from foreign rule and (re)incorporated into India. Geographical proximity, but also the historical and cultural affinities between 'Indo-Portuguese' and Indians, were the chief arguments employed to validate such demands.[3] Conversely, Portugal believed that while the *Estado Português da Índia* was indeed geographically part of India, it was socially, religiously, and culturally part of Europe, a product of more than four centuries of Portuguese presence and influence on the Indian subcontinent. *Índia Portuguesa*, moreover, was intrinsically part of the Portuguese nation and of its history, and thus altogether inalienable.[4] Such contrasting views regarding sovereign rights culminated in the late 1940s, in a conflict that involved multiple dimensions (i.e. political, diplomatic, economic, religious, and military), several stages (i.e. a bilateral approach, followed by *satyagraha*, followed by an international approach), and various actors (i.e. diplomats, politicians, and freedom fighters). Eventually, this dispute came to an end following a military intervention by India in December 1961, which finally dislodged the Portuguese from the subcontinent.

Although encompassing several dimensions, this thesis is particularly focused on the diplomatic aspects of the dispute between Portugal and India. This is not because other dimensions (such as the economic or religious) were unimportant – rather, it is because much of the substance of this conflict

[1] The Goa Congress Committee, which was granted representation on the All India Congress Committee, was established in 1929. However, Portugal's rule in the Indian subcontinent had been challenged numerous times by local elites (and even by non-elites), including in the late 19th century. For a concise history of Portugal's presence in Goa, see Pedro Avelar, *História de Goa. De Afonso de Albuquerque a Vassalo e Silva* (Alfragide: Texto Editores, 2012).

[2] Portugal recognized *de facto* India's sovereignty over the territories on September 24, 1974 (approximately five months after the re-establishment of democracy in Portugal). In December 31, both countries signed a treaty in which Portugal recognized *de jure* India's sovereignty. They also re-established diplomatic relations, which had been interrupted in 1955. The Decree-Law 206/75 of April 17, 1975 approved this treaty. See *Diário do Governo*, no. 90/1975.

[3] See, for instance, "CWC Resolution on Goa," July 23, 1955, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, Second Series, Volume Twenty-Nine (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2001), 389-393.

[4] See, for example, "Extracto do discurso proferido pelo Presidente do Conselho, Prof. Doutor António de Oliveira Salazar, na biblioteca da Assembleia Nacional em 25 de Novembro de 1947," November 25, 1947, No. 14, *Vinte Anos de Defesa do Estado Português da Índia, 1947-1967*, Volume I, 15-16.

was waged through diplomacy. Indeed, throughout the 14 years that it lasted, and during its several stages, both Portugal and India continually relied upon diplomatic means to achieve their opposing goals (retention vs. incorporation, respectively): during the period between 1947 and 1953, India privileged the diplomatic approach, hoping to persuade the Portuguese government to come to the negotiation table; from 1954 to 1955, Portugal initiated an international campaign to close the 'window of opportunity' for a military intervention by India (this having been initially opened by movements of *satyagrahis*); from 1956 to 1960, both countries embarked upon a 'global campaign', with the objective of recruiting international support for their opposing causes (i.e. whether Goa, Daman, and Diu were to be designated as provinces or colonies), especially at the UN; in 1961, Lisbon eventually launched an international campaign as a final attempt to dissuade New Delhi from a *coup de force* against Goa, Daman, and Diu.

By privileging such diplomatic dimensions, this thesis will emphasize the international environment in which these processes took place. This was characterized by two main phenomena, namely the decolonization process and the Cold War. In 1945, most people in Asia and Africa were still under European colonial rule, and the Cold War was still in its early stages; in 1962, the once preeminent colonial empires had been virtually dismantled, and the contest for world supremacy between the US and the USSR was expanding into the global South.[5] These phenomena, which mutually affected each other,[6] influenced the course (and outcomes) of the diplomatic struggle in question. This was reflected in the varying geographical origins and ideological positions of the international supporters recruited by the contestants: Portugal relied upon countries from the Western world, from NATO, and (to some extent) from Latin America (i.e. France, the US and Brazil); India rallied recently independent nations from Asia and Africa (i.e. Indonesia and Egypt), and (to some extent) nations from the Socialist camp (including the USSR).

[5] The literature on decolonization is extensive. See, for instance, Martin Thomas, *Fight of Flight. Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History. Power and the Politics of Difference* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010); Martin Thomas, Bob Moore and L.J. Butler, *Crises of Empire. Decolonization and Europe's Imperial States, 1918-1975* (London: Hodder Education, 2008); Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question. Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940. The past of the present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Literature on Cold War is also extensive. See, for instance, Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (New York: Basic Books, 2017); John Lamberton Harper, *The Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Federico Romero, *Storia della Guerra Fredda* (Torino: Giulio Einaudi editore, 2009); Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008); John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (London: Penguin Boks, 2006) On the expansion of the Cold War into the global South, see, for instance, Robert J. McMahon (ed), *The Cold War in the Third World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[6] See Mark Philip Bradley, "Decolonization, the global South, and the Cold War, 1919-1962," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume 1. Origins* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 464-485

To be sure, this protracted dispute between Portugal and India has received some academic attention, not least because it marked the beginning of the demise of Portuguese colonialism. Besides general works[7] and works that have touched upon the topics in passing,[8] two studies have been fully dedicated to the question. Maria Manuel Stocker's book, *Xeque Mate a Goa* (2005), and Sandrine Bègue two-volume study, *La Fin de Goa et de L'Estado da Índia* (2007), provided the very first comprehensive and serious studies of the crisis.[9] Although differing in their approaches (Stocker framed this episode within the overall crisis of the Portuguese colonial empire, while Bègue tended to balance both international and local dynamics), both authors reached similar conclusions with regard to the diplomatic dimension: considering it to be militarily indefensible, Portugal's strategy for the *Estado Português da Índia* focused primarily on conducting a diplomatic campaign, intended to create a network of alliances that would dissuade India from its attempt at incorporation. Arguments included juridical and historical rights, international law, the wishes of the local population, but also Cold War-based justifications. Both authors privileged Portugal's relations with the US and the UK in their analyses, since these were perceived as the only allied nations that could influence the development and outcome of the dispute. Stocker and Bègue generally concluded that both Washington and London initially adopted a position of tacit support for Portugal, but eventually came to regard with increasing embarrassment Portuguese obduracy regarding decolonization (especially after the 'internationalization' of the Portuguese colonial problem at the UN). Although focusing mainly on Portugal's point of view, these authors also shed some light on India's actions during the dispute. Both emphasized that Nehru privileged a non-violent approach throughout the crisis (Bègue claimed that India even sought to avoid the internationalization of the latter until 1955), but was subsequently compelled to abandon diplomacy in favor of a military solution in 1961, for both external (increasing pressure from its non-aligned partners) and domestic reasons (increasing criticism of Nehru's foreign policy; the electoral imperatives of the Minister of Defense, Krishna Menon, in the state of Bombay; and the need to alleviate opposition pressure regarding the Sino-Indian border conflict).

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[7] See, for instance, Valentim Alexandre, *Contra o Vento. Portugal, o Império e a Maré Anti-colonial (1945-1960)*, (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 2017), particularly chapters seven, eight and 20.

[8] See, for example, Pedro Aires Oliveira, *Os Despojos da Aliança. A Grã-Bretanha e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa. 1945-1975)*, (Lisboa: Tinta da China, 2007), namely chapters two and five; Daniel Marcos, "Uma Aliança Circunstancial: Portugal e os Estados Unidos nos anos 1950," (PhD diss., ISCTE, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, 2011), chapter three; Daniel Marcos, *Salazar e de Gaulle: a França e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa (1958-1968)*, (Lisboa: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007); Ana Mónica Fonsenca, *A Força das Armas: o Apoio da República Federal da Alemanha ao Estado Novo (1958-1968),* (Lisboa: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007); Luis Nuno Rodrigues, "Os Estados Unidos e a questão de Goa em 1961," *Ler História*, no. 42 (2002), 61-90; Luis Nuno Rodrigues, *Salazar e Kennedy: A Crise de uma Aliança* (Lisboa: Editorial Noticias, 2002). See also the biography of António de Oliveira Salazar by Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, *Salazar* (Alfragide: Dom Quixote, 2010).

[9] Maria Manuel Stocker, *Xeque-Mate a Goa*, (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 2005) and, the recent edition, *Xeque-Mate a Goa. O Princípio do Fim do Império Português*, (Lisboa: Texto Editores, 2011); and Sandrine Bègue, *La fin de Goa et de l'Estado da Índia; Décolonisation et Guerre Froide dans le Sous-Continent Indien (1945-1962), Volumes I and II,* (Lisboa: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007).

However, while Portugal's perspective has certainly received considerable academic attention, the same cannot be said with regard to India. The crisis has received little attention from Indian scholars, and no works focusing specifically on New Delhi's role exist. This, one might surmise, is because most of the relevant Indian official and private documents remain classified. Also, one might suppose, the language barrier has prevented many scholars from consulting the documents that have been declassified by the Government of Portugal. Therefore, this crisis has been only briefly addressed in general studies and biographies of Jawaharlal Nehru.[10] These have focused on its final stages, namely the 'liberation' of Portuguese India (often referred to as a 'police action'), and the political reasons for its timing. Regarding this latter aspect, these works have reproduced the explanations that have already been mentioned: Nehru's decision to embrace a military solution resulted mainly from domestic pressures (i.e. the fact that opposition parties criticized the lack of results of the Congress Party's policy regarding Goa; the electoral imperatives of Krishna Menon; the need to fend off pressure regarding the Sino-Indian border conflict). Moreover, Cold War historians – namely those focusing on South Asia – have also privileged the episode of military intervention, although they have been more concerned to highlight how the issue of Goa was just one of the many sticking points within the already tense relations between the US and India.[11]

Together, these studies have made a crucial contribution to our understanding of the diplomatic dimension of the crisis. Nonetheless, while privileging mainly the US and the UK as the main interlocutors of both Portugal and India, some authors have dropped other hints that deserve further inquiry. Countries such as Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico, and even the USSR – just to mention a few – seem to have also played a role in this dispute: they openly proclaimed their support for one of the contestants, or tacitly supported one of them; they voted in favor or against Portugal at the UN (or, sometimes, abstained or were absent at resolutions). Among these, though, one country stands out, and seems to have played a distinct role in this crisis, namely Brazil. Throughout this dispute, Brazil not only advocated the maintenance of the *Estado Português da Índia*, but also acted as the protecting power of Portugal in New Delhi (after the Indian government had severed diplomatic relations in 1955). Furthermore, Brazil formally supported Portugal's colonial policy at the UN – voting, for instance, against resolution 1542 (XV), which defined "Goa and its dependencies" as a non-self-governing territory. But what was the precise role of Brazil in this crisis?

[10] See, for example, Ramachandra Guha, *India after Gandhi. The History of the World's Largest Democracy*, (London: Picador, 2008); Benjamin Zachariah, *Nehru*, (London: Routledge, 2004); Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, *A History of India* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004); Stanley Wolpert, *Nehru. A Tryst with Destiny* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[11] See, for instance, Robert McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery. The United States, India, and Pakistan*¸ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) and Paul McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia. Britain, the United States and the Indian subcontinent 1945-1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). See also M. Srinivas Chary, *The Eagle and Peacock. U.S. Foreign Policy Toward India Since Independence* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995).

And why did an anti-colonial, democratic, and southern nation decide to support a colonial and authoritarian regime in its efforts to preserve its imperial hold over the Indian subcontinent?

Although scarce, the existing literature on Portugal-Brazil relations has put forward some explanations. General – but also more specialized works – have referred to the historical and cultural ties between the two countries, alongside the large and well-organized Portuguese immigrant community's influence (mainly in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo), in order to justify Brazil's international support for Portugal.[12] The work of Williams da Silva Gonçalves, *O Realismo da Fraternidade: Brasil-Portugal* (2003), which remains the only study of the period in which the dispute over Portuguese India took place, added (at least) two more powerful explanations.[13] First, the Cold War discourse employed by Portugal appealed to the most conservative sectors of Brazilian society, including not only those in the government, but also politicians, diplomats, and journalists. Second, the theory of *Luso-Tropicalismo*, which was formulated by the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, and which depicted Portuguese colonization as unique and non-racist, also created a favorable atmosphere. Gonçalves, however, dismissed the idea that this support received unanimous assent within Brazil: anti-colonial activists, in particular, questioned and contested such alignment with Portugal and support for Portuguese colonialism. However, Gonçalves' work did not cover the whole period (since his focus was on the presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek in Brazil, 1956-1961), leaving out of consideration, for instance, the Indian military intervention. Besides, his work was published in 1994, when most of Brazil's state and diplomatic documents were still classified. The book *Hotel Trópico* (2010) by Jerry Dávila considered Brazil-Portugal relations during 1961, but its main focus was on Brazil's actions regarding the Angolan uprising.[14]

Gonçalves' book also opened up some avenues regarding Brazil-India relations during the crisis, namely how New Delhi attempted to approach Rio de Janeiro between 1958 and 1959 (Nehru attempted to visit Brazil), and just how polarized the responses within Brazil's government actually were. Unfortunately, he did not develop this argument at greater length (indeed, this was not his objective). Unfortunately, too, historians have hitherto ignored these interactions. This is because

[12] See, for example, José Calvet de Magalhães, *Breve História das Relações Diplomáticas entre o Brasil e Portugal* (São Paulo: Editora Paz e Terra, 1999) and *Relance Histórico das Relações Diplomáticas Luso-Brasileiras* (Lisboa: Quetzal Editores, 1997). See also, although for a different period, Paula Marques dos Santos, "As Relações Luso-Brasileiras (1930-1945)" (PhD Diss., Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, 2005); Heloísa Paulo, *Aqui Também é Portugal. A Colónia Portuguesa do Brasil e o Salazarismo* (Coimbra: Quarteto Editora, 2000) and *Estado Novo e Propaganda em Portugal e no Brasil. O SPN/SNI e o DIP* (Coimbra: Livraria Minerva, 1994).

[13] Williams da Silva Gonçalves, *O Realismo da Fraternidade: Brasil-Portugal* (Lisboa: Instituto de Ciências Sociais, 2003). See also Williams da Silva Gonçalves, "O Realismo da Fraternidade: As relações Brasil-Portugal no governo Kubitschek" (PhD diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 1994).

[14] Jerry Dávila, *Hotel Trópico. Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization. 1950-1980*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010).

Latin America is often considered a peripheral region in Nehru's foreign policy, which has even led some Indian scholars to refer to the early period of relations between India and Latin America as one of "distant acquaintance" (the late 1940s to the early 1960s).[15] Nevertheless, Varun Sahni has recently recognized that among all the Latin American nations, Brazil played the most significant role for India, "both before (negative) and after (positive) India's liberation of Goa."[16]

Therefore, instead of re-examining the crisis of Goa and its diplomatic dimensions, this thesis will explore the latter through a diplomatic triangle, the sides of which were constituted by Portugal, India, and Brazil. This is due to a belief that the diplomatic dimensions of such a crisis cannot be understand solely through the interactions of both contestants with a Cold War power (in this case, the US) or a common ally (the UK). As already mentioned, the evidence strongly suggests that the conflict between Lisbon and New Delhi was also waged far away from the 'traditional centers of power', namely in an apparently neutral and unimportant capital city of Latin America. Bringing Brazil under consideration will permit a fresh approach to this episode, particularly by tracing how Portugal and India sought to recruit a country that was neither a Cold War power, nor a European colonial power, nor a recently independent nation in Asia and Africa. Furthermore, this triangular approach will enable us to connect countries and regions that have often been left separate in the relevant historiographies: Portugal and Latin America, and also India and Latin America.

Thus, this thesis explores the political and cultural aspects of the wider diplomacy carried out by both Portugal and India towards Brazil. It is interested in the strategy employed by both countries to recruit Brazil to their opposing causes: which discourses, arguments, and means were used to obtain Rio de Janeiro's sympathy? Which obstacles did they encounter during this endeavor? How important was the support of Brazil for both contestants? The thesis will also explore the way in which Brazil received Portugal's requests for support. How did Brazil's statesmen, diplomats, and intellectuals regard the dispute between Portugal and India? Was this dispute perceived as a minor question? How did they regard Portuguese colonialism and colonialism in general? How did they appraise the developments that characterized these years, namely the emergence of the Cold War, the rise of non-alignment, and the demise of colonialism? Crucially, what role was played by Brazil? Did Rio de Janeiro seek to influence its regional partners? If so, for what motives?

This thesis is divided into six chapters, and the narrative is chronological. After a brief introduction to the challenges faced by Portugal after World War II, chapter one explores the early period of the

[15] Varun Sahni, "India and Latin America," in Sumit Ganguly (ed.) *Engaging the World: Indian Foreign Policy since 1947*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)
[16] Varun Sahni, "Brazil: Fellow Traveler on the Long and Winding Road to Grandeza," in David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

dispute between Portugal and India over Goa (1947-1953), particularly the initial diplomatic interactions between the two countries, the pressure applied by India to compel the Portuguese to relinquish their ecclesiastic rights in India, and the first formal request by India to open negotiations for transferring the territories. This chapter also contextualizes and explores the development of relations between Portugal and Brazil, as well as between India and Brazil, during these early years. Finally, it examines the moment at which the Indian government opted to cease bilateral contacts. Chapter two is dedicated to the 'internationalization' of the crisis, which took place during the following two years (1954-1955), due to several developments: the occupation of the inland enclaves of Dadrá and Nagar-Haveli (in the district of Daman); the mass *satyagrahis* against Goa; the conference at Bandung; Nehru's visit to the Vatican; and the public proclamations of the US and the USSR regarding the crisis. Besides evaluating the impact of these events on the dispute, this chapter explores how Portugal and India appraised, and reacted to, these developments, as well as the reaction of Brazil. Attention is also given to the political crisis in the latter country (particularly the suicide of President Getúlio Vargas), and the subsequent impact of this, mainly on Portugal-Brazil relations.

Chapter three is largely dedicated to the first experiences of Portuguese diplomats at the UN and the subsequent 'globalization' of the problem of Goa (and of Portuguese colonialism in general). Besides examining the advantages and disadvantages of Portugal's membership in this international organization (for both Portugal and India), it explores the most significant motives behind the decision of the Portuguese government to accept membership in 1955. Subsequently, it explores the first clash between Portugal and the anti-colonial delegations, particularly in the Fourth Committee, and the ways in which both Brazil and India reacted. This chapter also explores how the new government in Brazil – presided over by Juscelino Kubitschek (1956) – pursued a foreign policy that concealed some significant tactical shits, which had the potential to modify (on a long-term basis) the behavior of Brazil regarding issues that could affect Portugal-Brazil relations. Finally, it explores in detail Portuguese President Craveiro Lopes' visit to Brazil in 1957, primarily for the purpose of reinforcing Portugal's diplomatic influence over Rio de Janeiro. Chapter four examines Brazil's first attempts to design a new foreign policy, which could accommodate recent international developments, and particularly policies that were more sympathetic to Asian and African nations. It also explores how Portugal sought to keep track of these developments, and how it approached the second clash with anti-colonial nations at the UN. Finally, the last part of the chapter examines the tentative diplomatic approach of India towards Brazil, and how Portugal actively sought to frustrate such overtures.

The third clash between Portugal and the anti-colonial delegations at the UN provides the starting point of chapter five. This explores the increasing difficulties faced by Portugal, and the suggestions

made by the Portuguese delegation about how to overcome them. It also emphasizes how the Brazilian delegation began to question its support for Portugal. This chapter also examines in detail a pivotal moment of the crisis between Portugal and Brazil, triggered by the request for political asylum in Rio de Janeiro by the Portuguese General Humberto Delgado in 1959, as well as the ways in which this episode was particularly harmful to the transatlantic relationship. Indeed, the last two parts of this chapter are dedicated to the aftermath of this crisis, exploring particularly the manifestations of discontent within Brazil's government and civil society regarding the policy of support for Portugal. Furthermore, it examines how some within the Itamaraty began to question the 'originality' of Portuguese colonialism, and to prepare strategies for a post-colonial scenario.

The last chapter is dedicated to the period between 1960 and 1961. The first part is dedicated to Portugal's efforts to bring Juscelino Kubitschek to Lisbon, and to counteract those voices within the Brazilian government that advocated a departure from the traditional alignment with Portugal. It also examines the renewed attempt by New Delhi to approach Rio de Janeiro. Finally, it explores the decline of Portugal's position at the UN, and the increasing difficulties in the dialogue between Portugal and Brazil regarding colonialism. A second part examines how Jânio Quadros and João Goulart (both of whom served as President in 1961) effected significant changes in foreign policy, and how this impacted upon the relationship with Portugal. Besides an examination of the so-called 'Independent Foreign Policy', the chapter explores the behavior of Brazil regarding two-crucial events: the case of the Santa Maria (the hijacking of a Portuguese liner by Portuguese political dissidents) and the uprising in Angola. Finally, the last part of the chapter is dedicated to the antecedents and aftermath of the military intervention by India, which put an end to this dispute. This focuses mainly on how Portugal sought to mobilize the international community (and particularly Brazil) to dissuade India from a *coup de force* against the territories, and how Brazil reacted to such requests.

Besides the relevant academic literature, this thesis makes extensive use of primary sources, with a particular focus on state and diplomatic documents. The bulk of the research was conducted in the archives of the Portuguese, Brazilian, and Indian foreign ministries, namely the *Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros* (Lisbon, Portugal), the *Arquivo do Palácio do Itamaraty* (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), the *Arquivo do Ministério das Relações Exteriores* (Brasília, Brazil), and the National Archives of India (New Delhi, India). The documents consulted are primarily ambassadorial cables, reports, memos, press clippings, treaties, and speeches. Other archives were also consulted, such as the *Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo* (Portugal), the *Arquivo Nacional* (Brazil), and the archive of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (India).

A collection of documents (4 volumes) dedicated to the 'diplomatic defense' of Portuguese India (*Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Vinte Anos de Defesa do Estado Português da Índia, 1947-1967)*, compiled by the Portuguese foreign minister Alberto Franco Nogueira (1961-1968), also complemented this research. The same is true of the *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, which was especially useful (although it only covers the period up to 1960), and the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series. This thesis also drew upon the *Diário das Sessões* (Session Diaries) of the Portuguese National Assembly, and the debate registry of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and Senate (*Diário do Congresso Nacional*; *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados*). Furthermore, it also made use of several periodicals (from Portugal and the US, but especially from Brazil), the memoirs of relevant diplomatic officials, private correspondence, and biographies.

Chapter One | Early Diplomatic Moves, 1947-1953

Postwar

The aftermath of World War II posed significant challenges to the Portuguese authoritarian regime. First and foremost was the need to contain the rising and threatening discontent at home. Besides the general dissatisfaction with the dearth of foodstuffs, low wages, and rising living costs (plus poor living conditions and significant social inequality in the case of industrial and rural workers), many opponents of the *Estado Novo* were also actively conspiring to overthrow António de Oliveira Salazar. Republicans, royalists, and communists saw this moment as a crucial opportunity to strike a blow against a regime which, they believed, now had more to do with the past than with the future.[1] Moreover, there was also a need to secure a smooth (and safe) integration of the regime into the new (democratic) international order. Despite its policy of 'cooperative neutrality' during the war (that is, after 1943), the *Estado Novo* was essentially a dictatorship that had been forged during the nationalist movement of the 1930s,[2] and whose role as a supporter of Francisco Franco's crusade during the Spanish Civil War was still vividly remembered.[3] Finally, and not least importantly, there was a need to safeguard the colonial empire against any threats. Although Portugal's empire was not directly threatened during the immediate aftermath of the war, the postwar panorama did not bode well for the future. Anti-colonial movements in other empires were already asserting their independence (i.e. Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam), demanding their independence (i.e. Lebanon and Jordan), and even successfully negotiating it (i.e. India and Pakistan). Besides, the two emerging postwar superpowers – the United States of America and the Soviet Union – were ideologically anti-colonial nations.[4]

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[1] See José Mattoso, *História de Portugal. O Estado Novo. Volume VII*, (Lisboa: Editorial Estampa, 1998), 353-369.

[2] On the pre-war *Estado Novo*, see among others, António Costa Pinto and Nuno Gonçalo Monteiro [dir], *História Contemporânea de Portugal. Olhando para dentro (1930-1960), Volume 4*, (Carnaxide: Objectiva, 2010); António Costa Pinto, *A Vaga Corporativa. Corporativismo e Ditaduras na Europa e na América Latina,* (Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2016); Valentim Alexandre, *O Roubo das Almas*, (Lisboa: Dom Quixote, 2006). On *Estado Novo* during World War II, see António José Telo, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra, 1941-1945,* (Lisboa: Vega, 1991).

[3] For instance, as Pedro Aires Oliveira has stated, the links between the *Estado Novo* and Franco's nationalist movement during the Spanish Civil War were quite vivid in the memory of the British left and Labour movement. In 1947, for example, Ernest Bevin had to intervene during a party meeting to appease the critics of the Portuguese dictatorship. See Pedro Aires Oliveira, *Os Despojos da Aliança. A Grã-Bretanha e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa. 1945-1975)*, (Lisboa: Tinta da China, 2007), 47.

[4] See Mark Philip Bradley, "Decolonization, the global South, and the Cold War, 1919-1962," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume 1. Origins* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 464-485. See also Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 1 and 2.

The regime eventually found solutions to these challenges. Discontent at home was assuaged through wage increases, a partial lifting of censorship, political amnesty, and, surprisingly, a call for 'free' legislative elections (across all Portuguese territories, including those overseas). Announced on October 6 and held on November 18 (1945), the election resulted in a 'total victory' for the *União Nacional* [National Union] – not least because the opposition [*Movimento de Unidade Democrática*] had given up, understanding that the normal conditions of democracy would not be respected. After a period of reorganization, the apparatus of repression was reestablished: the democratic movement was declared illegal; several opposition figures were arrested (others dismissed from their public duties); strikes and demonstrations were violently repressed.[5] The integration of the regime into the new international order was sluggish, but was eventually achieved. The British provided precious aid in 1946: two visits of the Royal Navy to Lisbon; a declaration of support from Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in the House of Commons; support for Portugal's request for membership of the United Nations; and a flattering reference to Portugal by Winston Churchill in his famous 'Iron Curtain' speech in Missouri. Together, such votes of confidence signaled that the *Estado Novo* had found a place within the new order.[6] Moreover, the Cold War progressed, much to Portugal's advantage: Portugal and the US signed a cooperation agreement in 1948, which stipulated the permanent presence of a US airbase in Lajes (located in the geo-strategically important area of the Azores); Portugal joined NATO as a founding member in 1949; and a bilateral defense agreement between Lisbon and Washington was concluded in 1951.[7] As for the empire, several 'juridical improvements' were made during the aftermath of the war. In September 1945, the Colonial Act of 1930 was 'technically' refined with regard to some particular points – although it still retained its fierce colonial spirit (i.e. article two stipulated that "it is of the organic essence of the Portuguese nation that its historic function is to possess and colonize its overseas domains, and to civilize the native populations within them") and terminology

[5] See Mattoso, *História*, 373-381; 394-399. On democratic opposition, see, for instance, Irene Flunser Pimentel, *História da Oposição à Ditadura, 1926-1974,* (Porto: Figueirinhas, 2014), chapter 3. On repression, see, for instance Fernando Rosas, *Salazar e o Poder. A Arte de Saber Durar,* (Lisboa: Tinta da China, 2013); Irene Flunser Pimentel, *A História da PIDE*, (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 2011); and Diego Palácio Cerezales, *Portugal à Coronhada. Protesto Popular e ordem pública nos séculos XIX e XX*, (Lisboa: Tinta da China, 2011).

[6] See, for instance, Oliveira, *Os Despojos*, 46-55. Winston Churchill underlined that "the British have an alliance with Portugal unbroken since 1384, and which produced fruitful results at critical moments in the late war."

[7] As Luís Nuno Rodrigues stated, "with the beginning of the Cold War, The Azores reinforced its strategic value as a transatlantic 'stepping stone', and therefore the U.S. negotiated with Portugal for the maintenance of military facilities on the islands. The Portuguese government accepted the request and renewed US base rights in 1946, 1948, 1951, and 1957. These bilateral agreements marked the gradual integration of Portugal within the US 'sphere of influence' in Western Europe during the early years of the Cold War. Multilaterally, Portugal was also invited to participate in the Marshall Plan and to be a founding member of [NATO]. The Azores, the Marshall Plan, and NATO, therefore, were important instruments for the international acceptance of Salazar's authoritarian regime […]" See Luís Nuno Rodrigues, "The International Dimensions of Portuguese Colonial Crisis," in Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto, *The Ends of European Colonial Empires. Cases and Comparisons* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 244. See also Mattoso, *História*, 399-402 and Nuno Severiano Teixeira, "Between Africa and Europe: Portuguese Foreign Policy, 1890-2000," in António Costa Pinto (ed.), *Contemporary Portugal. Politics, Society and Culture* (New York: SSM-Columbia University Press, 2011), 95-130.

(i.e. article three still employed terms such as 'colonial empire' and 'colonies').[8] Some months later, in May 1946, a new Organic Charter of the Portuguese Colonial Empire was introduced. Colonial governments were granted increased responsibilities, although control remained centralized via the Ministry of the Colonies.[9] Although some called for further adjustments (not only in terminology, but particularly in colonial administration), the regime apparently believed that these 'improvements' were enough for the time being.[10]

While the regime managed to contain discontent at home and to secure a smooth integration into the international order, the measures to safeguard the empire were minimal and insufficient, particularly bearing in mind the anti-colonial crescendo during the postwar period. Contrary to other colonial empires – namely the British and the French – the regime avoided major reforms in crucial areas, such as the political-administrative, the legislative, the economic, and the educational. Instead, Portugal continued to exert its imperial rule as in the 1930s: it allowed, for instance, practices of forced labor in its colonies in Africa; it permitted working conditions similar to slavery; and it maintained a discriminatory policy of 'citizenship,' which denied rights to the great majority of its African subjects.[11] The status of the *Indigena* [Indigenous' regime], which in Africa divided population between civilized, assimilate, and indigenous, was maintained. Such indifference was not only a result of deep-rooted racism – most natives were considered to be inferior, and naturally submissive to colonial power – but also of the idea that the Portuguese empire had a long and prosperous future ahead of it.

But while the situation in Africa (including in Portuguese Africa) remained under control, postwar developments in the Indian subcontinent indicated future difficulties. In March 1946, as nationalist agitation in India increased (the Royal Indian Navy had mutinied one month previously), the British government had initiated negotiations, with the ultimate goal of leaving India. Only seven months later, a transitional government was formed, and the Indian Congress Party leader, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's chosen successor, Jawaharlal Nehru, was appointed as both prime minister and foreign minister.[12] Meanwhile, in February 1947, the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee confirmed that the British Raj – the jewel in the imperial crown and a symbol of Britain's global power – would be brought to an end by March 31, 1948. Despite the subsequent partition of British India (between India and Pakistan, that is, along religious lines), and the shocking communal violence this involved

[8] See Diário do Governo, I Série, No. 208, Lei 2009, September 17, 1945.
[9] See Diário do Governo, I Série, No. 117, Lei 2016, May 29, 1946.
[10] See Valentim Alexandre, *Contra o Vento. Portugal, o Império e a Maré Anticolonial (1945-1960)*, (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 2017), 76-77.
[11] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 77-78
[12] On Jawaharlal Nehru, see, for instance, Ramachandra Guha, "Jawaharlal Nehru. A Romantic in Politics," in Ramachandra Guha (ed.), *Makers of Modern Asia*, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2014), chapter 5; Benjamin Zachariah, *Nehru*, (London: Routledge, 2004).

(which killed between 250,000 and 1,000,000 people, and made approximately 10,000,000 refugees),[13] the transfer of power to the new leaders would be accomplished ahead of schedule, on August 15, 1947.[14]

Such a sudden outcome surprised everyone, including the British themselves: approximately two years previously, the Labour Party's manifesto for the 1945 general election, *Let Us Face the Future*, had simply declared that a Labour government would seek "the advancement of India to responsible self-government." Nevertheless, Britain's grip on India had begun to slip, and the Attlee government concluded that London's interests would be best served by accelerating Indian independence, with the hope of retaining close economic and security ties with the Indian subcontinent.[15] However, the British withdrawal was also the outcome of decades of Indian struggle: the challenge to foreign rule had begun in the nineteenth century, but had accelerated during the 1920s, fueled by the Rowlatt Act (or the 'Black Act' of 1919, which had curtailed civil liberties), and by the Amritsar massacre of April 1919 (in which British troops had fired on an unarmed crowd and killed several hundred people). The entrance of Gandhi onto the political scene, the adoption of his programme of non-cooperation, based on civil disobedience (*satyagraha*,[16] instead of the more moderate methods employed until then), and the *Quit India* movement during the war had contributed to pushing Britain out of India.[17]

Such movement for liberation in India had inspired some Indo-Portuguese. After a brief period of limited autonomy that had been granted during the administrative decentralization of the Republican period (1910-1926), elite Goan circles had become disgruntled by the recentralization carried out by the *Estado Novo*. The publication of the Colonial Act of 1930 had further increased this discontent: in particular, Goans were denied any right to participation in their own affairs, and lowered to the status of second-class citizens in relation to metropolitan Portuguese (thus being placed on the same level as African subjects). However, in Goa – more so than in the rest of the empire – there was a local elite,

[13] Although the Boundary Commission's results were kept secret until August 15, 1947, many areas tried to cleanse themselves of their minorities. At the Punjab, for instance, "massacres of Hindus and Sikhs by Muslims and of Muslims by Hindus and Sikhs" were organized, "accompanied by apparently gratuitous mutilations of bodies, by rapes, abductions, and communities killing their own women to protect their 'honour'." See Zachariah, *Nehru*, 137. See also Ramachandra Guha, *India after Gandhi. The History of the World's Largest Democracy*, (London: Picador, 2008), 8-16. On partition, see, for instance, Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition. Violence, Nationalism and History in India,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chapter 1.

[14] See John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World*, (London: Macmillan, 1988). See also Paul McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia. Britain, the United States and the Indian subcontinent 1945-1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 9-11.

[15] McGarr, *The Cold War*, 10.

[16] As defined by Stanley Wolpert, *satyagraha* [hold fast to the truth] was a "revolutionary method of nonviolent non-cooperation [developed] during [Gandhi's] years in South Africa. […] Though rooted in the past, and drawing upon Hindu religious mantras, Gandhi developed *satyagraha* as a practical technique or method of "action" against social evil, believing it should universally effective in its power to combat cruel and violent forces of every kind." See Stanley Wolpert, "Satyagraha," in Stanley Wolpert (ed.) *Encyclopedia of India, Volume 4, S-Z*, (Hills: Thomson Gale, 2006), 7-9.

[17] See Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History. Power and the Politics of Difference*, (New Jersey: Princeton, 2010), 375-377; 390-393; 403-404; 418-420.

educated in Great Britain, Portugal, and India, which had long clamored for greater autonomy. Naturally, many prominent Goans regarded Gandhi, Nehru, and the Indian National Congress as the answer to these aspirations, and some even began to regard unification of Goa with India as their ultimate objective.[18]

The establishment of the Goa Congress Committee in 1929 was, as one prominent Goan recalled, "the first expression of the desire of the people of Goa to identify themselves with the Indian freedom movement." Established by Tristão Bragança e Cunha, the Goa Congress Committee south to eliminate the "unnatural distinction between Portuguese Indians and British Indians," arguing that these two groups were not "isolated distinct entities." This was acknowledged by the leaders of the Indian freedom movement, which recognized the Goan Committee, and granted it representation on the All India Congress Committee, thus accepting the principle that the freedom of India would be achieved only with the freedom of the Portuguese territories.[19]

T.B. Cunha carried on his activity in Goa and Bombay through the political education of the Goan people. Many pamphlets were published in Konkani, Marathi, English, and Portuguese languages, with titles such as "The Attack on the Indian Rupee," and the "Denationalization of Goans."[20] In March 1946, when the British Raj began to crumble, the Goa Congress Committee passed a resolution, stating that

> Although Goa cannot have any destiny of its own except that of our common motherland India, of which it is an integral part, it finds itself chained today by bonds of political and spiritual slavery to the bankrupt Portuguese imperialism. We Goans are separated from the rest of India by artificial barriers created by an alien Portuguese rule which is incompetent, corrupt and callous to the needs and interests of the Goan inhabitants. An inglorious rule of 435 years has systemically attempted to make us forget our culture and traditions and has landed us in complete economic ruin. The Portuguese have robbed us and exploited us and have forced upon us a costly bureaucracy and an alien civilization against which we revolt. The Goan Congress Committee adhere to the national call of 'Quit India' demand of the Indian National

[18]Maria Manuel Stocker, *Xeque-Mate a Goa. O Princípio do Fim do Império Português*, (Lisboa: Texto Editores, 2011), 39-43; 44-48; 54-57; Sandrine Bègue, *La fin de Goa et de l'Estado da Índia; Décolonisation et Guerre Froide dans le Sous-Continent Indien (1945-1962), Volume I,* (Lisboa: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007), 129-133; 136-138; P.D. Gaitonde, *The Liberation of Goa. A Participant's View of History*, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 13-27.

[19] B.G. Kunte (ed.), *Goa Freedom Struggle vis-à-vis Maharashtra, Volume VIII*, (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1978), 49-50, cited in Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 24.

[20] See Nishtha Desai, "The Denationalisation of Goans. An Insight into the Construction of Cultural Identity," in *Lusotopie*, 2000, 469-476.

> Congress and call upon the Portuguese to leave the shores of Goa, Daman, and Diu, so that we can achieve our destiny in common with the rest of India.[21]

Although the Goa Congress Committee was the most visible manifestation of Goan dissatisfaction with Portuguese rule, other movements soon emerged. Many preached non-violence (civil disobedience), as did the Goa Congress Committee. However, others considered sabotage and terrorism to be legitimate means to achieve unification with India, such as the *Azad Gomantak Dal*. At the same time, some elite circles favored independence over unification, since they believed that Goa had its own characteristics (such as its Christianity), and would risk losing its prominence following integration into India. Others, additionally, favored a special statute of autonomy, in order to maintain a privileged relationship with Portugal.[22]

The Portuguese regime was aware of all these developments. Besides the warnings of some prominent Goans and of the ecclesiastic authorities of the colony, the official reports that had reached Lisbon had already underlined the 'unification' goals of the Indian Congress Party.[23] During the 1930s, the Portuguese consul in Bombay had even complained to the British authorities about 'offensive' articles about Portugal, published in newspapers and pamphlets distributed in India.[24] Furthermore, the legislative elections of November 1945 (which also took place in Portuguese India) had demonstrated that Indian nationalism had already penetrated the colony: a list of candidates inspired by the Indian Congress Party's ideas regarding unification had run against the list supported by Lisbon. Although the outcome of the election was favorable to the *União Nacional* (which received two representatives in the Portuguese National Assembly), a local colonial official admitted that the list had aimed to demonstrate the strength of all Hindus, "united by the policy of the Congress Party," and had had enough support to defeat the *União Nacional*'s candidates – an admission which strongly implied that the election in Portuguese India was rigged (since the Goan nationalists officially received a mere 2,493 votes (26.5%), against the 6,892 votes ostensibly cast for the regime candidates).[25]

The agitation of 1946 just confirmed that India's independence could mean trouble for Portugal. Some months after Attlee's historic declaration, in June, Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, the North Indian socialist

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[21] B.G Kunte (ed.) *Goa Freedom Struggle vis-à-vis Maharashtra* (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1978), 49-50, as quoted in Gaitonde*, The Liberation*, 26-27.
[22] Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 44; Bègue, *La fin de Goa*, 141.
[23] Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 56-57; 73.
[24] Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 25.
[25] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 124; Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 75-76. See also Filipa Alexandra Carvalho Sousa Lopes, *As Vozes da Oposição ao Estado Novo e a Questão de Goa (1950-1961)*, (PhD diss., Universidade do Porto, 2017), 80-88.

leader,[26] arrived in Goa, organized a meeting with local nationalists, and ultimately attempted to address a public meeting in Margão, attended by approximately 5,000 people. The Portuguese authorities immediately arrested Lohia and dispersed the crowd, but other meetings took place throughout the Portuguese territory. Lohia was released two days later, and deported to India.[27] The news of his temporary imprisonment soon reached India. Gandhi, who had become aware of Portugal's discriminatory practices after a brief stopover in Mozambique – "I was astonished to see the distinction that the Government made between Indians and Portuguese and between the Africans and themselves" – commented in his paper *Harijan* that

> The small Portuguese settlement, which merely exists on the sufferance of the British Government, can ill afford to ape its bad manners. In free India, Goa cannot be allowed to exist as a separate entity in opposition to the laws of the state. Without a shot being fired, the people of Goa will be able to claim and receive the rights of citizenship of the free state. The present Portuguese Government will no longer be able to rely upon the protection of the British army to isolate and keep under subjection the inhabitants of Goa against their will. I would venture to advise the Portuguese Government of Goa to recognize the signs of the times and come to honorable terms with its inhabitants.[28]

While the Portuguese regime could do little or nothing to prevent Gandhi and others from expressing their opinions in India, they could limit the expression of such opinions within Portuguese India. Public addresses and acts of civil disobedience were severely punished: Purshotam Kakodkar, who would later become a member of the Lok Sabha, was sentenced to nine years of deportation by a military court; T.B. Cunha and José Loyola, amongst other leaders, were sentenced to between 8 and 28 years in prison, as well as to deportation to the Peniche Prison in Portugal, and to the Tarrafal concentration camp in Cape Verde. Under the pretense of safeguarding the colony against the communal violence that was currently convulsing India – but, in reality, seeking to reinforce Portuguese power – special African troops were dispatched to Goa. Up until June 1947, the Goan political movement sought to replicate the civil disobedience strategy of the National Congress. However, it faltered in the face of violent repression, prison sentences, and deportations.[29] On August 3, 1947, Lohia cautioned Goans,

[26] On Rammanohar Lohia see Ramachandra Guha, *Makers of Modern India*, (New Delhi: Viking, 2010), 385-403.
[27] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 124-125; Bègue, *La fin de Goa*, 141-142; Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 28-29
[28] Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 29. See also Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 79-80.
[29] Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 79; Bègue, *La fin de Goa*, 144-145.

in what amounted to a premonition of things to come: "In spite of the fact that there will be a national Government in New Delhi, still it will not be possible for that Government to look into these affairs immediately [referring to the liberation of Portuguese India]. They have to look into their own affairs."[30]

A Tough Start

At the stroke of midnight on August 14-15, India finally awoke to life and freedom, as announced by Nehru in the Constituent Assembly.[31] After approximately two centuries of dominion, Britain quit India, and power was transferred to the newly constituted sovereign state of India. Among those to congratulate Nehru on this new chapter in India's history was Salazar. "Prompted by the unfailing interest with which, for centuries, they had followed the destinies of India," he wrote in a brief note dated August 14, "the Portuguese Government wish on this notable occasion, to extend to Your Excellency their best wishes for success of the peaceful pursuits, and the future welfare of the peoples of India."[32] Replying two days later, Nehru employed the same terse language. "I hasten to thank Your Excellency for the kind message that you have sent me on the occasion of the attainment by India of her cherished goal of Sovereign Status, and take this opportunity to convey to you the assurance of my highest consideration."[33] As Alberto Franco Nogueira, the Portuguese diplomat and future minister of Foreign Affairs, would write some years later, this exchange was an "icy" start to Portuguese-Indian dialogue.[34] The Portuguese message emphasized that India was not a 'single people nation,' but rather a 'complex of peoples'. Likewise, there was no reference to cordial relations, nor any expression of the usual diplomatic courtesies.[35] The Indian reply also made no mention of any of these diplomatic formulas, nor made any reference to future cordial relations. Bearing in mind that Portugal and India

[30] Kunte, *Goa Freedom*, 115, as quoted in Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 35.
[31] In his speech to the Constituent Assembly at midnight on August 14-15, 1947, Nehru stated: "Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially. At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom." See "A Tryst with Destiny," August 14, 1947, in in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, (henceforth *SWJN*), Second Series, Volume Three (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), 135-136. Apparently, the celebrations had begun on August 14 because astrologers had stipulated that August 15 was an "inauspicious date." For more details, see Guha, *India after Gandhi*, 5.
[32] "Do Presidente do Conselho ao Primeiro Ministro da União Indiana," August 14, 1947, No. 4, *in* Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Vinte Anos de Defesa do Estado Português da Índia (1947-1967)*, Volume I, (henceforth *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I) (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1967), 5.
[33] "Do Primeiro Ministro da União Indiana ao Presidente do Conselho," August 16, 1947, No. 5, *VADEPI, 1947-1967,* I, 5-6.
[34] Franco Nogueira, *Salazar. O Ataque (1945-1958)*, Volume IV, (Porto: Livraria Civilização Editora, 1986), 79-80. On Alberto Marciano Gorjão Franco Nogueira, see Manuel de Lucena, "Franco Nogueira: os meandros de uma fidelidade," in *Análise Social*, vol. XXXVI (160), 2001, 863-891.
[35] See Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 41.

were now 'neighbors' in the Indian subcontinent following the latter's independence, these early communiques did not bode well for their future relationship.

Nehru's worrying declarations regarding Portuguese India had not gone unnoticed in Lisbon. Besides the early statements made by Gandhi, and the agitation initiated by Lohia – events that the Portuguese government had associated with the future rulers of India – Lisbon had also received the declarations made by the future Indian prime minister in mid-1946 with great concern. On July 20, after underlining that Goa was a "problem" that could not be ignored, and recalling that Goa was "part of India," Nehru stated that "any struggle for freedom there becomes part of our own struggle."[36] Roughly two months later, the Pandit emphasized the "deplorable conditions" of the Portuguese settlements in the Indian subcontinent, and cautioned that such a "state of affairs" could not "continue long in Goa."[37] Such worrying statements led Salazar, in a private letter to Marcello Caetano, the minister of the Colonies and future president of the Council, to request that the latter begin "to face the problem, and to prepare all the elements – historical, juridical, statistical, etc. – of our defense before any international body, or even before the world if needed." Although Salazar downplayed the possibility of an Indian military maneuver against the Portuguese settlements, he admitted that the new Indian government would make "life unbearable" through all available means.[38]

On the other hand, India also had reason to be worried about the Portuguese attitude in India. Besides the fact that Lisbon had repressed pro-India demonstrations, and that Portuguese leaders had made disquieting statements, the Indian government was also aware that talks were in progress between Portugal and Hyderabad regarding the possibility of the use of the Mormugão harbor by the latter. Mir Usman Ali – the Nizam [prince] of Hyderabad and the richest man in the world according to some sources – was allegedly expanding his army and buying arms in Europe, in order to preserve Hyderabad's status as a separate state. Moreover, he was also believed to have signed a secret treaty with Portugal, granting him the use of the strategic harbor. Access to the sea – vital to preserving Hyderabad's independence – would be exchanged for the development of the harbor facilities.[39] From the Indian perspective, the Nizam's refusal to accede to India was one of many headaches occasioned

[36] Nehru also stated that India "sympathized" with Goans, and that India was following Goa with "anxious interest." "Goa's Struggle for Freedom," July 20, 1946, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJN,* Volume Fifteen, (New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited, 1982), 468-469.

[37] "An Independent Foreign Policy," September 26, 1946, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJN,* Second Series, Volume One (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), 504.

[38] As quoted in Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 125-126; and Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 81. Originally quoted in José Freire Antunes, *Salazar e Caetano – Cartas Secretas*, *1932-1968* (Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores, 1993), 159-160.

[39] Such news even reached the international media. See, for instance, *The New York Times* [New York, U.S.], December 27, 1946, 10. See also *The New York Times* [New York, U.S.], April 9, 1947, 13. The Portuguese Consul to Bombay, João de Lucena, was later 'informally' warned that the Indian Government was aware of this Portugal-Hyderabad connection. See "Do Cônsul de Portugal em Bombaim ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," September 15, 1947, No. 7, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 7-8. See Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 132-134; Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 42-44.

by the departure of the British – as were the cases of Junagadh and Kashmir – since New Delhi was keen to ensure that India's largest princely state, with a population of nearly 16 million people (approximately 85 per cent of them Hindus, although Muslims dominated the army, police and civil service), would join the Indian Union, along with the other 500 or more princely states. After all, if Hyderabad preserved its independence (or joined Pakistan), it would effectively sever the north of India from the south.[40]

Both parties' reasons were thus well-founded. Besides the fact that Nehru despised Salazar and his regime – "Portugal does not differ in any way in regard to its present government from General Franco's Spanish government"[41] – the Indian government considered the absorption of Goa, Daman, and Diu into India as "inevitable", and planned to put forward a formal proposal to this effect as soon as was convenient, as is revealed by internal documents.[42] On the other hand, the Portuguese government was indeed negotiating with Hyderabad regarding access to Mormugão. Lisbon believed that its objectives in the region would be best served by the 'balkanization' of India, which would include not only the consolidation of Pakistan as an independent state, but also the separation of the other princely states from India – a strategy analogous to the one adopted by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's first Governor-General and the leader of the Muslim League.[43] Indeed, a divided India, the Portuguese leader believed, would be forced to adopt a position of greater tolerance regarding other sovereignties, including in Goa, Daman, and Diu. As such, when the Nizam first approached the Portuguese government – through the British businessman Sir Alexander Roger – Salazar did not disdain the opportunity of meddling in the complex political, religious, economic and strategic scenario of post-Partition India. However, contrary to Indian fears, negotiations between Portugal and the state of Hyderabad were still at a very early stage, and nothing concrete had been settled.[44]

In the months following India's independence, both nations did nothing to relieve this state of tension. Indeed, quite to the contrary. In November 1947, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the head of the Indian delegation to the UN, voted against the admission of Portugal to the organization, and harshly

[40] According to his biographer, Nehru "held strong views on this subject of the [princely] states. He detested the feudal autocracy and total suppression of popular feeling, and the prospect of these puppet princes […] setting themselves up as independent monarchs drove him into intense exasperation." In Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, *vol. I: 1889-1957* (London: Cape, 1975), 359; as quoted in Guha, *India After Gandhi*, 39. See also Srinath Raghaven, *War and Peace in Modern India* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), Chapter 3; and Guha, *India after Gandhi*, 36-56.

[41] "Portuguese Government in Goa," February 2, 1947, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJW,* Second Series, Volume One (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), 562-564.

[42] "The Future of the French and Portuguese Settlements," June 27, 1947, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Three (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), 411-412.

[43] See Raghaven, *War and Peace*, 28; Oliveira, *Os Despojos*, 85-87; and Bègue, *La fin de Goa*, 237.

[44] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 132-134.

criticized the Portuguese regime.[45] "Among the applicants for admission to the United Nations there is, in our opinion, one country, and one only, which is definitely not fitted to be a member of the United Nations – I mean Portugal," she said. "The Portuguese Government," she went on, "is from all accounts distinctly authoritarian. It has a distinctly Fascist flavor."[46] Vijaya Pandit then cited Portuguese India as a good example of such authoritarian and fascist tendencies: the territory had recently been the scene of a massive violation of civil liberties, in which the leader of a liberation movement [probably referring to T.B. Cunha] had been sentenced to eight years of prison and deported to Portugal. "The people of Goa do not have a representative government; if they ask for one, the response of Portugal is to send a war cruiser to Mormugão."[47] Much less critical but equally incisive, Salazar made his first speech on Portuguese India a couple of weeks later. After acknowledging that *"a queda"* [the fall] of the British Raj was a "great occurrence of our time," he emphasized that "if geographically Goa is India, socially, religiously, and culturally, Goa is Europe. If there are [in Goa] westerners, Indo-Portuguese, and Indians, politically there are only Portuguese citizens." Salazar went so far as to recall that Portugal would not bow to foreign pressure, asserting that "if new circumstances and popular demands […] justify modifications to [Goa's] statute or administrative regime, then this is a problem that concerns Portuguese India and ourselves."[48]

Irrespective of this tension, the Portuguese government looked forward to establishing diplomatic relations with India. Although recently cautioned by the British Foreign Office that India was not interested in establishing relations – allegedly due to an inflammatory speech made by the new minister of the Colonies, Teófilo Duarte, and the arrival of fresh troops in the colony – Lisbon considered it necessary to open a direct diplomatic channel with New Delhi, and to normalize the relations between the two neighboring nations. And, it ought to be added, to a certain extent, to mitigate threats. A first attempt to engage with the Indian authorities had already been made in mid-October without success – a request by the Portuguese Consul to Bombay, João de Lucena, for an interview with Nehru had received no reply.[49] Only in December had diplomatic contact finally been

[45] More than one year previously, on August 11, 1946, the Congress Working Committee had adopted a resolution in which it was stated that it was "improper and against the basic principles of the U.N.O. to admit to their membership a country which has an authoritarian and reactionary administration and denies democracy and civil liberties, and which, in its colonies, carries on the worst form of colonial rule. They trust, therefore, that Portugal will not be admitted to the U.N.O." See "The Freedom of Goa," August 11, 1946, in Sarvepalli Gopal, *SWJN*, Volume Fifteen, (New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited, 1982), 491-492.

[46] As quoted in *The New York Times* [New York, U.S.], November 9, 1947, 6.

[47] As described by the Portuguese Consul João de Lucena, according to the Bombay newspaper *National Standard*. "Do Cônsul de Portugal em Bombaim ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," November 10, 1947, No. 13, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 15.

[48] "Extracto do discurso proferido pelo Presidente do Conselho, Prof. Doutor António de Oliveira Salazar, na biblioteca da Assembleia Nacional em 25 de Novembro de 1947," November 25, 1947, No. 14, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 15-16.

[49] "Do Presidente do Conselho ao Cônsul de Portugal em Bombaim," September 25, 1947, No. 10; "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Cônsul de Portugal em Bombaim," October 14, 1947, No. 11; "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em Londres," November 27, 1947, No. 15; *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 9-14; 17-18.

established, namely between the Portuguese embassy in London and the Indian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, V.K. Krishna Menon.

These conversations concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations revealed the divergence of Portuguese and Indian views regarding the future of the Portuguese settlements. Portuguese diplomats, both in London and New Delhi, affirmed that their nation felt itself *indissoluvelmente* [indissolubly] tied to Goa, Daman, and Diu, for both historical and emotional reasons, and warned that their government was unwilling to discuss the issue of sovereignty. Furthermore, they had added that their position in India was different from that of the British, since Portuguese law considered all citizens equal, regardless of race, religion, or color, as exemplified by the presence of several Goans in prominent positions, in areas such as justice, politics, education, academia, and even diplomacy. On the other hand, Indian diplomats underlined that New Delhi believed that all foreign powers must quit India ("in a peaceful way such as England, or in a worse way if they prefer," as Krishna Menon told the Portuguese ambassador to London, the duke of Palmella). Nevertheless, the populace had the right to decide whether they wanted to integrate into India or not, and, if so, they would be allowed to retain economic, cultural, and religious ties to their former metropolis – only not political ones. Also, they stressed that it would follow two main principles regarding the "problem" of Portuguese India, as articulated by Nehru: not resorting to violent means, and respect for the popular will. In any case, this issue would be addressed after having established relations.[50]

These initial contacts also confirmed Salazar's suspicions regarding the situation: India would not employ military means against Portugal, but would surely do everything else possible to put an end to Portuguese rule in the Indian subcontinent. The forceful words of Krishna Menon, the reference to a possible plebiscite, and the repeated statement that New Delhi intended to address the "problem" of the Portuguese settlements all indicated that Lisbon was about to face several difficulties. Indeed, as the duke of Palmella wrote immediately after his first interview with the Indian High Commissioner, "these conversations […] had the advantage of clarifying [our different] positions [regarding Portuguese and Indians]. I believe that we have a very difficult period ahead, [since] our point of view is far removed from their point of view."[51]

Relations were finally established in August 1948, but not without successive postponements. Since March, Krishna Menon – the "great architect" of the establishment of India's diplomatic network,

[50] See, for instance, "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," December 7, 1947, No. 18; "Do Cônsul de Portugal em Bombaim ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," January 8, 1948, No. 31; *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 22-26; 38-42.
[51] "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," December 7, 1947, No. 18; *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 22-26.

according to Portuguese diplomats – had repeatedly delayed the conclusion of the negotiations between India and Portugal, citing reasons that ranged from unavoidable matters to the need to consult New Delhi. The motives behind this behavior are still unknown, but everything points to the conclusion that Menon had deliberately delayed the conclusion of talks. Indeed, it was only after the announcement of the opening of negotiations to establish diplomatic relations between Portugal and Pakistan – and a letter of reprimand from Secretary General Girja Shankar Bajpai ("this thing has been hanging fire for some time […] we ought now to regard conclusion of arrangements [with Portugal]") – that Menon had approached Lisbon again.[52] In Paris, following a meeting with the Portuguese foreign minister, José Caeiro da Matta, an agreement was finally achieved. "The Governments of India and Portugal, desirous of promoting and strengthening friendship between their respective countries, have decided to exchange diplomatic representatives at the Legation level."[53] Interestingly, just one month later, Hyderabad ceased to exist as an 'independent state', as the Indian government decided to launch Operation Polo in order to force its accession to India. Four days later, the Nizam resigned, taking with him Salazar's hope of 'balkanizing' India.[54]

The Religious Issue

Despite repeated references to the need to integrate Goa, Daman, and Diu into its territory, New Delhi lighted upon the problem of religion as a means to exert pressure on the Portuguese government, particularly through reference to the privileges that the so-called *Padroado do Oriente* had granted to Portugal since the 16th century. Established during the period of the *Descobrimentos* [Discoveries], and last reviewed in 1940, the *Padroado* conferred upon the Portuguese government the privilege of preferment for the Sees of Mangalore, Quilon, Trichinopoly, Cochin, Mylapore, and Bombay. Furthermore, according to its provisions, the Holy See was obliged to consult the president of the Portuguese Republic regarding any appointment. While the Bishops of Cochin and Mylapore were required to be of Portuguese nationality, the Archbishop of Bombay was to be alternately of Portuguese and British nationality. Finally, the Archdiocese of Goa still controlled several dioceses beyond the limits of Portuguese India.[55]

[52] "From Bajpai to Krishna Menon," [S], July 6, 1948, F. 18 (16) – X / 48, NAI.
[53] "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," August 6, 1948, No. 88, *VADEPI, 1947-1967,* I, 91.
[54] See Raghaven, *War and Peace,* Chapter 3; and Guha, *India after Gandhi*, 55-56
[55] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 135.

During his meeting with Caeiro da Matta in Paris, Krishna Menon had already stated that his government considered it unacceptable that certain dioceses in India were still subject to the jurisdiction of the Archbishopric of Goa. He had also revealed that New Delhi and the Vatican were in negotiations to modify this situation, as well as other matters of a religious nature, and that the Holy See was favorable to examining the situation.[56] Although Lisbon remained silent about these revelations, it could not ignore an *aide memoire* delivered on September 7. Here, India recognized the "valuable work that Portugal has accomplished in the spread of European culture and the Christian faith," but deemed that "the time has [now] come when all dioceses in India should be administered directly by the Holy See, without the intervention of a third power." Moreover, the authority of the Archbishopric of Goa should be limited to the Portuguese territories. As such, the message ended suggesting that the Portuguese government "should enter into discussions with the Vatican, in order to review the existing agreements."[57]

Nehru had been cautioned about these privileges, and the urgent need to put an end to them, even before the independence of India. The Indian consul in Goa, Mirza Rashid Ali Baig, had reported in late 1946 that the Portuguese state and the Goan Church "formed two halves of an integral whole," and that any movement for "unification with India was considered as anti-Catholic." Therefore, Baig believed, a "divorce" between Portugal and the local church was necessary, since for the movement to be successful, the "support of the majority of both Catholics and Hindus was needed." Although Nehru had suspected that the consul had "somewhat exaggerated the political significance of the Catholic Church in Goa," he recognized that Portugal as a colonial power, while generally "very weak," could still exert "a great deal of influence" thanks to the "backing" of the Vatican.[58] Perhaps even more annoying to Nehru was the symbolism of having another foreign power exerting a form of authority within Indian territory. To Reverend Jerome D'Souza, who would later become a member of the Indian delegation to the UN in 1949, Nehru had written:

> It appears to me rather extraordinary as it is an extension of the Portuguese Republic's authority over considerable parts of India. I do not understand this mixture of the spiritual domain and the Holy See with the political authority of a foreign government. You will realize, of course, that it is anomalous and irritating to have any rule or arrangement which keeps out

[56] "Apontamento da conversa realizada na Embaixada de Portugal em Paris entre o Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Dr. Caeiro da Mata, e o Alto Comissário da União Indiana em Londres," July 27, 1948, No. 82 *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 84.
[57] "Do Alto Comissário da União Indiana ao Embaixador de Portugal em Londres," September 7, 1948, No. 100, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 99-103.
[58] "The Future of Goa," February 2, 1947, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJW,* Second Series, Volume Two, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), 558-562.

> Indians from any position of authority in reference to a foreigner. The association of the Catholic Church with a foreign political power in India must necessarily produce confusion in people's minds and prejudice them in regard to the Church. I am sure this cannot be the desire of the Holy See. At the time when this arrangement was made, there may or may not have been justification for it. But in present circumstances any such arrangement comes into direct conflict with Indian nationalism and aspirations.[59]

Nehru had then approached the Vatican via the Apostolic Delegate Leo Peter Kierkels, with fairly encouraging results. After emphasizing that something had to be done regarding the Catholic Church in Goa and in India – "it [is] not good for religion to get mixed up with politics" – Nehru had obtained Kierkels' agreement that the matter needed to be addressed with Portugal. "The Church of Rome is far-seeing and looks at things with an eye to the future," Nehru later wrote to Baig. "They know what is coming and want to adapt themselves to it."[60] Indeed, in March 1948, having been appointed Papal Internuncio to New Delhi, Kierkels had informed Nehru that the Holy See "was wholly agreeable to revision of the Concordat," and especially those clauses that guaranteed Portuguese control over certain dioceses in India. Having gained the Vatican's approval, Nehru's only other question was whether India ought to take up the issue separately, or as part of its general approach to the Portuguese territories. Eventually, and in order to avoid further delays, the Indian government decided to raise the religious issue separately, trusting that the related political matters would later arise in due course.[61]

Neither Krishna Menon's friendly warning nor the *aide memoire* surprised the Portuguese regime. Some months previously, in June, the Necessidades[62] had received confidential and reliable information that the Indian government was sounding out the Vatican, with the aim of nullifying the existing agreements between Portugal and the Holy See.[63] However, the attitude of the Vatican regarding the Indian government was surprising, and surely left a bitter taste in the mouths of the Portuguese. Upon learning through the Indian newspapers that Anthony D'Mello, an Indian Catholic of Goan origin, had been received by Pope Pius XII in order to confer about the religious situation in

[59] "To Jerome D'Souza," February 8, 1947, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJW,* Second Series, Volume Two, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), 565-566.
[60] "To Rashid Ali Baig," February 14, 1947, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJW,* Second Series, Volume Two, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), 566-568.
[61] "India and the Vatican," March 3, 1948, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJW,* Second Series, Volume Two, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), 544-545.
[62] The Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was located at the *Palácio das Necessidades* [Palace of Necessidades]
[63] "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em Londres," June 2, 1948, No. 63, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 67-69.

India, and particularly the problem of episcopal nominations, Caeiro da Mata lamented: "It is regrettable that the Holy See has agreed to talk about such a delicate matter with a simple individual."[64] After all, even if some within the Vatican believed that the Portuguese *Padroado* was incompatible with an independent India, claiming that the Catholic Church needed to adapt to emergent Asian nationalism, the Pope had until then welcomed the missionary and civilizing activities of the Portuguese within their empire. Indeed, Pope Pius XII had recently encouraged the Portuguese government to cooperate in the expansion of the Faith throughout the Empire.[65]

But how did the Portuguese react to such developments? From an ecclesiastic point of view, as expressed in the opinions of the bishops of Mylapore and Cochin, despite the religious value of the *Padroado* and the missionary work made until then, the rise of Asian nationalism tended to suggest the advisability of a 'retreat', negotiated in agreement with the Vatican. In their opinion, Indian nationalists viewed with "hostility" any imposition made by foreigners, and it would thus be wiser to voluntarily renounce such rights before being forced to do so by the Indian government. From a political point of view, as expressed by the Minister of the Colonies, Téofilo Duarte, it would be reasonable to relinquish the *Padroado*, but only on the condition that this be compensated by India's formal recognition of Goa, Damão, and Diu as Portuguese territories. The ecclesiastic point of view was eventually adopted, albeit with some bitterness. Salazar believed that the disappearance of the *Padroado* was not only a "religious disaster," but also a "political disaster" for Portugal, since the Portuguese 'retreat' would damage the country's prestige, thereby its strength, and ultimately the stability of Portuguese India. Nonetheless, bearing in mind the new realities created by the independence of India, as underlined by the bishops of Mylapore and Cochin, a relinquishment of Portuguese religious privileges within Indian territory should be eventually conceded.[66]

Despite this decision, the Portuguese government delayed the revision of the existing agreements for as long as possible. In January 1949, Nehru reminded the incoming Portuguese minister to India, Vasco Vieira Garin, that he considered the situation to be "highly unsatisfactory," and that "no future appointments on the basis of the old Padroado will be accepted by India." Vasco Garin regretted the delay, and replied that the matter was being considered.[67] Approximately two months later, the Secretary of State for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, Monsignor Domenico Tardini, attempted

[64] "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal no Vaticano," July 12, 1948, No. 76; "Do Embaixador de Portugal no Vaticano ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," July 18, 1948, No. 77; "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal no Vaticano," July 19, 1948, No. 78; *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 77-70.
[65] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 138-139.
[66] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 140-143.
[67] "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," January 25, 1949, No. 120, *VADEPI, 1947-1967,* I, 116-119; "Portuguese Presence in India," January 25, 1949, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJN, Second Series,* Volume Nine, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 489-490.

without success to initiate negotiations with Portugal, allegedly due to a renewed request from New Delhi.[68] Annoyed by the absence of a reply to its *aide memoire*, along with such constant postponements, the Indian government eventually adopted an official position. "Eight months have elapsed since the presentation of the aide memoire, and, though the Government of India not received any reply, they are now more than ever convinced that the time has come to terminate the arrangements outlined," a message dated July 7 informed the Portuguese government. "The Government of India […] cannot permit any foreign and purely temporal Government to have a voice in any appointments to be made in India. [The Government of India], therefore, wish to inform […] that [it] can no longer recognized as binding any of the terms of the Protocol between the Holy See and Portugal respecting Portuguese ecclesiastical jurisdiction in India."[69]

Two days later, the Necessidades instructed its ambassador to the Vatican, the Count of Tovar, to enter into discussions with the Holy See regarding the *Padroado*. Postponement was no longer possible, since this risked provoking the Indian government into creating difficult conditions for Catholicism, which might in turn lead the Vatican to revise its agreement with Portugal unilaterally.[70] However, discussions did not end until one year later, and with considerable reservations: in the new agreement, signed on July 18, 1950, Portugal renounced the privilege of preferment for the bishoprics of Mangalore, Quilon, Trichinopoly, Cochin, Mylapore, and Bombay, and released the Holy See from any obligation to consult Portugal regarding appointments or to appoint Portuguese Bishops in Cochin and Mylapore (and a Portuguese Archbishop in Bombay). However, it still postponed the delimitation of the Archdiocese of Goa.[71] New Delhi considered the general terms of the agreement to be "satisfactory," but underlined the need for the future delimitation of the Archdiocese of Goa.[72]

The end of the *Padroado do Oriente* was regarded with resentment by the Portuguese leadership. Although considered necessary, renouncement of these privileges was a heavy loss for a regime that relied upon religion to reinforce its imperialist rhetoric. As Valentim Alexandre has underlined in his work, the *Padroado* had an historical importance in the construction of an image of Portugal as an evangelizing nation, since the *Descobrimentos* [Discoveries] had been made in the name of expanding

[68] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 139.
[69] "Do Ministro dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana ao Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi," July 7, 1949, No. 137, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 135-136.
[70] "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal no Vaticano," July 9, 1949, No. 138, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 137-143.
[71] "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi," July 10, 1950, No. 222; "Memorial da Legação de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministério dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana," July 12, 1950, No. 226; "Acordo entre a Santa Sé e a República Portuguesa," July 18, 1950, No. 233; *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 224-225; 227-228; 233-235.
[72] "Memorial dos Ministério dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana à Legação de Portugal em Nova Delhi," July 15, 1950, No. 230, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 231-233.

the Catholic religion.[73] Furthermore, the attitude of the Vatican towards Portugal was also regarded with resentment, since the Holy See had quickly adapted to the new political realities of Asia – as Nehru had correctly predicted in early 1947. For the Indian government, Portugal's renouncement of its privileges was surely a victory, in that it constituted an end to "extraordinary" foreign meddling in Indian affairs. However, this was but one small step towards a larger objective: the unification of Goa, Daman and Diu into India. And, with regard to this ultimate objective, little or nothing had so far been achieved.

A Formal Claim

In early February 1950, at a time when talks were in progress between Lisbon and the Vatican, Nehru was questioned regarding Goa in the Lok Sabha.[74] The questions were of a general nature, namely about defense and diplomatic issues. The prime minister replied with ease, reiterating his conviction that Goa would soon join India – a remark that drew forth noisy applause.[75] In private, however, Nehru confessed to some anxieties. "If the questions had been more explicitly framed about our policy towards Goa," he wrote in a document sent to the South Block,[76] "we might have had some difficulty in answering them with any satisfaction to ourselves and to others." Based on this observation, Nehru acknowledged that India's policy towards Goa had been until recently one of "almost complete inaction and passivity." Although he believed that such an attitude had been justifiable for a certain time – "because we were busy with other things" – almost two-and-a-half years of passivity were not. "Especially when the attitude of the Portuguese government," Nehru emphasized, "is an aggressive and sometimes insulting one."[77]

Therefore, the prime minister considered it necessary to "draw up a definitive and clear policy" regarding the problem. "The time has come," he cautioned the South Block, "when a written note should be presented […] making it clear that in the new order of things what is called Portuguese India must necessarily be incorporated in the rest of India." Such an official message, Nehru explained, should underline that the government of India was ready to initiate negotiations regarding the transfer of power in the Portuguese settlements, on the same lines as those that had taken place between New

[73] See Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 144-145.
[74] The lower house of India's Parliament.
[75] "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," February 6, 1950, No. 151, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 162-163.
[76] The Ministry of External Affairs was located at South Block, New Delhi.
[77] J. Nehru, Prime Minister's Secretariat [S], February 5, 1950, F. 5 10 EUR I 50, National Archives of India, New Delhi (henceforth, NAI).

Delhi and Paris nearly two years previously regarding the French settlements. However, Nehru continued, the message should not raise "any question of referendum or plebiscite."[78] Such a change in approach was apparently the result of Nehru's growing uncertainties regarding India's chances of winning a poll in Portuguese India, especially after the negative results obtained in the elections at the French possessions.

To be sure, a written note on Goa had already been under preparation since October-November 1949. However, it had encountered resistance from the new Indian representative in Lisbon, P. Achutha Menon. Although having only recently arrived in Portugal, P.A. Menon had immediately sensed how crucial the matter was for the Portuguese regime, and how counterproductive a message requesting negotiations based on rights might be. "I have serious misgivings about the effectiveness of the *aide memoire* in its present form," he wrote on January 21. "I fear that such a curtly worded approach is unlikely to achieve any immediate purpose but, on the other hand, may delay opportunities for further discussions in a spirit of goodwill." Instead of a bald insistence on Indian rights – as "the other party is also talking about 'rights' and asserting that 'by right' Goa has formed an integral party of the Portuguese Empire for centuries" – Menon believed that India should recognize Portugal's achievements during the past, and suggest that Portugal and India should now enter into a relationship that went beyond the simple exercise of Portuguese sovereignty on the Indian subcontinent. "[The] Portuguese are a sentimental race, rather touchy in small matters, but quite susceptible to praise or flattery." Menon had also suggested that India should consider the possibility of compensating Portugal for the loss of Goa, "as the Portuguese Government will not understand why they should be expected to be totally altruistic in this matter." Besides, a 'financial' approach, the Indian diplomat in Lisbon supposed, "might turn out to be a face-saving device for the Portuguese," since Salazar had already mentioned the financial costs entailed in the possession of Mormugão's harbor.[79]

Menon's suggestions had had no significant effect in the South Block, not least because a previous report on a meeting between him and Salazar had brought some discomfort to Nehru. Here, the Indian diplomat had portrayed the dictator as a gentle, educated, and humble individual, with the "ability to read the signs of the times,"[80] something that had led Nehru to suspect that his representative in Lisbon had been "swept away by the courtesy and civilized behavior" of the Portuguese leader. "The English ruler in the old days used to be a man of high culture and yet represented and upheld a system which was thoroughly bad," the prime minister noted. "It seems to me that Pam's [referring to P.A.

[78] J. Nehru, Prime Minister's Secretariat [S], February 5, 1950, F. 5 10 EUR I 50, NAI.
[79] "From P.A. Menon to K.P.S. Menon," [S], January 21, 1950, F. 5 10 EUR I 50, NAI.
[80] "From P.A. Menon to K.P.S. Menon," [S], January 6, 1950, F. 5 10 EUR I 50, NAI.

Menon] approach is far too personal [and] definitely harmful from our point of view."[81] Nonetheless, Menon's remarks on the need to 'soften' the *aide memoire* were later taken into consideration by G.S. Bajpai, the Secretary General of the MEA.[82] Although Bajpai rejected the proposed eulogy to Portugal's achievements in the past, he took care to remove any belligerent expressions. "At this stage," he noted after reviewing the final draft, "it seems desirable to avoid threats to the Portuguese Government."[83]

However, this softening of wording did not mean that the *aide memoire* was substantially less assertive. True, the final draft began by emphasizing India's satisfaction with the beginning of negotiations on the *Padroado do Oriente*, as well as with the Portuguese willingness to solve the problems that existed between Lisbon and New Delhi. However, it soon asserted a new order of things, continuing

> The nationalist movement which, after a prolonged but peaceful struggle, succeeded in securing the transfer of power from British to Indian hands was not, in sentiment or purpose, confined to what were formerly British India and Indian States under British suzerainty. It was, within the geographical limits of India, a universal movement and remains so. The historical and cultural unity of India transcends political frontiers such as those that now demarcate the French Settlements or the Portuguese colonies. Popular feeling in these territories is for union with the new and free India of the Republic. Any other sentiment would be unnatural; the interruption of India's fundamental unity by a few hundred years of foreign rule over various segments of the country cannot, in the perspective of history, be more than a transient phase. […] The movement for the union of the remaining foreign Settlements with the Indian Republic is part of this historical process; it is real and vital, and, as such, seeks urgent satisfaction.

Therefore, and after having recalled that the negotiations between India and France had achieved a peaceful solution regarding French India – as "this was the inevitable outcome of Indian independence, and the recognition […] of the impact of this historic event upon all parts of India" – New Delhi requested the "immediate" initiation of negotiations regarding the future of the Portuguese colonies

[81] Nehru's handwritten note on "From P.A. Menon to K.P.S. Menon," [S], January 6, 1950, NAI. Nehru's comment was subsequently sent to P.A. Menon weeks later. See "[unknown remitter] to P.A. Menon," [S] January 17, 1950, F. 5 10 EUR I 50, NAI.
[82] Indian Ministry of External Relations.
[83] "G.S. Bajpai, [no title]," February 12, 1950, F. 5 10 EUR I 50, NAI.

in the Indian subcontinent. "[The Indian government] sincerely hopes," the *aide memoire* emphasized, "for a prompt and friendly response."[84]

On February 24, only three weeks after Nehru's request, P.A. Menon went to the Necessidades in order to present the note. However, Secretary General António de Faria immediately refused to accept it, on the grounds that he could not discuss any question relating to sovereignty, and suggested that the matter should be pursued instead with the Foreign Minister, Caeiro da Matta. In New Delhi, Garin also refused to accept the note, stressing to Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon that he had specific instructions not to discuss any matter which raised the question of Portuguese sovereignty. Finally, three days later, the note was presented to Caeiro da Matta.[85]

Bearing in mind these two initial refusals, the Indian diplomat was hardly expected an encouraging reply. "Matta listened politely till I finished," Menon cabled the South Block. "Then he said that the Portuguese position was no doubt clear to the Government of India from conversations in the past." "[The] Foreign Minister," he went on, "had himself in 1948 told Krishna Menon in Paris that Portugal could not discuss questions of sovereignty with India. Goa was an integral part of Portugal, and not like the normal conception of a colony." Matta then repeated the already known arguments: Goans had long continued to occupy high official positions in Portugal; the Portuguese constitution forbid changes to the territorial integrity of Portugal and its colonies; and Goans considered themselves Portuguese. Besides, national sentiment ruled out the possibility of any negotiation. Menon replied that many Indians had held exalted offices under British rule, but that this had made no difference, and that the Indian government had information clearly demonstrating the desire of Goans for union with India. "I stressed again earnestly," the India representative reported to the MEA, "that the Government of India attached gravest (repeat gravest) importance to this question [but] the interview was concluded with [Caeiro da Matta] reiterating that an answer to our request for immediate negotiation was negative and adding that a written reply to the effect would be sent soon."[86]

Anticipating a negative reply, the Indian government had already started preparing several steps to be taken in pursuance of a new policy towards Goa. These actions had been proposed not only by Indian politicians and diplomats, but also by pro-India Goan nationalists. Broadly speaking, these fell into two main categories, namely the economic and the political. As for the first, steps included extreme

[84] See "Da Legação da União Indiana em Lisboa ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros," February 27, 1950, No. 180, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 187-190.
[85] On the Portuguese side, see "Apontamento da conversa do Director Geral dos Negócios Políticos do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros com o Ministro da União Indiana em Lisboa," February 24, 1950, No. 173; "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," February 24, 1950, No. 175, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 179-183. On the Indian side, see: "P.A. Menon to MEA," [S], February 24, 1950; "KPS Menon, [no title], February 24, 1950, F. 5 10 EUR I 50, NAI.
[86] "From P.A. Menon to MEA," T [S], February 27, 1950, F. 5 10 EUR I 50, NAI.

measures (such as a total economic blockade), moderate actions (limitation of imports and exports), and even softer approaches (imposition of exchange controls). Regarding the political, suggestions included the intensification of publicity and propaganda (in India, Goa, and abroad), the treatment of Portuguese Indians in India as foreigners (i.e. forcing them to report to the authorities after their arrival in India), assistance in the establishment of a Goan political organization, and the closure of the Indian legation in Lisbon (or simply the withdrawal of their representative, P.A. Menon). Also considered, but immediately dropped, was a reference to Portuguese India at the UN Security Council. "After our experience over Kashmir," G.S. Bajpai reminded in a note, "I definitely rule [this] out."[87]

These proposals were considered at an inter-departmental meeting on March 6, presided over by Bajpai, and attended by the representatives of several ministries, such as those of Home Affairs and Finance. Regarding the economic proposals, the conclusion was that India could do little which "might pinch" Goa. A ban on exports and imports, for instance, would not seriously affect the Goan economy, but would increase the incidence of smuggling. A diversion of shipping from the port of Mormugão was feasible, but would not be very effective. Besides, the Indian authorities concluded, India should not allow the Portuguese territories to become economically independent on India. As for political steps, instructions should be issued to Indian Information Agencies, both in India and abroad, to counter Portuguese propaganda, namely through the distribution of pamphlets. Portuguese Indians living in India, who did not qualify for Indian citizenship, should be treated as foreigners, and required to register within 72 hours of their arrival in India.[88] Acknowledging that the future of the Portuguese territories was dependent on the Goans themselves, the formation of an effective political organization was considered necessary. Since political organizations were prohibited in Goa, the government should encourage Goan organizations in India. As such, financial assistance was to be given to reliable organizations, in order to carry on underground political activity. Finally, the inter-departmental meeting concluded that the closing of India's legation in Lisbon would be counterproductive, since it would mean a loss of publicity, deprive the government of information regarding the development of opinion in Portugal, and also shut the door on all further negotiations. Withdrawing P.A. Menon and leaving the representation of India to a *chargé d'affaires* was also considered counterproductive, as such a move would be viewed with disapproval in Portugal, and might create a hostile atmosphere for the diplomat left in charge of the legation in Lisbon.[89]

[87] See "G.S. Bajpai, [no title]," February 12, 1950, F. 5 10 EUR I 50, NAI. On Kashmir issue see, for instance, Guha, *India after Gandhi*, 72-83.

[88] This was a retaliatory measure, against restrictions that the Portuguese government had recently imposed on Indians visiting Goa.

[89] Inter-departmental meeting, as reported in "Note on Goa for the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet," [S] [no date, circa August 1950], F. 5 10 EUR I 50, NAI. Unfortunately, the original report is not available (still classified or destroyed).

Despite the negative reply in late February, the Indian government seemed hopeful regarding a modification of the Portuguese attitude towards its requests. Or, at the very least, that changes in the international situation might pressure Portugal to reconsider the request for negotiations. After all, the Portuguese government had accepted – after some initial reluctance – the review of the existing agreements with the Holy See regarding the *Padroado*. Perhaps for this reason, the inter-departmental meeting had concluded that closing the legation or withdrawing the diplomatic representative would be counterproductive. However, these hopes began to fade in the subsequent months, as the Portuguese written reply took a long time to materialize.

Indeed, it was only on June 15 – almost four months after P.A. Menon's meeting with Caeiro da Matta – that India received the formal refusal. The Portuguese government reaffirmed its friendship and continuing goodwill towards India, but stated that, among other points, it could not recognize the "moral and legal value" of the Indian aspiration to geographical unity. Reiterating the already mentioned arguments – such as the loyalty of Goans to Portugal – the reply ended by stating that the government could not discuss matters of sovereignty.[90] "Leaving aside all the polite and involved verbiage," Menon cabled New Delhi after having received the reply from Caeiro da Matta, "we are left with a negative reply to our requests for negotiations." Anticipating a retaliation from his government – and acknowledging that it was "imperative that public sentiment and the pressure of political groups should be given due regard" – Menon immediately reiterated the need to act softly and wisely regarding the Portuguese regime, suggesting a gentle heightening of pressure, such as through propaganda in the UK and US, and publicity in Portugal, as well as giving greater facilities to Goans to acquire Indian nationality.[91]

These and other possible approaches towards Goa were addressed once again by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet on August 26. Surprisingly, the members of the latter disagreed with some of the measures that had been proposed by the Inter-Departmental meeting six months previously. Primarily, the committee believed that it was important, in all actions regarding the Portuguese settlements, to emphasize the oneness of the population of Goa with their brethren in India, and not their separateness. Thus, the committee felt that the Indian government should not resort lightly to retaliation against the inhabitants. Accordingly, it was decided that no action with regard to the registration of Portuguese Indians should be taken, meaning that it would not be mandatory for Goans visiting India to report to the police. Despite the arguments presented in favor of the retention of P.A. Menon in Portugal, the Committee decided that he should in fact be withdrawn, and the legation left

[90] "Memorial entregue pelo Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Ministro da União Indiana em Lisboa," June 15, 1950, N. 216, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 219-220.
[91] "From P.A. Menon to K.P.S. Menon," [S], June 16, 1950, F. 5 10 EUR I 50, NAI.

in the hands of a *chargé d'affaires*. Finally, and despite the need to assist Goan political organizations, it was decided that any assistance to the Goa National Congress was "out of the question in the present circumstances." The only point on which the Committee agreed was that an economic blockade to the Portuguese territories would be indeed useless, instead suggesting measures to prevent the Portuguese bank – the BNU, *Banco Nacional Ultramarino* – from functioning in Bombay.[92]

P.A. Menon did not agree that he should be withdrawn. "I am firmly convinced that the action contemplated would be seriously injurious to our interests," he cautioned the South Block. Menon reiterated his belief that India should follow a policy of 'appeasement,' rather than a 'tough' approach: only by influencing public opinion in Goa and Portugal, and in obtaining the cooperation of the Portuguese government, he believed, would it be possible to attain the objective of integrating Goa within a moderate period of time. "The Portuguese are by nature a proud and sensitive race, very impulsive in their actions," Menon subsequently wrote in a memorandum to Nehru. And he went on

> They are reverent of a glorious national past and this in turn has produced a haunting sense of inferiority. There is, however, no chauvinistic arrogance of the kind met with in many other countries. […] It will need a good deal of educative propaganda before the solidarity of Goa with Greater India can be brought home to the Portuguese mind. Any hurt to Portuguese pride will rally all opinion violently in favor of old-fashioned or reactionary elements. The withdrawal of the Minister from Portugal would be a gratuitous insult to the Portuguese Government and people and will cause a great deal of hurt to a mercurially sensitive race. […] In conclusion I may state my belief that our objective can only be achieved with patience and tact.

Unsurprisingly, P.A. Menon's requests fell on deaf ears. A few months later, in November, he was instructed to return to New Delhi and the legation left in the hands of a *chargé d'affaires*.[93]

How did Portugal react to these developments? Immediately after Nehru's provocative statements in the Lok Sabha – which were widely reproduced by the Portuguese media – the government had initiated a national press campaign, with numerous articles extolling the Portuguese presence in India.[94] Newspapers had also begun publishing messages of solidarity with the regime, including those

[92] "Ministry of External Affairs," [unknown signature], August 26, 1950; "Future Policy regarding Goa, M.A. Husain," [S], September 9, 1950, F. 5 10 EUR I 50, NAI.
[93] "From P.A. Menon to K.P.S. Menon," [S], September 22, 1950, F. 5 10 EUR I 50, NAI.
[94] Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 118.

of Goan communities scattered throughout the world, and reproducing favorable comments from both the Goan and the foreign media.[95] Meetings called in protest against India's demands, also initiated by the regime, but organized by municipalities, corporative entities, private associations, and student unions, had begun to take place throughout the country.[96] The *Casa dos Estudantes do Império* [House of the Students of the Empire], which gathered students from all of the Portuguese colonies, had dispatched a large delegation to the Portuguese minister of the Colonies, in order to deliver a message of protest "against the aggressive attitude of Nehru".[97] In the National Assembly, Constantino Sócrates da Costa, a Goan notary elected by Portuguese India in November 1949, had stated in his inaugural speech that Nehru's words deeply offended his "dignity as a free man and Goan."[98] Such public outcry aimed not only to empower the regime domestically, but also internationally: during the interviews between Caeiro da Matta and P.A. Menon, for instance, the former had referred to the "feelings of the Portuguese public opinion" in order to validate his government's decision to reject any discussion of sovereignty.[99] Indeed, such 'popular' mobilization around the 'problem' of Goa would soon become frequent, especially during the most acute moments of the crisis.

In private, however, Nehru's statements in the Lok Sabha had created some uneasiness amongst the Portuguese ranks – "[he] publicly demonstrated animosity against us, and gave the impression of wishing to rile up the Parliament" – and even compelled Garin to have a "heart-to-heart talk" about Goa with the Foreign Secretary, K.P.S. Menon, in the South Block.[100] However, the *aide memoire* had further intensified these concerns, particularly against the background of Nehru's increasingly erratic behavior. "It is difficult to predict to what extent the Indian government is prepared to go," Garin had cautioned Lisbon. "It is possible that this is simply a domestic or electoral issue," he went on, "[and] it is possible that after this attempt, and the firmness we have shown, [India] will abandon the issue for a while […]. But as the US ambassador told me some days ago, the mind of the prime minister is unpredictable, he is prone to nervous breakdowns, and easily loses control." Although the Portuguese diplomat had deemed it "hard to believe" that the Indian government would resort to violence or create an international crisis – especially "when its relations with Pakistan are worse than ever, and after Nehru's declaration that East Bengal is India's number one problem" – he had not ruled out the

[95] "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi," February 15, 1950, No. 161, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 171.
[96] See, for instance, *Diário de Lisboa* [Lisbon, Portugal], March 1, 1950, 1; 6.
[97] *Diário de Lisboa* [Lisbon, Portugal], February 18, 1950, 1; 6.
[98] Diário das Sessões, March 2, 1950, 325-326.
[99] See, for instance, "Apontamento da conversa do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros com o Ministro da União Indiana em Lisboa," February 27, 1950, No. 179, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 185.
[100] "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi," February 9, 1950, No. 154; "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," February 12, 1950, No. 158; "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," February 15, 1950, No. 162, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 165-166; 169-170; 172-173.

possibility of other complications. “Whatever the intentions of the Indian government regarding the issue of Goa might be,” Garin had stated, “it seems obvious to me that our relations with India will in any case deteriorate, and are about to pass through a very unpleasant phase.”[101]

These growing threats to Portuguese sovereignty in the Indian subcontinent had led the regime to begin a process of constitutional revision, which would incorporate the Colonial Act (1930) into the Portuguese Constitution and replace juridical and institutional formulas with others deemed more ‘suitable’ to the new international reality. Particularly important in this regard was the replacement of the outdated terms “colony” and “colonial empire” with “overseas provinces” and “Overseas.” To be sure, although initiated a couple of days after the receipt of the Indian *aide memoire*, this constitutional revision had already been requested by certain political circles during the final years of World War II. By then, many believed that the legal documents – which had been mainly inspired by the nationalism of the 1930s – would need to be ‘modernized’ in order to face the new challenges posed by the victory of the democracies. This necessity increased yet further during the aftermath of the war: besides the threat from India, the emergence of the Cold War (a contest between two superpowers which were both, at least in theory, anti-colonial), the sharp decline of European colonialism (in Asia, and soon in Africa too), and the increasing tendency of the UN to interfere with colonial rule dictated such revision. This would consist not only in cosmetic changes to wording, but also in a (re)affirmation of Portugal as an integral whole, divided into provinces (metropolitan and overseas). Indeed, following the approval of the revisions in June 1951, this argument would be used abundantly by the Portuguese authorities to defend their sovereign rights in Asia and Africa.[102]

However, despite the presence of dark clouds on the horizon, the Portuguese increasingly believed that the Indian controversy around Goa, Daman, and Diu was only momentary. Garin had already pointed out that the Indian general election, scheduled for 1951, might be the leitmotiv of such agitation.[103] However, over the following months, a series of informal meetings with British diplomatic representatives in India further increased his conviction. In April, the Deputy High Commissioner to India, Frank Roberts, had assured Garin that there would be no difficulties regarding Goa. “I believe that the Indian government does not consider the issue urgent,” Roberts told the Portuguese representative. “You already noted that even the press seemed to have abandoned the issue. They decided to mess around with you in a moment of bad humor and because things are not going well

[101] “Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros,” February 24, 1950, No. 174; “Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros,” February 25, 1950, No. 177; *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 180-181; 183-184.

[102] See Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto, “A Modernizing Empire? Politics, Culture, and Economy in Portuguese Late Colonialism,” in Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto, *The Ends of European Colonial Empires. Cases and Comparisons* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 55-57; and Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 198-212.

[103] On India’s general election of 1951, see Guha, *India after Gandhi*, 135-150.

with the French [regarding their possessions in India, namely Pondicherry]." Other British diplomats had endorsed Robert's remarks, stating that the Indian government sought merely to "divert the attention of public opinion."[104]

Furthermore, the Portuguese government considered to possess various means of deterrence. The *Aliança Luso-Britânica* [Anglo-Portuguese Alliance] was one such means: ratified by the Treaty of Windsor in 1386, and confirmed in 1899, this stipulated that the King of Great Britain was obliged to defend and protect all conquests or colonies belonging to the crown of Portugal against all enemies, future as well as present. This alliance had already provided protection to Portugal on various occasions, such as during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). However, it had also served British interests, such as during World War II, when the British Government formally invoked the alliance in order to request base facilities in Lajes (Azores).[105] Although hardly anyone believed that Great Britain would be willing to militarily defend Portuguese India, Portugal did expect that political and diplomatic support would be provided: in October 1949, during a radio speech dedicated to the issue of Portuguese India, Salazar dropped a sentence regarding the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, but the speech that had been circulated earlier among the foreign press contained this reference. Here, the Portuguese leader recalled that "India belonged to a community of nations of which England is part, and England is obliged, by treaty, to defend the Portuguese overseas territories."[106]

The other means of deterrence was NATO. Although the latter had been established on the principles of democracy, Portugal had been a founding member, largely due to the geostrategic importance of Lajes. Lisbon had tried without success to include its territories in the Southern Hemisphere. Nonetheless, article four of the NATO treaty stipulated that "members could consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties was threatened." Bearing in mind the fact that Portugal believed that its colonial territories were an integral part of the nation (as reaffirmed by the revised constitution of 1951), Lisbon could thus request consultation in the event of any threat against Portuguese India and exert an unpleasant pressure over the Indian authorities.[107]

[104] "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," March 2, 1950, No. 182; "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," April 17, 1950, No. 204, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 191; 207-209.
[105] Oliveira*, Os despojos*, Chapter One.
[106] Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 102.
[107] Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 103.

Brazil, Portugal and India

Postwar Brazil

Between 1945 and 1946, Brazil had embraced democracy. The military leaders, influenced by the victory of the democracies in World War II, deposed the popular dictator Getúlio Vargas (who had been in power since the Revolution of 1930). Free and fair presidential and congressional elections took place in 1945, and a liberal-democratic constitution came into force in 1946. The new democratic regime ensured basic civil rights, the rule of law, free and fair direct elections, and maintained the social rights that had been gained under Vargas' *Estado Novo*.[108] Although several restrictions still remained, such as the limitation of the right of strike, and the exclusion of illiterate adults from the electoral franchise (thus, approximately 50 per cent of the population), Brazil would subsequently experience almost 20 years of democracy, social-cultural transformations, and economic growth, which would later be described by historians as the *experiência democrática* [the "democratic experience" – referring to the period between 1946 and the military coup of April 1964].[109]

With few exceptions, Rio de Janeiro's postwar foreign policy remained essentially aligned with that of the US. The governments of Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946-1951) and Getúlio Vargas (1951-1954)[110] positioned Brazil firmly within the Western sphere of influence led by Washington. Brazil became a member of the *Tratado Interamericano de Assistência Recíproca* [Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance], usually known as the Rio Treaty, in 1947, signed a military agreement with Washington in 1952, repressed domestic communism, and actively supported the US at the UN and at the OAS. Although it declined to send troops to the Korean War (1950-1953), Brazil offered its diplomatic support and provided strategic minerals.[111]

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[108] The dictatorship led by Getúlio Vargas between 1937 and 1945 was also referred to as *Estado Novo.* See, for instance, Leslie Bethell, "Politics in Brazil under Vargas, 1930-1945," in Leslie Bethell, *The Cambridge History of Latin America, Volume IX. Brazil since 1930,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3-86.

[109] For the process of democratization, see Leslie Bethell, "Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic, 1945-1964," in Leslie Bethell (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Latin America, Volume IX. Brazil since 1930,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 87-100; and Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 48-252. In Portuguese, see Lilia M. Schwarcz and Heloisa M. Starling, *Brasil: Uma biografia* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2015) and Boris Fausto, *História do Brasil* (São Paulo: Edusp, 2012). For a more detailed account, see, for instance, Angêla Maria de Castro Gomes [et al], *O Brasil republicano: sociedade e política (1930-1964),* (Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, 1996).

[110] Getúlio Vargas returned to power through democratic means in 1951. See Leslie Bethell, "Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic, 1945-1964," in *The Cambridge History of Latin America, Volume IX. Brazil since 1930.* Ed. Leslie Bethell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 108-116.

[111] See Gerson Moura, *Brazilian foreign relations: 1939-1950: the changing nature of Brazil-United States relations during and after the Second World War* (Brasília: FUNAG, 2013), 237-300; Mônica Hirst, *The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1-7; Stanley E. Hilton, "The United States, Brazil and the Cold War, 1945-1960: End of the Special Relationship," *The Journal of American History,* Vol. 68, No. 3 (December 1981), 599-624. In Portuguese, see Amado Luiz Cervo, *Inserção Internacional: Formação dos Conceitos Brasileiros* (São Paulo: Saraiva, 2008), Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2007); Letícia de

Brazil's postwar alignment with its northern neighbor was the product of multiple factors. Besides the historically close relationship between the two nations,[112] Brazilian leaders regarded the US, which had emerged from World War II as the greatest military and economic power in the world,[113] as the only allied nation capable of providing both capital and technology to support Brazilian industrialization. To be sure, industrialization had been the main objective of Brazil's foreign policy since the 1930s, when Vargas had initiated a tentative transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy.[114] Besides, the Brazilian leaders believed that Brazil, more than any other Latin American country, deserved US economic assistance, since it had been the only country in the region to participate in World War II alongside the Allies.[115] Moreover, the US was also the only allied nation capable of providing military assistance. The modernization of Brazil's armed forces was considered a priority in Brazil: primarily, in order to keep Juan Peron's Argentina at bay, but also to prepare the country for a new global conflict, since some of Brazil's political, diplomatic and military leaders believed that the Cold War was going to turn hot at any moment. In return, Brazil was ready to provide political and diplomatic support to Washington, to act as its intermediary in the region, and to assume the defense of the South Atlantic.[116]

Ideology also played a decisive role in 'pushing' Brazil towards an alignment with Washington. Besides the overwhelming cultural influence exerted by the US,[117] Brazilian elites were fiercely, almost obsessively, anti-communist. The Soviet Union and Communism were regarded as a serious threat by a ruling elite that was still traumatized (or perhaps wanted to be traumatized) by the *Intentona Comunista* (Communist attempt coup) of November 1935 – the very first attempt at a communist-inspired insurrection in Latin America. This obsession encouraged, for instance, the Dutra government to assume extreme and rash attitudes: diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were severed in 1947, the *Partido Comunista do Brasil* [Communist Party of Brazil] was banned, its leaders arrested,

Abreu Pinheiro, *Política Externa Brasileira, 1889-2002* (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Ed., 2004); Amado Luiz Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno, *História da Política Exterior do Brasil* (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1992).

[112] Cervo, *Inserção,* 220-224; Hirst, *The United States*, 1-5; Bandeira, *Presença,* 203-307; and Cervo and Bueno, *História,* 137-245.

[113] Melvyn P. Leffler, "The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945-1952," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (ed.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume 1. Origins,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 67.

[114] Cervo, *Inserção,* 71-76.

[115] Moura, *Brazilian,* 40 and Hilton, *The United States,* 600.

[116] Moura, *Brazilian,* 277-282; Bandeira, *Presença,* 433 and Hilton, *The United States,* 599-601. See also Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, *Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War. 1944-1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, "Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War: Some Reflections on the 1945-8 Conjuncture", in *Journal of Latin American Studies,* Vol. 20, No. 1 (May, 1988), 167-189.

[117] See, for instance, António Pedro Tota, *The Seduction of Brazil: the Americanization of Brazil during World War II* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), Bandeira, *Presença,* 429, and Gerald Haines, *The Americanization of Brazil: a study of U.S. Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World, 1945-1954* (Wilmington, Del: SR Books, 1989).

and a Joseph McCarthy-style witch hunt was conducted within the State apparatus.[118] Indeed, the beginning of the Cold War resonated strongly within Brazil in the late 1940s.

The Cold War (and particularly US policies) partially explain the behavior of Brazil with regard to decolonization. Although Brazilians considered themselves as anti-colonial – after all, they were also former colonial subjects – they demonstrated little or no interest in solving the problems of colonized peoples in the aftermath of World War II.[119] Instead, they adopted a contradictory attitude: on the one hand, they proclaimed their sympathies with the legitimate national aspirations of peoples; on the other hand, they supported the colonial powers' efforts to retain their empires. This contradiction was particularly visible at the UN, where Brazil's delegation regularly supported the colonial powers or abstained from voting, while advocating simultaneously the granting of independence to colonial territories.[120] Publicly, Brazil justified this attitude by referring to the need to create an atmosphere of moderation and tolerance, in which the established powers could gradually foster a transition towards autonomy.[121] Privately, this stance arose from the idea that anti-colonialism was being exploited by the Communist bloc in order to discredit the West, and to conquer the hearts and minds of the colonized peoples. Moreover, it was also the result of the idea that an uncontrolled process of decolonization would tip the scales in favor of the Soviet Union, both through the rise of client-states in Asia and Africa, and through the resulting decline of the European economies (and, consequently, of the Western world).

Historical and cultural ties with Europe also played a role. Since its independence in 1822, Brazil had been closer to Europe (and, after 1889, increasingly to the US) than to its own Latin American neighbors. This was because Brazil was 'different' from Spanish America, in geography, history, language, culture and political institutions.[122] From this relationship, a 'sentimental' feeling towards Europe arose among Brazilians, not least due to the continuing influx of European migrants: from 1822

[118] Leslie Bethell, "under Vargas," 40-43 and Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta, *Em Guarda contra o 'Perigo Vermelho'. O Anticomunismo no Brasil (1917-1964)* (São Paulo: Editora Perspectiva, 2002), 47-88

[119] As Wayne Alan Selcher has noted, Brazil failed to participate in Committee II/4 of the San Francisco Conference, which dealt with the documents which later became the core of Chapters XI, XII, and XIII (on self-determination) of the UN Charter. Moreover, with few diplomatic and consular representatives in the colonial territories, and not belonging to the League of Nations, the Itamaraty (the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations) did not foresee the demand for independence that was about to emerge in the colonies of Asia, Africa and the Middle East. See Wayne Alan Selcher, "The Afro-Asian Dimension of Brazilian Foreign Policy, 1956-1968" (PhD diss., University of Florida, 1970), 240.

[120] Selcher, "The Afro-Asian," 241.

[121] Brazil's delegate to the UN, Mário de Pimentel Brandão, in his inaugural speech of 1951, for instance, highlighted not only this idea, but also how Brazil was dealing with the problems of colonialism. "While Brazil, in accordance with its political traditions, feels deep sympathy with the legitimate national aspirations of peoples," he said to the IV General Assembly, "it has nonetheless always been in the vanguard of those who advocate peaceful and conciliatory solutions for all the conflicts of international life." "At the present juncture," he stated, "it is of pressing importance that peoples aspiring to total freedom should endeavor to act with the prudence and calmness demanded by the need for safeguarding the security structure that has been so slowly and painfully built and that affords the best guarantee of the realization of their desires." In Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa, *Brazil in the United Nations: 1946-2011* (Brasília: FUNAG, 2013), 105-106.

[122] Leslie Bethell, "Brazil and 'Latin America'," *Journal of Latin American Studies,* Volume 42, Issue 3, August 2010, 457-485.

to 1945, for instance, an estimated total of 1.9 million Portuguese citizens arrived in Brazil, hoping to make a life for themselves.[123] Spaniards, Italians, and Germans (and also French and Polish) followed after them, bringing with them their own customs and culture. As such, many Brazilian leaders took a sentimental attitude to affairs involving Europe, including matters of colonialism.

Portugal-Brazil

After World War II, relations between Portugal and Brazil were at a low point. Although there had been peaks and troughs, the relationship between the two *Estados Novos* had generally been one of closeness.[124] However, the removal of Vargas from power, and the subsequent process of democratization, damaged the relations between the two governments. This was mainly because president Dutra was less sensitive to Brazil-Portugal relations, but also because (as had happened in other countries) public opinion did not forget Portugal's 'collaboration' in the Spanish Civil War. Indeed, in the aftermath of the war, the Brazilian media had become increasingly critical of Salazar and the Portuguese regime, primarily due to their collusion with Franco.

For Salazar, Brazil had considerable importance. Besides the "special relationship" between the two nations – often more proclaimed than practiced – the Portuguese leader believed that the West's center of gravity was now in the Atlantic region, where both nations had responsibilities. Salazar's decision to send one of his henchmen, Pedro Theotónio Pereira, to Brazil in January 1946 testified to the importance of Rio de Janeiro within Portuguese postwar foreign policy. Theotónio Pereira was charged not only with following the development of the new Brazilian constitution (particularly in relation to the rights of the Portuguese community), but also with restoring Portugal's image. In a letter to Salazar, written after one year of such endeavors, the Portuguese ambassador wrote that

> […] the feasible part of the work is assured; most of the emigrant community is as united and vibrantly patriotic as ever; the adverse elements [of the emigrant community] are reduced to a handful of pebbles at the bottom of a quarry […]; the press is completely calm, [and their] campaigns [against Portugal are] over; Brazilian intellectual circles no longer support our *reviralhistas* [Republican opposition] […]; all such virulence is now attenuated; and the fever

[123] José Sacchetta Ramos Mendes, *Laços de Sangue. Privilégios e Intolerância à Imigração Portuguesa no Brasil (1822-1945)*, (Porto: CEPESE, 2010), 21.
[124] See Paula Marques dos Santos and Paulo Amorim, "As relações Portugal-Brasil na primeira metade do século XX (1910-1945)," in Fernando de Sousa [et all.] *As Relações Portugal-Brasil no Século XX*, (Lisboa: Fronteira do Caos, 2010), 121-139. Carmem G. Burgert Schiavon, "Estado Novo e Relações Luso-Brasileiras (1937-1945)," (PhD diss., Pontíficia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2007).

> of one year ago has been reduced to a tenth [of what it was]. And, with all this, [there is] a new and rising respect towards Portugal, its government, and your Excellency.[125]

However, at a governmental level, such successes were scarce. During Theotónio Pereira's tenure, and also that of his successor, João António de Bianchi (1948-1949), Portuguese diplomats were unable to restore the relationship between Brazil and Portugal to its pre-war heights. Efforts were certainly made by Portugal: in mid-1948, for instance, the Necessidades sought to bring about a visit by president Dutra to Portugal, but without success.[126] The only important treaty between the two countries was the signing of a trade agreement in 1949.[127]

Although not initially regarded as auspicious by Portuguese diplomats, the return of Vargas in 1951 would turn out to be favorable to Portuguese interests in Rio de Janeiro.[128] Slowly but surely, both governments began to rebuild their relationship. Among other aspects, this included the solidarity shown by Brazil during the early phase of the conflict between Portugal and India over Goa. While keeping the Brazilian government informed of events, the Portuguese were able to obtain informal demonstrations of support for their policy in Portuguese India.[129] In 1952, the Brazilians eventually acknowledged the unique character of the Portuguese presence in the Indian subcontinent, via a communique to its delegation at the UN. Here, the Brazilian government stated that Goa, Daman, and Diu had "nothing to do with the colonial problem," since these territories were not subject to a colonial regime. Reproducing virtually all of the standard Portuguese arguments – "Goans, regardless of color, are Portuguese citizens, no different to those from Minho" – the document emphasized that India was not moved by an anti-colonial spirit, instead by the goal of annexing the Portuguese territories.[130]

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[125] "Pedro Theotónio Pereira to Salazar," March 26, 1947, Arquivo Nacional da Torre to Tombo, António Oliveira Salazar (henceforth ANTT-AOS), as quoted in Fernando Martins and Pedro Leite Faria, "Um primeiro passo no bom caminho. Tratado de Amizade e Consulta entre Portugal e Brasil de 16 de Novembro de 1953," in Zília Osório de Castro *et al* [ed.], *Tratados do Atlântico Sul. Portugal-Brasil, 1825-2000,* (Lisboa: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Instituto Diplomático, 2006, 260.

[126] Embaixada do Brasil em Lisboa [Embassy of Brazil in Lisbon] (henceforth, EMBRALIS) to Ministério das Relações Exteriores (henceforth, MRE), Telegrama (hencefort T) [Confidential (henceforth C)] 13, July 15, 1948; EMBRALIS to MRE, T [C] 11, July 14, 1948, Arquivo do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Brasília (henceforth, AMRE).

[127] See Serviço de Propaganda e Expansão Comercial, *Tratados e Actos Internacionais, Brasil-Portugal* (Lisboa: Serviço de Propaganda e Expansão Comercial do Brasil, 1962), 340.

[128] The Portuguese ambassador to Brazil believed that Cristiano Machado, one of the opponents of Getúlio Vargas in the 1950 election, would be more favourable to Portuguese interests in Brazil. Conversely, he believed that the election of Getúlio Vargas would initiate a period of political unrest, which could be averse to Portugal's objectives. See Embaixada de Portugal no Rio de Janeiro [Embassy of Portugal in Rio de Janeiro] (henceforth, EPRJ) to Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (henceforth, MNE), Ofício (henceforth O) 3, October 5, 1950, Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisboa (henceforth AHDMNE).

[129] See, for instance, EMBRALIS to MRE, Carta-Telegrama (hencefort CT) [C] 18, March 24, 1950; EMBRALIS to MRE, O [C] 236, August 30, 1950, AMRE.

[130] MRE to Delegação do Brasil junto às Nações Unidas [Mission of Brasil to the United Nations] (henceforth, DELBRAONU), CT [C] 114, November 28, 1952, AMRE.

Besides the consistent diplomatic and publicity endeavors that were initiated in 1950 by the experienced, competent, and adroit new ambassador to Brazil, António Leite de Faria, this rapprochement was also a product of the sympathetic attitude towards Portuguese colonialism that had been fostered by Brazilian intellectuals. Members of the Brazilian Academy of Letters, such as Pedro Calmon and Gustavo Barroso, were outspoken supporters of Portugal, and often participated in conferences at which Portuguese colonialism was praised.[131] However, it was Gilberto Freyre, the famous Brazilian sociologist and anthropologist, who contributed most to this attitude. His works, *The Masters and the Slaves* (1933) and *The Mansions and the Shanties* (1938), suggested that the Portuguese had a natural tendency towards *interpenetration*, which had allowed them to settle in and adapt to Brazil's tropical climate, particularly by absorbing African and indigenous customs. Crucially, Freyre claimed that the Portuguese people had a special tendency towards sexual mixing, which had ultimately led to a multiracial Brazil, which had, by the time of the twentieth century, become what he described as a "racial democracy" – a nation in which whites, Africans, and indigenous peoples lived in harmony. In a nutshell, Freyre's theory – later referred to as *lusotropicalismo* [lusotropicalism] – held that Portuguese colonialism was different to British, French and Belgian colonialism, in that it was non-racist.

Although these ideas had been repudiated by the Portuguese authorities (in the 1930s, sexual mixing and the intermingling of cultures were frowned upon), the latter soon realized that they could derive some advantage from them. Two months after the revision of the constitution in 1951, which had cosmetically transformed 'colonies' into 'provinces', the Portuguese minister for the colonies, Manuel Sarmento Rodrigues, invited Freyre to tour Portugal's overseas 'provinces', in order to observe them "with the eyes of a scholar." After all, the Brazilian social scientist could provide a modern justification for a colonial ideology that needed to adapt to new international imperatives. Freyre accepted the six-month tour at the Portuguese government's expense, and visited almost all of the overseas provinces (except Macao and Timor), including Portuguese India. He was hosted by the colonial authorities, delivered lectures, and made laudatory speeches. The Portuguese newspapers followed his adventures closely: broad coverage has given to each new stage of the trip, and interviews were published. However, the scientist saw only what the government wanted him to see, and spoke only with whom the government wanted him to speak: in Bombay, on the eve of his visit to Portuguese India, Freyre

[131] Williams da Silva Gonçalves, *O Realismo da Fraternidade Brasil-Portugal: do Tratado de Amizade ao Caso Delgado,* (Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2003), see chapter 7; and "As relações luso-brasileiras nos anos 1950," in Fernando de Sousa [et all.] *As Relações Portugal-Brasil no Século XX*, (Lisboa: Fronteira do Caos, 2010), 99-120. See, also, EPRJ to MNE, T [C] 93, September 28, 1950, AHDMNE.

was closely chaperoned by Portuguese diplomats, and contact with pro-India Goan nationalists was thus prevented.[132]

When Freyre returned to Brazil, he was full of praise for Portuguese colonialism. "The vivid impression that I retain is that the Portuguese continue to be a creative people. To the achievements of the past – some of them monumental – they are adding a great modern series of works in the tropics: in the Orient and in Africa."[133] Thus, Freyre extended his reading of Brazil to the entirety of the Portuguese empire. Moreover, he also published two new books: *Adventure and Routine* (1952), in which he reproduced his laudatory impressions of Portugal and its colonies, and *A Brazilian in Portuguese Lands* (1953), which brought together the speeches and lectures he had given during his tour between August 1951 and February 1952. Soon, Freyre's works on Portuguese colonialism had been translated into and published in several languages, thanks to the sponsorship of the Portuguese government. In return, he defended Portuguese colonialism as unique, not only in Brazil and Portugal, but also abroad.[134] Although his interpretation was contested by some (notably the Brazilian intellectual left, which accused him of being in the service of Salazar), Freyre's ideas obtained considerable resonance within political and diplomatic circles. Soon, these would be employed to the benefit of Portugal.

This benign atmosphere eventually led to the signature of the *Tratado de Amizade e Consulta* [Treaty of Friendship and Consultation] between Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro in November 1953. The treaty formalized the "perfect friendship between the two fraternal peoples," and its first article established a mechanism of consultation for international matters of common interest. Moreover, it also specified that Portuguese and Brazilian citizens would receive 'special treatment' in each other's countries: for instance, a Portuguese citizen would be able to circulate and establish himself in Brazil without hindrance, and carry on his economic activities with the same rights as a Brazilian citizen. At the same time, a Brazilian citizen would be able to count on all of the benefits conceded by Portugal to foreigners, without need for further agreements. The treaty thus created the much longed-for *Comunidade Luso-Brasileira* [Portuguese-Brazilian community], even if the document was rather vague, and it was not quite clear how many of its clauses would be applied.[135]

Although signed in 1953, the treaty had been the result of almost ten years of negotiations, these having been characterized by numerous setbacks. Having its origins within Brazilian intellectual circles, the initial project, which had been first presented to Lisbon in 1943 by the Brazilian ambassador, João

[132] Jerry Dávila, *Hotel Trópico. Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization. 1950-1980*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010), 15-20; and Cláudia Castelo, *«O modo Português de estar no mundo». O luso-tropicalismo e a ideologia colonial portuguesa (1933-1961)*, (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 1998), 87-96.
[133] As quoted by Dávila, *Hotel*, 18.
[134] Dávila, *Hotel*, 20.
[135] See Martins and Faria, *Um primeiro passo*, 251-283.

Neves da Fontoura (who was considered a true *lusophile*), had envisaged merely a special statute for Portuguese citizens in Brazil. In short, the idea was to facilitate Portuguese migration to Brazil, bearing in mind the latter's need for additional manpower. "Population increase is the key factor in order for Brazil to arise as a truly great power," Fontoura wrote to Vargas in defending his project. "Such an increase might come about slowly, over decades […], or might come about quickly through migration." The Portuguese, besides sharing the same language and having great facility for adaptation and integration, had one other important attribute: namely, they belonged to a nation that controlled a vast area on the western cost of Africa. "Brazil, within decades, ought to become a world power, and Portugal will be its base on the old continent," Fontoura declared. "Such a future should be prepared now, especially when American observers, such as Walter Lippmann, predict that the defense of our hemisphere now depends on the Atlantic, in which Portugal and its empire are on the one side, and Brazil on the other."[136]

The proposal had been received with reluctance by the Portuguese government, which manifested its preference for a formal convention rather than a mere declaration. However, negotiations stalled after Vargas' deposition in 1945. Despite some attempts to resume negotiations (mainly on the Portuguese side), the subject would only be readdressed during the second government of Vargas (1951), thanks to the initiative of the Brazilian ambassador to Portugal, Samuel de Sousa Leão Gracie. The simple statute with the Portuguese made way for an official treaty, which established a mechanism of consultation for international matters of common interest. The idea had arisen immediately after Portugal had become a NATO member. "I believe that such [an article] would be advantageous [to us]," Leão Gracie had explained to the Itamaraty, "since Portugal, a signatory of the Atlantic Treaty, will be both well informed about and involved in global problems that are interesting for us, and which could affect Brazil."[137] Moreover, Brazilians had felt that the gradual integration of Portugal into the sphere of influence of the US – mainly through NATO, but also via the Marshall Plan – was diminishing Rio de Janeiro's prestige and influence in Lisbon. "This is a problem of great importance to Brazil,

[136] "João Neves da Fontoura para Getúlio Vargas," May 24, 1945, AMRE. To be sure, these ideas were not exclusively the brainchild of Fontoura. Artur Hehl Neiva, a member of the colonization council since 1938, believed that a statute would be the first step towards the formation of a new supranational entity, in which Brazil would play a major role. "Politically, Brazil has in this war [World War II] reinforced its power over Portugal and its empire. The unity of language, the shared historical traditions, the fact that [Brazil] is the largest Portuguese speaking nation in the world, its geopolitical role in the South Atlantic, all give [us] the necessary authority to be the center of the Portuguese world," he wrote to Fontoura. "The signing of the Statute will represent the first step towards the emergence of Brazil as an Atlantic power, since many parts of the Portuguese empire, such as Guinea and Angola, are closer to us than to the colonial metropolis […] and [they are also] in the line of defense of our hemisphere." See "Artur Hehl Neiva to João Neves da Fontoura," June 12, 1945, AMRE.
[137] EMBRALIS to MRE, T [C] 20, May 11, 1949, AMRE.

[since] the Portuguese government will probably stop seeking the support of the Brazilian government, as it always used to do regarding key international issues."[138]

The possibility of establishing a mechanism of consultation with Rio de Janeiro had pleased the Portuguese government – but not to any great extent. "Minister João Neves [da Fontoura] is anxious to sign such a deal, despite the content seeming somewhat vague and redundant (or perhaps because of this)," Ambassador Faria wrote. "Nonetheless, in a country in which so many things are superficial, some advantages can be expected."[139] However, the text contained a fundamental problem: namely, an article that included the Portuguese empire in its scope, and which the Portuguese government believed required some emendation. Among the chief preoccupations of the Portuguese negotiators was that Brazilian companies would be able to take advantage of the treaty in order to establish themselves in Africa, and also that Brazilian citizens would be able to try their luck in the colonies through a regime of *porta aberta* [open doors].[140] This problem had led the Portuguese government to postpone negotiations for almost one year, at least until a new Brazilian foreign minister, Vicente Rao, began to pressure the Portuguese government to sign the treaty. After voicing their concerns, the Portuguese eventually found out that the Brazilians also preferred to limit the scope of the treaty to 'continental' Portugal. Rio de Janeiro had come to believe that a regime of *porta aberta* could also be prejudicial for Brazil, since the extension of privileged migration to the Portuguese empire risked provoking an influx of "undesirable" Africans and Asians into Brazil. A confidential note delivered after the signing of the treaty thus limited its scope to continental Portugal.[141]

India-Brazil

Contrary to Portugal, Brazil (and Latin America more generally) was not a priority for Indian foreign policy.[142] Nehru's diplomacy was far more focused on the Commonwealth, and, throughout the 1950s,

[138] EMBRALIS to MRE, O [C] 195, August 3, 1951, AMRE.

[139] EPRJ to MNE, O 293, July 24, 1951, AHDMNE. Replying, Salazar wrote: "Our impression [referring to himself and Faria] is that this is not worth anything. But there is no reason to reject it, because such rejection, indeed, would have consequences. In your letter, Dr. António de Faria stated that the text could achieve something or stimulate a new spirit more conducive to a more productive policy. [However] my belief is that we have lost several years, during which Portugal and Brazil ought to have done something for mutual benefit – and the fault is more from there [Brazil] than from here [Portugal], because I have made several suggestions that ultimately fell on deaf ears. However, this is indeed the reason why we could not refuse this deal, although I have severe misgivings." "António de Oliveira Salazar to António de Faria," November 8, 1951, in António José Telo (ed.), *António de Faria,* (Lisboa: Cosmos, 2001), 230-132.

[140] See EPRJ to MNE, O 293, July 24, 1951 and EPRJ to MNE, O 68, July 2, 1953, AHDMNE.

[141] Gonçalves, *O Realismo*, 105.

[142] As Varun Sahni noted, Latin America was almost entirely absent from Nehru's worldview. "No better evidence for this can be found than *Glimpses of World History* […] often cited as an exemplar of Nehru's globalist vision, yet it is, from a Latin America perspective, a curiously incomplete and unbalanced book. It covers all of Latin American in the following words: 'The Monroe Doctrine, about which I told you in my last letter, preserved the republics of South America from the greed of Europe. These republics are called Latin republics, as they were founded by people from Spain and Portugal. These two countries, as well as Italy and France, are called Latin Nations.' It is not just that Latin America is summed up in two sentences in a 992-page book; Latin American is acted upon: it is 'founded' by two countries, 'preserved' by a third." See Varun Sahni, "India and

on the two superpowers and various non-aligned nations. There were also historical links with the region between Egypt and Afghanistan, and contacts with large swathes of eastern and southern Africa. Besides, as an Indian scholar has noted, beyond the US and Canada, the "only part of the Western Hemisphere with which India had historically had any contacts were the islands and territories of the Anglophone and Dutch Caribbean."[143] Accordingly, in late 1940s and early 1950s, Brazil was on the periphery of India's foreign policy.[144]

Nevertheless, India was also motivated by a desire to make friends who might subsequently be converted into votes at the UN. Most likely bearing in mind the border conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir in early 1948, the MEA concluded that the absence of contacts with Latin America was a "serious handicap," and emphasized the need to establish relations "with certain Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, in view of the large voting strength of these countries" at the UN.[145] Struggling, however, with inadequate staffing and a limited budget, the South Block eventually selected Brazil as the site of its first embassy in Latin America. Being the largest and most populous country in South America, Brazil was an obvious choice. However, it was also noted that the country occupied a position of "special significance" in the region, analogous to that of India in its "own surroundings." The assumption that Brazil – like India – was a potential great power, whose emergence would "mean this shifting of the center of world civilization to the tropical zone," ultimately played a key role in this diplomatic decision. From Rio de Janeiro, Indian diplomats believed, it would also be possible to build up a network of contacts with other South American republics, and to thus compensate for the lack of direct diplomatic representation in the latter.[146]

Selecting Brazil for its first embassy in Latin America also served as a means to solve the problem of overpopulation. Constantly demanding immigrants, Brazil was perceived by New Delhi as a suitable destination for Indian families, since it was underpopulated considering its size (approximately 50 million persons occupied an area almost three times larger than India, which had approximately 360 million inhabitants), and was free from racial prejudices.[147] Although only 40 Indian immigrants lived

Latin America. Distant Acquaintance, Rhetorical Solidarity, Strategic Engagement," in Sumit Ganguly (ed.) *Engaging the World: Indian Foreign Policy since 1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 375-380.

[143] Sahni, *India and Latin America*, 377.

[144] Sahni, *India and Latin America*, 379. See also Varun Sahni, "Brazil: Fellow Traveler on the Long and Winding Road to Grandeza," in David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 524-528.

[145] MEA, "Extract of Note by Mr. B. Shiva Rao," February 3, 1948; "Note D.764-X/48," March 3, 1948, F. 2 (4) / 39 AMS, NAI.

[146] See IER, "Report on Brazil, Confidential" June 1948-June 1949, 11 September 1949, F. 2 (52) AMS 49; and MEA, "Report of Min. E.A. & Commonwealth Relations 1948-49, 12, MEA Library, MEA.

[147] Among several instances of praise for the absence of racial discrimination in Brazil, it is worth highlighting the report sent by the embassy in mid-1949, which stated: "While some of the other Latin American countries are apt to discountenance emphasis on the Amerindian or Negro elements in their make-up, Brazil like Mexico accepts with gratitude and some measure of pride the contribution made by each of these races. They are glad to recall that of the four heroes of the Brazilian war against the Dutch invaders [the 'Insurreição Pernambucana, in which the Dutch were expelled from the northeast of Brazil

in Brazil in 1948, mainly "illiterate, hard-working farmers, peddlers or railway workers […] most of them married [with] Brazilian women,"[148] the Indian government considered the possibility of proposing a scheme of large-scale emigration to Brazil, through an agreement to be concluded as soon as diplomatic conditions would permit.[149]

Apart from these motives, Brazil remained of little importance to India's foreign policy. Economic interests were virtually non-existent, since the MEA had concluded in early 1948 that "there are many points of similarity […] as both [countries] are industrially underdeveloped […] and it is unlikely that trade with Brazil will develop to a great extent."[150] The first ambassador to Brazil, Minocher Rustom Masani,[151] in a personal letter to prime Minister Nehru, reiterated this early assessment, stating that India and Brazil were "to a remarkable extent in a parallel condition, and parallels don't meet. Our wants are very much the same and our surpluses not too dissimilar."[152] Irrespective of this, the Indian government appointed and maintained a commercial secretary to look after India's trade interests not only in Brazil, but also in other republics and regions, such as Peru, Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador, and the Guineas.[153]

Established in June 1948, the embassy immediately realized that it would be necessary to present India as a "modern twentieth-century nation," and to counter the inaccurate image of India that currently occupied Brazilian minds. As M.R. Masani soon concluded, his country was generally seen "as a country of Oriental glamour and mystery, a country of maharajas and snake-charmers." Brazilian interest in India was confined to cultural, social, and spiritual aspects, and to Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore, while knowledge of India's political aspects and aspirations were "exceedingly fitful and sketchy." Only small numbers of public officials, politicians, and journalists, Masani observed, had "any point of view at all" about India's policies and international position. And even these, the ambassador

between 1648 and 1649]: one was a 'white' Brazilian, the second a Portuguese, the third an Indian and the fourth a Negro [referring to André Vidal de Negreiros, João Fernandes Vieira, Filipe Camarão, and Henrique Dias]. Most though not all Brazilians would agree with [Gilberto] Freyre in feeling that 'nothing is honestly or sincerely Brazilian that denies or hides the influence of the Amerindian and the Negro'. Though not yet complete, the Brazilian experiment in mass miscegenation is an object lesson from which the USA, South Africa and other countries of the world have a lot to learn."

[148] "As there is no colour distinction in Brazil, they are leading a happy and fairly satisfactory life." IER, "Annual Consular Report for 1951," January 23, 1952, F. 3 (13) R&I 52, NAI.

[149] Questioned after presenting his credentials as ambassador in Rio de Janeiro as to whether Indian immigration to Brazil was feasible, M.R. Masani pointed out that overpopulation in India, and a shortage of agricultural labour in Brazil, "certainly seemed to provide the basis of such immigration." He also said that it was for the two governments concerned to "get together to consider these possibilities in their mutual interest." See IER, Fortnightly Report No. 9, November 16, 1948, F.2 R&I 48; IER, "Report on Brazil, Confidential" June 1948-June 1949, 11 September 1949, F. 2 (52) AMS 49, NAI.

[150] Office of the Economic Adviser to the Government of India, "A note on trade possibilities with Brazil," 20 March 1948, F. 2 (4) / AMS 49, NAI.

[151] On Masani's life, see Zareer Masani, *And All is Said,* (London: Penguin, 2012). Unfortunately, his tenure as ambassador to Brazil is not addressed.

[152] "M.R. Masani to Nehru," December 27, 1948, F. 2 (4) / AMS 49, NAI.

[153] MEA, "Report of Min. E.A. & Commonwealth Relations 1948-49," 12; "Report of Min. E.A. & Commonwealth Relations 1949-50," 13, MEA Library, MEA.

implied, had only a basic notion of what modern India was, and – perhaps more importantly to him – what it could become in the near future.[154] Accordingly, monthly and fortnightly bulletins on general topics, agriculture, industrial development, and foreign policy were produced and distributed by the Indian embassy. Exhibitions on India were presented, conferences were organized, and good relations with the press were fostered. During Masani's tenure in Rio de Janeiro, the *Sociedade Brasileira de Amigos da Índia* [Brazilian Society of Friends of India] was sponsored, in order to deepen cultural relations between the two nations. Several prominent figures participated in the *Sociedade*: the presidency was held by Cecília Meireles, one of the most renowned Brazilian poets of her generation; the vice-presidency was held by Gilberto Freyre; and Brazilian foreign minister Raul Fernandes and ambassador M.R. Masani were chairmen.[155] Despite a limited budget, India thus displayed a commitment to promoting itself abroad.[156]

Such publicity campaigns eventually paid off, both during Masani's tenure and that of his successors. The embassy registered a growing interest from the Brazilian press regarding the international position of India, including its foreign policy. According to the Indian press *attaché*, in 1953, "there were far more press comments on India's policy […] and much greater discussion among the more knowledgeable newspapers on India's part in world affairs." These comments indicated, according to the embassy, that "India's independent foreign policy [had] gained considerable respect [and it was] obvious that newspapers in Brazil had begun to think of India as a power to be reckoned with in world affairs." Indeed, according to the *attaché*, the embassy had begun to receive information requests about important subjects, such as India's attitude towards communism and colonialism, and its diplomatic efforts to end the dispute in Korea.[157]

However, while the press displayed a growing interest in India's foreign policy, this did not appear to extend to Portuguese India. Indeed, the press did not welcome the Indian government's claims regarding the Portuguese territories, despite several attempts to clarify New Delhi's position. Early reports sent to the MEA had already recognized the possibility that Brazilians would not understand and accept India's claims: "Even though Brazilians may appreciate India's desire to see the end of foreign settlements on India's soil," one report stated, "it is […] possible that a certain amount of

[154] M.R. Masani to Nehru, 30 August 1948, F. 2 (4) / 49 AMS; IER, "Report on Brazil, Confidential" June 1948-June 1949, 11 September 1949, F. 2 (52) AMS 49, NAI. Although Masani was surveying Brazilian knowledge of his home country, his conclusions could be easily extended to other parts of Asia. General notions of this vast, distant, and diverse continent were little more than stereotypes and prejudices, and only a small section of society had any kind of informed understanding. This is no surprise, since Brazil did not have departments or centers dedicated to Asia, and most of its information was obtained through American and European channels.

[155] EIR, "Fortnightly Report no. 21," May 16, 1949, F.58 R&I / 49.

[156] See Ananya Chakravarti, "Peripheral eyes: Brazilians and India, 1947-61," in *Journal of Global History, Volume 10, Issue 01, March 2015,* 122-146.

[157] IER, "Yearly Publicity Report for the year 1953, Secret," F. S54 13514 87, NAI.

Brazilian sentiment may range itself behind the historical link between Portugal and Goa." Such early assessments were verified when India stepped up its campaign for the annexation of Goa. "Nehru's statement in the House [in February 1950] about the merger of Goa with India evoked strongly-worded editorials in the press […] Brazilians are Portuguese by origin and in spite of the fact [that] they [are] cut away from Portugal, still have a sense of loyalty to their fatherland." Even intellectual circles, among whom the Indian embassy usually enjoyed great credibility, showed signs of great hesitation whenever the subject was broached. "The hold that Portugal has over the intellectual and cultural strata of the Brazilian populace is somewhat different and has to be experienced to be believed," the embassy stated. "Scratch a Brazilian and he is a Portuguese."[158]

Perhaps because of these findings (but also because the conflict with Portugal was still at an early stage), the Indian government refrained from raising the topic with the government of Brazil.[159] Indeed, until 1953, New Delhi limited its 'campaign' for the annexation of the Portuguese settlements to the press, avoiding any approach at the diplomatic level. As such, relations between India and Brazil remained cordial and low-key: interactions were limited to solicitation of votes at the UN or within other multilateral organizations, and collaboration on other minor issues. Moreover, even the proposal for a migration treaty failed: according to the Indian embassy, the Brazilian government had stressed its preference for immigrants who could be "easily assimilated" and could "fit into the cultural patterns and way of life [in Brazil]."[160]

To be sure, the low-key character of these interactions was also a product of Brazil's indifference towards India. When Rio de Janeiro established diplomatic relations with New Delhi in 1948, the Itamaraty did not wish merely to 'strengthen' relations with India. Indeed, the Brazilian government was primarily motivated by a desire for international and regional prestige, especially vis-à-vis Argentina, with whom maintained an historic rivalry. It was also interested in monitoring the development of the Cold War in South Asia, since many political and military leaders in Brazil believed that the Cold War would soon turn hot. Finally, a diplomatic presence in India provided an opportunity to directly solicit votes for Brazilian candidates in international organizations, not only from India, but also from other Asian nations accredited in New Delhi.[161]

[158] EIR, "Press Report, January-June 1950, Secret," F. 3 (5) R&I 50, NAI.
[159] Apparently, Goa was not the only 'problem' avoided by the Indian government. According to a report of the Indian embassy, Hyderabad and Kashmir were also avoided. "The only issues on which Brazilians have perhaps found it difficult to appreciate altogether India's stand [excepting the Goa's problem] have been those of Hyderabad and Kashmir."
[160] IER, "Report on Brazil, Confidential" June 1948-June 1949, 11 September 1949, F. 2 (52) AMS 49.
[161] Embaixada do Brasil em Nova Deli (henceforth, EMBRAND) to MRE, CT 12, December 24, 1948; EMBRAND to MRE, CT 3, January 5, 1949; EMBRAND to MRE, CT 43, 3 December 3, 1949, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Rio de Janeiro (henceforth, AHI).

Indeed, Brazil's immediate objectives were political and economic, being primarily focused on the relationship with the US, Europe, and, to a certain degree, Latin America. The Itamaraty already knew that prospects of trade were limited, since Brazil and India shared similar economies, in the sense that both were essentially agrarian, and industrially underdeveloped. Besides, the lack of a large national shipping company with direct trading routes between South America and Asia, the preference for the US dollar as the currency of trade, and the difficulty of acquiring reliable information all tended to discourage Brazilians. Therefore, the embassy would seek merely to foster a cordial atmosphere in India, and, to a certain degree, to be the eyes and ears of Brazil in Asia (bearing in mind that this was Brazil's first embassy in South Asia).[162]

The mission of the first ambassadors to India was thus one of courtesy and observation: Caio de Mello Franco spent his short tenure in New Delhi (1949-1951) collecting and transmitting basic information regarding general topics, without any detailed analysis or comments. Besides, being a staunch conservative, he regularly dispatched alarming cables about the "red peril" – a fact that surely contributed to raising grave concerns in the Itamaraty regarding a possible war. During 1950, for instance, the ambassador admitted the danger of an "atomic-hydrogen storm" in Indochina, identified the potential annexation of Tibet by communist China as a "threat" to the fragile equilibrium of Asia, and declared that the political situation in Southeast Asia was leading to an "outcome that the world has [long] foreseen."[163] These catastrophic predictions were further influenced by the growing communist activity in India. In 1950, for instance, the horrified ambassador reported that "communist atrocities" had occurred in the state of Hyderabad, in which "communists [had] killed more than 2,000 people […] seized and destroyed villages, burned, and occupied land and properties."[164]

This initial reaction towards India – a blend of disinterest, uneven knowledge, and Cold War paranoia – prevented Brazilian diplomats from appreciating India's foreign policy and economic achievements. Without any constructive or active role to play, the staff of the embassy devoted most of their time to compiling vague information about India and South Asia. Considered a difficult, remote, and ill-equipped posting, India was shunned by Brazilian diplomats, and turnover of staff at the embassy was unusually high. Mello Franco's successor, Abelardo Bueno do Prado, took office in March 1952, procured a vote from India in favor of Brazil in the UN, and sent a few general reports, before leaving for Zurich four months later, never to return.[165] The Brazilian *chargé d'affaires*, Rodolfo de Souza

[162] EMBRAND to MRE, T 28, September 19, 1950, AHI.
[163] EMBRAND to MRE, CT 21, February 16, 1950; EMBRAND to MRE, CT 42, May 4, 1949, EMBRAND to MRE, CT 56, June 2, 1950, AHI.
[164] EMBRAND to MRE, CT 50, May 16, 1950, AHI.
[165] EMBRAND to MRE, CT 8, May 20, 1952, AHI.

Dantas, summed up the spirit of Brazilian diplomats during their posting in India. When asked by the Itamaraty to give his opinion about the closure of the consulate in Calcutta, Dantas replied

> Calcutta is, undoubtedly, one of the Indian metropolises […] that provides the least comfort to foreigners […]. The climate is terrible, much more depressing than Delhi or Bombay […]. People [particularly the refugees] are extremely poor, with non-existent habits of hygiene; they wander the streets […] like starving dogs […] a human scum, who bring forth an outbreak of unparalleled diseases and infections, turning Calcutta into a cradle of almost all those epidemics that regularly strike India. Water, vegetables, meat, the air, it all serves as fertile ground for the most dangerous microbes, and foreigners need to buy canned food from abroad […]. Cholera, malaria and smallpox, combined with the communists, make life even more unbearable. Calcutta is the greatest red area of the country; one avoids going there as one avoids visiting an asylum of lepers.[166]

Closing a Door

Between 1951 and 1952, the Indian government implemented the policy towards Goa that had been decided in mid-1950, and eventually applied a series of additional measures: in April 1951, for instance, foreign-exchange restrictions were applied, a measure that mainly affected the remittances of the large Goan community in Bombay.[167] A few months later, in July, various supplies were either refused or delayed, and European Portuguese (as opposed to Indo-Portuguese) citizens were required to register with the police within 24 hours of their arrival in India. All of these measures were intended to raise the pressure on the Portuguese government.[168] So far as religion was concerned, and following India's successful agitation against the *Padroado do Oriente*, the Vatican once again decided to privilege India over Portugal, by elevating, in December 1952, Reverend Valerian Gracias, the Archbishop of Bombay, to the Cardinalate (in preference to José da Costa Nunes, the Patriarch of Goa). Reverend Gracias was not only an Indian citizen, but also a well-known supporter of the unification of Goa with India. This decision, which caused astonishment in Lisbon, was immediately interpreted by

[166] EMBRAND to MRE, O 23, June 7, 1953, AHI.
[167] "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," April 14, 1951, No. 267, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 261. See also Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 145 and Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 117.
[168] "Informação do Governador Geral do Estado da Índia," July 3, 1951, No. 269, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 262-264. See also Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 145 and Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 117.

the Indian government as a "severe blow" to Portuguese prestige.[169] Nevertheless, the main objective – the integration of Goa, Daman, and Diu into India – remained as elusive as in late-1947, as the Portuguese government doggedly persisted in its policy regarding sovereign matters.

Bearing in mind the lack of tangible progress, New Delhi finally decided to raise the stakes. On January 9, 1953, Garin received a note in which the Indian government recalled that the delimitation of the Archdiocese of Goa had been postponed in 1951, and that the Portuguese government had successively delayed negotiations with the Vatican. Continuing, the Indian government regretted that "despite their previous representations, the Portuguese government has not seen its way to treating this question as a very urgent one."[170] Soon after this communication, on January 14, the Indian *chargé d'affaires* in Lisbon, Kewal Singh, delivered another note. Recalling the *aide memoire* of February 1950, and regretting that Portugal did not adopt a more realistic approach regarding the issue of Goa, the Indian government stated:

> [India] has accordingly come to the conclusion that no solution of this problem is now possible except on the basis of a direct transfer, which will ensure the merger of these territories at an early date with the Indian Union […]. The Legation of India earnestly hopes that the Portuguese Government will agree to the opening of negotiations for the direct transfer of these territories to India.[171]

This renewed approach – including the suggestion that the principle of direct transfer should be accepted from the outset – caused consternation in Lisbon. The Portuguese authorities truly believed that the *aide memoire* in 1950 and the furor that had followed it had been merely a ploy to placate some circles within Indian politics. Vasco Garin had even noted that Nehru had moderated his language, refusing some requests in the Lok Sabha to present an ultimatum to Portugal – a 'moderation' that was also noted by English and French diplomats posted in New Delhi.[172] Thus, some doubts arose: why this second note, and why at this particular moment? After all, India was facing so

[169] See The New York Times, [New York, U.S.], December 30, 1952, 6; "From Legation of India to MEA, Portuguese objection to the appointment by the Pope of the Most Reverend Gracias as a Cardinal," [S], February 9, 1953, EI 53 7421 52, NAI. See also Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 144; and Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 122-123.

[170] "Nova verba entregue pelo Ministério dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana à Legação de Portugal em Nova Delhi," January 9, 1953, No. 279, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 279-280.

[171] "Nota Verbal da Legação da União Indiana em Lisboa ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros," January 14, 1953, No. 280, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 281-283.

[172] "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," March 29, 1951, No. 264, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 258-259.

many domestic and international difficulties, and the issue of French India was still unresolved. Besides, Nehru had easily won the general election (1951-1952), and had just begun a new five-year term. "It is possible that this time," the Portuguese representative in New Delhi cautioned the Necessidades, "the Indian government has a more concrete objective than a simple reaffirmation of its position [regarding Portuguese settlements], or simply being able to tell the Parliament that it had not neglected this issue."[173]

Garin sought clarification of the actions of the Indians from the British High Commissioner in Delhi, Sir Alexander Clutterbuck. On February 10, Garin learned through Clutterbuck that the Indian note probably reflected the similar correspondence then taking place between India and France. Moreover, Clutterbuck also intimated that there was no reason to believe that India would deviate from its previous position.[174] The French ambassador had already expressed the same opinion a few days earlier.[175] In Lisbon, the Secretary General of the MNE,[176] Vasco da Cunha, summoned the US, British, and French representatives, in order to inform them about the Indian message. While the US Ambassador, Cavendish Cannon, expressed some sympathy towards the Portuguese position, the British ambassador, Sir Nigel Ronald, did not, and even stated that London would steer clear of the conflict. The French *chargé d'affaires*, Bernard Durant, revealed a deep interest, and promised to forward the note to the Quai d'Orsay.[177]

While Clutterbuck's appraisal indicated that India would not deviate from its policy, recent developments suggested the contrary. On March 17, Nehru publicly denounced the possibility that Goa, Daman, and Diu would be used as a base for military operations in association with NATO, forcing Garin to assert that "on the part of the Portuguese Government, no such designs are entertained, and any allegations to the contrary […] are totally devoid of foundation."[178] A few days later, on March 31, the Indian government handed another note, regretting that no reply regarding the problem of the Archdiocese of Goa had been received, requesting that a delimitation should be enacted before July 1, and announcing that India would soon discontinue the visa facilities granted to officials of the

[173] "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," January 20, 1953, No. 282, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 286.
[174] "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," February 10, 1953, No. 287, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 291-292.
[175] "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," February 6, 1953, No. 285, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 289-290.
[176] Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros [Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs].
[177] "Relato de conversas do Secretário Geral do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros com os Embaixadores dos Estados Unidos e da Grã-Bretanha e com o Conselheiro da Embaixada da França, em 4 de Fevereiro de 1953," February 4, 1953, No. 284, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 287-289.
[178] "Nota Verbal do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Primeiro Ministro e Ministro dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana," Abril 20, 1953, No. 291, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 296-297.

Archdiocese.[179] At the beginning of April, the Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Anil Kumar Chanda, informed the Lok Sabha that no Portuguese reply had been received regarding these matters. However, he guaranteed to the chamber that the Indian government "will continue to do everything possible to regularize the issue."[180]

Despite this pressure, the Portuguese government remained silent. This led Nehru to resurrect a measure that had been proposed at the inter-departmental meeting in mid-1950: namely, the closure of the legation in Lisbon. Indeed, on May 1, Singh presented a note in Lisbon stressing that, despite efforts to enter into negotiations regarding the Portuguese settlements, the attitude of the Portuguese government had rendered this impossible. Thus, New Delhi had come to the conclusion that its Legation in Lisbon had ceased to be of any "practical utility," and that there was no "advantage" to be gained in keeping a legation if Lisbon was unwilling to discuss the future of the territories. "[India] proposes," the note concluded, "to withdraw [its] Mission from Lisbon, unless the Portuguese Government [is] prepared, upon further consideration, to discuss the suggestions which have been made by the Government of India [regarding Goa]."[181]

Eventually, the boundaries of the Archdiocese of Goa were delimited as requested by New Delhi. Nonetheless, the Indian legation was closed in June 1953. The Portuguese government did not alter is policy of refusing to discuss its sovereignty on the Indian subcontinent, and *chargé d'affaires* Kewal Singh returned to India.[182] This, however, did not entirely sever diplomatic ties. Both the Portuguese legation in New Delhi and the Indian consulate in Goa remained in existence: both governments wished to maintain certain contacts (Portugal with the community, mainly in Bombay; India with the Goan nationalists inside the Portuguese territories). Both nations also wished to further pursue their 'underground activities', such as collecting confidential information, and carrying out propaganda. However, when Nehru closed the legation, he was also signaling that the diplomatic approach had

[179] "Nota verbal entregue pelo Ministério dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana à Legação de Portugal em Nova Delhi," March 31, 1953, No. 289, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 294-295.
[180] "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," April 10, 1953, No. 290, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 295-296.
[181] "Nota verbal da Legação da União Indiana em Lisboa ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros," May 1, 1953, No. 292, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 297-299.
[182] "Nota verbal do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros à Legação da União Indiana em Lisboa," May 15, 1953, No. 301; "Nota do Encarregado de Negócios da União Indiana em Lisboa ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," May 21, 1953, No. 303; "Nota do Encarregado de Negócios da União Indiana ao Ministro do Negócios Estrangeiros," May 26, 1953, No. 305; "Do Presidente do Conselho ao Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi," June 3, 1953, No. 306; "Nota Oficiosa do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros distribuída à imprensa em 10 de Junho de 1953," June 10 1953, No. 307; "Nota verbal da Legação de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministério dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana," June 11, 1953, No. 309; "Nota verbal do Ministério dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana à Legação de Portugal em Nova Delhi," June 24, 1953, No 313, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 305-313; 315.

failed. Despite his attempts to liberate Goa and to promote unification via negotiations, Salazar had shown himself unyielding.

In many respects, these early years were thus characterized by an almost complete stalemate. Apart from the religious issue – in which the Portuguese government was under pressure from the Vatican to relinquish the *Padroado do Oriente* – Lisbon continued to exert its rule in the Indian subcontinent without great difficulty. India's cautious, even timid, sanctions against the Portuguese territories were not enough to disturb the life and the economy of the colony. However, the authorities in Lisbon were far from complacent: the recurrent remarks of the Indian authorities on the need to annex Goa, Daman and Diu, the application of various retaliatory measures against the territories and their inhabitants, and the closure of the Indian legation all signaled that the issue was far from being settled, and led the Portuguese authorities to initiate their first demarches towards American, British, French, and Brazilian diplomatic officials. Amongst the latter, the Brazilians seemed to be the most responsive, clearly indicating that they considered the Portuguese presence in India as legitimate, and not subject to colonial administration. From a publicity point of view, the support of this former Portuguese colony (an anti-colonial nation, as well as from the global South) seemed to be a great success, which had the potential to yield further advantages in the future. For their part, the Indian authorities regarded these early years with considerable frustration. Despite several diplomatic initiatives and various retaliatory measures, the goal of unification remained as elusive as it had been in late 1947. However, given the myriad of problems that Nehru had to face during the post-independence period – particularly, but not only, the Kashmir crisis – one might question whether the issue of the Portuguese territories was really a priority, or was rather put on the backburner. Irrespective of the answer to this question, the decision to close the legation in Portugal signaled that New Delhi had finally begun to explore other ways to solve this problem.

Chapter Two | Internationalization, 1954-1955

Goa under Pressure

After three years of such consistent, yet unsuccessful, attempts, prime minister Nehru and his cabinet felt that additional measures were needed, in order to bring the Portuguese government to the negotiation table. In December 1953, after a secret meeting in Bombay with Morarji Desai, Vicente Coelho, Ashok Mehta, and Rafi Ahmed Kidwai,[1] Nehru eventually decided to implement a rigorous policy of economic denial against the Portuguese territories, as well as a 'psychological war' against the Portuguese colonial administration and the Indo-Portuguese population. Isolation and discrimination, Nehru and his close advisers now tended to believe, would push the local economy to the verge of collapse, demoralize the population, and ultimately compel the Portuguese government to finally assent to a 'French India formula'.[2]

Two further imperatives impelled Nehru to inaugurate a new policy regarding Goa, Daman, and Diu.[3] First, the Indian prime minister clearly understood that this was necessary to alleviate domestic pressure. Since the closure of the legation in Lisbon, Nehru and his cabinet were being urged to adopt much harsher measures against the Portuguese. Not only political opponents, but also political allies, such as the Governor of Bihar, Ranganath Ramachandra Diwakar, contended that a diplomatic approach alone was ineffective, and that additional measures were needed to bring the Portuguese government to the negotiation table.[4] Furthermore, some diplomats in the South Block had long favored a more proactive attitude on the part of the government, including the use of the 'economic bomb', irrespective of the damage this would cause to the local populations.[5] Along similar lines, pro-India Goan activists had become increasingly impatient, and privately urged concrete measures to accelerate the integration of the territories in India.[6] Second, there was concern that maintaining a

[1] Morarji Desai was the chief minister of Bombay, Vicente Coelho, the Consul General to Goa, Ashok Metha was the Secretary General of the Praja Socialist Party, and Rafi Ahmed Kiwai was the Minister of Food and Agriculture.
[2] Bègue, *La Fin de Goa*, 526.
[3] In July 1953, Nehru wrote "The step we took in closing our legation in Lisbon has almost everywhere been interpreted as a first step of a new policy. There is no new policy of course, but it is true that a certain dynamic phase has begun in regard to these Portuguese possessions. We cannot allow it to become static again." In 'Policy for the Liberation of Goa', 15 July 1953, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty Three (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 548.
[4] To R.R. Diwakar,' July 13, 1953, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty Three (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 547-548.
[5] MEA, S.K. Banerji, February 8, 1950; MEA, 'Note on Goa for the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet, Secret' August 25, 1950, F. 5.10 EUR I 50, NAI.
[6] See, for instance, 'A Talk with Tristao Braganza de Cunha,' September 4, 1953, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty Three (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 550. See also, *The Liberation*, 71-72.

'static' policy towards the Portuguese territories would risk surrendering the initiative to those who preached more extreme actions, such as sabotage and disturbance of order.[7] Indeed, many disgruntled Indian nationalists were keen to take action against the Portuguese territories, including the launch of *satyagraha*. However, to lose control to such extremists would cause numerous problems for Nehru, such as attracting (yet more) undesirable international attention to India's border conflicts, interrupting or jeopardizing the negotiations with France, or creating an unsustainable atmosphere within domestic politics, which might eventually *force* a military intervention.[8]

In his speeches during the months subsequent to the closure of the legation, Nehru had thus carefully combined promises of action with appeals for calm. On the one hand, he reassured his listeners that his government was fully committed to the liberation of Goa: in mid-September 1953, for instance, he informed members of Lok Sabha that the decision to close the legation had been an "important gesture," a "step" which would naturally be followed by "other steps."[9] On the other hand, he cautioned his fellow Indians about the need to follow a peaceful line, and to avoid the use of force: in a public meeting in Palghat, in the communist controlled state of Kerala, for example, the prime minister recalled that "as a free people, we have always to act with responsibility of freedom upon us […]. I am perfectly clear in my mind that we must stick to peaceful action […]. We may differ in certain matters, but let us differ peacefully."[10] Economic sanctions and administrative/bureaucratic hurdles were thus a sort of *half-way approach*, designed mainly to satisfy the growing demands to solve the problem of Portuguese settlements, but without sacrificing the prestige and pacifism of Nehru's government.

As early as 1954, the Portuguese territories in India were thus placed under a blockade by New Delhi. Trade, upon which the Goan economy was highly dependent, was drastically reduced, since the Indian authorities banned exports, while ignoring applications for the granting of import licenses. Basic foodstuffs, such as potatoes, onions, and sugar, were seized at the border. The transit of Indo-Portuguese, particularly important for the large community living in India, was also restricted, through new regulations and vexatious bureaucracy. Indian customs personnel often subjected travelers to nerve-racking searches and formalities, lengthy waiting periods, arbitrary customs fees, and various humiliations. Even Portuguese-European officials were not exempt from such constraints: for instance, bureaucratic hurdles were erected in order to hamper their movement between the district of Daman

[7] V.H. Coelho, Consul General of India, Goa to MEA, 'Report no. 7 – 1953, For the month of June 1953, Secret', July 2, 1953, F. 17(15) – XPP, 1953, NAI.
[8] Bègue, *La Fin de Goa*, 493-504.
[9] 'Continuity in Policy,' September 17, 1953, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty Three (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 392.
[10] "Stand on Foreign Pockets," October 4, 1953, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty Three (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 646. From *The Hindu*, October 5, 1953.

and the inland enclaves of Dadrá and Nagar-Haveli. Some were denied entrance to India, and all, except the Governor-General and the diplomatic and consular personnel accredited before New Delhi's central government, were prohibited from carrying any weapons and ammunition through Indian territory.[11]

Did this change of policy come as a surprise for the Portuguese government? Hardly. Immediately after the departure of the Indian *chargé d'affaires*, Kewal Singh, the Necessidades had instructed all Portuguese diplomatic representatives to contact their host governments, and to inform them of what Lisbon considered to be an "unjustifiable and objectionable" attitude regarding Portugal. Moreover, the representatives were also told to sound out the possibility of their host governments making a formal declaration to Indian diplomats, in support of the Portuguese government.[12] Nevertheless, this turn of events did cause some apprehension within the ranks: in January 1954, while appraising recent developments, Salazar declared in a session of the Council of Ministers that the situation in Portuguese India was "extremely serious", and confessed to a certain pessimism.[13] In a letter to his friend and ambassador, Marcelo Mathias, he wrote:

> We are subject to massive protests, media campaigns, parliamentary interpellations, restrictions of all kinds which affect people and goods […]. I suppose that Indian leaders are creating and rousing such a state of excitement that it will be impossible for them to back down. They are assembling people to create disorders […] and, if they manage to convince the world that there is an insurgency within their borders, to deliver a *coup de force*. Until now, there is only cold war, but their peaceful statements are so hypocritical that we cannot rely upon them.[14]

[11] "Nota verbal da Legação de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministério dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana," December 2, 1953, No. 321; "Nota verbal da Legação de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministério dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana," December 11, 1953, No. 322; "Do Cônsul Geral de Portugal em Bombaim ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," December 28, 1953, No. 324; "Do Cônsul Geral de Portugal em Bombaim ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," January 11, 1954, No. 325; "Nota verbal da Legação de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministério dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana," January 18, 1954, No. 326; "Da Legação de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministério dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana," January 20, 1954, No. 327; "Nota verbal do Ministério dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana à Legação de Portugal em Nova Delhi," February 3, 1954, No. 329; "Nota verbal da Legação de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministério dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana," February 11, 1954, No. 334; "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Secretário do Ministério dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana," March 12, 1954, No. 337; *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 322-324; 328-343; 351-352; 354-455.
[12] "Circular do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros a todas as Missões Diplomáticas e Consulares," June 27, 1953, No. 320, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 321-322.
[13] Nogueira, *Salazar,* 330.
[14] Maria José Vaz Pinto (org), *Marcello Mathias/Salazar, Correspondência,* 1947-1968 (Lisboa: Difel, 1984), 284.

The reaction to India's new policy occurred at three different levels: the local, the domestic, and the international. As was so often the case under the *Estado Novo*, the regime reacted locally with repression: Governor-General Bénard Guedes, who had until then been considered tolerant, liberal, and cooperative by the Indian consulate in Goa, gave *carte blanche* to the police, and numerous arrests were made.[15] Ordinary freedom fighters, but also high-profile pro-India Goan nationalists, were imprisoned, and some of them were deported to Portugal, where they were convicted of crimes against 'state security'. Among them was the famous Goan surgeon Pundalik D. Gaitonde, the president of the Working Committee of the National Congress (Goa) and a personal acquaintance of Jawaharlal Nehru, whose imprisonment and deportation caused a scandal in India, and led the Indian prime minister to declare in the Lok Sabha that "the way things are continuing to happen in Goa… […] strains our patience to the utmost."[16]

As so often occurred under the *Estado Novo* too, the regime sought to mobilize public opinion around the issue. Portuguese newspapers began to publish alarming reports in order to prepare public opinion for a clash against India. Most reports were supplied directly by the government.[17] In the Portuguese National Assembly, Sócrates da Costa recalled once again that Portuguese India was an 'Overseas province', and inveighed strongly against India. Da Costa criticized the interference of the Indian government in Portuguese domestic affairs; accused India of destabilizing the peace and tranquility of the Goan people; compared Indian tactics to Hitler's strategy; evoked the *lusotropicalismo*; and ended with the typical resort to all the heroes of Portuguese India: Vasco da Gama, Francisco de Almeida, and Afonso de Albuquerque. Thus, the assembly passed a vote of confidence in the 'Overseas policy' of the Portuguese government.[18]

Salazar took on the task of *announcing* the international reaction. On April 12, in a long speech broadcast by the *Emissora Nacional*, the 64-year old dictator reiterated the discourse regarding Portuguese colonial rights, criticized the attacks on 'colonialism', and finally reminded India that

[15] V.H. Coelho, Consul General of India, Goa to MEA, 'Report no. 4 – 1954, For the month of March 1954, Secret', April 4, 1954, F. 49 R&I/54, NAI. See also V.H. Coelho, Consul General of India, Goa to MEA, 'Report no. 1 – 1954, For the month of December 1953, Secret', January 5, 1954, F. 17(15) – XPP, 1953, NAI. See Bègue, *La Fin de Goa*, 495. According to data of the Ministério do Ultramar (Overseas Ministry), 1135 detentions were made in Goa during the year of 1954. See Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 128.

[16] Gaitonde was arrested after having made a verbal protest against the notion that Goa was part of Portugal. After hesitating, Nehru was forced to condemn Gaitonde's imprisonment: after roughly one month, Deputy Foreign Minister Anil Chanda informed Lok Sabha that a strong protest had been sent to the Portuguese government. The Indian government had expressed its condemnation of the "progressive curtailment of political liberties and summary and severe punishment" of a Goan professing sympathy with India. The Portuguese government was also informed that India could not "remain a silent spectator to this form of repression of Goa." See his personal account, in Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 72-76. See also his wife's personal account: Edila Gaitonde, *As Maças Azuis. Portugal e Goa. 1948-1961,* (Lisboa: Editorial Tágide, 2012). Quote of Nehru from 'Policy towards Goa,' March 16, 1954, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJN, Second Series, Volume Twenty Five,* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 512.

[17] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento,* 246.

[18] Diário das Sessões, Assembleia Nacional, no. 48, March 23, 1954, 812-815.

Portugal was protected by powerful 'friends': by the Anglo-Portuguese alliance of 1899, under which London was obliged to defend and protect the colonies of Portugal; and by the NATO alliance, under which article four stipulated that a member could consult other members if its territorial integrity or political independence was under threat. "The texts are so clear," Salazar stated ironically, "that they require no interpreter." Although the Portuguese ambassadors in Washington and London did not receive instructions to mention these treaties, they nonetheless approached both governments in order to convey Portuguese apprehension regarding India.[19]

Were the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and NATO really a defense against a possible militarist India? The answer was negative, and the Portuguese government knew it very well. London would never assume any responsibilities if Nehru decided to give a 'green light' to a military intervention, for obvious reasons: only a few years previously, the British themselves had been forced to retreat from India, and the idea that they would go to war to defend Portugal was fantastical nonsense. As for NATO, the Atlantic organization would probably only express its passive disapproval. However, the Portuguese government also knew that international pressure could work as a deterrence to war, and force Nehru to attenuate his domestic campaign. Indeed, although fully aware of the lack of feasibility of both treaties (interestingly, London and Washington had already briefed the Indian government about this in 1949 and 1951), Nehru did not ignore the words of the Portuguese government, and made several statements in the Lok Sabha, advising that India could not acknowledge foreign interferences.

At this point, Brazil seemed to be the only nation that was truly *engaged* in the conservation of the Portuguese presence in India. Besides the declaration of 1952, in which the Brazilian government had recognized the Portuguese 'Overseas provinces' as an integral part of Portugal itself, the Itamaraty had recently reaffirmed its solidarity regarding Portuguese rights in India.[20] Indeed, on April 1, the Portuguese *chargé d'affaires* had requested and received reassurances from Secretary-General Vasco Leitão da Cunha, to the effect that nothing had changed regarding Brazil's official policy.[21] However, these repeated declarations of solidarity did not completely reassure Lisbon's officials. Besides the usual skepticism towards Brazilian statesmen, Portuguese diplomatic officials were chiefly concerned with the left-leaning tendencies of President Vargas and some of his ministers, and specifically with

[19] As for criticism against 'colonialism', Salazar stated: "It seems that Europe feels embarrassed and regrets its acts of discovery […] and discretely tries to erase their vestiges. The fact is that progress is still measured everywhere by the degree of westernization achieved." See "Goa e a União Indiana. Discurso proferido pelo Presidente do Conselho, Prof. Doutor António de Oliveira Salazar em 12 de Abril de 1954, ao microfone da Emissora Nacional," April 12, 1954, No. 342, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 369-378.

[20] MRE to DELBRAONU, CT [C] 114, November 29, 1952, AHMRE.

[21] EPRJ to MNE, T 78, April 1, 1954, AHDMNE. A memorandum was even sent to Lisbon, confirming that Brazil's delegation to the U.N. had been instructed to block, in any circumstances, any discussion regarding Portuguese sovereignty rights in Asia and Africa.

their outspoken declarations on colonialism. Indeed, in October 1953, Vargas had made worrying remarks during a short speech marking the Day of the Americas at the Spanish embassy, in which he had stated that the American continent would only fulfil its historical destiny and vocation through the disappearance of colonialism.[22] Although he was only referring to colonialism in the Americas, the declaration had raised serious concerns amongst Portuguese diplomats regarding the seriousness of Brazil's commitment. Several months later, and despite subtle Portuguese protests, Brazil sponsored a resolution at the Conference of Caracas, which condemned the existence of American territories under the political and administrative jurisdiction of extra-continental powers. And, despite the excuses of the Itamaraty (notably, the desire to avoid an even harsher resolution sponsored by Argentina), Lisbon regretted that Brazil was undermining its commitment to defend Goa in the future.[23]

In April 1954, a diplomatic incident offered a flagrant opportunity to test Brazil's solidarity. The Portuguese Ambassador to India, Vasco Garin, became aware that the honorary consul of Brazil in Bombay had organized meetings to discuss the future of Goa. At the final meeting, Consul Jaime Heredia – an Indian citizen – had reunited pro- and anti-Portuguese Goan activists, and had requested that they sign a letter in support of a recent declaration by Nehru regarding the future of Goa.[24] Bearing in mind the official position of the Brazilian government, Garin informed the Brazilian ambassador to India, Ildefonso Falcão, of what he characterized as disloyal behavior. Without consulting the Itamaraty, Falcão decided to issue a clear warning to the consul regarding his illicit activities. "As Honorary Consul of Brazil in Bombay," he reminded Heredia, "you cannot and should not assume such attitudes, unless you were to resign, thus acquiring the desired liberty." Heredia seized the opportunity to embarrass the Brazilian government, and to create a major scandal: he tendered his resignation, and took the case to the Indian newspapers, which promptly made much fuss around it. The story was published by all the major Indian newspapers, such as *The Statesman*, *The Hindustan Times*, and *The Hindustan Standard*, and even reached newspapers in neighboring Pakistan. The Itamaraty immediately backed its ambassador, acknowledging that Heredia had misbehaved.[25]

While this seemed to be a simple incident – and one favorable to Portuguese interests – it soon became embarrassing, particularly when Falcão sought to settle the case by himself. Some days subsequently, he gave an interview to the Indian press, explaining, among other things, that a diplomatic

[22] Serviço de Documentação da Presidência da República, "Discurso pronunciado pelo Presidente Getúlio Vargas na Embaixada de Espanha, em 12 de Outubro de 1953," in *Getúlio Vargas, Disursos proferidos no terceiro ano do mandato presidencial, 1953* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1954), 67-69.
[23] See, for instance, EPRJ to MNE, A 5, February 20, 1954, AHDMNE.
[24] MRE to Embaixada do Brasil em Nova Delhi [Embassy of Brazil in New Delhi], (henceforth, EMBRAND), O [C] 66, April 24, 1954, AHMRE.
[25] MRE to EMBRAND, O [C] 66, April 24, 1954, AHMRE.

representative could not express political opinions, as stipulated by the regulations of the Brazilian foreign service. Besides, Falcão explained, the Brazilian government maintained a "strict neutrality" regarding the disagreement between Portugal and India. Unsurprisingly, senior Portuguese diplomats were astonished by such declarations, circulated by the Indian press under titles such as "Brazil: Strict Neutrality in Goa Dispute." "Our position in New Delhi is now diminished," Secretary General Manuel Rocheta wrote, "and this statement will be used by the Indian press against us, even if it does not correspond to the reality of the friendly feelings demonstrated by the Itamaraty."[26] In Rio de Janeiro, the Chief of the Political Department, Souza Gomes, deeply regretted Falcão's statements – "he is a madman that should never have been appointed ambassador, but rather forcibly retired." Leitão da Cunha also regretted this attitude, and a memorandum was soon delivered to the South Block: here, Brazil reiterated that the situation in Portuguese India was not comparable to that of a colonial regime; and that the will of the local populations was to remain Portuguese, leading to a protest from the South Block.

Although the Portuguese response might seem exaggerated, the truth is that Indian diplomats had kept a close eye on these events. A few days after Falcão's press statements, the Indian ambassador requested an audience to protest against Heredia's discharge, and to sound out the Secretary-General's personal opinion on Goa.[27] His report partially confirmed Portuguese fears:

> Although our protest has not, I think, convinced them [Government of Brazil] that they were wrong, still I feel that it has [had] a good effect, as in the future they will be more careful with us and particularly in any line they take up in the matter of Goa or Pondicherry. I personally feel that in spite of the divergences of views between Portugal and ourselves, the Brazilian Foreign Office can perhaps be made to take a more friendly and reasonable view in this matter provided we could give them the impression that we expect them, as a great country, to rise above the sentimentalities of the question concerned in spite of their great friendship on Portugal to act as a bridge between Indian and Portugal and thereby help to solve peacefully a difficult situation which contains apparently irreconcilable claims.[28]

[26] MNE to EPRJ, April 21, 1954; MNE to EPRJ, April 22, 1954, AHDMNE.
[27] EPRJ to MNE, April 27, 1954, No. 91, AHDMNE.
[28] "Embassy of India, Rio de Janeiro (henceforth, EIR) to MEA," Monthly Political Report for May 1954, July 5, 1954, 13 R&I 54, NAI.

The Occupation of Dadrá and Nagar-Haveli

On the evening of July 22, a group of freedom fighters snuck into the small enclave of Dadrá. After a brief skirmish with the Portuguese police, in which three police officers were killed, the freedom fighters successfully occupied the main village of Dadrá, and proceeded to hoist the Indian flag. The next day, the officials of Demani and Tighra, the two other villages of the enclave, also surrendered. This successful *satyagraha* had been launched under the leadership of Francis Mascarenhas and Waman Desai, members of the United Front of Goans, and supported by other pro-India Goan movements, such as the Azad Gomantak Dal and the Goan People's Party. According to eye-witness Jayant Dessai, "as soon as the people realized that the Portuguese domination had been wiped out, they rushed to the streets and cheered the liberators."[29]

Lisbon immediately blamed the government of New Delhi, believing that they had irrefutable evidence of India's connivance with the freedom fighters. In the evening, the Ministry of the Overseas had received some rather vague information from Daman, warning that a grave situation in Dadrá and Nagar-Haveli could soon arise: the governor had been prevented by the Indian authorities from travelling to Dadrá due to bureaucratic hurdles, and later discovered that preparations for war were being carried out. He had also reported the closure of all roads around Daman by the Indian police, and the deployment of around 1,200 Indian reserve policemen between Daman and Nagar-Haveli, all wearing combat equipment and supported by 11 jeeps and radio communications. According to the governor, these reserve policemen had been deployed in order to obstruct any reinforcements that might be sent from Daman.[30]

Although Portuguese officials were convinced of the connivance of the Indian government, they knew virtually nothing about what had happened that evening, nor about what was still in course. Lisbon had been informed via news agencies that a group of volunteers had 'defeated' the local garrison (composed of around 15 policemen without military instruction) following a brief skirmish, and had eventually gained control of the small enclave inhabited by around 3,000 people. The Ministry of the Overseas had not received any communication from Daman or Goa, and the situation remained highly confused: for a brief moment, the Portuguese government had raised the possibility of a general

[29] Alexandre, *Contra*, 259; Stocker, *Xeque Mate*, 135; Bègue, *La fin de Goa*, 535. Quote in Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 81-82.
[30] "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em Londres," July 21, 1954, No. 360; "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Encarregado de Negócios de Portugal em Nova Delhi," July 22, 1954, No. 361, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 399-402.

military assault by India against the district of Daman and Nagar-Haveli.[31] This situation would remain unchecked for some days, apparently because India had cut the communication lines between the territories. The fragility of Portuguese rule and its military apparatus had thus become glaring. In New Delhi, Garin presented a strong protest, and requested the right of passage through India's territory to re-establish order and sovereignty.[32]

Two days later, after having received official confirmation that Dadrá had fallen, the Portuguese government approached other Western governments, and particularly those of NATO countries.[33] Diplomatic representatives were instructed to contact host governments, and to request either a formal statement of solidarity with Portugal, or an official demarche towards New Delhi. Representatives were also told to underline the fact that New Delhi had violated international norms, and had thus created a dangerous situation that could lead to another military conflict in the Asian continent. Such an outcome, it was noted, was contrary to Western interests, as well as posing dangers to all Western countries.[34] Identical arguments were presented by Paulo Cunha, during a meeting with the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, the Portuguese foreign minister refrained from launching the consultant procedure as permitted in article four. Portugal preferred to brandish the threat of activating the article (thus leaving open all possible outcomes), rather than actually activating it, knowing that this would quite possibly be met with indifference by its close allies. The same was true regarding the Anglo-Portuguese alliance: in London, Ambassador Theotonio Pereira restricted his demarche to a short, factual memorandum, in which he did not even mention the treaty.[35]

An identical demarche was made in Rio de Janeiro. However, here, Portuguese diplomats both expected and obtained immediate results from their Latin American ally. On July 23, Ambassador António de Faria conveyed to Vasco Leitão da Cunha his government's deep concerns regarding the events in Portuguese India, and subtly requested a formal declaration of solidarity. "The Secretary-General [Leitão da Cunha] then told me that he could immediately manifest the solidarity of the

[31] "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em Londres," July 22, 1954, No. 362; "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Encarregado de Negócios de Portugal em Nova Delhi," July 23, 1954, No. 365; "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Encarregado de Negócios de Portugal em Nova Delhi, July 23, 1954, No. 367, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, I, 402-406.

[32] "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros a Encarregado de Negócios de Portugal em Nova Delhi," July 23, 1954, No. 367, *VADEPI*, 1947-1967, I, 406.

[33] "Comunicado do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, publicado na imprensa em 23 de Julho de 1954," July 23, 1954, No. 370, *VADEPI*, 1947-1967, I, 408-409.

[34] "Da Direcção Geral dos Negócios Políticos do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Chefe do Gabinete do Ministério do Ultramar [S], July 31, 1954, No. 399, *in* Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Vinte Anos de Defesa do Estado Português da Índia (1947-1967)*, Volume II, (henceforth *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II) (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1967), 32-33.

[35] "Da Direcção Geral dos Negócios Políticos do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Chefe do Gabinete do Ministério do Ultramar [S], July 31, 1954, No. 399, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II, 35.

Brazilian government," Faria cabled Lisbon, "but that he first needed to consider whether this should be through a public declaration, or rather a diplomatic demarche towards particular governments. I replied immediately that the second option did not exclude the first."[36] Less than 24 hours later, the Itamaraty issued a short declaration, expressing the "feelings of solidarity of Brazil towards Portugal", as well as their "great commitment to see this situation settled through peaceful means."[37] Leitão da Cunha also promised that the Indian, British, and US ambassadors would be summoned for a meeting within the next few days.[38]

At the same time, and as requested by Lisbon, Faria sought to generate strong press support.[39] Besides the dissemination of Portuguese statements, Faria used his personal contacts in the press to request relevant coverage and favorable comments.[40] The result was fairly positive: over the following days, the fall of Dadrá made the headlines in several important Brazilian newspapers, and pro-Portugal editorials and columns proliferated. Brazilian media employed the language of "legitimate rights" and "western civilization", as well as of "anti-communism" and "hypocrisy." The *Correio da Manhã*, one of the most important newspapers in Rio de Janeiro, condemned Nehru and his government for creating an international incident, while hypocritically attempting to portray India as a peaceful nation. Under the title "Portugal is not alone," the *Diário Carioca* opted to accuse India of profiting from the "defeatist atmosphere" and "anti-European mood" created by the fall of French Indochina. The *Mundo* went even further, suggesting an affinity between the terminology used by the freedom fighters – "liberation" – and that of the expansionist Soviet Union. For its part, the *Dia* preferred to compare Indian methods to those of Nazi Germany. Less radically, a *Diários Associados* newspaper stated that the existence of Portuguese settlements in India was "completely justified", due to its centuries-long presence in Asia. Although these newspapers used varying language to condemn India, most of them justified their heavy criticism (and their support for Portugal and its rights in the Indian subcontinent) through reference to the historical, religious, and cultural ties that persisted between the Portuguese and the Brazilian people.

This strong wave of solidarity towards Portugal quickly reached the Brazilian National Congress. In the Senate, Ezechias da Rocha pointed out that the collusion of the Indian government with the freedom fighters, whom he branded "usurpers," "terrorists," and "agitators," risked once again "lighting the fuse of war" in Asia. "Right after the end of the hostilities in Indochina, provoked by red imperialism,"

[36] MNE to EPRJ, T 125, July 23, 1954; EPRJ to MNE, T 155, July 24, 1954, AHDMNE.
[37] Comunicado do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, publicado na imprensa em 25 de Julho de 1954,' No. 375, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II, 3.
[38] EPRJ to MNE, July 24, 1954, No. 157, AHMNE.
[39] MNE to EPRJ, July 23, 1954, No. 125, AHMNE.
[40] EPRJ to MNE, July 24, 1954, No. 155, AHMNE.

he declared, “Lusitanian weapons were drawn to confront this perfidious treason against Portuguese sovereignty.” He thus criticized the Indian government, and particularly the Indian National Congress, for having betrayed Mahatma Gandhi’s peaceful principles. “The right of self-determination,” Da Rocha underlined, “of which the National Congress became the champion, is now despised by the same party. Indian chauvinism is under way!” The Brazilian government’s support for Portugal, he stated, was welcomed by the populace, since Brazilian public opinion “cannot approve such cold attacks on Portuguese sovereignty.”[41] Identical speeches were made in the Chamber of Deputies. One Member, Augusto Meira, raised the issue, stating that “when Portugal discovered India, and made possible communication between the Orient and the West, India was enslaved by Turks and Arabs.” “The Portuguese,” he emphasized, “were received as liberators, [and] India cannot be ungrateful to someone who was once a true friend and benefactor.” Aureliano Leite, in turn, decided to call attention to the fact that the President of Portugal, General Craveiro Lopes, was received “not only jubilantly, but also with affection” during his recent trip to Africa. “This demonstrates that the dominions are happy with Portuguese rule”, Leite declared, “and I cannot see why we should not express our feelings of solidary towards Portugal.” Interestingly, Meira intervened to correct the word “dominions,” suggesting that “provinces” would be a more appropriate term. This, one might note, was a very subtle but important distinction.[42]

Bearing in mind the favorable reaction in Rio de Janeiro, which contrasted with the hesitant feedback from Washington and London, the Necessidades invited the Brazilian government to carry out pro-Portuguese lobbying around the world. The Itamaraty, the Portuguese believed, could be particularly useful in conquering the ‘hearts and minds’ of other Latin American nations, in which Portuguese diplomacy was still underrepresented.[43] Portugal had only one embassy (Rio de Janeiro) and eight legations (Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Havana, Montevideo, Lima, Quito, and Santiago de Chile) in a region that comprised 21 republics, all with membership of the UN.[44] The Secretary-General Leitão da Cunha revealed himself to be sympathetic to the appeal presented by Faria, and thus prepared a circular letter to all Brazilian diplomatic representatives in Latin America, recommending that they make overtures to their host countries in favor of Portugal. Brazilian representatives should also seek to stimulate a pro-Portuguese public opinion, it was added, using all available means, particularly the press.[45]

[41] Diário do Congresso Nacional, Section II, July 27, 1954, 1807.
[42] Anais da Câmara de Deputados [93.ª Sessão], July 30, 1954, 190-193.
[43] MNE to EPRJ, July 25, 1954, No. 130, AHDMNE.
[44] Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *História de Portugal, O Terceiro Mundo contra o Portugal Ultramarino, 2ª Parte, História Diplomática, Social, Económica e Cultural*, Volume XVII (Lisboa: Editorial Verbo, 2007), 16-17.
[45] EPRJ to MNE, July 27, 1954, No. 162, AHDMNE

Meanwhile, as promised, Leitão da Cunha held a meeting with the Indian ambassador, in which the Secretary-General expressed his government's deepest concerns regarding the recent events in Dadrá. According to him, India had an obligation to prevent the invasion, and the Brazilian government expected that New Delhi would reconsider its attitudes concerning Portugal. The Secretary-General reminded the ambassador that India could not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, and underlined that Portugal would not be able to resolve problems under such immense pressure.[46] After the meeting, the Indian ambassador, Raji of Mandi, stated to the MEA that the Brazilian government "is by no means unconcerned, and appear to have made up their mind more now than ever as to what line they should more or less take in the matter." After what he considered to have been a "friendly but serious discussion," the Indian ambassador reported:

> I came away with the impression that they were really serious about the matter now and wanted that something should be done first to ease the tension, failing which they felt the situation might take a very ugly turn, much as they would not like this to happen. After the tension had been eased they thought it might be possible to find some peaceful solution to this complex matter.[47]

In New Delhi, the Indian government denied that it had had any involvement in the occupation of Dadrá. According to a note handed to Garin, the South Block rejected and protested against the "false accusations" made by the Portuguese government: communications had not been cut, nor were any Indian army personnel stationed on the frontiers. There were only police officers, who had been posted as far back as October 1953, in view of the large concentrations of Portuguese police and armed forces, and the alarming increase in smuggling. The MEA also believed that the press releases, protest notes, and press campaign blaming the Indian government had been made in order to "confuse world opinion over the actual situation […] in the colonies." In the same note, New Delhi rejected the demand for free passage of Portuguese troops through its territory, since it "cannot be a party to the suppression of a genuine nationalist movement for freedom," and blamed the Portuguese regime for the serious situation in which it now found itself. "[Portugal] must no doubt be aware that their repressive policies are out of tune with the developments that are taking place in the modern world,

[46] EPRJ to MNE, July 27, 1954, No. 166, AHDMNE.
[47] EIR to MEA, "Monthly Political Report for July 1954," August 5, 1954, 13 R&I 54, NAI.

more particularly in Asia. Instead of making statements about defending their colonies, they should accept the will of the people."[48]

Whether Nehru and his cabinet were informed or not about this 'operation' cannot be determined – at least not without full access to Indian diplomatic archives and Nehru's personal papers. Historians generally tend to believe that Nehru could have been overtaken by events, and that the occupation of Dadrá was orchestrated by Goan and Indian nationalists, with the connivance of Desai. Indeed, in his memoirs, the chief minister of Bombay endorsed this possibility, stating that "some leaders of Goa wanted to launch a movement for liberating Dadrá […] and I posted Reserve police batches in the territory surrounding these enclaves […] [and they] entered […] only after I had made these arrangements."[49] On the other hand, it is plausible that Nehru and his cabinet had knowingly turned a blind eye while the movement was prepared.

Irrespective of his involvement or knowledge, the occupation of Dadrá appeared to have brought more complications than benefits for Nehru. "I am much concerned with Goa," Nehru confessed to Desai on August 1. "The petty incidents at Dadra and roundabout have created a sensation in India, but they really do not amount to much. I have no doubt that the Portuguese will give us a great deal of trouble." The prime minister seemed particularly concerned with the possibility of a massive *satyagraha* against Goa, which could lead to a dangerous situation in which he had no choice but to initiate military maneuvers against Portugal – a solution which he was keen to avoid. "I am worried about the possible behavior of some of our own people," Nehru confessed, "[as] they demand government backing, if not now, then later." He noted that the volunteers would be "arrested or beaten or shown down", and that the situation would "naturally create an uproar and demands will be made on us to take some effective and strong steps." According to him, the situation would be settled peacefully, as "there are numerous forces working in our favor", and several nations were realizing that it is "inevitable for the Portuguese possessions to come to India." But first, Nehru reminded, the question of Pondicherry would have to be solved. "I hope you will make this clear to these people."

One day later, the occupation of the enclave of Nagar-Haveli served to compound Nehru's concerns. Taking advantage of the inability of the Portuguese authorities to pass through Indian territory, Nagar-Haveli was successfully invaded by freedom fighters, and control was easily established. Contrary to Dadrá, Nagar-Haveli presented more of a challenge, since the territory was about ten times larger, six times more densely populated, and sub-divided into 70 villages. However, at the time of the

[48] Nota Verbal do Ministérios dos Assuntos Externos da União Indiana à Legação de Portugal em Nova Delhi, July 27, 1954, No. 383, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II, 13-16.
[49] Morarji Desai, *The Story of My Life*, volumes I and II (Delhi: Macmillan, 1947 and Delhi: S. Chand & Co, 1979), as quoted in Gaitonde, *Liberation*, 85.

satyagraha, only 44 police officers were stationed at the 'capital' Silvassa, while the rest of the territory was not policed at all. Several days later, Nehru stated that he "naturally [knew] that people had been waiting do to that kind of thing for ever so long, but for us to be accused of organizing that or of having supplied people with arms and the like or of stationing troops all over is just a fantastic nonsense."[50] However, while one might accept at least hypothetically that the prime minister had been overtaken by the events in Dadrá, it is more difficult to do so regarding Nagar-Haveli. This is not to say that Nehru encouraged the freedom fighters, but he certainly did little or nothing to prevent another *satyagraha*.[51]

Evaluating the situation, Portuguese diplomats reinforced their demarches, particularly towards London. The Necessidades truly believed that a statement from Churchill's government would force India to take countermeasures against the freedom fighters, and particularly to prevent a mass *satyagraha* against Goa (scheduled for August 15, the Independence Day). In order to push London, Lisbon proposed the establishment of an 'international observation mission', designed to verify the situation at the borders. Although this did not officially require British participation, it strongly implied it. Accordingly, the Portuguese government began to invite other countries – including Brazil, which immediately accepted – to participate in this mission.[52]

Meanwhile, the Necessidades finally began to reap results from the demarches that had been made by Brazilian diplomatic representatives. In Latin America, in particular, the results were extremely encouraging: some governments decided to make public statements (i.e. Venezuela, Nicaragua, Peru, Haiti), others sent instructions to their delegations at the UN (i.e. Costa Rica), and others even made demarches towards the local Indian representative (i.e. Colombia, Peru). The local press also showed some sympathy regarding the Portuguese presence in India: in Havana, for instance, the local newspaper *El Mundo* published several favorable articles, including an editorial suggestively entitled *Maquiavelismo Hindu*. Some newspapers even agreed to publish reports regarding Brazil's political and diplomatic support for Portugal, as in the case of the Bolivian press. Bearing in mind that Goa, Daman, and Diu were but small dots upon the immense and distant Indian subcontinent, the Brazilians had undertaken an extraordinary publicity campaign, as the Necessidades eventually recognized.[53]

Such Latin American support for Portugal surely did not go unnoticed in New Delhi. However, everything suggests that the British statement was indeed the turning point: on August 6, the British

[50] "The Role of the Press," August 13, 1955, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty Six, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 291.
[51] Pereira, *Crepúsculo,* 91; Bègue, *La fin de Goa,* 545-546.
[52] Pereira, *Crepúsculo*, 92; Oliveira, *Os Despojos*, 101.
[53] Numerous documents. See Pasta 930.2 (88)(62a), AMRE.

Foreign Office informed the Portuguese ambassador that the government greatly regretted "the state of tension existing between a member of the Commonwealth and an ally of such long standing as Portugal." "Recent events," the public statement underlined, "appeared likely to intensify this tension and to result in bloodshed." Accordingly, the acting British High Commissioner in New Delhi had expressed to the Indian government "the earnest hope that there will be no resort to violence or to methods bound to lead to the use of the force." According to Portuguese diplomats, the final and subtle sentence – "or to methods bound to lead to the use of force" – had been added by Prime Minister Winston Churchill himself.[54]

On August 15, the *satyagraha* against Goa failed: less than 50 freedom fighters attempted to enter into the Portuguese territory. The Indian police had prevented non-Goans from crossing the frontier, and Goans were searched for arms. On the Daman border alone, 1,200 non-Goans were stopped. Nehru had decided to prevent the *satyagraha*: on August 9, the prime minister had privately confessed that the government was being compelled to do so.[55] Whether this decision was a result of British, Latin American, or other pressure cannot be determined without access to Indian sources. However, to Morarji Desai, Nehru mentioned his decision to "go slow because of the inherent difficulties […] and possibilities of international complications." In contrast, the Portuguese government was convinced that international pressure was effective. From New Delhi, Garin stated: "We have, without doubt, won the first round. We succeeded in not being attacked […]. But the ambiguous texts of the Indian notes, the press comments, and the speech delivered by Nehru yesterday show clearly our future difficulties. I think it is evident that at the moment, it is not possible to negotiate with these people on anything."[56]

Brazil in the Agendas

The momentary 'détente' regarding Goa prompted Paulo Cunha to reconsider his planned visit to Brazil. Scheduled to take place during early August, it had repeatedly been delayed, due to the tumultuous events in the Portuguese territories in India.[57] However, the Portuguese foreign minister knew that this visit had the potential to be highly productive: it could be used not only to strengthen

[54] Oliveira, *Os Despojos,*102; Gaitonde, *Liberation*, 94.
[55] "Policy Towards the Nationalist Agitation," August 9, 1954, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty Six, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 445.
[56] "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," August 16, 1954, No. 458, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II, 140.
[57] MNE to EPRJ, July 3, 1954, No. 98; MNE to EPRJ, July 25, 1954, N. 129; MNE to EPRJ, July 25, 1954, No. 131; EPRJ to MNE, July 27, 1954, No. 161; MNE to EPRJ, July 29, 1954, No. 138; MNE to EPRJ, July 20, 1954, N. 142; AHDMNE.

ties between Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro, but also – in his words – to "galvanize" the Brazilian government concerning the issue of Portuguese India. After the uproar, it was important not to allow the matter to fall into oblivion, as well as not to hurt the feelings of those that supported Portugal. Moreover, his presence in Brazil could also be used to reinforce the links between Portugal and the large, influential, and loyal Portuguese immigrant community.[58]

The volatile political situation in Rio de Janeiro, however, counseled prudence and reflection. Getúlio Vargas was under heavy pressure to hand over power: the 72-year-old president had been accused by the opposition of corruption, administrative incompetence, connivance with Peronism, sympathy for communism, and even dictatorial designs. Since mid-February, the press, some of the military, and the opposition had been calling for impeachment, resignation, and deposition. The situation had become virtually unbearable after Carlos Lacerda, journalist, editor-in-chief of the right-wing newspaper *Tribuna da Imprensa*, and one of the fiercest critics of Vargas, survived an assassination attempt on the night of August 4. He had escaped with his life, but his personal bodyguard, Air Force Major Rubens Vaz, was killed by unknown assassins. Subsequent investigations found out that Vargas' personal security chief, Gregório Fortunato (also known as *Anjo Negro* [Black Angel]) was involved in the attempted murder, and the president was instantly accused of plotting against Lacerda.[59]

Reports sent by Ambassador Faria thus depicted a rather unstable and unpredictable situation in Rio de Janeiro. According to his sources, Vargas could soon resign, or be forced to resign by the military, since the situation was tense, and his political position was weak. "Well informed people do not exclude the possibility that the evolution of events or the conclusion of the enquiry might lead to a more radical shift," Faria cautioned Cunha.[60] At the same time, Portuguese diplomats knew that Vargas had an unusual ability to overcome political crises, as he had demonstrated on numerous occasions during his 45-year political career.[61] Besides, the situation was not yet completely clear: military leaders seemed undecided about how to handle the 'political problem' created by the opposition, and the severity of the crisis virtually waxed and waned from day to day.[62]

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[58] EPRJ to MNE, T Urgente [Urgent] (henceforth, U) 174, August 20, 1954, AHDMNE.

[59] Leslie Bethell, "Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic, 1945-1964," in *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, Volume IX. Brazil since 1930. Ed. Leslie Bethell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). See also Lira Neto, Getúlio, *Da volta pela consagração popular ao suicídio*, 1945-1954 (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2014), 271-312 and John W. F. Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda: a vida de um lutador, Volume 1: 1914-1960* (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1992), 155-188.

[60] EPRJ to MNE, T 243, August 17, 1954, AHDMNE.

[61] See Lira Neto, Getúlio, *Do governo provisório à ditadura do Estado Novo, 1930-1945* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2013), Maria Celina D'Araujo, *O Estado Novo* (São Paulo: Zahar, 2000) and "Politics in Brazil under Vargas, 1930-1945," in *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, Volume IX. Brazil since 1930. Ed. Leslie Bethell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[62] Central Intelligence Agency (henceforth, CIA), Current Intelligence Bulletin [Top Secret, (henceforth TS)], "Army pressure for ousting Brazilian president seen easing," August 13, 1954; CIA, Current Intelligence Bulletin [TS], "Brazilian presidential crisis seen entering new phase," August 22, 1954.

This puzzling and unpredictable situation created a stalemate for Portuguese diplomacy. Carrying out a high-level visit in the aftermath of the Goa crisis could be highly productive for Portuguese interests. Moreover, it could even demonstrate how the Portuguese government was grateful to Getúlio Vargas and his cabinet. This would surely be used by the president to ease criticism of his government, as Paulo Cunha meanwhile predicted. On the other hand, such a visit could simply go unnoticed amid the political crisis, and thus lose all desired impact. And, in the case of a resignation or coup d'état, the Portuguese association with President Vargas could be counterproductive, especially if the subsequent government was formed by members of the opposition. The initial conclusions of top Portuguese diplomats thus indicated that it was necessary for the dust to settle before taking and transmitting any decision.[63]

These calculations became further complicated when the Itamaraty announced that a high-level diplomat was expected to visit Rio de Janeiro in early September. According to the Brazilian embassy in India, Krishna Menon was about to be sent to Brazil as a special envoy of Nehru. "Bearing in mind the declarations of our government and public opinion," Ambassador Falcão telegraphed Rio de Janeiro, "he will certainly attempt to explain the policy of his country regarding the Portuguese territories in India." He later added that Krishna Menon was also expected in Buenos Aires, in order to discuss this problem alongside other international issues.[64]

This was not the first time that India had sought to dispatch a high-level political personality to Brazil. In early 1954, New Delhi, via third parties, had subtly requested an invitation from the Brazilian government to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, a diplomat and the sister of prime minister Nehru. The Itamaraty had initially favored an invitation, but a negative reaction from its delegation to the UN had eventually quashed the idea. At this point, there was still considerable resentment against India, due to a diplomatic incident during the last UN General Assembly, in which the Indian delegation had mistreated the Brazilian mission during a backstage diplomatic maneuver to solve the Korean issue.[65] Interestingly, this time, Brazilian diplomats seemed receptive to Indian overtures, the schedule of Cunha's visit being the only obstacle to Krishna Menon's visit, as Falcão was instructed to convey to the Indian authorities in New Delhi.

Meanwhile, on the morning of August 24, the political crisis in Brazil acquired a new dimension. Under immense pressure, Vargas decided to commit suicide, after the generals demanded his resignation.[66]

[63] See, for instance, EPRJ to MNE, T 243, August 17, 1954, AHDMNE.
[64] EMBRAND to MRE, T [C] 45, August 20, 1954, AHMRE; EMBRAND to MRE, T 46, August 24, 1954, AHPI.
[65] DELBRAONU to MRE, O [S] 427, December 10, 1953; Memorandum, DPo, May 7, 1954; MRE to EMBRAND, D [S] 11, May 31, 1954; EMBRAND to MRE, O [S] 106, June 22, 1954, AHMRE.
[66] EPRI to MNE, T 255, August 24, 1954, AHDMNE.

His *carta-testamento* [suicide note], in which he accused powerful economic interests (strongly implying the US) of interfering in the people's affairs, had an enormous impact: around 100,000 people descended into the streets, there was violence against some newspapers, and the army had to protect the US embassy and businesses from a furious mob. Carlos Lacerda, regarded as the moral instigator of the situation, was forced to go into hiding. According to Faria, "all the events [thus] prove[d] that the political crisis did not have affect in nothing the absolute domination that the late president exercised over the popular classes."[67] Vice-President João Café Filho, a conservative and pro-US politician who had been involved in the political intrigues, was sworn in as president, as mandated by Brazil's Constitution of 1946.[68]

The unexpected and dramatic death of Getúlio Vargas created a great commotion in Portugal. Newspapers published front page headlines, with laudatory obituaries, and pictures portraying Vargas's most memorable political moments. The *Diário da Manhã* declared that Portugal had lost a "great friend", while the *Diário de Notícias* recalled that Portugal-Brazil relations had "become greater than ever" during his government. Brazil's embassy was flooded with letters. The Portuguese government declared five days of national mourning, and a frigate was ordered to fire gun salutes each half hour. Salazar signed the book of condolence, and recalled the feelings of profound friendship always demonstrated by Getúlio Vargas towards Portugal.[69]

In India, the death of Vargas did not go unnoticed. However, some newspapers were particularly harsh regarding the late president. The *Hindustan Standard* was perhaps the most caustic in its comments. "Latin American dictators seldom die by their own hands [but] having shot himself to death rather than resign, Vargas has given a slightly noble touch to the otherwise murky tradition of dictatorships." As for the immediate future, the newspaper did not change its tone. "A reshuffle of the Brazilian political cards now after Vargas's death may only present a Tweedledum of the Air Force and Navy combined in place of the outgoing army junta's Tweedledee." The *Times of India* did not differ significantly. "Vargas was amiable as dictators go, but he could be ruthless in his own way in dealing with political opponents […] [he was] a cowboy to have risen to be the ruler of his country for almost a quarter century except for an interlude of five years, having molded the constitution to his dictatorial purpose."[70] Whether these comments were intentional or caused by a lack of knowledge of political realities remains unknown. Yet, these and other comments led K. Menon to consult the Chilean *chargé*

[67] EPRI to MNE, T 260, August 25, 1954, AHDMNE; National Security Briefing, The Outlook for the new Brazilian Government, September 1, 1954; Huntington D. Sheldon to Deputy Director (Intelligence), "The Vargas Suicide and the New Brazilian President," August 24, 1954, CIA. See also Neto, *Vargas*, 1945-54, 345-351.
[68] Skidmore, *Brasil*, 180
[69] EMBRALIS to MRE, CT 118, August 25, 1954; EMBRALIS to MRE, CT 119, August 25, 1954; EMBRALIS to MRE, O 684, September 1, 1954; AHI
[70] EMBRAND to MRE, O 149, August 26, 1954, AHI.

d'affaires in India about the normal duration of a "revolutionary process" in Latin America, to which the latter ironically replied, "normally less than the time required to solve the conflict in Kashmir."[71]

Irrespective of these remarks, the outcome of the Brazilian crisis gave rise to some reflections. India's Permanent Representative to the UN, Arthur S. Lall, sent a brief note on the death of Vargas, and cautioned Nehru regarding the peril of dealing with US capital. "[Vargas] was unable to achieve his [developmentalist] objectives, allegedly due to foreign interests [US capitalists] […] that had a complete grip on the main sectors of the country's economy," Lall stated. "The case of Brazil delineates the clear lines of a pattern which had been shaped in Guatemala, Chile, Panama, and then in Iran – whenever American capital goes, there is clear evidence that it seeks to take control, including political control." Lall thus considered that India should be very careful about encouraging American-controlled industry, even if US capitalists were displaying "no particular enthusiasm about going so far afield as India."[72] Lall's remarks, considered as "interesting" and worthy of "consideration" by Nehru, came at a moment when the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization – the Asian equivalent of NATO – was created in Manila by the US, with India's rival Pakistan as a founder member.[73] "The whole question of US aid to India," Nehru then wrote to the members of the cabinet, "may have to be reconsidered in this context."[74]

Portuguese apprehensions were of another type. Faria was extremely worried about Vicente Rao's successor in the Itamaraty. According to inside information, president Café Filho had chosen the conservative and former minister of Dutra, Raul Fernandes. "A very intelligent man, of great prestige and experience," Faria telegraphed Lisbon, "but his nomination looks unfavorable to us given his skepticism, coldness and pleasure in saying unpleasant things." Faria was particularly worried about the fact that his nomination could mean the replacement of the highest echelons of the Itamaraty, including Vasco Leitão da Cunha, which had "acted in a completely favorable manner towards our interests."[75] These apprehensions led the ambassador, on August 27, to sound out the position of Fernandes regarding Portuguese affairs. "[Leitão da Cunha] confidentially informed me that Fernandes believes that Brazil under Vargas had gone too far regarding Brazil's anti-colonial policy," Faria informed, "especially bearing in mind that Portugal could have some problems in the future [regarding

[71] EMBRAND to MRE, T 49, August 26, 1954, AHPI.
[72] A.S. Lall to R.K.Nehru, "His reflections on the death of President Vargas of Brazil," August 26, 1954, S/54/13327/87/54, NAI.
[73] Robert McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery. The United States, India, and Pakistan*¸ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 208-215
[74] "US Investments in India," September 10, 1954, in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty Six, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 515-516.
[75] EPRJ to MNE, T [C] 262, August 26, 1954, AHDMNE.

the Overseas provinces], and that the Brazilian government thus needs to have the courage to offer its support."[76]

These combined developments served to relieve the stalemate faced by Portuguese diplomats. Although the Brazilian political situation was far from satisfactory, Cunha believed that his trip to Brazil was now more than necessary, "since there are two new delicate circumstances: the replacement of the foreign minister, and the visit of [Krishna] Menon." Moreover, he also acknowledged the need to raise once again the issue of Goa amongst Brazilian public opinion, given that this had slipped into the background during the crisis. However, Cunha's plans also included measures to indirectly counteract Menon's visit to other Latin American countries: for instance, he was willing to fund a series of conferences on the topic of Goa in Buenos Aires and other Latin American capitals. Here, the objective was to create an atmosphere favorable to Portuguese interests, particularly through academic conferences given by a distinguished resident of Goa. Thus, some nervousness appears to have arisen in the Portuguese ranks.[77]

Indeed, according to the international press, Menon's trip was not confined to Brazil and Argentina: it also included Chile and Peru. These same sources reported that Menon's goodwill-visit to South America was the result of Nehru's concerns regarding the lack of comprehension demonstrated by some countries towards India's policy towards Goa. "Knowing about the opposition of the Latin Americans to the existence of European colonial possessions in the region," the *Correio da Manhã* reported, "Nehru was particularly surprised with the lack of sympathy and comprehension regarding India's position towards Goa." "This is the reason," the newspaper stated, "why Menon's suggestion to visit the region was accepted by Nehru."[78] According to the CIA, Menon was expected to broach the issue of the Portuguese territories.[79]

Menon decided, nevertheless, to change his plans, and to exclude Brazil from his itinerary. "Apparently the [Indian] government and Menon did not appreciate our request of postponement," Falcão telegraphed the Itamaraty. "He would try to reach Brazil after the start of proceedings at the United Nations." During his 10-day good-will mission, Menon eventually visited Argentina, Chile, and Peru,[80]

[76] EPRJ to MNE, T 264, August 27, 1954, AHDMNE.
[77] EPRJ to MNE, T [C] 262, August 26, 1954; MNE to EPRJ, T 181, August 26, 1954; MNE to EPRJ, T 191, August 31, 1954, AHDMNE
[78] *Correio da Manhã* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], August 26, 1954, 6; Same reports in *Jornal do Brasil* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], August 26, 1954, 5.
[79] "Current speculation on the subjects which he is expected to discuss include: Goa, admission of Communist China to the UN; to elicit support for the Indian position on Kashmir; convince them that India is not pro-Communist; and UN matters in general." In CIA, "Biographic Report, Delegates to the United Nations General Assembly Ninth Session, New York from India," September 15, 1954.
[80] MEA, "Report, 1954-1955," 28, MEA Library, MEA.

in order to increase, according to the press, the mutual understanding between India and South America. However, as predicted by Portuguese diplomats, Menon also used his visit to wage a campaign regarding Goa. In a press conference at Buenos Aires, Menon declared that India wished to reach a "peaceful solution with Portugal" regarding its possessions in the Indian sub-continent, along the lines of the French example. Bearing in mind the weight of Catholicism in Latin America, Menon was careful to stress that Goan Catholics had nothing to fear from India, as Nehru himself had stressed several times.[81]

On September 8, Cunha was given a rousing reception and received enthusiastic greetings throughout his stay in Brazil. His itinerary, which included visits to the Catete, Itamaraty, Congress, and Universities, was used to demonstrate how close the two nations were to each other, and to promote the Portuguese line regarding Goa, Daman, and Diu. Cunha opened exhibitions in São Paulo, and was awarded the title of *honoris causa* by the University of São Paulo. He also conferred with Raul Fernandes, Café Filho, and other high-profile politicians, and received members of the Portuguese community in the embassy. Brazilians did not fail to recognize that, even after the dramatic events in Dadrá and Nagar-Haveli, Cunha had come to pay his compliments. Minister Fernandes thanked him, and stressed that the Brazilian government's attitude was "inspired by the unanimous feelings demonstrated in everything related to Portugal, feelings originated in a friendship based on blood ties, and cemented throughout the years." The *Correio da Manhã* referred to Cunha's trip to Brazil as a straight-forward "family meeting".[82] At the end of his journey, Cunha characterized his visit as a "notable diplomatic success", which marked the "hey-day of Portugal-Brazil relations", since it reinforced the position of the Brazilian government towards [the problem of] Goa."[83]

The Indian ambassador observed these events from a safe distance. "The Minister harped on the so-called aggression which his country had to meet in Goa from us," he wrote to the South Block, "and indulged in the usual misstatements of facts which are now a common feature of the utterances of Portuguese statemen […]. It has naturally been difficult to contradict these misstatements effectively, but in private we have been trying to put our side of the picture before the Brazilians that we come in contact with."[84]

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[81] EMBRAND to MRE, T [C] 51, September 1, 1954, AHMRE; *Jornal do Brasil* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], September 11, 1954, 7; *Tribuna da Imprensa* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], September 14, 1954, 5; *Diário da Noite* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], September 14, 1954, 2.

[82] *O Jornal* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], September 9, 1954, 1; September 10, 5-6; *Correio da Manhã* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], September 11, 1954, 5.

[83] EPRJ to MNE, T 297, September 6, 1954, EPRJ to MNE, T 305, September 10, 1954; EPRJ to MNE, T 306, September 12, 1954; EPRJ to MNE, T 309, September 15, 1954, AHDMNE.

[84] EIRJ to MEA, "Monthly Political Report for September, 1954, Official visit of the Foreign Minister of Portugal, Secret," October 26, 1954, 13 R&I 54, NAI.

However, despite Menon's unsuccessful visit to Rio de Janeiro, the Indian government still had a chance to promote its policy towards Goa at the highest levels of the Brazilian government. India's Vice-President, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, had been invited by the Itamaraty in early 1954 to include Brazil in his cultural tour around Latin America. The invitation had been made due to the interest demonstrated by Radhakrishnan in strengthening ties between India and Latin America, since the last Indian cultural figure to visit the region had been Rabindranath Tagore in 1925. Ambassador Frederico Chermont Lisboa, by then ambassador to India, had thus extended an invitation. Radhakrishnan was expected in Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and then finally Brazil, before heading to a UNESCO conference in Montevideo, Uruguay.[85]

Radhakrishnan's trip had been broached by Cunha during his informal talks at the Itamaraty. Although the Portuguese government could do nothing to prevent such a trip, the Portuguese foreign minister had conveyed to Fernandes his discomfort, particularly with the idea of having an Indian politician in Brazil, who might take advantage of his standing to talk about Portuguese possessions in India.[86] Fernandes promised to do "everything to prevent" Radhakrishnan's trip, but apparently it was already too late, since to do so would provoke considerable resentment from the Indian government. Despite the fact that his tour to South America was essentially cultural, Radhakrishnan did indeed end up making political statements regarding the Portuguese possessions. In La Paz, in October, he stated that if "the people of Goa wanted to remain Portuguese, India will respect its decision and will not resort to violent means. But we expect that any transition should occur in a peaceful manner."[87] In order to prevent equivalent statements in Brazil, Fernandes prepared a speech that indirectly broached the topic of Goa, insofar as it underlined the obligation of the international community to respect nation borders, the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs, and the principles of the Treaty of San Francisco. President Café Filho went slightly further: he instructed his cabinet staff to issue a press release in the eve of Radhakrishnan's arrival, declaring that he had accepted an invitation (made by Cunha during his trip to Brazil) to officially visit Portugal during 1955.[88]

The Indian vice president arrived in Rio de Janeiro on November 5, and, after two days, left for São Paulo. While in Rio, he met Café Filho and Fernandes, visited the Congress, and addressed the Press Association. Despite the tensions regarding Goa, the speeches that he made were harmless from a political point of view, focusing on the philosophical and human outlook of India. However, when asked

[85] *Correio da Manhã* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], November 2, 1954, 2. See MEA, "Report, 1954-1955," 28, MEA Library, MEA.
[86] EPRJ to MNE, T 306, September 12, 1954, AHDMNE.
[87] Embaixada do Brasil em La Paz [Embassy of Brazil in La Paz] (henceforth, EMBRALP) to MRE, T [C] 195, October 22, 1954, AHMRE.
[88] EPRJ to MNE, T 346, November 4, 1954; EPRJ to MNE, T 347, November 5, 1954; EPRJ to MNE, T 350, November 6, 1954, AHDMNE.

about the issue of Goa during a press conference, Radhakrishnan replied that "after 200 years of domination, Great-Britain understood that India had a right to freedom." "France showed coherence and did not pose difficulties," he recalled, "[and] we hope that Portugal understands us too. We are a country of 360 million souls, but we do not want violence. Our honor is something that we care about, and we hope to achieve our objectives without resorting to arms." Intentionally or not, the vice-president ended his response by suggesting something that Nehru had meanwhile avoided: "A free plebiscite," he pointed out, "is something to [consider]." According to Faria, "this was the first time that India had talked about a plebiscite, since they wanted to place Portugal in a difficult position in the eyes of anti-colonial opinion here."[89] Subsequently, the Portuguese ambassador learned that the topic of Goa was not broached during the private meetings, and that the Indian ambassador had even requested the avoidance of any political references during public meetings and press conferences. "This confirms my impression," Faria telegraphed, "that India wants to create an atmosphere of sympathy, avoiding a question that they know is quite unfavorable here."[90]

Friendship and its Limits

In early 1955, the Portuguese government was focused on securing the visit of President João Café Filho to Portugal. This was more than a routine event: the last visit of a Brazilian statesman had been made in 1919, by president Epitácio Pessoa, and Rio de Janeiro had not yet reciprocated President António José de Almeida's visit to Brazil in 1922. Besides the need to celebrate the friendship between the two nations, the Portuguese regime had two other objectives: first, to strengthen ties with the Brazilian government regarding Goa; and second, to demonstrate at home that Portugal had good and influential allies, including a former colony. Although the possibility of an invitation had originally been floated to Getúlio Vargas, Lisbon was unperturbed when he was 'replaced' by Café Filho in the presidential residence at the Catete.[91]

However, Brazil was once again immersed in a political crisis that menaced its democratic regime. President Café Filho was struggling against an unfavorable Congress, as the October congressional elections had failed to provide him with a supportive Chamber and Senate. Moreover, there were also adverse economic conditions, such as a shortage of foreign exchange and high rates of inflation. However, it was the presidential election of October 1955, and the possible return to power of

[89] EPRJ to MNE, T. 349, November 6, 1954; EPRJ to MNE, T. 353, November 8, 1954, AHDMNE.
[90] EPRJ to MNE, T 357, November 11, 1954, AHMNE.
[91] Palácio do Catete was the residence of the Presidents.

Getulismo, that was creating the greatest friction: Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira, the governor of Minas Gerais, who had long been regarded as a potential successor to Vargas, was preparing his presidential candidacy, with João 'Jango' Goulart as his vice-president. Kubitschek was regarded with suspicion by the anti-*Getulistas*, but Goulart was their real bugbear: he was a left-wing politician with close connections to labor unions and social welfare foundations, and had once briefly occupied the Ministry of Labor (February 1954) in order to propose a 100 percent increase in the minimum wage. Subsequently, such antics were cited by critics of Vargas, as proof that the latter was attempting to create a regime similar to that of Juan Peron. For Café Filho and other right-wing politicians and generals, a hypothetical return of *Getulismo* (even if through democratic means) was unconceivable. In a radio speech, Café Filho endorsed the idea that Brazil needed a single candidate, who would represent all political forces. However, by stating that the military was "profoundly worried" by the outcome of the elections, the president was giving clear signs that a military option was on the table.[92]

The Portuguese embassy closely monitored these developments. Although used to the serious political crises that frequently convulsed Brazil, Faria immediately sensed that this one could pose serious obstacles to Café Filho's state visit to Portugal. After one of the several meetings conducted with the Brazilian authorities to prepare the reception of the president in Lisbon, Faria telegraphed the Necessidades as a preventive measure. "Although nobody told me anything," he wrote, "it would not be a surprise if the deepening of the political crisis makes the presidential visit impossible."[93] According to his assessment, military leaders were extremely agitated by recent developments, and a coup could not be entirely ruled out. Besides, the news that Café Filho wanted to make an appearance in Lisbon on board the warship *Tamandaré* led many to criticize the president for his unnecessary expenditures. Days later, the Portuguese ambassador was eventually sound out regarding a possible postponement of the trip. Lisbon thus became increasingly apprehensive regarding these events, especially since the president of the Republic, Francisco Craveiro Lopes, was scheduled to visit Africa in late April.[94]

Possibly even more worrying was the campaign orchestrated to prevent Café Filho from visiting Portugal. The *Correio da Manhã*, which supported Portugal during the summer of 1954, fired the starting shot: in an editorial published on January 30 under the title "Untimely Trip," the newspaper argued that both the political situation and financial circumstances militated against a trip to Portugal. "Mr. Café Filho has already strolled a lot since he became president," the editor ironized, "it is his main duty to remain in the workplace." Weeks later, the *Jornal do Brasil* added more fuel to fire. "Brazil appreciates the invitation […] but during [Café Filho's] absence many unforeseen things could happen

[92] Bethel, *…under the Liberal*, 119-123; Skidmore, *Brasil*, 180-183
[93] EPRJ to MNE, Aerograma [Aerogram] (hencefort A) 9, February 15, 1955, AHDMNE.
[94] MNE to EPRJ, T [U] 27, February 25, 1955, AHDMNE.

[…]", a journalist pointed out. "We advise the president to postpone his trip until the end of October or November, when he will have less political responsibilities, and will consequently be able to smile more frankly."[95] Throughout February, other newspapers followed suite: the *Última Hora,* the *O Mundo,* the *Diário da Noite,* the *Dia,* and even the *Diário Carioca* – all of these being quite sympathetic to Portuguese interests – criticized the president for leaving Brazil to embark upon a visit to a foreign country.[96]

Although Faria had initially downplayed the relevance of this campaign, he soon reappraised his position. Posted in Brazil since 1950, the ambassador was keenly aware of what the Brazilian press was capable of doing: roughly eight months before, the newspapers had virtually driven Vargas to suicide. However, from his perspective, what was particularly worrying was the fact that practically *all* of the newspapers had come out against president Café Filho's visit to Portugal. "It was expected that after the statement of the Minister of the Marine [downplaying the expenses of a trip in the *Tamandaré* warship], the attacks would be reduced or limited to the less responsible newspapers," Faria telegraphed the Necessidades. "Unfortunately, this has not been the case, and even [the journalist] Macedo Soares, who supported us on Goa and on the Treaty [of Friendship and Consultation], has published a particularly harsh article, and a serious newspaper such as the *Jornal do Brasil* has also favored a postponement of the visit."[97]

These apprehensions led the ambassador to initiate a set of demarches in order to reverse the situation. On an official level, Faria called the attention of Raul Fernandes towards what he considered to be the "deplorable fact" that the press – despite all the political aspects of the crisis – had forgotten that this was a courtesy that Brazil owed to Portugal. "They should impose a truce," he claimed. The same message was conveyed to the Secretary General António Camillo de Oliveira. However, in this case, Faria felt confident enough to directly request the latter's best efforts in promoting articles and news that could counterbalance the present negativity of the press. On a non-official level, Faria also contacted his usual friends in the press, hoping to modify the negative atmosphere that had been created. The poet and journalist Augusto Frederico Schmidt, the newspaper directors Elmano Cardim and João Dantas, the newspaper proprietor Roberto Marinho, and the former minister Neves da Fontoura heeded his complaints, and agreed to write articles in support of the presidential visit of Café Filho to Portugal.[98]

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[95] *Correio da Manhã* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], January 30, 1955, 6; *Jornal do Brasil* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], February 18, 1955, 5. See also EPRJ to MNE, T 14, January 31, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 19,February 18, 1955, AHDMNE.
[96] See, for instance, EPRJ to MNE, T 33, March 1, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 34, March 1, 1955, AHDMNE.
[97] EPRJ to MNE, T [C] 35, March 1, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 36, March 2, 1955, AHDMNE.
[98] EPRJ to MNE, T 37, March 2, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 39, March 3, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 40, March 3, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 44, March 4, 1955, AHDMNE.

A few days later, Faria reported prolific results. "We can now consider the press campaign against this visit to be virtually settled, even if the smallest newspapers still insist on publishing opposing points of view." Apparently, he was right. The most important newspapers published favorable articles, stressing the importance of the presidential trip to Portugal: it was not only a matter of honor to reciprocate the visit of António José de Almeida, but, after all, this was Portugal, an exceptionally important ally; thus, neither the absence of the president nor the expense involved were sufficient grounds to refuse such an invitation. Schmidt, in the *Correio da Manhã,* emphasized that such a refusal would represent a snub against a nation to whom Brazil owed great respect. João Dantas' *Diário de Notícias* ironically emphasized that the state visit could be postponed *ad aeternum* on the grounds of political instability; however, this was an unmissable chance to strengthen friendly relations. The *Globo* admitted that the political juncture was less than ideal, but added that cancelation could be interpreted as an act of disrespect towards Portugal, "a nation that deserves the greatest and most eloquent demonstration of affection." Other newspapers also ceased to criticize the trip, probably due to the intervention of elements connected to Brazilian diplomacy, including Fernandes.[99]

However, Faria's optimism suffered a setback when he learned that Café Filho's state visit was still dependent upon Congressional authorization. While the senate had already authorized the absence of the president, as well as an extra budget allocation (this had been agreed during the previous term, when Café Filho had a more favorable Senate, and the political crisis was still at an early stage), the Chamber had not yet given its permission. According to Faria, this posed an additional problem, which could jeopardize Café Filho's state visit to Portugal. Indeed, one of the members of the Chamber, who happened also to be the director of the *Dia* – one of the most vocal critics of Café Filho – had announced that he would raise the issue and vote against.[100]

Bearing in mind all these problems, Faria urged Raul Fernandes to intervene urgently, in order to persuade the president of the Chamber to convince the majority to vote in favor. The same demarche was made to the chief of protocol. Initial reports indicated that there was no danger, and that the situation was under control. However, Faria was far from convinced. As he told Cunha: "It is lamentable, the irresponsibility with which certain members of the chamber, overtaken by political passions, treat a matter that could jeopardize relations with Portugal. I hope that good sense prevails […] but there is in evidence a deplorable lack of political maturity, not to say a lack of patriotism, and respect for the rules of international courtesy." In Lisbon, an exasperated Cunha refused to publish

[99] EPRJ to MNE, T 45, March 4, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 48, March 5, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 53, March 9, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 57, March 10, 1955, AHDMNE.
[100] EPRJ to MNE, A 16, March 5, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 71, March 21, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 77, March 24, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T [U] 78, March 24, 1955; AHDMNE.

any announcements, since the "admission that a state visit is dependent upon congressional authorization would cause a scandal in Portugal."[101]

Fearful of losing control of the situation, Faria reached out to some members of the chamber, seeking to persuade them to vote favorably. According to a conversation with a member of Goulart's party, Rubens Berardo, the *Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro* would vote against the trip for political reasons. They considered Café Filho to be a traitor, who was in large part responsible for the suicide of the late president, and who had insufficient political authority to represent Brazil abroad. Besides, the political and financial crisis meant that a trip to Portugal was untimely. Perhaps more worryingly, Berardo revealed that his party was angry with the Portuguese government, since the latter had invited Café Filho immediately after the suicide of Vargas, and most of their members did not wish to see him reap the acclamations that legitimately belonged to Vargas. Faria sought to convince him, and stressed that Portugal would never be able to comprehend a refusal. Berardo later contacted Goulart, and was, according to Faria, instructed to initiate demarches, in order to convince his party to vote favorably.[102]

On March 29, the Chamber initiated a discussion, and, two days later, voting was postponed for lack of quorum.[103] The Brazilian ambassador to Lisbon, Heitor Lyra, was summoned to the Necessidades. The Secretary-General Manuel Rocheta conveyed Paulo Cunha's dismay regarding the recent events, and stressed how embarrassed the Portuguese government felt after witnessing such opposition. Indirectly, Rocheta threatened to suspend the preparations to receive the president.[104] Indeed, Cunha was extremely irritated by these events. To Faria, he stated that the failure of such a visit would be viewed as a gross affront, and would lead to the ruin of the Portuguese-Brazilian community. "Only fools think that this is solely a matter of Brazilian domestic policies," he fumed. "We are spending millions of *escudos* [the Portuguese currency] to receive the president of Brazil […] and it is miserable that the Brazilian chamber opposed such a visit under the pretext of expenses". Profoundly irritated, Cunha had meanwhile ruled out the official invitation of Brazilian journalists to cover the events – even if Faria considered their presence important, as a safeguard for future contingencies regarding Goa.[105]

However, authorization was eventually conceded at the final hour: out of 203 members, 119 voted favorably, while 84 voted against.[106] The Brazilian president arrived in Lisbon on April 22, and received enthusiastic greetings throughout his 7-day stay. Café Filho recalled the fraternal, historical, and cultural links between Portugal and Brazil, expressed the emotion he felt when setting foot upon

[101] MNE to EPRJ, T 65, March 26, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 82, March 25, 1955, AHDMNE.
[102] EPRJ to MNE, T [U] 79, March 24, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, A 31, March 26, 1955; AHDMNE
[103] EPRJ to MNE, T 86, March 27, 1955. See also EPRJ to MNE, T 97, March 31, 1955, AHDMNE
[104] EMBRALIS to MRE, T [U/C] 21, April 1, 1955, AMRE.
[105] EPRJ to MNE, T 61, March 15, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, A 27, March 25, 1955; MNE to EPRJ, T 76, April 1, 1955, AHDMNE.
[106] EPRJ to MNE, T [U] 99, April 1, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 100, April 1, 1955, AHDMNE.

Portuguese soil, and reiterated Brazil's support for Portugal regarding the issue of Goa. Bidding farewell, Café Filho saluted "all the compatriots" in the other "provinces" of Portugal, namely those on other continents. While the visit was thus impressive, and almost theatrical, little or nothing of a concrete nature came out of it, besides the usual friendly statements.[107]

The Conference of Bandung

While Café Filho was renewing Brazil's support for Portuguese colonialism, the first Afro-Asian conference was underway in the city of Bandung, Indonesia. The gathering had been conceived by the Indonesian prime minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, in the course of a meeting during April 1954 with the so-called Colombo Powers, specifically Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon. Eight months later, after a second meeting in Bogor, invitations were extended to a conference to be held from April 18-24, 1955. Twenty-nine governments from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East accepted to participate, alongside with observers from liberation movements.[108] This was a novelty: for the first time, a vast section of the world that had once been under colonial occupation now gathered to discuss international issues, and to look into possible solutions. The agenda ranged from cooperation in UN votes and trade, to cultural collaboration and mutual assistance against external aggression. The ongoing problem of colonialism was obviously included in this agenda.[109]

Just a few days previously, Indian leaders had renewed their criticism of Portugal for its behavior over Goa. In Bombay, for instance, Morarji Desai had characterized Goa as an Indian territory under foreign occupation, and had issued subtle warnings. "It is not difficult to take Goa by force," he declared to his audience, "but when we advocate peace to other countries, it is our first duty to solve our own problems by peaceful means." The Home Minister, Govind Ballabh Pant, had declared, during a speech in Gwalior, that "little Portugal" was unable to hold Goa for long, and emphasized that "the march of history could not be resisted." Behind closed doors, the situation was equally tense. Garin had just returned a diplomatic note, in which the Indian government had condemned Portugal's repressive policies in Goa, on the grounds that New Delhi was meddling in Portugal's domestic affairs. The South Block had responded with "friendly warnings", and promised "further steps" against Portuguese

[107] Nogueira, *Salazar*, 378-379; Serviço de Documentação da Presidência da República, *Visita do Presidente João Café Filho a Portugal* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1955).
[108] From Asia and Middle East: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, People's Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, North and South Vietnam, and Yemen. From Africa: Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Liberia, Libya, and Sudan. See, for instance, Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations. A People's History of the Third World* (New York: The New Press, 2007).
[109] Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 427. See also Moritz Pöllath, "'Far away from the Atlantic…': Goa, West New Guinea and NATO's out-of-area policy at Bandung 1955," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 11:4, 387-402.

stubbornness, while the Portuguese diplomat had reply with a pledge to defend "the Portuguese of Goa until the end."[110]

Interestingly, Nehru's statements during the gathering did not directly mention Portuguese colonialism. However, unlike the Indonesian president Sukarno, who condemned colonialism in general, the Indian prime minister sought to raise the question by criticizing NATO and its overweening meddling:

> I have nothing to say against NATO. It is open to the European countries to join it for self-defense. I cannot challenge it in the slightest. But I should like to point out to this assembly that this conception of the NATO has extended itself in two ways. It was gone far away from the Atlantic and has reached other oceans and seas…[111]

His criticism of NATO was hardly novel. Nehru considered the transatlantic organization as a protector of colonialism: roughly eight months before, he had openly criticized the alliance in identical terms:

> [NATO] developed geographically, supposed to be the North Atlantic community, but it spread to the Mediterranean, to the coast of Africa, Eastern Africa and to distant countries which have nothing to do with the Atlantic community […]. When NATO was first envisaged it was for defense, but gradually we find that it is supposed to cover colonial possessions and all those powers also.[112]

Nehru's statements on NATO surely inflamed the discussion about colonialism (and its definition), which had already been initiated by the Prime Minister of Ceylon, John Kotewala, and his question as

[110] "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," April 11, 1955, No. 600; "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," April 11, 1955, No. 601; "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi," April 11, 1955, No. 602; Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," April 12, 1955, No. 603; "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," April 14, 1955, No. 604; "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," April 19, 195, No. 607, VADEPI, 1947-1967, v. II, 376-383.
[111] Pöllath, "Far away from the Atlantic", 390-391.
[112] "The Broad Policies," September 29, 1954, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty Six, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000) *Selected Works*, 322.

to whether the East European satellite-states ought to be considered colonies or not. Supported by China's premier, Chou En-Lai, India adopted a legalistic position, arguing that countries who were full members of the UN could not be considered colonies. Others, such as the representative of the Philippines, General Romulo, claimed that the conference should condemn "all types of colonialism," including that of the Soviet Union. During the debate, Nehru intervened, using the issue of Goa to re-center the debate, and to prove that NATO served as an umbrella for the protection of colonialism:

> Do [you] realize that the NATO today is one of the most powerful protectors of colonialism? I say that explicitly. I am not saying that indirectly, but directly and explicitly. Here is the little territory of Goa, in India, which Portugal holds. We get letters from the NATO powers – mind you, Portugal is a member of NATO – and Portugal has approached its fellow members in the NATO on this point – telling us, 'You should not do anything in regard to Goa, you should not do this and that.' I will not mention these powers; they are some of the so-called big powers. It does not matter what powers they are, but it is gross impertinence. The Republic of India told them that it is gross impertinence on their part. Let there be no doubt about it, we shall deal with this little matter in the way we like.[113]

The Final Communiqué denounced all manifestations of colonialism, declared its support for the cause of freedom and independence, and called for colonial powers to concede freedom and independence to their colonized subjects. Although it mentioned Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (while also making references to Palestine, West New Guinea, and Yemen), the final declaration omitted the issue of the Portuguese territories. The reasons remain unknown, but most likely Nehru was unwilling to add more fuel to the fire: in particular, such a declaration would have given greater strength to those calling for a military intervention against the Portuguese possessions. Indeed, the absence of any such mention, according to the Indian consul to Goa, caused "a sense of disappointment" among pro-Indian Goan activists, who had expected a general declaration of Afro-Asian support.[114]

Despite the omission of references to Goa in the final communiqué, the Portuguese sought to make their NATO allies aware of the dangers posed by the event. In the North Atlantic Council, Cunha stated that Portugal feared that the problem of Goa was approaching another acute conjuncture. He believed

[113] "World Peace and Cooperation," April 22, 1955, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty Eight, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 110; Pöllath, "Far away from the Atlantic", 391.
[114] "Consulate General of India to Foreign Secretary, Fortnightly Report no. 4," May 6, 1955, D-1894 R&I/55, NAI.

that the main reason that there had not yet been any armed aggression against Goa was the fear of the other powers standing behind Portugal. To ensure that Asia remained peaceful, "the Western powers should keep the situation in Goa under consideration, and should make it clear to India that they were aware of what was happening."[115]

How did Brazilian diplomats respond to Bandung? The initial Brazilian reaction to a possible conference was a combination of disinterest and disdain. Although lacking accurate information, the Ambassador to India, Ildefonso Falcão, had immediately downplayed the importance of the conference. According to his assessment in September 1954, it was simply a scheme by prime minister Nehru to enhance India's regional and global prestige. "Although convened by Indonesia," Falcão informed the *Itamaraty*, "Nehru is the real father [of this conference] aimed at realizing his plan of Afro-Asian unity […] and emphasizing the leadership of India among all the countries of this region." His only objective was, according to the ambassador, to "give Asia the supremacy that has always been the dream behind [Jawaharlal Nehru's] policies."[116]

Furthermore, the ambassador revealed a great deal of prejudice, and even racism, towards Asians and Africans. He insinuated that rather than calling conferences, the leaders of these countries should first dedicate themselves to "teaching the majority of the [Asian and African] people to read and write," and then to giving them "some minimal idea of what is modern life." This remark surely raised some eyebrows even among the most conservative diplomats in the Itamaraty, especially bearing in mind the fact that almost 50% of the Brazilian population could not vote due to their illiteracy. However, at the same time, it demonstrates how some diplomats depicted and despised the leaders of the Third World. But perhaps even more revealing were the terms used by the ambassador to refer to the African nations. "Let us wait to see what the *Zulus* and the other *African creoles* have to say about this [proposed meeting]."[117]

Interestingly, after the Bogor Meeting, at which the Five Colombo powers had decided to call the conference, Falcão adopted a substantially different position. Although he still believed that India was paving the way for leadership in Asia and Africa, the conference was now seen as an important moment in the destiny of these peoples, as well as of the world at large. "Without doubt, this will be an event with great significance for world politics, [since] it is the first attempt at political articulation across the two continents," he reported in December 1954.[118] Falcão's colleague in Jakarta echoed his

[115] As quoted in Pöllath, *Far Away from the Atlantic*, 394. "Telegram from Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State," May 11, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, v. XXVII, 442-443.
[116] EMBRAND to MRE, O 165, September 13, 1954, AHI.
[117] EMBRAND to MRE, O 165, September 13, 1954, AHI.
[118] EMNREND to MRE, O 299, December 31, 1954, AHI.

new position. Recently appointed ambassador to Indonesia, Oswaldo Trigueiro, a former politician which had granted an ambassadorial post, predicted that the meeting would have a "moral significance, a psychological effect, and a political resonance that we should not underestimate."[119]

Despite such predictions, both ambassadors immediately foresaw complications. Although they recognized that anti-colonialism was the glue that bound together Asians and Africans, Trigueiro and Falcão stressed that the latter were divided on other fundamental, crucial issues. For instance, the initial difficulties regarding which countries should be invited to participate was a bad omen. "There [were already] some issues provoked by old divergences, as well as racial and religious antagonisms," Falcao immediately observed. Besides, the sheer breadth of the agenda also raised some doubts regarding the practical effects that the conference would have. "The objectives of this conference […] are both broad and imprecise […]. Thus, [it] cannot arrive at more than abstract principles or harmless generalities," Trigueiros emphasized. "It is neither possible to bring about agreement between Japan and China, India and Pakistan, Turkey and North Vietnam, nor to resolve the specific disputes and ideological divergences that separate them." In sum, tangible results could only be expected regarding anticolonial issues, although this event would put an end to the "historical cycle initiated by Vasco da Gama's voyage."[120]

The Itamaraty remained a silent onlooker, since no written feedback was given to either embassy. Without a department, division, or section exclusively dedicated to Asia or Africa, everything suggests that the upcoming conference was not considered worthy of immediate attention from Brazilian officials. This is no surprise, since the Itamaraty, and especially its higher echelons, were particularly conservative in the way they envisioned the world in the mid-1950s: a globe divided between the free world and the communist one. Post-colonial Asia and Africa, sooner or later, they believed, would have to choose which side they would join. At the height of the Cold War, any attempt at a 'Third position' could only be temporary.

Eventually, at the beginning of April, roughly ten days before the conference, a document was produced. Drawing on the information gathered by several embassies, the Itamaraty considered Bandung to be an over-crowded conference, with an overinflated agenda. This, according to Secretary General António Camillo de Oliveira, was a consequence of the "political immaturity" of certain organizer countries, as well as a product of an "ambitious and individualist" Indian foreign policy. However, some degree of recognition was required. India's objective, alongside the other four

[119] Surprisingly, Trigueiro first referred to Bogor as a meeting between the "prime ministers of the communist powers." See Embaixada do Brasil em Jacarta [Embassy of Brazil in Jakarta] (henceforth, EMBRAJACARTA) to MRE, T 40, December 30, 1954. For the quote, see EMBRAJACARTA to MRE, O [R] 14, January 3, 1955, AMRE.
[120] EMNREND to MRE, O 299, December 31, 1954, AHI; EMBRAJACARTA to MRE, O [R] 14, January 3, 1955, AMRE.

Colombo powers, was to "shift the axis of world politics to Asia," and successful cooperation between them could "place the Afro-Asian states at the political and strategic forefront."[121] Moreover, despite the participation of red China, it seemed clear to the Itamaraty that the organizers of the conference aimed at a "realistic policy" by inviting the largest nation.

When the five Colombo powers invited the Brazilian government to attend the opening ceremonies, alongside all the other diplomatic missions stationed in Jakarta, the Itamaraty designated Oswaldo Trigueiro as its representative. Eventually, Trigueiro travelled with Secretary Adolpho Bezerra de Menezes to the Conference, which granted him the status of 'unofficial diplomatic observer'.[122] Although this presence at Bandung might seem interesting to historians, especially considering Brazil's participation at Belgrade in 1961,[123] the detailed report sent by Trigueiro does little to satisfy such interest. The ambassador attended the official reception alongside the other Western representatives, avoided the representative of Communist China, and returned four days ahead of schedule. "I was forced to anticipate my return [to Jakarta]," Trigueiro reported, because "we [the Western representatives] did not have access to adequate accommodation in Bandung […] and we all returned to Jakarta, except the US ambassador." Furthermore, Trigueiro declined a last-minute invitation to attend the closing ceremony, "being confident that our absence would not be noticed, as in fact it was not, due to the tumultuous and disorderly character of the reception."[124] Intriguingly, the ambassador's report did not mention the presence of Secretary Bezerra de Menezes, nor the instructions sent by the Itamaraty, even if these arrived only 13 days after the end of the conference (after all, such delays in communications were then common).[125]

In the course of the same report on the conference, however, Trigueiro considered its results to be surprising. Nehru's failure to dominate the conference, and to emerge as the undeniable leader of both continents, was particularly noted. Such initial expectations, the ambassador highlighted, "were completely shattered by his clumsy personal performance, and the rejection of his theories [by the other participants]." "Indian neutrality" had been, in his opinion, completely rejected by a conference characterized by "profound divergences," namely between those who defended "integral neutrality," and those who remained "uncompromising in their opposition to the communist threat." Decolonization, nevertheless, was the topic that had sustained some degree of consensus among the delegates, who had "expressed their continuing determination to liquidate the remnants of

[121] MRE to Embaixada do Brasil em Washington [Embassy of Brazil in Washington] (henceforth, EMBRAWAS), O [U] 32, April 7, 1955, AMRE.
[122] Dávila, *Hotel,* 27.
[123] See chapter Six.
[124] EMBRAJACARTA to MRE, T 3, April 22, 1955, AMRE.
[125] MRE to EMBRAJACARTA, O [U] 4, April 19, 1955, AMRE.

colonialism." The sense of relief that Trigueiro, but also Falcão, had expressed after the conference was palpable. "From a Western point of view, the conference is a relief [strongly implying that it was also his]" the ambassador to New Delhi wrote. "The [Afro-Asian] front against Western civilization […] and the white race [….] did not materialize, since various grievances revealed that many nations at the conference preferred the friendship of Europe and of the US to the friendship of their continental brothers."[126]

A Diplomatic Coup at the Vatican

Although Nehru had avoided the issue of Goa at Bandung (at least in the Communiqué), he was now resolved to carry out a foreign policy 'coup'. Immediately after his state visit to the Soviet Union in June 1955, during which he had received pledges of solidarity regarding the case of the Portuguese territories, the Indian premier was expected to make a stop at the Vatican, in order to conduct a brief meeting with Pope Pius XII. Although the religious factor was no longer central to the conflict (at least, compared with the previous years), it still played an important role. Bearing in mind the weight of Catholicism in Portuguese India, Nehru had recently pointed out India's commitment to religious freedom, as well as to respect of cultural and social difference. "Freedom and rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India and which specifically refer to freedom of conscience, worship and practice of religion," Nehru had declared in August 1954, "will extend in full measure and in all their implications to [Portuguese territories].[127] His objective was to reassure Goan Catholics, but also to challenge the Portuguese discourse, which often portrayed the problem of the Portuguese settlements as a religious issue. Nehru could already rely on the support of the Indian Catholic Church, which openly supported the integration of the Portuguese settlements into India, but he was clearly aware that a favorable pronouncement by the Vatican could remove, once and for all, the religious issue from the agenda. Furthermore, Nehru was aware that relations between Portugal and the Vatican were quite strained.

Indeed, relations between the Portuguese government and Pope Pius XII were extremely tense.[128] As noted earlier, the appointment of the Archbishop of Bombay as a Cardinal was considered a severe blow to Portuguese prestige in the East, and a clear sign that the Vatican was rather more interested in expanding Catholicism (and its influence) in India than glorifying and protecting the Portuguese

[126] EMBRAND to MRE, O 112, April 26, 1955; EMBRAJACARTA to MRE, O [R] 88, May 4, 1955
[127] "Liberation Movement in Goa," August 25, 1954, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty Six, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 454.
[128] See Bruno Cardoso Reis, *Salazar e o Vaticano* (Lisboa: Instituo de Ciências Sociais, 2006), chapter 4.

presence in the Indian subcontinent.[129] Subsequent events strained relations yet further: during the troubled month of August 1954, the Vatican had issued a simple and neutral communiqué in the *Osservatore Romano*, stating only that the apostolic internuncio to India had expressed a desire for a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Lisbon and New Delhi.[130] Absent were any mention of Portuguese legitimate rights, or any condemnation of India's policy towards the region. Several weeks later, the Vatican reacted ambivalently to Portuguese complaints regarding the pro-India statements that had been made by Cardinal Valerian Gracias and other members of the Indian Catholic Church.[131] Such attitudes led António de Oliveira Salazar, in November 1954, to set his personal religiousness aside, and to make an uncharacteristic speech against the *Propaganda Fide* in the National Assembly. Although the Vatican had conveyed its disappointment, the president of the council reiterated its criticism, and seized the opportunity to condemn the inaction of the Vatican regarding the Indian clergy.[132]

Irrespective of this tension, Salazar was clearly aware of the weight of the Vatican, and became personally involved in the attempt to attenuate the impact of Nehru's visit. Some days before the arrival of the Indian prime minister, he instructed the Portuguese *chargé d'affaires* at the Vatican, Francisco Calheiros e Meneses, to request a "moderate demarche" of the Pope towards Nehru. "This cannot be less than a declaration stating that the Pope expects everything to be settled through peaceful means, and with due respect for the rights of all," he telegraphed.[133] Simultaneously, Salazar dispatched José Nosolini, his friend and former ambassador to the Vatican, in order to raise the awareness of the Pope. Nosolini was expected to direct the attention of Pius XII towards the problems that had been created by the statements of Cardinal Gracias, and also to lessen the international spotlight over Nehru's reception at the Holy See.[134] This was Salazar's plan to counteract Nehru's daring. Despite all this, the 66-year-old dictator displayed a profound apprehension regarding the fact that Nehru had secured a hearing with the Pontiff. "It is no small thing that we already have to deal with the effects that such a reception is going to produce in international public opinion," he raged, "especially after a visit to Russia, and with Soviet support for India over the issue of Goa."[135]

[129] "Kewal Singh to Padmanbhan" [S], February 9, 1953, EI 53 7421 52, NAI.
[130] "Comunicado do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, publicado na imprensa em 11 de Agosto de 1954," August 11, 1954, No. 439 *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II, 101.
[131] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 332-333.
[132] "O Caso de Goa. Discurso pronunciado pelo President do Conselho, Doutor António de Oliveira Salazar, em 30 de Novembro de 1954, na Assembleia Nacional," November 30, 1954, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II, 301-324. Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 333-335.
[133] "Do Presidente do Conselho ao Embaixador de Portugal no Vaticano," June 29, 1955, No. 646, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II, 429.
[134] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 335.
[135] Do Presidente do Conselho ao Embaixador de Portugal no Vaticano," June 29, 1955, No. 646, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II, 429.

Both demarches failed, and Nosolini was not even able to gain a hearing.[136] On July 8, Nehru was received by the Pope at the Vatican, and the topic of Goa was eventually discussed by the two men. According to the available sources, Nehru sought to reassure Pius XII that the problem of Goa was not a religious issue, as the Portuguese often claimed. "I told him that as against the 200,000 Roman Catholics in Goa, we had 7,000,000 of them in India as a whole," Nehru later revealed. "I also said that there were 400,000 people in Goa belonging to other religions, mostly Hindus."[137] The Pontiff listened, and replied that he considered Goa to be a "political matter". He also expressed his personal desire to see the matter resolved without violence, to which Nehru replied, "naturally, without uprisings, with calmness and tranquility." Moreover, Nehru even promised that under the Indian Constitution, religious freedom would be respected in Goa. During a post-hearing press conference in Rome, Nehru partially disclosed the conversation, and confessed that the Pope, with respect to Portuguese India, had agreed with his own judgement.[138]

The Portuguese ambassador to Rome, António Ferro, immediately arranged a press conference to counteract Nehru's statement.[139] Interestingly, Ferro invited the Brazilian diplomatic representative in Rome to assist him in preparing the conference. "Ferro called me, and said that he wanted me to participate in the press conference," *chargé d'affaires* Fernando Ramos de Alencar reported to Rio de Janeiro, since this would be "real proof of Brazilian solidarity [towards Portugal]." Although Alencar had instructions to convey Brazil's point of view – hostile to any violent solution, or to threats of violence – he considered that such co-participation could not be justified, since Brazil would thereby "assume co-responsibility for everything that Ferro said […] he has a strong character, and is somewhat prone to making drastic and even violent statements." By way of a compromise, he politely suggested the invitation of some Brazilian correspondents to cover the event, and promised that he would reiterate Brazilian solidarity if contacted by the press. However, he rejected the request for the direct participation of the Portuguese representative. Subsequently, the Itamaraty approved Alencar's decision.[140]

In New Delhi, however, the Indian prime minister started to publicize his meeting with the Pope unashamedly: he revealed not only the contents of the conversation with the Pontiff, "one of the

[136] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento,* 335.
[137] "Policy of India," July 16, 1955, *Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), SWJN,* Second Series, Volume Twenty Nine*,* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 19.
[138] "Do Embaixador de Portugal no Vaticano ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," July 8, 1955, No. 648, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II, 430; Embaixada do Brasil no Vaticano [Embassy of Brazil in the Vatican] (henceforth, EMBRAVAT) to MRE, CT 40, July 11, 1955, AMRE.
[139] "Do Ministro de Portugal em Roma ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," July 9, 1955, No. 649, *VADEPI, 1947-1967,* II, 430-432.
[140] Embaixada do Brasil em Roma [Embassy of Brazil to Rome] (henceforth, EMBRAROM) to MRE, O [C] 185, July 9, 1955, AMRE.

world's respected leaders", but also seized every opportunity to threaten Portuguese sovereignty. "The Portuguese say that Goa has been in their possession for four hundred years or so," Nehru stated, "[and] this only proves that they must be removed as quickly as possible from here. Enough wrong has been done and now the place must be cleaned." [141] According to the Portuguese *chargé d'affaires* in India, Álvaro Laborinho, the Indian press was giving a great deal of attention to Nehru's reception, and this was causing considerable dismay among Goans based in Bombay, and even sowing doubts among the foreign diplomatic corps.[142]

To force the Vatican to break its silence, Salazar requested a public statement. On July 28, the *Osservatore Romano* published a brief, neutral article, summarizing the last year of the conflict between Portugal and India, as well as the Holy See's position. Although the Vatican declared its unwillingness to interfere in "political problems", it recognized that Goa was one of the most important centers of Catholicism, and pointed out that the government of India – through the voice of Nehru himself – had guaranteed that religious freedom would be respected. As the Brazilian ambassador later reported, this was the cause of "bitter desolation" to Portugal.[143]

The *Satyagraha* of 1955

Despite his triumphs abroad, Nehru was facing increasing pressure at home. Since early 1955, groups of *satyagrahis* had been occasionally crossing the border with Portuguese India, eventually being arrested, beaten, or simply expelled by the Portuguese authorities.[144] According to Indian figures, between January and April, at least 196 *satyagrahis* were arrested, and some of them deported.[145] This time, however, the *satyagraha* was being ostensibly organized and publicized by Indian opposition parties, such as the Praja Socialist Party, Jana Sangh, and the Communist Party, and could even count on the participation of many distinguished politicians, including Narayan Ganesh Goray, Tridip Chowdhari, and Vishnu Ghanashyam Deshpande.[146] Therefore, as the movement gained momentum, the government was put under severe pressure to respond effectively to the wave of repression that

[141] "Policy of India," July 16, 1955, *Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.), SWJN,* Second Series, Volume Twenty Nine*,* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 19-20.
[142] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 336-337.
[143] "Do Presidente do Conselho ao Embaixador de Portugal no Vaticano," July 21, 1955, No. 438, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II, 438-439. *L'Osservatore Romano* [Vatican], July 29, 1955; EMBRAVAT to MRE, O [Reservado (henceforth, R)] 96, July 30, 1955, AMRE.
[144] See, for instance, "Comunicado do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros publicano da imprensa em 24 de Janeiro de 1955," January 24, 1955, No. 573, *VADEPI, 1947-1967,* II, 346-348.
[145] Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 101-105. "Diplomatic Relations with Portugal," May 6, 1955, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty-Eight (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2001), 299.
[146] Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 104. "International and National Situation," June 28-29, 1955, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty-Nine (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2001), 252.

had been unleashed in Goa (and against the *satyagrahis*) by the Portuguese authorities: the right-wing party Bharatiya Jan Sang demanded a 'police action'; the Central Committee of the Communist Party called upon Nehru to take direct action in Goa; and even the Jivatram Bhagwandas 'Acharya' Kripalani reminded the Lok Sabha that India had a "strong and efficient army," which had already been employed in Hyderabad.[147]

Remaining faithful to his policy towards Goa, Nehru had rejected any 'police action,' and had accused the opposition of attempting to make political capital out of the issue. "If the satyagrahis wish to create a commotion which will force the Indian forces to march in, that is no *satyagraha*. It is wrong," he had said at a public meeting in Pune early in June. "It will be directed not merely against the Portuguese government but to some extent against us, by creating conditions which will compel us to march in. Whatever the Indian government wishes to do, it will do in its own way and not by shouting about it from the rooftops. We do not wish to employ the military method. We want to solve the matter peacefully."[148] Nevertheless, the situation became increasingly worrying, especially when a mass *satyagraha* against Goa, Daman and Diu was scheduled to take place on August 15.[149] The movement of volunteers against Portuguese colonialism in India was expected to bring together people from various areas, such as Maharashtra and Gujarat. For Nehru, it constituted a headache. "We should avoid any development, such as a mass satyagraha," we wrote to his chief ministers, "which will necessarily come in the way of peaceful action in the future"[150]

On July 23, a Congress Working Committee confirmed this position, and passed a resolution calling for a peaceful settlement of the problem of Goa, while opposing any attempt at a mass *satyagraha*. Furthermore, and as a means of counterbalancing this non-supportive position, the Committee decided to close the Portuguese legation in New Delhi, as a retaliation against Portugal's recourse to violent repression. Although the Portuguese general consulate in Bombay and the two honorary consulates in Calcutta and Madras were spared – especially because their closure would inevitably have led to the closure of the Indian consulate in Goa (which was of great assistance to the Goan

[147] Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 107. "To Chief Ministers," May 20, 1955, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty-Eight (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2001), 590.
[148] "Tasks Ahead," June 4, 1955, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty-Nine (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2001), 10-11
[149] Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 105. *Satyagraha* also continued. See "Comunicado do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros publicado na imprensa em 8 de Junho de 1955," June 8, 1955, No. 639, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II, 415-424.
[150] "To Chief Ministers," July 20, 1955, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty-Nine (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2001), 438.

freedom fighters) – this virtually meant a severing of diplomatic ties between Portugal and India. Vasco Garin, who had been the only Portuguese representative in New Delhi, was requested to leave.[151]

For its part, the Portuguese government had already taken precautions with regard to the possibility of such a severing of relations. Exactly one year previously, during the height of the nerve-racking crisis of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Portuguese diplomats had sounded out the Itamaraty regarding the possibility of Brazil becoming a protecting power in India, having received positive signals in response from Rio de Janeiro.[152] Accordingly, immediately after having received the Indian communique requesting the closure of the legation, Portugal designated Brazil as its protecting power in New Delhi.[153] Nevertheless, contrary to the crisis of 1954, the Portuguese authorities were somehow more relaxed this time: there was no national or international media campaign; no organized public demonstrations;[154] and demarches towards friendly or allied countries were of a merely informative nature. Regarding this latter point, Brazil had once again assumed the role of messenger in those Latin American nations in which Portugal had no permanent diplomatic mission, including Bolivia, Colombia, Panama, and Paraguay,[155] and successfully extracting some pro-Portugal reactions, such as in the case of Honduras.[156] This more relaxed approach was due to the fact that the Portuguese leadership, basing itself mainly on the appeals to calm made by Nehru, believed that New Delhi would not march into Goa. And, if the mass *satyagraha* did take place, the Portuguese local authorities would 'easily handle' the problem, through police and military repression.[157] Ultimately, the responsibility would rest solely with the Indian leaders.[158]

Irrespective of Nehru's public (and private) disavowal of a mass movement against the Portuguese settlements, between 2,000 and 6,000 Goan and non-Goan volunteers marched into Goa, Daman and

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[151] "CWC Resolution on Goa," July 23, 1955, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty-Nine (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2001), 389-393; "Do Encarregado de Negócios de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," July 23, 1955, No. 658, *VADEPI, 1947*-1967, II, 443-444. See also Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 105-107.

[152] MNE to EPRJ, T [S] 132, July 25, 1954; EPRJ to MNE, T 162, July 27, 1954; EPRJ to MNE, T [S] 173, July 29, 1954; EPRJ to MNE, T 178, July 30, 1954, AHDMNE. See also "Do Director-Geral dos Negócios Políticos do Ministério dos Negócios Eestrangeiros ao Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi," January 4, 1955, No. 552, "Do Encarregado de Negócios de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," June 1, 1955, No. 637, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II, 349; 414.

[153] MNE to EPRJ, T 139, July 25, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 174, July 28, 1955; MNE to EPRJ, T 140, July 31, 1955, AHDMNE. See also "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal no Rio de Janeiro," July 25, 1955, No. 660, "Do Embaixador de Portugal no Rio de Janeiro ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," July 25, 1955, No. 661; "Do Encarregado de Negócios de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," July 27, 1955, No. 663; "Do Embaixador de Portugal no Rio de Janeiro ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," August 11, 1955, No. 673; *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II, 447-449; 466-467.

[154] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 345.

[155] Also, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

[156] MNE to EPRJ, T 141, August 2, 1955, AHDMNE. See, for instance, Embaixada do Brasil em Tegucigalpa [Embassy of Brazil in Tegucigalpa] (henceforth, EMBRATEG) to MRE, O [R] 116, July 28, 1955, AMRE.

[157] Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 345.

[158] See, for instance, "Do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros à Legação de Portugal em Nova Delhi," May 14, 1955, No. 614; "Do Ministro de Portugal em Nova Delhi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," May 15, 1955, No. 615, *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, II, 388-393.

Diu on August 15.[159] Exactly what happened that day still remains unknown. However, several accounts claimed that the Portuguese police opened fire, giving the excuse that the *satyagrahis* had ignored orders to stop. Figures specify that 22 were shot dead, and 225 wounded.[160] The nature of Nehru's real position regarding the mass *satyagraha* also remains unknown: was he really unable to prevent it? After all, the prime minister had reiterated several times his disapproval of such actions, and one can question his political ability to contain such a national movement. Or, on the other hand, was he unwilling to prevent it? After all, the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-Haveli had been successfully occupied, and, in the midst of everything else, Daman or Diu could also be liberated. Once again, without full access to Indian sources – especially to the prime minister's papers – these considerations will necessarily remain in the realm of hypothesis.

Whatever the answers to these questions, Nehru immediately reacted to the Portuguese violence: India closed its consulate general in Goa, and Portugal was given until September 1 to close its consulates in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.[161] The direct diplomatic channel of communication was now definitely closed. At the domestic level, the All India Congress Committee passed a resolution expressing its opinion that, in the prevailing context, the *satyagraha* against the Portuguese settlements should be ended.[162] However, both decisions were heavily criticized at home. First, pro-India Goan nationalists opined that Goa had become "the graveyard of Indian diplomacy," since the movement had failed to dislodge the Portuguese.[163] Second, several opposition leaders issued a statement criticizing the Congress Party, for having suddenly let down the "brave people of Goa". And, to make things even bleaker for Nehru, only a few leaders of the Bandung Conference countries had expressed their sympathy towards India on this occasion.[164] Privately, John Kotelawala had even joked about the *satyagraha* movement.[165] All in all, the outcome of the *satyagraha* seemed to have been a great disaster.

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[159] Several Indian sources estimated 2,000 *satyagrahis*. The Portuguese press indicated more than 6,000. See Stocker*, Xeque-Mate*, 154-155.

[160] Gaitonde*, The Liberation*, 108.

[161] "Cable to Portuguese Governor General," August 18, 1955, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty-Nine (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2001), 414-415.

[162] Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 110.

[163] Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 110.

[164] Apparently, only Burma, Indonesia and the People's Republic of China. See "Message to Prime Minister of Indonesia," September 2, 1955, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Thirty (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2002), 368; "Attitude of the Bandung Conference Countries," September 8, 1955, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Thirty (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2002), 373.

[165] According to B.N. Chakravarty, the Indian High Commissioner at Colombo, Kotelawala, had said "India seems to have developed a new technique of invasion by *satyagrahis*. What could the Portuguese do but to shoot them? …If the million Indians in Ceylon were to start a satyagraha movement, Ceylon would perhaps have to follow a similar course." "Statements by Sri Lanka Prime Minister on Goa," August 22, 1955, Sarvepalli Gopal (ed), *SWJN*, Second Series, Volume Twenty-Nine (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2001), 422.

A Taste of Cold War

The three-week visit of Soviet Premier Nikolay Aleksandrovich Bulganin and Communist Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev to India in November and December 1955 offered reconciliation with militant sectors of Indian public opinion. The Soviet Union was looking to strengthen its ties with leading nonaligned states, based on the assumption that closer relations with these nations could reduce the effectiveness of the West's anticommunist alliances, weaken Western influence in the Third World, and demonstrate that Moscow was finally a global player vis-à-vis Washington. India, as the largest and most influential nonaligned state, was identified by Soviet policy-makers as one of the most promising prizes. Promises of economic assistance had already been made to Indian leaders, including aid to construct and finance a planned steel mill in Bhilai. Moreover, such overtures would predictably be accompanied by statements condemning European colonialism, and particularly Portuguese colonialism in the Indian subcontinent, in order to further cultivate Indian leaders' and populace sympathies.[166]

Bulganin, Khrushchev, and their entourage were received with due pomp and circumstance. According to the Brazilian ambassador to India, New Delhi had been dressed up like a "bride waiting for her enchanted prince." Falcão emphasized the careful preparations that had been made to receive the two leaders, including the distribution of free tickets from nearby villages to Delhi. This, the diplomat ironically observed, would be "a good opportunity for the unemployed to see something new and amusing, [so that] he that does not have bread might yet have a circus." During the three-week visit, the Soviet leaders renewed their promises to build and finance the steel mill in Bhilai, offered additional economic assistance, underlined their willingness to sell military aircraft, and sought to increase Indo-Soviet trade. During a visit to Kashmir, the two leaders declared the support of the Soviet Union for India in the conflict, and later made subtle references to anticommunist regional alliances. "The Soviet Union notes with satisfaction that several Asian countries are fighting against the establishment of military bases and the posting of foreign troops in their countries," Soviet Premier Nikolay Bulganin declared before his audience. "In this, I see a turning point in the history of Asia."[167]

Unsurprisingly, the issue of Goa was addressed by the Soviet leaders. In Madras, during a speech against colonialism in general, Khrushchev labelled the Portuguese "blood-sucking leeches," and

[166] McMahon, *The Cold War*, 218-219.
[167] EMBRAND to MRE, O 359, November 17, 1955; EMBRAND to MRE, O 368, November 22, 1955; EMBRAND to MRE, O 369, November 22, 1955; EMBRAND to MRE, O 375, November 24, 1955; EMBRAND to MRE, O 382, November 28, 1955, AHI; McMahon, *The Cold War,* 219-220.

stated that it was "surprising that certain European countries do not understand that the times have passed when they could keep colonial footholds." "The continued retention of Goa by Portugal," the Communist Party secretary stated in closing, "is a shame for civilization." Nehru then seized the opportunity to express his gratitude for such Soviet support, but in such a way as to simultaneously rebuke those countries that had opposed Indian policy towards Portugal:

> A few days ago, I had said that the issue of Goa is like the touchstone with which one tests gold. On this issue, one can judge where all the nations really stand because it is an issue over which there can be no two opinions. Now, if any country sides with Portugal over this issue or even chooses to maintain silence, that would make it abundantly clear that their thinking is confused. What is this, some kind of joke? […] Well, let's leave that aside, but the question is what the other countries of the world think over a matter which is crystal clear. Everyone has many things to say about freedom and sovereignty, etc., the real test of a nation is the stand it takes over any issue.[168]

The Soviet statement on Goa (and, to a certain extent, Nehru's declaration) could not have been more ill-timed. The Portuguese foreign minister, Paulo Cunha, was in Washington to discuss Portuguese-American relations with US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The negotiation of the Azores military base agreement was the official leitmotiv of this meeting. However, the Portuguese government was determined to deliberately postpone any agreement due to Washington's hesitations regarding Goa. Indeed, Portuguese leaders were upset about the lack of US comprehension and support, over what they considered to be a crucial problem. In August 1954, the State Department had subtly declined a request to directly condemn the Indian government for turning a blind eye to the occupation of Dadrá and Nagar-Haveli. Although the Eisenhower administration had exerted some pressure towards New Delhi, the Portuguese government had retaliated by refusing the US invitation extended to President Craveiro Lopes to visit Washington in late 1954. In August 1955, Dulles had sought to rectify the American position, and had publicly conveyed his government's concern regarding the heightened

[168] EMBRAND to MRE, O 383, November 29, 1955; "The Relevance of Panch Shila," November 30, 1955, H.Y. Sharada Prasad and A. K. Damodaran (eds), *SWJN,* Second Series, Volume Thirty One, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 316.

tensions between Portugal and India. The Dulles' statement, nevertheless, was so couched as to be relatively well received in New Delhi, and somewhat disappointing to Lisbon.[169]

Cunha opened the talks with the subject of Goa. He reaffirmed the importance of Goa to Portugal and the Portuguese people, recalled the centuries-long Portuguese presence there, underlined the traditional bonds of culture and faith, and evoked the absence of racial prejudices within the territories. Bearing in mind the recent statements of both Bulganin and Khrushchev, Cunha then emphasized that India had been showing some signs of reasonableness, until the recent "diatribes" in India of the Soviet leaders. He regretted such occurrences, but pointed out that they at least served to show the world "how the Soviet Union was joining forces with the Asiatics to throw out the Westerners." Thus, Cunha reiterated the arguments that had been employed at the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty council during the aftermath of Bandung. Replying, Dulles suggested a plebiscite, as a means to enable "Portugal's friends, such as the United States, to help [Portugal] on this issue." However, Cunha argued that to hold a plebiscite in Goa "would be like the United States holding a plebiscite in Alaska, Massachusetts or Florida." During the conversation, Dulles mentioned his statement of August 1955, and stressed that it was his intention to be "as helpful as possible." However, he also recognized that the Indian press had twisted his statement to favor the Indian cause. Bearing in mind the need to appease the Portuguese government, Dulles agreed to issue a joint statement with Cunha. Although this did not mention Goa – as desired by the Secretary of State[170] – the final paragraph of the declaration was clear

> Various statements attributed to Soviet rulers visiting in Asia, which included references to the policies of Western powers in the Far East and allegations concerning the Portuguese provinces in the Far East, were discussed by the two Foreign Ministers. They considered that such statements do not represent a contribution to the cause of peace. The two ministers whose countries embrace many peoples of many races deplored all efforts to foment hatred between the East and West and to divide peoples who need to feel a sense of unity and fellowship for peace and mutual welfare.[171]

[169]"Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Defense Talks regarding Azores Negotiations," January 13, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, v. XXVII, 439-441. See also Daniel Marcos, "Uma Aliança Circunstancial: Portugal e os Estados Unidos nos anos 1950," (PhD diss., ISCTE, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, 2011), 166-191.

[170] "Telephone Conv – General," September 1, 1955 to December 30, 1955, Dulles, John Foster: Papers, Telephone Conversations Series, Box No.4, A67-28, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library

[171] "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Problems of Concern to Portugal," November 30, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, v. XXVII, 445-452; "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Problems of Concern to Portugal,"

Following this joint statement, Dulles stressed that the declaration had taken no position specifically on Goa. However, he expressed the mutual concern of the US and Portugal regarding the Soviet leaders' attempts to "whip up prejudice and hate in a situation that needs to be dealt with in a spirit of calm." However, when asked whether he considered Goa to be a province of Portugal, Dulles off-handedly replied, "as far as I know all the world regards it as a Portuguese province. It has been Portuguese for about 400 years." The Necessidades quickly circulated a letter among its diplomatic representatives: amongst other things, the fact that the US State Secretary had described Portuguese India – as well as Macao and Timor – as Portuguese provinces was a diplomatic triumph, which it was imperative to exploit. Moreover, the fact that the statement recognized that these issues had been discussed within the framework of NATO was also quite valuable to the Portuguese cause.[172]

The Cunha-Dulles Joint Declaration, as well as Dulles's subsequent clarifications, infuriated the Indians. "Nothing could have been more calculated to irritate Indian opinion," Nehru stated to the Chief Ministers, "than Mr. Dulles' amazing statement on Goa." Indeed, the Indian prime minister had legitimate reason to be upset: recently, the US Ambassador, Sherman Cooper, had stated that the Eisenhower administration had not yet adopted any position in regard to Goa, and that any unsympathetic views towards India should not be taken as official. This apparent shift in the US position towards Goa, as well as the Indian disappointment this had prompted, were quickly transmitted to Cooper and Washington. After meetings and exchange of notes, in which India stressed its bitterness and the need to rectify the situation, Dulles arrived in New Delhi on March 1956. He explained to Nehru that the statement did not imply US support for Portugal regarding Goa. However, little more was done to foster US-India understanding. Privately, however, Nehru admitted to his closest advisers that he was "rather glad that this statement has come out because it enables us to deal directly with the US on this subject.[173]

December 2, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, v. XXVII, 452-453; Embaixada do Brasil em Washington [Embassy of Brazil in Washington] (henceforth, EMBRAWAS) to MRE, O [U] 953, December 5, 1955, AMRE.

[172] "Impressions: Soviet Leaders' Visit to India," December 20, 1955, H.Y. Sharada Prasad and A. K. Damodaran (eds), *SWJN,* Second Series, Volume Thirty One, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 359; "Da Direcção-Geral dos Negócios Políticos do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros a todas as Missões Diplomáticas e Consulares," No. 748, December 10, 1955, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Vinte Anos de Defesa do Estado Português da Índia (1947-1967)*, Volume III, (henceforth *VADEPI, 1947-1967*, III) (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1968), 55-56. See also Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 680; Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 113.

[173] "Fallout of the Joint Statement," December 4, 1955, H.Y. Sharada Prasad and A. K. Damodaran (eds), *SWJN,* Second Series, Volume Thirty One, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 434; "Impressions: Soviet Leaders' Visit to India," December 20, 1955, H.Y. Sharada Prasad and A. K. Damodaran (eds), *SWJN,* Second Series, Volume Thirty One, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 364; "Dulles-Cunha Joint Statement," December 4, 1955, H.Y. Sharada Prasad and A. K. Damodaran (eds), *SWJN,* Second Series, Volume Thirty One, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002); Alexandre, *Contra*, 680-681; McMahon, *The Cold War*, 223-225; Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 113-114.

For his part, the Brazilian ambassador to India was less optimistic. In his view, these events had created a serious problem regarding Goa. "Until now this was a controversy between India and Portugal," Falcão reported, "but the Russians broke their neutrality, and transformed Goa into a problem just as universal as Korea, Germany, China, and other points on the globe." An American reaction, he stated, had been provoked, and this had firmly shifted Goa into the international arena. "Until now, any violent action could have developed without major concerns," the Brazilian ambassador noted. "[Now,] I doubt that the same would apply."[174]

Falcão's remarks on the arrival of the Cold War in Goa were rather hasty and overly alarming. True, Foster Dulles' response to Soviet leaders had been a novelty. However, to claim that the Portuguese territories were a crucial point in the conflict between the West and the Soviet Union was nonsense. Goa, Daman and Diu offered little in terms of size, strategic location, and economic resources. In reality, the 'problem' of the Portuguese territories was being exploited by both American and Soviet politicians for short-term political gain. For Washington, it served as a means to please the Portuguese government, in order to attenuate the diplomatic let-downs of the past (i.e. the silence of American diplomats during the crisis of August 1954), and to gain some room for maneuver with regard to the renewal of the Azores base agreements. For the USSR, on the other hand, the problem offered a means to conquer the hearts and minds of the leaders of the largest and most influential nonaligned nation (i.e. India), and to prove that the Soviet Union was unconditionally opposed to colonialism. Falcão, furthermore, had failed to understand that the problem of Goa had already shifted into the international arena. When the Portuguese were removed from Dadra and Nagar-Haveli in 1954, Lisbon did not refrain from raising the issue with friendly and allied governments, thus bringing external actors into the crisis. Besides the United Kingdom, various governments from Europe and Latin America had expressed their sympathies towards Portugal and/or their concerns about Indian policy, having been convinced by historical and juridical – but also Cold War-inspired – arguments. Such internationalization, everything seems to suggest, contributed to alleviating some of the pressure that the Indian government had been exerting over the Portuguese territories.

Brazil significantly contributed to this development. Besides having articulated its support for Portugal's stance in the Indian subcontinent, the Brazilian government had promptly agreed to conduct lobbying within Latin America, thus rallying additional opposition against India, including from nations with whom Portugal did not even have diplomatic relations (and, one might say, had been previously been unaware of the problem). Nevertheless, the Portuguese regime still continued to regard Brazil with its traditional suspicion. Ongoing political instability, and particularly the episode of Café Filho's

[174] EMBRAND to MRE, O 405, December 19, 1955, AMRE.

state visit to Portugal, during which Brazil's internal political strife had been allowed to take precedence over its relations with Portugal, served as a reminder that Brazil remained an unreliable ally. Moreover, the fact that Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan had been received in Rio de Janeiro (and Krishna Menon was about to) surely increased this suspicion, even if Brazil had carefully avoided any pro-incorporation statements. However, at the moment, Brazilian foreign policy-makers seemed far from perceiving the shifting trends that were occurring in the world. Their indifferent response to Bandung exemplified this: they seemed to have failed to understand the magnitude of such a gathering, and how, together, Asia and Africa could challenge the weight of Latin America.

For its part, the Indian government eventually contributed to the internationalization of the problem. Although not mentioned in the final communiqué, Goa was broached during the Bandung conference, at which Nehru had sought to frame the problem in the wider context of regional alliances, and had drawn attention toward the larger problem of foreign meddling in Asia. Furthermore, the entrance onto the scene of the Soviet Union, with the proclamations made in June and December 1955, further contributed to such internationalization. However, despite all these developments, and the fact that India had removed the religious aspect from the crisis, Nehru's policies and actions for the liberation of Goa continued to fall short.

Chapter Three | Optimism and Prudence, 1956-1957

New Challenge

In January 1956, all eyes were on Juscelino Kubitschek's semi-official state visit to Portugal. Despite a series of threats of coups and one preemptive coup during the course of November 1955, Kubitschek had eventually secured the legitimacy of his election as president of Brazil (and of João 'Jango' Goulart as his vice-president).[1] Although Brazil was still under an official state of emergency, the recently-elected president had decided to initiate a 17-day diplomatic tour of the US and Western Europe, including a three-day visit to Portugal, not only for "sentimental reasons," but also to present his political and economic program for Brazil. Kubitschek's stopover offered the Portuguese government an excellent opportunity to win his sympathies, as well as to raise the 'problem' of the Portuguese territories in the Indian subcontinent.[2]

Indeed, Portuguese leaders had already gathered encouraging information about Kubitschek's feelings in this regard. The grandson of a Portuguese emigrant,[3] he had already expressed his desire to visit the "motherland," and his wish to meet Salazar, whom he considered one of the "greatest statesmen of modern times." Although his position on Portuguese India remained unknown, the Portuguese embassy had already reported promising signals from the interim minister of External Relations, José Carlos de Macedo Soares (who had since been confirmed in his office in January). Besides having made laudatory statements regarding Brazil-Portugal relations during his inaugural speech – "a centuries-long friendship so pleasing to our hearts" – Macedo Soares had also intimated to ambassador António de Faria that the new government intended to follow his predecessors' policy towards Portuguese India.[4]

Kubitschek was given a triumphal reception. During his three-day visit, the recently-elected president of Brazil was cheered by enthusiastic crowds, decorated by President Francisco Craveiro Lopes,

[1] Predicting a military coup to prevent Kubitschek and Goulart from assuming the presidency and vice-presidency, on November 11, 1955, General Henrique Teixeira Lott initiated a preemptive military counter-coup, in order to assure that the election results would be respected. See, Bethell, "*…under the Liberal Republic*," 124-126; Skidmore, *Brasil*, 183-194.
[2] EPRJ to MNE, T 255, November 11, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 256, November 11, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 257, November 11, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 259, November 12, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T [C] 260, November 14, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 262, November 14, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 265, November 16, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 272, November 22, 1955, AHDMNE.
[3] For a biography of Kubitschek, see, for instance, Claudio Bojunga, *JK. O artista do impossível* (Rio de Janeiro: Objectiva, 2010)
[4] EPRJ to MNE, T 264, November 15, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, A [C] 125, December 15, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 288, December 20, 1955; EPRJ to MNE, T 292, December 23, 1955, AHDMNE.. Speech of José Carlos de Macedo Soares available at Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, Centro de História e Documentação Diplomática.

applauded in the National Assembly, and counselled on economic affairs by Salazar during a long informal meeting. In turn, the soon-to-be president expressed his deepest regard for Portugal, recalled the strong ties between Portugal and Brazil, and praised Portugal's achievements in its Overseas territories. Questioned about Goa during a press conference, Kubitschek assured his hosts that his government not only intended to maintain Brazil's support towards Portugal, but even planned to increase it "unconditionally." According to Alberto Franco Nogueira, in his biography on António de Oliveira Salazar, the president of the council felt a deep empathy with Kubitschek. Indeed, he had reason to view this trip as an unequivocal success.[5]

Kubitschek's declaration was particularly relevant for the Portuguese leaders, since they were about to face a new challenge: in November 1955, Portugal had finally been admitted to the UN. Its admission had been made possible only due to an agreement between the US and the Soviet Union, whose aim was to unlock the process of admission of new members, which had been frozen since 1946, due to disagreements between the two superpowers. Portugal was then included within a 16-country 'package deal', which included nations such as Albania and Bulgaria, but also Austria, Spain, and Italy – that is, the 'neutral' and defeated powers of World War II.[6]

Although involuntary, this absence of Portugal from the UN had brought significant advantages for the Portuguese regime, and particularly for its imperial interests in Asia and Africa. First, Portugal and its colonial rule were practically shielded against any sort of criticism, interference, or scrutiny from the UN, which was increasingly determined to accelerate and conclude the process of decolonization. Indeed, contrary to other colonial powers in the UN, whose colonial administrations were subject to increasing scrutiny, Portugal was able to carry on its imperial rule without major interference, pressure, or threat from the international community. To be sure, such a privileged and unique position among colonial powers was also the result of specific conditions, which contributed to keeping the Portuguese empire off the agenda. First, Lisbon did not have to deal with developed, coordinated, and internationally recognized nationalist movements, capable of promoting turmoil in the colonies, or articulating their struggle at an international level[7]; second, Portuguese colonialism was still tolerated within the West, and was even perceived as altruistic and legitimate by some Latin American nations.

[5] Nogueira, *Salazar,* 409-410; Conrad Wrzos, *Juscelino Kubitschek. Estados Unidos-Europa* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editoria, 2000), 129-139; 179-188.

[6] On Portugal's admission to the United Nations, see Aurora Alexandrina Vieira Almada e Santos, "A Organização das Nações Unidas e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa: 1961-1970" (PhD diss., Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2014), particularly chapter one and two.

[7] Apparently, the only exception occurred in 1952, when a group of Angolans (identified as 'ELA') requested the intervention of the organization in support of the independence of Angola. The UN did not respond to this petition. See Santos, "A Organização," 89-90 and Douglas Wheeler, "'May God Help Us'. Angola's First Declaration of Independence: The 1951 Petition/Message to the United Nations and U.S.A.," in *Portuguese Studies Review*, 19 (1-2), 2011, 271-291.

The wide variety and nature of the diplomatic support granted during the crises of 1954-1955, although specifically directed to the 'particular' case of Portuguese India, proved that Portuguese colonialism was still far from being compared to French, British, Dutch, or Belgium colonialisms.[8]

Furthermore, Salazar's regime could take advantage of its non-membership of the UN at a domestic level. Supported mainly by elites – and, to a certain extent, by a misinformed civil society – all of whom perceived the colonial empire as vital to maintaining Portuguese sovereignty and economic development, Salazar sought to capitalize on this 'imposed absence', portraying it as a deliberate strategy within a wider colonial-oriented foreign policy. Indeed, during these years, the regime fostered a discourse of 'disdain' towards the UN, which was often classified as an "irresponsible, radical, and anti-Western' international forum. "In major assemblies such as the United Nations," Salazar declared once, "European colonialism is strongly attacked, judged without mercy, condemned without forgiveness."[9] Since Portugal was distant from the organization, the regime had been able to ensure the nation's permanent interests, such as its sovereignty towards Spain, and its access to markets and raw materials, while at the same time also preserving its legitimate historical rights and 'civilizing Christian mission' in Asia and Africa. Vital Western geostrategic interests were also protected, since the regime tended to consider the Overseas provinces as a bulwark against communist expansion, an idea already disseminated among its allies, including those in NATO. This extensive and elaborate discourse, moreover, would allow the regime to secure the sympathies (and support) of the most conservative elites in Portugal, namely those with colonial economic interests in Africa.

Nevertheless, such exclusion from the UN also had crucial disadvantages. For example, Portugal was unable to resort to internationally-recognized bodies such as the Security Council, or even the International Court of Justice. This disadvantage, in particular, became quite evident during the Goan crises of 1954-1955: without UN membership, it had been impossible to protest against India at the international level, and consequently impossible to expose India's 'aggression' against Dadrá and Nagar-Haveli. Many Portuguese allies, including Belgium and the Netherlands, had emphasized that a protest presented in the Security Council, or even at the International Court, would have generated substantial pressure, as well as some unpleasant and inopportune attention for the government of India. Second, Portugal could neither participate in nor influence decisions that could directly or indirectly affect its national interests on a long-term basis, especially those related to colonial issues. The UN was a decisive international forum, in which the destiny of the European colonial empires was

[8] See, for instance, Bruno Cardoso Reis, "As primeiras décadas de Portugal nas Nações Unidas, um Estado pária contra a normal da descolonização (1956-1974)," ed. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto, *Portugal e o fim do colonialismo. Dimensões internacionais* (Lisboa: Edições 70, 2014), 179-215; Bruno Cardoso Reis, "Portugal and the UN: A Rogue State Resisting the Norm of Decolonization (1956-1974), *Portuguese Studies,* 01/2013; 29(2), 251-276.
[9] António Oliveira Salazar, *Discursos e Notas Políticas, v. 5 1951-1958* (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1959), 134.

being decided, and Portuguese colonial interests in Asia and Africa were closely linked to the fate of the latter – a political destabilization of the Belgian Congo, or a French withdrawal from Algeria, would sooner or later have an impact on Portuguese colonial stability. The disappearance of French rule in the Indian subcontinent, in a matter of only a few years, had had an undeniable impact on Portuguese India's problem.[10]

Although somewhat less significant, another negative aspect stemmed from the question of international prestige. In this sense, Portugal was not yet entirely accepted by the postwar international community, alongside those nations that had borne serious responsibility for World War II, such as Austria, Italy, or Spain. Despite being a founding member of NATO, Portugal was not recognized as a fully-fledged member of this new international community, unlike certain newly independent nations, such as India. Such international 'discrimination' had significant domestic consequences: communists, but also republicans, exploited Portugal's exclusion from the UN as proof that the regime of the *Estado Novo* had led Portugal into a position of 'imposed isolationism.' Despite its undemocratic character, such criticism could, to a certain degree, affect its carefully cultivated image of patriotism, responsibility, and efficiency.[11]

Similarly, for India, this absence also had some disadvantages. Without a Portuguese delegation at the UN, India was unable to initiate and promote the use of legal mechanisms of scrutiny and interference, as provided by the UN legal apparatus. These valuable and useful techniques, notably of the Fourth Committee, were at that time being increasingly employed by other anti-colonial nations, in order to slowly but surely corrode the position of other European colonial powers. Belgium, for instance, was frequently 'summoned' and 'exposed' before the members of this committee, due to its colonial administration in the Congo. Indian diplomats not only lost an opportunity to use such mechanisms, but were also unable to organize, mobilize, and enlist the increasingly important Afro-Asian community in support of their cause. Without a stage on which to make the most of such Afro-Asian cooperation, the chances of pressuring Portugal to negotiate a solution concerning Goa, Daman, and Diu decreased dramatically.

However, the fact that Portugal was not among the members of the UN implied at least one advantage. Above all, India could confine the issue of Portuguese India to a limited sphere of actors, thus avoiding undesired external interferences, and an unduly large international audience. Indeed, if Portugal managed to properly internationalize the case of Goa – as it had done during the crises of 1954-1955 – the problem of the Portuguese foreign territories might suddenly be transformed into a 'Kashmir II',

[10] See Bègue, *La fin de Goa,* 861
[11] Teixeira, "Between Africa and Europe," 105-112; Pimentel, *História da Oposição*, 244.

with the same adverse effects that India had already experienced during the latter conflict: a long-term stalemate, the active involvement of external, undesired actors, and increasing domestic criticism towards Nehru's government.[12] To avoid such an adverse scenario, Delhi would have to be prepared to incorporate Goa, Daman, and Diu into a 'colonial package,' in which were included the remaining Portuguese territories in Asia and Africa. Yet, this strategy could lead to a long and inopportune process, which would probably delay yet further the 'liberation' of Portuguese India, especially bearing in mind the inflexibility of the Portuguese government on any matter directly related to issues of colonial sovereignty.

It is not entirely clear why Portugal eventually accepted admission to the UN. After almost a decade of absence, Salazar and his top diplomatic officials knew very well the risks posed by the UN to those with colonial possessions. Indeed, historians are still trying to decipher this change of strategy. Most tend to underline the 'excessive optimism' of the Portuguese, or even a 'lack of alternatives'.[13] However, some recent authors, such as Bruno Cardoso Reis, have advanced more concrete, tentative hypotheses regarding Salazar's optimism towards UN admission.

First, the Portuguese leaders sincerely believed that their juridical defense was robust enough to withstand any significant complications, embarrassments, or even condemnations at the UN. Since the amendments of 1951, the Portuguese Constitution had stated that Portugal was a single and indivisible state, including the Portuguese 'overseas provinces' in Asia and Africa, which were placed on the same footing as the Algarve or Minho. Thus, Portugal would always have a legal basis for denying the existence of "colonies" as such, and thus for opposing any interference in what were considered to be domestic affairs. Composed largely of lawyers,[14] the Portuguese political elite truly believed that international law, and even the Treaty of San Francisco, would recognize and respect the Portuguese Constitution. Indeed, they calculated that admission to the UN would in itself imply the recognition of the Portuguese Constitution.

Second, Portuguese diplomats believed that their colonial partners had a solid, feasible plan to resist a process of rapid and disorganized decolonization. They supposed that Great Britain – but especially France and Belgium – would probably give ground on some colonial issues, but would never allow the process of decolonization to run to extremes. This perception was the result of various international experiences and interactions with these colonial powers: within NATO, France and Belgium, alongside Portugal, always sought to underline the strategic importance of their colonial territories for Western

[12] See Raghavan, *War and Peace*, chapter four and six; Guha, *India after Gandhi*, 242.
[13] Oliveira, *Despojos*, 193
[14] See Pedro Tavares de Almeida and António Costa Pinto, "Portuguese Ministers, 1851-1999: Social Background and Paths to Power," in *South European Society and Politics,* 7: 2, (2000), 5-40.

security against communism. According to this discourse, Algeria, Congo, and Angola were key assets in containing communist expansion, and any territorial losses to nationalists would serve to tip the scales in favor of Moscow. Although Washington sought to keep colonial topics off the agenda, some issues were raised – including Goa. Besides, the existence of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of Sahara reinforced Portuguese optimism.[15] Established in 1950 by Great Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia (after 1953, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland), this organization was designed to provide a new mechanism for cooperation in Africa, but also to keep UN agencies out of the area, and to reduce the publicity given to African problems.[16]

Third, Salazar and Cunha believed that India's political and diplomatic positions regarding Portuguese India had been profoundly weakened following the setbacks of 1954-1955. The long-term impasse of the situation, the partial failure of the *satyagrahis*' movements against the Portuguese territories, the international condemnation of the occupation of Dadrá and Nagar-Haveli, and the US acknowledgement of the existence of Portuguese provinces (as opposed to colonies) all contributed to the idea that India was in a position of international weakness. Furthermore, Portuguese leaders also believed that Nehru and his government were busy dealing with domestic issues, and would thus drop the issue of Goa for the foreseeable future.

Fourth, Portugal would always have the option of 'abandoning' the organization. If membership of the UN became too onerous for Portuguese interests, Lisbon could simply carry out a 'strategic withdrawal' – even if this would condemn Portugal to the status of a 'rogue nation.' Of course, such an option might seem radical or even unreasonable. However, Cunha nonetheless advanced it during a private meeting with the Brazilian ambassador to Portugal, Heitor Lyra, in 1955.[17] On the other hand, by doing so, Portugal would inevitably be accused of abandoning the terrain of reasoned argument and defense. Indeed, even after the strident condemnation of Portugal during the 1960s, the regime never adopted such a strategy. However, this does not mean that Portuguese leaders did not entertain it in the meanwhile.[18]

For the Brazilian government, Portugal's admission (and acceptance) at the UN came as no surprise. Rio de Janeiro had followed closely, though discreetly, the evolution of the Portuguese position concerning the UN. Through several meetings, in which Goa and its development were the main topics, the Itamaraty and its diplomatic representatives in Lisbon had become aware of this shift in attitude.

[15] Reis, *As primeiras décadas*, 187.
[16] John Kent, *The Internationalization of Colonialism: Britain, France and Black Africa, 1939-1956* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) and Isebill V. Gruhn, "The Commission for Technical Co-Operation in Africa, 1950-65," in *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* Vol. 9, No. 3 (Oct. 1971), 459-469.
[17] EMBRALIS to MRE, T [C] June 20, 1955, AHMRE.
[18] See Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, chapter 18.

In May 1955, Ambassador Lyra had met Cunha and broached the subject, at which point the Portuguese foreign minister had revealed that Portugal was not interested in UN membership. "Besides all the obligations concerning its empire," Lyra reported, "admission into the UN would give India, and certainly some Arabic countries, the opportunity to raise the issue of Goa, [and Cunha] does not want that." However, Cunha had also confessed that if the Brazilian government, or any other friendly government, decided to propose and support Portugal's admission, "Portugal [would have] no choice but to accept the consequences of such a situation." One month later, the two men had dined together, and Lyra learned that the Portuguese government was extremely worried about the situation in Goa. In response to Lyra's suggestion of presenting the case to the UN, Cunha did not dismiss the possibility, and even revealed that the Portuguese government in fact intended to do so, sooner or later.[19]

Albeit discretely, Brazilian politicians and diplomats had consistently emphasized the advantages of belonging to this international organization. In their opinion, UN membership would bring not only international prestige and recognition to Portugal, as well as the power to participate in and influence the outcome of global decisions, but also the chance to raise the issue of Goa at the highest level. Indeed, on several occasions, the Itamaraty guaranteed that Brazil would always support Portuguese colonial interests, stressing that Portugal would also be able to rely on the support of the majority of the organization members, including those from Central and South America.[20] Such constant remarks regarding the benefits of the UN led Faria to suggest that Brazil was interested in acting as an international mediator between Portugal and India. Indeed, Vicente Rao even discretely sounded out the Portuguese ambassador regarding the possibility of a meeting between Cunha and Menon in September 1954.[21] Although this remained in the realm of hypothesis, all the evidence indicates that the Brazilian government wished to project its *soft power*, and to raise its international prestige. Since Portugal was excluded from the organization, Brazil wished to demonstrate that Rio de Janeiro could sponsor or, at the very least, lobby for Portuguese admission to the UN organization.

At the very least, Brazil's delegation to the UN intended to take immediate advantage of Portugal's admission. The Head of the Delegation, Cyro de Freitas Valle, proposed to the Itamaraty the inclusion of Portugal in the so-called 'Latin American group', together with Francisco Franco's Spain. According to a letter, the expansion of the organization through the admission of 16 new members would serve to decrease the diplomatic weight of Latin America, as well as to reduce the number of commission

[19] EMBRALIS to MRE, CT [C] 54, May 28, 1955; EMBRALIS to MRE, CT [C] 61, June 20, 1955, AHMRE.
[20] See, for instance, EPRJ to MNE, A 4, February 13, 1954; EPRJ to MNE, T 155, July 24, 1954; EPRJ to MNE, T 157, July 24, 1954; MNE to EPRJ, T 147, August 17, 1955, AHDMNE.
[21] During the talks mantained during 1954, as developed in the previous chapter.

seats for Latin Americans. This disadvantage, the representative in the UN calculated, could be attenuated through the inclusion of Portugal and Spain in the group, with whom Latin American countries shared numerous common features.[22]

Freitas Valle's proposal was, nevertheless, received with extreme caution by the Itamaraty. According to a report prepared by the Political Department, the Itamaraty recognized the "electoral advantages" of a hypothetical inclusion of Portugal and Spain in the 'Latin American group.' However, at the same time, the report underlined the numerous disadvantages. The chief of the Department, Dayrell de Lima, reminded his superiors that Portugal and Spain were both "outsiders," not only in geographical terms, but also in political terms. De Lima acknowledged the existence of several Latin American regimes with non-democratic characteristics. However, he then underlined that even these were significantly different to the totalitarianism of the two regimes of the Iberian Peninsula. "The only [Latin American] government that was really dictatorial was Argentina," he stated, "but even this had a remnant of political opposition […] something that we cannot find in the totalitarian regimes of Spain and Portugal." Moreover, De Lima underlined another crucial disadvantage. In his opinion, if Spain and Portugal were admitted to the 'Latin American group', Brazil would probably lose some influence over its regional partners. Spain, he believed, would probably make some attempt at "guidance of its ex-colonies", while Portugal might also attempt to have a dominant voice (even if De Lima judged the Portuguese regime to be a "dictatorship endowed with a reasonable inferiority complex"). De Lima also considered the issue of colonialism to be a substantial disadvantage, since the Portuguese position regarding the issue of decolonization was "diametrically opposed" to that of the Latin American countries.

De Lima's report thus recommended keeping both Portugal and Spain in a separate group. The inclusion of Portugal in the 'Latin American group' would serve to alienate Brazil even further from the Hispanic states, and consequently to diminish Rio de Janeiro's political and diplomatic influence over them. To avoid such problems, De Lima suggested maintaining both at a different level: the "special alliance" with Portugal, for instance, ought to be regarded as an additional "string in the bow," rather than being "wasted" within a 'Latin American group'. According to De Lima's analysis, maintaining strong and privileged relations with nations outside of the region would provide more "elasticity" to Brazilian foreign policy, particularly regarding its prestige and effectiveness. "If Brazil wants to become a world power," he reasoned, "subordination to a regional group is probably counterproductive." To

[22] MRE O [C], December 14, 1955, AHMRE.

the dismay of Freitas Valle, the Itamaraty adopted these guidelines, and instructed him to avoid further demarches related to this topic.[23]

Such reactions, hopes, and apprehensions apart, Portugal became a member of the UN, and soon began to take advantage of these new conditions. Immediately after its admission, Lisbon submitted an official complaint against India at the International Court of Justice (The Hague), accusing the Indian government of disrespecting international law, particularly by obstructing the passage of Portuguese military personnel, who had been dispatched to re-establish order and sovereignty in the occupied enclaves of Dadrá and Nagar-Haveli. Despite its diplomatic endeavors, Lisbon lamented, New Delhi had repeatedly refused to allow the Portuguese authorities to cross its territory. Such complaints, nevertheless, had even more important objectives than that of re-establishing Portuguese sovereignty in the two small enclaves. First, they aimed to cause India some international embarrassment; second, they sought to provoke a decision that would imply official recognition of the legitimacy of Portugal's presence in the Indian subcontinent. However, despite such early attempts to take advantage of its new membership, and to use the legal mechanisms at its disposal, Portugal would soon face the challenges of belonging to the UN.

The Inevitable Clash

At the end of 1956, the UN plenary was dominated by two major international events. The first was the crisis initiated by the invasion of Nasser's Egypt by Israel, supported by British and French forces. On October 29, the Israeli army crossed into Sinai, and British and French planes attacked Egyptian airfields, in order to gain control over Suez, which they considered crucial to their imperial positions and status in the Middle East. The second event, which occurred only a few days later, on November 4, was the occupation of independent Hungary by Soviet forces, thus putting an end to an uprising against one-party communist rule. The moderate socialist leader of the government, Imre Nagy, had announced free elections, freedom of the press, the release of political prisoners, and his intention to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact. After a series of events, which included mass protests by university students, workers, and urban residents, Khrushchev ordered the mobilization of five-thousand Soviet tanks, in order to suppress the riots, which eventually resulted in the death of about 32,000 people, and the exile of 200,000 Hungarians. However, if the Soviet intervention had exposed the fractures within the Socialist camp, as well as the ruthless repressiveness of Moscow, the Suez crisis had demonstrated that the Western colonial powers could no longer simply act at will: the US,

[23] MRE O [C], December 14, 1955, AHMRE.

the Soviet Union, and the UN called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal, and, after political and economic pressure by Washington, the British withdrew, followed by the French and the Israelis. The US response regarding Suez signaled that European colonial power in the region had already evaporated, and that Cold War priorities now prevailed.

It was in this atmosphere that the Portuguese delegation was preparing its first participation in the UN General Assembly. The Necessidades and Vasco Garin[24] were convinced that their opponents would inquire about Portugal's position regarding article 73 of the Charter.[25] Although rather ambiguous, and thus regarded as a mechanism to protect colonial administrations from foreign interference, article 73 was continuously employed by anti-colonial delegations, in order to interfere in the imperial affairs of those who had admitted owning colonies. Bearing this in mind, the Portuguese government had decided to reply negatively to the Secretary General's question.[26] Although they believed that any reply would lead to an "inevitable clash" between Portugal and the noncolonial states, the Portuguese authorities wanted to be consistent with their policy of a 'single and indivisible' state, and to make clear to the international community that they would not allow any foreign interference in its empire.[27]

Portuguese suspicions proved to be right. At the first meeting of the Fourth Committee, referred to as the 'Special Political and Decolonization Committee', the Iraqi delegate immediately insisted on access to the new members' statements regarding article 73. Bearing in mind that Portugal and Spain were the only colonial powers among the newly admitted members, there were few doubts as to whom this referred. "Such an initiative, as well as some information gleaned from friendly delegations," Garin stated, "leave no doubt that our statement is going to be discussed and attacked." The Portuguese delegate also had reason to believe that the Fourth Committee could present a resolution unfavorable to Portuguese interests. "Our line of action must be outlined," the delegate emphasized, "but, in the meantime, it would be wise to give all sorts of information to our diplomatic representatives in

[24] Vasco Vieira Garin, former ambassador to New Delhi, was appointed delegate to the UN.
[25] Included in chapter XI, entitled 'Declaration regarding non-self-governing territories,' article 73 established that each single U.N. member had to "transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible."
[26] Namely: "The Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations, with reference to note TR 320, addressed on 24 February by the Secretary General of the United Nations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, is pleased to announce that Portugal does not administer territories under the category indicated in the article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations." See MNE to DPONU, T 83, October 1, 1956, AHDMNE.
[27] MNE to Delegação Portuguesa às Nações Unidas [Delegation of Portugal to the UN] (henceforth, DPONU), T 54, October 1, 1956; DPONU to MNE, T [C] 106, October 3, 1956; MNE to DPONU, T 83, November 2, 1956; DPONU to MNE, T 176, November 13, 1956, AHDMNE. On the 'imperial' nature of the United Nations, see, for instance, Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace. The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 16-18

countries that hold a seat at the UN, especially in the region of South America, in order to prepare [our] future demarches."[28]

Following Garin's suggestions, the Necessidades immediately approached several nations. Besides the most obvious, such as Great Britain and France, Portuguese diplomats focused their attention on those Latin American states that had given "public testimonies of goodwill" during the crises of 1954-1955. Although some were considered to be intrinsically anti-colonial, the Necessidades believed that such contact would "at least prevent hostilities" against Portugal in New York. It was surely easier, they reasoned, to convince a government to issue a statement, summon an ambassador, or order a demarche, than it was to request a vote at the UN. However, the immediate objective was to contact these governments and to appraise them of the situation, in order to ensure some comprehension (and thus, diplomatic support) in the near future.[29]

However, there was a shortage of Portuguese diplomatic representatives across Latin America, and especially in Central America. Faria had already warned of this problem, and of the importance of having a solid presence in the region. And, once more, he returned to the issue. "With two or three thousand dollars per month," Faria emphasized, "we could count on at least six more votes in the United Nations." As noted earlier, Portugal did not have ambassadors or even a *chargé d'affaires* in several major Latin American capitals, such as Montevideo, Lima, Bogotá, Asunción, and Quito. In the end, a lack of personnel and budgetary constraints probably prevented such an expansion. And, without diplomatic connections with these countries, the task of establishing contacts would fall mainly on Faria and his embassy. Nevertheless, he had serious doubts about the utility of such demarches, "even if the Central and South American ambassadors [in Brazil] did agree to telegraph their governments in our favor." In his opinion, "with only a few exceptions, the majority of the [Latin American] diplomats [in Brazil] are politicians, who have been deliberately posted far away, or the friends of presidents, whose influence towards their governments is insufficient." Sending demarches delegation-by-delegation at the UN, according to him, "would certainly be more effective."[30]

Simultaneously, Faria sought to inform the Itamaraty, and to request a declaration of support for Portugal. He evoked the Portuguese Constitution, recalled the fact that Portugal did not make distinctions between metropolitan provinces and overseas provinces, reiterated that the UN could not interfere in domestic affairs, and underlined the fact that previous statements on article 73 by other UN members had not been challenged. The new Secretary-General of the Itamaraty, Henrique Sousa

[28] DPONU to MNE, T 183, November 21, 1956, AHDMNE.
[29] MNE to EPRJ, T [C] 175, November 24, 1956, AHDMNE.
[30] EPRJ to MNE, T 192, November 26, 1956, AHDMNE.

Gomes, acknowledged the Portuguese position, guaranteed Brazil's support for the Portuguese statement, and promised to sound out other Latin American delegates. Less than a week later, the Brazilian delegation received instructions to support the Portuguese declaration on article 73, on the grounds that the UN had accepted previous statements without any comments or discussion.[31] In New York, Garin seized the opportunity to organize a meeting (called by Brazil's delegation) with the Latin American group.[32] Meanwhile, meetings with Latin American representatives in Rio de Janeiro eventually proved fruitful. According to Faria, he registered encouraging reactions towards Lisbon's position on article 73, "even if they will surely take some time to make contacts with their respective government."[33]

As predicted, in January 1957, the clash between Portugal and the anti-colonial delegations in the Fourth Committee occurred. Adnan Pachachi, the delegate of Iraq, raised the problem of the Portuguese statement on article 73. According to Pachachi, who was supported by other delegates, all the principles of the Charter were mandatory, and Portugal ought to comply with all of them, without exception. By refusing to transmit information regarding its colonies, he claimed, Portugal was infringing the Charter. The Iraqi delegate accepted and recognized the existence of Portuguese sovereignty and unity, which he did not seek to dispute. However, Baghdad believed that it was Portuguese law itself that recognized the existence of a large population in Angola, in Mozambique, and in Portuguese Guinea, still considered to be 'indigenous', or – in other words – without the rights of citizenship. For this reason, Lisbon was obliged to inform the UN and the international community of the way in which it exerted its rule, to provide all the information requested, and to wait for the organization to evaluate this information. In order to comply with this request, the Iraqi delegation argued that it would be necessary to appoint a special commission to examine the Portuguese reply. This modest, but well-informed statement, and the subsequent request, thus outlined a juridical strategy to defeat or to weaken the Portuguese position in the international organization. Without entering into specifics, the anti-colonial delegations were criticizing Portuguese colonial policy as a whole, and identifying its juridical contradictions.[34]

The Portuguese delegate to the committee, Alberto Franco Nogueira, replied in the same spirit. According to his statement, Portugal recognized that all the principles of the UN were mandatory, and it was not the Portuguese intention to ignore them. However, he recalled that if article 73 was, in fact,

[31] EPRJ to MNE, T 194, November 30, 1956; EPRJ to MNE, T 195, December 8, 1956, AHDMNE; MRE to DELBRAONU, T 184, December 7, 1956, AHPI.
[32] DPONU to MNE, T 12, January 11, 1957; MNE to EPRJ, T 11, January 17, 1957; AHDMNE, DELBRAONU to MRE, T 42, January 16, 1957, AHPI.
[33] EPRJ to MNE, T 196, December 11, 1956, AHDMNE.
[34] Nogueira, *Salazar,* 423.

a declaration regarding 'non-self-governing' territories, Portugal had already complied with its obligations, simply by declaring that it had no such territories. The delegate recalled that in the past, the General Assembly had "never examined, discussed, or contested any statement" on this issue. Portugal, he emphasized, considered such treatment a "discriminatory measure" against a nation that did not in fact have territories with a different international status. The Portuguese delegation, moreover, believed that the UN would have to discuss all the Constitutions. Otherwise, the organization would be infringing articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, which established the equality of all members, as well as article 7, which forbid the interference of the UN in internal affairs. Moreover, even article 73 stated that all the information provided by states was subject to constitutional limitations. For these basic juridical reasons, the Portuguese government believed that it was under no obligation to provide any information to the UN, or to any other international organization or agency.[35]

Such a reply (and such an uncompromising position) came, according to Franco Nogueira, as a surprise to the UN. Other colonial powers, such as Great Britain, France, and Belgium, had already declared those of their territories that fell under article 73, and had frequently provided information regarding these to the UN.[36] Indeed, during earlier bilateral meetings with their British counterparts, Portuguese diplomats had been advised to assume a less 'radical' attitude regarding article 73. For their part, British officials believed that Portugal ought to adopt a 'friendly' attitude, supplying some information – particularly on economic, social and educative matters – in order to avoid clashes with the various UN commissions. At the same time, the British officials recommended that Portugal adopt a position of non-committal regarding a possible schedule for independence. In similar meetings with French and Belgian officials, Portugal had been granted full diplomatic support. Nevertheless, even these two colonial powers were occasionally obliged to supply information regarding their colonial territories to the UN. In this regard, their strategy was, insofar as possible, to delay or to deny the requested information.[37]

In accordance with the instructions of the Itamaraty, the Brazilian delegate, Donatello Grieco, decided to intervene in favor of the Portuguese position. He opened his intervention with a laudatory historical allusion. "[Brazil's delegation] is obliged to intervene […]," the delegate cautioned, "because what is at stake is the word of a State that for 300 years was responsible for consolidating the social, cultural, economic, and political progress which led Brazil to achieve its independence." Grieco then referenced Portugal-Brazil history, and particularly the Napoleonic invasions, so as to underline that Portugal had

[35] Nogueira, *Salazar*, 424; 439-442
[36] Nogueira, *Salazar*, 424; 439-442
[37] Alexandre, *Contra,* 599; Oliveira, *Despojos*¸ 196-197.

always considered Brazil an integral part of its territory. Moreover, he also recalled the Portuguese constitution, underlined Portugal's civilizing mission, and proclaimed the admiration of Brazilian people for Portugal. "Our Portuguese ancestry," he stated, "is for us a great national pride." After these flattering remarks, and bearing in mind the Constitution, Grieco informed the commission that Brazil could hardly disagree with the Portuguese statement regarding article 73. He then explained that the General Assembly had never challenged any previous statements, and argued that the admission of Portugal had implied a tacit recognition of the Portuguese constitution. "Any discriminatory attitude towards Portugal," he reminded the Portuguese delegate words, "is an attack on point 1 of Article 2 of the Charter, which stipulates that this organization is founded on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members."[38]

The impact of the Brazilian delegate's strong statement on behalf of Portugal was not lost upon the Indian delegation. Indeed, Rikhi Jaipal confessed his astonishment. "I never heard a more faithful exposition of the Portuguese point of view," he remarked ironically, "than the one made by the Brazilian delegate." Although Jaipal contested Grieco's description of Portuguese India as a province – stating that it was rather a colony, that had been "conquered by force" – the Indian delegation generally adopted a more discreet position during the debates. Indeed, Nehru had informed the Head of the Delegation, Krishna Menon, that he considered it "undesirable" to raise the question of Goa and India during a debate about non-self-governing territories, even if India considered the Portuguese territories in the Indian subcontinent to be a colony rather than a province.[39] Although lacking access to the relevant Indian sources on this matter, one can at least state that this position was consistent with the prudent line followed by Nehru in relation to Goa at the international level. In particular, this aimed to avoid provoking the interference of third parties, so that Goa did not end up becoming another Kashmir.

For his part, Jorge Velando of the Peruvian delegation declared that he supported, unreservedly and without qualification, the Portuguese position as articulated by the Brazilian delegation. "As a former diplomat in Lisbon, I can affirm that the facts conveyed to the public by the illustrious Brazilian delegate are entirely true." The American and Belgian representatives echoed this statement, although in a more restrained manner. In Lisbon, the speech of the Brazilian delegate was enthusiastically received and widely circulated by the press. "Grieco's words are inestimable, particularly towards the Latin American republics," Paulo Cunha stated.[40]

[38] DELBRAONU to MRE, O 155, January 31, 1957, AHPI.
[39] "Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon," January 23, 1957, Mushirul Hasan (ed), *SWJN,* Second Series, Volume Thirty Six, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 418.
[40] DPONU to MNE, T 48, January 30, 1957, AHDMNE; *Diário de Lisboa* [Lisbon, Portugal], January 31, 1957, 1-2.

Although such reactions provided some cause for optimism among the Portuguese delegation, the anti-colonial nations were not willing to surrender. As noted earlier, the latter had been employing article 73 to slowly but surely erode European colonial stance. Even if they did not reach their objective immediately, negative media coverage of a colonial power at the UN could ultimately yield results. Algeria's struggle for independence, for instance, would be a good example.[41] Despite some doubts about its probable success, Ceylon, Greece, Nepal, Liberia, and Syria presented an improved resolution, which proposed, in essence, the creation of an *ad hoc* committee to study the application of Chapter XI, and particularly to analyze the declarations submitted by the recently admitted states. This committee, they proposed, should then prepare a full report with recommendations, taking into account the previous explanations given to the UN by these states. Such a resolution, the five delegations emphasized, would be a way of avoiding any complications or doubts in the near future. Although not directly mentioned, Portugal was undoubtedly one of the targets (if not the primary inspiration) of this resolution.[42]

Predicting such an outcome, the Necessidades had already begun to lobby governments and delegations in order to head off their possible approval. Besides Cunha in Lisbon and Garin in New York, Faria had undertaken intense diplomatic activity in Rio de Janeiro: in less than one week, he had managed to contact representatives from Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Guatemala. Rather than a mere positive vote, the Portuguese government was interested in securing a solid Latin American position for the future. However, there was a fear that a split within the Latin American group regarding Portugal could encourage the Afro-Asian delegations to exploit such divisions, especially if their proposal was approved at the Fourth Committee. Eventually, the Itamaraty also issued instructions to support the Portuguese delegation in their contacts with other Latin American representatives. However, this was an overly optimistic attitude: countries such as Mexico, for instance, adopted irreducible positions in favor of the anti-colonial cause, while others remained undecided.[43]

On February 5, the resolution was approved at the Fourth Committee by a majority of two votes. Among those who contributed to this outcome were several Latin American states: Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay. For their part, Argentina and Venezuela abstained. According to Garin and Franco Nogueira, the reasons for this outcome were complex. First,

[41] See Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution. Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), namely parts II and III.
[42] DPONU to MNE, T 45, January 30, 1957; DPONU to MNE, T 48, January 30, 1957; DPONU to MNE, T 64, February 4, 1957, AHDMNE; DELBRAONU to MRE, CT 133, January 30, 1957; DELBRAONU to MRE, CT 142, February 1, 1957; AMRE. Spain too had denied having non-self-territories.
[43] MNE to EPRJ, T 11, January 17, 1957, AHDMNE.

this was not a matter related solely to article 73: many Latin American delegations feared that they could be accused of inconsistency, especially because of their attitude to the Algerian issue, while others wanted to demonstrate their solidarity with their neighbors. Others had not received clear instructions from their governments, or, having done so, simply opted not to follow them. "We cannot trust in the majority of the Central American representatives," Garin cautioned the Necessidades. "There is always a risk of delegation chiefs not following the instructions of their governments, or of [individual] delegates not following the instructions of their delegation chiefs."

However, Portuguese diplomats had another trick up their sleeve. Although not considered 'important' by the UN, the Necessidades wished to convince the General Assembly that any decision on article 73 was in fact highly important to member states. This strategy had two main objectives. First, if the General Assembly recognized the matter as 'important', two-thirds of the votes would be needed to approve any resolution. Since the Assembly was still fairly evenly divided, this would serve to drastically reduce the chances of an 'anti-Portuguese' resolution. Second, it would also provide an opportunity for some undecided and reluctant delegations to come to Portugal's aid, but without abandoning their anti-colonial principles. In particular, such delegations could vote in favor of the two-thirds rule, thus relieving the pressure on Portugal, but, at the final vote, could still support a resolution against Portuguese colonial interests (safe in the knowledge that this would not pass).[44]

Bearing in mind this strategy, the Portuguese representatives reassumed their diplomatic activity immediately after the voting session. The Necessidades instructed its ambassadors and delegates to insist on the previous interpretation, but, most importantly, to raise as quickly as possible the two-thirds maneuver. "It is important," the Necessidades declared, "that they support us in the two-thirds rule, regardless of their position in the final voting session." "Except for Mexico, which was responsible for a resolution, approved in 1953, that stipulated that all matters relating to article 73 should be approved by a simple majority."

António de Faria once again made contact with the Itamaraty. At this point, he reasoned, it was important to redouble his demarches towards the Latin American states, particularly those that were still considered to be 'recoverable.' To a meeting with the Political Director, Faria brought a short list of Latin American countries, which also contained brief instructions for each one: for instance, Argentina should be pressured to vote against the resolution, while Uruguay should be urged to abstain. In cooperation with Brazilian diplomats, Faria studied the best and most suitable approach to each state or delegation. Although the Itamaraty considered some demarches to be pointless, most of

[44] Nogueira, *Salazar*, 441-442.

the requested overtures were made by Brazilian representatives without protest. In New York, the Brazilian delegation sought to conquer votes *in extremis* for the Portuguese delegation, especially in support for the two-thirds rule.

Everything suggests that India, along with other anti-colonial delegations, did not expect this kind of procedural maneuver. Or at least, they were unable to counteract it effectively. Bearing in mind that the General Assembly still hung to the West, and that many Latin Americans were sympathetic to Portugal and Brazil's argument, the UN plenary approved by a simple majority the two-thirds rule, as proposed by the Portuguese delegation. Among 38 favorable votes, there were ten Latin American nations (four more abstained, and only three voted against). After six hours of debate, the main resolution, as proposed by the group of five at the Fourth Committee, was rejected, with 35 in favor, 35 against, and five abstentions.[45]

In many respects, this first clash between Portugal and the anti-colonial nations was an unquestionable victory for the former. Portuguese leaders could take encouragement from the success of their overseas' policy, the impressive achievements of Portuguese diplomats, the untiring support of the Brazilian government, and, to a certain extent, the support provided by the rest of the Western world. As Portuguese leaders correctly perceived, Lisbon was indeed in a position to inflict a defeat upon the anti-colonial movement. However, some days later, the US ambassador, Philip Bonsal, while congratulating Garin, added a friendly warning. "Prepare yourself for the future; your enemies will definitely strike back," he underlined. "I believe you should immediately start thinking about organizing 'things' in your territories in order to discard the factual arguments […] that they have against you." In a lengthy report sent to Lisbon, Garin partially replicated the words of Bonsal. He cautioned his superiors about the "future attacks" that would certainly be "more violent", and stressed that certain countries could easily change their position towards Portugal. Furthermore, Garin emphasized that the future admission of new members to the UN – from Africa and Asia – would also mean new opponents. In Lisbon, however, such warnings had little effect. For the time being, it was considered a straightforward Portuguese victory.[46]

[45] DPONU to MNE, T [U] 126, February 20, 1957; DPONU to MNE, T [no number], February 20, 1957, AHDMNE.
[46] DPONU to MNE, A 19, February 28, 1957, AHDMNE.

Brazil shifts its Position?

On the surface, the relationship between Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro had never been better. Despite the internationalization of the Portuguese colonial issue through the UN, Brazil had stood in clear support of António de Oliveira Salazar's colonial notions and policies. Indeed, there had been a high degree of continuity and coherence between the foreign policies pursued by Getúlio Vargas and Café Filho, and those of Juscelino Kubitschek – a continuous, unquestioning, and tireless support for Portuguese colonial policy, mainly through diplomatic initiatives, statements, active lobbying, and strategy coordination. Bearing in mind the size, relevance, and conspicuousness of the UN, one can even state that Brazil raised, to a certain extent, the degree of its diplomatic commitment to Portuguese colonialism, expressing at the highest level its pro-Lisbon foreign policy. Certainly, as Kubitschek had announced during his visit to Portugal, in early 1956, the Brazilian government was not only maintaining its solidarity with regard to Portuguese India, but was even increasing it "unconditionally."

Beneath the surface, however, Kubitschek's policies concealed some significant shifts, which had the potential to generate profound consequences for the relationship between Brazil and Portuguese colonialism. Like his predecessors, especially Getúlio Vargas between 1951 and 1954, the new president regarded national development as the central objective of his policies. Kubitschek's government was implementing a plan that promised fifty years of development within a mere five [*50 anos em cinco*]. The so-called *Programa de Metas* [Targets Plan] aimed at several significant investments in strategic sectors of the economy, namely energy, transportation, food, basic industries, and education. Its main objective was to free Brazil from its longstanding agricultural status, from its chronic underdevelopment, and from its deep-rooted pessimism. A major symbol of this will to modernize the country was the beginning of work on a new capital – Brasília. Provided for in the Constitution of the late 19th century, the city was planned from scratch by the Brazilian urban planner Lúcio Costa and the architect Oscar Niemeyer, and aimed to present a new Brazil to the world: modern, rational, and organized.[47] "Brazil has awakened," Kubitschek declared in 1956.[48]

Kubitschek's foreign policy was thus essentially focused on economic development. Besides his tour of major political and economic centers in early 1956, in which he presented his economic plans for Brazil, Kubitschek had focused on attracting foreign and private capital, and had sought to guarantee markets

[47] Bethell, "…under the Liberal," 87-164; Bojunga, *JK*, 511-567 and Skidmore, *Brasil*, 202-225. On Brasília, see, for instance, Juscelino Kubitschek, *Por que construí Brasília,* (Brasília: Senado Federal, 2000); Oscar Niemeyer, *Minha Experiência em Brasília,* (Rio de Janeiro: Revan, 1961). See also Philip Jodidio, *Niemeyer*, (Cologne: Taschen, 2013).

[48] Serviço de Documentação da Presidência da República, "São Bernardo do Campo (SP), 28 de Setembro de 1956. Por ocasião da inauguração da fábrica de caminhões Mercedes-Benz," in *Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira, Disursos proferidos no primeiro ano do mandato presidencial, 1956* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1958), 267

for Brazilian exports, primarily coffee. However, contrary to his predecessors, Kubitschek was being pressured to cultivate, albeit discreetly and gradually, relations with both Eastern Bloc countries (including the USSR) and nonaligned nations. Although firmly anchored in the West, and particularly in the Inter-American system, Brazilians were becoming increasingly aware that their 'blind alignment' to the US was not paying off as had initially been expected. Politicians and businessmen thus looked to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as a solution to their need for markets, as well as a way to extort concessions from Washington. Intellectuals were also attracted to the Soviet and Communist worlds, as demonstrated by a succession of visits by journalists and writers to the USSR.[49] They were also becoming increasingly aware of the political-diplomatic weight of the Asian nations, and notably India, with its ability to win concessions through a position of non-alignment in the Cold War.

A good example of this increased attention towards the Eastern Bloc and the global South is provided by Ildefonso Falcão, the Brazilian ambassador to India. Appointed late in 1953, Falcão observed how India's policy of non-alignment, and subsequent flirtation with both Moscow and Washington, served to generate both political-diplomatic leverage and economic-technical aid. Although he had consistently criticized India's foreign policy, and particularly that of its figurehead, Nehru – "a bad pupil of Mahatmaji Gandhi" – Falcão recognized that such a policy was ultimately paying dividends. After observing the Indian tycoon B.M. Birla's visits to the US and Europe, where the industrialist encountered a "great interest in helping India," Falcão wrote:

> The Western nations, and specifically the United States, court favors from Nehru's India, just as they would court favors from a sly brunette goddess who refuses to be seduced. And why? Assuming that India leans towards communism, they fear that millions of starving Indians would join the red hosts. Fearful of losing a stronghold [in South Asia], they turn a deaf ear to all the weighty insults that fall upon them, and accept the half-humiliating position that they have here. What is the result? 'They are looking forward to helping us.[50]

[49] See Tobias Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin. Interaction and Exchange between the USSR and Latin American during the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) and Tobias Rupprecht, "Socialist high modernity and global stagnation: a shared history of Brazil and the Soviet Union during the Cold War," *Journal of Global History,* v. 6, I. 3, November 2011, 505-528.

[50] EMBRAND to MRE, O [C] 291, December 28, 1954, AHMRE.

Such missives had touched a raw nerve at the Itamaraty. Despite Rio de Janeiro's 'blind' alignment to the West, and particularly to the US, Brazil was obtaining nothing or little in return. In December 1954, Falcão fumed:

> Brazil, a nation traditionally within the anticommunist group, faithful to the principles of Pan-American solidarity, a tireless worker alongside US delegations, has been relegated to the status of a poor relative that people are ashamed to invite home. We are loyal, we ask with hat in hand, and we receive in exchange, most of the time, mere possibilities. On the other hand, India is unreliable, Machiavellian, audacious, and treacherous, and – in return for such virtues – she receives what she will.[51]

As a means to obtain financial aid from the US, Falcão proposed a strategy that many Brazilian nationalists were already advocating: economic rapprochement with the Soviet Union, reestablishment of relations with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic, and recognition of Communist China. "Subsequently," he emphasized, "we can even play the trump card of reestablishing Soviet-Brazilian relations." Although he considered this approach to be slightly risky, Falcão assured his superiors that Washington's reaction would be instantaneous. "This policy would force Washington to recognize that we exist, and, moreover, that we still are their best friends in the new world." Even if such an approach failed, "Brazilian products would find a market, and many types of machinery would reach the country under more advantageous financial conditions."[52]

Falcão's successor in India, ambassador José Cochrane de Alencar, reiterated such views. Appointed in mid-1956, Alencar soon made laudatory statements regarding Nehru's foreign policy. Although he avoided remarks on the "moral dimension" – clearly bearing in mind the expression that US Secretary of State Foster Dulles had used to define 'neutralism' – he nonetheless believed that Nehru "was right" when he had decided not to join either of the two sides in the Cold War. "Some argue," he reported to the Itamaraty in mid-1957, "that India has not a single friend […]. If, however, the success or failure of a policy is measured by its results, it seems to me […] that [Nehru] appears to have weighed up [his foreign policy decisions] with great sense and wisdom […] taking into account the current position and prestige of his country." According to such an assessment, India's position in the world was currently an enviable one: despite the ambiguous position that had been adopted towards the Hungarian issue,

[51] EMBRAND to MRE, O [C] 291, December 28, 1954, AHMRE.
[52] EMBRAND to MRE, O [C] 291, December 28, 1954, AHMRE.

the diplomatic affront to the US, and even the threats against the international community regarding Kashmir, India had still been able to win concessions from the US. "It was at that exact moment," Alencar informed the Itamaraty, "that the Indian Minister of Finance, Tiruvellore Thattai Krishnamachari, went to the US and raised massive American funds."[53]

Indeed, India was one of those countries in the global South that had attracted Brazil's attention. Already in 1953, when Ildefonso Falcão had been appointed ambassador, his instructions had underlined the need to devote special attention to the Indian development program. According to the Itamaraty, it was of "great importance" for Brazil to learn about Nehru's decisions as well as their results. "[Brazil] has similar problems, and, to solve them, we could learn lessons from the Indian experience," the instructions emphasized.[54] Falcão had thus sent numerous reports regarding economic development (including on the Indian five-year plans), as well as regarding products and markets that competed directly with Brazilian ones, such as Indian coffee.[55]

Nevertheless, Falcão's tenure in New Delhi had coincided with the escalation of tension between Portugal and India over Goa. Besides the incident involving the Brazilian honorary consul, a more difficult phase of relations between Brazil and India emerged in 1955, when Brazil became the protecting power of Portugal. Although he had no detailed instructions, Falcão played the role of an intermediary between the two parties. However, he was apparently treated as a mere apologist for Portuguese colonialism. "After assuming the protection of Portuguese interests, hostility towards Brazil has significantly increased," he reported. "We are now treated […] with the same kind of coldness that had been hitherto reserved for the Portuguese [….] we are considered a kind of continuation and surrogate of Portugal." Despite his best efforts, Falcão felt that India was attempting to hamper his mission: the Indian authorities had delayed for months the recognition of Brazil as protector of Portuguese interests, attempted to block the reopening of the Brazilian consulate in Bombay, obstructed the conduct of field observation missions, refused Portuguese notes delivered by the embassy, and disregarded him personally.[56]

Although no relevant Indian sources are available, everything suggests that the irascible personality of Falcão, combined with the increasing aversion of the Indian authorities, contributed greatly to such misunderstanding. Indeed, Falcão's reports revealed several biased, inappropriate attitudes towards India, which ultimately caused him to lose credibility both in New Delhi and in Rio de Janeiro. In

[53] EMBRAND to MRE, O [R] 256, September 27, 1957, AHI.
[54] MRE to EMBRAND, D [R] 8, November 28, 1953, AHI
[55] EMBRAND to MRE, O 129, 25 July 1954; EMBRAND to MRE, O 130, 26 July 1954; EMBRAND to MRE, O 113, 30 June 1954; EMBRAND to MRE, O 133, 28 July 1954; EMBRAND to MRE, o 164, 10 September 1954; EMBRAND to MRE, O 219, 11 November 1954; EMBRAND to MRE, CT 6, 15 April 1955; AHI.
[56] EMBRAND to MRE, O [C] 333, October 29, 1955, AMRE.

September 1955, for instance, Falcão conducted a very tense discussion with Jawaharlal Nehru on the issue of Goa. According to his report, after what he considered to be another unproductive conversation, Falcão had stood up, and said: "I am sorry, Your Excellency, to come for the second time to your office and to realize the futility of my mission as ambassador of Brazil […] having successfully transmitting the request of my Government, I can only now officially ask my withdraw from our country." Perhaps already exhausted by Falcão, Nehru simply replied, "Do whatever you think is best."[57] The report of the meeting caused a bad impression at the Itamaraty, as did Falcão's suggestion of closing the embassy. He would remain in office for a few more months, but it had become clear that relations between Brazil and India had foundered.

Shortly after Kubitschek took office, the Itamaraty became keen to normalize relations with India. Having appointed the more balanced and pragmatic diplomat José Cochrane de Alencar as ambassador, the Itamaraty's instructions outlined a new approach to India. Indeed, recognizing the growing importance of India in international affairs, as well as that of post-colonial nations more generally, the Brazilian government hoped to shake off the "suspicion of connivance with colonialism" that had haunted the international image and prestige of Brazil. To reverse this distrust not only in India, but also in other countries that had participated in Bandung, the Itamaraty advised Alencar to emphasize the non-European cultural traits of Brazilian society, and the absence of racial prejudice among Brazilians. By adopting such a "courteous" approach towards the Indian authorities, the Itamaraty believed, it would be possible to clarify this issue, and to obtain some immediate political results. Interestingly, the Itamaraty also demonstrated a great deal of interest in following the developments stemming from Bandung, and instructed Alencar to pay "special attention" in this regard. Although neutralism was not an option for Brazil, at least not in 1956 and under Kubitschek, the Itamaraty left the door open to the possibility of sending official observers to any future gathering.[58]

These instructions represented a significant change in the way the Itamaraty perceived India. Until the mid-1950s, the top officials of the Itamaraty had seen India as a problematic, underdeveloped, and unstable new nation, convulsed by internal divisions, border conflicts, and the threat of communism. Thus, they had considered it to be devoid of economic, political, and diplomatic interest, believing that the only real 'asset' to be gained from India was votes in the UN and other international organizations. Such indifference was reflected in the way that the Itamaraty organized its embassy in New Delhi and its consulates around India: these were often considered a 'punishment' for diplomatic troublemakers,

[57] EMBRAND to MRE, O [C] 301, September 29, 1955, AMRE.
[58] MRE, M [C] [DP] 239, 20 July 1956, AHMRE.

not only because of the immense geographical distance, but also due to the climatic, living, housing, and social conditions. Such indifference, moreover, was also reflected in the limited flow of telegrams, letters, and reports between Rio de Janeiro and New Delhi.

Acting on his instructions, the incoming ambassador met Nehru and his Foreign Secretary, Subimal Dutt, in October 1956, in order to present his credentials and gestures of goodwill. After the disastrous tenure of Falcão, such a new beginning could prove to be crucial for Brazil-India relations. Interestingly, Nehru and Dutt behaved with "extreme courtesy," warmly welcoming Alencar, and praising the "friendly relationship" between Brazil and India. Both expressed a desire that the relationship between the two nations would not be harmed by Brazilian support for Portuguese interests in India. Alencar replied in a similarly friendly spirit, referring to the desire of the Brazilian government to strengthen the ties between the two nations, and guaranteeing that he would personally put his "best efforts" into making relations between Brazil and India as "cordial and respectful as possible." [59] Although this meeting was essentially a formal ceremony, it represented a turning point with regard to Brazil-India relations. After a turbulent period, in which Goa had become a sticking point, both governments had shown an interest in resuming a normal diplomatic relationship, and, to a certain extent, in strengthening the very fragile relationship between the two regional powers.

Indeed, the Indian embassy in Rio de Janeiro had reported encouraging information regarding Kubitschek. Besides characterizing him as a "moderate socialist," who was likely to steer a middle way between both right- and left-wing extremists, the embassy had emphasized several "noteworthy" developments in the field of foreign affairs, particularly the tendency to strengthen Brazil's position within international organizations. "[Kubitschek] recently defined Brazil's aims at the U.N.," Ambassador J. Sen-Mandi reported, "[namely] to support the stepping-up of a programme for increased economic aid to under-developed countries and, in colonial questions, bring the divergent blocs together, by mediation and consolidation."[60]

Preparing the Future

The Portuguese President, Craveiro Lopes, received an enthusiastic welcome when he disembarked in Rio de Janeiro in June 1957. According to some Brazilian newspapers, his reception in the capital was one of the "biggest demonstrations" ever recorded, comparable only to the 'welcome home parade'

[59] EMBRAND to MRE, T 168, 5 October 1957, AHMRE.
[60] EIR to MEA, "Political Report for the month of January 1956," (no date), D.773 R&I/56; EI to MEA, "Annual Political Report for the year 1957," F. 3 (13) R&I 58, NAI.

that had been given to the *pracinhas*[61] more than ten years previously.[62] Ambassador António de Faria described the presidential arrival in Rio de Janeiro as "triumphant," with an "immeasurable mass of people" cheering the Portuguese head of state.[63] During the following 15 days, the presidential entourage visited the states of Bahia, Minas Gerais, Paraná, Amazonas, Pará, Ceará, and Pernambuco, and even the construction site for Brasília, the future capital. The visit was not only a way of reciprocating the official visit by Café Filho to Portugal in April 1955, but also a clear affirmation of the friendship and fraternal ties between the two countries. As president Craveiro Lopes proclaimed amid his visit, "only rarely have the policies of rapprochement carried out by the statesmen of two countries found such comprehensive, genuine, and enthusiastic popular support as in the case of Brazil and Portugal." "This is indeed," he went on, "one of the greatest guarantees that the bilateral relations between these two great countries will attain to perfect understanding in the future."[64]

Other more immediate interests, however, had also motivated the presidential visit to Brazil. At the beginning of March, António de Faria had emphasized and praised the "perfect timing" of the visit. According to the Portuguese diplomat, three factors had justified its importance. First, the postponement of the state-visit of Italian president Giovanni Gronchi to Brazil would ensure full priority and full media coverage of Portugal-Brazil relations. Separated only by a couple of weeks, such an Italian visit would have reduced, according to Faria, the prestige and public impact of Craveiro Lopes' visit, especially since it would have been the first since 1922, and the first during the so-called 'Second Republic'. Second, Craveiro Lopes' visit would contribute to reinforcing the political and diplomatic influence of Portugal in Rio de Janeiro. It could help, Faria argued, to counteract the "anti-colonial tendencies, heavily infiltrated by communists, and highly critical of Brazil's support regarding Goa, and other overseas problems more generally." "President Craveiro Lopes," Faria underlined, "will make us less vulnerable to such tendencies." Third, the visit would create a more favorable atmosphere for Portuguese interests if the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru did in fact decide to visit Latin America. Indeed, Ambassador Faria had heard rumors that Nehru was planning a diplomatic tour of the region. "It came to my attention that Mr. Nehru is considering a state visit to Latin America […] for which he has already received a formal invitation from the Argentinian government," Faria warned. "If this visit takes place, it is possible that the ambassador of India [to Brazil] could request a Brazilian invitation [for Nehru]." Although this event was not officially confirmed, Faria warned that Nehru might find a favorable and welcome response to his "policy of

[61] 'Pracinhas' was the 'nickname' given to the 'Força Expedicionária Brasileira,' the Brazilian military force dispatch to Europe during World War II.
[62] *Folha da Manhã* [São Paulo, Brazil], June 9, 1957, 1
[63] EPRJ to MNE, T 204-3, June 8, 1957, AHDMNE.
[64] *Diário de Lisboa* [Lisbon, Portugal], June 9, 1957, 1, 7.

neutrality" in Brazil, "especially among the left-wing politicians and intellectuals, as well as among anti-US political parties and circles."[65]

Indeed, Faria's analysis and fears had some foundation: many were increasingly aware of Nehru's foreign policy. However, such awareness was, to a large extent, still confined to a confined group of politicians and diplomats, whose influence on foreign policymaking was limited or even inexistent. Top diplomatic officials, such as Odette de Carvalho e Sousa, the Head of the Political and Cultural Department and 'number two' in the Itamaraty hierarchy, considered alignment with Portuguese and Western interests as a key, fundamental component of Brazil's foreign policy, which still privileged security matters over economic considerations.[66] António de Faria was, in fact, more worried by other non-official actors, in which such an awareness was slowly emerging, and would be more difficult to contain. The press, as well as the Portuguese political opposition in Brazil, were undoubtedly two of the most significant sources of anxiety for the Portuguese ambassador.

Indeed, the Brazilian press had a long tradition of political intervention. Newspapers, in particular, were still a significant instrument of political struggle, sometimes using an aggressive, virulent, and polemical language, profoundly influenced by the passion of great political debates. Brazilian newspapers had been deeply involved in several political crises that had taken place during the period between democratization and the Kubitschek presidency: in 1954, as noted earlier, Carlos Lacerda's *Tribuna de Imprensa* had fueled the political crisis that had led Vargas to commit suicide. During Vargas's presidency, all the major newspapers had been actively involved in the debate around the nationalization of oil. In 1955, the media had played an important role in the events that led to general Teixeira Lott's preemptive coup. The Brazilian press, to a certain extent, was thus a 'major player' in the Brazilian political landscape, able to exert a significant public pressure towards the government, and to influence its decisions [67]

As for Portuguese affairs, the Brazilian newspapers were at this time virtually unanimous in supporting Lisbon's government and colonial policy, particularly with regard to Goa, Daman, and Diu, as well as Brazil's political and diplomatic support for this policy. The major newspapers were always understanding – and some of them even supportive – of Portugal's desire to maintain its colonial empire. With the exception of the newspapers linked to the Communist movement, such as the *Imprensa Popular*, the Portuguese embassy did not detect anything but support for Portugal and its colonial policy, and a corresponding condemnation of Nehru's India. Nevertheless, the admission of

[65] EPRJ to MNE, A [no number], March 14, 1957; EPRJ to MNE, A [C] July 4, 1957.
[66] Gonçalves, *O Realismo*, 176.
[67] Ana Paula Goulart Ribeiro, *A imprensa e a História no Rio de Janeiro nos anos 1950*, (Rio de Janeiro: E-papers, 2007)

Portugal to the UN, and consequent internationalization of Portuguese colonialism, caused some noteworthy changes in this position. On the one hand, some newspapers that had until then been strongly pro-Portuguese became more discreet and impartial, refraining from comment on the issue. On the other hand, others that had until then been discreet, or even outright silent, on Portuguese affairs, began to dedicate some attention to the Portuguese colonialism at the UN, as well as to the Brazilian delegation's behavior.

The *Última Hora*, in particular, was one such newspaper, and had quickly become a significant concern for the press office of the Portuguese embassy. Established in 1951 by the journalist Samuel Wainer, the *Última Hora* was a left-wing newspaper, highly critical of established Brazilian elites. Moreover, it had gained great prominence in the media landscape over the years.[68] Indeed, in less than six years, the Rio de Janeiro-based newspaper had been able to compete with long-established, traditional newspapers, such as the *Diário de Notícias* and the *Jornal do Brasil*. Its tabloid style and modern design had been fundamental in conquering this position, as had been its modern, professional, and 'nationalist' staff. Despite never having been an 'admirer' of the Portuguese regime, the newspaper had never directly criticized Portuguese overseas policy, or made any negative comment regarding Goa. In fact, the Brazilian alignment with Portugal did not feature in editorials and comment pieces. Nevertheless, the *Última Hora*'s journalists had become progressively aware of the negative impact caused by Brazil's alignment with Portuguese colonial interests, especially after the admittance of Lisbon to the UN, and its subsequent participation in the Fourth Committee and General Assembly. In May 1957, for instance, the newspaper had published an extended and very critical editorial on Brazil's alignment with Portugal at the UN. Entitled 'A Strange Attitude,' the editorial was particularly harsh regarding the attitude of the Brazilian delegation to the UN, considering it to be not only surprising, but also contrary to Brazilian interests. "Brazil had a tradition of supporting the self-determination of peoples, and not the decadent colonial spirit," the editorialist wrote. The editorial was particularly harsh regarding the "sentimental statements" made by the Brazilian delegates in relation to the Portuguese colonial issue. "They completely forgot the dangers that a policy of resistance to the nationalist movements represents for a country like us." Such statements, the editorial continued, "imply an aggressive attitude towards these peoples […] [and] implicates Brazil in policies that suffocate their struggles for independence."[69] Although this editorial was primarily a criticism of Kubitschek's government (more than his policy), it also represented an indirect attack on the

[68] See Ribeiro, *A Imprensa*, chapter one. See also the autobiography of Samuel Wainer, owner of the *Última Hora*: Samuel Wainer, *Minha razão de viver: memórias de um repórter* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1988)
[69] "Última Hora [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], March 9, 1957, 3

Portuguese regime and its colonial policy. Indeed, it was a novelty to see a major Brazilian newspaper criticize the Portuguese regime in such a manner.

The Brazilian press, however, was not the only source of concern for Portuguese diplomats. After a period of relative silence, Portuguese exiles in Brazil had begun to show signs of renewed activity. This was mainly due to the arrival of new political exiles from Portugal – mostly intellectuals, but also some military – with certain organizational capabilities, as well as the will to initiate a pro-democracy movement from their Brazilian exile. In 1956, for instance, a small group of Portuguese 'anti-fascists' in São Paulo had established the newspaper *Portugal Democrático*, which was dedicated primarily to denouncing the Portuguese dictatorship not only before the Portuguese *colónia*, but also before the Brazilian people at large.[70] Indeed, the real situation in Portugal was little known abroad: the censorship imposed by the Portuguese authorities ensured that Portuguese realities – and 'colonial realities' – would not become known internationally. Even if limited, such opposition groups sought to publicize some of these realities in Brazil, denouncing the restrictions on freedom imposed by the regime that had ruled Portugal since the 1930s. What was particularly interesting about these groups was their political diversity. Among the main participants there were Portuguese communists, who already had a dedicated 'sector' within the Brazilian Communist Party, and also Republicans, mainly intellectuals, such as the writers Jaime Cortesão, Adolfo Casais Monteiro, and Maria Archer, and the journalist Thomaz Ribeiro Colaço. Although still at a very early stage, this group of political exiles demonstrated that the Portuguese opposition was regaining organizational capacity, which might sooner or later become a source of embarrassment to Portugal. [71]

The Portuguese embassy had recognized the dangers of these groups, fearing that they might use Craveiro Lopes' state-visit to Brazil as an opportunity to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the regime, either by public demonstrations, or by other means. A month before the state visit, two Portuguese were arrested by the Brazilian political police[72] in Rio de Janeiro, on suspicion of plotting against Craveiro Lopes. The two men were identified as former military, who had previously been tried in Portugal for an alleged communist campaign within the Armed Forces. Investigations, however, proved that the two suspects had sought only to hand out tracts calling for amnesty for political prisoners, and for free elections. Nevertheless, the Brazilian police informed them that any attempt to

[70] Douglas Mansur da Silva, *A oposição ao Estado Novo no exílio brasileiro, 1956-1974* (Lisboa: Instituto de Ciências Sociais, 2006), 31-37.

[71] See, for instance, Heloísa Paulo, "O Republicanismo e a Oposição exilada combates e crises," in *Revista Estudos do Século XX,* no. 10 (2010), 423-426 and "Os 'Insubmissos da Colónia': A recusa da imagem official do regime pela oposição no Brasil (1928-45)", in *Penélope 16, 1995*: 9-24.

[72] The 'Polícia Política e Social' or 'Politic and Social Police' was a police force dedicated to controlling political activities in Brazilian territory, this comprising the investigation of social movements, trade unions, and other groups or individuals considered to be 'dangerous' to political stability.

approach Craveiro Lopes would result in "immediate execution." Significantly, this case led the Portuguese government to request the reinforcement of security in Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian authorities reassured them that the president's security would be ensured, but Lisbon did not want to take any risks, and dispatched the Director of the PIDE[73] to develop a detailed plan with his Brazilian counterpart in Rio de Janeiro.

For all these reasons, Oliveira Salazar had been deeply concerned about Craveiro Lopes' visit to Brazil. Rio de Janeiro was a valuable asset, as recognized by Portuguese diplomats. However, they were also aware that the relationship between Portugal and Brazil was, to a certain extent, highly unstable. In one of the many cables exchanged between António de Faria and the Necessidades during the preparations for Craveiro Lopes' visit, the Portuguese ambassador had emphasized that any mishap could place Lisbon in a complex, embarrassing, and difficult situation. "Brazilians are particularly susceptible about the Portuguese, quickly passing from one extreme to another. Our interest is to keep them in a good spirit," Faria observed.[74] This awareness had led the President of the Council to become personally involved in the preparation of the visit, discussing with Faria and Cunha every single step of the official tour, as well as the pre-emptive public and private actions taken in order to avoid any unnecessary risks.[75]

One such initiative was a significant investment in 'public relations.' The Portuguese embassy sought to contact all the major national newspapers, as well as the regional ones, in order to guarantee the greatest and most beneficial coverage of the presidential tour. A flood of information, biographies, pictures, and pamphlets were sent to Rio de Janeiro, and subsequently distributed among the press. Additionally, the embassy sought to 'facilitate' contact between the Brazilian press and the Portuguese authorities. Although adverse to interviews, Oliveira Salazar, as well as Craveiro Lopes, granted several to newspapers and journalists considered 'friendly' towards the Portuguese regime and its colonial policy.[76] The *Globo*, in particular, was one of the newspapers which benefited from such access. On the eve of Craveiro Lopes' arrival in Brazil, the newspaper published an exclusive interview with the Portuguese president, which included an extensive and sympathetic survey of Portuguese-Brazilian bilateral relations.[77]

Another important overture was made towards the Portuguese *colónia* in Brazil. Traditionally 'faithful' towards the Portuguese regime, this was considered by Lisbon to be fundamental to the success of

[73] 'Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado' or 'International and State Defense Police' was the Portuguese security service agency of the regime.
[74] EPRJ to MNE, T [C] 123, April 20, 1957 AHDMNE.
[75] Nogueira, *Salazar,* 455-457.
[76] EPRJ to MNE, T [U] 128, May 14, 1957, AHMNE.
[77] *O Globo, Suplemento Especial* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], June 7, 1957.

this visit, and notably to discouraging hypothetical 'anti-fascist' demonstrations organized by the political opposition in Brazil. Moreover, it was also a way to demonstrate the size, presence, and extent of this *colónia* in Brazil – an aspect that would not go unnoticed among Brazilian politicians. Indeed, Portuguese Ambassador Faria sought discretely to organize demonstrations of support, as well as receptions by the *colónia*. In one of these preparatory meetings, conducted with one of the leaders of the Portuguese community, he learned that "the *colónia* will comply with any decision [by the embassy] as an indication of the desire of the head of state."[78] Particularly impressive was the emergence of advertisements in the newspapers, paid for by Portuguese immigrant businessmen, saluting and welcoming Craveiro Lopes to Brazil.

Irrespective of such concerns and apprehension, Craveiro Lopes' 15-day visit to Brazil was an undeniable success, notably for the image of the Portuguese regime. It was also an opportunity to strengthen the Portuguese position in Brazil. Among many other issues, Portuguese diplomats were particularly interested in concluding the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation. Although signed in 1953, the treaty was still virtually inoperable: legislative and administrative measures were needed both in Portugal and Brazil in order to make the treaty truly useful for Portuguese interests. With the results of the studies presented by both Portuguese and Brazilian diplomats now available, it was crucial to follow up the matter. Portuguese diplomats took advantage of the presence of Cunha in Brazil, as well as of the beneficial atmosphere around the state visit, in order to pressure the Itamaraty regarding this fundamental objective. Indeed, both Portuguese and Brazilian diplomats agreed to constitute a joint commission, in order to propose concrete measures for implementing the treaty. At the end of visit, both presidents signed a joint statement authorizing the establishment of a commission to "study and analyze the studies of the two national commissions, with the aim of applying the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation." The declaration also stated that it was the objective of this commission to stimulate a more "intimate and productive" collaboration between the two nations on foreign policymaking, "further tightening the ties that united them, as well as their solidarity within the wide world of the Portuguese language." As stated by Portuguese diplomats, Portugal and Brazil were finally assuming a common "position in world politics, holding each other's hands."[79]

Portugal also came up with the idea of conducting preliminary UN meetings, in order to exchange views on major issues, and to promote necessary adjustments in matters of common interest. This kind of high-level meeting was, to a certain extent, already quite common with Portugal's other

[78] EPRJ to MNE, T [C], May 23, 1957, AHDMNE.
[79] José Calvet de Magalhães, *Relance Histórico das Relações Diplomáticas Luso-Brasileiras* (Lisboa: Quetzal, 2007).

colonial partners, such as Belgium and Great Britain. However, Portugal wanted to extend such preliminary meetings to its Brazilian partners. Besides being a way to recognize the importance and increased weight of Rio de Janeiro's influence at the UN., Portuguese diplomats wanted to pressure Brazilian diplomats to intervene with other Latin American nations. Through this mechanism, Portuguese diplomats believed, it would be possible to anticipate and request demarches at the highest level, instead of using the standard channels, such as the embassy in Rio de Janeiro and the delegation at the UN. In exchange, Portugal would directly provide some information about its positions and strategies, as well as some sensitive information regarding its closest partners, be they colonial partners (France, Belgium) or strategic partners (the United States, other NATO members). Receptive to this suggestion, the Itamaraty even proposed to initiate these preliminary meetings in September, in order to prepare the strategy for the next General Assembly.

Portugal also used this visit to officially propose the creation of a so-called 'Day of the Portuguese-Brazilian Community.' Although the treaty that had created the 'Portuguese-Brazilian Community' was still virtually inoperable, Portugal thought that such a holiday would serve to promote the special relationship between the two countries. Nevertheless, the main objective was to underline the differences between the two countries and the rest of the Hispanic world. Indeed, Portuguese leaders were always worried about Spanish political and diplomatic influence in Brazil. They knew, for instance, that the signature of the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation had created great discomfort within the Spanish government, since Franco had desired a sort of 'Iberian-American International Community', which would function as an international bloc for all Hispanic-Portuguese nations. However, more importantly, they were also keenly aware of Spain's diplomatic activity among Brazilian intellectuals, through state-decorations, sponsored trips, and cultural invitations, and also through the activity of the Brazilian Institute of Hispanic Culture. Indeed, during António de Faria's term as ambassador, there had been numerous cables drawing attention to Madrid's diplomatic offensive. In 1956, for instance, the Portuguese ambassador had emphasized that Brazil was "one of the countries in which [Spanish] political seduction and involvement was strongest."[80]

The idea of such a holiday dedicated to the Community, initially proposed by the Portuguese *chargé d'affaires* in Bangkok in 1956, was presented to the Itamaraty. However, Portuguese diplomats soon realized that the Brazilians were particularly apprehensive about the idea of celebrating the holiday on June 10 (the Day of Portugal and the Race). Indeed, a telegram sent by the Brazilian embassy to Lisbon recalled that despite being a "beau geste" by the Portuguese government, this day was already considered the day of the "race." Such an association, in their mind, would not be particularly

[80] EPRI to MNE, T 167, October 4, 1956, AHDMNE.

beneficial for Brazil's image.[81] Nevertheless, after conversations with the Itamaraty, the Portuguese and Brazilians eventually agreed to celebrate this holiday on April 22, the day of Brazil's discovery by the Portuguese navigator Pedro Álvares Cabral.

The careful preparation of Craveiro Lopes' state visit to Brazil demonstrated the importance that Portugal attached to its south Atlantic ally. After all, Brazil had (once again) proved that the transatlantic relationship amounted to more than mere proclamations of friendship: in the UN, the Brazilian delegation had stood out as one of the fiercest defenders of Portugal's colonial doctrines, voting with Portugal, and lobbying for votes among its Latin American counterparts. Moreover, the proclamation of the Brazilian delegate – the words of which were widely reproduced by the Portuguese press (including the purported statement – "he who messes with Portugal, messes with Brazil" ["*tocar em Portugal, é tocar no Brasil"*] – made a valuable addition to this defense: Portugal was being openly defended against its accusers by its former colony, which was itself an anti-colonial nation. Internationally, but also internally, this was a compelling asset to be exploited to the full.

Optimism surely prevailed among the Portuguese authorities, but only to a certain degree: Ambassador Faria did not fail to warn Lisbon that the Brazilians were "particularly susceptible about the Portuguese, quickly passing from one extreme to another", almost implying that the support for Portuguese colonial interests was as instable as the political situation in Brazil. Faria also did not fail to warn that nationalist and anti-colonial sectors of opinion, which were opposed to Brazilian support for Portugal, were becoming more and more active: the fact that Brazil was increasingly 'unconditional' in its solidarity (particularly at the UN) also heightened the visibility of the problem, and thus made it more prone to criticism within Brazil. Furthermore, the fact that Goa was becoming a sticking point in the relations between Brazil and India surely did not go unnoticed within the Itamaraty, which consequently sought to correct the problem through a new approach (and through the appointment of a new ambassador to New Delhi).

For its part, India appears to have adopted a discreet approach. During the debates in the Fourth Committee, in which other anti-colonial delegations had actively challenged Portugal and its position regarding article 73 of the Charter, the Indian delegation had been instructed to refrain from intervening, and the dispute between Portugal and India over Goa, Daman, and Diu was apparently not even mentioned. Indeed, from the outset, the Indian government had sought to avoid any kind of internationalization of the problem, perhaps fearing that it risked being dragged into a process of international mediation, which would not serve its objectives, and which, at the same time, could

[81] EPRJ to MNE, A 86, October 12, 1956, AHMNE.

provoke even more domestic criticism of Nehru's "do-nothing" policy. After all, ten years had elapsed since India had become independent, and Portuguese India still remained an unsolved 'problem'.

Chapter Four |A Warning Signal, 1957-1958

Designing a new Foreign Policy?

In early 1957, while the UN General Assembly was still in course, developments relating to the emerging 'Third World' were finally addressed in the Itamaraty. According to a memorandum prepared by the Political Division, it was now evident that the "Afro-Asian world is no longer the backyard of the West, [since] it is now exerting itself actively and dangerously as one of the [globe's] major political actors." The Conference at Bandung, India's pro-active foreign policy in Indochina, Northern Africa, and Korea, various regional defense pacts, Afro-Asian nationalism, and multiple economic development plans that had the potential to transform Asian economies, were all indicated as signs of the increasing relevance of the newly independent nations in world affairs. "Anything we say about the importance of Asia and Africa in today's world," the author of the memorandum, diplomat Sérgio Corrêa do Lago, wrote, "would not be enough." As for the future, he predicted that these nations, "once indolent and subdued," were likely to grow yet further in importance. "They do not have any lack of raw materials or human resources, and, once they solve their food problems, their onwards march can hardly be halted."[1]

The Itamaraty was, nevertheless, poorly equipped to deal with these newly independent nations. In 1957, Brazil only had embassies in Jakarta, Karachi, and New Delhi (plus an ambassador accredited to Kabul), a legation in Addis Ababa (although the representative was in Beirut), and consulates in cities such as Alexandria, Algiers, Casablanca, Colombo, Dakar, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Tangier.[2] However, most of these presences, especially the consulates (which were mainly vice-consulates and honorary consulates), did not frequently report to the Itamaraty, and/or performed only elementary tasks. "To us, that immense region [referring to Asia and Africa] only exists in newspaper headlines and articles," Lago emphasized in his memo. "For the Itamaraty, with the exception of India, in which our links to Portugal led us to represent its diplomatic interests there, Brazilian missions and consulates from Karachi to Hong Kong are only used to request votes or to deliver invitations." Besides, even the

[1] MRE, Memorandum (henceforth M) Divisão Política (henceforth DPo) [C] 3, January 3, 1957, AMRE.
[2] Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Departamento de Administração, Divisão do Pessoal, *Anuário 1964 a 1966* (Rio de Janeiro: Seção de Publicações da Divisão de Documentação, 1967).

information received – "and many missions send us a fair amount of reports" – could not be properly assessed by the Itamaraty, due to the lack of a policy for Asia and Africa.[3]

This assessment, alongside with others, led the Political Division to debate the outlines of a new policy towards Asia and Africa. Bearing in mind the objective of building a "predominant position" among the Afro-Asian nations, with one eye on Brazil's empowerment at the UN, and another on Asian markets, the Division suggested several initial approaches. Lago proposed a tour of "observation and courtesy" to Asian and African nations, in order to visit local authorities, to hold conferences, and to show movies regarding Brazil. The aim was to create empathy, and to produce reports on political, economic, and trade conditions, that could then be used to define a Brazilian policy towards the two continents. Interestingly, in order to succeed, the diplomat recommended the inclusion of Brazilian citizens of diverse racial origins, namely Asian, Arab, and African. Moreover, given that "Orientals and Africans are sensitive to pomp and certain other honors," the mission ought to be made up of a large number of persons, and State decorations ought to be distributed among Asian and African leaders. "We would open an avenue that might bring us many advantages for a low price," Lago informed. At the same time, he considered it crucial to expand Brazil's diplomatic network throughout Asia and Africa. Establishing diplomatic relations, creating legations and consulates, and negotiating trade agreements, among other measures, would constitute an important step towards a new policy.[4]

The highest echelons of the Itamaraty agreed with the assessments of the Division, especially "in what concerned the importance of the Afro-Asian nations, and the need to study the possibilities of making Brazilian-Afro-Asian relations more useful." However, the Political Department immediately ruled out a 'mission of courtesy and observation' – which would quickly be transformed into a mission of "uselessness" and "leftist propaganda" – and called attention to the fact that "if these regions are no longer the backyards of the West, then they are now a propitious field for 'Soviet imperialism' […] which Brazil ought to fight." The Department, led by the staunch anti-communist Odette de Carvalho e Sousa,[5] concluded that the Itamaraty should first produce preparatory studies – to be complied by the existing embassies – and then act accordingly. In particular, the Department proposed several eventual demarches in order to establish diplomatic relations, and to accredit joint ambassadors in some African and Asian countries, such as Tunisia, Morocco, Thailand, and the Philippines.[6]

[3] MRE, M DPo [C] 3, January 3, 1957, AMRE.
[4] MRE, M DPo [C] 3, January 3, 1957; MRE, M DPo [C] 46, February 6, 1957, AMRE.
[5] On Odette de Carvalho e Sousa, first female ambassador in the Itamaraty, see Guilherme José Roeder Friaça, *Mulheres Diplomatas no Itamaraty (1918-2011). Uma análise de trajetórias, vitórias e desafios* (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2018).
[6] MRE, M DPo [C] 3, January 3, 1957; MRE, M DPo [C] 46, February 6, 1957, AMRE.

This growing importance of the Afro-Asian nations, however, led the Itamaraty to contemplate a redefinition of Brazil's foreign policy concerning the issue of colonialism. The Itamaraty knew via the delegation at the UN that Brazil had been displeasing African and Asian delegations through its somewhat contradictory attitude. On the one hand, Brazil proclaimed the right of self-determination. On the other hand, its delegations openly supported the European colonial powers – even making laudatory statements, such as the one made by Donatello Grieco regarding Portugal during the Fourth Committee.[7] This contradictory attitude was also jeopardizing, according to several UN delegation's reports, Brazil's prestige within the organization, especially as the leader of the Latin American countries, since many 'neighboring delegations' had consistently adopted an anti-colonial position in the UN, such as that of Mexico. Indeed, in February 1957, the Itamaraty acknowledged that Brazil's "traditionally favorable position" regarding the "progressive autonomy of peoples and self-determination" had been "tempered," notably by the desire to avoid the weakening of the "democratic European powers," as well as to contain the expansion of communism. Moreover, it also acknowledged that this position was diminishing its prestige "as the leader of the Latin Americans," and tending to alienate the sympathies of the Afro-Asian delegations, "which we already contradict" due to the Portuguese settlements. Finally, the Department recognized that it was time to redefine Brazil's foreign policy in these matters, and to formulate – according to the highest echelons of the Itamaraty – an "active and coherent" policy that would fulfill Brazilian national interests.[8]

Brazil's delegate to the UN, Cyro de Freitas Valle, who had directed the attention of the Itamaraty to this problem on numerous occasions, reacted with great satisfaction. Still serving in New York, he once again repeated his early assessments, arguing that it was impossible to ignore the increasing political influence of the Afro-Asian countries. "Even if they are acting without a constructive spirit," Freitas Valle telegraphed, "we cannot afford to ignore them." Until the Itamaraty had decided the best policy to be followed, he considered it essential to maintain a strategic, non-interventionist position. At the same time, he suggested that the new policy should be immediately articulated in September, during Brazil's UN inaugural speech.[9]

Five months later, and much to the despair of Freitas Valle, the Itamaraty was still debating the new foreign policy. According to the few documents available, on July 11, the Political Division had been particularly worried about developments with regard to Africa. On the one hand, the Itamaraty's top officials recognized that a series of events could affect Africa, including: India's strategic objectives on

[7] See Wayne Alan Selcher, "The Afro-Asian Dimension of Brazilian Foreign Policy, 1956-1968" (PhD diss., University of Florida, 1970), 240.
[8] MRE to DELBRAONU, T [C] 61, February 14, 1957, AHMRE.
[9] DELBRAONU, T [Confidential/Urgent (henceforth C/U)] 128, February 16, 1957, AMRE.

the east African coast; the persistent and deep penetration of communism into several African nations; the social destabilization created by the 'white nationalism' of states such as the Union of South Africa; and the emergence of black nationalism. On the other hand, the creation of the European Common Market (ECM) would allow African colonies to penetrate not only European markets (through preferential treatment), but also other non-European markets. Before deciding upon Brazil's new foreign policy, the Political Division recommended that the Itamaraty prepare a "basic approach" to political and economic conditions. Particularly, the Political Division underlined the need to understand whether it was desirable or not to attempt to block the integration of African territories into the ECM. If so, emergent and radical African nationalism might be considered beneficial for Brazilian interests.[10]

African coffee, in particular, was the major motive that lay behind so many Brazilian apprehensions. With a cheap workforce, significant investments, and increasing global consumption, the African coffee industry had begun to grow steadily during the previous decades, endangering Brazil's historical dominance of the international coffee markets. During the 1930s, African coffee had had a share of only 7% of world exports; in 1956, this share had increased to 22%. Although normally considered to be of lower quality, the Robusta coffee produced in Africa had begun to be used by the instant coffee industry, and was particularly popular in the US, which accounted for its considerable growth. At the same time, Brazilian Arabic coffee beans had begun to lose their share of the world coffee market. In 1930, Brazil had had an average percentage of 56% of world exports; between 1946 and 1952, this figure was reduced to 52%; by 1956, it was only 44%. This sharp decline was particularly serious and worrying in the context of Brazilian exports, which were still highly dependent on coffee. In 1952, for instance, coffee had represented almost three quarters (73.7%) of Brazilian exports; in 1956 this figure had dropped to (an admittedly still impressive) 69.5%. True, Brazilian industry had registered some rising figures, and had contributed to diminishing the importance of coffee to overall exports. However, the competition of African coffee had also played a role. These changes would certainly have a direct impact on Kubitschek's development program. Indeed, his fifty years in five' plan had considered such exports as an important means to fuel Brazilian industrial growth. The integration of African territories into the ECM would thus reduce even further the Brazilian share of the world coffee market, and consequently reduce Brazilian prospects of industrial development. Indeed, Brazil was not only unable to compete with coffee produced with significantly lower productions costs (i.e., through a cheap workforce), but would also struggle to penetrate a protectionist market.[11]

[10] MRE, M DPo [C] 278, July 11, 1957, AHMRE.
[11] António Delfim Netto, *O problema do café no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas /Ministério da Agricultura, 1979), Gonçalves, *O Realismo*, 202-207.

The Brazilian press had, moreover, already recommended that Brazil adopt a new foreign policy. Addressing similar concerns, the Director of the *Jornal do Commércio*, Francisco San Tiago Dantas, recognized that the newly-independent states, as well as the other independent nations of the African continent, were about to embark upon a course of rapid economic development. Even those territories under the 'softest' colonial dominance, he underlined in an article, were progressing in both economic and cultural spheres. African coffee, but also cocoa produced in these countries, placed Africa in direct competition with Latin America. However, San Tiago Dantas stated that Brazil should not offer any opposition, nor attempt to obstruct the improvement of African living conditions, especially due to Brazil's traditions of international humanitarianism and solidarity. To the contrary, "nothing is more obvious than the need to support the political emancipation, as well as the economic and social progress, of the colonized," he wrote. "These people can only fight the ills of economic underdevelopment (that also affect us) through the exercise of their sovereignty […] it is our duty to support them in their just demands." Such newly-liberated African nations, consequently, should co-operate with Brazil, in order to ensure a fair price for raw materials, thus finally putting an end to the system of unbalanced markets. In San Tiago Dantas' perspective, it would then be necessary to revise Brazil's misguided foreign policy, and particularly the diplomatic support it gave to colonialism. "We have supported some claims of colonized nations, but we have also supported colonial powers," he underlined. Put simply, San Tiago Dantas was thus proposing to transfer Brazil's support from the colonizers directly to the colonized people, not only because of their rights, but also because of Brazilian economic interests, mainly with regard to raw materials.[12]

Although the Itamaraty seemed aware of this, they also recognized that Brazil, as 'part' of the West, could not simply support the uncontrolled decolonization of Asia and Africa. Thus, allegiance to Western allies took precedence over the need to please the Afro-Asian nations, particularly during the debate around the issue of the new foreign policy. Accordingly, in August 1957, the Itamaraty provided some basic guidelines to its delegate at the UN. Here, it stated once again that Brazil had assumed "an apathetic position with regard to the anti-colonial claims of Arab, Asian, and African nations, at the moment the largest group in the UN." However, the Itamaraty would have to maintain a position that took into account the interests of the West, whose strategic assets in the Mediterranean and Orient could not be ignored. In order to establish a policy of *via media*, Brazil should now reinterpret article 2 of the Treaty of San Francisco[13], which would mean the Brazilian delegation voting in favor of the inclusion of items related to colonial issues. "This initial concession," the Itamaraty underlined, "could

[12] *Jornal do Commercio* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], April 9, 1957, 4. See also Gonçalves, *O Realismo*, 213-215.

[13] Reference to Chapter 1, Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the Charter of the U.N. "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter."

place us in a better position to mediate issues between the colonial powers and the Afro-Asian group, [thus] allowing us to make overtures towards the latter." However, it also emphasized that Brazil should not assume any kind of commitment regarding substantial matters, such as Algeria or Cyprus, since these involved "strategic assets and serious Western interests." As for the case of Portuguese India, the Itamaraty did not wish to fundamentally modify its stance, but rather to act more discretely.[14] Interestingly, Brazil's delegate at the UN, Freitas Valle, applauded and approved these initial guidelines. In particular, he was delighted with the idea of maintaining a moderate position regarding Goa, Algeria, New Guinea, and Cyprus. "As your Excellency points out, the delegation should support the inclusion of [colonial] topics on the agenda, but should permit itself to vote in favor of the colonial powers in the Commissions and in the General Assembly, usually without any guarantee of statements."[15] In simple terms, the Itamaraty believed that a small concession, or sympathetic statements, regarding the progressive autonomy and self-determination of peoples would probably please the Afro-Asian nations, and allow Brazil to assume a 'mediating role' between the latter and the colonial powers.

The Portuguese ambassador, Faria, who followed the Itamaraty closely, had received some information about a possible change in Brazil's foreign policy regarding the issue of colonialism. Indeed, on August 9, Faria had had a conversation with Odette de Carvalho e Sousa, in order to discuss some matters related to Portugal-Brazil relations, as well as to confirm the planned meetings on UN affairs between senior Portuguese and Brazilian diplomats. Carvalho e Sousa had confirmed that the Itamaraty was working on a new position "for several reasons," not least to "positively affect" other Latin American delegations. No less importantly, she had assured Faria that Brazil would always "bear in mind" Portuguese interests in this regard. Nevertheless, Carvalho e Sousa was ready and willing to "exchange some impressions" about this and other relevant matters with the Portuguese envoy, who was expected to arrive in September.[16]

Following these initial plans, the Portuguese UN Section Chief, José Manuel Fragoso, flew to Rio. According to his instructions, Fragoso should meet directly with Carvalho e Sousa, in order to present the "plans and prospects" for the next UN General Assembly, to promote "necessary adjustments," and to discuss several matters directly related to Portugal-Brazil relations. Nevertheless, this formal meeting was subordinated to one single objective: namely, to guarantee the Itamaraty's support for Portugal during the next General Assembly, particularly through a campaign of lobbying towards other

[14] MRE to DELBRAONU, T [C] 220, August 27, 1957, AMRE.
[15] DELBRAONU to MRE, T [C] 442, August 29, 1957, AMRE.
[16] EPRJ to MNE, T [C] 244, August 10, 1957, AHDMNE.

Latin American nations. This time, moreover, the Portuguese had already prepared a comprehensive list of requests, country-by-country.[17]

On September 12, during the first meeting, Carvalho e Sousa immediately addressed the issue of a possible statement on "colonialism" and "anti-colonialism." According to her argument, such a statement was needed, because of the public reaction (including within the Itamaraty) to the emotional and exaggerated speech of Donatello Grieco at the Fourth Committee. Although she believed that Grieco had "fulfilled his instructions and respected Brazilian feelings, [Brazil] [could not] completely disregard its anti-colonial traditions." Nevertheless, Fragoso was assured that the instructions to the Brazilian delegation had been drafted with "great skill," in order to avoid any clashes with Portuguese interests, including a paragraph that confirmed the continuance of Brazil's support for Portugal. Acting in such a manner, she believed, Brazil would be in a better position to gather pro-Portugal votes "among Latin American and non-aligned countries."

Although Fragoso was tempted to challenge such a statement, he decided not to. "Brazil's position has definitely been decided at the highest level […] and [they are] unsusceptible to any change in its general outlines," Fragoso wrote in a brief cable to Lisbon. According to him, any attempt to influence the Itamaraty would be counter-productive, since these matters were considered to be internal affairs. In fact, he feared that any counter-proposal might undermine the friendliness and openness in which the conversations had hitherto taken place. Consequently, he believed that it would only be possible to collect the largest possible amount of information about such a statement, in order to expose the Portuguese "certainties and doubts" on its various aspects.[18]

During a second meeting, senior Portuguese and Brazilian diplomats studied the agenda for the next UN General Assembly. With regard to Portuguese colonial matters, Carvalho e Sousa reported that the Itamaraty was preparing a plan to "ensure a safe margin of votes," although she recognized that Brazilian diplomats would only be useful regarding other Latin American delegations. A detailed plan would be submitted to the Portuguese embassy, in order to prepare both UN delegations to oppose a possible Afro-Asian maneuver against Portuguese colonial interests. Despite these signs of good-will, the Portuguese envoy remained dissatisfied. "It is clear that Brazilian support will not be diminished," he emphasized in a telegram sent to Lisbon. "However, I cannot hide my conviction that the Itamaraty is now putting all its emphasis on procedural tactics as the best defense of Portuguese interests at the

[17] MNE to EPRJ, T 247, September 8, 1957, AHDMNE
[18] EPRJ to MNE, T 261, September 12, 1957, AHDMNE; MRE, M DPo [C] 443, September 17, 1957, AHMRE.

UN." "Although this corresponds to a realistic vision, and serves our immediate interests," Fragoso wrote, "such an attitude reflects Brazil's new political orientation with regard to anti-colonialism."[19]

One day later, Fragoso went once more to the Itamaraty, in order to present his farewell salutations. To his delight and surprise, the Political Division's chief, Luis Bastian Pinto, revealed that the Itamaraty had decided not to include any reference to the anti-colonial problem during the inaugural speech. "The instructions to avoid [diplomatic] hostilities towards the anti-colonial delegations were maintained," Fragoso reported in an urgent cable, "but the Itamaraty decided not to announce its new policy." In the words of Luis Bastian Pinto, "Brazil will be consistent in its anti-colonial policy regarding situations characterized as colonial; as for Portugal, however, it will be consistent in the friendship that connects the two countries."[20]

The Second Clash

The UN was now an arena of crucial importance for Portuguese diplomacy. Without significant advances on the ground or ongoing negotiations, the Portuguese authorities recognized that the UN was essential to pursuing their objectives regarding Portuguese India. First and foremost, Portugal had decided to internationally legitimize its 'non-colonial' rule in Asia and Africa, as well as to confirm the incontestable, historical unity of the nation. Through patience, tact, and diplomacy, Lisbon believed, India could eventually be forced to give up its claims on Goa, Daman, and Diu; at a minimum, the confrontation could be dragged out over several years or even decades, without any complications for Portugal. On the other hand, India seemed truly cautious about committing itself to bringing about a UN condemnation of Portuguese colonialism, both in Asia and in Africa: by doing so, it would have to include Portuguese India within the 'overall' problem of colonialism. And, thereby, it risked making the problem too large to become a viable international cause.

However, if decided too, India, along with the other anti-colonial delegations, had a crucial advantage over Portugal. In particular, the Indian delegation was able to choose the place, timing, and even the form of its 'offensive strategy' against Portugal. Indeed, they could take advantage of the numerous committees existing within the UN; advance or delay their actions according to their strategy; shape the character of their proposals; and prepare in advance a diplomatic approach that would ensure the necessary votes. At the same time, the Portuguese delegation was kept in total darkness, without

[19] EPRJ to MNE, T 267, September 16, 1957, AHDMNE; MRE, M DPo [C] 443, September 17, 1957, AMRE.
[20] EPRJ to MNE, T [U] 269, September 16, 1957, AHDMNE.

information that could be used to outline a comprehensive plan of diplomatic defense. Perhaps even more significantly, Lisbon was virtually unable to contact other governments in order to ensure necessary and vital diplomatic support.

As in the previous session, Ambassador Vasco Garin was the Necessidades' man on the ground. Active in New York since mid-August 1956, the head of the Portuguese delegation had been devoting most of his time to searching for information that might shed light on the Indian strategy for the 12th Session of the UN General Assembly. Although predicting renewed trouble with regard to the Portuguese interpretation of article 73, Garin was unable to determine precisely the probable source of these troubles, their nature, and exact timing.[21] During a series of informal meetings held over the following months, the limited information that had been gathered by the Portuguese delegate in New York was everything but clear. Speaking with the UK Representative to the UN Trusteeship, Sir Andrew Cohen, Garin had learned that London was expecting a "diplomatic offensive" against the Portuguese position. However, its probable source was vague. "He is sure that we will be under attack […] [and] told me confidentially that several delegations had asked for information about the Portuguese provinces," Garin informed Lisbon. "[Although] he did not want to identify the delegations involved in these inquiries […] I believe that they belonged to the Iron Curtain."[22] Some weeks later, in a meeting with French delegates, he had learned that Paris was also convinced that Portugal would be targeted by the anti-colonial delegations. "Although it is not possible to determine how and by whom," Garin stated, "the insistent rumors indicate that our problem is going to be raised by some delegations."[23]

Increasingly concerned with these persistent rumors and 'friendly' warnings, Garin urged the Necessidades to immediately initiate a set of demarches towards those countries that might accept and support the Portuguese position in New York.[24] Although lacking accurate, complete information, he believed that it was crucial to carry out these demarches as soon as possible, in order to rectify the imbalance that had been created by the recent admission of several 'hostile' states. "The delegation in New York does not conceal from your Excellency its serious and deep concerns," Garin cautioned Paulo Cunha. "[T]his year, [Portugal] will have to face new enemies: Hungary, certainly Ghana, and also Malaysia."[25] This new imbalance at the UN, which had already been predicted by Garin during the last General Assembly, could jeopardize the possibility of winning a voting session, including that which required a two-thirds majority.

[21] DPONU to MNE, T [no number], August 12, 1957, AHDMNE.
[22] DPONU to MNE, T 266, September 7, 1957, AHDMNE.
[23] DPONU to MNE, T 312, October 3, 1957, AHDMNE.
[24] DPONU to MNE, T 312, October 3, 1957, AHDMNE.
[25] DPONU to MNE, T 315, October 5, 1957, AHDMNE.

The Necessidades worried about the diplomatic problems caused by this 'total darkness.' Paulo Cunha believed, however, that persistent ignorance regarding the anti-colonial strategy would prevent the success of the demarches suggested by Garin. Lacking solid and accurate information, he reasoned, Portuguese diplomats would be unable to court allied, friendly, or neutral governments and delegations, simply because they did not have anything concrete to court for. Although the clock was against the Portuguese, acting without a sufficient basis could be counterproductive for Lisbon. "I am following with great attention your reports," Cunha assured Garin, "[but in these] current circumstances […] it is difficult to carry out any demarches in order to drum up diplomatic support [for the Portuguese cause] […] we need to economize our flow of diplomatic influence." Although apprehensive, Cunha was nevertheless hopeful that Portugal would still have room for maneuver, especially if the Indian delegation or other 'hostile' delegations chose to use the same strategy as employed during the previous session. "We should, first of all, raise our opposition to the idea of discussing a subject that was already discussed and concluded by a voting session […] our efforts and your efforts [in this moment] should thus be directed to this objective," Cunha advised his representative in New York.[26]

Despite his 7-year experience as minister of Foreign Affairs, Paulo Cunha was still somewhat naïve. Or, at the very least, far too optimistic and confident. Removed from the frenetic and unpredictable atmosphere of the UN, as well as unable to grasp the determination and strength of the anti-colonial movement, Cunha was incapable of advising or instructing the diplomats in New York, who were in fact far better informed than him. Believing that the anti-colonial nations would not renew the offensive, he was both ill-informed and insufficiently cautious. Indeed, sometimes he and his closest advisers at the Necessidades seemed to be entirely divorced from reality. A few days after a casual encounter with the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mahmoud Fawzi, for example, the Necessidades believed that it would be possible to obtain a position of abstention from the government of Gamal Abdel Nasser.[27] In stark contrast, Vasco Garin and his younger delegation were able to interpret more accurately the events on the ground, and to present a more realistic appraisal of the situation. As seen before, Garin had already predicted that this session would pose additional challenges to Portugal, particularly if the government did not change its attitude towards the organization, as well as its approach to administration in its African empire.

[26] MRE to DPONU, T 277, October 8, 1957, AHDMNE.

[27] Fawzi had apparently made some 'moderate' comments regarding Goa during a brief in Lisbon. This was enough to 'convince' the Necessidades that Egypt (protecting power of India in Lisbon) could be 'converted' to a position of abstention. MNE to DPONU, T, October 10, 1957, AHDMNE.

Despite Cunha's hesitations, Garin had already decided to unilaterally initiate some informal contacts with the head of the Brazilian Delegation, Oswaldo Aranha. Bearing in mind the relative success of the talks between the Necessidades and the Itamaraty during the previous months in Rio de Janeiro, he delivered to Aranha a complete list of Latin American delegations, as well as the main objectives required for each of them. Garin's request for such demarches was well received by the Brazilian delegate. For his part, Aranha was convinced that his influence over the Latin American delegations would be sufficient to guarantee the expected results. As for the delegations that might appear more difficult, the Brazilian delegate promised that he would immediately telegraph the Itamaraty headquarters in Rio de Janeiro with a personal request.[28]

However, Aranha's encouragement and confidence were tempered with some warnings. According to him, the Brazilian delegation would without doubt have to adopt a more discreet approach to Portuguese colonial affairs at the UN. Donatello Grieco's exuberant statements at the previous Fourth Committee, he recalled, had provoked some adverse reactions in Rio de Janeiro, and consequently could not be repeated. However, Aranha went yet further in his comments. He also cautioned Garin that the most significant obstacle for his 'pro-Portuguese demarches' in New York was Portugal's policy in Africa. "From conversations [with other Latin American delegations]," Garin telegraphed Lisbon, "[it seems that] the most substantial problem for our defense is the limited number of assimilated [citizens] in our two largest provinces in Africa [Angola and Mozambique]." "In Aranha's opinion," he added, "we should make efforts to fix the situation as soon as possible, in order to safeguard our future [in Africa]."[29]

Indeed, this was hardly a novelty. Not only Vasco Garin, but also the Necessidades, were aware that certain aspects of the Portuguese colonial administration in Africa, namely the attribution of citizenship rights to the so-called 'indigenous,' tended to be exploited by the anti-colonial delegations at the UN in order to criticize Lisbon. As has already been seen, during the Fourth Committee of the previous General Assembly, the Iraqi delegate, Adnan Pachachi, had employed this particular argument to support his case against the Portuguese interpretation of article 73. Even the US delegate to the UN, Philip Bonsal, had called attention to the need to improve the overseas colonial administration, in order to neutralize the 'factual arguments' that could be used by the anti-colonial movement against the Portuguese. Although aware of such difficulties, Lisbon was still reluctant to modify the old-fashioned and openly racist Native Statute, which had been promulgated in the 1930s, and slightly revised in 1954. This Statute prevented the overwhelming majority of the African

[28] DPONU to MNE, T 319, October 7, 1957, AHDMNE.
[29] DPONU to MNE, T 319, October 7, 1957, AHDMNE.

population under Portuguese rule from obtaining citizenship, by requiring the fulfillment of five preconditions. First, to be of legal age; second, to speak Portuguese correctly; third, to have a professional occupation or economic means sufficient to ensure financial independence; fourth, to have a record of good moral conduct and habits; and fifth, to have no ongoing issues with the Military (e.g. regarding conscription). Only those who could fulfill these preconditions could request the status of 'assimilated,' and consequently gain access to citizenship. Thus, in the mid-1950s, the 'assimilated' minority did not exceed one percent of the population living in the 'overseas provinces.'[30]

Despite the mixed results of his meeting with Aranha, Garin had reason to be fairly optimistic. During October, the Brazilian and Portuguese delegations had managed not only to contact several other delegations, but also to successfully convince some of them. According to Garin, Portugal could count on at least 30 delegations, seven of them Latin American, while there were others that could be convinced to vote in favor, to abstain, or merely to be absent at a hypothetical voting session. Eventually, Cunha and the Necessidades had thus accepted Garin's suggestion on the need to initiate demarches. In mid-October, the minister cabled most of his diplomatic representatives, informing them that Portugal would certainly be questioned at the UN regarding its interpretation of article 73. Although lacking precise information about the 'form' of such an 'attack,' Cunha instructed his diplomatic representatives to be prepared to execute demarches in the following weeks.[31]

By the end of October, the second clash between Portugal and the anti-colonial delegations had begun at the Fourth Committee in New York. Although never directly mentioning the Portuguese issue, India, as well as Iraq, Panama, and Burma, believed that the rejection of the proposal concerning the interpretation of article 73 during the last session had created a problem for the organization. Speaking before the committee, the Indian delegate, Tarkeshwari Sinha, supported by other Afro-Asian delegations, argued that it was crucial to fix the situation as soon as possible, and proposed two possible solutions. "We can request a juridical opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding the […] constitutional delimitation of article 73, or, alternatively, we can examine ourselves the situation, and establish a subordinate body to deal with it."[32]

After several interventions, the anti-colonial delegates decided to present a proposal that followed the second solution. This resolution proposed an urgent definition of criteria regarding the character of non-autonomous territories, which all member states of the UN would have to respect. Since the organization had recently struggled with some divergences on this particular point, the General

[30] Valentim Alexandre, 'The colonial empire,' in António Costa Pinto, *Contemporary Portugal. Politics, Society, and Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 81.
[31] MNE to EPRJ, T, October 20, 1957, AHDMNE.
[32] Diário de Lisboa [Lisbon, Portugal], November 1, 1957, 1, 9.

Assembly should, therefore, elect a committee to examine and recommend a uniform and mandatory criterion. This *ad hoc* committee should be formed by three colonial powers, and three-member states without any colonial responsibilities. At the same time, the Sixth Committee, responsible for the consideration of legal questions at the General Assembly, was already analyzing a request for a definition of the way that the UN General Assembly should vote on resolutions directly related to non-autonomous territories (simple majority, or two-thirds majority). Although this was directly relevant only for those territories that had already been declared non-autonomous during past sessions, it threatened to undermine the Portuguese procedural strategy of relying upon the need for a two-thirds majority.[33]

This move caused some alarm within the Portuguese delegation. In a series of telegrams to Lisbon, Garin immediately ruled out the possibility of defeating the resolution presented in the Fourth Committee. Instead, Portugal should focus its energies on ensuring approval of the two-thirds rule.[34] For its part, Lisbon accepted this suggestion. According to Franco Nogueira, the Portuguese delegate to the Fourth Committee, the objective was threefold: to overturn the decision of the last session; to diminish the international support for Portugal; and to pressure the UN to assert its active responsibility. "[This last objective] was particularly well received by some delegates," he would recall years later, "especially those from the Third World and Latin America. [They were] enthusiastic about the prospect of having a role that would confer upon them the fame and importance that they did not have in their own country of origin."[35] Indeed, without directly mentioning Portugal, its colonial policy, and its contradictions, the anti-colonial delegations hoped to garner some sympathies among the Latin American, as well as those other nations considered to be neutral.

In an effort to guarantee enough Latin American votes to prevent the anti-colonial delegations from achieving a two-thirds majority, Garin sought to pressure the Brazilian delegate, Cyro de Freitas Valle, who had temporarily replaced Aranha as the leader of the delegation. He was particularly interested in renewing personal demarches towards Argentina, Uruguay, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and even Panama. These demarches, he believed, were fundamental for the Portuguese strategy, and only the Brazilians had the necessary influence to sway these votes. Known for his difficult temperament and his 'sympathy' towards the anti-colonial nations, Freitas Valle told Garin that the Brazilian delegation was unable to perform these demarches. According to the telegram sent to Lisbon: "Freitas Valle told me […] that he had to be more cautious, according to his instructions […] and, moreover, Portugal was not being directly attacked." Although he promised to do his best, Garin telegraphed Lisbon, and

[33] MNE to EPRJ, T, October 31, 1957; Nogueira, *Salazar*, 478-481.
[34] DPONU to MNE, T 396, November 2, 1957, AHDMNE.
[35] Nogueira, *Salazar,* 479.

requested urgent contacts between the Portuguese embassy to Rio de Janeiro and the senior diplomats at the Itamaraty. Nevertheless, the Portuguese delegate was particularly worried about the negative repercussions that such demarches could cause among the senior Brazilian delegates. "In order to avoid misunderstandings or hurting feelings, it is important to underline that Ambassadors Aranha and Freitas Valle are being diligent with us," Garin cautioned the Necessidades. He also emphasized that there was a chance that the Itamaraty would simply deny such requests. "According to [delegate] Grieco (and this is strictly confidential), it is possible that they will refuse our requests, since the Secretary-General [Décio Moura] has instructed the delegation to be as discreet as possible […] so that Brazil is not accused of supporting colonialism."[36]

As expected, the resolution presented by the anti-colonial delegations was approved by a large majority: 42 votes in favor, 27 against, and only 8 abstentions. This result led the Spanish Delegate, Manuel Aznar, to express his dissatisfaction. He declared that while the resolution did not mention any particular country, its real target was more than obvious. "There prevails the idea that this proposal aims at a particular member state, Portugal," he pointed out, "and it is a kind of indirect accusation against this very noble country, that shares with us the sun and the shadow of the Iberian Peninsula. Please show us if we are wrong, we would appreciate it very much."[37] Also, Franco Nogueira stated what he considered to be evident. "This resolution is an attempt to reopen a discussion that was already voted and decided upon during the last session […]. This is a dangerous precedent, which could destroy the balance between international cooperation and national sovereignty, as well as threaten the dynamics, authority, and prestige of the United Nations."[38] The Guatemalan delegate, José Rolz, by contrast, denied such accusations, and described the proposal and resolution as merely "routine."[39]

Perhaps more worrying than this defeat was the sudden lack of Brazilian cooperation with the Portuguese delegation. Garin and his colleagues had already expected increasingly discreet behavior at the Fourth Committee, namely the 'silence' of the Brazilian delegate, but they now noted that Oswaldo Aranha had become somewhat vague and distant towards their delegation. Through a series of inquiries, Garin came to learn that Aranha was resentful towards him. Apparently, the Brazilian ambassador had not appreciated the urgent demarches towards the Itamaraty that had been made by the new Portuguese Ambassador to Rio de Janeiro, Manuel Rocheta. To a certain extent, he felt that the Portuguese were disregarding his collaboration, as well as his influence and prestige among the Latin American delegations.[40] Indeed, Aranha was very annoyed. In a brief telegram sent to his

[36] DPONU to MNE T 396, November 2, 1957, AHDMNE.
[37] Diário de Lisboa [Lisbon, Portugal], November 6, 1957, 1.
[38] Diário de Lisboa [Lisbon, Portugal], November 6, 1957, 11.
[39] Diário de Lisboa [Lisbon, Portugal], November 6, 1957, 11.
[40] DPONU to MRE, T 429, November 18, 1957, AHDMNE.

minister, he complained about the behavior of the Portuguese. "I cannot understand the meaning of these Portuguese 'demarches' [towards the Itamaraty] […] I spend literally day and night receiving the thanks of the Portuguese for my personal action on their behalf."[41] Although he had instructions to support, albeit discreetly, the Portuguese efforts, Aranha had unilaterally decided to slow down his collaboration, due to his own personal resentments. This episode illuminates at least one notable characteristic of Brazilian diplomacy, namely the considerable autonomy and independence of the Brazilian delegation at the UN with regard to the Itamaraty. Despite the general instructions prepared and issued each year, the delegation could freely decide upon on their implementation, according to its own appraisals. This particular characteristic, to be sure, would cause some significant problems for Portuguese diplomacy regarding the Brazilian delegation in the future.

This whole episode caused substantial discomfort between the two Latin delegations. Nevertheless, Aranha eventually resumed his collaboration with the Portuguese delegation, as well as with the Itamaraty. In a series of telegrams exchanged between New York and Rio de Janeiro, it became clear that both sides were executing the demarches that had been requested in favor of Portuguese interests. Moreover, despite the approval of the proposal at the Fourth Committee a few days previously, Aranha was fairly confident that the Portuguese delegation would have the votes necessary to approve the two-thirds rule during the subsequent days.

His confidence proved to be right. The General Assembly approved the two-thirds rule by a simple majority. Consequently, the resolution presented by India, and supported by the Afro-Asian and Communist blocs, was defeated, having received only 41 of the 55 votes needed to succeed. The results of the voting reveal Brazil's significant influence in securing this outcome: Argentina, the Dominican Republic, the Philippines, Honduras, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Thailand, and Uruguay (the latter even exceeding the Itamaraty's expectations) voted in favor of the two-thirds rule. An enthusiastic Cunha wrote to the Brazilian Minister of External Relations, Macedo Soares, to express his congratulations and gratitude. "It was most valuable […] the effective diplomatic support provided by your diplomatic corps […] many thanks for another proof of friendship, a real proof of the vitality and efficiency of Portuguese-Brazilian common policy."[42]

The Brazilians were, however, anything but enthusiastic. In a confidential telegram sent several days after the final voting session, Oswaldo Aranha warned the Itamaraty that the Brazilian position at the UN had been negatively affected by Brazil's support for Portuguese colonialism. "This negative effect was clearly demonstrated when Brazil was elected to the Committee of Information by only a minimal

[41] DELBRAONU to MRE, T [C], November 16, 1957, AMRE.
[42] MNE to EPRJ, T, December 4, 1957, AHDMNE.

margin of one vote […] while Uruguay was elected to the Committee on South West Africa by 62 votes [only 38 being necessary]." He considered, moreover, that the Portuguese procedural maneuver would be the last one to be made. "Personally, I think that it will be very difficult [for Portugal] to repeat this in 1958," he stated. According to his recent experience, many Latin American delegations had already warned him that during the following session, it would be very difficult, or even impossible, for them to support such procedural maneuvers. For this reason, the Brazilians began to believe that the Portuguese prospects for the 1958 General Assembly would be altogether extremely "grim."[43]

India's Diplomatic Offensive

In mid-1956, the Indian government had shown interest in normalizing its relations with Brazil. Indeed, a document drawn up in July 1956 had underlined that the MEA was "anxious to create more cordial relations between India and Brazil." The former ambassador to Brazil, Raja J. Sen of Mandi (1952-1956), had even suggested that as a preliminary step, New Delhi should conclude a cultural agreement with Rio de Janeiro.[44] Although Brazil was not a priority in India's foreign policy, New Delhi was keenly aware of its diplomatic weight. Rio de Janeiro exerted a considerable, and sometimes decisive, influence in Latin America, had significant international prestige, and had already secured a seat on the UN Security Council three times (namely in 1946-1947, 1951-1952 and 1954-1955). Besides, Brazil belonged to one of the largest regional groups in the UN, and India had already paid a concrete political price for ignoring it. When the Kashmir issue was discussed and voted on at the Security Council, in which Latin American nations exercised considerable influence, the Argentine delegates had assumed, at certain moments, a partisan attitude against India.[45] The same was true in the case of Portuguese India. Although on a different scale, many Latin American nations had criticized the Indian government for turning a blind eye to the *satyagrahas* against the colony during the crises of 1954-1955.[46]

Although the Indian government was aware of the political benefits that a flirtation with Latin America could eventually produce, financial and human resource constraints had prevented a more effective diplomatic approach, as was recognized in several internal documents. Indeed, in 1949 and 1952, the question of establishing new presences in Latin American capitals had been debated at the MEA, but this had led only to the establishment of a presence in Chile, bringing to four the number of Indian

[43] DELBRAONU to MRE, T [C], November 27, 1957; MRE to DELBRAONU, T [C], December 14, 1957, AMRE.
[44] Prime Minister's Secretariat, "Letter from Prof. C. Mahadevan to Prime Minister suggesting the creation of (1) Educational Fellowships for Brazilians and (2) a scheme for emigration of Indians for Brazil," 30 July 1956, F. 2 (26) AMS 56, NAI
[45] Varun Sahni, "India and Latin America," in Sumit Ganguly (ed.) *Engaging the World: Indian Foreign Policy since 1947*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 380-381.
[46] Venezuela, for instance, issued a formal protest against the Indian government in August 1954.

diplomatic missions in the region (Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico). Between 1955 and 1956, this matter was discussed once again at the South Block, on the grounds that India was "assuming more and more responsibilities in the international affairs," and that it was therefore "important that her point of view is widely known." Ultimately, the dearth of personnel, as well as the limited budget of the Indian foreign service, prevented, once again, the opening of new India's diplomatic representations in Latin American capitals.[47]

To remedy this problem, right after his official visit to Washington in late 1956,[48] Nehru began to contemplate a wide-ranging state visit to South America. After all, he had already been twice to the northern hemisphere, but had failed to visit the southern, and a tour of the region might prove impressive. Indeed, as the former ambassador to Brazil, Minocher Masani (1948-1949), had proposed roughly eight years previously, a whistle-stop tour of several South American nations, including Brazil, could easily produce a "marked and enduring impression."[49] During the first half of 1957, Nehru thus conveyed to some South American representatives his willingness to visit, and eventually secured invitations from Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile. According to France Press, Nehru wanted to establish direct contacts with those nations with whom India had hitherto had little interaction. Allegedly, to "reinforce the Afro-Asian group in the UN."[50]

These combined developments attracted the attention of the Brazilian government. The Itamaraty had downplayed several official letters from Ambassador Alencar indicating such a possibility, as well as his requests to make an official invitation to Nehru, on the grounds that "[Brazil] was the first Latin American nation to establish an embassy" in India. However, when several newspapers in Brazil reported the scheduled visit to South America – underlining the fact that Argentina was included on the itinerary – the Itamaraty requested information from its ambassadors in New Delhi and Buenos Aires. Despite their confirmation, and their emphasis that the visit would take place in 1958, officials at the Itamaraty did not come to any decision.[51]

In early 1958, Alencar received information indicating that a state visit by Nehru to South America was still under consideration, although this would probably be dependent upon a Brazilian invitation. Indeed, after a conversation with Miguel Serrano, the Chilean ambassador to India, Alencar had learned that Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt had remarked that the Brazilian government had not yet issued an invitation. A similar observation was made by another Indian diplomat, this time to his

[47] MEA, 'The question of opening of new missions in Latin American countries, Secret' 13-1/55 AMS, NAI.
[48] McMahon, *The Cold War*, 229.
[49] M.R. Masani to Nehru, 27 December 1948, F. 2 (4) / AMS 49, NAI.
[50] MRE to EMBRAND, CT 21, 8 May 1957, AHI.
[51] EMBRAND to MRE, T [S/U] 213, January 4, 1957; EMBRAND to MRE, O [S] 117, May 23, 1957; Embaixada do Brasil em Buenos Aires [Embassy of Brazil in Buenos Aires] (henceforth, EMBRABA) to MRE, CT [C] 379, June 19, 1957, AMRE.

Mexican counterpart. According to Alencar, this was the proof that "Nehru's state visit to South America will be delayed, for multiple reasons, until Brazil decides to present an official invitation." [52] Foreseeing some problems related to the issue of Portuguese India – not only the reaction of the Portuguese government, but also that of the Portuguese *colónia* – Alencar believed that the Brazilian authorities should not refrain from inviting Nehru, but should take certain precautions. Accordingly, Alencar proposed a discrete, yet nonetheless important, demarche towards the Indian embassy in Rio de Janeiro, in order to convince New Delhi to refrain from political statements or diplomatic demarches that could harm the Portuguese. "Sometimes, there are statements about Goa […] mainly because of domestic pressures," Alencar underlined, "but the Indian government would surely understand our motives and our desire to ensure the success of [Jawaharlal Nehru's] visit to Brazil."[53]

Although his assessment might seem exaggerated – particularly the point at which he claimed that Nehru's state visit to South America was dependent upon Brazil – a few weeks later, in April, Nehru gave his first interview to a Brazilian newspaper. The Indian prime minister stressed the similarities between both nations, underlined the need for greater economic and cultural cooperation, and expressed his hope of meeting the reporter of the *Correio da Manhã*, Durval Rosa Borges, once again, whether in India or Brazil.[54] According to Alencar – who had had a role in securing this interview – this was a rare feat, since the prime minister was a very busy man.[55]

Having received no reaction from Rio de Janeiro, the Indian government finally decided to raise the bar. At the end of June, the Indian ambassador to Brazil delivered an official invitation to Kubitschek for a state visit to India in late 1958.[56] This move was a way of demonstrating that India was keen to strengthen its ties with Brazil, and wanted to honor its president by making him the first Latin American statesman to visit India. By inviting Kubitschek before any other head of state, India was also demonstrating its conviction that Brazil was the most important country in the region for its foreign policy. Although no Indian sources are available for this period, one can imagine that Nehru wanted to send a strong signal to the Brazilian government regarding his own visit to South America. Indeed, as Luis Bastian Pinto, the head of the Political Division of the Itamaraty, immediately recognized, the Brazilian government "for obvious reasons, cannot avoid inviting Nehru to visit Brazil should he come to South America."[57] Alencar, however, believed that his invitation "of great significance" was the result of Kubitschek's foreign policy, as well as of the great interest displayed by India in a

[52] EMBRAND to MRE, O [S] 78, February 17, 1958; EMBRAND to MRE, O [S] 92, March 7, 1958, AMRE.
[53] EMBRAND to MRE, O [S] 78, February 17, 1958, AMRE.
[54] *Correio da Manhã* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil] 17 April 1958, 1, 12.
[55] EMBRAND to MRE, CT 46, March 29, 1958; EMBRAND to MRE, CT 77, May 31, 1958, AHI.
[56] MRE to EMBRAND, T [C] 37, July 11, 1958, AMRE.
[57] MRE, M [C] 212, July 11, 1958, AMRE.

rapprochement with Brazil. Moreover, the ambassador recalled, he had always "sought to demonstrate that Brazil wanted to maintain the best possible bilateral relations with India […] relations that cannot be harmed by the fact that we are ensuring the protection of Portuguese interests [in New Delhi]."[58]

The Indian invitation, however, unleashed other forces unconnected to Brazil-India relations. The Portuguese ambassador to Brazil, Manuel Rocheta, although only recently appointed, was immediately informed, and rushed to the Itamaraty in order to convey his government's deepest concerns. In a meeting with the young and recently appointed Head of the Political Department, João Araújo Castro, Rocheta explained that his government believed that a state visit by Nehru to Brazil would constitute a "serious setback" to Portugal-Brazil relations. In response, Castro acknowledged Portuguese anxieties, and suggested that a visit might actually help to "soften" the Indian government. Rocheta immediately replied that New Delhi's only objective was to "alienate" Brazil from Portugal.[59] Days later, a similar demarche was made towards the new Secretary General, António Mendes Viana. This time, Rocheta employed more elaborate arguments. Although he believed that the Portuguese government would be very displeased with the "unfavorable effects" that a visit by Nehru could produce, the ambassador also recalled that the Indian prime minister's state visit could encourage nationalist and non-aligned movements within Brazil. Thus, Rocheta emphasized that such a visit could only harm the development objectives of Brazil, as well as the development priorities of other Latin American nations. Mendes Viana recognized such dangers, and ruled out a state visit by Kubitschek to India. However, he believed that it would be difficult to avoid a state visit by Nehru to Brazil. According to Rocheta, Mendes Viana feared that a refusal would further antagonize nationalist and non-aligned movements, which might eventually cause complications for Kubitschek's government.[60] Finally, the Portuguese ambassador met with the new minister of External Relations, Francisco Negrão de Lima, who also recognized the probable adverse effects on Portuguese interests, while also stressing the difficulty of avoiding an official invitation to the Indian leader.[61]

These three meetings demonstrated to the Portuguese just how divided, confused, and contradictory the Itamaraty was regarding the issue. This was not only the result of the fact that different ideologies, perceptions, and opinions had to coinhabit the same space, but also a glaring example of the lack of guidance from the presidency. Without a clear, defined, international agenda, and precise foreign policy guidelines, the Itamaraty was, to a certain extent, a place where several different ideas hung in

[58] EMBRAND to MRE, T [S] 58, 12 July 1958, AMRE
[59] EPRJ to MNE, T 111, July 19, 1958, AHDMNE.
[60] EPRJ to MNE, T 114, July 23, 1958, AHDMNE.
[61] EPRJ to MNE, T 119, July 24, 1958, AHDMNE.

the air, converging on some points, but diverging on others. Consequently, the foreign policy decision-making process within the Itamaraty was anything but clear: to the contrary, it was a complex, almost anarchic, and uncontrolled process, which might produce unexpected outcomes for Portugal.

Indeed, at the Itamaraty, but also at the *Catete*[62], many people sensed that a rapprochement with India could be highly useful in developing a more "independent" Brazilian foreign policy. Men like the former ambassador to India, Ildefonso Falcão, believed that Brazil needed to adopt an autonomous foreign policy as a means to pursue its own interests, and to gain some diplomatic leverage towards Washington. Others even contemplated the possibility that a dialogue with India might eventually lead Brazil into the non-aligned group of countries. On the other hand, even the idea of a simple dialogue with India, a non-aligned nation, horrified the most conservative sectors of the Itamaraty, who believed that Brazil was firmly anchored in the West, and had assumed clear responsibilities within the framework of the *Tratado Interamericano*. Pressured by both sides, president Kubitschek was in a diplomatic deadlock, and chose to postpone any decision: Alencar, who had been invited to an informal meeting with Nehru, received instructions to avoid the issue, allegedly because the government was under "huge pressure" from the Portuguese embassy.[63]

Although worried by the idea, the Necessidades ruled out any direct contact with the Brazilian ambassador in Lisbon. "It seems preferable not to engage the [Brazilian] government with a formal request […]," a telegram sent to Rocheta stated. "Negative Brazilian reactions [to our requests] would certainly have undesirable repercussions for our relations […], and acquiescence would exacerbate [adverse circles] against us as well as place the Brazilian government under attack [of those adverse circles]." However, while privately deploring the attitude of the Brazilian government, the Necessidades accepted that the decision whether or not to invite Nehru was ultimately the prerogative of Brazilians. Moreover, they also understood that it would be difficult for Brazilians to see Nehru visit the rest of Latin America without visiting their country. By not offering excessive opposition to such a visit, the Necessidades believed, Portugal would at least avoid being accused of interfering in Brazil's diplomatic affairs.[64]

However, the conservative wing of the Itamaraty and the Portuguese ambassador decided to combine forces, and to contact, separately yet simultaneously, the US embassy in Rio de Janeiro. Mendes Viana, a conservative and staunch anti-communist, conveyed his deep concern regarding a possible rapprochement between Brazil and India, hoping to thus provoke a reaction from Washington. For his

[62] The official residence and workplace of the Brazilian President
[63] MRE to EMBRAND, T [S] 43, 31 July 1958; EMBRAND to MRE, T 83, 6 August 1958, AMRE.
[64] MNE to EPRJ, T 131, July 30, 1958, AHDMNE.

part, Rocheta suggested to an American *attaché*, Woodruff Wallner, that Kubitschek was being misinformed by his advisors, who claimed that a visit to India would benefit Brazil's interests, as well as those of Washington in South Asia. A few days later, Waller confirmed the State Department's disapproval of both Kubitschek's visit to India and Nehru's reception in Rio de Janeiro, but ruled out any official demarche, which would risk being considered interference in Brazil's domestic affairs. The US *attaché* suggested that the Portuguese government should "invite Kubitschek to visit Goa," and "provoke [other] embarrassing invitations to the president, such as a visit to South Korea or Taiwan."[65]

Surprisingly, president Kubitschek eventually accepted the Indian invitation to visit New Delhi. Brazilian economic interests and the international dimension impelled him to do so, as did his desire to be the first Latin American statesman to visit India (Arturo Frondizi, the president of Argentina, had in the meantime been invited by the Indian government to visit New Delhi later that year). However, Brazil's ambassador in Washington, Walther Moreira Salles, was persuaded by Mendes Viana to convince Kubitschek of the dangers of a rapprochement between Brazil and India. Facing congressional elections in October, and thus deciding to avoid any unnecessary controversies, Kubitschek ultimately backed down. Indeed, the note delivered to the Indian embassy accepted the invitation made by New Delhi, but, at the same time, did not set any specific date, and – more important to the Portuguese – did not invite Nehru to visit Brazil.[66]

Despite all the pressures that were impelling Kubitschek to visit India (and inviting Nehru to visit Brazil), well-established forces ultimately prevailed, namely the Portuguese 'establishment' and Brazilian conservatives. For Portuguese diplomats, an exchange of visits between the Brazilian and Indian leaders would be a total disaster, for obvious reasons; and, for Brazilian conservatives, a rapprochement of Brazil to Portugal's main adversary (and a nonaligned nation to boot) would also be a total disaster. However, the fact that Portuguese diplomats and Brazilian conservatives had to resort to the American embassy illuminates a fundamental issue: namely, that there was a growing divergence of interests between the two countries, that this was becoming increasingly visible, and that the Portuguese were less and less able of dealing with it. Indeed, this episode was just part of a much larger set of conflicting perspectives, objectives, and interests. Brazil was searching for international prestige, economic development, and social progression in a world full of new opportunities; on the contrary, Portugal was still tied to colonial conceptions and to ideas of European predominance, and thus unable to recognize and accept that the world had changed. Even if there

[65] EPRJ to MNE, T 143, August 23, 1958; EPRJ to MNE, T 147, August 30, 1958, AMRE.
[66] EPRJ to MNE, T 147, August 30, 1958; EPRJ to MNE, T 148, August 31, 1958; MNE to EPRJ, T 161, September 1, 1958, AHDMNE; EMBRAND to MRE, CT 108, August 15, 1958; MRE to EMBRAND to MRE, August 27, 1958; AMRE.

were special and historical ties between Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro, Brazilians in general were becoming less and less willing to accept requests that, directly or indirectly, harmed their international interests.

Indeed, the debate within the Itamaraty around the creation of a new foreign policy towards the Afro-Asian nations, as well as around the problem of colonialism and decolonization, highlights how Brazil was attempting to adapt itself to the new international environment. As several Brazilian diplomats recognized, Brazil could not simply ignore the fact that Africa and Asia were "no longer the backyard of the West", and that anti-colonialism was one of their main convictions. Although in the end, security concerns still prevailed over other considerations, the Itamaraty was slowly but surely taking some notable steps (including a more discreet attitude regarding Portuguese colonialism), which only one or two years before would have seemed almost inconceivable.

Finally, this episode also highlights how India was looking to engage in a closer relationship with Latin America, and notably with Brazil. After all, Indian foreign policy-makers had already identified the potential importance of the region to New Delhi. However, virtually nothing had been done to bring about a rapprochement. Nehru's overture regarding an exchange of visits with Brazil (and with Argentina) marked the first real attempt to strengthen the contacts between the two regional powers. Unfortunately, one can only speculate about the reasons that lay behind this attempt. International prestige and UN votes would seem to be the most rational justifications – however, to what extent India had in mind the case of Goa, or the building of a united front against economic underdevelopment, which might include some Latin American nations, will remain in the realm of hypothesis.

Chapter Five | Turning point, 1958-1959

The Third Clash

Having already successfully employed the two-thirds strategy, Portuguese diplomacy remained committed to securing the votes necessary to defeat an anticolonial resolution, particularly amongst the various Latin American delegations. It was a wise decision: in 1956-1957, Portugal had received at least 13 votes from this region; in 1957-1958, between 13 and 16. In accordance with the suggestions of its former ambassador to Rio de Janeiro, Portugal began to accelerate the expansion of its diplomatic presence in Latin America. During the months preceding the inauguration of the General Assembly, Portugal was working to establish relations with Honduras, Paraguay, Haiti, and Costa Rica, and its diplomatic agents in the region were instructed to prepare in advance a defense against any eventual 'attacks' regarding article 73.[1]

As in previous sessions, however, the forecasts were hardly encouraging. Portuguese diplomats had already begun to receive worrying signals, especially from London. The British, to be sure, believed that the Portuguese position was unsustainable, and that it was only a matter of time until Lisbon suffered a heavy defeat. However, in late 1958, top British officials were convinced that Portugal could no longer avoid an adverse resolution. This belief was conveyed to the Portuguese Ambassador, Pedro Teotónio, by the Colonial Office, and later reiterated to Vasco Garin by the British delegation to the UN. In July 1958, Garin reported that London considered it "improbable" that Portugal could "win" at the next General Assembly. "[The Head of the Delegation, Sir Andrew] told me that it was obvious that sooner or later, the defeat would come," Garin cautioned Lisbon, "especially due to the admission of new African members."[2]

In September 1958, the Portuguese delegate to the UN, Franco Nogueira, flew to Rio de Janeiro, in order to meet with the senior officials of the Itamaraty. His visit to Brazil had a dual purpose. On the one hand, he intended to formulate a plan of action between the Portuguese and Brazilian delegations to the UN; on the other hand, he wished to inform the Brazilians about the quadripartite talks that were being held with Britain, France, and Belgium regarding colonial issues. This exchange of information was made in the usual spirit of friendship between the two countries. However, it also allowed the Portuguese government to keep track of Brazil's strategy towards the UN (and, to a certain

[1] MNE to EPRJ, T [C], May 29, 1958, AHDMNE.
[2] DPONU to MNE, T [C], July 25, 1958; MNE to DPONU, T [C] July 22, 1958, AHDMNE.

extent, that of the other Latin American countries), while, at the same time, allowing the Brazilian government to keep track not only of the actions of Portugal, but also those of the other NATO and colonial powers regarding the UN.

Despite some apprehensions, Franco Nogueira, as well as Manuel Rocheta, learned that the Brazilian government was willing to support the Portuguese delegation during the next Assembly, either with its vote or with its influence over other Latin American countries. In a meeting with Francisco Negrão de Lima, the minister of External Relations, Portuguese diplomats were assured that Brazil would support Portugal "one hundred percent." Always faithful, the secretary general, António Mendes Viana, confirmed this support, and recommended a program of demarches towards other Latin American nations. Even Araújo Castro from the Political Department promised to nominate a "combative delegate" to represent Brazil at the Fourth Committee. Those encouraging words, however, did not completely convince the Portuguese diplomats. In a report sent by Rocheta, the latter highlighted some signs of hesitance in the Brazilian diplomats' attitude. "These recent meetings left no doubt that Brazil is going to vote with us," he reported. "However, we could not establish whether Brazil's delegation is going to publicly and openly intervene in our favor or not."[3]

Indeed, Portuguese doubts regarding Brazil's attitude were well-founded. For this General Assembly, the Brazilians were particularly committed to changing their behavior towards colonial issues, and to reducing drastically their support for Portugal. In the instructions prepared for its delegation, the Itamaraty underlined that "despite past demonstrations, made in order to avoid significant problems with colonial powers, Brazil should clearly support the principle of self-determination […] [and] any initiative that seeks to define the concept of self-determination should also be supported by Brazil." As for the Portuguese case, and particularly regarding the issue of Goa, the Itamaraty instructed the delegation to "avoid inflammatory" statements in defending the Portuguese point of view. "If necessary, this point of view should be defended only within the two-thirds procedure." However, perhaps more worryingly for Portuguese interests, the Brazilian government had decided to concede greater "freedom of action" to its delegation, since "they are more capable of making decisions than an isolated officer in the Itamaraty." As in previous sessions, the Brazilian delegation would be headed by Cyro de Freitas Valle, a diplomat who had already proved to be everything but favorable to continuing support for European colonialism, and in particular for Portuguese colonialism.[4]

[3] EPRJ to MNE, T 158, September 10, 1958; EPRJ to MNE, T,159 September 11, 1958; EPRJ to MNE, T 162, September 14, 1958; AHDMNE.
[4] MRE to DELBRAONU, O [C], August 25, 1958; MRE to DELBRAONU, O [C], October 16, 1958, AMRE.

The Portuguese strategy for this session was identical to the strategy applied in past sessions. Without any information about the 'nature' of the expected 'attack' upon the Portuguese interpretation of article 73, Garin and his associates in the delegation were instructed to behave discretely. In particular, the delegation was encouraged to intervene only in the general debate, so as to avoid drawing "undesirable attention" to the fact that Portugal was staying quiet. "I will once again emphasize the special characteristics of Portuguese unity, notably Portugal's long-standing overseas policy," Garin reported.[5] At the same time, the Portuguese delegates should always underline the original aspects of Portuguese colonization, as well as the juridical aspects of their defense. Through the French delegation, Portugal also sought to neutralize several Asian nations, such as Lagos and Cambodia, "at least for the two-thirds voting session."[6]

A few days after the beginning of the Fourth Committee session in December 1958, the Iraqi delegate reopened the debate regarding the interpretation of article 73, and presented a proposal for a resolution. Written by 15 countries, including India, Yugoslavia, Jordan, Morocco, and Guatemala, this proposal was virtually identical to the one presented at the previous session. It called for the urgent establishment of criteria regarding the definition of non-autonomous territories, and the election of an *ad-hoc* committee to examine and recommend a uniform and mandatory criterion. Once again, the resolution did not mention the Portuguese case, but the Yugoslav delegate pointed out that Lisbon was ruling over territories in which a substantial part of the population did not have citizen rights. In this case, these colonial territories should be considered as non-autonomous under article 73. The Portuguese delegate, Franco Nogueira, reaffirmed Portugal's inability to accept the "impugnation of a sovereign right," and rejected what he considered to be an "interference" in a matter of "internal jurisdiction." Again, the same arguments were repeated, and, again, the anticolonial proposal was adopted by the Fourth Committee, with 41 votes in favor, 29 against, and 4 abstentions.[7]

This victory sounded alarm bells in Lisbon. According to the senior officials of the Necessidades, it was now "indispensable" to collect more votes among Latin American delegations, with the objective of "avoiding a defeat in the two-thirds rule voting session." Although the result was relatively similar to that at the 1957 session, Portuguese diplomats were worried by the fact that some Latin American delegations were already informing Garin that they could not support the Portuguese. According to Franco Nogueira, this was the result of the probable admission of a set of African nations, which would bring greater political force to the Afro-Asian block at the UN. While having a degree of understanding towards the Portuguese cause, many Latin American delegations believed that it would be 'political

[5] DPONU to MNE, T, September 13, 1958, AHDMNE.
[6] DPONU to MNE, T [U], November 28, 1958; DPONU to MNE, T, December 2, 1958, AHDMNE.
[7] DPONU to MNE, T, December 5, 1958; DPONU to MNE, T, December 6, 1958; AHDMNE.

suicide' for their governments to support Portugal at the UN. Indeed, they preferred to change their attitude, and to adopt the point of view that would surely prevail in 1960. To counteract this tendency, Rocheta was instructed to carry out urgent demarches in the Itamaraty, requesting Rio de Janeiro's influence towards a series of countries, including Argentina, Venezuela, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. Although these last-minute demarches were made with some degree of success, they illustrate the increasing precariousness of the Portuguese position at the UN. Indeed, Portugal was at risk of finding itself in an "extremely serious" position if it proved unable to reverse the situation in its favor.[8]

Unexpectedly, Iraq, along with the remaining signatories, withdrew its proposal only a few hours before the voting session. Instead, Iraqi delegates presented a new draft, requesting a legal opinion of the International Court regarding procedural issues. The objective was to obtain a negative opinion concerning the applicability of the two-thirds rule in the case of article 73, thus ending the Portuguese 'juridical stronghold' in the UN. However, the New Zealand delegation then proposed rescheduling the discussion to the next session, on the grounds that the issue was so important that it could not be assessed in such a short period of time. The General Assembly then approved this resolution by a large majority. The motives behind this move are still unclear, but it is plausible that the anticolonial delegations realized that Portugal would be able to gather the necessary votes to reaffirm the two-thirds rule – as had already been done on two occasions. Indeed, Garin had meanwhile reported to Lisbon that the Portuguese delegation already had the necessary votes required to overcome the maneuver.[9]

Although the Necessidades had deemed this result as "favorable" for Portuguese interests, as well as a "big moral setback" for the anticolonial nations,[10] Garin did not share their enthusiasm and optimism. From his point of view, the Portuguese position at the UN was becoming gradually more precarious, in a very "frightening way." In a telegram dated December 24, Garin articulated his apprehensions with unusual incisiveness, clarity, and courage. According to him, three fundamental reasons justified his fears. First, the persistence and commitment of the anticolonial movement to "destroying" the Portuguese position regarding the interpretation of article 73. "They will surely continue to employ 'extreme' measures to solve something that they consider unfinished business," Garin cautioned the Necessidades. Moreover, he underlined that the anticolonial delegations would exploit "hesitations,

[8] MNE to EPRJ, T [VU] 238, December 6, 1958; MNE to EPRJ, T 239, December 9, 1958; EPRJ to MNE, T 237, December 9, 1958; EPRJ to MNE, T 239, December 11, 1958; EPRJ to MNE, T 240, December 12, 1958; EPRJ to MNE, T 241, December 13, 1958, AHDMNE; MRE to DELBRAONU, T [C/U], December 9, 1958; MRE to DELBRAONU, T [C/U], December 10, 1958; AMRE. Alexandre, *Contra o Vento,* 603.

[9] MNE to EPRJ, T 243, December 14, 1958; DPONU to MNE, A [S], December 24, 1958, AHDMNE. Alexandre, *Contra o Vento,* 602.

[10] MNE to EPRJ, T 243, December 14, 1958, AHDMNE.

political fears, and pangs of conscience," in order to dissuade some of the nations that had supported Portugal in the past. Second, the Portuguese delegate believed that the imminent admission of new members in 1960, "from whom we can only expect a hostile position," would make it impossible to reaffirm the two-thirds procedural rule in the plenary. Indeed, with the admission of African nations such as Nigeria, Somalia, and Togo, "[everything] would become a simple problem of arithmetic, and our efforts against it would prove worthless." Third, Garin warned that some pro-Portuguese nations and delegations, including even Portugal's closest allies, were already showing worrying signs of demoralization, exhaustion, and desertion. "Among the Latin Americans, there is a growing conviction that the support they have given to Portugal is eroding their political prestige within the organization […] we [the Portuguese delegation] can feel that some of them are truly terrified by the risks involved, particularly when they want to be elected to other committees." Significant changes regarding Portuguese colonial rule, as well as a less rigid position towards the UN, would thus be necessary to retain the diplomatic support of the Latin American nations for the Portuguese delegation. "The Paraguayan delegate told me that despite its great affection for Portugal," Garin reported, "Paraguay will probably adopt a position of abstention [regarding Portuguese affairs] during the next General Assembly […], unless, that is, we bring new elements, or assume new positions, which could serve to justify their diplomatic support."

Furthermore, the veteran Portuguese diplomat had grown increasingly perplexed with the Brazilian attitude during the debates in the Fourth Committee. "Despite our request," Garin emphasized, "the Brazilian delegate to the Fourth Committee refused to intervene in the debates. During the discussion of our problem, the Brazilian delegation was completely apathetic." The same was true of other nations outside the Latin American group. Pakistan, in particular, was experiencing some doubts about its support for Portugal. Despite their clear and obvious diplomatic support regarding the case of Goa, Garin noted that the Pakistani delegation was divided. "The Head of the Delegation, Prince Ali Khan, warned me in these terms: I beg you to warn your government about my difficult situation here; [they need] to think urgently about new measures or new legislation [referring to Africa] in order to allow us to help Portugal."

Due to such worrying signs, Garin believed that Portugal faced a dark outlook. "The collapse of our front could assume catastrophic proportions, in the event that the US (which might have a Democratic government by 1960), or England, or even Brazil decide to abandon us." Moreover, in order to convince Salazar and the Necessidades of the precariousness of the Portuguese position, Garin emphasized one particular episode. "The difficulties we faced this year were immense," he reported. "But one of them – more than any other – revealed the precariousness of our situation: it was impossible to find an

accommodating and friendly delegation to propose the two-thirds rule. We made great efforts, but in vain. Several Latin Americans refused, the Nordics refused; Canada refused, and, finally, the US refused. Some of them granted us their support during the debates – but that was all. In the end, only England accepted, but we realized that it would be better for us to present it ourselves – as actually happened."

In conclusion, Garin offered some wise – albeit quite risky – advice to his superiors. Although lacking the "competence to propose measures," he believed that Portugal should seek to modify some aspects of its colonial rule in Africa, in order to eliminate some of the more common criticisms, and to create a better "atmosphere" at the UN. "The enormous numbers of non-assimilated [inhabitants] does not decrease in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea; there are accusations of forced labor and criticism of our labor law; insinuations about our weak and slow educational, social, economic, and political progress in Africa," he underlined. "I do not know to what extent we should attempt to change this […] [in order] to help those that want to support our position in New York." Perhaps more daringly, Garin proposed a complete overhaul of the Portuguese strategy towards the UN. Accepting a Committee to analyze conditions on the ground might actually yield some positive results. "If we decide to change some laws [in Portuguese Africa] in order to make our cause more attractive […] this would at least give us some hope of gaining a more favorable hearing for our position at one of the committees of the UN." Finally, Garin urged the Necessidades to seriously consider his pleas. "Whatever the future, we simply cannot become overly involved in the article 73 mechanism […] if we accept it […] it could be hazardous [for the Portuguese overseas provinces],' he concluded[11].

Garin's aerogram remains one of the most balanced and enlightened assessments of the Portuguese position in the UN. Indeed, its words should have called forth a prompt response from the regime. Lisbon was facing heavy criticism; its allies and friendly nations were vacillating, and even the once trusty Brazilians were showing clear signs of reluctance. Nevertheless, the conservative Portuguese regime showed no inclination to undertake significant changes in its colonial empire. Blinded by old colonial conceptions, and incapable of accepting the 'new world,' Salazar and his ministers were prepared to do everything but modify the colonial administration. At the very least, Brazilian apprehensions regarding the defense of Portuguese colonial interests should have sounded an alarm in Lisbon. However, as it turned out, even this was not enough.

Indeed, the Itamaraty had received several reports that indicated an urgent need to reformulate Brazilian attitudes and behavior regarding colonialism. Perhaps the most enlightening was the one

[11] DPONU to MNE, A [S], December 24, 1958, AHDMNE.

presented by José Joffily, the president of the majority party in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. Although not a diplomat, he had been appointed delegate to the Fourth Committee, and had been particularly harsh regarding Brazilian conduct at the UN. In his extensive report, Joffily characterized colonial problems as "highly important" to Brazil. "Due to geographic fatalism, colonized areas are almost all located in the same tropical zone as the Latin American nations," he noted. "Through this coincidence, there is another one: we share the same economic structure; we both operate in the same markets." This consideration led him to believe that the economic and social development of these non-autonomous territories would have positive effects in the struggle against Latin American underdevelopment, notably for Brazil. "It is sufficient to consider the unequal competition on the international market between the African and South American countries, which stems from the difference between cheap [African] labor, and a regime of working conditions marked by a social conscience [in Latin America]." Joffily believed that the UN was dominated and manipulated by the Soviet bloc, "something which results in a situation of perplexity and indecision" among underdeveloped nations. However, that did not mean that Brazil ought not to analyze the problems of colonization and decolonization from a different perspective. According to Joffily, Brazil should actually look at these problems from an economic perspective, since they did not involve any security (or 'Cold War') concerns. "Our analysis and conclusions should be limited to the international trade of coffee, cocoa, fibers, minerals, and other raw materials," he underlined.

Conversely, the Brazilian attitude in the Fourth Committee was everything but 'economic'. In particular, Joffily criticized the "melancholic" Brazilian vote against a proposal to invite Britain, Belgium, and Australia to formulate an economic and social program, designed to create the necessary conditions for the independence of territories such as Tanganyika or New Guinea. "After a voting session with 13 Latin American countries, ten voted yes, while we, Uruguay, and Chile abstained," he noted. "I believe that such behavior was detrimental to a nation with aspirations to leadership." Concluding, Joffily urged the adoption of a stronger, more economic-oriented policy at the UN, in order to promote a position of "greater authenticity" regarding the colonial problem.[12]

Joffily's report was soon seized upon by the more 'liberal' wing within the Itamaraty, in order to criticize Brazil's tacit support for Western colonialism, and particularly Portuguese colonialism. In an internal memo dated 25 November, the number two at the Itamaraty, João Araújo Castro, recognized that Brazil could not radically change its position of support for colonial powers, "especially bearing in mind that we are still under the same government [of president Kubitschek]." Nevertheless, in his opinion, Brazil was adopting a position that was barely distinguishable from that of colonial powers

[12] José Joffily to DELBRAONU, O [no number], November 13, 1958, AMRE.

such as France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Portugal. "Certainly, we have responsibilities towards the Western powers," he noted. "However, nothing can justify the fact that our position regarding anticolonialism is even more timid and cautious than that of the US." In particular, Araújo Castro recognized that support for Portuguese interests at the UN was a "heavy burden" for Brazil. "Although we have attenuated our actions, and sought to restrict our arguments to an exclusively juridical level," he acknowledged, "it is also true that we have continued to accept the diplomatic disadvantages of identifying Brazil with the Portuguese point of view […] and, of course, our statements regarding Goa and the other Portuguese overseas territories have prevented us from adopting a more forward approach in other significant cases [of colonialism]."[13]

In short, Brazilian diplomats were growing progressively more convinced about the need to review their foreign policy regarding colonialism and decolonization. Other significant events were taking place at this time, particularly the rise of African nationalism, and it was necessary to conclude and practice a new foreign policy, one which would better serve Brazilian interests. Nevertheless, there were other forces pushing for the continuance of the existing policy, more focused on support for the West, and more dominated by Cold War assumptions. From this perspective, support for Portuguese colonialism was part of the larger fight against communism. Such conservative forces, however, would soon be diminished by an event that would unfold over the following months, and which would affect their ability to defend Portuguese obduracy.

The Case of Delgado

In January 1959, the Portuguese General Humberto Delgado made a request for political asylum at the Brazilian embassy in Lisbon. Delgado was not only a General of the Portuguese Air Force: he was also the defeated opposition candidate in the 1958 Presidential election, which had been 'won' by the regime candidate, Admiral Américo Thomaz. His electoral campaign, however, had given rise to one of the deepest and most serious political crises that the *Estado Novo* had faced since the end of World War II. Delgado's polemical statements (including his pledge to dismiss Salazar – *Obviamente, demito-o!*), his frenetic political rallies, and his charisma had shaken a country that was used to routine, and to fraudulent and uncontested elections. At the height of his campaign, the regime had had to deploy the military in the capital in order to prevent an uprising. The police had repressed pro-Delgado demonstrations with great violence, and had launched a campaign of persecutions, arrests, and intimidation against his supporters. Although defeated – through a fraudulent election – Delgado had

[13] MRE, M DPC [C], November 25, 1958, AMRE.

been subjected to persecution over the following months, and had eventually been expelled from the Air Force. Having been informed that he was about to be arrested, he requested political asylum in Brazil, confident that Ambassador Álvaro Lins would grant it. Indeed, within hours, his appeal had been accepted.[14]

Ambassador Lins had been an admirer (or at least a 'collaborator') of the Portuguese regime. Recognized and respected as an intellectual of the Brazilian Academy of Letters, he had been successfully courted by the Portuguese government with state decorations, invitations to visit Portugal, conferences, and other courtesies. Lins had repaid these with ardent declarations of support for the Portuguese regime, as well as praise for the long-standing, fraternal relationship between Portugal and Brazil. Such dedication to Portugal, moreover, had even convinced Lins' friend, President Kubitschek, to appoint him as Brazilian ambassador to Lisbon, one of the most coveted posts in the Itamaraty. Nevertheless, his subsequent direct and continual contact with the realities of Portuguese life, as well as his encounters with democratic intellectuals and politicians, combined with an increasing awareness of the problems caused by the 'collaboration' of Brazil with Portuguese colonialism, had led him to rethink his position. Not only Lins, but also his diplomatic staff, had thus become staunch critics of the Portuguese regime, and of the relationship between Brazil and Portugal. They now characterized the latter as a form of "emotional exploitation," from which Lisbon extracted "maximum political performance" for domestic purposes, as well as a form of "indiscriminate service" to Portuguese colonialism, expressed mainly in "diplomatic games" and "voting sessions in assemblies." The Brazilian diplomatic corps in Lisbon thus believed that Brazil was supporting a dictatorship wedded to old imperialist assumptions, and whose political and diplomatic intimacy with Rio de Janeiro had brought only embarrassments, obstacles, and international discredit to Brazil.[15] The fact that Lins was still ambassador in Lisbon demonstrates one of the most significant contradictions of Brazilian behavior towards Portugal at this time: while Kubitschek supported the Portuguese regime and its colonialism, he nonetheless retained an ambassador who was a staunch critic of this policy. Indeed, this contradiction had become increasingly evident.[16]

In Rio de Janeiro, the Itamaraty was taken by surprise. Delgado was a well-known politician in Brazil, and Itamaraty officials soon realized that his presence inside their embassy was highly problematic. Senior diplomats worried – with good reason – that the case might create significant problems for Portugal-Brazil relations and cooperation. Delgado was particularly disliked by the Portuguese regime

[14] See Iva Delgado and Carlos Pacheco, *Humberto Delgado, as eleições de 58* (Lisboa: Vega, 1998) and Frederico Delgado Rosa, *Humberto Delgado. Biografia do General sem Medo* (Lisboa: A Esfera dos Livros, 2008).
[15] See Álvaro Lins, *Missão em Portugal* (Lisboa Centro do Livro Brasileiro, 1974).
[16] Lins, *Missão,* 18.

(which later considered him a political agitator, an opportunist, and a lunatic) and, if the Brazilian government decided to confirm his asylum, Lisbon would probably consider this a grave insult. However, the Itamaraty also worried – also with good reason – that Delgado's case might create significant domestic problems for Kubitschek's government. The case would eventually reach the media, and the government would be judged on its response. Indeed, the decision to grant asylum (or, at least, diplomatic protection) to Delgado had been communicated by Lins to the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marcelo Mathias, and any contradiction of its embassy in Lisbon would be perceived as a sign of weakness, or (even worse) as an act of subordination towards the Portuguese government – especially since Lisbon had already made clear that it did not subscribe to the asylum conventions, and consequently did not recognize General Delgado's right to asylum.[17]

Eventually, the Itamaraty decided to endorse the position of its ambassador. One day later, on January 13, Negrão de Lima informed the embassy that he "entirely approved their actions" regarding Delgado's asylum request. However, in the same cable, as well as in subsequent ones, the minister also stressed that the government was keen to avoid protracted negotiations. In particular, the Brazilians feared a lengthy exchange of messages that did not in the end lead to any practical solutions – a situation that should be "definitely avoided." Moreover, Negrão de Lima also reported, for the benefit of his ambassador and diplomatic staff, that among the Brazilian press and public opinion, there prevailed "an almost complete unanimity" in favor of the position adopted by the Brazilian embassy.[18]

Unquestionably, the Brazilian newspapers were already familiar with Portuguese domestic affairs. The 1958 Portuguese Presidential election had been followed with great interest, and particularly the candidature of Humberto Delgado, for obvious reasons: he was a general with great prestige, a man of the regime, and had captured headlines with his statements. At the peak of the electoral campaign, the Brazilian newspapers had published the latest developments on a daily basis, including the statements, the censorship, and the violence. Despite such interest, the Brazilian press had refrained from commenting directly on the election, for instance through the publication of editorials. Instead, they had expressed a preference for one of the candidates through a process of news selection. For example, the *Globo* had tended to lend such support to the regime candidate, while the *Última Hora* had inclined towards the opposition.

[17] Lins, *Missão,* Chapter one
[18] MRE to EMBRASLIS, T [C], January 13, 1959; MRE to EMBRALIS, T [C/U], January 14, 1959; MRE to EMBRALIS, T [C], January 17, 1959; MRE to EMBRALIS, T [C] January 17, 1959; AMRE.

Nevertheless, Delgado's request for asylum immediately prompted a reaction in the Brazilian press. In an editorial, the *Última Hora* stated that it was favorable to the decision to grant asylum to Delgado. "His right to asylum in our embassy is more than clear […], and, to Brazil, it is a matter of honor to support this right." The editorial also underlined that Brazilian diplomacy could not change its position, since to do so would mean the imprisonment of Delgado. "We must be prepared for the inevitable attempt to overrule our diplomatic representative […] [this would be] equivalent to condemning this great democrat to Portuguese prisons, or to the concentration camp of Tarrafal." The *Jornal do Brasil*, on the other hand, declared for the opposite position. The Rio de Janeiro-based newspaper considered the case as "unfortunate," and described as "perfect" the case made by Portuguese diplomats against Delgado's request. "We do not know this case in detail […], but for now, we fully agree with Lisbon." The *Globo* took a similar position. For its part, the newspaper argued that the case did not directly concern Brazil, since the facts and circumstances surrounding it were an exclusively Portuguese affair. However, the editorial stated that Brazil should be ready to receive the general if necessary, although with some conditions. "If this happens, Delgado should behave as the Brazilian exiles [in Portugal] did in the past […] [that is to say] without bringing their political disputes [to the country of exile]. [We] do not want to add any more problems to those we already have […] since this could affect one of the most important realities of our history – the Portuguese-Brazilian community."[19]

Ambassador Rocheta was particularly worried about the media attention surrounding the case. According to him, the *Última Hora* was taking the lead in the campaign for granting Delgado asylum, publishing new information and interviews with political exiles, and roundly criticizing the attitude of the Portuguese government. The newspaper openly declared that Salazar's regime was an outdated and repressive dictatorship, and that the Brazilian government should adopt a firm position towards it. The *Diário de Notícias*, the *Correio da Manhã*, and the *Diário Carioca* – all major newspapers – shared a similar opinion. In addition, Rocheta drew attention to some articles regarding the unfair competition of Angolan coffee and Mozambique cotton, which sought to expand the debate over the pros and cons of the relationship between Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro.[20] The Delgado's case was bringing undesired attention towards the regime.

With Brazilian-Portuguese issue rapidly assuming critical dimensions, and without any advance in the negotiations between Lins and the Necessidades, the Portuguese ambassador in Rio de Janeiro sought to interfere directly at the Itamaraty. Following a series of meetings with Negrão de Lima, Rocheta tried to sound him out regarding the problems created by Delgado's request for asylum, as well as the

[19] *Última Hora* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], January 14, 1959, 3; *Jornal do Brasil* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], January 15, 1959, 6; *O Globo* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], January 16, 1959, 1.
[20] EPRJ to MNE, T, January 14, 1959; EPRJ to MNE, T, January 15, 1959, AHDMNE.

different juridical approaches to the right of asylum. He also emphasized that Portugal was ready to let the General travel to Brazil or to another country, albeit on one condition: the Portuguese government could not accept a formal offer of asylum, since this would imply that the Portuguese authorities were unjustly persecuting Delgado. Somehow, these arguments persuaded Negrão de Lima. The latter believed that the Portuguese government was not obliged to recognize the right to asylum, and that the Brazilian government could do nothing about this. Negrão de Lima also believed, moreover, that it would be possible to settle all these problems if Delgado would simply leave the embassy without any kind of constraint or juridical obstacles. Nevertheless, he would need to examine in detail the conditions and diplomatic formalities surrounding the case. He reassured Rocheta that as a refugee in Brazil, Delgado would be obliged to end his political activities against the Portuguese regime[21].

The complications were, however, much larger. When Álvaro Lins had granted asylum, Delgado had gained a certain leverage to impose his own conditions: he was a public, renowned, and powerful individual, he had Ambassador Lins and the staff of the embassy on his side, and he was supported by a large majority of the Brazilian press and public opinion. Besides, the Itamaraty was paralyzed, confused, and undecided about what to do and how to act. Indeed, more than 15 days after his entrance into the Brazilian embassy, the negotiations with the Portuguese government had stalled, and the media buzz around the case continued to grow.

Rocheta was forced to employ indirect means to control the damage. By the end of January, in a series of meetings with the so-called 'friends of Portugal,' he had learned that the situation was even worse than expected. The famous intellectual Pedro Calmon had revealed that he was worried about the prolonged divergence between the two governments regarding Delgado, and particularly feared the effect on Brazilian public opinion, "which will not rest until the General leaves the embassy for Brazil." Consequently, Calmon promised a direct demarche towards president Kubitschek, in order to impress upon him the Portuguese point of view. Also, the former minister of External Relations and former Brazilian ambassador to Lisbon, João Neves da Fontoura, expressed his deep concern, and proposed sending a Brazilian diplomatic envoy – "worthy of the confidence of your government" – in order to find an acceptable solution. However, to the dismay of Rocheta, both men emphasized that any solution would have to be accepted by Delgado himself. "Public opinion," he cautioned the Necessidades, "would never understand if Brazil's government decided to handover or abandon a refugee."[22]

[21] EPRJ to MNE, T [C], January 17, 1959; EPRJ to MNE, T [C], January 17, 1959, AHDMNE.
[22] EPRJ to MNE, T, January 31, 1959, AHDMNE.

The extent of the problem can be gauged from the debates at the Chamber of Deputies. Although the topic was not scheduled on the agenda, the UDN representative and journalist Carlos Lacerda enthusiastically asserted that the Brazilian ambassador, Álvaro Lins, had "performed his duties in such a way that any representative of Brazil is obliged to do so […] [he] received in his home a Portuguese citizen, who was seeking the protection of the Brazilian flag." Well known for his incisive speeches, Lacerda added that general Delgado had good reasons to request diplomatic asylum. "There are precedents, and nobody, not even the greatest supporter of the current situation in Portugal, can deny them," Lacerda pointed out. "Military officials who are apprehended in, or suspected of, subversive actions are immediately punished and imprisoned." Resorting to the special relationship between Brazil and Portugal, he made a final appeal to the government of Lisbon. "From this tribune, I dare to appeal to the Portuguese government, to the country, where I once found asylum myself […] with the authority of fraternal love, with the authority of understanding […], may the Portuguese government grant a passport that allows our guest and brother, Mr. Delgado, to board a Brazilian airplane."[23]

With remarkable fury, the new Portuguese minister of Foreign Affairs, Marcelo Mathias demanded an immediate reaction from Rocheta, in order to "clarify the confusion and bad faith of some, the ignorance of others, and the general levity of all." "Seriously, how can Mr. Lacerda make such appeals […] if he completely ignores our official position […] how can [he] speak publicly about a case that he does not know?" Accordingly, Mathias instructed his Ambassador and diplomatic corps to clarify the Portuguese position before Brazilian public opinion, "by any means that you consider useful, whether these be personal, political, or general contacts […] and, if the Brazilian government do not consider it opportune to clarify this issue in the Chamber of Deputies […] or you are unable to prompt a statement from a friendly member of the parliament […] you should grant an interview to the newspaper *O Globo*, in order to clarify our position."[24] Indeed, this aggressive attitude towards Portugal was so widespread by this point that it was almost impossible to remain silent. Although the Necessidades wanted to maintain a relatively low profile in the case, especially since they feared provoking even more adverse reactions, such behavior could be seen as a sign that the Portuguese government was in effect accepting all the accusations that were being made against it regarding the case of Delgado.

Rocheta openly expressed his deep apprehensions regarding such suggestions. More cognizant of Brazilian political and social realities, he warned that it would be wiser to manage the situation through indirect means. "Giving an interview about the case could be dangerous," he cautioned, "since we could provoke a polemic, whose consequences would be very difficult to predict." For similar reasons,

[23] 'Diário do Congresso Nacional,' Câmara dos Deputados, Secção I, Ano XIX, nº 20, 31 Jan 1959, p. 933.
[24] MNE to EPRJ, T, February 1, 1959, AHDMNE.

he also believed that it would be counterproductive to demand a public declaration from the Brazilian government. Instead, Rocheta had arranged to meet with the now former head of the Political and Cultural Department, Odette de Carvalho e Sousa, who was still highly influential. "She is a very close friend of Carlos Lacerda, and has already promised to avoid any deterioration [in the situation] […] she is also going to intervene directly at the Itamaraty." Indeed, although Rocheta believed that it was important to reach an agreement on the case as soon as possible, he was convinced that the 'Delgado affair' would eventually be forgotten by the Brazilian press and public opinion[25].

Despite being fairly confident of his assessments, Rocheta soon discovered that he was wrong. Not only did the Brazilian press continue to speculate over the case, and to harshly criticize the behavior of the Portuguese government, but it also began to report significant problems in the relationship between the governments of Rio de Janeiro and Lisbon. Furthermore, the fact that another Portuguese opposition figure, Captain Henrique Galvão, had escaped from prison in Lisbon, and requested asylum at the Argentinian embassy, had heightened, yet further, the media buzz surrounding the case of Delgado. Rocheta voiced his concerns in one of the many telegrams he sent to the Necessidades. "The case of Galvão is everywhere in the press, and it has served to reopen the discussion around Delgado," he informed Lisbon. "I think we should insist on our statement that General Humberto Delgado can leave the embassy whenever he wants [although without political exile status]. However, we really should work as fast as possible for a solution. Otherwise, certain circles will continue to use this problem against us."[26]

In the face of these worrying events, the Itamaraty began to show some signs of anxiety. By the end of March, in a cable sent to Ambassador Lins, Negrão de Lima had noted that the ongoing polemic surrounding the Delgado case "compels us to find a satisfactory solution to the problem, since this situation cannot be maintained indefinitely." He believed that Delgado was not in a position to reject offers or to stipulate conditions, since this would "look as if he is taking advantage of the asylum issue, in order to create turmoil and hostility against the [Portuguese] government." Like their Portuguese counterparts, Brazilian diplomats thus sought to find a swift and satisfactory solution to the case. However, they felt that the Brazilian government was unable to control the outcome. On the one hand, they could not reach a solution without Delgado's personal agreement. On the other hand, they could not simply expel Delgado from the embassy, due to all the media interest around the case. Indeed,

[25] EPRJ to MNE, T, February 2, 1959; EPRJ to MNE, T, February 2, 1959, AHDMNE.
[26] EPRJ to MNE, T, February 18, 1959; EPRJ to MNE, T, February 20, 1959, AHDMNE.

despite the appeals of Negrão de Lima to Lins to convince Delgado to leave the embassy without asylum – and being simply accompanied by Brazilian diplomats – the general was unwilling to accept.[27]

In an effort to force a final resolution, Kubitschek decided to intervene personally. After some failed attempts, in mid-April, the Itamaraty received instructions to nominate a special diplomatic envoy. With the agreement of the Portuguese government, Secretary General António Mendes Viana thus traveled to Lisbon, in order to negotiate a solution directly. After several days of intense meetings between Mendes Viana, Marcelo Mathias, and Álvaro Lins, the latter of whom was in constant contact with Delgado, a final agreement was eventually reached. General Delgado was free to leave Portugal without safe-conduct, with a normal passport, and being driven to the airport in a private car without any diplomatic credentials. Some days later, Delgado embarked on a Panair flight for Rio de Janeiro, where he was received with considerable enthusiasm.[28]

Although it had at first clearly endorsed Lins' position, the Itamaraty had quickly lost control of the situation, and had become the hostage of both Delgado and the Brazilian press and public opinion. Despite all attempts to manage the situation, and to maintain the greatest possible discretion, the case was exhaustively explored in the pages of the newspapers over a period of almost three months. Nevertheless, Rio de Janeiro decided that it was preferable to support the Portuguese position, rather than to jeopardize the Brazil-Portugal relationship for the sake of a political dissident. However, the implications of such a decision were far-reaching: Ambassador Lins immediately resigned, accusing Kubitschek of treason; the Brazilian media harshly criticized the behavior of the government; voices within Kubitschek's administration, as well as nationalist currents of opinion, began to question the extent to which Brazil was entangled with the Portuguese dictatorship. Indeed, even if the damage was still difficult to gauge, the following months would prove that the impact of the Delgado case on the relationship between Rio de Janeiro and Lisbon was massive.

Delgado's Aftermath

Although both Kubitschek's foreign policy advisors and the top officials at the Itamaraty were divided regarding the resolution of Delgado's case, all of the Brazilian leadership agreed that sooner or later, Brazil would have to revise the character of Brazil-Portugal relations. In particular, they acknowledged that Brazil's association with Salazar's regime and its colonial policy was damaging the country's

[27] MRE to EMBRALIS, T [C/U], March 24, 1959, AMRE.
[28] MNE to EPRJ, T, April 20, 1959, AHDMNE.

reputation internationally. However, they significantly differed as to what the extent of such revision should be. Indeed, numerous politicians, diplomats, and, to a certain degree, some intellectuals, reasoned that Brazil would have to urge the Portuguese government to reconsider and readapt some aspects of its (colonial) policies, in order to enable the Brazilian government to justify its support internationally. However, they virtually dismissed any sort of radical and sudden rupture with the Portuguese regime. On the other hand, an increasing number of diplomats argued that Brazil should definitely put an end to this toxic and harmful relationship, and pursue a more independent foreign policy regarding Portugal. Although they recognized the importance of Brazil-Portugal relations in historical and cultural terms, Salazar's regime had already proved unable to adapt to postwar demands.

This crucial division was also the result of significant differences in the way that different groups of Brazilians assessed and perceived postwar international dynamics. A considerable number of these politicians, diplomats, and intellectuals still deemed alignment with the 'Western World' (including Portugal) as both normal and essential to Brazilian and Latin American security interests. The importance of this alignment resulted from a combination of several factors: identity, ideology, and strategy. Indeed, they considered themselves an intrinsic part of the 'Western World,' despite their geographic location in the global South. They were of European descent, they spoke a European language, and they had European traditions, manners, and habits. Thus, their legacy was fundamentally European. They wanted, moreover, to be recognized by their Western counterparts as part of this 'World,' especially due to Brazil's special, long, and privileged political, diplomatic, and cultural relations with the US, Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, and Germany. As a senior diplomat at the Itamaraty declared during a conference in 1959, "any international crisis that leads the United States to engage a war [against the USSR] […] would have sooner or later to count on our [military] involvement […]. Not only because of all the [cooperation and defense] treaties but also because Brazil is indeed part of the West […] although not juridically, politically we belong to this 'Western world'."[29]

This factor was normally combined with ideological anticommunist considerations. Such Brazilians believed that communist ideology and its expansion throughout the world was a direct threat to their "way of life," as President Juscelino Kubitschek informed Western leaders during his 17-day tour of the US and Europe in 1956.[30] Indeed, they had only narrowly escaped this menace during a communist-inspired coup in 1935, which had been initiated by the Brazilian Communist leader Luis Carlos Prestes, and supported by the Comintern. And, over subsequent decades, this experience had continued to

[29] MRE, Mendes Viana to General Arthur Hescket Hall, O [S] [no number], June 5, 1959, AHMRE.
[30] See chapter three.

substantiate anti-communist discourse among the most conservative, right-wing politicians, intellectuals, and military officers. During the 1950s, for instance, Brazil was one of the few countries in Latin America that still did not maintain political, diplomatic, or economic relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Cold War dictated that Brazil should collaborate intimately with the Western World against the expansion of the communist ideology, not only in Latin America, but also in Europe, Africa, and Asia.[31]

The question of strategy provided another justification for this alignment. Certain Brazilians, notably those connected to the military elite, believed that the west coast of Africa was fundamental to Brazil's security and geostrategic interests. They considered it imperative to maintain stability in the so-called 'South Atlantic', where several vital Brazilian interests lay. While under the direct control or indirect influence of colonial powers, African territories would not pose a threat to this stability. However, the ideological uncertainty of some new African nations (some of them receptive to Soviet influence and communist ideology) risked jeopardizing Brazil's security interests in this crucial region of the South Atlantic area.

In stark contrast, an increasing number of Brazilian politicians and diplomats reasoned that such Cold War security fears and ideological considerations were outdated. Or at least, they were of secondary importance when compared with other political and economic considerations, which could better serve Brazilian interests on a long-term basis. Instead of a 'blind alignment' with Western interests, they argued, Brazil should instead offer sympathy, interest, and support towards the nationalist movements in Asia and Africa. Although they believed that the independence of former European colonial territories could undermine the European powers (and, consequently, reduce the political influence and strength of the Western World), they did not believe that this would necessarily lead to communist expansionism. Liberation movements were, indeed, considered rationally justifiable. For this reason, such Brazilians believed that the European powers should recognize that withholding independence from their colonial territories, particularly in Africa, was creating an even greater danger, as communism (and the Soviet Union) would exploit such intransigence as a means to denounce and discredit the West.

Brazil's engagement with these new nationalist movements and recently independent nations would surely provide political and diplomatic prestige, bargaining leverage, and markets. Indeed, Brazil could expand its foreign policy, which was still mainly confined to the Latin American 'region,' to a worldwide level. Such expansion would allow Brazil to gain prestige not only among Latin American and Afro-

[31]See Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta, *Em Guarda contra o 'Perigo Vermelho'. O Anticomunismo no Brasil (1917-1964)* (São Paulo: Editora Perspectiva, FAPESP, 2002)

Asian nations, but also among Western countries. The US, thought these circles, would appreciate this political and diplomatic movement, since Brazil would be carrying out a policy that Washington approved, but could not (at least for the moment) openly declare. Moreover, the recognition of African nationalist movements would pay a Brazilian "debt," in the words of the Brazilian ambassador to India, José Cochrane de Alencar, since it was Africa that had provided "people to Brazil." It would also be a formal recognition of the racial and cultural ties that connected Brazil to the vast African continent.

This engagement would also provide increasing bargaining leverage to Brazil. Although they recognized that the new Afro-Asian nations were direct competitors of Latin America in the search for technical, economic, and financial assistance, they also recognized that Brazil could create a 'united front' in order to reinforce this search. Together with these nations, Brazil and Latin America could use their strength to obtain more assistance from the developed countries, and to reach a higher level of industrialization, thus increasing the living standards of their citizens. Finally, Brazil would also gain new and extensive markets for its exports. Although still excessively dependent upon the export of raw materials, such new markets would allow Brazil to accumulate capital to invest in areas such as industry and communication.[32]

Although these contrasting views cohabited in the same space for some years, the Itamaraty was still virtually dominated by those who privileged security concerns over economic considerations. The minister of External Relations, Francisco Negrão de Lima, and the Secretary-General António Mendes Viana, were conservatives, with a rigid perspective on the international system, and highly suspicious about any deviations, modernizations, or rapprochements towards recently independent nations. Although Brazil had striven for a rapprochement with some of these nations, notably India, Pakistan and Indonesia, its policy remained essentially vague, imprecise, and inconsistent. The presence of these men at the top of the chain of command sheds considerable light upon the striking contradictions of Kubitschek's foreign policy: how could Mendes Viana, who considered decolonization as a process that would only strengthen communism, not obstruct Brazil's rapprochement with such recently independent nations? By contrast, the men who favored such a policy were still in relatively low positions in the hierarchy of the Itamaraty. The head of the Political and Cultural Department, João Augusto Araújo Castro, was one of the few diplomats who were able to 'push' Brazilian foreign policy towards a more defined and accurate position regarding colonialism. Alongside him, some diplomats stationed abroad also often had a more informed perspective, for example ambassador Alencar in India.

[32] EMBRAND to MRE, O [S], February 15, 1959; MRE, M DPo [S], April 29, 1959, AHMRE.

Nevertheless, these more junior diplomats were soon to gain increasing prominence within the Itamaraty. In mid-1959, Kubitschek's government was facing considerable economic and political problems: inflation was rising, economic growth had slowed down, and opposition parties (including that of Kubitschek himself) were urgently demanding significant political changes in his government. One measure adopted to counteract this crisis was a cabinet reshuffle: External Relations, in particular, was one of the ministries targeted. To replace the conservative and Western-oriented Negrão de Lima, Kubitschek had made allusions to Horário Lafer, a politician who was well-known for his economic skills, possessing both vast ministerial experience and great respect among political and diplomatic elites. Although he cannot be considered a 'non-aligned' partisan, he surely privileged economic considerations over security concerns. In other words, Lafer would consider an economic (and political) rapprochement with the Soviet Union or with a non-aligned nation, if this served to achieve Brazil's development objectives.[33] Although having been appointed only in July, his nomination was apparently already known among some diplomats in the Itamaraty, and had provoked varying reactions. The more 'conservative' faction realized that it would now be difficult to maintain the same policy, revolving around security considerations, while the reforming 'nationalist' faction seemed to have now gained considerable some room for maneuver.

Between April and June 1959, the more conservative wing of the Itamaraty thus began to lose much of its ability to shape policy at will. In a series of documents produced during this brief period, the Itamaraty (and its conservative hierarchy) made some remarkable concessions towards the nationalist wing. In April, the Itamaraty claimed that it would be "excessive" to state that there was now a political crisis between Portugal and Brazil due to the Delgado case. However, at the same time, it acknowledged that it was Brazil's objective to progressively reduce its general involvement in the questions of Portuguese Goa, Daman, and Diu. "We are not thinking about withdrawing our support for Portugal [in the UN], or about abandoning our mission to protect [Portuguese interests]," a document stated. "However, we are determined to disconnect Brazil from colonialism."[34] One month later, the Itamaraty informed its ambassador in Delhi that it would be necessary to maintain a "strict impartiality" regarding Portuguese interests, underlining that Brazil should not "limit its relations with India, or distance [itself] from the anticolonial orientation" of the latter.[35] Although such attitudes were not entirely novel, the reasons presented by the Itamaraty were. Now, it emphasized that "the African eruption" had made it impossible for Brazil to continue supporting Portuguese policies.[36]

[33] Horário Lafer, in *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação Contemporânea do Brasil).
[34] EMBRAND to MRE, CT [C], April 8, 1959, AHMRE.
[35] MRE to EMBRAND, CT [C], May 29, 1959, AHMRE.
[36] MRE, [C] October 22, 1959, AHMRE.

It is unclear if the Portuguese were aware of the magnitude of this shift. However, they were certainly aware that the Delgado case had caused significant damage to the image of Portugal in Brazil. In May, Ambassador Rocheta cautioned the Necessidades that there were still some residual issues "that we cannot simply ignore," even if the case was officially considered closed. He indicated that Portuguese affairs continued to make headlines in the Brazilian newspapers, and that the activity of Portuguese opposition forces in Brazil was growing steadily and dangerously. Both realities, he claimed, served to complicate the work of the embassy, and would probably harm the pursuit of national interests. "The truth," the ambassador cautioned the Necessidades, "is that we are living through a crisis that could become very serious."[37]

Indeed, Portugal-Brazil relations foundered in the aftermath of the Delgado case. During, but especially after this episode, the Itamaraty had received worrying reports about disrespectful Portuguese behavior towards Brazilian diplomats, particularly by Ambassador Álvaro Lins, but also his diplomatic corps. Moreover, the embassy in Lisbon became more vigilant regarding Portuguese internal affairs, reporting on the activities of the Portuguese opposition, and the resulting reaction of the Portuguese regime: political arrests, persecutions, intimidations, and trials. The Portuguese colonial administration was also under scrutiny by the embassy. Slowly but surely, Brazilian diplomats became aware that Portuguese rule in Africa was everything but 'selfless,' as was claimed by Portuguese official discourse and Portuguese newspapers. At the same time, the Brazilian press was exploring this new and exciting subject, and, some of this press, clearly assuming a posture of opposition towards the undemocratic Portuguese regime.

In an effort to renovate the image of Portugal, the Necessidades initiated a public relations campaign towards the Brazilian government, and particularly towards Juscelino Kubitschek. Rocheta received instructions to invite the Brazilian president to attend the celebrations of the fifth centenary of the death of Henry the Navigator. The commemoration, according to Lisbon, should include representatives of all the Latin American countries, but particularly Brazil, "as a nation that was associated with the great historical epic that originated in the life and work of Prince Henry." For this reason, the Necessidades intended to dispatch a "special mission" to Rio de Janeiro, in order to invite the Brazilian president to act as co-host of the ceremonies, alongside President Américo Thomaz.[38]

Despite the current problems with Brazil-Portugal relations, president Kubitschek informally accepted the invitation, and stressed that he would receive a Portuguese special mission. The motives behind this acceptance are unclear. However, it is plausible that Juscelino Kubitschek was already preparing

[37] EPRJ to MNE, T, May 18, 1959, AHDMNE.
[38] MNE to EPRJ, T, May 13, 1959, AHDMNE.

his candidacy for the 1965 election.[39] The Portuguese community could, indeed, play an essential role in the latter. According to the statistics of the *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística*, in 1957, more than 300,000 Portuguese-origin citizens could vote in Brazilian elections – a significant number, considering that Kubitschek had been elected in 1955 with only three million votes. Bearing in mind the fact that the Portuguese *colónia* was particularly close to António de Oliveira Salazar's regime, a visit by president Kubitschek to Portugal, just a few months before ending its presidency, would surely not be forgotten.[40]

On May 23, just a few days after the acceptance of the invitation, Salazar decided to speak out publicly regarding the Delgado case and relations between Portugal and Brazil. He declared that Delgado's request for asylum in the Brazilian embassy was part of a vast international campaign against Portugal and Spain, which aimed at strengthening the opposition forces within both countries. Moreover, it was also an attempt to destabilize the links between Portugal and Brazil, two countries that had always maintained an excellent relationship. "Indeed, they also hoped to stoke a conflict between Portugal and Brazil," Salazar declared in a meeting of the *União Nacional*, "even if they already know that the affection that links these two peoples will not give them any hope." Salazar then took the opportunity to elaborate his thoughts regarding the importance of Brazil. "Without doubt, Brazil could be the advisor and guide [of Latin America] […] although [it remains] economically linked to the US. [However] there is another set of relations that should be established in a different direction: to the Iberian Peninsula." Indeed, he explained, "we need to promote a grand Iberian-American policy, which is already foreshadowed in the Portuguese-Brazilian Community, in the Peninsular Bloc, and in the intimate relations of Spain with the South American republics."

Perhaps more pertinently, Salazar played the 'African card' in order to seduce the Brazilian elites. His words are illuminating. "What kind of Portugal is interesting for Brazil?" he asked, continuing

> When we look at the immense Brazilian coast, and we evaluate its weight and potential in the South Atlantic, we understand that Continental Portugal and its small islands [the Azores and Madeira] in the Atlantic are insufficient to Brazilian security and expansion […] [However] Portugal as it is, with its vast expanses of African coast, its harbors, its bases, and its presence

[39] At the time, presidential mandates had a duration of five years, without possibility of reelection.
[40] Waldir José Rampinelli, "A política internacional de JK e suas relações perigosas com o colonialismo português," *Lutas Sociais*, volume 17/18, 1º semestre (São Paulo: Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2007); Waldir José Rampinelli, *As duas faces da moeda. As contribuições de JK e Gilberto Freire ao colonialismo português* (Florianópolis: Editora da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2004).

> and importance in the Dark Continent [can offer far more to Brazil]. Only in this situation can we glimpse a vast maritime space, in which Portuguese-Brazilian power is undeniable; both by its territorial expansiveness and by its defensive capabilities. However, evidently, calling into question the Overseas presence of Portugal would serve to undermine any such construction.[41]

To be sure, Portugal was not only highlighting the strategic importance of Portuguese Africa, but also 'opening its own doors 'to Brazil. In 1958, Rocheta had already emphasized to the Itamaraty (following precise instructions from Lisbon) the desire of the Portuguese government to extend the geographical scope of the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation to the African territories under the control of Lisbon.[42] Nevertheless, at this juncture, Portugal was inviting Brazil to engage in a sort of joint Portuguese-African-Brazilian policy, which could guarantee some assets to Rio de Janeiro in exchange for its international support. "Portugal is waving to Brazil, indicating the possibility of gaining greater political power through use of its overseas territories, and its maritime and air bases," a top official at the Itamaraty later reported. "In exchange, naturally, Brazil would assume new responsibilities. Not military […] but rather those that would oblige us to defend the political, juridical, and economic permanence of Portugal in Africa, against the will of its [native] inhabitants."[43]

Indeed, Portugal was able to read some of the Brazilian anxieties concerning Africa. Aware that its privileged position in Rio de Janeiro was weakening, Portuguese diplomats decided to play the only asset they had left: namely, to demonstrate not only that Brazilian security was, to a certain extent, dependent upon Lisbon's control of its 'extensive' African territories, but also that Portugal was willing to share 'some' African dividends with Brazil. Through this strategy, Lisbon hoped, Rio de Janeiro could be persuaded to continue to grant its political and diplomatic support for Portuguese colonialism. Moreover, this would also provide the more conservative and Cold War-oriented politicians and diplomats at the Itamaraty with an argument to counterattack the nationalists. On July 27, the Portuguese 'special mission' to invite president Kubitschek disembarked in Rio de Janeiro. Headed by the esteemed former Portuguese minister of Foreign Affairs, José Caeiro da Matta, the delegation did not touch upon any topic concerning foreign policy. However, the Portuguese must surely have felt

[41] 'Comunidade Luso-Brasileira. Discurso do Presidente Oliveira Salazar;' 'Ofício [Confidential] sent by the Brazilian Embassy to Lisbon to the Minister of External Relations,' 25 May 1959, AMRE.
[42] See Chapter One.
[43] MRE, M DPo [C] July 15, 1959, AHMRE.

some kind of uncertainty: would the Brazilians accept the African offer? Or, to the contrary, was it already too late?

These recent developments did not pass unnoticed at the Indian embassy in Rio de Janeiro. According to Ambassador Kirpalani, Portugal was pressing for closer ties. However, in response, Brazil was maintaining a "discreet silence." In any case, the Indian diplomat informed the South Block that Brazilian public opinion regarded the Salazar regime "as being obviously in an advanced stage of decomposition [such that it] would collapse of itself when the country may breathe again." However, until that point was reached, India should not expect any significant modification in Brazil's behavior regarding the issue of Goa. "There is no disposition on this account to support our case," Kirpalani wrote. "This is a problem which it is felt Portugal must solve itself. Brazil is not the one to impose its own way of thinking on another country, however close." [44]

Brazil and the Portuguese (African) Empire

How was Rio de Janeiro supposed to react? Until then, Brazil under Kubitschek had tended to distance itself from African developments. True, there had been some attempts at rapprochement with the newly independent African nations, but Brazil's foreign policy nonetheless remained heavily centered on the US, Europe and Latin America. Besides, Africa was still virtually unchartered territory for Brazil. In mid-1959, and despite the advance of the decolonization process, the Itamaraty remained poorly represented on the dark continent. In total, Brazil had only a legation in Addis Ababa (cumulative with Beirut), a general consulate in Damascus, and consulates in Algiers, Alexandria, Casablanca, Dakar and Tangier. The same meagre levels of representation were maintained in Portuguese Africa, where the Itamaraty had only a consulate in Beira (Mozambique), and honorary consulates in São Vicente (Cape Verde) and Lourenço Marques (Mozambique). Therefore, the Brazilian government was poorly equipped in terms of observation posts, and consequently unable to develop an informed policy in relation to African affairs. Such shortcomings had recently prompted the Itamaraty to search establishing relations with Tunisia and Morocco,[45] and had also led the Brazilian embassy in Lisbon to request the creation of career consulates in Luanda and Lourenço Marques, in order to "follow, directly and objectively, the evolution of the two largest provinces" of Portugal. Until then, the embassy noted,

[44] "Annual Reports of 1959 from Rio de Janeiro," [S], 3(13) R&I/60, NAI.
[45] The Itamaraty opened its embassies in Tunis and Rabat in late 1959.

it would have to continue to rely mainly upon information and data from Portuguese sources – "with problems regarding impartiality" – to define its policy.[46]

However, the Brazilian embassy in Lisbon appeared to have found an answer. Since 1958, Brazilian diplomats in Portugal had been devoting substantial attention to the development of Portuguese-African affairs (even prioritizing the latter over metropolitan Portuguese matters), and producing numerous well-informed reports.[47] Contrary to the previous ambassadors, who had mainly dispatched reports limited to the business of Angolan coffee, Álvaro Lins had widened the spectrum of the reports to include topics such as colonial economics (mainly related to the economic developmental plans – *planos de fomento* – devised by the Portuguese authorities in order to modernize the colonies), education, administration, and even general African politics. Although lacking access to impartial sources, and relaying upon Portuguese (and also foreign) newspapers, official data, and even personal contacts, Lins and the embassy staff had thus begun to challenge certain assumptions and theories regarding the 'distinctive' character of Portuguese colonialism.[48]

Indeed, a series of reports had challenged the well-established theory – both in Portugal and in Brazil – that the Portuguese African empire had escaped the African nationalist turmoil thanks to the policy of assimilation carried out by Portugal. Based on data provided by the Portuguese government, which had identified a mere 30,000 "assimilated" individuals in Angola, less than 4,500 in Mozambique, and no more than 1,500 in Guinea, the embassy questioned the validity of Portugal's claims. "This reality shows us that the principle of assimilation has not yet developed from theory to practice," Lins emphasized in one report, "and that the resistance of the indigenous culture to the attraction of Portuguese civilization has been stronger [than expected]." Certainly, the diplomat claimed, any future assessment of Portuguese Africa would have to consider this factor. "The majority of the [African] population is not assimilated, either by language, religion, or by a sense of living in a Portuguese overseas province." Indeed, he underlined, even the *mestiços*[49] population was limited: there were only 55,500 such individuals in the entirety of Portuguese Africa, namely 26,000 in Angola, 25,000 in Mozambique, and 4,500 in Guinea. "This [also] proves that the purported inexistence of racial

[46] Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Departamento de Administração, Divisão do Pessoal, *Anuário 1964 a 1966* (Rio de Janeiro: Seção de Publicações da Divisão de Documentação, 1967); EMBRALIS to MRE, O [R] 288, August 21, 1958, AHI; and EMBRALIS to MRE, O [C] 328, September 12, 1958, AMRE.

[47] As noted by the embassy. See EMBRALIS to MRE, O [C] 328, September 12, 1958, AMRE.

[48] The Brazilian chargé d'affaires, Martin Francisco Lafayette de Andrada, emphasized that despite its best efforts to collect information, the embassy was still held back by the "nature of the available sources," particularly newspapers that "insist only on the positive aspects of [Portuguese] colonization [and] that silence other significant aspects of the overseas context." Lafayette de Andrada had even emphasized how easy it was to remain completely 'blind' regarding these important subjects. "If it was not for Salazar's interview with *Le Figaro*, the Portuguese would still be unaware that Angolan and Mozambican [nationalist] delegations had attended the latest anticolonial international conferences." See EMBRALIS to MRE, O [C] 328, September 12, 1958, AMRE.

[49] *Mestiço*, was used to describe individuals born from European white and African black mixing.

prejudice in the Portuguese empire really only applied to the colonization of Brazil and Cape Verde […] [since the inhabitants of the latter] identify strongly with Portuguese culture and with Portuguese-Brazilian civilization." However, even these *mestiços* remained excluded from the political sphere, since power still lay with the 'white minority'. "This administrative rigidness – and the inability to adapt or to look to the future – is the greatest vulnerability of the Portuguese empire."[50]

But how had Portugal managed to contain the forces of African nationalism? Having failed at assimilation, and being unable to bring about rapid modernization – "since Portugal, contrary to other colonial powers, is an underdeveloped country with a small population" – the embassy believed that the Portuguese authorities had instead achieved their objectives by discouraging improvements in education,[51] by reinforcing the administrative apparatus designed to control the population, by violently repressing any black political associations, and by promoting an ideology based on the supposed principle of racial equality. "[However] these policies aimed essentially to contain [and] to withstand – not to innovate," *chargé d'affaires* Lafayette de Andrada cautioned in another report. "From this point of view, the Portuguese solution is closer to that of South Africa (although without the racism of the latter) than to that […] of the British, the French, and, to a certain degree, the Belgians." Therefore, the diplomat concluded, the absence of nationalist agitation within Portuguese Africa was not due to a "feeling of [African] solidarity towards the Metropolis," as had been claimed by the Portuguese government, but was rather due to such preemptive measures. Indeed, "the indigenous inhabitants of the Portuguese provinces seemed, from an ideological point of view, entirely open [to anticolonial ideas]," Lafayette de Andrada wrote. "However, there is an effective obstacle, in the form of a series of preemptive measures, which constitute, in essence, the overseas policy of the *Estado Novo*." "Thus, the Portuguese presence in Africa is characterized by two fundamental aspects," he went on. "[First] by an admirable spirit of resistance, quite superior to the spirit of other colonizers; and, at the same time, by an inability to conceive solutions that would capture the imaginations of the [indigenous] populations."[52]

This "admirable spirit of resistance" could nevertheless have its limits. Although some indigenous populations were not prone to ideologies of liberation – "mainly in Angola, where they are still at a very primitive cultural stage" – the embassy believed that anticolonial ideas, although still diffuse, were already present in Portuguese Africa, and could soon undermine Portuguese authority. For example, Arab nationalism and Pan-Africanism, Lins and Lafayette de Andrada underlined, were gaining force in

[50] EMBRASIL to MRE, O [C] 12, January 7, 1959, AMRE.
[51] A reference to the prevalence of illiteracy in Portuguese Africa (more than 90% in Angola and Mozambique). See EMBRALIS to MRE, O [C] 266, June 30, 1959, AMRE.
[52] EMBRALIS to MRE, O [C] 464, October 8, 1959, AMRE. See also EMBRALIS to MRE, O [C] 266, June 30, 1959, AMRE.

the provinces of Mozambique and Guinea. Together with other recent developments, such as the independence of several African nations, the imminent independence of others, the emergence of young nationalist students trained in Moscow, and the nationalist agitation in other territories, it was unlikely that Portugal would be able to prevent a nationalist uprising within the empire. "Perhaps Portugal does not have […] the institutional capacity to maintain for much longer the dams that it has traditionally used to contain irredentism within its colonies." As such, Brazilian diplomats in Lisbon had begun to raise the hypothesis that the Portuguese government would sooner or later face a crisis – identical to those currently faced by other colonial powers in Africa.[53]

So, how was Rio de Janeiro supposed to react? Taking into account these developments, Lins' embassy argued that the Brazilian government ought to draw its own conclusions, thinking solely of Brazil's own interests, and eschewing "sentimental considerations that could bring us unpleasant consequences in the future." However, according to the embassy, Brazil should no longer "underestimate the possibilities offered by the surviving Portuguese empire, an empire that Brazil could legitimately inherit, by natural and historical laws of succession, […] in the case of it being divided […] by the anticolonial movements." These possibilities included the chance to export Brazilian products to African maritime ports, the opening of new routes of trade, and the opportunity of developing new branches of production and new industrial processing cores. In a telling document, the Brazilian diplomats reminded the Itamaraty of the geostrategic advantages of each province: Cape Verde was an excellent maritime port for trade between Africa and Latin America, and São Tomé was a superb location for air connections; Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique also offered the best harbors and airports in Africa; Portuguese India provided access by river to the Indian subcontinent, as well as access to the coveted port of Mormugão; Macao provided access to Chinese markets and to Asia; while East Timor would soon have a maritime port of great and undeniable importance. Rio de Janeiro's international prestige, the embassy noted, would also benefit from an economic presence around the globe.[54]

Based on this assessment, the embassy had then proposed that the Brazilian government should begin preparing for a post-colonial scenario. Brazil should attract the Portuguese empire – "on the eve of its subversion" – into a supranational federation under the auspices of the Portuguese-Brazilian community, and then slowly but surely establish its own position. The strengthening of this position – namely with regard to those African populations that had not yet been "conquered by the African anticolonial movement" – should occur primarily through culture: literature, the press, theater,

[53] EMBRALIS to MRE, O [C] 12, January 7, 1959; EMBRALIS to MRE, O [C] 135, April 9, 1959, AMRE.
[54] EMBRALIS to MRE, O [C] 461, December 2, 1958, AMRE.

popular music, and all manner of other Brazilian cultural forms. "Capitalize upon the affinities of language, climate and race that link Angola and Mozambique to Brazil, give special attention to the assimilated minority of *mestiços* and blacks, on the assumption that it is from this group that nationalist leaders will emerge; strengthen […] the idea that we all belong to the same community of Portuguese-speaking peoples," these were the key suggestions put forward by the embassy.[55]

Such assessments downplayed, however, several crucial factors. First, Portugal could resist the decolonization process, including by military means. Although its capacity to resist successfully was doubtful, it was naïve to assume that the Portuguese regime would give up easily. Portugal under Salazar was already showing some degree of commitment towards the maintenance of its overseas territories, not only via diplomatic means, but also through considerable investment in infrastructure and industry. Second, Brazil would have little ability to simply 'impose' its influence (by political, diplomatic, or economic means) within a post-colonial scenario. Despite a degree of cultural leverage, Brazil's economic and financial resources were negligible when compared to those of other nations with geostrategic interests in Africa, namely the US and the Soviet Union (and even Europe). Third, post-colonial African nations could simply choose to reject Brazil's presence, despite sharing some cultural and linguistic attributes in common, especially considering the fact that Brazil's foreign policy regarding decolonization was not particularly appreciated by African nationalists. Even *lusotropicalism*, as celebrated and praised by Brazilians, was considered a falsehood by the Portuguese African nationalist leaders.[56]

Despite the boldness of these assessments and proposals, the Itamaraty persisted in its traditional behavior: in other words, it had remained silent. However, the Portuguese proposals of mid-1959 led the Political Division to recover its essential ideas, and to reevaluate Brazil's position towards the African continent, particularly regarding Portuguese Africa. In a memorandum, the Political Division suggested that Sub-Saharan Africa might prove to be "easy prey for communism." On the other hand, the newly independent African nations might evolve their own distinctive characteristics, "sui generis." "Neither substantially democratic, nor totally socialist, but definitely non-aligned at the international level." "In this context," the head of the division, Jorge de Carvalho e Silva, wrote, "it is too risky for Brazil to accept an association with any protection policy for that region." Thus, regarding the Portuguese proposals, he recognized that the Portuguese government was indeed attempting to engage Brazil in the empire in return for "new [Brazilian] responsibilities" within its territories.

[55] See EMBRALIS to MRE, O 177, May 21, 1958, AHI; EMBRALIS to MRE, O [C] 12, January 7, 1959; EMBRALIS to MRE, O [C] 201, May 25, 1959; EMBRALIS to MRE, O [C] 464, October 8, 1959, AMRE.
[56] João Medina, 'Gilberto Freyre contestado: o lusotropicalismo criticado nas colónias portuguesas como alibi colonial do salazarismo,' in *Revista USP*, São Paulo, n. 45, Março/Maio 2000, 48-61.

However, ultimately, he believed that Brazil ought to take into account the associated disadvantages. First and foremost, Rio de Janeiro would have to adopt an active defense of Portuguese colonial rights, and that would contradict the anticolonial and antiracist spirit of Brazil. Second, it would go against Brazilian economic interests, since both nations had different objectives. Third, and referring directly to the ideas of the embassy in Lisbon, Carvalho e Silva pointed out not only that Salazar was far from considering the empire to be "doomed," but also that he was not interested in any kind of economic collaboration. Moreover, Carvalho e Silva underlined that neither Portugal nor Brazil was in a position to remain in Africa, for two main reasons. First, whether alone or in alliance with each other, they were not strong enough to successfully combat nationalist and communist ideologies. Second, they were incapable of guaranteeing a gradual and peaceful transition from colonies to independent nations. For these reasons, the Itamaraty should act carefully: first, Brazil could take advantage of the Portuguese proposal to open consulates in Luanda and Lourenço Marques. Through these consulates, the government could begin to collect information and data, in order to outline a comprehensive outlook on Portuguese Africa; second, Brazil could also accept the Portuguese invitation to send a diplomatic envoy to visit the Portuguese provinces in Africa, and thus take advantage of the opportunity to observe political, social, and economic conditions on the ground.[57] Kubitschek, ultimately, would have to decide whether Brazil would seize the opportunity to granting some influence in the African continent.

What is clear is that General Delgado's claim for asylum was a watershed in Portugal-Brazil relations: the disastrous way in which the problem was handled by Portugal – entrenching itself in a position (accepting the General's departure, but not his asylum), and allowing the problem to drag out for months – reminded some Brazilians that their friendship with Portugal had its limits. Although Kubitschek eventually found a solution, the damage to Portugal's reputation was considerable: the issue had escalated beyond the boundaries of diplomacy into general public opinion, and many people had seized the opportunity not only to criticize the 'offensive behavior' of the Portuguese government towards one of its most valuable allies, but also to raise other sensitive topics, such as the coffee trade. After all, Angola was one of the main competitors of Brazil in this market. Indeed, as the former ambassador to Brazil, António de Faria, mentioned in 1957, Brazilians could "quickly pass from one extreme to another" about Portugal, and, this time at least, Portugal had completely failed to keep the Brazilians in a good mood.

Acknowledging, however, the importance that Brazil held within its foreign policy, the Portuguese government came up with the idea of inviting Kubitschek to attend the celebrations (and to act as co-

[57] MRE, M DPo [C] 222, July 15, 1959, AHMRE. See also MRE, M DPo [C] 219, July 13, 1959, AMRE.

host) of the fifth centenary of the death of Henry the Navigator, which were scheduled for the following year. This was a way of honoring not only Brazil and Brazilians, but especially their president, who had proved to be a true friend of Portugal. However, more important was the subtle signaling to Brazil regarding the fact that Portugal was receptive to granting a share in some of its imperial dividends – although, without specifying the precise terms in which such a relationship would develop. Regarding such a proposal, Brazilian diplomats seemed divided: the future of the Portuguese empire did not bode well, but, at the same time, Brazil could potentially play a role in Africa due to a common language, cultural influence, and, ultimately, its racially egalitarian values. Nonetheless, in exchange, Brazil would have to assume the burden of defending the presence of Portugal in Africa, against the will of the African populace. The question was: was it worth it?

Chapter Six | The Coup de Grace, 1960-1961

Farewell to Kubitschek

The late 1950s and early 1960s were a bitter period for the Portuguese regime. After three years of upholding its position at the UN – refusing to provide any information regarding its colonial territories and hiding behind the two-thirds rule – the Portuguese delegation finally experienced defeat. In December 1959, as had been foreseen by Garin, the General Assembly had established, under resolution 1467 (XIV), a special committee of six members, in order to study the principles intended to guide members in determining whether or not they were obliged to provide the information requested under article 73 of the charter.[1] This would mean that in the next General Assembly, the organization would probably define the Portuguese 'provinces', including the territories of Goa, Daman and Diu, as 'non-self-governing territories' ('colonies').

Irrespective of this, Portuguese and Brazilian diplomats were preparing for the visit of president Kubitschek to Portugal, during which he was scheduled to serve as co-host of the *Comemorações Henriquinas*, a commemoration of the fifth centennial of the death of Prince Henry the Navigator. This event was not only a way of promoting Portugal-Brazil relations, which had been damaged by the Delgado case, but also a means to finally regularize the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation. Although signed in 1953 and ratified in 1954, both countries had dragged their heels during the subsequent regulatory process, thus making the Treaty virtually inoperative. According to the Itamaraty, the Brazilian commission on the treaty had concluded its work, and was now ready to meet its Portuguese counterpart in May, "before the visit of the president […] and in order to seize the opportunity to sign the conventions provided for." Nevertheless, Manuel Pio de Correia, anticipating possible delays from the Portuguese side, warned that Kubitschek was "very keen" to disembark in Lisbon with "concrete achievements" having been made. In particular, he warned the Portuguese ambassador that the overall atmosphere was rather unfavorable to Brazil-Portugal relations, and that this could be the last chance to realize the "old ambition" of the Portuguese *colónia* and of the circles sympathetic to Portugal.[2]

[1] Three of the six members were administering members, and three non-administering members, namely Great Britain, the United States, Netherlands, México, India and Morocco.
[2] EPRJ to MNE, T 42, March 30, 1960; EPRJ to MNE, T [U] 55, April 8, 1960, AHDMNE.

Pio de Correia's warnings were not unfounded. Behind closed doors, the Itamaraty had been debating the future of Brazil-Portugal relations since early that year. Following on the heels of the reports produced by the embassy in Lisbon, and of the long-anticipated independence of numerous sub-Saharan countries, senior diplomats believed that it was now time to adopt a new position regarding Portugal. The fundamental reason for this was that the political and diplomatic relations that had been maintained until then had been everything but practical and useful. "Interactions remain in a sentimental realm […] The declarations and speeches that have characterized the contact between prominent Brazilian and Portuguese figures are filled with praise for [the Portuguese poet Luiz Vaz de] Camões, for navigators, and for ties of friendship, but without yielding fruitful results," one of the divisions underlined. The Treaty of Friendship and Consultation – "signed in a moment of euphoria" – was considered "useless," whereas, the same document stated, "the trade agreement simply does not work." Moreover, despite Brazil having defended Portuguese India at the UN and having protected the power of Portuguese interests in India, Portugal had undermined several Brazilian interests. "Coffee and other products from Portuguese Africa compete with Brazilian ones under unfair conditions, in the sense that the native workers of Angola and Mozambique have a status similar to that of slaves. In 1958, Portugal erected numerous obstacles to the Coffee Agreement sponsored by Brazil; it also caused great nuisance to Brazil regarding the removal of General Humberto Delgado."

Therefore, some senior diplomats embraced the ideas that had been proclaimed by the embassy in Lisbon: Brazil should take advantage of the Portuguese in order to enter Africa, so as to expand its own trade network, but also in order to prepare for an eventual post-colonial scenario. "Sooner or later, Angola and Mozambique will be independent nations, with a seat in international organizations, participating in collective affairs," another document stated. "Unless we begin to establish contacts with the Portuguese territories [in Africa] now, we might risk losing the sympathy that we currently enjoy among [African] peoples to other powers." In this regard, senior diplomats also had geo-strategical considerations, and particularly Cold War anxieties, in their mind. They feared that Africa could fall victim to "ideological and economic penetration by the communist bloc," leading to a proliferation of communist states that might jeopardize Brazilian national security, "given the geographical proximity of the African continent to the northeast of Brazil." In conclusion, in the short-term, Brazil should open career consulates in Luanda and Lourenço Marques, and dispatch a diplomatic mission to establish economic and political contacts throughout the continent.[3]

How would Kubitschek react to these proposals? To be sure, the opinion of these senior diplomats was not binding. However, the president was being increasingly pressured to adopt a more realistic policy

[3] MRE, M [C] 19, February 19, 1960; MRE, M [C] 67, March 16, 1960; MRE, M [C] 92, May 30, 1960, AMRE.

– and, to a certain degree, a less sentimental policy – regarding the relationship with Portugal. The world had changed significantly since he had assumed power in 1956, and was about to change even more later that year, with the achievement of independence by almost 17 sub-Saharan African nations. And, even in 1956, many in the Itamaraty were already calling for a new foreign policy. Yet, Kubitschek had adopted his usual conciliatory approach: without defining a concrete path, he had instead oscillated between two opposing views of foreign policy, tolerating both on the condition that a basic alignment with Western interests was maintained.[4] However, Kubitschek was about to reach the end of his presidency: at this late stage, he was hardly likely to carry out any fundamental modification.

A good indicator of Kubitschek's unwillingness to modify his policies had recently occurred. In early May, Alencar had informed the Itamaraty about the prospect of Indira Gandhi undertaking a goodwill visit to Mexico and several other Latin American countries.[5] According to subsequent information, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela and Peru had invited the former leader of the Indian National Congress (and Nehru's daughter), and would likely be included in her visit, which was scheduled to take place in October. The Brazilian ambassador in New Delhi immediately encouraged the Itamaraty to extend an invitation, emphasizing how critical this could be for Brazil-India relations. "Nehru did not undertake his state visit to Latin America because he did not wish to do it without visiting Brazil, which had failed to present him with an invitation," Alencar reminded his superiors. "It seems to me […] that it would be in our interest to invite Mrs. Gandhi, [and] that this would please both her and Nehru himself […]. Besides, Indira's visit presents no difficulties to us [referring to the political-diplomatic problems regarding Goa]."[6]

In July, Alencar received strong signals regarding Indira Gandhi's desire to include Brazil in her itinerary. During an informal meeting with the Foreign Secretary, Subimal Dutt, the ambassador learned that Indira was open to a visit to Brazil.[7] A few days later, following a brief visit to the South Block, Alencar was directly contacted about the possibility of an invitation.[8] Having received no response from the Itamaraty to his enquires, Alencar once again emphasized the advantages that were at stake. "I ask you to take into account the fact that Brazil is the only important Latin American nation that never invited [Indira's] father, Nehru," the ambassador repeated to his superiors. "[An] invitation [from

[4] Gonçalves, *O Realismo*, 115.
[5] EMBRAND to MRE, O [C] 332, May 6, 1960, AMRE.
[6] EMBRAND to MRE, O [C] 332, May 6, 1960; EMBRAND to MRE, T 12, July 6, 1960; EMBRAND to MRE, CT 77, July 14, 1960, AMRE.
[7] EMBND to MRE, T 12, July 6, 1960, AMRE; "Subimal Dutt to Indira Gandhi," July 11, 1960, F. 52 (19) AMS / 60, NAI.
[8] EMBRAND to MRE, T [C] 23, July 21, 1960, AMRE.

Brazil] to the daughter would be highly appreciated by the father, as well as by the country at large," he concluded.[9]

Bearing in mind the policy of rapprochement with the Afro-Asian world that was being advocated by the Itamaraty, even if this was still extremely vague, a positive answer to Alencar's pleas was to be expected. Nevertheless, the Itamaraty responded negatively to its ambassador's suggestions, without giving any clear explanation as to why. "Although we do not have the possibility of inviting Indira Gandhi to visit Brazil officially," the Secretary General, Fernando Ramos de Alencar, replied, "you may inform her that, if she decides to come [to Brazil], she will be received with attention, and with all the facilities due to her political position."[10] Although the available documents do not reveal the reasons behind this negative response, one might speculate that Kubitschek was unwilling to receive such a high-profile Indian figure directly before his final visit to Portugal as president, as well as in the midst of Brazil's presidential election. Everything suggests that Ambassador Alencar decided to conceal the indifferent attitude of his superiors. During a conversation with the Indian Joint Secretary, S.K. Banerji, Alencar told the latter that there had been no response from his government – a silence that he surprisingly justified through reference to Portugal's political and diplomatic influence over Rio de Janeiro. Unlike in 1959, Indian diplomats did not propose any alternative, and Brazil was simply taken off Indira's agenda.[11]

Despite the attempts of some officials within the Itamaraty to reshape Kubitschek's foreign policy, the president continued to founder upon an entrenched conservatism and sentimentalism. Indeed, when he arrived in Portugal in order to act as co-host of the *Comemorações Henriquinas*, an event heavily characterized by an outdated nationalism, the president had downplayed all the suggestions that had been made by his modernizing advisors. Besides having the regulatory process of the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation ready, Kubitschek eventually signed another six agreements with Portugal regarding migration rights.[12] He also proposed the creation of a Portuguese-Brazilian Institute of Astronautics, so that Brazil and Portugal could explore outer space in the same way that Portugal had navigated the world during the Age of Discoveries. As Jerry Dávila has ironically noted in his book, the

[9] EMBRAND to MRE, T 15, July 26, 1960, AMRE.
[10] MRE to EMBRAND, T 15, July 26, 1960, AMRE.
[11] "S.K. Banerji to M.C. Chagla," August 25, 1960; "M.K. Kirpalani to S.K. Bajerji," September 8, 1960; "S.K. Banerji to M.K. Kirpalani," September 27, 1960, F. 52 (19) AMS /60, NAI. Her goodwill trip was eventually cancelled by prime minister Nehru, allegedly due to the death of Indira's husband, Feroze Gandhi, in September. Ultimately, only Mexico was honored with her presence. See "Note, Prime Minister's Secretariat," September 23, 1960, "S.K. Banerji to M.K. Kirpalani," September 27, 1960, F. 52 (19) AMS / 60, NAI.
[12] Gonçalves, *O Realismo*, 117-119.

optimistic president Kubitschek failed to specify "how two countries with illiteracy rates over 30 percent and whose principal exports included cork and coffee might reach outer space."[13]

However, the situation for Portuguese colonialism was less optimistic. In Africa, the crisis in the newly-independent Congo threatened the stability of the neighboring Portuguese colonies: after the Belgians left, the country's new leadership, under Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, tried without success to avoid the collapse of a country that seemed destined to civil war. Within weeks, Congo was fragmenting, and UN troops were dispatched to avoid a total collapse. In the meanwhile, Lumumba had brought Congo into the Cold War by appealing for Soviet support – a worrying signal for Portuguese Africa. Approximately six months previously, Harold Macmillan had made his famous speech, in which he had stated that a "wind of change" was blowing through Africa, and that "we must all accept it as a fact." However, in Portugal, the old dictator, António de Oliveira Salazar, preferred other terms: "Literally, Africa burns [and it burns because] they are starting fire from abroad."[14]

This uneasy atmosphere has not gone unnoticed among the Portuguese delegates to the UN. Once again, Vasco Garin was the bearer of bad news. In a three-page, highly confidential cable, he warned the Necessidades about the possibility of Portugal facing a "distressing situation" at the forthcoming General Assembly. The hostility of the Secretary General and of the Secretariat towards colonialism, the results of the debate about South Africa and Congo, the lax attitude of the European colonial powers, the expected adverse outcome at the Special Committee of Six, and, finally, the admission of 14 African nations, were all reasons for disquiet. "With the admission of new members," he stated, "we should count on a howling mass of 30 countries, among them Africans, communists, and Asians […] and virtually no friends and allies with the courage to openly defend us. I confess that my biggest anxiety stems from the fact that we could find ourselves […] in as deplorable a situation as South Africa [i.e. an exports boycott]." Once again, Garin also emphasized the need to undertake reforms that might momentarily 'clear the air' for the Portuguese delegation. He pleaded for the reinforcement of the political and juridical structure of Portuguese Africa, namely through the end of the *Indigenato*, the revision of the 'color' representation in the local and central legislative bodies, and the announcement of an education program for the native population. Through the simple announcement of these reforms, Garin believed, the Portuguese delegation would have the "weapons to defend itself in the United Nations, and before international public opinion, and to stimulate our friends to block the two-thirds majority in resolutions of dramatic consequence [to us]." Above all, Garin thought, these

[13] Dávila, *Hotel*, 27-28.
[14] Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War. A World History* (New York: Basic Books, 2017), chapter 10. See also Martin Thomas, Bob Moore, and L.J. Butler, *Crises of Empire. Decolonization and Europe's Imperial States, 1918-1975* (London: Hodder Education, 2008), Chapter 16.

measures would serve "to win time until the eruption of the unavoidable grievances between African states, between these and the Asians, and between the blacks and the Arabs."[15]

Certainly, the Necessidades were already aware of this precarious and dangerous situation. Franco Nogueira, who would become Foreign Minister in April 1961, had already predicted that the 1959 General Assembly would probably be the last one in which Portugal could avoid a condemnatory resolution. The creation of the Special Committee of Six on the transmission of information under article 73 served to reinforce such fears. However, this did not mean that the leadership at the Necessidades considered Portugal to be on the edge of the precipice, as feared by Garin. Or at least, their actions (or lack thereof) gave this impression: despite consistent warnings of the need to improve certain "things" in the Portuguese territories – as suggested by the US ambassador, Philip Bonsal, in early 1957 – Lisbon did little or nothing to neutralize the factual arguments that anti-colonial nations used against Portugal. The maintenance of the *Indigenato* regime was just one of these.

Whether through optimism, naivety, or despair, the Necessidades had begun to prepare Portugal's candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council in early 1960. The government considered the acquisition of such a seat a highly important matter, not least because they believed that the Hague's judgment on Dadra and Nagar-Haveli – which was expected to be satisfactory to Portuguese interests – might be debated by the General Assembly.[16] Nevertheless, in April of that year, the court's verdict was everything but favorable: although the judges had recognized Portuguese sovereignty on the two inland enclaves, they had simultaneously denied the right of passage for Portuguese military and police forces (through Indian territory). In practical terms, the verdict was a bitter defeat, since Portugal could thus do nothing to re-establish control of the two inland enclaves.[17] Irrespective of this setback, the government decided to maintain Portugal's candidacy, ignoring the advice of friendly and allied countries, who had warned that at least two-thirds of the votes cast would be needed to secure a non-permanent seat.[18]

Brazil's support and influence was soon requested by the Necessidades. The latter knew that Rio de Janeiro could bring many Latin American delegates – if not the entire regional block – to vote in support of Portugal's candidacy. Writing to Brazil's top diplomatic officials, Rocheta stressed the reasons in favor of Lisbon's application: the country had never occupied (or been candidate for) any position in the organization or in its subsidiary bodies, including the vice-presidency of the General Assembly, or the presidency of any committee or subcommittee; and Portugal was the obvious candidate among

[15] DPONU to MNE, A [C] 28, July 28, 1960, AHDMNE.
[16] MNE to EPRJ, T [S] 65, April 11, 1960, AHDMNE.
[17] Bègue, *La fin de Goa*, 997-1039
[18] See José Calvet de Magalhães, *Portugal e as Nações Unidas: a questão colonial (1955-1974)*, (Lisboa: IEEI, 1996).

the Western European group, since Austria and Finland were neutralized, Spain was a member of the Economic and Social Council, and Ireland was preparing its candidacy for 1962.[19] Although the Itamaraty received this request with sympathy, few or no steps were taken to support the Portuguese cause during the following months, as noted by Garin and the delegation at the UN. Cyro de Freitas Valle, the veteran Brazilian delegate in New York, was once again the primary obstacle: he had repeatedly refused to lobby on behalf of Portugal's candidacy, claiming that a European candidate had no right to meddle within the Latin American group. However, his real motive was his disapproval of Brazil's policy towards Portugal and its colonies. As on many occasions in the past, these stalemates were overcome outside the Itamaraty: on the day after an informal dinner between Rocheta and the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Horácio Lafer, Freitas Valle received urgent instructions to initiate a pro-Portugal campaign within the Latin American group at the UN.[20]

To Freitas Valle, it was obvious not only that Portugal would not secure a non-permanent seat on the Security Council, but also that the Special Committee of Six's report would be highly unfavorable to Portuguese interests. Indeed, according to the information collected by the Portuguese delegation in early September, the report would be even worse than previously expected. "I am very afraid that the final result will be a document in which we will not find any sort of protection," Garin cautioned the Necessidades. "To the contrary, the Indian [delegation] has already established the principle that there is an obligation to transmit information regarding territories which in 1945 were considered to be colonies or dependencies (this probably bearing in mind the fact that, by then, [the Portuguese] constitution referred to the existence of colonies)."[21]

Anticipating more requests from the Portuguese (especially regarding the Special Committee of Six's report), Freitas Valle seized the opportunity of Jânio Quadros' presidential victory – Quadros had defended the need to modify Brazil's foreign policy during his campaign – to exert pressure on the Itamaraty.[22] Immediately after the official election results, he encouraged his superiors to "review" his instructions – "at least regarding Argelia, the Portuguese provinces and New Guinea" – since it was expected that the General Assembly would continue beyond the early months of 1961. Thus, he believed, it would not be "reasonable or possible to have one point of view in November, and another in January or February." The Itamaraty took some time to reply, which suggests that the matter was studied by Kubitschek himself. However, the government rejected any revision. "The fact that the current presidential term is coming to an end is not a sufficient motive to change specific points of

[19] MNE to EPRJ, T 18, February 13, 1960, AHDMNE.
[20] EPRJ to MNE, T [U/C], April 5, 1960; EPRJ to MNE, T 54, April 8, 1960, AHDMNE; DELBRAONU to MRE, T [C] 155, April 25, 1960; MRE to DELBRAONU, T [C] 83, April 26, 1960.
[21] DPONU to MNE, T 221, September 16, 1961, AHDMNE.
[22] Jânio Quadro's presidential victory is examined in the following section.

Brazil's foreign policy." However, the Itamaraty counseled Freitas Valle to maintain a "restrained and discreet attitude" regarding subjects that might be handled differently by the incoming government.[23]

When the discussions around the report of the Special Committee of Six began, the Portuguese delegation was heavily criticized. Several accusations were made. These included the existence of forced labor, corporal punishment, and the absence of 'indigenous' rights. Amid this controversy, the Brazilian delegate adopted a discreet attitude, intervening only to say that his country stood between "two friends [i.e. the Africans and the Portuguese]." Questioned about his attitude by an increasingly anxious Garin, Freitas Valle replied that he had eliminated "by superior order" all those arguments that could be favorable to Portugal. When the Portuguese invoked the instructions that Freitas Valle had received to support Portugal (of which they had learned through the embassy in Rio de Janeiro), Freitas Valle replied drily: "Yes, but the 'thing' is left to my consideration […], and I am bearing in mind the beliefs of the new president-elect [i.e. Jânio Quadros]."[24]

The Portuguese did not think twice. While they could do little to convince other allies, such as Great Britain and the United States, to change their attitude, they felt much more confident in relation to the Brazilians. In an urgent meeting, Rocheta asked for Kubitschek's full backing, including a commitment to vote in Portugal's favor, "because at the moment the moral value of Brazil's declaration matters." Kubitschek agreed, and, in the presence of the ambassador, called Lafer and ordered him to send instructions to New York in order to give "total coverage" to Portugal. "It does not matter that they call us colonialists," he allegedly yelled down the phone.[25] Despite Freitas Valle's attempt to (once again) wriggle free of his instructions, the Itamaraty informed him that he was expected to vote favorably to Portugal's interests, and to justify his vote by referring to historical friendship, common language, and common religion. His superiors, the veteran delegate was warned, "would not tolerate any attitude except one of support for Portugal."[26]

However, the campaign in the UN against Portugal was massive. And, in the midst of the crisis in the Congo, and with Africa becoming one of the sensitive zones of the Cold War, few were willing to support old colonial assumptions. The report of the Special Committee of Six, which established criteria to define a non-self-governing territory (i.e. geographic, ethnical, cultural), was overwhelmingly approved by 66 votes in favor, 3 votes against (Portugal, Spain and South Africa), and 19 abstentions (including Great Britain and the US). During this round of voting, the Fourth Committee would also approve two particularly harsh resolutions against Portugal: resolution 1541 (XV), which validated the

[23] DELBRAONU to MRE, T [C/U] 438, October 22, 1960; MRE to DELBRAONU, T [C] 258, October 27, 1960, AMRE.
[24] MNE to EPRJ, T 250, November 8, 1960, AHDMNE.
[25] EPRJ to MNE, T 279, November 10, 1960, AHDMNE.
[26] MRE to DELBRAONU, T [C] 261, November 10, 1960; DELBRAONU to MRE, T 68, November 10, 1960, AMRE.

conclusions of the report and stipulated an obligation to transmit information under article 73; and resolution 1542 (XV), in which all the Portuguese 'provinces' were listed as non-self-governing territories, including "Goa and its dependencies." As promised by Kubitschek, the Brazilian delegation voted against these resolutions, alongside Spain, South Africa, France, and Belgium, which led Freitas Valle to exclaim: "We have to recognize that this is no good company for a country that seeks to please Africans. The latter and the Asians were astonished, and some of them spoke of [Brazil as a] 'fake anti-colonialist' nation".[27] Meanwhile, as expected, Portugal failed to secure a non-permanent seat on the Security Council. After several voting sessions, the Portuguese were advised by the rest of the European group to abandon their candidacy. As a result, the Portuguese delegation withdrew its candidacy. "The world keeps changing," Freitas Valle ironically noted.[28]

Changes on the Horizon?

In mid-January 1961, Jânio da Silva Quadros was about to be sworn in as president of Brazil.[29] Progressive and populist, Quadros had campaigned while brandishing a *vassourinha* [little broom], a symbol of his pledge to "sweep corruption out" of Brazilian politics. Furthermore, he had also promised economic development, social justice, and an independent foreign policy that would serve Brazil's interests. This included support for the Cuban Revolution, solidarity with the people of Algeria, a rapprochement with the nations of Eastern Europe, and a reestablishment of fully-fledged relations with the Soviet Union. Indeed, before ultimately winning the presidential election in October, Quadros had travelled extensively abroad, where he had met Fidel Castro, Nikita Khrushchev, Josip Tito, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Jawaharlal Nehru. According to one of his advisors, Quadros had thus become "fascinated by Nehru and Tito."[30] Although he was still only president-elect – and it might reasonably

[27] DELBRAONU to MRE, T 70, November 12, 1960; DELBRAONU to MRE, T 117, December 16, 1960, AMRE.
[28] DPONU to MNE, T [V/U] 375, December 10, 1960, AHDMNE; DELBRAONU to MRE, T [V/U] 109, December 13, 1960; DELBRAONU to MRE, T [U] 111, December 14, 1960, AMRE.
[29] Jânio Quadros was born in 1917 in Campo Grande (Mato Grosso), the son of physician and agronomist. Quadros studied law at the University of São Paulo, and subsequently taught Geography and Portuguese in schools. In 1947, he began his political career as councilor in São Paulo, and, three years later, he was elected state deputy. In 1953, Quadros managed to defeat a coalition between the three major national parties, and become mayor of São Paulo. Roughly one-and-a-half years later, he was eventually elected governor of the State. According to Leslie Bethell, Quadros was "Brazil's first taste of mass populism based on the support of the urban poor for a charismatic politician with a strong ethical (anticorruption) as well as antielite message." His rapid and continual political ascent led him to consider running for president, and, after much deliberation and difficulties, he accepted the support of the UDN. See Bethell, *…under the Liberal Republic*, 114, 119, 129-133; Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda*, 315-320, 327-344, 367-371.
[30] See Dávila, *Hotel Trópico,* 33-34. As for this 'fascination' with Nehru and Tito, in February 1961, the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, John M. Cabot reported: "of possible interest we noted on Janio's table unsigned photo of Tito and ebony statue sent Jânio by Che Guevara and presented by Prensa Latina representative. These have been added to engraving of Lincoln presented by Rockefeller which was only decoration there at time first visit." See "Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State," March 3, 1961, *FRUS*, v. XII, 427. Unfortunately, there is no account of the meeting between Quadros and Nehru.

be expected that many of his 'promises' would turn out to be mere propaganda – it seemed clear that Brazil under his leadership would attempt to take a step forward regarding some crucial foreign policy matters, including the traditional policy towards the Portuguese government and its colonies.

Despite these indications, Portuguese diplomats believed that Quadros would maintain Kubitschek's position of supporting the Portuguese regime and its 'Overseas' conceptions. Or, at the very least, that he could be persuaded to do so. After all, Quadros was one of those Brazilian politicians who had visited Portugal several times during recent years, and had made laudatory statements regarding the Portuguese *colónia*. Besides, his statements on foreign policy were always 'tempered', invariably recalling Brazil's commitments to the West, and a rejection of communism and non-alignment. Finally, his victorious coalition included the conservative UDN party, which could be relied upon to moderate any attempt to turn Brazil too far 'to the left' in foreign policy matters. Bearing in mind these assumptions, Quadros had been 'briefed' on Portuguese overseas policy by Marcelo Mathias during a stopover in Lisbon – a conversation that the Portuguese foreign minister had described as "extremely friendly and cordial," being likely to yield "useful results" for Portuguese interests in both Asia and Africa.[31]

Such Portuguese optimism was not as unreasonable as one might think. According to the Indian ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, it was unclear whether Quadros would in fact modify Brazil's foreign policy. Indeed, as M.K. Kirpalani noted in his report to the South Block, at this point "one can only speculate." Although Quadros certainly intended to revive "Brazil's old tradition of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism," Kirpalani also noted that the soon-to-be president had already underlined his intention to strengthen existing ties with the US, and to honor Brazil's commitments to the OAS. Perhaps due to his two-year experience in Brazil, Kirpalani harbored considerable suspicion regarding Quadros' electoral campaign. In this regard, he reminded the South Block that the Itamaraty remained a "stronghold of conservatism," and also conveyed some harsh criticism to the Brazilian foreign ministry. "There is no real interest in Asia and Africa countries or their problems," the diplomat wrote. "Despite its high sounding and oft-repeated declarations on liberty, democracy, on the fight against colonialism, against racial discrimination, [the Itamaraty] is a stronghold of conservatism." Nevertheless, subsequent events would prove that he and the Portuguese diplomats were mistaken regarding Quadros.[32]

The first such dramatic event occurred during the lame-duck government of president Kubitschek. On January 22, a former Portuguese colonial officer and politician, Henrique Galvão, along with 24

[31] EPRJ to MNE, T [C] 269, October 31, 1960; MNE to EPRJ, T 258, November 16, 1960, AHDMNE.
[32] IERJ to MEA, "Annual Reports from Rio de Janeiro for 1960, [S]," January 10, 1961, F. 3 (13) R&I/61, NAI.

Portuguese and Spanish political exiles, hijacked the 29,000-ton Portuguese luxury liner *Santa Maria* in the Caribbean.[33] Aboard were more than 600 passengers, and almost 400 crew. Codenamed 'Dulcinea', the operation was an act of political protest against the Portuguese and Spanish regimes. It aimed to attract international attention to the lack of freedom in the Iberian Peninsula, and also to initiate an uprising in Portugal and its colonies. Galvão's plans included disembarking on the island of Fernando Pó [Bioko] in Spanish Guinea, where a base would be set up, followed by an invasion of the city of Luanda, in Angola. Meanwhile, the Portuguese army was expected to rebel and overthrown the dictatorship. However, these plans suffered a setback. During the hijack, the third mate was killed, and two crewmen were wounded. After much deliberation, Galvão decided to allow the wounded crewmen to disembark on the island of Saint Lucia, and, as a result, the operation was discovered. Having lost the benefit of surprise, Galvão and his associates embarked upon a cat-and-mouse game in the Atlantic Ocean, with the effect that operation 'Dulcinea' would now be limited to causing international embarrassment to the Portuguese dictatorship.[34]

The Portuguese government immediately characterized the hijacking as an "act of piracy." With insufficient warships and technology to effectively pursue the liner, whose location was now unknown, Lisbon requested aid from London and Washington. Both NATO allies dispatched warships: the British frigate *Rothesay* initiated the pursuit, alongside US surveillance planes and the US destroyers *Robert L. Wilson* and *Damato*.[35] At the same time, Rocheta received instructions to ensure the protection of the *Vera Cruz*, which was expected to dock at Rio de Janeiro within a few days. Indeed, Lisbon feared that the *Santa Maria*'s sister ship could also be hijacked. Rocheta was also instructed to appeal to Brazil, in the event of the *Santa Maria* entering its waters, to restore the ship to its owners, and to hand Galvão over to the Portuguese authorities. Brazilian Foreign Minister Horácio Lafer was sensible to these requests, and immediately guaranteed the full collaboration of the Brazilian authorities, including the seizure of the luxury liner if spotted in its territorial waters.[36]

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[33] Henrique Galvão was a former supporter of Salazar. He was involved in the military coup of May 28, 1926, and occupied several administrative and political posts. In 1952, he was jailed after a failed conspiracy against the regime. In 1959, he escaped, and was granted political asylum by the Venezuelan embassy. Since then, he had lived in Caracas. In 1960, he created, with other Portuguese and Spanish exiles, the *Directório Revolucionário Ibérico de Libertação* [Iberian Revolutionary Liberation Directory], an armed organization dedicated to overthrowing both Salazar and Franco. See Henrique Galvão, *Minha cruzada pró-Portugal. Santa Maria* (São Paulo: Martins, 1961), D.L. Raby, "O DRIL (1959-61). Experiência única na Oposição ao Estado Novo", in *Penélope*, 16, 1995, 63-86.

[34] For a first-person account, see the already mentioned: Henrique Galvão, *Minha cruzada pró-Portugal. Santa Maria* (São Paulo: Martins, 1961). For another account – that challenges Galvão in some details – see Jorge Soutomaior, *Eu Roubei o Santa Maria. Relato de uma Aventura Real* (Lisboa: Texto Editores, 2010).

[35] See Luis Nuno Rodrigues, *Salazar-Kennedy: A crise de uma aliança* (Lisboa: Editorial Notícias, 2002), 37-39; Oliveira, *Os despojos*, 220-221. See also *Diário de Lisboa* [Lisbon, Portugal], January 24, 1961, 1; *Diário de Lisboa* [Lisbon, Portugal], January 25, 1961, 12.

[36] MNE to EPRJ, T [C/VU] 13, January 24, 1961; MNE to EPRJ, T [VU/C] 14, January 24, 1961; MRE to EPRJ, T [VU/C] 15, January 24, 1961; EPRJ to MNE, T 15, January 24, 1961, AHDMNE.

But as soon as Galvão revealed his motivation to the NBC, the situation was immediately transformed. The British Labour Party convoked a special House of Commons meeting, in order to interrogate the MacMillan government about the involvement of the British navy in the pursuit of the *Santa Maria*, stating that the government would have to either declare Galvão a pirate or abandon the operation. A few days later, the *Rothesay* stopped to refuel, and received instructions to abandon the pursuit. In Washington, the incoming president, John F. Kennedy, decided to carry on the pursuit of the *Santa Maria* (which had meanwhile been spotted by a plane). However, the initial orders were now modified: instead of 'intercept' and 'approach', the Navy should merely follow and report. During his first press conference, president Kennedy declared that the Navy did not have "any instructions to carry out boarding operations," as requested by Lisbon.[37] To be sure, Washington seemed primarily concerned with the 36 US citizens onboard, and far less with Portuguese international 'prestige': a few days later, Galvão and the US Navy initiated a dialogue in order to find a 'solution' to the hijacking.[38]

But what about Brazil? After several days, the *Santa Maria* was drifting without purpose. But there was a great probability that Brazil could be its final destination: besides the geographic proximity, Galvão would find a nation with a tradition of hosting Portuguese political exiles.[39] Moreover, Humberto Delgado – with whom Galvão was collaborating (as reported to the NBC) – had already begun preparing Brazilian public opinion through an active press campaign.[40] Bearing in mind these factors, as well as the fact that the Kubitschek government was about to draw to a close, the Itamaraty began to take precautions to prevent any political complications for the incoming government: a statement was issued affirming that the Brazilian government would treat the case in the light of international law, conventions, and legislation.[41] Despite several complaints by Rocheta regarding the "evasive terms" of the statement – which meanwhile had been noticed by the press – the Itamaraty remained silent. According to the Portuguese ambassador, top diplomatic officials at the Itamaraty

[37] Galvão, *Minha cruzada*, 135-136, 138-145; Oliveira, *Os despojos*, 221-223; Rodrigues, *Salazar-Kennedy*, 40-41. Quotes from Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Press Conferences. 25 January 1961. JFKPOF-054-001. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, US.

[38] Rodrigues, *Salazar-Kennedy*, 40-44.

[39] See, for instance, Heloísa Paulo, "O exílio português no Brasil: Os 'Budas' e a oposição antisalazarista," in *Portuguese Studies Review,* v. 14, no 2, Trent University. Peterborough: Ontario, jun. 2009, 125-142.

[40] Galvão was also acting on behalf of the *Movimento Nacional Independente* [Independent National Movement], presided over by the 'elected president of Portugal' – Humberto Delgado. The movement had been created by Delgado in the aftermath of the 1958 election. As seen in chapter five, Delgado had been exiled in Brazil since April 1959.

[41] On January 24 – when the *Santa Maria* hijacking became known – the Itamaraty requested a legal opinion from its legal division. Haroldo Valladão believed that the *Santa Maria* case could not be considered an 'act of piracy' due to Galvão's political objectives. Thus, Brazil would have to treat the case according to international law. See MRE, Parecer [C] 1.700, January 24, 1961; MRE, Aditamento a Parecer [C], January 27, 1961, AMRE. For a juridical analysis, see David F. Marley, *Modern Piracy. A Reference Handbook* (California: AC-CLIO, 2011), particularly Chapter 1.

were unwilling to collaborate as had been hoped, since they truly feared the disapproval of the Brazilian newspapers.[42]

Indeed, as usual, the Brazilian press had been reporting the case since day one, "underlining the romantic aspect of the adventure, its belligerent side, and its political nature […]," as stated by Rocheta.[43] Although some conservative newspapers, such as *O Globo* and the media chain *Diários Associados*, published favorable editorials, a significant number of newspapers supported Galvão and his political struggle, and condemned the Portuguese dictatorship, either on the front page or through editorials. The *Correio da Manhã*, for instance, reproduced Galvão's statements, mocked Lisbon's characterization of Galvão as a pirate, and even gave a platform to those Portuguese students in Brazil who supported the "rebellion" against "totalitarianism".[44] The *Diário Carioca*, another Rio de Janeiro-based newspaper, went further, describing Galvão's operation as the beginning of "a revolution against Salazar." Although stating that Galvão's plans were still unknown, the editor-in-chief, Danton Jobim, expressed his hope that Salazar "finally realizes that it is time to plan a political reform on extending public liberties," while adding: "however, it looks like he is too old to change."[45] The *Última Hora* expected that the *Santa Maria* would be allowed to carry on its course – "with tranquility and with pride, as it is writing an emotional page in the history of the liberation of Portugal; the Brazilian people is with Capt. Galvão and his fighters."[46]

It was through the newspapers that Rocheta learnt that Quadros had made worrying statements regarding the *Santa Maria* some days before his inauguration. According to the *Última Hora*, the soon-to-be president had privately declared that Galvão was "an old friend of mine." "He knows that I will not restore the ship [to Portugal]. I bet that he is going to lay anchor in Recife or Salvador after my inauguration […] if this happens, I will give him all the necessary guarantees."[47] Although Portuguese diplomats could not verify these statements, the fact that the Governor of Guanabara, Carlos Lacerda – also the owner of the *Tribuna da Imprensa* and a political supporter of Quadros – had published an exchange of telegrams with Galvão, in which he effectively granted asylum to him and his crew, was revealing.[48] Indeed, on January 31, on the same day as Quadros' inauguration, Galvão requested (and

[42] EPRJ to MNE, T [U] 17, January 25, 1961, AHDMNE.
[43] EPRJ to MNE, T [U] 17, January 25, 1961, AHDMNE.
[44] See, for instance, *Correio da Manhã* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], January 26, 1961, 6; *Correio da Manhã* [Rio de Janeiro], January 27, 1961, 1; *Correio da Manhã* [Rio de Janeiro], January 29, 1961, 1; *Correio da Manhã* [Rio de Janeiro], January, 29, 1961, 1961, [2.º Caderno], 1.
[45] *Diário Carioca* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], January 25, 1961, 1; *Diário Carioca* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], January 27, 1961, [no page].
[46] *Última Hora* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], January 27, 1961, 3.
[47] *Última Hora* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], January 30, 1961, 2. Indeed, Quadros had met Galvão during a visit to Caracas, in April 1960. See Paulo, *"1961: O Assalto,"* 69.
[48] *Tribuna da Imprensa* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], January 30, 1961, 1.

was granted) political asylum. In effect, he had been sailing in circles, waiting for the moment that Quadros would receive the presidential sash from the outgoing president, Kubitschek. He planned to lay anchor in Recife (Pernambuco), in northwest Brazil.[49]

When Quadros' inauguration took place, Rocheta discarded his limited contacts at the Itamaraty, and sought to confer directly with the incoming foreign minister, Afonso Arinos. The fact that the conversation took place in Brasília – and a few hours before Arinos' inauguration ceremony – revels the anxiety of the Portuguese government. Arinos opened the one-hour meeting by stating that it was his government's desire to maintain the "friendly traditional relations" with Portugal. But his friendly words quickly faded when he approached the *Santa Maria* issue: in this regard, he warned that the personality of the new president, popular opinion, and the political aspects of the case would prevent the new government from collaborating with Lisbon as Rocheta had wished. The new Brazilian government could only promise to release the passengers and crew – as for the *Santa Maria* itself, the Portuguese government would have to resort to the relevant legal mechanisms. Rocheta contested the so-called 'political aspects', since for his government Galvão was simply a convicted criminal, and also sought to convince Arinos to intervene to ensure the speedy restoration of the ship. Regarding Galvão, the Portuguese government could do nothing to prevent the Brazilian government from offering him political asylum.[50]

What Rocheta and the Portuguese regime did not know was that Quadros had different plans. Although he had assured Galvão and his collaborators of political asylum, the new government was also considering the possibility – in the case that Galvão or others refused to disembark – of allowing them to sail back into the Atlantic. Indeed, confidential instructions sent to the diplomat and negotiator Dario Castro Alves in Recife underlined the fact that his mission was to "insistently try to convince" Galvão to accept political asylum and to restore the ship, and, in the case that he refused, to allow him to sail away, on the understanding "that the ship would be moved outside Brazilian territorial waters" as soon as possible. In the latter case, and in order to avoid Portuguese recourse to legal mechanisms, a judge would invoke the authority of the new minister of External Relations, Afonso Arinos.[51] Whether Galvão's friend or not, Quadros wished primarily to avoid the prospect of beginning his tenure with an ugly military assault against a Portuguese democratic movement, solely for the purpose of defending the prestige of the Portuguese government.

[49] Some authors have claimed that Recife – and not Luanda – was always the final destination of Galvão.
[50] EPRJ to MRE, T [U] 3-B, February 1, 1961, AHDMNE.
[51] RECIFE to MRE, T [C-V/U] 4, February 2, 1961, AMRE.

On February 2, the *Santa Maria* dropped anchor in Recife, as agreed with Brazilian and US authorities. After talks between Galvão and the Brazilian authorities – which involved some tension, due to the presence of 60 marines – the passengers and crew were released. However, Galvão and his fellows remained another day upon the liner. After again receiving guarantees of political asylum from Quadros, and warnings from the US navy that the ship would be put under "constant vigilance," and thus be vulnerable to "hostile warships," Galvão finally decided to abandon the *Santa Maria*.[52] The liner was subsequently restored to the shipowner – and not to the Portuguese government – in accordance with the personal instructions of Quadros, who wished to avoid any recourse to legal mechanisms.[53]

The hijacking of the *Santa Maria* attracted worldwide attention, since it was the first case of 'political piracy' on the high seas. Galvão capitalized upon this audience by giving interviews, denouncing Salazar's dictatorship, and demonstrating that his nation did in fact have a democratic, non-communist opposition. However, Galvão's audacity also demonstrated that Portugal was increasingly isolated: besides the fact that the British had abandoned their pursuit and the US had tacitly recognized Galvão and his collaborators as 'political rebels', Brazil had consistently failed to show the desired solidarity. Quadros' attitude demonstrated that the new Brazilian government was going to deal with Portugal in a different manner – namely, one that was more pragmatic, and less driven by emotion. Indeed, at no point of this crisis did the Quadros' government risk discrediting itself solely in order to protect the Portuguese regime's prestige. This attitude, one must note, contrasted with that which had been assumed by Kubitschek during the Delgado case, in which Kubitschek had sought to protect Portuguese interests – even if this meant discrediting his own ambassador and close friend, Álvaro Lins.[54]

Inadvertently, the Brazilian Naval Command had issued a press release revealing Quadros' plans, thus leading Rocheta to question the good faith of the new government. "We are left to wonder whether the Brazilian government was speaking with a forked tongue […] or whether this was a strategy to facilitate the seizure of the ship." However, reviewing the episodes of tension, the Portuguese ambassador envisaged a difficult period for Portugal-Brazil relations. "I see with serious apprehension the future attitude of this government regarding our interests," he cautioned. "The personal integrity, intellectual discipline, and moral atmosphere […] in which Minister Arinos moves are perhaps our best support, even if his extreme political Jacobinism and deep-rooted anti-colonialism work against us. I do not think that the President is hostile to us. But certain sectors […] amongst whom he seeks support are." However, at the same time, Rocheta 'excused' the new government, pointing out that it was a

[52] See Rodrigues*, Salazar-Kennedy*, 44.
[53] MRE to EMBRALIS, T [C/U] 20, February 3, 1961; MRE, M DPo [C] 88, February 16, 1961, AMRE.
[54] See chapter five.

"revolutionary" one. "Numerous allies, including Arinos and almost all the UDN, fought the dictatorship of Vargas.[55] Therefore, a certain spirit of exaltation and extremism during these early days are not so strange – positions that time and pro-Portuguese public opinion might correct or rectify."[56] However, another dramatic event over the following days – also of international proportions, albeit far more serious – would prove that the ambassador was simultaneously right and wrong.

Tensions in Angola, Tension with Brazil

On February 4, three separate groups raided the police station, jail, and custody center in Luanda, Angola. As a result, five policemen and around 25 attackers died. The raids were allegedly organized by the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], a Marxist-inspired group founded by Angolan nationalists in 1956, which had become increasingly active following the independence of the Belgian Congo.[57] The Portuguese reaction was particularly draconian: the funeral of the five policemen created an atmosphere of racial tension in Luanda, and episodes of unrest occurred. Certain European settlers, seeking revenge, brutally and indiscriminately attacked the *musseques* [slums] on the outskirts of Luanda, with the connivance of the police. These events brought to an end the myth of *racial harmony*, which had been one of the pillars of official Portuguese discourse, and marked in a very symbolical the onset of the Portuguese colonial war.[58]

The timing of the attacks was far from accidental. Luanda was at that time flooded with journalists, who had been posted to the Congo in the expectation that the *Santa Maria* might attempt to dock there, and who broadcast the news around the world. *The New York Times*, for instance, immediately reported the event as "the strongest evidence of African nationalism" in Portuguese West Africa. Subsequent retaliatory measures were also reported by the international media – at least until the governor began to expel correspondents on charges of insulting behavior and disrespect.[59] The attacks also coincided with a UN Security Council session on the situation of the Congo. Liberia immediately proposed the inclusion of Angola in the agenda due to the "recent disturbances" in Luanda, and pleaded for a swift reaction by the UN, in order to avoid "subsequent deterioration and abuses of the

[55] Ambassador Manuel Rocheta was referring to the period of dictatorship between 1937 and 1945 – even if the UDN had *always* fought Getúlio Vargas, including during the so-called second Vargas government, between 1951-1954.
[56] EPRJ to MNE, T [S] 48, February 8, 1961, AHDMNE.
[57] On Angolan nationalism, see, for instance, Alexandre, *Contra o Vento*, 477-502.
[58] On Portuguese Colonial Wars, see Aniceto Afonso and Carlos de Matos Gomes, *Guerra Colonial* (Lisboa: Editorial Notícias, 2000).
[59] Quote from *The New York Times* [New York, US], February 5, 1961, 1. About the behaviour of the Portuguese administration regarding the press immediately after the raids, see: Tânia Alves, "Reporting 4 February 1961 in Angola: The Beginning of the End of the Portuguese Empire," in *Media and the Portuguese Empire,* ed. José Luis Garcia *et al* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 244-245.

privilege and rights of men in Angola." The Brazilian delegate to the UN, Cyro de Freitas Valle, soon reported to the Itamaraty that Afro-Asian delegations were already working on resolutions regarding Cabinda and Macao. "Then," he cautioned his superiors in Rio, "India would come with Goa."[60]

If Goa was an 'inalienable territory', a 'beacon of Christianity', and the proof of Portuguese 'original colonization', Angola was all that and more, being the jewel in the crown of the Portuguese regime. The formula to protect it against foreign interference was nevertheless identical to the one employed in the case of Portuguese India: Lisbon immediately rejected any meddling, on the grounds that this was a "domestic issue." A connection between the hijack of the *Santa Maria* and the events in Luanda was also established, in order to downplay the importance of the nationalist rebellion. At the level of NATO, the Portuguese delegation employed far more elaborate language: Liberia's action was part of a general campaign to force Portugal out of Africa, and to thus destroy the West's position there. Recalling the geostrategic importance of Angola in the context of the Cold War, the Portuguese requested that those powers with a seat on the Security Council (the US, France, Great Britain, and Turkey) firmly oppose the efforts of Liberia. Identical demarches were made towards the Chilean and Ecuadorian governments, both of which were recently elected non-permanent members.[61]

Although the *Santa Maria* case (along with the indifferent attitude of the new Brazilian government) was still fresh in their memory, the Necessidades did not refrain from approaching the Itamaraty. Portuguese diplomats believed it necessary to request Brazil's diplomatic influence in order to secure both the Chilean and Ecuadorian delegations' votes. During a meeting with Afonso Arinos, the Portuguese ambassador gave the foreign minister an account of the events, explained the Portuguese position, recalled their mutual interests in terms of defending the West, pointed out the particular interest of Brazil as a member of the Portuguese-Brazilian community, and requested Brazil's diplomatic collaboration in Santiago and Quito. "Without any public statements that could risk alienating certain sectors of public opinion, whose confidence and sympathy the Brazilian government may not wish to alienate," Rocheta added. Although Arinos promised to consult the president, he did nothing to help himself, and made some remarkable comments about Portugal and the issue of colonialism. According to Arinos, Portugal should begin considering decolonization as an "undeniable evolution" and an "irreversible process." "Responsible governments," he went on, "ought not to suppress these developments, but rather to support and guide them [referring to the colonized]." Rocheta promptly expressed his "profound sorrow" regarding what he considered the "gap" between Portugal and Brazil with regard to a subject that "profoundly affects the future and existence of

[60] DELBRAONU to MRE, CT 28, February 18, 1961; DELBRAONU to MRE, CT 34, February 21, 1961; DELBRAONU to MRE, T 70, February 22, 1961, AMRE.
[61] Rodrigues, *Salazar-Kennedy*, 79; MRE to EPRJ, T [U] 71, February 18, 1961, AHDMNE.

Portugal." After hearing Rocheta's evocations of the importance of Portugal-Brazil relations, Arinos questioned him regarding the possibility of a joint collaboration in order to solve the Portuguese African issue, to which Rocheta replied – "although without instructions" – that Lisbon was always keen to reach a "common understanding," which could "satisfy both nations' interests in all the Portuguese territories." The foreign minister promised to be a "faithful interpreter" of these statements towards the president.[62]

Although this was a 'regular' demarche, the meeting between Rocheta and Arinos opened a new chapter in Portugal-Brazil relations. Never before had a Brazilian foreign minister or other statemen directly challenged the Portuguese overseas policy: Arinos not only treated Angola as a colony – and not an 'overseas province' – but even suggested that Lisbon itself should recognized it as such. True, several members of the Itamaraty (Freitas Valle was perhaps the most conspicuous) had for a long time rejected the characterization of Angola as a 'province' and not a 'colony'. However, such heretical notions had been confined to internal documents, and to a restricted circle within the Itamaraty. Officially, Angola – as well as the other territories under the administration of Lisbon, including Portuguese India – was a legitimate overseas province of a multicontinental Portugal. And, to be sure, this position had not changed since Brazil voted against resolution 1542 (XV). Perhaps because of this – but also because these demarches were confidential – Rocheta believed that Brazil would accede to his request. "Obviously, I cannot anticipate the reaction of President Quadros," he telegraphed the Necessidades, "but I have some hope that Brazil – which is excused from making a public statement at this moment – could respond favorably towards our request."[63]

Despite the upcoming Security Council voting session, Brazilian diplomats remained silent regarding such Portuguese requests. Meanwhile, the Necessidades had already guaranteed that Liberia's proposal would be voted down – in part, through Chile and Ecuador's abstentions. Nevertheless, Rocheta requested a meeting with Arinos, which was only granted after almost one week. Arinos opened the conversation by stating that Quadros agreed with the Portuguese government's views, and that he did not contest the Portuguese position towards the UN Security Council. However, he had decided not to initiate any overtures towards Santiago and Quito, claiming that these might be scrutinized by the press. "He feared that he could not keep such demarches confidential," Rocheta wrote, "and would thus be caught contradicting statements that he had made during his electoral campaign." The ambassador regretted that his arguments were insufficient to convince Quadros of the "particular Portuguese case vis-à-vis conventional colonialism," or of the "moral importance of the

[62] EPRJ to MNE, T 66, February 20, 1961, AHDMNE.
[63] MRE, M DPo [S] 83, February 15, 1961, AMRE.

support of our Brazilian friends" regarding an issue of "national survival." However, having noted that Quadros had excused himself through reference to internal politics, and that Arinos had demonstrated some interest in the debate regarding Portuguese Africa, Rocheta toyed with the possibility of a top Portuguese official visiting Brazil, in order to confer with Quadros' government. For his part, Arinos recognized that the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation justified the need for such a meeting, but once again indicated that Brazil's position was now more 'independent' regarding Portugal.[64]

Meanwhile, on March 15, Liberia's proposal was voted down by the Security Council, since it had failed to achieve the necessary votes. But this 'victory' for the Portuguese delegation revealed a precarious reality: the proposal, presented by the United Arab Republic, Ceylon, and the Soviet Union – long-standing and proactive opponents of Portuguese colonialism – had also been supported by the US delegation. Although the Kennedy administration had initially attempted to abort the Liberian initiative, Washington had ultimately decided to send a clear message to the General Assembly: Washington would no longer support Portuguese colonialism. Instead, it would support the Angolan people's right to self-determination.[65] To make things even bleaker, as the Security Council was taking place, a series of brutal attacks against Portuguese settlements and administrative posts in the north of Angola took place. The most prosperous region of Angola (but also one of the most vulnerable, especially because the border with the Congo was only a few hours away, and most of the Portuguese armed forces were stationed in urban centers) was attacked by a furious mob, armed mainly with *catanas* [machetes]. Whites, blacks, women, and children were slaughtered with a level of violence unprecedented in contemporary Portuguese Africa. These brutal attacks were prepared by the *União das Populações de Angola* [United People of Angola], another Angolan nationalist movement. A few months later, following his famous television speech – *"Para Angola, rapidamente e em força!"* [To Angola, quickly and with strength!] –, Salazar dispatched the military to reestablish order and sovereignty, and thus officially began a war that would last until 1974.

What would be the impact of these adverse events upon Portugal's already tense relations with Brazil? Inauspicious, to judge from the first message to the Congress by the Quadros' government, which was delivered exactly the same day as the attacks. In this document, Quadros' revealed the guiding principles of his so-called Independent Foreign Policy. Although it belonged ideologically to the Western world, Brazil was going to adopt a more "affirmative and independent" foreign policy, bearing in mind its national character and legitimate interests. In practice, Brazil was about to distance itself from automatic alignment with the US and Portugal, and to pursue instead relations with other

[64] EPRJ to MNE, T 78, March 3, 1961, AHDMNE.
[65] For the US behavior towards Portugal in the UN, see Rodrigues, *Salazar-Kennedy*, 89-121

nations, including the Soviet Union, the Eastern European countries, and the Afro-Asian nations. Quadros' foreign policy also announced a new position regarding the problem of colonialism: Brazil was going to support decolonization, "in order that all colonial peoples, without exception, will achieve their independence as soon as possible." Under Quadros' government, Brazil would finally cut its ties with European colonialism, and adopt an active position against it: instead of Portugal and France, Brazil would choose Angola and Algeria; instead of Europe and the US, Brazil would choose Africa and Asia.[66]

Rocheta's reaction was remarkable. Instead of predicting a gloomy future for Portuguese interests, as well as for Western interests more generally, the experienced diplomat downplayed the significance of this new foreign policy. Rocheta did not believe that Quadros was really capable of undertake such a "radical shift," not least because several domestic factors would strongly oppose it. "The geographical position of Brazil, the feelings of the population, the ties with the Western world, the Armed Forces, and the Church would never allow it," he claimed. According to the ambassador, such proclamations were mainly intended to please the left-wing and nationalist forces in Brazil. "Brazilian leaders," he stated, "tend to proclaim over and over – as if it were something new – that the new government is going to follow an independent foreign policy. As a matter of fact, Brazilian foreign policy seems to be more of a 'domestic policy' for Mr. Jânio […] in order to reinforce his popularity, to face the Congress (in which he does not have a majority), and to win leverage to apply his policies of austerity." "Moreover," he continued, "certain initiatives and statements had no objective other than that of winning more concessions from the United States. We can expect that Brazil will not forget its loyalty to the West."[67] Indeed, his appraisal would prove extremely accurate in the long-run, especially when, roughly three years later, on April 1964, the military (under the auspices of 'anti-communism' and supported by conservative forces) established a dictatorship, which would last until 1985.[68]

Nonetheless, despite the optimism of the Portuguese ambassador, Portugal had the odds stacked against it. Within the Itamaraty, which had once been dominated by *lusophile* diplomats and clerks, everybody now seemed ready to crucify the Portuguese regime and its colonialism. Numerous documents surfaced, in which a bleak picture of Portuguese Africa was painted.[69] Among those more critical observers, Freitas Valle was naturally the most active partisan of a radical change regarding Portugal. Indeed, he was particularly impressed by the American change of attitude regarding

[66] "Jânio Quadros. Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional. Remetida pelo Presidente da República na abertura da Sessão Legislativa de 1961, March 15, 1961, Brasília, Brasil."
[67] EPRJ to MNE, T 97, March 18, 1961, AHDMNE.
[68] See Bethell, *…under the Liberal*" 159-164. See also Leslie Bethell and Celso Castro, "Politics in Brazil under Military Rule, 1964-1985," in Leslie Bethell, *The Cambridge History of Latin America, Volume IX. Brazil since 1930,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 165-230.
[69] MRE, M DPo [C] [no number], March 18, 1961, AMRE.

Portuguese colonialism. "I was surprised by the decisive way that [the US delegate to the UN] Adlai Stevenson spoke [at the Security Council]," he reported, "advising Portugal to take measures for the progress of Angola, in order to avoid a situation similar to the one in the Congo. This marks a great change in [U.S.] foreign policy regarding colonial problems." Knowing that the Afro-Asian delegations would not allow the issue to fall into oblivion, Freitas Valle believed that, following Washington's shift, "the Portuguese claim that the United Nations has no jurisdiction [in its colonial affairs] will only be supported by other colonial powers and by South Africa." As such, the veteran delegate believed that it would be "impossible" for Brazil to abstain from a future Afro-Asian resolution regarding Portuguese colonialism. "If we support the Portuguese claim," he cautioned the Itamaraty, "Brazil will find itself isolated, and will alienate itself from the Afro-Asian block."[70]

Arinos expressed similar opinions to the Portuguese ambassador. On March 25, he diplomatically explained to Rocheta that Brazil considered the African problem to be important, for historical and geostrategic reasons. Accordingly, Brazil believed that it was crucial to avoid "chaos" in Angola, which could ultimately open the way to communism, or the development of other "unfavorable factors." Bearing this in mind, Brazil was seeking an understanding with Portugal regarding the problem of Angola, due to the friendly relationship between the two nations, and the obligations of the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation. Although he was aware that the Brazilian perspective – supporting a gradual evolution of Angola towards self-determination – did not coincide with the Portuguese one, Arinos nonetheless hoped to arrive at a "harmonization of viewpoints, so far as this is possible." Rocheta acknowledged that their perspectives were different, and believed that it would be useful to conduct a high-level meeting, "since Brazil is moving away from the position that has been maintained since the time of Paulo Cunha." However, until then, the ambassador also hoped that Brazil would abstain on any resolution regarding Angola, which was expected to be voted on within a few days, at least by the beginning of April. Arinos replied that this was a possibility, but gave no decisive answer.[71]

In order to obtain a promise of abstention, Rocheta flew to Brasília to meet with Quadros. The president "regretted" that it would be difficult to "reconcile [his] loyalty" to his principles with his "great desire" to please the Portuguese government. After a brief explanation by Rocheta, Quadros confessed that the Brazilian delegation in UN, "which for years had felt constrained by the instructions issued by the previous government," had declared its opposition to abstaining on the resolution regarding Angola. However, he also confessed that he did not wish to "incense" Portugal and cause "irreparable damage." He then suggested that Rocheta return immediately to Rio de Janeiro and

[70] DELBRAONU to MRE, T [U] 128, March 16, 1961; DELBRAONU to MRE, O 210, March 22, 1961, AMRE.
[71] EPRJ to MNE, T [S] 107, March 25, 1961, AHDMNE.

contact Arinos, in order to reach a solution that would be acceptable to Portuguese interests. "Our odds have improved," Rocheta reported to Lisbon. "The president was very cordial and understanding during the entire audience."[72] As Rocheta landed at the Santos Dumont airport, he was received by a member of staff from the Arinos cabinet, who told him that the Itamaraty was going to issue a statement, declaring that the Brazilian delegation was going to abstain, since "further conversations with Portugal" were required before any final decision. Meanwhile, Arinos was expected in Lisbon for further talks.[73]

Having been informed about the statement, Freitas Valle was furious. In a personal telegram to Arinos, he wrote

> To invoke a bilateral agreement with Portugal to justify Brazil's vote means admitting that Brazil has specifically committed itself to supporting Portugal's policies in Angola, which would be disastrous for our standing at the United Nations […]. In the end, Brazil's abstention in the vote would be a needless sacrifice of our prestige, both because the proposed resolution is going to be approved overwhelmingly, and because the dismantling of the Portuguese empire in Africa is inevitable and will probably happen in short order.[74]

As arranged, Arinos arrived in Lisbon at the beginning of April. Despite the nature of his mission, the minister did not fail to make suitably laudatory statements. "Portugal and Brazil are nations linked by the friendship of a father and son," he told the Portuguese press. "Everything we do to improve our relationship is a benefit for our nations." Behind closed doors, the atmosphere was less friendly. According to Franco Nogueira's account, in a five-hour meeting with Mathias and Rocheta, Arinos described anti-colonialism as a "dynamic force," which Brazil, as a former colony, felt an obligation to support. In the case that Portugal considered the independence of Angola, Brazil would stand with it. If not, Brazil would have no choice but to oppose Lisbon.[75]

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[72] EPRJ to MNE, T 115, March, no date, 1961, AHDMNE.
[73] EPRJ to MNE, T 116, March 30, 1961; EPRJ to MNE, T 117, March 30, 1961.
[74] Freitas Valle also reiterated several facts that were already known. "Everyone at the United Nations knows that Portugal uses forced labor in Angola, divides Angolans into first and second-class citizens ("assimilated" and "non-assimilated"), and practices racial discrimination against the blacks, who are 97% of its population. Everyone also knows that after five centuries of Portuguese rule, 99 per cent of the black population of Angola is illiterate. Finally, everyone knows that in Angola there are violations of human rights and individual liberties. Portugal denies this, but it refuses to admit any kind of international observers." See: DELBRAONU to MRE, T [C/VU] 190, March 31, 1961, AMRE.
[75] Franco Nogueira, *Salazar. A Resistência (1958-1964), Volume V,* (Porto: Livraria Civilização Editora, 1986), 230-231; 233-236.

In a meeting with Salazar – who had already been informed about the position of the Brazilian government – Arinos did not raise the topic of Angola.[76] A second meeting was needed for the two men to discuss the problem: Arinos encouraged Salazar to grant self-determination to Angola; Salazar tried to convince Arinos to support Portugal. In particular, Salazar reminded Arinos that Brazil could only enter into Africa through Portugal. According to the account of Franco Nogueira, Salazar argued in the following terms:

> What is the real interest of Brazil? To dominate Portuguese Africa? In order to achieve that policy – and ruling out the possibility of territorial domination – what means do you have? You cannot send capital, since what you have is insufficient for your own needs; you cannot send people, since Brazil is an empty country; you cannot provide technicians, since they are so few; you cannot send or buy because Africa and Brazil are competitors. What remains? If Africa becomes independent, can Brazil match the penetration of larger political, military, and economic powers – Americans, Russians, British, Germans, French, and others – which will immediately invade Angola and the remaining territories? […] It is certain that Brazil could enter into Africa through Portugal, the other great powers would not allow it.

According to the Franco Nogueira, Arinos recognized the justice of these arguments, but nonetheless reiterated his own position.[77] As Dávila underlined, two further memoirs described the meeting. The first memoir was that of Arinos itself, in which he recalled the meeting in the following terms:

> I watched him like a writer – curious, even though I felt diametrically opposed to his political opinions. As I watched him hold forth moderately and with clarity about so many international issues, I couldn't help but ask myself whether this lucid, composed old man approved the brutality of the PIDE, the miseries of Tarrafal. Or was he just another cog in the monstrous machinery of twentieth-century dictatorships, a machine that escapes the control of its engineers and runs on its own momentum, obeying an obscure design. Or worse yet, running without any design at all?[78]

[76] Nogueira, *Salazar V*, 234.
[77] Nogueira, *Salazar V*, 235-236.
[78] Dávila, *Hotel*, 100. (Dávila translation).

The second memoir was by Secretary General Vasco Leitão da Cunha, a man much closer to Portuguese colonial interests. Here, he recorded Salazar's alleged post-meeting remarks: "This boy came here, he was very bright and talked a lot, trying to convince me that Brazil's policy was correct. But in the end, he felt me thinking that what Brazil really needs is to be ruled from the *Terreiro do Paço* [the Portuguese governing palace]."[79]

All accounts are disputable. Franco Nogueira's book is biased; Arinos wrote his memoirs in 1968; Leitão da Cunha gave his oral testimony in 1983. But irrespective of this, Arinos returned to Brazil without any results. Indeed, some days later, the Brazilian government issued a declaration, establishing a new policy towards Portugal and its colonies: "Without breaking the fraternal ties that bind the Brazilian and Portuguese people […] Brazil reserves the right of following the development of the African situation with freedom of action, and committed to a policy […] of self-determination for all peoples aspiring to independence."[80] Simultaneously, Freitas Valle was instructed by Arinos to vote in favor of the Afro-Asian proposal on Angola. As the *Tribuna da Imprensa* ironically wrote – *"Amigos, amigos, Angola à parte"* [Friends, Friends, Angola aside].[81]

Having been informed about the decision to vote in favor of the Afro-Asian proposals on Angola, the Portuguese chargé d'affaires, Mesquita, met with Secretary-General Vasco Leitão da Cunha, and expressed his government's "great surprise" with the decision of the Brazilian government to vote against Portugal. Lisbon had expected that the policy of abstention would be maintained, not least because Arinos had already received the necessary support for its continuance.[82] Also in Lisbon, Mathias had made a request for abstention to the Brazilian ambassador, Negrão de Lima. "He made a last and desperate plea for Brazil's abstention," the latter informed the Itamaraty. "He asked you [Arinos] to explain to [Quadros] that the Afro-Asian resolution does not aim at the self-determination of all the Angolan people, but [rather supports] a movement that implies the expulsion of the Portuguese [from] Angola […]. He stressed that the present attitude [of the Portuguese government] has no purpose other than to safeguard those sacred interests, based on history, of establishing a Portuguese-African civilization, which permits the co-existence of everyone, and not exclusion through the total sacrifice of the Portuguese part of the Angola population."[83]

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[79] Vasco Leitão da Cunha, *Diplomacia em Alto-Mar. Depoimento ao CPDOC.* (Rio de Janeiro, Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1994), 230.
[80] EPRJ to MNE, T 135, April 14, 1961, AHDMNE.
[81] *Tribuna da Imprensa* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], April 14, 1961, 7.
[82] MNE to EPRJ, T [V/U] 123, April 17, 1961, AHDMNE.
[83] EMBRALIS to MRE, T [C/VU] 97, April 18, 1961, AMRE.

What had happened in the meantime has not left traces in either Brazilian or Portuguese diplomatic archives. According to Mário Gibson Barbosa, the head of Arinos' cabinet, Rocheta went to confer with Quadros in Brasília. Returning to Rio de Janeiro, Rocheta informed Arinos that Quadros had changed his mind, and that Brazil would abstain. According to Barbosa's memoirs, reproduced in Jerry Dávila's book, Arinos replied: "I cannot accept that you would say something like that. I am the Minister, and the President would not change his mind about a decision like that without notifying me directly." Apparently, Portuguese Ambassador Rocheta suggested that Arinos call Quadros, who confirmed the change of vote. The president also confessed that he had even cried when the Portuguese ambassador described the difficult position Brazil was creating for Portugal.[84]

Indeed, against the judgement of Freitas Valle, Brazil abstained on Resolution 1603 (XV), calling upon the Portuguese government to consider the introduction of measures and reforms to advance Angola towards self-determination, and appointing a sub-committee to investigate the situation – a resolution that was approved. Brazil was part of a group that included Australia, Belgium, El Salvador, France, Netherlands, Great Britain, Dominican Republic, and Thailand. Another 14 delegations were absent; Spain and South Africa voted against. The US delegate voted in favor, despite several Portuguese demarches.

Crisis in Brazil

On August 25, Quadros unexpectedly resigned. After a brief ceremony on the occasion of the Day of the Soldier, the president called the military ministers, and announced his decision. He later sent a resignation statement to the Congress, blaming the forces of reaction – *"forças terríveis"* [terrible forces] – for blocking his "efforts to lead the nation along the road of true political and economic liberation, the only one which would make possible that real progress and social justice to which a generous people had a right." Ignoring appeals from his military ministers to reconsider, Quadros flew from Brasília to his home city of São Paulo. And, just a few days later, he embarked on the *S.S. Uruguay Star* with his family for a lengthy trip to Europe.[85]

[84] As described and analysed by Dávila, *Hotel*, 101.

[85] Schwarcz and Starling, *Brasil*, 433; Bethell, *…under the Liberal*, 135. Quote from the resignation statement as published by *The New York Times* [New York, US], August 26, 1961, 1; 4. The original stated "Mas baldaram-se os meus esforços para conduzir esta nação, que pelo caminho de sua libertação política e econômica, a única que possibilitaria o progresso efetivo e a justiça, a que tem direito o seu generoso povo," in "Jânio Quadros," Alzira Alves de Abreu (ed) *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro – Pós-1930* (Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC, 2010). See also *The New York Times* [New York, US], August 29, 1961, 16; *The New York Times* [New York, US], September 3, 1961, E1.

Quadros' resignation was a political maneuver. Struggling against an adverse Congress, Quadros wanted to create a situation that would lead him back to the *Planalto*[86] with reinforced powers. And he thought he had the perfect plan: the military, the state governors, the businessmen, and the *povo* ['people'] would never accept his resignation, nor the appointment of vice-president João 'Jango' Goulart as his successor. Instead, the military would assume power, and invite him back with heightened powers. Goulart, who was still returning from a state visit to the People's Republic of China, could not interfere. However, Quadros' plans failed spectacularly: when he arrived in São Paulo, carrying the presidential sash in his bag, he found no acclamations: no politicians, no military, and no *povo*. In Brasília, the Congress had immediately accepted his resignation, and named Ranieri Mazzilli, the speaker of the Chamber of the Deputies, as interim president until Goulart's return to Brazil.[87]

Quadros had overestimated his political leverage. Although some backed his orthodox economic policies, few supported his independent foreign policy. The military, in particular, regarded his flirtation with the Soviet Union and the Third World with great suspicion. The decoration of the Cuban minister Ernesto Guevara some weeks before had been the straw that broke the camel's back. The announced participation of Brazil as observer in the 1961 Belgrade non-aligned conference added more fuel to the contestation.[88] Quadros' supporters at the Congress were few, and increasingly disillusioned with his eccentric policies, which had included the banning of both horse racing and the wearing of bikinis on public beaches. Contrary to his predecessor, Quadros was unable (or did not wish) to create political alliances. He believed instead that he could 'remove' the Congress. In the end, as he had prophetically declared at his inauguration just seven months previously – "by August, I will not have a friend left in this country" – it was the Congress that 'removed' him from power, without significant opposition or commotion.[89]

Quadros' resignation and Goulart's inauguration should have posed no problem in a democratic Brazil. The Constitution specified that, in the event of the resignation of the president, the vice-president would assume the office. However, the military vetoed Goulart for "reasons of national security," and demanded a new election. They feared that once in power, the 43-year-old vice-president would promote a Peron-style *república sindicalista* ['unionist' republic], or – even worse – create the political, social, and economic conditions for a communist takeover. Goulart was meanwhile advised not to return to Brazil, under threat of imprisonment. Pro-Constitution demonstrations were repressed by

[86] Palácio do Planalto was (and still is) the official workplace of the President of Brazil, located in Brasília.
[87] Schwarcz and Starling, *Brasil,* 433-434; Bethell, *…under the Liberal,* 135-137.
[88] About Brazil's participation in the 1961 Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference see James G. Hershberg, "'High-Spirit Confusion' Brazil, the 1961 Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference, and the Limits of na 'Independent' Foreign Policy during the High Cold War", in *Cold War History*¸7:3, 373-388.
[89] Schwarcz and Starling, *Brasil,* 434; Bethell, *…under the Liberal*, 136-137. Quote of Quadros' speech as published by *The New York Times* [New York, US], August 26, 1961, 4.

the military police, a bank holiday was declared, strict censorship was imposed, and arrests were made – including of General Henrique Teixeira Lott, the candidate defeated by Quadros in 1960, and responsible for the 'preemptive coup' in 1955. On the other hand, the governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Leonel Brizola, did not accept the military veto, or even a new election. He initiated a national campaign to guarantee the Constitution: Brizola organized a network of radio stations against the military intervention, armed the population, and cordoned off the governmental palace. He then received important political support: state governors, mayors, and the Church. The Congress remained divided.[90]

This stalemate brought Brazil close to civil war. Challenged by Brizola, the military ministers instructed General José Machado Lopes – the commander of the Third Army, the largest in Brazil – to bombard the governmental palace of Porto Alegre, the capital-city of Rio Grande do Sul. Machado Lopes refused (on the grounds that he only accepted orders from Goulart), and military maneuvers began. With a country divided and a clear threat of civil war (or a military coup), Congressmen eventually began to formulate a solution: Brazil would adopt a parliamentary system of government. As such, João 'Jango' Goulart could assume the presidency with reduced powers, and govern through a Council of Ministers presided over by a Prime Minister. After much deliberation, the military ministers accepted the parliamentary formula, and Goulart was allowed to return. Two weeks after Quadros' resignation, he was inaugurated as president. As *The New York Times* correctly stated, Brazil had just lived through one of the most momentous periods in its history.[91]

The Portuguese government had followed these developments with considerable attention. Indeed, any change in the Brazilian presidency was seen as a sensitive matter by the Necessidades, as has been noted in relation to the crisis of August 1954.[92] However, Quadros' resignation and the ensuing political-institutional crisis inspired particular concerns – but also some hopes. Concerns, because, despite all the initial setbacks – such as the *Santa Maria* case and Arinos' declarations – Quadros had eventually shown himself to be malleable and accommodating regarding Portugal-Brazil relations. His political disappearance at a delicate moment for Portugal, and his unexpected replacement by Goulart, meant an unpredictable future. Although Goulart was also a politician with connections to Portugal – in 1956, for instance, he had been received as a private visitor in Portugal – his connections with left-wing (and frequently anti-colonial) circles hardly augured well for Portuguese interests. But there was also hope, insofar as the crisis indicated that a military dictatorship, inspired by anti-communist values,

[90] Schwarcz and Starling, *Brasil,* 434; Bethell, *…under the Liberal*, 137-138. *The New York Times* [New York, US], August 29, 1961, 1; 16.
[91] Schwarcz and Starling, *Brasil,* 435; Bethell, *…under the Liberal*, 138-140. *The New York Times* [New York, US], September 3, 1961; E8.
[92] See chapter two.

could emerge in Brazil. Although the democratic regime had been – generally – favorable to Portuguese interests, a right-wing dictatorship led by the military would surely be even more so. Perhaps more importantly, it would forcibly muzzle anti-colonial currents of opinion. Indeed, during the crisis, the Portuguese military attaché, Colonel Cunha, reported that the Congress was trying to change the Constitution in order to "please the Armed Forces, [but] there is the chance of a military dictatorship if this solution fails – and this could be more favorable to us."[93]

With the crisis virtually solved, the new Portuguese ambassador to Brazil, João Battaglia Ramos, was charged with unveiling the new government's position regarding Portugal and its overseas issues.[94] Prior to his arrival, the Goulart government had already indicated that it would follow Quadros' foreign policy, but Ramos collected encouraging words from the new leaders. During the presentation of his diplomatic credentials, Goulart confessed to Ramos that he was a "great friend of Portugal," and that Portugal could always count on his friendship and goodwill. Prime Minister Tancredo Neves – formerly Vargas' minister of Justice – also presented himself as a "great friend of Portugal." However, he went even further, stating that he had "great esteem" for Portugal and its government, and felt admiration for Salazar. "I follow keenly the extraordinary work of that great statesman – one of the greatest men of our time," Ramos was told by Tancredo Neves. Was this a good omen? Although he had only recently arrived in Brazil, the Portuguese ambassador already expressed the traditional distrust towards Brazilian politicians. "I am very impressed by the words of the prime minister, which seemed to me sincere," he promptly informed the Necessidades. "However, I am wondering to what extent Tancredo Neves wants to, or can, translate these words into action." In any case, Ramos underlined, he first needed to meet with the new chief of Brazilian diplomacy, the minister San Tiago Dantas, in order to ascertain the possibilities of the Portuguese government.[95]

An opportunity for sounding out Dantas emerged days after – but in undesirable circumstances. According to the Portuguese delegation to UN, Afonso Arinos (meanwhile appointed head of the Brazilian delegation) was going to make several mentions to Portugal during Brazil's inaugural speech, particularly a severe critic and condemnation of Portuguese overseas policy, that would have to be avoided. On September 21, Ramos met minister Dantas in the Itamaraty. Ramos opened the meeting stating that the Portuguese government was extremely concerned with this information and cautioned Dantas about its dangers. "As you might understand, this attitude will penalize us a lot [because] it is a big and friendly country such as Brazil who takes it, especially in the opening session and on a

[93] EPRJ to MNE, T 260, August 29, 1961, AHDMNE.
[94] Ambassador Manuel Rocheta was meanwhile posted in the Portuguese embassy in London.
[95] EPRJ to MNE, T 278, September 15, 1961; EPRJ to MNE, T 279, September 16, 1961; EPRJ to MNE, T 280, September 16, 1961, AHDMNE.

voluntary basis," Ramos cautioned. "As you might understand too, such attitude will deeply dismay the Portuguese government and Lisbon will never comprehend it." The Portuguese ambassador then requested Dantas' intervention to avoid such references, which would seriously harm the relations between the two countries. Dantas tried to reassure Ramos by saying that the speech – which he had seen – did not contain any content to justify these concerns. However, he emphasized that Brazil could not continue to abstain over the issue of Angola. "Brazil supports the great movement of independence in Africa, [and] it cannot continue to accept the rigid position of the Portuguese government," the minister stated. "If the position of the Portuguese government was not so rigid, I could even propose a solution of the problem on the basis of Portuguese-Brazilian understanding." Ramos ignored this proposal, and repeated the usual discourse on Portuguese unity, multiracial societies, and the inexistence of racial discrimination. After an exchange of ideas, Dantas underlined that Brazil was not voting against Portugal, but rather "against Portuguese policies."[96]

Whatever hope there had been for Portugal had now evaporated. According to his report, Ramos believed that the new foreign minister's position was "considered" and "fixed" – even if he was willing to seek "less drastic solutions" to Angola. However, the problem was not Portuguese colonialism or the Angolan issue as such, but rather the fact that the Brazilians were concerned with their international standing. "Brazil is looking for a position of leadership in the international arena, and it cannot achieve it without the support of Afro-Asian group," he stated. "The discreet suggestion to solve the problem of Angola, the news of Brazil's candidacy for the UN Secretary General's seat… everything suggests that these are objectives that Brazil could achieve by adopting such a position towards Portugal." Symptomatic of the dismay of Ramos towards the new Brazilian government was the way in which he ruled out a demarche towards Tancredo Neves. "He is in Brasília, which makes impossible any demarche in a timely manner," he informed the Necessidades. "On the other hand, I feel that his position within the government is weak. And, moreover, he is somehow irresponsible, as the declarations he made regarding the Portuguese government and the President of the Council [Salazar] were made at a moment that Brazil had already decided to adopt the position which it is adopting."[97]

The day after, Arinos made a remarkable opening speech in New York. Contrary to Dantas' reassurances, the speech justified all of the Portuguese fears, since it publicly revealed everything that had been discussed in private since the Quadros' government:

[96] MNE to EPRJ, T [V/U] 221, September 20, 1961; EPRJ to MNE, T [U] 289, September 21, 1961, AHDMNE.
[97] EPRJ to MNE, T 292, September 21, 1961, AHDMNE.

> Our brotherly relations with Portugal, and our traditional friendship with France, cannot prevent us from taking up a very clear position on the painful differences that colonialism in Africa is raising between the United Nations and these two countries, to which we owe so much and with which we still have so much in common. We think that these two States should bring about self-determination in Algeria and Angola. Nothing will prevent the liberation of Africa.[98]

Going beyond a simple reaffirmation of the independent foreign policy inaugurated by Quadros, Goulart's government specifically demanded the self-determination of Angola and French Algeria, two of the most important issues of the decolonization process during the early 1960s. By doing so, Brazil was clearly breaking with its long-standing policy of connivance with European colonialism, which had been particularly visible during the second half of the 1950s.

Bearing in mind the warnings of Ramos to Dantas, a chill in relations between Portugal and Brazil was to be expected. However, the Portuguese regime stood to lose more than it would gain by distancing itself from Brasília. In mid-1961, Portugal was virtually isolated in the UN, and could rely only on two more or less consistent partners, namely Spain and South Africa. Its European partners – including the former colonial powers and its NATO allies – increasingly regarded Lisbon as an embarrassment, and Washington, at least since John F. Kennedy's arrival in power, had changed its policy towards Portugal. As for the Latin American countries, which had generally been supportive (albeit inconsistently) in the past, Portugal could only count on a few timid abstentions or absences. Although Brazil was progressively distancing itself from Portuguese colonial policy, recent experience had demonstrated that Brazilian governments tended to be malleable, and eventually yielded to pressure from Portuguese diplomats.

As such, the Portuguese diplomatic approach to Brasília did not change significantly following Arinos' speech at the UN, as the Necessidades and Ramos continued to court the Goulart government, and Dantas in particular. Indeed, only a few days later, Ramos met again with Dantas, and (once again) explained the Overseas policy, recalling the special ties between Portugal and Brazil, and underlining the efforts of the Portuguese government to develop Portuguese Africa, namely the recent changes

[98] Speech of Minister Affonso Arinos de Mello Franco at the XVI Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly. In Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa, *Brazil in the United Nations. 1946-2011* (Brasília: FUNAG, 2013), 208.

made regarding the 'indigenous' citizens.[99] Ramos, moreover, sought to influence public opinion in order to pressure the government. Former ambassador Rocheta, for instance, had already made a remarkable effort to improve the coverage of Angola by the Brazilian press, granting privileged information, and requesting the direct intervention of some friends. Kubitschek, for instance, had been largely responsible for a favorable shift of opinion by the *Diário Carioca* regarding Portugal and its issues in Angola.[100]

In the weeks following Arinos' statement in New York, Ramos sought to intensify the 'reactivation' of many of the 'friends of Portugal' in Brazilian political circles. Although Portuguese 'prestige' in Brazil had progressively diminished – especially due to the Delgado case and the international condemnation of Portuguese colonialism – Lisbon still had powerful, influential, and loyal friends. Eurípedes Cardoso de Menezes, a Member of the Chamber, was one of them. He was supplied not only with Portuguese-government documents, but also with classified information, including NATO documents, in order to help him make a speech in the Chamber of the Deputies regarding the Portuguese 'Overseas policy.' During his 50-minute address, Cardoso de Menezes eulogized Portuguese policy in Africa, and accused "bolshevist colonialism" of attempting to tear down the "Portuguese stronghold in Africa."[101] Cardoso de Menezes, as well as other politicians (including senators), were then invited to visit Angola and other parts of the empire. Others, such as Senator João Villas-Boas, were received in Lisbon by Franco Nogueira, where they attended a briefing on Angola, and other issues concerning colonial topics.[102] Senator Vitorino Freire, for instance, reported cross-partisan meetings behind closed doors, which involved discussion of sensitive topics regarding Portuguese interests, notably in Angola.[103] However, Portuguese public efforts would soon be redirected to another part of the Portuguese empire.

The Coup against Goa

In early December, the issue of Goa re-surfaced. The Portuguese government had received intelligence to the effect that India was planning a military strike against the territories of Goa, Daman, and Diu. According to its sources, the Indian army was expected to strike in mid-December, simultaneously

[99] In 1961, the *Indigenato* regime was abolished. But, as António Costa Pinto and Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo underlined, its "formal abolition did not prevent or halt the social, cultural, economic and political consequences that its long-standing existence entailed. Inequality continued to be the (colonial) rule" See Jerónimo and Pinto, *A Modernizing Empire*, 60.
[100] EPRJ to MNE, T [S] 197, June 21, 1961
[101] EPRJ to MNE, T 300, October 2, 1961; EPRJ to MNE, T 305, October 6, 1961; EPRJ to MNE, T 308, October 10, 1961, AHDMNE.
[102] MNE to EPRJ, T 231 [C], October 10, 1961; EPRJ to MNE, T 309 [U], October 10, 1961; MNE to EPRJ, T 232 [U], October 10, 1961; EPRJ to MNE, T 317, October 12, 1961, AHDMNE.
[103] EPRJ to MNE, T 310, October 10, 1961, AHDMNE.

employing ground, air, and naval forces – including an aircraft carrier. Such intelligence was reinforced by field observations and press reports: the Indian army was positioning its units along the border, warships had been spotted near Karwar (south of Goa), and anti-Portuguese propaganda was being increased significantly. Moreover, the Governor-General, Manuel Vassalo e Silva, had reported numerous border incidents and other subversive activities. Assessing such information, the government had little doubt that Nehru was planning to lay aside his pacifism. Indeed, it was only a matter of *when* and *how* the attack would occur.[104]

Nehru had already sent signals that he was reconsidering his policy regarding the problem of Goa. On August 15, the Lok Sabha had unanimously approved a constitutional amendment proposed by the government in order to facilitate the integration of the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-Haveli into India. Although *de facto* territories since July-August 1954, the Indian prime minister had deferred official integration due to the judgement of the International Court of Justice, but also because he wanted the broader issue of the Portuguese territories on the Indian subcontinent to be settled. The fact that he anticipated such integration was revealing, as were several of his statements. On one occasion, Nehru told the lower house of the Indian parliament of his hope that Portuguese India could soon be annexed. And, just a few days later, he admitted for the first time his intention to employ violent means. "I believe conditions are ripening for an advance to be made," the Indian prime minister told the Rajya Sabha.[105] "It is difficult for me to say anything definitive. But, in the context of what is happening in the Portuguese colonies abroad, what is happening in Goa today will produce a new situation requiring a new approach. We are watching them carefully."[106]

Seen from an Indian perspective, conditions were indeed highly favorable to a new 'approach'. By late-1961, the Portuguese regime was living through what Portuguese historians usually call an *annus horribilis*: with the international condemnation of December 1960 as prelude, the issue of the *Santa Maria*, the outbreak of the war in Angola, the subsequent UN resolutions of condemnation, and even

[104] "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Pretória ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," November 5, 1961, No. 1045; "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," November 14, 1961, No. 1049; "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," November 22, 1961, No. 1053; "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, November 27, 1961, No. 1054; "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," November 29, 1961, No. 1056; "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Karachi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," No. 1057; "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," December 2, 1961, No. 1059; "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros aos Embaixadores de Portugal em Londres, Paris, Rio de Janeiro e Washington," December 3, 1961, No. 1061; *VADEPI, 1947-1967,* IV, 41-42; 45; 52-56. See also Stocker, *Xeque*, 292-294.

[105] The upper house of the Parliament of India.

[106] EMBRAND to MRE, T 26, August 15, 1961; EMBRAND to MRE, CT 68, August 25, 1961, AMRE. "Do Encarregado de Negócios de Portugal em Karachi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," August 24, 1961, no. 1027, *VADEPI,1947-1967,* IV, 17.*The New York Times* [New York, US], October 13, 1960, 2; *The New York Times* [New York, US], August 15, 1961, 8; *The New York Times* [New York, US], August 18, 1961, 4.

domestic political agitation,[107] had seriously damaged the Portuguese regime's capacity. Indeed, its inability to attract support – particularly that of its Western allies and Latin American friends – revealed Portugal's increasing international isolation. Furthermore, Portuguese and international attention was now focused on Angola, which was surely regarded in New Delhi as a good opportunity to settle the issue. Finally, on a more practical level, the Portuguese military reaction in Angola – which had been slow and inadequate – demonstrated that Portugal would be virtually unable to resist a swift and powerful strike by the Indian military.

However, Nehru's position also demanded a new 'approach'. After more than one decade of moderate policies, which had included diplomacy, economic blockades, and *satyagraha*, the Indian prime minister was now being urged to adopt a new stance towards the Portuguese regime and its stubbornness. Political opponents – but also Congress Party members – were concluding that Nehru's peaceful doctrine was failing all down the line, and putting at risk vital Indian national interests. Not only in Goa, but also elsewhere: the never-ending dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, and the Sino-Indian border conflict over Arunachal Pradesh (South Tibet). Moreover, 1962 was an election year in India, and virtually all the political parties – including the Congress Party – were ready to use the issue of the liberation of Goa, Daman, and Diu as their banner.[108]

Furthermore, Nehru was also under external pressure, namely from several other non-aligned nations. During the Belgrade Conference – and despite the absence of explicit references to Goa in the final communiqué – Nehru had faced heavy criticism due to his inaction regarding the problem of Portuguese colonialism. According to one other participant, Nehru "was the target of violent and angry criticism, being accused of having lost his anti-colonial fire." "He had," P.D. Gaitonde wrote in his memoirs, "previously proclaimed that whatever happened in Africa affected Goa. Now the African leaders were reversing his words and saying that whatever happens in Goa affected, and would even facilitate, the Africa revolution." Communist China, in particular, had been particularly harsh with the Indian leader and his peaceful proclamations. "[China] claimed that Nehru was doing nothing to help the African cause beyond passing resolutions, while communists were taking more active measures." Clearly, as he recalled, for the nations present at the non-aligned Conference of Belgrade, the solution of the Portuguese settlements in India was "definitely more important than the issue of 'world peace'."[109] Furthermore, even the African freedom fighters were pressing Nehru to adopt a more

[107] In April 1961, the Portuguese Minister of Defense, General Júlio Botelho Moniz, attempted a *coup d'état* to overthrow Salazar. Among several reasons cited in justification of the coup was the colonial policy of the regime – and particularly the contemplation of military resistance in Angola. Botelho Moniz, alongside other political forces, believed that the Portuguese Armed Forces were unable to undertake such resistance. The *coup*, of which the US was aware, was discovered, and swiftly aborted. For an analysis of the case, and particularly the role of the US, see Rodrigues, *Salazar e Kennedy*, 54-69.
[108] Oliveira, *Os Despojos*, 264-265.
[109] Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 133.

radical stance. During the Seminar on the Portuguese colonies, which brought several Portuguese African nationalist leaders to New Delhi, the Indian prime minister faced unanimous disapproval, since his doctrine of non-violence was considered to be ineffective in bringing freedom to the Portuguese colonies. Marcelino dos Santos, who later founded the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* [Mozambique Liberation Front], stated that the greatest contribution India could make towards the liberation of the Portuguese colonies was to liberate Goa. During his intervention, he did not fail to welcome the Indian prime minister's stand on India's right to use violent means against Portugal.[110]

How did the Portuguese government react to all these developments? Between November and early December, Lisbon had begun to develop a military defensive strategy for Portuguese India. Indeed, on November 15, Vassalo e Silva received military instructions which stipulated two main actions: prevention of a domestic uprising, and delaying tactics. Regarding the latter, Lisbon instructed Panjim to carry out a coordinated retreat, culminating in a last stand on the peninsula of Mormugão and on the island of Goa, during which either the invader would be defeated, or the Portuguese soldiers killed.[111] Despite these instructions, one might question whether anyone in Lisbon truly believed that such a military defense was possible: Portuguese military forces in India were few (roughly 3,500 men), ill-equipped, and ill-trained. The Air Force was non-existent, as were anti-aircraft guns, and there was only one operational warship. Reinforcements were not available. However, the Portuguese government believed that the Portuguese military could prevent a *fait accompli* for at least eight days, which would buy sufficient time to mobilize diplomatic support at the UN, and pressure India to retreat.[112]

A strategy of diplomacy and publicity was also set in motion as a preemptive measure. The Portuguese government believed that by creating an international campaign – highlighting the imminent military attack on Goa – India could be compelled to reappraise its hypothetical *coup de force*. Such a strategy was targeted to Brazil (but also to the US, Great Britain and France), and consisted in four different stages.[113] First, the Portuguese ambassador in Rio de Janeiro was instructed to initiate all possible demarches in Brazil during the early days of December. The first step was to mobilize the media. "We are inviting world press representatives to visit Goa," the Necessidades declared, "to witness the normalcy of life, and the people's will to see the *status quo* maintained." Accordingly, Brazilian newspapers should be requested to send their correspondents to Goa as soon as possible. The

[110] Gaitonde, *The Liberation,* 154-155.
[111] Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 291-292.
[112] Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 301
[113] "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros aos Embaixadores de Portugal em Londres e Washington," October 10, 1961, No. 1039; "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros aos Embaixadores de Portugal em Londres, Paris, Rio de Janeiro e Washington," December 3, 1961, no 1061, 55-56; "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em Karachi," December 5, 1961, No. 1071, *VADEPI, 1947-1967,* IV, 35;62.

Portuguese government assured all facilities, and was even "ready to assume any [travel] costs if requested." The second step was to mobilize the *colónia*. "It is imperative to set in motion a wide spectrum of public opinion against India," Ramos was informed. "Besides demonstrations, we suggest sending numerous and expressive telegrams to President Goulart, Prime Minister [Tancredo Neves], Minister [San Tiago Dantas], members of the Congress, and other entities and organizations." Lisbon also advised that the *colónia* send telegrams to the White House, the State Department, and the US Congress. "They should," the Necessidades emphasized, "not rule out sending energetic messages of protest to Nehru himself." The third step was to invite important political figures to visit Portuguese India under the auspices of the government. In particular, Lisbon believed that a visit by the former president, Juscelino Kubitschek, would "make an effective contribution towards avoiding a violent coup" against the Portuguese territories. "You should appeal to his friendship for Portugal, which he has never disavowed […] [and] to which the [former] President could now do justice." Finally, the last step included demarches towards the Brazilian government, in connection with demarches towards the Brazilian embassy in Lisbon. A statement, an official letter, or even a diplomatic communique delivered in New Delhi, were possible means to exert the desired pressure over premier Nehru.[114]

Ramos was swift to act. After a series of overtures, the group *Diários Associados* and the newspapers *Diário Carioca*, *A Noite*, *Diário de São Paulo*, *Globo*, *Jornal do Comércio*, *A Tarde*, and *Tribuna da Imprensa* all accepted the Portuguese invitation, and less than one week later their correspondents embarked for Portuguese India. They would join a babel of other media: the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Times* from the U.K., the *Baltimore Sun*, the *Evening Sun*, *The New York Times*, and NBC from the US, *Le Figaro* and *Jours de France* from France, *Dawn, Morning News*, and the *Pakistan Times* from Pakistan, *Jamiuri* and *Mainichi* from Japan, Reuters, France Press, United Press International, and many others were all sending their correspondents in order to witness a possible invasion.[115] For its part, the *colónia* was responsive to Lisbon's requests. The president of the *Federações*, which represented the *colónia*, sent multiple telegrams expressing the apprehension of Portuguese in Brazil regarding India's

[114] MNE to EPRJ, T 271, December 3, 1961; MNE to EPRJ, T 272, December 3, 1961; MNE to EPRJ, T 275, December 5, 1961, AHDMNE.

[115] "Do Embaixador de Portugal no Rio de Janeiro ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," December 7, 1961, No. 1090; [115] "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," November 20, 1961, No. 1050; "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em Karachi," December 7, 1961, No. 1082; "Do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em Karachi," December 8, 1961, No. 1100; "Do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em Karachi," December 8, 1961, No. 1102; "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em Washington," December 8, 1961, No. 1103; "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Paris ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," December 8, 1961, No. 1118; "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Karachi ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," December 9, 1961, No. 1131; "Do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em Karachi" December 11, 1961, No. 1188; "Do Cônsul de Portugal em Hong Kong ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," December 12, 1961, No. 1203; "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Paris ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," December 12, 1961, No. 1207; "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Tóquio ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," December 13, 1961, No. 1225; "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Washington ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," December 13, 1961, No. 1238; *VADEPI, 1947-1967,* IV, 45, 73, 86-87, 95-96, 103, 134, 142-143, 155, 161.

aggressiveness. Besides the leaders of the Brazilian chambers and other political figures, the US president Kennedy received a letter requesting the attention of the White House regarding the issue.[116]

Nevertheless, obstacles to the Portuguese 'diplomatic-publicity strategy' very quickly emerged. The first problem was the readiness of Juscelino Kubitschek in supporting the Portuguese government. True, there had been encouraging signs: roughly one month earlier, the former president had been in India as a state visitor, and had (allegedly) cautioned Nehru about the disapproval of Brazilian public opinion regarding a violent solution to the issue of Goa. "Seventy-million Brazilians would never understand it," he was rumored to have said.[117] During a brief stopover in Lisbon, Kubitschek had even conferred for an hour with Franco Nogueira, revealing his "sincere regrets" regarding the new Brazilian attitude towards the Portuguese government and its overseas problems.[118] However, in the first meeting with the now Senator Kubitschek, who was taken by "surprise," Ramos immediately felt that his 'last-minute invitation' to visit Goa was somehow an embarrassment. The ambassador reported that Kubitschek had excused himself through reference to the Brazilian political crisis, and "several commitments in the time ahead," and had thus rejected the invitation, while promising to "think about it." Three days later, and after much persistence, the same excuses were repeated. "He told me: let us wait for a couple of days to see if I can change my appointments," Ramos telegraphed. "[Such] resistance […] seemed to me his delicate way of declining our invitation." That Kubitschek, one of the most 'collaborative' presidents, had rejected this plea did not bode very well for the future of Goa.[119]

The second problem – and perhaps more serious – was the willingness of the Brazilian government to exert any diplomatic pressure over India. True, both Arinos and Dantas had always assured the Portuguese government that Brazil considered the problem of Goa to be *different* to that of Angola – mainly because it was a clear case of foreign interference in sovereignty. However, these remarks had been made *informally*, in the course of conversations regarding Angola, and thus did little to reassure the Portuguese diplomats. Taking advantage of a meeting on Angola with Dantas – in which he said that Brazil supported Portugal in issues involving a transference of sovereignty – Ramos told the Brazilian foreign minister that he had received information disclosing an imminent attack against Portuguese India. According to the report sent to the Necessidades, Dantas "did not make any

[116] EPRJ to MNE, T [U] 400, December 6, 1961; MNE to EPRJ, T 283, December 8, 1961; EPRJ to MNE, T 416, December 19, 1961, AHDMNE.
[117] "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Paris ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros," November 9, 1961, URGENT, No. 1047, *VADEPI, 1947-1967,* IV, 44.
[118] MNE to EPRJ, T 257, November 13, 1961, AHDMNE.
[119] EPRJ to MNE, T 396, December 5, 1961; MNE to EPRJ, T 277, December 7, 1961; EPRJ to MNE, T 404, December 7, 1961; MNE to EPRJ, T 280, December 8, 1961; EPRJ to MNE, T 411, December 9, 1961, AHDMNE.

comment."[120] Ramos had to resort to 'less political' figures at the Itamaraty in order to gain the necessary attention: days later, the ambassador told the Secretary-General, Carlos Alfredo Bernardes, that the Portuguese government was "profoundly apprehensive" about the possibility of an offensive against Goa, Daman, and Diu. The movements of the Indian army, as well as a strong and provocative media campaign, he went on, were proofs that New Delhi was considering a strike against the Portuguese territories. Bernardes promised to make urgent contact with the Brazilian embassies in New Delhi and Washington, requesting more information about the situation on the ground. Compared to the prompt and decisive replies of the Vargas and Café Filho governments during the 1954-1955 crises, the Itamaraty's reaction was now extremely cold and even disinterested.[121]

Indeed, the Brazilian government could not have been less interested in the problem of Portuguese India. With the apparent waning of the conflict between Portugal and India, the international condemnation of Portuguese colonialism, and the emergence of the Angolan crisis, the issue of Goa had been relegated to a secondary position. And, to be sure, the Brazilians seemed satisfied with this state of affairs: Brazil discretely continued to play the role of protecting power, while, at the same time, avoiding a potential point of *frisson* with Portugal – and, indeed, of tensions with New Delhi. The reduced circulation of cables between the Itamaraty and its embassy in India about this matter is revealing, as is the lack of internal instructions about how to handle the case. Nonetheless, this did not mean that the Itamaraty was unware of the situation: the recently appointed ambassador to India, Mário da Costa Guimarães, drew attention to the increasing tensions in India regarding Goa, and even suggested that the Portuguese government should avoid needless provocations, which would risk giving the Indian opposition additional ammunition against Nehru during the election. So far as the evidence shows, the Itamaraty at no point made use of this and other information during the meetings held with the Portuguese ambassador, or even informed its ambassador in Lisbon.[122]

Replying to the Itamaraty's request for information on the situation, Guimarães was peremptory: "Portuguese apprehension is justified." Despite emphasizing the current political moment – "the emotiveness of the [Indian] electoral campaign" – the Brazilian ambassador believed that this was not enough to justify the movement of troops. "I cannot rule out a demonstration of force," he cautioned Rio de Janeiro. "The Indians may be tempted to take extreme action with regard to Goa, in order to compensate their inability to confront the Chinese." Taking advantage of a meeting with Nehru,

[120] EPRJ to MNE, T 397, December 6, 1961, AHDMNE.
[121] EPRJ to MNE, T 418, December 9, 1961, AHDMNE.
[122] EMBRAND to MRE, T 45, December 1, 1961, AMRE.

Guimarães was told by the "tired" prime minister that it was "increasingly hard to contain public reactions after so many years of patient waiting."[123]

Despite Guimarães' worrying assessment, which was promptly shared with the Portuguese embassy, the Itamaraty seemed reluctant to act. In a meeting with Ramos, Bernardes confessed that he had already thought about a Brazilian statement on Goa, "but that he needed to first find a situation that justified it." Ramos underlined that the situation was "severe" and "critical," but the Secretary-General was "hesitant," and unable to "solve anything" without first consulting minister Dantas. Under pressure from Lisbon, Ramos unblocked the situation though a meeting with the president. "Goulart expressed concern and a great deal of interest, and promised to communicate immediately with the Itamaraty."[124] The day after, on December 11, a communique was transmitted to Lisbon:

> Brazil, having noted, with great apprehension, the news circulating about the possibility of a military intervention against the Portuguese territories of Goa, Daman, and Diu, reaffirms its official rejection of the use of armed force, and expresses its confidence that the Indian Union will abstain from employing measures contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. The Brazilian government, in accordance with the principles of the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation between Portugal and Brazil, continues to follow the situation with great attention, and is prepared to provide its full collaboration, in order that the peaceful resolution of problems, traditionally defended by the most illustrious leaders of the Indian Union, can be applied to its divergences with Portugal.[125]

Brazil's statement was immediately circulated among all the Portuguese diplomatic entities. In London, the Portuguese ambassador, Manuel Rocheta, was instructed to publicize this statement, since it could "possibly influence the attitude of the British government."[126] The Foreign Office was trying to avoid at all costs any involvement in the issue, for the exact same reasons that had caused British diplomats to act so discretely during the previous years: the desire to upset neither the Portuguese government (a historical ally) nor the Indian government (a commonwealth member). Instead, London hoped that

[123] EMBRAND to MRE, T [U] 47, December 6, 1961; EMBRAND to MRE, T [U] 48, December 7, 1961, AMRE.
[124] EPRJ to MNE, T [V/U] 422, December 11, 1961, AHDMRE.
[125] "Nota Oficiosa do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros publicada na imprensa em 11 de Dezembro de 1961," December 11, 1961, No. 1180, *VADEPI, 1947-1967,* IV, 130-131.
[126] "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em Londres," December 11, 1961, No. 1181, *VADEPI, 1947-1967,* IV, 131.

Washington would handle the situation, but the State Department was similarly reluctant to act: after much internal debate, the Kennedy administration expressed to New Delhi its concern over the use of force in Goa, and eventually put forward a proposal that India should postpone action for six months, in order to enable a resolution that would allow a UN force to remove the Portuguese.[127] Remarkably, the Brazilians were also seeking a way of avoiding a violent solution: a memorandum dated December 15 stated that Brazil should urge India to accept an international commission, in order to discuss the problem and to pressure Portugal to accept a plebiscite in Portuguese India within six months.[128]

However, it was now too late. Ignoring several appeals, including a last-minute demarche from Washington, Nehru decided to give the 'green light' to an invasion. On December 17, roughly 45,000 Indian Army soldiers, under the command of General J.N. Chaudhury, launched 'Operation Vijay' against Goa, Daman, and Diu. Although having received clear orders from Salazar to resist until death – *"sinto que pode haver apenas soldados e marinheiros vitoriosos ou mortos"* ["there can only be either victorious Portuguese soldiers and sailors, or dead ones"][129] – the Portuguese offered only a brief and token defense against the Indian Goliath. Although Chaudhury's plan had aimed at completion within three days – clearly overestimating Portuguese military forces – a mere 36 hours after the beginning of 'Operation Vijay,' Vassalo e Silva had surrendered, thus putting an end to Portugal's 460-year presence on the Indian subcontinent.[130]

The 'eight-day resistance plan' had thus evaporated. However, Portugal still sought to persuade the UN Security Council: Vasco Garin requested a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Indian troops from the Portuguese territories. After a tough conversation with the US ambassador in Lisbon – in which the Portuguese foreign minister, Franco Nogueira, had warned that an unsympathetic response by Washington regarding the 'invasion' would have serious repercussions for Portugal-US relations – the US delegation, in collaboration with Britain, France, and Turkey, submitted a resolution "deploring" the use of force by India, and calling upon New Delhi to withdraw its forces immediately. Although it obtained the necessary seven votes – apart from those of the sponsors, those of Nationalist China, Ecuador, and Chile – the resolution was eventually vetoed by the Soviet Union.[131] During this process,

[127] McGarr, *The Cold War*, chapter 4; Rodrigues, *Salazar e Kennedy*, 135-157.
[128] MRE, M [C] 64, December 15, 1961, AMRE. The US State Department also came up with a similar idea: the US ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, proposed to Nehru a six-month standstill on military action, during which the Kennedy administration would undertake a serious effort to broker a settlement between Lisbon and New Delhi. See McGarr, *Cold War*, 130-131. This suggests that Brazilian and US diplomats might have discussed a settlement, although there is nothing in Brazilian documents to confirm this.
[129] In his final instructions to the Governor-General, dated 14 December, Salazar also wrote: "These words, because of their serious nature, can only be addressed to a military man who is conscious of his highest duty, and is entirely disposed to fulfil it. God will not permit such a military man to be the last Governor of Goa." See Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 167.
[130] Stocker, *Xeque-Mate,* 317-330
[131] See Resolution S/5033, United Nations.

Adlai Stevenson was severely critical of Nehru. He recalled that "few nations have done more [than India] to uphold the principles of this Organization or to support its peace-making efforts all over the world, and none have espoused non-violence more vehemently and invoked the peaceful symbolism of Gandhi more frequently." The US delegate then predicted difficult times for the UN due to India's military action against the Portuguese territories: "Tonight we are witnessing the first act in a drama which could end with [the UN's] death."[132]

The public reaction of the Brazilian government was less harsh, and more emotional. A statement published by the Itamaraty stated that the military invasion "had painfully surprised the Brazilian people and government." It recalled that the Brazilian ambassador in Lisbon had recently "publicly expressed Brazil's apprehensions" and "confidence in a peaceful solution," and regretted that "such hopes" had been "dissipated by events." The note ended by affirming that the Brazilian people shared the "feelings" of the Portuguese people regarding this "serious occurrence," which was a "glaring violation of the Charter of the United Nations."[133] For its part, the Brazilian press was virtually unanimous in condemning the violent action of India. The *Globo* wrote on December 20 that India's aggression was criminal, and a "betrayal of history and the UN Charter."[134] The *Correio da Manhã* underlined that both Europe and South America were outraged by an attack against an "outpost of European civilization."[135] The *Jornal do Brasil* stated that "despite all the [proffered] explanations," India's attitude "could not be justified."[136] Moreover, the *Jornal* also noted that the Soviet Union had in effect "guaranteed the impunity of the Indian assault."[137] Even Kubitschek, which had ignore Lisbon's pleas, argued in defense of Portugal during a public ceremony. "Here I am, in this hour of pain and bitterness, to say that there is no gesture, no act regarding Portugal, that does not find an echo, a reaction, and an emotion in Brazil. Only in this hour of pain, in face of aggressions such as the one that Portugal has suffered in India, can we perceive the extent to which [Portugal and Brazil] are linked."[138]

Behind closed doors, however, the reaction of the Itamaraty was far less heated. Referring to a speech by Salazar in the aftermath of the hostilities – in which, among other acknowledgments, he had praised the actions of Brazilian diplomats, while at the same time hinting that these had been largely ineffective[139] – the now Secretary General Adjunct, João de Araújo Castro, took the chance to propose

[132] As quoted in Gaitonde, *The Liberation*, 172. Original in Rubinoff, *India's Use*, 95-96.
[133] EPRJ to MNE, T 442, December 18, 1961, AHDMNE.
[134] *O Globo* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], December 20, 1961, 1.
[135] *Correio da Manhã* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], December 20, 1961, 6.
[136] *Jornal do Brasil* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], December 19, 1961, 1.
[137] *O Jornal* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], December 22, 1961, 2.
[138] *O Jornal* [Rio de Janeiro, Brazil], December 23, 1961, 1.
[139] In this speech, Salazar had expressed Portugal's thanks to the Brazilian government, but had criticized, in a veiled manner, the foreign policy inaugurated by Quadros and continued by Goulart, especially the "fluctuations" of the alignment between

a "step forward" regarding Portuguese affairs. "[Salazar's] disenchantment is remarkably favorable for our current objective of 'disengaging' Brazil [from Portugal]. If this had been stated by us, it would have been serious; but having been stated by Portugal, it frees us from numerous concerns," he wrote. "It is excellent that Mr. Salazar mentioned that the position of Brazil regarding Goa is different [to that of Angola]. We should tacit interpret that Goa was *different* from Angola. […] It is also excellent that Mr. Salazar stated that Brazil's action was ineffective, as our policy now should be precisely this: Brazil has no [inclination] to effectively aid Portugal in its colonial affairs, at least not until the Portuguese position has been modified." Having also noted that Portugal had "changed" its attitude towards Brazil without any consultation, as foreseen by the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation, Araújo Castro counselled that Brazil should immediately adopt a "more affirmative" position regarding the problem of Angola, namely full support, once and for all, for its self-determination at the UN.[140]

After 14 long years, the dispute over Goa had come to an end. In a letter sent to the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, Nehru attributed total responsibility for this outcome to Salazar. "As a democratic leader," he wrote, "you will appreciate that there are limits to what one can do against a widespread and resentful public opinion." Fearing a spiral of repression within Goa, the decision to carry out a military strike had been "the lesser of two evils".[141] However, other motives had also fueled the decision to send Indian troops into Goa. Besides the heavy criticism that Nehru had faced at the non-aligned conference in Belgrade and during the Seminar on the Portuguese colonies – in which his commitment to the anti-imperial cause was openly questioned – Nehru was facing rising domestic pressure to solve the problem summarily. Indeed, since 1961, the Indian Prime Minister had been under heavy criticism, due to his weakness in counteracting Chinese incursions into northern India, and his apparent 'unwillingness' to expel the Portuguese from India. Facing a general election in early 1962, the Goan crisis had, as Paul McGarr has stated, all the ingredients to turn the election into "a referendum on Nehru's anti-colonial credentials."[142] Furthermore, Krishna Menon's influence over the Indian Prime Minister had, it would seem, a decisive role on Nehru's decision to give the 'green light' to 'Operation Vijay'. Indeed, the Minister of Defense was himself suffering heavy criticism due to his inability to secure northern India vis-à-vis the Chinese, and a successful action against the Portuguese had the potential to win him many much-needed votes in his electoral region, North Bombay, in which a large Goan community lived. In the end, not only was the Congress Party re-elected by a large margin,

Brazil and the Afro-Asian nations. See "Discurso pronunciado pelo Presidente do Conselho, Doutor Oliveira Salazar, na Assembleia Nacional, em 3 de Janeiro de 1962," January 3, 1962, No. 1528, *VADEPI,* 1947-1967, IV, 378-393.

[140] MRE, AOI/8 [S], January 4, 1962, AMRE.

[141] "Nehru to Macmillan, December 17, 1961", quoted in McGarr, *Cold War*, 133.

[142] McGarr, *Cold War*, 123.

but Menon's direct adversary in North Bombay, Acharya Kripalani, lost by more than 100,000 votes.[143] Irrespective of these reasons, Goa, Daman, and Diu were finally incorporated into the Indian Union, despite all the Portuguese 'objections'.

For Portugal, it was a humiliating denouement. In a speech delivered in the National Assembly, and read by the president of the chamber, Mário Figueiredo, due to Salazar's alleged temporary loss of voice, the passing of Goa was depicted as "one of the major disasters of our History and a profound blow in the moral life of the nation."[144] The 90-minute discourse, repeatedly interrupted by noisy applause from the plenary and shouts of support from the galleries, did not depart too much from previous ones: besides the historical context, the juridical arguments, and the supposed insolence of India, Salazar seized the opportunity to rehearse the dispute, and to offer his acknowledgment to certain allies, including Brazil. However, he failed to acknowledge that Goa, Daman, and Diu were little more than mere pawns in a larger imperial game: negotiating the transfer of the territories to India, or conceding the principle of self-determination to Goans, would inevitably lead to similar outcomes in Portugal's African colonies. And Portugal, according to Salazar, could not survive without these possessions. For this reason, Salazar continued to offer stiff diplomatic opposition, recruiting allies from every part of the globe, expounding a discourse based on Cold War fears, legitimate rights, international law, and even popular wishes. However, at the same time, he concealed the fact that he had slowly but surely withdrawn military forces from the Indian subcontinent in order to station them in Africa – this, it would seem, was the center of Portugal's colonial priorities. Indeed, Nehru was right when, in a letter sent to Kennedy in the aftermath of the intervention, he stated that Portugal had simply run out of "force and willingness."[145]

[143] See Norman D. Palmer, "The 1962 Election in North Bombay," in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer, 1963), 120-137. See also McGarr, *Cold War*, 141; Guha, *India after Gandhi*, 327-329.
[144] "Discurso pronunciado pelo Presidente do Conselho, Doutor Oliveira Salazar, na Assembleia Nacional, em 3 de Janeiro de 1962," January 3, 1962, No. 1528, *VADEPI,* 1947-1967, IV, 378-393.
[145] Stocker, *Xeque-Mate*, 327.

Final Remarks

Contrary to other colonial powers, Portugal under António de Oliveira Salazar decided to resist decolonization. The regime developed a new political language to justify continued rule in Asia and Africa: Portuguese State of India, as well as Angola and the remaining colonies, were re-designated as 'overseas provinces' and the 'colonial empire' became 'overseas'. In theory, 'Portuguese' from Portugal and 'Portuguese' from 'overseas were no different: instead, they made part of a large Portugal, scattered around the world. The *lusotropicalismo* of Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, which portrayed Portuguese colonization as unique and non-racist, was adopted by the regime in the 1950s and provided a modern, scientific justification for this policy: the entire empire was made of 'Portuguese', whit no race prejudices and linked by shared language. Actually, Portuguese colonial state was equally – if not more – rigorous in racial categories than the other European colonial states: the *Indigenato* regime distinguished the Portuguese between *civilizados* and *indígenas* and remained fully operation until its abolishment in 1961 (even if the discriminatory attitude remained in practice).

Albeit not vital, Portuguese India was considered a part of this empire. Besides the affective, historical attachment proclaimed, the colony in the Indian subcontinent had a very specific role: by denying any transfer of power (to the Indian Union or to Goans), the Portuguese regime signaled that its colonial policy was coherent – an inseparable 'Portugal', made of provinces located in Europe, Asia and Africa. More crucially, the regime under Salazar knew that negotiating the transfer of power would inevitably lead to similar outcomes in Portugal's African colonies – definitely more vital to Portugal's economy. This has been explored in countless studies. This study focused, instead, on the diplomatic aspects of the dispute between Portugal and India over Goa, although in a dimension that received less attention: the role of Brazil, an anti-colonial, democratic, and southern nation, and its evolution during the years. It explored the "special relationship" between Portugal and Brazil, but also between Brazil and India.

Portugal had had a head start in Brazil. Despite some ups and downs in their history, Portugal and Brazil had cultivated a relationship that could be characterized as "special". Besides more than three centuries of shared history, a common language, and a similar culture, Brazil was home to numerous Portuguese: from 1822 to 1945, for instance, an estimated total of 1.9 million Portuguese arrived in a country that was supposed to be "the land of the future." Governments on each side of the Atlantic – irrespective of their regime or political characteristics – extolled the "special relationship" between the two nations, employing a discourse based on historical, cultural, and fraternal ties. Intellectuals, in

particular, greatly contributed to this discourse: in the early 20th century, some proclaimed the need for an ethnocultural, geopolitical, and economic-social 'utopia' between the two nations, in order to build a truly world power. Although the concrete political, economic, and cultural achievements of this relationship were rather scanty, the idea of a special relationship prevailed throughout decades.

Portugal under Salazar significantly invested in this 'special relationship', and sought to capitalize on it in order to align Brazil more closely with Portuguese interests. To this end, it addressed the affective discourse towards governmental, diplomatic, and cultural circles, while also employing more up-do-date languages: *lusotropicalismo*, which portrayed Portuguese colonization as unique and non-racist (and Brazil as the 'proof' of such a theory, with its supposedly 'racial democracy'); references to the Portuguese-Brazilian community, recognized through the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation (1953); and Cold War-based justifications, which depicted Portugal and its colonial empire as a bulwark against communist advance. Portugal also sought to strengthen ties through an unusual exchange of state visits: João Café Filho was received with all due pomp in Portugal, being the first president of Brazil to officially visit the country in decades (1954); Juscelino Kubitschek visited the "motherland" two times (1956 and 1960), and even acted as co-host in an event characterized by an outdated nationalism; Craveiro Lopes made a 15-day state visit to Brazil, in which he proclaimed that both nations were finally assuming a common "position in world politics, holding each other's hands."

The Portuguese authorities seem also to have used the Portuguese *colónia* to their own advantage: the large Portuguese communities in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo were particularly well-organized and influential in Brazilian society, and could apparently exert considerable pressure towards governments and political parties. During the visit of Craveiro Lopes, for instance, the *colónia* was mobilized in order to make the trip of the Portuguese president a success; in 1961, on the eve of India's military intervention, the more distinguished members of the community did not fail to pressure the Brazilian government to declare its concerns regarding the future of the Portuguese territories in the Indian subcontinent. Portuguese diplomacy also seems to have fostered (with great care and success) good relations with the press, which played a decisive role in Brazil. This campaign became easier for two main reasons: first and foremost, the press in Brazil remained largely concentrated in the hands of great cartels, led by media tycoons such as Assis Chateaubriand and Roberto Marinho – both conservatives, and sympathetic to Portugal and Portuguese interests. Second, many contributors to the press were former ministers and politicians, including lusophiles, and never lost any opportunity to protect Portuguese interests. Neves da Fontoura, for instance, was one of the main contributors.

All in all, such investment bore fruit: throughout the dispute between Portugal and India, Brazil stood as one of the main defenders of Portuguese rights in the Indian subcontinent. Besides the

proclamations made during the early period of the conflict, Brazil soon 'materialized' its support on several occasions and through several actions: in 1954, Rio de Janeiro appealed to India to respect Portuguese sovereignty, and lobbied other Latin American governments to do the same; throughout the second half of the 1950s, Brazilians not only voted against resolutions that could harm Portuguese interests, but once again lobbied other Latin American nations, with a great deal of success. To a certain degree, Brazil was thus the 'diplomatic arm' of Portugal in Latin America, where Brazil's voice carried an important weight: through such efforts, Portugal was able to collect valuable votes, which allowed it to temporarily sustain its strategy at the UN. Furthermore, at a domestic level, Brazil's support – alongside with other friendly nations – allowed the Portuguese regime to demonstrate that its colonial cause was internationally supported. The 'attacks' against the empire were executed by countries that were at the service of the communism.

Brazil initially accepted this duty with enthusiasm. Particularly during the Vargas and Café Filho administrations (and, to a certain extent, during the Kubitschek's government), the Portuguese regime and its colonial policy did not deserve any criticism. By the contrary: Lisbon had a considerable reputation and Rio de Janeiro acknowledged Portugal's reasons regarding the dispute with India. Furthermore, Portugal was a member of NATO and could, whenever possible, to update Brazil about Cold War developments. But international developments, decolonization and the growing international criticism in the UN led Brazilians to slowly, but surely, reappraise their actions towards Portugal: the first voices came from the UN delegations, followed by less senior officials of the Itamaraty, until reached the higher echelons and even presidential aides. Surprisingly, Delgado's case played an important role to draw the public's attention for the Portuguese 'undemocratic' reality. When Quadros arrived in power, two years later, the duty with Portugal was already seen as a 'burden'.

India also demonstrated some interest in Brazil. Being the largest and most prominent nation in the region, Brazil was soon identified by Indian policy-makers as the 'diplomatic prize' in Latin America. Primarily through a publicity campaign, the Indians sought to project a positive image of their nation, in the areas of culture, economic development, and foreign policy. This was mainly to mitigate the images that had long prevailed in Brazilian minds, namely of an India "as a country of Oriental glamour and mystery, a country of maharajas and snake-charmers," but also as a country convulsed by the political turmoil and violence that the disastrous partition had provoked. These efforts bore some fruits: India's culture was well-received in Brazil, attracting distinguished intellectuals such as Cecília Meireles and (surprisingly) Gilberto Freyre, the architect of the racial theory (*lusotropicalismo*) widely used by the Portuguese regime. India's achievements, whether economic or international, also

received considerable praise, especially in the press, as well as within certain nationalist, socialist, and anti-imperial sectors of opinion.

The dispute with Portugal required additional efforts: the Indians published several pamphlets explaining their cause, but they eventually ran up against Brazilian incomprehension. Politicians, intellectuals, and journalists generally rejected India's justifications. During the several crises between Portugal and India, particularly during the 'warm years' of 1954 and 1955, the Indian embassy registered unpleasant remarks regarding their country's leadership and policies. Indians attributed these reactions to the fraternal connections between Portugal and Brazil, and to the "sense of loyalty" felt by Brazilians towards their fatherland. Although few documents are available, everything suggests that such a reaction was unexpected: the Indians had believed that their cause was fair, and that Brazilians would sooner or later lay their sentimentalism aside. However, additional archival research would be needed to confirm this hypothesis.

Irrespective of such setbacks, India redoubled its efforts to bring about a rapprochement with Brazil (and, one might say, with other Latin American nations): in 1954, through Krishna Menon's attempt at a whistle-stop visit to Rio de Janeiro, and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan's cultural sojourn; in 1958-1959, through the projected visit by Jawaharlal Nehru to Latin America (in which Brazil, everything suggests, was his main 'target'), and the invitation to Kubitschek to visit New Delhi; in 1960, when Indira Gandhi hoped to include Brazil in her extensive good-will visit to South America. The reasons behind these efforts must remain in the realm of hypothesis: international prestige; expansion of trade; migration and cultural agreements; the desire to build a united front against underdevelopment; the desire to bring Brazil into the non-aligned camp; the invitation to Brazil to play a mediating role regarding Goa; or, perhaps, all of these combined. Additional archival research is still needed in order to understand the precise motives behind such repeated attempts at rapprochement with Brazil. Nevertheless, it is clear that Brazil (and Latin America) did indeed have a place in Nehru's foreign policy during the 1950s.

For its part, Brazil's interactions with India from 1947 to 1961 show that such interest was reciprocated. During the initial years, this was primarily driven by Cold War assumptions (mainly the idea that Asia would be the point at which the Cold War would turn hot), but soon became broader: India's plan for development towards modernity, Jawaharlal Nehru's non-aligned foreign policy, and ultimately the growing international weight of India, all attracted attention within Brazil, including at the Itamaraty. Ambassadors Ildefonso Falcão and José Cochrane de Alencar gave voice to this Brazilian interest (even if pervaded with feelings ranging from envy to true admiration) particularly well, since both suggested that Brazilians should emulate India's foreign policy. Among the most senior officials at the Itamaraty, such interest also surfaced: although the relevance of Bandung was initially downplayed, during the

following years they become increasingly aware of the weight of Africa and Asia in the international arena. In this sense, Brazil's participation in the non-aligned conference in Belgrade (1961) represented the culmination of a process that had begun during the Kubitschek administration.

This is not to say, however, that Brazil was ready to engage in an active partnership with India (or with any other Asian or African country) in the cause of non-alignment. Firmly anchored in the Western camp, Brazil's rapprochement with India seemed to have been limited to its 'immediate' interests, particularly its political prestige and its solicitation of votes at the UN (as well as at other international organizations). Political interactions were indeed limited: close association with a non-aligned nation was perceived by many as a move that could place Brazil on the 'wrong track', this is, towards communism. Indeed, even if some displayed interest in a real rapprochement with India, conservative forces still carried overwhelming weight not only within the State apparatus, but also within Brazilian society. Indeed, as the Portuguese ambassador, Manuel Rocheta, correctly pointed out immediately after the announcement of an 'independent foreign policy' by Jânio Quadros, Brazil was not ready to carry out such changes: not only because of its links to the Western camp, but also because two powerful domestic forces – the Church and the Armed Forces – would never allow it. The unexpected resignation of Quadros in August 1961 can thus be partially attributed to his political flirtation with the Soviet camp and the non-aligned nations. However, even more revealing was the military coup that would overthrow João Goulart in April 1964, claiming that the latter was attempting to lead Brazil out of the Western camp.

Indeed, Brazil's behavior regarding Portugal and India (and their disputes) aggravated the already-existing split within the Brazilian elite, namely between those who identified with anti-communist Westernism, and those connected with developmentalist nationalism. The first group, which largely dominated the Itamaraty throughout the 1950s, deemed alignment with the 'West' as essential to Brazil: not only due to their historical, cultural, and privileged ties, but also because they considered the West to provide a model for achieving modernity, as well as security against alien ideologies (most notably communism). Any concessions to the Socialist camp – or even to non-aligned nations, perceived by many as 'tools' of Communism – would mean the weakening of the 'free world' against communism. Many still recalled the *Intentona Comunista* of 1935, in which a communist-inspired group had attempted a military coup. The second group, which was always present within the Itamaraty, was largely dominated by those who believed that Brazil should adopt a more 'independent' foreign policy regarding the US, and prioritize economic development above all else. This would mean – if necessary – a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and eventually the emulation of its economic approach. Indeed, contrary to the first group, the second group seemed to have tacitly accepted that

Brazil was part of the greater global South, and that, despite various 'differences', they shared a common feature with its other parts, namely, underdevelopment. Furthermore, they hoped to bring Brazil more closely into line with the anticolonial ethos: the colonial dominance of old Europe – which they experimented, although in a substantially different manner – was outdated, as the proliferation of nationalist movements demonstrated. The emergence of newly independent nations in Africa, for instance, would also serve the economic interests of Brazil: these would no longer constitute an 'unfair' competition against Brazilian products, particularly coffee.

Brazil's attitude towards the Portuguese African empire was, nevertheless, still very much incipient during the 1950s. The Brazilians knew very little about the relevant political developments, not least because Portugal jealously guarded the secrets of its empire. The overtures of Lisbon regarding the 'entrance' of Brazil into Africa generated, however, varying appraisals. Perhaps the most pertinent was the one made by the Brazilian embassy in Lisbon: besides asserting that Portuguese colonialism had failed, and that Portuguese rule in Africa was about to crumble, Ambassador Álvaro Lins also proposed that Brazil should move as soon as possible to establish its own independent influence within these territories. Lins, an intellectual, believed that Brazil had certain 'natural' characteristics that could facilitate its establishment in Africa: a common past, language and even cultural similarities. Therefore, in a post-colonial scenario, Brazil would be the country that could 'better equipped' to take advantage of an independent Angola, Mozambique or Guinea-Bissau. Others immediately downplayed such appraisals. But Brazilians demonstrated – even if still very much incipiently – that they were increasingly aware of the future relevance of Africa (and of the Global South) in the future decades.

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