

European University Institute
Department of History and Civilisation

German science as a medium of cultural policy and propaganda? The scientific relations between Greece and the Third Reich: A case study.

By

Maria Zarifi

Thesis submitted for
assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of
Doctor in History and Civilisationfrom the European University Institute

Florence, December, 2005

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Thesis submitted for
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the degree of Doctor of the European University Institute

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements i

Abbreviations ii

List of Tables iv

Introduction 1

PART I.

1. Scientific internationalism and national culture 11

1.1. Beginnings of the German Foreign Cultural policy. Science as a cultural instrument 11

1.2. Government, industry and scientific research. The creation of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society 19

1.3. The Zoological Station in Naples, Italy 31

1.4. The institute for marine biology in Rovigno d' Istria, Italy 41

2. German science under threat and the Weimar Republic's rescuing policies 51

2.1. Scientific isolation from international community 51

2.2. Germany's damaged image abroad and its Foreign Cultural Policy after World War I 63

2.3. Supporting German science and culture. The establishment of new institutions 69

2.4. The "Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaften" 81

2.5. German science and international relations 91

3. The emerging interest in the Balkans and the significance of Greece. 97

3.1. The impact of World War I on Germany's relations with south-eastern Europe 97

3.2. Cultural and scientific relations with Greece 105

3.3. Medicine as a cultural-political instrument 119

PART II.

4.	**Science, culture and the economic interests of Nazi Germany in southeastern Europe**	**133**
4.1.	"Lebensraum", geopolitics and cultural expansion	133
4.2.	Science, culture and foreign policy in the Third Reich. The agenda for the Balkans	141
4.3.	Planning the cultural conquest of south-eastern Europe	161
4.4.	The Four-Year Plan. Science and technology in the war service	177
4.5.	The "Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft" and its cultural political role in the Balkans	187
4.6.	The "Ahnenerbe" research program and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft projects for the Balkans	197
5.	**Cultural propaganda in Greece during the National Socialism**	**209**
5.1.	Exploring Greece's economic relations with Germany and the involvement of science and technology	209
5.2.	Language propaganda and science	227
5.3.	Bilateral institutions and cultural agreements	241
5.4.	German propaganda, the Greek scientific community and the policy of scholarships	249
5.5.	Scientific expeditions to Greece and their cultural mission	259
6.	**The German-Greek biological institute in Piraeus**	**273**
6.1.	The Kaiser Wilhelm-Institute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem	273
6.2.	The creation and operation of the German-Greek Biological Institute	289
6.3.	Prof. Dr. Max Hartmann	309
6.4.	The Greek Protagonists. Resistance or collaboration?	317
	Conclusions	331
	Sources / Bibliography	343

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Abbreviations

AAD	Akademischer Austauschdienst
AEG	Allgemeinen Elektrizitaets-Gesellschaft (General Electric Society)
AKA	Akademischen Auslandsstellen
A.O.	Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP (National Socialist Organisation for Issues Abroad)
AvHSt	Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung
BAB	Bundesarchiv, Berlin
BAK	Bundesarchiv, Koblenz
CRF	Central Relief Committee
DAAD	Deutsche Akademische Austausch Dienst (German Academic Exchange Service)
DAASt	Deutsche Akademische Auslandsstelle (German Academic Office for Foreigners)
DFG	Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Society)
DKZ	Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale (German Central Office for Congresses)
DWI	Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Institute (German Scientific Institutes)
ΕΑΜ	Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο (National Liberation Front)
ΕΔΕΣ	Εθνικός Δημοκρατικός Ελληνικός Σύνδεσμος (National Democratic Liaison)
ΕΚΘΕ	Εθνικό Κέντρο Θαλάσσιας Έρευνας (National Center for Marine Research)
ΕΛΑΣ	Εθνικός Λαϊκός Απελευθερωτικός Στρατός (Popular Liberation Army)
GDR	German Democratic Republic
HHA	Hans Hass Archive
ΙΑΡΑ	Ιστορικό Αρχείο Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών (Historical Archive of Athens University)
ΙΩΚΑΕ	Ινστιτούτο Ωκεανογραφικών και Αλιευτικών Ερευνών (Institute for Oceanographic and Fishery Research)
KWG	Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften (Kaiser Wilhelm Society for the Advancement of Science)
MPGA	Archiv zur Geschichte der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
MWT	Mitteleuropaeische Wirtschaftstag
NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist Workers Party)
NSDDB	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Dozentenbund (NS-Professors Association)

OKW	Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Military High Command/ High Commander of the German Army)
OKM	Oberkommando der Marine (High Commander of Marine)
PAAA	Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amts
RFR	Reichsforschungsrat (Reich Research Council)
RfWEV or REM	Reichsministerium fuer Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksaufklaerung [or Volksbildung] (Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Public Instruction)
SOEG	Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft (South-East European Society) renascence
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
ΠΕΕΑ	Πολιτική Επιτροπή Εθνικής Απελευθέρωσης (Political Committee of National Liberation)
ΦΕΚ	Φύλλο Εφημερίδας της Κυβερνήσεως (Official Gazette of the Greek Government)

List of Tables.

		Page
Table 1.	International Congresses 1922-1922. (PAAA, R 64981)	56
Table 2.	European participation in international congresses 1914-1923. (PAAA, R 64981)	57
Table 3.	Number of foreign students in Germany, France and the United States in 1899, 1900, 1904 respectively. (BAB, R 8088/796)	73
Table 4.	Number of foreign students in United States, France, Germany, Britain, Czechoslovakia, in 1926. (BAB, R 8088/796)	74
Table 5.	Percentage of American students at German universities, in 1892 and 1924. (BAB, R 8088/796)	74
Table 6.	Visits of German scholars to Bulgaria and Greece from April to July 1940. (PAAA, R 60661)	145
Table 7.	Number of foreign students who took German language courses from 1942-1942 at the *Prinz Eugen-Institut.* (BAB, R 63/5)	195
Table 8.	Percentage of foreign scientists who visited German universities from Oct. 1941 to Oct. 1942. (BAB, R 63/ 174)	196
Table 9.	Distribution of Greek exports and imports 1927-1940 (Pelt 1998)	210
Table 10.	Metal economy in south-eastern Europe, 1938. The case of Greece. (BAK, R 57 / 1392 / I-II, (Band I.) 1942)	214
Table 11.	Production of bauxite in Greek mines from the beginning of WW II until 1941. (BAB, R 63/ 84)	221

Introduction.

What usually comes to ones mind when one thinks of *culture* is more or less the arts and humanities, i.e. film, architecture, theatre, the literary tradition, the folk traditions of a country and its national language. Each country has a strong belief in the importance of its own culture and perhaps the desire that other countries should get to know it and appreciate it. The establishment of cultural centers, institutes, schools, the exchange of students, professors, teachers, and experts in various fields of intellectual and artistic expression, the exchange of books and other printed material, as well as the organisation of lectures, concerts and exhibitions are some of the practices that countries usually use to familiarize other nations with their own culture.[1] In some dictionaries, such as the Webster's and the Oxford Dictionary of English, *culture* is defined as "the arts and other manifestations of human intellectual achievement regarded collectively", including their "attitudes, values, beliefs, arts, sciences, handicrafts agriculture, economics, music, traditions, language, and story".[2] Along the same line, some historians, such as Hans Mommsen, use the term in a narrower sense, i.e. "high culture, popular culture and working-class culture replete with their intellectual products". Other historians, such as Lucien Febvre, Marc Bloch, Michel de Certeau, define *culture* as "the production of meaning by individual actors in on-going, heterogeneous and contested processes of representation, discursive construction and appropriation".[3] Nevertheless, why some countries desperately desire to expand or export their culture? When and why was culture first acknowledged as an important component of their foreign policy agenda? Does cultural policy provide communication and better understanding between peoples or its ultimate aim is to serve political, economic or other interests?

Before I place my work in the cultural discourse, I would like to give a general picture of how sciences, in particular natural sciences, have been discussed by historians with regard to culture, cultural practice and cultural policy. It should be noted, however, that the following account is not a detailed description of the different approaches of the

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[1] RUTH EMILY MCMURRY, MUNA LEE, The Cultural Approach. Another Way in International Relations, Washington 1944. New York/London 1947 (Reissued in 1972), p. 5.

[2] See: The New International Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language and Encyclopaedic Edition, 1998; Oxford Dictionary of English, (Revised edition), 2005. See also: SIMON BLACKBURN, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford 1994, entry culture.

[3] Cited in: STEFAN BERGER, "Social History vs Cultural History. A German Debate", in: *Theory, Culture & Society* Vol. 18 (1), (2001), pp. 145–153, here p. 148.

cultural dimension of science, but a summary of the extended and varied bibliography on the subject matter. In rough terms, many historians study the issue of cultural policy, and in particular foreign cultural policy, in political and/or sociological terms focusing on humanities while overlooking the role of natural sciences, while some others view exact sciences as the product of a specific cultural environment. It is striking, however, that despite the fact that natural sciences and technology had a large share in the economic and political establishment of the world powers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and consequently in their international prestige, very few historians have systematically studied their cultural role and their significance in foreign cultural policy planning.

With the rise of imperialism in the nineteenth century, culture became an exporting element "after traders have established their outposts, [...] foreign armies have decimated native hosts, [and] [...] new rulers have instituted a taxation system and police force".[4] Around that time, exact sciences together with technology acquired great significance, because they supported the process of imperialism. France, Britain, the United States and, from 1884, Germany, put science in the service of their colonial policies and their economic and political establishment overseas. Natural sciences became an essential part of foreign policy and they were employed by foreign cultural policy-makers, given the fact that they were acknowledged as certain cultural resources, moreover as "civilizing forces".[5] Culture alone, however, does not justify the eagerness of the European powers to expand abroad, but it is recognized as indispensable means for world politics,[6] as it embodies strong political and economic connotations. "How can one separate the economic motive from political or cultural one?" queries Pyenson studying the relation of German cultural imperialism with exact sciences in the first decades of the twentieth century.[7]

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[4] LEWIS PYENSON, Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences. German Expansion Overseas 1900-1930. New York 1985, p. 6.

[5] Cited in: LEWIS PYENSON, "Pure learning and political economy: science and European expansion in the age of imperialism", in: R.P.W. VISSER, H.J.M. BOS, L.C. PALM, H.A.M. SNELDERS (eds.), New Trends in the History of Science. Proceedings of a conference held at the University of Utrecht, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 209-278, here p. 238.

[6] RUEDIGER vom BRUCH, "Kulturimperialismus und Kulturwissenschaften", in: *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte* 13 (1990), pp. 83-92, here p. 83.

[7] PYENSON, Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences, p. 12.

Focusing on the German case, which is the main issue of my thesis, many historians primarily concentrate on the use of language as the instrument *par excellence* for cultural expansion, as well as on the neighbouring sciences.[8] Others try to approach and historicise foreign cultural policy by applying sociological models while tracing ideological principles that again leave exact sciences aside.[9] This is perhaps because "among all branches of knowledge, the exact sciences are least obviously grounded in ideology", as Lewis Pyenson remarks.[10] Similar narratives have been suggested by the now more or less classic works of Kurt Duewell, Werner Link and Ruediger vom Bruch that focus on the structure and principles of Germany's foreign cultural policy and the process of its formation within the German political and social environment.[11] Other historians concen-

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[8] See: REINHARD MERKER, Die bildenden Kunste im Nationalsozialismus: Kulturideologie, Kulturpolitik, Kulturproduktion. Koeln c1983; KLAUS BACKES, Adolf Hitlers Einfluss auf die Kulturpolitik des Dritten Reiches: Dargestellt am Beispiel der Bildenden Kunste. Doctoral thesis Ruprecht-Karl-University, Heidelberg 1985; MICHELS ECKARD, Das Deutsche Institut in Paris 1940-1944. Ein Beitrag zu den deutsch-franzoesischen Kulturbeziehungen und zur auswaertigen Kulturpolitik des Dritten Reiches. Stuttgart 1993; FRANK-RUTGER HAUSMANN, "Deutsche Geisteswissenschaft" im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die "Aktion Ritterbusch" (1940-1945). Dresden-Muenchen 1998; *Ibid.* (Hg.), Die Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften im Dritten Reich 1933-1945. München 2002; BIRGITTA ALMGREN, Illusion und Wirklichkeit. Individuelle und kollektive Denkmuster in nationalsozialistischer Kulturpolitik und Germanistik in Schweden 1928-1945. Stockholm 2002; KATHRIN ENGEL, Deutsche Kulturpolitik im besetzten Paris 1940-1944. Film und Theater. München 2003.

[9] See: EMGE R. M., Auswaertige Kulturpolitik. Eine soziologische Analyse ihrer Funktionen, Bedingungen und Formen. Berlin 1967; KURT DUEWELL, Interne Faktoren auswaertiger Kulturpolitik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: Institut fuer Auslandsbeziehungen, 1981; RUEDIGER vom BRUCH, "Gesellschaftliche Initiativen in den auswaertigen Kulturbeziehungen Deutschlands vor 1914", in: *Zeitschrift fuer Kulturaustausch*, 1vj, 31 Jg. (1981), pp. 43 –67; *Ibid*, "Idealismus und positivismus. Die Grundspannung in Kultur und Kulturwissenschaften um 1900", in: *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte*, 17 (1994), pp. 138-143; *Ibid*, "Kulturimperialismus und Kulturwissenschaften", in: *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte*, 13 (1990), pp. 83-92; MAX FUCHS, Kulturpolitik als gesellschaftliche Aufgabe: Eine Einfuehrung in Theorie, Geschichte, Praxis. Opladen 1998, which is a general, theoretical work.

[10] LEWIS PYENSON, "Why science may serve political ends: Cultural imperialism and the mission to civilize", in: *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte*, 13 (1990), pp. 69-81, here p. 71.

[11] KURT DUEWELL, Deutschlands auswaertige Kulturpolitik 1918-1932. Grundlinien und Dokumente. Koeln 1976; KURT DUEWELL, WERNER LINK (Hsg.), Deutsche auswaertige Kulturpolitik seit 1871: Geschichte und Struktur. Vienna 1981; RUEDIGER vom BRUCH, Weltpolitik als Kulturmission: Auswaertige Kulturpolitik und Bildungsburgertum in Deutschland am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges. Paderborn u.a. 1982. A more recent work on the subject is that of JURGEN KLOOSTERHUIS, Friedliche Imperialisten: Deutsche Auslandsvereine und auswaertige Kulturpolitik, 1906-1918. Frankfurt a.M c1994.

trate on scientific institutions, particularly on those referring to the exchange and granting policies for the dissemination of scientific knowledge beyond national borders, giving, however, little space to exact sciences.[12] In the same vein, Frank-Rutger Hausmann focuses on language teaching and the cultural activities when he studies the role of the branches of the German Scientific Institute (*Deutsche Wissenschaftliches Institut*, DWI) in a number of European cities, despite the fact that departments dedicated to natural sciences operated or planned to operate there.[13] In addition, studies on the main German institution for the support and promotion primarily of the exact sciences, namely the *Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaften*, -which in 1937 was renamed "*Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*"-, hardly explore its cultural political aspect.[14]

A different approach to the science-culture question is suggested by Paul Forman with his pioneering work, at the time it was published, on the impact of the Weimar cultural environment on German physics.[15] Unlike other historians, who occasionally and in a diffident manner try to give to science cultural credentials, Forman unfolds the way a field science is affected by a cultural milieu. Similarly, Jonathan Harwood explores the

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[12] Apart from the relatively old but important work of VOLKHARD LAITENBERGER, Akademischer Austausch und Auswaertige Kulturpolitik. Der Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst, DAAD, 1923-1945. Goettingen 1976, I name few of the recent works: PETER ALTER (Hg.), DAAD 1925-2000. Spuren in die Zukunft. 1) Der DAAD in der Zeit. Geschichte, Gegenwart und Zukunftige Aufgaben 14 Essays. Koeln 2000; MANFRED HEINEMANN, DAAD 1925-2000. Spuren in die Zukunft. 2) Fakten und Zahlen zum DAAD. Koeln 2000; BERNHARD vom BROCKE, "Internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehungen und die Anfänge einer deutschen auswärtigen Kulturpolitik: Der Professorenaustausch mit Nordamerika" in: *Ibid*, Wissenschaftsgeschichte und Wissenschaftspolitik im Industriezeitalter. Hildesheim 1991, pp. 185-242. An early version of this essay was published by the author ten years earlier. See: BERNHARD vom BROCKE, "Der deutsch-amerikanische Professorenaustausch", in: *Zeitschrift fuer Kulturaustausch*, 31 (1981), pp. 128-182; KARL-HEINZ FÜSSEL, Deutsch-amerikanischer Kulturaustausch im 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt a.M. 2004.

[13] FRANK-RUTGER HAUSMANN, "Auch im Krieg schweigen die Musen nicht". Die Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Institute im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Goettingen 2001.

[14] KURT ZIEROLD, Forschungsfoerderung in 3 Epochen. Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. Geschichte – Arbeitsweise – Kommentar. Wiesbaden 1968; ULRICH MARSCH, Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft. Gruendung und fruehe Geschichte 1920-1925. Frankfurt/Main 1994; NOTKER HAMMERSTEIN, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten Reich. Wissenschaftspolitik in Republik und Diktatur. Muenchen 1999.

[15] PAUL FORMAN, "Weimar Culture, Causality and Quantum Theory, 1918-1927: Adaptation by German physicists and mathematicians to a hostile intellectual environment.", in: *Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences* 3 (1971), pp. 1-115.

cultural and social elements that had driven German scientists to develop a specific approach to basic problems on genetics.[16] In a different discipline, Paul Lerner analyses the issue of how psychiatric treatment was used in the industrialized period and in World War I, adopting elements from mechanized destruction as well as models and techniques from industrial management.[17] These are among the few studies that highlight the cultural aspect of science focusing on specific disciplines, in other words, performing a case study analysis. Much of the literature that relates to science as cultural product of a specific socio-political environment, deals with the issue theoretically using sociological tools and philosophical notions.[18]

In the last two decades, some historians have begun to view science not only as the outcome of cultural agitation in a specific social, political and economic environment, but also as an active performer in foreign cultural-policy planning. It is not a coincidence that almost all of them focus primarily on the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century.[19] This was the high industrial age, when science had become an inherent part of industrial production and therefore an important factor of economic growth. It was also the period of colonialism, as the big economic powers of Europe were keen to expand overseas in quest of new resources. Science was put in the service of colonial policy and a number of scientists went overseas to build and organise the infrastructure of the regions in questions, while others became engaged in medical research for the fighting of tropical diseases that threatened the settlers. In addi-

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[16] JONATHAN HARWOOD, Styles of Scientific Thought. The German Genetics Community 1900-1933. Chicago 1993.

[17] PAUL LERNER, Hysterical Men: War, Neurosis and German Mental Medicine 1914-21. Doctoral thesis, Columbia University 1996.

[18] See: LATOUR B. and WOOLGAR S., Laboratory Life: the Social Construction of Scientific Facts. London 1979; BRUNO LATOUR, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society. Open University Press 1987. These are now considered classic textbooks. See also: ANDREW PICKERING (ed.), Science as practice and culture. Chicago 1992; HANS ERICH BOEDECKER, PETER HANNS REILL, JUERGEN SCHLUMBOHM (Hrg.), Wissenschaft als kulturelle Praxis 1750-1900. Goettingen 1999. One should not confuse, however, the social, political and cultural impact on the scientific outcome with the committed or ideologically oriented science. In the latter case, sets of values that mainly serve political interests are injected into science. The "deutsche Physik" in National Socialism and the "reactionary genetics" of Lyssenko in the UdSSR, are characteristic examples of this practice.

[19] Such are the works of: DANIEL R. HEADRICK, The tools of empire technology and European imperialism in the nineteenth century. Oxford 1981; JURGEN KLOOSTERHUIS, Friedliche Imperialisten: Deutsche Auslandsvereine und auswaertige Kulturpolitik, 1906-1918. Frankfurt a.M. c1994. See also footnotes 20 and 23.

tion, a number of scholars staffed research and teaching institutions abroad, exerting influence over the local scientific community.

Perhaps the most representative and systematic historian who deals with the role of science in cultural expansion is Lewis Pyenson. He investigates how exact sciences' utility interacted with explicitly imperialist strategies of the European powers, namely Germany, France and the Netherlands.[20] Along the same line, two German historians, Stefan Wulf and Wolfgang Eckart examine medical science as a cultural instrument in Germany's foreign policy. The former gives a detailed account of the cultural political role of the Institute for Tropical Diseases in Hamburg overseas, but also in the Balkans.[21] This institute was Germany's most important institution of this kind and one of the very few worldwide.[22] Eckart, explores the relation of tropical medicine with Germany's colonial policy.[23] He argues that tropical medicine did not only serve Germany's expansion; moreover it was transformed into a science for "colonial expropriation", namely into a "practical instrument for optimizing colonial economy", as medicine and hygiene was expected to make the indigenous labour forces of the colonies more productive.[24] The dissemination of western culture is regarded as a new form of imperialism, that is to say, "cultural imperialism". This kind of imperialism and international prestige followed by the economic enterprise. The expansion of the imperialists' culture maintained their rule over the colonized peoples. "Export and institutionalization of European ways of life, organizational structures, values and interpersonal relations, language and cultural prod-

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[20] LEWIS PYENSON, Cultural imperialism and exact sciences: German expansion overseas, 1900-1930. New York 1985; *Ibid.*, Empire of reason: Exact sciences in Indonesia, 1840-1940. Leiden 1989; *Ibid.*, Civilizing Mission: Exact Sciences and French Overseas Expansion, 1830-1940. Baltimore 1993.

[21] STEFAN WULF, Das Hamburger Tropeninstitut 1919 bis 1945: Auswaertige Kulturpolitik und Kolonialrevisionismus nach Versailles. Berlin 1994.

[22] England was the first colonial power that founded such institutes only a year before Germany, in 1900. See chapter three.

[23] WOLFGANG U. ECKART, "Von der Idee eines 'Reichsinstituts' zur unabhaengigen Forschungsinstitution – Vorgeschichte und Gruendung des Hamburger Instituts fuer Schiffs- und Tropenkrankheiten, 1884-1901", in: RUEDIGER vom BRUCH, RAINER A. MUELLER (Hg.): Formen ausserstaatlicher Wissenschaftsfoerderung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert.. Stuttgart 1990; *Ibid.*, Die Medizin und das "Größere Deutschland": Kolonialpolitik und Tropenmedizin in Deutschland, 1884-1914, in: *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte*, 13 (1990), pp. 129-140.

[24] ECKART, Die Medizin und das "Größere Deutschland", pp. 130, 135f.

ucts" were the alternative weapons of European imperialists in Africa, Asia and the Pacific.[25]

After the end of World War I and the signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919, Germany was forced to withdraw from the group of colonial powers, as it was deprived from its colonies and all its acquisitions abroad. The sanctions of the Treaty dramatically affected the young Republic's international affairs. At the scientific level, the country lost all of its institutions that had been created or supported by the Germans since 1900, losing at the same time its long-lasting influence on the local scientific communities. German science and research was cut off from the international scientific community and was restricted to its national borders threatened with provincialism and backwardness. What was at stake was Germany's culture and its national image abroad. In other words, its economic and political hegemony.

In the inter-war years, Germany having nothing left to defend from its glorious past but its culture, focused on advertising it abroad by making it an essential part of its foreign policy planning. The Republic established a number of institutions dedicated to the cultivation and promotion of its culture beyond its borders. The creation of the Cultural Section at the Foreign Ministry, in 1919, was the first decisive step towards this direction. During the Weimar years, the Balkan region was of particular significance for the Germans, as it seemed it could replace the lost colonies overseas and their resources. "Traditionally", argues Danckelmann, "the foreign cultural policy of the German imperialism concentrated to the Balkans, the Near East, the south-western Europe and the Latin America".[26] It was not a surprise, therefore, that during the Weimar years the focus of the Republic's foreign cultural policy became Bulgaria and Spain.[27] German cultural and economic interests in the Balkans led to the establishment of a number of institutions to serve as a tool for strengthening German presence there and, in particular, in friendly territory. These conditions were primarily met in Bulgaria, Germany's ally in the war. Educational institutions, such as the German Academy, created branches for disseminating the German culture, primarily the German language. The cultural presence of Germany abroad was not confined, however, to the foundation of language schools or to

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[25] ANNABELLE SREBERNY-MOHAMMADI, "The Many Cultural Faces of Imperialism", in: PETER GOLDING, PHIL HARRIS (eds.), Beyond Cultural Imperialism. Globalization, Communication and the New International Order. London 1997, pp. 49-68, here p. 51.

[26] OTFRIED DANCKELMANN, "Aus der Praxis auswaertiger Kulturpolitik des deutschen Imperialismus 1933-1945", in: *Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtswissenschaft*, Heft 6 (1972), pp. 718-737, here p. 724.

[27] *Ibid.*

the creation of philological and archaeological societies and institutes. Moreover, it took a practical and applied character with the establishment of research and experimental centres that turned out to serve the economic and military interests of Germany. In Europe, the only such institutes were the zoological stations in Naples and Rovigno. The former, was a model for international scientific co-operation and the latter was a branch of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem since its establishment, in 1911. Both of them, however, were confiscated according to the provisions of the 1919 Peace Agreement.

Nevertheless, language was the precondition for attracting young promising and from "good families" people to visit German universities, because a co-operative native elite, even a small one, was regarded as vital. "No imperial power", observed Sreberny-Mohammadi, "could rely on its own national alone"[28] and educating or training "teachers of technology, civil engineers, architects, mechanical engineers, mining engineers, and science teachers",[29] but also doctors, economists, lawyers and civil servants was crucial for Germany to re-establish political and economic influence abroad. Therefore, Germany launched a scholarship programme for those who were considered that they could facilitate its interests in their home countries. This policy was not a German originality and the Weimar Republic had to deal with the established French influence, not only in Bulgaria, but also in other Balkan countries, such as Greece.

Although Greece was not as favourably disposed towards Germany as Bulgaria was after the end of the First World War, there was a strong affiliation between the two countries that dates back to the creation of the modern Greek state and the arrival of King Otto to Greece, in 1832. Many Greeks, primarily from the local elite, decided to go and being educated in Germany. On their return, they staffed the most important administrative institutions of the Greek kingdom and were apparently favourable to their intellectual "homeland". Although this trend was not the result of the German Reich's well-designed foreign cultural policy, it created a fertile soil for a more systematic cultural effort in Greece in the years to come. Despite the fact that Greece was under the strong cultural influence of France after World War I, Germany was the indispensable leading technological and scientific power in Greece, having the absolute monopoly in some certain fields, such as engineering and medicine. Germany encouraged and promoted the germanophile climate in Greece basically through the German schools, the activities of

[28] SREBERNY-MOHAMMADI, "Faces of Imperialism", p. 60.

[29] PYENSON, "Pure learning and political economy", p. 239.

the German-Greek Society and a number of scholarships granted to teachers and young scientists. In addition, at that time, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, being the only German scientific and research institution remained that enjoyed international recognition, approached two Balkan states, Yugoslavia and Greece, in quest of favourable conditions to continue the research projects carried out in Naples and Rovigno. However, it was only in the late years of National Socialism and during the Second World War that the Kaiser Wilhelm Society succeeded to expand to the Balkan Peninsula establishing a network of research centres, which were also supported by the German Army. In addition to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes, other networking institutions such as the German Academy, the German Scientific Institute and the South-eastern European Society contributed not only to the promotion of Germany's culture, but also to the establishment of its economic control over the Balkans.

Ultimately, can we talk about German imperialism in the Balkans in the years of the Hitler regime? And if so, what characteristics did this kind of imperialism have? If imperialism is "in itself a multi-faceted cultural process", "a means of cultural transformation",[30] as Sreberny-Mohammadi argues, then it is legitimate to ask this question for the Balkans and try to unveil the hidden aspects of the German foreign cultural policy during the Nazi years. The case of Greece is my tool to approach the whole problematic, which I believe casts some new light on the intertwined scientific, political, and cultural issues that conclusively go beyond the Greek borders. It should be underlined that my investigation is based on archival material that is fragmented and largely located in German institutions. From my thorough and extensive research in Greece and Germany, the Greek archives proved to be poor, in regard not only with the cultural aspect of science, but also with the cultural relations between Greece and Germany through science, particularly for the period from 1938 to 1945. Therefore, the thesis is not a detailed account of a specific scientific discipline, of an institution, or of important figures. It is a narrative that uses examples of all of those aspects in an effort to understand Germany's interest to promote its scientific relations with a country well known for its ancient culture and not its scientific achievements.

The thesis has two parts. The first part is dedicated to the period of the Weimar Republic, as it was during that time that the necessity of an organised foreign cultural policy became Germany's conscience and science was to contribute to this purpose. In

[30] SREBERNY-MOHAMMADI, "Faces of Imperialism", p. 51.

the first chapter I am exploring how the notions of "nationalism", "internationalism", "culture" and "science" are interrelated giving the example of the creation of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and the two German zoological stations in Italy, which paved the way for Germany's scientific expansion to the Balkans through the Society. The mechanisms used by the young Republic to save its international prestige and its science are the issues on which I focus in the second chapter. In the third chapter, I investigate the significance of the Balkans, particularly of Greece, for the deprived of its colonies German state.

National Socialism is the focus of the second part of my thesis. In chapter four, I study how the focus of discussion on internationalism was shifted to geopolitics and the expansion of the German "*Lebensraum*" eastwards. During this period, new cultural and scientific institutions along with the old ones were put in the service of Germany's militaristic plans. In the last two chapters I reduce the scale of my research bringing the general discussion of cultural politics and science down to the case of Greece. The final chapter of my thesis is based almost exclusively on primary sources and ultimately concentrates all the dimensions of the German foreign cultural policy as I highlight them throughout the thesis.

PART I.

1. Scientific internationalism and national culture

1.1. Beginnings of the German Foreign Cultural policy. Science as a cultural instrument.

"The one who gives, dominates.
The theory of the donor works
not only for individuals and societies
but also for civilisations."[31]

Germany's institutional cultural presence abroad dates back to the *Kaiserreich*. A large number of cultural exchanges and activities were furthered through many private channels and were funded by Germans living abroad as well as by their clubs. The promotion of German science outside the Reich was essentially a matter of private initiative. Material support from the Reich was either non-existing or limited. In the latter case, it usually was the Prussian Ministry of Culture that sponsored the cultural initiatives in foreign countries. This kind of state-support was given to a number of teachers who were sent on their own request overseas, like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Chile, to organise the higher and military education of those countries. Japan, China and Turkey were also among the countries to which the Prussian Ministry of Culture not only sent teachers to contribute to the organisation of learning, but also established universities and technical schools there. The archaeological institutes in Rome, Athens, and Cairo, the Institute for Art History in Florence and the *Bibliotheca Herziana* in Rome, as well as the hospitals Germany built abroad, were all supported largely by private pockets rather than the public purse, although some money did come from the Prussian Ministry of Culture and Education.

Despite those important acculturating efforts and the material support by the Reich, official German cultural policy abroad remained rather discrete. The fact that the Reich's support came from the Prussian Ministry of Culture and not from some department of the Foreign Ministry, indicates the absence of an organised and systematised foreign cultural policy during that time. Moreover, German people, as it was often ar-

[31] FERNAND BRAUDEL, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, *cited in*: LEWIS PYENSON, Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences. German Expansion Overseas 1900-1930. New York 1985, p. 302.

gued, were not very well aware of their common culture as the French and Britons were. Thus, an official initiative for promoting a representative image of Germany abroad that would also unite the German minorities who lived there, who could then further campaign for their homeland's culture, remained a hesitant undertaking. The answer of the Reich's Chancellor, Theodor v. Bethmann-Hollweg, on 21 July 1913, to the cultural and economic historian Prof. Karl Lamprecht, who was the first to use the term "foreign cultural policy" in 1908, was characteristic of this hesitant attitude. The Chancellor stressed the necessity of a systematic diffusion of the German culture beyond its frontiers:

> "[...] We are not sure and conscious enough of our culture yet, our inner identity, our national ideals. It is due to the peculiarity of our individualised and still unbalanced culture that it has not the same suggestive power as has the British and the French one. This is the reason why every German abroad does not dream of his homeland as the French does for Paris and the Englishman for the island of Britain. [...] We are a young nation and, perhaps, we naively believe too much in violence. We underestimate the refined means [*feinere Mittel*] and we don't know yet that what violence can conquer, violence alone cannot maintain."[32]

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Germany had already found its place in the *Weltpolitik*, "a place in the sun", gaining a reputation as a strong military and economic power.[33] Like every other great European power, Germany, exerting its imperialist authority, sought to control territories with sources of raw materials in order to strengthen its own economy. Lewis Pyenson, however, rightly notes that, even though political economy was the driving force behind imperialist actions, not all discussions associated with imperialism should be restricted to political economy.[34] Cultural expansion, cultural influence or dependence is quite a complicated phenomenon to be exclusively interpreted as the outcome of imperialism or the "epiphenomenon of imperial control".[35] If, in nineteenth century, the spread of cultural activity that follows the establishment of traders' outposts in a conquered region, or the institutionalisation of a system

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[32] *Vossische Zeitung* (Morgenausgabe), 12.12.1913, reprinted in: RUEDIGER vom BRUCH, Weltpolitik als Kulturmission. Auswaertige Kulturpolitik und Bildungsbuergertum in Deutschland am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges. Padebom 1982, pp.149-150, here p. 149.

[33] See: WOLFGANG J. MOMMSEN, Grossmachtstellung und Weltpolitik. Die Aussenpolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1870 bis 1914. Frankfurt a.M., Berlin, 1993, in particular pp. 107-206.

[34] PYENSON, Cultural Imperialism, p. 3.

[35] *Ibid.*, p.6.

of laws by the new rulers was typical of overseas expansion, at the beginning of the twentieth century, cultural infiltration, in many cases and in particular in Europe, preceded military, political or economic domination, as I will try to argue later on.

The establishment of primary schools abroad held a particular place in the late nineteenth century German foreign policy. At the turn of the century, the general perception in other countries about the Germans was either that of "romantic dreamers" or of "imprudent militarists", both unattractive models for imitation.[36] In order to correct this unfavourable image, Germany had to adopt an official cultural policy that would systematically propagate its culture outside its boundaries and it turned to the French the British policy models to achieve its goal. School policy went hand in hand with language policy and a number of schools were built world-wide to foster and cultivate the German language and culture. Plans were drawn up and put into practice after the establishment of the German Reich, in 1871. These schools were primarily addressed to the German minority abroad and then to the local population.[37] Soon they were turned into "propaganda schools" and came to be associated with German political and economic interests. These schools were affiliated to and complemented by organisations already existed abroad, usually the German clubs.

Even though the promotion of schools was the oldest, most widespread, and apparently an effective instrument for Germany's foreign cultural policy, rapid industrialisation and the growing socio-political requirements demanded a parallel development of cultural strategies at another level. Science and technology were recognised as essential features for the national image on the world stage. Furthermore, paramount scientific and technological achievements became an "important ingredient of national intellectual self-perception".[38] As Brigitte Schoeder-Gudehus puts it,

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[36] FRITZ von TWARDOWSKI, Anfaenge der deutschen Kulturpolitik zum Ausland. Bonn, Bad Godesberg, 1970, p. 11.

[37] See: RUTH EMILY McMURRY, MUNA LEE, The Cultural Approach. Another Way in International Relations. New York/London 1947 (Reissued in 1972), pp. 39-47.

[38] BRIGITTE SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, "Science, Technology and Foreign Policy", in: INA SPIEGEL-ROESING and DEREK J. DE SOLLA PRICE, Science, Technology and Society. A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective. London, California 1977, pp. 473-506, here p. 473 f.

"There was in fact a growing tendency to evaluate and to compare the different nations' contribution to the advancement of scientific knowledge in terms of pre-eminence and inferiority, ascent and decline."[39]

Notwithstanding the recognition science and technology enjoyed as part of German culture and as valuable tools for foreign policy-making, there was still a reluctance to develop scientific relations with other states. It is true that some official scientific initiatives had already been taken overseas, - in China for example-, but this was a more one-way traffic, a result of imperialistic policy, rather than scientific co-operation and exchange. Such reluctance was not only a German phenomenon. However, the increasing need for intensive flow of scientific knowledge in the industrial era forced the modernising countries to start planning scientific collaboration. Moreover, the need to exert scientific influence demanded a well-organised foreign cultural policy and an appropriate science policy. Before World War I, the modified German foreign policy demonstrated the desire for a global peace-policy rather than the promotion of the German image abroad. Cultural propaganda, cultural prestige or the cultural imperialism that Germany aspired to, had to serve the ideals of peace and security as well as of a better and mutual understanding between nations rather than power control.[40] In the first decade of the twentieth century, Karl Lamprecht emphasized that even intellectual influence could increase rivalries between states. In his view, the reason was that intellectual infiltration, usually preceding economic or political domination, might misuse the cultural initiatives for political interests. Lamprecht argued further that Germany, as opposed to other "big nations", had to follow the peaceful way on practicing foreign cultural policy.[41] He also believed that, if Germany wished to find its place in world history and to play an important role on the international stage, it should promote the concept of international friendship that could unify the whole humankind.

"German historiography [...] has achieved in 19th century something great for the unification of our people. She should play the same triumphal and determined role

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[39] *Ibid.*, p. 473.

[40] BERNHARD vom BROCKE, "Internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehungen und die Anfaenge einer deutschen auswaertigen Kulturpolitik: Der Professorenaustausch mit Nordamerika", in: *Ibid*, Wissenschaftsgeschichte und Wissenschaftspolitik im Industriezeitallter. Hildersheim, 1991, pp. 185-242, here p. 185.

[41] "Rede Karl Lamprechts, gehalten am 7. Oktober 1912 auf der Tagung des Verbandes fuer internationale Verstaedigung zu Heidelberg", reprinted in: KURT DUEWELL, Deutschlands auswaertige Kulturpolitik 1918-1932. Grundlinien und Dokumente. Koeln, Wien 1976, pp. 255-167.

> for the unification movement of the humankind in 20th century, which becomes more and more prerequisite for the development of international relations."[42]

Whether, and to what extent Germany actually exercised this kind of foreign cultural policy at the beginning of the twentieth century, is an issue in question.[43]

The criteria a cultural undertaking or a cultural initiative had to meet, in order to be recognised as foreign cultural policy and not as a "form" or "type" of it, appear to be the following: first, the character of those initiatives had to be official, i.e. the state should be very much to the fore, showing that any cultural initiatives represent the will of the state, as opposed to individual interests; second, the undertaking had to be systematic and organised in agreement with the broader foreign policy agenda.[44] These criteria had already been drawn up by the German Reich before the First World War, but a systematised and intensified foreign cultural policy was only practised under the pressure of the Versailles Treaty, in 1919.[45]

Two government figures stood out in Germany's educational and science policy: the Minister of Culture and Education, Friedrich Althoff, and his colleague and subsequently his successor, Friedrich Schmidt-Ott. In 1905, Althoff set up an ambitious exchange programme between the teaching staff of the universities of Berlin and Harvard in the United States. A year later, another exchange agreement with Columbia University in New York was signed at the highest political level. Thus President Theodore Roosevelt and Kaiser Wilhelm II inaugurated an era of scientific collaboration between the two countries, which had significant political overtones. The interchange of professors be-

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[42] *Ibid.*, p. 267.

[43] See: ROGER CHICKERING, Imperial Germany and a World Without War. The Peace Movement and German Society 1892-1914. Princeton 1975.

[44] RUEDIGER vom BRUCH, Weltpolitik als Kulturmission. pp. 27-40. Vom Bruch argues that, apart from these two criteria, the lack of an explicit and coherent determination of the term 'foreign cultural policy', despite Lamprecht's efforts, indicates the absence of such policy before the war. The question, one might ask, is what exactly does names or terms denote and what does their use mean? Do they denominate a fact that could be perceived as an entity worth to be studying as such or are they constructions that determine what should be included or excluded putting an order in nature? In other words, what comes first, the name or the meaning (*τό σημαῖνον ἤ τό σημανόμενον*)? This is a nominalistic problem, however, that goes beyond the scope of this project.

[45] Kurt Duewell's argument in his work *Deutschlands auswaertige Kulturpolitik 1918-1932. Grundlinien und Dokumente* that the criteria were only met after WWI, is not acurate. The professorial exchange with the United States that began in 1905 and the number of several scientific institutions overseas advocates the opposite view.

tween Germany and the United States was "the first big cultural undertaking of Germany abroad".[46] It was the official institutionalisation of the academic relations that had existed between the two countries since 1850. During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Cultural Ministry in Berlin had followed with great interest and attention the scientific and technological achievements in the United States and German scientists were sent there, either to study or to represent their country at scientific conferences. One such scientist was Max Sering, a young agrarian economist who was sent to the US to study American agricultural issues, while another was the mathematician Felix Klein. Klein was the German delegate at the international fair in Chicago in 1892/93, and he also participated in the congress for mathematics organised there at the same time.[47] Both Althoff and Schmidt-Ott contributed to the realisation of scientific communication with the United States.

The tradition of academic exchange between the two countries was confirmed by the great numbers of American students who visited German universities. In 1880, for example, their number amounted to 1,088 students.[48] In addition, several American professors who were appointed in American universities and had been educated in Germany contributed consciously or unconsciously to the German influence in their own country. This is evident by the fact that some American universities in the last decades of the nineteenth century -like the Johns-Hopkins University, founded in 1876- were established on the German model.[49] However, it was only in 1899 that scientific relations and science were recognised as a "political factor" in the rapprochement between the two countries. The employment of this factor was slow and not yet systematic and, therefore, it did not bring quick results.[50]

Few years later, the idea of a systematic exchange of professors between the German Reich and America had found wide acceptance. The first step was taken by establishing the "Germanic Museum" in the US in 1903, an institution supported both by Germany and the United States. In the framework of the museum's activities, a number of lectures

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[46] With these words described the undertaking the first director of the *'Schulreferat'* –the early office of the cultural section (*Kulturabteilung*)- of the German Foreign Ministry. Cited in: B. vom BROCKE, "Internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehungen", p. 185.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 195.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 196.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] Letters of the German ambassador in Washington, Theodor von Holleben, to the Foreign Ministry on 21.3.1899 and 2.8.1901. Cited in: vom BROCKE, "Internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehungen", p. 197.

were given by German scholars on a regular basis. A year later, at the international congress for scholars, organised on the fringe of the International Fair in St. Louis, the exchange issue again came to the fore and an academic exchange was finally agreed between Harvard and Friedrich Wilhelm University of Berlin. Professors would have a three-month teaching contract –or longer after special agreement- and they would teach in their own language. The exchange project was put into practice in winter semester 1905/06. Adolf von Harnack, a prominent church historian and a major figure for the future scientific organisation in Germany, appraising this cultural initiative characterised it as "a big scientific business" that engendered new international scientific obligations, to which Germany had to respond.[51] The costs of the "Roosevelt Chair", as it was the title of the American exchange professor in Germany, would partly be covered by "*Speyer-Stiftung*". The "Kaiser-Wilhelm Chair", the position for the German professor in the US, was sponsored by the newly established "*Kaiser-Wilhelm-Stiftung*", a foundation created by Americans in 1905/06, under the aegis of Harvard University.[52] Furthermore, the Prussian Ministry of Culture contributed to the travel costs with funds from the "*Koppel-Stiftung*" created specifically for this purpose and endowed by the banker Leopold Koppel, in 1905. A new era, in which industrialists and bankers would play an essential role in the advancement of German science, had just begun.

[51] ADOLF von HARNACK, "Vom Grossbetrieb der Wissenschaft", in: *Preussische Jahrbuecher* 119 (28.1.1905), pp. 193-201. See also: RUDOLF VIERHAUS, "In Grossbetrieb der Wissenschaft. Adolf von Harnack als Wissenschaftsorganisator und Wissenschaftspolitiker", in: *Ibid.*, Vergagenheit als Geschichte. Studien zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Goettingen 2003, pp. 423-445.

[52] Vom BROCKE, "Internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehungen", p. 200.

1.2. Government, industry and scientific research. The creation of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society.

> "Die Wissenschaft ist in ihrer Ausbreitung und in ihrem Betriebe an einen Punkt gelangt, an welchem der Staat allein fuer ihre Beduerfnisse nicht mehr aufzukommen vermag. Eine Kooperation des Staates und privater kapitalkraeftiger und fuer die Wissenschaft interessierter Buerger ist ins Auge zu fassen."[53]

Economic and social developments in nineteenth century like the growth of population, industrialisation and the expanding world trade all provided an impetus called for systematic use of scientific achievements and intensive research activity. The main concerns of every modernising state were to ensure public health, apply scientific knowledge and technological achievements to industrial production, and develop agriculture, namely the quantity and quality of products in order to be competitive on the international market. These social and economic demands had become more acute by the turn of the century and scientific potential began gradually to be recognised as "national resource".[54] In Germany, the main sites of scientific research were academies and university laboratories, which employed professors, whose research activity was limited by their teaching duties. The increased need for practical applications of scientific knowledge and technological development demanded specialised, accelerated and large-scale research, which could not be performed at university laboratories. The fact that entire disciplines could not fit in the contemporary research policy and, therefore, were not yet institutionalised, was due to the lack of modern and expensive infrastructure that no university institute could provide. In addition, the scientific problems that emerged were too complicated to be dealt with by students at university labs. Universities and academies were in close relation with the state, which both sponsored them and exercised influence over their activities. Professors, researchers, even industry representatives, who were appointed to the existing research centres, were regarded as civil servants, committed to the so-called "state-oriented" research. These were problems that all industrialised nations faced at the end of nineteenth century. To tackle them and to respond to the demands of the times, they began to foster knowledge and to modify their research agenda, creating

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[53] Adolf von Harnack to the Prussian Minister of Education, Schmitt-Ott on 21.11.1909, cited in: VIERHAUS, Vergagenheit als Geschichte, p. 418.

[54] SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, "Science, Technology and Foreign Policy", p. 474.

boundary-spanning mechanisms. The traditional university-government relationship was to be reconsidered with the prospect of being replaced by a network of science-state-industry interaction.

Despite the fact that at the turn of the century the German Reich held one of the leading positions in the international scientific community, its authoritarian scientific policies in the years before 1907, which did not leave any space for independence from public authorities, threatened the supremacy of German science.[55] It was also at that time that a new need, -in addition to teaching and research-, was emerging at universities world-wide. This need was the development of international relations, the so-called "third mission"[56] of universities that aimed at collaboration and exchange of knowledge among different academic communities but, above all, at the prestige and influence of the state in question. The United States and Great Britain were the countries, with which Germany primarily wanted to develop closer scientific relations, in order some of their most important universities would come to be influenced by the German intellect. Adolf von Harnack underlining the significance of the international character of science, argued that, if science were an individual, rather than a collective enterprise, scientific problems would never have been solved.[57] He also suggested that Germany should strengthen its ties with America arguing that even though "this cultural state was geographically very distant from Germany, intellectually it was the nearest and the most kindred nation to the Reich."[58] It is likely, argues Vierhaus, that in addition to the political power and scientific greatness of Britain and the United States that made Harnack talk about closer cultural relations with those countries, the Protestant character they had in common with Prussia played some role as well.[59]

Perhaps one of the most fundamental arguments for the reorientation of German scientific and research policy was the belief that Germany had fallen behind in some im-

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[55] VIERHAUS, Vergagenheit als Geschichte, p. 410.

[56] HENRY ETZKOWITZ, LOET LEYDESDORFF, 'The endless transition: A "Triple Helix" of University – Industry – Government relations', in *Minerva* 36 (1998), pp. 203-208, here p. 203. Wilhelm von Humboldt regarded the establishment of research institutes as the "third factor in all scientific foundations." See: VIERHAUS, Vergagenheit als Geschichte, p. 435.

[57] Cited in: VIERHAUS, Vergagenheit als Geschichte, p. 412.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 413.

[59] *Ibid.*

portant areas of research, such as biomedicine, compared with other countries.[60] It became primary need, argued Harnack, for the research institutes to disengage themselves from the Prussian tradition of state restrictions, if the country wanted to keep its place among other "cultured nations" (*Kulturnationen*), like the USA, France, England, and Sweden.[61] Almost all of the above countries, unlike Germany, had already formulated innovative strategies to foster research, focused on social imperatives but also on the scientists' interests. On the grounds that the performance of specialised research at university laboratories was in question and because of the state weaknesses in raising and intensifying its material support for large-scale scientific research, these countries had turned to individuals and, in particular, to industrialists and bankers. Private means had become essential for the creation of research institutes, independent from university and state restrictions. Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Carnegie Insitution and the Rockefeller Medical Institute in the United States and the Nobel Institute in Sweden were supported by private funds. In France, however, the Pasteur Institute, -also established at around that time,- was funded by the state. Germany, argued Harnack, should follow the Anglo-Saxon example, developing closer ties between science and industry and creating similar scientific centres, in the search for greater competitiveness.

The establishment of independent institutes in Germany and the heavy involvement of industrialists were alien to the German tradition. Education and research fell squarely into the competence of the state. Universities and academies were exclusively state enterprises. The participation of industrialists, who were becoming ever more influential, created fears among academic and governmental circles that the field of research would be dominated and controlled by some Maecenas, whose only interest would be in increasing their profits from the technological and scientific achievements.[62] Harnack was explicit about the independence of the new institutions, stressing that, if they had to be independent from the state, they had also to be independent from "clique and capital".[63]

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[60] The advance in biomedical sciences in the United States and the creation of Carnegie Institution and the Rockefeller Medical Institute that promoted them were regarded by Harnack as especially impressive and threatening, cited in: KRISTIE MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika. Scientific Research in Nazi Germany. New York 1993, p. 16.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 12, 15 f.

[62] *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 21. See also: GUENTER WENDEL, Die Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft, 1911-1914: Zur Anatomie der imperialistischen Forschungsgesellschaft. Ost-Berlin 1975.

[63] Cited in: VIERHAUS, Vergagenheit als Geschichte, pp. 418, 434.

Yet, how could the goal of advanced research be achieved by strengthening on the one hand academic-industry relations while, at the same time, controlling the power of capital? The only mechanism that seemed to respect the Prussian tradition and at the same time to satisfy the demands for specialised research, was the economic contribution of both government and industry to the new undertaking. Some attempts to set up research centres with private means had already been made successfully in Germany at the end of nineteenth century. Such example was the Union for Applied Physics and Mathematics created in Goettingen, in 1898. The Union was comprised of scientists as well as representatives from the business community. A number of institutes focused on different fields, such as geophysics, technical physics, applied mathematics and aircraft construction were founded as a result of the work of this union. All of them were linked to the University of Goettingen, namely the teaching staff and the institution's infrastructure. The rest of their needs were met by individuals. In 1899, the Institute for Serum Research was created, which in 1906 was merged with the private Institute for Chemotherapy funded by the "*Georg-Speyer-Haus*". Another private initiative was taken by the "*Koppel-Stiftung*", a foundation established in 1905 and sponsored by the banker Leopold Koppel, as it has been mentioned before. This foundation apart from the intellectual exchange between Germany and the United States also sponsored the German-Chinese University in Tsingtau and the Medical School in Shanghai.[64] Nonetheless, those institutes were not exactly what Harnack and several eminent scientists had envisioned as independent research institutes.

The new research policy that seemed to be able to solve many of the social and economic problems of the time should not only respond to the challenges of the century but it also had to respect the German tradition. The main feature of this policy was the performance of an intensive, broad-scale research, independent from universities. One of the strongest arguments for adopting Germany this policy, was the fact that rapid advancement in research could be achieved, only if the scientists of the new institutes were released from teaching duties. Therefore, the appointment process or the management of research personnel should not be determined by universities, but would be decided by another mechanism that was not yet clear.

Another feature of the new research policy was its openness to the industrial sector. Industry represented the systematic and mass production of goods, the extensive use of machines and technological achievements, the economic growth, in other words,

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[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 415 f. Also: MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 19.

the modernised state. Therefore, wide-scale research should go hand in hand with industrial activity. Industry needed the aid not only of science and technology but also of the cost-intensive research. This would provide enterprises with the necessary applied knowledge, which in turn, required material support from industrial or other capital. Nevertheless, what troubled the scientific community was the contingency of being subject to industrial interests and performing applied research at the expense of basic research. It was the latter's advancement, argued scientists, that led Germany to one of the foremost positions in the international scientific scene. Neglecting basic research was like neglecting Germany's culture. Its image abroad was a very important part of the research policy agenda The promotion of Germany's hegemony in foreign territories through scientific knowledge and research was fundamental to its political and economic role on the international political stage. However, one might ask, did not the "*Koppel-Stiftung*", for example, serve Germany's foreign cultural policy by fostering the German-American scientific relations or by sponsoring scientific centres overseas? What more could Germany wish for increasing its national prestige abroad?

It appears that each of the initiatives at the beginning of the twentieth century responded only to some aspects of the new science and research policy. German modern science policy had to secure freedom in research, to promote both basic and applied research, to become independent from universities, to have closer relations with industry, and to become internationally competitive. Goettingen and some other similar institutes as well as the "*Koppel-Stiftung*" could not fulfil these requirements. Moreover, despite the existence of a number of German scientific institutions abroad, like the Zoological Station in Naples, the University and the Medical School in China, the Centre of Theoretical Physics in Argentina, and the Geophysical Observatory in Samoa, the German Reich still lacked an institution that would operate as an interdisciplinary organisation with all the features of the new science policy and, above all, with a significant scientific impact both within German borders and abroad.

In January 1911, the plans for a modern research centre were drawn up with the establishment of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society for the Advancement of Science in Berlin-Dahlem (KWG). The Society inaugurated a new era for the German scientific and research policy adjusting itself to the changing imperatives. It was a semi-private organisation, under which a number of specialised institutes could function as pure research centres. Its foundation was the result of long discussions between the government - particularly the Ministry of Education-, scientists, and industrialists that lasted nearly two

decades. The idea of the establishment of a research park in Dahlem, was put forward by Friedrich Althoff, the Prussian Minister of Education, who was responsible for university affairs. Before the end of the century, realising the needs of the modern state, he formed a plan for the expansion of universities by founding "new pure research institutes" that would represent fields not yet institutionalised.[65] Fully dedicated to the Prussian tradition, he envisioned these institutes as state bodies, linked to universities but free of teaching duties. Although Althoff played a central role in the first discussions for the creation of modern research institutes, it was the Berlin scientific community and particularly the Nobel laureate in chemistry Emil Fischer who drew attention to the issue and again brought it up for discussion in the first decade of the twentieth century. Adolf von Harnack was asked by the Kaiser to formulate a detailed draft on the new scientific organisation. The Kaiser himself had a vivid interest in science and wanted to present the draft in public on the occasion of the forthcoming centenary of Berlin University in 1910. Harnack turned to the associations of physicists and chemists to help him illustrate the needs of modern science and their visions for an independent research.

The central argument of Harnack's blueprint was Germany's scientific backwardness compared with other advanced countries. This backwardness also affected the Reich's cultural and economic position on the international stage, in other words, its influence over other nations. It was certainly an argument that struck a patriotic chord and in order to support his argument, he stressed the achievements of researchers working abroad and the advancement in disciplines that were not yet institutionalised in Germany. "Science and military strength (*Wissenschaft und Wehrkraft*) [were] the two strong pillars of Germany's magnitude", he demonstrated.[66] Consequently, scientific institutes moreover institutes that would house the non-institutionalised scientific fields was a national necessity. Harnack underlined that this effort would be feasible and the institutes would be viable only with material support by the state *and* industry. Despite the strong nationalistic prose, one could hardy argue that Harnack approached Germany's elevation to a

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[65] Cited in: MACRAKIS, p. 12.

[66] "Denkschrift von Harnack an den Kaiser," 21 November 1909. Cited in: MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, pp. 15, 26. The recognition of science as a pillar of German national greatness was not only reflected the cultural dimension of the scientific achievements, but also their contribution to technical excellence and industrial success. See: BRIGITTE SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, "Science, Technology and Foreign Policy", in: INA SPIEGEL-ROESING and DEREK J. DE SOLLA PRICE, Science, Technology and Society. A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective. London, California 1977, pp. 473-506. In the same vein, the author argues on national wealth and security.

powerful and cultural state with chauvinism.[67] On the contrary, he admired the achievements and scientific advancement of other nations and in particular of the United States, which was the main model for the new institution in Germany.

Scientific development always had an eminent national and political value not only for Germany. However, the fact that science acquired a great economic significance in the late industrial period, made the reorganisation of German scientific policy a request of utmost importance. Many industrialists and bankers responding to Harnack's appeal, donated large sums, which by 1910 amounted to six million marks.[68] On 11 January 1911, donors, state representatives, Emil Fischer, and Harnack met at the Royal Academy in Berlin for the official inauguration of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. The executive bodies, i.e. the assembly (*Hauptversammlung*), the executive committee (*Verwaltungsausschuss*), and the senate (*Senat*), were composed of industrialists as well as members of the government. Nonetheless, it was guaranteed that the Society would be independent and free from any state influence.

The presence of the state in the administration was not only regarded as a safety-guard against capitalist manipulation as Harnack feared, but it was also indicative of residual links with the German tradition. The "Americanisation" of German scientific policy with the state's exclusion from the developing process of knowledge was foreign to the German society. Breaking with the Prussian tradition, according to which the state was the "concerned father" of every endeavour, would probably have affected the whole social structure.[69] Both social democrats and liberals criticised the tendency to adopt American elements incompatible with the German social and political conditions. Consequently, the founding of the Society brought forth a unique mixture of traditional and modern features. It is interesting to note that at the inaugural meeting in January 1911, scientists were hardly represented. Only the chemist Emil Fischer was present. The absence of scientists from the major decision-making organs supported the argument that the Society was a creation of plutocrats, who were to shape the research agendas according to their capitalist interests. This Marxist argument was not only used by the social democrats but also by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) after the collapse of

[67] VIERHAUS, Vergagenheit als Geschichte, p. 439.

[68] MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 15.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

the Third Reich.[70] However, it seems that this interpretation of the Society's character overlooks the complexity of its administrative structure and its operation.[71]

Perhaps the most important feature of the Society that protected its scientific freedom from any industrial or state influence, was the so-called "Harnack Principle". In the founding memorandum in 1909, Harnack suggested that the research direction of every future Kaiser Wilhelm Institute should not be preordained but should be determined by the director of the institute and would be formed in accordance with the outcome of the research undertaken. Furthermore, the institutes should not be overspecialised and the internal organisation of the Society ought to be flexible and should not prevent the progress of the research.[72] The directors of the institutes were the central figures for the scientific operation of the Society. Friedrich Glum, the general secretary of the Society in 1930, demonstrating the leading role of directors underlined that "the Society should not first establish the institute and then try to find the right man for it, but it first ought to find the right person and then to build up the institute around him".[73] The "Harnack Principle" gave scientists great latitude to practise basic research in addition to applied research, which was closer to industrial interests. Basic research was of central importance to Germany's cultural and international status and it was this kind of research that was to place Germany once more at the forefront of the international scientific community. Therefore, despite the initial absence of scientists from decision-making bodies, they turned out to play an active role in the Society, deciding the nature and the process of the projects. One might argue that this dimension of the "Harnack Principle" was in part attributable to the German reluctance to break ties with its traditional culture.

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[70] See: WENDEL, Die Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft, 1911-1914: pp. 75 ff; VIERHAUS, Vergagenheit als Geschichte, p. 419. On science and technical progress on the capitalist economic system see: FREEMAN C., "Economics of Research and Development", in: INA SPIEGEL-ROESING and DEREK DE SOLLA PRICE, Science, Technology and Society. A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective. London, California 1977, pp. 223-275, here pp. 239 ff.

[71] Blanka Vavakova argues that "the promotion of better relations between academic institutions and the economic sector is not a negative practice *per se*". "The question", she continues, "is how to prevent the effects on society of the reduction in the knowledge available as a public good". BLANKA VAVAKOVA, "The New Social Contract Between Governments, Universities and Society: Has the Old One Failed?", in *Minerva* 36 (1998), 209-228, here pp. 226 f.

[72] MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 16; VIERHAUS, Vergagenheit als Geschichte, p. 446 ff. See also: BERNHARD vom BROCKE, HUBERT LAITKO (Hsg.), Die Kaiser-Wilhelm/ Max-Planck-Gesellschaft und ihre Institute. Studien zu ihrer Geschichte: Das Harnack-Prinzip. Berlin, New York 1996.

[73] Cited in: VIERHAUS, Vergagenheit als Geschichte, p. 447.

In the same vein, another condition of the principle required all directors to be professors with teaching experience, even though they were exempted from such duties.

Harnack's mastery was his ability not only to approach and convince different circles of the German society, i.e. the administrative, the economic, and the scientific one. Moreover, he succeeded in bringing the interests of all the above together, in the name of the nation's magnitude. This mixture of traditional with modern ingredients shaped the unique character of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and gave to it a dynamic that allowed the institution not only to flourish under democracy during the Weimar years, but also to survive under a totalitarian regime and to continue to flourish until today.

The first Kaiser Wilhelm Institute that was set up was the Institute for Chemistry. Chemistry had been a well-established discipline since 1900 and plans for chemistry institutes were well under way even before the inauguration of the Society. The protagonist behind those plans was the Reich's Chemical Association, the aims of which were to foster both pure and applied chemistry, in particular for industrial purposes.[74] The Association merged with the Society, thereby partly fulfilling its goals, as the work performed at the institute mainly concentrated on basic research. The second Kaiser Wilhelm Institute was dedicated to physical chemistry and was created with the generous contribution from Leopold Koppel. The head of this institute was a professor at the Technical University in Karlsruhe, Fritz Haber, who became famous for his work on nitrogen fixation and the synthesis of ammonia, an important element for fertilisation in agriculture as well as for the warfare. He was one of the most enthusiastic scientists to hasten to offer his services to the state, soon after the Great War broke out. His institute was almost transformed into an industrial laboratory at the service of the army and it became the centre for chemical warfare research in Germany.[75] It should be noted that the initiative to use science for the war effort came from the scientists themselves and not from the state.[76]

The next priority after the two chemistry institutes was biology. In contrast with chemistry, biology was a young science and many fields had not yet been institutionalised. Soon after the inauguration of the Society, discussions regarding the determination of the institute's profile began. A number of biologists –among them Anton Dohrn, the

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[74] MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, pp. 21 ff.

[75] For Haber's contribution to the chemical warfare see: FRITZ L. HABER, The poisonous cloud: chemical warfare in the First World War. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986; F. J. BROWN, Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraints. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press 1968.

[76] MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 26.

director of the Zoological Station in Naples- introduced their plans, which despite the diversity of opinion, converged onto supporting the study of heredity, a highly significant field for agriculture and medicine.[77] The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology begun to operate during the war in 1915, two years after the decision of the establishment was made.

The close connection between scientific research and industry indisputably reflects Germany's desire to maintain the economic position it occupied in the late nineteenth century. Chemical industries bore ample testimony to the Reich's conspicuous economic power and drive on the world market, towards the end of the century and throughout the decades preceding World War I.[78] Nonetheless, the choice of chemistry, physics and biology as disciplines worthy of representation in the modern scientific institutes of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, did not just reflect the economic aspects of the German *Weltpolitik*. The conceptualisation for a new research centre for science emerged in a period in which three elements played a decisive role for its inauguration. The first was the growing interchange between science and technology, coupled with the need to strengthen ties with industry. The second was the specialisation in science and the emergence of new scientific fields, and the third one was the increasing social requirements, like health care and food production. The three disciplines chosen for the first Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes had these technological, scientific and social merits, which Alvin M. Weinberg names "external criteria" for scientific choice.[79] More precisely, parts of basic research in chemistry and physics could be used in technological applications, while some basic research in biology, which was also embedded in other scientific fields and would contribute to a number of scientific problems of the other two disciplines chosen, justified the choice. However, the social merit, i.e. "the relevance to human welfare and the values for man",[80] has particular interest for my project, as it will be shown from now on.

Apart from the social values, like public health or nutrition, which science could contribute in order to be achieved and are relatively easily described, some others are

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[77] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[78] This was the case particularly in the dye industry. See: FRITZ L. HABER, The Chemical Industry During the Nineteenth Century: A Study of the Economic Aspects of Applied Chemistry in Europe and North America. London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1958; BEER J. D., The Emergence of the German Dye Industry. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1959.

[79] ALVIN M. WEINBERG, "Criteria for scientific choice", in *Minerva* 1:2 (1962), pp. 158-171, reprinted in: *Minerva* (Classics) 38, (2000), pp. 253-269, here pp. 259 ff.

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 261.

harder to define. National culture and prestige could be reckoned among them, which in the first decades of the twentieth century were already regarded as the society's highest good. The Kaiser Wilhelm Society even though a semi-private scientific organisation, operated as a national delegate for the German culture. Harnack's argument that the new organisation could strengthen the Reich's position abroad, proved to be more than a tactical one. The "Harnack House" in Berlin-Dahlem, which was built in 1929, institutionalised the Society's scientific co-operation with other countries, hosting foreign scholars and international scientific meetings.

Promoting Germany its image within its own borders through an institution with an international character, was undoubtedly a significant cultural undertaking. Yet, advancing its scientific eminence beyond national frontiers, was an act of explicit political engagement. Hence, soon after its creation, the Society wanted to expand beyond the German borders, seeking territories which would offer favourable climatic conditions for research difficult to carry out in Germany. The nearest and most favourable destination for Germany's scientific expansion was the Mediterranean coasts, where the first branches of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institutes made their appearance, also operating as centres of diffusion the German scientific greatness.

1.3. The Zoological Station in Naples, Italy.

Towards the end of nineteenth century, the first international scientific centre outside Germany's borders was founded in Naples by the prominent German zoologist, Anton Dohrn. With his own funds and despite the opposition of his father and the city of Naples, Dohrn brought his two-year-old plan to build a laboratory for marine biology to fruition, in 1872.[81] The first contract with the city of Naples was signed in 1875. Two other complementary contracts were signed later, in 1885 and 1895. The latter gave the German scientist the right to use the "Villa Communale" as his laboratory, for a period of ninety years, i.e. until 1965.[82] After that time, the city of Naples could claim the ownership of the institute.

The "Zoological Station in Naples", as it was officially known, was a unique research center not only in Europe but also worldwide. Dohrn's vision was to create a research institute that would promote international scientific co-operation in the field of marine biology. Its location and a number of other factors very soon made the station an attractive place for many researchers and amateur observers from all over the world. The gulf of Naples thanks to its underwater volcanic rocks and warm streams offered ideal conditions for the development of rich fauna and flora. In addition, the building facilities, the unique aquarium, the technological equipment and the library of the institute that numbered in 1920 about 25,000 monographs and 250 journals,[83] -not to mention the number of specialists in zoology and marine biology working there-, attracted scientists not only from Germany and Italy, but also from the Netherlands, Switzerland, Romania, England, even the United States, and Russia.[84]

The international character of the station was secured by a system of working spaces (*Arbeitstische*) that were available to scientists from several research institutes or university laboratories. The institutions in question could lease a limited number of working spaces

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[81] ARMIN von TSCHERMAK. "Die Zoologische Station in Neapel", in: *Meereskunde*, 8 Jahrgang, 2 Heft, (1914), pp. 1-40, here p. 5.

[82] Report of Reinhard Dohrn entitled "Die gegenwaertige Lage der Zoologischen Station zu Neapel". Zuerich, April 1920; Schaxel to Altesse le Prince Danilo de Monténégro, 20.06.1918, both in: Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amtes (PAAA), R 64570.

[83] Report of Reinhard Dohrn entitled "Die gegenwaertige Lage der Zoologischen Station zu Neapel". Zuerich, April 1920, in: PAAA, R 64570.

[84] V. TSCHERMAK, "Die Zoologische Station in Neapel", p. 10; Report of Reinhard Dohrn entitled "Die gegenwaertige Lage der Zoologischen Station zu Neapel". Zuerich, April 1920, in: PAAA, R 64570.

for their researchers for a specific period of time. Among those institutions were the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, as well as Oxford and Cambridge Universities in England. Needless to say that Germany and the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, in particular, leased the majority of the working spaces, which in 1914 amounted to over twenty-two permanent places out of fifty-three. Prussia leased over eight places, whilst Italy took twelve, Russia four, England three and the United States five.[85] This system, together with the aquarium, which also operated as a reservoir of marine organisms supplying many zoological laboratories and museums abroad with material, were the most important sources of income for the station.

The station was divided into three sections: the morphological, i.e. zoological-botanical; the physiological; and the chemical section.[86] Each one had its own director and a certain number of specialists as permanent staff. Significant work was conducted at the station on the physiological mechanism and the chemical texture of protozoa, in particular of sea-urchins, murexes, and amoebae. From 1879 until 1914, about thirty-three volumes were published with contributions of both the permanent staff and the visiting researchers.[87] In 1879, was launched the official journal of the station with the title "*Mitteilungen der Neapler Station*", and was issued only in German. The success of the research center in Naples was such that it not only gained world-wide reputation, but also it became a model for research institutes in many countries, including Germany itself.[88] However, it was Anton Dohrn -a convinced Darwinist- considered by many as the founder of marine biology who guaranteed the quality of scientific work in Naples.

Apart from the advancement of basic research on marine biology, the Zoological Station also contributed to the development of fishery and the trade in sea-products, providing a link between science and the economy for both Italy and Germany. On the other hand, the institute offered an environment where the exchange of experience and ideas among scientists from different countries could foster friendship between people. Despite the fact that the station boasted its international character and independence of any private or national interest that guaranteed it's freedom in research, the German

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[85] V. TSCHERMAK, "Die Zoologische Station in Neapel", p. 10.

[86] MARGRET BOVERI, "Die Zoologische Station in Neapel", in: LUDOLPH BRAUER, ALBRECHT MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, ADOLF MEYER (Hsg.) Forschungsinstitute. Ihre Geschichte, Organisation und Ziele. Bd. II, Hamburg 1930, pp. 578-598, here p. 589.

[87] V. TSCHERMAK, "Die Zoologische Station in Neapel", p. 11.

[88] See: KARL JOSEF PARTSCH, Die Zoologische Station in Neapel – Modell internationaler Wissenschaftszusammenarbeit, Goettingen 1980.

presence and influence was apparently dominant. Germany itself regarded the station not only as scientific enterprise, but also as a cultural undertaking, through which German achievements in the field of marine biology could travel throughout the world and influence the scientific community. Therefore, the German regime and in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, decided to support Anton Dohrn and to finance his institute. It was often said that even the Kaiser himself gave money from his own pocket.[89]

No matter how valuable Dohrn's station turned out to be for Germany or how much support from the German state it received, this was not the case at the first stage of the institute's life. Dohrn's new idea of creating a scientific center in Italy with international character was initially regarded by the German regime as an undertaking which did no merit support. The Prussian Ministry of Culture as well as the Prussian Academy of Sciences refused to support Dohrn's initiative[90] and only after a series of long discussions did he finally convince them of the national significance of the zoological institute. It is noteworthy that despite the financial support the station received from the Reich, it maintained its freedom to choose and conduct research projects for its own and not for the Reich's interests. Its independence from German and any other national intervention seemed to be an important reason that made the station attractive to scientists worldwide.

In 1909, after Anton Dohrn's death, the Zoological Station passed to his son Reinhard Dohrn, who became the new director, retaining its international character. A year after the start of World War I, R. Dohrn left Naples, having entrusted the management of the station to the Italian professor of zoology at the University of Rome, F. Raffaele. From that time on and for almost ten years, the station became an object of dispute between Dohrn and the Italian state. What was at stake was the station's national significance for both Italy and Germany. In November 1915, with an Italian state order the management of the station passed from F. Raffaele to a Government Commission (*Commissione Governativa*), the head of which was the professor of zoology at the University of Naples, E.S. Monticelli.[91] Despite the objections that were raised by Dohrn, the Italians went even further and with a new order in May 1918 changed the status of the station to that of a legal entity ("*ente morale*"), which meant that the station no longer be-

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[89] Speech of the Italian Minister of Education, B. Croce, on the Zoological Station in Naples, before the Italian Senate on 9 December 1920, in: PAAA, R 64572.

[90] *Ibid.*

[91] Report of Reinhard Dohrn entitled "Die gegenwaertige Lage der Zoologischen Station zu Neapel". Zuerich, April 1920, in: PAAA, R 64570.

longed to Dohrn but to the City of Naples.[92] This decision derived, according to Dohrn, from the mistaken presumption that his property was Germany's property. Both Dohrn and the German state objected anew claiming damages for the expropriation of Dohrn's assets.

The long discussions between Italy, in particular the Minister of Culture and Education, and Dohrn, as well as the proceedings the German scientist instituted for the restitution of his institute bring to the fore the fluidity between private and public, national and international. The rhetoric and interpretive alterability of the above notions emanated from the recognition of the station's cultural influence, which was considered a national issue. Therefore, already in November 1915, Italy deprived Dohrn of his rights to the station. Due to this development, the so-called neutral states, such as the United States, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Romania contacted Dohrn and decided to withdraw their contribution from the institute. Moreover, when the status of the station changed to "*ente morale*", they rejected Italy's official invitation to send scientists to Naples and refused to do so in the future, unless the institute regained its old status.[93] Russia and Belgium also withdrew their contributions and the only states that continued to support the station, amid the war, were England and France.

As soon as it became a national institution, Italy had to bear its financial burdens alone. This task proved to be very difficult and soon the institute started to vegetate and its scientific activity came to a standstill. Meanwhile, disputes among the Italians who directed the institute had surfaced, making the preservation of the station's national character difficult and problematic. English but also Italian scientists started to argue that the station could become operational on an international basis, only if it regained its private character.[94] Despite the fact that Italians wanted to disentangle themselves financially but also to mark their national presence in the administration and the scientific life of the station, they were eventually forced to accept their involvement in the operation of the station after the war, engaging at the same time in its financial and administrative problems.

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[92] *Ibid.*

[93] *Ibid.*

[94] Reinhard Dohrn to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, 'Die Wiederuebernahme der Zoologischen Station', 13.09.1920, in: PAAA, R 64570. Also: Report of Dohrn entitled "Die gegenwaertige Lage der Zoologischen Station zu Neapel". Zurich, April 1920, in: PAAA, R 64570; Report of Reinhard Dohrn to the Reich's Foreign Ministry entitled "Bericht ueber die Schicksale der Zoologischen Station zu Neapel waehrend des Weltkrieges und ihre jetzt erfolgende neue Organisation", on 14.02.1924, in: PAAA, R 64572.

In 1920, and after R. Dohrn had brought an action against the Italian state demanding to be reimbursed for the loss of his property, the Italian Minister of Science and Education, Benedetto Croce, approached him and asked him, whether they could find a compromise. He proposed to give Dohrn back the ownership of his station. In return, the German scientist would have to guarantee that in future the institute would develop closer relations to Italian biology. In addition, Dohrn had to appoint Italian scientists as his assistants and the station's publications had to be written in both German and Italian.[95] Even though Dohrn agreed to these conditions, the compromise proposal was put into practice only in April 1924, when he took back the management of the station. The war and the Versailles Treaty intensified the national feeling, which was already strong in both countries. It was inevitable, therefore, that the ownership of the Zoological Station should become a national issue, a matter of national pride, which could give the Italians and the Germans international prestige.

Croce's compromising proposal seemed to reflect the desire of a limited circle of Italian scientists rather than the demand of most Italians. A certain number of people were opposed, among them scientists who held high-ranking posts at the station. They argued that the station in the immediate years before the war had attained a strong German character. That belief was reinforced when Anton Dohrn replaced his Italian assistant Prof. Lobianco after his death with a German scholar.[96] The group of Italian opponents, therefore, demanded "emancipation from German science".[97] In the Italian press, in the scientific journals, as well as at the Italian Academy of Sciences and the scientists' associations, the return of the most important biological institution in Italy to German hands was regarded an insult to Italian science.[98] It was clear that the opponents were eager to transform the station into a pure Italian institution. The Italian navy got also in-

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[95] Reinhard Dohrn's report to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 08.08.1920, in: PAAA, R 64570; Speech of the Italian Minister of Education, B. Croce, on the Zoological Station in Naples, before the Italian Senate on 9 December 1920, in: PAAA, R 64572.

[96] Speech of the Italian Minister of Education, B. Croce, on the Zoological Station in Naples, before the Italian Senate on 9 December 1920, in: PAAA, R 64572.

[97] Report of Reinhard Dohrn entitled "Die gegenwaertige Lage der Zoologischen Station zu Neapel", Zurich, April 1920, in: PAAA, R 64570.

[98] Reinhard Dohrn's report to the Reich's Foreign Ministry on the future of the Zoological Station on 14.02.1924, in: PAAA, R 64572.

volved in the debate, arguing that for military and national security reasons, the institute should remain in Italian hands and threatened to veto the process in any other case.[99]

Towards the end of 1922, and while Dohrn was waiting the final decision of the Italian Supreme Court on his appeal about the ownership status of the station and the reimbursement from the city of Naples, the fascists came to power. Nationalism came again to the fore and a government official notified Dohrn that "even if the decision of the Supreme Court were favourable, the government would not allow the station to regain its previous private status".[100] Under this pressure, Dohrn finally signed a contract with the Italian government and the city of Naples. According to the contract, he was recognised as the owner of the station, but he was bound to secure the Italian presence at the institute. This meant in practice that the Italians would be scientifically strongly represented at the station, having the right to lease the same number of working spaces with the Germans. Both Italy and Germany had serious reasons to increase their working spaces at one another's expense. With the above agreement, each of the two states would equally share fourteen working spaces out of thirty-nine.[101] Finally, it was decided that Dohrn should be the one to take over the station's financial management.

Italy's leasing of working spaces was its only financial commitment, whereas Germany contributed a certain amount of money every year. According to the new statutes of the Zoological Station, it was advisable that the economic support of the institute should come from a scientific institution rather than directly from governments.[102] On the German side, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society was regarded the most eligible institution to mediate financially. Its involvement would guarantee the conduct of scientific research, independently of any national interest. Dohrn counted on the contribution of states that had supported the station in the past for the revival of the international character of the station. These were Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Spain, Romania, Russia, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. The new states that supported the Naples' research center were the countries of Latin America, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,

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[99] *Ibid.*

[100] *Ibid.*

[101] German consulate in Naples to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 08.07.1925, in: PAAA, R 64573.

[102] German consulate in Naples to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 17.03.1925, in: PAAA, R 64573.

Yugoslavia, and Greece.[103] In 1925, the station offered thirty-nine working spaces and aimed to increase the number over fifty.[104]

Although Italy and Germany were both keen on having a distinct national presence at the station, their respective reasons for this desire differed appreciably. For the Italians, it seemed to be a matter of national pride to prevent Germany from using the Italian territory for exerting international influence. With the number of German institutes on their soil, (at least seven at this time),[105] they were not only jealous but also felt they were being culturally colonized by the Germans. It seems that Italy wanted to enjoy the international glory of the Zoological Station alone, transforming it from a private undertaking into a national enterprise. The lack of money together with the ending of the private status of the station, condemned the plans to failure. Italy did not seem to have an organized foreign cultural policy, in order to use the research center in Naples for cultural purposes. The Italians were more interested in, if not removing Germany from its claim on the station, at least to control its contribution. After about nine years of Italian occupation and failure to transform the station into a national enterprise, the Italian government decided to give it back to its German owner. That decision, which was made by the state and not by the Supreme Court, to which Dohrn had turned for redress, was regarded a noble gesture and characterized by the Italians as a demonstration of national merit.[106]

Germany's position on the issue of the station was more complex. Before the war, the German Reich had a discreet presence at the station, watching its activities closely and, to some extent, sponsoring Dohrn's undertaking. Having recognized the significance of all its scientific institutes abroad for the state's cultural and political relations, Germany left nothing to chance.[107] After the war, the Republic found herself in a very

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[103] Reinhard Dohrn's report to Berlin on 08.08.1920, in: PAAA, R 64570; Reinhard Dohrn to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, 'Die Wiederuebernahme der Zoologischen Station' on 13.09.1920, in: PAAA, R 64570; German consulate in Naples to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 08.07.1925, in: PAAA, R 64573.

[104] German consulate in Naples to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on, 08.07.1925, in: PAAA, R 64573.

[105] Apart from the Zoological Station, there were the Zoological Institute in Rovigno/Istria, the Volcanic Institute in Naples, which belonged to the German Immanuel Friedlander, the Institute of Art History in Florence, and four institutes in Rome: the Archaeological Institute, the Bibliotheca Herziana, the Institute of History, and the German Academy (Academia Tedesca).

[106] Speech of the Italian Minister of Education, B. Croce, on the Zoological Station in Naples, before the Italian Senate on 9 December 1920, in: PAAA, R 64572.

[107] Apart from the institutes in Italy, Germans had found the Archaeological Institutes in Athens and Cairo and the Institute for Egyptology also based in Cairo. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Germany

difficult position, being excluded from the international scientific community due to the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. The young Republic's cultural relations with other countries became particularly important. Industry, as well as the use of technology, suffered from the boycott the Treaty imposed. The continuity of research became a matter of national existence. Therefore, the return of the Zoological Station to German hands was essential for the country's image abroad and therefore its exodus from the intellectual isolation.[108]

Dohrn identified his institute with Germany's national culture and he tried to convince the German government to continue to support him, recognizing his country's "national sacrifice".[109] Interestingly, his rhetoric mixed notions like 'private', 'national' and 'international'. He argued that only the private status of the institute could guarantee its international character and would provide friendship between peoples. He also emphasised that the private status would be secured only through the appointment of a German director.[110] Dohrn was aware that research, particularly after the war, was a national duty for Germany and he stressed this belief in order to convince the authorities to increase their financial support. The state, on the other hand, regarded Dohrn's struggle a unique chance for the Weimar Republic to return to the international political arena. Germany acted very carefully and systematically in order to avoid being accused of nationalism and violation of the Versailles Treaty. The fact that the station was a private undertaking gave Germany some space to act under cover. The involvement of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in the institute's financial and scientific activity provided excellent cover for the Republic's interests.

What the case of the world-famous Zoological Station in Naples tells us, is that no matter what arguments Italy and Germany used to defend their commitment to universalism and global friendship after the war, it seems that their perception of international-

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expanded natural sciences beyond the continental borders, setting up four scientific centres overseas: the centre of theoretical physics in La Plata, in Argentina, the geophysical observatory located at Apia, capital of Western Samoa in the South Pacific, the German-Chinese University in Tsingtau, and the German Medicine School in Woosung, a suburb of Shanghai, China. See: LEWIS PYENSON, Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences. German Expansion Overseas 1900-1930, New York 1985.

[108] Report of Reinhard Dohrn, "Die gegenwaertige Lage der Zoologischen Station zu Neapel". Zuerich, April 1920, in: PAAA, R 64570.

[109] *Ibid.*

[110] Prof. Dr. Reinhard Dohrn to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, titled 'Die Wiederuebernahme der Zoologischen Station' on 13.09.1920, in: PAAA, R 64570.

ism derived from mere patriotic feelings rather than from altruistic or humanistic ideals.[111]

[111] BRIGITTE SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, Deutsche Wissenschaft und Internationale Zusammenarbeit 1914-1928. Ein Beitrag zum Studium kultureller Beziehungen in politischen Krisenzeiten. (Dissertation), Genève 1966, p. 49.

1.4. The institute for marine biology in Rovigno d' Istria, Italy.

"... der eigentliche wissenschaftliche Grossbetrieb
bei uns laengst von den Universitaeten zu den
grossen Instituten abgewandert sei, wie z.B. von der
Kaiser Wilhelm-Gesellschaft eingerichtet waeren. ...."[112]

With these words the German ambassador in Rome, Kehr, refused the proposal of his Italian counterpart in Berlin, De Martino, for a regular professorial exchange program between the two countries. The proposed exchange program would be a part of a broader rapprochement project suggested by Italy in 1920, in order to re-establish its cultural relations with Germany which had been shaken after the Versailles Treaty. According to the sanctions of the Treaty, Germany lost all its property beyond its borders. Every cultural or other institution the Germans owned abroad was confiscated by the country, in which the institution was based. German institutes in Italy met with the same fate, even though many of them were not state but private enterprises. This was the case not only of the Dohrn station in Naples but also of the marine station in Rovigno. The latter was located on the peninsula of Istria, in the northern Adriatic.

The existence of the marine station in Rovigno dated back to 1899. It was a fishing-station created by Dr. Hermes, which provided the world-renowned aquarium in Berlin with experimental material. The station was Austrian property and it seems that its significance was such for German science that in 1911 it was purchased by the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, soon after its establishment. It should be noted that this acquisition was made before the creation of a Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology, to which the station was later affiliated.

Within a few years, the station developed into a high-quality research centre that attracted a significant number of foreign scientists, due to the favourable climatic conditions for the study of the Mediterranean fauna and flora but also due to its easy access by train from central Europe. Apart from German and Austrian scientists, the station was host to Hungarian, Swedish, Norwegian, Russian, English, American and French scholars.[113] It was closely related to the neighbouring Zoological Station in Triest, which had a

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[112] The German Ambassador in Rome, Kehr, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, on 07.08.1920, in: PAAA, R 64570.

[113] The director of the Zoological Station in Rovigno, Dr. Tilo Krumbach, on the history of the station, on 27.04.1922, in: Archiv zur Geschichte der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (MPGA), Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 1240/2.

significantly rich library, but also with the famous Zoological Station in Naples. Perhaps the most important work conducted in Rovigno was the research on protozoa, the microscopic organisms, some of which related to the cause of malaria. It was not surprising, therefore, that besides the scientists engaged in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes or in university laboratories, civil servants working at the Reich's Ministry of Health also were among the researchers in Rovigno. This first Kaiser Wilhelm research centre outside the Reich's borders fulfilled one of the social values that stipulated by the new research policy in Germany, i.e. the safeguarding of public health.[114] In addition to its research character, the institute also operated as an educational centre for the German Popular Universities (*Volkshochschule*) and other institutions promoting popular education.[115] A series of films on marine fauna and flora made a great contribution to the cultural and economic significance of the institute.[116]

After the war, the fate of the station in Rovigno shared much with that of Dohrn's station in Naples. In 1918, it changed hands, becoming property of Italy. Due to its location in war territory, the governor of Venice, General Giulia Petitti and the Italian Admiralty occupied the institute and immediately appointed a director.[117] The new director was Prof. Magrini, the vice-president of the R. *Comitato Talassografico Italiano*, and the institute changed its name to the "*Istituto di biologia marina per l' Adriatico*". Magrini was not held in great respect by the Germans and was regarded as a very ambitious man who for years had coveted both German zoological stations in Italy, namely Naples and Rovigno.

With a decree of 30 April 1921, Italy, having annexed the region of Istria, officially announced to Germany that it had occupied the institute, practically terminating its relations with central Europe. Unlike Dohrn, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, following the advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, did not go to law against Italy but preferred to get in contact with Italian officials in order to get the station back.[118] The president of the

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[114] Letter of the Reich's Minister of the Interior to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 25.05.1926, in: PAAA, R 64575; Reich's Ministry of Health to the Kaiser-Wilhelm Gesellschaft, on 09.04.1920, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 1235/4.

[115] Dr. Massimo Sella, director of the Institute in Rovigno to the German ambassador in Rome Baron von Neurath, on 23.10.1924, in: PAAA, R 64575.

[116] *Ibid.*

[117] German Ambassador in Rome, Kehr, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, on 07.08.1920, in: PAAA, R 64570.

[118] The President of the KWG to the Reich Ministry of the Interior on 17.12.1924, in: PAAA, R 64575.

Kaiser-Wilhelm Society, Adolf von Harnack, was personally involved and got in touch with the Italian ambassador in Berlin, Grafen Bosdari, who subsequently contacted the Italian Ministry of Education. In 1924, the occupied status of the institute in Rovigno fell within the competence of the 'International Dietary Court' (*internationales Schiedsgericht*). The court would decide whether Italy had the right to confiscate foreign property in its newly annexed territories, or not. Meanwhile, the Italian zoologist Massimo Sella was appointed director of the institute. Unlike his predecessor Magrini, Sella was a committed scientist, who was interested in the institute functioning under its previous status. He had very good relations with the Germans, with whom he had worked many years in Italy. Sella wanted to make the institute an attractive scientific centre again, but he knew that it would be difficult to realise his wish without Germany's scientific or material contribution. Therefore, he tried hard to convince the Germans to send Victor Bauer, the assistant at the physiological institute at the University of Bonn, to represent Germany in Rovigno.[119] Bauer had worked for ten years as assistant and as guest scientist at the Zoological Station in Naples and he had become an expert in Mediterranean fauna and flora.

Long discussions had took place a year earlier, in 1923, between the German ambassador in Rome, Baron von Neurath, Sella, and Bauer about the German scientific representation in Rovigno. What Sella proposed in 1924, was that Bauer could visit the institute for some months each year, preferably during the university holidays, so that he could also meet his commitments at Bonn University. In addition, Sella believed that a closer relationship between the institute in Rovigno and Bauer's university could be developed through a mutual effort to investigate theoretical and practical scientific problems. The Ministry of Education would continue to pay Bauer for his professorial duties at the university in Bonn, but also would cover some of the expenses of his stay in Rovigno. Sella was going to try to get additional money from the International Education Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, which eventually approved fund for this purpose.[120] This was the first step of Sella's project, planned together with the Senator of the Italian government and Grassi, the member of the *Comitato Talassografico*. The next phase of Sella's proposal was an offer to Bauer to get a position at the *Comitato Talassografico*.

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[119] Letter of Dr. Massimo Sella, director of the Institute for marine Biology, to the German ambassador in Rome, Baron von Neurath on 23.10.1924, in: PAAA, R 64575.

[120] *Ibid.* On the approval of the Rockefeller Foundation see the letter of the German Embassy at Rome to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 02.03.1925, in: PAAA, R 64575.

This move was recognised by the Italians as "a sort of German representation" at the institute.[121]

Despite the political significance this project had for both countries, Germany rejected it. Harnack and the Minister of Education, Kruess, were very explicit about their decision not to allow Bauer or any other scientist to go to Rovigno, as long as the matter of the institute's ownership remained in dispute. They argued that the appointment of German scientists to the marine station would not improve their position at the International Court; moreover, it would be considered as recognition of the Italian management.[122] Germany's rejection of the offer seemed absolute to the Italians, leaving no latitude for negotiations. Sella pointed out to the Germans that the issue demanded "a particular political delicacy" rather than the mere appointment of a German representative, which he himself warmly recommended, but he could not impose it.[123] Meanwhile, on the German side the pressure for a solution to the institute's problem had increased. The scientific section of the Ministry of Health, let alone the Berlin aquarium, depended on the material coming from Rovigno. The director of the aquarium argued that Naples, the other alternative supply centre, was too far away, making it impossible to transport fragile material to Berlin. In addition, the aquariums in Trieste and Fiume which also supplied Berlin by that time with sea organisms, no longer existed. Consequently, the only place that could provide Berlin with the desired sea material, was Rovigno, but since it was in Italian hands, the material had to be purchased from them. Another problem was that Rovigno's material source had also started to dry up, due to the lack of funds and to the shortage of staff. The best way forward, was either for the institute to be handed over to Germany or for another institute to be established on some other coast of the Adriatic or in the Mediterranean.[124] While the Kaiser Wilhelm Society was seriously thinking of looking elsewhere for favourable conditions in order to set up a new institution, the first

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[121] Dr. v. Bauer to the German Ambassador in Rome, Baron von Neurath, in May 1925, in: PAAA, R 64575.

[122] Preussische Minister fuer Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung, Kruess, to the Staatliche Hauptstelle fuer den naturwissenscahftlichen Unterricht in Berlin, on 20.01.1925, in: PAAA, R 64575; The President of the KWG, Harnack, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 27.05.1925, in: PAAA, R 64575.

[123] Dr. v. Bauer to Baron von Neurath, in May 1925, in: PAAA, R 64575.

[124] Actien-Verein des zoologischen Gartens zu Berlin. Abteilung: Aquarium to Legationsrat Terdenge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 19.11.1926, in: PAAA, R 64575. For the alternative solution on the Mediterranean see the letter of Adolf von Harnack, President of the KWG to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, on 28.05.1927, in: PAAA, R 65806.

offer came from Yugoslavia. The local director of the newly established zoological station in Split made a partnership proposal to the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and offered a management position to Tilo Krumbach, the former director of the station in Rovigno.[125] The president of the Society, Adolf von Harnack, in accordance with the Prussian Ministry of Education, encouraged Krumbach to accept the offer, as it seemed unlikely, in 1926, the Rovigno station to be returned to the Society.[126]

At the same time, another serious proposal came from a German making business in Greece, Wilhelm Kraft. He was engaged in the Rovigno station before the war and in the period in question he was trading goods on the east Mediterranean. Kraft sent to the German Embassy in Athens a detailed plan for the establishment of a German marine institute in southern Greece. He had an excellent knowledge of the area and among the arguments he demonstrated were the climatic conditions of the region; the ideal temperature of the waters, which was a precondition for the rich variety of fauna and flora; the big diversity of the coastline; and above all the fact that in the eastern part of the Mediterranean there was no other institute of this kind.[127] Germany would be the first nation, he argued, that would inaugurate the area with a research station, leaving France and Italy, who possessed first-class marine institutes in the west, one step behind.[128] Kraft regarded as the most ideal place of the whole Greek coastline the bay of Koroni, on south-western Peloponnese between Kalamata and the small village of Petalidi. The second best place was, according to Kraft, the island of Corfu.[129] Although the German Foreign Ministry as well as the Kaiser-Wilhelm Society were in favour of Kraft's plan, both rejected it on the grounds that the still unsolved Rovigno issue did not leave any space for new financial commitments. In addition, it was argued that the location suggested by Kraft did not meet the geo-strategic criteria the German Foreign Ministry desired for an institute of that kind.[130]

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[125] Confidential (*vertraulich*) letter of the German Consul in Zagreb, Seiler, to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 12.11.1927, in: PAAA, R 65806.

[126] Harnack to Krumbach on 09.04.1926, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 1243/1.

[127] Detailed report of Dr. Wilhelm Kraft in Egina under the title "Moeglichkeiten der Errichtung eines deutschen Meeresforschungsinstituts in Griechenland" to the German Embassy at Athens, on 2 June 1926, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 1243/1.

[128] *Ibid.*

[129] *Ibid.*

[130] German Embassy in Athens to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 11 June 1926, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 1243/1. See also: Harnack to the Reich's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16 June 1926, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 1243/1.

At the beginning of 1927, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in agreement with the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, filed an application to the Italian government asking for the lifting of occupied status at the institute and its return to the Society. This application meant on the one hand how much important the institute was for the Society, on the other hand that Germany still wished to re-establish of closer relations with Italy. The Germans reassured Italy that, should the institute be returned to them, they would continue to co-operate with the Italian state and would be willing to discuss the best way for the station's operation, in order to serve the common interests of both nations.[131] Nonetheless, Germany already knew that the full restitution was rather an optimistic scenario, because the station was no longer a state but a military property as a holding of the Ministry of the Admiralty. The good news was that, according to a general agreement (*Globalabkommen*) about the Reich's property in the new Italian provinces, Germany could be entitled to compensation of eighty-five per cent of the institute's value, in case Italy continued to claim the ownership of the station.[132] Although Germany's application for restitution of the station was rejected, as it was expected, the German government did not take up its reimbursement right immediately. The reason was that Italy, in a diplomatic manoeuvre, suggested collaboration with the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in return for its contribution to the costs of the station.[133] The Italian government, with the unfortunate experience of the Naples case still fresh in mind, was determined not to leave the institute in German hands, nor to pay the associated expenses all on its own. Italy also knew, how desperately Germany wanted to have the station and her suggestion appeared to be the best solution for German interest. It seems that what Italy had failed to do in Naples, it would eventually accomplish in Rovigno. If the German presence in the station was a guarantee for attracting scientists from abroad, as it had been in the past, Italy's proposal would help the isolated German Republic to re-establish its international relations. The accessibility of the institute to foreign scholars was announced by a decree of the Italian government on 29 April 1927.[134] Scholars from different countries would have the chance to do research in an international environment. Germany, and in particular the Kaiser Wilhelm Society could, of course, lease a certain number of working spaces, but that number would be fixed by the Italians. Even though the Society recog-

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[131] German Embassy at Rome to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, on 19.03.1927, in: PAAA, R 65806.

[132] *Ibid.*

[133] *Ibid.*

[134] The President of the KWG to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, on 28.05.1927, in: PAAA, R 65806.

nised Italy's interest in fostering the international scientific co-operation, it could not accept the degree of Italian control over the station's status. It was not only a matter of losing its property. Germany's research demands of the time could not be satisfied by a limited number of working spaces. Therefore, President Harnack suggested the following compromise: the Society would waive its claim for restitution or reimbursement, on condition that the Society would be recognised as Italy's equal partner in the institute's administration.[135] Harnack also preferred to collaborate with an Italian scientific foundation rather than with the government, in order to guarantee the institute's flexibility and freedom. The new status of the station in Rovigno would be modelled upon the Biological Station in Lunz, in lower Austria. This station was founded in 1906 with the donation of Karl and Hans Kupelwieser, but in 1923 it became the property of the Academy of Sciences in Vienna and the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. In the period in question, the station in Lunz met the Society's requirements, which, before the war, had been met by the institute in Rovigno.

Harnack believed that German science could have a greater impact on international scientific scene, if research was conducted at institutes abroad. Hence, it would be in Germany's scientific, cultural and political interest to play a leading role in Rovigno and not to compromise this with a mere contribution, leasing some working spaces. Harnack finally made clear to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin that, if Italy denied her equal partnership, Germany should start thinking more seriously about the possibility of creating another station in Yugoslavia, Spain, or Greece.[136] His statement was far from what the director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem, Fritz von Wettstein, was to campaign for fifteen years later, when he was talking about the creation of a scientific network in south-eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. However, Harnack did recognise the importance an institute for marine biology could have for Germany in that region, not only for German science but also for the country's military interests.

At the end of 1927, Italy, under the reimbursement pressure suggested one Italian and one German delegate of the respective Foreign Ministries to draw up a contract with regard to the station's management. Harnack authorized the General Secretary of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, Friedrich Glum, to represent Germany, backed by a diplomat from the Embassy in Rome. In 1928, Glum together with the General Secretary of

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135 *Ibid.*

136 *Ibid.*

the *Comitato Talassografico*, Prof. Magrini, agreed upon a first draft of the contract. The institute in Rovigno would be recognized as property of both institutions, i.e. the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and the *Comitato Talassografico*.[137] Like the station in Naples, the Rovigno station would have an international character offering working spaces to foreign scientists. Harnack stated that "under the present circumstances, the contract was the best solution for Germany to once again exert its influence on Rovigno".[138] The contract was finally signed on 25 February 1930 and work began on 21 April 1931. The new name of the station was "German-Italian Institute for Marine Biology" and Adolf Steuer and the Italian Massimo Sella were appointed first co-directors.

Three elements, in particular, made the stations in Naples and Rovigno so important for Germany's scientific and foreign cultural policy: their location, the matter of ownership and their international character. Both of them were the first German research centers located beyond the Reich's borders and within the European territory. In a period when social and economic demands called for development in research, institutes situated abroad and dedicated to that end were regarded by the scientific community as a step head. The climatic conditions and the rich fauna and flora of the Mediterranean Sea were not only favourable in performing research that could not be carried out on the North Sea, but they also provided other research centers and aquariums within the German state with important material. Many of those domestic institutes were engaged in projects regarding public health and agriculture, both very important for Germany's needs at that time.

Although both stations in Italy initially had a private or semi-private status, they were considered as German state property. The long debate on the ownership of the institutes after World War I and the Versailles Treaty bear witness to the prevalence of this belief. The boundaries between private and public were quite vague for both countries and jumping from one status to the other was more a function of the argument in hand than any solidly based distinction between state and private property. It is true, however, that crossing the public-private line was more obvious on the German side, while Italy seemed to avoid the complications of the private-state distinction and preferred to regard

[137] The only thing that was excluded from the common ownership and remained under Italian title, was the library of the former zoological station in Trieste, which had been assigned to Rovigno See: Article 14 of the 1929's draft, in: PAAA, R 65806. This part, however, was not mentioned on the official contract.

[138] Adolf, von Harnack to the German Foreign Ministry, on 01.02.1928, in: PAAA, R 65806.

the institutes as simply German. Nonetheless, what was really at stake was the national prestige of both countries, regardless of whether it was the official state or some private enterprise that contributed to its promotion.

National prestige did not appear to mean much outside the international context. What was unique in the two stations in Italy was not only the fact that they reflected the German scientific and cultural prestige abroad. This was also cultivated by the German scientific institutes overseas in China, Argentina and Samoa. Yet, unlike those institutes, the research centers in Italy had an international character, meaning, they were a sort of melting-pot, in which scientists from all over the world could come and do research exchanging experience and ideas. They were very different from all other institutes overseas subordinated to a colonial policy, imposed by the German central government. Nevertheless, it is evident that after World War I the young Republic, being in no position to exert influence through the practices of political and territory domination, continued to do so through international scientific co-operation, exchange of ideas, and knowledge distribution. Those strategies were simply indicative of an era of re-orientation and modification of Germany's policy at all levels, including science policy.

2. German science under threat and the Weimar Republic's rescuing policies.

2.1. Scientific isolation from international community

In the years preceding World War I, international scientific competitiveness was at the centre of foreign policy planning for every powerful state. It seemed that the impending war was to be the first of its kind, which was to consume "the major industrial nations of the world".[139] Alliances, established in 1900, between research centres, government and industry had to accelerate their projects on science and technology, which were expected to meet economic and, in particular, military demands. Scientific supremacy became synonymous with economic and military strength.

Germany, at the turn of the century, could boast that its military and scientific supremacy were the reasons for its extraordinary might.[140] Despite claims of scientific backwardness, Germany was a leading power in a number of scientific disciplines, and chemistry in particular. Major discoveries in that field, such as the synthesis of fertilisers, more precisely aniline and alizarin colours, were of great importance for Germany's economy and made huge expanses of land suitable for growing wheat. Moreover, Fritz Haber, one of Germany's leading chemists at the time, developed a process to synthetically produce liquid ammonia, a key compound for the extraction of nitrates, the main substance used in the manufacture of munitions and fertilisers. This achievement not only contributed to Germany's industrial and rural economic growth, but also gave the country an unparalleled advantage in chemical warfare. For his innovative work on the synthesis of ammonia, Haber was awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry, making him the ninth German, and seventeenth overall, awarded this honour between 1901 and 1921.[141]

By 1914, Germany had begun research on synthetic materials, which allowed them to be less dependent on other countries' raw materials. Otto Hahn, the future director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry, discovered *mesothorium*, a viable and

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[139] ROY MacLEOD, "Secrets among Friends: The Research Information Service and the 'Special Relationship' in the Allied Scientific Information and Intelligence, 1916-1918.", in: *Minerva* 37, (1999), 201-233, here p. 201.

[140] See footnote 66.

[141] The other eight laureates were from England (2), France (2), Sweden (1), the United States (1), the Netherlands (1), and Poland (a woman), in: Interpellation on 16 October 1922, included in: Reichstagsverhandlungen vom 15. und 16. November 1922, entitled "Die Not der Wissenschaft im Reichstag", p. 9008, in: PAAA, R 65519.

cheaper substitute for radium, while working for the Emil Fischer Institute at Berlin University.[142] During the war, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry, with Fritz Haber and Emil Fischer at its helm, was transformed into a centre of military science creating a *ménage-à-trois* between science, industry and military technology. Germany's achievements in chemistry forced the Allies to collaborate more closely on scientific knowledge and secret sharing, making this "the first war of scientific information".[143]

Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, who jointly declared war on Germany on 2 April 1917, joined forces to promote research in four fields: submarine detection, chemical warfare, trench warfare, and aeronautics. Scientific missions, between these countries, were constantly moving across the Atlantic during the spring of 1917. Meanwhile, US President Wilson was approving the creation of the National Research Council, in agreement with the Council of National Defence, in 1916, mobilising science in the service of war.[144] The inter-allied scientific collaboration during the war laid foundations for the creation of an international scientific council, which would foster scientific communication and the exchange of information when the war was over.

The United States - represented by George Ellery Hale, then foreign secretary of the United States National Academy of Sciences in Washington, DC - played a central role in the co-ordination of information flow. In the summer of 1918, on a draft for the establishment of an Inter-Allied Research Council, Hale underlined that the Germans "introduced and constantly improved new, powerful devices of offence and defence embodying the most advance [sic] conceptions of science", which the Allies could only meet through "a similarly effective utilisation of all the agencies of scientific research at their disposal".[145] The future research council would not only contribute to current military needs but also, as Hale had envisioned, would become an institution for the post-war modification of international science, which would also further the creation of an organi-

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[142] KRISTIE MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika. Scientific Research in Nazi Germany. New York 1993, p. 21. For details on Fritz Haber's work see: STOLZENBERG DIETRICH, Fritz Haber. Chemiker, Nobelpreistraeger, Deutscher, Jude. Weinheim 1994; MARGIT SZOELLOESI-JANZE, Fritz Haber 1868 bis 1934. Eine Biographie, C.H.Beck 1998.

[143] MacLEOD, "Secrets among Friends", p. 201.

[144] BRIGITTE SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, Deutsche Wissenschaft und Internationale Zusammenarbeit 1914-1928. Ein Beitrag zum Studium kultureller Beziehungen in politischen Krisenzeiten. (Dissertation), Genève 1966, p. 104.

[145] Cited in: MacLEOD, "Secrets among Friends", p. 226.

sation that would side-step the pre-war German-dominated International Association of Academies.[146]

Nonetheless, Hale opposed the position of his European colleagues who had adopted a rather hard line against Germany and its allies. At the first preparatory meeting of the Inter-allied Academies in London during October 1918, French representatives recommended that governments should not send delegates to international congresses, in which the Central Powers were also be represented. Moreover, their nationals should be discouraged from attending such congresses as private citizens. The meeting, however, did not accept the French recommendation. Furthermore, Hale did not share the French and Belgian objectives to "shut the door squarely to the German men of science and not make any compromise with them", humiliate them by removing their names from the lists of honorary membership in their National Academies, or by attacking them in other ways.[147] The Royal Society of London was also wary of employing such measures against Germany, regarding them as superfluous.[148]

It seems that the Anglo-Americans did not think –at that time, in any case- to exclude German scientists from future international research organisations and believed that radical measures against Germany might stand in the way of international cooperation, creating doubts and prejudices at the end of the war.[149] Instead, they decided that the post-war organisation would allow Germans to join, but remain free of their domination. In consequence, the existing order, based on the tradition and prestige of German academic leadership, had to be replaced with a new order based on scientific disciplines open to the world community. Ironically, the openness of the new order was restricted to the winners of war, who created a close network of scientific organisations. These were usually headed by the same small number of individuals. Despite the fact that, during the preparatory London meeting in 1918, officials suggested that the new international organisation be staffed with executives from the respective national research committees, the absence of these committees in most of the countries passed the ball to the academies, which were already represented in other international organisa-

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[146] *Ibid.*, p. 225.

[147] *Ibid.*, p. 226. Also in: Académie Royale de Belgique. *Bulletin de la classe des Science,* 1919, cited in: SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, Internationale Zusammenarbeit, p. 107.

[148] "Conférence des Académies des sciences interalliées tenue à Londres en Octobre 1918. Compte rendu". *Académie Royale de Belgique, Bulletin de la classe des sciences,* 1919, cited in: SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, Internationale Zusammenarbeit, p. 93.

[149] *Ibid.*, pp. 89 f.

tions. Employing the same people in institutions with very different aims seriously weakened the matter of order and representation within these institutions.[150] The number of tasks the new Research Council had to manage, such as organising conferences, drawing-up scientific reports, editing journals, contacting institutions, associations and foreign scientists, and organising the exchange of scientific publications, demanded a larger circle of scientists than the academies alone could provide. The creation of the new International Research Organisation should be done as soon as possible, for the Allies feared that the Germans might take over the organisation and eventually exert a strong influence over it after the end of the war.[151] They believed that any further delay would benefit Germany. The *Secrétaire Perpétuel* of the *Academie des Sciences* of Paris, Emile Picard, characterised the immediate formation of the International Committee a matter of "capital importance".[152] After two preparatory meetings in London and Paris during 1918, the new International Research Council was officially approved by the Allies in a conference held at the *Palais des Académies* in Brussels from 18-28 July 1919. The aim of the Council was not to conduct research but, according to the first Article of the statutes, to stimulate, support and co-ordinate international scientific co-operation. The new Research Council shaped the framework for future international scientific collaboration, encouraging the use of the English language, although its headquarters were in Paris.[153] Additionally, German and Austrian scientists were explicitly excluded by a vote called for by France and Belgium. Meanwhile, the Versailles Treaty was signed by the Allies and the Central Powers on 28 June 1919, inaugurating an unpropitious era for German science.

The most devastating Article for Germany's international scientific relations, which damaged scientific production within its own frontiers, was Art. 282 and those following. According to these Articles, all multilateral treaties, conventions or agreements of an economic or technical character that Germany had signed in the past, were deprived of any legal force. The only exception made was for agreements concerning organisations, in which Germany's co-operation was absolutely necessary, such as the Convention for the Unification and Improvement of the Metric System and the Agricultural

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[150] *Ibid.*, pp. 101 ff.

[151] E. Picard, Minutes of the 27. November 1918 meeting, held in Paris. Cited in: SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, Internationale Zusammenarbeit, p. 108.

[152] *Ibid.*

[153] *Ibid.*, p. 228.

Institute in Rome.[154] Interpreting the General Articles of the Treaty, the statutes of the Council excluded the Central Powers and their allies from every scientific congress until 1931, unless two thirds of the council should decide otherwise. Not even Albert Einstein could participate in physics congresses without the approval of more than the two thirds of the members of the Council. This action ignored the voice of the international physics community and was reported with disaproval in an issue of the journal "*Nature*" in 1921.[155] Furthermore, German representatives would be struck from international commissions -the International Commission for Atom Weight, the Commission for the Teaching of Mathematics, the International Electro-technical Commission, and so forth- and if necessary, the Council would announce new commissions to be established.

It is interesting to note that within the International Research Council there were groups dedicated to legal manoeuvres, which were specifically designed to leave the Central Powers shut out of the international community. Such practices were also applied elsewhere, for example, to the XIth International Congress for Geography on 1-9 April 1925, in Cairo. Egypt's precipitous accession to the International Research Council, on 26 July 1922, forced the country to withdraw the official invitations it had sent to Germany and Austria almost a month before, on 22 June 1922. Egypt, as a member of the Research Council, was no longer the official organiser of the congress. The organisation was handed over to the International Geographical Union, founded on 29 July 1922, which was subject to decisions made by the International Research Council. In effect, the former Central Powers were excluded from the new, official invitations of Egypt.[156] From 1919 until 1925, Germany was barred from participating in roughly 165 out of 275 international meetings in the fields of the humanities, natural and technical sciences.[157] For the Germans, even though the discussions for their country's admission into the League of Nations were on-going, the measures of prohibition were as tight as they had

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[154] See paragraphs 20 and 23 of Article 282 of the Versailles Treaty, in: http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/ptxiii.htm

[155] This is what Prof. Hardy (Oxford) strongly criticised on an article in *Nature* on 24 March 1921. Cited in: KARL KERKHOF, Der Krieg gegen die deutsche Wissenschaft. Eine Zusammenstellung von Kongressberichten und Zeitungsmeldungen. Wittenberg 1922, p. 12.

[156] *Ibid.*, p. 124 ff.

[157] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

been in the first years after the signing of the Treaty. The figures released by "*Reich's Central News Agency for Natural Sciences*" in 1925, illustrate a dismal picture:[158]

Table 1.

"International" Congresses 1922-24

	Total	without Germany
Human and Natural Sciences (incl. Medicine),		
Public Law, International Law	57	51
Social Sciences	08	02
Technical Sciences	20	17
Subsidiary Sciences	21	16
Sum:	106	86

As one might expect, things were different when international congresses were organised by neutral states or the Central Powers. Germany was invited to all but one of the twenty-one international congresses, organised by the Central Powers from 1920 to 1924. However, the Allies, in particular France and Belgium, keeping true to the Articles of the Versailles Treaty, refused to send their delegates to thirteen congresses in which Germany was also invited during this time.[159]

Immediately after the war, the International Academic Association for Humanities, founded in Brussels in October 1919, as well as a number of scientific organisations and institutions under the direction of the International Research Council. These organisations were created mainly to support natural sciences, the development of which was particularly significant in post-war economic planning and national security. Central Powers were, again, explicitly excluded from all of them. The new institutions created by the Council were the International Associations for Astronomy, Geodesy, Geophysics, and for Pure and Applied Chemistry.[160] Some of the old associations were transformed into new ones, like the International Association for Mathematics and the International

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[158] "Denkschrift der Reichszentrale fuer naturwissenschaftliche Berichterstattung vom 29. Januar 1925", in: PAAA, R 64981.

[159] *Ibid.*

[160] These and the International Mathematical Union as well as the International Geographical Union were not developed beyond nominal existence. Cited in: BRIGITTE SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, "Challenge to Transnational Loyalties: International Scientific Organisations after the First World War", *Science Studies*, 3 (1973), pp. 93-118, here p. 102.

Association for Scientific Radiotelegraphy. Some other projects remained lay dormant to be revived in the future, among them the International Association for Biological Sciences and the International Technical Union. It is noteworthy that, as a result of the restrictions to Article 282, many unions or organisations that had previously had their central offices in Germany, relocated their headquarters to other countries after the war.[161] This was the case for the International Seismological Association in Strasbourg (*Internationale Assoziation fuer Siesmologie in Strassburg*), which was re-established as the "International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics" (*Union géodésique et géophysique internationale*). Another example is the Central Office for International Earth Measuring in Potsdam (*Zentralbuero der Internationale Erdmessung in Potsdam*), the projects of which were mainly undertaken by the Japanese Latitude Station in Mizusawa.[162]

Not surprisingly, by 1923 France housed thirty-seven international scientific organisations, societies and institutes, as opposed to only eighteen in 1914. During this same period, Belgium increased the number of international institutions headquartered on its territory from thirteen to twenty-one, England from nine to fourteen and Italy from three to four. On the other hand, the number of international organisations that had their head offices in Germany decreased from fourteen, in 1914, to six, in 1923.[163]

Table 2.

European participation in international congresses 1914-1923

	1914	1923
Germany	*14*	*6* [164]
German-Austria	3	3
Belgium	14	31 [165]
France	18	37
England	9	14
Italy	3	4

[161] SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, Internationale Zusammenarbeit, p. 115.

[162] *Ibid.*, p. 116, see also: „Denkschrift der Reichszentrale fuer naturwissenschaftliche Berichterstattung vom 29. Januar 1925", in: PAAA, R 64981.

[163] „Denkschrift der Reichszentrale fuer naturwissenschaftliche Berichterstattung vom 29. Januar 1925", in: PAAA, R 64981.

[164] Emphasis added. In other documents the figures are 15 and 3 respectively. See: Abstract of KARL KERKHOF, Internationale wissenschaftliche Kongresse und Organisationen 1922-1923. Berlin 1923, in: PAAA, R 64981.

[165] Again, the figures, according to Kerkhof, are different, 13 and 21 respectively. *Ibid.*

Congresses and organisations were not the only scientific outlets from which Germany was shut out. Probably "the most effective means used against the 'domination' of German science", as Max Planck, secretary of the Physics-Mathematical Department of the Prussian Academy, wrote in a 1919 report, "[was] the exclusion of Germany from international bibliographies, in which German scientific works [were] supposedly disproportionately represented".[166] Suffice it to say that the number of foreign journals the State Library of Berlin could purchase in 1920, had dramatically decreased after the war: from 2,200 titles, in 1914, to a low of only 140 acquisitions.[167] Given these figures, German science might justifiably be regarded as provincial and backward in international scientific discussions. Until 1919, Germany undoubtedly had a profound presence in the international bibliographies of many disciplines. Botany, zoology, anatomy, biology, and physiology were the fields in which German scientific progress was most apparent.[168] One measure that seriously damaged Germany's international scientific prestige was the currency conditions of purchasing scientific works from abroad. Scientific books and journals were very expensive and represented a substantial outlay for even the largest of cultural institutions, such as the Germanische Museum in Nuremberg, the German library in Leipzig and the German Museum in Munich, which at that time was under construction.[169] Rather than the international scientific community independently rejecting German output, a number of reviewing bodies were established by the Federation of the Societies of Natural Sciences (*Fédération des Sociétés des Sciences naturelles*), an organisation founded in March 1919. These were engaged in driving the German review journals off of the international scientific stage, an undertaking that proved very effective. Nonetheless, Germany, through a number of salvage mechanisms and with gradual foreign support, had recovered about half of her pre-war international periodical position by 1930 and, by 1940, had impressively increased its share in international scientific production, especially in the field of chemistry.[170]

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[166] Cited in: PAMELA SPENCE RICHARDS, "The Movement of Scientific Knowledge from and to Germany under National Socialism", *Minerva*, 28, 4 (1990), pp. 401-425, here p. 402.

[167] WINFRIED SCHULZE, Der Stifterverband fuer die Deutsche Wissenschaft 1920-1995. Berlin 1995, p. 50.

[168] On the eve of the First World War, German scientific periodicals held about 45% of the world production. SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, "Challenge to Transnational Loyalties", p. 99, footnote No.15.

[169] Interpellation on 16. October 1922, included in „Reichstagsverhandlungen vom 15. und 16. November 1922", entitled "Die Not der Wissenschaft im Reichstag", in: PAAA, R 65519.

[170] DEREK J. de SOLLA PRICE, "Nations can publish or perish", *Science and Technology*, 70 (1967), pp. 84-90, here p. 90.

Reflecting the strong anti-western feeling the "boycott movement" created in Germany, Karl Kerkhof, director of the "Central Office for Scientific News Reports" (*Reichszentrale fuer wissenschaftliche Berichterstattung*), argued that the first initiative against German science was taken in 1915 by England.[171] He claimed that the British Association for the Advancement of Science at a meeting held that year in Manchester, had planned to create a front against German science through a number of natural science journals published by the allied countries. In the same vein, the Royal Society of Literature and the Italian publisher of the international journal "*Scientia*", Eugenio Rignano, suggested launching journals, archives and yearbooks with an international character and in collaboration with the Entente states, in order to defeat what he described as Germany's "hegemony" and "monopoly" in the scientific press.[172]

The ostracisation of the German language was another way their influence was to be restricted and the international scientific stage was to be liberated from the German authority. The use of German in congresses was also forbidden for members of the Council –such as Dutch and Scandinavian scientists- for whom German had been the international scientific language at that time. This reaction came from the belief, largely shared by the Allies, that German:

> "had become pre-eminently the international language of science and that German professors had set up a kind of scientific empire which covered the entire north, central, and eastern Europe and exerted considerable influence on Russian, American and Japanese science".[173]

The paradox was that even the German-speaking delegates from neutral countries, like Switzerland, were forced to use French or English rather than their mother tongue, even in international congresses that took place in their own country.[174] Despite the strict and uncompromising spirit of the Council, there were cases in which German was used by some of the conference delegates. For example, at the International Congress of Byzantinologists in Bucharest, in 1924, three Yugoslavian, two Romanian and one Greek participant presented their work in German.[175]

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[171] KERKHOF, Der Krieg gegen die deutsche Wissenschaft, p. 9.

[172] *Nature*, 25 January 1917, cited in: KERKHOF, Der Krieg gegen die deutsche Wissenschaft, p. 9.

[173] Cited in: SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, "Challenge to Transnational Loyalties". p. 99.

[174] This happened at the International Conference for Tuberculosis in Lausanne, in August 1924.

[175] SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, Internationale Zusammenarbeit, p. 115. See also the report of the Greek delegate in Bucharest, Σ. Β. ΚΟΥΤΕΑΣ. "Εντυπώσεις εκ Ρουμανίας. Απόσπασμα εκ του ημερολογίου της Μεγάλης Ελλάδος." ["Impressions from Rumania, by S.B. Kougeas. Abstract of the diary of Great Greece"], 1925.

All the above measures that the Allies took in order to punish Germany, led the intellectual and political circles of the defeated country to talk about a "war against German science".[176] In 1922, Kerkhof blamed French imperialism as well as the English and American latent economic interests for Germany's scientific isolation. France urged the expansion of its cultural domain through a number of propaganda organisations, such as the *Lingue française de Propagande,* the *Fédération internationale pour l' extension et la culture de la langue française,* the *Groupement des Universités et Grandes Écoles de France* and so forth, making many nations notice that "after the Versailles dictate, the world's scientific centre has been transferred to Paris".[177] English and American propaganda, on the other hand, aimed at the major contributors to Germany's industrial growth, i.e. chemistry and physics.[178] On 7 September 1921, for example, Françis P. Carvan, the president of the American Chemical Foundation, argued in a meeting of both the Society of Chemical Industry and the American Chemical Society at Columbia University in New York that the development of chemistry "at the dirty hands of Germans is a history of crimes, fallacy and murderous attempt" and it was time to be passed on to the "idealistic hands of the Anglo-Saxons".[179] Moreover, the English and American press complained about the award of the Nobel for chemistry to Fritz Haber and Walther Hermann Nernst, portraying the reward as a mistake.[180] Propaganda and exclusion measures imposed on Germany, were of no benefit to science as a whole, as was to be realised by the scientific community later on. It was also to be recognised that co-operative research and congresses attended by representatives of all nations of the globe, had to be accompanied by mutual exchange of the results of long painstaking study and research and not to be restricted to few elite nations. Yet, by that time and until the year Germany joined the League of Nations, in 1926, even the states that remained neutral during the war did not seem to receive equal treatment in the international scientific community led by the big Entente nations, for fear they might share scientific results with Germany.

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[176] See the essays of GEORG KARO, Der Krieg der Wissenschaft gegen Deutschland. Muenchen 1919; *Ibid.*, Der geistige Krieg gegen Deutschland. Halle 1925; KARL KERKHOF, Der Krieg gegen die deutsche Wissenschaft. Eine Zusammenstellung von Kongressberichten und Zeitungsmeldungen. Wittenberg 1922.

[177] KERKHOF, Der Krieg gegen die deutsche Wissenschaft, p. 20.

[178] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[179] *Ibid.*, p. 23 ff.

[180] Haber was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1918 for the synthesis of ammonia from its elements and Nernst in 1920 in recognition of his work in thermochemistry.

Democratic ideals did not seem to be represented in the International Research Council and the effort to keep it "between ourselves" advocates the "aristocratic character of this academic corporation".[181] In addition, Germany's cultural-political seclusion forced the country to develop ways of supporting science and reforming its science policy. Moreover, the isolation created the conditions for the development of an ideological framework that instigated hostility to western countries, particular against France, also by distinguishing *culture*, with which Germany identified itself, from the western *civilisation*, represented by the French Enlightenment. This conceptual division was to find its radical expression some years later in national socialist ideology.

[181] SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, Internationale Zusammenarbeit, p. 103.

2.2. Germany's damaged image abroad and its Foreign Cultural Policy after World War I.

In autumn 1922, long discussions on the status of German science and its impact on the Weimar Republic's foreign relations took place at the German Parliament. It was the first time in the history of the *Reichstag* that German science was discussed as the main subject of a parliamentary debate. The discussion initiated by Prof. Georg Schreiber, a senior representative of the Central Party, brought up the issue of Germany's foreign cultural policy, which was a subject of serious concern to the young Republic after the war. Schreiber also was a professor of engineering at Muenster University and had developed something of a reputation as the "eminence grise" behind the scenes, on the account of the influential role he had played in the discussion on shaping the state's foreign cultural policy.[182] He stressed the strong relationship between German science, culture and the state's economy, describing science as the "moral capital" of Germany, which needed to be placed and developed abroad.[183] German science and culture, argued Schreiber, was just as important for the country's foreign relations as diplomacy, financial policy and commercial policy were. Lack of cultural exchange with other countries not only meant scientific provincialism and backwardness, but also threatened the country with total devastation. As an engineer, Schreiber used powerful metaphors arguing that not only industry depended on raw materials from abroad, but also science.[184] This was evident for certain disciplines in natural science, such as bacteriology and medicine, but also history, art history, archaeology, language studies, in short, studies that depended on 'old texts'. The 'raw materials' that both natural sciences and humanities required, were, for Schreiber, the participation in international congresses and organisations, the acquisition of scientific books and journals, the undertaking of research missions, and the like. The German institutes abroad, which were more or less depended on Foreign Ministry's money occupied the same 'feeding' role. Among these were the Archaeological Institutes in Rome, Cairo and Athens and the Zoological Station in Naples.

It seems that some economic circles of the Republic had realised that the old diplomatic means Germany had used, were inadequate for the new, multifarious de-

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[182] FRITZ von TWARDOWSKI , Anfaenge der deutschen Kulturpolitik zum Ausland. Bonn, Bad Godesberg, 1970, p. 23.

[183] Interpellation on 16 October 1922, included in "Reichstagsverhandlungen vom 15. und 16. November 1922", entitled "Die Not der Wissenschaft im Reichstag", p. 8992, in: PAAA, R 65519.

[184] Notice of Ministry Director Heilbron to Prof. Dr. Schreiber, on 31 October 1922, in: PAAA, R 65519 Compare also: Interpellation on 16 October 1922, *ibid.*

mands the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was called to deal with in the post-war period. Schreiber acknowledged that Germany's devastating economy forced the country to focus on the economic dimension of its foreign relations, leaving aside the cultural-political problems. He stressed, however, that this neglect would seriously affect the state's economy in the future.[185] Nonetheless, the focus of foreign policy, even of foreign cultural policy, on the Republic's economic interests was not something new directly attributable to the war. The pre-war discussions on cultural influence abroad had been held along the lines of economic influence. What was new, though, was the cultural-political ideals with which the German 'materialistic' life, particularly German foreign policy, had to be nurtured. In 1919, the Prussian State Secretary and future Minister of Education, Carl Heinrich Becker, on a draft for the National Assembly's Constitution attempted to define cultural policy stating that

> **"cultural policy, is the conscious establishment of intellectual values in the service of the state and its people, for inner consolidation and for negotiation (*Auseinandersetzung*) with other peoples abroad." [186]**

The new Republic, unlike France, Britain and the United States, as the Germans argued, planned their new cultural policy in the same peaceful and non-aggressive spirit that had already been introduced by Karl Lamprecht, in 1912. However, that conscious idealism, which came to the fore primarily as a defence against French culture and its influence on the 1919 peace-text, only seemed to be a theory, as political and economic interests were always present in foreign cultural policy discussions.

The double dimension of that policy was illustrated by Prof. Eduard Spranger, in 1923. In his view, cultural policy should aim either at "ethical cultural ideas" ("*ethische Kulturidee*"), at the cultural output itself, or at gaining power abroad.[187] With regard to science, he stressed what had already been argued in the "International Association of Academies" in Wiesbaden, in 1899:

> "Two conflicting conceptions for the purpose of scientific research prevail at the present day. According to one of them even the knowledge that is acquired and distributed by the nation is only an instrument to be used for promoting its own political power, greatness and renown. The other view says that this knowledge is the contribution which

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[185] Interpellation on 16 October 1922, *ibid.*

[186] Cited in: KURT DÜWELL, Deutschlands Auswaertige Kulturpolitik, 1918-1932. Grundlinien und Dokumente. Koeln 1976, p. 29.

[187] *Ibid*, p. 33.

as a matter of plain duty, a nation owes to the whole civilisation to be used for increasing the welfare and happiness of mankind [sic]." [188]

Spranger particularly emphasised what one might call the 'altruistic' or 'idealistic' character of German science and implying the imperious role of the Allies by excluding Germany from the international scientific community, he declared that:

"German scientists [...] would consider it a great misfortune to mankind, if science no matter in what form, were to become a monopoly."[189]

One of the issues discussed in the Republic with regard to cultural policy planning, was what Germans called "hostile propaganda" (*Feindpropaganda*) of the Allies in particular that of Britain and France. Campell Stuart, one of the leaders of the hostile propaganda, according to Germans, argued that in order for the propaganda to be effective, a favourable climate was needed. By this he meant creating an "atmosphere" favourable to the propagandists.[190] Without an appropriate atmosphere, even the most sophisticated propaganda would fail. Everyone, who possessed the power to cultivate this climate, would be in a position to poison foreigner's minds against other nations using a number of intellectual weapons (*geistige Waffen*).[191] Germany considered itself a victim of this tactic. To reverse the unfavourable climate was a particularly hard task for the young Republic. Producing anti-propaganda that would targets the French or English culture would not only be extremely difficult, but would also be in conflict with German ideals. What they had to do was promote the inner values of German culture, without using the same aggressive means as their opponents. There was "no need to resort to intellectual imperialism, noted Becker in 1926, because national particularities know no boundaries in the scientific or cultural realm".[192]

In the first years of the Bismark era, there was a lack of a jointly designed education policy with an international character, due to the vague boundaries of responsibilities between the land-states and the Reich. At that time, while the other world powers began to develop and use education as a modern cultural weapon, in Germany it was still a

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[188] EDUARD SPRANGER, Deutschlands Anteil an der Internationalen wissenschaftlichen Arbeit (Germany's work for international science), Leipzig 1926, p. 5. The essay was written both in German and English.

[189] *Ibid.*

[190] R. BORNEMANN, "Bildungswesen, Kultur und auswaertige nationale Politik", *Das Zentrum. Monatsschrift fuer politische Bildung*, Nummer 4, 15 (April 1923), pp. 57-60, here p. 57.

[191] *Ibid.*

[192] Abstract of the Cultural Minister's speech, Dr. C.H. Becker, on "Kulturpolitik in der modernen Demokratie", held on 2 March 1926, in: PAAA, R 64853.

land-state matter. The various interests of each land-state that designed its educational system were not yet privy to the Reich's any foreign policy agenda. In addition, the authorities of the Reich, to their discredit, did not pay enough heed to this fact. Consequently, the end of the war and the cultural propaganda against the defeated Reich left Germany unprepared to defend its image abroad. Its improvised counter-measures were not effective enough against the foreign, more precisely the French propaganda. As it was turned out, France had planned and prepared for a cultural policy for many years, or for the "continuation of war with other weapons", as a prominent French intellectual formulated it.[193] Germany's pre-war 'arsenal', i.e. the *Wehrmacht* and the economy, were devastated by the Peace-Treaty. All that had been left was German culture and education, which had not previously been developed as weapons and were threatened with marginalisation and provincialism. To avert the danger of a total national catastrophe, the state had to work in two directions: first, to systematically observe the educational policy of other countries with regard to their foreign policy, and second, to give its own education system a clear foreign political character.[194] German idealism, as was demonstrated by politicians and intellectuals, was still present in the recent years but only in theory.[195] Since foreign policy was, by definition, very closely related to economic and political interests, idealism eventually found itself edged out by them. However, after the war, the belief that even the best economic propaganda abroad would not last long without comparable cultural propaganda, gained considerable ground among the economic circles of the Republic.[196]

Towards the end of the 1920s, Georg Schreiber demonstrated that the purpose of foreign cultural policy was to preserve national culture and retain its influence and world power in the process of strengthening the state's relations with other countries. Taking care of German minorities abroad was an exceedingly important task as well, as the significance of maintaining close contact with them became clear.[197] They were a considerable economic force beyond German borders that could provide the motherland with important information on each country, vital in the Republic's foreign policy planning.

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[193] Cited in: BORNEMANN, Bildungswesen, p. 58.

[194] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

[195] In 1923, for example, R. Bornemann argued that the state's effort to strengthen the ties between education and foreign policy should be done under the spirit of peoples reconciliation. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[196] Dr. Gerh. Menz and Herr Selke to the Foreign Ministry Director on 22.10.1920, in: PAAA, R 64853. The same letter was also sent to the head of the Stock Market Union (*Boersenvereins*).

[197] DÜWELL, Deutschlands Auswaertige Kulturpolitik, pp. 33 f.

The same role played diplomats, who were responsible for commercial issues, but also were advisors for all cultural-political issues. Germany's cultural attachés (*Kulturbeiraete*) were to be drawn both from the business class and the diplomatic corps and their task would be two-fold. They would be the "German eyes abroad", reporting on the situation of German people living beyond Germany's borders, as well as on cultural activities in the other countries, i.e. unions, schools, museums, the spread of the German language, literature, art, and science.[198] Their duties were also to include reporting on the position of local authorities towards the delegates themselves. The other task of the *Kulturbeiraete* would be the observation of the cultural activity of those antagonistic to the German nation. The main reason for this was that Germany wanted to learn from their strategies, fill in the gaps in its own policy, and to stay ahead of the game in cultural matters, or rather propaganda methods. Among these strategies, priority was given to the exchange of professors and the awarding of grants to foreigners. Grants would also be given to German students who wanted to study abroad, but priority of scholarship allocation was given to students wanting to study in countries considered important for German interests. North and South America, Japan, China, Iran, and Afghanistan were in the first rank, followed by Spain, the Nordic States and the Balkans.[199] The international dimension of the Republic's cultural policy could only be achieved through similar state cultural policies, which defined every modern democracy. Germany, as one such young state, followed the example of the Unites States and France, striving to shape its cultural policy by aiming at "big policy". At the same time, it was recognised that cultural policy, more than ever, was attached to the nation and its history.[200]

This oratory, leaping constantly from 'national' to 'international' and vice versa, clearly shows the state in a transitional phase regarding both its domestic and foreign policies. The new era in German history, inaugurated by a democratic polity, which was short-lived, challenged old institutions through a continuous dialectic between tradition and modernity, German idealism and western materialism.[201] Kurt Duewell rightly observes that Germany's industrialisation and the strong technocratic nature of its society that developed almost simultaneously with the Reich's establishment in 1871, caused a deep crisis in ancestral cultural values. A second crisis occurred, due to new technologies,

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[198] Dr. Gerh. Menz and Herr Selke to the Foreign Ministry Director on 22.10.1920, in: PAAA, R 64853.

[199] *Ibid.*

[200] Abstract of the Cultural Minister's speech, Dr. C.H. Becker, on "Kulturpolitik in der moderner Demokratie", held on 2 March 1926, in: PAAA, R 64853.

[201] See chapter 4.2.

when a national cultural state was about to come into existence. The crisis this time was the perception and definition of German traditional education.[202]

[202] DÜWELL, Deutschlands Auswaertige Kulturpolitik, pp. 13 f.

2.3. Supporting German science and culture. The establishment of new institutions.

After the signing of the Versailles Treaty, the general belief in certain economic circles in Germany that the Republic's financial situation seriously threatened its scientific research and consequently the nation's culture was apparent. That juncture called for immediate drastic steps.

> "The interests of trade and industry seem to be predominant. On the contrary, the cultural-political issue runs the risk of being neglected. This harbours a serious hazard. In due course, all economic propaganda will be in vain without a meaningful and organised cultural propaganda. German goods and, more generally, all high-quality products that we want and can manufacture, will never conquer the world, nor dominate the international market, if Germany, on the one hand, does not be kept abreast of the cultural currents and developing tendencies abroad, [...] and on the other hand, does not enlighten the foreign countries on German culture, intentions and the capability of German work in all fields."[203]

In these words, two prominent figures of the economic circles in Leipzig summarised the problem and brought to the fore a dimension of culture, which was widely overlooked by that time.

Until 1919, there was no Ministry of Culture that represented the Reich as a whole, but only a Cultural Department initially subject to the Ministry of the Interior. It was usually the Prussian Ministry of Culture that supported the cultural initiatives that had been undertaken abroad since the end of the nineteenth century, and not the Reich's Foreign Ministry.[204] In 1919, a section dedicated to cultural issues was set up at this Ministry. Nonetheless, the Cultural Section or Section VI, as it was also named, did not really operate until 1921, when the Ministry was reformed.[205] During the Weimar years, the Foreign Ministry financed a number of newly established institutions that aimed to support German science and culture abroad. The effort to retrieve Germany's lost greatness was focused on the campaign and promotion of its culture beyond its frontiers, because its military and economic power, which by that time were the Reich's main means of influence abroad, had collapsed. Germany's cultural political agenda had to be developed

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[203] October 1920, Leipzig, Ausarbeitung Dr. Gerh. Menz, Herr Selke. (Deren Vertretung an zustaendiger Stelle Herr Siegismund, der 2. Vorsteher des Boersenvereins, uebernommen hat.) to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, in: PAAA, R 64853.

[204] von TWARDOWSKI, Anfaenge der deutschen Kulturpolitik, p. 9.

[205] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

along two main lines: support of its people abroad and promotion and expansion of culture beyond its national borders. According to the Minister of Culture and Education, Carl-Heinrich Becker,

> "Cultural policy, as organisational strategy, should be sharply distinguished from culture, which must be freely developed. Modern democracy does not have a unified culture", he declared.
>
> "In democratic France, for example, cultural policy [is] not a mere instrument, but reflects the aim of a big policy." [206]

And he concluded that the state cultural policy does not involve abstract goals, but rather a mechanism by which these goals can be realised.[207]

In 1917, the "Institute for Germans Abroad" (*Deutsche Institut fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland*) was set up in Stuttgart. The initiative was taken by the Union for Commercial Geography in Wuerttemberg (*Wuerttembergischen Vereins fuer Handelsgeographie*), but it was planned to operate for public benefit with the support of the Ministry of Culture of Wuerttemberg. It was not a university institute but a central service for German minorities abroad, which provided them with the commercial and legal advice necessary for the industry, commerce and the Reich's economy, in general.[208] Among the institute's aims was to strengthen the national, cultural and intellectual ties of German Diaspora with their homeland, and to remain in close contact with the "Association for Germans Abroad" [*Verein fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland*]. In 1927, a new organisation with the same purpose was established under the name of "*Deutsche Stiftung*". During the first years of the Weimar Republic leading German personalities - intellectuals, economists, civil servants, press correspondents, artists and so forth-, who travelled abroad, were the country's first unofficial cultural delegates. Without being aware of the cultural and propagandistic importance of their travels, these people who were usually good judges of the local political, social, economic and cultural conditions, did not keep in contact with the German consuls or embassies, but acted alone and for their own personal interests. To control those private initiatives, highly important at that time for the country's foreign relations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded advance notice of such travels

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[206] Abstract of the Cultural Minister's speech, Dr. C.H. Becker, held on 2 March 1926 on "Kulturpolitik in der modemer Demokratie", in: PAAA, R 64853.

[207] *Ibid.*

[208] "*Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung*", 26.04.1925, Essen Dr. H. Jansen, Muenster i.W., in: Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), R 8088 / 733.

by the aforementioned people in order to give them guidelines for their visits abroad.[209] It was obvious that foreign cultural planning had become an urgent necessity.

Beginning in 1924, a number of organisations were created one after the other, giving a remarkable stimulus to the German scientific presence beyond its national borders. Besides the institutes that already existed in China, Argentina, Samoa, Naples and Rovigno, a systematic campaign for German culture was planned. This involved improving structured state organisations, which would henceforth comprise of all the fragmented or private cultural initiatives had been taken by that time. This ambitious plan for rescuing German culture and correcting the state's damaged image abroad, shaped anew the state's post-war science and educational policy, as well as its foreign policy agenda. One of the first attempts at cultural promotion by the young Republic was centred on its history and language. For this purpose, the "German Academy for the Promotion of the German Language" (*Deutsche Akademie zur Pflege der deutschen Sprache*) was established on 5 May 1925, to be superseded in 1932 by the Goethe Institute. It was inaugurated in Munich, being perhaps the most representative institution for the promotion of the German language and culture abroad. This initiative came from the University of Munich and found support from other universities in the region of Bavaria, as well as from industrial, commercial and banking circles, and various prominent figures of the region.[210] The aim of the Academy was to bring Germany's intellectual and economic forces together in order to promote and expand the appreciation of German culture world-wide.[211] Through numerous branches that were set up, from the Far East and Latin America to South Africa and the Balkans, the Academy co-ordinated large-scale cultural activities, always holding the spread of the language as its first priority.

By that time, Germany did not have a national representative institution for the promotion of its culture, as other big nations, like France, did. Despite the fact that the Academy was supported by private and regional funds, it did not seek to serve their interests but rather the interests of the entire nation. The idea of creating an institution of this kind had existed since 1850 and, more importantly, it was not based on any foreign model. King Maximilian II had planned, together with Leopold von Ranke, the estab-

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[209] Reichswirtschaftsminister, Ruelberg to the Verband Deutschen Hochschulen in Muenster i/Westfalen, 16.10.1923, in: BAB, R 8088/ 770.

[210] Undated document: Akademie zur wissenschaftlichen Erforschung und zur Pflege des Deutschtums. Deutsche Akademie. Einfuehrung in der Plan der Deutschen Akademie (Vertraulich!), in: BAB R 43 I/ 812.

[211] *Ibid.*

lishment of an institute with exactly the same name.[212] Yet, despite the German origins of the idea, the Germans themselves had little experience of running such an institution.[213] Unlike Germany, other states, like England, Italy and France, did have this experience, having established cultural institutions a long time before. These institutions were the official carriers not only of their national culture. Moreover, they were a vector of propaganda against Germany, as the Germans saw it, who to a certain extent, used their models to form its own Academy.[214] Its establishment was very carefully planned and in the early stages was kept confidential. It was very important for the new institution to receive support from all other academies, as well as from economic and other organisations. The first institution that responded to request for support was the Bavarian Academy of Science, which along with the Prussian Academy of Science, were the two excesivelly important cultural institutions in Germany. The "German Academy" was regared as a genuine and direct representation of the state's national life and culture and would serve to protect and promote these attributes. The advancement of what was described as the German nation's *intellectual* culture would be the first, direct undertaking of the Academy. However, the emphasis on German *material* culture had to be indirect and remain at the margins of the Academy's task.[215] In other words, the Academy was designed to develop close relations with commercial, industrial, technical and other similar organisations abroad and support their undertakings, because:

> " [...] Wherever abroad, the German language, German schools, German books, German music, and German art make their influence felt. There, would be fertile soil for the expansion of German material culture. [...] If material culture does not exert world influence nor have a world status, German intellectual culture will become poorer, because the material basis will be missing. Like intellect and flesh, body and soul, intellectual and material culture belong to each other in the German people's lives and work."[216]

This co-existence was translated into science-based 'thinking' and 'bargaining' (*Denken* und *Handeln*) for domestic and foreign policy-making and it became an integral part of Germany's education focus on the state's consciousness and communal feelings.[217] To

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[212] Undated document: Akademie zur wissenschaftlichen Erforschung und zur Pflege des Deutschtums. Deutsche Akademie. Einfuehrung in der Plan der Deutschen Akademie (Vertraulich!), in: BAB R 43 I/ 812.

[213] *Ibid*

[214] *Ibid*

[215] *Ibid.*

[216] *Ibid.*

[217] *Ibid.*

fulfil these requirements, the German Academy planned to use the following methods: continually train speakers to be sent to lecture abroad; organise foreign missions with German doctors; expand German books and daily newspapers; increase the number of German acquisitions in foreign libraries; create branches for the expansion of language (*Deutsche Schule*); organise language courses; disseminate German music, theatre, and fine art; support German clubs and unions abroad; participate in the expansion of German industry, handicrafts, technology and commerce, and so forth. In close collaboration with the administration of the state the Academy aspired to become a symbol for the Republic with the motto: "from the nation, through the nation, with the nation, for the nation!".[218]

Since late nineteenth century, Germany's higher education had proven to be the most effective means for large-scale cultural influence over other nations. In 1900, the German Reich was the "uncontested Mecca" for foreign students who streamed in, from all over the world, to the German 'temples of knowledge'.[219] In 1899, the foreign students in German universities numbered 6,284. The equivalent figures for France in 1900 (1,770) and for the United States in 1904 (2,673) clearly show the student traffic to Germany at this time was of a different magnitude [See: *Table 3*]. The majority of foreign students at German universities in 1892, were Americans, accounting for 22% of the total number of foreigners. This figure, however, was dramatically decreased to 0.7% by 1924 [See: *Table 5*].

Table 3.[220]

Country	Number of foreign students in the year:		
	1899	*1900*	*1904*
Germany	6284		
France		1770	
The United States			2673

[218] *Ibid.*

[219] Protokoll der vom "Verband der Deutschen Hochschulen" einberufenen Besprechung ueber die Fragen der Foerderung der Auslandsbeziehungen und Auslandsbestrebungen der deutschen Hochschulen. Berlin, 9.11.1926. Spoke: Assessor Dr. Schairer (Wirtschaftshilfe der Deutschen Studentenschaft), p. 3. In: BAB, R 8088/796.

[220] *Ibid.*

Table 4.[221]

Country	Foreign students in 1926	
United States	10000	
France	9000	
Germany	8000	2500 (German speaking foreigners) 5500 (non German speaking foreigners)
England	5000	
Czechoslovakia	5000	

Table 5.[222]

	1892	*1924*
American students at German Universities	22%	0,7%

The number of students who had previously preferred Germany for their higher education were now attracted by France, which intensified its cultural propaganda at the expense of Germany. Paris, which in 1927 attracted four thousand foreign students, had already built student houses for each nation that had sent its promising young scholars to France. Plans were already well in hand to build new student residences for Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, Scandinavia, and Chile.[223] Scientific investigation was in particular danger and, with it, all scientific, artistic and technical forces of the state that depended on research. German production was, in consequence, cut back and this domino effect of these cuts, as many Germans argued, entailed an unsettling of the "ideal and technical foundations" of their culture.[224] This and Germany's desire to regain its lost "place in the sun" on the international political stage was exactly what was at stake.

An effective medium that Germany had used to regain the large numbers of foreign students that it had had once before, and also to attract professors, researchers, scientists and intellectuals to its universities and laboratories, was to grant them scholarships. In fact, this was not a new or innovative strategy. Foreign students in Germany had already been accommodated with discounted fees, awards, and the like, which by

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221 *Ibid.*

222 *Ibid.*

223 Der Vorsitzender des Verbandes der Deutschen Hochschulen Kiel an den Rektoren des angeschl. Hochschulen, on 04.02.1927, in: BAB, R 8088/ 800.

224 Reichstag I. Wahlperiode. Interpellation, Berlin 16 October 1922. Nr. 5052 in: PAAA, R 65519.

that time had a more charitable than cultural-political character.[225] In addition, the profile of the foreign students who visited the country's universities was almost unknown.

> "We hardly know anything about them, exept their name, their country of origin and their educational background. [...] Their personality only occasionally becomes better known",

reported the government's advisor, Professor W. Franz, to the Minister of Education, in 1924.[226] What was new though, was the careful restructuring of the old grant-policy. This new policy suggested sponsorship for foreigners who were very gifted and favourably disposed towards Germany.[227] It was believed that those people could stand Germany in good stead on political and economic plane, as soon as they returned to their homelands. Nonetheless, this elite selection of foreigners was hindered by the limited budget available due to recession. In order for Germany to benefit from the students to whom scholarships were granted, Prof. Franz suggested that each university provide tutors for foreign students (*Auslandskuratoren*), each tutor taking a specific group of countries. Their role would be to supervise the payment of the grants, help them with their studies, and also introduce them to the German culture. The tutors would regularly report to the university's administration. It was very important for the tutors to stay in close contact with the students in their care, even after they had returned to their homelands.[228] That particularly applied to technical experts and business graduates. These groups of students would become familiar with production areas in Germany, making it more likely that they would develop business contacts with those sectors, thus supporting German industry.[229] It was very well-known that many foreign students, who were grateful for their education in Germany, were at the disposal of their tutors, who had advised and supported them for many years. What had been introduced by Prof. Frank was a kind of network among the students, their universities and professors, and particular economic sectors in Germany. Prof. Frank's suggestion justified the belief that "cultural politics

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[225] Confidential letter of Excellency Wrkl. Geh.Rat Herrn Dr. Willy von Dirksen from D. (?) on 21.03.1925, in: PAAA, R 64794.

[226] Prof. W. Franz, Geheimer Regierungsrat to the Reichsminister f. Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung on 12.07.1924, in: PAAA, R 64795.

[227] Confidential letter Excellency Wrkl. Geh.Rat Herrn Dr. Willy von Dirksen from D. (?) at 21.03.1925, in: PAAA, R 64794.

[228] Prof. W. Franz, Geheimer Regierungsrat to the Minister f. Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung,on 12.07.1924, in: PAAA, R 64795.

[229] *Ibid.*

pave the way for foreign policy and trade policy".[230] The only institution that could and should take over the grant-project, was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its previous experience in the area was the most important credential for that choice. Nonetheless, it was very important for the role of the Ministry to be kept secret, giving the impression that the whole undertaking was initiated by private citizens. In this way, Germany would not fall foul of the Versailles Treaty and would not breach the provisions that prevented the country from signing any bilateral contracts.

The first organisation to provide foreign students and university teachers with grants was the "*Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung*", the oldest German institution of its kind, which founded in 1861 as a private initiative.[231] In 1925, with significant support from the Foreign Ministry, it was re-established as a public corporation.[232] There were two main reasons why the foundation encouraged foreigners to study at German universities: first, those students who benefited (even a brief period) from the German education system, would, in the future, build bridges between their homelands and Germany. Second, they hoped to counteract student-propaganda from other countries.[233] The allocation of grants to several German Universities and Technical Schools for foreign students was "the most important cultural undertaking" the Cultural Section had ever embarked on.[234] In 1927, the German Academic Office for Foreigners [*Deutsche Akademische Auslandsstelle* (DAASt)] was created from the pre-existing Union of German Universities (*Verband Deutscher Hochschulen*). This service, located in Dresden, encouraged the establishment of similar offices for foreigners at all German Universities. The task of these services was to advise foreign students on their studies and any problems that might arise during their stay in Germany. Moreover, their task was to encourage foreign students to socialise and integrate into German student circles, and, above all, to introduce them to German culture. In the beginning, only eighty foreigners were granted yearly scholarships of 1,500

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230 Report on the first meeting of the Academic Service for Foreigners [Ueber die erste Tagung der Akademischen Auslandsstellen (AKA)], on 14-16.03.1931, Berlin, in: Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), ZSg. 137/ 16.

231 DÜWELL, Deutschlands Auswaertige Kulturpolitik, p. 171.

232 Confidential letter of the Ministry Director Friedrich Heilbron to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AA), on 16.05.1925, in: PAAA, R 64794.

233 Runderlass von Schubert an saemtliche Deutsche Missionen und Berufskonsularbehoerden im Auslande, 03.07.1925, in: PAAA, R 64794.

234 H.R.Poppe to Herrn Dirigenten on 23.06.1925, in: PAAA, R 64794.

Marks, but by 1930, over three hundred students from forty-seven countries received an *Alexander von Humboldt* grant.[235]

If attracting foreign students to German Universities was vital for the new Republic's foreign cultural policy, the presence of German students at foreign universities was just as important. In the case of the former, it was hoped that students would carry German culture and science back with them, when they returned to their homelands. Consequently, they were expected to influence the political and economic circles of their own countries in favour of German interests. In the case of the latter, most important was the fact that German students abroad were one of the few points of contact the country had with the international scientific community. The experience of foreign academic life, the advancement of research, scientific achievements, and in short, the new knowledge on the international scientific community, from which Germany was shut out, could to some extent become accessible through its students abroad. In 1925, in order to promote the exchange of knowledge, professors and students of Heidelberg University decided to establish an institution that could fund the exchange of their own scholars with those from foreign universities.[236] This initiative was also supported by the Prussian Cultural Minister, Carl Becker. The "Academic Exchange Service" ("*Akademische Austauschdienst*"), as it was renamed in 1929, merged with the *Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung*. Soon, all German universities, following Heidelberg's example, set up branches of the above service. With Germany's admission to the League of Nations in 1926, the activities of the Academic Exchange Service were intensified and branches were opened in many foreign countries. Among the tasks at these branches was the selection of local students for grant assistance. It should be underlined that one of the most important criteria for the selection of candidates was the social position of their families. Candidates of "good descent", i.e. of prominent and powerful families, were more likely to become the future members of the elite of their own countries. Therefore, being favourably disposed towards the country that contributed to their education, they were expected to become

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[235] Bulgaria was first on the list with 43 bursars, following by USA with 21, Turkey with 18 and Hungary with 16 bursars. All figures cited in: DÜWELL, Deutschlands Auswaertige Kulturpolitik, p. 171.

[236] Undated document "Akademischer Austauschdienst. Deutsche Vereinigung fuer staatswissenschaftlichen Studentenaustauch e.V.", in: PAAA, R 64794. In 1923, was created the "Deutsche Vereinigung fuer staatswissenschaftlichen Studentenaustausch e.V." in Heidelberg, which was the early form of that created in 1925. See: DÜWELL, Deutschlands Auswaertige Kulturpolitik, p. 175.

Germany's solid political and economic partners.[237] Consequently, the criteria for the allocation of scholarships to foreign students seemed to be more socio-political than academic.

The Republic initially concentrated its efforts on the United States of America, with which it had been engaged in close scientific collaboration since 1850. Among the country's priorities was to revive the exchange program for professors, which had been in existance since 1905. By 1925, soon after the Academic Exchange Service was established, twelve to fifteen German students were selected to be sent to America, the contemporary Mecca of science in many disciplines.[238] Despite the fact that, at this time, Germany could not find enough money for American students who wanted to study at its own universities, German students in America received great support. For a number of reasons, German engineers, technicians (*Techniker*) and doctors were among the most favoured scientists who were to visit foreign universities as exchange students. Before the war, German technical specialists and engineers abroad had enjoyed great respect, comparing to their foreign colleagues, because of their good education and wide training experience.[239] English and American companies engaged in projects outside their own countries preferred to work with German technicians rather than with local scientists. Yet, this changed after the war, and induced the following problems: the war experience gave foreign engineers precedence over their German colleagues who were establishing a career outside their country, affecting Germany's technical competitiveness abroad. In addition, the state's impotence to support almost any building or technical project in Germany created unemployment in the field, discouraging many engineers from return to their homeland. Moreover, there was a fear that the country's best engineers and technicians would be forced, on these grounds, to leave their country and look for a job abroad. Thus, the Republic would be left stripped of its best graduates who were absolutely essential for its reconstruction. Another serious problem was the decline in the quality of training in German technical universities, which were also affected by the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. Germany had to intensify projects that persuaded stu-

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[237] Confidential letter of D. (?) to Wrkl. Geh.Rat Herrn Dr. Willy von Dirksen, on 21.03.1925, in: PAAA, R 64794. See also: Report of Prof. W. Franz, Geheimer Regierungsrat to the Minister f. Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung, on 12.07.1924, in: PAAA, R 64795.

[238] Dr. R. Schlubach (Hamburg) to the German Foreign Ministry on 26.05.1925, in: PAAA, R 64794.

[239] Undated reports written by A. A. Schubert, Geheimer Baurat, regarding 1) Ausbildung von Auslandsingenieuren 2) Betreuung der auslaendischen Studierenden an den deutschen Hochschulen., in: PAAA, R 64794.

dents, scientists and intellectuals to travel abroad and to motivate them to experience foreign academic and research environments, but above all to attract as many foreigners as possible to its own educational institutions. In 1931, the three biggest institutions for the support of scientific exchange, i.e. the "Alexander vom Humboldt-Stiftung", the "Academic Exchange Service" (*Akademische Austauschdienst*), and the "German Academic Office for Foreigners" (*Deutsche Akademische Auslandsstelle* (DAASt) joined hands and began to operate under the name of the "German Academic Exchange Service" (*Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst* DAAD), and in close collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[240]

One might notice that a great number of systematic initiatives for the support of German science and culture came into existence and flourished in the mid 1920s. This was no coincidence, but rather due to the increased number of voices coming from scientists from all over the world the Allies to lift the sanctions the peace agreement had imposed on Germany. Gradually, the Weimar Republic acquired greater latitude for manoeuvre and the Allies seemed to be more tolerant towards Germany's struggle for international communication.

[240] This organisation survives until today and still is Germany's largest scholarhip institution.

2.4. The "Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaften."

> "Ernst und dunkel wie ein Rembrandtbild liegt die Zukunft der deutschen Wissenschaft vor uns. Aber inmitten der dunkel Farbenmassen flutet jene Helle koestlichsten seelischen Lichtes, das den schier unerschoepflichen Tiefen des deutschen Idealismus entstammt." [241]

Germany's achievements in chemistry and its advances in chemical warfare notwithstanding, in the years following the Great War the country found itself behind the big nations, in particular the United States, in disciplines where German science had been a leading power before the outbreak of hostilities. Among those disciplines was plant breeding (*Pflanzenernaehrung*), in which Germany's backwardness after the war was particularly evident. The development of this science demanded an interdisciplinary research that should have also included the theoretical fields of agronomy, physical chemistry, and physiological chemistry (*physiologische Chemie*). Research on plant breeding focused on the knowledge of elements like ground mineral salts, which is necessary for the rapid development of green plants. One of the most serious problems scientists had to deal with were what quantity of elements each species of cultivated plant needed. The specification of the external and internal factors, i.e. climatic conditions, micro-fauna and flora of the soil, plant physiology and so on, which affected the maintenance and absorption of the nutritional elements, was also an important research question. The solution of these problems would allow large-scale cultivation, which was difficult at that time. Moreover, the systematic use of fertilisers would boost the chemical industry, inaugurating a new era in German agriculture and improving its economic position.

At the beginning of 1920, the Germans realised that their country's economic plight seriously threatened scientific research and, in a broader sense, their culture. Germany's decline would not only mean the tarnishing of its image abroad and its intellectual influence upon other states, but also the downgrading of German education, which threatened with provincialism. Science and technology was regarded as the all-important instrument to remedy the country's deficiencies. Fritz Haber emphasised the role science had to play in reviving Germany's intellectual and economic pre-eminence:

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[241] "Grave and dark, like a Rembrandt picture, appears the future before us. But, amid the darkness of colours, it suffuses with bright, endearing spiritual light that comes from the pure, perennial depths of the German Idealism", in: *Akademische Nachrichten*, V. Jahrgang, Nummer 9, 01.12.1923, (Leipzig), in: PAAA, R 65520. Translation is mine.

"The destruction of our country as a great political power will remain what it is today: a reminder of our existence as a people depends on the maintenance of our great intellectual strong position, which is inseparable from our scientific enterprise."[242]

Similarly, Adolf von Harnack called science "the absolutely essential and necessary pillar of culture", to which the "conquest of nature" and "the conquest of humanity" belong.[243] These two forces had to be built up in harmony, making both natural sciences and humanities inseparable elements of German culture.[244] Consequently, the creation of a single national institution that would support German science became a priority. The idea was that the new institution would sponsor all German universities, academies, libraries, and research institutes. Scholarships would be given to every young promising scientist who could potentially contribute to the advancement of science and the country's prosperity. Nonetheless, the relationship between science and culture was not the only motivation behind the creation of a new funding organisation, but also was the alliance between science and the economy. Hence, the arguments regarding the promotion of natural sciences, technology, and medicine rather than literature, archaeology and the similar disciplines, were more evident and much stronger.

The Kaiser Wilhelm institutes, which by that time had advanced research in natural sciences with extraordinary success, were also affected by the economic and financial crisis that succeeded the war. Difficulty in supplying experimental material caused serious problems for the normal running of some institutes, like the institutes for physical chemistry and electrochemistry, biology and experimental therapy, which were threatened with paralysing.[245] The money the Society was receiving from industrial and trade circles had proven inadequate and additional support for the survival of the country's most important research centre was as essential as ever. It was not a coincidence, therefore, that the same figures that played a leading part in the establishment of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society were also engaged in the creation of the new supporting organisation. The Prussian Minister of Education, Friedrich Schmidt-Ott, the State Secretary, Carl-Heinrich Becker, the physicist and assistant at the Prussian Educational Ministry, Hugo Andreas Kruess, the secretary of the Prussian Academy, Max Planck, and Fritz Haber

[242] Haber's announcement of the founding of the Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaften, cited in: MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika. p. 33.

[243] Adolf von Harnack, "Wissenschaft und Kultur", Parlamentarische Abend on 23 November 1920, cited in: NOTKER HAMMERSTEIN, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten Reich. Wissenschaftspolitik in Republik und Diktatur 1920-1945. Muenchen 1999, p. 52.

[244] *Ibid.*, pp. 52 f.

[245] "Bericht ueber Finanzlage der KWG, 3 Dez. 1923", cited in: MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 32.

dreas Kruess, the secretary of the Prussian Academy, Max Planck, and Fritz Haber had frequent informal meetings between 1919 and 1920 on the formation of an organisation that could rescue German science. Although Adolf von Harnack was, once again, the person who used his influence to bring together figures from state, science, and industry, Fritz Haber was the spiritual founder of the new organisation.

By the end of 1916, Haber had set forth the idea of a new scientific foundation, the "Kaiser Wilhelm Foundation for War Technical Science" (*"Kaiser Wilhelm Stiftung fuer kriegstechnische Wissenschaft"*). The money for its support came from the profits a German Company for gas lamps was making from the manufacture of gas masks. The "Kaiser Wilhelm Foundation" aimed at the systematic promotion of scientific and technical research at Universities, so that "a rationalised relationship between the military and German science" could be established in times of both war and peace, argued Haber amidst the war.[246] Few years later, in peacetime, he suggested a purely civilian organisation that would foster research in all disciplines of universities and other institutions. He emphasised that Germany's "technical and natural science-orientated education should not be deprived of the humanities' weft".[247] Moreover, an education of that kind, stripped of the humanities' culture, would be confined to specialisation, which was poor in idealism.[248]

Taking into account the war experience, when he was at the helm of the most important research institute of the time in Germany the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry, Haber proposed a self-governing corporation of science, financed by the state and private capital. Nonetheless, his proposal met with opposition from some industrialists, like Carl Duisberg, who tried to hinder the relations of the new organisation with industrial capital by setting up competitive 'counter organisations'.[249] Despite the fact that the money would come from the state and some private enterprises, the new scientific organisation had to be independent. As had happened with the Kaiser Wilhelm Society almost a decade before, the choice of projects and scientists had to be made on the basis

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[246] Cited in: MARGIT SZOELLOESI-JANZE, "Der Wissenschaftler als Experte. Kooperationsverhaeltnisse von Staat, Militaer, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft, 1914-1933", in: DORIS KAUFMANN (Hsg.) Geschichte der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus. Bestandaufnahme und Perspektive der Forschung. Goettingen 2005, pp. 46-64, here p. 55.

[247] Cited in: HAMMERSTEIN, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, p. 42.

[248] *Ibid.*, pp. 42, 54.

[249] SZOELLOESI-JANZE, "Der Wissenschaftler als Experte" pp. 55 f.; HAMMERSTEIN, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, pp. 54 f.; WINFRIED SCHULZE, Der Stifterverband fuer die Deutsche Wissenschaft 1920-1995. Berlin 1995, pp. 76 ff.

of the country's needs and not on the special interests of some authority or personality.[250] In addition, "Harnack Principle" of scientific freedom, which marked Germany's most important and prestigious research organisation in 1911, would also place its stamp on the new scientific organisation.

On 30 October 1920, the German Academies of Sciences together with universities, technical universities, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, the Organisation of Technological Unions, and the Union of German Natural Scientists and Doctors established the much-desired organisation under the name of "Emergency Association for the German Science" ("*Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaften*"). After its establishment, the agricultural and veterinary schools, as well as the Academies for Forestry became members of the *Notgemeinschaft*. Its aim was to prevent the increasing danger that German science would collapse.[251] In it, Fritz Haber finally saw his vision fulfilled "in peace times". Being one of the instigators of the new funding organisation, he suggested that Friedrich Schmitt-Ott co-ordinate the organisation. Schmitt-Ott was eventually appointed president of the organisation, while Haber together with Adolf von Harnack and the mathematician Walter von Dyck were elected vice-presidents.

The main supporters of the *Notgemeinschaft* were the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance, which by June 1920, had put up a sum of twenty million Marks.[252] Considerable contributions was also made by the Union of German Bankers, the industrial and agricultural associations, the unions of small and wholesale merchants, and some germanophile organisations abroad. Combined, they collected the sum of 47 million marks by July 1921.[253] The yearly budget was estimated at 2,4 million marks, half of

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[250] Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft. Denkschriften (Korrekturabzuege) zur Mitgliederversammlung am 12 Maerz 1926, Muenchen. (Als Handschrift gedrueckt! Vertraulich!) Preamble by F. Schmidt-Ott, in: PAAA, R 65522.

[251] "Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31. Maerz 1922", p. 5, in: PAAA, R 65519.

[252] "Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31. Maerz 1922", p. 6, in: PAAA, R 65519. Another source reports that the initial amount of money came to 2.6 million golden Marks. *Akademische Nachrichten*, V. Jahrgang, Nummer 9, 01.12.1923, (Leipzig), in: PAAA, R 65520.

[253] By 31 March 1922, the amount of money from abroad came to 3,260,143 Marks, let alone the two million Marks the Japan Foundation, Hoshi, offered for chemical research. "Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31. Maerz 1922", pp. 6 ff, 33, in: PAAA, R 65519.

which would be allocated to libraries, Technical Universities and Forest Academies.[254] The *Notgemeinschaft* would also cover printing costs for books and journals, expenses for foreign scientific literature, laboratory infrastructure, experimental material, and expenses for expeditions. Humanities received about 30% of the total budget, while medicine and natural sciences were allocated 50%. The equivalent figure for technical sciences and engineering was 12%. The remaining 8% was allocated to various undertakings and agricultural research.[255] Additionally, an important initiative that was taken against Germany's exclusion from the international scientific community was the establishment of the "*Reichszentrale fuer wissenschaftliche Berichterstattung*", a national office for scientific documentation. It was founded in 1920, supported by the Ministry of the Interior and administrated by the Prussian Academy of Sciences. Under the direction of Dr. Karl Kerkhof, the author of some of the most spirited essays about "the war against German science",[256] the *Reichszentrale* used photocopying technology to became a clearing house for foreign scientific periodicals. In 1923, it supplied German libraries with 6,440 reproductions, and by 1929 the figure rose to over 100,000, which the *Notgemeinschaft* funded with 90,000 marks.[257]

If the scientific embargo deprived German scientists of the knowledge of scientific ctivity abroad, the international scientific community also remained in the dark about what had been going on inside Germany. Karl Kerkhof, realising the cultural and political importance of the dissemination of German scientific and technical achievements abroad, launched, in 1925, the periodical "*Forschung und Fortschritte*". This journal became the official organ of the *Notgemeinschaft* and, in 1927, was first published in Spanish, in an attempt to reach a wider public. Apart from its scientific contributions, the periodical also had a political mission. It informed German scholars about the scientific boycott and gave them guidelines in case they were invited to represent the country in interna-

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254 "Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31. Maerz 1922", p. 8, in: PAAA, R 65519.

255 HAMMERSTEIN, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, p. 64.

256 KARL KERKHOF, Der Krieg gegen die deutsche Wissenschaft. Eine Zusammenstellung von Kongressberichten und Zeitungsmeldungen. Wittemberg 1922; *Ibid.*, Internationale wissenschaftliche Kongresse 1922-1923. Berlin 1923; *Ibid.*, "Die internationalen naturwissenschaftlichen Organisationen vor und nach dem Weltkriege und die Deutsche Wissenschaft", in: *Internationale Monatsschrift*, XV, 3, (Jan.-Feb. 1921), pp. 225-242; *Ibid.*, "Das Versailles Diktat und die deutsche Wissenschaft", in: *Monatshefte fuer Auswaertige Politik*, VII, 11 (Nov. 1940), pp. 836-850.

257 SPENCE RICHARDS, "The Movement of Scientific Knowledge", p. 404; HAMMERSTEIN, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, pp. 69 f.

tional congresses or other scientific undertakings abroad. Gradually, the journal was transformed from a pure scientific instrument into a cultural propaganda publication. This anti-boycott initiative not only enforced the national character of German science policy, but also instigated nationalist, anti-western, and even vindictive feelings.[258]

Most of the research projects the *Notgemeinschaft* supported were proposed by scientists rather than institutes. Large-scale projects that demanded contributions from scientists of different disciplines were limited to expeditions on the Atlantic (1925-27), Greenland (1930-31), and the Russian mountains on the borders with Afghanistan and China.[259] These expeditions also had an obvious cultural-political aim, not only internationally championing Germany's achievements, but also giving the country the chance to collaborate with other scientific communities, for instance the Russian, and braking the fetters of the country's isolation. Nonetheless, what really determined the direction of Germany's science policy and the promotion of some disciplines over others, was the country's concern about economic recovery and the welfare of its people. The Kaiser Wilhelm Society and the *Notgemeinschaft* were the chief constitutional elements of the German scientific reform, complementing and supporting one another. The Society was the major vehicle for the advancement of German scientific research, while the *Notgemeinschaft* was its financial supporter. In its first report of 1922, it announced immediate support in five major disciplines: chemistry, physics, technology, medicine, and biology.[260] Chemistry was at the top of Germany's priorities and research on enzymes, as well as on the constitution of cellulose, vitamins, chemical radicals, and colloid chemistry was to be generously financed. In physics, priority was given to research on problems of relative and quantum theory, on particles and their movement, and on radiation. Scientists had to be provided with requisite apparati and other materials and to be financed with

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[258] *Ibid.*, pp. 70 f.; See also: BRIGITTE SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, "Internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehungen und auswaertige Kulturpolitik 1919-1933. Vom Boykott und Gegen-Boykott zu ihrer Wiederaufnahme", in: RUDOLF VIERHAUS, BERNHARD VOM BROCKE (Hg.), Forschung im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Gesellaschaft. Geschichte und Struktur der Kaiser-Wilhelm-/Max-Planck-Gesellschaft. Stuttgart 1990, pp. 858-885.

[259] HAMMERSTEIN, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, pp. 74 f. On the German expedition to the Atlantic Sea with the legendary ship "Meteor", see the relevant publication in: PAAA, R 65521.

[260] "Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31.Maerz 1922", pp. 38 f., in: PAAA, R 65519.

considerable sums, if German physics were to match the achievements made in the field abroad and to resurrect the old glory of its Nobel-prize laureates again.[261]

The *Notgemeinschaft* would also sponsor technological research despite its financing by industry, on the grounds that extensive and inter-disciplinary projects needed expensive apparatus and techniques to make progress, equipment that industry alone could not provide. Medicine was a discipline of particular importance, with a large number of projects conducted in related fields, like pharmacology and biology. The *Notgemeinschaft* provided enough funds not only for the absolutely necessary supply of test materials, but also for the projects on theoretical medicine, physiology, pathology, experimental therapy and pharmacology. Some of these projects focused on nutrition, albumen and carbohydrates –the fundamental elements of life- and on the biological effects of radiation. Last but not least, biological research, which was particularly poor in German institutes at that time, was also among the state's priorities. The investigation of evolutionary mechanics, plant and animal-heredity, fertilisers and questions on cultivated plants, as well as on primitive and wild forms of plants were eagerly supported by the *Notgemeinschaft*. In 1926, the institution financed projects on metal research, applied geophysics, geology, the properties of electrical currents and atmospheric research, in addition to existing projects on theoretical and practical medicine –like cancer and tuberculosis-, applied entomology and agriculture. The latter together with all the related fields, of biology, botany, entomology, zoology, and, to a certain extent, medicine, had great importance for Germany's foreign policy agenda. Scientific missions, particularly to Asia, Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans for studying the indigenous fauna and flora to launch improvements in German agriculture, as well as research excursions for the fight against tropical diseases, resulted in the gradual development of scientific collaboration between Germany and other countries. Needless to say, economic and political interests were concealed behind this collaboration, which later in the Nazi years, was transformed from a co-operative scientific interchange into an aggressive territorial expansion in the name of the state's self-sufficiency.

An additional priority in the framework of Germany's new science policy was research on vitamins A and B. The need for vitamins for the nation's nutrition was intensified as soon as trade ground to a halt in the war years, thereby blocking sources of foods

261 "Bericht der Notgemeinschaft", *ibid.*

rich in these vitamins and trace minerals, such as milk.[262] At first, it was German industry that undertook and sponsored projects on vitamins A and B. The measurement of vitamin content in basic food from the German diet was essential for the state's agriculture. In addition, proteins, albumin, and fat were also a significant part of agricultural research in order to develop the country's rural economy. Albumin, for example, was a very expensive yet basic food element, which the human body could absorb almost exclusively from animal products. Therefore, the quality of cattle-feed, also rich in proteins, had to be very high, making cattle-breeding after the war a particularly expensive task. To tackle this problem, scientists suggested to shift focus from animal rearing to attempting to create cheap synthetic albumin.[263] To develop this and other similar projects in practice demanded close collaboration among scientists of different disciplines, if not from different countries. Plant physiologists and agricultural chemists from various national institutes, who were ahead on practical issues, had to work together and find a way to deal with these new rural problems. Moreover, contact with research stations and institutes abroad, in particular with those in the United States and Russia, were needed more urgently now than ever.[264]

Germany's admiration for American science existed since the beginning of the 20th century. Its advancements in almost every field of life sciences made the United States a model for Germany's research policy, and even more so with the foundation of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. It was no surprise, therefore, that on the other side of the Atlantic, close co-operation between plant physiologists and agricultural chemists had already been established. Again, America became Germany's model for the creation of agricultural research stations staffed with plant physiologists, who, by that time, were absent from the German research centres. Although Germany sought to create research institutes inside its borders, the possibility of setting up branches abroad was not excluded. This plan was to be put systematically in place after Hitler's assumption of power. Meanwhile, the Zoological Station in Naples, the Institute for Marine Biology in Rovigno, and the Biological Station in Lunz, in southern Austria, were the only stations outside the country that contributed to German agricultural and biological research.

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[262] Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft. Denkschriften (Korrekturabzuege) zur Mitgliederversammlung am 12 Maerz 1926, Muenchen. (Als Handschrift gedrueckt! Vertraulich!) Preamble by F. Schmidt-Ott, p. VII 4, in: PAAA, R 65522.

[263] Denkschriften der Notgemeinschaft, am 12 Maerz 1926, *ibid.*, p. VIII 3, in: PAAA, R 65522.

[264] *Ibid.*, p. X 3.

If America was the western model for modernising German research policy, in the east it was the Soviet Union, and in particular Ukraine, holding the huge grain reservoir that could provide material for advanced research. Moreover, Russia housed the institute of the prominent soviet geneticist, Nikolai Ivanovic Vavilov, which boasted the richest and most exquisite collections of wild and primitive forms of plant life in the world. Vavilov's experiments for the detection of the characteristics of plants on varrying terrains and temperature conditions were vital for German agriculture.[265]

In order to meet the new requirements in research, as described above, and to cope with the problem of scientific movement, communication and co-operation, the Republic had to modify its research policy along the following lines: support the existing research institutes, create new ones, foster new scientific disciplines, and strengthen its international relations. The *Notgemeinschaft* was called upon for contributions to this planning. Among the first projects funded by the institution was research on malaria, as well as on mosquitoes and other insects of importance for tropical medicine, located largely in the Balkan region. The Institute for Ship and Tropical Diseases in Hamburg was at the helm of most of those projects, organising expeditions which had scientific, as well as cultural political character to better serve Germany's foreign relations.[266]

Nonetheless, the lack of money was not always easily surmounted. In 1926, the money that all the new institutes needed in order to purchase only the absolute minimum of apparati amounted to 20,000 marks, while the state could only contribute 1,500 marks per year.[267] The state's inability to pay the subscriptions of important journals for institute libraries, like the American periodicals *Journal of Agricultural Research*, *Phytopathologist*, and *Soil Science*, as well as research reports of the most significant American scientific centres made it difficult to find these publications in Germany at all. In 1930, the *Notgemeinschaft* decided to cut funds for interdisciplinary projects and to reduce the number of research grants, employing strict criteria instead of supporting every research proposal, as it had declared in its founding statutes. Excavations, expeditions and library acquisitions were

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[265] UTE DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler. Portraet einer Wissenschaft im NS-Staat. Frankfurt a.M., 1995, pp.152 ff; SUSANNE HEIM, "Forschung fuer die Autarkie. Agrarwissenschaft an Kaiser-Wilhelm-Instituten im Nationalsozialismus", in: *Ibid*, (Hg.), Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus, Goettingen 2002, pp. 145-177, here p. 159. See also chapter 6.1. of the present work.

[266] See chapter 3.3.

[267] Denkschriften der Notgemeinschaft, am 12 Maerz 1926, *ibid.*, p. X 4, in: PAAA, R 65522.

to be financed with less money and the support of new plans was out of the question.[268] The *Notgemeinschaft* was, and continued to be in all the years of its existence, an integral part of Germany's cultural political agenda remaining an independent and self-administrative scientific organisation. The advancement of science after the World War II became a *Machtersatz*, a power-substitute, for the loss of war and for the loss of a great political power status.[269]

[268] HAMMERSTEIN, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, p. 84.

[269] PAUL FORMAN, "Scientific Internationalism and the Weimar physicists: the ideology and its manipulation in Germany after World War I.", in: *Isis* 64 (1973), pp. 151-180, here 161 ff.

2.5. German science and international relations

Given that the Peace Treaty left very little -if any- space for Germany to develop bilateral, let alone international relations, one might ask, how did German scientific institutions manage to develop their relations with other countries and what kind of relations were they? Was it a matter of preventing German science and research from becoming provincial and rescuing them from certain decline, or was there a concept of scientific internationalism behind this effort that involved interests other than scientific?

The political and economic aftermath of the Great War forced the German Republic to develop foreign relations with two dimensions: to maintain the international prestige and influence Germany had before the war and to recover economically. The Peace Treaty seemed to have trapped the country within its own boundaries. However, this was not exactly the case. Countries that remained neutral during the war became the Republic's first foreign partners in science and commerce after the war. The "danger" of developing relations with those states was already predicted by Emile Picard, one of the "big five" men of the International Research Council. At a conference of the Interallied Academies of Sciences on 27 November 1918 in Paris, the French delegate suggested closing these "small doors" which allowed Germany to enter into international interests, by leaving the neutral states out of the International Research Council.[270] However, there were certain misgivings by some British delegates about the effectiveness of the measure suggested by Picard. They believed it was most likely to have the opposite effect, "throwing the neutrals into the arms of Germany".[271] Among those countries that were finally accepted in the Research Council by the summer of 1918, were Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain, all retaining friendly relations with Germany.[272] They also were one of Germany's main sources of bibliographical acquisitions. Switzerland, for instance, donated a collection of Swiss scientific books to Germany, bought with money raised by former Swiss students who had studied in German and Austrian universities. The initiative was undertaken by the rectors of the universities of Basle, Bern, Zurich, as well as of the technical universities and the director of the

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[270] BRIGITTE SHROEDER-GUDEHUS: "Challenge to Transnational Loyalties: International Scientific Organisations after the First World War", in: *Science Studies* 3 (1973), pp. 93-118, here, pp. 96 f.

[271] *Ibid.* p. 97. footnote.

[272] *Ibid.*

central library of Zurich.[273] Apart from Switzerland, Nordic states also contributed to German acquisitions. The libraries of scientific institutions in Hamburg, for example, which suffered severely from the lack of foreign journals, particularly on research, managed to acquire about 137 periodicals from those and other countries by 1923. The project of enriching the German libraries was generously supported not only by the *Notgemeinschaft*, as it is mentioned above, but also by a number of foreign organisations like the Swedish Aid Organisation, the Royal Scientific Society in Denmark, the Association of Foreign Scientific Acquisitions based in The Hague, and the "Germanistic Society of America" in New York.[274] The latter donated about 133 of the newest American medical works to both the State Library and to the library of Berlin University.[275] Surprisingly enough, it was not only the neutral states that supported the young Republic. Some big nations, like the US, Canada and Japan became warm and generous sponsors of German science. This stance was not only due to the distinguished record the country continued to have in science, but also to the enormous efforts made by Germans living abroad to influence authorities in their adoptive countries.

In its early days, the *Notgemeinschaft* acquired through personal contact with Dr. Lieber, the former president of the Central Relief Committee (CRF) based in the United States, financial support for its organisational needs.[276] The New Order Committee, subject to the CRF, sponsored the *Notgemeinschaft* with 1,075,000 marks in 1921.[277] Perhaps the most ambitious plan the *Notgemeinschaft* had at that time, was to establish exchange agreements with Italian libraries, such as the *Bibliotheca Herziana*.[278] Furthermore, one of the most important institutions of external help was the Emergency Society for German and Austrian Science and Art, based in New York. Under the directorship of a German professor at Columbia University, Franz Boas, it was developed into an organisation

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[273] "Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31. Maerz 1922", pp. 32 f, in: PAAA, R 65519. See also: "Dritter Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft" from 01.04.1923 to 31.03.1924, in: PAAA, R 65520, and in R 65521.

[274] *Berliner Tageblatt* 99, 28.02.1923, in: PAAA, R 65519.

[275] *Ibid.*

[276] "Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31. Maerz 1922", pp. 32-33, in: PAAA, R 65519.

[277] *Ibid*

[278] GEORG SCHREIBER, Die Not der deutschen Wissenschaft und der geistigen Arbeiter. Geschehnisse und Gedanken zur Kulturpolitik des Deutschen Reiches. Leipzig 1923, pp. 102 ff.

dedicated to promoting his country's science and culture, with branches in Chicago, St. Louis, San Francisco, and Newark.[279]

Apart from the "Germanistic Society of America", which in 1923/24 gathered more than 10,000 dollars, other big foundations sponsored scientific work in Germany generously. The eminent Japanese Hoshi-Foundation for Chemistry, for example, had funded the Republic since 1922, giving 2,000 Yen monthly, while the American General Electric Company donated 15,000 dollars in the year 1923.[280] Moreover, General Electric started to collaborate with the General Society for Electricity (*Allgemeinen Elektrizitaets-Gesellschaft AEG*) and the Siemens company for the advancement of electro-physics in Germany.[281] The involvement of German industry in the rehabilitation of science was not only restricted to the national enterprises. Industrialists who were involved in business abroad, were voluntarily recruited for that purpose as well. In South America, the German community played a crucial role, more than anywhere else, in collecting a considerable sum of money for the advancement of science in their fatherland. In 1920, the German Overseas Bank (*Deutsche Ueberseeischen Bank*), through its branches in South America gathered about a 100,000 marks. In addition, the German Scientific Union in Buenos Aires, under the directorship of Dr. L. Merzbacher, allocated about 200,000 marks. In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Dr. Affis-Chateaubriand set up a committee for the support of German science, which, by February 1922, had raised 1,350,000 marks for this purpose.[282] Finally, it should be noted that numerous Germanophiles in many countries, and in particular in the neutral states, also made a significant material contribution to German science.[283] In addition, one of the two most prestigious North American scientific organisations, the Rockefeller Foundation, was among the most generous supporters of German science, even from the beginning of its isolation. The foundation primarily supported young scientists in the disciplines of medicine and natural sciences, and for the period of five years

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[279] *Ibid.* See also: "Zweiter Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft" from 1. April 1922 until 31 Maerz 1923, pp. 5 f., in: PAAA, R 65519, and in 65521.

[280] "Dritter Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft" from 01.04.1923 to 31.03.1924, pp.33 ff., in: PAAA, R 65520, and in R 65521.

[281] *Ibid.*

[282] All figures in: "Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31. Maerz 1922", p. 32-33, in: PAAA, R 65519.

[283] As such a case was recorded the "funs of German science" in Estland. See: "Zweiter Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft" umfassend ihre Taetigkeit vom 1. April 1922 bis zum 31 Maerz 1923, p. 5 f., in: PAAA, R 65519 and in 65521.

allocated a sum of 50,000 dollars for research on the above fields.[284] In addition, the "Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial", by 1925 had sponsored the German state and university libraries with 90,000 dollars for the purchase of books and journals in the field of social sciences.[285]

It seems that the crusade undertaken by the Weimar Republic to rescue German science was mainly based on personal contacts initiated by eminent German businessmen or scientists. Fritz Haber also was among those men. He travelled across the US to demonstrate the threat over scientific production and research in his country and to ask for aid. Albert Einstein, on the other hand, made a series of journeys, in 1922, to China, Japan, Spain, and even to Paris, although he stood aloof from any political propaganda in favour of the Republic's government. On the contrary, he criticised Germany's pre-war foreign policy and he resolutely declared his pacifism.[286] In 1923, the systematic campaign to convince the international community about the "lies of foreign propaganda against German science" started to bear fruit.[287] England, Switzerland, Denmark, Spain, the United States, China, and Brazil increased their financial contributions as well as shipments of books, journals and experimental material. The main co-ordinator of the anti-propaganda campaign and managing body of all the money coming from abroad was always the *Notgemeinschaft*. However, this umbrella-organisation was responsible not only for the "incoming" aid of philanthropic or charitable character, but also for the "outgoing" undertakings of international character, such as the publication of the *Forschung und*

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284 "Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31. Maerz 1922", pp. 32-33, in: PAAA, R 65519. See also: "Zweiter Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft" umfassend ihre Taetigkeit vom 1. April 1922 bis zum 31 Maerz 1923, pp. 5 f., in: PAAA, R 65519 and in 65521, and "Dritter Bericht der Notgemeinschaft", *ibid.* On the medicine projects sponsored by the Rockefeller in the first years of 1920s see: article written by Dr. Ercih F. Dach entitled "Deutschlands und die Rockefeller-Stiftung. Die groesste wissenschaftliche Stiftung der Welt. Die ermoeglichten Forschungsarbeiten.", in: "*Berliner Boersen-Courier*", 28.01.1925, in: PAAA, R 65521.

285 *Ibid.* See also: Letter of Dr. F. Schmidt-Ott to the Foreign Ministry on 27 March 1925, in: PAAA, R 65521.

286 Einstein's awarding of the Nobel Prize created much controversy regarding his citizenship, a debate that was revived when he visited France. See: PAAA R 64677.

287 See: KARL KERKHOF, Der Krieg gegen die deutsche Wissenschaft., p. 19; *Ibid.*, "Das Versailles Diktat und die deutsche Wissenschaft", in: *Monatshaefte fuer auswaertige Politik* VII 11, (Nov. 1940), pp. 836-850; GEORG SCHREIBER, Die Not der deutschen Wissenschaft und der geistigen Arbeiter. Geschehnisse und Gedanken zur Kulturpolitik des Deutschen Reiches. Leipzig 1923; GEORG KARO, Der geistige Krieg gegen Deutschland. Halle 1925; *Ibid.*, "Der Krieg der Wissenschaft gegen Deutschland", in: *Suedd.Monatshefte*, (Mai 1919), pp. 162-168.

Fortshritte. In that way, it was believed, the national status of Germany's science would become international, escaping the isolation.

3. The emerging interest in the Balkans and the significance of Greece.

3.1. The impact of World War I on Germany's relations with southeastern Europe.

Among the countries with which the new Republic sought to strengthen its ties, were the Balkan states that were to occupy special place in the German foreign policy agenda in the following years. But what did the Balkans mean for the Germans? Was the interest an old one or was it newly emerged? What was the nature of the German interest? It should be noted that as Balkan states were usually regarded the following: Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and a part of Turkey.

The region dominated by the massif of the 'ancient Haemus' –as it was called by western travellers before the nineteenth century- running parallel to the Danube river and stretching between the Adriatic and the Black Sea, began to trouble western Europe in the second half of the seventeenth century.[288] The Ottoman Empire, to which the region belonged, started to wane, raising the hopes to its neighbours for expansion towards east and to the Mediterranean Sea. The growing wealth of Habsburg Austria and Russia, which came from foreign trade, enabled these empires to modernise their armies and to threaten the Ottoman rule. At first, the Habsburg army captured Hungary, Croatia and the adjoining territories were subdued and repopulated with Christians for security reasons.[289] In the nineteenth century the concept of "Balkans" signified an agrarian, backward, primitive, uncultured and uncivilised land, but even the lawless, violent, and savage territory that linked the Danube Monarchy with the Ottoman Empire. Constant insurrections, among which were the 1804 and 1815 Serbian uprisings and the 1821 Greek revolt for independence, as well as the increasing repression imposed by the Ottomans, justified the western image for the region, which was gradually filled with political connotations. In Europe, the labelling of the Balkans as "Orient" clearly signalled that they did not belong to the western civilisation. Despite the acknowledgement that this 'uncivilised' region was seen as "the *Volksmuseum* of Europe",[290] the civilising –or even, the 'europeanisation'- of the Balkans, became a priority for the European Powers in their foreign policy agenda. The involvement of the 'civilised' Europe in the Balkan affairs was

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[288] MARIA TODOROVA, Imagining the Balkans. Oxford Univ. Press 1997, pp. 21 ff.; MARK MAZOWER, The Balkans. (2000), Phoenix Press 2001, p.8.

[289] MAZOWER, *ibid.*

[290] FRANZ THIERFELDER, Der Balkan als kulturpolitisches Kraftfeld. Zwischenstaatliche Propaganda und geistiger Austausch in Suedosteuropa. Berlin 1940, p. 7.; TODOROVA, Imagining the Balkans, p. 63.

accelerated by the war of independence that all the peoples in the region gradually declared on the Ottoman Rule. Despite the fact that the religious and ethnic homogeneity was what those peoples wished for their new states, by 1914 ethnic minorities were very present in all of them. It was inevitable that these ethnic and religious groups should become a bone of contention between the neighbouring new states, which were eager to expand their borders.[291] The end of World War I left the mountainous peninsula no less fragmented as it had been before the outbreak of hostilities. The big European powers were very much involved in this. Ideologies like fascism and communism sharpened the rivalries between them transferring the tension to the Balkans, while the growing nationalism eventually pushed the strain to the extreme. When the Second World War broke out, only the southern part of Yugoslavia was regarded a Balkan state. For the Nazis Hungary and Turkey were 'also-Balkan' [*auch-balkanisch*] states, implying that they were something else as well, by contrast to the other states which were 'only Balkan' [*nur-balkanisch*].[292] Hungary, in particular, was held in great esteem by the Nazis, as it played a leading part amongst other Balkan nations in the independence war against the Ottomans and was regarded as "the middle-European bridge to the south-east".[293] The northern parts of Yugoslavia, i.e. Croatia and Slovenia, did not belong to the Balkans according to the Nazis, who solidified the use of the term 'South-Eastern Europe' for the peninsula.[294] For them, the agrarian and mountainous region on the south-east fringes of Europe was, to a certain degree, a rediscovery. The Balkans became an important concept in the geopolitical views of the Nazis and they were seen as the *Wirtschaftsraum Grossdeutschland Suedost*, "the naturally determined economic and political completion" of the German Reich.[295] Perhaps the most interesting thing is that they stressed their historical affiliations with the region or even invented them. The selective bonds the Nazis believed they had with some Balkan peoples, like the ancient Greeks, supported their racial theory of the purity of the German race. "No other people had such strong bloodties and so contiguous a presence on the Balkan ground as the Germans did", emphasised Franz Thierfelder, the general secretary of the German Academy of Sciences in

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[291] MAZOWER, The Balkans, p. 102.

[292] THIERFELDER, Der Balkan als kulturpolitisches Kraftfeld, p. 9.

[293] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[294] *Ibid.*, p. 9; TODOROVA, Imagining the Balkans, pp. 28 ff.

[295] Cited in: TODOROVA, p. 28. See also: WOLFGANG SCHUMANN (Hg.), Griff nach Suedosteuropa. Neue Dokumente ueber die Politik des deutschen Imperialismus und Militarismus gegenueber Suedosteuropa im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Berlin 1973, pp. 29 ff.

Munich and director of the cultural political department of the Foreign Ministry, in 1940.[296]

Despite the fact that the borders of the small states of the Balkan Peninsula had been drawn up before the Great War, it was only after it that the term 'balkanisation', which was equated with *'Kleinstaaterei'*, was launched to describe the "small, unviable, mutually antagonistic and internally intolerant states".[297] This, was not exactly what the Great Powers had planned for the region. The nineteenth-century nationalism that led to the unification of Germany's and Italy's "tiny antiquated statelets into larger and economically more rational units", had the opposite outcome for the Balkans.[298] Yugoslavia was the exception to that rule, whose creation after World War I was "the reverse of balkanisation".[299] The fragmented territory in south-eastern Europe, as the Balkans were gradually called, could hardly represent the economic entity the foreign powers wanted to have under their control.

As for Greece, the full impact of World War I only became visible some years after it had come to an end. The period was marked by the calamitous march of the Greek army from the coast of Asia Minor into the interior of Anatolia and sealed by the 'catastrophe of Smyrna', as the burning of the city by the Turks lived on in the memory of the expatriate Greeks. The greatest cultural and economic metropolis of the Ionian coast, where there had been a prosperous Greek presence for over two thousand years was reduced to ashes. Thousands of Greeks were forced to leave the coasts of Asia Minor and eastern Thrace, after the defeat of the Greek army in that territory. The enormous wave of Greek refugees arriving in the motherland changed not only the geographical map, but also the demographics of Greece and along with it the country's economy. The majority of them, who only brought a few modest possessions with them, were settled in northern Greece in the regions of Macedonia and western Thrace, while many others found "temporary" shelter in the surrounding areas of the country's biggest cities. Meanwhile, agricultural reform, essentially the land distribution to small farmers, which was described as "one of Europe's most radical" was affected by the far-reaching repercussions on the country's economy following the failure of the Greek army's ad-

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[296] THIERFELDER, p. 14.

[297] TODOROVA, pp. 32 ff.; MAZOWER, The Balkans, p. 4.

[298] MAZOWER, The Balkans, p. 103.

[299] TODOROVA, p. 33.

vance to Asia Minor.[300] The reduction in the availability of arable land in comparison to 1918 was gradually became more marked, particularly in the provinces of Macedonia and Thrace, where tobacco became the dominant crop.[301] Together with grapes and raisins, tobacco was Greece's primary export. Nevertheless, the exports of raisins, which were largely cultivated in the Peloponnese, fell during the 1920s, giving way to the growing of tobacco, which was intensified due to the labour of Greek refugees.[302] On the other hand, according to the Supreme Economic Council the industrial production of Greece experienced rapid rates of growth during the interwar period,[303] despite being affected by the Great Depression.[304] After 1925, metallurgy, machinery, construction materials, chemicals, tanning/leather products, paper, textiles and clothing, foodstuffs, tobacco, and electricity were the major industrial sectors that recorded rapid rates of growth. These developments were not unrelated to the Asia Minor catastrophe. The sudden increase in population and consequently, the abundance of cheap labour which led to a decrease in wages, particularly in urban centres, the entrepreneurial skills of the refugees contributing to an improvement of some sectors, e.g. the carpet-manufacturing,[305] and the boost in demand from the increase in population were the three main factors that contributed to the country's industrial growth.[306] Nevertheless, in 1923, a year after the Asia Minor disaster, the country's economic activity witnessed its first recession. The second was recorded in 1929, as a result of the international economic developments.[307] Britain and Germany were the major importers of Greece's agricultural products until 1929, in light of the recession. Greek exports were badly affected by this development and for the following three years, the country's foreign trade sharply declined.[308] Tech-

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[300] MARK MAZOWER, Η Ελλάδα και η Οικονομική Κρίση του Μεσοπολέμου. Αθήνα 2002 (trans.), pp. 111, 113, [title of the original: Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis. Oxford 1991]

[301] *Ibid.*, pp. 112-124, 396.

[302] *Ibid.*

[303] *Ibid.* pp. 128 ff, 327 ff.

[304] OLGA CHRISTODOULAKI, "Industrial growth in Greece between the wars. A new perspective." in: *European Review of Economic History*, 5 (2001), pp. 61-89. Christodoulaki challenges the orthodox view within the traditional literature that Greece escaped the Great Depression unscathed, using new indices and a more reliable method of data analysis.

[305] MAZOWER, Η Ελλάδα και η Οικονομική Κρίση, p. 129.

[306] CHRISTODOULAKI, Industrial growth in Greece, pp. 78 f.

[307] *Ibid.*, pp. 63, 72 f., as well as figures 3 and 4 of Table 3 of her essay.

[308] See: MAZOWER, Η Ελλάδα και η Οικονομική Κρίση, pp. 159-193, on the stagnation of Greece's foreign trade, particularly the tobacco trade. On the impact of the Great Depression on the country's trade

nology was another sector in which Germany sought to increase its market influence in Greece. Its main competitor was the British industry which had dominated the high-voltage electromechanical market in the country. Since 1925, the British company "Power and Traction Finance Company Ltd." signed a contract with the Greek government that was ruled by the dictator Theodoros Pangalos. According to the contract, "Power" –as it was known- had the absolute right to produce and supply electricity to the town of Athens and run the trolley buses and trams.[309] American capital competed with the British during the 1920s, when Germany was ostracised from the international economy. The "American Foundation Company" had begun negotiations with the Greek government for the draining of Axios valley, west of Saloniki in northern Greece, and the work was started in 1927. The project was expected to relieve the region from malaria and other water-related infectious diseases that had plagued the refugee camps set up in the area. Similar plans were made for Thessaly and the Strimonas valley in eastern Macedonia.[310] Germany was, of course, absent from all of those major projects, as the Versailles sanctions were in force until 1926. The alternative explored by Germany was to try to re-establish its influence not only in Greece but also in the broader Balkan area, invoking historical or political ties with the new states and advertising its technical expertise and scientific advancement.

Up to 1914, Germany had been one of the biggest technological powers of the world and its universities, technical schools and industries attracted many foreign students who wished to be introduced to the German achievements. At the same time, was founded the *Mitteleuropaeische Wirtschaftstag* (MWT), an organisation aiming at intensifying Germany's economic relations with south-eastern Europe. The MWT, established in 1924, was one of the most important instruments for the German Reich's indirect and covert imperialistic penetration of the Balkans.[311] As the president of the organisation, Tilo Freiherr von Wilmowsky, explained in 1938, some circles of the German chemical

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relations with Germany see: MOGENS PELT, Tobacco, Arms and Politics. Greece and Germany from World Crisis to World War 1929-1941. Copenhagen 1998, pp. 49-54.

309 MAZOWER, Η Ελλάδα *και* η Οικονομική Κρίση, p. 146.

310 *Ibid.*, pp. 146 ff.

311 SCHUMANN, Griff nach Suedosteuropa, p. 52. See also: KLAUS THOERNER, Deutsche Suedosteuropaplaene, 1840-1945. Dissertation an der Carl-von Ossietzky Universitaet, 31.10.1999, chapters 6.1., 6.2. For a detailed approach about the undertakings of the MWT in Bulgaria see: MARKUS WIEN, Markt und Modernisierung Deutsch-bulgarische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 1918-1994 in ihren konzeptionellen Grundlagen. Thesis submitted at the European University Institute. Florence 2005.

and power industries, particularly in the region of the Ruhr, began in 1929/30 to shift their focus to south-eastern Europe and its economic possibilities for German interests.[312] Germany should first intensify its trade relations with the region and then use part of the capital for research on the most common minerals in the Balkans. Britain and France had already launched, argued von Wilmowsky further, major projects for the exploitation of lead, zinc, and copper sediments in Yugoslavia.[313] Chromium, antimony and oil were other important minerals that could be found in the Balkans.

Nonetheless, the Germans were very much aware that the absolute conquest of the Balkans would be no easy undertaking, for the French influence was very strong and had become even stronger during the last hundred years, particularly in Greece and the Danube principalities. For Germans, however, French infiltration in the political, commercial, cultural, and scientific circles of the region did not necessary mean that France had contributed to the development of the Balkan peoples in the above sectors. This was a German job and perhaps the most evident proof of this was the political systems of the small countries in the peninsula, as the Germans and in particular the Nazis, interpreted it. The later argued that the whole nineteenth century had been marked by the battle between two political systems: the western ideal of a rationally organised state, characterised by excessive individual freedom and the socialist model of central Europe, in which the individual will was an organic part of the whole.[314] The symbol of the first one was the French Revolution of 1789 and of the second was the seizure of power by the National Nocialists in Germany in 1933. For them, the creation of small independent states in the Balkans was not based on the French model, as was mistakenly believed by other Europeans. Its roots should rather be sought in the German-Austrian ideal, where the 'principle of the people' [*das voelkische Prinzip*] stood at the centre of political life. In other words, the creation of nation-states in the region was to be decided by the Balkan peoples and not by some kind of administration or other similar institution. The fact that the French language was very important in the new Balkan countries and that they had adopted parliamentary democracy "of western type", was no proof that the young states were "the child of the Parisian Revolution".[315] National Socialism and fascism put an end to the era of 'individualisation' in the Balkan

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[312] Cited in: SCHUMANN, Griff nach Suedosteuropa, p. 17.

[313] *Ibid.*

[314] THIERFELDER, Der Balkan als kulturpolitisches Kraftfeld, p. 13.

[315] *Ibid.*

peoples, claimed Thierfelder in 1940.[316] The end of Balkan 'individualisation' not only meant the end of parliamentarianism in those countries, as one after the other their fragile democracies were turned into dictatorships. For the German national socialists it also meant the end of minorities, both metaphorically and literally speaking. The Nazis defined and treated minorities according to principles of biological racism, which in the Balkans found only "a faint echo", despite the political sympathies of their authorities to Hitler.[317] The Slavs, for instance, were characterised as inferior to the German race, predestined to serve the Aryans. On the other hand, for the Nazis, Croats and Slovenians were not part of the still-stigmatised as 'uncivilised' Balkans, but belonged to the western 'civilised' Europe. This selective exclusion contradicted the German policy for peace and equality in the region, as was enunciated by Thierfelder, inciting ethnic feelings of hostility between the Balkan states.[318] It seems that the political plans of the Nazis for the Balkans entailed a project of "permanent demographic engineering" for south-eastern Europe.[319] Encouraging its small states to remain neutral in the conflicts of the big European nations, in order to avoid another splintering off of their region, the German National Socialists believed that their domination of that edge of Europe with indisputable geo-strategic importance would be accelerated.

The Nazi authorities however, considering the experience of World War I, argued that diplomacy alone might well increase German influence over the region, but could hardly retain it. A well-organised and intensified cultural undertaking in the territory, would facilitate and support the geopolitical plans of the Third Reich. It was necessary, therefore, to develop strong cultural relations with the countries in south-eastern Europe, because intellectual dominance clearly meant power. Unlike the other European powers, argued Thierfelder in 1940, Germany approached the Balkan area with respect and would continue to do so. Germany was not going to play the role all the other "cultural nations" (*Kulturnationen*) –and he had France in mind- had played, in order to expand its influence. The Balkans were of themselves a treasury-house of culture, a place where western civilisation had been frozen in the course of the centuries and, therefore, should be treated with respect and caution, rather than brashly.[320] When the war broke out, Germany established the "Cultural Institute for the Balkans and the

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316 *Ibid.*, p. 20 f.

317 MAZOWER, The Balkans, p. 110.

318 THIERFELDER, Der Balkan als kulturpolitisches Kraftfeld, pp. 20 ff.

319 MAZOWER, The Balkans, p. 111.

320 THIERFELDER, Der Balkan als kulturpolitisches Kraftfeld, p. 12.

Danube-States", in an effort to realise the idea of creating a Big German Reich in southeastern Europe.[321] In theory, what Germans expected to achieve by imposing cultural policy on the Balkans, was to revive western culture according to the German model by providing co-operation among all peoples. In practice, the 'alternative' German cultural project to southeastern Europe, proved very different.

[321] See: Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amts (PAAA), R 61270.

3.2. Cultural and scientific relations with Greece.

The German presence in Greece dates back to the 19th century, when the young prince, Otto von Wittelsbach of Bavaria was appointed King of Greece, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of London signed on 7 May 1832. Because of his youth (he was only 12 years old) the nascent Kingdom of Greece was put under the supervision of Great Britain, France and Russia until Otto's coming of age. The control of political life in Greece by the Great Powers and their struggle to exert influence upon the Greek people became an integral part of the country's political development. It was an unfortunate legacy for the small Balkan state to have to bear, heavy enough to be easily shaken off of its shoulders and one that continued to irk well into the following century. Some ninety-one years later, in 1923, the prominent archaeologist at the German Archaeological Institute in Athens and future local leader of the National Socialist Party in Greece, Walter Wrede, noted that Greeks knew very well they did not make their own policy or for their own interests, but they still were a play-thing, a marionette of the big European powers.[322] The continuing presence of the German community in Greece congregated at that time at the "Philadelphia" club, which had become their pre-eminent social and cultural point of reference. However, it was only a few months before the outbreak of the First World War that relations between the two nations were officially consolidated through the establishment of the German-Greek Society. This new institution, based in Hamburg, was headed by Professor E. Ziebarth and enjoyed the patronage of Queen Sofia of Greece. The society was regarded as the first official bilateral cultural agreement with Greece. According to the Article Two of the Statutes, the aim of the organisation was to improve and strengthen cultural and commercial relations between the two nations through lectures, publications, excursions and the like.[323] Soon the society set up branches in Munich, Leipzig, Dresden, Hamburg, and Vienna and by 1939 in Berlin, Frankfurt, Cologne, even Karlsruhe, whose members included about thirty Greek students enrolled in its technical universities.[324]

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322 Confidential report of Walter Wrede to the Union of Germanism Abroad (Verein fuer das Deutschtum im Auslande, Berlin), in June 1923, in: PAAA, R 60057.

323 Satzungen der Ortsgruppe Hamburg der Deutsch-Griechischen Gesellschaft e.V. (Undated document), in: Bundesarchiv Koblenz [BAK], R 57 neu/1025. See also: Καταστατικόν Ελληνο-Γερμανικής Εταιρείας Αθηνών 1925. Αθήνα 1928. In: BAK, R 57/ 1063 [1α].

324 In Dresden and Hamburg were initially based the largest Greek communities engaged in the manufacture of cigarettes and import-export agencies. Later, the largest communities were found in Hamburg and

In 1925, a Greek branch was established in Athens by Greek scientists who had been educated in Germany. The existing "Philadelphia" club was incorporated in the new branch, which in 1927 counted about 300 members.[325] The Greeks who set up the branch in Athens had retained close relations with German culture and they wished to introduce their compatriots to the German science and achievements. Five years later, in 1932, some of the most prominent figures in the scientific and economic sectors in Greece, such as the director of the National Observatory in Athens, Prof. Nikolaos Kritikos, the professor of medicine, Konstantinos Mermingas, the professor of theology, Nikolaos Luvaris, and the lawyer, Alexandros Kanellopoulos, became members of the society's committee.[326] All of them were to play a significant part during the occupation of Greece by the Nazis about eight years later.

Nonetheless, the society's aspiration to strengthen the economic and cultural relations between Germany and Greece had been complicated after the end of World War I. The political development that occurred in southeastern Europe (and in particular in Greece) had a great impact on Germany's foreign policy in the region. It had been realised that, if the so-called Eastern Question had been an interesting problem for the German Reich before the war, it had become an undeniably first-order priority now that hostilities were over. What should be done was to strengthen the Weimar Republic and foster its old cultural, economic and political bonds with the Balkan states and, of course, with Greece. This policy was initially focused on the protection of ancient Greek culture and the promotion of trade relations between the two countries. It has already been mentioned that in 1920, despite the undeniable significance the promotion of industrial and commercial interests had for the young Republic, it was realised that its economy would be damaged, -if its cultural policy abroad were to be neglected. Economic propaganda should go hand in hand with cultural propaganda. The German ambition was to conquer the international market for high-quality goods, which the country was still able to produce. However, this would not be possible without the creation of a

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Munich. See: Mitteilungen der "Vereinigung zwischen staatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V" 01.02.1939, in PAAA, R 61274.

[325] Undated note-letter, [1927?], in: BAK, R 57 neu/1063.

[326] Notice of the German-Greek Society in Athens in 1932. In: BAK, R 57 neu/1063.

"cultural current" in target countries, which would help Germany to pave the way for economic investment there.[327]

The war had dismantled Germany from all the intellectual and cultural threads the country had developed with other nations. This also affected the German minority abroad, as it had lost, to some degree, cultural contact with its homeland. The minority that had contributed officially or unofficially, consciously or unconsciously, to the dissemination of German intellectual advances and culture, came to be seen as a dormant resource for the Republic's foreign policy and one that had to be re-activated as soon as possible. Nonetheless, the Republic's efforts to restore its foreign cultural relations were hindered, as the Germans argued, by the propaganda the Allies disseminated against German culture. Therefore, Germany's counter-propaganda should be carefully designed, avoiding any direct attack on the Allies. The Allies' policies, particularly the French cultural policy, had always been used and continued to be used as a model for Germany's cultural planning abroad. What was left aside, though, from that model, was its 'hostile' connotation, the Germans argued. In order for the Republic to regain its cultural influence abroad, it had to revive its relations with the German minority and to maintain or to re-establish close relations with other countries. The promotion and propagation of language, the German schools, the scientific centres, in particular the archaeological institutes, the series of lectures, the musical events and other similar activities were undertakings that the German state continued to support and on which the new cultural policy was initially focused. In 1923, the German Embassy in Athens reported that the limited influence Germany had on the political life in Greece was counterbalanced by the acknowledgement of the German culture and science by the Greeks.[328] The series of public lectures organised in Athens, usually on the initiative of the German-Greek Society's, had a two-fold significance: to strengthen the ties of Germans living there with their homeland and to give an opportunity to the Greeks who had learned or were still learning the language to test their skills and to broaden their knowledge of German culture.

In the past the group of scientists, academics, engineers, architects, artists, teachers and so forth in the entourage of King Otto in Greece, also were the bearers of German

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[327] Copy of letter Dr. Gerh. Menz and Herr Selke sent to the Foreign Ministry Director, Friedrich Heilbron on 22 Oktober 1920, Leipzig. In: PAAA, R 64853. The same copy was also sent to the head of the Stock Market Union (*Boersenvereins*).

[328] Notice (Aufzeichnung) of the Foreign Ministry Director, Friedrich Heilbron on 08.12.1923, in: PAAA, R 64853.

culture, who had a profound influence on the scientific and cultural life of free Greece. Meanwhile, universities, scientific institutes and technical and commercial schools had been established in accordance with the German model. German technical scientists were employed in a number of Greek companies, while many sectors of Greek handicraft production were run by German businessmen[329] or by other who modelled themselves on German standards, thus, strengthening commercial relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, the German archaeologist Walter Wrede in Athens made clear that Germany should forget the golden period of Otto, in which Germans had controlled Greek administration and were present in almost every aspect of the Greek everyday life.[330] In 1923, the German scientific activity in Greece was confined to the projects of the German Archaeological Institute. Nonetheless, many young Greeks of other scientific disciplines visited German universities to continue their studies or research, or to take up internships in German enterprises. The University of Athens, built by Bavarians in 1837, was a rather inadequate scientific institution at that time forcing many Greeks, usually wealthy, to go abroad for advanced studies. Before the war, Greek students abroad were divided equally between Germany and France. Only in the faculty of Law did French universities have a numeric advantage.[331] Despite the increased number of Greek students in Germany immediately after the end of the war, the high cost of living in the Weimar Republic made many of them register in French or Italian universities, where the cost of living and the registration fees were much lower. Thus, the "Parisian wave in orient", always present in south-eastern Europe, with a number of schools, hospitals, and the *'Alliance Française'* established in 1885, were strongly reinforced.[332] The popular and dominant political figure in Greece, Eleutherios Venizelos, contributed greatly to the Francophile movement. He was favourably disposed towards France, unlike the Germanophile King of Greece, Constantinos. For all these reasons, the German policy was mainly concentrated on the interception of the growing dominance of France in the region and the anti-German propaganda activity, as well as on the improvement of the image of Germany.

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[329] For example the Fix brewery and the Achaia Claus wines.

[330] Walter Wrede (Dr. Phil.) from Athens to the "Verein fuer das Deutschtum im Auslande", Berlin (Vertraulich!) June 1923, in PAAA, R 60057.

[331] Note of Legation's secretary Clodius on the cultural relations between Germany and Greece, on 11 March 1924, in: PAAA, R 64853.

[332] Confidential report of Walter Wrede to the Union of Germanism Abroad (Verein fuer das Deutschtum im Auslande, Berlin), in June 1923, in: PAAA, R 60057.

The dramatic political developments in Greece in spring 1923 troubled some Germans about the future attitude of Greece towards their country. Germany was deeply involved in the so-called Greek expedition to Asia Minor and in the theatre of bloody fighting between Greeks and Turks, supporting the latter. In the name of the so-called 'Great Idea' of "the two continents and five seas" Greece found herself in the vortex of the clashing interests of all European powers, who each tried to avoid casualties of their own. However, German fears about the future of their relations with Greece were not verified. As Walter Wrede reported from Athens in 1923, there certainly was a small number of Greeks who expressed antipathy to Germany. However, the majority of the Greek people still had great respect for the Germans, often showing "an almost strange enthusiasm" and believing that Germany would again be able to display its greatness.[333] On the other hand, the educated circles having developed a strong national feeling had reservations about the Germans, as they were very much aware of the German sympathies towards Turkey. Taking into account all the above parameters, the Embassy Secretary, Clodius, who had spent a long time in Greece, argued that Germany's plans for strengthening its cultural relations with the small Balkan country should be concentrated on the following issues:

- to facilitate young Greeks that were choosing German universities for studies by abolishing the registration fees and all the additional complications a foreigner usually faced in Germany,
- to support the scientific, literature and art lectures held in Greece by German specialists,
- to support the German-Greek Society and its branch in Greece, and
- to influence public opinion in Germany in favor of Greece.

The last point was considered to be the most important one.[334] The very well organized cultural presence of France in the country and the French sympathies of many Greeks were two big obstacles that Germany had to deal with. The varied means that France had at its disposal, like its hospital, the Pasteur Institute, the number of books and journals of "*Alliance Française*", and the organisations "*Amis de la Langue Française*" and "*Ligue Franco-Hellénique*", challenged the German plans. Germans did not have any illusions about the obstacles they had to surmount or about their limits, but they were determined to make

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[333] *Ibid.*

[334] Note of Embassy Secretary Clodius on the cultural relations between Germany and Greece, on 11 March 1924, in: PAAA, R 64853.

their voice heard. The personal ties with some prominent figures of the Greek society who were German-educated, were the strongest weapon they had in their hands.

In 1923, during the administration of Alexandros Papanastasiou, who also was German-educated, a law was passed which provided for certain number of Greek secondary school-teachers to be send to Europe at state's expenses for advanced studies over the following five years. On their return, it was planned that they would educate other teachers.[335] The law was of great importance to the Germans, for they thought they could strongly influence the Greek educational system, which at that time promoted French ideals, attracting as many teachers as they could, funding them to some extent. The available names of Greek students show that Germany seem to have succeeded in attracting many teachers -not only for five years, but for much longer-, almost until the end of 1930s.[336]

Germany wanted to exert influence not only on the Greek secondary education but to expand it also on universities. In 1925, the German ambassador in Athens proposed to the Rector of Athens University, Prof. K. Zengelis, to introduce a committee that would have the responsibility for recommending to *Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung* young promising scientists, who wished to go to Germany for advanced studies. Zengelis, a professor of physical sciences, was favourably disposed towards Germany having studied in Heidelberg, Leipzig, but also in Geneva and Paris. He warmly supported the creation of an *Alexander von Humboldt* committee in Greece, underlining that the German organization should give the opportunity to "less wealthy but eager-for-knowledge Greek students to have access to the incomparable achievements of German science and research".[337] Zengelis also argued that it would be of great benefit to Greek science, if instead of students would be funded young scientists, already engaged as assistants at the university's laboratories.[338] The reason for this was that studies in natural sciences at Ath-

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[335] *Ibid.*

[336] See: Legation de Grece a Berlin to Auswaertigen Amt, Berlin. Verbalnote, 18.06. 1932, in: PAAA, R 64064.; i.A. gez. v. Heinz in Abschrift dem Bayerischen Staatsministerium des Aeussern fuer Wirtschaft und Arbeit in Muenchen 26.11.1932, in: PAAA, R 64064; List of Greek professors in secondary schools (Gymnasia) who studied in Germany from summer semester 1929 until winter semester 1931/32 in: PAAA, R 64064.

[337] Cited in the letter sent by the German Embassy in Athens to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 30.07.1925. In: PAAA, R 64794.

[338] Rector, K. Zengelis to the Legationsrat, M. Immelsen, of the German Embassy in Athens, on 27.08.1925. In: PAAA, R 64795.

ens University were insufficient. For example, it was impossible for someone who wanted to study the principles of electrochemistry to do so in Athens. Some foreign institutions, like the Carnegie Foundation which offered scholarships to Greeks to continue their studies at any European university, did not support scientists older than thirty years old, which was usually the case in Greece.[339] Therefore, Greece's gratitude to Germany for its support to young scientists would guarantee the rapid diffusion of German science in the country and with it the promotion of its cultural interests. The *Alexander von Humboldt* committee was eventually created in summer 1925. The committee consisted of three eminent Greek scientists, i.e. Prof. Dimitrios Hondros, Prof. Marinos Gerulanos and the Rector Zengelis. All of them were German-educated. Hondros had studied physics in Goettingen and Munich, where he was granted the Doctorate in physics. Gerulanos was a prominent surgeon, who had been educated entirely in Munich. He was already famous in Germany, where he had began his career, when he went back to Greece in 1902. He had married a German and was one of the founding members of the Greek-German Society in Athens and its future president from 1938-1942.

The whole undertaking was planned to be carried out very carefully, leaving aside any political or propaganda aspect of the project but stressing "the pure scientific and cultural character" of the *Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung*.[340] The first Greeks to travel to Germany with the *Stiftung* were a chemist, an assistant at the university's institute for inorganic chemistry, Dr. D. Dalmas, and one assistant at the university surgical clinic, Dr. N. Miniatis.[341] The whole project seemed to work quite well at the beginning. However, by 1929 the number of Greek students was reduced dramatically, especially in Karlsruhe and Freiburg, the universities which had traditionally attracted many Greeks. The reason for this was not only the economic crisis that broke out worldwide. It also was the precondition the Greeks had to fulfil before their admission to German universities, namely the completion of at least one year of studies at Athens University or Technical University. Where this condition was not met, they were restricted to the status of guest-student, and were obliged to sit special exams in order to be registered as normal students.[342] In view of this complication, it was hardly surprising that many Greeks dropped

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339 German Embassy in Athens to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, on 30.07.1925, in: PAAA, R 64794.

340 *Ibid.*

341 Rector, K. Zengelis to the Legationsrat, M. Immelsen, of the German Embassy in Athens, on 27.08.1925, in: PAAA, R 64795.

342 Greek Consulate in Gernsbach, Baden-Baden to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 21.02.1929, in: PAAA, R 64064.

out and chose to continue their studies in other European universities, particularly in France.

Another issue that interested Germans, apart from the increase of Greek students at their universities, was the export of their language. The existence of German schools in Greece dated back to 1886, the year the first German school was established in Saloniki. Ten years later, a second school was set up in Athens. Both were initially created for the interests of the German colonies in those two cities. From 1907 onwards, these schools following the French, Italian and American model, were transformed into "propaganda" schools, designed not only to educate the German-speaking children of the colonies, but also to teach the language to young Greeks through an official institution.[343] By that time Greeks, usually of wealthy families, learnt the language either with German governesses or other private tutors. German politicians argued that the use of language by Greeks not only for scientific reasons but also for more practical reasons, i.e. in business, industry and technology, was of the greatest importance for the permeation of German culture in Greece.[344] In 1925, the promotion of language was put under the auspices of the German Academy. It seems that the success of those schools in Greece was so great that by the end of 1933 seven out of the seventeen branches of the Academy world-wide had been set up in Greek cities.[345]

The expansion of German was a necessary pre-condition for Germany's other big cultural aim: the expansion of German books. The economic regulations of the Versailles Treaty were a severe blow to the country's trade, and not least, its book trade. The devaluation of German currency caused a reduction of demand for books, music records and other educational and cultural tools in Greece. The price of German books was very high, compared with French titles. For example, a German novel cost eighty-eight drachmas, while one could buy a French novel with only twenty-five. Moreover, the German edition of Greek and Latin classics cost three times more than the equivalent French books.[346] Consequently, the Greeks preferred French literature, which they regarded closer to their taste. In addition, the knowledge of French was very widespread, making French books very competitive in the Greek market. German technical books

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[343] HAGEN FLEISCHER, „Europas Rückkehr nach Griechenland. Kulturpolitik der Großmächte in einem Staat der Peripherie", in: HARALD HEPPNER/OLGA KATSIARDI-HERING (Hg.), Die Griechen und Europa. Außen- und Innensichten im Wandel der Zeit. Wien 1998, pp. 125-191, here p. 131.

[344] *Ibid.*, p.132.

[345] *Ibid.*, p.141.

[346] German Embassy in Athens to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 23.09.1926, in PAAA, R 65401.

and books about architecture, chemistry, medicine, political science and law were still much sought-after in Greece.[347] In addition, the lack of German books and journals in the libraries of Athens University and Technical University was more than evident. The German cultural work in the country became, therefore, very difficult, while the cultural plans of other powers, as the Germans argued, like Italy, particularly benefited from the prevailing circumstances.[348] The promotion of German science in Greece was restricted to the considerable numbers of German scientific acquisitions, already held by almost all disciplines. To those numbers should be added the big collection of books that had been gathered in Germany for the projected university in Smyrna. As the project was never completed, the collection consisted of old German and other foreign books, a significant number of books about natural science and a valuable microbiological equipment, eventually came to the property of Athens University.[349]

As long as the prices of German books remained high, very little could be done to improve Germany's share of the Greek book-market. However, it was very important to retain its printed cultural presence in Greece and to keep the readers' interest as keen as it could possibly be under the circumstances, hoping that soon things would be better for German concerns. One initiative that could help, as it was believed, the expansion of German printed culture, was the creation of a book-store on the model of the already existing international book-store "Eleftheroudakis & Barth" in Athens, initially under joint Greek-German ownership. It was thought that the idea was more likely to succeed in Saloniki. The central figure pushing the project was Professor Nikolaos Luvaris, a theologian, who was teaching at the town's seminary at that time. Luvaris was to play an important role in the political life of Greece few years later. Educated in Germany, he was appointed general secretary of the Ministry of Education in 1926 and retained that post until 1928. In 1936, he served again for a short time in the same post, to which he was reinstated in 1943. The German Consul in Saloniki reported that Luvaris was en-

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[347] *Ibid.*

[348] Confidential report of Walter Wrede to the Union of Germanism Abroad (*Verein fuer das Deutschtum im Auslande, Berlin*), in June 1923, in: PAAA, R 60057.

[349] Kostantinos D. Zeggelis, Ordinary Professor of Inorganic Chemistry and Rector of Athens University Speech in 1924-5. [Πρύτανης: Κωνσταντίνος Δ. Ζέγγελης, τακτικός Ανόργανης Χημείας], in: Historical Archive of Athens University (IAPA), Πρυτανικοί Λόγοι (Rectors' Speeches) 1924-25. See also: Note of the Royal Embassy of Greece in Berlin to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, on 23.07.1923, in: PAAA, R 65401.

gaged in the expansion and propagation of German books like no other.[350] Luvaris guaranteed the German Consul that some people from his own circle were interested in getting involved in setting up a book-store, minimising in that way the risk for German businessmen. For the success of the project, though, the bookstore had to develop close relations with a German enterprise, which could supply the store.[351] It was also important the book-store to sell not only German books and periodicals but also Greek, French, English and Italian. The reason, according to the Consul, was primarily the fact that the number of Greeks who knew the language was not big enough to support an exclusively German book-store. Therefore, "German books should only be the decoration".[352] It seems though that this tactic was part of Germany's prudent foreign cultural policy that was due to the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. Nevertheless, it was expected that the establishment of the University of Saloniki, which was eventually opened in autumn 1926, would meet the German interests in the Greek book-market.

So far, one might argue that it is not clear, how the German government would or could control the book-business and use it for cultural propaganda purposes. It was possible, the business to have the fate of the "Eleftheroudakis & Barth" international book-store in Athens, in which the German Wilhelm Barth was no longer a business partner but just an employee with no influence on the orders.[353] To diminish the danger of such unfortunate complication in Saloniki, the German Consul suggested the creation of a some kind of committee that could monitor the progress of the book-business. The German side would be represented by a member or members of the city's German Club, while from the Greek side Luvaris reassured the Germans that he was "ready to co-operate with such an institution".[354] The exercise of cultural propaganda in the northern regions of Greece, namely Macedonia and western Thrace, had acquired a special importance for Germany's foreign policy during 1920s. The French influence upon the northern part of the country during the Ottoman Rule continued undiminished in the years after the collapse of the empire. More evident was the dissemination of the French

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350 German Consul in Saloniki to the section for foreign affairs of the bookstore of Walter Bangert in Hamburg on 21.07.1924. In: PAAA, R 65401.

351 *Ibid.*

352 *Ibid.*

353 Note of Legation's secretary Clodius on the cultural relations between Germany and Greece, on 11 March 1924, in: PAAA, R 64853.

354 German Consul in Saloniki to the section for foreign affairs of the book-store of Walter Bangert in Hamburg on 21.07.1924. In: PAAA, R 65401.

culture among minorities, primarily the Jewish community, which formed a significant minority in Saloniki. In 1929, the German Consul reported that the foreign language mostly spoken by the population was French.[355] The bookshops sold great numbers of French books which were favoured by Greeks for their low price. Nevertheless, after the establishment of the University of Saloniki, the exchange of professors with German universities strengthened Germany's scientific and cultural relations with northern Greece. German professors were invited to lecture in Saloniki and vice versa. In 1927 the university consisted of only one faculty, the Faculty of Philosophy. The Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics was planned for the following years. The departments of agriculture and veterinary medicine were to come on stream in 1928 and 1929 respectively.[356]

What should be underlined, though, is that the movement of intellectuals was basically activated by individuals rather than by the institutions they represented. More precisely, Greek professors, who had been educated in Germany, invited their German colleagues with whom they had retained contact, to lecture at their university. From the German side, the process was slightly different. It was also based on personal contacts, but it was organised and supported by organisations, such as the German-Greek Society, the German Academy or the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). In both cases, though, the personal networks were the main channels through which relations between the two scientific communities were built and would continue to exist in the future. The establishment of personal networks, however, was not German-Greek exclusiveness. It was rather an international phenomenon that, to a great extent, survives until to the present day. The use of this kind of network was intensified by Germany after 1918, as it appeared to be the only remaining way, through which the Republic could gradually re-establish its international scientific relations. It also appeared that personal networks could work better than institutions in some countries, and Greece was one of them. Nonetheless, some gestures indicating the effort to develop the two countries close cultural and scientific contacts had an official and ceremonial character. The nomination of six Germans out of twenty-one scientists from abroad as members of the

[355] German Consul in Saloniki to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 20.06.1929, in: PAAA, R 61191.

[356] German Consul in Saloniki to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 17.11.1927, in: PAAA, R 64064.

Academy of Sciences in Athens is one such example.[357] The award was the first to take place in the Academy's history. Among the scientists nominated were the physicists Albert Einstein and Max Planck, the geographer Alfred Phillipson and the archaeologist Wilhelm Doerpfeld.[358] It seems that towards the end of the decade of 1920s the relations between the two counties became closer and the German press reported that, if the relations with Greece were restricted to cultural before the war, it was time to expand them at economic, even at political level.[359]

The German-Greek Society with its branches, which constituted a network of individuals affiliating scientifically, economically or personally to one of the two countries, organised cultural events that supported Germany's foreign cultural-political agenda, in 1920s. Most of the events were primarily related to humanities, like history and literature, but also to culture narrowly defined, namely music, theatre and fine arts. However, some of them were closer to more practical issues, like justice, economics, as well as natural sciences and technology. In winter 1922/23, a series of lectures were given in Athens, but only one of them was related to natural sciences. The lecture entitled "The construction of matter in the light of recent research" (*Der Aufbau der Materie im Licht der neuesten Forschung*) and was given by Prof. Hardt at the German Archaeological Institute.[360] It is interesting that occasionally some human scientists lectured on more practical issues. This was the case of A. Heisenberg, professor of science in Byzantium, who spoke at the first official event of the German-Greek Society in Hamburg, in 1918, about "The economic importance of Greece".[361] This event was the first one after four years of the society's existence and it seems that the choice of the subject was not accidental. It was addressed to an audience that consisted mainly of businessmen and other contributors to Hamburg's economic life. Nonetheless, this first invitation of the German-Greek Society

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357 German Ambassador in Athens Dr. Eisenlohr to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 29.03.1933, in: PAAA, R 64064; Πρακτικά Ακαδημίας Αθηνών, Συνεδρία της 16 Μαρτίου 1933, Έτος 1933, Τόμος 8ος (Minutes of the Academy of sciences of Athens, meeting on 16 March 1933).

358 See: Πρακτικά Ακαδημίας Αθηνών, Συνεδρία της 25 Μαρτίου 1933, Έτος 1933, Τόμος 8ος (Minutes of the Academy of sciences in Athens, meeting on 25 March 1933); German Ambassador in Athens, Eisenlohr to the Foreign Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin 29.03.1933, in: PAAA, R 64064.

359 Γραφείο Τύπου Πρεσβείας Βερολίνου (Press Office of the Greek Embassy in Berlin) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens, "Ο Γερμανικός τύπος και η Ανατολή" Δελτίον υπ'. αριθ. 48, ["The German Press and the Orient, Press Release Nr. 48], in October 1929, in: Ιστορικό Αρχείο Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών, IAYE (Historical Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs), File: A/3/II, Sub-file: A/II/I, 1929.

360 German Embassy in Athens to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 29.06.1924, in: PAAA, R 60057.

361 See: Invitation of the German-Greek Society in Hamburg on 10.10.1918, in: BAK, R 57 neu/1025.

to all its members was an undisputed cultural event, strongly indicative of Germany's effort to regain its lost economic influence on south-eastern Europe through cultural rapprochement.

After 1925, all cultural undertakings of the German-Greek Society were organised under the auspices of the German Academy. Personal references continued to play an important role in invitations. In 1932, for example, Professor Ioannis Spyropoulos, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Saloniki, was invited by the Academy to lecture at the University of Munich and at the University of Jena. Apart from the official lecture, Spyropoulos was scheduled to give a radio-interview. His name was suggested by Antonios Sigalas, the famous Byzantinoligist in Saloniki and an old familiar to the Academy.[362] Sigalas also suggested Professor A. Keramopoulos of Athens University to give a talk at the same time at the German-Greek Society in Munich. Some years later, during the Nazi period, Keramopoulos visited Munich, Hamburg and the University of Berlin for the same reason.[363] Even though invitations were addressed to eminent professors of both countries, primarily to lecture, some German specialists were invited to take short-term positions as directors at Greek university laboratories. The reason was to contribute to the advancement of Greek science and research. In this context, the bacteriologist at the University of Neustadt Dr. H. Kordes was invited in 1931 by Ioannis Papadakis, professor at the University of Saloniki, to take over the laboratory of plant physiology and pathology of Athens University for about a year.[364] However, his appointment as laboratory director seemed very unlikely, because his financial demands were too big to be met by the Greek University.[365] The case of Professor Konstantin Karathéodory, the Greek mathematician with an international reputation, who had studied and made his career in Germany, is of particular interest. He had been employed by the Greek government in 1920 to organise the university that was planned to be founded in Smyrna, in Asia Minor. The war with the Turks and Greece's defeat put paid to these plans and few

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[362] Letter of the German Academy in Munich to Prof. Joh. Spyropoulos on 23.05.1932, in: PAAA, R 64064.

[363] *Ibid.*; Letter of the German Academy in Munich to Prof. Keramopoulos on 23.05.1938, in: PAAA, R 64064. See also chapter 5.2.

[364] Dr. H. Kordes to the German Foreign Ministry, Department F, on 05.11.1931, in: PAAA, R 64064; see also: letter of Dr. H. Kordes to Prof. Koutsomitopoulos, University of Agriculture in Athens on 05.01.1932, in: PAAA, R 64064. Koutsomitopoulos was the director of the laboratory for plant physiology and pathology.

[365] *Ibid.*

years later, in 1924, the Greek government offered Karathéodory the Rectorship of the Technical University in Athens. For personal reasons Karathéodory preferred the ordinary professorship of mathematics in Munich, which was offered to him that same year.[366] Nonetheless, he retained his ties with Greece and particularly with the Prime Minister E. Venizelos, who in 1930 called upon him for a university matter. It seems that Karathéodory's presence in Greece was so important that Venizelos used the diplomatic route to convince the Ministry of Education of Bavaria to permit the scientist to travel and stay in Greece for two or three months.[367] The historical bonds between the university with the Bavarians were even stressed. It was they, who had established the institution and therefore it would be in their interest to see the university operating normally.[368] The official reason the Greek government gave to Munich for the summoning of Karathéodory to Athens, was the reorganization of the university, to which the prominent mathematician could contribute with his experience from his appointment in Smyrna. However, the real reason was the conflicts between the professors for some appointments that had been made, as Karathéodory confidentially reported to the Bavarian Minister of Education.[369] At the turn of the century, French influence among intellectual circles in Greece had started to increase and gradually a sort of "French faction" had developed at Athens University. It seems that the dispute between the French and the existing German faction, which still dominated the Faculty of Medicine, had damaged the smooth running of the institution. Karathéodory was expected to reconcile the two "fronts", exerting influence upon both sides. Despite his 'international conviction', Germans hoped that his visit to Greece, which was repeated over some years, was of great cultural-political significance for Germany's interests.[370] That hope, however, was never really fulfilled.

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[366] State Ministry of Education in Bavaria to the Legationsrat of the Foreign Ministry, Terdenge on 10.02.1930, in: PAAA, R 64064.

[367] Legation de Grèce, Berlin.Verbalnote to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 30.01.1930, in: PAAA, R 64064.

[368] Legation de Grèce, Berlin. Verbalnote to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 15 Mai 1931, in: PAAA, R 64064.

[369] Ministry of Education in Bavaria to the Legationsrat of the Foreign Ministry, Terdenge on 10.02.1930, in: PAAA, R 64064.

[370] *Ibid.*

3.3. Medicine as a cultural-political instrument.

The devastating impact of the "dictated" or "forced" peace ("*Friedensdiktat*", "*Gewaltfrieden*") -as the Germans usually called the Versailles Treaty- on their country's economy, was primarily due to reduction of its export trade. Deprived from its colonies, Germany lost a great share of the international sea trade as well. The belief solidified in the first decade of the twentieth century that strong interdependence between economy, industry and science could guarantee Germany's leading position on the international scientific scene but also on the political stage, was reinforced in 1920s. During that period, the young Republic had to reform its domestic and foreign policies and to reassess its priorities. Some of them, like the economic prosperity of the country, were to be seen through the old cultural lens that required, though, a new glance. Culture came to the fore after the efforts of the Allies, particularly France and Belgium, to damage, in the view of Germans, the image of their country abroad and to ostracise them from the international chessboard.

If the Zoological Station in Naples as we saw in the first chapter, represented Germany's international aspirations in science with some cultural and economic connotations, medicine -more precisely tropical medicine- seemed to portray even better the strong interrelation between science, economy and culture that transcended Germany's borders. With the loss of colonies, tropical medicine in Germany seemed to have come to an end. The Reich's medical organisations abroad had been confiscated by the Allies, causing serious shrinkage to the German medical culture overseas and consequently an immense foreign "cultural deficit".[371] The "Institute for Ship and Tropical Diseases" in Hamburg, the Tropical Convalescent Ward (*Tropengenesungsheim*) in Tuebingen and the Institute of Catholic Missionary Doctors (*Katholische Missionsaerztliche Institut*) in Wuerzburg now depended on the aid of the *Notgemeinschaft*.[372] So did the expeditions abroad that were largely organised by the Tropical Institute in Hamburg, which was established

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[371] GEORG SCHREIBER, Deutsche Medizin und Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft. Geschehnisse und Erlebnisse deutscher Medizinalpolitik und Kulturpolitik. Leipzig 1926, p. 55. England confiscated during the war German medical stations and hospitals like the "Viktoria-Krankenhaus der Diakonissenanstalt Kaiserswerth" in Cairo (established in 1885) and Alexandria, the "Koenig-Wilhelm-Hospiz" in Coubeeh les Bains near Cairo created in 1912, and the "Hospital der Sudan-Pioniermission" in Assuan, established in 1906. In Iran, the *Kaiserreich* contributed to the foundation of the National Hospital in Teheran in 1885, which since summer 1919 was directed by English doctors. See: *Ibid.* p. 51.

[372] *Ibid.*, pp. 54 f.

in 1901.[373] It was regarded as a "*Reichsinstitut*" and supported by the Colonial Department of the German Foreign Ministry. Since the very first days of its operation the institute conducted research on topical diseases in German colonies and offered its services to the ship crews that travelled overseas. The economic dimension of the institute and its importance for the German trade was highlighted by the fact that even the first expeditions that its scientists made to Latin America and to north and east Africa, were sponsored both by the state and by some enterprises in Hamburg.[374] The research conducted at the Tropical Institute focused on parasitic diseases usually caused by protozoa and spread by mosquitoes. When the Great War broke out, some of the institute's scientists were appointed health advisors in the Balkans and Turkey offering their services to the Reich's troops and also became involved in health and cultural policy in the region. After the war, science and technology seemed to be the basic elements that could bind Germany's two post-war aspirations together, i.e. economic strength and cultural influence. In that context, a confidential petition that appeared in Hamburg in 1921 declared that "science and technology, industry and commerce should go hand in hand".[375] In 1924, the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine in Hamburg University, Ludolph Brauer, argued that medicine and in particular the Tropical Institute were both "the carriers of German culture" abroad. Brauer further stressed the new role the Institute was going to play by way of compensation for the loss of the *Kaiserreich's* colonies, promoting Germany's "old traditions" in that regions.[376] Despite the fact that one might argue that these were arguments developed by the scientists to defend the institute's existence which was threatened during the 1920s,[377] they reflected the need to change the Republic's science policy. This meant, among other things, that science was to be included together with culture and economy in the state's foreign policy agenda.

The first step the Tropical Institute took to adapt its activities to the political developments of the time, was to collaborate with the newly-created "German Society for the Establishment of Hospitals Abroad" (*Deutschen Gesellschaft zur Gruendung von Kranken-*

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[373] The first two tropical institutes in Europe had been created in England a year before and these were the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and the London School of Tropical Medicine.

[374] STEFAN WULF, Das Hamburger Tropeninstitut 1919 bis 1945. Auswaertige Kulturpolitik und Kolonialrevisionismus nach Versailles. Hamburg 1994, pp. 1 ff.

[375] The title of the petition was "Fuer das Institut fuer Schiffs- und Tropenkrankheiten". Cited in: WULF, Das Hamburger Tropeninstitut, p.10.

[376] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[377] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

haeusern im Ausland), based in Darmstadt. The initiative was taken by the director of the institute, Bernhard Nocht, in 1918, while the war was coming to its end.[378] The 'hospital propaganda' was neither a German idea nor an innovation. England and France had already used this kind of cultural propaganda in their own colonies.[379] This "demonstration of power", as Stefan Wulf calls it, had a cultural and economic dimension. The provision of medical treatment in the developing countries by a 'civilised', 'superior' nation caused a deep obligation in those who benefited from that treatment and this outcome was not without its economic benefits for the provider of medical care.[380] By the end of World War I, it became clear that the role of the Hamburg Institute abroad should not be confined to scientific tasks. Its mission should also be cultural and economic. In other words, the institute should be transformed into an instrument for Germany to convince the international community of its scientific competitiveness, all the while trying to correct its image abroad. In 1923, the director of the clinical section of the Tropical Institute, Peter Muehlens, who was to become the central figure for tropical research in the Balkans in the following decades, made his first post-war visit to Latin America as the Institute's representative. It should be reminded that despite the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, Germany kept its relations with scientists abroad, in particular with Spain and Latin America, where the Tropical Institute enjoyed unquestioned respect for its pre-war medical research and its service to the local population. Muehlens' visit to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago, Asuncion and Rio was essentialy of a cultural-propaganda character. It is important to note that the German scientist visited Latin America on the invitation of the directors of the Medicine and Hygiene Faculties of the local universities.[381] In Buenos Aires, he was invited to lead a malaria-expedition to north Argentina and in Montevideo to lecture on the latest German achievements on tropical medicine. The fact that Muehlens spoke Spanish on his mission, seemed to work in the Republic's favour, promoting German intellect in a region, where French cultural propaganda had

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[378] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[379] See: HAGEN FLEISCHER, "Europas Rueckkehr nach Griechenland. Kulturpolitik der Grossmaechte in einem Staat der Peripherie", in: HARALD HEPPNER, OLGA KATSIARDI-HERING (Hg.), Die Griechen und Europa. Aussen- und Innensichten im Wandel der Zeit. Wien 1998, pp. 125-191, here pp.144 f, particularly footnote 68.

[380] WULF, Das Hamburger Tropeninstitut, p.9.

[381] Report of the German Embassy at Montevideo to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, on 10.12.1924. In: PAAA, R 64680.

been intensified the previous few years.[382] Muehlens' cultural-political mission to Latin America was not restricted, though, to the use of Spanish during his lectures. Reading his confidential report to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, one could ascertain his new role as a cultural missionary, rather than simply a scientific delegate, making discerning statements about the cultural, economic and political situation of the countries he visited. This seemed to become his dominant role in all expeditions he made later on, not only to Latin America but also to the Balkans. In his revealing report of 1924, Muehlens concentrated on Argentina, a country that traditionally was Francophile. The German scientist brought to the fore the old well known issue of the respect German science enjoyed with regard other 'cultured nations', namely the United States and France. The invitation by the director of the Department for Hygiene of the Buenos Aires University to lead a malaria-expedition had particular importance for the Germans. By that time, the Rockefeller Foundation was the only institution to have undertaken research projects on infectious diseases in Argentina. Rockefeller had established a great reputation by conducting medical research not only in Latin America but also in many European countries. The fact that the Argentinean administration rejected the offer that was made by the American organisation in favour of the German Tropical Institute in 1924, was regarded by Muehlens as a triumph for German science over American scientific endeavours.[383]

It seems that this was also an indication that despite the boycott against German science, its great achievements in some disciplines could no longer be ignored by the international scientific community. In 1921, two new drugs, i.e. *Bayer* 205 and *Yarten* 105, had been successfully tested in the clinical section of the Tropical Institute in Hamburg, for the cure of *Trypanosomiasis* and *Amoebiasis*.[384] These infectious diseases, better known as sleeping sickness and dysentery caused by specific protozoa, are transmitted by insects vectors. Both were major killers in tropical countries. Acknowledging the undeniable importance of Germany's medical advancement, many foreign scientists started to press their countries to lift the Versailles sanctions imposed on Germany and to allow the country to re-join the international scientific community. The prominent biologist Julian Hurley of Oxford, for example, wrote on *Daily Herald* that it was criminal foolish to bring

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[382] *Ibid.*

[383] "Allgemein-wissenschaftliche, kulturpolitische und wirtschaftliche Eindruecke aus Suedamerika.", by P. Muehlens, 1924. The report was confidential and not for publication. In: PAAA, R 64680.

[384] WULF, Das Hamburger Tropeninstitut, p. 8. See also: Dr. Muhlens' lecture held in Argentina with the title "Die Kulturelle und wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Gesundheitsfuersorgen in den warmen Laendern", published on the daily newspaper "Argentinisches Tageblatt" on 28(?).11.1924. In: PAAA, R 64680.

a major scientific nation, like Germany, in a position in which its scientific achievements was difficult to be known. The discovery of *Bayer* 205, noted Hurley, was apparently of great financial importance for the Allies, more than the whole reimbursement sum they had demanded from the defeated Germany after World War I.[385] It is not surprising therefore, that for the Allies the "remarkable character" of *Bayer* 205 "opened a fresh vista of hope" to the Germans to restore their colonial empire.[386] No matter how utopian these hopes and beliefs may seem, one thing was to be certain: the propaganda allegations about the decline of German science could no longer hold. Germany's competitiveness in pharmaceuticals increased in Latin America after the success of *Bayer* 205 and *Yarten* 105, even though the German drugs were considerably more expensive than the French or American equivalents. This development had a direct impact on the Republic's economy and the country's growing pharmaceutical industry.

In spite of its dominance of pharmaceutical market in Latin America, Germany remained far behind in exerting strong influence in the Americas. The German medical and chemical industry, although growing, was not yet competitive comparing with the French, English or North American industries. These countries had dominated the Latin American market, not only offering low prices on drugs, but also providing high-quality medical equipment, like the X-ray machines which were better than the German, even by Muehlens' own admission.[387] He also emphasised that, "if we believed for a long time after the war that the numerous Argentineans who came to Germany were our "*friends*" and they wished to know our culture better, then this is a "*big mistake*".[388] He justified the Argentinean tendency, arguing that Germany had become a very cheap country after the war and, therefore, a good market for Argentineans to buy the necessary equipment for their laboratories. As soon as Germany's gold currency had pushed up the prices of all its products, they returned to the countries they traditionally did business with, namely France and, to a limited extent Italy.[389] The mission of the Hamburg Institute was also to

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385 Cited in: Muhlens' lecture in Argentina "Die Kulturelle und wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Gesundheitsfuersorgen in den warmen Laendern", *Ibid.*, in: PAAA, R 64680.

386 Article published on *Times* on 25.08.1922 with the title "Deutschland ueber Alles", cited in: WULF, Das Hamburger Tropeninstitut, pp. 156 f. See also: Muhlens' lecture in Argentina "Die Kulturelle und wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Gesundheitsfuersorgen in den warmen Laendern", *Ibid.*, in: PAAA, R 64680.

387 Muehlens' confidential report about the "Allgemein-wissenschaftliche, kulturpolitische und wirtschaftliche Eindruecke aus Suedamerika" in 1924. In: PAAA, R 64680.

388 *Ibid.* The emphasis is his.

389 *Ibid.*

try to attract customers for Germany's medical products. It seemed that the Institute did not only brought Germany back to the international scientific community, but was also an institution in which tropical medicine, politics and economics intertwined. This intimate relationship, between science and wider political issues was to inaugurate a new era in the Republic's science policy, where medicine, as well as exports of scientific material, became integral elements of the country's cultural-political concept.[390]

The next target of this concept was the Balkans. Muehlens' first scientific expedition to the peninsula was made in 1915. He was appointed health adviser in Turkey and then in Bulgaria soon after the latter entered the war. This was the beginning of Muehlens' long relationship with the region and in particular with Bulgaria. On one of his numerous trips between 1915 and early 1940s, he visited the Greek province of Macedonia twice to conduct research on malaria, a disease which was endemic in that area, decimating not only the local population but also weakening the Allies' army. This disease continued to plague southeastern Europe for decades. The problem had to be tackled as soon as and as effective as possible to give Germany the chance to play an important scientific and, consequently, a cultural-political role in the region. In other words, the Balkans seemed to offer fertile soil for Germany's ambition to extent its foreign influence, pursuing almost the same policy as it had done for its colonies overseas in the past.

Towards the end of 1926, Muehlens made another long trip to the Balkan countries, this time to Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey. His mission was not only to report on the medical situation in the region, but also on the degree of its cultural and political inclination towards Germany.[391] Even though Muehlens already knew that part of the Balkans very well, Turkey, as well as Bulgaria continued to dominate his interest in the region. He went to Turkey at the invitation of the Faculty of Medicine of the University in Istanbul to lecture on the results of chemotherapy used for diseases in tropical areas.[392] His lecture was so well received that Muehlens took the chance to discuss anew the possibility of German professors teaching at Istanbul University. It was known that Turks did not like foreign professors at their universities, even though there were seven French professors that were already teaching there. These appointments were according to the German Embassy in Ankara, the result of the cease-fire between the Central Pow-

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390 WULF, Das Hamburger Tropeninstitut, p. 11.

391 Muehlens' confidential report entitled "Kurzer Bericht ueber medizinische und kulturelle Eindruecke aus Jugoslawien, Griechenland, Bulgarien und der Tuerkei", in 1926. In: PAAA, R 64680.

392 Deutsche Botschaft in Angara(sic!) to Auswaertigen Amt, 29.10.1926, in: PAAA, R 64680.

ers and the Entente and the pressure the French High Commissioner in Istanbul put on the Turkish government.[393] The Germans thought that Turks were particularly pleased when prominent German scientists went to Istanbul to lecture and these lectures stood out from the majority of the ordinary courses. Muehlens' visit, as well as the warm reception Professor Erwin Baur of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology had received a few months previously, were indicative of the fertile soil for exerting Germany scientific influence in Turkey.[394]

The political and social upheaval that was due to the war led to large numbers of people moving into new areas where disease was spread more easily. Muehlens visited the refugee barracks of those who were forced to move during and after the war between Greece and Turkey, as well as to camps in Bulgaria. According to the German doctor the situation was unremittingly appalling. In Greece, he visited Saloniki, where he tried the new drug, *'Plasmochin'*, against malaria on new cases, as he did in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.[395] Saloniki, the biggest harbor in north Greece, had, by that time, become a refugee-city, as great numbers of Greeks who had been living for centuries in Asia Minor, eastern Thrace and in some of the biggest cities of the Black Sea, were forced to emigrate to Greece during and after the end of the Great War. The sudden increase in the population of Saloniki, which was unprepared to receive huge numbers of refugees, was one of the causes of the several epidemics that broke out at refugee camps. The lack of readiness for the great upheaval was not unique to this area but was duplicated all over Greece. Unsurprising perhaps, malaria and typhus were now threatening the whole population. Muehlens as a well-known figure was not only welcomed warmly to the city of Saloniki by both the local and state authorities, but he was also permitted to visit the local military hospital and to try the new drug against malaria on Greek soldiers.[396] The health organization in Greece was primitive, reported the German scientist and compared unfavourably with arragements in Yugoslavia, where adequate equipment and supplies were in place. Greece was in a desperate economic situation and the impact of

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[393] *Ibid.*

[394] *Ibid.* Erwin Baur became a year later, in 1927, director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Plant Breeding in Muechenberg.

[395] Report of the German Consul on Saloniki to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, on 07.08.1926. In: PAAA, R 64680; also: Muehlens' "Kurzer Bericht ueber medizinische und kulturelle Eindruecke aus Jugoslawien, Griechenland, Bulgarien und der Tuerkei" in 1926, PAAA, R 64680.

[396] Report of the German Consul on Saloniki to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, on 07.08.1926. In: PAAA, R 64680.

the disease was immense, causing many lost days of work. The word "crisis" was heard everywhere in Saloniki and the Greeks, observed Muehlens, no longer spoke in warm terms about their French allies.[397]

Even though one could argue for the "humanitarian" character of Muehlens' visit to the territories of south-eastern Europe which were so desperate for medical help,[398] his trip was more than that. It is a fact that the German scientist already knew the region of Macedonia and Saloniki front very well from his four-year posting in the Turkish and the Bulgarian army. His knowledge, though, was not limited to medical issues, but went deeper to the mentality of the people, particularly the Bulgarians and the Turks, as he himself recalled in 1926.[399] As for the Greeks, he noted in the same report, they still held German science in high esteem, despite the allied propaganda against it during and after the war. Moreover, among the Greek doctors, there were many who had studied in Germany and who had succeeded in the state exams, a procedure through which foreigners were not only recognised as equal of their German colleagues in scientific ability, but also entitled them to practise in Germany. Muehlens received an invitation from Greek physicians to participate in their national congress in Saloniki and to give a lecture. This was interpreted by the German specialist as clear expression by the Greeks of high regard towards German science as well as an acknowledgement of his country's contribution to helping Greece cope with the serious problem of infectious diseases. Muehlens, however, declined their invitation for health reasons and because of his planned departure for Istanbul. The cultural-political significance of medicine in Greece was recognised by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1932, the Ministry made known its intention to the authorities of the Hamburg University to create "a firm tradition of the education of Greek doctors in Hamburg".[400] Co-operation with the university's administration, which would secure economic support for the young Greeks, as well as with the German Academic Exchange Service was demanded in order for the Ministry to bring its plan to fruition.[401] One case, this of Basilios Malamos, will serve to

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[397] Muehlens' "Kurzer Bericht ueber medizinische und kulturelle Eindruecke aus Jugoslawien, Griechenland, Bulgarien und der Tuerkei" in 1926, PAAA, R 64680.

[398] German Consul on Saloniki to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, on 07.08.1926. In: PAAA, R 64680.

[399] Muehlens' "Kurzer Bericht ueber medizinische und kulturelle Eindruecke aus Jugoslawien, Griechenland, Bulgarien und der Tuerkei" in 1926, PAAA, R 64680.

[400] Auswaertiges Amt to Wrochem (Hochschulbehoerde d. Univ. Hamburg) 22.06.32, in: PAAA, R 61147.

[401] *Ibid.*

illustrate the profile of Greeks who received this kind of aid from the German state. He was not only a good student who justified financial support. He also was the son of a Greek merchant in Hamburg and former admiral, who had been forced by the Entente to accept a discharge in 1917, as he had expressed germanophile feelings during the war.[402] During the Nazi era, Malamos as a prominent parasitologist with an international reputation, who in the meanwhile had become a professor in Greece, became the link for the cultural-political plans of German scientists in Greece. The same expectations had the Germans for other Greek bursars as well.

Medicine in general, although recognised as an important tool for foreign cultural policy, did not seem to be particularly promoted by the German authorities in the Balkans. Unlike Germany, France, the United States, even Italy, were less reluctant to use medicine for scientific, cultural and economic influence abroad. Greece became the recipient of medical aid, and in particular 'hospital propaganda', exerted from all the above powers. As mentioned earlier, hospitals were the institution par excellence through which an effective cultural policy could be exerted. Their effectiveness was on the one hand, due to the services that were offered to a large part of population, evoking feelings of gratitude to the benefactor, on the other hand it was due to their contribution to the advancement of the country's interest in science and research. In this context, the effort for the establishment of a German gynaecological and maternity clinic in Athens is of particular interest. The initiative came, however, from a Greek doctor, Constantinos Louros, who had studied in Germany. As Greece was lacking in medical institutions, particularly a maternity hospital, C. Louros created a private clinic in 1910 in Athens. A great and loyal admirer of the German culture and intellect he sent his only son, Nikolaos Louros, to Berlin to study medicine and train as gynaecologist. Nikolaos during his stay in Germany, where he had started his career, built close contact with Dr. von Cranach, Administrator (*Geschaeftsfuehrer*) in the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, and with a number of other prominent scientists. Von Cranach would play the role of mediator in the following years for Louros' plans. In 1926, Dr. Louros, Sr. made a proposal to the cultural department of the German Foreign Ministry to contribute to his plan to transform his clinic into a "German Gynaecological Clinic", arguing that it would be a very effective tool in the

[402] Hochschulbehoerde d. Univ. Hamburg, to Herr Terdenge, Ministerialdirigent des Auwaertigen Amtes 16.06.1932, PAAA, R 61147.

German cultural propaganda campaign in Greece.[403] His proposal however, did not meet with approval because of the lack of funds. Two years later, Dr. Louros, Jr. being on leave from the Friedrich-Wilhelm University of Berlin, in which he had part-time teaching duties, came back to Athens and took over his father's clinic. This time he approached the Kaiser Wilhelm Society asking for support for his project. On his side, he had Dr. von Cranach. At the same time he became member of the Society. His father was also encouraged to apply for membership.[404] What Nikolaos Louros proposed was the creation of a "German Gynaecological Clinic affiliated to the Kaiser Wilhelm Society" ("*Deutsche Frauenklinik in Athen angeschlossen der Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften*"). According to the Greek doctor this basically meant support by the Society to build an extension to his clinic for about sixty to eighty new beds for the poor, who could not pay a first -or even second class- hospital expenses.[405] The conditions of his offer were ideal for the German side. Louros offered a complete and modern equipped clinic (i.e. operating theatres, auditorium, X-ray laboratories, policlinic etc.) and he committed himself to defray the expenses for the extra construction, making clear that his clinic would be at Germany's full disposal.[406] What he wanted was a relatively small contribution from the Germans of approximately 250,000 Marks for the extra infrastructure and about 80,000 marks for yearly expenses, while the price of the site was estimated at 200,000 marks and the whole clinic with its expansion at 1,500,000 marks.[407] Louros, Jr. stressed the fact that the new 'third class' department would operate as a philanthropic institute, which would make the German propaganda even more effective.

What is striking is that the Greek scientist, in his effort to convince the Germans, showed considerable skill in marshalling arguments based on ideas of cultural propa-

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[403] Prof. Nikolaos Louros (Athens) to the President of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in December 1930, in: Archiv zur Geschichte der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (MPGA), Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/1.

[404] See: Prof. N. Louros (Athens) to von Cranach on 01.11.1930, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/1; General Director of the KWG, Friedrich Glum to Nikolaos Louros on 15.05.1931, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/2.

[405] Prof. Nikolaos Louros (Athens) to the President of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in December 1930, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/1.

[406] Prof. N. Louros (Athens) to von Cranach on 01.11.1931, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/1; Denkschrift des Dr. N.C. Louros, betrifft Vorschlaege ueber eine deutsche kulturelle Porpaganda in Griechenland namentlich ueber die Gruendung eines Deutschen Krankenhauses in Athen, p. 9, (undated document presumably between 1933-35) in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/4.

[407] N. Louros to von Cranach on 01.11.1931, *ibid.*; also undated and unsigned document presumably of v. Cranach to the KWG, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/1, paper numbers 4, 5.

ganda that even an enthusiast statesman would be jealous of. For example, he argued that "the exact sciences served not only the general welfare, but were also an important element for the nations rapprochement, promoting a propitious mutual intellectual influence".[408] He also demonstrated that his medical degree from Berlin University would be held in great esteem and for this reason his father was willing to make a considerable financial sacrifice in order to promote German cultural policy in Greece.[409] In the same vein Louros, Sr. noted that the hospital would have the "German imprimatur", thereby expanding the German science and culture in Greece and it would be dedicated to scientific work in the German intellect.[410] He argued further that the contact point of cultural relations between the two countries was restricted to what he called the "dead area", namely the Greek history, literature and archaeology. He acknowledged however, the importance of the German Schools, as a great number of their graduates later studied at German universities, enrolling in faculties of medicine, law, and engineering or, in time becoming professors. Using arguments, common in Germany particularly in the Weimar years that aroused the German national pride, he compared the German cultural tactics to those of other big nations and claimed that German influence in Greece was not as strong as it used to be in the past. One important reason for this, underlined Louros, was the growing French influence, aided by their numerous cultural institutions, not to mention the effort of Italians and the Americans to push their own cultural agenda.[411]

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[408] *Ibid.*

[409] Prof. Nikolaos Louros (Athens) to the President of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in December 1930, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/1.

[410] C. Louros to unknown recipient on 01.12.1930, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/1.

[411] Denkschrift des Dr. N.C. Louros, betrifft Vorschlaege ueber eine deutsche kulturelle Porpaganda in Griechenland namentlich ueber die Gruendung eines Deutschen Krankenhauses in Athen, pp. 2 ff., (undated document presumably between 1933-35) in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/4. France exerted influence, noted Louros, through 1) the French Schools, 2) a well organised French-Greek Union, 3) four French newspapers, 4) lectures of prominent French intellectuals, 5) a French hospital, 6) a chair for philology and philosophy at Athens University, which according to Louros was occupied by a French professor, 7) the "Institute Pasteur", 8) French missionaries, 9) organised visits of French tourists to Greece, and 10) the strong campaign of the French diplomats. As for the Italians, Louros named the "Casa d' Italia" and the lectures of Italian scholars in Athens, while for the Americans he mentioned the organisation "Near East Relief" as cultural propagandistic tool.

Recruiting new foreign members and therefore establishing a network of eminent scientists abroad was one of the Society's cultural political activities.[412] Therefore, his arguments and his generous partnership offer at first convinced the administration of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, which drafted a provisional contract and the statutes of the German clinic in Greece. Nevertheless, the development of the whole procedure was quite disappointing for the Greek gynaecologist. Despite the fact that his German colleagues with whom he had worked in Germany for many years were favourably disposed towards him and agreed to support him participating to the clinic's committee (*Kuratorium*), the German Foreign Office had certain reservations about him personally and the timing of the initiative. The reaction of the Greek government troubled the Germans despite Louros' assurances that there would not be any difficulties, for "there were already existing several French, American and Italian hospitals in Greece (sic)".[413] In addition, the Germans had information about the conflicts between Nikolaos Louros and Konstantinos Logothetopoulos, another prominent gynaecologist in Greece who was deeply devoted to the German cause. The establishment of a German clinic, in collaboration with Louros, might alienate not only Logothetopoulos from Germany, but also a number of other German-educated doctors, or other sympathisers to Germany, such as Marinos Gerulanos, Valettas, Apostolopoulos, who were closely related to the German colony in Athens and were influencial in the Greek-German Union.[414] It was obvious that the Germans did not want to risk their well-established relations with a number of important Greeks for Louros, no matter how much they might benefit from his clinic. Therefore, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society rejected Louros' offer to his great disappointment. Apart from his deep knowledge of the importance cultural policy had for Germany, the cultural political activities of other nations in his country and his rhetorical skills, were also remarkable is his perseverance in seeking out German collaboration. After the rejection by the KWG, he addressed himself to the German Red Cross for financial aid and

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[412] Dr. von Cranach to Prof. Dr. Karo, Director of the German Archaeological Institute in Athens on 21.01.1931, and reply of Karo to v. Cranach on 24.01.1931 both in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/2. Von Cranach asked Karo to propose professor of gynaecology Konstantinos Logothetopoulos to apply for membership in the Society.

[413] Prof. Nikolaos Louros, Athens to the President of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in December 1930, and Karo to v. Cranach 14.01.1931, both in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/1.

[414] German Ambassador in Athens, Heberlein, to Dr. v. Cranach on 14.01.1931, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/2. See also the reply of the President of the KWG, Max Planck to N. Louros, on 04.03.1931, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/2. The relevant paragraph has been omitted.

when the Nazis came to power he made a new effort without success. It should be noted that, even though the Rockefeller Foundation was very likely to finance his project, as he claimed, -and this does not seem to be a mere rhetoric to convince the KWG-, he desperately sought German support. This was perhaps due to his great affection for his intellectual homeland or because he believed he would stand higher in the esteem of Greek medical circles, which were German-educated for the most part, if had the German rather than the American backing.

4. Science, culture and the economic interests of Nazi Germany in southeastern Europe.

4.1. "Lebensraum", geopolitics and cultural expansion.

From 30 January 1933 onwards, Germany's place in the world political scene changed dramatically as the National Socialist Workers Party (NSDAP) seized power under the leadership of Adolf Hitler. The party was created in 1919 and Hitler became its member within months. Within less than a year he had taken charge of the party's campaign and in February 1920, in the first mass gathering of the party in Munich, he declared the twenty-fine points of the party's program. The third point spoke of the "land and ground" (*Land und Boden*) that Germany needed for its people food self-sufficiency and settlement eastwards, due to the country's overpopulation.[415] That meant that, having lost its colonies overseas, Germany had to seek new land where she could expand in order to survive. The bitter feeling related to the territorial loses after the Great War and the rise of a strong nationalist sentiment were present in the political oratory of all post-war parties in the Weimar Republic. However, in the case of the NSDAP these concepts had a decisive significance for the construction of its ideology, which was composed of "very German", anti-Semitic, anti-Marxist, and anti-liberal features.[416] However, it was the biological and racial perception of the world that epitomised the Nazi worldview (*Weltanschauung*). For Hitler, race was the key to understanding world history. Praising of German race went hand in hand with the *Voelkish* thought, which was the most ominous expression of German nationalism. Rooted in the second half of nineteenth century *Voelkish* thought sought to bind together the German people through a deep love of their language, traditions and fatherland. *Voelkish* thinkers also regarded German culture as unique, innately superior and in opposition to the humanist outlook of the French Enlightenment. They embraced the ideas of H.S. Chamberlain, an Englishman who provided intellectual legitimacy for the National Socialists and whose fascination for 'Germanism' led him to adopt German citizenship. In the *Foundations of Nineteenth Century*, published in 1899, Chamberlain asserted in pseudoscientific fashion that races differed physically, but also morally and

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[415] WOLFGANG WIPPERMANN, "Ideologie", in: WOLFGANG BENZ u.a. (Hrsg.), Enzyklopaedie des Nationalsozialismus. Muenchen 1997, pp. 11-21, here 11 f.

[416] MARTIN BROSZAT, Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung. Muenchen 1969, [14]1995, pp. 33-49, here p. 33.

intellectually, and that the struggle between races was the driving force of history. He held that the Germans, descendants of the ancient Aryans, were physically superior and bearers of a higher culture. Catch phrases like "blood and soil" and notions like "*Ahnenerbe*", population "cleaning", "repopulating" became propaganda battle-cries for the Nazis, which justified their radical strategies for the extinction of nations (*Voelkermord*). These concepts also justified their geopolitical plans to the east and south-east. As a higher race, the Germans were entitled to expand eastward at the expense of the 'racially inferior' Slavs, acquiring *Lebensraum*, supported and justified scientifically by geopolitics.

The notion of geopolitics was first used by Fridrich Ratzel in 1897. Influenced by Social Darwinism Ratzel used it as a central concept in a biological theory asserting that species migration was the most important element of social adaptation.[417] In the Nazi era, however, the dominant figure was General Karl Haushofer, who developed the notion further trying to legitimise his imperialist theories scientifically, thereby exerting great influence over the Nazis. Haushofer was professor of geography at the University of Munich and a sometime teacher of Rudolf Hess, who apparently introduced him to Hitler. In 1934, Haushofer became president of the German Academy, further influencing this major German cultural-political institution with his doctrines. He himself had contributed in the mid-1920s to the establishment of the institution. Haushofer's views on geopolitics, which combined traditional imperialism with the notion of living space (*Lebensraum*), found fertile soil in the national socialist *Weltanschauung*. Using geographical criteria (*geographischen Grundlagen*) he defined geopolitics as the science of world politics (*Weltpolitik*) and as a doctrine with practical application in foreign policy.[418] Geopolitics, political science and foreign policy were intimately and enduringly intertwined. As for its relationship with *Lebensraum*, geopolitics, argued the Munich professor, was the instrument for its conquest. The *Lebensraum* struggle had two dimensions for Haushofer: one defensive and the other offensive. By 'defensive' he meant the employment of tactics and strategies for protecting the state from any foreign geopolitical influence. On the other hand, the expansion of Germany's own power and the reunification of its people cattered abroad

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[417] KRISTIE MACRAKIS, "The ideological origins of institutes at the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft in National Socialist Germany", in: MONIKA RENNEBERG, MARK WALKER (ed.), Science, Technology and National Socialism. Cambridge 1994, pp. 139-159, here p. 143.

[418] HANS-ADOLF JACOBSEN, "Auswaertige Kulturpolitik als 'geistige Waffe'. Karl Haushofer und die Deutsche Akademie (1923-1927)", in: KURT DUEWELL, WERNER LINK (Hg.), Deutsche Auswaertige Kulturpolitik seit 1871. Geschichte und Struktur. Koeln 1981, pp. 218-261, here p. 221.

was defined as the Reich's 'offensive' struggle for its leaving space.[419] The scientific element of Haushofer's geopolitics could also be traced to what he called "breathing space" (*Atemraum*), an environmental factor that was essential for the existence of a nation.[420] Therefore, foreign policy should secure adequate *Lebensraum* for the people and, where this "living space became too narrow, the state was obliged to expand it. An adequate *Lebensraum* was for Haushofer the prerequisite for the state's highest cultural development, for its independence from foreign powers and for its economic self-sufficiency.[421] A piece of land that would secure to human beings autarky, namely a rich fauna and flora for their 'provisioning freedom' (*Naehrungsfreiheit*), was how the German geographer understood sufficient *Lebensraum*. For him geopolitics was also an endless interaction between theory and praxis, knowing and dealing, cognisance and performance. In other words, every political action was dependent on the enduring relationship with land configuration (*Bodengestalt*).[422] Geopolitics, he argued, was a sort of "fusing science" that combined the world of nature with the world of intellect. It was a synthesis, for example, of biology, agriculture, botany, zoology, medicine, sociology and political science, philosophy and jurisprudence. These disciplines were for Haushofer the "main platform" for geopolitics, while all others were regarded by him as more or less "supportive sciences" (*Hilfswissenschaften*). Reigning supreme above all other disciplines, however, was geography.[423]

Having served in the army, Haushofer related geopolitics to defence geography (*Werhgeographie*). Reccounting his own experiences, he argued that the martial-geographical *Atemraum* was of decisive importance for the state's development for its future security. The restricted space (*Kleinraeumigkeit*) of central Europe with its numerous minorities made their enduring geopolitical existence impossible, let alone the existence of the so-called great nations, which were growing rapidly.[424] Germany was in danger of becoming "a nation without space". Trying to awaken the national feeling, Haushofer

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[419] *Ibid.*

[420] *Ibid.*, p. 225.

[421] See also: HANS HISS, "Autarkie und Weltwirtschaft", in: *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik*, Jahrgang 5, Heft 4, (April 1928), pp. 302-306.

[422] JACOBSEN, "Auswaertige Kulturpolitik als "geistige Waffe", p. 219.

[423] *Ibid.*, pp. 219, 260.

[424] KARL HAUSHOFER, "Die Geopolitische Lage Deutschlands", in: KARL LANGE, ERNST ADOLF DREYER (Hg.), Deutsche Geist. Kulturdokumente der Gegenwart. Erster Jahresband 1933: Der Ruf. Leipzig 1933, pp. 79-87, here: 80.

argued that a small, weak and spatially confined Germany should not be called "Reich", for it did not reflect the greatness of the term *per se*. "That name", he exclaimed, "was [but] a noble remembrance and a glorious advancement to the future with unrivalled greatness feasible, however, only with the motto 'all forces to be maintained in every tenacity'; otherwise the Reich could not be revived".[425] Great Britain was, for Haushofer, perhaps the best model of how geopolitics could be combined with military and foreign policy-making, particularly overseas. The Britons played a dominant role in the Asian Sea and its surrounding states, due to the empire's wisely organised military resources, placed in positions of greatest geopolitical importance.[426] Japan was another such example, which Haushofer had experienced himself for about two years, from 1908 to 1910, when he served there as military observer. "If we want to live," he stressed in 1934 in the auditorium of Munich University, "Germany has to modify its military policy according to its geopolitical interests". Controlling geo-strategic territories on land and sea, he continued, Germany would increase its power on the world scene, meeting the preconditions for the security of the state, for the maintenance of the *Volkslebensraum*, as well as for its economic and cultural development.[427]

Despite the fact that his concept of *Lebensraum* became the core of the national socialist foreign policy agenda, Haushofer believed that the Nazis never understood the essence of his ideas.[428] For him, space was an organic political category and the notion of *Volk* was defined by cultural, economic and geographical terms, representing in social terms the nation and in political terms the state. Unlike him, the Nazis associated the *Volk* with race and *Lebensraum* with biology and agriculture, cultural and economic imperialism. Agriculture was regarded the science that appealed to romantic longings, like blood and soil (*Blut und Boden*), *Lebensraum* and people's soil (*Volksboden*), and therefore, was crucial for German society. For National Socialism agriculture was reactionary and modern at the same time: reactionary in its romanticism and modern in its technology.[429]

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[425] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

[426] See: KARL HAUSHOFER, Wehr-Geopolitik. Geographische Grundlagen einer Wehrkunde. Berlin 1941. Particularly chapters B and H.

[427] KARL HAUSHOFER, "Erdkunde, Geopolitik und Wehrwissenschaft", in: *Muenchener Universitaetsreden*, Heft 28, (1934), pp. 1-15, here p. 11. *Ibid.*, "Die Geopolitische Lage Deutschlands", p. 86.

[428] JACOBSEN, "Auswaertige Kulturpolitik als "geistige Waffe", p. 223.

[429] See: JEFFREY HERF, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich. Cambridge 1984.

By expanding into the rich agricultural territories of the east and south-east Europe, the German *Volk* could achieve more economic autarky.

The National Socialists dressed Haushofer's views in the garb of the racial and cultural elements of their ideology relating geopolitics with the *Voelkish* thought. For the modern Reich *Lebensraum* was not restricted to the state's territory drawn by a natural or an artificial border. It was closely affiliated to a "common consciousness of German belonging" (*Gesamtdeutsches Bewusstsein*).[430] This idea embraced all German minorities living abroad, which were regarded by the Nazis as valuable tools for foreign policy at all levels. Germany, they argued, was neither a geographical notion nor was it confined to the state. Germany was, wherever Germans lived and regarded themselves as the bearers of a unique mission, namely to make the German soul the foundation of a new world order.[431] What bound them with their fatherland was German culture. Arian descent, the sacred soil and traditions, as well as the technical, economic, scientific and military achievements were all conceptualised in this framework. The German *Volk*, wherever it was settled, should be enlightened with the ideals of German culture and thus it should be diffused further, thereby expanding the German living space. *Lebensraum* was a dynamic notion dependent on the luminous physical and intellectual energy of the people. The cultural element, argued the Nazis, was exactly what differentiated the German *Lebensraum* from the imperialistic definition of space by the contemporary powers.[432] Nevertheless, what they themselves defined as *Lebensraum* was itself none other than imperialism, albeit under slightly different guise. The expansion of Germany's living space was difficult to achieve overseas. Therefore, modern colonisation, believed the Nazis, had to be undertaken in an eastwards direction. The Danube, Rhine, Elbe, Weichsel and Oder Rivers were, in the nineteenth century the main communication and commercial roads of the Habsburg Empire, controlled by the metropolises of Berlin and Vienna. Soon after the decline of the empire, the newly formed states in the territory took the control of this network, restricting Germany's free mercantile movement within central Europe and consequently limiting its economic influence. Expansion to the north-east did not only

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[430] HILLEN A. ZIEGFELD, "Deutscher Lebensraum", in: KARL LANGE, ERNST ADOLF DREYER (Hg.), Deutscher Geist 1935. Kulturdokumente der Gegenwart. Zweiter Jahresband 1935: Gestaltung des Reiches. Leipzig 1934, pp. 63-73, here p. 64.

[431] *Ibid.*, p. 65. Compare also the definition of "Mitteleuropa" by Friedrich Neumann in 1915. Cited in: WOLFGANG SCHUMANN (ed.), Griff nach Sueosteuropa. Neue Dokumente ueber die Politik des deutschen Imperialismus und Militarismus gegenueber Suedosteuropa im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Berlin 1973, p. 16.

[432] *Ibid.*, pp. 69 f, 72.

mean taking back control of the former Habsburg territories, but also of Russia. On the other hand, south-east Europe was a valuable economic resource, moreover an access-point to the Mediterranean that would facilitate trade with the Near East. New forms of political order had to be adopted for Germany to win a place in world politics.

When the Nazis began to organise the state's foreign policy, they tried to differentiate themselves from traditional imperialists by introducing a new type of expansion, giving emphasis to culture. *Kulturpolitik* was the euphemistic term employed for cultural imperialism and it was no more than a cover for the economic, political and military expansion plans of the Reich. Culture, however, had a particular meaning for the Nazis which was shaped during the Weimar Republic. France was thought to be primarily responsible for Germany's disgrace, but so also, by extension, was the entire western civilisation that derived from the ideals of the French Enlightenment. Nazi culture rejected Enlightenment reason, which sought liberation from magic, but embraced modern technology, the advancement of which was precisely due to that same rationale. Nevertheless, the Nazi rationale was quite different from the French variety, mingling anti-liberal, anti-capitalist and idealistic, romantic and magical elements with concrete thinking, organisation and creative performance. This was influenced by the reactionary modernists of the Weimar Republic and the cultural policy of German engineers. This "cultural paradox", as Jeffrey Herf calls it, became the backbone of the Nazi worldview.[433] The reactionary modernists, he specified, distinguished 'culture' (*Kultur*) from 'civilisation' (*Zivilisation*), identifying the first with the German tradition and the latter with the declining west.[434] To *Kultur* belonged notions like community, blood, will, productivity, race, while *Zivilisation* was related to reason, intellect, internationalism, materialism, and finance. What formed the national socialists' culture was a mixed bag of both 'culture' and 'civilisation'. They rejected modernity as it had been shaped by the political values of the 1789 Revolution, as well as scientific modernity. Science, in contrast to technology, was regarded as a product of the Revolution and a theory that was foreign to the German soul. Technol-

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[433] JEFFREY HERF, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich. Cambridge 1984.

[434] One of the anti-modernist demonstrators *par excellence* of the cultural crisis in Weimar Republic was Oswald Spengler. In his particular influential work "Der Untergang des Abendlandes" he tried to reconcile the romantic and irrational feelings with the enthusiasm of the technological progress and hoped that this reconciliation would make the new generation to turn to technology and politics rather than to poetry and philosophy. See: OSWALD SPENGLER, Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Umrisse einer morphologie der Weltgeschichte. (Ungekuerzte Sonderausg). Muenchen (1923), 1981.

ogy on the other hand, not only held a fascination for the Nazis. It even became part of the German national identity. In that peculiar modernity that was German National Socialism, in which reason and myth intermingled, as Horkheimer and Adorno pointed out,[435] practice did not contradict Nazi ideology.

The concept of "*Lebensraum*" was also developed along the same reactionary modernist lines. It was deeply related to race, irrational and mythical elements, but it also became a matter of Germany's economic policy, which was planned and developed with the help of science and technology. As soon as the Nazis gained one victory after the other in Europe by *Blitzkrieg* tactics, "*Lebensraum*" gave way to "*Grossraum*" and "*Grossraumwirtschaft*" (great space for Germany's economy). In 1942, though, the public use of these terms was prohibited. The geopolitical language of Haushofer that was enriched with the terms of the "Great Space", threatened to jeopardise the Reich's war propaganda.[436] This was a serious complication and it forced the Party's chancellery to intervene and give guidelines, suspending any public discussion or any written study on "*Grossraumpolitik*" and "*Grossraumwirtschaft*" issues.[437] These were serious and sensitive questions, related to political and economic management, to the outcome of the war itself and thus only the *Fuehrer* had the authority to speak or to write about them.[438] The party's chancellery argued that discussion on the division of the globe into continental large territories was not in the Reich's favour. For example, when the Germans said that North and South America make together a *Grossraum* or a *Grossraumwirtschaft*, it was tantamount to Germany encouraging the United States' Pan-American aspirations. That would greatly damage the Reich's interests, for South America under normal circumstances, the Nazis claimed, was culturally and financially affiliated more with Europe rather than with the United States. Likewise, the establishment of a "European *Grossraumwirtschaft* under German leadership" could hurt Italy. In addition, the idea of the *Grossraumwirtschaft* might not be well received by other states like Spain, Portugal or Swe-

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[435] MAX HORKHEIMER, THEODOR ADORNO, Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York 1972.

[436] Letter of the Reich's Broadcasting director (Leiter Rundfunk) to the Reichshauptamtsleiter Tiessler, on 11.12.1942, in: Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), NS 18/615.

[437] Notiz der Partei-kanzlei an die Abteilung Rundfunk, im Propagandaministerium, on 04.12.1942, in: BAB, NS 18/615; Ritterbusch. Notiz fuer Pg. Tiessler on: 16.10.1942, in: BAB, NS 18/615.

[438] *Ibid.*

den, unless practical measures should follow German propaganda. It was stressed, however, that the importance of the peoples should be fully respected.[439]

[439] Richtlinien von der Partei-kanzlei an die Abteilung Rundfunk, im Propagandaministerium ueber die Verwendung der Begriffe "Grossraum" und "Grossraumwirtschaft", on 03.12.1942, in: BAB, NS 18/615.

4.2. Science, culture and foreign policy in the Third Reich. The agenda for the Balkans.

Although a complete theory for the role of technology in Germany had existed since the last quarter of nineteenth century and its significance for the state's reorganisation and rearmament was acknowledged by the Nazis, this was not the case for science. Having succeeded in integrating German engineers and technology into the German national culture and soul through "a process of selectively borrowing from past cultures", they created the conditions for the full technological program launched by the Nazis after 1936.[440] Scientists and modern German science, on the other hand, being theoretical in nature, clashed with Hitler's ideology, as theory was regarded as alien to the German soul. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that when the Nazis came to power they did not have any particular science policy agenda. The official texts of the Party[441] did not give any guidelines as to what national-socialist science should be. Even the so-called 'Aryan', 'Nordic', or 'German' physics was not a closely defined set of beliefs, as Alan Beyerchen argues.[442] The only thing that was explicitly proclaimed, was the denouncement of what the Nazis called liberal, Jewish, rational, theoretical, materialistic science and the rejection of objectivity and internationality in science.[443]

> "The Jews", claimed Philipp Lenard, "are everywhere, and whoever today still defends the assertion of the internationality of natural science means probably unconsciously the Jewish science, which is of course everywhere with the Jews and everywhere the same."[444]

Aryan technology and science should be based on experiment and observation. That assertion also advocated Houston Stewart Chamberlain:

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[440] See: KARL-HEINZ LUDWIG, Technik und Ingenieure im Dritten Reich. Duesseldorf 1974, chapter three; HERF, Reactionary modernism. p. 210. About the 'cultural policy' or 'cultural revolution' of the German engineers, as Herf calls it, see chapter seven of his book.

[441] Some of the most propagandistic and influential texts were: Das Manifest zur Brechnung der Zinsknechtschaft des Geldes, (Munich 1919) by Gottfried Feder; Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts (Munich 1930 ff) by Alfred Rosenberg and of course Adolf Hitler's, Mein Kampf, (Munich 1925).

[442] Beyerchen argues that Aryan physics was more politics than physics. ALAN BEYERCHEN, Scientists under Hitler. Politics and the Physics Community in the Third Reich. Yale Univ. Press 1977, pp. 123-140. See also: MARK WALKER, German National Socialism and the quest of nuclear power 1939-1949. Cambridge 1989, pp. 60-66.

[443] BEYERCHEN, Scientists under Hitler, pp. 131, 136.

[444] PHILIPP LENARD, Deutsche Physik. 4 vols. Munich 1936-37, here vol. 1, p. ix, quoted by: BEYERCHEN, p. 135.

> "Experience –i.e., exact, minute, tireless observation- provides the broad unshakeable foundation of Germanic scholarship, regardless of whether it concerns philology or chemistry or anything else. The capacity to observe, as well as the passion, self-sacrifice and honesty with which it is pursued, are essential characteristics of our [sic] race. Observation is the conscience of Germanic scholarship."[445]

It is remarkable that even some works written by the pen of some distinguished ideologues and despite the fact that they had all the requisite credentials to become textbooks of Nazi ideology, were rejected by the Ministry of Propaganda. This was the case with Ernst Krieck, a professor of education who was the author of "*Das Reich als Traeger Europas*". Krieck was embittered by his rejection by the Nazis and he decided to put an end to his scientific work confessing that he did no longer knew "what science can be, is allowed to be, or must be".[446] Such incidents could not be avoided as long as there was no established institution that could provide guiding principles to the fundamental problem of the 'Aryanisation' of German science and research. Several attempts were made to set up such an organisation, but all proved unsuccessful. The main reason for these failures was the rivalries between the state and the Party or within the Party itself. In 1935, for example, the plans to establishing a "Reich Academy for Research" (*Reichsakademie der Forschung*), drawn up the Ministry of Education, fell through because the president of the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* and 1919 Nobel laureate in Physics, Johannes Stark, strongly opposed them. The same fate befell the efforts of the NS-Professors Association (NSDDB) to give guidelines to all disciplines with the support of the various Academies of Science in the Reich and other scientific circles. This time it was Alfred Rosenberg who hindered the NSDDB plans for opportunistic reasons.[447]

Although the Nazis ruled out the notion of internationalism in science, they aspired to make German science and technology not only internationally accepted but also dominant. The lack of a systematic and coherent science policy, however, was to prove no bar to them putting that aspiration in the Reich's foreign cultural policy agenda. As the priorities of the Third Reich until 1936 were the organisation of the state and its economic recovery from the depression, the Nazis made use of institutions established in the Weimar Republic to support and promote the German culture and intellect abroad.

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[445] HOUSTON STEWART CHAMBERLAIN, Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Munich 1900², p. 786, quoted by: BEYERCHEN, Scientists under Hitler, p. 132.

[446] Cited in: MICHAEL GRUETTNER, Wissenschaft, in: WOLFGANG BENZ u.a. (Hg.), Enzyklopaedie des Nationalsozialismus. Muenchen 1997, pp. 135-153, here: p. 144.

[447] *Ibid.*

Despite the fact that the structure and personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained more or less the same until 1938, some changes were indeed made. Therefore, the director of the ministry's cultural sector was replaced because of the 1933 "Law for the Restoration of the Career Civil Service" (*Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtemtums*). A new director was appointed in March 1933, in the person of the historian Dr. Stieve, the former ambassador in Riga, who for ten years had been in charge of publishing the "Foreign Ministry Archives against the Lies for Germany's Responsibility in the Great War". However, he was not a Nazi sympathiser, as his successor, Fritz von Twardowski reported in 1970.[448] Additional small changes were made, when the Ministry for the People's Enlightenment and Propaganda (*Reichsministerium fuer Volksaufklaerung und Propaganda*) also wanted to get involved in the Reich's foreign cultural relations.

It should be noted that the Nazis perceived the development and cultivation of those relations through the prism of their ideology, namely only as potential political propaganda.[449] This perception was quite different from the rationale of the Foreign Ministry, which resisted Goebbels' plans to transfer and incorporate the cultural sector of the Foreign Ministry into his own. Ultimately, the Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Public Instruction (RfWEV or REM),[450] was also involved in Germany's foreign cultural affairs, seeking funds from the Ministry of the Interior intended for the Foreign Ministry's cultural department. In particular, the REM sought responsibility for the Reich's scientific, academic, student and educational relations abroad from the Foreign Ministry.[451] In 1935, the ministry also took under its control part of the German Academic Exchange Service (*Deutsche Akademische Austausch Dienst*, DAAD) and the *Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung* -the two major academic exchange organisations,[452] and went even further, signing cultural agreements with other countries, without the

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[448] FRITZ v. TWARDOWSKI, Anfaenge der deutschen Kulturpolitik zum Ausland, Bonn 1970, p. 29.

[449] *Ibid.*

[450] In May 1934 the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Science, Education and Art (*Reichs und Preussische Ministerium fuer Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Kunst* –also as *Preussische Ministerium fuer Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung*) incorporated into the Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Public Instruction (*Reichsministerium fuer Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksaufklaerung* or *Volksbildung*) and its head became Bernhard Rust.

[451] VOLKHARD LAITENBERGER, Akademischer Austausch und auswaertige Kulturpolitik. Der Deutsche Akademische Austauschdinest (DAAD) 1923-1945. Goettingen 1976, pp. 81f (footnote 3).

[452] *Ibid.*, p. 82 (footnote 6). Under its auspices of *Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung* were the 'Deutschland-Stiftung des Mitteleuropaeischen Wirtschaftstages', the 'Stipendien des technisch-wirtschaftlichen Beratungsdienstes', the 'Stipendien der Zwischenstaatlichen Verbaende', the 'Friedrich List-Stipendien der deutschen Wirtschaft', and the 'Deutsche Luftfahrt-Stipendien'.

acquiescence of the Foreign Ministry.[453] After strong protests from the latter ministry, it was decided that academic exchanges should be organised, supported and controlled by both ministries, sharing responsibility for this area. Furthermore, the establishment of the National Socialist Organisation for Issues Abroad [*Auslandsorganisation (AO) der NSDAP*], in 1934, put extra obstacles in the path of the Reich's foreign cultural policy. The purpose of the AO was to organise the German minorities into a solid and effective group for Germany's political interests abroad.[454] In the course of time, the organisation intervened in academic travels to foreign countries and the selection of lecturers, professors and researchers to be travel abroad, very often excluding foremost scientists. When the war broke out, however, the involvement of the AO -and in particular its Cultural Service (*Kulturamt*)-[455] in propaganda abroad was increased. Southeastern Europe became the focus of that propaganda and a series of scientific travels by prominent German scholars to major Balkan cities was organised in agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[456] The propaganda plan intended to invite German and foreign scholars – university professors, doctors, teachers, journalists, economists, and industrialists- to lecture on their area of expertise in local closed circles of ten to twelve people and, through the scientific interest that would be raised, to serve Germany's political concerns. The reliability of the national socialist convictions of those people was, however, a prerequisite to any involvement, while personal acquaintances were essential. The propaganda-related thrust of the whole undertaking should be kept secret.[457] From April to July 1940, for example, about fifteen scientists were sent to Bulgaria, Greece, or both.[458]

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[453] This was the case with Hungary See: TWARDOWSKI, Anfaenge, pp. 32f.

[454] EMIL EHRICH, Die Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP, Berlin 1937, pp. 11-15. The author was *Gauamtsleiter der AO der NSDAP*. See also: SEPPO KUUSISTO, Alfred Rosenberg in der Nationalsozialistischen Aussenpolitik 1933-39, Helsinki 1984, in particular chapter IV.

[455] For the structure and the several departments and services of the AO see: EHRICH, Die Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP, pp. 18ff.

[456] The focus was set on Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece. See: NSDAP. Die Leitung der Auslands-Propaganda. (Heinz Otto) to Herrn Gesandten Altenburg Auswaertigen Amt, Berlin on 18.03.1940 (paragraph: 'Entwurf'), in: PAAA, R 60661.

[457] *Ibid.*, (paragraph: 'Aktion fuer Kulturpropaganda').

[458] Undated document [1940]: Aufzeichnung. Betr.: Besucheraktion, in: PAAA, R 60661. About the lectures held by German scholars in the Balkans from September 1940 until June 1941 see table A of the document: Kulturpolitische Planung in den Balkanlaendern waehrend dees Winterhalbjahrs 1940/41, in: PAAA, R 61415.

Table 6.

Name	*Towns in visit order*	*Date of travel beginning*
Baeumler	Saloniki, Athens, Sofia	20.4.1940
Berve	Athens	20.5.1940
Boehme	Zagreb, Athens, Patras, Saloniki, Sofia, Budapest	2.5.1940. [That date was altered]
Doelger	Athens	2.5.1940
Fiala	Sofia	15.4.1940
Kaftan	Sofia	10.5.1940
Kindermann	Belgrade, Neusatz, Ossijek, Athens	2.5.1940
Kroh	Sofia, Plovdiv, Burgas, Varna, Russe, Saloniki, Athens, Budapest	15.5.1940
Muehlens	Belgrade, Athens, Sofia	15.4.1940
Nordmann	Neusatz	15.5.1940
Schmidt	Athens, Saloniki	20.5.1940
Staebel	Belgrade, Ossijek, Saloniki, Sofia, Plovdiv	1.6.1940
Unvericht	Zagreb, Athens, Patras, (Volo), Saloniki, Sofia	15.5.1940
Vogt	Neusatz, Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna	1.6.1940
Weltzien	Zagreb	10.5.1940

Source: *Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amts*, R 60661: "NSDAP. Die Leitung der Auslands-Propaganda (Heinz Otto) to Herrn Gesandten Altenburg Auswaertigen Amt, Berlin on 18.03.1940.

The Ministry of the Interior, which supported the German cultural institutes in Rome, the Archaeological Institute, as well as the Zoological Station in Naples and the Institute of Art History in Florence also participated in the German culture campaign abroad. These institutes were under the patronage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in 1934 handed over the direction to the above ministry. Last but not least, party organisations like the Archive Administration of the Mobilisation Echelon Rosenberg (*Archiveverwaltung Einsatzstab Rosenberg)* and the *Ahnenerbe* Office of the *Reichsfuehrer SS*, were also aspired to participate in the activities and research –whether planned or were already under way abroad.[459]

[459] Vortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), in: PAAA, R 60608.

It is clear that since the early years of Hitler's regime, there were differences among these various institutions. Those differences were developed in the following years into power ambitions, reflecting the profound antagonisms between the Party, and the State and the chaotic bureaucracy brought about by this dynamic. "Too many services are working side by side usually without knowing of each other's existence", noted the director of the cultural department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fritz von Twardowski, in 1942.[460] The pressure this situation exerted on the Foreign Ministry, which bore the main responsibility for cultural policy abroad, forced Twardowski to plead desperately with several party organisations to avoiding any intrusion in the ministry's affairs, because this would create conflicts that would eventually damage the nation's interests.[461] In 1936, the "cultural desk" of the Foreign Ministry was renamed the "cultural political sector".[462] That change indicated the fact that foreign cultural policy had begun to be recognised by the Nazis as a significant factor on the international political stage.

The year 1937 was the turning point in Nazi Germany's foreign cultural policy. At the Party's extravagant annual festivities in Nuremberg Hitler made his first speech about cultural policy, in which he placed this kind of policy in the framework of the general state policy.[463]

> "This state should not be an authority [*Macht*] without culture, a power [*Kraft*] without beauty. The armament of a nation is morally justified, only when its shield and sword have a higher mission. Therefore, we do not aspiring to the brutal force of a Ghengis Khan, but the affluent power to create a strong social and patronage community as a bearer and guardian of a higher culture!"[464]

How seriously Hitler meant those words, as Hausmann remarks, remains in question. What is certain, however, is that the Nazis echoed Weimar Republic's conviction that Germany had lost the war because the country lacked intellectual rather than material weapons. "We did not lose the war", claimed Goebbels, "because our cannons failed, but rather because our intellectual weapons did not fire".[465]

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[460] *Ibid.*

[461] *Ibid.*

[462] TWARDOWSKI, Anfaenge, p. 33.

[463] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[464] Quoted in: FRANK-RUTGER HAUSMANN, "Auch im Krieg schweigen die Musen nicht". Die Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Institute im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Goettingen 2001, pp. 19f.

[465] Joseph Goebblels, *Reden* (March 25, 1993), cited in: HERF, Reactionary modernism, p. 195.

In 1938, Joachim von Ribbentrop was appointed as the new foreign minister and one year later Fritz von Twardowski became head of the cultural-political sector. The distinction between 'cultural policy' and 'propaganda' present in Weimar Republic was now abandoned, despite Twardowski's reservations.[466] 'Cultural propaganda' was now used as a synonym of 'cultural policy' and the Ministry of Propaganda itself tried anew to take the cultural affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under its control. The latter regarded "the lighter muses" as propaganda, namely the concerts, theatre, art and other exhibitions, and poetry reading.[467] These undertakings, as well as sports affairs and radio broadcasts were the only areas that eventually came under Goebbels control and were sponsored by his ministry.[468] Furthermore, the bilateral cultural societies, like the German-French Society, the German-Bulgarian, the German-Greek Society and so forth, which for decades had been supported by private funds, were recruited by Goebbels for propaganda purposes.[469] However, the most important issues, namely the German education, language and scientific affairs abroad, remained in the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry. In 1937, its cultural sector was further divided into eleven departments. Among them was the department *Kult W*, which was responsible for the promotion of German science abroad, i.e. congresses, travels, lectures and the German books; the department *Kult U*, responsible for university affairs, professors and students and their relation with other countries, as well as scholarships; and the *Kult I* department, in charge of the German institutes abroad.[470] The Foreign Ministry, and in particular Fritz v. Twardowski, strongly and explicitly emphasised that propaganda and cultural policy had to remain separate for the sake of Germany's influence abroad. Twardowki in his revealing and forceful speech in the meeting of cultural councillors (*Kulturreferententagung*), on 13 August 1942, made a clear distinction between propaganda, cultural propaganda and cultural policy:

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[466] Vortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), in: PAAA, R 60608. See also HAUSMANN, Auch im Krieg, pp. 20 f., (footnote 21). Kurt Duewell made in his 1976 work a basic distinction between the notions regarding the foreign cultural relations. KURT DUEWELL, Deutschlands auswaertige Kulturpolitik 1918-1932. Grundlinien und Dokumente, Koeln 1976, pp. 35 ff;

[467] Vortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), in: PAAA, R 60608.

[468] TWARDOWSKI, Anfaenge, p. 31.

[469] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[470] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

" By 'propaganda' I understand the effort to influence a country's public opinion, in relation with an acute political, economic or military situation. Propaganda works, therefore, in the short term. There is also, of course, the cultural propaganda –Kulturpropaganda-, but this is for the big cultural nations only a repercussion of a hostile propaganda that denies our [*sic*] cultural achievements. [...] In addition, exerting cultural policy means presenting and establishing an intellectual leading ambition; it means organising an intellectual co-operation between nations; moreover, it means achieving an enduring intellectual influence over a select intellectual elite of other nations and making it, as far as possible, dependent on the German intellect."[471]

Warning about the damage a blunt cultural propaganda policy might cause to Germany's influence, Twardowski stressed that the candidate country, with which Germany planned to develop cultural relations, should decide of its own free will about any future cultural collaboration with the Reich.

"No political or economic pressure [should be applied] for the sake of cultural work of any kind. Equality and reciprocity, no violence but dialogue, cultural exchange at its broadest, not one-sided performance [should be our principles]. In short, we must exercise our cultural policy with soft gloves [...]"[472]

In 1932/33, the dean of the faculty of philosophy at the University of Leipzig, Professor Weickmann, in his opening speech talked about a global cultural community and echoing the post-war trauma he stressed that Germans wished not only economic, but also cultural relations with countries that could understand the German spirit. Nevertheless, the cultural exchange, he argued further, should have a national character and Germany should try to promote its own to the young foreign scholars, particularly to those supported by the Reich's scholarship foundations, namely the DAAD and the *Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung*. Southeastern Europe should have priority, underlined the German professor.[473]

In addition to the cultural infrastructure, the new regime also established a number of new institutions involved in science policy planning, even though what was planned remained unclear until the launch of the Four-Year Plan in 1936. The most important institutions between 1934 and 1936 were the University Commission of the

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[471] Vortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), in: PAAA, R 60608.

[472] *Ibid.*

[473] Akademische Auslandsstelle des Universitaet Leipzig. Taetigkeitsbericht, 16.07.1932 – 30.09.1933, in: PAAA, R 64028.

NSDAP (*Hochschulkommission der NSDAP*), the National Socialist Professors Association (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Dozentenbund*, NSDDB), and the Department of Science in Alfred Rosenberg's Office (*Amt Rosenberg*), while others were created after 1936 in the framework of the Four-Year Plan.[474] The co-ordination, however, of those organisations not at all systematic, for there was a total absence of official science policy, gave rise to conflicts between government and party institutions which prevented the smooth operation of Germany's scientific and research institutions. Only the Ministry of Education seemed to have a powerful voice in scientific planning, for it maintained good relations with the *Wehrmacht* and close contacts with the SS. However, the antagonisms and the unclear competencies of the newly established party institutions, which were eager to get involved, damaged Germany's scientific and research production and consequently its image abroad. The fact, for instance, that both the Ministry of Education and the Party were striving to gain power and control over universities and the professorial appointments, had the result of depriving professors of any power they may have had in the past, with unfortunate consequences for the country's scientific production. The combination of appointments, Herf rightly remarks, based on ideological rather than on scientific or technical criteria, along with bureaucratic conflicts over jurisdiction, hindered technical innovation and scientific research.[475] To this should be added the regime's unwillingness to understand the close and unbreakable relationship between science and technology, which according to Herf, was due to the lack of scientific background of people in positions of responsibility, leaving them unable "to grasp the implications of scientific advances for technical advances."[476]

The Ministry of Education, under Bernhard Rust, who had also been director of the Ministry's cultural department since 1 June 1934 and founder of the Reich Research Council (*Reichsforschungsrat*, RFR) in 1937, intensified its close relations with the *Wehrmacht*, as the final countdown to the war outcome began slowly to emerge in 1941/2. Nonetheless, the mobilisation of science for war purposes had already been started in 1936, when Herman Goering, the Minister of the Airforce, officially announced the Four-Year Plan. Goerring was also the head of that organisation, the aim of which was to prepare Germany for war, making the state self-sufficient in raw materials

[474] GRUETTNER, Wissenschaft, p. 135.

[475] HERF, Reactionary modernism, p. 202.

[476] *Ibid.*, p. 203.

and independent of foreign currency in four years.[477] An additional aim was that Germany's dependence on the world economy should be reduced through technical innovation.[478] There were three major institutions which collaborated towards these ends: the Ministry of Education, the Office of Military Weapons (*Heereswaffenamt*) and the Reich Research Council. All these, and some new institutions, like the *Ahnenerbe* established in 1937, got involved in scientific research, which was expected to make Germany ready to wage a successful war. However, the research fever in the late 1930s did not justify a continuing interest of the Nazis in science. Even in the Four-Year Plan period, the polemic against science was very strong. In 1941, one could read in the "*Schwarze Korps*", organ of the SS:

> "What we are, we know it from the *Fuehrer*. Everything else that has been written does not concern us. The *Fuehrer* does not need any professors to conduct what he has already considered expedient. We don't need any theories".[479]

The absence of any official guidelines on German science and research policy did not, however, mean that the party officials did not try to indoctrinate existing scientific institutions with elements of their ideology. On the contrary, these efforts were systematic with devastating results. The 1933 "Law for the Restoration of the Career Civil Service" was to have perhaps the most catastrophic effect on German science in the years to come. More than fifteen per cent of scholars and scientists at universities and their laboratories were dismissed because of that law, which aimed at changing fundamentally the state's bureaucracy without destroying its effectiveness in administrating its affairs.[480] The concept of race, but also political convictions, was the core of that law. Specific civil servants were relieved of their duties in order for a "national" civil service to be restored and for administration to be simplified. Those without proper qualifications, meaning those who had taken office since 9 November 1918 (i.e. political appointees); those, whom previous political activities did not guarantee, according to the Nazis, an unreserved loyalty to the new regime; and those of "non-Aryan" descent were all af-

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[477] See: PETZINA DIETER, Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich. Der nationalsozialistische Vierjahresplan, Stuttgart 1968.

[478] HERF, Reactionary modernism p. 201

[479] Cited in: GRUETTNER, Wissenschaft, p. 143.

[480] "Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums", vom 7. April 1933, *Reichsgesetzblatt* I S, 175. Part of the law in: INGO von MUENCH (Hrsg.), Gesetze des NS-Staates. Dokumente eines Unrechtssystems. Paderborn 1994, pp. 26-28.

fected by the application of that law.[481] The legislation left gaping-holes to the academic and scientific community of Germany, for more than a thousand scholars were forced to emigrate, primarily to the United States and England.[482] Some universities, which were regarded as liberal, suffered massive loss of their personnel compared to other more orthodox instituitions. The universities of Berlin, Frankfurt and Breslau, for example, which before 1933 were open to Jewish, liberal, even to Marxist scientists, lost one third of their academic staff. By contrast, universities, like those in Tuebingen and Rostock, with nationalistic inclinations, could hardly count a loss.[483] Hitler, defending the law he stated provocatively:

> "If the dismissal of Jewish scientists means annihilation of contemporary German science, then we shall do without science for a few years."[484]

The "Aryanisation" of German universities was accelerated by adapting their programs to the directives of the Nazi regime. This practically meant prohibition colleagues left behind citing scientists who had emigrated. Moreover, it meant a ban on of quoting Jewish scientists. Jewish scientific method, as it was called, was denigrated as alien to nature and science itself.[485] German scientists found themselves hemmed in a double role: the ideologue and the expert.[486] The issue of the 'political' and 'apolitical' scientist, which very much troubled contemporary historians and continues to trouble them up to today, was very closely related to that role. The criteria that portrayed and classified the scholar as belonging to one category or the other, were not explicit, however. Rather, they were

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[481] *Ibid.* Paragraphs 2, 3, 4.

[482] About the emigration of German scientists and its post-war impact particularly on American as well as on German science see: CLAUS-DIETER KROHN, "Deutsche Wissenschaftsemigration seit 1933 und ihre Remigrationsbarrieren nach 1945", in: RUEDIGER vom BRUCH, BRIGITTE KADERAS (Hg.), Wissenschaften und Wissenschaftspolitik. Bestandsaufnahmen zu Formationen, Bruechen und Kontinuitaeten im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart 2002, pp. 437-452. See also: STRAUSS HERBERT A., TILMANN BUDDENSIEG, KURT DUEWELL (eds.), Emigration: Deutsche Wissenschaftler nach 1933, Entlassung und Vertreibung. Berlin: Technische Universitaet Berlin 1987. About the emigrated scholars in life sciences see: UTE DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler. Portaet einer Wissenschaft im NS-Staat. Frankfurt a.M., 1995, chapter one. Some data about the emigrated physicists there are also in BEYERCHEN, Scientists under Hitler, chapter three.

[483] GRUETTNER, Wissenschaft, p. 138; ASH G. MITCHELL, "Scientific Changes in Germany 1933, 1945, 1990: Towards a Comparison", in: *Minerva* 37 (19990, pp. 329-354, here: p. 332.

[484] Cited in: ALAN BEYERCHEN, "What we now know about Nazism and Science", in: *Social Research*, 59 (1992), pp. 615-641, here p. 618.

[485] BEYERCHEN, Scientists under Hitler, p. 132.

[486] GRUETTNER, Wissenschaft, pp. 145f.

formed and transformed according to the political currents and the social circumstances of the time.[487] In the Nazi period though, the elements that illustrated the 'political' or 'apolitical' scientist, derived from the concept that the role of citizen and the role of scientist were inseparable. Unlike the majority of citizens and civil servants, the "citizen-scientist" had the unique privilege of access to knowledge that could scientifically contribute to the economic, military, and social demands of the time.[488] It seems that in the end Hitler's regime managed to achieve its plans for expansion of every kind –however short-lived- with the help of science, which supported and justified them.

Nonetheless, the ideological accommodation that new type of scientist had to make trying at the same time to secure the necessary funds by all means, was to prove below the Party's expectations. Bargaining with the polycratic Nazi mechanism, the scholars very often used a rhetoric they knew would convince the authorities to give them money for their projects, even where they did not seem to have any direct relation to the government's plans. The "*Krigswichtigkeit*", that was the importance for the war planning, and the "*Kulturwichtigkeit*", namely the significance for the state's culture, epitomised the rhetoric the scientists used for the above purpose, particularly after 1943.[489] Despite the poor adaptation of science in general to the Nazi ideology, some disciplines made the racial principles an essential part of their existence. Public law and history, but also disciplines affiliated to biological racism, like race hygiene and eugenics, as well as the science of defence (*Wehrwissenschaft*), folk-history, prehistory and colonial sci-

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[487] See: WALKER, The quest of nuclear power 1939-1949, pp. 4 ff; also PAUL FORMAN, "Weimar culture, causality and quantum theory, 1918-1927: Adaptation by German physicists and mathematicians to a hostile intellectual environment", in: *HSPS*, 3 (1971), pp. 1-115; *Ibid.*, "Scientific Internationalism and the Weimar Physicists: The Ideology and its Manipulation in Germany after World War I", in: *Isis* 64 (June 1973), pp. 151-180; CLIFFORD GEERTZ, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York 1973, pp. 193-233; FRITZ STERN, The Failure of Illiberalism. Essays on the Political Culture of Modern Germany. New York 1992, pp. 3-25.

[488] WALKER, The quest of nuclear power, p. 5.

[489] Even though what was characterised as "*kriegswichtig*", or relevant to war, and what not has not yet been systematically studied by historians, as Helmut Maier argues, the excessive use of the term by the scientists, at least in some disciplines, amid the chaotic research bureaucracy, leave us some space to consider the "*Kriegswichtigkeit*" as mere rhetoric. How convincing, however, was that oratory, is indeed an issue to be investigated as a "quasi-category of the historical analysis". See: HELMUT MAIER, "'Wehrhaftmachung' und 'Kriegswichtigkeit'. Zur Ruestungstechnologischen Relevanz des Kaiser-Wilhelm-Instituts fuer Metallforschung in Stuttgart vor und nach 1945", in: Max-Planck Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften e.V. (Ergebnisse 5: "Geschichte der KWG im Nationalsozialismus") 2002, pp. 7f.

ence were areas representing not only the Aryan intellect but also its new epistemic orientation. Hand in hand with this ideological adaptation went the so-called "alignment" or "tuning" (*Gleichschaltung*) of scientific institutions, primarily universities. This involved the centralisation of power by the organisation's leader, in accordance with the *Fuehrerprinzip*, which proclaimed among other things authority of every leader to those subject to him and responsibility from the people below to the top.[490] It also was a bargain between the regime and the scientific organisations and institutes. The latter, in return for their devotion and support for the regime, would retain quasi-autonomy, allowing them to organise and run their programs. That typical autonomy, however, was in due course either restricted or violated. The effectiveness of the *Gleichschaltung* varied from university to university and from institute to institute. Here again, the state and the Party antagonised one another in appointing their men to leading positions. Those conflicts left scientists some latitude for manoeuvre through the chaotic polycratic structure of the regime. In practice, scientists sought alliances with particular centres of power that would secure the independent operation of their own institutions. However, German scholars often announced "self-mobilisation" of their institution to the regime's demands, in order to secure state support for their ongoing research projects in addition to those they had to carry out for the warfare needs.[491]

The Nazi hostility to science and theory and the persecution of thousands of prominent Jewish scholars stripped the country's universities of some of their best minds and damaged not only German science but also the country's reputation abroad once again after the Great War. On the other hand, though, the German-Jewish academics who found new posts in foreign universities, -usually in high-ranking English and American educational or research centres-, fortified the reputation of the German scientific tradition in those countries. In certain disciplines, like physics, the departure of the most outstanding scientists like Albert Einstein, Max Born, Victor Weisskopf, Lise Meitner and others, were a major set-back for Germany, and had the added (albeit unintentional) effect of boosting the advancement of English and American science.[492] The picture in

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[490] WOLFGANG BENZ u.a. (Hg.), Enzyklopaedie des Nationalsozialismus. Muenchen 1997, entry: Fuehrerprinzip, p. 475.

[491] HERBERT MEHRTENS, "Kollaborationsverhaeltnisse: Natur- und Technikwissenschaften im NS-Staat und ihre Historie", in: CHRISTOPH MEINEL, PETER VOSWINCKEL (Hrg.), Medizin, Naturwissenschaft, Technik und Nationalsozialismus. Kontinuitaeten und Diskontinuitaeten. Stuttgart 1994, pp. 13-32, here: 27 ff.

[492] BEYERCHEN, Scientists under Hitler, chapters two and three.

biology was similar. Richard Goldschmidt and Viktor Jollos were two of the most prominent geneticists who emigrated to the United States, while many others were dismissed and forced to emigrate for political reasons.[493] German science suffered not only from the vast loss of its most capable personnel at universities and research institutions. The purging of Jewish contributions from German scientific journals increased the danger of German isolation from the international scientific community. The prestige of German science abroad through publishing of scientific works and the importation of foreign currency by the purchase of journals from abroad were seriously threatened. At the same time, an emigration wave also affected the publishing sector, as many German-Jewish scientists were forced to resign from their editorial positions. Additionally, the dramatic increase of the price of German scientific periodicals in early 1930s, in combination with the devaluation of the American dollar in 1933, made the purchase of German periodicals for American libraries a difficult task, so that the American Library Association considered taking counter-measures or even boycotting German publications.[494] Meanwhile, the increasing distrust the Nazi authorities felt for the foreign scientific press, which was regarded as a vehicle of "Jewish science", was to prove yet another obstacle to German scientists seeking to stay up to date on the findings of their colleagues abroad. That handicap seemed to be greater for those based at universities rather than at *Technische Hochschule* or at institutes for defence research.[495] The reason was that the latter two, in the framework of Germany's preparations for war, became the officially favoured institutions and the latest scientific works from abroad were purchased, whatever the cost. Therefore, the restrictions imposed by the regime in university libraries for economic or ideological reasons did not apply to institutions that in one way or another, related to the Four-Year Plan.

Fortunately, the situation at private or semiprivate scientific institutions seemed to be rather different than universities. The Kaiser Wilhelm Society, which was the most representative research institution of that kind with a global reputation, managed, in general, to secure considerable independence from the directives of the NSDAP. Moreover, in some disciplines, like those related to life sciences, the basic scientific research contin-

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[493] DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler, pp. 36-46, particularly tables 1 and 2.

[494] PAMELA SPENCE RICHARDS, "The Movement of scientific Knowledge from and to Germany under National Socialism", in: *Minerva*, Vol. XXVIII, Number 4, (Winter 1990), pp. 401-425, here: p. 409.

[495] *Ibid.*, p. 412.

ued freely and relatively unaffected by ideological considerations.[496] For example, the *Fuehrerprinzip* took effect in the Kaiser Wilhelm Society only in 1937. In addition, the Society was put under the aegis of the Ministry of Education. The Society's presidential appointments during the years in question advocate the distance the organisation kept from the Party, as its heading personalities were elected by the academic and industrial circles. Even Albert Voegler, who served as president from 1941 until 1945 and was regarded as "Party man", also kept aloof the NSDAP.[497]

Despite the chaotic situation in Hitler's administration, some of the elements that shaped the general framework of the Reich's higher education and science policy can be discerned. Apart from the scientific abilities of scholars, their race, namely the Aryan descent, and their political sympathies played a crucial role in the national socialist modification of higher education and their research institutes. According to the Party's guiding principles, the scientific and research centres had to leave aside their democratic structure and to follow the *Fuehrerprinzip*. In addition, the disciplines that appeared to be politically important to the Nazis, like the Aryan physics and the racial biology, received considerable support, as they were considered to represent the national socialist intellect and ideals.[498] Publications of some Nazi professors, for example, and in particular of the 1905 Nobel laureate in physics, Phillip Lenard, illustrated the features of what was regarded as "Nazi science".[499] One of the tenets of the new type of science was that it should not be separated from life. Therefore, science as an end in itself was denounced by the Nazis, who declared that any intellect, culture or education should serve the needs of German people. The utility of science for the state's demands was proof of whether any scientific undertaking was in accordance to National Socialism. Another element that distinguished Aryan science from "liberal" science was the lack of specialisation that marked the former. Nazi scientists defended the unity of science and argued that the boundaries of the disciplines had to be transcended. In addition, every research project, they declared, should be driven by the notion of race. Last but not least, Aryan science had to have its roots to the people's soul and therefore internationalism in science was condemned.

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[496] See: KRISTIE MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika. Scientific Research in Nazi Germany. Oxford 1993, chapters 4, 6.

[497] See: ULRIKE KOHL, Die Präsidenten der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus Max Planck, Carl Bosch und Albert Vögler zwischen Wissenschaft und Macht, Stuttgart 2002.

[498] GRUETTNER, Wissenschaft, pp. 141-143.

[499] In particular his four-volume work "Deutsche Physik". See footnote 444. Also: BEYERCHEN, Scientists under Hitler, pp. 123-126 about the "Aryan canon" in physics.

In 1934, Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, troubling the international community for its future political role on the world scene. In science, the first alarming signs appeared, when German scientists gave lectures of a national socialist or racial character at international meetings. In order for the representation of the German spirit abroad to be secured by pro-Nazi academics, a number of bureaucratic processes screened the would-be delegates, applying a system of political selection. Thus, only those academics who favoured the national socialist regime were promoted, while all others were left behind.[500] This policy, as well as the state's heavy criticism on scientists, who did not relate their findings to racial ideals, alerted many foreigners to the lack of freedom of scientific speech in Germany.[501] In effect, the unwillingness of foreign scholars to co-operate with their German colleagues increased, while German applications to join international scientific organisations, like the Astronomical Union in 1938, were turned down.[502] Additionally, American foundations withdrew their support for German science and the Rockefeller Foundation, which continued to fund several projects in the Reich's institutes, eventually stopped its contribution. The only exception was made for some projects on basic biological research, which the Foundation continued to finance until 1937.[503] Germany's prestige was again falling into decay and the German government as well as the party tried to tackle the problem by increasing support to undertakings which had existed since the 1920s.

The German Academy was among the first institutions that were recruited to spread German science beyond the country's borders. With the support of the Foreign Ministry, the Academy became after 1933 an important proponent of German science and scholarship abroad. It also supervised the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the major organisation that co-ordinated the exchange activities and contacts with foreign scientific institutions. The DAAD had been re-established in 1931 and a couple of years later it succumbed to Party's involvement, more precisely the control of

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[500] SPENCE RICHARDS, "The Movement of scientific Knowledge", p. 414.

[501] *Ibid.*

[502] *Ibid.*, p. 413.

[503] The exception was made for Alfred Kuehn's and Adolf Butenand's co-joined work on genetics. See: KRISTIE MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, 112 ff.; also: *Ibid.*, "Wissenschaftsfoerderung durch die Rockefeller-Stiftung im "Dritten Reich". Die Entscheidung, das Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut fuer Physik finanziell zu unterstuetzen, 1934-39", in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* (Sonderdruck), 12. Jahrgang, Heft 3 (1986), pp. 348-379.

its publications by Goebbels' Ministry.[504] However, its leader, Adolf Morsbach, who had directed the Exchange Service since 1927,[505] largely succeeded in securing its cultural-political role as specified along the pre-1933 lines. In 1934, Morsbach enlarged the competences of the DAAD, some of the most important of which were the exchange of young scholars, travels of senior academics and philologists to and from Germany, solicitude for all foreigners who studied at German universities, campaign by senior and junior foreign scholars regarding German universities and summer courses organised there, occasional wide propaganda abroad about the scientific and academic environment through the DAAD periodicals and the like.[506] Correspondence between German scholars and foreign scientists, particularly from the Balkan states, who had studied in Germany or had just visited the country, was a strong propaganda tool during the war years. At the University of Bremen, dispatches of letters, periodicals and books sent to the Balkan countries amounted to over 3.300 in December 1940, while a year later the number increased to 33.000.[507]

Foreign scholars abroad constituted a very important capital for the Reich's cultural policy. Therefore, in addition to the DAAD organisation which granted scholarships, a number of other supporting institutions, like the Professor's Foreign Service (*Auslandsamt der Dozentenschaft*), were established in order to help them during their stay in Germany promoting the exchange ideas with them through personal contacts. By 'exchange' the Germans meant introducing them to German achievements in cultural, scientific, economic and educational areas. For that introduction the foreigners would be invited to workshops and meetings, as well as participate in touring several industries, scientific institutions, clinics and hospitals. The funds for this cultural political undertak-

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504 LAITENBERGER, Akademischer Austausch, p. 51.

505 In 1927, it was named *Akademischer Austauschdienst* (AAD) and in 1931 it was incorporated together with the *Deutsche Akademische Auslandsstelle des Verbandes der Deutschen Hochschulen, Dresden* (DAASt) and the *Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung* (AvHSt) into the *Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst* (DAAD). The institution survives until today in the same name.

506 LAITENBERGER, pp. 65 f.

507 H. Baatz. Auslandsamt der Dozentenschaft der deutschen Universitaeten und Hochschulen. Jahresarbeitsbericht 1. Oktober 1941 bis 30 September 1942. Streng vertaulich! In: BAB, R 63/174. See also: Dr. Baatz (Leiter des Auslandsamts edr Dozentenschaft Universitaet und Hochschulen Berlin) Taetigkeitsbericht ueber das Sommerhalbjahr vom 1.4 bis 30.9.37. Vertraulich!, in: BAK R 73/48.

ing came from the Foreign Ministry as well as from the Ministry of Education (REM).[508] Besides the DAAD scholarships, exemption from tuition fees was another measure that was expected to attract foreign scholars to German universities. The decision on which student to fund was taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and only those nationals, whose governments had asked for the facility were eligible. In 1934, Greece was reported to have made the most applications of all countries.[509] The fee-exemption was estimated to be in Germany's cultural-political interest, for it was not only expected to increase the number of foreign students, but also to weaken the anti-German propaganda abroad put about by emigrants.[510] Foreigners were acknowledged as the "auxiliary troops for Germany's struggle for world prestige" and influencing them by all means possible was a major priority in the Reich's cultural policy agenda.[511]

World prestige also meant economic influence and dominance. In the national socialist economic planning southeastern Europe was regarded as the "informal empire" of the Third Reich[512] that would provide Germany with what had lost overseas in the First World War. Therefore, in addition to the several institutions -particularly the *Deutsche Schule*- which were established in the area for advertising the German culture and language, the "*Deutschland-Stiftung des Mitteleuropaeischen Wirtschaftstag*" was established in spring 1936. This was a scholarship foundation created for the financial support of young scientists from southeastern Europe, who were specialising in engineering, economy and medicine and who wished to visit German institutions for advanced studies. The foundation was affiliated to the *Mitteleuropaeische Wirtschaftstag* (MWT), an organisation that had been set up in 1924 and aimed at intensifying the economic relations of Germany with south-eastern Europe. It was re-established in 1930/31 and during Hitler's era it became the link between German heavy industry, namely the IG-Farben, and the NSDAP. The MWT was one of the most important instruments for the Reich's indi-

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[508] Auslandsamt der Dozentenschaft Universitaet und Hochschulen Berlin to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Herrn Konsul Roth). Undated document [probably on 3.6.1937], in: PAAA, R 64037 (Microfiche Nr. 7325).

[509] Auswaertiges Amt (i.A. gez. Oster) to Reichskultusministerium z.Hd. von Herrn Reg. Rat Burmeister, Berlin 20.11.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065.

[510] *Ibid.*

[511] Dr. Knapp, Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale. Jahresbericht 1935 to Auswaertigen Amt u.a. on 15.01.1936, p. 7, in: PAAA, R 60598.

[512] KLAUS THOERNER, Deutsche Suedosteuropaplaene, 1840-1945. Dissertation submitted at the University of Oldenburg, 1999, see chapter 6.3, where he uses and argues about the term.

rect and covert imperialistic penetration of the Balkans.[513] Even though the *Deutschland-Stiftung* was subject to the MWT, the DAAD, and in particular the *Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung*, was responsible for its administration, while the funds came from the industry, among others the Krupp Company and the I.G.Farben.[514] It is clear that the interests of the economic and industrial circles became an additional factor to the cultural political considerations for allocating grants to foreigners, and their influence on the DAAD increased during the war years. Another instrument the Nazi regime used to enhance its prestige in international scientific circles was the scientific publications that were addressed to foreign public. These publications were considered cultural-propaganda instruments for disseminating German achievements abroad. On the top of all, stood the periodical "*Forschungen und Fortschritte*", which had already been launched in Spanish, in 1927. In 1935, an English and in 1939 a Chinese version of the journal increased Germany's chances to expand its influence over larger groups of the international scientific community.[515]

In 1939, though, when the war broke out, Germany's scientific communication with the English-speaking world was interrupted. The Nazis turned to Europe, which they regarded as their future territory, where –among other things- they could impose the New Order of learning, inspired by the national socialist ideals. In occupied countries, the existing organisations for the cultivation and promotion of German culture received additional state support for their propaganda purpose. The German Academy with its branches in several cities in occupied European countries was the leading organisation in co-ordinating and controlling the Reich's cultural activities, focusing on the expansion and dissemination of the German language. Planning documents drawn up in 1933 suggest that the Academy should focus its activities on five geographical areas: Near and Far East, South Africa, Latin America and the Balkans.[516] The numerous "German Insti-

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[513] SCHUMANN, Griff nach Suedosteuropa, p. 52. See also: MARTIN GERHARD BONGARDS, Raumplanung als wissenschaftliche Disziplin im Nationalsozialismus. Marburg 1995, chaper 4; THOERNER, Deutsche Suedosteuropaplaene, chapter 6.1, 6.2 for the early years of the MWT, and chapter 6.3. For a detailed aproach about the undertakings of the MWT in Bulgaria and the scholarship policy see: MARKUS WIEN, Markt und Modernisierung Deutsch-bulgarische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 1918-1994 in ihren konzeptionellen Grundlagen. Thesis submitted at the European University Institute, Florence 2005, chapter 5, pp. 284 ff.

[514] LAITENBERGER, p. 110.

[515] SPENCE RICHARDS, "The Movement of scientific Knowledge", p. 414.

[516] At the end of 1933 seven out of seventeen branches of the Academy were located in Greece. HAGEN FLEISCHER, "Europas Ruekkehr nach Griechenland. Kulturpolitik der Grossmaechte in einem Staat der

tutes" (*Deutsche Schule*) and the "Goethe Institutes", which operated under the auspices of the German Academy, increased the number of language courses offered to the local population and scientists. In addition to propagating the German language, these institutions promoted the German universities that young scientists could visit and become familiar with the 'superior' German intellect and achievements. Exchange programs for lecturing, as well as summer schools were organised for senior scientists. It is interesting to note that the Nazis were very eager to create professorial chairs for language and literature at foreign universities, even at technical institutes, as was the case in Greece, seeing these as the ultimate corroboration of their cultural influence abroad. This tactic was expected to ensure that German would gradually become Europe's common language and also the international second language of choice overseas.[517] Nevertheless, the creation of language and literature chairs abroad, and in particular in the Balkans, was not a policy pursued only by Germany in this regard. France, Britain, even Italy and Spain had the same ambition: to gain a foothold in the foreign academic elite and to influence as many as they could for their own interests and prestige, transforming the foreign learning and research institutions into cultural-political arenas.

Peripherie", in: HERALD HEPPNER, OLGA KATSIARDI-HERING (Hg.), Die Griechen und Europa. Aussen- und Innensichten im Wandel der Zeit. Wien u.a., 1998, pp. 125-191, here p. 141. As for the activities of the German Academy in Greece see: FEDRA KOUTSOUKOU, Die deutsche auswaertige Kultur- und Sprachpolitik in Griechenland 1933-1944. Thesis to be defended at the Technische Universitaet Berlin in January 2006, chapter five.

[517] SPENCE RICHARDS p. 416.

4.3. Planning the cultural conquest of south-eastern Europe.

In 1940, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs inaugurated a network of institutes abroad, with the mission to champion German achievements in humanities in specific European countries. The German Scientific Institutes (*Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Institute*, DWI), as they were named, under the cover of science aimed at exploring those countries, in which Germany was interested, and preparing them to align themselves with the Nazi regime. This overture clearly involved "space research" (*Raumforschung*) in order for these territories to be "repopulated and exploited" (*Umvolkung und Ausbeutung*).[518] Nevertheless, the base of this campaign was aimed at scientific collaboration with the countries in question and the development of relations with the foreign elite.[519] It should be noted, though, that the grade of autonomy of each DWI branch, its alignment to the regime, and its collaboration with the host country depended on whether the branch was established in a country that was occupied, neutral or allied to Germany, on its geographical proximity to the Reich and the time of its creation.[520] During the following four years, sixteen branches of *Deutsche Wissenschftliche Institute* were established not only in major European cities, i.e. Paris, Brussels, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Stockholm, Lisbon, Madrid, Venice, Budapest, but also in the following Balkan cities, i.e. Sofia, Bucharest, Bratislava, Belgrade, Athens, Zagreb, and Tirana. The DWI co-operated with the German Academy to arrange receptions, exhibitions and lectures. Even though a network of several institutions (state, industrial or private) existed in the disciplines of technology, medicine and natural sciences before 1933, a similar network in humanities was a Nazi creation and indicated the special role allotted to humanities by the Third Reich.[521] The DWI was not another organisation with a number of branches spread over Europe, but it offered, as Hausmann notes, the means for an intellectual war in the "third front" (*Dritte Front*).[522]

The structure of each DWI branch abroad consisted of at least three main departments: the scientific department, which was financially supported by the *Notgemeinschaft* and organised the exchange of professors, lecture trips, exhibitions, concerts and

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518 HAUSMANN, "Auch im Krieg schweigen die Musen nicht", p. 9.

519 *Ibid.*

520 *Ibid.* pp. 26f.

521 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

522 See: HERBERT SCURLA, Die Dritte Front. Geistige Grundlagen des Propagandakrieges der Westmaechte. Berlin 1940.

book fairs; the academic department, supported by the DAAD and therefore responsible for exchanges of students, teachers etc.; and the department of language issues, which received funds from the Goethe Institute.[523] However, none of the above departments operated independently. The DWI was involved in joint research under the auspices of academies or other institutions. The scientific results, though, of those projects were very poor.[524] Even though the scientific sector which, by definition, includes both the exact and the theoretical sciences, it was usually confined to activities regarding only the latter. In some cases, the agricultural science belonged to another separate section,[525] but as far as the rest of natural sciences concerned, they did not seem to be seriously represented in any of the DW Institutes. No matter how awkward it may sound, in the war years the Nazis seemed to have believed that the *litterae* should not stand behind the *arma*. Moreover, the theoretical sciences should also become "fighting sciences" (*'kaempfende Wissenschaften'*) and make their contribution to the final victory.[526] The Aryans believed their higher mission in this world would not be accomplished only through territorial but also through cultural expansion. It is interesting to note, though, that in 1942 the leader of the cultural department of the Foreign Ministry, von Twardowski, argued that the scientific societies of lesser importance, such as the Union of Authors or of Composers should not play a leading role in the international organisations and congresses. On the contrary, priority should be given to other more important disciplines like medicine and chemistry. The importance of the language remained, however, in any case, very high and he underlined that "in the centre of every cultural policy stands the language".[527] Therefore, the director of the *Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Institute* branch, appointed by the *Deutsche Akademie* in Munich, usually occupied the Chair of German at a foreign university.

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[523] TWARDOWSKI, Anfaenge der deutschen Kulturpolitik *ibid.*, p. 42; HAUSMANN, pp. 27f.; copy of letter containing the "Richtlinien fuer die Arbeit der Akademischen Abteilung des Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Instituts" of gez. Schaefer-Ruemelin from cultural department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Minister 30.11.1940, in: PAAA, R 64287.

[524] Such was the case of the Arbeitsausschuss fuer die Neuerlegung der internationalen wissenschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit, which resulted little more than a few French prisoners of war being used by the Prussian Academy for editorial work on the *Jahrbuch ueber Fortschritte der Mathematik*. See: SPENCE RICHARDS, "The Movement of scientitif knowledge", p. 416.

[525] Vortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), in: PAAA, R 60608.

[526] HAUSMANN, Auch im Krieg, p. 13.

[527] Vortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), in: PAAA, R 60608.

Nevertheless, Germany, complained Twardowski, did not appreciate the political significance of purely cultural activity abroad during the war, even though everyone in the country admired the well-planned cultural policy of France and acknowledged how much damage it had made to Germany, after 1919. He stressed that cultural policy presented "missed opportunities" and Germany was about to miss one this time as well. Everything in Europe was fluid and there were many areas, argued Twardowski further, in which Germany could get a foothold, provided the Reich could accurately assess and make use of the situation before its rivals took action.[528] What Germany should do, according to the German cultural specialist, was to invest time, money and qualified people, allowing for the fact that patience and understanding were also important elements in the war years.[529] Despite the fact that no serious research was conducted in the *Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Institute*, they were designed to play an important role in disseminating German culture abroad, in Europe in particular. Nevertheless, it was not an easy task, as the DWI, like every other institution in the Third Reich, was subject to the "polycratic principle", according to which a number of ministries and offices were involved in and were entitled to have their say in its affairs.[530] On the other hand, according to the *Fuehrerprinzip*, the role of the presidents of the *Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Institute* was strengthened, securing independence for their institutes.[531]

The campaign of German culture as such, was the task of a number of other scientific centres in Europe that had been established before the Nazis' seizure of power. The *Bibliotheca Herziana* in Rome, which the Kaiser Wilhelm Society owned since 1914, was one such example.[532] Meanwhile, the Society became partner of a number of scientific institutes abroad, which according to the official statutes, were created for the cultivation and promotion of cultural and scientific relations between Germany and their respective host countries. In that framework, the Zoological Station in Rovigno, which had belonged to the Society since 1911, was transformed in 1930 into a German-Italian In-

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528 *Ibid.*

529 *Ibid.*

530 The different sources, from which the DWI departments were funded, advocate to the enforcement of that principle. In addition, the scientists of the DWI departments were appointed by the Ministry of Education, while the language teachers (*Lektoren*) by the German Academy, who after 1941 were administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Propaganda Ministry. Last but not least, the DWI depended on the Foreign Ministry for the exchange of professors and other minor scholars. See: HAUSMANN, pp. 33f.

531 *Ibid.* p. 35.

532 In 1934, it was renamed the "Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute for Art and Cultural Sciences".

stitute for Marine Biology. The Reich's effort to establish similar bilateral scientific research centres in Europe, was accelerated in 1940 against the backdrop of the continuing war. The eagerness to have Germany scientific bases beyond its borders in that particular time is obviously not irrelevant to its political and military plans. The first such institute was created in Sofia, with the name "German-Bulgarian Institute for Agricultural Research". It followed by the "German-Greek Research Institute for Biology", in Piraeus, while serious plans were made for the creation of a "German-Hungarian Institute for Agricultural Research" in Budapest, and a "German-Bulgarian Research Station for Microbiology" on the Greek island of Thasos, which had been annexed by Bulgaria.

All the above feverish efforts to make the Nazis' cultural presence noticeable in Europe, were sealed by a number of cultural agreements between the Reich and some European countries, focusing on the south-eastern European states. The initiative for the accord was taken by the Reich's Foreign Ministry. The main concerns of these agreements was the inclusion of German in the curricula of other countries as the main foreign language, the creation of cultural institutes, the exchange of scholars, and the status of German schools abroad.[533] In other words, the bilateral contracts confirmed at the state level almost all the cultural initiatives Germany had taken in the past. For the Foreign Ministry, the dissemination of German was the number one priority of the Reich's cultural policy abroad with scholarships following next in order of importance.[534] In 1936, the Third Reich signed its first bilateral cultural agreement with Hungary. The agreement was initiated by the Ministry of Education and it was the first (and also the last) such accord to be initiated by a Ministry other than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[535] The contract stipulated, among other things, the strengthening and intensification of scientific relations between the Reich and the named country. This meant in practice mutual creation of "guest chairs" at universities in both countries to host short or long-term lecture series. It also meant the exchange of university assistants, the creation of

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[533] HAUSMANN, *ibid.*

[534] *Ibid.*; Vortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), in: PAAA, R 60608.

[535] The personal relations between the Minister of Education, Bernhard Rust, with his Hungarian counterpart, Hóman, was the main reason that the Reich's Ministry of Education and not the Foreign Ministry represented the Reich in its first bilateral agreement. That contract became, however, the model for similar agreements that the Reich signed with a number of countries few years later. LAITENBERGER, Akademischer Austausch, pp. 86f.

positions for scholars at local universities, and the granting of scholarships for student exchange by the DAAD and the *Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung*.[536]

Some years later, when the changes in the cultural section of the Foreign Ministry were completed, a number of contracts were signed between the Reich and the Balkan countries.[537] In 1938, Germany signed a cultural agreement with Greece, in 1940 with Bulgaria, in 1941 with Rumania, and in 1942 with Slovakia. Meanwhile, in 1938, the Nazi State had signed similar agreements with the Axis-countries, namely Italy and Japan, and in 1939 with Spain. The priority of all these agreements was the promotion of German culture, i.e. music, theatre, literature, fine arts, and above all the language. Germany "discovered" the cultural agreements, as Jan-Pieter Barbian notes,[538] in a period in which the state was intensifying its foreign policy, thereby securing its alliances with countries that were ideologically affiliated to the Reich. On the other hand, the Nazis aspired to create a larger Europe under their control, where German would be the dominant language. South-eastern Europe had a particular importance in the Reich's foreign policy agenda. It had a great geographical, political, economic, and cultural significance for German interests in territories far beyond that region. The National Socialists regarded the Balkan states as bridge to the Near and Middle East and beyond.[539] These were territories influenced by the British, while the Balkans, were in general influenced by the French. To a certain extent Nazi Germany saw the Balkan Peninsula both as colonial territory as well as the threshold for its future colonial plans, when the Reich would annex the possessions of its defeated enemies, namely France and Great Britain. The occupation of France by the Nazis in 1940 did not, however, mean that its cultural dominance in the Balkan states was ended and that the Germans would continue their cultural propaganda undisturbed. In 1942, the number of French nationals travelling to southeastern Europe for cultural-political reasons, the Germans believed, increased. Therefore, they decided to prohibit French travellers from entering to any Balkan state, even if they tried to do so

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536 JAN-PIETER BARBIAN, "'Kulturwerte im Zeitkampf'. Die Kulturabkommen des 'Dritten Reiches' als Instrumente nationalsozialistischer Aussenpolitik", in: *Archiv fuer Kulturgeschichte*, Band 74 (1992), pp. 415-459, here: p. 421

537 See: PAAA, R 61415, R 61416, R 61417.

538 BARBIAN, "'Kulturwerte im Zeitkampf'", pp. 415 ff.

539 Kulturberichte des Ges. Johann Kirchholtes betr. Bulgarien u. Rumaenien 1939-1944, in: PAAA, R 60662.

via Italy, where they could get the necessary documents.[540] Germans were also aware that they were not popular abroad. "They respect us, they admire us for our achievements, they are afraid of us, but they don't want to be like us", noted Twardowski in 1942. The ideal German life resembled the military life, characterised by discipline, work, efficiency, and sacrifice. It was not surprising, therefore, that such way of living was not attractive to other nations, which preferred the French and the English lifestyle.[541] Nevertheless, Germany continued to champion its culture through language propaganda in the several institutions abroad, scholarships and new types of research institutes. Two such developments were the institute for seed research in Bulgaria and the institute for marine biological research in Greece, both branches of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. In addition, plans for the creation of hospitals affiliated to German clinics in Athens/Greece and in Galatz/Romania for research in rare diseases was a cultural political undertaking that seriously troubled the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[542]

Apart from the DWI, Nazi Germany planned to establish a number of cultural institutes abroad, focusing on the Balkan region as well as on the so-called, Danube-states. From 1938-40, all cultural institutes abroad were also controlled by the Reich Ministry of Education, which because of its inexperience in such matters was a force for stagnation to Germany's cultural-political work abroad. It should be noted that the Ministry of Education, because of its close relations to the Nazi Party and the *Wehrmacht*, was able to get involved in the Reich's foreign cultural policy, thereby by passing the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which was normally have played a leading role in these undertakings. In 1940, the Foreign Ministry tried hard to take under its auspices the "cultural" institutes, namely those focused on the promotion of the German language and culture abroad. In a compromise move von Twardowski suggested to the Secretary of the Ministry of Education, Werner Zschintzsch, that the cultural-political direction of the institutes abroad should become responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while their scientific activities would be supervised of the Ministry of Education. The economic part should, according to von Twardowki, belong to his own ministry, while the appointment

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[540] F. v. Twardowski to the German Embassy in Rom on Deutsche Botschaft in Rom 26.11.1942 (Geheim!) [Date and month are noted with blue pencil by hand]. In: PAAA, R 60608.

[541] Vortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), in: PAAA, R 60608.

[542] *Ibid.*

of the scientific personnel should be the responsibility of the Ministry of Education.[543] Zschintzsch responded by separating the cultural institutes abroad into what he called "pure scientific institutes" subject to his Ministry, and the "pure cultural-political institutes" subject to the Foreign Ministry. To the first belonged the German Historical Institute in Rome; the archaeological institutes in Rome, Istanbul, Athens, Cairo and Isfahan; the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute (KWI) for cultural science; the KWI for art science in Rome; the Institute for Art History in Florence; the German Academy in Rome (Villa Massimo); and the Institute for Marine Biology in Rovigno. Zschintzsch's suggestions did not please the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it reiterated its position that every single institute outside the Reich's borders, even the purely scientific ones, were a significant factor for German cultural policy and could have a foreign political mission as well. Therefore, they had to be directed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone.[544]

It is true that this ministry had a great experience in the management of cultural affairs since the Bismarck era. Its greatest advantage was the specially trained personnel spread all over the world that the ministry had at its disposal. A number of people working at several embassies or consulates gathered valuable information about the local conditions that would facilitated or hinder a successful cultural policy. Very often, they used their personal networks in the country of interest, something that demanded diplomatic skills and time for the development of relationships of trust with the local elite. The Ministry of Science and Education had none of these resources and its involvement could damage German interests. One striking example was the order the Ministry of Education gave to the management of the archaeological institute in Rome to suspend its co-operation with the American archaeological institute in the Italian capital. This happened due to a misinterpretation of information released by the Foreign Ministry in Berlin and the unwillingness of the Ministry of Education to let the German Embassy in Rome to intervene to clear up the misunderstanding.[545] This kind of embarrassment had the result of promting the acknowledgement that some responsibilities should remain at the Foreign Ministry. Nonetheless, in a number of other undertakings the two ministries eventually shared responsibility and supervision.

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[543] Note of F. v. Twardowski on 22.07.1940 regarding the "Unterstellung der deutschen Kulturinstitute im Ausland unter das Auswaertigen Amt" to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in: PAAA, R 66612.

[544] *Ibid.*

[545] *Ibid.*

In 1938, an unsigned note addressed to the Foreign Ministry, with the title "Establishment of German Cultural Institutes Abroad", presumably by the Ministry of Education, gives some idea of the character and the guidelines for the institutes abroad, but also the rationale for their establishment. That rationale put forward was anti-French, not surprising perhaps as France was Germany's oldest and biggest cultural rival, particularly in southeastern Europe. The note underlined that the German institutes should have a different profile from their French equivalents.[546] The latter were more or less affiliated to the French higher education system. This meant that the foreigners, who attended them had to follow a series of courses like French, literature, history, art history and so forth, and at the end of their studies gaining the appropriate certificate.[547] Unlike France, Germany's plans were to establish cultural institutes that were less academic and more adapted to the present.[548] What was meant by "present" was quite clear. The mission of the cultural institutes abroad should not be the dissemination of the German culture in general, but the promotion of modern Germany. The institutes should rather try to spread the Party's ideals, focusing on recent German history, the namely National Socialism. The French Revolution brought no serious change in the world, argued the Nazis, and "despite all the vague contemporary notions, like naturalism and materialism, as a result of its strong formalism and logical intellectualism", its content remained empty. In contrast to French cultural ideals, National Socialism transcended liberal thinking introduced by the French Revolution, bringing a deep change, as it was claimed, to political thought.[549] The rest of the world new almost nothing about this change, however, and did not seem to understand it. Therefore, in order for the new political theory - which, according to the Nazis, was superior to the existing western political system introduced by France- to be further transmitted, they had to follow a different strategy from their rivals.

It is clear that what the Nazis understood by 'culture' was everything that derived from the National Socialist ideology and they believed that cultural policy should have political connotations. Consequently, the Reich's cultural institutes abroad should not be limited to the propagation of language and science. They should provide other elements of the German greatness as well, like the history of the National Socialist movement, the

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[546] o.D. (1938) Errichtung deutscher Kulturinstitute im Ausland, in: PAAA, R 61270.

[547] *Ibid.*

[548] *Ibid.*

[549] *Ibid.*

organisation of young people according to the national socialist ideals, national, social and educational policy, as well as books, the arts, and sports.[550] The Nazis were very much aware of the possible resistance their views might meet in western democracies, like France and Britain. Therefore, they had to introduce those people to the merits of National Socialism gradually. As for those countries with similar political regimes, like Italy and Japan, they could act in a more open and direct fashion.[551] However, the blunt political profile that the Nazis so strongly proposed for the Reich's cultural propaganda abroad, seemed to be moderated in the following years, mainly because of the resistance of the Foreign Ministry and particularly its cultural political department. Nevertheless, many of the Nazi elements penetrated the Reich's cultural political agenda, even when the Foreign Ministry was in charge of most of the projects abroad.

Besides the "western democracies" and the "politically allied" countries, south-eastern Europe had a different significance for Germany's cultural plans. Unlike the rest of Europe, the Danube and the Balkan states were crucial for the Nazi geopolitical enterprise. This territory was seen as their "living sphere" (*Lebensphaere*) and the economic and political completion of the Reich in the Southeast.[552] The economic significance of the Danube states was concentrated on the waterway network of the Danube River, through which Germany could trade products to and from the counties of the Black Sea, like Ukraine.[553] The Balkan states were the second most important territory after Ukrainethat could provide Germany with agricultural products and could make the country self-sufficient for the planned war. However, this sort of colonisation would not be successful without a well-organised cultural policy. Germany would secure its political and economic hegemony over the south-eastern countries, only if it could dominate them culturally.[554] The cultural initiatives that were taken to influence them after the First World War seemed inadequate for the Reich's purposes in the region. And despite the historical links that some of the countries had had with the Habsburg Empire, these were not enough for Germany to overcome its cultural stagnation in those territories caused

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[550] *Ibid.*

[551] *Ibid.*

[552] H.G.v.Studnitz, Berlin to the Foreign Ministry, "Expose ueber die Errichtung eines deutschen Kulturinstitutes fuer die Balkan – und Donau – Staaten", on 25.05.1939, in: PAAA, R 61270.

[553] It was believed that Ukraine alone could provide Germany with agricultural products, particularly grains, for some generations.

[554] H.G.v.Studnitz, Berlin to the Foreign Ministry, "Expose ueber die Errichtung eines deutschen Kulturinstitutes fuer die Balkan – und Donau – Staaten", on 25.05.1939, in: PAAA, R 61270.

by financial and bureaucratic deficiencies. If the Third Reich did not want to see those potential colonies turning towards Paris, Rome, or even London, then Berlin should inaugurate a systematic and competitive cultural policy.[555]

One of the early important organisations created for these purposes was the "Association of Bi-national Unions and Organisations" (*Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen"*). The *Vereinigung* was established in 1938 and brought under its aegis the existing bilateral societies. It was subject to the SS and its president was the SS-*Obergruppenfuehrer* Werner Lorenz. In November 1938, Lorenz demonstrated the purpose of the *Vereinigung*, by underlining the Reich's contribution to the preservation of world peace.[556] More precisely, Germany had committed itself before the other big European nations to promoting mutual understanding and friendship among peoples, to securing their rights and to contributing to an enduring balance of their interests. That commitment was stronger than ever, declared Lorenz in 1938, and this was due to the creation of the *Vereinigung*.[557] The bilateral unions and societies Germany had set up many years ago were, according to him, better organised, while new ones were planned, primarily for neutral states, including Greece.[558] Those societies, clubs and unions, like the German-French society, the German-Turkish, the German-Greek society and the like, were practically the standard cultural bearers and transmitters of German culture, even though they were described as organisations of cultural reciprocity. Their mission, further argued Lorenz, was the exchange of cultural goods, through which the nations could understand each other. Education should have pride of place in those bilateral organisations.[559] Lorenz's argument sounds strange, even unreal, at a time that Germany was preparing for war and the Four-Year Plan had already been put into practice. So how can his peace declaration be reconciled with Germany's war planning? Did he have his own vision for the state's foreign cultural policy or something else hidden behind his peace rhetoric? It is interesting to note that his notification was confidential. Therefore, if it was not some kind of diplomatic rhetoric addressed to the people or the authorities of some other na-

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[555] *Ibid.*

[556] Mitteilungen der "Vereinigung zwischen staatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V." by gez.: Lorenz, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer, (Geheim!), on 01.11.1938, in: PAAA, R 61274.

[557] *Ibid.*

[558] LS.Dr. Grosche. Taetigkeit der Zwischenstaatlichen Gesellschaften im Ernstfall (Aufzeichnung) on 02.09.1939, in: PAAA, R 61280.

[559] Mitteilungen der "Vereinigung zwischen staatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V." by gez.: Lorenz, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer, (Geheim!), on 01.11.1938, in: PAAA, R 61274.

tion in order to convince them of Germany's good intentions, how could his language be justified in terms of Nazi ideology?

The National Socialist Party, which was attracted to the idea of cultural domination of the world, strove to get involved in areas of activity that at that time, were responsibility of the Foreign Ministry. After the hard and justified criticism had been made by the Ministry of the impact a Nazi-oriented cultural propaganda might have for German interests, it is possible that Lorenz, as a senior party member, wished, in his note, to underline the 'careful and smooth introduction' to the Nazi ideals. It is also likely, that the Party authorities adopted a new moderate language as a concession to the demands made by the Foreign Ministry for a cultural policy abroad that steered clear of any overtly political propaganda. However, the cover of "understanding other peoples and preserving world peace" provided by the party has proven to be a mere rhetoric, if one believes the reciprocity of the "understanding" declared by Lorenz. It seems, however, that what the Nazis desired was to be understood by other nations rather than to understand them. In addition, the way they perceived world peace and the means one should use to preserve it, were governed by their *Weltanschauung* which incited hostile depending on the percieved status of the race concerned. The confidential character of the "*Mitteilungen der Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V.*", which were the official records of the organisation's activities, advocates the propagandistic nature of the *Vereinigung*, as the material published in irregular basis was strictly controlled.[560]

Among the tasks of the *Vereinigung* was its engagement in several organisations in the Danube and the Balkan states. In 1938, for example, the *Vereinigung* got involved in the modification of the directorship of the Southeast European Institute in Vienna (*Suedosteuropa-Institut in Wien*).[561] The institute was of great scientific and economic significance for the entire Viennese administration. It consisted of two departments, loosely directed by that time by Dr. Plattner and Dr. Hermann Neubacher, the Mayor (*Oberbuergermeister*) of the City of Vienna and future special commissioner for south-eastern Europe.

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[560] Gez.: Dr. Heinevetter, Leiter der Pressestelle der "Vereinigung", in: Mitteilungen der "Vereinigung zwischen staatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V." by gez.: Lorenz, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer, (Geheim!), on 01.11.1938, in: PAAA, R 61274.

[561] Bericht Nr. 5 der Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V. (Geschaeftsfuehrener Vizepraesident), betr. Suedosteuropa-Institut in Wien, on 20.09.1938, in: PAAA, R 61273.

The extent, however, of the *Vereinigung*'s involvement in the directorship of the *Suedosteuropa-Institut* is not clear. What is certain though, is the role the bilateral societies had to play, as they were regarded as the unofficial vehicles of Germany's cultural campaign abroad.[562] Nonetheless, the question that still troubled the foreign cultural policy-makers was whether the 'cultural vehicles' should be engaged in a covert political undertaking and, if so, to what extent. In 1939, a working program for those societies was drawn up, in case they should eventually be used for political propaganda purposes. The program focused on the organisation of the two-sided leagues, the undertakings abroad and at home, and the affiliation with other institutions.[563] As for the organisational part, the first thing to be done was the liquidation of the organisations that were set up by enemy states, –implying essentially France-, and their replacement either by new societies with Germany as a partner or by old ones, which should be re-established. The external cultural undertakings organised by the *Vereinigung*, according to the working plan, should include the development of propaganda material, and the promotion of exhibitions, lectures of German politicians, the military and other personalities who were supporters of the Nazi ideology. Additionally, the two-sided societies and leagues abroad would be responsible for the promotion of the institutes planned to be established in the countries where they were active, as well as for the creation of German libraries and the promotion of German, or rather Nazi, writings. The publication of journals regarding cultural activities in the local community and the surveillance of the cultural developments of other countries, particularly of those hostile to Germany, should also be among the competences of the bilateral leagues. Equally important would be the influence they could exert on the public opinion of the country in question. Ultimately, the bilateral unions, acting as an intermediary intelligence agency should develop close ties with the information department of the Foreign Ministry, the defence section of the *Wehrmacht*, as well as with the Secret Police Office.[564]

At the beginning of 1939, the *Vereinigung* made an agreement with the "German Central Office for Congresses" [*Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale (DKZ)*], the chief organisation for the support and control of delegations for scientific meetings abroad.[565] With the

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[562] Note about the "Taetigkeit der Zwischenstaatlichen Gesellschaften im Ernstfall" by LS.Dr. Grosche to the Foreign Office in Berlin, on 02.09.1939, in: PAAA, R 61280.

[563] All the points discussed below are based on the above document.

[564] *Ibid.*

[565] Rundschreiben von der "Vereinigung zwischen staatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V." von den Geschaeftsfuehrenden Vizepraesidenten Dr. Grosche und Dr. Springer, 18.02.1939, in: PAAA, R 61274.

above agreement the *Vereinigung* increased its power to control and influence foreign delegations to congresses organised in Germany, while other institutions related to the *Vereinigung* were to be represented in congresses by their directors (*Geschaeftsfuehrender*), so as to bring them into contact with the foreign guests.[566] Finally, all information with regard to the foreign participants should be registered with the DKZ.

The *Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale* was established in December 1934 by the Reich Ministry of Propaganda in agreement with the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior. Its origins lay in was a branch of the Medical Society of Berlin and its aim was to provide help in organising medical congresses. It was initially called "Central Office for Scientific Congresses" (*Wissenschaftliche Kongress-Zentrale*). Soon the organisation comprised all scientific disciplines and the Ministry of Propaganda together with the Ministry of Education changed its name into *Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale*. The task of the DKZ was, on the one hand, to advise all the existing scientific institutions that organised international meetings in Germany and, on the other, to assess the experience of the undertaking for future cultural-political planning. In this framework, co-operation with Germany's bilateral organisations abroad was essential, in order for the DKZ to be informed about the foreign participants who were going to attend the relevant congresses.[567] Foreign scientists who had been educated in German technical schools or universities tended to defend Germany's prestige, not only in their own countries, but also in the international scientific community. The DKZ after 1938, was eager to revive and strengthen the foreigners' affection for Germany, which in the previous few years had been diminished as they had turned to Britain, France and the United States. The reason, argued the Nazis, was the anti-German propaganda by those nations that derived from a "ridiculous misunderstanding [of German culture] that was due to their political economy".[568] On the other hand, in cases in which Germany was invited to international meetings, the DKZ should come to an agreement with the ministries in charge and other institutions – whether state or party- and choose a "selected group of appropriate participants" to represent the Reich.[569] Repeating the post-war arguments about Germany's catastrophic

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566 *Ibid.*

567 Rundschreiben von der "Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V.", die Geschaeftsfuehrenden Vizepraesidenten gez.: Dr. Grosche, gez.; Dr. Springer, 18.02.1939, in: PAAA, R 61274.

568 H.G.v.Studnitz, Berlin to the Foreign Ministry, "Expose ueber die Errichtung eines deutschen Kulturinstitutes fuer die Balkan – und Donau – Staaten", on 25.05.1939, in: PAAA, R 61270.

the Reich.[569] Repeating the post-war arguments about Germany's catastrophic cultural collapse, the head of the DKZ, Dr. Knapp, stressed the cultural-political significance of national and international scientific associations and their meetings.[570] He argued further that the system of congresses combined with high politics ("*Kongresswesen und Hohe Politik*") would allow Germany to influence international organisations, as France had done at the end of the Great War.[571] Nevertheless, Germany's cultural-political struggle, specified Knapp, aimed at having the foreign nations understand and recognise the Reich's cultural achievements and at having them exchange experiences with them on knowledge, ideas and values.[572] When the war broke out in 1939, the DKZ, the *Vereinigung* and the DAAD began to collaborate closely to increase the number of foreign scholars in Germany and thus to activate what was called "supporting troops".[573] The cultural-political dimension of congresses organised by national or international institutions had been very well known in Germany since 1919. So was the impact of the country's isolation from them at France's insistence. Their country, they argued, at that time had been completely undefended against the Allies' strategy, which paralysed its voice and actions abroad. The DKZ was a response -albeit belated - to any potential similar threat for Germany's culture, either by France or by any other would be imitator of hers. About a thousand international organisations, reported the DAAD in 1940, from every possible field of human activity still presented a common front against German science and culture. A thousand more existed in Germany for its defence but they were weakened by their lack of manpower –a direct result of their downsizing by many authorities.[574] The role of the DKZ was to centralise power by taking the organisation of congresses and

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[569] Dr. Knapp, Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale. Jahresbericht 1935 to Auswaertigen Amt a.o., on 15.01.1936, p. 1, in: PAAA, R 60598.

[570] In 1936 the DKZ was planned to get involved in twenty-one congresses and in ten cases would be represented by its own leading figures. *Ibid.*, pp. 10f.

[571] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[572] *Ibid.* See also: Vortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), in: PAAA, R 60608.

[573] During 1939 seventy-eight scholarships of the amount of 42.000 Reich Marks in sum were given to foreigners via the bilateral unions. See: Report of the DAAD to the "Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbaende und Einruichtungen", about the "Vorlaeufigen Jahresbericht ueber die Verwaltung der Stipendien der zwischenstaatlichen Verbaende und Einrichtungen im Rechnungsjahr 1939 (1.4.1939 bis 31.3.1940)", on 28.03.1940, in: PAAA, R 61280.

[574] *Ibid.*

other external activities of the German scientific institutions under its control and thus mounting its defence of German culture.

4.4. Four-Year Plan. Science and technology in the war service.

Despite the fact that Germany's foreign economic relations were severely compromised by the Versailles restrictions, after 1925 the Republic took advantage of the post-war inflation to improve its financial status on the world stage. Thus, the Republic's foreign trade was increased from nothing to 21,6 billion marks, a figure that continued to rise until 1929, when the world economic crisis occurred.[575] Nevertheless, in 1933, the turnover of Germany's foreign trade sharply decreased from 26,9 billion marks to only 9 billion, thus plunging to the levels not seen since 1898, as a German expert estimated.[576] Germany was poor in raw materials, like ores, oil, rubber, not to mention agricultural products. This insufficiency forced the country to import raw materials or semi-products from abroad.

When the Nazis came to power imports of this kind amounted to fifty per cent of total imports.[577] Hitler's economic planning in the first years of his administration aimed at dealing with the depression and stabilising the country's economy, by creating a self-sufficient state in the European *Grossraum*. Germany's autarky, however, could not be achieved without a well-organised foreign economic policy, which since 1936 was transformed to serve the Reich's plans for war, bringing to the fore the Nazis' desire for territorial expansion. Insufficiency in raw materials was not the only factor that dictated the Nazi expansionist foreign policy. They also regarded Germany as a densely populated state. Its population of 66 million lived in a country of 471.000 square kilometres (1935 figures), i.e. about 104 people per square kilometre, while in France the equivalent number was seventy-six inhabitants per square kilometre.[578] It was clear for the Nazis that Germany's *Lebensraum* was not enough. The Nazis envisaged Germany, Austria and Hungary as a European *Grossraum*, taking in also the north and south Europe, in other words the whole territory from the North Sea across the continent and up to the coasts of the Mediterranean states. Germany should build a third zone in middle Europe, with Denmark, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Switzerland, the Netherlands and perhaps Italy, as

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575 WALTER KRUSPIG, "Deutschland und die Weltwirtschaft", in: CARL LANGE, ERNST ADOLF DREYER (Hg.), Deutscher Geist 1935. Kulturdocumente der Gegenwart. Zweiter Jahresband 1935: Gestaltung des Reiches. Leipzig 1934, p. 92.

576 *Ibid.*

577 *Ibid.*, p. 93.

578 *Ibid.*, p. 96.

economic counter-power to the Anglo-American and the Russia-Asian financial zone.[579] Germany's agrarian underproduction and its industrial overproduction made the country dependent on foreign agricultural products and raw materials, which were the main factors, the Nazis argued, that shaped the Reich's foreign economic policy agenda. The organisation of their economic policy went hand in hand with their agricultural policy, which demanded self-sufficiency in food production. By the end of the First World War, the Reich's colonies offered the additional sources required for feeding the German people. The English blockade, which, according to the Germans, was the main reason for famine in Germany, should not be allowed in a future war. After the National Socialist accession to power, the colonial policy of the *Kaiserreich* was replaced by the *Lebensraum* policy that demanded food and raw material autarky for the state.[580] The future "*Kolonialreich*" should not be located overseas, where Germany once had possessions, but in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.[581]

The Nazi aspirations for eastward expansion was put into action in 1936 with the Four-Year Plan. Among the competences of the Office of the Four-Year Planning (*Vierjahresplanbehoerde*) was the co-ordination of all the research institutes of the country along an autarky policy. In 1937, a new organisation was established which was entirely dedicated to the war research. By that time, the main state institution that sponsored the German scientific research was the Emergency Office for the German Science (*Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft*), which had been founded in the very first years of the Weimar Republic. In 1937, the president of the *Notgemeinschaft*, Rudolf Mentzel, renamed the institution the "German Research Society" (*Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* DFG).[582] On 25 May of the same year, the Minister of Education, Bernhard Rust, set up in addition to the DFG institution that co-ordinated all the research projects related to the Four-Year Plan, either at university or non-university research centres. The new institu-

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[579] HANS-ERICH VOLKMANN, Oekonomie und Expansion. Grundzuege der NS-Wrtschaftspolitik. Ausgewaehlte Schriften. Muenchen 2003, p. 21.

[580] THOMAS WIELAND, " 'Die politischen Aufgaben der deutschen Pflanzenzuechtung'. NS-Ideologie und die Forschungsarbeiten der akademischen Pflanzenzuechter", in: SUSANNE HEIM (Hg.), Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus. Goettingen 2002, pp. 35-56, here p. 55.

[581] *Ibid.*, pp. 47 ff.; SCHUMANN, Griff nach Suedosteuropa, pp. 9-29.

[582] See: NOTKER HAMMERSTEIN, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten Reich. Wissenschaftspolitik in Republik und Diktatur. Muenchen 1999, pp. 88 ff.

tion was the German Research Council (*Reichsforschungsrat*, RFR).[583] The two organisations that operated under Mentzel's orders worked closely together for the advancement of German science, sharing funds and research projects.[584]

The war preparations gave priority to certain scientific and research fields, not only to those related to technology and armament, but also to agriculture and food autarky. Germany mainly produced carbohydrates and had to import proteins and fat. The lack of these kinds of agricultural products, as well as the lack of food plants resistant to extreme climatic conditions, aggravated the country's dependence on foreign currency.[585] The agricultural and biological research was, therefore, considered a national issue and was supported by the DFG/RFR. A number of special projects regarding the conservation of soil fertility and the need for using fertilisers, as well as the farming of plants rich in fat and proteins along with animal breeding were launched in view of the immediate implementation -of the Nazi reserve- and agrarian policy.[586] In 1940, the most important foods in the German diet were bread and potatoes. To avoid a drop dwindling in the potato and cereal harvest that was likely to be caused by a virus, frost or drought[587] with catastrophic consequences for the German people and army, German scientists promoted research on species resistant to extreme climatic conditions and diseases. Additionally, the lack of cattle feed rich in albumin which affected the human diet was an impetus for research on artificial proteins, like urea and *Glykokoll*.[588]

The Kaiser Wilhelm Society played a major role in the Four-Year planning adjusting its projects to the preparations for war. The Ministry for Nutrition and Agriculture generously sponsored research in several Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes in order to reduce the importation of food, semi-products and raw materials. The agrarian scientist Konrad Meyer and the secretary in the above ministry, Herbert Backe, played a key role

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583 *Ibid.* pp. 205 ff.

584 In 1942 the *Reichsforschungsrat* was re-established on Hitler's order and its new president became Hermann Goering. See: Copy of a decree signed by Hitler on 09.06.1942 and published on the Reichsgesetzblatt Nr. 64, on 15.6.42, in: BAB, R 26 III/186.

585 SUSANNE HEIM, Kalorien, Kautschuk, Karrieren. Pflanzenzuechtung und landwirtschaftliche Forschung in Kaiser-Wilhelm-Instituten 1933-1945. Goettingen 2003, pp. 23-124.

586 W. Wuest, Vortrag A/63/1 on 03.11.1940, in: BAB, NS 21/ 281.

587 This was what happened in 1846/7 in Ireland, when the virus *phytophthora*, a water mould (*oomycota*) species caused the Great Potato Famine that killed neady a million people. The water mould virtually wiped out the country's potato crops, which were an essential staple in the Irish diet. See also chapter 6.1 and 6.3 of the thesis.

588 W. Wuest, Vortrag A/63/1 on 03.11.1940, in: BAB, NS 21/ 281.

in research regarding food autarky. Backe was the vice-president of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society from 1941 to 1945 and gradually became more influential than the minister of agriculture, Walther Darré.[589] Meyer's efforts were concentrated on plant breeding and the social structure of rural regions. He was one of the co-authors of the *Generalplan Ost*, according to which tens of millions of civilians in eastern European territories were forced to evacuate large parts of the occupied lands, which set aside for settlement by the Germans, while many others were killed or deported to concentration camps.[590] Scientists in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Breeding Research were also engaged in experiments with soya beans, rape-seed, turnips, alfalfa, clover, vetch, millet, sunflowers, potatoes, tomatoes, various kinds of fruits, and grapes. The aim of these experiments was to make plants that were important for humans or animals as hardy as possible against vermin, diseases, aridity and frost.[591] In order to conduct research of that kind, scientists should have at their disposal large quantities of seeds from which to make selection of the right plants for cross-fertilisation. Therefore, Germany sought to control strategically important scientific resources, i.e. genetic resources, which were available only in certain geographical zones, one of which was the eastern and southeastern Europe, namely Russia and the Balkans. Expansion to those regions would solve Germany's *Lebensraum* problem providing its people with enough food.

The war planning aimed both at the Reich's military and economic victory primarily over other European countries. In practical terms, this meant a self-sufficient Europe in peace-time not for the needs of the local population but for the German people and the settlers across the continent.[592] Whether they were Nazi sympathisers or not,

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589 SUSANNE HEIM, "Forschung fuer die Autarkie. Agrarwissenschaft an Kaiser-Wilhelm-Instituten im Nationalsozialismus", in: *Ibid.* (Hg.), Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus, Goettingen 2002, pp. 146 ff. For the early version of the paper in English see: SUSANNE HEIM, "Research for Autarky. The Contribution of Scientists to Nazi Rule in Germany", in: *Ergebnisse 4. Vorabdrucke aus dem Forschungsprogramm "Geschichte der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus"* 2001.

590 See: ROESSLER MECHTILD, SABINE SCHLEIERMACHER (Hg.), Der "Genaralplan Ost". Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Plannungs- und Vernichtungspolitik. Berlin 1993.

591 HEIM, "Forschung fuer die Autarkie", pp. 149 ff.

592 Compare the documents Nr. 13 and Nr. 83: "Aus dem Vortrag von Tilo Freiherr von Wilmowsky, Praesident des Mitteleuropaeischen Wirtschafstages, 2.09.1940" and "Aus dem Schreiben von Rudolf Kratz an August Heinrichsbauer, 04.06.1942", both published in: WOLFGANG SCHUMANN (Hg.), Griff nach Suedosteuropa. Neue Dokumente ueber die Politik des deutschen Imperialismus und Militarismus gegenueber Suedosteuropa im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Berlin 1973, pp. 89 ff, 182 f. T.F. v. Wilmowsky and

scientists had to adjust their research projects to the country's war needs and the new economic planning. Their existence turned out to be dependent on the war and its outcome. Alan Beyerchen, for example, argues that "the extent to which Aryan physicists could gain influence and power was therefore dependent on their views in regard to technology", noting that "technology played a crucial role not only in peacetime agricultural and industrial production but also in warfare".[593] Thus, scientists were forced either to shift focus of research or to adopt a rhetoric that would guarantee them the financial support of the authorities. It is not surprising, therefore, that most of the projects conducted in the war period and particularly at the KW Institutes were classified "important for the warfare" (*kriegswichtig*). What seems to be more interesting, though, is that these projects were also characterised "important for culture" (*kulturwichtig*). As *kriegswichtig* were described not only the projects related to Germany's food self-sufficiency but also the armament research, which was also to a certain extent conducted at the institutes of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. The Four-Year Plan policy was not only aiming at making the country independent from imported raw materials and agricultural products, but also at creating a self-sufficient "defence-state" (*Wehrstaat*) with war capabilities (*kriegsfaehig*). The armament research was a complex project directly related to the Four-Year Plan and the war economy, intertwining more obviously than any other project the interests of military, state and industry.[594]

The first concern of the regime for Germany's armament was the sensible use of the state's existing resources, like coal, wood and ore, but also the investment in research for synthetic raw materials, primarily fuels.[595] The whole industrial sector as well as the

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Kratz see differently the development of agriculture in south-eastern Europe for the benefit of the local population.

593 ALAN BEYERCHEN, Scientists under Hitler. Politics and the Physics Community in the Third Reich. Yale Univ. Press 1977, pp. 135, 138.

594 HERBERT MEHRTENS, "Kollaborationsverhaeltnisse: Natur- und Technikwissenschaften im NS-Staat und ihre Historie", in: CHRISTOPH MEINEL, PETER VOSWINCKEL (Hg.), Medizin, Naturwissenschaft, Technik und Nationalsozialismus. Kontinuitaeten und Diskontinuitaeten. Stuttgart 1994, pp. 13-32. Some historians argue that this project had many of the characteristics of the so-called "big science". See: HELMUTH TRISCHLER, "Wachstum – Systamnaehe – Ausdifferenzierung. Grossforschung im Nationalsozialismus", in: RUEDIGER vom BRUCH, BRIGITTE KADERAS (Hg.), Wissenschaften und Wissenschaftspolitik. Bestandsaufnahmen zu Formationen, Bruechen und Kontinuitaeten im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart 2002, pp. 241-252.

595 KARL-HEINZ LUDWIG, "Technik", in: WOLFGANG BENZ u.a. (Hg.), Enzyklopaedie des Nationalsozialismus. Munchen 1997, pp. 270 ff.

transportation network was dependent on the mechanical power of the machines. German scientists worked on creating a variety of products from the indigenous resources, not only compatible with the machines in use, but also as profitable as possible. In the same vein experiments on different types of wood-products were also undertaken, some of them on the aviation research. Efforts were also made to substitute wood with aluminium, a light metal derived from bauxite ore. Bauxite could be found in almost all the Balkan countries and in most of them in considerable quantities.[596] Other industrial sectors that had to be aligned to the autarky policy included the ceramic and textile industry as well as the electricity production and chemical industry which were the basis of all industrial research. The fabric industry was closely related to agricultural research and the cultivation of plants, such as flax, hemp and cotton. "We will be satisfied", stated a spokesman of the I.G.Farben, "when [...] one day we have in our hands an artificial cotton-like fibre." The big challenge, however, was the creation of a wool-like fibre, as it was a material surrounded with still unsolved "mysteries of nature".[597] Silk and rubber cultivation was also parts of agricultural research.[598] Experiments on artificial silk and rubber began to gain importance as soon as the efforts to increase production from natural materials proved unsuccessful. Those experiments, however, fared no better than those that had gone before.

Not only did the Kaiser Wilhelm Society adjust its projects to the needs of the Reich's war preparations and the war industry, but so also did the university research centres, which at that time played a secondary role in the country's scientific research. In 1938, the minister for the Four-Year Plan, Hermann Goering, and the head of the Board of Directors of IG-Farben and the representative of the Office for Raw and Industrial Materials (*Amt fuer Deutsche Roh- und Werkstoffe*), Carl Krauch, together with the president of the *Notgemeinschaft* and vice-president of the Ministry of Science, Education and People's Enlightenment, Rudolf Mentzel, signed an agreement for the establishment of the "Four-Year Plan University Research Institutes". This was a plan concerned principally with the needs of the war industry. Despite their relationship with industry, the new in-

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[596] On the exploitation of the bauxite mines in Greece see: Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), R 63/ 84, 106. On the involvement of the IG-Farben, see: BAB, R 8128.

[597] I.G. Farben Hauptindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Ludwigshafen a. Rh. Hauptlaboratorium. (Ebel's) 34 pages "Vortrag vor den Hochschulen bei Schaffung der gebietsmaessigen Gruppenleiter." 1 Fassung 21.10.1940, paper sheet 188, p. 33 in: BAB, R 4901/932.

[598] See: HEIM, Kalorien, Kautschuk, Karrieren, pp. 125-198; WIELAND, 'Die politischen Aufgaben der deutschen Pflanzenzuechtung', pp. 50ff.

stitutes would retain their autonomy, which was to prove more rhetorical than real.[599] Nevertheless, only specialised universities would be affiliated to German industrial groups, like the IG-Farben chemical company, which was one of the most important pillars of the state's war economy.[600] Those universities would have to fulfil some preconditions, like having tradition in particular disciplines and being located close to industrial plants.[601] Examples of chosen universities were the Universities of Darmstadt and Heidelberg, where the first new type of laboratories were being created.[602] In 1940, however, industry and universities did not work closely enough, even though the cooperation between them was acknowledged as being absolutely necessary.[603] The reason was, according to the IG-Farben, the reservations and a kind of distrust from both sides. The secrecy among industrial enterprises and other interested parts about the advancement of research projects, in order to remain competitive, was another serious reason. On the other hand, universities that provided industries with scientific achievements and the know-how feared that these would be used, not in the public interest but for private purposes. These reservations and fears from both sides, argued the spokesman of the I.G. Farben, should be set aside to be replaced by a common front for German science, as National Socialism had replaced the private concerns of the old economic model with the common interest.[604] German science was considered the means for the Reich to achieve two major goals: to take over the leadership in the new Europe and to present a defensive front against America.[605]

The organisation of the "Four-Year Plan Institutes" was the responsibility of the Office for Raw Materials. Directors would be university professors, who would not have

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599 Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschaftsausbau. Vorlaeufige Richtlinien fuer die Forschungsinstitute des Vierjahresplanes 18.02.1938, part IIIa. Verhaeltnis zur Industrie, in: BAB, R 4901/932.

600 See: FRIEDRICH STRATMANN, Chemische Industrie unter Zwang? Staatliche Einflussnahme am Beispiel der chemischen Industrie Deutschlands 1933-1949, Stuttgart 1985, pp. 41-137.

601 Prof. Dr. Mentzel to Dr. Krauch, Amt fuer Deutsche Roh- und Werkstoffe on 11.01.1938, in: BAB, R 4901/ 932. For the detailed guidelines of the new institutes see: Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschaftsausbau. Vorlaeufige Richtlinien fuer die Forschungsinstitute des Vierjahresplanes 18.02.1938, in: BAB, R 4901/932.

602 Protokol ueber die Errichtung von Forschungsinstitute des Vierjahresplanes (Paragraph 1), 11.01.1938, in: BAB R 4901/932.

603 I.G. Farben Hauptindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Ludwigshafen a. Rh. Hauptlaboratorium. (Ebel's) 34 pages "Vortrag vor den Hochschulen bei Schaffung der gebietsmaessigen Gruppenleiter." 1 Fassung 21.10.1940, paper number 157, p. 2 in: BAB, R 4901/932.

604 *Ibid.*

605 *Ibid.*, paper number 162, p. 7.

the status of industrial employees, but would retain their position at their universities and consequently their affiliation to the Ministry of Education.[606] The research would be conducted under the supervision of the Reich Office for Economic Expansion (*Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschaftsausbau*) and should be kept secret.[607] Therefore, the university institutes ought to operate exclusively for industrial research and the appointment of foreign scientists was strictly forbidden.[608] Financial support was to come primarily from the Office, but contributions from industry were always welcome.[609] The research projects were focused on synthetic raw materials, like synthetic petrol, rubber and textile fibres.[610] It is interesting to note that the Minister of Education suggested a "lecturing plan" between universities and the new institutes, in which scientific as well as financial issues could be discussed.[611] This project was expanded during the war years and lectures organised by a sponsor or central university (*Patenuniversitaet*) to which Four-Year Plan institutes were affiliated were held for soldiers. The undertaking occasionally took place outside Germany, in occupied countries, contributing to the Reich's cultural policy abroad. This was the case with the University in Vienna, which was the *Patenuniversitaet* for southeastern Europe.[612] It is noteworthy that these research centres, despite the fact that they were

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606 Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschaftsausbau. Vorlaeufige Richtlinien fuer die Forschungsinstitute des Vierjahresplanes 18.02.1938, part I. Organisation, Dienstaufsicht, in: BAB, R 4901/932.

607 *Ibid.*, part IIIg. Geheimhaltung. Also: Leiter der Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschaftsausbau, Dr. Crimanis: Vorlaeufige Richtlinien fuer die Forschungsinstitute des Vierjahresplanes, 18.02.1938, in: BAB R 4901/932.

608 Protokol ueber die Errichtung von Forschungsinstitute des Vierjahresplanes (Paragraph 2, 3, 4), 11.01.1938; Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschaftsausbau. Vorlaeufige Richtlinien fuer die Forschungsinstitute des Vierjahresplanes 18.02.1938, part IIIg. Geheimhaltung, both in: BAB, R 4901/932.

609 Protokol ueber die Errichtung *Ibid.*

610 IG-Farben Vortrag vor den Hochschulen bei Schaffung der gebietamaessigen Gruppenleiter, on 21.10.1940, in: BAB R 4901/932. It is a detailed presentation of the work on synthetic raw materials. On the arguments for the need of research on synthetic textile fibres see also: 1941 report of Dr. Joachim Loebering (Sueddeutsche Zellwolle A.G. Kelheim A.D.Donau) under the title "Ueber Grundlagen- und Zweckforschung auf dem Fasserstoffgebiet", in: BAB R 4901/932.

611 Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschaftsausbau. Vorlaeufige Richtlinien fuer die Forschungsinstitute des Vierjahresplanes 18.02.1938, part IV. Unterrichtsfragen, in: BAB, R 4901/932.

612 Lectures were also given to soldiers in Greece, in 1944, by two distinguished professors of biology at the University of Vienna and by the Kaiser Wilhelm zoologist Otto Schartau, who was the local director of the German-Greek Institute for Biology in Piraeus. See: Letter of Schartau to Max Hartmann, director of the Institute for Biological Research in Berlin-Dahlem, on 5.4.1944, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr 1282.

designed for the Four-Year Plan project, could continue to operate as university institutes later on for the needs of a so-called "second Four-Year Plan".[613]

It should not be forgotten that even though the university institutes recruited for war preparation and were engaged in exclusively practical problems, they were regarded as institutions that served the national socialist ideals, broadly defined. Even the industrialists themselves saw the systematic and pioneering work performed at those institutes as "national socialist research" that "promoted the national socialist *Weltanschauung*".[614] The close co-operation between industry and the Ministry of Education advocated, it was believed, the Nazi ideal of community and common work.[615]

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[613] Protokol ueber die Errichtung von Forschungsinstitute des Vierjahresplanes (Paragraph 6), 11.01.1938, in: BAB R 4901/932.

[614] Letter of Dr. Joachim Loebering (Sueddeutsche Zellwolle A.G. Kelheim A.D.Donau) to the Oberregierungsrat Dr. Demmel, Reichsministerium f. Erziehung und Unterricht, on 12.12.1941, in: BAB R 4901/932.

[615] See: Broadcasting speech of Prof. Mentzel's on "Deutsche Wissenschaft als voelkische Aufgabe, July 1943, in: BAB, R 26 III/174.

4.5. The "Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft" and its cultural political role in the Balkans.

"Ein wesentlicher, ja, man wird ohne Uebertreibung
sagen koennen, fuer die naechste Zukunft der voraussichtlich
bedeutendste Wirtschaftsraum in dieser kontinentalen
Neuorientierung Deutschlands duerfte der Suedosten werden."[616]

With these words Anton Reithinger, the person in charge at the politico-economic section in the IG-Farben industry (*Leiter der Volkswirtschaftlichen Abteilung der IG Farben Industrie AG*) described in 1940 the role the south-eastern Europe could play for the economy of the Reich, namely its war economy. Having occupied France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, Germany was certain that the French and English competition in the Balkans would be eliminated and the Reich could almost exclusively exploit the mineral resources as well as the agricultural production of the region.[617] Wheat, corn, olives, oil, wood and other forest resources, minerals and textile fibres made up the Balkans' natural wealth, which was to prove essential for the Third Reich's economy. The region, argued Reithinger, would be important as an investment market area that, after the end of the war, would secure Germany's export profits in the long term. In addition, Germany's investment of industrial capital in south-eastern Europe, particularly in transportation road, water or railway networks, would create the necessary technical preconditions for larger and cheaper exploitation of its raw materials.[618]

Achieving that goal, Germany did not escape the complexity of distribution of duties and power by several institutions, complexity that was characteristic of the polycratic Nazi regime. What was also characteristic was the rivalries among those institutions, often leading to the establishment of new umbrella organisations, transferring the tense onto another level. This was the case of the two most influential organisations for Germany's expansion to the south-east, that is, the *Mitteleuropaeische Wirtschaftstag* (MWT) and the *Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft* (SOEG), both of which had their central offices in Vienna. Even though both were created for the same purpose, namely to establish economic influence over the Balkans and to exploit its resources, they did little to co-

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[616] Anton Reithinger, Suedosteuropa und seine wirtschaftliche Bedeutung fuer Deutschland, in: Schriftenreihe der Finanzwochenzeitschrift "Die Bank", H. 12, o.O.u.J., [1940] S. 21, cited in: SCHUMANN, Griff nach Suedosteuropa, p. 9.

[617] *Ibid.*

[618] *Ibid.*

operate with each other towards their stated goals. The *Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft*, unlike the MWT, was a newly established organisation. On 14 October 1939, within the framework of the Economic and Commercial Fair in Vienna the Minister of Finance, Walther Funk, and the *Gauleiter* and Governor of Vienna, Josef Buerkel, made a speech about the initiatives Austria should take with regard to the Reich's war economy and the role of south-eastern Europe.[619] They further presented the foundations for the creation of a department dedicated to the south-east European economy in Vienna. Austria was regarded the indispensable geopolitical area for Germany's interests, the "bridge pillar" (*Brueckenpfeiler*) to the south-east,[620] which traditionally had close relations with the region. The department, therefore, was considered a "vein of life" (*Lebensader*) for Germany's war economy.[621] Its role was to put Austrian companies and Austrian economy, in general, at the disposition of the Reich, taking measures to secure industrial production, the promotion of exports and the tariff policy.[622] At the same time, it was expected that the commercial exchange with the Balkan countries would help Germany to break Briatin's efforts to blockade the Reich's economy.[623] Several months later, on 8 February 1940, those first plans to "decentralize the activities and the administration of Germany's economy from Berlin to Vienna",[624] took the shape of a new institution named "South-East European Society" ("*Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft*", SOEG).

According to its founding Articles, the role of the SOEG was "to cultivate, strengthen and foster Germany's relations with the south-eastern countries".[625] In fact, what was hidden behind this euphemistic declaration was the co-ordination of research for the east on ulterior motives the unification and Germanisation of the Balkan peoples and their economic exploitation, as the region was considered the "economic supple-

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[619] E. Pistor's report,"Die Schaffung einer ostmaerkischen Wirtschaftsstelle fuer Suedost" on 24.10.1939, p.1 in: BAB, R 63/37.

[620] SCHUMANN, Griff nach Suedosteuropa, p. 20.

[621] E. Pistor's report,"Die Schaffung einer ostmaerkischen Wirtschaftsstelle fuer Suedost" on 24.10.1939, p.1 in: BAB, R 63/37.

[622] *Ibid.*

[623] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[624] Abstract of Minister Funk's speech, quoted in Pistor's report, "Die Schaffung einer ostmaerkischen Wirtschaftsstelle fuer Suedost". *Ibid.* p.1.

[625] Undated document (presumably of 1941): Satzung der "Suedosteuropa – Gesellschaft", paragraph 3 in: BAB, R 63/1. See also: "Der Aufbau der Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft" December 1942, Wien in: BAB, R 63/2.

mentary space" for Germany.[626] The organisation should be in close co-operation with all authorities, unions, institutes, societies and other similar institutions that were connected to the Balkan countries or aimed at establishing economic or cultural relations with them.[627] In June 1941, in order to avoid further rivalries between the SOEG and the MWT, it was suggested by the latter and the Reich's industrial circles that the SOEG should be engaged in the scientific preparation of the industrial activities in south-eastern Europe. A committee with economic-scientific competencies was constituted in the SOEG at the beginning of 1942. The *Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft* was subjected to the Reich's Ministry of Finance and worked under the auspices of the Minister of Finance and president of the German Bank, Walter Funk.[628] Nevertheless, the organisation was not to be attached to any state, party, industrial or other economic organisation, but to be autonomous.[629] In addition, it was to take necessary action to avoid conflicts and rivalries with other organisations. Moreover, it should rather be careful, even wary of co-operating with all of them, operating as an umbrella organisation.[630] President of the society was initially appointed the Reich Commissar for the Re-unification of Austria with the German Reich, Josef Buerkel and a year later the Governor and *Gauleiter* in Vienna, Baldur von Schirach, while the vice-president became the Reich Brigadier and Mayor of Vienna, Hans Blaschke.[631]

Despite the scientific role the SOEG was called on to play, it did not run any scientific program of its own. It operated rather as a coordinating organization for a numerous other institutions focused on south-eastern issues, either engaged in theoretical science or in practical economy, without obstructing the execution of their projects.[632]

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626 SCHUMANN, Griff nach Sueosteuropa, p. 10.

627 Undated document (presumably of 1941): Satzung der "Suedosteuropa – Gesellschaft", paragraph 3 in: BAB, R 63/1. See also: "Der Aufbau der Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft" December 1942, Wien in: BAB, R 63/2.

628 [1941?] Satzung der "Suedosteuropa – Gesellschaft", paragraph 2 in: BAB, R 63/1.

629 Taetigkeit und Aufbau der Suedosteuropa – Gesellschaft 01.03.1942, in: BAB R 63/4.

630 Taetigkeitsbericht der SOEG to its President Baldur von Schirach 29.05.1942, in: BAB R 63/4.

631 By 1944 were appointed two more vice-presidents, Karl Hermann Frank, who was the State's Minister in the protectorate Boehmen und Maehren and SS-Obergruppenfuehrer, and the engineer Walter Rafelsberg, who was Gauwirtscaftsberater Stadtrat SS-Oberfuehrer. See document about the structure of the SOEG, mid February 1944, in: BAB, R 63/2.

632 [1941?] Satzung der "Suedosteuropa – Gesellschaft", paragraph 3 in: BAB, R 63/1; Geschaeftsfuehrer der SOEG, Heinrichsbauer to the Sonderbeauftragten des Fuehrers General der Infanterie von Unruh on

Many of these programs conducted research on nutrition, export and import trade, industry, and transportation. The practical issues the SOEG supervised were focused on two major areas: agriculture and industry. A number of leading enterprises became interested in the new organisation and among those that joined its projects were the I.G. Farben Industry, the Coal Syndicate, and the German-American Petroleum Society.[633] After 1938, the Nazi successive march to the east and the war developments in the following years increased the Reich's interest in exploiting the raw materials of the Balkans. Iron, manganese, copper, chrome, bauxite, coal, liquid petroleum gas, and, above all, oil were the most important resources that Germany desperately needed, in order to buttress its war economy. Manganese, for example, was among the most important minerals required for the production of iron and steel, while bauxite was significant for the fabrication of aluminium, a material used by *Luftwaffe* for building planes. The aluminium economy in the Balkans was very high and therefore of great importance for Germany. The Italian exploitation of Balkan bauxite deposits made German eagerness to gain a foothold in the region ever greater. In 1942, European shortages in food supplies increased the importance of the Balkans, as it was also a valuable agricultural and cattle-breeding resource, with great potential for farming plants rich in fat and proteins.[634]

The Society consisted of the following eleven departments:[635]

- the Committee for Scientific Economic Planning (i.e. the industrial economy),
- the Working Group for Danube River Issues,
- the Sunscreen Institute (*Photogrammetrisches Institut*),
- the Department for Supplies and Agriculture,
- the Committee for Corn Production,
- the Institute for South-East Law,
- the Security Committee,
- the Department for Cultural-Political Undertakings,
- the Department of South-East Union of the Vienna Universities,
- the Press Office, and

25.05.1943, in: BAB, R 63/ 3; "Der Aufbau der Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft", December1942, in: BAB, R 63/ 2.

[633] Heinrichsbauer to the Minister a.D.Dr.Hans Fischboeck, Crediranstalt – Bankverein Wien 06.04.1940, in: BAB, R 63/ 33.

[634] Protokoll der am 25. Maerz 1942, 17 Uhr, unter dem Vorsitz des Herrn Karl Meywezedt und im Beisein des Herrn Stellvertretenden Gauleiters SS-Brigadefuehrer Schanitzer, in: BAB, R 63/27.

[635] "Gliederung der SOEG", mid February 1944 in: BAB, R 63/2.

- the Office for Literature, Theatre and Music.

As autarky in food supplies was one of the major problems of the German war economy, the SOEG established in1941 the "South-east Agricultural Institute" (*Suedost-Agrarinstitut der Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft e.V*), also based in Vienna. The institute reported to the University for Agronomy (*Hochschule fuer Bodenkultur*). It was underlined that the *Suedost-Agrarinstitut* should not be engaged in economic undertakings of any commercial enterprise.[636] On the contrary, it should carry out its own business, namely to consult the SOEG at a scientific level about the provision of supplies, agricultural and forest exploitation issues. Among the competencies of the new institute were the agriculture and "space research" in the south-east. To these ends, the institute would grant scholarships to young scientists of that region to study at the University for Agronomy in Vienna.[637] The work carried out should be focused on practical applications, that is to say, to meet the war needs. If the institute was engaged in other projects than these, stressed the general director of the SOEG, August Heinrichsbauer, the *Suedost-Agrarinstitut* had no future.[638] Some of the experiments carried out at the agricultural institute were on soya beans, oil-reach pumpkins, olives, corn, and even on different sheep breeds for milk production and other milk-based products.[639] Other projects that were planned to be carried out at the *Suedost-Agrarinstitut* had to do, among other things, with the so-called 'industrial plants', namely fruits and vegetables that could be canned, hemp, and above all Kok-Saghys, from which one could take rubber, so essential for the Reich's war economy. Bulgaria had a highly developed canning industry; moreover it was regarded as the right place for potential rubber plantations.[640] Even though the Kaiser Wilhelm Society was engaged in research on almost all the above problems, only some departments of its institutes, like the Department for Animal Pathology at the Institute for Heredity Research contributed to the SOEG's projects with its directors giving lectures to the *Suedost*

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636 Undated document (presumably of June 1941), "Satzunbg des Suedost-Agrarinstitutes der Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft e.V.", paragraph 2, in: BAB, R 63/49.

637 *Ibid.*

638 A. Heinrichsbauer to Prof. Hausmann, Geschaeftsfuehrer des SOagrarinstitut on 03.02.1943, in: BAB, R 63/ 74.

639 "Kurzer Taetigkeitsbericht 1944" from Prof. Hausmann Geschaeftsfuehrer des SOagrarinstitut to the SOEG on 08.08.1944, in: BAB, R 63/5.

640 Hausmann to the Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft –Ernaehrung und Landwirtschaft- z.Hd. Herrn Dr. v. Rischka 06.01.1943, in: BAB, R 63/74.

Agrarinstitut in Vienna.[641] All the above projects, whether carried out in the SOEG or in the Kaiser Wilhelm Society were classified important or decisive for the war (*kriegswichtig/ kriegsentscheidend*). Other important research institutes with which the organisation was involved were:

- the Institute for Economic Research in Vienna,
- the Institute for Consume and Commerce , also in Vienna,
- the South-east Seminar organised by the SOEG and the German Academy, and
- the South-east Institute for Forest and Timber Research created by the SOEG.[642]

Among the problems investigated by the first institute was that of bauxite exploitation, while the Institute for Forest and Timber Research was engaged in research on malaria, and particularly in mapping the malaria-infested areas and those in which the *Anopheles* mosquito reproduced. Experiments on fighting the *Anopheles* with healing herbs like quinine in Bulgaria and northern Greece were also part of the institute's project.[643]

The SOEG also planned to develop the industrial sector of the Balkans –that is to say to exploit its production-, and, in order to influence the region economically, politically and culturally, it used the network of authorities, unions, institutes, societies and other organizations that Germany had already developed in the Balkan states. The bilateral friendship unions that had existed for many years between Germany and those countries, like the German-Greek Union (*Deutsch-Griechische Gesellschaft*), and the German-Bulgarian Union (*Deutsch-Bulgarische Gesellschaft*), created branches in Vienna for closer collaboration with the SOEG. The work performed under the supervision of the SOEG soon transcended the borders of Austria and the organisation set up branches in almost all the Balkan states, i.e. Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Croatia and Greece for gathering information valuable for the economic planning of the area. Branches were also created in Berlin and Munich. It should be underlined that in its effort to exploit the wealth of the Balkans, the Third Reich activated not only the full

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641 Prof. Hausmann to the SOEG z.H. des Herrn Min. Rat Dr. Hans Augenthalter 25.02.1944, in: BAB, R 63/74.

642 "Der Aufbau der Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft" December 1942, and "Gliederung der SOEG", mid February 1944: both documents in: BAB, R 63/2. See also Untitled document of 1943 about the institutes with which the SOEG was related, in: BAB, R 63/14.

643 Bericht ueber die im Rahmen der SOEG bearbeitete theoretisch-wissenshcaftliche Untersuchungen (Vertraulich) 01.08.1943, in: BAB, R 63/2; undated document (probably of 1941): Aktenvermerk von Dr. Rischka, Amt fuer Agrarpolititk der Gauleitung der NSDAP, Wien, in: BAB, R 63/49; Schimitschek to the Suedostinstitut fuer Wald- und Holzforschung, Wien 06.02.1943, in: BAB, R 63/5.

panoply of the state economic mechanism, but also some of the bearers or representatives of German culture, such as the German Academy. The number of interdisciplinary projects the SOEG undertook, demanded co-operation with other scientific institutes. If these institutes happened to have branches in the south-eastern countries, so much the better. The only such institution was the German Scientific Institute (DWI), with which the SOEG developed close relations.

Vienna had great the potential to become the educational center of south-eastern Europe for the Nazis, as it had been in the past, particularly for agrarian studies. Therefore, the universities of the Austrian capital could play an important role not only for the promotion of research on the Balkans, but also for the Reich's foreign cultural policy.[644] Nevertheless, there were a number of problems that had to be dealt with, in order for Germany and Austria to be able to attract as many students, economists and other experts or interested scholars as possible, not only from the Reich but also from the Balkans. In 1942, agronomic studies in Germany were neither as intensive or as broad as they had previously been, nor as they had been in south-eastern countries or Italy. In addition, the three-year courses in Germany was considered insufficient, as the Balkan countries offered four-year course of studies. As for the practical application of theory, this was something lacking in Germany in contrast to the Balkans. The high fees, comparing to France, charged at the Vienna University and its poor equipment also made the institution unattractive.[645]

Nevertheless, it seems that in order to meet the Reich's wishes -at least to some extent- the SOEG took some measures for promoting Germany's cultural relations with the Balkan states. The cultural-political undertakings of the organization gained almost equal importance to the theoretical-scientific and the practical-economic projects. Most of these initiatives took place in the framework of the cultural activity of the city of Vienna, even though they had or they should have had their own character. One of the closest relationships the SOEG had developed with Vienna's cultural organizations was with the "Society of Friends of the German Academy". In 1942, the city of Vienna, the SOEG and the German Academy established the "South-east seminar" (*Suedostseminar*).[646]

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[644] Dr. von Rischka, Leiter u. Geschaeftsfuehrer der Abteilung Ernaehrung u. Landwirtschaft to the SOEG, Geschaeftsbericht zur zweiten Tagung des Beirats der Gruppe "Ernaehrung und Landwirtschaft" der Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 30 Nov. – 1 Dec. 1942, in: BAB, R 63/262.

[645] *Ibid.*

[646] Geschaeftsfuehrer des Kulturpolitischen Arbeitkreises Felix Kraus Abschrift. Abkommen zwischen: Stadt Wien, Deutsche Akademie und SOEG, 27.10.1943, in: BAB R 63/175.

The director of the seminar was Otto Kunz and its stated aim was to familiarize those who were interested in south-eastern Europe with the region through language courses, lectures, expeditions and other cultural and scientific, economic, activities.[647] The extension of the program to foreigners was also anticipated. The SOEG affiliated with the Department of South-East Union of the Vienna Universities (*Abteilung Suedostgemeinschaft der Wiener Hochschulen in der SOEG*) and the laboratories of Vienna universities, in order for the scientific problems of the region to be studied.[648] The department of South-East Union embraced about twelve universities in Austria and the Protectorate and its role was to centralize and manage scientific work of every kind related to the south-east and conducted at universities and institutes.[649] The program of the *Suedost*-seminars that lasted a week, included a series of lectures on agricultural and economic issues, but also a number of cultural activities dedicated not only to the Reich but also to one or more Balkan countries at a time. Scientists from several German universities and research institutes usually lectured in front of students but very often their audience also comprised military officers and soldiers. It is interesting to note that to cater to the needs of the seminar the authorities of the city of Vienna, the German Academy, and the SOEG singed an agreement for the establishment of another institute, the "*Prinz Eugen-Institut*". The role of this new institute was to co-ordinate the scientific and cultural activities of the above three partners, namely, to promote joint propaganda initiatives through courses, the organisation of big cultural events and other cultural-political and scientific undertakings.[650] In the framework of the *Prinz Eugen-Institut*, the German Academy in co-operation with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, offered language courses for foreign students at Vienna universities and technical schools. The increase in the number of foreign students who took language courses from 1942 to 1944 is quite impressive:[651]

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[647] Document of December 1942 "Der Aufbau der Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft", in: BAB, R 63/2.

[648] *Ibid.*

[649] Taetigkeitsbericht der SOEG 29.05.1942, to the President of the SOEG, von Schirach, in: BAB, R 63/4.

[650] Geschaeftsfuehrer des Kulturpolitischen Arbeitkreises Felix Kraus Abschrift. Abkommen zwischen: Stadt Wien, Deutsche Akademie und SOEG, 27.10.1943, paragraphs 3b,d, in: BAB R 63/175.

[651] Taetigkeitsbericht fuer Suedost-seminar, SOEG u. Deutsche Akademie 17.04.1944, in: BAB, R 63/5.

Table 7.

October 1942	- February 1943	sum	138	foreign students
March 1943	- June 1943	"	150	"
October 1943	- February 1944	"	227	"
March 1944	- June 1944	"	312	"

The seminar was divided into two sections: one for foreigners and a second for Germans and Austrians. The latter offered a series of courses in almost all the Balkan languages,[652] as well as introductory seminars on the land, culture, and the people of the region. The foreigners, on the other hand, could take similar courses for language, organised by the personnel of German Academy and the Ministry of Education,[653] as well as for politics, economy and the culture of the "Great German Reich". Language learning was the first step the SOEG should take in order to attract foreigners to enrol in the universities in Vienna and to continue their studies there subsequently, usually in trade and industrial economy, agriculture and the related sciences. These young scientists were expected to become Germany's "extending hand" after returning to their homelands, strengthening at the same time the ties with Germany and eventually being well disposed towards the Reich's interests.[654] The number of young Balkans who visited the Reich's universities seemed to be quite big, given the fact that the war was in progress and Germany exercised brutal occupation policies against some Balkan peoples. The cultural-political and the economic-political significance (*kultur- und wirtschaftspolitisch*) of granting scholarships to young scientists from the Balkans, basically to do Ph.D research at the University for Agronomy, was well acknowledged by the director of the SO-*agrarinstitut* and professor at the above university.[655]

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[652] There were organised Slovak, Bulgarian, and Rumanian, even Croatian, Hungarian and Russian language courses. Greek is not mentioned. *Ibid.*

[653] Geschaeftsfuehrer des Kulturpolitischen Arbeitkreises Felix Kraus Abschrift. Abkommen zwischen: Stadt Wien, Deutsche Akademie und SOEG, 27.10.1943, paragraph 1, in: BAB R 63/175.

[654] Suedost-Seminar, Wien. Anlage zum Fragebogen 23.04.1943, in: BAB, R 63/3; Prof. Hausmann, Geaschaeftsfeuhrer der Suedostagrarinstitut der SOEG to Geschaeftsfuehrer der SOEG, Heinrichsbauer 26.11.1942, in: BAB, R 63/74.

[655] Prof. Hausmann, Geaschaeftsfeuhrer der Suedostagrarinstitut der SOEG to Geschaeftsfuehrer der SOEG, Heinrichsbauer 26.11.1942, in: BAB, R 63/74.

Table 8.

Percentage of foreign scientists who visited German universities from October 1941 to October 1942			
Bulgarians 22,9 %	Japanese 3,84 %	Ukrainians 2,15 %	Indians 1,25 %
Rumanians 8,85 %	Greeks 3,84 %	Belgians 1,96 %	Arabs 1,16 %
Chinese 7,33 %	Spaniards 3,75 %	Slovaks 1,8 %	Peruvians 1,07 %
Hungarians 7,4 %	Dutch 3,6 %	Swedes 1,7 %	
Croats 6,6 %	Swiss 3,04 %	Tuerks 1,6 %	
Italians 6,08 %	Persians 2,5 %	Danes 1,34 %	7,24 % of twenty-four other states

Source: *Bundesarchiv Berlin* (BAB), R 63/ 174 H. Baatz. Auslandsamt der Dozentenschaft der deutschen Universitaeten und Hochschulen.
Jahresarbeitsbericht 1. Oktober 1941 bis 30 September 1942. (Streng vertaulich!)

Even though prizes and grants were funded for German students, like the *Prinz-Eugen-Preis* of the *Goethe-Stiftung* and the *Prinz-Eugen-Studienstiftung*, that strong cultural propaganda tool was not applied to foreigners, at least at the beginning, something that troubled the authorities of the SOEG very early on.[656] However, it is unlikely, that similar grants were later given to Balkan scholars directly by the SOEG. As the granting of scholarships to foreigners was the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry, the SOEG tried to avoid any conflicts with it. Thus, the cultural political program of the SOEG was only involved in occasional and carefully selected cultural activities.[657]

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[656] "Taetigkeit und Aufbau der Suedosteuropa – Gesellschaft" 01.03.1942, part III, in: BAB, R 63/4.

[657] Taetigkeitsbericht der SOEG to the President of the SOEG Baldur von Schirach 29.05.1942, paragraph number 3, in: BAB, R 63/4. Grants were also allocated or planned to be allocated to young scientists who wished to work out a dissertation on south-eastern agricultural issues. In 1943, are reported two Romanians who were doing such research in Vienna, while publication of relevant dissertations was planned to be a financially supported by the German Academy in Munich, for contemporary works of that kind were lacking. That lack was well presented on the list of dissertations carried out at the University for Agronomy in Vienna, which most of them were quite old. Among those were the works of two Greeks: Orphee-Papadopoulos Dimitri: "Das griechische brachyzere Rind. Die Rinderschlaege von Hellasfestland, der Insel Euboea, Peloponnes u.d. Insel Kreta." Diss. v. 25. Apr. 1933. 67 S, and Wlissidis Thrassybulos: "Studien ueber die Aufforstung Griechenlands." Diss. v. 1. Apr. 1919. 41 Bl., see: Verzeichnis der Dissertationen an der Hochschule f. Bodenkultur mit einer Beziehung zum SO, 1943 in: BAB, R 63/74. Wlissidis was appointed professor at Athens University in 1933. See: ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ Εμφαίνουσα το σύνολον των αποδοχών των Εκτάκτων Καθηγητών Χρήσεως, 01.04.1933 – 31.03.1934, in: Historical Archive of Athens University (IAPA), 1-1 Appointments of Professors (Διορισμοί καθηγητών. Προκήρυξις Πληρώσεως Εδρών και άλλες Διαδικασίες), 1934-1935.

4.6. The "Ahnenerbe" research program and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft projects for the Balkans.

Hitler's obsession with the superiority of the Aryan race and his eagerness to prove and to spread this belief abroad had displayed ever since the establishment of the National Socialist Worker's Party. In "*Mein Kampf*" he argued passionately for the uniqueness of the German by contrast to the Jew. Apart from Jews, the Nazi racial theory considered the Slavs and the gypsies as inferior races. Political and social groups, like communists, homosexuals and people with mental illness or other handicap also became targets of discrimination and threatened with extinction for the sake of the purity of the German race. The Nazis believed that as a "higher" race, the Germans were entitled to conquer and subjugate other races. Germany, therefore, should acquire *Lebensraum* by expanding eastwards at the expense of the racially inferior Slavs. The whole plan had to be well organised and science – or rather pseudo-science- was called to play its part in it.

The racial issue, therefore, became the foremost problem addressed to a number of newly established institutions created to support "scientifically" the superiority of the German race. The most representative one was the Research and Study Organisation "*Das Ahnenerbe*", established in summer 1935 by the SS *Reichsfuehrer* Heinrich Himmler, the Minister of Nutrition and Agriculture, Richard Walther Darré, and the scholar Herman Wirth, specialist in German prehistory. The organisation aimed at investigating and rediscovering the ancient past of the German people, its historic language and culture, and justifying historically the greatness of the German race and culture and its continuity over time. Gradually, the Aryan heredity became the "practical-ideological" component for the National Socialist organisation of the every-day life.[658] In 1938, Himmler used the SS-*Ahnenerbe* as a mechanism for alignment and cultural political suppression within the Reich and later in the occupied territories. Chief Director (*Kurator*) of the *Ahnenerbe* project was the professor for the Indo-Germanic language and Culture and deputy president of the German Academy, Walther Wuest. The organisation comprised about forty scientific sectors and in the first years it focused on the *Geisteswissenschaften*, namely the Aryan history and folklore, and particularly on *Germanistik* and the comparative study of language (*vergleichende Sprachwissenschaft*).[659] Just before the outbreak of the Second World

[658] MICHAEL H. KATER, Das "Ahnenerbe" der SS 1935-1945. Ein Beitrag zur Kulturpolitik des Dritten Reiches. Muenchen 2001, p. 7.

[659] *Ibid.*, pp. 47 ff.

War, natural sciences became the subject of study of the SS-*Ahnenerbe*. Himmler's major interest was the "*Rassenkunde*", namely the biological anthropology, and medicine. Research on the human immune system occurred in concentration camps from 1942 onwards, where notorious experiments on inmates took place under the command of the SS-*Ahnenerbe* and the support of the German Research Society (DFG).[660]

The war was in any case, a turning point for the Reich's science policy, but the shift of focus in research from humanities (*Geisteswissenschaften*) to natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*) indicated a more complex rationale than just meeting the war needs. Himmler had realised that despite the "scientific" justification the study of German prehistory gave to the racial theory, and by extension to the national socialist ideology, the status of the *Ahnenerbe* remained precarious, as long as its project remained on the theoretical level. After 1939, when research in general began to take a practical turn (*Zweckforschung*), the *Ahnenerbe* adjusted its projects accordingly. This happened for an additional reason: financial support coming from state institutions or even industry started to grant primarily projects classified as "*kriegswichtig*". Consequently, the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* (DFG), which was the major contributor to the *Ahnenerbe* research, from 1939 on funded more and more war-related scientific work rather than the theoretical-ideological research.[661] In general, natural sciences, without fail, were classified "*kriegswichtig*", while humanities were only occasionally marked as such.[662]

Nonetheless, the cultural-political connotations of the *Ahnenerbe*, were never abandoned and Himmler tried to accommodate the mission of his institution with the immediate demands of the state. In summer 1939, for example, the *Ahnenerbe* together with the Ministry of Science, Education and People's Enlightenment organised a scientific week in Salzburg, during which Germany would "present to the world public, in a way that will be in full keeping with the dignity of the occasion, the achievements of German Science during the course of her political renascence".[663] More precisely "notable representatives of all branches of learning [would] give a cross-section of German culture and its contribution to that of Europe".[664] Lectures would be given on the disciplines of folklore, history, history of literature, classic antiquity, German history, finance, chemistry and others. Apart from the *Grossraumpolitik* that seemed to have taken shape

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[660] *Ibid.*, pp. 98-104.

[661] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

[662] *Ibid.*, p. 191.

[663] Pamphlet "1939, Saltzburger Wissenschaftswochen 13 Aug.-2. Sept. 1939", in: BAB, NS 21/ 163.

[664] *Ibid.*

after the conquest of the "*germanische Norden*", i.e. Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, the quest of *Lebensraum* in the east and its exploitation, became the main concern of the *Ahnenerbe*. Himmler who had been a student of Gustav Froelich, the future director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Animal Breeding Research, was engaged with great enthusiasm in the exact sciences, and in particular, in the breeding project. He got also involved in the Reich's foreign cultural policy with a number of other scientific projects. The cultural activity of the *Ahnenerbe* abroad was not only restricted to archaeological excavations or cave-studies, in order to bring to light findings of the Germanic civilisation. The institution also got involved from 1938 onwards in recording, even "collecting", the monuments of cultural heredity of the occupied countries. That mission was clearly cultural-political, as Germany, it was believed, would not only be acknowledged as rescuer of these foreign cultural treasures, but would also have at its own disposal invaluable material for scientific study. The *Ahnenerbe* activities overlapped the ambitions of the "*Amt Rosenberg*", which during the war years stripped the occupied territories from their cultural and historical possessions.[665] This was the case of the religious relics, particularly the holy manuscripts of the monastic complex on the mountain of Athos in north Greece.[666] In 1944, another Greek mountain, Olympus, which is the highest massif of the country, became a subject of research for Himmler's organisation. The ultimately unsuccessful expedition, which met with stiff resistance of the local partisans, had the full support of the *Wehrmacht* and it seems to have lasted about three months.[667] The reason of the excursion is not reported in the available documents. It is very likely, though, that its purpose might have been the collection of primitive forms of plants or indigenous animals as part of the project to rescue, as the Nazis argued, the natural treasures of the world's reservoir zones.[668] After the failure of the Olympus expedition, the same project was planned for the Pyrenees in Spain.[669]

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[665] See: REINHARD BOLLMUS, Das Amt Rosenberg und seine Gegner. Studien zum Machtkampf im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem, Stuttgart 1970, (Munich ²1997).

[666] "Abschlussbericht ueber die Taetigkeit des Sonderkommandos Rosenberg in Griechenland" 15.11.1941, in: BAB, NS 30/75. See also: BAB, NS 8/259. See also: FLEISCHER, "Europas Rueckkehr", p. 153.

[667] Deutsche Foerschungsgemeinschaft, Auslandsabteilung (Adams) an Reichsfuehrer-SS Pers. Stab. Amt "A" Lehr- und Forszchungsstatte fuer Innerasien und Expeditionen, 2.3.1944, in: BAB, NS 21/ 330.

[668] SUSANNE HEIM, "Forschung fuer die Autarkie. Agrarwissenschaft an Kaiser-Wilhelm-Instituten im Nationalsozialismus", in: *Ibid.* (ed.), Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus. Goettingen 2002, pp. 145-177, here p. 161.

[669] SS-Sturmbahnfuehrer an DFG, Auslandsabteilung z.H. von Herrn Dr. Adams, 13.03.1944, in: BAB, NS 21/ 330.

During the war years the *Ahnenerbe* research program went even further to promote the exact sciences with the zoologist Ernst Schaefer being the leading figure in the struggle for national autarky in textile and agricultural production. In this context, he led an expedition to Tibet in 1938/39, which had also a cultural-political significance.[670] The enterprise lasted about sixteen months and for the first time, it was reported, Germans entered "the holy city of Tibet", namely Lhasa. This privilege was regarded by the Nazis as an acknowledgement of the superiority of Aryan culture over the British, which exerted great political influence in the region.[671] The main purpose of the expedition was the collection of wild and primitive forms of indigenous plants that could be used for cross-breeding experiments in Germany in the search of plants resistant to low temperatures. Collection of animals was also among the aims of the research mission. Ethnologists and anthropologists, on the other hand, measured the skulls and physical proportions of the highland tribes and recorded their outer features in order to justify the origins of the German race.[672] Part of the findings in Tibet were exhibited in the "Week of Science" in Salzburg (*Saltzburger Wissenschaftswochen*) in 1943.[673] In the "Week of Science" the achievements of German Science during the course of her "political renascence", i.e. the National Socialism, were presented to the world public, with all the pomp and circumstance appropriate to such an occasion, in order to mark Germany's contribution to the European culture.[674]

In summer 1943, a gigantic enterprise took place in the Caucasus, which according to the theory of classical biology was one of the bio-geographic bridges between the Asian and European fauna and flora.[675] The expedition was mounted under the aegis of the Special Forces SS (*SS-Sonderkommando*) and was headed by Heinz Bruecher. The enterprise turned out to be an extended pillage of the rare and valuable plant and seed col-

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[670] It was his third personal expedition in Tibet but the first under the SS-Ahnenerbe. See: UWE HOSSFELD, CARL-GUSTAF THORNSTROEM, " 'Rasches Zupacken'. Heinz Bruecher und das botanische Sammelkommando der SS nach Russland 1943", in: SUSANNE HEIM (ed.) Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus. Goettingen 2002, pp. 119-144, here footnote 30 p. 127.

[671] KATER, Das "Ahnenerbe", pp. 211 ff.

[672] About the expedition and its results see: BAB, NS 21/ 633. The file contains press cuttings. See also: BAB, NS 21/ 799, Heft 222.

[673] KATER, *ibid.*, p. 213.

[674] The first event occurred in 1939. See: Advertising pamphlet titled "Saltzburger Wissenschaftswochen 13 Aug.-2. Sept. 1939", in: BAB, NS 21/ 163.

[675] KATER, *ibid.*, p. 214; HOSSFELD and THORNSTROEM, " 'Rasches Zupacken', pp. 125-130.

lections of Nikolai Vavilov, Russia's most prominent plant geneticist who had an international reputation and wide influence in scientific circles. His unique collection was spread to over eighteen scientific stations and institutes across Russia.[676] That unspeakable robbery also had a military purpose: to reduce Russia's agricultural resources and consequently to cause starvation among the country's population and thus, to annihilate it, for it was considered an inferior race. In addition, the food shortage would seriously weaken *Wehrmacht's* hardy opponent, the Red Army.[677] In April 1942, was created by Himmler's command an institute for the study of wild species of arable plants (*Kulturpflanzen*) grown in the interior of Asia. Expeditions to that region were an integral part of the institute's project. The "*Sven-Hedin-Reichsinstitut*", as it was named, was directed by Ernst Schaefer and affiliated to the *Ahnenerbe* research program.[678] Towards the end of 1943, the *Ahnenerbe* set up for war purposes another similar institution, the Department for Plant Genetics in Lannach, near Graz, (*Deutsche Versuchsantalt fuer Ernaehrung und Verpflechtung G.m.b.H. Hof Lannach*) under the directorship of Bruecher.[679] The department was fully dependent on the Sven-Hedin Institute and was dedicated to the study of collections from Schaefer's Tibet expedition in 1938/9 as well as from the *SS-Sonderkommando* expedition in Ukraine and Crimea.[680]

One of the German "achievements" in science that were never shared with the rest of the world in a celebratory way in any *Saltzburger Wissenschaftswochen*, was the entomological research conducted under the aegis of Himmler's organisation at the concentration camp of Dachau. In January 1942, Himmler and the president of the RFR, Sievers, were planning to establish an institute for the research and fight of vermin insects.[681] Peter Muehlens, the epidemiologist who offered his services to the Bulgarian army during the First World War and who travelled later to the Balkans as Germany's medical and cultural delegate, had in the meantime become director of the Institute for Tropical Dis-

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[676] HOSSFELD and THORNSTROEM, *ibid.*, pp. 128 f.; MICHAEL FLITNER, Sammler, Raeuber und Gelehrte. Die politischen Interessen an pflanzengenetischen Ressourcen 1895-1995. Frankfurt 1995, pp. 115 ff.

[677] HEIM, "Forschung fuer die Autarkie", p. 167 ff.

[678] HOSSFELD and THORNSTROEM, " 'Rasches Zupacken', pp. 130; KATER, Das "Ahnenerbe", pp. 213 f.

[679] *Ibid.*, pp. 130-135; KATER, p. 216.

[680] See also: Gez. Sievers, Praes. d. Reichsforschungsrats Leiter d. Geschaeftsbeirats to Dr. Konrad Meyer, Leiter der Fachsparte Landbauwissenschaft und allgemeine Biologie on 30.09.1943, in: BAB, R 26 III / 175; Das Ahnenerbe. Der Reichsgeschaeftsfuehrer, Waischenfeld/Orf. to Karl Becker, Leiter des Apparatenausschusses der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, Berlin-Steglitz on 09.12.1943, BAB, R 26 III / 231.

[681] KATER, p. 227.

eases in Hamburg. At the beginning of 1942, he was studying the insects that caused typhus, while he was engaged in Himmler's plan to create the institute for vermin insects.[682] The plan emerged after a severe outbreak of typhus at the concentration camp of Neuengamme in Hamburg, in 1941. The medical aspect of the problem started to be investigated a year later in the concentration camp of Dachau by Professor Claus Schilling.[683] In autumn 1943, an entomological institute for the study of behaviour and life circle of the insects was set up at the barracks of Dachau. The institute was headed by the thirty-six year old industrial consultant Eduard May.[684] The entomological laboratory was not designed to compete with the already existing research centres, like the Hygiene Institute of the *Waffen*-SS or the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. Its purpose was to investigate the nature of insects, such as lice, fleas, bed-bugs, flies, horseflies, mosquitoes, but also ants and termites that caused infectious diseases, to fight them and, if possible, to exterminate them with chemicals. Unlike other institutes, which were already working on similar investigations, Himmler argued that the laboratory in Dachau would focus on problems that only specialised zoologists rather than experts in human medicine could deal with.[685] Needless to say, co-operation between all institutes of that kind was more than necessary. In particular, the institutes of May and Claus Schilling, which was working on *malaria tropica* in the same concentration camp, were regarded complementary.

Schilling, a distinguished scientist of tropical diseases reported to the Hygiene Institute of the *Waffen*-SS and he was doing experiments exclusively with humans.[686] His institute was established few months before May's and his project was focused on the medical fighting against malaria infection caused by the mosquito *Anopheles*, the fever

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[682] *Ibid.*, p. 228. See also: Letter of Muehlens, Institut fuer Schiffs- und Tropenkrankheiten, to Sievers, Reichsgeschaeftsfuehrer des "Ahnenerbe", on 10.01.1942, in: BAB, NS 21/ 784.

[683] ERNST KLEE, Auschwitz, die NS-Medizin und ihre Opfer. Frankfurt a.M., 2002, pp. 117 ff. See: "Bericht an den RFR betreffend Studien ueber Malaria.Von Prof. Klaus Schilling" June 1938 to RFR, in: BAK, R 73 / 14290.

[684] KATER, p. 228.

[685] Anordnung des Reichsfuehrers-SS, Himmler vom 29,01.1942 ueber das Insitut zur Erforschung und Bekaempfung der dem Menschen laestigen und schaedlichen Insekten, in: BAB, NS 21/ 910.

[686] Dachau 3. Bauinspektion der Waffen-SS u. Polizei Reich-Sued an Reichsfuehung-SS – Pers.Stab, Berlin-Dahlem, 30.10.1942, in: BAB, NS 21/ 33. Also: Der Reichsfuehrer-SS Reichsarzt SS an Reihsfuehrer H. Himmler (Abschrift), Betr.: Professor Dr. Claus Schilling – Malaria-Forschung, 20.01.1942; Vierteljahrsbericht der Malariastation im KL.Dachau von C. Schilling an Reichsartzt-SS und Polizei SS-Gruppenfuehrer Grawitz, 01.01.1943; Bericht fuer das I. Viertelsjahr 1943 von C. Schilling an Grawitz, 01.04.1943, all documents in: BAB, NS 21/ 920.

mosquito as it was known. That species was particularly spread across the Balkan countries and it became the number one enemy for the *Wehrmacht*. Therefore, a large enterprise for fighting the *Anopheles* pupas with an arsenic preparation took place in Greece under the commands of Dr. Daueberschmidt early in 1942.[687] The *Luftwaffe* also became interested in the project and provided its planes for this purpose. A year later, Greece was again at the centre of interest. Schilling wanted to experiment on immunisation against malaria with new-borns. His experience had shown that infected children reacted differently than adults. In order to verify that observation, he planned to vaccinate babies coming from malaria territories against the virus and to expose them afterwards to natural infection in their countries.[688] Schilling believed that Greece was the right country to do the experiments and he intended to ask for aid from Professor Marinos Geroulanos, the most prominent and influential doctor in Greece, to whom he was related.[689] It is not known, however, whether that particular project did indeed take place. What is known is that Schilling was charged with war crimes and was summoned before the Nuremberg tribunal. It is estimated that he used about 1.100 people as guinea pigs in the concentration camp, from which over 300 have died.[690] He was eventually sentenced to death and executed.[691]

As mentioned above, the German Research Society (DFG)/ German Research Council (RFR) supported the *Ahnenerbe* projects that were classified *kriegswichtig*. Schilling's work also received some help from the RFR, which provided him with necessary expensive equipment.[692] Malaria research was a major issue for Germany during the war and in 1941 Peter Muehlens suggested to the colonial sector of the RFR to establish a

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[687] Letter of the SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Sievers on 03.04.1942, regarding his conversation with E. May in Munich on 1.4.1942, in: BAB, NS 21/ 910. It was also known that there was a kind of a small fish on the island of Crete that was eating the pupas of the mosquitoes that spread malaria. See: HAGEN FLEISCHER, "Schwert und Olive", in: WILLI BENNING (Hg.), Festschrift fuer Klaus Betzen. Athens 1995, p. 170.

[688] Bericht fuer das I. Viertelsjahr 1943 von C. Schilling an Grawitz, 01.04.1943, in: BAB, NS 21/ 920.

[689] *Ibid.*

[690] January 1946, Berlin. Copy of the document sent to the Commending General 3rd US. Army, APO 403 Subject: Procedure contra Professor Dr. Claus Schilling, Dachau, Bavaria, in: BAB, NS 21/ 920. See also: KLEE, Auschwitz, p. 123; TILL BASTIAN, Furchbare Aerzte. Medizinische Verbrechen im Dritten Reich. Muenchen 1995, pp. 77 f.

[691] See: KATER, Das "Ahnenerbe", footnote 20 of chapter eight p. 419.

[692] Claus Schilling (Malariastation in Dachau) to the RFR on 12.02.1944, in: Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), R 73/ 14290.

research institute for tropical diseases of humans and animals in Bulgaria.[693] Muehlens argued that the present circumstances were the best for an immediate application of his plan. In Bulgaria, particularly to the south of the country, a number of tropical diseases, like malaria, typhus, dysentery and other intestinal infections, were wide spread. Muehlens argued that the problem seemed to hold quite well since the years of the First World War. Meanwhile, the Rockefeller Foundation had established two very well-equipped institutes for the fighting of those diseases, one in Burgas, near the Turkish borders and a second in Petritsch on the borders with Greece. Both institutes enjoyed the respect of the locals. Bulgaria was Germany's ally and it was in the Reich's interest, argued Muehlens, to work together with its old friend on the military hygiene, which remained wretched. Bulgaria would not only offer research material to the institute in Hamburg, necessary for the training of its doctors, who were going to staff Germany's future colonial hygiene service. Moreover, it would provide an ideal field for the scientists' praxis on tropical and infectious diseases as well as on war hygiene.

Since the WW I Muehlens had created an important and strong personal network in Bulgaria that comprised politicians, ministers, physicians, clinics, medical and hygiene institutes, including even King Boris, who was his personal friend. Hence, the creation of a tropical institute by the Germans was expected to be welcomed by the Bulgarian political and scientific community. Muehlens did not forget his role as cultural delegate when he travelled to the region in the 1920s and late 1930s. On his last visit he also went to Greece and one of his cultural-political plans was to organise a week of tropical medicine in Athens and Sofia. The attraction of these scientific events would be the mobile museum (*Wandermuseum*) of the Hamburg institute. As for Greece, Muehlens underlined that this event would be the first cultural undertaking of the kind between the two countries since the time of the Versailles Treaty.[694] It must be noted that Muehlens' suggestion to create Germany a tropical institute in Bulgaria, in 1941, was not new. On his last visit to the country as well as to Greece, in 1939, he discussed the idea with the respective authorities. In Greece he had prepared the ground the year before. He had presented the idea to the King of Greece George II, who had agreed to support it. In his travel report Muehlens stressed the cultural-political significance of the institute. He argued that Ger-

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[693] P. Muehlens to RFR, Kolonialwissenschaftliche Abteilung zu Haenden Herrn Dr. Wolff, on 14.02.1941, in: BAK, R 73/ 13257. The document was classified "Streng vertraulich!".

[694] Reisebericht Professor Muehlens. Griechenland (Auszug) (3-7.06.1939), in: Archiv zur Geschichte der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (MPGA), Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/2. The date is not mentioned on this document.

many would exert sweeping influence, given the lack of interest in a similar institute by the British and French. However, the only "threat", he warned, to the German prestige seemed to be the Americans with their Rockefeller Foundation.[695] Apparently, his fears were to be soon confirmed.

Muehlens was not the only scientist to travel to the Balkan region. In mid-1930s, a group of botanists and zoologists headed to the mountainous area of south-eastern Europe to collect material for their laboratories. Hans Stubbe, a research fellow at the KWI for Biology and later director of the KWI for Research on Cultivated Plants made his first expedition with his group to the Balkan peninsula, particularly to the region of north Greece and Albania, in order to collect wild forms of plants cultivated in Germany. The KW Institute for Breeding Research (*Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut fuer Zuechtungsforschung*) in Muechenberg was also involved in the enterprise.[696] A second expedition was organised again by Stubbe, in 1942. Like the first, the expedition was supported by the RFR as well as the scientific section of the Military High Command (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht OKW*). This time the destination was Peloponnese and the island of Crete and the purpose was also to map the population of wild animals and rare species and to collect specimens for genetic studies.[697] Head of the mission in Crete was Stubbe, while in the Peloponnese it was Rudolf Freisleben of the Institute for Plants and Plant Cultivation in Halle. He alone received 17.000 RM from the RFR to develop, prepare and classify the material collected on his travels.[698] The German scientists met with prominent Greek

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[695] *Ibid.*

[696] File: Hoffmann Walter. KW Institut fuer Zuechtungsforschung Muechenberg / Mark "Durchfuehrung einer Expedition in d. zentrale Gebirgsmassiv d. Balkans zur Sammlung von Wildformen unserer Kulturpflanzen 1936-1941", BAK, R 73/ 11757. See also: MPGA, Apt. I. Rep. 1A, Nr. 2963/3, 4.

[697] 1943. Stubbe's report to the KWG Bericht about the second expedition to Peloponnese and Crete in 1942, in: MPGA, Apt. I. Rep. 1A, Nr. 2964/1. The collection of animals amounted to 77 mammals, about 300 reptiles and amphibians, about 1000 smaller animals and 1000 snakes. This collection went to the natural historical museum in Vienna, curator of which was Otto v. Wettstein, the father of Fritz von Wettstein, who was director of the KW Institute for Biology in Berlin Dahlem. See: Letter of Dr. Dellbruegge, Ministry of Education (RfWEV) to DFG on 23.02.1943, in: BAK, R 73/ 15655. See also chapter 6.1.

[698] Mentzel (Praesident der DFG) and Meyer (Leiter der Fachsparte "Landbauwissenschaft und allgemeine Biologie") to Doz. Dr. Freisleben, on 07.05.1943; Mentzel and Meyer to Freisleben, on 02.02.1943, both in: BAK, R 73/ 11095. For the purpose of his research and its results see: Freisleben's reports to DFG on 15.01.1943 and 21.01.1943, in: BAK, R 73/ 11095. Stubbe received for the first Balkan expedition from the RFR 10.000 RM and for the second 16.000 RM see respectively: Mentzel and Meyer to Stubbe, KWI f. Biologie on 30.05.1941, in: BAK, R 73/ 15057, and Mentzel and Meyer to Stubbe on 19.03.1942, in: BAK, R 73/ 15058.

politicians and scientists as well as directors of Greek agricultural institutes, representatives of the chemical industry and local authorities. All of them were particularly friendly and co-operative with the German delegations, as Stubbe noted on his report. From the same report it is clear that the expedition's aim went beyond the collection of primitive forms of plants and animals. The German scientists also mapped the agricultural conditions of the areas they visited suggesting at the same time rural reforms for the Greek regions that could make Germany self-sufficient in many agricultural products.[699]

Apart from the biological and agricultural research in the Balkans, another important discipline for Germany's future domination in the region was geological research. Scientific expeditions in the region sponsored by the *Notgemeinschaft* date back to 1924.[700] The aim of these and later expeditions was to collect information for geological and palaeontological research in southeastern Europe, i.e. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey,[701] as well as for historical survey, namely the movement and exchange of populations and the settlements that took place in the eastern part of the Mediterranean basin.[702] German scientists were particularly interested in the north and north-east regions of Greece, as it still was *terra incognita* in geomorphological, colonial and economic aspects.[703] The region was notable for its cultivation of "the best and most expensive tobacco on earth",[704] but it was also a region that was heavily infested by mosquitoes. Not only did this exact a heavy death toll of the local population, many of whom were refugees from Asia Minor, Eastern Thrace, Caucasus, and southern Russia, but its impact on agriculture was correnspondigly severe. The geomorphology of the region was closely related to the malaria epidemic that had decimated not only the settlers of 1922/3, but also the European troops during the First World War. Perhaps this was the most impor-

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[699] 1943. Stubbe's report to the KWG Bericht about the second expedition to Peloponnese and Crete in 1942, in: MPGA, Apt. I. Rep. 1A, Nr. 2964/1.

[700] File: Panzer Wolfgang Prof. Dr. U. Heidelberg. Geographisches Institut. Studienreise nach Kreta 1924-1942, in: BAK, R 73/13529.

[701] File: Leuchs Kurt Prof. Dr. U. Wien. Geologisches Institut. [Geologische Untersuchungen in Suedosteuropa und Vorderasien 1941], BAK, R 73/12697.

[702] File: Panzer Wolfgang Prof. Dr. U. Heidelberg. Geographisches Institut. Studienreise nach Kreta 1924-1942, BAK, R 73/13529.

[703] Privatdozent Dr. Joachim Heinrich Schultze, Jena University to the Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft, Berlin, on 01. 06. 1933, in: BAK, R 73/ 16860.

[704] Privatdozent Dr. Joachim Heinrich Schultze, Jena University to the Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft, Berlin, on 02. 09. 1933, p. 3, in: BAK, R 73/ 16860.

tant motive for the Germans in undertaking scientific expeditions in the area, for cultural-political, not to mention the military reasons.

5. Cultural propaganda in Greece during the National Socialism.

5.1. Exploring Greece's economic relations with Germany and the involvement of science and technology.

The vivid economic concern Germany had for Greece, as it has been described in chapter three, continued undiminished during the Nazi era. Despite the two recessions of 1923 and 1929, Greek industry showed signs of significant recovery after 1933. The increase of electricity supply in this period recorded high rates of growth in the secondary sector. However, industrial growth was not accompanied by signs of modernisation, such as technological improvement and structural change, and the main reason for this was the fact that Greek industry was still dominated by small, self-financed family enterprises.[705] The industrial growth during the 1920s found few supporters among the Greek politicians, who viewed it with distrust. Both the royalists of the Popular Party (*Λαϊκόν Κόμμα*) led by Panagis Tsaldaris as well as the Liberals (*Φιλελεύθεροι*) of Eleutherios Venizelos appears to be driven by anti-industrial feelings, each for their own political purposes, which reflected the problem of national division caused by the Asia Minor campaign.[706] Greece remained an agricultural state with raisins and tobacco dominating the country's exports, which were primarily headed to Germany and Britain.

Over the next two years after the Nazis came into power, Germany became Greece's best trading partner leaving behind Britain, the other major importer of Greek products, particularly of raisins. On the other hand, Germany enjoyed the lion's share of all of Greece's imports. The following table shows, according to Morgens Pelt, the distribution of the Greek exports and imports among the three Great Powers: Germany, Britain and the United States from 1927 to 1940:[707]

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[705] MARK MAZOWER, Η Ελλάδα και η Οικονομική Κρίση του Μεσοπολέμου. Αθήνα 2002 (trans.), pp. 111, 113, 130 [title of the original: Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis. Oxford 1991]; OLGA CHRISTODOULAKI, "Industrial growth in Greece between the wars. A new perspective." in: *European Review of Economic History*, 5, 2001, pp. 61-89, here p. 78.

[706] MAZOWER Ελλάδα και η Οικονομική Κρίση, pp. 128-138.

[707] MOGENS PELT, Tobacco, Arms and Politics. Greece and Germany from World Crisis to World War 1929-1941. Copenhagen 1998, p. 51, table 9.

Table 9.

	Germany				Britain				USA			
	percentage		*index*		*percentage*		*index*		*percentage*		*index*	
	X	M	X	M	X	M	X	M	X	M	X	M
1927	21.4	7.5	91	72	11.4	13.5	90	103	21.8	16.0	149	102
1928	25.8	8.7	109	84	13.8	14.5	110	111	19.9	15.6	136	102
1929	23.2	9.4	99	90	11.7	12.7	93	97	16.1	15.7	110	100
1930	23.6	10.4	100	100	12.6	13.1	100	100	14.6	15.7	100	100
1931	14.0	12.2	60	117	15.5	13.2	119	101	10.2	13.8	70	88
1932	14.5	9.7	61	93	23.7	13.7	188	105	10.2	13.8	70	88
1933	17.7	10.3	76	99	18.9	14.4	150	110	12.5	5.8	86	37
1934	22.5	14.7	95	141	17.4	16.7	138	127	14.7	6.3	101	40
1935	***29.8***	***18.7***	***126***	***179***	***12.6***	***15.5***	***100***	***118***	***16.9***	***6.3***	***115***	***40***
1936	36.4	22.4	154	215	12.2	16.1	97	123	14.3	7.1	98	45
1937	31.0	27.2	131	262	9.7	11.0	77	84	16.5	4.3	113	27
1938	38.5	28.8	163	276	8.3	13.0	66	99	17.7	7.3	117	46
1939	27.6	30.0	116	288	13.9	12.0	110	91	21.6	7.0	148	45
1940	37.8	23.5	160	226	7.4	11.1	59	85	25.0	11.4	171	73
1940	27.1	13.9	115	133								

Distribution of Greek exports (X) and imports (M) according to Pelt (1998). (*Emphasis added*)

As mentioned above, tobacco and raisins were Greece's main export products, with tobacco alone amounting to nearly half of the total revenue, as noted by the German Vice-Consul in Kavala, in 1939.[708] Kavala was the one of the two major trading ports of tobacco in northern Greece. In 1934, Greece received a visit from a high-ranking official of the new German regime. The Reich's Marshal and *Ministerpresident*, Herman Goering,[709] visited Greece within the framework of his Balkan visits to the capitals of south-eastern Europe, namely Belgrade, Athens and Bucharest. The German official was accompanied by the director of the German Railways, Julius Dorpmueller and the Secretary of State for Aviation, Erhard Milch, among others.[710] Although Goering was not officially invited by the Greek authorities –in fact neither the Greek Minister

[708] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[709] Hitler appointed Goering as Minister Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, which was launched in 1936. In 1942, he became the new president of the Reich's Research Council (*Reichsforschungsrat*, RFR), established in 1937.

[710] In 1943-44 Milch became presidential member (*Praesidialmitglieder*) of the RFR.

of Foreign Affairs nor the German Embassy in Athens seemed to have been officially informed-[711], his visit was perceived by the foreign observers "as an indication of possible future developments of Germany [towards Greece]".[712] Two years later, in 1936, Germany was officially represented in the 11th International Fair in Saloniki for the first time, which was an important forum for campaigning for the scientific and technological advancement of the participating countries and for promoting their culture. It was obvious that Nazi Germany was trying to strengthen not only its economic position in the region including its participation in the Greek production of ammunition but also its cultural presence, inaugurating a new period of foreign cultural policy, which had been largely ignored in the early years of the Nazi regime.

When the Greek Minister of Defence Ioannis Metaxas came to power establishing dictatorship on 4 August 1936 with the support of the King George II, Greek industry did not receive greater attention than it had under the previous government.[713] The only exception was the armaments industry. Metaxas laid particular stress on the country's rearmament, which was one of the most important goals of his political programme inspired by his authoritarian values. He was an enthusiastic supporter of Mussolini's fascist party as well as Hitler's National Socialism. In copying Hitler, Metaxas believed that the "restoration of the state" resulted from his assumption of power, which he described as "the third Greek culture".[714] Despite his commitment to the principle of neutrality as ratified in treaties and agreements signed after the Balkan wars and the outcome of the Greco-Turkish war in Anatolia,[715] the rearmament of Greece would not only boost the

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711 PELT, Tobacco, Arms and Politics, p. 110.

712 British ambassador Waterlow to Foreign Office 06.06.1934, cited in: PELT, p. 111.

713 Metaxas ruled Greece until 1941. He died unexpectedly of a tumour of the duodenum. See: HAGEN FLEISCHER, Στέμμα και Σβάστικα. Η Ελλάδα της Κατοχής και της Αντίστασης 1941-1944. Τόμος Α'. Athens 1989, p. 67. [Enlarged Greek edition of the original work: Im Kreuzschatten der Maechte. Griechenland 1941-1944. (Okkupation – Kollaboration - Resistance) Frankfurt a.o. 1986].

714 See: GUNNAR HERING, "Aspekte der Kulturpolitik des Metaxas-Regimes (1936-1940)", in: REINHARD LAUER, PETER SCHREINER (Hgs.) 'Die Kultur Griechenlands in Mittelalter und Neuzeit'. Bericht ueber das Kolloquium der Suedosteuropa-Kommission, 28. – 31. Okt. 1992. Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Goettingen. Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 3 Folge, Nr. 212, Goettingen 1996, pp. 285-321, here p. 290 (footnote 20). Also: *Magdeburg. Zeitung*, 21.07.1939 "Die Dritte hellenische Kultur." (newspaper clipping), in: BAB, R 4902/ 2090.

715 The Asia Minor campaign ended with the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923 between Greece and Turkey providing, *inter alia*, the exchange of populations, which had an enormous impact to Greece's social, economic and political development. In 1930, the Prime Minister of Greece, Eleutherios Venizelos,

"pro-labour" image that he was trying to establish, but would also contribute to the country's security, as it was widely believed, that it was vulnerable to a potential attack from Bulgaria or Turkey.[716] Germany seemed to respect and acknowledge Greece's commitment to neutrality, for its own interests of course, and criticised Britain's efforts to weaken it, principally for the purposes of strengthening its naval dominance on the Mediterranean. For that and a number of other reasons regarding the country's modernisation and agricultural development, it was in Germany's interest to invest in the country as quickly as possible.[717] There were some suspicions among Greeks, which were indeed justified, that the government negotiated the tobacco exports with Nazi Germany through a commitment to increase its imports from the Reich, particularly industrial products and armament.[718] The relevant law was eventually passed by the Greek government on 19 April 1935 giving the green light to Germany to become the major contributor to Greece's rearmament project.[719] It was no coincidence therefore, that in the same year, Germany had already won a tender announced by the Greek government to several countries (Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Netherlands) for the purchase of forty-five war planes.[720] In 1938, G. M. Schlagdenhaufen, a representative of the IG-Farben in the "S.A. de Poudrieries et Cartoucheries Helleniques" in Athens, which was under the control of the German

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who was associated with the Asia Minor campaign, signed the Greek-Turkish friendship Pact with his counterpart Ismet Inonou in Ankara that ratified among other things increased economic relations between the two countries. In the same Pact the thorny issue of property exchange between the Christian and Muslim refugees was also settled. With this Pact and with the 1933 'Entente Cordiale' agreement Greece and Turkey affirmed that they did not have any territorial aspirations. A year later, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Romania signed the Balkan Pact in Athens to protect their interests that they felt were threatened by the Soviet Union and Nazi policy, and also by Bulgaria. Finally, during the Metaxas regime, an additional agreement between Greece and Turkey was signed in Athens on 27 April 1938, according to which Greece would come to the assistance of Turkey in case of conflict with any other Balkan state and vice versa. The two states were bound by a commitment to neutrality in case of any international conflict.

[716] The Abyssinian Crisis in October 1935 added to the belief that Greece was unprepared for a modern warfare. See: PELT, Tobacco, Arms and Politics, pp. 65 f.

[717] *Berliner Boersenzeitung*, 28.12.1938 "Griechenlands Lage. Fester Wille zur Neutralitaet.", vom Schriftleitungsmitglied Dr. Hermann Ullmann. Athen. (Newspaper extract), in: BAB, R 4902/ 2090.

[718] PELT, Tobacco, Arms and Politics, p. 112.

[719] *Ibid.*

[720] (1935?) "Ankauf deutscher Flugzeuge durch die griechische Regierung", in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen Nr. 22 [*1. Ankauf deutscher Flugzeuge durch die griechische Regierung, 2. Entsendung deutsche Offiziere nach Griechenland (Major Babicht, Korvettenkapitaen Mirus) 1935-1938*].

chemical giant industry, reported that production in all types of munitions had been considerably increased, satisfying the Greek War Ministry and the General Staff.[721] Furthermore, Schlagdenhaufen noted that by the end of the same year, Greece had also become even more self-sufficient in war material and for that purpose, would also contribute the School of Engineers, which had opened in the previous year. The School was staffed with expert professors in the field and it operated in line with standards other schools set by abroad created for the interests of similar industries. According to the German representative, the technical experts on the particular industrial sector of munitions, who were expected to graduate from the school, were "a great hope", for the development of the country's war industry.[722]

In the sector of technology, Germany started to increase its influence on Greece during the 1930s. The German chemical industry IG-Farben, which was a member of the "*Vierkartel*" agreement since 1929 between the French dye industry, Centrale des Matiéres Colorantes (CMC), the Swiss IG-Farben and the Imperial Chemical Industries (since 1932), controlled 75 per cent of the dyestuff imported into Greece in 1938, while the Swiss IG-Farben controlled 11 per cent. In addition, the IG Farben dominated the production of artificial silk in Greece, which was traded by ETMA.[723] Although Greece was relatively rich in certain raw materials, such as arsenic, bauxite, lead, chromium, iron, magnesium, nickel, silicon dioxide, emery, and tin, which were necessary for the development of its chemical industry, it lacked raw phosphorus, coal and oil.[724]

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[721] "Anlage zu Bericht No. 57 vom 27.6.1938 von G.M.Schlagdenhaufen, Athen an I.G., Buero des kaufmaennischen Ausschusses, Berlin NW 7." [Translated], in: BAB, R 8128/ A 3849.

[722] *Ibid.* It is not mentioned if the professors were Greek or German and it is not clear if the School for Engineers was under the country's Technical University, the Ministry of War, or some other institution.

[723] PELT, Tobacco, Arms and Politics, pp. 54 f.

[724] Report about "Die Chemiewirtschaft Griechenlands und wichtige Unternehmen der chemischen Industrie." Nov. 1940, in: BAB, R 8128/ A 421.

Table 10.

Metal economy in south-eastern Europe, 1938. (The case of Greece)		
	Production in meter tons	(Position of Greece with regard to other Balkan states)
Bauxite (crude metal)	179.900	Second after Yugoslavia with 404.600 mts.
Magnesium (crude metal)	168.200	First position
Lead	4.100	Second after Yugoslavia with 77.400 mts.
Copper	-	
Zinc	4.800	
Nickel	2.000	
Antimony	-	
Mercury	-	
Chromium (crude metal)	42.500	Second after Turkey with 208.400 mts.
Manganese (crude metal)	7.000	
Molybdenum (crude metal)	1560	
Iron (crude metal)	348.600	Second after Yugoslavia with 607.100 mts.
Bismuth (crude metal)	-	
Ferric disulphide (crude metal)	244.000	First position

Source: *Bundesarchiv Koblenz*, R 57 / 1392 / I-II, (Band I.) 1942, Wirtschaftsdienst.[725]

The Greek chemical industry, which was largely represented by the firm "Chemical Products and Fertilisers", also known as "Oxea" or "Lipasmata", became increasingly dependant on imports of both basic and heavy chemicals, particularly sulphuric acid, from Germany.[726]

Imports from Germany to Greece were not confined to chemicals. The former was traditionally Greece's main provider of technological equipment and construction materials. It should not be forgotten that when the young prince, Otto von Wittelsbach of Bavaria, was crowned king of the newly established Greek state in 1832, a large number of technical experts, engineers, architects, and other scientists came with him to Greece in order to assist in the reconstruction of the country. The leading Technical University

[725] It should be noted that the data was prepared between 1941 and 1942

[726] Report on "Die Chemiewirtschaft Griechenlands und wichtige Unternehmen der chemischen Industrie." Nov. 1940, in: BAB, R 8128/ A 421; PELT, Tobacco, Arms and Politics, pp. 54 f. "Lipasmata" was founded in 1909 by Nikolaos Kanellopoulos and Leonteios Oikonomidis and focused on agricultural chemistry. During the period in question, the owners of the company were Epaminontas Charilaos and Aggelos Kanellopoulos. The latter was the brother of the founder.

of Greece, and indeed the only one in the whole country until the middle of the 1920s, was established by Bavarians and initially staffed with German scientists.[727] The impact of German technology on Greece was enormous and following the end Germany's international isolation, the ties between the two countries were in the area of science and technology revived. Germany was regarded by Greeks as the country of scientific and technological advancement *par excellence* and the majority of Greeks who wished to study or to receive further training visited the German or Swiss Technical Universities. It did not come as a surprise, therefore, that many German enterprises were often given the task of carrying out technical works in Greece and exported the technological equipment for these activities. In 1934, for example, Germany took on the reconstruction of the Greek railways, despite pressure from the Austrian firm "*Wiener Lokomotiven Fabrik*" on the Greek government, during negotiations that lasted for some years.[728] The German company that made the best offer, according to the Greek government, was the "*Deutsche Wagenbau-Vereinigung*" of Berlin, which was the main firm involved in the construction of the German railways. The work on the electrical infrastructure was planned to be undertaken by "*Siemens-Schuckert-Werke*" or "*Allgemeine Elektrizitaets-Gesellschaft*, AEG".[729] It is interesting to note that in the relevant memorandum of the Greek government it is underlined, among other things, that the materials of the German trains were internationally famous for their quality and thus they could guarantee excellent standards in construction. From a financial perspective, the German offer was the best not only because it was the lowest, but also because it was agreed that the payment would be made in Greek currency, rather than in a foreign one.[730]

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[727] On the history of the Technical University in Athens until 1917 see: Κ. ΜΠΙΡΗΣ, Ιστορία του Εθνικού Μετσοβίου Πολυτεχνείου, Αθήνα 1957. [The history of the *Metsovio* National Technical University.]

[728] When the Greek government rejected the trains offered by the Austrian firm as unsuitable, the Austrians threatened to boycott the import of Greek tobacco, unless the Greeks purchased the trains. Eventually, the Greek government bought two Austian trains. See: Confidential Memorandum "Prometheus", [a German] Financial and Technical Corporation in Athens to Ambassador of Germany on 18.10.1934. The document classified "private and confidential", in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen Nr. 54 (*Deutsch-griechische Handelsbeziehungen: Lieferungen von Triebwagen, Eisenbahn- und Strassenbahnmaterial fuer den griechischen Staat, 1933-1938*).

[729] Memorandum (in Greek), 1934, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen Nr. 54 (*Deutsch-griechische Handelsbeziehungen: Lieferungen von Triebwagen, Eisenbahn- und Strassenbahnmaterial fuer den griechischen Staat, 1933-1938*).

[730] *Ibid.*

Nonetheless, agriculture remained the main sector of the Greek economy of interest of the Reich, not only for its tobacco production. The Four-Year Plan prioritised Germany's self-sufficiency in food, arms and currency, leaving little space for large imports of semi-luxury products, such as tobacco or raisins. Even before the entry of the German troops onto the Greek soil, Germany was interested in the development of the Greek agriculture, particularly in fruit, wheat, corn and other basic products for export to the Reich.[731] On the other hand, Germany exported not only raw material for the production of fertilisers but also the know-how and technical expertise, on which Greece had already become dependent since the mid-1930s. This expansion "without currency"[732] not only to Greece but also to the rest of the Balkans was one of Germany's most effective weapons later on. A year after the Nazis had invaded Greece they launched a plan for the "mobilisation of the Greek rural population".[733] In 1942, the country was occupied by Italians and Bulgarians, besides Germans. The Bulgarians had annexed the northern provinces, Macedonia and Thrace, which were among the most fertile parts of the country. That loss of fields as well as the reduction in the number of Greek farmers, due to their recruitment by the Greek army or their participation in the resistance, complicated the Nazis' plan for food autarky for its army in the region. In addition, the deterioration of food stocks among the local population during the harsh winter of 1941-1942, which left tens of thousands of dead, particularly in the urban areas, forced the Germans to impose drastic measures for the cultivation and exploitation of the Greek soil.[734] As a result of these measures, the Nazis started to move parts of Athens' population to the provinces in order to cultivate the land. This was the beginning of what they called "agricultural mobilisation" which was planned on a large scale.[735] In addition, through the collaboration of the government of George Tsolakoglou, a new law was passed, which enacted the plan for the complete cultivation of agricultural land. In

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731 N.F. Aussenhandel. Griechenland – Richtlinien zur Foerderung der Landwirtschaft, 21.05.1940, in: BAB, R 4902/ 2096.

732 Cited in: PELT, Tobacco, Arms and Politics, p. 158.

733 "Mobilmachnung des griechischen Bauern. Streng Vorschriften fuer die Nutzung des Bodens. Deutsch-italienische Hilfe Eigener Auslandsdienst der Muenchner Neuesten Nachrichten", in: *Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten*, 7.07.1942, (Zeitungsabschnitt), in: BAB, R 4902/ 2096.

734 See: FLEISCHER, Στέμμα και Σβάστικα, chapter: Πείνα και Προπαγάνδα' pp. 193-216.

735 "Mobilmachnung des griechischen Bauern. Streng Vorschriften fuer die Nutzung des Bodens. Deutsch-italienische Hilfe Eigener Auslandsdienst der Muenchner Neuesten Nachrichten", in: *Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten*, 7.07.1942, (Zeitungsabschnitt), in: BAB, R 4902/ 2096.

the future, the owners of the non-cultivated fields were permitted to give them in tenancy to the farmers of neighbouring villages.[736] The plan particularly encouraged rice and soya-bean farming, and were made further plans for the re-organisation of Greek fishery with the help of foreign experts, mostly Germans.[737] In order to "rescue Greece", as it was described by the Germans, it seemed necessary to provide economic aid from the Axis forces, namely Germany and Italy, and to boost the county's exports to those countries.[738] Italy's role, however, in the Greek economy eventually turned out to be very limited.

To that purpose also contributed the "*Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft*" (SOEG), which inaugurated a department dedicated to Greece in Vienna, in 1940. The purpose of this department was to encourage the economic and commercial relations between the Reich and Greece, and in 1942, Karl von Hervay was sent to the country to represent the organisation and to report back to it. However, regardless of whether they had the character of expansion "without currency" or not, economic relations would not be successful without the "*geistige Waffen*", already known since the German isolation after the First World War. Therefore, on the initiative of the SOEG, a number of cultural activities took place between the two countries after 1939. These activities were organised by the Vienna branch of the German-Greek Society, which had been established a year earlier, in April 1938, just one month after the 're-unification' of Austria and Germany.[739] The president of the branch was the E. Pistor, and its vice presidents were the big industrialist Baron Dr. A. Bachofen von Echt and the general director of the Austria tobacco consortium, H. Rueff. Subsequent vice presidents were the university professor, C. Praschniker, and the bank manager, Leonhard Wolzt. Two Greek diplomats, K. Dumba and A.A. Saktouris, were named honorary presidents, whilst Th. Petrocochino, prince E. Ypsilanti and two university professors, A. Wilhelm and E.

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[736] *Ibid.*

[737] *Ibid.* Before the war, Greece imported the majority of its salted and smoked fish from Turkey. See also: Report of Dr. von Rischka, the director of the Food and Agriculture Department of the Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft (SOEG), entitled "Geschaeftsbericht zur zweiten Tagung des Beirats der Gruppe 'Ernaehrung und Landwirtschaft' der Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft" from 30 November to 1 December 1942 to the Central Office of the SOEG in: BAB R 63/ 262.

[738] "Mobilmachnung des griechischen Bauern. Streng Vorschriften fuer die Nutzung des Bodens. Deutsch-italienische Hilfe Eigener Auslandsdienst der Muenchner Neuesten Nachrichten", in: *Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten*, 7.07.1942, (Zeitungsabschnitt), in: BAB, R 4902/ 2096.

[739] See: "Gesetz ueber die Wiedervereinigung Oesterreichs mit dem Deutschen Reich vom 13.3.1938", in: INGO von MUENCH (Hg.), Gesetze des NS-Staates. Paderborn 1994, pp. 50f.

Ziebarth were named honorary members. The latter also was the president of the German-Greek Society in Hamburg. The Vienna branch was the last one of a number of similar branches established in Dresden, Goettigen, Hamburg, Leipzig and Munich, while the central organisation was located in Berlin. In Greece, two Greek-German Society branches had already been existed in Athens and Saloniki. The creation of the 'Great Germany' (*Grossdeutschland*) was a product, according to the Nazi's, of "the Fuehrer's intelligence" and of a well organised interaction between science, technology, production, consumption, and people's welfare.[740] Within this framework, the aim of the German-Greek Society in Vienna was to promote the "intellectual and material exchange and friendship", in other words, the cultural and economic relations between "Great Germany and *Ostmark*, on the one hand, and Greece and Hellenism, on the other".[741]

It is important to note that Greek students in Germany played a significant role in all of the society's activities. Therefore, the meeting of the Vienna branch on 19 September 1940 was in fact a meeting between the Greek students and professors and their German colleagues. In the presence of the rector of the university Prof. Knoll, they discussed, the society's twelve-month plan, emphasising the welfare of Greek students and scientists' and the understanding of the Greek people and its cultural value.[742] The most important activities organised in Vienna were the study of the increasing movement of the population in the countries of the southeastern Europe and the "south-east week in Vienna" (*Suedostwoche Wiens*). In addition to these activities, the creation of a "working group" (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft*), was planned between 1941 and 1942, which in the case of Greece, would not only be dedicated to cultural -usually glamorous- activities but also to specific practical works of particular disciplines.[743] The working group would include the Union of Gymnasium's Friends as well as a number of German and Greek specialists, who were expected to provide their services regularly in the interest of promoting links between the two nations.[744] The scientific collaboration between Greece and Austria in the framework of the German-Greek Society in Vienna was supported by "*Eranos*

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740 Undated document entitled "Deutsch-Griechische Gesellschaft, Zweig Wien", in: BAB, R 63/ 37.

741 *Ibid.*

742 "Bericht ueber die Tagung der Deutsch-Griechischen Gesellschaft am 19.Sep. 1940", in: BAB, R 63/ 37.

743 1941 December, Deutsch-Griechische Gesellschaft, branch of Vienna. "Veranstaltungs- und Arbeitsprogramm 1941/42 und Gruendung einer Arbeitsgemeinschaft", in: BAB, R 63/ 37.

744 *Ibid.*

Vindobonensis".[745] The society was in close contact with other institutions in Vienna, such as the Office for Agricultural Policy of the regional NSDAP administration (*Amt fuer Agrarpolititk der Gauleitung der NSDAP, Wien*) under the management of Dr. von Rischka. This office was responsible for all of the agricultural-political activities in the southeast and it was recognised as a Reich's office.[746] Rischka later became responsible for the department of Nutrition and Agriculture of the *Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft.*

Among the cultural activities that were undertaken by the German-Greek Society in Vienna, were the monthly lectures, which largely focused on ancient Greek culture and these continued until the end of the war. For instance, in the spring of 1944 Professor Hedwig von Kenner gave a lecture called "*Die Betrachtung der antiken Kunst von Winckelmann bis heute*", and Professor G. Stratigos, the director of the national gallery of Athens, gave a lecture on the modern Greek painting.[747] In the same year, Dr. A. Formosis from Saloniki was invited to Vienna to speak about the irrigation system in Macedonia, whilst a prominent professor at Munich University, D.F. Doelger, presented the findings of the German excursion to the holy peninsula of Athos in Chalkidiki in northern Greece, in 1941.[748] The aim of the excursion was to draw up a list of all of the Byzantine treasures and moreover, to study the largely unknown and precious manuscripts that would give great prestige to the German science, particularly for undertaking such an activity at that time. Doelger's lecture was given in the framework of the so-called "University Week" (*Hochschulwoche*) in the two largest Greek cities, Athens and Saloniki, which had the same objective as the "Vienna week of the south-east" (*Suedostwoche Wiens*). It should be noted, however, that the "University Weeks" were largely addressed to the *Wehrmacht* soldiers and their officers, rather than the Greek public.[749]

The practical interests that were supported by the many cultural activities in Vienna and in Greece, could be epitomised to agriculture and the exploitation of the bauxite mines in the country. Greece was a significant producer of bauxite from which one could obtain aluminium, an important material for constructions and essential for

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[745] 1942-1943, Deutsch-Griechische Gesellschaft, Branch in Vienna. [Rueckblick], in: BAB, R 63/ 37.

[746] Dr. Rischka to Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft Herrn Min. Rat Dr. Augenthaler 28.03.1944, in: BAB, R 63/ 253.

[747] "Mitteilungen fuer die Mitglieder", April and May 1944, in: BAB, R 63/ 37.

[748] "Mitteilungen fuer die Mitglieder", beginning of July 1944, in: BAB, R 63/ 37.

[749] See: 27.03.1944 – 21.04.1944, "Bericht ueber Stadtler's Griechenlandsreise in dieser Zeit", sheets Nr. 133-135, in: BAB, R 63/ 253.

the war economy. In 1940, the German armaments industry need of aluminium amounted to 250,000 tons. Given that for the production of one ton aluminium was needed four tons of bauxite, Germany turned to Yugoslavia, Hungary and Greece to exploit their bauxite recourses.[750] Despite the existence of several bauxite mines, Greece lacked serious infrastructure necessary to increase the production of aluminium. In 1942, Professor Ludin, who also lectured on Greek affairs, referring to the need and importance of waterfalls to supply power to Greece, reported that the country lacked financial means, rather than scientists or engineers. He underlined that the Greek specialists, most of whom had been educated in Germany, already knew about the problem and its impact on the country's industrial development.[751] The first attempts to deal with this problem were made in the late 1920s by the British and Americans. In 1938, American capital regained a strong presence in Greek economy. The Greek government signed an agreement with the American Cooper Engineering Co. and the Chemical Construction Corporation in the same year for the production of hydroelectric power. The creation of an electro-metallurgical and electrochemical industry was also planned for the elaboration of aluminium from the Greek bauxite.[752] By 1942, it was only the city of Patras and its port that were still provided with power from the hydroelectric works in the region, therefore, it was clear that there were enormous perspectives for the Germans to modernise the country for their own interests, using waterfalls as a source of energy. According to the *Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft* official in Athens, von Hervay, by November 1942, some of the most important mines in Greece were some way or another linked to German interests, either because they had been purchased by the Germans or because their production had been transported to the Reich. These mines included the following:

1. "Société de Parnasse" in the district of Caniani, which belonged to Mr. Iliopoulos and traded the ore through the local small port of Itea;
2. "Eleusis", which was the property of the engineer D. Scalistiris in the district of Mandra Attikis, which also used the local port of Eleusis for trading;
3. "Société des mines Bauxites Delphi" in Amphissa;

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[750] WOLFGANG SCHUMANN (ed.), Griff nach Sueosteuropa. Neue Dokumente ueber die Politik des deutschen Imperialismus und Militarismus gegenueber Suedosteuropa im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Berlin 1973, p. 10 and table 2, pp. 12 f.

[751] Karl von Hervay to the Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft, on 17.02.1942, in: BAB, R 63/ 106.

[752] *Ibid.*

4. "Crikelos" on the island of Amorgos, which belonged to the engineer, S. Papasotiriou.

The *Hansa Leichtmetall A.G.* in Berlin was the main owner of the above mines.[753] Wener Miehle was appointed the German *chargé d' affaires* for the mines in Parnassos and Delphi, however, he never took charge of his office as he was killed in a plane crash, while Freyberg was named the director for the mines in Mandra and Amorgos.[754]

Table 11.

Production of bauxite in Greek mines from the outbreak of the WWII until 1941.				
Name of the company	*Location*	*Mine*	*Year production*	
			in tons	*in proportion*
S.A des Mines des Bauxites de Parnasse	Athens	Topolio Caniani	56.563 37.989	53%
S.A. des Mines des Bauxites Delphi	Delphi	Amphissa	35.379	20%
S. Papasotiriou	Krikelos, island Amorgos	Krikelos, island Amorgos	28.000	15%
S.D.Scalistiris	Athens	Mandra	21.937	12%
Total			179.868	100%

Source: *Bundesarchiv Berlin,* R 63/ 84: July – Oct. 1942, "Bauxit in Griechenland", Herr Dr. Kratz, Berlin.

Apart from the mineral wealth of the country, Germany's major interest in Greece continued to be its agricultural production. By the end of 1942, the majority of the shares of the largest Greek fertilizer-company, "Lipasmata" of the Kanellopoulos family, became German property. In 1942, Greece had a number of institutions dedicated to all aspects of agriculture. There were agricultural state schools in Saloniki, Athens, Larissa and Patras, which each specialised in the products of the region. These cities were the 'capitals', so to speak, of the most productive provinces in Greece. For example, Saloniki was the trading centre of tobacco from northern Greece to Germany, Larissa was the productive centre of fruit and vegetables in the province of Thessalien in central

[753] Report of Dr. Kratz "Bauxit in Griechenland July – Oct. 1942, Herr, Berlin, in: BAB, R 63/ 84.

[754] Report of Karl von Hervay from Athens to Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft, Vienna 09.11.1942 (arrived on 27.11.1942), in: BAB, R 63/ 106.

Greece and Patras specialised in fruit and vineyards. This port, however, was most important for the trade of raisins, which were produced in the province. In Athens, several institutes specializing in the area of agriculture, including soil research, plant diseases, the control of the imported seeds, meteorological and statistical research, animal breeding and animal diseases were located at Athens University, at Agricultural School and the Ministry of Agriculture. Two further institutes, the Benakeio Phytopathology Institute, which was semi-private, and the Institute for Chemistry and Agriculture attached to the "Chimika Lipasmata" of Kanellopoulos worked towards similar aims. Several other smaller institutes were spread across the country in Drama in Macedonia, Volos in the central-east, Herakleion in Crete, and Pirgos in Peloponnese.[755] It is interesting to note that almost all of the Greeks who worked in the above institutions had been educated in Germany.[756] Needless to say that these organisations already existed before the German occupation show that Greece was an agricultural country, which, together with other Balkan countries, was regarded by the Nazis as the main provider of food for the German population and army. The most fertile regions of Greece were located in eastern Macedonia and Thrace, which were under Bulgarian occupation immediately after the Nazis invaded the country. Even though they could produce more than their population needed and could feed the whole country, the reduction of the local population due to war meant that large parts of these regions to remain uncultivated. The fact that these northern provinces remained under Bulgarian control troubled Germany greatly, as it threatened its own interests, particularly in tobacco. For example, the profits from the export of tobacco were reduced by 67% after the annexation of eastern Macedonia and Thrace.[757] Moreover, if the Greece continued to be deprived of the above territories, which led to its dependence on foreign food aid, the country's future was deemed to be quite bleak.[758]

The economy of Greece was largely depended on agriculture. It was not surprising, therefore, that Sotirios Gotsamanis, the Minister of Finance in the 'first collaborative' government of Georgios Tsolakoglou, was also appointed Minister of Food and Ag-

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[755] See: Hervay's report to the SOEG on 17.03.1942, in: BAB, R 63/ 106.

[756] *Ibid.*

[757] Report of Karl von Hervay from Athens to Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft on 19.03.1944, in: BAB, R 63/ 106.

[758] Hervay's report to the SOEG on 17.03.1942, in: BAB, R 63/ 106.

riculture in the 'second collaborative' government of Konstantinos Logothetopoulos.[759] In 1942, the economy of Greece was in a very bad condition with the black market setting the prices of the goods at will and with inflation rising at an enourmous rate. In order to deal with the catastrophic rate of inflation, the Special Commissioner for economic and financial questions in south-eastern Europe (*Sonderbeauftragter fuer Wirtschaftsfragen in Suedosteuropa*) and former Major of Vienna, Hermann Neubacher, was moved to Athens.[760] In agreement with the Italian Special Commissioner,[761] he issued a law restricting the credit limit that the banks were allowed to give to wholesale and retail dealers.[762] In addition, on 28 November 1942 the "DEGRIGES" (*Deutsch-griechische Warenaustausch Gesellschaft*) was established by a decree of the Reich's Ministry of Finance and a statute of the Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance. Its purpose was to control and normalise exports and consequently, the influx of currency from Germany to Greece.[763] The organisation was based in Berlin and had branches in Athens, Saloniki, Patras and Volos. The president of the organisation in Berlin was Otto Braun, while the director of the "DEGRIGES" in Athens was the vice president of the German Chamber of Commerce in Athens, Fred Goecker, and in Saloniki director was appointed the Berlin lawyer, Kurt Zoepke.[764]

Nevertheless, Neubacher's measures did not lead to any improvement in the economic situation in Greece.[765] In January 1944, Greece was in the worst position

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[759] During the German occupation of Greece three collaborative governments were formed by the Nazi regime: from 8 May 1941 until November 1942, Prime Minister was Georgios Tsolakoglou. Konstantinos Logothetopoulos served in the same post until 6 April 1943 and Ioannis Rallis until the end of the war. The Greek government with its president Emmanuel Tsouderos went into exile on 21 April 1941, first, to the island of Crete and soon after to Alexandria in Egypt and finally, to London.

[760] FLEISCHER, Στέμμα και Σβάστικα, pp. 327 ff.

[761] Italy controlled parts of Greece at this time.

[762] Report of Karl von Hervay, Athens to Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft, Wien on 28.09.1942, in: BAB, R 63/ 106.

[763] FLEISCHER, Στέμμα και Σβάστικα, p. 331 ff; SCHUMANN, Griff nach Sueosteuropa, pp. 61 f.; MARK MAZOWER, Στην Ελλάδα του Χίτλερ. Η εμπειρία της Κατοχής. Αθήνα 1994, [Inside Hitler's Greece. The Experience of Occupation, 1941-1944. New Haven 1993], pp. 95 ff. See also: GOETZ ALY, SUSANNE HEIM, Vordenker der Vernichtung. Auschwitz und die deutschen Plaene fuer eine neue europaeische Ordnung. Hamburg 1991, p. 43.

[764] 27.03.1944 – 21.04.1944, "Bericht ueber Stadtler's Griechenlandsreise in dieser Zeit", sheet Nr. 154, in: BAB, R 63/ 253.

[765] Fred Goecker (Deutsche Handelskammer in Griechenland) to Herrn Heinrichsbauer (Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft, Wien) on 25.01.1944, in: BAB, R 63/ 114.

among all of the occupied countries in terms of its currency. For instance when Greece was occupied by the Axis powers, the country's banknotes amounted to twenty billions. Within two years, in October 1942, the amount came to 1,500 billions and after that, they increased 300 billions per month.[766] As for the rate of exchange, the equivalent of the English pound to the Greek drachma was, according to v. Hervay, 550 to 660 times higher in the pre-war period, while in France it was twelve to fourteen times higher.[767] In May 1944, the situation had dramatically deteriorated rocketing the value of the drachma to the golden pound from thirty million to seventy million within a week and in just two days, to 105 million![768] The reason for this catastrophe was attributed to the communist movement by the Major-General v. Hervay, which he described it as "the land's plague".[769] He recognised, however, that Greece was a poor country and that the occupation by three powers had worsened the levels of food stocks, as Greece not only had to feed its people but also the occuping troops. In addition, great strains were put on its resources by the fortifications, which were necessary for its own security but also for the security of the whole of south-eastern Europe.[770] In addition, the bombardment of Piraeus by the Allies in January 1944, which caused severe casualties to the local population, destroyed the two railway stations and caused serious damage to the port, paralysing the transportation of goods to and from the Greek capital.[771]

During the occupation, however, the Germans initiated a number of measures for the exploitation of the country's agricultural production and to plan its future potential. Before the war, apart from tobacco, sultanas and currants (the country produced one third of the world production in currants at the time)[772]- Greece also produced grapes, figs, citrus fruit and almonds. According to some commentators, Greece had the potential to become, under certain conditions, "Europe's California".[773] Since 1942, most of

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[766] Report of Hervay, ["Lagebericht Griechenland (Jan. 1944)"] to the SOEG on 05.01.1944, in: R 63/ 252.

[767] *Ibid.*

[768] Karl von Hervay to Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft on 14.05.1944, in: BAB, R 63/ 106.

[769] Report of Hervay, ["Lagebericht Griechenland (Jan. 1944)"] to the SOEG on 05.01.1944, in: R 63/ 252.

[770] *Ibid.*

[771] In summer 1944, the products that Greece exported to the Reich were restricted to ore, raisins, raw silk and untreated hides, since the other products could hardly cover the country's needs. See: report of Karl von Hervay to Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft on 18.06.1944, in: BAB R 63/ 106.

[772] Zweite Tagung der Gruppe "Ernaehrung und Landwirtschaft" der SOEG 30.11. – 01.12.1942. Pressecommunique, in: BAB R 63/ 28.

[773] Fred Goecker (Deutsche Handelskammer in Griechenland) to Heinrichsbauer (Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft, Wien) 25.01.1944, in: BAB R 63/ 114.

the production had been exported to Germany and in the summer of 1943 there were daily flights between Athens and Berlin, which basically facilitated the trade relations between the two countries.[774] The *Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft* advertised summer-school university courses in Germany in order to strengthen Germany's relations with the Balkan countries. In Greece however, a campaign of this kind was considered "more than unnecessary".[775] On the other hand this was because many Greek was fully aware that his country depended on Germany's industrial products and on Germany itself, and on the other hand, that it needed and would continue to need Greece's agricultural products. Moreover, several Greeks who had studied in Germany, along with others who used to visit the Reich every year for various reasons were no longer able to travel abroad. Therefore, it was quite difficult to advertise Germany as business, training and cultural destination.[776] Nevertheless, in 1944, it was reported that there were about two hundred Greek students in Germany, of which thirty-six received German scholarships.[777]

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[774] See: "*Merkblatt fuer Griechenland*", 1943 August, (Hsg. von der Deutschen Handelskammer in Griechenland- Athen), in: BAB, R 63/ 114.

[775] Report of Karl von Hervay to Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft, Vienna on 22.11.1943, in: BAB, R 63/ 106.

[776] *Ibid.*

[777] 27.03.1944 – 21.04.1944, Bericht ueber Stadtler's Griechenlandsreise in dieser Zeit, Bl. 136, in: BAB R 63/ 253.

5.2. Language propaganda and science.[778]

In Hitler's regime, the use of foreign cultural policy as a mean of propaganda became a valuable instrument for the dissemination of the national socialist ideology abroad and in many cases, it was regarded as *kriegswichtig*, in other words, important for the war. About two years before the occupation of Greece by the Nazis, German cultural policy, which was mainly carried out through the branches of the German Academy, appeared, according to the Nazi propagandists, to be rather weak in the Balkan region, in comparison to the achievements of the other significant "cultural nations" there. France and Britain, had an important and somewhat different cultural presence in Greece, even before the First World War, through the establishment of hospitals. In 1933, the small French hospital in Greece was expanded and an amphitheater was also built for regular seminars on topics relating to physical sciences and medicine.[779] Therefore, Germany believed that it should not delay any longer in promoting a similar activity in Greece and the Nazi authorities sought to intensify their cultural propaganda in neutral countries, giving priority to the Balkan states.[780]

Since the mid-1920s, the teaching of language became the primary instrument for Germany's cultural expansion and was regarded a prerequisite for its economic expansion into new markets. Its main rival had always been France, which at the same time, was often used as a model for the country's foreign cultural policy design. France had a long tradition in the dissemination of its language not only in its colonies but also in other territories, which were of political and economic importance to the country, such as the Balkans. In 1929, Franz Thierfelder, the secretary of the German Academy in Munich, which was responsible for the teaching of German abroad, reported that the interest in German had increased in the multiethnic city of Saloniki, even though French was

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[778] Fedra Koutsoukou in her dissertation elaborates the cultural political propaganda through language policy in Greece during Nazi period, by studying all aspects of the phenomenon in detail and all of the language institutions involved. FEDRA KOUTSOUKOU, Die deutsche auswaertige Kultur- und Sprachpolitik in Griechenland 1933-1944, (chapter five). Thesis to be defended at the Technische Universitaet Berlin in January 2006. Here, I am roughly describing the main mechanisms of language propaganda for scientific influence on Greece.

[779] HAGEN FLEISCHER, "Europas Rueckkehr nach Griechenland. Kulturpolitik der Grossmaechte in einem Staat der Peripherie", in: HARALD HEPPNER, OLGA KATSIARDI-HERING (Hg.), Die Griechen und Europa. Aussen- und Innensichten im Wandel der Zeit. Wien 1998, pp. 125-191, here pp. 144 f.

[780] *Ibid.*, p. 150.

still the dominant foreign language. As for Athens, Thierfelder remarked that the French language was the most popular foreign language in comparison to the other Balkans capitals.[781] Nevertheless, in both of the cities that hosted the country's universities, the professors were well disposed towards the learning of German, on the grounds that they considered it to be the most important for science.[782] Of course, this conviction was not shared by all professors, as there were cliques of Francophiles and Germanophiles, in line with their education. In 1933, it was reported that the German language teacher, Rudolf Helm, who was appointed by the Munich Academy in the *Deutsche Schule* in Saloniki also lectured at the local university.[783] On the other hand, at Athens University, a post for the teaching of German had officially existed since 1929, but only on paper, as it remained vacant due to the reluctance of the Greek government to appoint any foreign professors at the time.[784] The reason for that reluctance, argued Thierfelder, was that modern Greece wanted "to find its feet" as much as it could and that a foreign cultural presence might hinder rather than foster these efforts. The German Balkan expert further noted that the country's poor economy resulted from an inadequate education system, which forced many youths to turn to German and other foreign universities in order to undertake advanced studies. According to Thierfelder, it was in Germany's interest to increase the number of Greek students and that language teaching would certainly contribute to this objective. It is not an exaggeration to say that from then on the complex mechanism of the Reich's foreign policy agenda began to unfold and in order to achieved this aim, a number of old methods were employed while some new ones were invented.

At first, former students of German universities, who had occupied important positions in Greek political, economic or scientific life at the time and continued to maintain links with their "intellectual homeland",[785] were invited to give lectures at the Academy of Munich and some German universities. They became the mediators between the two countries creating the preconditions for stronger cultural ties between Germans and Greeks. This was the case of Kyriakidis, a professor of ancient Greek and the Rector of the University of Saloniki. He was awarded the title of honorary correspondent mem-

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781 "Bericht von Dr. Franz Thierfelder, Muenchen, ueber die Lage der deutschen Sprache auf dem Balkan". Undated document, probably on 26.08.1929. In: PAAA, R 64200.

782 *Ibid.*

783 Thierfelder an Auswaertiges Amt, Abteilung VI on 27.01.1933, in: PAAA, R 64200.

784 "Bericht von Dr. Franz Thierfelder, Muenchen, ueber die Lage der deutschen Sprache auf dem Balkan". Undated document, probably on 26.08.1929, in: PAAA, R 64200.

785 Prof. Dr. A.D. Keramopoulos to Deutsche Akademie in Muenchen on 09.08.1932, in: PAAA, R 64200.

ber of the Munich Academy of Sciences in 1933, for his services in the dissemination of the German in Saloniki and his fight against the strong Francophile opposition at his university.[786] A year earlier, the professor of archaeology, A. D. Keramopoulos, also became an honorary member of the German Academy in Munich. He was considered an "important factor for the German cultural undertaking in Greece" and the title he was bestowed was redeemed in the following years in the best interests of Germany.[787] Keramopoulos, who became the Dean of the faculty of philosophy at Athens University in 1933, was completely devoted to German culture and worked intensively for the promotion of German in Greece, using his influence with the Greek authorities. He recognised that the teaching of German at secondary schools should be intensified for economic, commercial and industrial reasons[788] and to become, as the Germans wished, a regular subject "as it had [already] been in most of the other European cities"[789] [sic]. The year of 1933 was regarded by the Senator of the German Academy in Munich and the president of the German Archaeological Institute in Athens, Professor Karo (elsewhere, Caro) as particularly favourable for the expansion of German to Greece. This was not only due to generally sympathetic climate for German culture, but also the new Greek juridical code[790] which was based on German model, a fact that obliged every Greek lawyer to read and understand German.[791] Karo argued that the creation of a chair for the teaching of German at a Greek university was a pressing need. By February 1933, there still was no chair for foreign languages or philology. Even the Spanish readership that had been established in the framework of the Spanish-Greek co-operation remained vacant.[792] A few months later, Germany was surprised with the establishment of readership for French at Athens University by France, who bore all of the costs instead of the Greek Ministry of Education and also sent a specialist from the Sorbonne. Germany was

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[786] See: Deutsche Akademische Auschtauschdienst to Auswaertiges Amt on 16.06.1933; German Ambassador in Athens Eisenlohr, to Auswaertiges Amt on 28,07.1933, both in: PAAA, R 64200.

[787] Prof. Dr. Karo, Deutsches Archaeologisches Institut in Athen [und Senator der Deutschen Akademie in Muenchen] to Thierfelder on 02.02.1933, in: PAAA, R 64200.

[788] Keramopoulos to Deutsche Akademie in Muenchen on 09.08.1932, in: PAAA, R 64200.

[789] Deutsche Akademie, Muenchen to Keramopoulos on 26.01.1933, in: PAAA, R 64200.

[790] It is not mentioned, if it was the civil, penal or other code.

[791] Deutsche Akademie, Muenchen to Auswaertiges Amt on 02.10.1933; Prof. Dr. Karo, Deutsches Archaeologisches Institut in Athen [und Senator der Deutschen Akademie in Muenchen] to Thierfelder on 02.02.1933, in: PAAA, R 64200.

[792] Thierfelder to Auswaertiges Amt, Abteilung VI Hemn Vizekonsul v. Heinz on 07.02.1933, in: PAAA, R 64200.

once again one step behind its cultural rival. Herman Goering's visit in 1934, was therefore, not only the German answer to the French initiative, but also an indication of stronger economic and cultural relations between the two countries, as the foreign press had underlined.[793] His mission was also cultural-political, as he emphasised the need for German cultural propaganda in Greece and he recognised the progress that had already been made in this area.[794] In the same year, Germany followed France by creating a position with the same profile to promote German at Athens Technical University. The Reich seemed to have won this cultural round by convincing the Greek government to make German obligatory at this university, in which 95% of its professors had been educated in Germany.[795] A young historian from Leipzig, Gottfried Felix Merkel, occupied the chair. The following year, he was asked by the rector of the Teacher's Training College, who also was General Secretary at the Ministry of Education, to take up the newly established chair for German at his college.[796] In addition, Merkel taught at the Greek Railway School.[797] According to Merkel, a noteworthy incident which showed the significance of German at Greek universities was the comment of the rector of Athens University professor of mathematics, P. Zervos, who followed a private course, that "his authority would be over, if someone finds out that he does not know German".[798] This sweeping propaganda of German culture in Greek academic life made the British, the

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[793] Greek Ambassador on Berlin, Rizos Ragavis to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens on 31.05.1934, in: Ιστορικών Αρχείον Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών (Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry, IAYE), A/11/I, 1934. Ελληνο-γερμανικές σχέσεις.

[794] G.F.Merkel, Athens to Dr. Juergens of the Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaften on 06.06.1934, in: PAAA, R 64200.

[795] Twenty-seven out of thirty ordinary professors were educated in Germany. See: German Embassy in Athens on 04.07.1934. Also: Notgemeischaft der deutschen Wissenschaften to Auswaertiges Amt, Abteilung VIW on 08.03.1934; G.F. Merkel to Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaften on 18.05.1934, all documents in: PAAA, R 64200. In 1936, was reported that 178 Greek professor out of 320 had studied in either German or Austrian univeristies. See: "11seitige Bericht ueber die deutsche Schule Athen, Saloniki" on 31.11.1936, in BAB, R 4901/ 10526.

[796] Merkel to Auswaertigen Amt, Kulturabteilung on 15.10.1935, in: PAAA, R 64200.

[797] German Ambassador in Athens, Prinz zu Erbach, to Auswaertigen Amt on 28.02.1937, in: PAAA, R 64200.

[798] Merkel to Auswaertigen Amt, Kulturabteilung on 15.10.1935, in: PAAA, R 64200.

French, and even the Italians quite nervous.[799] Merkel, however, emphasised the need to avoid any open rivalry with the other leading cultural nations.[800]

The year of 1936 was crucial for Greece's political life, but also for Germany's culture policy in the country. On 4 August of that year, the dictator Ioannis Metaxas came to power backed by the King George II. Metaxas was considered by the Nazis to be a very active man, with great vision and experience.[801] Given the fact that he had graduated from the famous Military Academy of Berlin in 1903 and his well-known anti-parliamentary feelings, the respect which he enjoyed among the Nazis was justified. In contrast to the Greek King, who was a British sympathiser,[802] Metaxas was more affiliated to the German tradition. Combined with his commitment to the country's neutrality, Metaxas brought about a break in British propaganda in Greece, which was often turned against Germany, as the Nazis argued. The Minister of Education in Metaxas regime, Nikolaos Louvaris, was a supporter of the idea of creating a chair for German language and literature at Athens University. Louvaris, who was awarded an honorary doctorate from the University of Heidelberg, was a theologian educated in Leipzig and an admirer of the German sciences. Apart from the Technical Univerisy, the creation of a German chair at Athens University was still in suspense, in 1936. In the academic year 1935-36 the director of the *Deutsche Schule Athen*, Alfred Romain, was appointed professor of the German literature at Athens University.[803] However, the status of his position was still unclear, as there was no law that would officially recognise the creation of a German chair. The law that allowed the creation of foreign chairs at Athens University and the appointment of foreign professors was only passed in February 1938.[804] The first

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[799] The London "Times" dedicated a whole article to the success of the German cultural propaganda and the dwindling influence of English in Greece. See: Merkel to Auswaertigen Amt, Kulturabteilung on 15.10.1935, in: PAAA, R 64200.

[800] *Ibid.*

[801] *Berliner Boersenzeitung*, 28.12.1938 "Griechenlands Lage. Fester Wille zur Neutralitaet.", vom Schriftleitungsmitglied Dr. Hermann Ullmann. Athen. (Newspaper's clipping), in: BAB, R 4902/ 2090.

[802] He was in exile for twelve years in London and he only returned to Greece at the end of 1935.

[803] Romain succeeded Merkel at the Technical University in Athens in 1940. See: Ministry of Education in Athens (N.I. Spentzas, the deputy Minister) to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens, on 15.10.1940, in: Ιστορικόν Αρχείον Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών (Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry, IAYE), 26/1/ 1940, Διδασκαλία Γερμανική γλώσσας στο ΕΜΠ.

[804] Αναγκαστικός Νόμος 1100. «Περί ιδρύσεως εδρών ξένων λογοτεχνιών παρά τη Φιλοσοφική Σχολή του Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών». Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως του Βασιλείου της Ελλάδος. (ΦΕΚ) (Official Gazette),

country, however, to establish a foreign chair at this university was France, which had created a readership since the academic year 1933-34.[805] Germany, who was once again one step behind France was the next to create a position of that kind.[806] Rudolf Fahmer, the future director of the German Scientific Institute in Athens (*Deutsches Wissenschaftliche Institut, DWI*) occupied the chair.[807] Britain followed almost immediately afterwards creating similar chairs.[808] The latter hoped that the Athens chair would become the spring board for the dissemination of British knowledge to the rest of eastern Mediterranean bringing commercial and educational success.[809] In conjunction with the Senate of Athens University the respective governments sponsored all of the above chairs.[810] As for the Greeks, they wished to participate in this cultural undertaking by introducing some type of exchange with the above countries, however, they did not have any concrete plan or a serious foreign cultural policy.[811]

Τεύχος Πρώτον, Αρ. Φύλλου 69, 23.02.1938. The law was republished in the Year-Book of 1939-1940 of the University of Athens. See: Επετηρίς του Πανεπιστημιακού έτους 1939-1940. Αθήνα 1940, pp. 98 f.

[805] Undated Notice (Notiz), probably of 1938, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandschaft Athen, Band Nr. 63 (Kulturpolitik: Schulen, Presse, Verschiedenes, Wissenschaft, 1935-1939).

[806] Βασιλικόν Διάταγμα «Περί ιδρύσεως έδρας της Γερμανικής Φιλολογίας και Λογοτεχνίας παρά τη Φιλοσοφική Σχολή του Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών», Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως του Βασιλείου της Ελλάδος. (ΦΕΚ) (Official Gazette), Τεύχος Πρώτον, Αρ. Φύλλου 31, 24.01.1939.

[807] The official appointment of R. Fahmer at the German chair was ratified with a Royal Decree: Βασιλικόν Διάταγμα "Περί κυρώσεως συμβάσεως μεταξύ της Β. Κυβερνήσεως και του Καθηγητή της Γερμανικής Φιλολογίας και Λογοτεχνίας στο Παν. Αθηνών κ. R. Fahmer." Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως του Βασιλείου της Ελλάδος. (ΦΕΚ) (Official Gazette), Τεύχος Πρώτον, Αρ. Φύλλου 31, 20.10.1939. See also: "Abordnung des Prof. Dr. Rudolf Fahmer, Heidelberg an den Lehrstuhl fuer Germanistik der Universitaet Athen 1938-1945", in: BAB, R 4901/ 15141.

[808] Βασιλικόν Διάταγμα «Περί ιδρύσεως έδρας της Αγγλικής Φιλολογίας και Λογοτεχνίας παρά τη Φιλοσοφική Σχολή του Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών», Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως του Βασιλείου της Ελλάδος. (ΦΕΚ) (Official Gazette), Τεύχος Πρώτον, Αρ. Φύλλου 31, 14.12.1938.

[809] Cited in a Scottish daily newspaper, the name of which is not mentioned in: Document of the Greek Embassy in London to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens on 05.05.1937, in: Historical Archive of Athens University (Ιστορικό Αρχείο Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών, IAPA), Αρχείο Πρωτοκόλλου, 1-1 Διορισμοί Καθηγητών (Προκήρυξη Πληρώσεως Εδρών και άλλες Διαδικασίες) 1936-37 [Correspondence archive, 1-1 Appointments of Professors].

[810] Επετηρίς του Πανεπιστημιακού έτους (Year-book of Athens University) 1938-1939, Athens 1939, p. 17 (footnote 1). Also: German Embassy in Athens to Auswaertiges Amt on 09.07.1937, in: PAAA, R 64200.

[811] Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, N. Mavroudis, to Ministry of Education on 20.05.1937, in: IAPA 1-1 Διορισμοί Καθηγητών (Προκήρυξη Πληρώσεως Εδρών και άλλες Διαδικασίες) 1936-37; Αναγκαστικός Νόμος 1100. «Περί ιδρύσεως εδρών ξένων λογοτεχνιών", Article 2, See also: GUNNAR HERING, "Aspekte

Despite the intensive promotion of the German language in Greece, the presence of German books, journals and other printed material was limited in comparison to the numbers of French ones. In 1929, Thierfelder had already stressed the need to intensify Germany the export of books to the Balkans.[812] The main reason for the low readership was the high cost of the German books which made them unattractive to the Balkan readers, who preferred French ones as they were cheaper. In 1934, Merkel underlined to the "Emergency Association for the German Science" [*Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft*] that despite the dominance of the German language at Athens' Technical University and in other Greek universities and third level schools, there was no library with scientific literature for students and professors.[813] Merkel's appeal to the *Notgemeinschaft* for support found a warm response. The organisation argued that "an old book is always better than no book" and promised to provide Merkel with a large amount of scientific material including all of the issues of the official journal of the Union of German Engineers (*Verein Deutsche Ingenieure*), founded in 1856.[814] In addition, some new books, particularly books about the Third Reich, would also be sent to Greece. This cultural-political undertaking was expected to contribute to transforming Merkel's readership at the Technical University of Athens into a German institute, which would campaign on a constant basis for the German science.[815] In the following months, the *Notgemeinschaft* helped with its own funds to build up the collection at Technical University library, continuing the tradition of the German donors to this institution dating back to its establishment.[816] As for the book sales, perhaps the most serious attempt to support them

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der Kulturpolitik des Metaxas-Regimes (1936-1940)", in: REINHARD LAUER, PETER SCHREINER (Hgs.) 'Die Kultur Griechenlands in Mittelalter und Neuzeit'. Bericht ueber das Kolloquium der Suedosteuropa-Kommission, 28. – 31. Okt. 1992. Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Goettingen. Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 3 Folge, Nr. 212, Goettingen 1996, pp. 285-321.

[812] "Bericht von Dr. Franz Thierfelder, Muenchen, ueber die Lage der deutschen Sprache auf dem Balkan". Undated document, probably on 26.08.1929, in: PAAA, R 64200.

[813] Merkel to the Notgemeinschaft on 18.05.1934, in: PAAA, R 64200. See also: Legationsrat des Auswaertigen Amtes, Roth, to the "Deutsch-Auslandischen Buchtausch" on 11.03.1937, in: PAAA, R 64279, [Microfiche Nr. 7556].

[814] Dr. Juergens, Notgemeinschaft, to Merkel 28.05.1934, in: PAAA, R 64200. A similar collection of books and journals was also sent to Shanghai in China.

[815] *Ibid.*

[816] See: ΕΛΕΝΗ ΚΑΛΑΦΑΤΗ, «Ο ρόλος των δωρεών στη συγκρότηση της βιβλιοθήκης του Ε.Μ.Π. (1836-1950)», in: ΕΘΝΙΚΟ ΜΕΤΣΟΒΙΟ ΠΟΛΥΤΕΧΝΕΙΟ (εκδ.) 'Βιβλιοθήκη των Αναγκαιούντων Βιβλίων και Ομολογουμένως Καλλίστων Εφημερίδων'. Οι παλαιές συλλογές του Εθνικού Μετσόβιου Πολυτεχνείου,

came, when Germany lowered the price of all books, journals, records and the like exported abroad by 25%, except to Palestine and Switzerland. This measure was taken on 9 September 1935, making German books more competitive in the international market.[817]

In 1941, Nazi Germany intensified its cultural political propaganda abroad by inaugurating a branch of the *Deutsche Wissenschaftliches Institut* (German Scientific Institute DWI) in Athens, an institution that was established by and subject to the *Deutsche Akademie* of Munich.[818] As with every other DW Institute, the Athenian branch became responsible for all of the existing cultural institutes in Greece, which consisted of the many *Deutsche Akademie*-branches throughout Greece, from Crete and Peloponnese to the island of Mytilene, Macedonia and Thrace. Even though these branches were focused on spreading the German language, the work of the DWI went beyond this task. It aimed at the diffusion of German science and culture in Greece and the promotion of intensified co-operation with Greek scientists focusing on archaeology and Greek philology, as well as on astronomy, medicine, land planning, and folklore. According to the Reich Ministry of Education, the new cultural institution should not serve any political or propaganda interests, but instead, would be exclusively focused on scientific work.[819] However, neither the idealistic aim of mutual scientific collaboration nor the apolitical activity of the institute fully materialised.

Αθήνα 1995, pp. 13-40 [ELENI KALAFATI, "The role of the donors in the creation of the *Metsovio* National Technical University's library (1836-1950)", in: ETHNIKO METSOVIO POLYTEXNEIO (ed.), 'Library of needed books and admittedly best journals'. The old collections of the *Metsovio* National Technical University, Athens 1995].

[817] "Auslandsberichte über die Auswirkung des Buchexport-Ausgleichverfahrens" by Dr. Hövel to Auswaertiges Amt Abteilung VIII on 07.07.36, in: PAAA, R 65711, Bd.17. The document was classified „strictly confidential, for official use only " (Streng Vertraulich! Nur für den Dienstgebrauch bestimmt!). Also: German Embassy on Athens to Auswaertiges Amt Abteilung VIII on 01.05.36, in: PAAA, R 65711, Bd. 17.

[818] The archival material on the Deutsches Wissenschaftliches Institut in Athens is fragmented and the only study available so far is Frank-Rutger Hausmann's work: FRANK-RUTGER HAUSMANN, "Auch im Krieg schweigen die Musen nicht". Die Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Institute im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Goettingen 2001, pp. 238-255. Fedra Koutsoukou works at the moment on the history of the DWI in Athens in her dissertation. See: KOUTSOUKOU, Die deutsche auswaertige Kultur- und Sprachpolitik in Griechenland 1933-1944, chapter six.

[819] HAUSMANN, Auch die Musen, p. 245.

The organisation had three departments dedicated to scientific, academic and linguistic activities. The famous professor of German language and literature in Heidelberg, Rudolf Fahmer, was appointed director of the DWI in Athens on 1 October 1939, who also was an expert in ancient and modern Greek literature and held the chair of German language and literature at Athens University. However, the DWI did not officially open its doors until two years later, in October 1941. In 1942, the gynaecologist and science historian, Eberhard Zeller, took over the directorship of the department of science, while the academic and the language departments were taken over by Rudolf Grimm and Kurt Meyer respectively.[820] Meyer was later succeeded by Alexander Steinmetz. Apart from the teaching of German, the most important activities of the DWI in Athens were, the exchange programmes funded by the DAAD and the *Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung*, the organisation for lectures, concerts and exhibitions. In the scientific department, the only activity that was reported to have taken place was a series of lectures given by Greek and German specialists. For example, the director of the Athens observatory and Fahmer's friend, Stavros Plakidis, gave lectures on astronomy, while a number of well-known German scientists gave lectures usually relevant to the Greek affairs. As for natural sciences and technology, Fahmer reported that some lectures were given in 1944 on the use of new materials, such as petrol and aluminium, on new mining techniques, nutrition, and the link between climate and forests in south-eastern Europe.[821] The most prominent scientists, however, such as Sauerbruch, Max Planck, von Weizsaecker and Carl Schmitt, were never invited to Athens.[822] The DWI in Athens was also used for organising the *Wehrmacht's* 'University-Week' (*Hochschulwoche*), during which a number of professors visited the Greek capital to lecture not only the *Wehrmacht* soldiers and officers but also Greeks students, and to meet their Greek colleagues. The Vienna University was the only one that sent scientists to the university-week of the *Wehrmacht*, as it was recognised as the 'contracting university' (*Patenuniversitaet*) for south-eastern Europe. By the summer of 1944, the faculties of technology and agriculture, law and political economy of the Vienna University sent their scientists, who had not been mobilised by the *Wehrmacht*, to Athens.[823] In the same period, the architect, biologist and environmentalist, Alwin Seifert,

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[820] There is very little information about Fahmer, Grimm, Meyer and Zeller contained in their files in the Politisches Archive des Auswaertiges Amts in Berlin. See: PAAA, R 64394 d, e, k, q respectively.

[821] This report is held in the private archive of Dr. Stefano Bianca, which has been used extensively in the work of F. R. Hausmann. See: HAUSMANN, Auch die Musen, pp. 248 f.

[822] *Ibid.*, p. 248.

[823] *Ibid.*

was invited to Athens to give a series of lectures on the problems relating to water supply, the construction of water mains in Greece and the use of waterfalls as a source of energy, particularly for industry. Furthermore, [Werner?] Zabel, a professor of medicine, gave lectures on biological aspects in medicine and on nutrition science.[824] Both series of lectures were of great importance to the Greeks, as they were attempting to reconstruct their country after the war, which had caused serious damage both to the infrastructure and the people's health, particularly after the bitter winter of 1941/2 and the shortage of food supplies afterwards.

The Balkan peninsula was regarded by the Nazis as the region of exercising *Grossraumpolitik* and applying Europe's New Order. Therefore, a number of scientists worked intensively on the economic and political problems of the region.[825] Within this framework, the geographer, Hugo Hassinger, a professor of geography at Vienna University and the director of the Geographical Society in Vienna, made a four-week expedition to Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Croatia, and Slovakia. The main purpose of the expedition, as Hassinger reported to the Reich Ministry of Education, was to make contact with geographers and research institutes, as well as with representatives of the key geographical organisations of south-eastern Europe for the purpose of collaborating with their German colleagues.[826] These contacts were very important for the geographical meeting which was planned to take place in 1943 on German soil, aiming at the future collaboration among the European geographers –or rather, between the Balkans and Germany- as a response to western propaganda.[827] Exchanging journals and printed material, as well as encouraging scientists and other individuals from the Balkan countries to contribute to specific journals, such as the "*Mitteilungen*" and the "*Abhandlungen*" -both organs of the German Geographic Society-, were among the means chosen to meet the above objectives. In the same vein, perhaps the most important undertaking within the sphere of cultural propaganda but also of practical use for the Germans was a collective work dedicated to questions about the "living space of European people", ("*Lebensraumfragen europaeischer Voelker*"), posed by non-Germans.[828] Hassinger described two further

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[824] *Ibid.*, p. 249.

[825] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[826] "Bericht Prof. Dr. Hugo Hassingers die in der Zeit vom 10-27. April 1942 nach Griechenland, Bulgarien, Serbien, Ungram, Kroatien und vom 7-9. Mai 1942 nach der Slowakei ausgefuehrten Studienreise", in: BAB, R 4901/ 2819.

[827] *Ibid.*, Part I. Reisezwecke.

[828] *Ibid.*

aims of his visit to south-eastern Europe. The first was the expansion of the space research project directed by Vienna University including the Balkans with particular interest in Romania, and the other was the naming of candidates for the *"Prinz-Eugen Preis"* and a Vienna cultural prize for south-eastern Europe that had not been set yet.[829]

In Greece, Hassinger visited the director of the DWI branch in Athens, Rudolf Fahmer, the German cultural attaché Erich Boehringer, the director of the German Archaeological Institute and the leader of the NSDAP in Greece, Walter Wrede, as well as a number of Greeks, who were mostly scientists. Apart from the gynaecologist, Kostantinos Logothtopoulos, who also was the Minister of Education and Public Health at the time, Hassinger carried out interviews with scientists at the geographical, meteorological and geological institutes of Athens University, as well as with some intellectuals of the Academy of Science in Athens. More specific, he met the economist in the Academy of Sciences, Dr. Megas, the geographer Mistardis, who was a bank official but also lectured at the Agricultural School, the university professor of geology and geography, Ioannis Trikallinos, the geologist, Maximos Mitsopoulos, the geophysicist and astronomer, Nikolaos Kritikos at Technical University, and the meteorologist, E.G.Mariopoulos. All of them, with the exception of Mariopoulos had been educated in Germany to some degree. Hassinger was also informed about the prominent scientists of related disciplines, such as Xenophon Zolotas, a professor of political economy, and the political scientist, Angelos Angelopoulos, the relevant individuals in the ministries of economy and civil aviation, who were responsible for the geological and meteorological institutes, respectively.[830] Despite the existence of eminent figures in all of the departments relevant to geography, Hassinger reported that the science of geography in Greece did not hold a prominent position. The institutes were primitively equipped, the libraries were poor and although the Greek Geographic Society was directed by the very well-known professor of geodesy Vasilios Lambadarios and the academic Antonios Keramopoulos, however, it did not have any publications.[831] The German scientist also noticed that the situation in occupied Greece, primarily due to the lack of food that touched large parts of the Greek population and the attitude of the occupied forces, resulted in the Greeks becoming more reserved and less friendly towards the Germans. Nevertheless, as underlined by

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[829] *Ibid.*

[830] *Ibid.*, Part III Reiseergebnisse, A. Griechenland.

[831] *Ibid.*

Hassinger, they were never impolite and they continued to show respect for German culture and science, especially the educated people.[832]

Overall, Hassinger believed that the way for the meeting of European geographers scheduled for autumn 1943 had been more or less paved in all of the south-eastern countries. Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovakia agreed to participate fully, as did Romania, whereas Hungary was only expected to respond in the summer of 1943. As for Greece, the situation was still unclear, as Hassinger noted. Mistardis was regarded as the only person likely to foster the German-Greek geographical co-operation, even though he was not yet a professor and did not have the weight of the older and more established Greek scientists, such as Trikallinos, with whom he had poor relations. He was perceived, however, to be open minded and quite ambitious, virtues that seemed to be appreciated by Hassinger, who recommended the inclusion of his contribution entitled "*Meliorierung und laendliche Innenkolonisation in Griechenland seit der Umsiedlung der kleinasiatischen Griechen*" in the collective work "*Lebensraumforschungen europaeischer Voelker*".[833] The 1943 geographers' meeting would focus on the development of the cultural landscape of European states and their colonies from the aspect of the supply of food and raw materials.[834] It was expected that the participants would consist of German geographers and some of the Balkan states which were friendly towards the Reich. The section dealing with the issue of *Lebensraum* and the governing of its peoples was classified as "*kriegswichtig*". In other words, the economic exploitation of the sources of these countries, the studying of the natural elements of the ground, the climatic conditions that could allow the growing of important agricultural products were among the key interests of the south-eastern countries and, moreover, of Germany. Another geographical issue which the Germans expected to discuss at the meeting was the relationship between the raw material centres for industry and the consuming urban centres. This issue was of great importance for the applied economy and the achievement of its goal of self-sufficiency.[835]

The DWI in Athens was eventually closed towards the end of October 1944 and all of the books and other material possessed by the institute were packed up and stored at the National Museum in Athens, whose director, as the Germans reported, was loyal

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[832] *Ibid.*

[833] *Ibid.*

[834] Hassinger, Geographisches Institut Univ. Wien to Reichsminister f. Wissenschaft Erziehung u. Volksbildung on 02.02.1943, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2819.

[835] *Ibid.*

to the aims of the German cultural project.[836] The Technical University was also another safe place for storing the material of the other German cultural institution in Athens, namely the German Academy. The director of the Technical University not only offered a safe place to store the entire property of the Academy but also recommended to ensure the safe-keeping of the German materials and the building itself through a contract.[837] The German plenipotentiary for south-eastern Europe, Hans Dittmer, emphasised the "virtuous character" of the Greeks, who offered their help to the Germans during this difficult time, even those individuals who had not visited the institute before.[838] It is questionable, however, if the Greeks' interest departed from their traditional respect for German culture and their regret at its future absence from their country or whether it was motivated by other concerns.

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[836] Hans Dittmer, Athens, to Prof. Dr. Six. Auswaertiges Amt, Kult.Pol. Abt., Berlin 09.09.1944, in: BAB, R 4901/ 15115.

[837] *Ibid.*

[838] *Ibid.*

As it is described in chapter four, Germany had not signed any official cultural agreement with any country until 1936. The reason was partly because the Versailles Treaty strictly prohibited any bilateral relations for the defeated Reich after 1919. When the new Republic joined the League of Nations in 1926, it was too early to institutionalise its cultural undertakings abroad on governmental level. During the early years of National Socialism, the idea of a bilateral cultural agreement at an intergovernmental level was not a high priority. The only bilateral institution which also served cultural-political purposes was the relatively wide network of societies, unions and clubs abroad primarily established by and for the German Diaspora. These groups of Germans who had settled abroad and also some foreigners, who in one way or the other were affiliated to Germany, became the torch-bearers of German culture abroad and their importance was officially recognised. These 'societies' (*Gesellschaften*), as they were usually called, gradually found support from the German state and developed a bilateral character with a cultural-political dimension.

Soon after the Nazis' assumption of power the branches of the German-Greek society in Germany focused on promoting awareness about the new regime among the Greeks living there, particularly among the students. Students proved to be the most powerful weapon in Germany's foreign policy agenda, especially these that had a scholarship from the Reich. One of the most active Greek members of the German-Greek Society in Hamburg was Vasilios Malamos who studied medicine in Hamburg University and became an assistant professor (*Dozent*) at the same university in 1937.[839] He also was the assistant of the famous doctor for tropical medicine and the expert in the Balkan region, Peter Muehlens for many years. Malamos had an active role in almost every cultural undertaking organised by the Hamburg D-G Society[840] and was regarded as a valuable individual for German interests in Greece. He returned to his homeland in 1938 and became an assistant professor at Athens University in the same year. At the same time, the so-called "German Revolution" carried out under Hitler's leadership gave the German people living in Greece a great boost, according to the Nazis. There were various bodies

[839] Greek Ministry of Education to Athens University Rector (Notification of the Greek Ambassador on Berlin Rizo Ragabé for the Greek Ministry of Education) on 24.11.1937 in: ΙΑΠΑ 1-1 Διορισμοί Καθηγητών (Προκήρυξη Πληρώσεως Εδρών και άλλες Διαδικασίες) 1937-38.

[840] See: Undated document entitled "Mitteilungen aus dem Arbeitsgebiet der Deutsch-Griechischen Gesellschaft", in: BAK, R 57 neu/1063.

responsible for this boost including the local organisation of the NSDAP under Karl Kudorfer during the early years of the Nazi regime, and the newspaper "*Griechische Post*", which was "the first German newspaper in Athens" and the official organ of the NSDAP in Greece.[841]

If the Greek communities in Hamburg and Dresden were the biggest group in Germany during the 1920s, the Greek colony in Munich became the largest and one of the most important for Nazi foreign policy in the 1930s. Among the cultural activities organised by the German-Greek Society in Munich in collaboration with the German Academy, was the invitation of prominent Greek scholars to give lectures emphasising the importance of close scientific relations between the two countries. In June 1932, the professor of archaeology at Athens University, who was also a member of Athens Academy and an honorary member of the Munich Academy of Sciences, A.D. Keramopoulos, and a professor at Saloniki University and Dean of law faculty, Ioannis Spyropoulos, were invited to give lectures in several German cities and in Munich Academy.[842] Keramopoulos visited Berlin, Hamburg and Munich, while Spyropoulos, apart from his lecture in Munich, planned to give a radio interview and to visit the University of Jena for the same purpose.[843]

During the war years, the Greek community in Vienna developed into the largest in Germany and it was apparently one of the most important, as Vienna was the centre of operations in south-eastern Europe. In 1938, the Austrian-Greek Society in Vienna had 155 members, twenty-five of which were "non Aryans" and its profile was strongly economic.[844] It received 10,000 marks in funding each year and it was reported that it had

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841 Undated document entitled "Mitteilungen aus dem Arbeitsgebiet der Deutsch-Griechischen Gesellschaft", in: BAK, R 57 neu/1063. In 1934, the name of the paper was renamed "Neue Athener Zeitung" and in 1941 to "Deutsche Nachrichten fuer Griechenland".

842 Muenchen. Akademie fuer wissenschaftlichen Forschung und zur Pflege des Deutschtums –Deutsche Akademie- Dr. F. Tierfelder (i.A. L. Horzinger ?) to Herrn Legationssekretaer Dr. Freudenberg, Auswaertiges Amt Berlin 23.05.1932, PAAA, R 64064.

843 Deutsche Akademie to Prof. Dr. Keramopoulos, Mitglied der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Athen on 23.05.1938; Deutsche Akademie Muenchen to Univ. Prof. Joh. Spyropoulos z.Zt. Dekan der Juristischen Fakultaet an der Universitaet Saloniki on 23.05.1932, both documents in: PAAA, R 64064. The title of Keramopoulos' lecture was "Forschungen in Obermazedonia und der dortige Zusammenstoss der Legaten von Pompeius und Caesar im Buergerkrieg vom Jahre 48 v. Chr.", while Spyropoulos would speak about the political efforts of convergence on the Balkans.

844 Undated document, presumably of 1938, also unsigned: "Bericht Nr. XIII. Betrifft: Oestereichisch-Griechische Gesellschaft", in: PAAA, R 61272.

the best bilateral relations in the Balkans.[845] The president of the society was the former director of the Chamber of Commerce in Vienna, *Hofrat* Dr. Kuester. Dr. Nicolo Dopelus was the director of its branch in Athens. The Greek-Austrian League, as it was named, was separate from the Greek-German Society in the Greek capital, however, it collaborated with it. As for the society in Vienna, it had close relations with the Evangelical Church. It was also suggested that it should change its name to "German-Greek Society/ Vienna" and at the same time that a new organisation should be established called "German-Greek Central Society" (*Deutsch-Griechischen Hauptgesellschaft*), which would be responsible for the operations of both societies.[846] Although it was not stated in the available documents whether the Central Society eventually came into being, however, it should be noted that another institution came into being to assist Nazi Germany in the control of foreign policy-making in the Balkans. This refers to the establishment of the "*Southeast European Institute*" in Vienna (*Suedosteuropa-Institut in Wien*), in 1938. Members of the board of the institute were also representatives of related offices in both the party and the state. The institute was consisted of two main departments, namely science and economy, under the direction of Dr. Plattner and Hermann Neubacher, the Mayor of Vienna, respectively.[847] Neubacher later became the Special Commissioner for economic issues in southeastern Europe (*Sonderbeauftragter fuer Wirtschaftsfragen in Suedosteuropa*), in 1943. Nevertheless, it was highlighted in the 1938 report on the drafting of the articles of the institute that suitable experts had to be found for these posts.[848]

It is interesting to note that the idea of creating bilateral institutions or developing the already existing ones was seen by the Nazis in 1938 as part of the Reich's new foreign policy agenda that would contribute to the preservation of world peace.[849] In the same year, the director of the Mediation Office for the German People (*Leiter der Volks-*

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[845] "Protokoll der Vorstandssitzung der Stiftung Deutsches Auslandswerk vom 11. August 1938", in: PAAA, R 61273.

[846] Undated document, presumably of 1938, also unsigned: "Bericht Nr. XIII. Betrifft Oestereichisch-Griechische Gesellschaft", in: PAAA, R 61272.

[847] Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V. (Geschaeftsfuehrener Vizepraesident) Suedosteuropa-Institut in Wien Bericht Nr. 5., 20.09.1938, in: PAAA, R 61273.

[848] *Ibid.*

[849] Mitteilungen der "Vereinigung zwischen staatilicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V." gez.: Lorenz, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer, Praesident der "Vereinigung zwischen staatilicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen" 01.11.1938, in: PAAA, R 61274. The document was classified as "confidential" (Vertraulich!).

deutschen Mittelstelle), Werner Lorenz, who was also the president of the Association of Binational Unions and Institutions ("*Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V.*") highlighted Germany's determination to promote understanding among peoples, to foster their rights and fulfill mutual interests. He also claimed that efforts to promote peace were undertaking by the *Fuehrer* and that the bilateral unions provided a cultural mean for interaction between nations leading "the security of our *Fuehrer's*, Adolf Hitler, peace-project".[850] The results of these activities were announced in the *ad hoc* publication of the journal "*Mitteilungen der Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.*V.", first launched in 1938, which were classified documents and only for administrative use.[851] It seems to have been used as an instrument of propaganda by the Party. The claim of promoting peace contradicted the Four-Year Plan that had been announced two years earlier and was clearly aimed at Germany's preparations for war.

On the "*Mitteilungen*" of 1939, the director of the German-Greek Society, Professor Erich Ziebarth, argued that Germany's stance towards Greece was in fact different from its position towards other countries. The reason for this, according to Ziebarth, was that Greece owed her independence, the rebuilding of the state and the protection of its people to the German kings, Ludwig I and Otto as well as to the Bavarian authorities that had settled to Greece. Therefore, Ziebarth argued that the Germans, and in particular the German-Greek Society, ought to develop and deepen this "natural relation" expanding their efforts from science and economy to the cultural life of Greece as the French influence over the country had increased since the beginning of the twentieth century.[852] In short, it was in the Reich's interest to nurture its friendship with Greece, which would be achieved through the mediation and collaboration with other institutions of the German-Greek Society and its branches in both countries. The official publication of the society was the "*Hellas-Jahrbuch*", replacing the "*Hellas*" journal, which was first published in Hamburg in 1921 and continued to be published until 1928. Its aim was to expand and strengthen the cultural, scientific and economic relations between Greece and Germany through relevant and original contributions.[853]

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[850] *Ibid.*

[851] *Ibid.*

[852] Mitteilungen der "Vereinigung zwischen staatilicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V" [u.a. Die Deutsch-Griechische Gesellschaft e.V. (Prof. Dr. E. Ziebarth)] 01.02.1939, in: PAAA, R 61274.

[853] After its second issue in 1930, the 'Hellas-Jahrbuch" was not published again until 1934/5 apparently for financial reasons. See: Undated document entitled "Mitteilungen aus dem Arbeitsgebiet der Deutsch-Griechischen Gesellschaft", in: BAK, R 57 neu/1063.

As a number of activities relating to Germany's foreign cultural propaganda were carried out through the German-Greek Society, it could be imagined that the institution would have been powerful enough and effective in promoting cultural policy abroad. While this might have been the case in Germany's bilateral societies, clubs and unions elsewhere, it was not the case in Greece. The branch of the German-Greek Society in Athens only seemed to have a supplementary role in the Reich's cultural propaganda programme, despite the fact –or perhaps because of it- that the branch in Athens was subject to the new guidelines for Germany's bilateral institutions. In 1938, as it has already been mentioned above, behind the claims of promoting friendship and peace, the *SS-Obergruppenfuehrer*, Werner Lorenz, understood the potential of these organisations created by German expatriates as an instrument of cultural propaganda. It was precisely this transformation that the Greek-German Society in Athens was trying to resist under Nazi party rule. In the summer of 1940, the professor of medicine and Head of the Office for German Professors at Universities Abroad (*Leiter des Auslandsamtes der Dozentenschaft der deutschen Universitaeten und Hochschulen*), H. Baatz, reporting on his visit to Greece, he noted that the Athens branch of the German-Greek Union was not determined enough to make an impact on the local society. He blamed the old committee for its lack of success, which remained rather inactive, despite its efforts to improve its friendly stance towards Germany.[854] It is true that the president of the committee (1938-1942), Marinos Geroulanos, the prominent surgeon with a bright career in both Germany and Greece, was one of the oldest members of the society. However, it seems that it was more his dislike of the Nazi ideology, rather than his age that made him reluctant to bring the society in line with Nazi guidelines. It is also true that the older members of the society had a different attitude towards it, treating it as a social club, rather than transforming it into a more political organisation, or moreover into a tool of propaganda. The younger members, however, such as Professor Vlavianos, who was the secretary of the society in Athens, seemed to be more willing to take on in a more active role. In his report on the Greek-German society in Athens, Baatz characterised Vlavianos as the driving force (*treibende Motor*) behind the society's activities. Vlavianos, who was awarded the Humboldt medal, tried indeed to invite German scholars to lecture in Athens. His efforts, however, do not seem to have been supported by the other members of

[854] Bericht von Prof. Baatz ueber seine Vortragsreise nach Griechenland betreffend die Griechisch-Deutsche Gesellschaft. Auszug aus Bericht Prof. Baatz ueber seine Vortragsreise nach Griechenland (Partei 6102/40) 13.07.1940, in: PAAA, R 61271.

the committee, as the Greek authorities apparently hindered these activities.[855] The rivalry between other foreign societies in Athens, namely the Greek-English Society and the French Institute, were intensified in 1940. This time, it was the turn of England to gain ground in Greece. The teaching of English became more widespread and English scholars were invited to lecture in the Greek capital. According to Baatz the lobbying of several societies forced the Greek government to maintain a balance between these cultural nations, and therefore the number of foreigners that visited Greece also had to be balanced.[856] Three years later, during the occupation of Greece by German, Italian and Bulgarian troops, Germans reported that their cultural relations with the country were thriving, despite British propaganda against the philhellenic Germans![857] The increasing interest of the Greeks in German culture at the time apparently went beyond mere admiration and respect for the German cultural and scientific achievements. In many cases, opportunism provided an incentive for increased cultural co-operation between these countries.

Regardless of how effective these societies were in promoting Nazi propaganda, Germany sought official recognition of its foreign cultural policy through high profile bilateral agreements. As it has already been shown, 1936 was the decisive year for the Third Reich's foreign policy agenda. Among the changes, in the foreign policy planning was a series of bilateral cultural agreements. The first of these agreements was signed with Hungary. Two years later, Italy, Japan, Spain became cultural partners with Germany, while the agreement with Hungary was renewed. Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia joined the cultural partnership in the following years. It is interesting to observe that Greece was among the very first countries to ratify with Germany a cultural agreement, even though the country was not bound by any alliance pact to Germany as in the case for the other cultural partners. The reason behind this "early" agreement with a non-allied country was not solely the product of Germany's foreign policy agenda. The year 1938 marked a period of Greek cultural rapprochement with France and Italy. On 19 December 1938, the Greek state signed a cultural agreement with France following

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[855] *Ibid.*

[856] *Ibid.*

[857] Guenther Stein from Berlin reported on "Deutsch-griechische Kulturbeziehungen." 20.09.1943, in: BAB, R 4902/ 11204.

the initiative of the latter.[858] The agreement provided for the exchange of prominent professors and scientists who could produce original work, and it also recognised the existence of two important French cultural institutions, namely the French School of Athens and the Institute of French Studies also in Athens.[859] Soon afterwards, Italy approached Greece through the secretary of its embassy in Athens and requested a copy of this agreement on the grounds that it was also interested in signing a similar contract with Greece. Italy was also interested in knowing whether Greece had made cultural agreements with other countries, such as Germany.[860] The Italian government was close to ratifying a cultural contract with Greece in 1937, however the negotiations fell through because the Italian authorities in the Dodecanese began persecuting the Greek islanders, closing Greek schools and dismissing the teachers in the summer of the same year. It was obvious that any cultural agreement that *de facto* recognised and respected the native language of the two participating countries could not be signed between Greece and Italy.[861]

While Italy made inquiries about the possibility of a cultural agreement with Greece, the latter approached Germany for the same reason, which had already signed a similar contract with its Italian ally. The German Reich welcomed the Greek initiative[862] even though it highlighted their contradictory attitude, in light of the Greek postponement of "particularly important undertakings for the [German] cultural policy" over the past three to four years.[863] The term "important cultural undertakings" referred to the failure to appoint Professor Rudolf Fahmer to the vacant chair of German

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[858] Αναγκαστικός Νόμος υπ' αριθ 1608. "Περί κυρώσεως της εν Αθήναις υπογραφείσης τη 19η Δεκεμβρίου 1938 Συμφωνίας σχετικής προς τας πνευματικάς και καλλιτεχνικάς σχέσεις μεταξύ Ελλάδος και Γαλλίας." Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως του Βασιλείου της Ελλάδος. (ΦΕΚ) (Official Gazette), Τεύχος Πρώτον, Αρ. Φύλλου 57, 14.02.1939, See also: Auswaertiges Amt, (Stieve) to Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen 12.01.1939, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesamdtschaft Athen File Nr. 63.

[859] Αναγκαστικός Νόμος υπ' αριθ 1608. *ibid.*, Articles 1 and 2. These were the only articles of the agreement.

[860] Unsigned notification on 02.02.1939 presumably of the secretary of the Foreign Ministry in Athens to the Minister of Foreign Affairs , in: Ιστορικόν Αρχείον Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών (Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry, IAYE), A/10/3, 1939, 6. Σύμφωνο Πνευματικής Συνεργασίας μεταξύ Ελλάδος – Ιταλίας.

[861] *Ibid.*

[862] Telegram of the Greek Ambassador Rizo Ragabé in Berlin to the Greek Foreign Ministry in Athens on 13.01.1939, in: IAYE, A/11/4. 23. Γερμανία – Ελλάς σχέσεις 1938-1939.

[863] Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen to Auswaertigen Amt 25.01.1939, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesamdtschaft Athen File Nr. 63.

philology that had been created in the previous year.[864] The German interest, however, in a bilateral cultural agreement with Greece differed from Greek expectations and also from similar agreements with their political allies, Italy and Spain.[865] The basic aims of the cultural agreements with these two states included the creation of readership posts at the universities of the participating countries; the regular exchange of students from universities and schools; scholarships and summer courses; the exchange of school teachers; the creation of German schools; the translation of German books; the promotion of film and radio propaganda; and exhibitions. Any activities that distorted the "historical truth" of the countries in question were not allowed.[866] According to the German Ambassador in Athens, these provided a wide framework for cultural co-operation with Greece, as Germany was more interested in the ancient culture of the country rather than modern Greece or its contemporary language.[867] As for the mutual character of the agreement, this was regarded as largely rhetorical by the Germans, on the one hand, as the Greeks understood reciprocity only in terms of eagerness rather than action, according to the German Ambassador, and on the other hand, as there would never be an equal exchange of students, although he did not provide any justification for this claim.[868]

The proliferation of cultural agreements with the strong European countries only a few months before the outbreak of war, could not be understood outside of the following context. It seems on the one hand that Greece sought to secure its neutrality by making cultural allies. On the other hand, France, Italy and Germany wished to strengthen their cultural influence over the small Balkan country in order to encourage a political alliance in light of the impending war, and perhaps even to control it by securing their own interests in the region.

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[864] See: Βασιλικόν Διάταγμα "Περί κυρώσεως συμβάσεως μεταξύ της Β. Κυβερνήσεως και του Καθηγητή της Γερμανικής Φιλολογίας και Λογοτεχνίας στο Παν. Αθηνών κ. R. Fahrner." Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως του Βασιλείου της Ελλάδος. (ΦΕΚ) (Official Gazette), Τεύχος Πρώτον, Αρ. Φύλλου 31, 20.10.1939.

[865] Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen to Auswaertigen Amt 06.06.1939, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen File Nr. 63.

[866] Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen to Auswaertigen Amt 25.01.1939, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen File Nr. 63.

[867] Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen to Auswaertigen Amt 06.06.1939, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen File Nr. 63.

[868] *Ibid.*

5.4. German propaganda, the Greek scientific community and the policy of scholarships.

"Die besten Aktivisten sind zweifellos
[die] gerade aus Deutschland zurueckgekehrte
junge griechische Wissenschaftler."[869]

The increasing proximity and consequently, the growing influence of Germany over the Greek state alarmed, -and even infuriated- its political rivals, particularly Britain. England was particularly displeased with the Greek leader, Metaxas, for his German-oriented policy, which jeopardised British interests in the broader region. England was most afraid of the prospect that Nazi Germany might seek to control the eastern Mediterranean, a strategic position for British interests in the Near East. Germany had undoubtedly became involved in activities on Greek soil which gave British cause of concern, such as the fortifications of the Greek coasts, the construction of which was taken over by military officials; the railway line between Athens and Saloniki; the plans for new stations in those towns; and above all the rearmament of the Greek military forces.[870] "Athens is suffering from German measles," wrote a British admiral Usborne, in 1937, referring to Germany's growing influence upon Greece since the seizure of power by Metaxas and the dangers lurking behind the alliance with the Third Reich.[871] "It is common knowledge," continued Admiral Usborne, "that the trade agreement with Germany enables Greece to sell her tobacco to that country, receiving in exchange not cash but munitions, some of them second-hand," fearing that the Greeks might "invite future trouble", if their alliance with the Germans went beyond commercial commitments.[872] However, the British acknowledged the dominant position of Germany in Greece not only in the economy but also on a cultural level as they admitted that it was "German, not French, [...] the foreign tongue most heard."[873] On the other hand,

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[869] Abstract from Prof. Baatz's report on his "Vortragsreise nach Griechenland betreffend die Griechisch-Deutsche Gesellschaft." (Partei 6102/40) on 13.07.1940, in: PAAA, R 61271.

[870] Political report of the German Ambassador in Athens, Prinz zu Erbach, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, "Bericht des griechischen Gesandten in London" on 10.03.1937, in: PAAA, R 61147. See also the political report "Die Achse Berlin-Rom und die Besserung der italienisch-griechischen Beziehungen" on 29.05.1937, in: PAAA, R 61147. Both reports were classified as secret (Geheim!).

[871] Undated copy classified as Pol. IV.2930 of the article of Vice-admiral a. D. Usborne in the journal "Great Britain and the Near East", 1937, in: PAAA, R 61147.

[872] *Ibid.*

[873] *Ibid.*

the Nazis proudly reported that their position in Greece had improved beyond expectation since 1936 and this was largely due to the sympathies of Metaxas with the regime. Nevertheless, the British fears over German aspirations in the eastern Mediterranean seemed to be misplaced. It was precisely due to the lack of direct interest in the region, argued the German ambassador, that the Greeks trusted Germans more than the British, Italians, or even the French.[874] They admitted, however, that Greece regarded England as its "protector" (*Schutzmacht*) in the case of conflict on the Aegean Sea, which was a constant fear that had again come to the fore with the Abyssinian conflict in 1935.[875]

However, Metaxas' appreciation of national socialist Germany did not leave much latitude for Britain to expand its influence over other aspects of Greek life. It was obvious that it was the golden age for Germany not only in business but also in terms of its cultural influence over Greece. In 1937, Germany boasted that it was the leading importer and exporter of goods in Greece, reporting that its business turnover had been increased from seventy-four million marks in 1933 to 132 millions in 1936, as a direct result of its increasing cultural influence.[876] This claim is corroborated by a number of institutions established not only for the systematization of the existing cultural undertakings in Greece but also for the validation of its bilateral cultural co-operation. These activities were also aimed towards influencing higher education in Greece and attracting young scholars to Germany.[877] More precisely, in 1934, a Greek-German Student Union was created at Athens University in order to promote student exchanges and to organise lecture evenings with German scholars based in Athens. A year later, G.F. Merkel, the tutor for German at Technical University, along with the German ambassador in Athens, Eisenlohr, set up the Mediation Office for the German-Greek Cultural Exchange (*Mittelstelle fuer den deutsch-griechischen Kulturaustausch*). It became the central organisation for student exchanges, and, more precisely, for the campaigns to promote German Universities for advanced studies. The same office also organized and controlled the language propa-

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[874] Political report of the German Ambassador in Athens, Prinz zu Erbach, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, "Die Achse Berlin-Rom und die Besserung der italienisch-griechischen Beziehungen" on 29.05.1937, in: PAAA, R 61147.

[875] *Ibid.*

[876] *Ibid.*

[877] Report of Dr. Feist (Part I. Hochschulwesen) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 03.09.1938, in: PAAA, R 66599.

ganda throughout Greece.[878] The distribution of scientific literature that was difficult to obtain in Greece also was among the tasks of the above office. In the framework of this policy of cultural mobility, the number of prominent Greek academics who were invited to Germany, as well as the number of scholarships, was increased.[879] The German-Greek Student Union and the Mediation Office operated under the auspices of the German Academy of Munich. An agreement for the German-Greek students' exchange was signed between the German Academic Exchange Office (DAAD) and the Athens University Club in 1937. According to the agreement, three students from each country would visit Greece and Germany each year respectively.[880] As it has already been shown, a cultural agreement on an inter-governmental level was signed between the two countries almost a year later, thus validating their long-standing cultural collaboration.

It is pertinent to analyse the nature of these long-standing cultural relations between Greece and Germany since 1933 and how they were advanced in the course of the following years before reaching their peak, just a few months before the outbreak of the war. In a ceremonial speech at the end of his tenure in 1933, Konstantinos Logothetopoulos, the rector of Athens University, admitted that the means for advancing of research in applied pharmacology were very limited, thus hampering the capacity of Greek scientists to work on issues of practical importance. He underlined, however, that the situation would become worse, if Germany did not donate German journals to a number of laboratories such as anatomy, pathological anatomy, histology, experimental physiology, pathological physiology, applied pharmacology, microbiology, hygiene, and anthropology.[881] This donation was made the following year.[882] Greek admiration for the superior quality of the advancement of the German scientific community was reflected in the

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878 G.F.Merkel, Mittelstelle fuer Deutsch-griechischen Kulturaustausch Athen,. Mittelstelle der Deutschen Akademie Muenchen to Auswaertiges Amt Kulturabteilung, Berlin 21.02.1935, in: PAAA, R 64065.

879 Surprisingly enough the amount of 800 marks that was planned to become available for the *Mittelstelle* was suspended in 1935, as the German Ambassador in Athens considered that this expenditure was not essential. In the following year, the amount of money was reduced to 600 RM. See: Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen to Auwaertiges Amt 21.03.1936, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen Nr. 63 (*Kulturpolitik: Schulen, Presse, Verschiedenes, Wissenschaft, 1935-1939*).

880 *Ibid.*

881 Konstantinos Logothetopoulos, Professor of Gynaecology: Report on the laboratory work on experimental Pharmacology, directed by G. Joachimoglou [Έκθεση Πειραματικής Φαρμακολογίας (Διευθυντής Γ. Ιωαχείμογλου)], in: IAPA, Πρυτανικοί Λόγοι (Rectors' Speeches) 1932-33.

882 Speech of Stylianos Seferiadis, Professor of International Public Law, p.10, in: IAPA, Πρυτανικοί Λόγοι (Rectors' Speeches) 1933-34.

efforts made by the Greek scientists to emulate German achievements not only through the journals but also through other means. In 1934, the professor of medicine at Athens University, Vlassios Vlassopoulos, made plans to establish a large laboratory for chemical medicine on the German model. Lacking experts to work at the lab, he contacted the "Reich's Labour Society for the Social and Medical Service" (*Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft der Berufe im sozialen und aertzlichen Dienste*) and made a request for technical assistants.[883] He avoided, however, having to sign a contract presumably for policy reasons, as the Greek scientific community might have been irritated at the official appointment of a foreigner at a Greek university.[884] The need to be closer to the German sciences was not only due to the lack of quality of Greece's higher education. Certain ministries, such as agriculture, transport and public health also had an urgent demand for people with expert knowledge, who usually came from the academic circles. In 1934, for example, Georgios Karakassounis, a civil servant in the Greek Ministry of Hygiene, assistant at the Technical University of Athens and bursar of the Rockefeller Foundation, was sent to the Technical University in Berlin in order to specialise in water and ship works.[885] On the other hand, Georgios Joachimoglou, a professor of pharmacology and the director of the respective laboratory at Athens University reported to the cultural attaché of the German Embassy in Athens that it was more important on cultural political terms for German scholars to give series of lectures at the university, rather than an occasional lecture by a visiting professor.[886] It was more likely that long-term lectures would encourage Greek students to choose a German university for advanced studies. Particular was the case of Vasilios Malamos, the son of a Greek merchant in Hamburg. After studying medicine at the local university he received a one-year advanced research grant to work as an assistant at Hamburg University, which would apparently pave the way for a professorial

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883 Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft der Berufe im sozialen und aertzlichen Dienste to Auswaetigen Amt on 23.03.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065.

884 See for instance the case of the entomologist Franz Maidl, the curator at the zoological department of the Museum of Natural History in Vienna, who was applied to the zoological museum of Athens University for a post in 1938 and the director's reply. In: Archive of the Zoological Museum of Athens University (AZM), File Nr. 504-719, Jan. 1937 - Dec. 1938.

885 Verbalnote. Legation de Grece a Berlin to Auswaertiges Amt on 26.3.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065. Also: List of "Studierenden (griechischen Gymnasial-professoren) in der Zeit vom Sommersemester 1929 bis Wintersemester 1931/32", in: PAAA, R 64064.

886 "Aufzeichnung" of the German Embassy in Athens to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 22.05.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065.

chair in Athens.[887] In addition, as an assistant and friend of Peter Muehlens, the director of the Institute for Tropical Medicine in Hamburg, Malamos later became his link to Greece, when the German doctor tried to establish a tropical institute in Athens.

Being aware of the importance of these young scientists for both countries, Joachimoglou also raised the idea of following the French example of awarding prizes and diplomas to students which would give them prestige in Greece, and at the same time, promote the German cultural propaganda in this country. Joachimoglou, a German educated scientist himself with a strong career in Berlin, was regarded by many Germans as one of the most significant Greek representatives of German science.[888] Therefore, both of his suggestions, including the professors' exchange and the awarding of diplomas to young scientists, were warmly supported by the German ambassador in Athens, Eisenlohr.[889] Few months later, Joachimoglou was invited by the German Academy in Munich and the Friedrich-Wilhelm University in Berlin to become guest speaker, while Professor Borcherdt of Munich University was sent to Athens to give series of lectures, in line with Joachimoglou's proposal.[890] In addition, as Malamos, another young Greek doctor, Antonios Valassis, was put forward for scholarship in Munich University in order to learn about the new advances in medicine, in particular the welfare of students. The proposal came from Kostantinos Zeggelis, the president of the Students' Club of Athens University, professor of chemistry and a member of Athens Academy of Sciences. Nevertheless, the number of Greeks who studied in Germany at the time on a German scholarship was very low. Eisenlohr reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin that almost thirty Greeks received grant from *Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung* in 1934, which was able to award only two scholarships a year, in addition to one for a student

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[887] *Ibid*; Hochschulbehoerde Hamburg to Mr. Terdenge, Ministerialdirigent of the Auswaertigen Amt 16.06.1932, PAAA, R 61147; Greek Ministry of Education to the Rectorate of Athens University. Signed notification by the Greek Ambassador in Berlin Rizos Ragabé, on 24.11.1937, in: Historical Archive of Athens University (Ιστορικό Αρχείο Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών, IAPA), Αρχείο Πρωτοκόλλου, 1-1 Διορισμοί Καθηγητών (Προκήρυξη Πληρώσεως Εδρών και άλλες Διαδικασίες) [Correspondence archive, 1-1 Appointments of Professors] 1937-38.

[888] He studied at Berlin University and in 1918 until 1922 was appointed professor at this university.

[889] German Ambassador in Athens (Eisenlohr) to Stieve, (Leiter der Kulturabtielung des Auswaertigen Amts) 02.05.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065.

[890] Deutsche Akademie, Muenchen to Auswaertiges Amt z.H. von Herrn Vizekonsul von Heinz, Berlin 12.06.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065; Der Preussische Minister fuer Wissneschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung, Berlin to Reichsministerium fuer Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung and to Auswaertiges Amt 11.08.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065.

from the Technical University in Athens. It should be noted that in the early years of the Nazi cultural propaganda, priority for scholarships was given to human science candidates, while natural sciences and medicine regarded to be in the second place. In the field of technology, grants were only given exceptionally to candidates in disciplines of cultural political importance, such as engineering.[891] In any case, the small number of Greek scholarships due to the limited budget available led Goering to admit during his visit to Greece that it put Germany's influence in the country at risk. He also promised to request the Prussian Ministry of Education to increase the number of grants to one hundred, not only for the two universities in Athens and Saloniki but also for the Technical University.[892] More precisely, Goering promised to support an increase in the number of scholarships given by the Industry and Commercial Chamber in Breslau leading a number of Greek students to study at Breslau University, which traditionally had close relations to the University of Athens.[893] In 1935, the number of grants dedicated for students and assistants at Athens Technical University was increased from one to five.[894] In the summer of 1934, the students of Athens University created the Greek-German Union with the purpose of bringing the Greek students closer to the German scholars who visited and lectured at the university and promoting student exchanges of German and Greek. At the inaugural meeting, representatives of the German Embassy in Athens were also present acknowledging the importance of the Greek initiative.[895] In the academic year 1935-6, the Athens University Student Club, in conjunction with the *Deutsche Studentenschaft* in Berlin, sent twelve Greek students to Germany for a month within the student exchange programme in order to gain an in-

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[891] Central Office DAAD to the Deutschen Auslandsvertretungen. Zweigstellen der DAAD. Akademischen Auslandsstellen. (Den Mitgliedern des Auswahlausschusses der Alexander v. Humboldt-Stiftung und den Mitgliedern des Vorstandes und Senats des Deutschen Akademischen Austauschdienstes zur Mitkenntnis.) on 22.06.1935, in: BAK, ZSg 137/18.

[892] German ambassador in Athens (Eisenlohr) to The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 26.05.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065.

[893] German ambassador in Athens (Eisenlohr) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 27.06.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065.

[894] German ambassador in Athens (Eisenlohr) to Stieve, Leiter der Kulturabtielung des Auswaertigen Amts 25.10.1934; Reichs- und Preussischen Minister fuer Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung, Berlin (Remme) to DAAD, Berlin 14.12.1935, in: PAAA, R 64065.

[895] German ambassador in Athens (Eisenlohr) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 20.07.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065.

sight into the German culture. An equal number of German students was expected to visit Greece the following year.[896]

This euphoric climate between the Greek and German university communities was augmented following the German decision to reduce fees for all foreign students. The aim of this decision, on the one hand was to increase the number of foreign students, and on the other, it was considered as "the most effective measure against the nasty propaganda of immigrants abroad".[897] This measure had been introduced since the academic year 1932-33 for Greeks who did not yet have student status but were expected to receive it as they were attendants (*Hoerer* or *Gasthoerer*).[898] The facilitation for the Greek students at Munich University, which attracted a large numbers of them however, was decided in the abovbe context but also because the Greek community in Munich was able to put some pressure on the local authorities which was impossible for the Germans to ignore. At the beginning of 1935, a decision allowed Greek students at Berlin University to obtain a full exemption from fees.[899] It is interesting to note here that scholarships for purely political "enlightenment" were given to foreigners who applied through their national official authorities that were sympathetic to the Nazi regime. The governor of Athens, Kostantinos Kotzias, was certainly among these individuals. On the occasion of his visit to the *Fuehrer* on 5 May 1936, he suggested that the Reich could support ten to twelve young Greeks of his choice that would be sent to Germany for national socialist training, particularly to forge links with the Reich's Youth (*Reichsjugend*) and the Labour Service (*Arbeittsdienst*).[900] Kotzias' proposal was fully supported by Hitler.[901] These kind of

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[896] Speech of P. Zervos, professor of geometry: International Student Relations p. 25, in: ΙΑΡΑ, Πρυτανικοί Λόγοι (Rectors' Speeches) 1935-36.

[897] Auswaertiges Amt (i.A. gez. Oster) to Reichskultusministerium z.Hd. von Herrn Reg. Rat Burmeister, Berlin 20.11.1934; Bayer. Staatsministerium fuer Unterricht und Kultus, Muenchen to Bayer. Staatskanzlei 27.12.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065. See also: Stieve from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the "Bayerische Staatsministerium fuer Unterricht und Kultus" in Munich on 23.12.1933, in: PAAA, R 64065.

[898] See the correspondence of the Greek Embassy in Berlin with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education in Athens, in: Ιστορικόν Αρχείον Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών (Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry, IAYE), Α/11/3, 1935. Ελληνο-γερμανικές σχέσεις.

[899] German Ambassador in Athens (Eisenlohr) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 19.02.1935, in: PAAA, R 64065.

[900] Kotzias was one of the few Greeks who was personally received by Hitler. See: RENATE MEISSNER, Η εθνικοσοσιαλιστική Γερμανία και η Ελλάδα κατά τη διάρκεια της μεταξικής δικτατορίας, in: HAGEN FLEISCHER, NIKOS SVORONOS (eds.), Ελλάδα 1936-1944. Δικτατορία – Κατοχή – Αντίσταση. Πρακτικά Α' Διεθνούς Συνεδρίου Σύγχρονης Ιστορίας, Αθήνα 1989, [Greece 1936-1944: Dictatorship-Occupation-

scholarships, however, were neither part of the foreign cultural political project nor did they come from the same budget with *Alexander v. Humboldt Stiftung*/ DAAD.

Although the awarding of grants was regarded as essential for the promotion of the German-Greek cultural relations, there were some reasons for limiting the number of scholarships given for graduates of the Technical University in Athens. According to the central office of the DAAD, this was due to previous experience which showed that the cultural-political effect was greater on the students of humanities rather than those who studied technical subjects.[902] This explains why the grants from *Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung* were given exclusively to young scholars of humanities including music.[903] However, this statement was treated with particular skepticism in Athens. The ambassador, Eisenlohr, warned that Germany risked losing its leading position in the field of technical sciences in Greece. He argued further that there would be serious material losses for their economy, if the young generation of Greek engineers went to France or Italy instead of Germany.[904] Therefore, the availability of only five scholarships for technical subjects was two low and was recommended that it should be increased. It was not rare for young Greek scholars to apply for a grant through other channels rather than the official ones, namely the Mediation Office of the German Academy in Munich. This was made up of Greeks who were on leave from a ministry or university. The patronage of a personal or a high-ranking political network was often necessary in order to receive a German grant. Needless to say that regardless of the influence of the cultural propaganda on Greek society, the creation of a future elite in Greece that would be sympathetic towards Nazi Germany would provide a guarantee for German interests in the country. It should not be forgotten that it was the prominent members of all spheres of Greek society that had initially given their support to the German cultural policy in the first place,

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Resistance. Proceedings of the 1st International Congress of Contemporary History, Athens 1989], pp. 50-58, here p. 54. Nevertheless, in 1941 Kotzias switched sides denouncing his affiliation to Nazism and fled to the United States. See his correspondence with the Greek community in Chicago and the exiled Greek government in London during his stay in the United States from August 1941 until 1946. In: Ελληνικό, Λογοτεχνικό και Ιστορικό Αρχείο (Greek Archive for Literature and History, ELIA), Kostantinos Kotzias, File Nr. 2, Correspondence 1940-1945, Subfile 2.2 [1941].

[901] Abschrift der Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen to Herrn Reichsminister des Auswaertigen 06.05.1936, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen Nr. 32 (Deutsch-Griechische Beziehungen 1933-1939).

[902] DAAD, Berlin to Reichs- und Preussischen Minister fuer Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung, Berlin. 16.01.1935, in: PAAA, R 64065.

[903] *Ibid.*

[904] Eisenlohr to Auswaertigen Amt 10.05.1935, in: PAAA, R 64065.

and it was indeed continued these individuals to support it. Candidates for medicine and related disciplines as well as candidates from certain ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance, Public Health and Agriculture, were regarded by the Germans as an important investment. Within the framework of this policy, grants were awarded to the above mentioned Greek scientists, Vasilios Malamos and Antonios Valassis. Furthermore, in 1935, Georgios Trimis, the inspector for labour issues in the Ministry of Finance applied for and received support from the Reich for almost eighteen months to study social and labour issues in Germany. In his case, were Nikolaos G. Photias, a professor at the School of Commerce in Athens, and Stephanopoulos, the Greek Minister of Economy who acted as mediators.[905] In 1936, at the request of the German Ambassador in Athens the *Humboldt-Stiftung* and the *Mitteleuropaeische Wirtschaftstag* agreed to allocate grants to Greek students from the newly established faculty for veterinary medicine at Athens University.[906] However, in the same letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin the German Ambassador suggested that the cultural-political campaign in Greece should be suspended for a while, despite its important role in Metaxas' Greece. The justification given for the suspension related to the currency shortage, which even threatened the operation of the branches of the German Academy in Greece.[907]

If the suspension took place at all, it must have applied to the activities linked to the German Academy. It is certain, however, that, in 1937, on the occasion of the centenary of Athens University and Technical University, Germany donated a significant amount of books to the latter institution and the German ambassador in Athens requested an increase of the secret fund given to the Embassy for the promotion of the relations between the two countries.[908] A similar donation of books was also planned for Athens University, whose festivities would be attend by the German Minister of Education, Bernhard Rust.[909] In addition, at the festivities of the Technical University, the Siemens company planned to establish an electro-technical laboratory at the university

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[905] Eisenlohr to Auswaertigen Amt 26.06.1935; DAAD, Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung (Dr. Goepel), Berlin to Auswaertigen Amt, Berlin 11.07.1935, in: PAAA, R 64065.

[906] Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen to Auswaertigen Amt, Berlin 19.10.1936, in: PAAA, R 64065.

[907] *Ibid.*

[908] German Ambassador in Athens, Prinz zu Erbach to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Herrn Geheimrat Dienstmann), on 20.02.1937, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen Nr. 50, Band 1. The document was classified as secret (Geheim!)

[909] Political report of the German Ambassador in Athens, Prinz zu Erbach, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, "Bericht des griechischen Gesandten in London" on 10.03.1937, in: PAAA, R 61147.

and to donate it by the German Ambassador.[910] The awarding of medals and the title of honorary member to prominent Greek scholars was also among the German plans. It is interesting to note that Rust received an official invitation from the rector of Athens University to attend the festivities, an invitation that was not extended to the Minister of France, who was going to send a delegate from the Sorbonne University.[911] This gesture was particularly appreciated by the Germans, which, combined with a last-minute decision of the Athens University senate to honour Bernhard Rust in a special ceremony before the official festivities, was a clear sign of the German cultural precedence over its rivals.[912] It has already been shown, 1937 was the golden year for the strengthening of the German-Greek cultural relations, bolstered by a number of organisations created in the same year. In the following years, Germany's cultural activity shifted in favour of the natural sciences. In August 1942, about a year after the German occupation of Greece, it was reported that thirty-two out of seventy-six Greeks were enrolled at German technical universities while another thirty-two were students at its universities and academies for medicine.[913] Shortly afterwards, the first attacks on the laboratories of Athens University were reported.[914] The confiscation of venues, the atrocities of the German troops and the lack of food led the majority of the Greek academic community to change its previously favourable attitude towards its "intellectual motherland".[915]

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[910] *Ibid.*

[911] In the end, the French Minister attended the festivities and he was also awarded an honorary doctorate from the University of Athens like his German counterpart, Bernhard Rust.

[912] *Ibid.*

[913] Report of the Buero fuer Studentenkulturaustausch, Berlin. Informationsdienst, "Griechische Studenten in Deutschland" 10.08.1942, BAB, R 4902/ 11204.

[914] The incident related a collection of rare bird eggs held at the university's zoological laboratory and museum. See: G. Pantazis, director of Athens Zoological Museum to the rector of Athens University on 24.09.1942, in: Archive of Zoological Museum (AZM), File Nr. 901-1190, Jan. 1941-Dec. 1948.

[915] See: GEORGE SKLAVOUNOS, "Λόγος στην Ακαδημία το Χειμώνα 1942. «Η Ακαδημία αρνήται»", in: *Επιθεώρηση Τέχνης*, Year H', Band IE', Issue Nr. 87-88, March - April 1962, pp. 298-299.

5.5. Scientific expeditions to Greece and their cultural mission.

If awarding grants to foreigners was an effective instrument that was expected to be redeemed in the near future in Germany's interest, the participation of experts in international conferences was regarded a direct promotion of the German image and prestige in the scientific circles abroad. Those conferences usually turned out to be cultural political arenas, particularly when their organisation was under governmental auspices. Recognising the significance of propaganda at foreign conferences, the National Socialists tried to ensure through bureaucratic mechanisms that only pro-Nazi scholars would be allowed to stand for the Aryan science abroad, often damaging the reputation of what was known as German science. This political selection of scientists was usually reflected in the official national delegations at foreign conferences, which were not, however, consisted of party's favourites alone. The scientific expertise as a criterion of campaigning for the German intellect abroad could not be ignored. In addition, the eminent German scientists had already established their networks abroad and it was often the case the invitations for participating in international scientific meetings to be sent personally to them rather than the German authorities alone.

As the Balkans had become a ground of cultural political rivalry, particularly between Germany and France, the international meetings organised there did not only reflect the efforts of these two countries to advertise their national intellect. Moreover, they sought to increase their influence over the Balkan states, at first on cultural and then on political and economic level, because "a good precursor for economy and politics [...] is science", as a German prominent scientist emphasised in 1936.[916] It is noteworthy, that several scientific international meetings took place in the southeastern Europe during the 1930s, most of them with the initiative of the local governments, which were in a modernising process. At the same time, congresses were organised between the Balkan countries almost every year, aiming at the scientific and economic co-operation but also at strengthening the ties between them. Bulgaria and Albania however, tried to keep aloof from the Balkan Union due to their alliances with Germany and Italy respectively. It is not a coincidence, therefore, that most of those conferences took place in Turkey,

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[916] Report of Friedrich Zahn (Praesident des Bayerischen Statistischen Landesamts und Prof. an der Universitaet Munchen) to Reichsminister f. Wissenschaft Erziehung u Volksbildung on 16.12.1936 on the 23rd Meeting of the International Institute for Statistics taken place on 27 September until 4 October 1936 in Athens, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2996, Bl. 84 (pp. 7-8)

which held a neutral position at the time and many Jewish scholars found refuge at its universities, particularly in Istanbul.[917] Nazi Germany kept an open eye at those meetings and the role of Jews with regard to its influence over the region's scientific community and its image abroad. The Fourth Congress of Balkan Doctors took place in Istanbul on 7 until 10 October 1936, in which, apart from Turkey, participated Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece. What the Nazis wished to know about this scientific meeting was the position of the participants towards the German medicine and National Socialism. Moreover, they wanted to know through the official channel of the German Embassy in Ankara, whether the "very shrewd Jews" were represented at the conference and if they dominated the meeting.[918] This information was very important for the Germans for political and cultural-political reasons, as they knew about the intense struggle of the immigrants in Turkey against the Third Reich and the Nazi professors that had been appointed at Turkish universities.[919] According to the Nazis, Turkey's manipulations were very tactful in blocking the dominance of the Jewish specialists who lived and worked in the country and participated in the conference.[920] In the next conference of the Balkan doctors organised again in Istanbul in September 1938, Turkey's position towards the Jewish scientific community was even clearer. This time no Jew from the University of Istanbul was invited to participate in the medicine conference and their presence was restricted to that of the mere attendant.[921] It should be noted that apart from Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia did not include any Jews in their delegations.[922] The explicit position of the Turkish government towards the Jewish scientific community was due to the 1938 new migration policy. According to this policy, the emigrants who were coming to Turkey had to display a Christian identity, while ships with emigrants heading to Palestine were not allowed to stop in Turkey without the permission from the British

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[917] About two hundred scientists and artists were forced by political and racial reasons to leave Germany and to immigrate to Turkey between 1933 and 1938. Among them was the eminent scientist Ernst Reuter. See: ÖZDEN UZUNOGLU, 'Tuerkei', in: WOLFGANG BENZ et. al. (ed.), Enzyklopaeidie des Nationalsozialismus, Munich 1997, pp. 768 f.

[918] Der Stellvertreter des Fuehrers, Stab, NSDAP Muenchen (Abschrift) to the Reichs- und Preussischen Minister des Innern on 15.12.1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2740-1.

[919] *Ibid.*

[920] German Embassy in Ankara to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 09.04.1937, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2740-1.

[921] German Embassy in Ankara to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 31.10.1938, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2740-1.

[922] *Ibid.*

administration in Palestine. These developments were due to Turkey's economic and commercial rapprochement to the Third Reich and in particular its export of chromium to the Allies' enemy.[923]

Medicine conferences also took place in Greece. Athens organised the Third International Conference for Comparative Pathology on 15 until 18 April 1936, inviting national delegates from around the world. Pathologists, veterinarians, parasitologists, microbiologists, and tropical hygienists took part in this interdisciplinary conference and discussed urgent problems of their field. The two previous conferences for comparative pathology took place in Paris, the first in 1912 and the second in 1931. At the second one Germany did not send any scholars due to its strained relations with France.[924] As for the conference in Athens, Germany initially rejected the Greek invitation. The explanation they gave was that the planned period for the event was unfavourable for the German scientists, who would still be engaged in teaching duties on the chosen date. The truth was, however, that the Germans were hesitant to participate in a conference, in which the French influence was expected to be overwhelming, barely leaving any space to Germany to make its voice heard. It is interesting to note that the Greek organisers sent personal invitations to some German scientists instead to the German government, namely to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Science and Education.[925] One might expect that the scientists who personally received an invitation, in order to become members of the delegation, would try to convince the official authorities for the importance of *their* inclusion to the national delegation. In fact, what is recorded to be argued by the scholars was the importance of Germany's participation *as a nation* for the

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[923] ÖZDEN UZUNOGLU, 'Tuerkei', *ibid.*

[924] R. Roessle (Biological Institute at Berlin University) to Prof. Dr. Behrens (Minister of Education) on 06.07.1935, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.

[925] Among the scientists who received personal invitation from Bensis and A. Codounis and were requested to speak at the conference were R. Roessle at the Biological Institute at Berlin University, Professor Uhlenhuth, the director of the Institute for Hygiene at the University of Freiburg i.Brsg., and Professor Friedrich Koch, the director of the University Hospital and Polyclinic in Tuebingen. However, when the Greek committee was informed that the prominent neurologist, B. Fischer-Wasels, was interested in participating in the conference, it replied that the invitation was officially sent to the government and not to individual scientists. This inconsistency of the Greeks perhaps indicates the role the personal networks played even in cases of state-formed delegations. See: Bensis and Codounis to Prof. B. Fischer-Wasels, Neurologisches Institut in 12.1935, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.

promotion of its scientific and cultural-political interests.[926] However, this perception of the international scientific meeting in Athens, as it was expressed by some German scientists, is not surprising. It should be underlined, however, apart from the fact that the national feeling of the German academia had been strengthened during the Weimar Republic, the argument that an international conference was of great national importance was also made in order the scientists to get funds for their travelling expenses. However, after Hitler's assumption of power, nationalism became the core of the state's organisation. Scientists had to be aligned to a number of guidelines that would secure, as the Nazis believed, the interests of the Reich to ultimate degree. The arguments of the scientists, therefore, were in this line, in order to convince the Nazi authorities to permit them to travel abroad, despite the fact that many of them were not sympathetic to the Nazi regime.

The significance of the German scientific presence in Athens' conference was underlined by the Greek scientific community, which was very disappointed at the German initial refusal. At the same time, Greek scholars exerted pressure on their German colleagues arguing that their absence from such an important meeting would be unjustified.[927] It is also reported that the president of the Greek organisers, Vladimiros Bensis, who was educated in France, would resign his presidency, in the case of a German delegation was missing from Athens' conference.[928] It seems that all the above led German scientists to change their mind and put pressure on the Nazi government and finally send a delegation to Athens. However, the number of national representatives initially permitted by the Nazi authorities was very small. The head of the delegation, von Bergmann, opposed the government's decision to allow only five scientists to represent Germany abroad, while France planned to send sixty to eighty people to Greece, indicating the "enormous cultural propaganda" Germany's rival prepared for Greece.[929] Von Bergmann also criticised the fact that not a single German pathologist was on the list of delegates for a conference dedicated to pathology. He suggested that at least ten

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926 Prof. Uhlenhuth (Direktor des Hygienischen Institus der Universitaet Freiburg i.Brsg.) to Reichs- und Preussischen Minister f. Wissenschaft Erziehung und Volksbildung on 03.07.1935, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.

927 V. Bensis, president of the Greek organisation committee and A. Codounis to R. Roessle (Biological Institute at Berlin University) on 25.06.1935, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.

928 Bericht des Leiters der deutschen Delegation (Bergmann) ueber den 3. Internationalen Kongress der vergleichenden Pathologie in Athen vom 15-18 April 1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.

929 Prof. Dr. G. von Bergmann, (Director of the II. Med. Univ. Clinic) to Interior Minister Fricke on 27.1.1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.

scientists should represent the Reich and he named four eminent pathologists (Uhlenhuth from Freiburg, Fischer-Wasels from Frankfurt, Aschoff and Roessle from Berlin) as well as the well known in the Balkan region, Peter Muhlens from Hamburg, to be included in the list. The exclusion of those scientists, who were invited by the organisers in Athens, would make bad impression, argued von Bergmann, to the international scientific community. He finally warned the German authorities that, should the matter of delegation were not to be changed, he would not travel to Athens.[930] It seems that Bergmann's pressure brought the desired result and forced the Ministry of the Interior, to approve travelling permission for eleven scholars, including those suggested by the German scientist.[931] It is rather peculiar that v. Bergmann was not assigned leader of the German delegation by the Ministry of the Interior, which initially chose the four representatives, but by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose cultural section the German scientist contacted in the spring of 1935. Von Bergmann had visited Athens at Easter of 1935, and he was invited to the Prime Minister's office, Panagis Tsaldaris. The prominent German scientist reported to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that he was approached by the secretary of the Greek organising committee, Professor Anton Codounis, who made a personal request to him to create a delegation for the planned congress in Athens including Volhard, Koch and Muehlens. The Greek organisers had already sent invitations to those scientists asking them to give lectures at the conference and expressing their wish that the German science would be strongly represented in Athens.[932] As v. Bergmann could not reassure his Greek colleague at the time, whether he were to join the German delegation or not, he advised Codounis to make the proposal to Berlin via the Embassy in Athens.[933] In the end, the German scientist went to Athens, presumably with the encouragement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. V. Bergmann reported in 1936, that his

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[930] *Ibid.*

[931] Apart from G. von Bergmann participated in the conference Friedrich Koch, the director of the University Clinic in Tuebingen; Dr. Uhlenhuth, the director of the Institute for Hygienics in Freiburg i.Brsg.; H. Miessner, the director of the Institute for Hygiene at the Veterinary School in Hannover; F. Volhard, the professor at the Faculty of Medicine at Frankfurt University and the director of the University Clinic in Frankfurt; R. Roessle from the Biological Institute at Berlin University; Professor Aschoff from Freiburg; Poppe, the professor for Animal Sanitation and Pathology in Rostock; the botanist O. Appel from Berlin; H. A. Gins from the Robert Koch Institute for Infectious Diseases, and the Balkan expert, Peter Muehlens, from the Institute for Tropical Diseases in Hamburg.

[932] Bericht des Leiters der deutschen Delegation (Bergmann) ueber den 3. Internationalen Kongress der vergleichenden Pathologie in Athen vom 15-18 April 1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.

[933] *Ibid.*

choice as a leader of the German delegation was made in agreement between the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry for the Interior.[934] However, it seems that the rivalries between these ministries as well as with the Ministry of Education, which was explicit about increasing the number of the German representatives in Athens,[935] played a role in this decision.

The congress in Athens turned out to be a field for cultural propaganda for the two major cultural rivalries in the Balkan region, France and Germany, as it was often the case in those kind of international meetings at the time. The fact that the two previous international congresses for comparative pathology took place in France and the absence of Germany from the last one gave France some cultural precedence over the Reich. The Germans already knew that their presence in Greece would be outshone by France, who planned to boost her cultural influence by sending a large number of delegates in Athens.[936] The use of French by almost all scientists at the conference was certainly a strong evidence of France's cultural predominance in international meetings. In fact, French had been re-established as the language *par excellence* among intellectuals after the Versailles Treaty. It was not a surprise for the Germans, therefore, that the Greek King and the president of the committee, Vladimiros Bensis, used French as they opened the proceedings of the congress, which was hosted at the building of the Greek Parliament.[937] The representatives of all the other countries, which were about twenty, also spoke in French, except, of course, from the German delegates, whom the majority of the Greek doctors as well as many of other participants were able to understand very well.[938]

It should be noted that beside G. v. Bergmann who officially reported to the Reich's Ministry of Education on the congress, the director of the Institute for Hygiene at the Veterinary School in Hannover, H. Miessner, also sent his remarks about the scientific event in Athens to the above ministry. Miessner was one of the first five scientists assigned by the Reich's Ministry of the Interior to travel to Greece and it appears that he has acted as the government's agent in Athens. His remarks, however, were not different

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[934] *Ibid.*

[935] *Ibid.*

[936] *Ibid.*

[937] "Beobachtungen waehrend des III. Internationalen Kongress fuer vergleichende Pathologie in Athen 15-18 April 1936 von Dr. Miessner, Hygienisches Institut der Tieraerztlichen Hochschule Hannover", 5.5.1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.

[938] *Ibid.* Also: Bericht des Leiters der deutschen Delegation (Bergmann) ueber den 3. Internationalen Kongress der vergleichenden Pathologie in Athen vom 15-18 April 1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.

from v. Bergmann's. Both scientists focused on the Reich's cultural supplanting by France, as well as on the friendly position of Greeks towards the Reich and their wish to strengthen their ties with German science. Both Miessner and v. Bergmann reported that there were disputes between the Greek doctors that were due to their educational background. The rivalry between the doctors who studied in Germany and those who were educated in France were, according to v. Bergmann, more intensive within the francophile Athenian society rather than in the Peloponnese, the sympathies of which with Germany were much stronger.[939] Despite the fact that the majority of the Greek professors of human medicine were German educated, the discipline of veterinary medicine was dominated by French educated scientists. Miessner argued, however, that the French influence and cultural dominance in Greece was not well accepted by all Greek veterinarians and this was leaving some space to Germany to increase its own influence on the field in Greece. More precisely, given the lack of a veterinary faculty at Athens University, Miessner contacted the professor of pharmacology, George Joachimoglou, and tried to convince him of creating a veterinary faculty in Athens.[940] Miessner also suggested that the new faculty could be organised in line to the similar faculties in Ankara Turkey and Iran, which had been established with German contribution.[941] The German scientist noted further that Greece seemed to be "a good ground for the German interests and [the promotion of] friendship" and it would be for their concern to help young Greeks to study veterinary medicine in Germany granting them scholarships.[942] Miessner's recommendation found support from the German ambassador in Athens, Prinz Victor zu Erbach – Schoenberg, who suggested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin to include the scholarship foundations *Alexander von Humboldt* and the *Mitteleuropaeische Wirtschaftstag* also Greek veterinary students in their lists.[943]

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939 Bericht des Leiters der deutschen Delegation (Bergmann) ueber den 3. Internationalen Kongress der vergleichenden Pathologie in Athen vom 15-18 April 1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.

940 "Beobachtungen waehrend des III. Internationalen Kongress fuer vergleichende Pathologie in Athen 15-18 April 1936 von Dr. Miessner, Hygienisches Institut der Tieraerztlichen Hochschule Hannover", 5.5.1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.

941 *Ibid.*

942 *Ibid.*

943 German Embassy in Athens to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Durchschlag) on 19.10.1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.

The "good ground" that Greece offered, as v. Bergmann argued, was due to the country's strong sympathy with Germany, in particularly within the intellectual circles, which was expressed on every occasion. He explained this arguing that the educated Greeks were very proud of the German archaeologists, such as Schliemann, Furtwaengler, Humann, Doerpfeld, and Wiegand and their achievements in Greece and they regarded them as their "national cultural patrons".[944] The leader of the German delegation did not miss the opportunity to stress "the old interdependence between ancient Greece and Germany" in the opening and closure ceremonies of the conference that took place in the Greek Parliament and the ancient altar of Asklipios in Epidaurus respectively.[945] It is obvious that v. Bergmann was very much aware of his role as a delegate of the Third Reich and he acted accordingly, emphasising the relation between the Arian and the ancient Greek culture also on the occasion of the Eleventh Olympic Games that were hosted in Berlin in the same year.

The promotion of Nazi Germany's image at the conference in Athens seemed to have been crowned with success. V. Bergmann wrote that not only the Greeks expressed great enthusiasm about his speech on Germany's cultural affiliation to the ancient Greek culture, but they also admired the fact that "Germany was ruled by a strong hand and, in contrast to Greece, the constant parliamentary misdeeds did not any longer exist".[946] The Greek sympathy with the Nazi regime was also expressed in an evening reception held by the King's personal doctor, Anastasopoulos, who invited eighty personalities -primarily doctors- from the germanophile circle of Athens in honour of the German delegation. The importance of German presence at the conference was not only recognised by the Greeks, but also by the French delegation. More precisely, the oldest scholar at the meeting, the eighty-two year old French doctor, Achard, proposed the creation of a permanent organising committee consisted of three Germans, three French and one Greek scientist. The proposal was viewed as a triumph of the German medicine by the German scientists, given that the number of their representatives was much smaller in comparison to the French delegation. Nevertheless, v. Bergmann tactfully avoided to accept the French proposal, on the grounds that the political tensions between the two countries were still strong at the time. It is not a coincidence that few months later, in

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[944] Bericht des Leiters der deutschen Delegation (Bergmann) ueber den 3. Internationalen Kongress der vergleichenden Pathologie in Athen vom 15-18 April 1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.

[945] *Ibid.*

[946] *Ibid.*

September 1936, Greeks and Belgians organised the '*VIII Congrés International des Haute Culture Médicale*' in Athens, which basically was a meeting of French-speaking and Greek doctors.[947] It seems that France and Belgium acted very fast to gain back any ground they had lost from the Germans in April's conference. On the other hand, Greeks also hastened to pre-empt Frnace's disaffection towards them, as France was a good cultural ally to Greece.

However, the "23rd Meeting of the International Institute for Statistics" that took place in Athens from 27 September until 4 October 1936, with the initiative of the Greek government, seemed to have a different purpose than a propagandistic one for Germany's interests. At least, this was what the president of the International Institute for Statistics and the congress, Friedrich Zahn, argued for, who, like v. Bergmann, referred to the Olympic Idea in his opening speech, on the occasion of the Olympic Games. Zahn stressed the fact that the Olympic spirit of the international co-operation should also be applied to the field of science and in particular to the science of statistics.[948] It is worth mentioning that Zahn was the first German who was elected president of an international scientific organisation after the First World War, in 1931.[949] It is also interesting that despite the fact that he could use the meeting in Athens in his country's cultural political interest, he did not seem to jeopardise his international scientific esteem transforming the conference into a political arena. Therefore, the working language of the conference was French, while interpreters for French, German and English also were available, as it was the case at previous meetings of the Institute, in order "to help the exchange of ideas".[950] However, Zahn stressed on his report to the

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[947] President of the Greek committee was again Vladimiros Bensis. See: BAB, R 4901/ 2740. Except from an advertising poster with the detailed program and the names of all of the participants, there is no other relevant material in the file.

[948] Report of Friedrich Zahn (Praesident des Bayerischen Statistischen Landesamts und Prof. an der Universitaet Munchen) on the 23rd Meeting of the International Institute for Statistics taken place on 27 September until 4 October 1936 to the Reichsminister f. Wissenschaft Erziehung u Volksbildung in Athens, on 16.12.1936 in: BAB, R 4901/ 2996, sheet 81 (p. 2). A detailed report, including his speech, the conference's proceedings and the opening speech of the Greek Minister of Finance, Hadjikyriakos, was published on the journal *Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv*, 26. Band, 1937, pp. 309-332, here 309 f.

[949] The International Organisation for Statistics has been established more than fifty years before 1930 and its central offices were in Hague.

[950] Report of Friedrich Zahn (Praesident des Bayerischen Statistischen Landesamts und Prof. an der Universitaet Munchen) on the 23rd Meeting of the International Institute for Statistics taken place on 27

Ministry of Education that Greeks offered him and the German delegation great hospitality and they showed their affection for the German science and in particular the German statisticians.[951] Zahn also described the political and economic situation in Greece and its efforts to be modernised under the authoritarian regime of J. Metaxas and argued that "for the national regeneration of Greece, Germany could help in many ways".[952] Promoting further the already existing economic and cultural relations between the two countries was one of them. This belief combined with his remark that "a good precursor (*Wegbereiter*) for economy and politics is [...] science" reveals that what was behind the declaration of the international scientific collaboration, was merely the political and economic interests of the Reich.

The favourable and friendly climate, according to v. Bergmann, Miessner and Zahn, in Greece for the promotion of Germany's cultural-political relations with this small Balkan country, appears to have altered after August 1936, when Metaxas seized power by *coup d'état*. The dissolution of Parliament and the outlaw of the Communist Party resulted in the frustration of the left wing and communist supporters. The university and academic circles also reacted to this decision, which led significant numbers of students to vigorous protests. In the spring of 1937, heavy clashes occurred between left-wing and nationalist students, when the French Minister of Education Jean Zay, who was a Jew, gave a lecture at the philological society "Parnassos" on the occasion of the centenary of Athens University. The episode took the authoritarian regime of Metaxas by surprise, which underestimated, according to the German ambassador in Athens, Prinz zu Erbach, the size the left opposition had taken in the Greek academic circle.[953] The incident was to Germany's advantage, argued Prinz zu Erbach, because the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernhard Rust, who visited Greece shortly before his French counterpart, was more careful in his cultural political campaign. However, the political situation in Greece was regarded unfavourable for further public lectures planned to be given by other German prominent figures and the German ambassador suggested that the Reich's cultural-political campaign in Greece should be suspended for some time.[954] Such figures

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September until 4 October 1936 to the Reichsminister f. Wissenschaft Erziehung u Volksbildung in Athens, on 16.12.1936 in: BAB, R 4901/ 2996, sheet 81 (p. 2).

[951] *Ibid.*, sheets 82-83 (pp. 3-5).

[952] *Ibid.*, sheet 84 (pp. 7-8)

[953] Confidential report of the German Embassy in Athens to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 01.06.1937, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandschaft Athen, Band Nr. 35.

[954] *Ibid.*

were the leader of the NSDAP, Alfred Rosenberg, who was invited by the professor of theology and the vice president of the Greek-German society in Athens, Nikolaos Louvaris, to give a public lecture at the same place, where the French Minister Jean Zay had lectured some months before.[955] The German ambassador was worried that the political activists who demonstrated against the Metaxas government on the occasion of the French Minister's presence, would demonstrate again, if Rosenberg were to give his planned lecture. At the same time, Prinz zu Erbach hastened to reassure the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that he was not against Rosenberg's visit, but he warmly supported the idea of giving the *Reichsminister* a public speech, provided that the event would guarantee a positive impact on the Greek public.[956] Therefore, the German ambassador asked the president of the Greek-German society, the pre-eminent surgeon Marinos Geroulanos, to postpone the event for the beginning of 1938, providing that the political situation in Greece would be improved.[957]

Eventually, Rosenberg did not give that lecture. Instead, he organised a big project on the holy mountain of Athos after Greece's occupation by the Nazis in 1941. The project was organised in the framework of the "*Einsatzstabes Rosenberg*" organisation, which was established on 7 July 1940. Its aim was to collect all the valuable material of the occupied countries, such as art treasures, books, archival material and the like, from every place that could be possibly found, i.e. museums, libraries, universities, churches, private institutions. Needless to say that the whole enterprise was nothing but an outspoken robbery of the treasuries of the occupied countries.[958] Rosenberg was also encouraged to organise the expedition to Athos by the monks of Bulgarian and Russian clois-

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[955] See: German Embassy in Athens to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 04.06.1937, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandschaft Athen, Band Nr. 35.

[956] Confidential report of the German Embassy in Athens to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 01.06.1937, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandschaft Athen, Band Nr. 35.

[957] German Embassy in Athens to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 28.05.1937, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandschaft Athen, Band Nr. 35.

[958] "Abschlussbericht ueber die Taetigkeit des Sonderkommandos Rosenberg in Griechenland" on 15.11.1941, in: BAB, NS 30/ 75, See also document Nr. 117: "Aktenvermerk von Ingrim, Leiter der Abteilung Referat Westen und Suedosten in der Stabsfuehrung des Einsatzstabes Reichsleiter Rosenberg fuer die besetzen Gebiete, vom 6. November 1943". On Greece see document Nr. 40: "Aus der Verfuegung des Quartiermeisters des Kommandanten rueckwaertiges Armeegebiet 560 vom 21 Mai 1941", both documents published in: WOLFGANG SCHUMANN (Hg.), Griff nach Suedosteuropa. Neue Dokumente ueber die Politik des deutschen Imperialismus und Militarismus gegenueber Suedosteuropa im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Berlin 1973, pp. 230, 130 respectively.

ters, who wrote a petition to the Bulgarian government describing that for many year the Greek government was trying to repress the non-Greek monk communities, thus violating the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 and the Sevres Treaty in 1920.[959] With this excuse the Nazis advertised the expedition to Athos as a rescue enterprise. With the support of the army, they planned to record the works of art and to collect manuscripts and official historical documents. The Nazis believed that the fact alone that they could do scientific work of that kind and they could publish it amidst the war, was an evidence of New Germany's magnitude.[960] This was also the argument of Hans Hass, a young marine biologist who made an expedition to the Aegean Sea for scientific and cultural purposes.[961] The expedition took place from June until November 1942 and supported by the *Reichsforschungsrat* (RFR) and the German navy (*Kriegsmarine*).[962] It aimed at exploring the marine resources of the Sporades and Cyclades island-complexes and the island of Crete, as well as testing his construction of the first breathing device for swim-divers (closed circuit oxygen equipment) for research in undersea caves and production of full feature film, which launched in 1947, entitled "*Menschen unter Haien*".[963] The zoologist of the KW Institute for Biology in Berlin, Max Hartmann, who was at the time working in Piraeus as the director of the German-Greek Institute for Biology, and his assistant Otto Schartau

[959] "Petition der Athos-Kloster Sograph und Panteleimon an die Achsenmaechte, ueberreicht in Sofia im Juli 1941", in: BAB, NS 8/ 259.

[960] "Abschlussbericht ueber die Taetigkeit des Sonderkommandos Rosenberg in Griechenland" on 15.11.1941, Part III: Arbeitsbericht, 2. Sonderstab "Athos", in: BAB, NS 30/ 75.

[961] Draft of a Hans Hass' newspaper article (summer 1942) entitled "Expedition im Krieg" he was going to publish on a German newspaper in order to advertise the impending expedition, pp. 1, 9. The document can be found at the archive of the "Hans-Hass-Institut für Submarine-Forschung und Tauchtechnik" in Merzig in Germany, (Hans Hass Archiv, HHA), classified as HH2. I am grateful to the director of the institute Dipl. Ing. Michael Jung, who drew my attention to Hass' expedition to Greece and for the relevant information and material he shared with me.

[962] *Ibid.*, see also: "Bescheinigung von Admiral Aegaeis (der Chef des Stabes)" to the General Director of the KWG, Ernst Telschow on 24.06.1942; "Reichsforschungsrat, Kolonialwissenschaftliche Abteilung" to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (forwarded to the KWG) on 04.06.1942, both documents in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 1314/ 2.

[963] See: Short Vita of Prof. Dr. Hans Hass and a friendly response, in: http://www.hans-hass.de/Englisch/Short_Vita/Short_Vita.html. For a German version see: http://www.hans-hass.de/Biographie/Biografie.html.

supported and were to participate the expedition. The two KW scientists, however, did not go aboard the researchship "Ostmark" due to the pressing work in Piraeus.[964]

Last but not least, in 1940, in the framework of promoting the image of Nazi Germany and the national socialist ideals abroad, the National Socialist Organisation for Issues Abroad [*Auslandsorganisation (AO) der NSDAP*] sent a number of prominent scientists to the southeastern Europe, including Greece, not only to give lectures but also to make contacts with the key persons of their disciplines. These scientists reported back on their contacts as well as on the political situation in the Balkan countries and the general climate towards the Reich in detail. Among the scientists who visited Greece, were the professor of modern German phychology and education in Munich, Dr.Kroh; the professor of forestry, Dr. Werner Schmidt in Eberswalde; the professor of radiology in Rostock, Dr.Boehme, the director of the Institute for Tropical Medicine in Hamburg, Peter Muehlens; and the director of the department for cancer research at the university clinic in Berlin, Dr. Unverricht.[965] Their visits had a cultural propagandistic aim with a view of influencing Greece economically and politically. Invitations to the Greek scientists and suggestions to the German authorities to award some of them an honorary doctorate were also among the purpose of their visits to Greece. Professor Schmidt, for example, reported that the cultural attaché of the German Embassy in Athens, Erich Boehringer, suggested to donate an apparatus for experiments to the Faculty of Forestry in Athens, on the occasion of his visit, in the hope that the Greeks would make orders of more apparati.[966] There were also some thoughts Germany to contribute to the creation and equipment of a laboratory for radiology at Athens University. This plan was considered of great propagandistic significance, as it would reinforce the German influence on the Greek science. It was underlined, however, that the donation of apparati

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[964] Draft of a Hans Hass' newapaper article (summer 1942) entitled "Expedition im Krieg" he was going to publish on a German newspaper in order to advertise the impending expedition, In: "Hans-Hass-Institut für Submarine-Forschung und Tauchtechnik" in Merzig in Germany, (Unclassified Hans Hass Archive, HHA) pp. 1 f. The lines that give the information of Hartmann's and Schartau's participation are written-off by Hass. See also: Newspaper article entitled "Mit Fussflossen in die Meerestiefe. Eine neue Expedition des Unterwasserjaegers Hans Hass bricht auf.", in: *B.Z-Mittag*, 06.07.1942; Hans Hass to his manager Thea Schneider-Lindemann, Berlin on 03.08.1942, in: HHA.

[965] See: Die Leitung der Auslands-Propaganda, NSDAP (Heinz Otto) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin (Herrn Gesandten Altenburg), "Veranstaltungen fuer die Zeit vom 1. April bis 31 Mai 1940" (Anlage 4), in: PAAA, R 60661.

[966] Report of Prof. Dr. Werner Schmidt entitled "Bericht ueber meine Reise im Auftrage der AO nach Griechenland, Rumaenien und Ungarn, 20. Mai – 9. Juni 1940, in: PAAA, R 60661.

and the creation of an institute for radiology on Greek soil would not be for the benefit of either the Germans or the Greeks, if the institute were not to be directed by a German scientist. The reason, argued the professor of radiology, Boehme, was that the use of the equipment needed experienced scientists and the Greeks did not have this experience. Furthermore, Greece purchased in any case alsmost all of its technical equipment from Germany and an institute with German apparati under Greek directorship would not mean much for the German interests.[967] What the Greeks mostly needed, concluded Boehme, was the German intellect and the German education and thus a radiology institute in Greece should operate under a German director.[968] There is no further evidence, however, to what extent the above plans came into being.

[967] Report of Dr. Boehme, Rostock entitled "Bericht ueber eine Vortragsreise nach Griechenland, Bulgarien und Ungarn vom 22.4. bis 10.5.1940 " to the Leitung der Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP. Amt Kultur, Hauptstelle Wissenschaft, on, 18.05.1940, PAAA R 60661.

[968] *Ibid.*

6. The German-Greek biological institute in Piraeus.

6.1. The Kaiser Wilhelm-Institute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem.

While the political and racial theories of National Socialism were influencing every aspect of German life, including science and research, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society (KWG) struggled to retain its autonomy both at the administrative and the scientific level. Established in 1913, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology was among the least politicised KW institutes during the National Socialist regime, even though the science of biology had been capitalised, distorted and mobilised by the ideologues and supporters of the Nazi movement. The KW Institute for Biology, however, succeeded in appointing non-Nazi scientists for managerial posts at its several departments and offered protection to scientists who were banned from continuing their research, which was regarded as threat to the regime. Moreover, innovative and high-quality basic research was being carried out without "direct Nazi-support", which surprised the international scientific community.[969] Two other Kaiser Wilhelm institutes that also continued to conduct research untainted by the Nazi ideology were the KW Institute for Biochemistry in Berlin-Dahlem and the KW Institute for Brain Research in Berlin-Buch, with which the Institute for Biology closely collaborated. These institutes were directed by Adolf Butenandt and Nikolai Timoféeff-Ressovsky respectively, and together with Fritz von Wettstein, Max Hartmann and Alfred Kuehn, who co-directed the KW Institute for Biology, constituted the key players in the biological community in Berlin, as they co-ordinated interdisciplinary projects of major international significance.

More precisely, Max Hartmann was appointed the director of the newly established KW Institute for Biology in 1914, and was the oldest appointee among the group of scientists referred to above. His work focused on the sexuality and genetics of protozoa as well as of invertebrates and fish. During the Nazi period he continued to work on the same areas discovering the fundamental materials of animal fertilisation within sea urchin, namely the *gamone* and *termone*, in 1939. Hartmann's work also involved hereditary physiology, a discipline of political significance and, therefore, it could be easily manipulated in order to receive financial support for his project. Hartmann's interests also included research on more complex animals, as well as on problems of conserving energy,

[969] KRISTIE MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika. Scientific Research in Nazi Germany. New York 1993, p. 110.

as formulated by Robert Meyer.[970] He was also engaged in writing on philosophical topics in biology, such as ageing and death, both related with the conservation of energy, as he had done earlier in the 1920s.[971] In 1939, due to the lack of experimental material for his work, Hartmann became involved in organising the German-Greek Institute for Biology in Piraeus, which was a branch of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem. He became the director of the new branch in 1942, ensuring in this way, the continuation of his research project. It should also be noted that the prominent zoologist Hans Bauer carried out cytogenetic research at Hartmann's department on the fruit fly *Drosophila melanogaster*, which was one of the most valuable of organisms in genetics and developmental biology.[972] Alfred Kuehn, the other director of the KW Institute for Biology was also engaged in this type of research. Hans Bauer succeeded Hartmann in Berlin-Dahlem after the latter's appointment as director of the German-Greek Institute for Biology.

Fritz von Wettstein took over as first director of the KW Institute for Biology in 1934, following the death of the previous director, Carl Correns, a year earlier. Von Wettstein, who was regarded as the leading plant geneticist in Germany, continued Correns's research project on physiological genetics in cultivated plants and also took it in new directions. He was not only an excellent scientist, but he also proved to be a great "diplomat" in dealing with Nazi authorities.[973] As a non-party member and a non-sympathiser of the National Socialism, von Wettstein was regarded as the only person who could shield the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology from Nazi-oriented projects, and thereby preserve its autonomy. He was also engaged in several administrative functions, becoming a senator of the KWG and head of the genetics and cytology division of the "Agriculture and Biology" section of the German Research Council (DFG/RFR). It is interesting to note that despite the fact that the DFG/RFR was controlled and led by Nazis, it seems that there was some latitude for scientists without a political agenda, such as von Wettstein, to influence the allocation of funding for the benefit of pure research, untainted by the whims of the government. At von Wettstein's department, three major

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[970] Curriculum Vitae of Hartmann, around 1936, in: Archiv zur Geschichte der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (MPGA), Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1.

[971] *Ibid.*

[972] UTE DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler. Portraet einer Wissenschaft im NS-Staat. Frankfurt/Main 1995, p. 144.

[973] Macrakis cites the opinion of two of his colleagues who described his character and acknowledged his diplomatic skills. See: MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 112.

research projects were carried out: the analysis of the effect of genes on the plant-ontogenetic; the investigation of the genetic aspects in the formation of patterns; and research on experimental mutation.[974] Mutation research as well as the study of developing physiology of the algae and of protozoa and their sexual behaviour were the major projects that also carried out by scientists of the KW Institute for Biology at the Zoological Station in Rovigno.[975]

The zoologist, Alfred Kuehn, was appointed to the post of second director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology, succeeding Richard Goldschmidt, who was forced to emigrate to the United States in 1935 due to his Jewish origins. When he arrived in Berlin-Dahlem, the focus of Kuehn's work was on the development physiology and genetics. His research object was the meal moth, *Ephestia kuehniella,* and the central problems of his research were similar to von Wettstein's, concerning the formation of patterns and the effect of genes.[976] Kuehn and von Wettstein had worked together when they were both professors at the University of Goettingen leading to the joint study of zoology and botany, thus transcending the traditional barriers between those disciplines.[977] In Berlin, they continued their collaboration by inviting colleagues to join forces in interdisciplinary projects. However, the range of qualified non-Nazi scientists available, who could contribute to these efforts, was crucial. Von Wettstein proved to be the right man to form a powerful team of researchers that would lead the way on some areas of basic biological research, surpassing their competitors in the United States.

At the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem, co-operation among scientists within different departments became an integral part of the whole research process. In fact, the advancement of biological science and particularly of genetics, where the Americans had taken over the lead, led the directors of the departments to work more closely together in order to respond to the American competition. The issue

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[974] DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler, p. 144.

[975] See file: Dr. J. Haemmerling, deutscher Direktor des Deutsch-Italienischen Instituts fuer Meeresbiologie Rovigno d'Istria an den Forschungsdienst Berlin-Dahlem on 27.07.1941, in: Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), R 73/ 11422; File: Moewus Franz Dr. Berlin KWI fuer Biologie. "Untersuchungen bei Algen; Untersuchungen ueber die Sexualitaet von Enteromorpha-Arten 1933-1940", in: BAK, R 73/13207; File: Beth Kurt, Dr. Rovigno d' Istria/ Italien. [Entwicklungs- und Fortpflanzungsphysiologische Untersuchungen am Algen 1940-42. (Als wissenschaftlicher Assistant)], in: BAK, R 73/10179.

[976] See: HANS-JOERG RHEINBERGER "Ephestia: Alfred Kuehns experimenteller Entwurf einer entwicklungsphysiologischen Genetik", in: *Dahlemer Archivgespraeche,* Band 4 (1999), pp. 81-118.

[977] MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 113.

of cultural and national prestige once again came to the fore, while the scientists at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology were struggling to retain their autonomy and protect research from "the sins of the cultural ministry".[978] Although it could not be argued that the American advancement in science gave rise to nationalistic feeling among German biologists, they still attempted to incite these nationalistic emotions when dealing with the Nazi authorities, particularly in arguing for the importance of their research in the national interest.[979] On a closer inspection, the type of biological research which was carried out at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes was of international interest and at the same time, it also seemed to be crucial for the Reich's interests and in particular for its war preparations.

Within all of the departments of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology the primary focus of research was genetics. One of the most important works that attracted international attention was the research on the effect of genes on the mutation of meal moth (*Ephestia kuehniella*). Alfred Kuehn, who was the director of the project, investigated how the genes affected visible qualities of the organism causing the production of hormones. The organic chemist Adolf Butenandt, joint his project in 1937, the year in which he became the director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biochemistry, replacing Carl Neuberg, who had been forced to resign and emigrate to Palestine and then to the Unites States. Butenandt, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1939 for his work on the isolation and purification of sex hormones, began to work on hormone synthesis and the relation of the hormones with cancer, when he arrived in Dahlem. Like v. Wettstein, he had previous experience of working together with Alfred Kuehn in Goettingen, during his studies. Their collaboration continued in Dahlem and their research on hormones focused on eye pigmentation in insects. Their work was considered to be so important that the Rockefeller Foundation funded their project from 1934 and it continued to do so until 1937, even without a request for funding.[980] This was an exception to the Foundation's funding policy towards Germany, as Rockefeller had stopped supporting all projects at German universities and the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes in 1933, in response to the new totalitarian regime.[981] It seems that by 1934, the institute had become a "centre

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[978] Max Planck to F. v. Wettstein, 13 April 1934, cited in: MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 116.

[979] PAUL FORMAN, "Scientific Internationalism and the Weimar Physicists: The Ideology and its manipulation in Germany after World War I", in: *ISIS*, Vol. 64, Issue 2, (June 1973), pp. 150-180, here p. 152.

[980] DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler, p. 64.

[981] *Ibid.*; MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 114.

of biology of which the whole world would be jealous", which would sweep away the "stiff American competition", as envisaged by von Wettstein, leading an officer of the Rockefeller Foundation to remark that "nowhere in the continent or England [could one] find chemists, embryologists, and geneticists willing to co-operate among themselves as these German scientists are."[982]

In the 1920s, as Germany was attempting to formulate its foreign cultural policy in an effort to surmount other cultural nations such as the French or the American, it adopted their policies. It seems that also during the 1930s, some foreign models for organising cultural and scientific activities were adopted by the Germans. This was the case of von Wettstein's plan to organise the research at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology in interdisciplinary working groups, following the model of the Morgan School in America.[983] Von Wettstein argued that biology and, in particular, the discipline of genetics underwent some changes and the collaboration between botanists and zoologists was now seemed essential. This interdisciplinary co-operation had also been a feature of his work with Alfred Kuehn in the Goettingen years.

Together, the three scientists, the zoologist, Kuehn, the organic chemist, Butenandt, and the botanist, von Wettstein, created three informal working groups for virus research in 1937.[984] Two years later, they made a proposal for the foundation of a "Branch for Virus Research of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes for Biochemistry and Biology" to the General Secretary of the Society, Ernst Telschow.[985] In 1941, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Virus Research was established and the existing groups were brought into its operations. They had already been provided with unique and complex instruments, such as the ultracentrifuge and the *Tilesius electrophoresis* apparatus, and they also had a greenhouse for their experiments on virus diseases at their disposal. Their aim was to decipher the composition and structure as clearly as possible of the chemical viruses in order to understand their reproduction processes. Mutations were their analytical tool. The oft-repeated justi-

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[982] Cited in: MACRAKIS, pp. 113 ff.

[983] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[984] Georg Melchers (from Wettstein's institute) was selected for the botany department and worked on plant viruses, Rolf Daneel (from Kuehn's institute) was in charge of the zoology department and worked on animal viruses, and Gerhard Schramm (from Butenandt's institute) was the director of the biochemistry department and worked on chemical research associated with the tobacco mosaic virus. Later, in 1942, a fourth department for entomology was added to the *"Arbeitsstaette fuer Virusforschung"* led by Gernot Bergold, who also was the director of the KWG branch for Entomology in Oppau.

[985] *Ibid.*, p. 119; DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler, pp. 148 ff.

fication for support for the official creation of a "workshop for virus research" ("*Arbeitsstaette fuer Virusforschung*") was purported to be the American advancement in the field at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in Princeton. In 1935, the American biologists had succeeded in isolating and crystallising the tobacco mosaic virus and they claimed that the infectious virus was a protein.[986] The virologists and biologists of the time disputed over the problem of whether the mutation occurred in proteins or in nucleic acid, both parts of the molecule. They sought to understand the molecular nature of the mutations, in other words, the mechanism of evolution. This "new terrain" of research required close collaboration among biochemists, botanists, and zoologists which would be of great interest both for German agriculture and the chemical industry. Despite the "basic" character of their research, the results could be shared with plant breeders and on a larger scale with those involved in advancing the German rural economy. The "pilot experiments" at the laboratories of the workshop could be later carried out as larger practical experiments at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes for Animal Breeding in Dummerstorf and for Breeding Research in Muechenberg.[987]

The "*Arbeitsstaette fuer Virusforschung*", initially received generous support from industrial capital, through the I.G. Farben and the Schering pharmaceutical company. Additional research funding came from the DFG, the Ministry for Education and the Ministry for Food and Agriculture, which contributed to the project at the end of the war.[988] It is certainly not surprising that in February 1941, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society obtained the sum of 500,000 marks for further virus research and the establishment of the institute, and additional 200,000 marks for the creation of an institute for the collection and research on wild and primitive forms of cultivated plants.[989]

This institute was eventually created towards the end of the war, in 1943. The initiative for the creation of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Cultivated Plants, as it was called, again came from von Wettstein. The idea of an institute of this kind that would be closely related to the Institute for Virus Research emerged from the increasing need for material for the mutation experiments on polyploidy. Given the importance of the polyploid organisms for the network of KW institutes described above and others that

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[986] *Ibid.*

[987] MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p.119.

[988] DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler, pp. 74-77, 80-83 (tables), also 148 f; MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 120.

[989] DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler, pp. 148 f.

were planned beyond the German borders, a briefly introduction to this area of research will now be undertaken.[990]

Polyploidy is the process of genome doubling that gives rise to organisms with multiple sets of chromosomes.

n sets of chromosomes per nucleus

Diploids	⟶	2n of chromosomes
Triploids	⟶	3n of chromosomes
Tetraploids	⟶	4n of chromosomes
.....		
Polyploids	⟶	vn of chromosomes, (v>2)

Polyploidy appears almost exclusively in the plant kingdom. It is much rarer in animals but it is found in some insects, fish, amphibians, and reptiles. Polyploidy is also found in some bryophytes and algae and these were the subjects used in the experiment of von Wettstein.[991] The zoologist, Max Hartmann, also experimented with marine algae in an attempt to understand their fertilisation process and determine their sexuality. Polyploidy can arise from spontaneous somatic chromosome duplication or as a result of non-disjunction of the homologous chromosomes during meiosis resulting in diploid gametes. It seems that these two explanations of the origins of polyploidy, that is, the somatic doubling and the unreduced gametes, were the crucial areas of interest for the German specialists. This kind of polyploid (autopolyploid) involves only one species and it is usual in cultivated plants. Tetraploids, such as tobacco and potato, were the primary subjects of the experiments carried out by the scientists involved in von Wettstein's mutation research project, because the tetraploid plants can breed with each other and a new species could be formed within one generation. Polyploidy was, therefore, recognised as a prominent force shaping the evolution of plants.

It can also be artificially induced in the plant-breeding laboratory by treating dividing cells with drugs, such as *colchicine*, which inhibits cell division. *Colchicine* was perhaps the only chemical that had been already used since 1937 for the production of polyploidy which was resistant to extreme climatic conditions.[992] It is true that many poly-

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[990] I am grateful to the professor of genetics, Costas Krimbas, who helped me to understand the mechanism of polyploids and the relevant readings that I was not familiar with previously. However, the responsibility for any misconceptions is mine exclusively.

[991] DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler, p. 145.

[992] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

ploids are tougher than their diploid progenitors and this is exactly what made the polyploidy important for the Germans, who were looking for species that could be cultivated on German soil: in particular, their high ability to adapt themselves to extreme conditions. The degree of *ploidy* often correlates sometimes with the morphological features, geographic distribution, or ecological preferences of a species, apart from temperature. Other factors can induce chromosome doubling, such as the degree of hydration and certain chemicals, including X-rays, ultraviolet radiation, mechanical injury, infection caused by certain viruses or mites, and genetics. The tobacco mosaic virus research was carried out within this framework, in which the working groups of Kuehn, von Wettstein, and Butenandt sought to understand the nature of mutations through the action of the virus on tobacco. Timoféeff-Ressovsky's work was also carried out from the same perspective at the department of experimental genetics in the institute for Brain Research. He developed an influential theory of how mutations occur by experimenting on the fruit fly species, *Drosophila funebris* and *Drosophila melanogaster*.[993] His research focused on the fields of population and radiation genetics in order to study the rules of genetic inheritance.

Besides the tobacco mosaic virus, research on mutations and polyploidy was carried out using primitive forms of cultivated plants. The rationale was different, however, from the virus research. At the new KW Institute for Cultivated Plants in Tuettenhof near Vienna, von Wettstein and Hans Stubbe, the director of the institute, planned to undertake experiments on wild and primitive forms of cultivated plants in order to produce artificially polyploids that would be more resistant to the cold, drought and other extreme conditions. With the method of "back-cross-breeding" of cultivated plans, it was hoped that the genetic mechanism, which makes certain species resistant to extreme circumstances, would be revealed. The discovery of these species provided the strategic key for plant breeders. Hans Stubbe was a well-known plant geneticist, whose research was focused on mutations with snapdragons (*Antirrhinum*) at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Breeding Research in Muechenberg. He also worked on radiation genetics, in other words on the mutative effect of X and ultraviolet rays on plants. He was one of the best examples of a scientist who promoted interdisciplinary research among the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes, long before he became director of the institute. His pioneering proj-

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[993] See: DEICHMANN, Biologen Unter Hitler, pp. 159-168; MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, pp. 120 f; DIANE PAUL, COSTAS KRIMBAS, "Nikolai V. Timoféeff-Ressovsky", in: *Scientific American*, , Vol. 266, No. 2 (1992), pp. 86-92.

ect on mutation research demanded close co-operation with the physicists and physicians.[994] In 1936, Stubbe was dismissed from the Institute for Breeding Research together with two other scientists, on the grounds that they were disrupting the smooth operation of the institute by helping Jews and disseminating Marxist literature in the institute.[995] Stubbe's Marxist political past cost him a professorial career at a German university, despite his reputation as an excellent plant geneticist.[996] However, von Wettstein was the one who protected him and ensured that he received a DFG grant, and furthermore, appointed him as a director of the newly established institute. It should also be noted that the Senate of the Society considered Stubbe for the directorial position in the German-Bulgarian Institute for Agricultural Research in 1941, which was a Kaiser Wilhelm branch established in Sofia in 1942.[997] However, von Wettstein's attempts to create an institute in Tuttenhof did not meet with the approval of the director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Breeding Research, Wilhelm Rudorf. Rudorf's institute, which was created by Erwin Baur in 1927, focused on the breeding of plants that were resistant to extreme climatic conditions and parasites and it was incorporated into the four-year autarky plan in 1936. Rudorf regarded the new institute in Tuttenhof as antagonistic and he tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to prevent its establishment.

The wild and primitive forms of cultivated plants were of great interest to both Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes in Muechenberg and Tuttenhof and expeditions to build up their collections were funded by the DFG/RFR. It is noteworthy that the Institute for Cultivated Plants was created on the model of the institute of the famous Russian geneticist Nikolai I. Vavilov.[998] His institute had become known world-wide for the rich plant collections while his theories of plant genetics and plant breeding had a great influence on plant genetics at the time. Vavilov argued that there were "centres of origin" of cultivated plants, namely specific geographical territories in which one species of cultivated plants or its wild form existed in enormous varieties. He mentioned that there were seven major "plant pools" around the world. Two of them were located on the American continent and the rest could be found in the area around the Mediterranean (the Balkans

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[994] DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler, pp. 98 ff.

[995] MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p.123

[996] For Stubbe's political stance and its impact on his career see: SUSANNE HEIM, Kalorien, Kautschuk, Karrieren. Pflanzenzuechtung und landwirtschaftliche Forschung in Kaiser-Wilhelm-Instituten 1933-1945. Goettingen 2003, in particular, the third part of the book.

[997] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

[998] DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler, p. 152.

and Asia Minor), south-west Asia (India, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Armenia, Kurdistan), the Caucasus, as well as in eastern China and Ethiopia.[999] Expeditions to these territories had been undertaken since 1935, when the first "Hindukusch Expedition" took place under the leadership of Arnold Scheibe, the future director of the German-Bulgarian Institute. Further expeditions which were organised and sponsored by the Reich's Research Council (RFR) were made to Tibet in 1939 and to the Balkan Peninsula during the course of the war in 1941 and 1942.[1000]

Von Wettstein envisaged the institute as the centre of a network of plant collecting stations ranging "from the polar sea to the Mediterranean, from the Atlantic to the extreme continental region, from the seacoast to the Alps zone".[1001] The already existing institutes had been established by the Society in Germany and the others that were planned to be established in the Balkan region, namely in Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, but also in Spain, would make up the continental network. It was described by von Wettstein as an "observing network across the Mediterranean", and moreover, as a "biological penetration in the Mediterranean", which would guarantee German control over the plant genetic resources of the continent.[1002] The global network announced by von Wettstein, had to be created during the war at any cost, as the wild forms of cultivated plants were in danger in such an unstable environment.

Himmler was personally interested in these expeditions and the SS became involved in these activities. The expeditions were also considered to be military enterprises and they were supported and accompanied by the German army. Scientists, together with military personnel, became engaged in collecting primitive forms of plants from the occupied territories and regions where access would become more difficult in the near future. The task was not easy however, due to the events caused by the war such as bombardments and resettlements, which put the existence of wild plants at risk. Therefore,

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[999] SUSANNE HEIM, "Forschung fuer die Autarkie. Agrarwissenschaft an Kaiser-Wilhelm-Instituten im Nationalsozialismus", in: *Ibid.* (Hg.), Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus. Goettingen 2002, p. 156, also the footnote 39. For an early version of the paper in English see: SUSANNE HEIM, "Research for Autarky. The Contribution of Scientists to Nazi Rule in Germany", in: *Ergebnisse 4. Vorabdrucke aus dem Forschungsprogramm "Geschichte der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus"* 2001.

[1000] See: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2963, 2964.

[1001] Cited in: HEIM, "Forschung fuer die Autarkie", p. 159; see also: DEICHMANN, Biologen Unter Hitler, pp. 152 ff, and 182 f.

[1002] Fritz von Wettstein to the General Secretary of the KWG, Ernst Telschow, on 04.01.1941, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 14, Nr. 1.

the job had to be done as quickly as possible.[1003] Three major expeditions were made during the war, two of them in the Balkan region and the third one to Russia, where the *Sonderkommando SS*, which organised the mission in 1943, stripped the many Soviet breeding stations of their material including Vavilov's precious collections.[1004] In the Balkans, the first excursion took place to Albania and northern Greece in 1941 and the second to the island of Crete and the Peloponnese in 1942. Both excursions were made by order of the High Commander of the German Army (*Oberkommando der Werhmacht*, OKW) and sponsored by the German Research Council (RFR/DFG). Both of these botanical expeditions were led by Hans Stubbe.

The aim of the first mission was the systematic collection of wild species of cultivated plants in Germany, which were located in the border area between Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece. In the second expedition, the German specialists sought to find evidence of the origin and creation of cultivated species, in other words the evolution genetics.[1005] In the second expedition to Greece, apart from Stubbe, the members of the group which visited Crete included: Otto v. Wettstein and K. H. Rechinger of the Museum of Natural History in Vienna, K. Zimmermann from the KW Institute for Brain Research, and H. Behnke from the *Wehrmacht*. The Peloponnesian group was comprised of R. Freisleben from the Institute for Plant Research and Plant Breeding in Halle, W. Rothmaler from the Botanical Museum of Berlin, and the *SS-Sturmmann*, G. Niethammer who represented the Vienna Museum of Natural History. In the Peloponnese, the primary focus was on the conditions for the improvement of crops, while, in Crete, the aim was to make the island self-sufficient by transforming it into a huge natural laboratory. The rationale for these objectives was not only to collect material for the laboratories in Germany but also to ensure the continuous food supply for the *Wehrmacht*[1006] in its operations to Greece and also to North Africa and the Middle East. Crete was of interest to the Germans for another reason: the fauna and flora of the island was so rich and unexplored to a great extent that the discovery of new species would put Germany in the

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[1003] HEIM, "Forschung fuer die Autarkie", p. 160.

[1004] See: UWE HOSSFELD and CARL-GUSTAF THORNSTROEM, " 'Rasches Zupachen'. Heinz Bruecher und das botanische Sammekommando der SS nach Russland 1943", in: SUSANNE HEIM (Hg.), Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus. Goettingen 2002, pp. 119-144.

[1005] "Stubbe's Bericht ueber die im Auftrage des OKW und des Reichsforschungsrates durchgefuehrte zweite Biologische Forschungsreise nach Peloponnes und nach Kreta 1942", in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2964/1.

[1006] *Ibid.*

leading position in plant and animal collections in comparison to other cultural nations. In this regard, it was reported that England only had a thirty year old collection, which consisted largely of fossils that had been collected by the female scientist, Bates.[1007] The cultural political dimension of those expeditions was very evident and Stubbe highlighted their cultural significance, despite the fact that the botanical excursions were fully justified by the war-time demands alone.

Stubbe also reported that the collection of primitive and wild species in Greece was of major importance not only for the research on cultivated plants but also for research on cattle breeding. It should be noted that, traditionally, the German speaking researchers were the ones that were mostly interested in the study of Greek fauna. Most German, Austrian and Swiss natural history museums -including the very well-known one in Vienna that sent delegates to Greece in 1942 expedition- had large collections from Greece in contrast with the French and the British museums that had acquisitions from other parts of the world.[1008] Apart from the systematic collection of primitive species of domestic cattle the zoological investigation in Greece included the geographical mapping of these species in order to obtain a clearer picture of genetics and evolution in zoology.[1009] The co-operation between the two disciplines of botany and zoology was again underlined in order fundamental biological problems to be successfully handled. Apart from the rich material from Crete's fauna and flora that Stubbe and his group brought back to Germany, he made a detailed report on the island's agricultural production and its potential future development. Some of the most valuable collections he sent to Germany for the experiments at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology and its branches included fungi, algae, and moss, and also live insects, such as *drosophila melanigaster*.[1010] As for the Peloponnese, the group of scientists made contact with the local director of the German-Greek Institute for Biology in Piraeus, Otto Schartau, without reporting whether there had been any further collaboration between the institute and

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1007 *Ibid.*

1008 ANASTASIOS LEGAKIS, "Recent Trends in the Study of the Greek Fauna", in: 2e Congrés International sur la Zoogéographie et l' Écologie de la Grèce et des Régions Avoisinantes, Athènes, Septembre 1981, [*Biologia Gallo-Hellenica* 1985 – Volume 10 Extrait], pp.17-20, here p.18. I am grateful to Prof. Legakis for having drawn my attention to this reference.

1009 "Stubbe's Bericht ueber die im Auftrage des OKW und des Reichsforschungsrates durchgefuehrte zweite Biologische Forschungsreise nach Peloponnes und nach Kreta 1942", in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2964/1.

1010 *Ibid.*

Stubbe's groups. Nevertheless, the biggest chemical company in the country, "*Chimika Lipasmata*", was greatly interested in co-operating with the German scientists and became directly involved in the expedition sending its best chemist, M. Nevros, to accompany the German mission.[1011] The report made by Stubbe on the Peloponnese largely concentrated on the agricultural production of the region and on the means for its improvement. Nonetheless, the group collected a great deal of domestic plants as well as their primitive forms although there is no account of animals collected. Unfortunately, part of the plant collection was destroyed soon after their return to Germany, due to "a catastrophe", as Rothmaler reported, apparently meaning the Berlin bombardment by the Allies.[1012] In 1944 plans for another expedition to the Balkans, in particular to the mountain of Olympus in Greece, were made by the SS "*Ahnenerbe*" which would be sponsored by the DFG. However, the expedition was never made, as it has been described in chapter four, due to the stiff resistance of the Greek partisans in the region that could put the research group at risk. Instead, plans for an expedition to the Perinea mountains in Spain were discussed.[1013]

It was clear that the botanical expeditions in the Balkans went beyond the aims of pure scientific research and the collection of indigenous plants and animals. It is no coincidence that both of them took place during the war when the need for supplies for the German army had increased. If the rationale of the Four-Year Plan was to make Germany self-sufficient in raw materials and independent from foreign currency so that the Reich would be ready for war in four years time, Germany should also had to achieve self-sufficiency while the country was at war. The development of new plant and animal species at German labs with material from the Balkans, the reorganisation of agriculture and cattle breeding in Greece, the use of chemicals for fighting vermin and fertilisers for accelerating crops in Crete and Peloponnese should also be seen in the context of the policy of autarky.

In spite of the fact that the scientists managing the projects of mutation research, particularly, the research in polyploidy were neutral in the sense that they did not support National Socialism, they were engaged in a very political agenda, which combined two

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1011 *Ibid.*

1012 WERNER ROTHMALER, "Floristische Ergebnisse einer Reise nach dem Peloponnes. Ergebnisse einer biologischen Forschungreise nach dem Peloponnes und nach Kreta 1942 im Auftrag des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht und des Reichsforschungsrates. X. Mitteilung". In: *Botanische Jahrbuecher*, 73:4 (1944), pp. 418-452, here p. 418. I am grateful to Prof. Hagen Fleischer for this source.

1013 See chapter 4.6.

clearly controversial objectives: autarky and expansion. The support given to the botanical research by the DFG and the SS was justified by the Nazi concept of the 'expansion of German living space' (*Erweiterung des deutschen Lebensraums*), which was initiated in 1939 with Germany's invasion to Poland.[1014] In October of the same year, Heinrich Himmler, who became the "Reich's Commissar for the Consolidation of the German People" (*Reichscommissar fuer die Festigung deutschen Volkstums*), ordered the 'Germanisation" (*Germanisierung*) of the annexed territories. The concept of '*Lebensraum*' was adopted and scientifically justified at that time by the agricultural scientist Conrad Meyer who was in charge of the section of "Agriculture and Biology" of the German Research Council (RFR) and supported the expeditions to the Balkans. Von Wettstein and Kuehn were in charge of two of the six divisions of Meyer's section, including genetics, cytology and developmental physiology, exerting their influence upon the RFR for the allocation of funds in favour of their research projects. Meyer, in contrast, was a high ranking SS official and the author of the memorandum for the "General Plan for the East" (*Generalplan Ost*). This plan contained a comprehensive scheme for the legal, economic and spatial reconstruction of the annexed future territories between the Oder River and the Ural Mountains. It was envisaged that new settlement areas for German farmers would be placed under the control of Himmler during the period of reconstruction, and the new settlers would be selected on racial grounds in line with the ideas of the SS.[1015]

The Kaiser Wilhelm scientists went along with the above concept in order to convince the DFG/RFR officials to support their work. In 1942, in his application for the Balkan expedition, Stubbe argued:

> The systematic collection and maintenance of such plants [primitive strains of crops – UD and BMH] is priority for the German breeding research, because the extraordinary diversity of these plans in the hitherto *still unexplored mountains of the Balkans* and their adaptation to extreme living conditions guarantee the finding of cold-, drought-, and para-

[1014] UTE DEICHMANN, BENNO MUELLER-HILL, "Biological Research at Universities and Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes in Nazi Germany" in: MONIKA RENNEBERG, MARK WALKER (ed.), Science, Technology and National Socialism. Cambridge 1994, pp. 160-183, here p. 176.

[1015] *Ibid.*, p. 177. See also: ROESSLER MECHTILD, SABINE SCHLEIERMACHER (Hg.), Der "Generalplan Ost". Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs- und Vernichtungspolitik. Berlin 1993.

site-resistant strains among them. These plants, with their precious qualities, play a decisive role in the breeding of generally resistant strains for the German East.[1016]

It seems that the plant-collecting expeditions to the Balkan peninsula were regarded not only as part of the German war economy but also as a unique enterprise in that region that would give German science precedence over other nations, principally America. In the grant applications submitted to the DFG between 1937 and 1942, von Wettstein and Alfred Kuehn repeatedly emphasised the danger of losing priority in all fields to researches in the USA. Combined with the self-sufficiency plan in the expanded Germany in eastern and south-eastern Europe this argument guaranteed them the much-needed support. Culture, science, economy, and military were all given almost equal importance within the German foreign policy agenda, even during the war, in which the objectives "*kriegswichtig*" and "*kulturwichtig*" were two sides of the same coin.

[1016] Cited in: DEICHMANN, MUELLER-HILL, "Biological Research", p. 177, emphasis added.

6.2. The creation and operation of the German-Greek Biological Institute[1017]

The establishment of a bilateral research centre in occupied Greece is perhaps the clearest case in which natural sciences were put to the service not only of Germany's war planning, but also of its foreign cultural policy in a peripheral Balkan country that was neither a pioneer in natural sciences nor had any significant and indigenous tradition in the field. Why, then, were the Germans so keen to develop scientific relations with Greece, which was traditionally associated with the classical culture of antiquity? How did the German scientists exploit the "cultural argument" when they became involved in establishing an institute in Piraeus, Greece's biggest port? What was the link between the institute and the *Wehrmacht's* activity and interests in the region? What other interests was the research station expected to serve apart from the scientific ones? To what extent were the initial plans of the German scientists and the Greeks realised? Given that the material regarding the establishment of the German-Greek institute is either fragmented or inaccessible, the above questions will be dealt with as comprehensively as possible, noting that some aspects of the institute's story have yet to be unfolded.

The initial plans to create a German-Greek institute for biological research date back to 1937-38. However, the original idea of establishing a research station for marine biology by the Germans on the Greek coasts was much older. Its roots can be traced back to 1926, when –as we saw in the first chapter - Wilhelm Kraft, a German merchant made a detailed proposal to the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, indicating that the southwestern coastline of Peloponnese would be the best place for carrying out marine biology research. Greece was regarded as an alternative base in case the KWG permanently lost its zoological station in Rovigno. Nevertheless, the Greek interest in a marine biological institute had not been aroused by the Germans. Aware of its significance for the state's fishery and economy, Greece set up a small hydrobiological station just outside the capital of Athens at Palaion Phaliron, in 1924. The station was built on the recommendations of the Italian ichthyologist Vinciguera, who was invited by the Greek government for that purpose. However, this station did not produce any work of great significance, thus, failing to contribute to the modernisation of the Greek economy. According to the zo-

[1017] For an early version of this chapter see: MARIA ZARIFI, "Das deutsch-griechische Forschungsinstitut fuer Biologie in Piraeus, 1942-1944", in: SUSANNE HEIM, (Hg.), Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus. Goettingen 2002, pp. 206-232.

ologist, Georgios Pantazis, the main reasons for its failure was the fact that the station was too small for the demands of the modern state. In addition, it was located on the coast with unfavourable conditions for marine studies and near to the capital, which affected the quality of the water. Moreover, the limited financial support from the state and the lack of permanent scientific and technical personnel, as well as the lack of equipment and a library meant that the creation of a new hydrobiological station became a more pressing need.[1018] The existing station was affiliated to the Ministry of Finance, which appointed the scientific personnel, although there was only one member of staff, who acted as both its director and at the same time, the supervisor of fishery in the ministry.[1019]

In November 1935, Pantazis submitted a complete proposal to the Greek Thalassography Committee, which supervised the station at Palaion Phaleron, for the transfer of the old station to a new location. Pantazis, who was himself a member of the committee, also proposed that the station should be affiliated to Athens University, however, his proposal was rejected.[1020] He seemed to be the only person at that time who was serious in promoting the creation of a new marine station and worked very hard to convince the Greek authorities of the importance and the necessity of the station. As a professor of zoology and the director of the university's Zoological Museum, he was the only expert in the field who knew that a modern and efficient marine station would not only contribute to the country's economy, but would also provide a boost for the Greek science. In 1936, Pantazis took the initiative to seek private funding for the purchase of land suitable for a new hydrobiological station that would be affiliated to the university.[1021] He insisted on this affiliation for several reasons. Firstly, the university and, in particular, the Zoological Museum had scientific personnel that would be able to work at the station. In addition, the museum's library would be at the disposal of the station and

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[1018] Pantazis to the Ministry of Education on 17.05.1937, in: Archive of the Zoological Museum of Athens University (AZM), File Nr. 504-719, Jan. 1937 - Dec. 1938. Also in: Pantazis to the Ministry of Education on 14.03.1939, in: AZM, File Nr. 720-900, Jan. 1939 - Dec. 1940.

[1019] *Ibid.*

[1020] Pantazis to the Greek Thalassography Committee on 22.11.1935, in: AZM, File Nr. 204-342, Jan. - Dec. 1935.

[1021] Pantazis to the Rector of Athens University on 25.06.1936, in: AZM, File Nr. 343-503, Jan. – Dec. 1936. See also: Pantazis to the Ministry of Education on 17.05.1937, in: AZM, File Nr. 504-719, Jan. 1937 - Dec. 1938; and Pantazis to the Ministry of Education on 14.03.1939, in: AZM, File Nr. 720-900, Jan. 1939 - Dec. 1940.

its existing contacts on an international level would be of great benefit to the station. However, the most important reason lay in the fact that the university could guarantee more finances than would have been available before.[1022] Unfortunately, Pantazis did not receive much from private contributions. Moreover, he abandoned his efforts when the Ministry of Finance took the initiative to create an Institute for Environmental Fishery and a hydrobiological station.[1023]

In 1934, Adolf Meyer, a professor at Hamburg University and the director of the German-Dominican Institute for Tropical Research since 1939, made a proposal to the Greek Ministries of Education and Finance for the creation of a "Research Institute for Marine Biology" on the island of Samos. His interest in creating an institute in Greece stemmed from what he called "biological archaeology".[1024] Having studied Aristotle's work on the observation and classification of animals, Meyer noted that it had not been possible for many of the animals described by the Greek philosopher, more precisely the marine animals, to have been identified by the German scientists by that time. He believed that many of those animals might still be living in Greek waters and their discovery might provide some answers to contemporary biological problems. The arguments of the Hamburg scientist, in 1934, were similar to those made by the Kaiser Wilhelm scientists in Dahlem, particularly with regard to the primitive forms of cultivated plants and animals, and the theory about the polyploids, which led to a series of expeditions in search of those species. In emphasising the practical significance of the institute, Meyer argued further that it would modernise the Greek fishery, industry and more generally, the national economy by providing marine products to the eastern European market, as Spain and Portugal did in the west and Norway in the north.[1025] However, the investigation of the *genic* make-up (*Laichgruende*) of the living fish in the Aegean Sea was a precondition for achieving that objective.[1026] It was true that Greek fishery remained backward with regard to other countries referred to above and Meyer underlined that this was due to the limited knowledge available about the Greek marine fauna not only to the Greek scientists but also to the rest international scientific community. He also stressed that it was not

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[1022] Pantazis to the Greek Thalassography Committee on 22.11.1935, in: AZM, File Nr. 204-342, Jan. - Dec. 1935.

[1023] Pantazis to the Ministry of Education on 14.03.1939, in: AZM, File Nr. 720-900, Jan. 1939 - Dec. 1940.

[1024] "Memorandum ueber die Schaffung eines Forschungsinstitutes fuer Meeresbiologie auf Samos", 25.02.1934, in: AZM, File Nr. 1-203, Jan. – Dec. 1934.

[1025] *Ibid.* p. 2.

[1026] *Ibid.*

only the marine fauna but the fauna and flora of the whole country in general, as well as, that of the southern Balkans which remained almost unknown to the scientists.[1027] It is interesting to note that in order to get support by the German officials, Stubbe put forward the same arguments in 1941 that Meyer had made some years earlier to the Greek authorities without managing to convince them. On the other hand, it seems that the complex role suggested by Meyer for the institute in Samos, as well as its structure was more or less the same as the plans for the German-Greek Institute for Biology established six years later. Meyer argued that the marine station would aim to carry out research on the fish biology, the biological archaeology and general scientific investigation of the Aegean Sea. He claimed that this triple function of the institute, would be the first of its kind. What the Zoological Station in Naples was for the west and north Europe, the Greek institute would be for the east, namely for the Balkans and Turkey.[1028] According to Meyer's plans, the institute would be comprised of two departments, the national Greek section, focused on the modernisation of Greek fishery and therefore financed by the Greek government, and the international one, focused on "biological archaeology". The funds for the international department would come from several institutions, which would lease working spaces as they had done in Naples. Meyer suggested twenty-two foundations both German and non-German that could lease five working spaces in total from the future institute. Among these, he mentioned the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, the Nobel Institute in Stockholm, the Royal Society in London, the Rockefeller and Carnegie Institutes, as well as some foundations of humanities, such as the Society of Ancient Culture and the Kant Society of Berlin.[1029]

It seems that Meyer did not officially delegate any German institution when he made the proposal to the Greek government, but rather he acted of his own accord. Nonetheless, he was given support by a Greek biologist before he addressed the Greek ministries and this person seems to have been his link with Greece. This biologist was Emmanouil Sarris, who had been an assistant at the Institute for Environmental Research at Hamburg University since 1933. He had not only encouraged Meyer to continue with his plan, but had also stressed the practical dimension of the project and its significance for modern research in Greece and the advancement of the national econ-

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[1027] *Ibid.*

[1028] *Ibid.* p. 3.

[1029] *Ibid.* pp. 4 f.

omy.[1030] Since the late 1920s, Sarris had been granted an *Alexander von Humboldt* scholarship to study animal physiology in Hamburg. He was regarded as an extraordinarily gifted student and he continued to receive the grant until 1934, having already been awarded his doctoral degree in 1931.[1031] The *Alexander v. Humboldt* Foundation considered him to be a valuable asset as he was expected to take a leading position in public life after his return to his own country, thus influencing the Greeks in favour of Germany. It was not surprising therefore that Sarris suggested working with Meyer, if the institute was established in Greece. Sarris, like many other foreign researchers who had received a scholarship in Germany, played the cultural political role he was expected to play, even when he was still in Hamburg.[1032] Nevertheless, Meyer's proposal was rejected by the Greek authorities due to the fact that the Greek state was not in a position to support the project financially.[1033] In addition, his proposal was scientifically problematic. The German scientist was not an expert in hydrobiology (he was a professor of the history of natural sciences), and in addition, the station would require experienced personnel that was not available in Greece.[1034] Furthermore, the location of the proposed station in Samos on the east Aegean Sea, was considered by the Greek specialists to be inappropriate for marine biological research, as the sea currents could only bring very limited and poor quality material to the island's surroundings.[1035]

[1030] *Ibid.* p. 2.

[1031] Geschaeftsbericht der Alexander v. Humboldt Stiftung fuer das Jahre 1930-1931; Geschaeftsbericht der Alexander v. Humboldt Stiftung fuer das Jahre 1933-1934, both documents in: Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), ZSg. 137/ 18.

[1032] In 1933/34 he published two works with the support of Humboldt Foundation, entitled: "Die individuellen Unterschiede bei Hunden" and "Ausbildung statt Abrichtung swe Blindhunde". In: Geschaeftsbericht der Alexander v. Humboldt Stiftung fuer das Jahre 1933-1934 in: BAK, ZSg. 137/ 18.

[1033] Meyer suggested that Greece should contribute half of the amount needed for the institute, namely 10,000 marks. See "Memorandum ueber die Schaffung eines Forschungsinstitutes fuer Meeresbiologie auf Samos", 25.02.1934, in: AZM, File Nr. 1-203, Jan. – Dec. 1934, p. 4. The Greek state, however, could only afford the one tenth of the money needed. See: G. Pantazis, Director of the Zoological Institute at Athens University, to Adolf Meyer, on 22 June 1934, in: AZM, file Nr. 1-203, Jan. – Dec. 1934.

[1034] G. Pantazis to the Rector of Athens University on 07.06.1934, in: AZM, file Nr. 1-203, Jan. – Dec. 1934.

[1035] G. Pantazis to Adof Meyer, on 22 June 1934, also: Pantazis to the Rector of Athens University on 07.06.1934, both documents in: AZM, file Nr. 1-203, Jan. – Dec. 1934.

In 1937, this idea was raised again, this time by the Greek scientist, Konstantinos Tzonis, who made the proposal to the zoologist Max Hartmann.[1036] Tzonis had worked as a researcher alongside Hartmann in his department from August 1936 until November 1937. Hartmann, together with Fritz von Wettstein, warmly supported Tzonis proposal and they became involved in the negotiations for the institute on behalf of the Germans. Tzonis was committed to acting as their link on the Greek side. After his return to Greece, he contacted the Greek authorities in order to promote his plans for the institute in his capacity as the director of the Institute for Chemical Biology and Cancer Research Centre in Athens. The climate was favourable for such discussion, given that the Greek President, the dictator Ioannis Metaxas, was an enthusiastic supporter of Hitler. As well as Metaxas, many Greek intellectuals were also admirers of German culture. In fact, almost the half of the professor at Athens University and four fifths of the professors at the Technical University had been educated in Germany.[1037] This included the Governor of Athens, Konstantinos Kotzias, who had strongly supported the idea of the institute from the onset.[1038] Kotzias, with whom Tzonis made contact, was an eager supporter of Hitler and he was regarded by the Germans as their most trustworthy person in Greece, a close ally and friend of National Socialism.

The contacts between the Greeks and the Germans had continued during the German occupation in Greece, since April 1941. Notable personalities of the Greek scientific community as well as these from the Greek political and economic circles participated in the discussions with Max Hartmann and Erich Boehringer, the German archaeologist and cultural attaché of the German Embassy in Athens. These included Konstantinos Georgikopoulos, the Munich educated professor of theoretical mechanics in Athens Technical University and the rector at the same university from 1937 until 1939; Konstantinos Logothetopoulos, the professor of gynecology, who served minister of education and vice-president in the future first occupation government; Spiros Dontas, the professor of physiology and member of the Athens Academy of Sciences and since

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[1036] Tzonis to Hartmann, 15.12.1937, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1490; see also Hartmann's "Report on the establishment of a German-Greek research institute for biology in Athens" sent to the KWG on 15.1.1938, in MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1490; Hartmann to Ernst Telschow, General Director of the KWG, 26.8.1940, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/3.

[1037] HAGEN FLEISCHER, Στέμμα και Σβάστικα. Η Ελλάδα της Κατοχής και της Αντίστασης 1941-1944. Τόμος Α'. Athens 1989, p. 118.

[1038] German Embassy in Athens to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, 12.8.1940, MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/3.

1942 vice-president of the Academy; and Kanellopoulos the owner of the company "Chemical Products and Fertilisers" (*Chimika Lipasmata*).

Although the establishment of the biological institute in Piraeus was planned as a bilateral project, it was only during the German occupation in Greece and after long negotiations that the institute came into being, basically as a German institution. In October 1940, the Italian army attacked Greece as a reaction against the German military presence in Romania. Hitler criticised the Italian move, however, he held a neutral position. When the Italian army was close to being defeated by the unexpectedly strong resistance from the Greeks, the German troops were forced to march into Greece, occupying part of the country. In this way, the Germans sought to prevent any damage to the prestige of the Axis forces', as well as the British advance into the Balkans, which could put the German plans to seize the Romanian oil fields in danger. Despite their aggressive act, the German occupied forces reassured the Greeks that they were well disposed towards the Greek people and their march was "a war against England on Greek soil".[1039] By the end of April 1941, the first Greek government to collaborate with the occupiers was formed.

The changing political situation in Greece clearly affected the foundation of the planned institute in Piraeus. The establishment of the institute was enacted by a legislative decree on 22 April 1942,[1040] and the final agreement between the Greek government and the Kaiser Wilhelm Society was signed on 31 October of the same year.[1041] According to the agreement, the institute would promote cultural and scientific relations between the two participating countries.[1042] The research institute would be located in Piraeus and it would operate under the auspices of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and the Athens Academy of Sciences. The latter however, expressed some misgivings about its involvement during the occupation period.[1043] Therefore, it was reported that the Greeks

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[1039] See: HAGEN FLEISCHER, "Siegfried in Hellas. Das nationalsozialistische Griechenlandbild und die Behandlung der griechischen Zivilbevoelkerung seitens der deutschen Besatzungsbehoerden, 1941-1944", in: ARMIN KERKER (Hg.), Griechenland – Entfernungen in die Wirklichkeit. Hamburg 1988, pp. 26-48, here p. 30.

[1040] Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως της Ελλάδος. (ΦΕΚ) (Official Gazette), Τεύχος Πρώτον, Αρ. Φύλλου 103, 30.04.1942.

[1041] Contract (Vertrag) on 31.10.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2951/3. The contract was signed by Logothetopoulos and Hartmann. There is also the Greek translation in the same file.

[1042] Article 1 of the contract (Vertrag) on 31.10.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2951/3.

[1043] See: GEORGE SKLAVOUNOS, "Λόγος στην Ακαδημία το Χειμώνα 1942. «Η Ακαδημία αρνήται»", in: *Επιθεώρηση Τέχνης*, Year H', Band IE', Issue Nr. 87-88, March - April 1962, pp. 298-299.

senting the Society. The German ambassador Guenther Altenburg, and Fritz von Twardowski, who was the director of the cultural section of the Foreign Ministry, would represent the Ministry.[1051] In June 1943, Twardowski was succeeded by the new director, Franz Alfred Six.[1052] Finally, Rudolf Mentzel, the president of the German Research Council (DFG), would represent the Ministry of Education.[1053] The German Navy would also have a representative on the committee and the High Commander of the German Army (OKW) recommended Fritz v. Wettstein for this position.[1054] According to the relevant Articles, the Greek government would be responsible for purchasing the building, known as 'Villa Skouloudi', for its restoration and the necessary infrastructure. The Kaiser Wilhelm Society, on the other hand, would be responsible for the equipment, the furnishing and the library acquisitions. The rest of the expenses would be shared equally.[1055] However, in spite of the agreement, the Society eventually also took over part of the expenses for the construction works, as the Greeks were unable to contribute financially due to increased inflation during the war years.[1056] The funds that would be made available by the Society for the new institute came from the Reich's Research Council (RFR), the German Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Education. The RFR partly funded the purchase of the scientific equipment, in particular the optical instruments, the Foreign Ministry overwhelmingly supported its cultural political role and the Ministry of Education agreed to support the research project.[1057] The work that would be carried out at the institute would focus on general biology. More precisely, it would con-

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1051 German Foreign Ministry to Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft on 07.06.1943 and on 28.02.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2952.

1052 German Foreign Ministry to Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft on 07.06.1943, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2952. About Six see: LUTZ HACHMEISTER, Der Gegnerforscher. Die Karriere des SS-Fuehrers Franz Alfred Six. Munich 1998.

1053 The Reich's Ministry of Education (Zschintzsch) to Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft on 17.11.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2952.

1054 However, on an *Aktenvermerk* on 28.08.1942 reported that the navy would be represented by the vice admiral Kurze, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2950/4.

1055 Articles 3 to 6 of the contract on 31.10.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2951/3.

1056 In fact, the Greek government promised several million Drachmas but the release of these funds was constantly delayed. In 1943, the Greek authorities promised further 325 million Drachmas, however, they were not worth very much due to the high inflation. See: Schartau to Hartmann on 02.02.1943, 18.09.1943 and 07.10.1943, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282.

1057 Aktennotiz Telschow's, 16.1.1942 and Ministry of Education (RfWEV) to KWG (forwarded letter of the Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of Education), on 29.01.1942, both in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/8.

would be temporarily represented by the Ministry of Education until the Academy could take over this role in the future.[1044] It was agreed by the German Ministry of Education and the Foreign Ministry that the management of the institute would be taken over by Prof. Max Hartmann.[1045] He suggested the hiring of two young scientists, Otto Schartau and Klaus Paetau, who had worked with him in Berlin and at the Zoological Station in Naples as his assistants. It was also recommended that Tzonis should become the Greek director of the institute.[1046] After the promulgation of the decree for the establishment of the institute, Tzonis put forward his own assistant who, nevertheless, had to be sent to Germany "to learn something" before he could work at the institute.[1047] Tzonis, however, never took up the position of the Greek director, although he played an important role in forming the institute's committee. He was the one who had drawn up a list of candidates from the University of Athens, the Technical University and the Academy who, in his view deserved to become members of the committee.[1048] It was stipulated that the committee would be composed of six Greek and six German members, apart from the two directors.[1049] The Greek individuals who agreed to participate on the committee were: Prof. Spiros Dontas, a physiologist, Prof. Ioannis Politis, a botanist at Athens University, Prof. Constantinos Georgikopoulos, a mathematician at the Technical University, Dr. Stratigis, the mayor of Piraeus, and the owner of the company "Chemical Fertilisers".[1050] The German members were Albert Voegler, the president of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, who would have the chief position on the board, and Fritz von Wettstein, also repre-

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[1044] Abschrift aus der Niederschrift ueber die Sitzung des Senats der KWG on 24.4.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2950/1; Gruendungsstatut 1.2.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2951/1;, Auszugsweise Abschrift aus der Niederschrift. Ueber die Sitzung des Senats der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft 24.04.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2952.

[1045] Vertrag on 1.4.1943, in: MPGA, Abt. II, Rep. 1A, Bd. 1. The contract had retrospective effect, coming into force on 1 April 1942.

[1046] See: Hartmann's travel report (Reisebericht) on 28.07.1941 on his visit to Athens from 16.07 1941 to 23.07.1941, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 14, Nr. 1.

[1047] Schartau to Hartmann 3.4.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1281. The name of the scientist is not mentioned.

[1048] See: Hartmann's travel report (Reisebericht) on 28.07.1941 on his visit to Athens from 16.07 1941 to 23.07.1941, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 14, Nr. 1. The list, however, has not been found.

[1049] Article 10 of the Satzungen des Deutsch-Griechischen Instituts fuer Biologie in der Kaiser Wilhelm-Gesellschaft on 31.10.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Also in Greek in: Nr. 2951/6.

[1050] Der Bevollmaechtigte des Deutschen Reichs fuer Griechenland (Guenther Altenburg) to Auswaertige Amt, Berlin on 09.01.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2951/1.

sist of two departments, one dedicated to general biology under Greek management and a second one focused on genetics under German management.[1058]

The responsibilities of the institute's committee included not only the promotion of the institute's bilateral relations between Greece and Germany, but also its international links with other institutions and organisations.[1059] This was a clear indication of the role of the institute, which was expected to replace the zoological station in Naples, according to the German scientists. This station was regarded as a model for the German-Greek institute, which was expected to exert international influence as the Naples station had done, however, this time the Germans would have more control over it. Therefore, the cultural-political character of the institute in Piraeus would not only be limited to the small territory of Greece but it would also contribute to the Reich's international cultural policy. On a scientific level it was anticipated that the institute would be dedicated to research on the fauna and flora of the eastern Mediterranean[1060] and more precisely, on questions of general biology, morphology and evolutionary physiology, on the insemination and sexual behavior of plants and animals, as well as on heredity. In other words, it seems that the proposed research would follow Hartmann's ideas. On the other hand, it would be an instrument of cultural propaganda, attempting to bring Greek and German cultures together.[1061] One of the institute's most important cultural contributions to Greek science would be the library that was due to be enriched with a large number of volumes and collections. Tzonis argued that by that time the only scientific library that was worth mentioning in this field in Greece was that of the Pasteur Institute in Athens.[1062] Therefore, this pre-eminence of the French culture was a further justification for the establishment of the Piraeus institute on cultural grounds. With regard to its scientific significance Max Hartmann argued that

> "Modern biology played an important role not only due to its pure scientific theoretical significance in today's intellectual life. Moreover, it is the basis of medicine, as well as of

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[1058] Undated document entitled *Aufstellung*, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/2.

[1059] Article 14 of the statutes of the institute on 31.101942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. A1, Nr. 2951/5, 6.

[1060] 'Gruendungsstatut des Deutsch-Griechischen Instituts fuer Biologie' 1.2.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2951/1.

[1061] Letter of Dr. Tzonis translated into German on the "Zweck und Richtungen des Deutschgriechischen Biologischen Instituts", 1940, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/3.

[1062] *Ibid.*

plant cultivation and animal breeding, fishery and other disciplines that day by day acquire even greater practical importance."[1063]

Furthermore, the German zoologist argued that Greece offered particularly favourable conditions for modern experimental biological research with its rich geographical morphology, its significant climatic changes, and in particular, the rich variety of its coastline and islands, some of which had remarkably deep waters. Tzonis also stressed these factors to the Society, which could lead to new findings and would play an important role in providing answers to questions about general biology.[1064] Hartmann also claimed that evolutionary physiology and experimental heredity had their origins in Germany. In other countries, particularly in France, modern experimental biology was an "almost unknown science".[1065] The German scientist believed that the new institute would provide new means for Germany to challenge the cultural dominance of France.

Hartmann did not fail to account for the potential advantages of the institute for the Greek state itself. Research on the biological link between the mainland and the sea would give practical assistance to the country's agriculture and fisheries, thus, boosting its economy. Therefore, there was an economic dimension to the institute besides the purely scientific and cultural one. On the other hand, the long-term presence of German experts in Greece would influence the young scientists, who in turn would contribute to the advancement of science and research in their own country. In addition, Tzonis argued that the continuous contact between the Piraeus institute and the German biological institutes, and moreover with non-university institutes, as in the case of the Kaiser Wilhelm institutes, could contribute to the education and training of Greek students.[1066] Tzonis' argument may have reflected his experience at the Institute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem and he probably envisaged the biological station in Greece as part of a broader network of institutes, namely the Kaiser Wilhelm ones. The concept of network-institutes was expressed also by von Wettstein. In his enthusiastic letter to Ernst Telschow in 1941, the general secretary of the Society, von Wettstein laid out his plan for the operation of the Kaiser Wilhelm institutes abroad and in particular, for those in the Mediterranean. One of the most important factors underlying the aspirations of the

[1063] "Gutachten Hartmanns an die KWG", 15.01.1940, MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1490.

[1064] *Ibid.* See also the translated letter of Tzonis on the "Purpose and the direction of the German-Greek Biological Institute", 1940, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/3.

[1065] "Gutachten Hartmanns an die KWG", 15.01.1940, MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1490.

[1066] Letter of Dr. Tzonis translated into German on the "Zweck und Richtungen des Deutschgriechischen Biologischen Instituts", 1940, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/3.

German scientist to establish research centers in the Mediterranean, was the favourable climatic conditions for the study of numerous scientific questions that were impossible in the North Sea. Therefore, it would be in Germany's interest for the already existing stations in Rovigno and Naples to become part of a network of similar institutes, from the Spanish Blanes in the west to Piraeus in the east.[1067] Germany's "biological penetration to the Mediterranean", as von Wettstein described it, should be intensified through close co-operation between all these institutes.[1068] In particular, he argued that the institute in Piraeus could become the centre of biological research on the eastern Mediterranean. Apart from the existence of the hydrobiological station on the island of Rhodes established during the occupation of the Dodecanese since 1912 by the Italians, there was no other institute of its kind in that part of the Mediterranean. The scientific, moreover the cultural role of the station on Rhodes island seemed to be very limited and fell short of German expectations for Piraeus. In other words, they wished to become the leading players in scientific experiments in the waters of the eastern Mediterranean. It was envisaged that the network would expand to southeastern Europe as well, including the proposed German-Bulgarian Institute for Microbiology on the Greek island of Thasos in northern Greece, which was annexed to Bulgaria in 1941, and the German-Bulgarian Institutes for Agricultural Research in Sofia and Budapest. However, the latter as well as the proposed institute in Thasos still only existed on paper. All of these were expected to be more than scientific centres. Moreover, they would be regarded as "cultural-propagandistic institutes", as von Wettstein emphasised in January 1941.[1069] As regards Greece, the German presence in the country was deemed as necessary because the English and French influence over the Greeks was becoming even stronger.[1070] This fear was not unfounded because despite the fact that the Greek government closed all of the foreign cultural institutes "for security reasons" in November 1940, the French and Britons continued to organise language courses in private houses which were tolerated by the

[1067] Wettstein to Telschow, 04.01.1941, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 14, Nr. 1.

[1068] *Ibid.*

[1069] Wettstein to Telschow, 04.01.1941, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 14, Nr. 1.

[1070] Hartmann's report from Athens from 03.12.1941 to 17.12.1941, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/7. See also: Reisebericht Professor Muehlens. Griechenland (Auszug) (3-7.06.1939), in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/2. The date is not mentioned on this document.

Greek police. The French influence over Greece did not cease, even after the Nazis had occupied France.[1071]

The cultural propaganda was used as an instrument for the dissemination of the national socialist *Weltanschauung* abroad, which was dominated by racial connotations. However, cultural policy did not simply mean racial propaganda. Although, campaigning for the superiority of the German intellect through the achievements and preeminence in science supported the racial theory, it nevertheless, was different from being engaged in racially oriented scientific projects. Despite the fact that all institutions, including the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, were obliged to become aligned with the guidelines of National Socialism, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology managed to retain its autonomy to a certain degree and to continue carrying out research as before for purely scientific purposes.[1072] However, among the tactics used by its directors to secure the institute's independence and to continue to get the much-needed funds for the projects, was the classification of their work as "*kriegswichtig*" and "*kulturwichtig*". The term "*kriegswichtig*" was given almost to every scientific activity, after 1939, and it was a necessary precondition for obtaining funding the several scientific institutions and therefore essential for their survival under the Nazi rule. Cultural policy was also regarded as "*kriegswichtig*". The establishment of research institutes abroad as branches of the Society became a priority for the Institute for Biology in Dahlem, which urgently needed not only new material for its projects but also a favourable environment for carrying out experiments and studying specific scientific problems. The Mediterranean Sea offered the best environmental conditions for some of the projects carried out in Dahlem. For this reason, Hartmann, together with v. Wettstein, also stressed the cultural-political role of the Piraeus institute not only to make a stronger argument before the German authorities but also to convince the Greeks of the worthiness of the institute.

The assistants chosen to work in Piraeus belonged to Hartmann's circle, thus, securing the autonomy of the institute and the non-oriented research to Nazi directives. Tzonis, as well as all of the other scientists that Hartmann recommended to the administration of the Society, had already worked with him either in Berlin-Dahlem or at the

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[1071] See: HAGEN FLEISCHER, "Europas Rückkehr nach Griechenland. Kulturpolitik der Großmächte in einem Staat der Peripherie", in: HARALD HEPPNER, OLGA KATSIARDI-HERING (Hg.), Die Griechen und Europa. Außen- und Innensichten im Wandel der Zeit. Wien 1998, pp. 125-191, here p. 151.

[1072] MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika. On biological research see chapter 6. The argument is also discussed in *Ibid.*, "The Survival of Basic Biological Research in National Socialist Germany", in: *Journal of the History of Biology* 26, No. 3, 1993, pp. 519-543.

Zoological Station in Naples. It seems that the aim of his efforts to take all of these scientists with him to Greece was to continue his project, in a period which research had to align with the demands of war and racial theory. At the same time, the "*Kriegswichtigkeit*" of the institute was used as an argument against the mobilisation of scientists.[1073] Schartau and Paetau were also called up, but following Hartmann and Wettstein's intervention the former was sent to serve in Piraeus, while the latter remained in Dahlem.

The independence of scientific research in the Piraeus institute was ensured by the Article 32 of the agreement.[1074] According to this, the directors and their assistants should enjoy full freedom in choosing the scientific projects and in carrying out research. Nonetheless, the research should be undertaken in the framework of the institute's objectives and within the limits of its budget. The independence and flexibility of the scientific work at the KW Institute in Berlin seemed to give its directors the latitude to negotiate financial support for the German-Greek institute, adjusting the description of its research project either to the war needs of the Reich or to its cultural propaganda policy, depending on the circumstances.

Soon after the official agreement, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society purchased a large number of instruments, machines and other scientific equipment for the institute. Among this material was a microtom, a number of books belonging to Hartmann's personal library and the herbarium purchased in Marseilles. The microscope that Schartau had in Dahlem was also made available. Only part of this material was immediately sent to Greece, in 1942, and the institute began to operate albeit to a limited extent. Hartmann was still in Germany but his assistant Schartau, who was appointed local director of the institute, was engaged in military operations on the Aegean Sea and partly experimenting on some biological cultures, by order of the *Wehrmacht*.[1075]

Between 1941 and 1942, many of the KW Institutes of a theoretical nature were forced to change the focus of their projects to be more practical-oriented, if they wanted to continue receiving funding and thus survive. Research on autarky and in particular on food autarky was a clear example of a project with an explicitly practical orientation and it was of major importance for the war. Under these circumstances, apart from the pure research projects in some of its departments and branches, the Institute for Biology in

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[1073] See Hartmann's correspondence with the Oberkommande der Wehrmacht (OKW) and the KWG, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 14, Nr. 2.

[1074] Vertrag vom 31.10.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2951/5, 6.

[1075] Hartmann to Prof. Dr. v.

Buddenbrock (Zoologsches Institut d. Universitaet Wien), 17.01.1944 in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 47.

Berlin also became involved in projects relating to the war and it was transformed into a *W-Betrieb*, namely, a defence war-enterprise subject to military law.[1076] It is not a coincidence that two of its branches, the Branch for Virus Research of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes for Biochemistry and Biology in Berlin-Dahlem and the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Cultivated Plants in Tuttenhof were created precisely at that time. The *'W-Betrieb'* development also affected the status of the Piraeus institute. Klaus Paetau's task at the German-Greek institute related to cytogetetic research. He was engaged in methods to statistically detect critical errors which could be applied to empirical findings, more precisely, to mutation and virus research.[1077] The significance of these methods, Paetau argued, was that they were often used in the verification of the results of the research. In addition, their timely application in many cases could make possible the future planning of research.[1078] Paetau collaborated closely with the genetic department of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Brain Research under the management of Timoféeff-Ressovsky and with the botany department of the Branch for Virus Research under the management of Georg Melchers.[1079] He requested and received financial support for his work from the German Research Council (DFG) which amounted to 3,500 marks in the year 1944-5.[1080] Paetau did not go to Piraeus to carry out his research, but instead he stayed in Dahlem given the dangerous situation in Greece.

At the same time, the dramatic increase in inflation in Greece since its occupation by the Nazis, upset the entire economy. From the German side there were some concerns about whether the construction of the available building should be continued or not. As the continuation of the construction of the institute was under threat and the delivery of the equipment from abroad became increasingly difficult, the Society requested the assistance of the *Wehrmacht*. In return, it placed the institute in Piraeus at the service of the *Wehrmacht* to a certain degree. More precisely, the institute contributed to the marine science projects carried out by the scientific staff of Prof. Walther Wuest, the curator

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[1076] Wettstein to Hartmann, 26.01.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1575.

[1077] See File: Paetau Klaus. Institut fuer Biologie Berlin-Dahlem, in BAK, R 73/13518.

[1078] Application of Paetau, "Antrag auf Erteilung eines Forschungsauftrages und Einreihung in die Dringlichkeitsstufe", 19.07.1944, in: BAK, R 73/ 13518.

[1079] *Ibid.*

[1080] Rudolf Mentzel (Ministerialdirektor DFG) and Meyer (Leiter der Fachsparte "Landbauwissenschaft und allgemeine Biologie" der DFG) to Klaus Paetau on 15.06.1944, in: BAK, R 73/ 13518.

of the SS Research Group "*Das Ahnenerbe*".[1081] It is interesting to note that the Piraeus institute, as well as the German-Bulgarian Institute for Agricultural Research and the proposed institute for Microbiology on Thasos also served or were expected to serve military purposes and the Military High Command (OKW) together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministries of Education and Nutrition, warmly supported their creation.[1082] The involvement of these ministries and the OKW indicated the circumstances in which the above institutions operated, as well as the interests they were expected to serve due to their location in southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.

Between 1942 and 1943, Otto Schartau was sent by order of Admiral Conrad to Greifswald and Kiel to follow seminars on oceanographic methods. After his return to Greece, he participated in research on the Aegean Sea for oceanographic studies on behalf of the OKM.[1083] In November 1943, he became involved in four-day excursions for the same purpose as well as for the "settlement of some urgent issues".[1084] The excursions were due to last approximately one and a half months. However, these kind of studies are not reported in the available documents. What is certain, however, is the interest of the High Commander of Marine (OKM) in the salt content variation across the Aegean water and the reason for these variations.[1085] It was already known that the temperature and salt variation on seawater could affect the operation of radar and consequently, the detection of submarines.[1086] During this period, the oceanographic studies were expanded throughout the whole Aegean Sea, from Saloniki in the north to Crete in the south and the island of Limnos in the east.[1087] It is likely these studies were also linked to the detection of English submarines that were causing great damage to the German marine. In an official note of March 1943, Admiral Conrad and the vice-admiral Kurze considered that the institute of Piraeus was extremely important on account of the

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[1081] Schartau to Hartmann, 02.02.1943, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282; "Telegramm Junker. Diplogerma Athen" 20.04.1944, in: PAAA, R 27302. I am grateful to Prof. H. Fleischer for the latter reference.

[1082] Telschow to the Ministry of Finance, 16.10.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2953/2.

[1083] Schartau from Berlin to Hartmann on 15.05.1943, MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282.

[1084] Hartmann to Telschow, 22.11.1943, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2953/3.

[1085] Unsigned letter, presumably of Schartau to the General Administration of the KWG, 18.12.1943, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 14, Nr. 2.

[1086] See: Schartau from Piraeus to Hartmann on 30.10.1943, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282 and Hartmann to Prof. Dr. W. v. Buddenbrock, 17.01.1944, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 47.

[1087] Schartau to Hartmann 26.08.1944, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282.

impact of the work of German Navy.[1088] Regardless of the type of research the OKM conducted on the Aegean, Schartau reported that it also was important for Hartmann's project in February 1943.[1089] Additionally, Telschow underlined that "we want to help the Troops Armament Office (*Heereswaffenamt*), as it help us too."[1090] Within this co-operative atmosphere, the OKM gave permission for the urgent transportation of the electrical material for the institute, putting its construction under way.

In Greifswald, Schartau prepared a series of lectures, which would be given to the *Wehrmacht* soldiers by order of the Defence-Plan Officer (*Wehrbetreuungsoffizier*) after his return to Athens.[1091] These lectures were also planned for young academics of the university in Vienna, to which all universities in south-eastern Europe were affiliated (*Patenuniversitaet*). The topics that Schartau would discuss ranged from general zoology and biology, to comparative anatomy of the vertebrates, the theory of cells and seminal cells, as well as to problems of sex determination, heredity and the theory of origin. The lectures took place in Piraeus in the presence of two prominent professors from the University of Vienna, Wofgang v. Buddenbrock-Hettersdorf and Fritz Knoll.[1092] The lectures were continued until 1944 and were given not only to soldiers and students, but also to *Wehrmacht* officers of the occupation forces in Greece. They were also attended by representatives from the German Embassy; Walter Wrede, the director of the German Archaeological Institute in Athens, who also was the local leader of the NSDAP in Greece; some *Wehrmacht* teachers; and the director of Lufthansa in Greece, Starke. Schartau did not make a record of any of the Greek attendants apart from the Minister of Education, Nikolaos Louvaris, and the architect of the institute, Dragoumis, in whose garden the events took place.[1093] Schartau also referred to issues relating to mental characteristics,

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[1088] Aktennotiz 04.03.1943, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2953/3.

[1089] Schartau to Hartmann, 02.02.1943, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282. Schartau wrote: "on the matter itself, I cannot openly write you, but it is of great interest for us".

[1090] Telschow to Forstmann, 02.11.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2960/5.

[1091] Schartau to Telschow, 04.04.1944, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2953/4.

[1092] Schartau to Hartmann, 5.4.1944, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282. Buddenbrock was specialised on hormonal physiology and the change of matter (Hormon- und Stoffwechselphysiologie) in invertebrates. Knoll was a professor of botany and the rector at the Vienna University. He received financial support from Fritz v. Wettstein to study the morphology of fruit and to reorganise the botanic garden of Vienna. On Knoll see: SEBASTIAN MEISL, "Wiener Universitaet und Hochschulen", in: Wien 1938, Sonderausstellung des Historischen Museums der Stadt Wien. Wien 1988, pp. 196-209.

[1093] Schartau to Hartmann on 5.4.1944 and 07.10.1943, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282.

heredity, as well as philosophical issues, such as the question of free will.[1094] It appears that the German-Greek Institute was expected to become the cradle of modern biology in southeastern Europe, offering young scientists an opportunity to be introduced to the new developments in the field, and Schartau's lectures were apparently the first step in this direction.

Even under the protection and auspices of the *Wehrmacht*, the further construction of the institute and, apparently, its operation was hindered by the residents of Piraeus. Perhaps the most serious incident was the occupation of the building demanding its use as a quarantine hospital for infectious diseases. In February and March 1942, the Greeks strongly resisted the efforts of the Germans to use it as a biological institute instead of being used for urgent health facilities. This opposition was initiated by the Greek authorities of Piraeus and found support among the Police Commissioner, the president of the Chamber of Commerce of Piraeus and the Public Prosecutor (*Staatsanwalt*) of Piraeus, while the German *Kommandatur* tolerated it.[1095] According to Schartau this was a clear attempt to sabotage the establishment of the institute, however, he believed that the use of violence, even though it might provide an immediate solution, would jeopardise the institute's future in the long-term. In addition, he did not want the Germans to be blamed if some infectious disease broke out.[1096]

Tzonis did not get directly involved in any of the negotiations, because, according to Schartau, he did not want to make any enemies.[1097] The problem was solved by finding another building for the Greeks. The whole affair, however, delayed the restoration and expansion works even further. The next "challenge", as Schartau characterised it, was to find construction materials and food supplies for the workers. In dealing with the first issue, he eventually received support from the German army and marines, while the Greek government ensured the necessary food supplies at first, which they failed deliver later. The Kaiser Wilhelm Society took on the responsibility, in the end, of providing

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[1094] The theoretical and philosophical issues that troubled Hartmann have already been mentioned. Perhaps the most interesting of those was the question of immortality. In 1943, in his letter to Claus Schilling, who was director of the malaria institute at the concentration camp of Dachau, Hartmann expressed his desire to be able to dedicate his research exclusively to philosophical problems in the near future, particularly to the "methodological principles of natural sciences". See: Hartmann to Schilling, 23.11.1943, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 46.

[1095] See: Schartau's correspondence from Athens to Hartmann, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1281.

[1096] Schartau to Hartmann on 03.04.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1281.

[1097] Schartau to Hartmann on 25.03.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1281.

food for the workers.[1098] Nevertheless, the general delay in making the institute operational had not been resolved. One and a half years later, the scientific equipment that had already been purchased was still in Germany. In the end, it was transported to the biological research institute in Lunz am See in southern Austria, without ever reaching its final destination.

After Schartau's death on 2 September 1944,[1099] the funding for the institute was permanently stopped and the building was abandoned. A month later, the German troops retreated from Athens. Shortly afterwards, the institute was taken over by the Academy of Sciences in Athens. Spiros Dontas became the new director of the institute, however, due to the lack of finances and personnel, it did not start operating until 1947. For some years after the Germans left the institute, Hartmann continued to receive information about its fate through Anton Kanellis, a former researcher at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Brain Research, who had known Klaus Paetau very well.[1100] Kanellis was still in Germany when the Red Army marched into Berlin and he returned to Greece after a long and adventurous journey in 1945. It is interesting to note that Kanellis, as well as his mentor in Greece, the zoologist George Pantazis, refused to work at the institute.[1101] Pantazis had excused himself by claiming that he was already too busy to carry out scientific work at the institute. Dontas himself played a very limited role only taking responsibility of the completion of the construction of the building. Discussions about whether Hartmann should take charge of the institute again continued until 1949. He was informed by the Greeks that his involvement would remain open until the political landscape in Greece was more stable after the end of the civil war following the country's liberation.[1102] Both Dontas and Pantazis, who eventually became member of the institute's new committee, hoped that Hartmann would take over as director in the future.[1103]

In 1946, the only scientists who were reported to have worked at the institute were the Greek Minister of Education, Nikolaos Louvaris, whose role is not mentioned, and the French hydrobiologist, G. Bellock. A small ship, named the "*Glafke*", was converted into a research vessel and in 1946, carried out three oceanographic cruises in the

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[1098] Schartau to Hartmann on 29.04.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1281.

[1099] He was killed while flying from Athens to Germany, when his plane was shot down above Serbia.

[1100] In 1948, Paetau immigrated to the USA.

[1101] Kanellis to Mrs. Hartmann, 30.06.1946, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 727.

[1102] See: Hartmann's correspondence with Kanellis, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 727.

[1103] Kanellis to Hartmann, 15.11.1946, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 727.

Aegean under the direction of the already existing small hydrobiological station in Palaion Phaliron and also under the guidance of Bellock. The latter carried out hydro-biological research for about a year in the framework of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA), which provided international humanitarian assistance to the post-war countries.[1104] The purpose of the research, however, was not reported. In 1947, after the unification of the Dodecanese islands with Greece, the already existing hydro-biological institute on the island of Rhodes was incorporated into the Piraeus institute. The new institute created as a result of the above consolidation remained under the Academy's control until 1960, which published the institute's scientific minutes for some years. In 1965, it was incorporated into the newly established "Institute for Oceanographic and Fishery Research" (*Ινστιτούτο Ωκεανογραφικών και Αλιευτικών Ερευνών*, ΙΩΚΑΕ), which only started its operations in 1970. In 1985, having expanded its research scope, the ΙΩΚΑΕ was renamed "National Center for Marine Research" (*Εθνικό Κέντρο Θαλάσσιας Έρευνας*, ΕΚΘΕ), under the jurisdiction of the General Secretariat for Research and Technology of the Greek Ministry of Industry, Energy and Technology.

[1104] Kanellis to Mrs. Hartmann, 30.06.1946, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 727.

6.3. Prof. Dr. Max Hartmann.

Despite the fact that the exact scope of the scientific work that was expected to be carried out at the institute of Piraeus cannot be found within the fragmented material and sources available, some assumptions about the scientific role of the institute could be made using related documents. The fact that the director of the institute, Max Hartmann, sought to establish an organisation that would provide favourable conditions to continue his experiments on fertilisation and sexuality of the lower organisms, clearly indicates the future role of the Piraeus institute envisaged by the German zoologist.

Before focusing on biology, Max Hartmann's early studies were concerned with forest science. His teacher was Richard Hertwig, however, the person that influenced him the most was Fritz Schaudinn, the famous biologist who discovered the cause of syphilis. Hartmann soon became friends with Schaudinn who stimulated the former's interests in protozoa research.[1105] From 1914 onwards, following his appointment as director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology, Hartmann dedicated himself to research on the unicellular organisms, namely the protozoa and algae, and the problem of ageing and death, as well as to the issue of fertilisation and sexuality. His contribution to these areas earned him a place among the leading German biologists. Hartmann was also one of the few biologists who had great knowledge of large areas of biology and he was the author of the classic textbook "*Allgemeine Biologie*", published between 1925-1927, and the editor of two of the leading zoology journals, i.e. "*Zoologischer Jahrbuecher*" and the "*Archiv fuer Protistenkunde*". He also had a great interest in the question of energy conservation, and moreover, its philosophical dimension. The issues of ageing and death, with which Hartmann also dealt, were directly related to the issue of energy conservation problem.[1106]

Closely related to these issues was the significance of sexuality in fertilisation, which had troubled Hartmann throughout his career.[1107] In a lecture on death and reproduction at the University of Giessen, held in 1903, he gave his first public account of the

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[1105] Curriculum vitae of Max Hartmann 1936: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1.

[1106] *Ibid.*

[1107] MAX HARTMANN, "Autogamie bei Protisten und ihre Bedeutung fuer das Befruchtungsproblem", in: *Arch. f. Protistenkunde* 14 (1909), pp. 264-334. For a detailed and complete list of Hartmann's biological and other publications see: HENG-AN CHEN, Die Sexualitaetstheorie und "Theoretische Biologie" von Max Hartmann in der ersten Haelfte des zwanzigen Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart 2003, pp. 277-285.

complex problem of sexuality and fertilisation.[1108] The phenomenon of fertilisation without the joint action of female and male, i.e. vegetative reproduction or parthenogenesis, was already known to biologists. What was not known, however, was the process of this type of reproduction, which took place not only in vegetables but also in the animal kingdom. During the fertilisation process one can normally distinguish between the female and the male gametes. The *gynogamones* (*Gynogamone*), as the former are called, are usually bigger, less active and less numerous during their gender fusion, while the latter, the *androgamones* (*Androgamone*), are smaller, more active and more numerous than their female partner. However, it often happens that the partners cannot be distinguished from each other either from their form or from their behaviour and in this case they are called *isogametes*. Explaining the process of fertilisation in organisms in which female and male partners were indistinguishable continued to trouble the biologists during Hartmann's days. Before Hartmann, August Weismann and Otto Buetschli had made efforts to understand the cytological process of fertilisation. Weissmann had argued that the reproduction process is formed through mutation and because it eventually leads to a fusion of the hereditary properties of a male and a female gamete, this process becomes more selective. This was the *Amphimixis* theory or the theory of semen-plasma mixture (*Keimplasmamischungslehre*) which was criticised by Hartmann for providing a physiological explanation of fertilisation and the result of it and not the mechanism of the reproduction itself.[1109] Until mid-1920s, the other dominant hypothesis of the reproduction mechanism was the "rejuvenation hypothesis" (*Verjuengungshypothese*) supported by Buetschli. Hartmann himself had contributed to the debate with his experiments on *Eurodina* alga, which lasted ten years, by stopping fertilisation without causing physiological decrease or any other regulation in genes.[1110] Some biologists tried to transfer this process of parthenogenesis occurred on plants to animal *protists*.[1111] Despite some suc-

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[1108] MAX HARTMANN, Tod und Fortpflanzung. Eine biologische Betrachtung, (oeffentlicher Habilitiationsvortrag an der Universitaet Giessen, 1903). Munich 1906.

[1109] MAX HARTMANN, "Ueber relative Sexualitaet bei *Ectocarpus siliculosus*. Ein experimenteller Beitrag zur Sexualitaetshypothese der Befruchtung." in: *Die Naturwissenschaften*, Heft 26 (1925), pp. 975-980, here: p. 975.

[1110] *Ibid.*

[1111] The term "*Protista*" or "*Protists*" was used to describe a variety of single or simple multicelluar *eukaryotic* creatures, which means that their genetic information, the DNA, is enclosed in a nucleus inside the cell. All protists live in moist environments. According to the traditional classification, they were broadly divided into the animal-like protists or "Protozoa" and plant-like protists or "Algae". However, they are not plants,

cessful experiments, it was clear that the "rejuvenation hypothesis" could not be generalised and another explanation for the reproduction process had to be found. Hartmann maintained that sexuality and fertilisation did not occur independently from each other in separate phylogenic groups but were instead the two facets of the same process. He observed that this joint action was closer to the forgotten "hypothesis of sexuality" (*Sexualitaetshypothese*) which could provide biologists with the solution to the fertilisation question. This hypothesis had been originally formulated by Otto Buetschli between 1887 and 1889, who had argued that in general every *protist* and sex cell is in some way a hermaphrodite or bisexual and at the same time has all of the male and female potencies.[1112] According to this theory, the predominance of the male or female tendencies depended on one or more factors and could potentially occur any time without previous ageing.[1113] One of the most important factors or preconditions that had to be applied in order to confirm the theory, was the relative sexuality of the reproductive cells. The "relative sexuality-distinction" (*relative sexuelle Differenzierung*), which states that the gender differentiation of the germ cells is not absolute in all cases but relative in many of them, had been argued by Hartmann in 1909.[1114] According to him, only the relative sexuality could explain the fusion of female cells in parthenogenesis. The problem, however, was that the right experimental material had to be found to confirm this hypothesis in practice. After long year experiments with sweet water algae and fungi, Hartmann found the organism that he was looking for in the gulf of Naples in 1925. The experiments were carried out at the Dohrn Zoological Station and the material used was the brown alga named *Ectocarpus siliculosus.*[1115] Hartmann considered that the *Ectocarpus* from Naples and not from any other place, would provide the best test case for confirming the theory of relative sexuality which would be guaranteed easier and with a higher degree of certainty

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animals or fungi, but they are similar to them that scientists believe protists paved the way for the evolution of early plants, animals, and fungi.

1112 HARTMANN, "Ueber relative Sexualitaet bei *Ectocarpus siliculosus*", p. 975.

1113 *Ibid.*, pp. 975 f.

1114 MAX HARTMANN, "Autogamie bei Protisten und ihre Bedeutung fuer das Befruchtungsproblem", in: *Arch. f. Protistenkunde* 14, (1909), pp. 264-334.

1115 MAX HARTMANN, "Untersuchungen ueber relative Sexualitaet. I. Versuche an *Ectocarpus siliculosus*", in: *Biologisches Zentralblatt*, 45, (1925), pp. 449-467; *Ibid.*, "Ueber relative Sexualitaet bei *Ectocarpus siliculosus*. Ein experimenteller Beitrag zur Sexualitaetshypothese der Befruchtung." in: *Die Naturwissenschaften*, Heft 26, 1925, pp. 975-980.

in comparison to other objects of experiment.[1116] With these experiments, Hartmann proved the theory of sexuality in practice that had been first put forward by Buetschi in 1887, thus taking the problem of reproduction one step further. Despite Hartmann was still not in the position in 1925 to explain the exact nature of the sexuality, he made clear that "sexuality was the deepest cause of any kind of fertilisation".[1117]

During the following years, he tried to prove the theory of sexuality in more complex organisms, such as the lower vertebrates, fish and the amphibians. The results of his research culminated in the discovery of the most basic animal reproduction material in sea-urchin in 1939.[1118] Together with Richard Kuhn of the KW Institute for Medical Research in Heidelberg, who analyzed the chemical texture of the material, Hartmann named his new discovery *gamone* and *termone*.[1119] He described them as chemical substances or a group of substances which causes a fusion of cells that determine the gender.[1120] Hartmann also argued that the determination of the chemical basis of the fertilisation process on protozoa, marine algae, and sea urchins could possibly lead to the production of *gamone* and *termone* through experimentally controlled mechanisms. Although the project of the German zoologist was clearly linked to the hereditary physiology, which was of major interest to the Nazis, he underlined that it was only possible to study the physiological and behavioral peculiarities of the reproductive material on lower vertebrates, fish and amphibians and not on higher vertebrates, mammals or even hu-

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1116 MAX HARTMANN, "Sexualitaetsprobleme bei Algen, Pilzen und Protozoen. (Eine kritische Darstellung im Anschluss an einem Bericht von R.A.Lewin)", [Duplikat] in: *Biologisches Zentralblatt*, 74 Heft 5/6, (1955), pp. 1-23, here: p. 8.

1117 HARTMANN, "Ueber relative Sexualitaet bei *Ectocarpus siliculosus*", p. 979.

1118 MAX HARTMANN, OTTO SCHARTAU, "Untersuchungen ueber die Befruchtungsstoffe von Seeigeln I", in: *Biologisches Zentralblatt*, 59, (1939), pp. 571-587; MAX HARTMANN, KURT WALLENFELS, "Untersuchungen ueber die Befruchtungsstoffe von Seeigeln II", in: *Biologisches Zentralblatt*, 60, (1940), pp. 398-423.

1119 MAX HARTMANN, OTTO SCHARTAU, RICHARD KUHN, KURT WALLENFELS, "Ueber die Sexualstoffe der Seeigel", in: *Naturwissenschaften*, 27, 1939, p.433; MAX HARTMANN, "Die stofflichen Grundlagen der Befruchtung und Sexualiataet im Pflanzen- und Tierreich. I. Die Befruchtungsstoffe (Gamone) der Seeigel", in: *Naturwissenschaften*, 28, (1940), pp. 807-819; MAX HARTMANN, OTTO SCHARTAU, RICHARD KUHN, KURT WALLENFELS, "Ueber die Wechelwirkung von Gyno- und Androgamonen bei der Befruchtung der Eier des Seeigels", in: *Naturwissenschaften*, 28, (1940), p.144; MAX HARTMANN, "Die Befruchtungsstoffe Gamone der Seeigel", in: *Forschungen und Fortschritte*, 17, (1941), pp. 119-122.

1120 Hartmann to Paetau 10.07.1939, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1107; see also DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler, p. 143.

mans.[1121] It is also clear that Hartmann did not try to sell his project to the Nazis by linking it to the racial theory. Nevertheless, he managed to convince the authorities that his project was important for the ongoing warfare and he continued to receive financial support for his project during the war years, and also for the establishment of the German-Greek Research Institute for Biology in Piraeus, where he apparently planned to continue the research that he had began to undertake by that time with his fellow workers and students in Berlin and Naples.

However, what was the significance of the protist research? Hartmann like the other biologists at the KW Institute in Berlin-Dahlem, carried out basic research. However, the practical application of his investigation seemed to interest the Nazis, particularly during the war. Among the major problems that Germany had to deal with were the food self-sufficiency for its population and the army and the infectious diseases that threatened its forces. The most serious disease was malaria, which was regarded the number one threat to the *Wehrmacht* in territories such as the Balkans and Greece. It was also known that some fungus-like protists, like water moulds (*oomycota*) could wipe out whole crops putting the population at the risk of starvation. On the other hand, some animal-like protists are parasites and many of these protists, like *plasmodium*, cause diseases such as malaria. *Plasmodium* spends part of its life cycle in mosquitoes and the other part in human hosts, where it spreads infection and ruptures blood cells in large numbers. Some other protists cause parasitic diseases, such as *trypanosomes* that cause sleeping sickness. Therefore, the discovery of how the reproductive system of protists worked was of great importance in the fight against infectious diseases. In the early years of his career, as director of the protozoa department of the "Robert Koch" Institute for Infectious-Diseases from 1905-1914, Hartmann focused on this kind of protozoa in his research. Having received an invitation from the Brazilian government for the establishment of the department for protozoa at the Oswaldo Cruz Institute, he spent about nine months in Rio de Janeiro, where he had carried out research on pathogenic protists.[1122] The results of his fruitful years in Brazil were published in a series of works during 1910 and 1911. Hartmann also published some important work on pathogenic protists and bacteria with Peter Muehlens, one of the future leading experts on malaria in the Balkans, as well as with Claus Schilling, the director of a department at the "Robert Koch" Insti-

[1121] Max Hartmann to A. Meyer, director of the University gynaecological clinic in Tuebingen, on 04.05.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 45.

[1122] Curriculum Vitae of Max Hartmann 1936, in MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1.

tute for Infectious-Diseases and the director of the Malaria Research Station at the concentration camp in Dachau since 1941.[1123]

Despite the fact that since mid-1920s, Hartmann's research focus had shifted to the determination of sexuality, the Nazis did not seem to lose interest in his project. On the contrary, the Reich's Research Council (RFR) provided him with 24,000 marks in funding for genetic research for the period 1940-1945, while he had only received 1,800 marks during 1934-1939. From 1940 until 1945, he was supported with additional 8,320 marks for physiological research.[1124] The German-Greek Biological Institute in Piraeus, due to its clear sea water in front of the institute's building was regarded as the ideal place for Hartmann to continue his research on sea-urchins, which would be the next stage of his experiments with regard to relative sexuality. Nonetheless, these plans were never realised because of the intensification of the war. Some plans, however, that linked to this project were realised, despite some delay. In the winter of 1944, Hartmann together with Kuhn and Otto Schartau, the local director of the German-Greek Biological Institute, planned to carry out systematic research on the definition of the reproduction material in trout, which met with great success.[1125] The project was due to take place at the Kaiser Wilhelm Hydro-biological Station in Lunz but the research was postponed due to Schartau's death.[1126] Hartmann's research first on protozoa, then on sea-urchins and finally on fish, may have encouraged some Nazis to go further by using humans as objects of experiments. Hartmann himself, however, repeatedly stated that he did not believe his theory could be methodologically tested on higher vertebrates. It is worth noting, however, that in 1944, the SS Research and Study Organisation "*Das Ahnenerbe*" began a project on the sex determination on animals and in particular on humans under the management of

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[1123] MAX HARTMANN, PETER MUEHLENS, "Untersuchungen ueber Bau- und Entwicklung der Zahnspirochaeten", in: *Zschr. Hyg. u. Infektionskrankheiten*, 55, (1905), pp.92-109; MAX HARTMANN, CLAUS SCHILLING, Die pathogenen Protozoen und die durch sie verursachten Krankheiten. Zugleich eine Einfuehrung in die allgemeine Protozoenkunde. Ein Lehrbuch fuer Mediziner und Zoologen, Berlin 1917. On Schilling's role in Dachau see: Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), NS 21/912, 920.

[1124] UTE DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler. Portraet einer Wissenschaft im NS-Staat, Frankfurt/Main 1995, p. 81.

[1125] MAX HARTMANN, "Befruchtungsstoffe bei Fischen (Regenbogenforelle)", in: *Naturwissenschaften*, 32, (1944), p. 231.

[1126] Hartmann to Telschow on 22.09.1944, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2950/6. Graf Medem succeeded Schartau.

Wolfgang Abel, a professor of anthropology and the director of the Institute for Racial Biology at Berlin University.[1127] The experiments had no serious result.

[1127] See: BAB, NS 21/902.

6.4. The Greek Protagonists. Resistance or collaboration?

Although the Greek scientific community was, in general, well disposed towards the Germans, after the country's occupation by the Nazis "very few Greeks were willing to convert their old or new sympathies into concrete collaboration".[1128] This was largely due to the famine during the first winter of occupation in 1941-2 that decimated the Greek population, and the Nazi atrocities that occurred in response to the growing Greek resistance. Many germanophile Greeks preferred not only to refrain from any collaboration with the occupants, but also from joining the resistance movement. Nonetheless, the Greek interest for the promotion of cultural and scientific relations with Germany still remained strong. What did the Greeks expect to achieve from cultural and scientific interaction with the Germans? What kind of needs did they expect to satisfy with the newly established institute in Piraeus and to what degree did it fulfil their expectations?

It seems that the biological institute was very important for the Greeks in the interests of the advancement of applied sciences in the country. This was underlined both by Tzonis and Nikolaos Louvaris, the Minister of Education in the third collaborative government. The Germans understood how much the institute meant to the Greeks and they emphasised this in their dealings with them in order to commit them into supporting the institute financially.[1129] However, as a result of the poor economic situation, these commitments and promises were never fulfilled. After the harsh winter of 1941-42, during which thousands of people had died of starvation, the scientific advancement of the country was no longer a priority and the only concern of Greeks was survival. The position towards the Germans had changed in comparison to the summer of 1940. According to Hartmann, the main reason was the fact that many laboratories in Athens University had been occupied by the German troops.[1130] Characteristic was the speech of George Sklavounos, a professor of anatomy and member of the Athens Academy of Sciences, referring to Hartman's proposal to the Academy to represent the Greek side. In an unequivocal and ironic tone, Sklavounos expressed the reasons for the Academy's refusal to become involved in the institute's affair. He argued that the economic situation of the

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[1128] FLEISCHER, Στέμμα και Σβάστικα, p. 118.

[1129] Schartau to Hartmann, 07.10.1943, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282. Louvaris promised Schartau to fund the institute with an additional 100 million drachmas, after he visited the building in Piraeus.

[1130] These were the new institutes of theoretical medicine, anatomy, pharmacology and pathology.

country, the condition of the libraries (which had largely been destroyed), the use of university institutes as canteens for the German troops, and above all, the problem of starvation were the main reasons that forced the Academy to refuse any collaboration with the Germans.[1131] However, officially the Academy stated that it was only postponing its co-operation, not refusing to become involved. It is also interesting that Sklavounos, stated that one of its prominent members, Spiros Dontas, had refused to co-operate with the German scientists, an assertion that contradicts the information recorded in the documents. Dontas was not the only one who had initially signed Hartmann's written proposal to the Academy, but he also convinced his colleagues to represent the Greek membership of the institute.[1132] After the Academy's withdrawal, however, Dontas together with the botanist Ioannis Politis, who also was its member, seemed to act on their own without representing the Academy, reassuring Hartmann that they would participate in the institute's committee "without fail".[1133]

Dontas was one of the most important figures in the institute's affair. As a respected member of the Greek scientific community, he was able to make contact with key individuals in the country's political, economic, and academic circles and to influence them to a certain degree in favour of the institute. After his appointment as a professor of general physiology in 1916 at Athens Medical School, Dontas went to Germany and the Netherlands for further education. In the following years, he managed to climb up the academic hierarchy holding top positions of seemingly different disciplines. In 1925, he became a professor of experimental pharmacology and in 1927, a professor of physiology. In 1931, he was unanimously elected as a member of the Academy of Sciences and in 1943, he became its president. Nevertheless, his co-operation with the German scientists did not prevent him from resisting the Nazi occupants and participating in the Committee for the "Rescue of the Greek Jews". As president of the Academy, Dontas signed the historical petition against the persecution of the Greek Jews, drawn up by the Archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos and submitted it to the president of the occupation

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1131 GEORGE SKLAVOUNOS, "Λόγος στην Ακαδημία το Χειμώνα 1942. «Η Ακαδημία αρνήται»", in: *Επιθεώρηση Τέχνης*, Year H', Band IE', Issue Nr. 87-88, March - April 1962, pp. 298-299.

1132 Letter signed by Dontas and Hartmann to the Academy of Sciences in Athens on 21.07.1941, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 14, Nr.1; Auszug aus einem Schreiben von Herrn Professor Hartmann (to Telschow) on 28.07.1941, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/6.

1133 Bericht ueber die Verhandlungen von Prof. Dr.M.Hartmann ueber das deutsch-griechische Institut fuer Biologie in Athen vom 3. bis 17. Dezember 1941, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/7.

government K. Logothetopoulos.[1134] Dontas was a friend of Logothetopoulos, however, their relationship appears to have changed during the occupation years.

The prominent botanist Ioannis Politis was the most relevant Greek scientist to the Kaiser Wilhelm projects, apart from the zoologist George Pantazis, who did not get involved in the establishment of institute. Politis supported the idea not only in its first phase but also during the war years. He was educated in several countries and he studied in the most important European universities of the time. After completing his basic studies in Athens, he visited several Italian universities in Rome, Naples and Pavia, where he received his Doctorate, in 1911. Meanwhile, he visited the universities of Paris and Berlin between 1907 and 1908. Since 1917, Politis lectured in the major Greek institutions for natural sciences, namely the Forestry School, the Athens University and the Technical University. As soon as the Academy of Sciences was established in 1926, he was elected an ordinary member and became its president in the academic year 1949-1950. He was also a member of the Greek Thalassography Committee and the Institute for Cancer Research. In short, he participated in a number of significant scientific organisations and committees in Greece, which indicate that he was able to influence the leading figures in the scientific community of Greece.

Politis was a specialist in both the land and marine flora of Greece and he published several studies largely in Greek and French but also in Italian, English and German. Before the creation of the Piraeus Institute he had published works similar to those the KWG scientists concentrated on and were of great interest for the Nazis. Already by 1925, he had published on the sea algae of the Athos peninsula in northern Greece and in 1927, on the sea algae of the island of Syros.[1135] The fauna and flora of the island of Crete, which became particularly important for the German Four-Year-Plan, was also part of Politis' investigation. Since the Middle Ages, the island had attracted western botanists, including French, as well as Italian, Britons, Hungarians and Germans. The German contribution and in particular that of the director of the botanic garden of Athens, Heldreich, seemed to be the most important by the middle of the nineteenth cen-

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[1134] The petition dates on 23 March 1943 is included in the commemoration minutes titled "50 Years after the Holocaust of the Greek Jews 1943-1993", Central Council of Greek Jews, 17 March 1993. Athens War Museum.

[1135] IOANNIS POLITIS,, «Φύκη θαλάσσια της Χερσονήσου του Άθω», *Επιστημονική Επετηρίς Σχολ. Φυσικ. Μαθημ. Επιστ.* Τόμος Α. 1925; *Ibid.*, «Φύκη θαλάσσια της νήσου Σύρου», *Πρακτικά Ακαδημίας Αθηνών* (1927) 2: 480-484.

tury.[1136] Nevertheless, until 1930, all of the researchers had only focused, according to Politis, on the *spermatophytes*, neglecting the study of *sporophytes*, species which belonged to the algae of the Cretan coastline, which had been the object of research of the Greek scientist since 1926.[1137] In 1933, he published further on the *sporophytes* of the Attica coast, where he registered over five hundred species of fungi and algae, four hundred of which had not been previously observed on the Greek coastline.[1138] Politis undoubtedly had a useful role to play in assisting Hartmann and his group in carrying out their research in Piraeus. After the war, Politis and Dontas became members of the committee of the newly renamed "Hydrobiological Institute in Piraeus". In 1947, the institute launched the journal "*Practica of the Greek Hydrobiological Institute of Athens Academy of Sciences*". During this period, he chose to focus on plant cancer and issues relating to heredity.[1139]

The key person, however, who brought the Kaiser-Wilhelm Society and Hartmann into contact with the Greek authorities was a scientist who did not hold any high-ranking post in the academic or political life of Greece. Working next to Hartmann at his institute in Berlin-Dahlem, Kostantinos Tzonis carried out a series of experiments in the field of general biology. In particular, he dealt with questions of heredity and evolution as well as with the genotypic sex determination. He also experimented with new methods in order to find a way of dealing with the above problems.[1140] In his experiments with the marine worm, *Dinophilus apatris*, Tzonis hoped to detect the factors that affected the non-hereditary determination of gender. He proved that the influence of potassium and magnesium ions upon the worm suspend sexual behavior. A second series of successful experiments he carried out on the worm, *Eudorina elegans*. In these experiments, he investigated the process of cell increase and cell division, a fundamental question in the physiology of reproduction, which was related to the issue of potential immortality, which was of great interest of Hartmann. Tzonis' work included electro-taxis, electro-narcoses and electro-metanarcoses experiments in lower crabs and myriopodes in order to test the

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[1136] *Ibid.*, "Περί της Θαλάσσας Χλωρίδος της Νήσου Κρήτης", *Πραγματεία της Ακαδημίας Αθηνών*, Τόμος Β (3) 1932, pp. 1-30.

[1137] *Ibid.*

[1138] IOANNIS POLITIS, «Περί της Θαλασσίας Χλωρίδος της Αττικής», *Πραγματεία της Ακαδημίας Αθηνών*, Τόμος Γ(1), (1933), 1-44.

[1139] *Ibid.*, "Ανάπτυξις όγκων επί φυτών εκ διαταραχής της αναπνοής." *Ανάτυπον εκ των Πρακτικών της Ακαδημίας Αθηνών*, τόμος 22ος, 1947. (Αθήνα 1951); *Ibid.*, "Κληρονομικότης και εξέλιξις των οργανικών όντων" *Πρακτικά Ακαδ. Αθηνών*, 24: (Πανηγυρική Συνεδρία 29.12.1949), pp 67-85.

[1140] Hartmann to S. Dontas on 29.10.1937, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1490.

sensitivity of organisms of the same species towards different levels of electricity. In these experiments, he observed the organisms in a stationary position while under narcoses and occasionally he carried out small operations.[1141] The material for those experiments came from the Kaiser Wilhelm Hydro-biological Station at Lunz am See, in southern Austria.

Tzonis was a scientist from an interdisciplinary background. He began his studies at the National Technical University of Athens and after two years of studying electrical engineering, he turned to the life sciences. He was enrolled in the Medical School of Athens University and in 1933 he was awarded his Ph.D. In the same year, he went to Austria and he was enrolled in the Faculty of Philosophy at Vienna's University and later at the University of Graz. In Graz, he received a second doctoral degree from the Department of Natural Sciences in 1936, where he specialised in biology. During the following two years, he worked next to Hartmann and when he returned to Greece, he ran the laboratories of biological and biochemical research at the Greek Institute for Cancer Research. As a student at Athens Technical University he became active in left-wing politics.[1142] In 1939, Tzonis failed to be appointed professor of general biology at Athens University after receiving only one vote[1143] and his political activism cost him his post at

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[1141] KONSTANTIN TZONIS, „Gleichstromnarkose bei Insekten", in: *Mitteilungen aus der Biologischen Versuchsanstalt der Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Zoologische Abteilung Nr. 235, Sonderabdruck aus dem Akademischen Anzeiger Nr. 17 des Jahrgangs 1935 (Sitzung der math.-naturw. Klasse vom 27. Juni 1935); KONSTANTIN TZONIS, W. BAAR, „Elektrotaxis und verwandte Erscheinungen bei niederen Krebsen", in: *Estratto da "Radiobiologia Generalis"* 4, (1936), pp. 33-39; *Ibid.*, „Elektrotaxis, Elektronarkose, Elektrometanarkose und Elektroypnose bei Myriopoden (Tausendfüßler)" in: *Zeitschrift fuer Vergleichende Physiologie* 23, (1936), pp. 247-253; *Ibid.*, „Elektrometanarkose bei Fischen", in: *Mitteilungen aus der Versuchsanstalt der Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Zoologische Abteilung und der Biologische Station in Lunz, Nr. 272, Sonderabdruck aus dem Akademischen Anzeiger Nr. 23 des Jahrgangs 1937 (Sitzung der math.-naturw. Klasse vom 2. Dezember 1937). I am grateful to Prof. Alex Tzonis for providing me with the reprints of the above papers.

[1142] Encyclopaedia *Ήλιος*, entry: Konstantinos Tzonis. The information is confirmed by the son of K. Kotzias, Panagiotis Kotzias (informal interview on 23 August 2000, in Athens), as well as by Tzonis' own son, Alexandros Tzonis. According to the latter's account, his father was a member of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), as well as a member of the Agrarian Party (informal interview on 20 July 2000, in Athens).

[1143] Dean of the Department of Physics and Mathematics, J. Trikalinos to the Rector of Athens University on 25.02.2939, in: Historical Archive of Athens University (IAPA), 1-1 Appointments of Professors (Διορισμοί καθηγητών. Προκήρυξις Πληρώσεως Εδρών και άλλες Διαδικασίες), 1938-1939. According to his

the University of Saloniki, from which he was dismissed in 1946. Soon afterwards he worked at several food companies in Greece continuing his political activities along. With some other prominent scholars -also educated in Germany- he became involved in launching the journal "*Avταίος*" dedicated to the post-war reconstruction of Greece in 1945. Among those scholars were Professor Nikolaos Kitsikis from Athens Technical University and the mathematician Nikolaos Kritikos, who had refused to get involved in the German-Greek Institute. Tzonis also became the president of the Greek-Soviet Friendship Society. However, due to the constant threat of unemployment, he returned to Berlin around the early 1960s and by 1964, he was working as a professor at the physiological institute of Humboldt University.[1144] In 1959, Tzonis also became involved in the establishment of a Greek-GDR committee, which aimed to facilitate cultural exchange between the two countries.[1145]

Tzonis seemed to have three major interests including electrodynamics, cancer research and the production of industrial food.[1146] In Austria and Berlin, his research was focused on cancer, and in particular the experiments with the elecro-narcosis method aimed at preventing the mitosis procedure, which is the way in which cancer develops. Needless to say that Tzonis' interests were closely related to some of the most important projects carried out at the biological institute in Berlin-Dahlem, namely the research on mutations and polyploidy, as well as food autarky. However, his contacts with leading Greek personalities within the political and economic circles seemed to be more important than his scientific expertise. Despite the fact that he held radically opposing political beliefs, he got on very well with K. Kotzias, who was fond of the young Greek scientist. Tzonis also knew Karolos Fix, the Bavarian owner of the biggest brewery in Greece. It had been proposed that Fix should become a member of the institute's committee, however, this proposal was abandoned on the basis of his German descent.[1147] His place was

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son, Alex Tzonis, he was not elected due to his political beliefs. (Informal interview with Alexandros Tzonis on 20 July 2000 in Athens).

[1144] Aktenvermerk Gen Kiehne ueber ein Gespraech mit Prof. Dr. Tzonis am 12.8.1964 in der 5. AEA, on 20.08.1964, in: Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amtes (PAAA), MfAA/ A 1975.

[1145] Jahresanalyse 1959 Hauptreferat 204/ Griechenland, on 19.01.1960, in: PAAA, MfAA/ A 12490. I am grateful to Prof. Hagen Fleischer who drew my attention to this and the above mentioned document.

[1146] Informal interview with Alexandros Tzonis on 20 July 2000, in Athens.

[1147] Bericht ueber die Verhandlungen von Prof. Dr.M.Hartmann ueber das deutsch-griechische Institut fuer Biologie in Athen vom 3. bis 17. Dezember 1941, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/7, also in: Abt. I, Rep. 14, Nr. 1.

eventually taken by the industrialist Aggelos Kanellopoulos. As a professor of biology in Saloniki from 1942 onwards, Tzonis remained in contact with Hartmann, even although this contact became more low-key. Despite the fact that he had contributed to the establishment of the institute and he would later become its director, he remained in the background after the German invasion. Schartau attributed this change of attitude to the influence of other Greeks who became less well disposed towards Germany.[1148] However, even without being influenced, Tzonis –as with many other scientists- had good reason to keep his distance from the Germans due to the Reich's repressive policy that turned the majority of the Greek population against them. Schartau also reports that it was also very likely that Tzonis was afraid of being accused by his compatriots of collaboration with the Nazis after the end of the war.[1149] In spite of the tense situation in Greece and his active role in the resistance movement, Tzonis' interest in the establishment of the institute was not diminished. In 1944, he visited Schartau in Piraeus and he again expressed that he was ready "to share in it".[1150] His political activity, however, does not seem to have interested the German scientists, as the establishment of the institute was of the utmost importance to them.

Whereas Dontas, Politis and Tzonis tried to resist the Nazi occupation of their country in one way or another, other individuals were less discreet in expressing their sympathies to the Germans during the occupation and chose to co-operate openly with them. One of these figures was the gynaecologist, Kostantinos Logothetopoulos. As a Minister of Education and vice-president during the first occupation government, he gave his complete support to the German biological project in Greece. Although he may not appear to have played a role in Hartmann's proposed investigations on the Piraeus coast, Logothetopoulos was one of the most important links between Greece and Germany. His affiliation with Germany and the German culture can be traced back to the beginning of the century, when he was student of medicine at the University of Munich. After graduating, he started his career at the Obstetric and Gynaecological Clinic of Munich, where he remained until 1910. In that year he returned to Greece and established a small surgical gynaecological clinic in Athens. As a professor at Athens University, he played a leading role in the creation of several hospitals and institutions

[1148] Schartau to Hartmann, 06.03.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47. Nr. 1281.

[1149] *Ibid.*

[1150] Schartau to Hartmann, 26.08.1944, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47. Nr. 1282.

among which included the first Institute for Cancer Research in 1924. Through his efforts, the Medical School was founded at the University of Saloniki, which began to operate in 1942.[1151] However, his contribution to modern gynaecology in Greece was overshadowed by his collaboration with the Nazis. On 7 April 1943, Logothetopoulos was removed from office and in 1945, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, although he had already escaped to Austria.

Konstantinos Louvaris was another scientist who was involved in politics and held a post in the Greek government as Minister of Education in Metaxas regime for a short time in 1936 and in the third occupation government between 1943-44. He had also been educated in Germany and he pursued his studies in theology and philosophy in Leipzig. In 1936, he was awarded the title of honorary doctor of philosophy of the University of Heidelberg. In 1945, he was convicted of collaboration with the Nazis, nevertheless, his conviction was overturned in 1948.

The political figure, however, that played the most important role in establishing the Piraeus institute was undoubtedly the Governor of Athens, Kostantinos Kotzias. During the First World War, he studied law in Germany and his admiration for German culture remained undiminished even during the Nazi occupation in Greece. He was a very influential man with a genuine interest in the promotion of science. During his term of office as mayor of Athens from 1934 onwards, he attempted to create a zoological garden in Athens in collaboration with the zoologist Pantazis in 1938, but his efforts were not successful. He did succeed, however, in allocating a building site for the establishment of the Model Hygienic Organisation, which was initiated by the director of the Rockefeller Foundation in Greece, M.C. Balfour.[1152] Similarly, while he was still mayor, Kotzias used his influence to secure the purchase of the building "Villa Skouloudi" in Piraeus, which would house the German-Greek institute. Despite his evident sympathy for the Nazis, Kotzias took refuge in the United States in August 1941, a few months after the invasion of German troops into Greece.[1153] After Greece's liberation, surprisingly enough, he continued to exert influence upon his compatriots. His interest in the reform of the national public health system, devastated by the war and famine, again came to the fore. During his stay in the United States, Kotzias approached the American

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[1151] See: http://www.med.auth.gr/depts/amg/gr/history.htm

[1152] KONSTANTINOS KOTZIAS, "Σταυροφορία διά την Δημόσιαν Υγείαν", ["Crusade for Public Health"], in: *Ακαδημαϊκή Ιατρική*, Έτος 11, 3 (97), (1947), pp. 217-220, here 217.

[1153] See: Ελληνικό, Λογοτεχνικό και Ιστορικό Αρχείο (Greek Archive for Literature and History, ELIA), Kostantinos Kotzias, File Nr. 2, Correspondence 1940-1945, Subfile 2.2 [1941].

authorities and discussed a closer cultural and scientific relation between the two countries in the future.[1154] In 1946, he contacted the Unitarian Service Committee through his son George Kotzias,[1155] who was working at the Rockefeller Foundation at that time, in order to encourage American doctors to visit Greece and to help with the rehabilitation of the health services in Greece.[1156] It is interesting to note that in spite of the official statements related to the scientific and cultural objections of the German-Greek institute, it was clearly envisaged by Kotzias as an instrument to serve the racial ideology of the Nazis. In 1940, for example, expressing his support for the establishment of the research station he underlined that its "racial-political tendency" had yet to be classified.[1157] This statement reflected rather his own perception of the nature and purpose of a biological institute on Greek soil, given the fact that he sympathised the Nazi ideology and was a devoted follower. From the available documents, however, this assumption cannot be confirmed by the German scientists.

Even though the above figures played a leading role in the creation of the institute in Piraeus, it is interesting to highlight some of the prominent scientists that were less active in the institute's affair and remained, or preferred to remain, on the sidelines, or were completely absent from the whole undertaking. The personalities that were approached by the Germans to discuss the establishment of the institute included prominent figures in either the scientific or in the political life of Greece who were educated in Germany. Before the German occupation of Greece, almost all of the German-educated scientists admired the German culture and intellectual heritage, despite the fact that most of them disapproved of National Socialism. However, after 1941 things had changed as resistance movement had been organised at universities and many professors also joined forces with this movement. The resistance of professors at the Technical University of Athens was more explicit, while some of its most prominent scientists became involved in left-wing parties or other organisations. This was the case of Nikolaos Kitsikis, who became the first president of the Greek-Soviet Friendship Society in the post-war era, and Nikolaos Kritikos, a professor of mathematics at Athens

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1154 KONSTANTINOS KOTZIAS, "Οι Αμερικάνοι Ιατροί εις την Ελλάδα", ["American Doctors in Greece"], in: *Ακαδημαϊκή Ιατρική*, Έτος 12, 2 (102), (1947), pp. 111-113, here 111.

1155 Georgios Kotzias later invented the L-Dopa for Parkinson's disease.

1156 KOTZIAS, "Οι Αμερικάνοι Ιατροί εις την Ελλάδα", p. 111.

1157 German Embassy in Athens to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, 12.08.1940, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/2.

Technical University and the Dean of the same university in 1941. Kritikos had also been approached by Hartmann to participate in the work of the institute's committee, however, he refused on the grounds of political developments after German occupation. He excused himself that he was too busy, however, he latter confessed to Hartmann and the German Culture Attaché in Greece, Erich Boehringer, that it was "morally impossible" for him to participate in planning of the institute.[1158] After the liberation, he became a member of the National Council of the Political Committee of National Liberation (ΠΕΕΑ) and the National Liberation Front (EAM).[1159] Kritikos had studied advanced mathematics in Athens, Goettingen, Munich and Zurich, where he was awarded his doctoral degree. Since 1913, he had worked at Athens Observatory, first in the Meteorology Department and latter in the Seismology Department, which he was in charge of from 1937 until 1942. In 1923, he was sent to Goettingen and Hamburg to work next to some of the biggest names in the field, such as Wiechert in Goettingen and Zieharht in Hamburg. He was among the few scientists allowed to visit Hamburg's marine observatory (*Seewarte*), amidst Germany's scientific boycott at a time when all military, naval and air activity of the country was under the strict control of the Allies.[1160] In 1937, Kritikos went to Munich and Vienna on a scholarship from the Greek University to learn about the new developments in crystallography.[1161]

Another striking example of the absence of a prominent scientist from the institute's planning was the zoologist, Georgios Pantazis. As he had been educated in Germany, Pantazis was very well known in the German scientific community. He held the post of the professor of zoology at Athens University from 1933 onwards and he became director of the Zoological Museum in 1934. He had studied medicine in Athens and Leipzig before going to Munich on a Greek private scholarship to study natural sciences. Completing his education, he worked as assistant for three years at the

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1158 *Ibid.*

1159 Both Kritikos and Kitsikis, according to Alex Tzonis, were close friends with Kostantinos Tzonis. (Informal interview with Alexandros Tzonis on 20 July 2000, in Athens).

1160 Report of N. Kritikos to Athens Observatory, in 1923, in: undated file: "Αρχείο Προσωπικού του Αστεροσκοπείου" (Archive of Observatory's Personnel) in: Archive of Institute for Environmetal Research and Viable Development – Meteorological Institute of Athens Observatory in Penteli [ΙΕΡΥΑ]. The above valuable archive has not yet been classified. However, full access to the documents was made possible thanks to the generosity of the Director of the Meteorological Institute, Dr. Michalis Petrakis and his scientific assistant Mrs. Dimitra Vouta.

1161 Historical Archive of Athens University (IAPA), 1-1 Appointments of Professors (Διορισμοί καθηγητών. Προκήρυξις Πληρώσεως Εδρών και άλλες Διαδικασίες), 1937-1938.

laboratory of hygiene and microbiology at Athens University as well as at the Biogenetic Institute and the Institute Pasteur in Paris. Pantazis was awarded another grant from the Bavarian Academy of Science for research at the Zoological Station in Naples and the Rockefeller Foundation for research on medical entomology in Greece, which proves that he was a very-well known and respected scientist. However, he did not have a role in the formation of the committee of the institute, despite the fact that he was the only professor of zoology in Greece at that time, as well as a member of the Greek Thalassography Committee and a specialist in mosquito research. Why then, was he excluded from an institution directly related to his scientific interests and the interests of the Kaiser Wihlem Society? In March 1942, Pantazis was approached by Otto Schartau, Erich Boehringer and Tzonis to become the sixth member of the committee. His acceptance was expected to be confirmed, as he was well disposed towards the Germans, he was German-educated and a member of the presiding committee of the German-Greek Society in Athens.[1162] Nevertheless, the negotiations with Pantazis were not successful on the grounds that Pantazis and Tzonis did not understand each other very well.[1163] It was only after the end of the war that Pantazis got involved, when the institute came under the auspices of the Athens Academy of Sciences. In 1952 he became the scientific director of the newly established hydrobiological institute.

Despite the fact that the institute was linked to the chemical industry –and indeed the largest chemical company of Greece "Chemical Fertilisers" of Charilaos & Kanellopoulos was represented at the institute's committee- and in general, it was expected to serve the chemical interests of Greece, it is striking to note the absence of one of the most eminent Greek chemists at the time, Leonidas Zervas. His name was not even mentioned during the time of negotiations between the German and Greek scientists, even though he had been educated in Germany, had worked at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Leather Research in Dresden, and was married to a German woman. At the time when the discussions were taking place, he was a professor of organic chemistry at Athens University, leaving his post at the University of Saloniki when the Greek government asked him to teach in Athens in 1939.[1164] Zervas had

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[1162] Otto Schartau from Athens to Max Hartmann on 14.03.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1281.

[1163] Schartau from Athens to Hartmann on 03.04.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1281.

[1164] MICHAEL SKOULLOS, "Η εξέλιξη της Χημείας στο Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών" ["The development of Chemistry at Athens University"], in: GEORGIOS VLACHAKIS (ed.), Η Ιστορική Εξέλιξη της Χημείας στην Ελλάδα. Πρακτικά Πανελληνίου Συμποσίου 14-15 Οκτωβρίου 1994, Ένωση Ελλήνων Χημικών/ Union Of

studied chemistry for two years at Athens University before interrupting his studies to go to Berlin in 1921, where he completed his doctorate in 1926. His early work focused on carbohydrates. After his time in Berlin, he went to Dresden, where he was appointed as an assistant to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Leather Research until 1929. From 1929 until 1934 he was in charge of the department of organic chemistry, under the management of the German-Jew Max Bergmann. In 1932 Zervas published a joint paper with him on an innovative technique for the synthesis of peptides, a type of proteins that were regarded as the key to understanding the phenomenon of life. Even though their hypothesis, namely that the genetic code is contained in proteins, was later proved false and the focus of research moved to the study of the nucleic acids from which a protein is formed after the war, the impact of the "carbobenzoxy method", as Bergmann's and Zervas' discovery became known, was enormous. Soon after the Nazis came to power, Bergmann immigrated to the United States where he set up a new post at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research. A year later, in 1934, Zervas followed his mentor and friend to the United States. In 1937 Ioannis Metaxas appointed him as professor of organic chemistry in Saloniki going outside the normal election procedure.[1165] During the occupation period he joined the resistance participating in the National Democratic Liaison (ΕΔΕΣ) and was subsequently jailed by the Italians for his involvement.

The reason why such a brilliant scientist, as well as other eminent Greek scientists, who could have contributed not only to the creation of the institute but also to its reputation, were absent from this important scientific undertaking, which was supported and promoted by a country in which they were -at least intellectually- associated, remains in question. The fragmented documents, and in many cases the lack of evidence, only allows us to make some hypotheses of why the most prestigious research centre in Germany, the KWG, relied upon the assistance of Tzonis, a lesser well-known and a younger scientist at the beginning of his career to promote the establishment of a biological institute in Greece. The fact that a Greek scientist, who was Hartmann's assistant, took the initiative to revive an old idea for the creation of a German research centre in Greece was, of course, well-received by the Germans. Naturally, they took advantage of the opportunity to present their proposal to the Greek authorities through Tzonis. However, they were not aware of the extent of Tzonis'

Greek Chemists. Αθήνα 1996 [The historical development of Chemistry in Greece. Practica of Pan-Hellenic Symposium 14-15 October 1994, Athens 1996], pp. 195-204, here 202.

[1165] Daily Newspaper «*Τα Νέα*», Thursday 14 October 1999. "Leonidas Zervas", by C. Krimbas.

contacts in Greece or how much influence he could exert upon his compatriots, in order to find support for the future institute. The absence of some of the most eminent scientists in Greece in the negotiations, is largely due to their exclusion from Tzonis' network. In addition, it was vital for the smooth operation of the institute that all of the Greeks involved would be willing to collaborate with each other. Furthermore, the Germans did not seem to be much interested in finding out the top Greek scientists whom they could work with, due to the pressing need to continue their research in the framework of the projects of Berlin-Dahlem, regardless of co-operation from eminent or less prominent Greeks. Finally, it should be stressed that many Greeks, including those who had been educated in Germany and were well-disposed towards the Germans before the war, were particularly disappointed by the Reich's invasion and occupation of Greece, a feeling which was later transformed into resistance. Their refusal to participate in a German or German-organised institute, as was the case of Kritikos, certainly constituted an act of resistance.

Conclusions

In 1938, Werner Lorenz, the director of the Mediation Office for the German People (*Leiter der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle*) and president of the Association of Bi-national Unions and Institutions ("*Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V.*"), announced that the purpose of bilateral institutions was the promotion of understanding among peoples and the fulfillment of mutual interests.[1166] This turned out to be mere rhetoric, as the Reich's plans for self-sufficiency in raw materials, food and currency, which had been announced about a year previously, were patently inconsistent with such a declaration.

The 'promotion of understanding among people', however, had been acknowledged in the Weimar years, as Germany struggled to maintain anything it could of its damaged image abroad, following its defeat in the First World War. Germany blamed its miserable situation on the winners of the war, and on France in particular, and tried to correct its image abroad by introducing itself to people who had been influenced by what Germany saw as French-orchestrated anti-German propaganda. In other words, Germany sought to have foreign countries understand its own culture by making them familiar with it, by adopting an organised foreign cultural policy. Science was among the "*feinere Mittel*" used by Germany in order to achieve this goal.

However, national pride and the fervent wish of a state to gain international recognition and to expand its influence abroad is not far from what could be defined as 'nationalism'. The end of the World War I and the signing of the peace agreement left Germany no space for flag-waving exercises, when seeking to "solidify sentiments of national allegiance and to mobilise against foreigners".[1167] This practice had been dominant in the period of the formation of the nation-state and ended with the outbreak of the Great War. Cultural nationalism had already been intermingled with political nationalism. The peace agreement created socio-political conditions, in which nationalism became "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be

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[1166] Mitteilungen der "Vereinigung zwischen staatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V." gez.: Lorenz. SS-Obergruppenfuehrer, Praesident der "Vereinigung zwischen staatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen" 01.11.1938, in: PAAA, R 61274. The document was classified as "confidential" (Vertraulich!).

[1167] ELISABETH CRAWFORD, Nationalism and internationalism in science, 1880-1914. Four studies of the Nobel population, Cambridge 1992, p. 28.

congruent".[1168] Within these conditions German scientists developed nationalist feelings, which seem, however, to go beyond the interests of their nation. Being excluded from almost all international organisations and being blocked from international activities, the Weimar Republic regarded its culture and science as the only means to regain its lost reputation as a strong military and economic power and so once again to take a "place in the sun". Scientists were a "sort of organised army" in the service of the nation, as Hermann von Helmholtz had put it, in 1862.[1169] This was particularly true when the nation was at war and was to find its ultimate expression during the Nazi era.

Nevertheless, the impact of the World War I not only strengthened the nationalist feeling; it brought to the fore the notion of 'internationalism'. The ideological belief, however, that governments and peoples could act constructively together, particularly in order to abolish war and conflict, proved to be selective in its application, leaving Germany outside the world community. This contradiction turned out to be of Germany's benefit. The continuing scientific achievements in many disciplines not only invigorated confidence in German science, but also challenged the international scientific community. Many scientists in the international scientific community started to contact their colleagues in Germany, giving the country the chance to organise exchange programmes. In addition, these scientists exerted pressure on those monitoring the implementations of the Versailles Treaty to loosen their control over the exchange of scientific knowledge to and from Germany. At the same time, the idea of 'internationalism' as a constitutional element of scientists' position towards science in general, made the German scientists seek communication and co-operation abroad for the sake of science itself. In 1926, for example, Prof. Eduard Spranger, in his essay on Germany's contribution to international science argued that his country was traditionally interested in advancing science for the enrichment of the intellectual wealth of the whole of humanity rather than for Germany's individual concern.

> [The] achievements [of science] are therefore the common property of mankind [...] We only have to consider what would have happened to the new discoveries in physics and chemistry, if these sciences were to have been pursued as the secret scientific property of each individual nation, as was the case in the days of old Alchemists! [...] German science has always been particularly aware of the necessity of such survey, that is to say, the

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[1168] ERNEST CELLNER, Nations and nationalism, London 1988, p.1, cited in: CRAWFORD, Nationalism and internationalism, p. 29.

[1169] Cited in: CRAWFORD, Nationalism and internationalism, p. 35.

necessity of a general organisation. In consequence, Germany's organs of reference were always internationally present, and were valued and utilised by almost all nations.[1170]

Spranger particularly stressed the major German reference works and contributions to learned journals in natural science, which added most to international scientific knowledge. Some of those works, like the "New Annual for Mineralogy, Geology and Palaeontology" ["*Neues Jahrbuch fuer Mineralogie, Geologie und Palaeontologie*"], dated back to the very beginning of the nineteenth century. Despite declarations made by German intellectuals for the promotion of "idealistic" and "unselfish" competition,[1171] nationalist elements in the "ideology of scientific internationalism", as Paul Forman labelled it, were always present in their writings.[1172] These elements seemed to be stronger among the *Geisteswissenschaftler*, which regarded themselves as "the champions of true internationalism".[1173]

It seems that, no matter how conscious the mission of German science might have been before World War I, the political and economic circumstances in the Weimar period gave a new context to the old issue of scientific universality. The new institutional forms, like the German Academic Office for Foreigners, the Humboldt Foundation, the DAAD, and so forth, all had the same aim: to develop international scientific collaboration for economic and political purposes. No matter how effective those organisations, the most powerful instrument at Germany's disposal for 'internationalising' its science was the scientific and research centres and their branches abroad. Research was one of two dimensions in Germany's scientific life. The requirement that research should be separated from teaching in German scientific centres was first discussed at the beginning of the twentieth century and finally institutionalised in 1911, with the establishment of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. Research was considered equally important for both human and natural sciences, and it "reflected the greatness and the essence (*die Groesse und das Wesen*) of the German nation".[1174] The German Reich had over the previous hundred years, created a considerable number of research institutes abroad, thereby adding to the

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[1170] EDUARD SPRANGER, Deutschlands Anteil an der Internationalen wissenschaftlichen Arbeit. (Germany's work for international science), Leipzig 1926, p. 15.

[1171] *Ibid.* p. 33.

[1172] PAUL FORMAN, "Scientific Internationalism and the Weimar Physicists: The Ideology and its manipulation in Germany after World War I", in: *ISIS*, Vol. 64, Issue 2, (1973), pp. 150-180, here p. 152.

[1173] *Ibid.*

[1174] GEORG SCHREIBER, Die Not der deutschen Wissenschaft und der geistigen Arbeiter. Geschehnisse und Gedanken zur Kulturpolitik des Deutschen Reiches. Leipzig 1923, p. 9.

state's international prestige. This kind of power was now threatened by Articles 297 and 299 of the Versailles Treaty. The archaeological institutes in Rome, Athens and Cairo, for example, which for years had been centres of German and international science, were struggling to survive and save indigenous science from death.[1175] The Zoological Stations in Naples and Rovigno, Italy found themselves in a similar situation. The Weimar Republic was determined to maintain the operation of these and other institutes abroad, funding them with money from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[1176] However, this was not an easy task. However, the Germans took the view that world could ill-afford to dispense with German science. This was a "poor consolation", as Heilbron, the cultural director of Foreign Ministry, remarked, since the Allies were determined to establish an "international club" without Germany.[1177]

Nonetheless, it was not rare for scientists to highlight the essentially nationalistic foundations and functions of scientific internationalism by emphasising the participation of the nation in the scientist's fame, which advanced not only science but also the nation's interests.[1178] During Hitler's regime, this practice became common place, as scientists in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes, for example, were seeking financial support for their projects. In 1935, Secretary General Friedrich Glum stated that "the KWG does not need a special justification for being joyfully at the disposal of the new Reich of Adolf Hitler and thus to contribute to the work of reconstruction of our German Vaterland'.[1179] Similarly, his successor, Ernst Telschow, assured the German army some years later the aid of which was essential for the establishment of the German-Greek Biological Institute in Piraeus that "we want to help the Troops Armament Office (*Heereswaffenamt*), as it help us too."[1180] Both the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and the institute in Piraeus were rewarded for their services to the Reich, not only financially but also securing their free-

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[1175] Undated document with remarks on chapter 14 ("Die deutschen Ausland-Forschungsinstitute" pp. 73 ff.) of SCHREIBER'S work: "Die Not der deutschen Wissenscahft und der geistigen Arbeiter" *ibid.*, in: PAAA, R 65520.

[1176] In 1923 the Foreign Ministry funded 829.352 Marks the institutes in Rome and Athens and 9.180.000 Marks the institute in Naples alone! SCHREIBER: Die Not der deutschen Wissenschaft, p. 74.

[1177] Note-letter of Min. Director Friedrich Heilbron to Prof. Dr. Schreiber, on 31.10.1922, in: PAAA, R 65519.

[1178] FORMAN, "Scientific Internationalism", p. 152.

[1179] Cited in: UTE DEICHMANN, BENNO MUELLER-HILL, "Biological Research at Universities and Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes in Nazi Germany", in: MONIKA RENNEBERG, MARK WALKER (eds.) Science, Technology, and National Socialism. Cambridge/ New York 1994, pp. 160-183, here 175.

[1180] Telschow to Forstmann, 02.11.1942, in: MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2960/5.

dom to administer their affairs autonomously and, to a great extent, to conduct their own research programmes.

Back to the 1920s, the support and promotion of the German science and culture was not only a national enterprise aiming at the Republic's industrial and economic growth or its people's welfare. It became, in addition, an integral part of the state's foreign policy agenda as the state sought to strengthen its ties with the international scientific community and, if possible, to exercise cultural, political and economic influence abroad. In other words, Germany tried to exert *intellectual* and *material* influence,[1181] particularly after its admission to the League of Nations. One could argue that if the majority of the 1925 organisations were mainly designed for intellectual influence, the *Notgemeinschaft*, and later the German Research Council (DFG), was primarily focused on the advancement of German natural sciences and research. The purpose of publicising scientific achievements abroad was to awaken, even to provoke, foreign interest in German science. During the interwar years the Germans realised that their cultural presence abroad should not be confined to the foundation of language schools or to the creation of philological and archaeological societies and institutes. Moreover, they argued that it should have a practical and applied character, and this could be achieved with the establishment of research and experimental centres that would serve the economic and military interests of the country, in other words, to exert material influence. Nevertheless, basic science was not neglected, as it was regarded an inherently international activity.

After 1926, a number of forms of scientific internationalism were included in the German *Kulturpolitik*, which was being shaped at that time. These forms were the international societies and congresses for scientists, co-operation between individual researchers or between research laboratories and institutes, and, of course, collaboration between governments. All of them, as Paul Forman interestingly remarks, "monopolised the international relations of other nations by artificially multiplying bilateral ties".[1182] This meant in practice that governments were more interested in fabricating their prestige by influencing the scientific community and foreign governments, rather than in promoting the ideal of international co-operation. This cultural nationalism, as one could call it, is

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[1181] See undated document Akademie zur wissenschaftlichen Erforschung und zur Pflege des Deutschtums. Deutsche Akademie. Einfuehrung in der Plan der Deutschen Akademie (Vertraulich!), in: BAB R 43 I/ 812.

[1182] PAUL FORMAN, "Scientific Internationalism", p. 152.

not far from cultural imperialism or "cultural synchronisation".[1183] It was no coincidence, therefore, that Germany signed bilateral cultural agreements with a number of Balkan countries as well as with its allies from 1936 onwards.[1184]

Nevertheless, it seems that such agreements went beyond 'cultural synchronisation'. This cultural alignment that the Nazis tried to impose on the Balkans, and more precisely on Greece, went hand in hand with the political synchronisation of these countries, which had to be prepared to be put in the service of German rule after the end of the war. Economic and political influence are among the major goals of cultural infiltration, that is, "to capture markets for cultural commodities and to establish hegemony by shaping popular consciousness".[1185] If this one-way traffic of cultural products was relatively restrained under the Weimar Republic, on the grounds that the isolation made Germany more receptive to foreign intellectual -in particular, scientific- goods, under the Third Reich, the one-way nature of German cultural communication became overt. For south-eastern Europe, the trend in uni-directional communication was to take on new tones, as the National Socialists considered the region to be underdeveloped and thus, it was very likely to become dependent on Germany's science and technology, and hence, its economy. It must be underlined, however, that the real dependent partner in this relationship was Germany itself, as the natural resources of the Balkans became essential for Germany's war economy. The German systematic penetration into this region and its efforts to dominate its cultural life, were the forerunners to its economic exploitation.

Conclusively, can we talk about German imperialism in the Balkans? If we accept that imperialism exists in different periods in various forms and changes in the forms of imperialism encountered are the result of changes in the relationships between powerful and non-powerful states, then it seems legitimate to view German cultural nationalism, as it has been formed under democracy and dictatorship, through the lens of cultural imperialism. It would be misleading, however, to identify cultural imperialism with cultural policy. Cultural expansion is a complex phenomenon that belongs to the domain of political economy. Cultural policy supports this kind of expansion in a way that is not directly related to economic practices but rather takes the guise of noble ideals, such as co-

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[1183] The term has been coinded by C. J. Hamelink. Cited in: ANNABELLE SREBERNY-MOHAMMADI, "The Many Cultural Faces of Imperialism", in: PETER GOLDING, PHIL HARRIS (eds.), Beyond Cultural Imperialism. Globalization, Communication and the New International Order. London 1997, pp. 49-68, here p. 49.

[1184] See chapter 4.3.

[1185] Cited in: GOLDING, HARRIS (eds.), Beyond Cultural Imperialism, p. 6.

operation, strengthening of ties, rapprochement and the promotion of friendship, and contributes to the prestige of the power that is in a position to give. "The one who gives, dominates", remarks Braudel and the kind of domination is what relates cultural policy with political economy. This relation is, however, dynamic, depending on the time period, the social and political circumstances and the role of individuals, –in our case, of scientists.

During the time from the Weimar Republic up to the end of National Socialism, German cultural policy, or cultural propaganda, had neither the same goals, nor were they pursued in the same way, despite the fact that in both periods the means used for cultural policy-making were more or less the same. In the Weimar Republic, the goal of this policy was mainly to correct Germany's image abroad and to boost its national prestige particularly vis-à-vis France. Science was assigned the political mission of taking the country out of the isolation and helping it to rejoin the international community, more precisely the economic market. When Hitler came to power, he used the existing cultural propaganda mechanism. Unlike the Weimar Republic, in which only two Ministries (Foreign Affairs and Education) were involved in the country's foreign cultural policy, the Third Reich involved a number of institutions in propagating German culture abroad. These included the Ministry of the Interior, *Amt Rosenberg*, the *Ahnenerbe* Office of the *Reichsfuehrer SS* and the National Socialist Organisation for Issues Abroad [*Auslandsorganisation (AO) der NSDAP*].

During the war years, southeastern Europe was the main target for the Reich's cultural political plans. This cultural rapprochement was due to Germany's war-time economic and political interests in the region, which was regarded by the German more or less as a future colony. The number of scholarships to students and professors as well as visits by German scholars in the region were increased. In the early years of National Socialism, the cultural role of natural sciences, unlike humanities, was marginalized. With the announcement of the Four-Year Plan, natural sciences, together with technology came to the fore, however, not so much as essentially cultural tools, but rather as the instruments that could set the military machine in motion and make it triumph. The cultural-political role of science was regarded at that time as complementary. War needs forced the Nazi authorities to look eastwards for raw materials and other resources, such as agricultural goods, which could make Germany self-sufficient but would also provide the country with territories essential for the expansion of its *Lebensraum*. The eminent botanist Konrad Meyer, then professor at Berlin University, emphasised the fundamental

importance of the concept of *Lebensraum* for Germany's future in a lecture on planning and reconstruction in the occupied eastern territories, in 1942.[1186] In the same vein, botanists and geneticists at Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes emphasised the importance of their mutation research, particularly on polyploidy, for the fast breeding of new crop strains. Botanical expeditions to Russia and south-eastern Europe for the collection of primitive forms of plants that could be cultivated in Germany, were therefore essential and were funded as part of the political agenda of the expansion of the German living space.

In addition, scientists at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology argued for the establishment of research institutes of practical importance beyond Germany's borders that would promote research in botany and genetics. In other words, these institutes would help them seek the best techniques for transplanting commercially viable species, and, by extension, to transform agriculture in territories that were planned for future conquest. Thus, in war-time, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society established in 1941 the German-Bulgarian Institute for Agriculture in Sofia and the German-Greek Institute for Biology in Piraeus. Despite the fact that the war prioritised applied research, pure research continued to be promoted, as it was particularly this kind of research that had contributed and continued to contribute in Germany's prestige. The institute in Piraeus was one such case in which purely scientific interests were dominant. Nevertheless, both von Wettstein and Hartmann classified the project planned there as *kriegswichtig*, in order to receive support during war-time. At the same time, they also characterised it as *kulturwichtig*. One might then wonder: if the *Kriegswichtigkeit* argument was tactical but sufficient, optimising the chances of survival in a period when institutes pursuing theoretical research had stopped receiving financial support, then why the German scientists should have emphasised the cultural-political importance of their undertaking? It seems that, even though the declaration of a project as important for the war enterprise, -in other words, of having an immediate and practical application-, was a necessary and sufficient condition for financial support, its cultural political importance did not leave the Nazis indifferent. Interestingly, the *Kulturwichtigkeit* of the German-Greek Institute in Piraeus was mentioned more often by Hartmann and von Wettstein than its *Kriegswichtigkeit*. Scientists, observes Diana Crane, have virtually no power, as "they control neither economic nor political resources. Instead, they exert influence based on expert knowledge".[1187] There are some issues, how-

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[1186] Cited in: DEICHMANN, MUELLER-HILL, "Biological Research", p. 176.

[1187] DIANA CRANE, "Transnational Networks in Basic Science", in: *International Organisation*, Vol. 25, Nr. 3 (1971), pp. 585-601, here 587.

ever, that come into question and which are difficult to tackle. How was the cultural propaganda role of science perceived by scientists and by the regime? Did both of them share the same interest in promoting German culture through science? What kind of relationship was developed between scientists who could dictate the cultural political significance of science and the members of the regime who could make use of it? "Scientific prestige is notoriously difficult to elaborate", remarks correctly Lewis Pyenson.[1188] It seems, however, reasonable to say that science was a way of making foreign policy, no matter if and to what extent it achieved the goals of this political agenda.

As for the German regime, its eagerness to establish scientific bases abroad, at that particular time was closely related to its political and military plans. On the one hand, the research institutes in the Balkans seem to have been regarded as tangible proof of a political sphere of influence, whether on the other hand, they were expected to serve military interests, as the course of the war shifted the focus of research to projects of pre-eminent importance, such as malaria and agricultural research. The exploitation of natural resources was another reason for Germany to acknowledge cultural-political credentials to science, as its advertising abroad could attract young scholars to its universities, who could pave the way for Germany to material success, when they returned to their home countries. This was the purpose of granting them scholarships and this was what the German argument that Greece would benefit from the establishment of the institute in Piraeus implied. Exerting cultural influence on the Balkan youth was nothing else than educating and training them in the Reich. The case of the German-Greek Institute, however, was more complex. Although the research project planned for Piraeus was never really carried out there, the establishment of the institute does not constitute a bureaucratic incident, as one might argue. On the contrary, it is largely an indicative example of a number of interests that the national socialist cultural propaganda abroad aspired to meet through the instrument of science. More precisely, according to its founding character, the role of the institute was scientific as well as cultural-political. Von Wettstein and Hartmann wanted the biological institute in Piraeus to replace the Zoological Station in Naples, which was of the utmost importance to German research but it was no longer under German influence. In addition, the fact that Hartmann's closest fellow-workers, who had also spent some time in the laboratories of the Naples' station, were going to staff the institute in Piraeus, is indicative of his plan to draw the institute's research line

[1188] LEWIS PYENSON, Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences. German Expansion Overseas 1900-1930. New York 1985, p. 316.

according to his own interests and independently of the National-Socialist directives. Nevertheless, he did acknowledge the cultural-propaganda role of the institute and maintained, together with von Wettstein, that "biological penetration" was also cultural penetration. This was a point of view that was to find fertile ground in Greece. While in November 1940, the Greek government decided to close all foreign cultural institutes for security reasons,[1189] the negotiations for the establishment of an institute with the purpose to "strengthen the cultural and scientific relations" between Greece and Germany continued with undiminished pace.

The institute turned out to play an additional role during the war and the focus of research was shifted to military projects. To the extent that the institute operated at all, it was largely used for marine observations for the German Navy. Given its geo-strategic position on the Aegean Sea, biological studies no longer had priority. Schartau, the local director, was almost entirely engaged in oceanographic studies and not in biological research. In return for services rendered, the *Oberkomando der Marine* (OKM) promised to assist with the building of the institute. Both the OKM and the *Wehrmacht* provided the institute with the necessary construction materials, facilitating their transportation either from Germany or from Bulgaria, where they were cheaper to buy. Without the army's contribution the existence of the institute would have been impossible, even though it did not manage to produce the scientific work for which it was designed. Perhaps it is not too bold to conclude that the varying interests between the *Wehrmacht* and the biologists in Dahlem were not in conflict, but were put in a hierarchy forced by the war. In addition, the situation in Greece was turned out to be rather hostile for the realization of von Wettstein's and Hartmann's plans. The German occupation and the brutality of the *Wehrmacht* against the Greek population, in reprisal for the deeds of the Greek resistance, which was dominated by the communist organization EAM/ELAS, incurred the people's hatred for the Germans. It should be noted, however, that Hartmann saw the whole situation as transitional and continued to hope that after the end of the war considerable scientific progress could take place at the institute.[1190]

[1189] HAGEN FLEISCHER, "Europas Rueckkehr nach Griechenland. Kulturpolitik der Grossmaechte in einem Staat der Peripherie", in: HARALD HEPPNER, OLGA KATSIARDI-HERING (Hg.), Die Griechen und Europa. Aussen- und Innensichten im Wandel der Zeit, Wien 1998, pp. 125-191, here p. 151.

[1190] "Die weitere klaerung der phaenotypischen Geschlechtsbestimmung interessierte mich sehr. Ich hoffe, dass nach Ende des Krieges in Athen die Fragen an den Wuermern ebenfalls gute Fortschritte machen werden." Hartmann to Dr. Franz Moewus 17.01.1944, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 47.

One question, however, is still tantalizing: to what extent did the scientific relations between Germany and Greece constitute an attempt at cultural policy, propaganda or export *per se*? "The export and expansion of science", notes H. W. von der Dunk, "can be reduced to two main factors: pure scientific interest, [...] and the national interest to promote national culture".[1191] If we accept his view, then it is safe to say that our fulfils these criteria, with military, political and commercial interests all arraying in a loose or strong connection with them, depending on certain social and political environments. Transcending culture –broadly defined- national borders, is without fail a natural phenomenon as well as a necessary and imperative undertaking. It is, however, a phenomenon fraught with hidden or 'invisible' dimensions, which, when unveiled, bring to light the inherent complexity of the situation.

[1191] H.W. von der DUNK, "Commentary on the paper of Lewis Pyenson", in: R.P.W. VISSER, H.J.M. BOS, L.C. PALM, H.A.M. SNELDERS (eds.), New Trends in the History of Science. Proceedings of a conference held at the University of Utrecht, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 279-282, here 280. The paper he is referring to is entitled: "Pure learning and political economy: science and European expansion in the age of imperialism", published on the same book, pp. 209-278.

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