On the Cutting Edge: Border Integration and Security in Europe and North America

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Abstract
Within the rich literature on regional integration and immigration, many scholars discuss border issues. Nonetheless, rarely are border areas comparatively examined, despite the fact that they are most exposed to these international phenomena. This paper comparatively analyzes the development of regional politics and economies in border areas in Europe and North America, and its impact on immigration regimes. It responds to three inter-related research questions: 1) How has regional integration affected cross-border cooperation at the sub-national level? 2) How have recent socio-economic transformations related to cross-border cooperation affected migration regimes? 3) How well have border control strategies responded to recent changes in migration regimes? It contends that border integration is actually the most effective means of border control.

Keywords
Borders, Regional Integration, Immigration, European Union, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
I. Introduction

Security issues, such as organized crime, and terrorism have directly raised the visibility of border control on public agendas in Europe and the United States (US). In response to this heightened attention, nation-states have generally followed coercive border control strategies aimed at stopping clandestine migration and human smuggling. One of the most recent measures proposed by the US Congress in December 2005, would entail, should it be implemented, the extension of the current border wall system (in place in four points of the border) to the entire length of the US-Mexico divide. This plan has provoked indignation throughout Latin America where leaders, especially Mexican President Vicente Fox, have decried the measure as ‘shameful.’

Because immigration has been politically framed as a security threat, government responses have increasingly focused on the notion of ‘control,’ defined as the prevention of unauthorized migration across state borders. In response, many scholars (i.e. Cornelius) and political actors have questioned the effectiveness of such strategies. In fact, borders have received prominent attention in other political spheres, such as those related to labour market expansion, trans-national social movements, environmental conservation, etc. where border cities and regions have historically been recognized as dynamic areas. Many frontiers are known as places of opportunity and expansion, especially when they separate industrialized and developing countries.

This paper comparatively examines the relationship between immigration and regional integration in Europe and North America through the study of border areas located in both continents. By studying the impact of these global phenomena on sub-national communities, the paper identifies the mechanisms that best explain the foundations of clandestine migration and its relationship to regional integration models. It does so by responding to three inter-related research questions: 1) how has regional integration affected cross-border co-operation at the sub-national level?; 2) how have recent socio-economic transformations related to cross-border co-operation affected migration regimes in these border communities?; 3) how well have immigration control strategies responded to these recent changes in migration regimes?

Research Design

This paper focuses on regional integration and the politics of immigration in two border cases, 1) San Diego, USA-Tijuana, Mexico and 2) Bari, Italy-Durrres, Albania. These cases are part of a larger study on the impact of regional integration on four border communities. The other two cases in the overall research framework are Northern France-Southern Belgium (area of historic Flanders) and Cucuta, Colombia and San Cristobal, Venezuela. These communities were chosen for this study for specific demographic, political and economic characteristics. In terms of their similarities, all of these cases are traditional migration areas. Second, organized crime has created human smuggling/trafficking rings in each community. Third, each case has historically been considered ‘integrated’ due to bi-national ethnic ties, economic cooperation or colonial relationships. Finally, regional integration developed in each specific area during the same time period (early 1990s) due to lagging labour markets and the decision by local elites to restructure the foundations of the local economies.

These cases were also chosen due to various traits that make them ‘most different.’ San Diego-Tijuana and traditional Flanders represent cases where there is strong asymmetry along the border. In the former, there is little political interaction between the case cities’ local governments. Limited collaboration occurs in the economic sphere as chambers of commerce, and planning agencies work to stimulate local markets. In the latter, political cooperation occurs on a daily basis but economic collaboration is lacking due to differences in economic structures. Conversely, demographic and economic symmetry exists between Bari-Durres and Cucuta-San Cristobal. Nonetheless, significant differences remain. Cross-border co-operation between Bari and Durres encompasses both the political
and economic arenas as collaboration exists between firms, planning agencies, chambers of commerce, city, provincial and regional governments, and non-governmental organisations. Moreover, because Bari is found in Italy’s poorer south, its economy suffers from many of the structural problems found in Durres, such as a large informal economy, high unemployment, limited infrastructure, etc. Cucuta, Colombia and San Cristobal, Venezuela demonstrate little collaboration in either the political or economic arenas due to the deteriorated relationship between the Colombian and Venezuelan governments and the militarization of the border.

Key Concepts

For the purposes of this study, ‘regional integration’ is defined as the cession of sovereignty in policy arenas through multilateral agreements that transfer decision-making powers in those arenas to the supranational level. Specifically, the paper compares the institutional and legal differences in these arrangements between the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). ‘Immigration regimes’ are defined not only by the number of immigrants in the case of study, but by the qualitative differences in the types of immigration present in the selected cases. ‘Clandestine migration’ refers to those migrants who cross state borders without proper authorization. ‘Human smuggling’ is defined as the facilitation of unauthorized migration for economic gain, and ‘Human trafficking’ regards the facilitation of unauthorized migration for the purposes of future exploitation in illicit activities.

The direct focus of the study is security in border areas. As in most of the literature on security issues (i.e. Williams), I address this key concept both as ‘public security’ referring to threats to public order and ‘human security’ defined as the maintenance of human integrity or human dignity. Finally, the term ‘border areas’ concerns sub-national communities located in the proximity of nation-state boundaries.

Methods

In order to complete this study, library research on both regional integration (EU and NAFTA) and immigration was carried out at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of California, San Diego. Socio-economic data on the sub-national cases was gathered at local universities, local government development agencies, chambers of commerce, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Information regarding political cooperation was obtained through personal interviews with representatives of local government and NGOs.

Literature Review

This research project addresses three distinct bodies of literature and attempts to connect inter-related arguments found within them. First, it aims to fill a hole in the emerging literature on border communities. Numerous scholars, such as Blatter, Maganda, Brooks and Fox, Kirchner, etc. have analyzed the impact of regional integration programs on various aspects of local policy-making in border cities. While these studies are significant, they rarely employ comparative methods. The most extensive book in this field is Caught in the Middle: Border Communities in the Era of Globalization edited by Demetrious Papademetriou and Deborah Meyers. This volume presents research on recent transformations in border communities in Europe and North America. Nonetheless, it is a collection of cases and it does not employ the comparative method. Its theoretical introduction, however, accurately presents two arguments: 1) border regions are those most exposed to international phenomena, and 2) local actors often follow policy strategies that contradict national measures. This framework is the basis of this paper.

The second body of literature that is addressed by this research is that on immigration control. This scholarship has been developed extensively. Authors such as Cornelius, Money, Lavanex, Lahav, and
Geddes, to name a few, have analyzed the domestic and international pressures that have led to protectionist policy-making in immigration politics. Nonetheless, one of the weak points of these works is that they often fail to discuss immigration policies within the framework of general political systems. Some authors, such as Holliefield and Bretell, Freeman and Weiner have addressed this deficiency. This paper aims to contribute to this niche as well.

Finally, the research presented in this paper addresses issues raised by the current scholarship on comparative regional integration. Authors such as Mattli, Appendini and Bislev, Laursen, and Chambers and Smith have examined regional integration models in comparative perspective discussing issues such as: the national impact of regional integration, the theoretical arguments for regional integration, global incentives for regional integration, and the impact of different institutional frameworks on regional regimes. This paper aims to address the impact of regional integration on power in sub-national communities in different geographical contexts. By doing so, it addresses an area that is lacking in this international scholarship.

**Theoretical Arguments**

The paper is divided into five parts. Following this introduction, part two briefly outlines regional development strategies in Europe and North America and their impact on Mexico and Albania. Part three analyzes the impact of regional integration on the two border case areas. Part four discusses recent border control measures in Europe and North America and their effects on clandestine migration in the case regions. Finally, part five, presents theoretical conclusions.

The paper argues that regional integration significantly affects local patterns of cross-border cooperation. However, it also questions the notion that regional integration necessarily creates ‘border integration.’ In fact, it contends that levels of border integration vary due to different forms of cross-border cooperation in the economic and political arenas. The paper then contends that immigration control policies based on the unilateral use of force at the border cannot be effective unless they address the socio-economic contexts, created by regional integration, that significantly affect migration regimes. These socio-economic factors have, in part, been created by co-operation between local governments which have implemented policies aimed at stimulating cross-border economic exchanges. By ignoring this background to migration and focusing simply on border controls, states merely push immigration underground by improving the opportunity structures for organized crime groups that have created networks for human smuggling and human trafficking. The cases presented suggest that developed states need to address the underlying bases of migration if they are to manage this issue with any success. This is best accomplished through multi-level governance and cross-border local cooperation.

II. Regional Integration and Development in Europe and North America

Since World War II, regional integration has taken many forms. These models have been thoroughly discussed in the comparative literature on regionalism (see Laursen, 2003, Mattli, 1999, Appendini and Bislev, 1999). Rather than focus on the theoretical debates that surround regional integration, the purpose of this section is to briefly present the evolving contexts in which border politics have developed in Europe and North America. By describing these models of integration and their corresponding development strategies in Mexico and Albania, this section provides the necessary background for the analysis presented in part three.

**The European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement Compared**

Stephen Clarkson (2000) asserts that comparing the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is like comparing apples and oranges. When the Treaty of Rome
was signed in 1957, European integration was based on the tremendous need to reconstruct the continent, as well as political idealism tied to notions of international peace and co-operation. For this reason, the concept benefited from a tacit consensus throughout Europe allowing the forefathers of European integration to lay the foundations for integration in the political, economic and social spheres.

Since that time, integration objectives have shifted away from responses to security issues and the implementation of ideals concerning peace, and moved towards the efficient management of economic forces in the global economy. As regional integration developed in Europe and other parts of the world, it gradually became linked more closely with political and economic competitiveness.

This is visible in the differences between the EU and NAFTA. Because the EU represents a model of early integration, its institutional and legal mechanisms are more developed and its political objectives are more ambitious than those included in NAFTA, an example of later, market-based integration. These differences are summarized in Table 1.

**TABLE 1: EU and NAFTA Compared**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>State-Market Relationship</strong></td>
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<td><strong>EU</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NAFTA</strong></td>
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**European and North American Development Strategies**

The political and economic disparities between the EU and NAFTA are clearly evident in the development strategies that they promote. The greatest difference between the economic aspects of regional integration in Europe and North America regard the notion of equity. In North America, regional harmonisation is not an objective of NAFTA and socio-economic equity has never been part of the agreement. Conversely, European integration has institutionalized the principle of equity though regional funding and social programs aimed at reducing ‘the differences between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions.’

**TABLE 2: Commitment to Development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>ECONOMIC MARKETS</strong></th>
<th><strong>POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS</strong></th>
<th><strong>CIVIL SOCIETY</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAFTA</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium (Peripheral Interest)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NAFTA and Mexico and the EU and Albania

Scholars of development, such as Larry Diamond, have long identified three arenas that contribute to stability and prosperity: market liberalisation, the presence of transparent political institutions and fair legal structures, and cohesive civil society. The greatest difference between regional integration in Europe and North America regards the emphasis placed on the various sectors of development.

Under the auspices of NAFTA, it is clearly evident that political reform is not a priority. Instead, it is a secondary objective of the agreement to be achieved through economic reform. This outcome occurred for two reasons. First, as stated earlier, NAFTA was championed by US corporations with little interest in political reform. Due to these external restraints, US leaders (especially President George Herbert Bush), had little opportunity to include democratisation on the NAFTA agenda. Second, Mexican leaders also opposed a dual agenda. When the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) began liberalizing the economy after the shocks of the early and mid 1980s, democratic reform did not follow. Instead, PRI leaders maintained oligarchic political structures that permitted them to remain in power. Political reform did not even become part of Mexico’s agenda until Vicente Fox and the Partido del Accion Nacional (PAN) won the 2000 presidential election, a full eight years after NAFTA was signed.

The results of this approach have been clear in Mexico. Due to trade liberalisation, many economic indicators demonstrate improvements in Mexico’s overall economy. Foreign investment has increased (stock of foreign investment doubled between 1994 and 1999 from US$42 billion to US$83 billion), as has gross domestic product (to one trillion US dollars), exports in manufacturing (from US$41.6 billion to US$105.9 billion), and employment (official unemployment rate decreased from 3.7 percent in 1993 to 2.3 percent in 1999). However, social marginalization has also boomed as precarious labour has led to a relative decline in wages (by 13.2 percent) and regional disparities in economic performance have also grown (25 of 32 states account for less than three percent each of total production in Mexico). Politically, reform of the justice system and the institutionalisation of human rights have been slow to develop. Furthermore corruption continues to run rampant even after the change in power in 2000. Public dissatisfaction with President Fox combined with some high profile scandals that have included ruling PAN officials have actually made a quick return to power for the PRI a legitimate possibility in the next presidential elections. This is especially true given the PAN and PRI’s successful campaign to destitute the leading Left-wing candidate for President, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador from his position as Mayor of Mexico City. This act has created mass public outcry and instigated international criticism that it is a blow to democracy in Mexico.

Conversely, despite numerous challenges to development, democracy in Albania has been consolidated more evenly and international organisations, such as the World Bank, Council of Europe and the EU have praised the country for the progress that has been accomplished both politically and economically. For example, Nadir Mohammed, World Bank Country Manager for Albania has stated:

We are encouraged by this performance and commend the government of Albania for its commitment. Major regulatory reforms have put the banking sector on a firmer footing, energy-pricing reforms are reducing the fiscal burden, and privatisation is picking up momentum. Albania is also making important progress in its path towards EU integration.

In fact, since the fall of the Communist regime in 1991, Albania’s economic markets and political institutions have progressively stabilized, despite significant internal and external challenges, such as the 1997 pension crisis and the military conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia. While these events created added difficulties for the development process, they also led to heightened foreign aid and political support. Unlike Mexico, Albania has benefited from significant foreign assistance directed at political and social incorporation, especially from the EU. Since 1991, Albania has received over one billion euros in EU assistance. At the beginning of the 1990s, financial aid targeted food and emergency relief. Since then, the EU has heavily subsidized economic and political reform through the PHARE (Pologne et Hongrie: Assistance pour la Restructuration Economique) and CARDS
(Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) programs aimed at: developing a fair judicial system and transparent legal structures, establishing basic infrastructure, improving customs and tax collection, developing civil society, strengthening education and environmental protection, and opening Albania to its neighbours through transportation programs and cultural and educational exchanges.

These investments have significantly improved Albania’s political, economic and social situations. Following the fall of Communism, the country was confronted with deep social divisions, institutional inefficiency and underdeveloped markets. Gains in all three arenas have been evident. Politically, a stable parliamentary republic has been established, public administration has been improved dramatically, and a fair judicial system has begun to develop (which remains one of Mexico’s greatest problems). One of Albania’s largest institutional challenges has been the development of an effective tax and customs administration. Because of the progress accomplished in this area, tax revenues increased twenty six percent in 2000 with respect to 1999 which contributed to a decrease in the fiscal deficit from 11.5 percent of GDP to 9.2 percent.7

Other economic indicators reflect the positive effects of political development on economic markets. Overall, Albania has shown steady growth since 1991 (except for 1997 due to the aforementioned pension scandal) with yearly improvements of seven to eight percent of the country’s overall GDP.8 The service sector has the most dynamic growth rate at 20.1 percent, followed by construction (18.4 percent) and industry (13.6 percent). Foreign direct investment has also increased from US$20 million in 1992 to US$135 million in 2002 and inflation is at its lowest point since the economic transition began fourteen years ago.9 Finally, remittances from Albanian’s living abroad are estimated at approximately US$440 million.10

This final statistic, however, touches on many of the social problems that continue to afflict Albania. Due to the weakness of civil society, the importance of poverty, the structural problems in education, the strength of organized crime, and low wages, many Albanians have chosen to emigrate. It is estimated that 500,000-600,000 Albanians left the country in the 1990s, creating a problematic ‘brain drain.’ Moreover, approximately 36,000 migrants pass through the country each year on their way to the European Union.11 Albania has become of the busiest transit points in Europe for human smugglers and traffickers. For this reason, special attention has been placed on police training and border controls. In fact, after having been considered one of the ‘most closed’ countries in Europe throughout the Communist regime of Enver Hoxha, Albania has become one of the continent’s most open, due to its geographic position. For this reason, border issues have become as publicly prominent as they have traditionally been in Mexico. This is the focus of the section three.

III. The Impact of Regional Integration on Border Communities

Since the early 1990s, asymmetry and shifts in balances/uses of power have been a central focus of border studies. Many scholars (i.e. Blatter, 2004, Papademetriou, 2001, Kirchner, 1998) have noted that local actors often follow economic and political strategies that counteract policies instituted at the national level. Moreover, excluded groups on both sides of a border often unify their efforts to further a common political cause (i.e. Brooks and Fox, 2002). What has not been sufficiently examined is what types of cross-border co-operation develop at the local level from regional integration and how these varying models of political co-operation relate to the management and restructuring of economic markets. These questions have not been analyzed closely in much of the literature. For example, Joachim Blatter correctly argues that scholars of borders often assume two theoretical points related to globalization: 1) that political economy represents the increasing integration of the political and economic spheres and 2) regional integration creates cross-border co-operation by definition.

This section examines border politics and markets in San Diego-Tijuana and Bari-Durres. Rather than simply focusing on how integration has occurred in these communities, this section questions whether integration has occurred at all, and if so, to what extent? Its basic premise is that border
integration involves a series of changing relationships that encompass markets and political systems. These relationships may shorten or lengthen the distances between communities, but these communities remain separate entities within each case of study. By focusing on the character of the relationships that have developed between local political institutions, as well as the nature of cross-border economic ties between cities, this section attempts to describe how the regional integration models described above have influenced these border communities. These outcomes will then be utilized as the basis of the analysis of immigration policies presented in part four.

**Defining Border Integration: A Qualitative Question**

Globalization has certainly increased the number of cross-border transactions and it has accelerated rates of economic exchange. Urban planners interested in border questions often examine this latter aspect of globalization. For example, Steven P. Erie, one of the leading scholars of the San Diego-Tijuana region’s economic transformation, has publicly called for improved transportation infrastructure on both sides of the border because current capabilities are insufficient for faster exchanges of commodities and services. Similarly, scholars of economic development in the Adriatic Basin (which includes Bari and Durres), such as Gianfranco Viesti, have acknowledged that increased economic interdependence in this geographic area has created a need for improved airports, seaports, and roads.

While globalization has certainly affected the volume and speed of economic exchanges, it cannot be taken for granted that it has created market integration in border areas. Integration, defined as the incorporation of market structures into (even loosely) unified economic bodies, is not found in all border communities. Through an analysis of socio-economic changes in San Diego-Tijuana and Bari-Durres, this section aims to show that communities in border areas do not necessarily need to be considered integrated, even if their patterns of development are similar. Moreover, these cases show that regional integration models have an impact on how political and economic co-operation occurs at the local level.

**San Diego-Tijuana**

The San Diego-Tijuana area represents the busiest border in the world with about seventy million crossings each year. The region’s economy is worth US$100 billion which ranks it as the thirty sixth largest economy in the world. Its population has skyrocketed to over four million inhabitants, 2.8 million of whom reside in San Diego and 1.2 million of whom live in Tijuana. For these reasons, this case is often considered a ‘well-integrated’ border. In fact, this demographic and economic growth has been significantly affected by NAFTA as the importance of this area developed with the introduction of regional integration. Following World War II, both San Diego and Tijuana were only minor cities with limited industrial bases. Due to the region’s climate and location, both cities received significant amounts of internal migrants. Moreover, San Diego’s economy received a boost from the defence industry, as Navy and Marine bases located in the county were expanded. Nonetheless, the signing of NAFTA in 1993 accelerated expansion tremendously.

Since that year, both of these cities experienced major transformations of their economic foundations. Between 1990 and 1992, 53,000 jobs were lost in San Diego County. This represented five percent of the local workforce. Because of this recession, local officials effectively planned and negotiated a shift to a ‘New Economy’ based on high technology. They identified nine clusters in high-tech fields, including biomedical production, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, computer software, wireless telecommunications, electronic and computer manufacturing, business services, financial services, defence and transportation manufacturing, and environmental technology. This shift fundamentally changed the focus of the San Diego economy from one based on regional markets to an economy oriented towards international exports. Not surprisingly, due to the timing of this transformation as well as San Diego’s geographic location, Mexico became the primary target of these
exports. Whereas other California cities, notably Los Angeles and San Francisco have fostered east-west connections between Asia and Europe, San Diego’s ties run north-south. This is obvious in its trade with Mexico which receives forty-four percent of the city’s exports, compared to twenty-three percent for all Asian states, and nine percent for Canada. Furthermore, of the 126,000 international passengers who pass through San Diego’s airport every year, 102,000 are estimated to be Mexican.14

Similarly, Tijuana has greatly benefited from NAFTA. The city has an official growth rate of 6.9 percent each year. Its population has increased from 740,000 in the late 1970s to 1.3 million in 2000. Actually, local planners expect growth to continue at even higher rates doubling the population again by 2020.15 This demographic expansion has significantly contributed to the development of the local maquiladora economy.16 Even though there is much internal migration to Tijuana from poorer parts of Mexico, the city has a highly educated workforce. The official literacy rate is ninety-seven percent. The local Chamber of Commerce has utilized high rates of education to lure companies such as SONY, Panasonic, and Samsung to the area. In fact, Tijuana has one of the highest concentrations of specialized workers in Mexico and the highest concentration of maquiladoras in the country.17

Of course, the city’s economic growth has also been aided by its geographic position. Tijuana has proclaimed itself ‘the television capital of the world’ because of the strong presence of maquiladoras. These televisions, radios, stereos, etc. are mainly produced for the US market. They represent the leading imports from Mexico that cross into the US at the San Diego border. Moreover, in 2002, they were 48.6 percent of the all exports from Mexico with a value of US$18,680 million.18

While these trends that have enveloped San Diego and Tijuana are encouraging, they cannot be considered the fruit of cross-border co-operation. In fact, they closely reflect the market-based model, described above, that was implemented under NAFTA. Little cross-border governmental co-operation between these cities exists. A planning agency called SANDAG (San Diego Association of Governments) has instituted a Border Committee which formally includes officials from all of the border cities in Southern California (including San Diego) and Northern Baja California (including Tijuana). However, a member of this committee stated during a personal interview that the Mexican representatives do not actively participate and their input is largely symbolic. Most scholars of this border, (i.e. Carmen Maganda, 2005) point to two obstacles that have blocked cross-border co-operation. First, the asymmetry of power at the border offers little incentive for leaders in San Diego to enter into institutionalized dialogue with their Mexican counterparts. Economically, San Diego is ten times wealthier than Tijuana (added value of US$90 billion versus US$11 billion19). For this reason, there have actually been anti-border reactions amongst the electorate in San Diego when integration has been discussed. Because local leaders lose more votes that they gain by opening new avenues of co-operation, they avoid such dialogue.

Leaders in Tijuana have expressed equal concern about sovereignty in negotiations with counterparts from San Diego. Due to the exploitative behaviour of US officials in the past, many Mexican leaders, especially those in border communities, worry about ceding sovereignty in political and economic matters. Furthermore, because there is significant anti-US sentiment in the area, many leaders worry about the impact of cross-border collaboration on their own re-election chances. For its part, the Mexican Consulate in San Diego has focused its energies on protecting the rights of Mexican migrants in the city who, due to aggressive behaviour by local immigration officials, often risk deportation when their situations are not regular. For this reason it has had limited involvement in cross-border co-operation.

This situation demonstrates numerous difficulties that have prevented political collaboration between San Diego and Tijuana. In fact, due to the lack of co-operation in the political sphere, the above-mentioned economic sectors have expanded without integration into a cross-border market. Instead of a single, integrated economy one finds two separate parallel markets. Tijuana does export goods to the United States, but San Diego is not considered a consumer market. It is merely a point of passage to other areas in California and beyond, especially Los Angeles, with whom Tijuana has
tighter political and trade relationships. Similarly, San Diego’s high-tech products are destined for markets in Mexico’s interior, by-passing Tijuana. These facts suggest that consumption is a much better indicator of integration than production.

A second observation from the San Diego-Tijuana case concerning the impact of supranational integration regards changes internal to each city’s socio-economic structures. Because market expansion occurred on both sides of the border without significant political collaboration beyond deregulation, the populations of each of these border cities have been exposed to economic fluctuations caused by regional integration. Due to the lack of concern for equity, increased social stratification has occurred in both cities. For example, despite overall increases in levels of wealth in San Diego, social marginalization has risen as well. Rafael Alarcon (2005) reports that from 1990 to 1998, job growth in the non-targeted industry clusters (71,079 positions) far outdistanced that in the targeted industry clusters (36,794). Similarly, the Union Tribune (2004), the city’s newspaper, reported that even though unemployment had decreased below six percent, most of the positions that encouraged this drop were in precarious or part-time employment which has led to a resulting decrease in wages and quality of life, especially among ethnic minorities, including Mexicans and Mexican-Americans. In fact, geographical studies of the city’s neighbourhoods (i.e. San Diego Association of Governments, 2004) show a distinct separation between wealthy districts and poorer ones. Census data gathered at the neighbourhood level shows that this gap has significantly increased between 1990 and 2000.

Tijuana has faced a similar and even more dramatic situation. Despite an increase in overall levels of wealth, education and health, wages have been decreasing in the area. In 1993, when the maquiladoras first opened in the city, the average wage was US$1.80/hour. This wage has dropped to US$1.70/hour since then. Moreover, due to less expensive international competition, Tijuana is losing jobs to other parts of the world, most notably China, where wages are almost four times cheaper (less than fifty US cents per hour). Between 2000 and 2002, the city’s maquiladora industry cut over 300,000 jobs. This loss of employment; combined with lower wages, and dynamic demographic growth has been a dangerous combination for Tijuana. Entire abusive neighbourhoods, constructed by residents without government authorization and usually lacking basic hygienic services, have been erected by internal migrants from Mexico’s poorer southern states. City planners estimate a need for 50,000 new low-cost homes to be built within the year with the same necessity next year. This housing shortage has also led to increased crime and violence. Thus, economic and social trends in Tijuana mirror those found in San Diego. This can due be attributed to market forces promoted by NAFTA, which have created marginalization in both border communities despite the lack of formal border integration, such as that which has developed in Bari-Durres.

Bari-Durres

Unlike, the previous North American case, one finds numerous examples of political and economic collaboration between Bari, Italy and Durres, Albania. In fact, the City of Bari has proclaimed itself ‘A Bridge Between East and West.’ Located in the Southern Italian region of Puglia along the Adriatic Sea, the city’s economic and political ties have, in fact, been traditionally stronger with counterparts in the Balkans than they have with Northern Italian cities. Since the fall of Communism in Albania and the ex-Yugoslavia, city, provincial and regional officials have focused on re-establishing these historical links in order to improve the area’s economic foundations, which were shaking in the late 1980’s and early 1990s. One of the closest relationships that has been resuscitated is that with the Albanian city of Durres. Like Bari, it is an Adriatic port city with a rich history. Due to Albania’s colonial situations, it has passed from one ruler to another thirty-three times. During the early part of the century, it was a focal point of the Albanian independence movement, in part due to the importance of Italian influences.

The economy of Durres has been built around trade in the Adriatic Basin and the city’s recent history has been marked by its relationship with Italy. In fact, Italians have had a strong interest in the
city since the end of the nineteenth century. For this reason, they significantly invested in the independence movement while Albania was ruled by the Austro-Hungarians. During the brief rule of King Zog in the 1920s, Italy, and specifically Puglia, contributed large amounts of capital to improve infrastructure in the city. Specifically, investments were made to construct wider roads, improve the port, and build factories that produced predominantly flour, cigarettes and pasta. Because of these interests, the city has been occupied twice by the Italian military, first in 1918, and later under Mussolini’s Fascist regime in the 1930s.

Like San Diego and Tijuana, Bari and Durres underwent significant socio-economic changes during a period of regional integration due to the consolidation of the European Union in 1992. The fall of Communism in Albania (1991-1992) coincided with the *tangentopoli* corruption scandals that fundamentally altered Italian politics and significantly affected Bari. While Durres was learning to cope with a market economy, Bari was addressing the loss of jobs at its three biggest employers: the *Aquedotto Pugliese*, the seaport, and the *Fiera del Levante*, which were semi-public entities that had been mismanaged and defrauded through corruption.

This situation created economic need on both sides of this water border. Durres, one of the most dynamic cities in Europe’s poorest country, and Bari, a poorer Italian city with great potential but structural problems, constructed a partnership based on reciprocal interests related to regional integration. In fact, these cities have created a working relationship through the private sector, as well as through political collaboration on European Union-sponsored programs. This has led to a continuous working relationship in various sectors that represents a model of stable political and economic border integration.

In fact, there is great symmetry in the relationship between these two cities. Demographically, Bari is the larger metropolitan area with approximately 500,000 inhabitants compared to 350,000 people living in the Province of Durres and 180,000 in the city, itself. Both cities rely heavily on foreign trade through their ports. More than two million tons of merchandise passes between them each year, which represents eighty five percent of Albania’s total import-export.23

Both cities have a diversified economy based on the dominance of small firms in various economic sectors. Of the 16,501 businesses present in Bari 89.1 percent employ five people or less.24 Similarly, 78.5 percent of the 5,844 companies active in Durres employ less than ten people.25 Moreover, in both of these cities, these businesses are spread through different economic sectors. In Bari, forty five percent are found in industry, 33.5 percent in commerce and 21.5 percent in services.26 Outside the city, there is a strong agricultural sector based on seasonal labour and small farms. In Durres, 8.9 percent of the companies are industrial, 49.9 percent are commercial, and 35.8 percent are active in services or transportation.27

A second structural similarity between Bari and Durres is their reliance on ‘traditional family labour.’ Under this model, the family units that live in the areas surrounding these cities are not dependent on a single breadwinner. They rely on numerous components of the family working part-time or precarious jobs. This makes employment flexibility a necessity in order to guarantee the security of entire families. Potential for mobility within the local workforce is high in both sectoral and geographic terms. Giandomenico Amendola writes: ‘Its [the family’s] flexibility has acted as a buffer during periods of economic crisis… in that this labour, which outperforms the urban and less reusable workforce, was easily displaced, without a heavy impact on either the local system of production or, above all, the political system.’28 The negative impact of this labour model, however, has been the lack of incentives to invest in technology or improved production techniques.

For these reasons, Bari’s economy has never realized its full potential. Unemployment rates remain high at 16.7 percent. This figure is especially dramatic for women (twenty six percent) and young people (33.7 percent). Moreover, education levels are low as only 19.3 percent of the city’s working population has a high school or university degree.29 This has contributed to an increase in precarious
work and the development of a significant informal economy that includes activities that are ‘not regulated by the institutions of society in a legal and social area where similar activities are regulated.’\textsuperscript{30}

Because the size of informal markets is a function of flexibility in economic systems, they are prominent in both Bari and Durres. Since 1999, more than 1,000 businesses in Bari are denounced for ‘irregularities’ every year.\textsuperscript{31} The informal sector is so important that one local businessman who operates in a small town in the suburbs of Bari reports: ‘I am regular and I pay my workers’ contributions and my taxes. However, I cannot report all of my sales because I would lose two-thirds of my clients. Unfortunately, if I do not sell to these firms, I cannot make a living myself. This is the market reality.’\textsuperscript{32} A similar situation exists in Durres as Albania’s regulatory agencies are not stable.

Because of their history of co-operation and present economic symmetry, Bari and Durres have become partners in the regional integration of the Adriatic Basin. Numerous protocols have been signed by city, provincial and regional officials creating economic partnerships and cultural/educational exchanges. The aforementioned \textit{Fiera del Levante} has organized business fairs in Albania aimed at promoting cross-border trade and the \textit{Gazetta del Mezzogiorno}, Bari’s main newspaper has begun publishing special editions in Albanian.

The largest benefit of this partnership has been the arrival of European Union funding. Both Bari and Durres have received EU structural funds to improve their airports, modernize their seaports and build roads. The largest sum of thirty-three million Euros was contributed within the framework of the Interreg program. The cities were also chosen for participation in the Corridor 8 program aimed at constructing rail and auto routes ‘from Northern Europe to the Black Sea.’ This large endeavour will eventually connect Bari and Durres with the cities of Tirana, Skopje, Sofia, Plovdiv, Burgas and Varna. Thus, Bari and Durres have the opportunity to become transportation nodes between Western and Southeastern Europe. This demonstrates a true interest in border integration, politically, economically and socially. In fact, EU support has not only affected infrastructure and transportation. While overall unemployment rates remain high compared to San Diego-Tijuana, they have decreased over the last ten years. This reduction of social marginalization has significantly affected migration in the area. This point is further developed in the discussions below.

\textbf{IV. Contemporary Developments in Border Control Strategies}

Like the literature on regional integration, immigration studies pay significant attention to borders, but they rarely focus comparatively on border communities themselves. Authors, such as Alarcon, Kopinak, Andreas, and Alegria, have extensively studied local immigration politics along the US-Mexico border. Similarly, locally focused works (by scholars such as Di Comite, Pace, and Bonifazi) have discussed border immigration politics in Europe. Despite these similarities, little dialogue exists between these bodies of literature. This paper aims to create this link. Local border immigration studies on both European and North American cases accurately argue that while migration discussions affect national political debates, border communities are the areas where international developments and local citizen concerns intersect. In the sub-field of clandestine migration, most attention is paid to discussions pitting public security (migration controls) versus human security (rights of migrants) in these areas.

By comparatively focusing on recent developments in border areas, this paper aims to add a new dimension to discussions of migration politics. On one hand, the evidence presented in the previous section suggests that local and regional actors follow border strategies that directly contradict control policies orchestrated at the national level. Instead, border integration follows models of regional integration. Nonetheless, the effects of the logic of control which lies at the base of national migration policies in Europe and North America are clearly visible in the border cases discussed in this paper.
Controlling Borders in the EU and North America

The relationship between development and immigration has already been illustrated in the literature on international migration (see Cornelius et. al. 2004, Jamieson and Silj, 1998). Nonetheless, immigration policies in Europe and North America largely ignore the relationship between these phenomena. In the European Union, despite the activities of the European Parliament and the Commission in areas related to social integration and anti-discrimination, the Council, which has ultimate policy-making authority in this arena, has focused its attention almost entirely on border controls.

Since the 2002 Seville Council meeting, the EU has further strengthened its efforts to control its external borders. The resolutions passed at this meeting further reinforced the EU’s commitment to improving border security. The approved strategies entail the following:

a) Harmonizing measures to combat illegal migration: including the creation of a common visa identification system; acceleration of the conclusion of readmission agreements with specific countries identified by the Council; approval for elements of a program on expulsion and repatriation policies, including the optimization of accelerated repatriations to Afghanistan; and formal approval for reinforcing the framework for suppression of assistance for illegal migration.

b) Progressive operationalization of coordinated and integrated administration of external borders: including joint operations at
- external borders and the creation of government liaison officials for immigration;
- drafting a common model of risk analysis;
- drafting common training procedures for border police together with consolidation of European norms concerning borders; and
- drafting a study by the Commission on the administration of external borders.

c) Integration of immigration policy in the relations of the Union with third countries:
- a clause be included concerning the common administration of migratory flows and regarding obligatory readmission in the case of illegal immigration in all future agreements of co-operation, association or the equivalent that the European Union or the European Community signs with any country; and a systematic evaluation of relations with third countries that do not collaborate in the fight against illegal immigration.

Most recently, many EU states have supported the creation of transit camps in third states, such as Libya, so that clandestine migrants can be intercepted before they reach Europe’s borders, and in June 2005, the EU harmonized forced deportation procedures.

The results of this strategy are clearly evident in the Adriatic Basin. Along the shores of the Region of Puglia, the Italian Coast Guard carries out 28,000 hours of navigation and 1,500 helicopter missions each year. It also boards approximately 3,500 vessels yearly searching for clandestine migrants.

Immigration policies in the United States have followed a similar pattern. Despite provisions for internal migration controls (i.e. employer sanctions) that were included in the 1996 Immigration Reform and Control Act, most of the policy changes in the field of immigration have focused on preventing the infiltration of the country’s external borders. This is especially true at the border with Mexico where the ‘Southwest strategy’ instituted by president Clinton in 1993 and strengthened by President George Walker Bush, has created concentrated efforts to regulate border crossings and stop clandestine migration. Under this strategy, the budget for the Immigration and Naturalisation Service more than tripled, and the Border Patrol has more than doubled in size, making it the second largest federal law enforcement agency. Most significantly, this strategy has included the construction of three sixty-six mile walls at strategic points of the border, including San Diego-Tijuana, forcing clandestine migrants to cross in areas where geographic conditions are harsh including deserts, and extremely cold mountainous terrain.
Effects of Border Controls

Since the implementation of more rigid border controls in North America and Europe, illegal migration has obviously not stopped. The current stock of clandestine migrants in Europe is estimated to be over one million. In the United States this stock is approximately 9.3 million, which is twenty six percent of the foreign-born population, and five percent of the total workforce. It is estimated that 300,000 to 400,000 undocumented migrants enter the US every year.35

While these strategies have not stopped migration, they have changed its character significantly. Scholars of migration both in the Mediterranean and in North America have noted that these measures have severely restricted short-term commuter migration and cyclical seasonal migration. Whereas legal short-term migration (often daily) was once common in border areas, it now represents just a small amount of what it used to be. Moreover, anthropologists conducting work with clandestine migrants (i.e. Chavez, 1998) have shown that these workers have reduced their number of yearly border crossings for fear of being discovered upon re-entry. This has curtailed return migration as well.

The biggest impact of these policy developments has been the increase of danger in the migration experience. Paradoxically, border controls have significantly reduced the safest and economically most productive migration flows while they have stimulated activities in more dangerous clandestine migration regimes. Because immigration controls have become sophisticated, human smugglers have been forced to further professionalize their networks, increasing transaction costs. For this reason, the cost for passage into Europe or the United States has tripled in the last decade. Moreover, because smugglers have invested so much in these networks, they often combine this business with other criminal activities, such as drug trafficking and the transport of arms or stolen vehicles. Finally, the de-humanisation of smuggling through its growth into a multi-national business has led to increased amounts of human trafficking for forced labour or the sex industry.

These assertions are supported by statistics gathered in the border communities included in this study, which illustrate the increasingly dangerous nature of contemporary migration experiences. Between 1993 and 2003, more than four hundred people have died attempting to cross into California from Baja California.36 Similarly, almost three hundred people died during their crossing from Albania into Puglia during the 1990s.37 Thus, increased attention to border controls have contributed to systemic transformations in migration regimes that have created increased threats to both public and human security, suggesting the need for an alternative approach to the management of migration flows. Recent developments in border communities suggest that multi-level, bi-national co-operation could provide an effective strategy to the management of migration. This is the focus of part five, the conclusion.

V. Conclusion: Improving Border Control Through Border Integration

In both political and academic debates concerning regional integration and immigration, it is generally assumed that these phenomena weaken the ability of nation-states to control their external borders. Recent developments in both European and North American politics demonstrate the fear that this assumption can create amongst native citizens. For example, in June 2005 a group of citizens in San Diego created an association organized to ‘hunt’ clandestine migrants attempting to cross the US-Mexico border in the rural areas east of the city. While the group’s organizer stated that they would contact immigration officials once illegal migrants were identified, he also confirmed that the organisation’s members would be armed ‘for their own protection.’

This anecdote illustrates how border areas are those most exposed to international phenomena and how they are the places where their impacts are felt most strongly. By examining developments in these regions, one can effectively study how international phenomena affect local communities and, by doing so, identify what mechanisms can be implemented to effectively manage these pressures. By comparing models of supranational integration and cross-border co-operation (or lack thereof) at the
sub-national level, this paper attempts to identify sources of power, defined as the ability to manage national borders.

Current immigration policies in Europe and North America have proven to be ineffective and dangerous. Not only have they failed to keep would-be migrants out of developed states (see part four), they have also cut off the safest and most economically beneficial forms of migration (commuter migration) while at the same time feeding clandestine immigration systems. As stated earlier, this has made the migration experience more dangerous and increased the importance of criminal influences. It has also created a negative atmosphere around migration which has led to nativist reactions, such as the one described above.

The San Diego-Tijuana case presented above illustrates the perverse effects of border control strategies and parallel economic development. The physical, political and economic walls that have been constructed between these two cities, and others along the US-Mexico border, have actually stimulated clandestine migration in the area, which continues without regulation. The number of clandestine migrants intercepted at the southwest US-Mexico border increased every year from 1993 (979,000) to 2001 (1.6 million). After a decline in 2002 and 2003, the number of apprehensions has risen again in 2004 to 1.16 million. Scholars of migration flows in the area, most notably Wayne Cornelius, have argued that the recent decrease in annual interceptions is more related to the improved ability of smugglers to avoid apprehension than it is to deterrence. This interpretation is supported by the increase in internal apprehensions in Southern California, (most notably in San Diego, Los Angeles and Orange County), the growth in the number of immigrant deaths along the US-Mexico border, and the escalation of violence involving competing networks of smugglers, which has resulted in murderous attacks on migrants in California, Arizona and New Mexico. The governors of each of these states has recently declared states of emergency in their border counties as the amount of border crime and the number of migrant deaths in these areas has reached record levels. This would seem to indicate that unregulated market expansion encouraged by NAFTA, and the resulting social marginalization found in bi-national communities, such as San Diego-Tijuana (both between and within the case cities) have stimulated crime and unregulated migration flows in the area. Scholars of case regions in Europe characterized by similar political and economic relationships, such as parts of the Spanish-Moroccan and German-Polish borders, have noted similar outcomes (see Andreas, Scott).

This conclusion is also supported by recent ethnographic work with clandestine migrants in the San Diego-Tijuana region. According to Tito Alegria, immigration controls have prevented legal commuter migration but they have not deterred clandestine migration at all. His research indicates that coercion has had little impact on labour decisions made by migrants in the area. Of the trans-national migrants that he interviewed, fifty three percent did not have legal papers. Moreover, his project showed that Tijuana, itself has become the target for educated and specialized migrants due to its recent economic expansion. These internal migrants, in turn, have expressed little overt interest in crossing the border, and they usually remain in Mexico. Alegria’s study shows that most of those immigrants entering the US clandestinely are those who cross the border because they are caught outside of Tijuana’s regular labour market or earning minimum wage, marginalized socio-economically, and looking for work in San Diego’s informal economy.

Conversely, the key to immigration management in border areas seems to be tied to bi-national development, symmetrical cross-border co-operation between sub-national officials and socio-economic equity. In Bari-Durress, where border integration has occurred, the impact of political and economic development on migration trends is clear. During the early 1990s, between 10,000 and 20,000 clandestine Albanian migrants were intercepted by the Italian coast guard in the province of Bari every year. The high point of these flows was 1996 when 21,000 clandestine migrants were caught along local shores. Since then, clandestine migration to Bari has dropped off significantly, falling to under 10,000 interceptions annually. Moreover, as smuggling routes were pushed further south, the nationalities of those immigrants intercepted significantly changed from Albanians to Asians and North Africans, signifying a shift in Albania from a sending country to a transit state. The
number of migrant deaths in the Adriatic Sea has also decreased significantly. This seems to suggest that the improved institutional and economic situation in Albania, combined with border patrols, has discouraged systemic clandestine migration in the Bari-Durres area. According to one local police official: ‘The trafficking rafts full of clandestine migrants don’t arrive in Puglia anymore, not since a couple of years ago. Now we find a few kids hidden in the trucks coming from Albania, Greece, and Turkey. They are groups of two or three people, usually relatives.’41 Furthermore, because of the cooperation between the city of Bari and various partners in the Balkans, there is little ethnic chauvinism in the local population. Instead of ‘hunting’ clandestine migrants like their counterparts in San Diego, the inhabitants of Puglia, where Bari is located, have been applauded for their reactions to this phenomenon and they were even nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize by the Italian government.

Regional integration in the Adriatic Basin has not only positively affected border security through development, but it has also brought together authorities from different levels of government who collaborate institutionally to combat crime in the area. By involving sub-national actors more significantly in institutionalized cross-border security discussions, more coherent strategies can be developed that link economic development to immigration management and the reduction of criminal influences. These phenomena are both trans-national and interconnected by nature so the development of policies that recognize these relationships and extend beyond borders is fundamental. Sub-national actors can become an integral part of this process. For example, in August 2005 the governors of the US state of New Mexico and the Mexican state of Chihuahua agreed to raze the small town of Las Chepas, a strategic border point for human smugglers, commit state funds to border security and share local law enforcement information. More significantly, they renewed discussions concerning the development of the bi-national border region.

Unfortunately, the use of soft power is currently being ignored by European and American leaders in the creation of migration control strategies. Soft power focuses on the socio-economic context that surrounds migration politics and it provides a coherent approach to migration management within the framework of regional development strategies promoted by the EU and NAFTA. Most studies of border communities, including this one, in fact suggest that these areas are characterized by inter-institutional conflict as sub-national leaders often follow economic development incentives that contradict national security strategies. Moreover, as the above-mentioned recent developments in the American southwest demonstrate, local communities often bare the financial and political costs of ineffective border control strategies based on coercion and deterrence.

This study demonstrates that national policies do not dictate development in border communities. Instead, the cases presented in this study indicate that contemporary developments closely reflect the interaction of local interests and supranational models of regional integration. This integration, as well as economic globalization, in general, is a phenomenon that worries many native citizens in developed states, who in turn pressure their representatives to invest human and financial resources in expensive border controls. However, this paper shows that short-sighted and unbalanced development strategies in border areas, rather than regional integration, are responsible for challenges to border security in these communities, such as clandestine migration. Recently, the Mayor of the US border city, Douglas, Arizona, stated, ‘I have seen illegal immigration all my life. Illegal immigration has a life of its own. You can’t stop it.’42 Instead, of continually trying to do so, it seems time to change course and address the underlying causes of this phenomenon. The evidence from this comparative study of border communities would suggest that cross-border development contributes to the reinforcement of border security both structurally and economically. Thus, accelerating border integration would actually by the most effective means of border control.
Endnotes


3 Ibid. pp. 401-02.


11 Ibid, p. 10.


16 *Maquiladoras* are bonded assembly plants found in Mexican border cities that are permitted to import goods without payment of import duties. These goods, especially electronics, are further processed or manufactured and exported. When the goods enter the US, tariff is levied only on the value added outside the US.

17 Tijuana Economic Development Corporation.

18 Eric, *Toward a Trade Infrastructure Strategy for the San Diego/Tijuana Region.*


21 Tijuana Economic Development Corporation.


29 ISTAT. 1996. *Puglia: Informazioni Utili*


32 Personal interview with author, conducted October 10, 2001.


34 Personal Interview with Italian Coast Guard Official, conducted October 10, 2001.


37 Personal Interview with Italian Coast Guard Official, conducted October 10, 2001.


40 Personal Interview with Italian Coast Guard Official, conducted October 10, 2001.


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