



Towards an Anatomy of Metaxas Fascist Experiment: Organic Intellectuals, Antiparliamentarian Discourse and the Authoritarian State Building

George Souvlis

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization of the European University Institute

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Department of History and Civilization

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Introduction

Main aim of this thesis is to shed a new light on the 4th of August of regime, the authoritarian state that was established in August 1936 by Metaxas, and the antiparliamentarian ideology that it developed during the years of its existence. Despite increasing production of literature on this topic in the last few years the bibliographical lacunae are still many and there is still a high degree of puzzlement in regard to the understanding of the nature of the regime. This thesis attempts to form a new understanding of its political nature and the discourses that it has developed as a regime on its own physiognomy. The antiparliamentarian discourse is chosen to be analyzed from the ideological motives that the regime adopted since it is considered crucial for the understanding of the mentality of Greek fascist experiment. The overcoming of the parliamentary rule was one of the key reasons for its establishment considered as destructive for the existence of the national totality. I adopt the concept of 'anti-parliamentarianism' as a more suitable term than that of 'anti-democratic' because it leaves room for alternative definitions of democracy. Despite the phenomenal oxymoron of democracy being used as a key definition by the fascists to define their dictatorial regimes, the thesis will show that democracy was an integral part of the far-right's rhetoric during the interwar period where the democratic principle was claimed from the whole political spectrum from the far-right to the far-left since liberalism was under collapse. Thus, the focus on the analysis of the regime's political argumentation will be on the various conceptual attempts to define the principle of legitimacy both with positive and negative terms. I endorse that the arguments, which were developed did not reject the "democratic principle" per se but the function of the parliamentary democracy as it worked in the previous bourgeois regimes. Following the argumentation on behalf of the regime's adherents the parliamentary democracy expressed the special interests of the dominant political class and its supporters being intrinsically incapable of representing the interests of the Greek nation as a totality. From this perspective, their argumentation is not so much antidemocratic – as most of the literature argues - but antiparliamentarian because it targets the institution of the parliament. Therefore, the anti-parliamentarian discourse of the regime will not be examined as a negation of the democratic rule per se but as a rejection of the liberal parliamentary bourgeois democracy.

I will present some basic arguments that have been produced in regard to the topic from existing literature and its main limitations. Then I will proceed to the exposition of the content of the chapters in form of a response to the lacunae of the studies relevant to the topic of my thesis.

The literature on the development of anti-democratic political ideas in the first half of the 20th century in Greece is rather limited. The only specialized study on Greek anti-parliamentarianism, of Thanassis Bohotis, concerns a prior historical period ending in 1911. Bohotis attempts to examine the anti-parliamentarian argumentation that developed in Greece between 1864-1911. Despite the large number of sources that he considers and the skillful use of arguments that he uses in order to support his views on the development of the anti-democratic discourse, his study is flawed by substantial methodological limitations. The most evident restriction of the study is his exaggerated claim that between "1864 ... and 1880, appeared in a completed form a bourgeois antiparliamentarianism which, from 1890 to 1909, transformed into an (uncompleted) fascism" (Bohotis, 2003, 9). That is to say, despite his effort to give a specific non-formalistic content to the term Fascism as the "acceptance of the antiparliamentarian ideology and its use against democracy by the petite bourgeoisie, which is characterized by a popular culture and democratic politics", his above-mentioned core argument continues to have a clearly anachronistic nuance (Bohotis, 2003, 9). Also, attempting to elude the historian's anathema for formalization, Bohotis falls into the trap of essentialism by considering the popular culture and the democratic politics of the petite bourgeoisie as natural characteristics rather than as historically defined features.

As far as the interwar period is concerned, many studies concerning specific aspects of the political life of Greece are relevant to my topic. Among these, the most significant for this investigation is that of Christos Hadziiossif, who interprets the constitutional deviations of interwar Greece on the basis of the incompetence of the native bourgeoisie to handle the social pressure of the newly created social strata of wage laborers (Hadziiossif, 2003). However, this study neither includes the ideological implications of this conflict nor does it examine the ways through which political ideas fueled the political conjuncture and were refueled by the latter. His central aim is to construct a history of the interwar political scene that goes beyond the dominant teleological narrations that consider the Metaxas regime as the reasonable outcome of the historical episodes which took place prior to it

(Hadziiosif, 2003, 37). For this reason, Hadziiosif attempts, covertly using a Poulantzian analytical framework, to examine the political and economic antagonisms at work between the various factions of the bourgeoisie to implement their hegemonic projects. His interpretation of interwar politics is, however, by far the most persuasive in regard to the existing literature because he brings to light the close connection between the policy-making process and the embedding liberal economy.

By means of this analytical preoccupation Hadziiosif shows clearly the incompatibility between the normal functioning of bourgeois democracy and the instability typical of a capitalist economy. In the case of Greece, schematically speaking, this structural antinomy was responsible for the political turbulences of the interwar period: in conditions of economic crisis, the upper classes - unable to handle the social pressures from below - resorted to the solution of dictatorships which, contrary to the practices of democratically elected governments, were able to implement unpopular policies. In other words, for the Greek bourgeoisie, there was only a rhetorical artifice the "*Schicksalsgemeinschaft*—that 'community of fate' of the Weberian nation— which binds rulers and ruled together in a common political order, in which the former will pay a heavy price for ignoring altogether the existential needs of the latter" (Anderson, 2012, 56). Despite the merits of his study, however, Hadziiosif underestimates the fact that in modern societies a class cannot dominate by merely advancing its narrow economic interests. Neither can it dominate purely through force and coercion. As Gramsci observed about capitalist societies:

"the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 'domination' [*dominio*] and as 'moral and intellectual leadership' [*direzione*]... A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise 'leadership' before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to 'lead' as well" (Gramsci, 1971, 57-58).

This theoretical omission is responsible for the devaluation of the ideological aspects of the various constitutional shifts that occurred during the interwar period. Thus, Hadziiosif's argument that the discussion during the 1920s on the appropriate form of the constitution "had not an ideological character but a practical one" can be

said to be true (Hadziiossif, 2003, 83). However, it is also true that this process presupposed a legitimization from below, namely a minimum of popular consensus. If an interpretation does not take into account this crucial factor, then it is very difficult to explain the bloodless character of the various constitutional shifts. My hypothesis is that the coups were considered by a crucial majority of the Greek people as a legitimate way to conquer power and that this legitimization was derived partly by the anti-parliamentarian discourse that was produced by the various organic intellectuals of the regimes. This is why interpretations of the constitutional shifts should, as well as looking for their materialistic causes, also take into account the consequent legitimizing discourses on them.

The seminal work by George Mavrogordatos, inspired by the field of Electoral and Political Sociology, is the point of departure for every study concerning Greek interwar politics, but his focus on political ideas is rather limited. In regard to the dilemma "democracy or dictatorship", Mavrogordatos considers that "electoral competition and military intervention should rather be regarded as *alternative* sites or arenas in the struggle for political power" (Mavrogordatos, 1983, 304). In his view, the degeneration of parliamentary processes and the choice for dictatorial solutions by the bourgeoisie is not related with the pressures coming from the subaltern classes. This kind of Marxisant arguments, following Mavrogordatos' reasoning, is "a common cynical misperception" of interwar politics. He counterproposes "insightfully" that "civilian party leaders on *both* sides were generally and genuinely committed to parliamentary politics"(Mavrogordatos, 1983, 304). That is to say, the military intervention and the abolition of the parliament was used as a technical solution, among others, in the political struggle conducted between two broader political camps, the Venizelists and Royalists. The outcome of the political struggle between these two equal but different party coalitions was considered as a matter of successfully or unsuccessfully using the army and electoral system. This analytical schema, however, provides a rather mechanical positivistic interpretation of interwar politics. In addition, Mavrogordatos takes into account the class, geographical and cultural divisions of the electoral base of the two coalitions. However, he uses these data more in order to better define the political identity of the Royalists and the pro-Venizelists than to interpret the conflict and its outcome.

Another important interpretational false step is his judgments on the Greek imperialistic war that was supported and was waged by the two dominant parties in

Asia Minor. Mavrogordatos begins his study by mentioning that one of the principle aims of the book is to combat the "myth of social homogeneity" which is one of the "central tenets of Greek nationalism" (Mavrogordatos, 1983, xvi, xvii). For this reason, he focuses his analytical lens on the divisions that penetrated the Greek interwar society. The nationalistic narration comes in through the back door though, when he attempts to understand the causes of the war in Asia Minor. He interprets it as not having any kind of relevance with the imperialistic aspirations of the Greek bourgeoisie and argues that "it represented the last and only realistic plan to save ancient Greek communities of probably more than two million people from imminent extinction" (Mavrogordatos, 1983, 199). In adopting this argument, Mavrogordatos reproduces uncritically the nationalistic discourse that was created by the Greek dominant political powers of the period in order to justify their political choice for the imperialistic expansion in Asia Minor.

Another useful study is that of Spyros Marchetos, which focuses on the Greek version of fascism from 1918 to 1932. However, one should notice here that, in the case of interwar Greece, 'fascism' was only one tendency, and a rather limited one, of the anti-parliamentarian spectrum. Marchetos' central argument is that "Fascism was a pan-European phenomenon, which had many faces; for this reason we should identify Fascism with the two successful paradigms (Italy and Germany)" (Marchetos, 2006, 15). Adopting this assumption, he thinks that "it is not reasonable to compare the trajectory of Greek fascism only with the two dominant paradigms ... So, we will focus on less prominent paradigms... like those of Belgium, Hungary and Finland"(Marchetos, 2006, 15). This move will, in his position, allow for a better understanding of the phenomena of the dictatorships, *pronunciamentos* and constitutional shifts that were common in the whole continent during the interwar period. So, following his reasoning, in order to understand some of the various fascist attempts in Greece, the analytical focus should be removed from Germany and Italy and other less noticeable cases with which to compare them. This suggestion is borrowed from the work of Martin Blikhorn, who considers that:

"it is important to recognize - and to do so explicitly - that the study of comparative or generic fascism is for the most part the study of failure, and in the great majority of its appearances abject failure. More concretely, we can say that it involves the study of innumerable unsuccessful individuals, cliques, clubs, societies

and political *groupuscules*; a much smaller but still significant number of larger but still unsuccessful parties and movements; a handful of cases in which such movements grabbed a share of power that was either brief and self-defeating (Hungary, Romania) or compromised and largely illusory (Spain); and just two, Italy and Germany of course, in which a self-proclaimed Fascist/National Socialist regime actually enjoyed a significant period of power" (Blikhorn 2004, 523-524).

Taking into account these conceptual elaborations, Marchetos considers that "Gounaris' government ... was an autocratic conservative regime with fascist tendencies, which did not manage, because it was unable or because it did not have time, to be completed"(Marchetos, 2006, 143). This interpretation argues against Hadziiosif's view - which considers that the Greek political world adopted an eclectic and opportunistic approach to Mussolini's regime because it rejected the nodal element of the mass movement that supported the Italian Fascism (Hadziiosif, 2003,108). Marchetos' point with respect to Hadziiosif assumption is that the latter builds his interpretation based on an ideotypical analysis which endorses the view that fascism only exists where a mass movement exists (Marchetos, 2006, 174). However, in my view, Hadziiosif does not advance this kind of reasoning as a result of his obsession with ideotypical approaches, but rather because he understands the mass movement as the *differentia specifica* of fascism in regard to other autocratic forms of government. Following Marchetos' argument, every dictatorship can potentially be transformed into a fascist regime and, thus, the only thing that the historian can do is examine the causes of a regime's failure. The result of doing this, however, is to fall into the trap of the logic that he condemns, that of "idiographic historicism" (Marchetos, 2006, 177).

It is evident from this critical reconstruction of Marchetos' study that one of its central aspects is the focus on the various regimes under examination. This choice goes against Marchetos' declaration in the introduction to his book that "the aim of this research is to relate the public discourse of fascism and on fascism with the political and social context of Greece"(Marchetos, 2006, 29). The outcome of this kind of emphasis is, however, in my opinion, a neglect of the ideological underpinnings and rational argumentations that were expressed by these autarchic regimes. This happens for two reasons: firstly, because of the eclectic and unstable nature of fascist ideology and, secondly, because, Marchetos thinks that fascist

regimes reproduce themselves through invoking irrational 'political sentiments' and dominating through force and coercion. Again, this kind of interpretation does not, in my view, take into account at all the hegemonic components of the dictatorships and presents the interwar Greek society as if it functioned in an ideological vacuum.

As far as the history of ideas is concerned, the study by Alexandros Kyrtsis provides us with some useful information about the process of Social Sciences' formation in Greece during the period under consideration. Indeed, in his view, it was precisely these social scientists who often produced antiparliamentarian arguments. However, Kyrtsis' study does not deal with this dimension; instead, its focus is limited to the analysis of a Weberian-inspired ideotypical presentation of the history of Greek sociology. This can be explained with reference to the discipline in which the study is placed, that of sociology. This also becomes clear in the formalistic nature of the central research question that penetrates the whole study, which is the detection of the causes of failure of the sociology, as an autonomous scientific discipline, to contribute to the modernization of Greek society. Kyrtsis' main argument is that during the second decade of the twentieth century, after sociological ideas were spread through the public sphere by the prominent Greek intellectuals who were returning from Germany, there was a Belle Époque of sociology. At that time, intellectuals retained a relative autonomy in regard to politics, and their sociological theories were marked by explicit normative claims about the political life of the country and its proper functioning. However, the attraction of the bourgeoisie world towards authoritarian forms of government and the direct engagement of intellectuals in politics after 1928 were responsible for the failure of the project to modernize sociology which had begun to be adopted during the previous decade. The new trends in the intellectual life of the country were now those of irrationalism and pessimism, both of which were disengaged from any kind of normative demands. Sociology as a discipline was, in fact, doomed to languish, and to flourish again only after the restoration of democracy in 1974, when conditions were more appropriate (Kyrtsis, 1996, 248-249).

Despite the apparent attractiveness of Kyrtsis' suggestive scheme, however, historical reality is more complicated than the interpretation that he gives. It is difficult, for example, to prove that there was an epistemological brake in the realm of sociological ideas during the interwar period, as Kyrtsis suggests. There were, also, some significant continuities in public sociological discourse which the Greek sociologist does not mention because they undermine the core of his argument. Of

course, the changing political climate contributed to the moving of many intellectuals to the right of the political spectrum but this change did not take place in one night. The autarchic theories that they advanced and their political positions marked by the requisite formal potentialities made the readjustment of their content in the new political conjunctures easy. However, this last point results from my preliminary research, and the historical concretizations of the continuities and the discontinuities of the antidemocratic discourse will be described in greater depth as the research process advances.

The studies by Michalis Psalidopoulos (1989) and Mark Mazower (1991) provide a clear historical contextualization between ideas and sociopolitical changes in relation to the impact of the world economic crisis of 1929 on Greek economic thought and Greek society, respectively. Both studies seek to demonstrate the connection between the crisis of economic liberalism in Greece and the shift of indigenous intellectuals and politicians towards political authoritarianism.

Mazower offers an insightful analysis into the trajectory of the financial crisis of 1929 and its impact on the political sphere. Focusing on the period between 1929 and 1932, he examines the way the Greek economy managed to recover from the crisis as an unintended consequence of collective action. However, as he notes, the victims of the unplanned economic regulation were the parliamentary institutions of the country. Moreover, Mazower emphasizes the spread of autarchic ideas in the political camp of the Liberal Party after the side effects of the crisis became clear. He considers the collapse of parliamentarianism not to have been unavoidable, but, rather, the result of failed political manipulations. The very refusal of the Liberal Party after 1928 to proceed to the necessary social reforms led to the dissolution of its political base and to the rise of authoritarian ideas within the party. When these autarchic tendencies crossed with the extremist wings of the People's party, the outcome was that of the destabilization of the parliamentary system. In these new conditions, authoritarianism was considered by the dominant bourgeoisie parties as the only solution (Mazower 1991, 366, 381). Despite his thorough research study, however, Mazower focuses mainly on the political handling of the crisis of 1929, and he does not take the responses of the intellectuals to it seriously into account. In addition, the narrow time span of his study does not permit him to examine the transformations of the antiparliamentarian arguments in the *long dureé*. This is why

he believes Venizelos's political attitude to have drifted to the right because of the crisis. A careful observer can instead see that Venizelos' authoritarianism already existed in embryonic form from the second half of 1920s. Of course, these remarks do not devalue the generally insightful findings of the study.

Finally, a study by Psalidopoulos attempts to examine the changing arguments in the realm of economic theory with regard to the sociopolitical transformations taking place in this period. Despite its merits, the exclusive focus of the study on the 'professional' intellectuals of the period, university professors, provides a segmented picture of the economic and political issues under contestation during this period. The academic world and the theories that it produces about social reality usually - although not always - reflect changing social conditions. In order to escape from this trap, the intellectual historian should take the parameter of the respective public discourse into account, since this gives a better understanding of the social sphere, given that the audience is not the academic world but society as a whole. This is especially true for historical periods in which institutions of higher education had not expanded and the social groups participating in them were constituted by a small minority (compared to those who were excluded). The interwar society of Greece formed part of this paradigm. For this reason, in these historical circumstances, the less elaborate arguments advanced by minor intellectuals may be more helpful to understand the realm of society.

In sum, although the above-mentioned studies have highlighted significant aspects of the intellectual and political life of interwar Greece, none of them has concentrated on the interaction between the political ideas of antiparliamentarianism and the respective political action *per se*. This absence is quite impressive since none of the studies do not examine the discourse of the political actors and the intellectuals who endorsed the several coups that coup during the interwar period. Either are focused on the intellectual developments missing the political context of the period or when they do focus on the political level they omit the legitimizing discourses that accompanied the deviations from the democratic rule. As it will be shown aim of this thesis is to show the dialectic between the two levels endorsing that the antiparliamentarian discourse triggered from the crisis of the political but in turn boosted dictatorial solutions to the political impasses becoming a common sense.

Shifting now the focus to the examination of the literature on the 4th of August regime's ideology a good start is Constantine Sarandis' article, "The Ideology

and Character of the Metaxas Regime". The writer's central purpose is to "examine the main aspects of regimes' ideology and political practice" in order to classify it as a Fascist regime or not (Sarandis 2009, 47). For this reason he carries out a discourse analysis of Metaxas political arguments based on the public speeches that he delivered during his government. He focuses on Metaxas central arguments in regard to the anticommunist policy that the regime implemented, the national-wide task of national regeneration, his populism, the paternalistic policies of the dictator etc. Though, there is an obvious inconsistency between the deliberate aims of the writer and the content of the article to the degree that the regime's ideology cannot be reduced to the ideas of the prime minister. They were an important ideological component of the dictatorship but not the only one. This leader-centered perspective in Metaxas regime is quite common in the Greek literature (Kofas 1983, Carabot 2003, Bogiatzis 2012). A reason that explains this trend of historiography is Metaxas' dominant presence in the governance of Greece assuming many responsibilities during his tenure as a prime minister because of the lack of followers (Close, 1993, 16). This lacuna can be remedied examining the discourses of the government's ministers and the institutional channels through which these diffused in the society. Another step in order to fill this gap is the systematic inquiry of the legitimizing arguments, direct or indirect, that were produced both by prominent and minor intellectuals who supported the 4th of August regime.

A second major limitation of the article is the exclusive focus on Metaxas discourse without examining its relevance to the political practices of the regime. Taking into account the methodological clarifications on the intellectual history that I have already mentioned, I suggest that in the approach of political ideas a double move is necessary: on the one hand, a horizontal analysis of the arguments is necessary, namely, the reconstruction of its inner logic, though, on the other, the argumentation per se should be connected vertically with the socio-political context. This gap is bridged following the methodology that will be developed in the relevant chapter that seeks to connect the discourses with the sociopolitical realities from which they emerge.

The second major historiographical tendency, after the leader-centered approach, in regard to the *weltanschauung* of the regime is that of the "weak ideology" summarized in Vatikiotis' words as "minimal, oversimplified political ideology which was never thoroughly put into practice" (Vatikiotis, 1998, 14). This

view reproduces, indirectly, an older though dominant understanding of Italian fascism considering that it "had no ideology, that it could be adequately placed in terms of opportunism, bourgeois reaction, and petty bourgeois *ressentiment*, that it was merely authoritarian and thus of secondary interest vis-à-vis the full-blown totalitarianism of German nazism" (Roberts, 2000, 185). This happens because the "weak ideology" approach compares Metaxas' regime to the Italian fascism and German Nazism which were considered to have robust ideological apparatuses in contrast to the Greek case that had not. The most exemplary study endorsing this line of argumentation is Alivizatos' book, *Oi Politikoi Thesmoi se Krisi 1922-1974: Opseis tis Ellinikis Ebeirias* [*The crisis of the Political Institutions 1922-1974: Aspects of the Greek Experience*]. Nikos Alivizatos, professor of Constitutional Law, in one of the sub-chapters of the above-mentioned book focusing on the constitutional history of modern Greece, discusses Metaxas' dictatorship. The emphases of this sub-chapter are on the unsuccessful attempt of the dictator to build a strong state and the lack of any serious ideological background which would be able to mobilize the masses. Commenting on these aspects of the regime, Alivizatos endorses that "Unlike fascism and national socialism, the 4th of August regime was not an outcome of a mass movement and lacked any popular support. In addition, it did not have any theory to support it. The regime basing on slogans that promoted vulgar anti-communism, 'moralist' anti-parliamentarianism and abstract nationalism failed to formulate positive suggestions that could provide the requisite rudimentary concepts for the formulation of an homogeneous ideology and a rational program of governance.... The 4th of August dictatorship did not manage to produce a general philosophy and its practices determined by the needs of the conjuncture as well as its so-called 'theoretical' conceptions which in any case did not develop beyond the empirical needs" (Alivizatos, 1983, 110 & 415). For this reason in the following pages he focuses mainly on the constitutionalization of the repressive policies of the regime. In other words, the dictatorship barren of substantial ideological foundations mainly exercised rigid and repressive controls over the social, economic and political life of the population. Alivizatos considers that the regime did not have a cohesive full-blown ideological program because of the division of the Greek bourgeoisie in King's and Metaxas' supporters. The two leading figures of the dictatorship had different international support, King George was an anglophile and Metaxas was a Germanophile and the bourgeoisie's fractions backed the politico-economic nexus that

promoted their interests. Therefore, the dictatorship's ideological fragility reflected its tremulous political background (Alivizatos, 1983, 111-118).

I will firstly present the obvious limitations of Alivizatos' interpretational schema and then I will attempt to refute his arguments suggesting an alternative approach to the regime's efforts to create conditions for social consensus. His position that there was a division of the Greek upper classes during the Metaxas' dictatorship is a groundless view which is not affirmed by any study of the relevant literature. In addition, several recent studies have shown that Metaxas' foreign policy changed from a position of relative balance between Germany and Britain to the country's realignment with Britain during the Abyssinian crisis (Papanastasiou, 2009). Therefore, Alivizatos' view that King George and Metaxas had different and opposing international affiliations is not valid. This fallacy, thus, undermines further the writer's position for the supposed ideological schism. Although, it should be mentioned that neither the Italian fascist regime nor the German Nationalist Socialist had a unified rigid ideological corpus. Both regimes' ideological apparatuses were discerned by "complexity and eclecticism" (Woodley, 2010, xi). The Greek dictatorship's ideological eclecticism, thus, was not an exceptional case. Any authoritarian regime has an ideology which is an amalgam of external intellectual transfers and indigenous discursive motifs. Following Aristotle Kallis' reasoning, that "the establishment and consolidation of the regime in Greece reflected a much wider process of political and ideological convergence and hybridisation between anti-liberal/ anti-socialist conservative forces, on the one hand, and radical rightwing/fascist politics, on the other. It proved highly receptive to specific fascist themes and experiments (such as the single youth organization, called EON), which it transplanted enthusiastically into its own hybrid of 'radicalized conservatism" (Kallis, 2010, 303). Therefore, the introduction "from above" of certain 'fascist' elements (inspired from Germany, Italy and Portugal) did not make it less 'fascist' than the other respective authoritarian regimes of the period. It may not have the massive support of agrarian cooperatives or other worker associations from below when it established but it does imply that it did not try to fascistize the Greek society with the politics that impose from above.

Having this understanding of ideology, the blame of 'eclecticism' has no meaning. The view that the 4th of August regime had no ideology is a senseless point to the extent that any regime, democratic or not, develops legitimizing discourses. The task of the intellectual historian is neither to provide a diagnosis about the eclectic or

consistent nature of discursive patterns adopted by a regime nor to decide if it has an ideology or not. Rather, some of his/her central tasks are to analyze the composition of the peculiar ideological crystallization under examination, to provide hermeneutic approaches to the specific discursive *bricolage* and its particular formations, to offer a socially grounded explanation of its many times seemingly abstract argumentation and to analyze its legitimizing functions. These methodological moves will help to go beyond the dominant analyses of regime's discourse which conceives it as an incomplete ideological project.

Another aspect of Alivizato's reasoning that should be re-examined is the "repressive hypothesis" namely the supposed one-dimensional autarchic methods that the regime adopted to control the subaltern classes. As has already been demonstrated, Metaxas - despite his anti-parliamentarian rhetoric against the old political world - consensually integrated into the regime some of its prominent members. Apart from the hard core of the state the same tactic was pursued by the regime to the sphere of the civil society attempting to attract various groups of intellectuals. In other words, using a gramscian term, the dictatorship attempted to form a "historic bloc" namely "an historical congruence between material forces, institutions and ideologies, or broadly, an alliance of different class forces politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction and coherence to its constitute elements" (Gill, 2002, 58). The repressive policies was only one aspect of the regime strategy to impose its power to the Greek society. The other aspect was the politics of social consent that will be presented in the chapters that follow. Obviously, these policies were accompanied by specific discourses of legitimization, that will be exposed as well.

Regarding the nature of the Metaxas regime two lines of argumentations have been expressed. The first endorses - and in this line of argumentation converge different strands of the literature - that it was a fascist regime without clarifying in an analytical way the reasons of this definition. In this line belongs a vulgar Marxist orientation which perceives the regime as the political expression of the bourgeois class in conditions of crisis. This analysis neglects the relative autonomy of the political apparatus of the regime and its effects in the social body. A fascist phenomenon has been defined also by Mogens Pelt for different reasons though (Pelt 2014). He argues for such a case adopting the reasoning that Metaxas as a fascist aligned the country with the Nazi Germany in the geopolitical antagonism that

developed the last years before the explosion of WWII. This explained with reference to Metaxas past geopolitical preferences during the WWI that lead him to tie Greece economic destiny with the Nazis. His analysis though based on the formalistic similarities that the Metaxas regime adopted following the examples of other authoritarian states of the period. This perspective though neglects the substantive issue of antliberal institutional building in which the regime proceeds after its establishment and the serious examination of the ideological corpus that it adopted.

The line of argumentation rejects the definition of 4th of August regime as a fascist one because it did not adopt one to one the institutional initiatives that the respective regimes that undertook or because its totalitarian institutions accompanied by the endorsement of conservative institutions like of the Greek orthodox church. The first strand tends to perceive Metaxas' regime as a premodern dictatorship that adopted superficially some elements from the fascist regimes of the period, for that reason was nothing more than a regime type who belong to the past. Here the institutional attempts by Metaxas to establish his own distinct regime are omitted and it is presupposed that fascism is only ascribable to the two main fascists regimes of the period, Italy and Germany. Thus, whatever diverges from this ideotype it is a fake imitation of it. It should be mentioned though that all the regimes were institutional crystallizations of different institutions, thus there was not one pure case that the rest countries followed. In regards to the critique of traditional character of Metaxas regime, an argument that Kallis has developed (2007) it will be shown in the chapters that a definition of Metaxas regime is attempted that suggests fascism to not be so much an ideotypical adoption modern institutions of massive mobilization since this implicitly adopts the case of Italy as the example case of the Fascist model. It was more a formula of governance which continued to claim the representation of the general will but with institutional expressions different from these of liberalism. Thus, it could combine different institutional models in the ways that established their political authority as reply to parliamentarianism, modernist or not.

The structure of my thesis follows the problems that have been posed by the literature. Thus, the first chapter I attempt to offer an overview of the key political developments that preceded the establishment of the 4th of August regime. The argumentation is constructed in a way to make resonance to the developments that followed with the authoritarian regime of Metaxas, thus it is a selective one. The main analytical thread that is used in order to understand the parliamentarian crisis the Gramscian notion of

hegemony. In the second part I attempt to conceptualize the Metaxas regime with the analysis of fascism that has been developed in Dylan Riley's study, *The Civic Foundations of Fascism*. Adopting his line of reasoning I endorse that the Metaxas regime was the authoritarian response in the organic crisis of the Second Hellenic Republic and can be defined as an authoritarian democracy since it attempted to substitute the parliamentary representation with other institutional forms that were considered more representative of the nation accompanied with new legitimizing discourses. This chapter functions as the general historical framework of my thesis. The narration goes back to the beginning of the interwar era since it is considered a totality that ends with the invasion of the German army in 1941. Riley's study helps to rethink the Metaxas regime that is described in existing literature. It defines it as fascist despite its incomplete character, a process that disrupted by the death of its leader. It is endorsed that the political direction that regime was more important than the unfinished implementation of its state reforms.

The second chapter is a theoretical one. It aims to tackle a series of epistemological issues about the field of intellectual history, one of the fields in which the topic of this thesis is inscribed. The first part offered few methodological counterproposals to the Skinnerian approach of intellectual history that had dominated the field from a Marxist point of view since it is considered limited for its explicit discursive focus on the study of political ideas. I endorse that despite its initial claim this approach lacks a proper understanding of what context means in the historical analysis of discourses articulated by political theorists. Then the methodological suggestions by Ellen Wood and Neal Wood are presented that have offered some counter-suggestions to Skinnerian approach. Its reductionist approach despite that it sheds light to context of a period it reduces only on the aspect of property relations neglecting that texts are part of wider hegemonic projects in the making. In this line of reasoning, Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser provide notions that tackle these issues in a more convincing way. The notions of organic intellectuals, hegemony, integral state and conjuncture offer ideas on how intellectual history of the 20th century can be conducted without being reductionist and by offering historicist alternatives at the same time. The second part of the chapter is focused on exemplifying these notions through my specific case study of the Metaxas regime. The general claim of the chapter is that proper historical understandings of specific ideas can only happen through the reconstruction of historical structures that emerged from within. Thus,

historical sociology as an approach- the first chapter's emphasis- functions as the supplementary epistemological viewpoint to intellectual history. This dialectical interplay between the general and the specific provides the proper method not only for the understanding of emergence of specific ideas like the antiparliamentarian ideas that were developed during Metaxas era but also proves to be crucial for the conception of the wider historical reality, which was a constitutive element of the discourse.

The third chapter focuses on the antiparliamentarian argument that was expressed by one of the key journalist of the royalist camp, George Vlachos from 1933 and onwards preparing the dictatorship of Metaxas. It is considered important because its professional position as journalist allowed him to diffuse to wider social strata this type of argumentation. Thus, Quentin Skinner's conceptual distinction between *major* and *minor* intellectuals is adopted because it helps to clarify the analytical distinction between those who, on the one hand, produced antiparliamentarian arguments stemming from their prestigious positions using a "scientific" discourse and those, on the other, who produced a popularized version of these arguments, enabling their social diffusion into the wider strata of the population (Skinner, 1978, xi). Considering that "investigating concepts and their linguistic history is as much a part of the minimal condition for recognizing history as is the definition of history as having to do with human society", I examine the processes by which antiparliamentarian ideas spread into wider social groups of Greek society (Koselleck 2002, 20). The editor of *Kathimerini* - one of the central news organs of the royalists - Georgios Vlachos can be used as an exemplary case of the derailment of the antivenizelist fraction towards authoritarian solutions in front of the evolving political crisis that took place since 1932's defeat of the Liberal Party as the result of the impact of the Global financial crisis on the fiscal policy of the Greek state. My argument in regards to the antiparliamentarian discourse that was expressed by Georgios Vlachos can be summed up as following: antiparliamentarism of the period that preceded and in reality prepared the advent of Metaxas' takeover of power was an offspring of the inability of the political elite of the country to articulate a hegemonic project that could ingrate interclass and intraclass demands in a coherent way to overcome the ongoing political crisis and the division of the country in two political camps - the Venizelists and the Royalists. In order to demonstrate my argument, I will divide the presentation of Vlachos discourse under examination in three distinct

periods. The first one is the period after the defeat of Venizelos in the 1932 elections in which the belief in the parliamentary institutions - although in a critical way - is still endorsed as a solution to the ongoing political crisis. This period lasts until June 1933. The following period is marked with an explicit criticism towards representative democracy and the adherence of extra-constitutional alternatives to the impasse of parliamentary politics. The last period is the period in which Georgios Vlachos endorsed wholeheartedly the Metaxas regime throughout its life-span as viable and mandatory solution to the National Schism that pervaded the country in state of emergency conditions.

The fourth chapter focuses on the Metaxas antiparliamentarian discourse and how it is developed from his formative years until the end of his life. I endorse that Metaxas shifted from a conservative critique of the liberal society to fascism through his experience of involvement in Greek politics during the 1930s. The attribute of fascist can be explained with the reference to the fact that not only did he criticize the parliamentary institutions for their inefficiency to express the popular will genuinely, but he attempted, and merely succeeded, to create institutions through which the Greek people, although in a controlled way, could express their will. One of his main interests during the 1930 was the parliament's inability to serve the interests of the nation in ways that would not be a challenge to his existential status. Metaxas considered the 4th of August regime as the political solution to the impasse of the country that would reconnect the pieces of social puzzle that modernity and its institutions had produced. This however would not happen through a return to a pre-modern condition where communal forms of socialization dominate but through the building of institutions via which the people would come closer to the leadership of the country, in a genuine way. This claim was also strengthened through the realization of the growing influence of the Greek Communist Party in the country's affairs.

The fifth chapter focuses on the main theoretical organ of the 4th of August regime, the journal *Neon Kratos* (New State) and its antiparliamentarian argumentation. It is argued that the nature of the argumentation took more the shape of a critique of the liberal institutions and the communist ideology rather a full-fledged presentation of the positive fascist character of the new political order that was in the making. Despite that there was not a robust elaborated theoretical dogma there were in the pages of the journal the basic arguments of regime's antiliberal political proposal. The first part of

this chapter focuses on the critiques articulated by the intellectuals of the regime toward liberalism and communism while the second part focuses on the more positive aspects of the philosophical foundations of the Metaxas regime that are expressed by the texts of Nicolas Koumaros and Dimitris Mantzoufas, who were the two legal advisers of the fascist leader. There the basic elements of the new legal order that the regime attempted to establish are presented; a process that was interrupted by the outbreak of WWII. Thus, far from lacking a specific ideology the regime attempted to forge a new distinct post-liberal theoretical apparatus in an unfinished form. Sources of inspiration were the respective elaboration in fascist Italy. In other words, the ideology of the Metaxas regime was formed in the light of European intellectual developments of the period, making it a part of the wider authoritarian experience of the interwar period.

The next chapter sheds further light to the theoretical and political origins of the basic legal texts of the 4th of August regime by examining the intellectual trajectory of the key legal figure of the regime, Nicolaos Koumaros, who was one of its two writers. It is argued that Koumaros' selection as the main mastermind of the new state can be explained with the reference to the fact that he was familiar with the developed debate on the legal foundation of the authoritarian state and at the same time proponent of fascist Italy. It was a decision that was related to the anti-individualistic ideology of Metaxas. This also indicates the political orientation of the Metaxas regime, which far from being another dictatorship, one of the many that have been emerged during the interwar period in Greece, was an fascist regime that adopted institutions and ideas by the other respective authoritarian states of the period. In Koumaros' earlier texts, that conceptually informed to a certain extent the constitution of the 4th of August regime, elements that constructed his a posteriori fascistic legitimizing discourse on the new state can be found. For that reason, I consider it necessary to present some of the arguments that proved to have informed the texts on 'the principles of the New State'. I will briefly present some arguments made by Koumaros on Rousseau's theory of the social contract in his relevant studies and the main ideas on the state and nation in fascist Italy that are exhibited in the pamphlet *Stato and Nazione nel Regime Fascista* aiming to show in a clearer way the ideas that underpinned the basic legal texts of the Metaxas regime.

The last chapter focuses on the propaganda that the 4th of August regime used for the Greek women's mobilization in the Metaxas' fascist statecraft shifting from the theory

to political impact of regime's ideology. I argue that the regime's propaganda instead to contribute to the formation of a stable normative image of the "new fascist woman" it promoted different, and in some way contradictory, representations of the proper "woman" determined in the last instance by the different historical conjunctures. Given this allegation Metaxas regime propagated three ideal types of "good" women that corresponded to three distinct historical conjunctures. The first role was performed successfully when women stayed inside the house acting as housewives and corresponded to a period of social order, between the establishment of the Metaxas regime and the Italian invasion in Albania on March 7, 1939. The second ideal type of the proper woman was the one who was not only responsible for the household but at same time she contributed, as far as she could, to nationally burning issue of war and it was closely linked to the hybrid period before the full involvement of Greece in the WWII. The last one dictates the absolute devotion of women to the service of the Greek Nation and it is related to a state of exception that is the Greco-Italian War which marks the irrevocable full-scale involvement of Greece in the WWII. The outcome of this process was that despite the initial aspirations of regimes' propaganda -that aimed to the maintenance of the traditional role for the Greek women primarily as wives who give birth - the national mobilization for the cause of WWII thrust them into new roles, previously unthinkable. These new roles were closely linked to the public sphere unsettling the fascist symbolic order of gender representation and far from establishing gender lines, confused them.

Summing up, my attempt offers to provide a historicized analysis of the antiparlamentarian discourse that produced in Greece between 1936 and 1941 and according to which conditions the experiment of the Fascitization of the Greek society conducted. I aim in this sense to understand not only what the Fascists said in Greece against the parliamentary democracy but also to understand why and what attempted they did in order to establish a new political order that consider a more representative of the Greek nation. Drawing from the theoretical resources that have been chosen I aim to reconceptualize specific aspects of the 4th of August regime and its logic in a different way from what the existing literature has suggested. In other words, I want to see the Metaxas regime under a new light replying to some questions that have been raised and opening the way for further research on the topic that Greek literature has till now neglected.

Chapter 1: The Historical Context of interwar period in Greece

Abstract

In the first part of this chapter I attempt to offer an overview of the key political developments that preceded the establishment of the 4th of August regime. The argumentation is constructed in a way to make resonance to the developments that followed with the authoritarian regime of Metaxas, thus it is a selective one. The main analytical thread that is used in order to understand the parliamentary crisis is the Gramscian notion of hegemony. In the second part I attempt to conceptualize the Metaxas regime with the analysis on Fascism that has been developed in Dylan Riley's study, *The Civic Foundations of Fascism*. Adopting his line of reasoning I endorse that the Metaxas regime was the authoritarian response in the organic crisis of the Second Hellenic Republic and can be defined as an authoritarian democracy since it attempted to substitute the parliamentary representation with other institutional forms that were considered more representative of the nation accompanied with new legitimizing discourses.

1.1 The interwar crisis of parliamentary democracy as a crisis of bourgeois hegemony

Between 1909 and 1922 three wider historical processes altered the political and social physiognomy of Greece. Firstly, a military coup organized by army officers related to the Military league in August 1909 put an end to the old political system of the country and prepared the ground for rise in power of the Cretan liberal, Eleftherios Venizelos, a figure that determined the political developments of the country decisively until the establishment of Metaxas regime. His policies modernized the country, establishing the conditions to embed within the capitalist order. His key political opponent during this period was the representative of the throne, King Constantine I, who succeeded his father, George I in 1913 after his assassination (Clogg, 1987, 6).

Secondly, the political division between the supporters of Venizelos and the supporters of King Constantine emerged in 1916–17 over the issue of whether or not to participate in the First World War. This provoked an intense political polarization in the country forming two camps called 'National Schism', that until the establishment of Metaxas regime in 1936 (Mavrogordatos, 1983).

Finally, the defeat of the Greek army in Turkey in the summer of 1922 led to the expulsion of 1.2 million ethnic Greeks from Turkey, their settlement in Greece and the delimitation of the Greek and Turkish borders by the Treaty of Lausanne the following year (Chatty, 2010, 86). These two events had important consequences for the structure of the Greek society during the following decades in geographical, political and social terms. On the one hand, the delimitation of the Greek state put an end to the imperialist aspirations of the country in Asia Minor and forced the ethnic Greeks that lived in the territories of the former Ottoman Empire either to move to Greece or to accept irreversibly their status as Greek diaspora. This created the conditions for the formation of a bourgeoisie within the borders of the Greek states, contributing substantially to the economic development of the country (Mavrogordatos, 1983, 181). On the other hand, the settlement of the refugees in Greece was the key precondition for the development of a genuine working-class and the appearance of a trade union movement together with a small but quite active Communist Party, for first time since the establishment of the state, that forged class-consciousness among the urban working classes, which would be proven crucial in the political developments of the country after the global economic crisis of 1929 (Leontidou, 1990, 70). In other words, the end of the war, the new borders and the exchanges of populations among the two countries formed a new social stratification within the country imported to a great extent by the two key classes of political modernity, working-class and bourgeoisie, that until this point, barely existed.

In the political level, the political polarization was expressed through two wide party coalitions, the republicans opposed to the royalists or, more precisely putting in negative terms, the parties that were affiliated with the Venizelos project and those who were pro-monarchist. The main parties that were in the epicenter of these two coalitions were, the Liberal Party under Venizelos and the People's Party of Panayis Tsaldaris. The political dichotomy between the two was neither related with the constitutional form of the country nor their different class projects and alliances they had formed based on different political ideologies. Rather, both were two traditional

party coalitions without modern organizational bases, rooted in personal loyalties shaped by the logic of patronage politics. The main aim of these two coalitions thus was to gain the control over the state and its key repressive mechanism, the army, in order to pursue their own interests.

Shifting now from the key sociological parameters of the interwar Greek society to the events when World War I started, the Greek authorities had to choose sides between the two geopolitical antagonist camps. Venizelos endorsed Greece's involvement in the war on the side of Entente, while the Royalists were in favor of the German neutrality (Clogg, 2002, 87). In August 1916, in territories of eastern Macedonia, the army units received orders by the Royalist government not to react to the Bulgarian invasion. This reality pushed some Venizelist army officers to organize a coup in Thessaloniki that was supported by Entente. After short hesitation, Venizelos and his supporters joined the coup as well and established a second provisional Greek government in Thessaloniki, as response to the official Royalist government, which entered the war on the side of the Entente (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2009, 81). The National Defense government endured for almost a year, until June 1917, when Entente abdicated Constantine I and paved the way to Venizelos to return to Athens as Prime Minister of a unified country that now was fully involved in WWI on the side of the allied power (Clogg, 2009, 264).

The provisional government of Thessaloniki did not focus only on the geopolitical contestations of the country but also on the internal politics of the country. Aiming to gain political legitimacy from the peasant populations by integrating them socially within the New Greece. One of the ways to do that was the plan for the agrarian reform that as Angelis-Dimakis argues "took its initial form in five legislative decrees enacted in 1917. The first objective of all those decrees was the restoration of the landless farmers, through the compulsory expropriations of private farms over 1000 acres or through the cession of public land. Their second objective was to secure the rights of the Greek state on the public lands as the successor of the Turkish state. When the government of Thessaloniki had dominated over the whole country, these decrees took the form of law 1072 on December 29, 1917" (Angelis-Dimakis, 2013, 3).

These policies along with land reform that followed the settlement of refugees from Turkey established small family farms as the backbone of Greek agriculture. The big land ownership of the past almost erased. These reforms were accompanied by the

state intervention in the agricultural development which was funded, as many sectors of the Greek economy, mainly by foreign loans. On the political level the land reforms that were promoted by the liberals proved quite crucial. On the one hand, the liberal camp succeeded this way to gain the political support from the individual smallholders that materially benefited from these land reforms not only in northern Greece but throughout the country. This consensus lasted until 1932 when the smallholders were affected by the aftermaths of the global financial crisis. On the other hand, this political attachment of this social strata to the Venizelist camp through the land distribution contributed decisively to the blockage of the emergence of a radicalized peasant movement as it happened in most of the countries of the European South this period (Mazower 1991, 74–6, 296). This process contributed to urbanization of the ex-landlords and its consequent dissolution as a class along with the landless peasantry. This particularity of the Greek social formation determined to a certain extent the nature of the political struggles that took place in the following decades and prevented the radicalization of those strata (peasants-landlords), who in other countries became the main actors in the fascistization processes that took place after the end of WWI. In that way the agrarian question, one of the great unresolved problems of the nineteenth century worked out before the political crisis that took place after the collapse of Venizelos hegemony in 1932 as a consequence of the global economic crisis mitigating the reactions from below.

After the end of WWI, Venizelos and his party focused their efforts to the diplomatic negotiations in order to settle the terms for peace and to forge the new geopolitical map of the European continent. The new treaties expanded the Greek state acquiring western Thrace, eastern Thrace, Smyrna, the Aegean islands, Imvros, Tenedos and the Dodecanese except Rhodes (Varnava, 2012, 234). The political polarization and the use of violence however was not reduced. Royalist attempted to kill Venizelos in Paris, on 12 August 1920, a move that was repaid with the suicide of anti-Venizelist Ionas Dragoumi on 13 August. In the new elections that took place on 1 November, five years after the last ones, the Liberal Party unexpectedly defeated leading Venizelos to leave the country (Vatikiotis, 1998, 110). The abuse of power on behalf of Venizelist camp and the promise of demobilization and withdrawal of the Greek Army from Asia Minor were considered as the two main reasons for the electoral defeat of the Liberals. Additionally, a plebiscite brought back King Constantine since

one of the main stakes of the elections was the constitutional question if the country would be a monarchy or a republic (Clogg, 2009, 239).

The royalists though against the promises of their pre-electoral campaign continued the war with Turkey. The overestimation of the capabilities of the Greek army that was divided, an offspring of the internal political developments, along with its abandonment from the other big powers did not include geopolitical calculations and that the continuation of the war would lead to the defeat in September 1922. The Greek state after this experience would not be the same as before (Pentzopoulos, 2002, 46). Now the Royalists were considered responsible for the defeat in Turkey leading to the coup by the Venizelists Colonels Nikolaos Plastiras and Stylianos Gonatas and the dethronement of King Constantine (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2009, 101). The revenge of the Venizelist camp was crystallized in the execution of six royalist officials that were considered the army figures who were responsible for the defeat. There was a new coup attempt in October 1923 by the Royalists, as reply to the aforementioned developments, however failed forcing King George II, who had succeeded his father in the throne, to leave the country (Vatikiotis, 1998, 126). Additionally, 1200 army officers of the Royalist camp were fired from the army. This situation paved the way for the proclamation of the Second Hellenic Republic on 25 March 1924. In the elections that had taken place few months before the Pro-Monarchist abstained, the Liberal won 250 seats out of the 398. Venizelos was back in Greece and became prime minister once again. However, he left in 1924 again after quarreling with anti-monarchists on the issue of the Republic (Mavrogordatos, 1983, 84). In the diplomatic level, Venizelos was the head of the Greek delegation that negotiated the peace treaty - the Treaty of Lausanne - with Turkey that arranged the conditions of the new realities that will accompany the relations of the two states affecting at the same time the internal structures of the two societies. The Treaty, among others, implied the exchange of more than a million Christian-Greeks who were expelled from Turkey with half a million Muslim-Turks that were forced to leave Greece (Gallant, 2001, 204). In the ideological level, the catastrophe that occurred in Minor Asia put an end to Megali Idea, the dominant cohesive ideological myth of the upper classes that was diffused also to the lower one's making it the official national narration. It was substituted by anticommunism that functioned as the connective ideological nexus for the elites of both political coalitions, republicanism and capitalist modernization that were the distinct features of Venizelos government

between 1928-1932. Now the enemy was not abroad but within the country. Sections of the new refugee proletariat constituted a significant part of the electorate of the Communist Party of Greece the following years. Thus, the new refugees not only acquired the social stigma of the foreigner within their new host country but many of them also engaged with the communist politics in the 1930's, which was labeled as a national threat.

The crisis due to the defeat was not just on the ideological level and the ways the upper classes self-defined themselves but had a specific impact in the articulation of the class alliances they forged. The first important attack to the hegemonic project of Venizelism that represented crucial sectors of the Greek bourgeoisie was with the division that was produced with the national schism in 1916. What Venizelos started in 1910 was a combined project of imperialist aspirations abroad and liberal reforms inside the country, a dialectic process where the two levels were interlinked. The Liberal Party succeeded these six years to represent itself as the main national party that was in position to improve the lives of the Greek people from all the social classes. Thus, it built connections not only with economic elites but also with petit-bourgeois, workers and peasants. This alliance was undermined by the division and further by the defeat in Turkey where significant sectors of the Greek capital disappeared. As Mavrogordatos has aptly described "by 1922, it [interclass coalition] had been essentially confined to entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, its petty bourgeoisie allies (mostly storekeepers with a stake in capitalist market expansion), some workers, and the landless peasants, who had a stake in liberal land reform" (Mavrogordatos 1983, 181). External causes, WWI and the defeat in the Greco-Turkish war- can account for the inability of the Greek political bourgeoisie through the vehicle of the Liberal Party to form at this historical point an effective historical block that would stabilize the political system preventing the successive following coups that took place from 1916 and onwards. Thus, the failure to implement the Venizelist hegemonic project effectively, decisively affected the structure of the political system of the country that would become even more volatile under the effects of the global financial crisis few years later. It was first and foremost the political division among the political elites of the country that could account for this failure.

In this new situation where the Royalist camp had been sidelined by the political developments of the country made the new Republic politically fragile. This was the reasoning that the Venizelist officer Theodoros Pangalos organized new coup on 24

June 1925, overthrowing the first government of the second republic. Pangalos declared a state of emergency on 3 January 1926 and assumed dictatorial powers (Spentzos, 2018, 126). In April 1926 additionally, he self-elected himself as president. On 29 August 1926, after being the head of the country for more than a year he was overthrown by the coup that was organized by the General Georgios Kondylis. In the aftermath of the coup Kountouriotis, the previous president, returned to his office (Kissoudi, 2013, 62).

These type of interventions into the politics by the army and the short-lived coups became quite common for the political scene in interwar Greece. After the Balkan Wars and the First World War, the rise of the army increased spectacularly. This changed the class composition of the people who joined the army forces acquiring a more middle-class character and transformed to a crucial pressure group that was concerned to promote their own economic and professional interests (Mouzelis 1978, 109). The fragile hegemonic projects of the two dominant party coalitions were responsible for the intertwinement of the army with the politics of the country forcing "a two way penetration between the military and political spheres. It was not simply the military who was interfering into politics - politicians were also interfering in military matters, in the sense that political factionalism and patronage politics permeated the army organization from top to bottom" (Mouzelis 1978, 109). The Greek army did not gain a serious autonomy until the crisis of 1930 and the Plastiras coup. Having linked its professional destiny with the Venizelist coalition after the events of 1909 a crucial number of officers developed a mild progressive-liberal orientation. Their politicization through a strictly intra-bourgeois conflict, their ideological orientation was kept within the boundaries of this conflict flirting widely with fascist ideas only after the crisis of 1931. Thus, in the interwar context, the army officers had the need of the politicians to secure their interests and the politicians in order to guarantee their political hegemony in times of crisis.

After the successful coup of General Kondylis, he formed a government proclaiming elections to be held in November. For the first time the elections were held with the system of proportional representation resulting in a relatively narrow victory of the Venizelists over the anti-Venizelists, forcing the two camps to a political collaboration in order to form a viable government. This compromise was expressed through the rise of so-called 'ecumenical' government on 7 November in 1926 that lasted for almost two years and in which representatives of both main coalitions were

represented under the premiership of Alexandros Zaimis who was not a member of the parliament at that time (Clogg 1987, 10).

In the new elections that were held on 19 August 1928, Venizelos became the leader of a five parties coalition that were coming from the liberal camp. They won 228 out of 250 places in parliament. During the electoral campaign, Venizelos propagated "a combination of large-scale projects aimed at increasing production, harmonious industrial relations, and good government and reform, which would render the country 'unrecognisable' within four years" (Stefaninis 1993, 195). In the new conjuncture Venizelos was apparently aware of the need to diversify his social basis in order to ensure his new hegemonic project that lacked this time imperialist discourse of the past. After the arrival of the refugees and the restructuring of the social composition of the country Venizelos could no longer count on as heading pillar of his policies "the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie" and the economically affluent Greek diaspora "to provide social leadership", as had been the case in the period between 1910 and 1916. He envisaged once again a hegemonic national inter-class role with the Liberal Party being at the head of a project where "several classes joined together in some general direction" (Stefanidis 1993, 196). Venizelos project was combined with various forms of state repression since the new proletariat that emerged after 1922 was considered as a potential social danger to his attempts to modernize the country from above. The implementation of anti-popular policies was another aspect that accompanied its project resulting in the alienation of both important sections of Venizelos' traditional electorate from the Liberal party and some of the key political figures that were crucial political allies disrupting the unity of the coalition as long as many of his proposed policies were met with disagreements.

More precisely, the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 1929 blew up the farmers' social rage, many of them being refugees that came to Greece after the populations exchange. Over the next years, several strikes were called in the areas of northern Macedonia and Thessaly, but also in Peloponnesus and Sterea Ellada. The most militant nuclei of the agrarian movement were in areas of northern Macedonia that could not withstand the unbearable taxation that lead to the further impoverishment of the rural strata (Seferiades 1999, 315-316). These economic hardships along with the bilateral agreement between Greece and Turkey in 1930 in Ankara – where it was decided that the refugees' assets in both countries were considered from this point and after as assets of the departed country- signifying the

demise of the refugees' dreams for compensation for their properties were proved crucial for the shift of a crucial number of the refugees' electorate from the Liberal Party to the parties of the Left. The refugees' resentments over the issue of the appropriated properties by the Turkish state was crystallized in the elections that took place on 25 September 1932. Almost 20% of refugee votes shifted from the Liberal Party to the Agrarian and the Communist parties. In the next elections in March 1933, the pro-monarchist People's party emerged as the largest party, winning 118 out of the 248 seats, securing a victory over the Venizelists after successive years of electoral defeats. These elections, as Kritikos argues, "marked the culmination of refugee separatism as 14% of the refugee votes of 1932 shifted to the People's Party (Antivenizelism) and 2% to the Communist party, at the expense of both the Liberal Party and the Agrarian Party" (Kritikos 2013, 365-366).

The wider context in which this process took place was the destabilized Greek economy and consequently its political scene under the effect of the global financial crisis. The devaluation of the British pound on 21 September 1931 led to a serious financial crisis in Greece that eventually pushed the country off the gold standard that was the common monetary zone that was aligned (Mazower 1991). Nikos Christodoulakis attempting to explain to the Venizelos government maneuvers on how to handle the effects of the crisis on the Greek economy argues that: "After the pound sterling exited the system in 1931, Greece, instead of following suit, chose a defense that drove interest rates at high levels, squeezed the real economy and exhausted foreign reserves. Unable to borrow from abroad, it quitted the system in 1932 and the Drachma was heavily devalued. Despite a rise in competitiveness, improvements in the trade balance were hindered by the wave of protectionism, while the erosion of real incomes cut domestic demand and unemployment continued to rise" (Christodoulakis 2012, 1). The crisis culminated only months before his term was due to expire. The depression spread from the fiscal front to that of the real economy. The GNP fell by more than one third within a year. As economic activity contracted, unemployment rose threefold (from 75,000 to 237,000) at a time when 73 per cent of working-class families lived below the subsistence level. According to Mavrogordatos, the economic crisis cost Venizelos the support of the business class – his staunchest ally in his modernising effort – and shattered "the liberal vision of continuous capitalist expansion and modernization, effectively inaugurated a crisis of

hegemony" (Mavrogordatos 1983, 181). The next four years until the establishment of the Metaxas regime anti-Venizlism will dominate the political scene of Greece.

Venizelos' passive revolution between 1928-1932 was accompanied by a vision of a strong state that could regulate the relation between labor and capital in a way that social peace could be guaranteed eliminating the unpleasant effects of worker's protest on the Greek society. Few months after winning the elections of 1928, the anticommunist "bill on security measures of the social regime and on the protection of citizens' liberties", known as Idionymon, was submitted to the parliament on behalf of the Liberal Party (Ghikas 2004, 68). It was the institutional tool that Venizelos considered necessary in order to prevent the radicalization of the Greek labor movement, especially in light of the presence of the Communist Party in the political life of a country for almost a decade. In the epicenter of Idionymon's provision was the organization and the propagation of the communist activity that was considered subversively challenging the foundations of the Greek state and the national security (Ghikas 2004, 67). The Idionymon Law was not a unique inspiration of the Greek political elites. It was one of the many legal frameworks that were institutionalized during the interwar period by the various liberal governments in order to erase the potential ideological affiliation of the working class by the communists and punish their political practice (Ghikas 2004, 75).

Fearing the further erosion of his electoral base in forthcoming elections after the implementation of the antipopular policies and the state, Venizelos resorted to a series of tactical maneuvers. One of these was his decision to disorientate the electorate from his government's all-too-evident failures, he embarked upon a strategy of unmitigated political polarization, conjuring up the spirit of the National Schism and reviving the memory of the anti-Venizelists' responsibility for the Asia Minor *débâcle* of 1922. From this point onward relations between the two blocs became increasingly hostile. This choice on behalf of Venizelos contributed substantially to deepening of the distance between the two party-coalitions making since then the possible coalition among the two parties almost impossible.

Venizelos' modernist project collapsed as it happened in the case of its first period 1910-1916 because of developments that took place outside the country. These two failures that can be described as the inability of the bourgeois political elites of Greece to establish a stable historical bloc with forces coming from different social strata. In this case the financial crisis destroyed the alliance that the Venizelist camp had

created with the refugees and led to a spiral crisis that ended up in the making of the Metaxas regime. The bourgeois project of effective hegemony proved unrealistic since it was not able to express the demands from below effectively. The refugees' shift to the left made the Communist Party, for the first time in modern Greek history, a considerable political force that would play a key political role in the forthcoming political developments. From this point and after Venizelists were in the opposition attempting to gain back the political power with authoritarian ways mainly through the army that it had for the most period from 1916 and onwards contributing substantially to the collapse of the second Hellenic republic. Thus, the use of violent means for the rise in power was not used so much by the parties of the right side of the political spectrum as it was the case in most of the European countries of the period but from the liberal camp who could not compromise with the idea that they won't be the central political player in the country.

The defeat of the Venizelist camp in the elections of 1933 triggered the organization of a coup by the Venizelist officer Plastiras. A military emergency government under the general Alexandros Othonaios undertook the political situation of the country for few days suppressing the revolt and then gave the power to the royalist People's Party appointing the leader of the party, Panagis Tsaldaris, as prime minister on 10 March (Clogg, 1987, 11). On 6 June 1933 an assassination attempt was made against Eletherios Venizelos and his wife in Marousi, an incident that fixed the revival of the national schism between the two parties, which made it impossible for the next 20 months to form any governmental coalition that could stabilize the political situation in the country (Zink 2005, 227-229). This ongoing polarization culminated in a second Venizelist coup on 1 March. This time initiated by Venizelos himself and aiming to regain state power and its influence within the army.

The developments that took place during the period of fourteen months between the coup under Venizelos and the abolition of democracy under Metaxas' governance have been summed up aptly by Zink as following:

"On the surface, this period was characterized by (1) the removal of the Venizelists from the centers of political and military power, (2) the displacement of the moderates by the extremists as leaders of the anti-Venizelist bloc, (3) the further intensification of the National Schism, (4) the restoration of the Monarchy, (5) the growing appeal of authoritarian ideologies among right-wing forces, (6) increased social tension resulting from the social inequalities engendered by Greece's economic recovery, and

(7) continuing state repression of social and labour protest. On a more fundamental level, this period of crisis can be seen as a process in which the intensification of the intra-bourgeois struggle for dominance within the hegemonic bloc (encompassing both Venizelists and anti-Venizelists) developed into a crisis of the traditional political structures and instruments of bourgeois hegemony itself" (Zink 2005, 230).

More precisely after the failed coup of Plastiras, in October 1935 Tsaldaris was overthrown by another general this time coming from the side of the Royalists, led by Georgios Kondylis. In turn, he proclaimed a dictatorship and declared the abolition of the Republic after nine years since its establishment and the restoration of the monarchy by organizing a plebiscite that brought back King George II (Koliopoulos, 2006, 243). In December, the King dissolved the Constituent Assembly and called for new elections to be held in January (Zink, 2000, 231).

After the elections on 26 January 1936, Venizelists and anti-Venizelists were in a position to form a government mainly over the key question of the return of the Venizelist army officers who had been involved in the 1935 Plastiras coup (Clogg, 1987, 182). In this new conjuncture, where the Royalists had dominated the political game, the role of the King upgraded its role intervening decisively in the political developments of the country. On March 5, he appointed Metaxas the Minister of Defense. This decision made clear the political orientation of the King towards the far-right fractions of the royalists since Metaxas had made his antiparliamentarian reasoning public since the end of 1933. Metaxas' role though was not limited only in the position of Minister of Defense when he was appointed Vice-President of the government on 14 March, after the death of Konstantinos Demertzis (Clogg, 1987, 12).

King George II had an additional reason to collaborate with Metaxas in this crucial conjuncture. The difficulty of the parliament to form a government together with fifteen MPs of the Communist Party being elected, created fears among the Royalist camp over a possible alliance between the Liberals and the Communists. This was not an imaginary fear since it was crystallized in the Sklavainas-Sofoulis pact. Sofoules, a key figure of the liberal camp, agreed with the communists that if they supported his premiership his party would endorse the abolition of Idionymon law and pardon those who had been convicted of political crimes in return (Vlavianos, 1992, 263). The growing institutional influence of the communist was reflected in its entrenchment to sections of the working class, which had been dissatisfied because of the austerity

policies that had been implemented from 1928 and onwards. The radicalization was illustrated in the impressive rise of strikes of the working class during those years, as Yaprak Gürsoy argues: "This deal was alarming for some of the elites, particularly because labor unrest was on the rise. During Venizelos's four years in office, between 1928 and 1932, clashes between government forces and striking or demonstrating workers led to 27 killings, 13,050 arrests, and 2,400 sentences of imprisonment or deportation. During the royalist government, between 1933 and 1935, there were 10 dead, 3,725 arrested, and 785 sentenced. In 1932, 80,000 workers struck on 199 different occasions. In 1933, these numbers increased to 100,000 workers and 473 strikes" (Gürsoy, 2017, 65).

Though, after the failure of the two political camps to reach an agreement, the Metaxas government secured a vote of confidence from the House of Parliament on 27 April with 241 votes in favor, 4 abstentions and 16 against (Gürsoy, 2017, 66). Three days later, Metaxas decided to resolve the parliament. It was planned its work to be suspended for five months, authorizing in the meantime the government to issue legislative decrees (Vlavianos, 1992, 14).

The strikes intensified during 1936 reaching unprecedented proportions before the Metaxas dictatorship. In May 1936, a strike for better wages by workers that organized and started in Thessaloniki quickly developed in a general strike that challenged the fragile political status quo of the country. The involvement of the army in the repression of the strikers led to the death of 12 workers and injuries of several others. The deaths had an impact on the public opinion across the country putting the government in an implicit dilemma to resign or to resort to extra-constitutional solutions. (Kissoudi, 2009, 151). In July, the government attempted to appropriate the political conflict ideologically that had been emerged and declared that the labor disputes between labor and capital would be resolved with the supervision of the state. In response, the GSEE announced a new national strike at the beginning of August. One day before the strike was to start, Metaxas and the king established their dictatorship.

The coup was met with almost no resistance, neither from the political parties of the period nor from the Greek population, which can be seen as indicative of the decomposition that the parliamentary structures have gone through. All parties, from the far-right to the far-left were banned and a new legal framework in regard to the civil liberties prevailed. In Metaxas' rhetoric the coup was implemented because there

was a real communist danger since the political structures had been disintegrated. This argumentation even if it was not completely true since the communist danger was not an immediate one, considering the level of disarticulation of the Greek political system at the period, nobody could guarantee a social peace for the near future (Mazower, 1991, 289).

Summing up, the triggering causes for the establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship should be looked for in the post-1931 conjuncture where the political system proved unable to articulate effective hegemonic politics in conditions of political and economic instability. This should be explained with reference to two central political features of the Greek political system, first the centrality of the state as the main focus of political power and political struggle, as well as the dominance of clientelism as the main form of intermediation between the society and parliamentary politics, combined with a lack of solid political organizations grounded on an explicit political ideology, through which social demands from below could have been absorbed more effectively (Zink, 2000, 237). The lack of a modern political organization alienated the vast majority of the electorate from the two dominant political camps when they could not deliver the premises of their clientelist politics because of the crisis, which turned them toward a more radical solution, hence toward the communist party, which was the only one with modern organizational base that attempted to politicize the Greek workers.

The National schism that took place between 1915-1917 dominated the country's political sphere until the establishment of Metaxas' dictatorship, preventing the political elites to formulate an effective interclass and then interclass hegemony. This reality blocked the articulation of any, in Gramscian terms, historic bloc based on a specific political ideology that would create a sense of belonging and identity between the governors and the electorate. This lack of a solid political identity that would bring the political elites and the working people together in a common destiny can account for the easy distrust that the former demonstrated towards the parliamentary institutions. Additionally, the reality of a separated political cast from the citizens that avoid developing any type of welfare institutions to meliorate the growing dissatisfaction of the former contributed substantially to the development of the antiparliamentarian sentiments that became dominants since 1931. The political elites limited themselves to the demonstration of feelings of fear and pity for the people that were not part of their cast.

The lack of solid political organizations proved crucial to the economic crisis of 1931 that evolved to a political one to the extent that the informal system could guarantee the distribution of sources due to the lack of the problematic finance once provided by the foreign loans. Politically the crisis triggered an ever-harsher struggle for the occupation of the state since it implied access to the military apparati that were extremely necessary for the political establishment in the new conjuncture. The social legitimization had been lost and the resort to the means of violence through the army was the only way to secure their political power. This focus on the occupation of the state apparatus did not allow the political establishment to seek adequate solutions to the urgent problems of the subaltern classes, like the ones they faced while the crisis was eroding their economic status and shifting many of them from the middle-classes to the working, if not in the Marxist terminology lumpen. The political power transformed steadily into a self-aim leading to the serial coups to crisis of the Greek political system. The ongoing crisis made the political protagonists of the country de facto to turn their face to authoritarian solutions in order to the overcome the political impasse that the country experienced since traditional politics had stopped to function for long time. Consequently, the suppression of democracy, fully or partly, was considered a legitimate move once the defense of the bourgeois order required it (Zink, 2000, 237-238). Thus, in this light, the words of Koliopoulos can be interpreted, to the certain degree, as a continuation that existed between the previous political order and the one that Metaxas established: "Metaxas did act within the accepted mores of the Greek political world, and ... was a product and a representative of the Greek political system; only he played the game more roughly than was conventionally expected" (Koliopoulos 1977, 46).

1.2 The Metaxas Regime and Dylan Riley's analysis of Fascism.

The following will focus on the nature of the 4th of August regime, which constituted the general context of the period. In regards the Metaxas regime there are two dominant historiographical approaches in the Greek literature on this issue. The first one, the traditional left perspective, follows the analysis of the Commitern and tends to produce a quite general economic understanding of the regime as fascist, considering it as the immediate expression of a direct dictatorship of monopoly capital

over the Greek society (Linardatos, 1996 & Psiroukis 1977). The main limitation of this kind of approach is that it totally ignores the examination of the political character of the Metaxas regime as far as it conceives it as an apparatus of the capitalist class without any degree of autonomy. The other trend using an ideo-typical analysis which endorses that the basic presupposition to name a regime fascist is the massive support from below, otherwise it should be defined a 'dictatorship' (Hadziiossif 2003 & Alivizatos, 1983). Therefore, as much as Metaxas government did not emerge from a movement from below, like in the respective cases of Germany and Italy, it is classified as a pre-modern dictatorial regime producing a circular mono-causal interpretation of the phenomenon.

Dylan Riley's study, *The Civic Foundations of Fascism in Europe* offers an innovative understanding of fascist regimes defining them as "authoritarian democracies", a conception that can be used as an epistemological alternative to the limitations of the aforementioned literature decoding the political nature of the Greek version of fascism (Riley, 2010, 5). With that conception the American historical sociologist suggests an understanding of the nature of these regimes that will not neglect their modern political character meaning their attempt to gain legitimacy from below claiming a popular mandate. In other words, Dylan Riley attempts to introduce the Archimedean point of the constitution of modern politics namely the principle that legitimacy can only derive from those who are governed to the study of fascism. In analytical terms Riley discerns between the sources of power and the institutional mediations of it. The reason for such an epistemological clarification is his willingness to avoid the dominant proceduralist definitions of democracy which identifies it with the procedure of the selections of governors through parliamentary elections. In contrast, drawing from Mosca, he clarifies that with the term democracy he means "a principle of legitimacy or sovereignty. From this perspective democracy is not so much a regime as, in Mosca's phrase, a 'political formula' that can be combined with a variety of institutional forms" (Riley 2010, 4). In this definition Riley refers to the representation and mobilization of the great mass of the population, which may be performed through parliamentary elections, or may take different autarchic forms, involving the mobilization and integration of the masses through corporative institutions. This is what Riley calls "authoritarian democracy": a representative state without parliamentary politics (Riley, 2010, 2).

This analytical framework is crucial in as much it permits to interpret the democratic claims of the fascist regimes and their opposition to the parliament as not representative of the nation. The key problem with political liberalism and its institutions like the parliament, from the fascist perspective, was not that it was democratic, but precisely the opposite. Elections and parliaments, from the fascist perspective, were unable of representing the interests of the nation in the conditions as they were shaped in the post-WWI conjuncture. Because of this, the nation cannot be but represented through some other mechanisms, modern political institutions where the political will of the people can be expressed in a more genuine way. From this point of view someone might say that fascist regimes were authoritarian democracies being states that continued to speak in the name of the people creating alternative institutional apparatuses in which people could participate yet in a way that did not change the basic rules of the political game (Riley, 2010, 4). In this sense, it was a formalist representation and not a substantial one. The people in this context got involved in the politics of the nation, yet not through organizations like parties that undermined their existence.

The aforementioned argumentation of Riley could possibly raise many doubts. The most obvious objection is that all modern regimes claim some form of popular mandate and that criterion is not useful to produce analytical distinctions among regime types. One basic key difference though between the fascist regimes and other authoritarian regimes is that the former perceived themselves as alternatives to parliamentary democracies and for that reason created substitute institutions. Fascists did not understand themselves as parenthetical deviations from the democratic paths that have been forged by the liberal parliamentary institutions. Rather as Riley points out: "The fundamental basis of the fascist claim to legitimacy lays in the belief that fascism offered a superior way of connecting the population to the state in modern social and economic conditions. In short, fascist regimes not only claimed popular legitimacy, they constructed institutions conceived specifically as alternatives to electoral democracy" (Riley, 2010, 5). In other words, the fascist perception of the modern version of the political was not a complete rejection of it but rather a distorted adjustment of it where the parliaments were substituted by other autarchic institutions of popular mediation.

Following this type of argumentation Metaxas regime fits completely to this definition that is suggested by Dylan Riley. As it will be shown in the following

chapters Metaxas and the intellectuals that adhered the regime were offered a solid argumentation that endorsed that the parliament was not a genuine form of representation of the popular will in the period that followed the Global financial crisis. Metaxas since 1933 argued that parliament should be abolished and to be substituted by different institutions that could represent the interests of the popular will in an effective way. He and his intellectuals, as Riley proposed, disconnected the discursive rhetoric of the legitimization from below from the liberal institutions that expressed it until the establishment of his regime. It becomes clear from their rhetoric that they not only criticized the previous political order but sought to develop a theoretical framework that could legitimize the new political realities. Though this was not limited in the level of rhetoric but proceeded to the building, although limited, of institutions, which should channel the popular will. Both in the level of institutions and discursive practices the regime borrowed from the respective authoritarian regimes of the period.

More precisely, the cult of a charismatic leadership was reproduced institutionally through the structure of the regime in which Metaxas was the one who made the final decisions about the various issues over the ministers of the government that their role was strictly advisory (Alivizatos, 1983, 115). The ministerial council was composed mainly by non-political experts/technocrats, army officers, bankers and journalists. This decision had to do with the fact that Metaxas aimed to build a politically neutral government in which the people who will be in the ministries would be specialists in the area of their political duties. Additionally, the army officers were to secure the hegemony within repressive apparatuses of the state. With the same reasoning, he aimed to put ministers related with the sector of finance, especially from the National Bank, the dominant credit institution in Greece and Industrialists in order to gain their support and practically be helpful in managing effectively finances of the country during the turbulent period before the WWII, thus to find solutions to the crucial issue of the national debt (Close 1993, 19-20). The ministerial council of course was not accountable to anyone else apart from the prime minister of the country. Though in any sense it substituted ministerial councils of the elected governments of the past.

Additionally, Metaxas government was the only one that systematically tried to implement corporatist ideas. A step towards this direction was the state's decision to institute the collective negotiations imposing compulsory arbitration in collective

bargaining between employer and employees (Mazower & Veremis, 1993, 124). The ministry that was responsible for this issue was the Ministry of Labor. The compulsory arbitration practically meant the abolition of the right to strike. It put labor and capital in obligatory terms, erasing the possibility of uprisings from below since the state supervised the process of negotiations. With new legal framework that the regime imposed in regards to the labor issues the General Worker's Confederation that was controlled by the government had "the exclusive right of representing all the state-licensed workers' and employees' organizations toward the administrative, judicial and social security authorities, especially in the conclusion of collective employment agreements" (Ploumidis 2014, 113). The official propaganda of the regime made it a very important issue, which was not limited only to industry but expanded to all the sectors of economy. The regime's leaflet, "Four year of governance" argued that during the first three years "823 collective agreements had been signed in total, 133 of which had a general application, whereas 690 had only a local effect" (Yphipourgeion Typou kai Tourismou A, 1939, 145-147). The Metaxas regime engaged also with the development of the working associations recognizing with the decree law 1435 "1,257 associations of workers and employees under the supervision of 41 individual secretariats of the (state-controlled) General Workers" (Yphipourgeion Typou kai Tourismou A, 1939, 200). The reasoning behind this recognition that the 4th of August regime proceeded was the control of their activities in a way that will not challenge the status quo promoting the national collaboration between for the sake of the development of the 'national' economy. Though, the corporatist reform remained uncompleted since "the 1,257 associations of workers and employees never transformed to corporations or tertiary syndicates and they did not represent the employers and employees" (Ploumidis, 2016, 121). The reasons for this failure however should not be seen in Metaxas' unwillingness to implement them but to the objections that the King had towards them. Only from 1938 and onwards when Metaxas established his authority in regards to the King, this become possible, although at that time the priorities of the country were different, and the emphasis was given to the preparation for the forthcoming war. As it is shown in the chapter that is focusing on his thought he had a specific analysis of the need for the corporatist regulation of the country. He believed to be the opposite of the parliamentarianism since it was cancelling the vertical relation between the politicians and the electorate promoting a horizontal one that was based on the different professions. This

organization of representation would lead to an apolitization of politics reducing them to a managerial level since the political antagonism that parliamentary life implied was erased. The fact though that the project was not fulfilled to a satisfying degree as in the case of Italy, does not mean it was of a different logic. Parliamentarianism belonged to the past, new institutional forms were predicted and implemented as a response to this institutional gap.

In the section of agriculture Metaxas regime did also few steps towards the corporatist organization of the farmer's interests. In March 1938, the regime-affiliated 'National Confederation of Agrarian Cooperatives of Greece' was founded, replacing the 'Panhellenic Confederation of Farmers' Cooperative Unions' who had been established during the liberal era. As it was the case with labor associations the state exercised strict supervision to agrarian one's as well. The associational organization of the producers was considered as one the key interests of the regime. (Yphipourgeion Typou kai Tourismou A, 107). Its renewal was necessary since the official discourse of the regime described them as corrupted by the party politics of the previous era. The way in order to be avoided this type of past mistakes was the developments of close relationship with the state that was beyond the political parties aiming to fulfill the national interests. regime (Yphipourgeion Typou kai Tourismou A, 108). This new type state interventionism in the level of agrarian economy imitated, as Nikos Ploumidis has observed, the Nazi model that has been propagated widely in the regimes' magazines (Ploumidis 2014, 67).

The main corporatist formations in the level of agrarian that were instituted by the Metaxas government was the 'Houses of Farmers' that were established with the decree law 1481. The 'Houses of Farmers' were established in November 1938, and replaced the peripheral Chambers of Agriculture, that had been founded by the Venizelos' Liberal government in 1914 and that were considered as a remnant of the past order (Yphipourgeion Typou kai Tourismou A, 109). Their role as it was clarified by the official discourse of the regime was expanded from a professional to political one educating the peasants and facilitating in that way their relationship with the state authorities. These new institutions would bring closer the peasant populations, who were isolated from the urban centers, and the institutions of education with the ideology of the state apparatus that attempted to gain further legitimacy from below and would facilitate the implementation of the policies from above. Of course these institutions were not Greek inspirations but rather "quasi-consonant in their title with

the Portuguese *casas do povo* ('Houses of the People'), the agricultural syndical bodies of Salazar's *Estado Novo* (1933–74), ostensibly drew on the eight Italian *corporazioni* of 'the productive and agricultural cycle', which had been created by Giuseppe Bottai in Mussolini's Italy in 1934, as well as on the *Bauernschaften* (the *Körperschaften* in the production, processing and trading of agricultural products) that had been established in Hitler's Germany in September 1933" (Ploumidis 2014, 68).

On the level of the youth, the regime founded EON (*Ethnikí Orgánosis Neoléas*), the youth organization of the regime that steadily grew in terms of membership reaching, according to official accounts, 1.201.450 girls and boys between 8 and 25 years old. Despite, the exaggerated numbers that the state presented regarding the membership, which had obligatory character, EON was definitely the biggest massive organization in the history of modern Greece until that time, in which young people from both genders were participating (Kallis, 2010, 317). This decision had to do with the realization that youth was a crucial section of the Greek society for the contemporary legitimization of the regime but also for forging its future political physiognomy. The Emergency Law No. 334 (November 1936) founded the EON as a state institution. Article 3 was clarifying the reasons that the regime established a discrete institution for the youth of the country : "The aims of EON are the profitable exploitation of leisure time from work or from school in order that the young people may promote their physical and intellectual training; the development of national morale and faith in religion; the creation of a spirit of cooperation and solidarity among them; and a prompt professional orientation relevant to each one's natural capabilities" (Anastasakis, 1992, 125). From this passage it becomes clear that the 4th of August attempted to indoctrinate the youth population with its ideas integrating them in its nationalist authoritarian project. The youth was in the epicenter of Metaxas efforts since the regime did not emerge from a movement from below, thus is his reasoning the youth of the party, which had not been poisoned with the politics and mentalities of the national schism was the most fertile ground on which he could build his legitimacy. Its first section was established in Thessaloniki and its members were coming mainly from the fascist National Union (EEE), while its Athenian section was stuffed by members of the anti-communist National Pan-Student Movement (Athanasakis, 1992, 125). The two main institutions from which EON drew its member since its establishment were the schools and the universities of the country. Additionally, it abolished all the antagonist organizations with similar aims with these

of EON, like the Scouts, in order to create a totalitarian institution that will be fully dedicated to the national aims of the 4th of August regime. Abolishing the Scouts movement also meant to reduce the influence of the King in the youth, an institution that was until this point under his control (Athanasakis, 1992, 126).

The institutions presented until this point were established and had a specific impact on shaping a new anti-liberal political physiognomy of the Greek society. Although there were many plans in this direction, they were not implemented since the WWII erupted and Ioannis Metaxas died in January 1941. For instance, one of those plans that uncover the mentality of Metaxas in regard to the political future of Greece is the new constitution of the country that was never implemented because of the above-mentioned developments. It is a clear sign of Metaxas' planning of expanding the new institutions through which the popular will could be expressed in a direct way since it included the right to vote for the prime minister of the country. It was a way to gain legitimacy from below through the popular participation without challenging substantially the existing political structures of the Greek society. It was a continuation rather a disruption of the institutional arrangements that Metaxas had implemented while he was alive. It should be perceived more as an effort for the further embedment of his regime realizing that his death was close. He attempted to leave a constitution that would not leave space for parliamentary politics to return, providing a sense of democratic legitimization to his regime. From his attempt of excluding parties, it becomes clear that Metaxas was not planning any return to the parliamentary rule but on the opposite, his future vision for Greece regarded representation with an authoritarian anti-liberal character.

In the end of 1940, while Metaxas was hospitalized, he dictated to Nikolaos Koumaros the basic principles of the new constitutional order that would be the legal framework of the 4th of August regime. It should be clarified that the formation of the physiognomy of the Metaxas regime was a conjunctural one, a dynamic procedure of state-crafting where the institutional changes were happening steadily and carefully taking into consideration the internal and external developments that were occurring that time. This because it was an attempt that was imposed from above without having gained popular legitimacy before and at the same time the geopolitical order was fragile enough, making Metaxas to think carefully about internal reforms. These institutions served the aim of forging a social consensus through non-violent means. The constitution starts with the clarification of the origins of the political power. It

clarifies that by being a constitutional monarchy the power derives from the King. Though, the King never acts by himself but through a government that is appointed by him. The governmental unity of this regime implies that the Prime Minister is only appointed by the King's decision while the rest of the government by a decree of the prime minister of the country. The legislative, judicial and executive power then derives from the Prime Minister (Metaxas, 1941, 5). In turn, Metaxas clarifies the role of the people in the new constitution defining it as "advisory". The ways that the popular will be expressed are two. Firstly, through the conduction of often referendums and secondly, through representatives. Though, the second procedure will not include parties as they cannot represent the totality of nation in a genuine way. The political body will be constituted by three powers that will be separate practically, but they will derive by the King. The three distinct powers will be embodied by three councils. One council for the legislative power, one council for the executive and a last one for the judicial. The way to be elected the representatives is through a secret universal vote. The elections for each council will take place in different periods but with a time distance no more than 12 months. The term for the elected people will last for three years (Metaxas 1941, 6). The legislative body will have an advisory role focusing exclusively on laws that will be proposed by the government. The executive board will deal with the administration. The last tasks will be related with the judiciary (Metaxas 1941, 7). The three councils together constitute the constitutional power but only the government has the right to propose the laws. Part of the expression of the popular is also the institution of the referendum when it will not be possible to find solutions through the other powers. All the people will have the right to vote, both women and men, in other words there will be a universal vote (Metaxas 1941, p. 8). This is the first time that a constitution includes the women vote in national elections, a feature indicative of the populist physiognomy of the regime. What the liberal parliamentary system failed to do, was aimed to be done by a fascist regime. The legislative body will be constituted by 80 people and by 60 and 40 executive and judicial respectively (Metaxas 1941, 13). The foundation of parties is legally forbidden (Metaxas 1941, 15). Women will have the right to be elected as well (Metaxas 1941, 16). The King has the right to appoint as the prime minister a candidate that has not gained the majority of the votes (Metaxas 1941, 19).

The physiognomy of the constitution was indicative of the perception of the 4th of August regime and more precisely of its leader regarding the way through which the

popular factor will get involved in the governance of the country. It limited the popular participation in a way that would not challenge the status quo of the regime. The abolition of the parties would secure the expression of the popular will in a genuine way avoiding the reproduction of the antagonistic politics that dominated the political sphere the previous liberal era. The popular participation would take a unified expression deactivating the diving politics of parliamentarianism. The power of three bodies would be limited. The legislative council could not form laws. Executive council could form questions. The convocation of the councils would be decided by the government. Imperative mandate would not exist. These limitations are indicative of the small degree of influence that councils would play in the new regime. The formation of the councils that Metaxas proposed aimed to the social participation in the regime in a controlled way believing that the regime could gain legitimacy without the challenge of its existential status. This insistence though in the making of this kind of institutions that would have a limited power indicated Metaxas perception of politics as a participatory process that both men and women should join in a way that would allow the reproduction of the regime as such preventing any possible return to the previous political order that consider disastrous for the country. The initiatives did not have a transitory character aiming to a smooth shift to parliamentarianism rather they attempted a permanent authoritarian regime that would contribute to the formation of a different type of society in which the divisions of the past would have been eliminated and the nation will be able to act then as a unified entity.

Coming back to Dylan Riley's argumentation, his study on the rise of fascism in interwar Europe provides another crucial contribution to the anatomy of the far-right movements during the interwar. Shifting from the nature of the political physiognomy of these regimes to the conditions of their emergency Riley offers a series of reflections on the reasons of their political dominance. He does that by re-elaborating the literature on the civil society and its role in the formation of modern societies. Riley's purpose thus is to "propose a rethinking of the impact of civil society development on regime forms and a rethinking of the nature of interwar European fascism" (Riley, 2010, 2). In this attempt he re-examines the Tocquevillian thesis that a robust civil society necessarily leads to the formation of robust democratic regimes. Utilizing the Gramscian analytical repertoire Riley notes that this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to have a solid liberal political regime to the extent that a

robust civil society should be combined with effective hegemonic politics, something that was not the case in any of the three that he examined in his study. In Italy, Spain and Romania before the establishment of the authoritarian, there were vibrant civil societies including several associational or civic groupings that were developed through the developments of modernity from 1870's and onwards. His argument is - that -in contrast to the dominant explanations on the causes of the emergence of fascism in these three countries - the phenomenon can be interpreted effectively only if it is taken into the robust civil societies that developed from 1900 and onwards in these societies together with the inability or unwillingness of the traditional parties to absorb effectively the demands that were expressed by the former. Thus, there was developed an asymmetry between the associational advancement and effective hegemonic politics. The outcomes of these historical processes according to the American historical sociologist can be summarized as follows: "Since political struggle was not defined in terms of a relatively consensual national task established prior to associational development civil society development produced a confusing welter of claims leading to a crisis of politics and ultimately undermining the legitimacy of the liberal systems of Italy, Spain and Romania"(Riley, 2010, 5). The inability of the parties to express and to absorb the democratic demands of an already established civil society resulted in the rise of Fascist movements that used a distinctive form of rejection of politics by using alternative anti-establishment discursive and political practices that gained hegemony within the societies.

This analysis helps to conceive better the analysis that has been preceded on interwar Greece and the reasons of Metaxas emergence as alternative to the Greek political establishment. The causes lie in the inability of the two main political formations of the country, Royalists and Venizelists, to form adequate hegemonic politics in the post-1932 conjuncture and even before. Their inability to form an intra-class and then inter-class hegemonic formations in conditions of economic crisis lead to a deterioration of the parliamentary rule transforming the political crisis to an organic systemic one leading to inability of the political system to reproduce itself. This happened because the political parties of the time had still traditional structures dominated by the patterns of clientelism without organization bases that could bring them into contact with the social sphere. Thus, the disjunction between the political sphere and the societal needs especially of those strata that had been affected by the consequences of the financial crisis in Greece lead to the increase of social protests

that the political elites could not handle effectively. For this reality can account also their liberal mentality regarding the measures that were not taken in the level of economic policies. The corrective interventionist policies that were necessary for the relief of the many were not considered as an option because of their belief in the self-regulating effects of the market. Clientelism was the key through which political demands from below could be satisfied. When it stopped to be effective the claims could not be addressed to the same extent as before because of the austerity policies that had been implemented and the limited circulation of capital since the loans from abroad stopped. The crisis unavoidably effected the internal structure of the political elite of the country in a decisive way. The national schism that took place in 1916 never bridged effectively. It was revived with the defeat in Turkey in 1922 where the Royalists were banned from the participation in the elections for a few years and many of its officers were expelled from their positions. The consent of 1926-1932 broke apart once again because of the global financial crisis. Thus, the hegemonic consensus through a stable historical block remained incomplete. Venizelism lost the legitimacy it had to refuge electorate that moved either to the communist party or the royalists. The dream of Venizelos modernization collapsed and the only thing that remained was its repressive heritage for the years that followed until the establishment of Metaxas regime. The political elites having in their deposit traditional mentalities of the country being divided proved unable to offer solutions to the emerging issues of the new conjuncture that had an explicit class character. From the beginning of the 1930s the cohesion of the political camps fell apart because of the disagreements on what is to be done to solve the ongoing fiscal and political crisis. The state became the main focus through which they could establish their power since their political legitimacy had been lost. They returned to themselves, self-absorbing in a vicious circle for the conquest of the power ignoring completely what was going on in the realm of the society. The extremists from both sides that in the Greek context were personified in retired army officers that still were holding a saying and influence within the army affairs, autonomized from the political camps that they were affiliated to, attempting to gain the power with the violence and establish their own alternative political regimes. The space was open since the parliament had lost its legitimacy and the means for holding became mainly extra-constitutional. While the centrists were fighting for the rise in power, they were legitimizing at the same time the far-right politicians of the parliament that were radicalized realizing that impasse of the

constitutional methods. The coup of Plastiras and the respective authoritarian attempts by Kondylis and Metaxas should be understood in this perspective. The centrists did not marginalize these elements both because they need them to form effective political coalitions and because of the fear that they could not protect themselves in the case of acts of vengeance on behalf of the opposite side. The difference though in Greece compared to Riley's analysis is that the civil society was not fascicized because the historical conditions were absent. The land reform and the division of the lands have happened already from the 1800 and onwards, a process that was accelerated by the arrival of refugees from Turkey after the defeat of Greece in the war of 1922. The agrarian associations and the labor unions were under the strict supervision of the two dominant families that attempted at radicalizing since the way they perceived politics was a traditional one. They failed either to obtain class consciousness since the political conditions for such developments did not exist or to create a workers-peasants alliance since until 1932, their organization was absorbed by the dominant political camps. What existed though was a labor movement that was increasing its power because of the Communist Party's modern political nature with organizational bases and a growing dissatisfaction of the peasantry who was experiencing the effects of the changing rules of the global market. Even this type of activity that cannot be compared with the struggles and the political tensions that occurred in other countries of the European continent was enough for the far-right to get anxious about the possible challenging of the status quo by the political practices of the communists. The decision of the Communist Party to follow the tactic of the Popular Front dictated by the Communist International increased their concerns. In the level of political elites almost everyone had lost its belief in parliamentarianism as the institutional medium of the general will. The politicians of the two camps focusing from the schism and onwards mainly on the rise to state power did not develop any democratic consciousness or identity since the point of reference was the political opposite other. This could have happened only if they have developed organization binding their electorate to a common cause. The intensification of the conflicts among the different sections of the two main political camps was an outcome of the delegitimization of the parliamentarian lacking any democratic mentality. The use of force for achieving consensus became more and more common. Metaxas had realized that already in 1933. He publicly endorsed the need to exit parliamentarianism. He did not even believe that unification of the Royalist camp under the leadership of the

People's Party could offer a solid alternative to the existing crisis since its far-right elements would split because of their different perception of how the national problems could be solved. The traditional nature of the political parties of the period who were person-centered with affiliations to specific sections of the state apparatus facilitated the implementation of the personal projects of their leaders ignoring both the society and the decisions of the other sections of the political camp of which they were part. The political system cancelled itself proving unable for more than three years to offer a stable government. Thus, the Metaxas project should be perceived as enforced hegemony from above both within the elites of the country under its leadership and the regulation of political conflicts that emerged from below through the intervention of corporatist policies. He put himself in the leadership of the country erasing the party politics and individualism that implied seeking new forms of political participation and legitimization.

To make his argument more solid and historically grounded Riley offers a typology of fascist phenomena according to the ways that attempted to legitimize their regimes. He categorized three analytical types under which the fascist phenomenon can be subsumed. In the first category the party is the main medium through which fascist regimes attempt to establish their power being the key pedagogic institution for the nation. In the type Fascism, Italy is subsumed. Romania belongs to the second type, hence a state that was considered as the embodiment of the nation. This is the model of Statist Fascism. Finally, the traditionalist model was based on the personification of the nation in the traditional institutions of the church, family and monarchy (Riley, 2010, 19-20).

Following Riley's categorization, it seems that the Greek case fits better to the paradigm of traditionalist fascism; namely, to the Spanish regime which sought to represent the nation through the family, the monarchy and the church. In this type of fascist experiment, the nation existed but was corrupted by the liberal institutions. Thus, the new regime claims to represent a true nation by going back and re-establishing these institutions through which the national community used to represent itself. Metaxas main political slogans were patria, religion, family and King, an almost identical definition to what Dylan Riley has suggested. Let's examine briefly how Metaxas regime conceived these institutions.

The Greek nation was conceived in a metaphysical sense that its true nature was corrupted by the liberal institutions. This new conceptualization of nation was one of

the key themes of the Metaxist ideology. It had metaphysical connotations since it was perceived as a transcendental entity that could not be identified only with the contemporary Greek People, standing above the living individuals. Its regeneration implied the formation of a new national civilization that would contribute to the raising of the nation's morale that had been devastated by the national schism of the previous historical era, the creation of a genuine national education that would be based on the ideology of the regime and the revival of the respect for the country abroad that the political personnel of the past demolished. This civilizational renewal could be achieved by returning to the Greek tradition that would be the main source of inspiration. The foreign influences would be rejected since they were considered responsible for the distortion of the national physiognomy of the country. This was one of the key contradictions of the regime's discourse since as it will be shown both the institutions and main themes of its discursive patterns adopted from abroad. Metaxas' regime though was not the exception since this cultural and institutional exchange was a key aspect of the nature of the authoritarian regimes of the interwar period. The Metaxas version of palingenetic myth named the Third Hellenic Civilization that was considered the project that it was in the making that it will inspire the its citizens to be identified with the national aims. Its predecessors were the ancient and the Byzantine one's. The modern civilization that was created with the establishment of the Greek state was considered a disaster that brought only national destructions. The Third Hellenic one combining features from the other two aimed to its negation creating something new through the process of the national transcendence. The return to the history was though only in order the nation to move forward. Thus, the regime looked to its to national past in order to forge its future (Sarandis, 1993, 150-152).

Regarding the feature of religion as Aristotle Kallis has endorsed, was inextricably linked with the Metaxas' vision of national regeneration: "The core of this vision was inhabited by a strong reverence for religion – Orthodox Christianity – and the historic legacies of the Byzantine empire. Metaxas celebrated the Orthodox Christian heritage of the modern Greek state – a legacy that suggested a cultural continuity from the medieval period to the twentieth century, but also helped modern Greek nationalism to reconstruct an idea of cultural specificity. He had repeatedly spoken about the centrality of the Orthodox religion for the spiritual regeneration of modern Greek society. He appealed to religion as a means for recapturing the ineliminable core of

Greek identity after three decades of allegedly corrupting modernising experiments. He also subscribed to the notion that the 'resurrection' [palingenesia, literally 're-birth'] of Greece in the 1820s had become possible through the spiritual leadership of the Orthodox Church. Thus, he turned to Orthodoxy as both the figurative moral guardian of the 'Hellenic soul' [elliniki psichi] throughout the centuries, in addition to an institution capable of assisting his project of forging a new spiritual conscience amongst modern Greeks" (Kallis, 2007, 237). This should be explained with reference to the conservative perception on behalf of Metaxas of the Greek nation that was perceived as transhistorical reality that survived through the centuries because of the connective tissues of Orthodox religion and Monarchy. This was the conservative nationalistic vision that Metaxas shared. His belief on the orthodox religion as an integral part of the Greek identity lead him to assign to the Greek church a key educational role in the forging of the proper national consciousness of its citizens. Thus, in EON the teaching of the dogma of the Greek orthodox religion was integrated in its educational program.

The institution of the family was another important parameter of the ideology of the 4th of August regime. Family was considered as the key institution for the reproduction of the Greek society. It was the institutional nucleus that provides cohesion to the Greek nation. Thus, reaffirming the dominant ideology of the Greek state assigned a pivotal role to women as birth givers and providers of the emotional labor for the Greek kids. Their role in this considered crucial providing and preparing the youth for the nation. Additionally, the mother had a cultural mission safeguarding the national and patriotic ideals by transferring the traditional values to their kids, a process vital for the regeneration of the nation.

This traditionalist perspective was in contrast with the modern nature of Metaxas regime being part of the authoritarian trend of the interwar period. Their discourse was a traditional one, but their politics were modern since for their legitimization needed the mobilization from below. The mobilization implied the brake with their logic of traditional institutions like this of family. The family in discursive was the nucleus of the nation and the mother should be mainly in the house, but this could be achieved only in conditions of social normality. The fascist states, in their conception, acted as war-machines that should prepare their citizens for the warfare. Thus, that the 4th of August regime established EON was further challenging the traditional way that children were nurtured until then. The socialization of the children was now

shared between the family and the state. The main issue that the families had with their female children joining EON was the fact that it was challenging the traditional perception of girls' upbringing in the house, in order to safeguard their moral integrity. Against this backdrop the exhortation on behalf of Metaxas towards the parents should be interpreted, hence that they should be available "to offer with pride their children to the Fatherland and Society" since "the child is not a piece of house-furniture...it belongs to Greece" (Sarandis, 1993, 160).

In regards the last institution, Monarchy was one of the foundational ones for the 4th of August regime since it was established with the support of King George II. As it will be shown in the chapter on Metaxas' antiparliamentarian discourse, the prime minister of Greece politicized being close to the father of King George II, Constantine I as one of key collaborators when he was the commander-in-chief of the Hellenic Army. A relation that lasted until his death in 1923. The affiliation of Metaxas with the crown was not only a professional one but influenced his ideological formation as well. As conservatives that reached maturity being around the circles of monarchy in the transitory era of the Greek state-building and the establishment of bourgeois institutions the crown was considered as the institution that guaranteed the continuity of the nation throughout the centuries. It was perceived the redeeming institution that could hold against the ongoing liberal reforms that were spreading within the country and abroad. With the establishment of Greek monarchy transformed from a symbiotic to an antagonistic one. Metaxas had the need of the institution of Monarchy in order to establish his regime internally and facilitate the support and the protection from Britain. Steadily though he developed his own plans and attempted to sideline the King's power and to a certain extent he succeeded with it in the autumn of 1938, where he replaced all the people in his ministries who were affiliated to the crown and undertaking the leadership of EON. The King's role though in the army's affairs, who was also their leader, did not change his institutional role as the head of the country. Metaxas, until the end of his life, never developed any plan of abolishing the institution of monarchy since it was the other pillar of his power. However, what he attempted to do was to create a vital space that would give the opportunity to implement his own plans for the political future of the country.

At this point though it should be added that the Metaxas regime was not a consensual one since it used the repressive apparatus to establish its authority wherever it considered that it was necessary. The police forces were upgraded and modernized in

order to fight the key internal enemy of the country, the communists. The Communist Party was dissolved by the secret services of Konstantinos Maniadakis who was the Deputy Minister of Public Security. The newly established Secretary of State had all the security forces in the country under its jurisdiction in order to coordinate effectively the anticommunist struggle. Maniadakis specialized also in the repression of foreign spies that were involved in the antagonisms of the contested geopolitical order of the period, especially those of Italy, Bulgaria and later on, Germany and Britain, (Petrakis, 2005, 208).

Political repression became steadily one of the key aspects of the regime. The first months of the dictatorship approximately 1,330 citizens were arrested by the police and convicted with accusations related to political crimes committed against the nation. During the whole period of the dictatorship more than 30.000 were arrested and many of them were sent as political prisoners in remote islands of the Aegean Pegalos, a method that would become one of key way of punishment for the next decades (Gallant, 2016, 219). The Communist Party of Greece was the key organization that Maniadakis and his collaborators focused on succeeding in dissolving its political structures. In that way, they managed to exterminate the key enemy of the regime at that period (Vlavianos, 1992, 16). Maniadakis was also trained in order to make the repressive techniques of the regime more efficient with the Nazi regime. He was invited and joined the congress that organized in Germany on methods for the suppression of the communist danger (Pelt, 2008, 120)

The Greek army was also obedient to the regime since all the Venizelists unhorsed from their positions, a process that started already from 1933 and was completed in the first months after the establishment of the regime. The few exceptions of officers, who attempted to organize a coup against the regime very quickly dissolved by the Metaxas secret services. The officers were satisfied because for the first time since the beginning of National Schism they had not dealt with the political affairs of the country but only with their professional tasks. Its leadership was under the King's authority.

In foreign policy Metaxas regime confronted a crucial contradiction, it could not align geopolitically because of their imperialist aspirations with the authoritarian states with which he had resemblance. Thus, Metaxas attempted unsuccessfully to adopt a neutral stance between UK and Germany. Germany during the late 1930s became the largest trading partner of the country. Metaxas also had formative experiences in Germany

where he studied, additionally to his affiliation with the King's circle in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Though, this neutral stance could not be adopted for long since Greece was a maritime country where its economic interests were inextricably linked with the ones of England. The King of the country was also attached to the British elites after his exile in London. Mussolini's Italy with its expansionist stance brought Greece closer to Britain since its leadership believed that this would contribute to its protection from a possible attack. Metaxas' efforts to keep Greece out of World War II became undone when Mussolini demanded occupation rights to strategic Greek sites. When the Italian ambassador Grazzi visited Metaxas' residence and presented these demands on the night of 28 October 1940, Metaxas replied in French, "Alors, c'est la guerre" ("Then, it is war"). A few hours later, Italy invaded Greece from the Albanian borders and the war between the two countries started (Koliopoulos, 1977)

Conclusion

This chapter attempted to overview the political developments in Greece before and after the establishment of Metaxas regime drawing on the analytical repertoire that has been suggested by Dylan Riley in his study of fascist authoritarian regimes during the interwar period. Following his argumentation, it is suggested that the 4th of August regime was an imposition of an authoritarian regime from above that attempted to forge the intraclass and interclass hegemonic rule that the bourgeois regime failed to do. In order to embed its authority, he developed his own anti-liberal institutions, to the extent that he was able to, in order for the Greek nation to be expressed in a more genuine way. Despite the limitation of his project, it can be argued that this was the Greek fascist version of authoritarian regimes in the interwar period, since it abolished the previous political order and attempted to establish a new one. It was a traditionalist fascist experiment that drew its legitimacy from the traditional institutions of family, church and the monarchy but at the same time created modern totalitarian institutions like these of EON and the 'Houses of the Farmer' where different social groups could participate massively.

2 Chapter: Intellectual History, Skinnerians Limitations, Marxist Counterproposals and the 4th of August regime.

Abstract

This chapter attempts to offer some epistemological insights on intellectual history from a Marxist perspective. It should be clarified that the various Marxist or materialist critiques that have been expressed towards the historiographical movement of the Cambridge School of the history of political thought are not presented but rather crucial limitations of this school using the reflections of some Marxist scholars with the aim to indicate, some possible epistemological counterproposals as alternatives that could be proved helpful for the study of the Metaxist intellectuals. I will mainly focus on the work of the most prominent exponent of the school, Quentin Skinner, who provided a canon regarding the proper approach to the study of political theory with his epistemological texts. Hence, I will first present the methodological aims of Skinner's approach, then I will present the critiques by the Marxist scholars on these methodological claims and how these suggestions can be useful to my study about the antiparliamentarian ideas developed by Metaxist intellectuals during the interwar period in Greece. I argue that the Skinnerian analytical repertoire cannot conceive adequately intellectual developments like these that emerged during the interwar era because it cannot grasp effectively the dialectic between the text and the context. It also fails to conceptualize the role of the intellectuals as social and political actors during this period. Their ideas were not aimed to enrich the public debate on what is to be done but also to be applied as organic ideas that could shape the physiognomy of the regime. In other words, the linguistic approach that Quentin Skinner has proposed cannot understand what role the intellectuals that endorsed the authoritarian regime of the era played to the extent that it does not theorize their close relationship with the state as organic exponents of its interests and state-builders, as well as the authoritarian public sphere that these regimes attempted to create. The methodological proposals through a Marxist perspective offer some ideas how these gaps can be filled effectively in a way to understand better both the texts that these intellectuals produced and the contexts in which they emerged.

2.1 Text and Context: Towards a Marxist Intellectual History

For decades, intellectual history has been methodologically dominated the work of Quentin Skinner emphasizing the reading of texts in light of their discursive contexts. For all its achievements, this approach has tended to neglect and therefore obfuscate the social relations and concrete political struggles that form the background of the production of the text and which also form the reality into which the text tries to intervene. The key questions therefore become: What should we understand by 'context'? And: what is the relation between text and context?

I try to synthesize different approaches to intellectual history in order to find answers to these questions. More concretely I criticize the work of Skinner by way of a discussion of the work of Neal Wood, Ellen Wood and Louis Althusser as well as conceptual tools deriving from Gramscian work that offer a broadening of the perspective on who counts as an intellectual for the intellectual historian and dialectical understanding of the relationship between the past and present.

From a Marxist perspective, these writers each understand context in separate ways, which considered individually might be deficient, but which may complement one another in the study of historical texts. Thus, Wood and Wood have rightly emphasized that the social context should be taken into consideration, yet their understanding of the social context often tends to be too generic or general when working with everything but the most canonical text. Similarly, Althusser has emphasized the context of the conjuncture (the political situation), yet his understanding of the conjuncture tends to overlook the concrete social relations that are also part of concrete struggles and disagreements. Finally, a global and Gramscian approach to intellectual history will make the context less one of internal discussion between great philosophers and more of a bottom-up perspective looking at how ideas form and travel in relation to concrete struggles of everyday lives. This is especially important for intellectual history of the modern period where technologies, infrastructure and forms of socialization make ideas travel in other ways than those of the early modern period, which, perhaps unconsciously, is what structures Skinner's methodology.

By synthesizing these different approaches, it is our aim to mark the path for a Marxist approach to intellectual history that stays clear of economic reductionism on the one side and discursive reductionism à la Skinner on the other.

In order to develop a *Marxist* intellectual history, that will take the Marxist emphasis on class on social relations seriously while retaining a certain focus on ideas as developed by intellectuals, we should therefore modify Skinnerian intellectual history in three ways: First, by redefining what we should understand by ‘context’; second by redefining what we should understand by ‘intellectual’; and, third, by redefining the relation between ‘text’ and ‘context’.

It should be mentioned that many of these criticisms have already been raised and changes have already occurred within the field of intellectual history. The new contribution lies in trying to systematize an alternative to the Skinnerian approach by embedding it thoroughly within the Marxist tradition and drawing on some of the key concepts of Marxist thinkers

The following will focus on three elements: the ‘context’, the ‘relation between text and context’ and what is meant by ‘intellectual’. This analysis will path the way to defining a Marxist alternative to Skinnerian intellectual history.

2.2 Context

In 2002, Skinner published “Visions of Politics”, a three-volume collection of his writing and the first publication, which contains his various articles on methods. Comprehensively revised and arranged in logical order, the ten essays that comprise the volume provide a useful systematic statement of the strand of contextualism that he has defended and that has proved so popular amongst historians of political thought.

His aim in substantially revising and representing his methodological essays for the twenty-first century is not merely to provide an historical document of the arguments he advanced in the 1960s and 1970s. It is rather, as he claims, to offer an “articulation and defense” of “a properly historical” approach to understanding political thought (2002: vii). One of the central concerns that emerges from these texts is the remedy of the insufficient historicity in the treatment of past linguistic acts by the dominant approaches of intellectual history. In other words, he aims, according to his statements, to a socially embedded history of ideas which was missing from the

dominant approaches in the field (Femia, 1981, 113). These ahistorical approaches, meaning both the Lovejoyan/ Straussian idealist conceptualizations and the vulgar Marxist method of Macpherson, arose due to a lack of contextualization of the texts of political theory, which meant that this kind of historians did not consider the wider context of the period in which the ideas were inscribed (Iggers, 1997, 127). Following Skinner's reasoning, any attempt that abstracts the concepts of a text from the wider context of the period it belongs to and claims trans-historical application of them, is considered as an anachronistic pitfall. Each and every text of political theory should be treated by the intellectual historian as a medium for the transmission of the writer's deliberate aims. From this perspective it is only possible to restore the historicity of the texts beginning from what the writer wanted to say with the texts he produced. Thus, one of the main tasks of the intellectual historian should be the reconstruction of the author's intentions regarding each text under examination (Femia, 1981, 114).

While Skinner's attack on decontextualised readings of political philosophy has been largely successful, at least as a theoretical statement, it is doubtful whether it has contributed to our understanding of politics and the relation between ideas and historical events.

The limitations of Skinner's approach have to do with his definition of context. This has been pointed out several times, perhaps most forcefully by the late Ellen Wood and Neal Wood, who point out that for Skinner and the Cambridge School, "it turns out that the 'social' matrix has little to do with 'society', the economy, or even the polity", and "to contextualize a text is to situate it among other texts, among a range of vocabularies, discourses and ideological paradigms at various levels of formality, from the classics of political thought down to ephemeral screeds or political speeches" (Wood, 2008, 8).

While this fact is apparent in Skinner's actual studies, Skinner himself seems to be aware of this fact. As quoted above, Skinner argues that in contextualizing, one should examine "the social conditions *or* the intellectual contexts", and in the first edition of the article on 'Meaning and Understanding', Skinner explicitly distances himself from ascribing a determinant function to the social context as one of two "orthodox answers" to the question of how to approach historical texts (the other being to focus on perennial debates) (Skinner, 1969, 3-4). With this rather weak rejection of the importance of social history, Skinner quickly moves on to focus on

the "intellectual context" or what John Pocock with a similar approach calls "languages of debate" (Skinner, 2002, 118 & Pocock, 1985).

Briefly, we could say that Skinner's methodology despite the fact that it started as part of a project that consciously aimed to rebut the socially unbounded approaches on the history of political thought by recognizing only the level of ideas as 'social' and by rejecting any form of reductionism ended up reproducing – to a great extent – the epistemological fallacies of the paradigms that were used as poles of differentiation and thus of necessary critical reconstruction.

If we reject Skinner's dismissal of social history, as it should be from a materialist/historicist perspective, the question of what the relation between social conditions and intellectual context is comes to the fore. Wood proposed that the social relations of a given period should form the central part of the context of a given text. Responding to Skinner's all too facile rejection of the context of social relations as determinism, she writes that when the mode of production is taken into account in analyzing political texts, it is "certainly not to say that the theorist's ideas can be predicted or 'read off' from his or her social position or class. The point is simply that the questions confronting any political thinker, however eternal and universal those questions may seem, are posed to them in their specific historical forms" (Wood, 2008, 12).

The American intellectual historian develops a further criticism towards the Skinnerian method for the restrictive proposal for the study of "political thought as a multiplicity of linguistic acts performed by language users in historical contexts" (Pocock, 2009, viii). The linguistic acts which Cambridge's historians focus their attention on, are not self-existent realities that can be studied in a fruitful way separately from the general socio-historical context of the period. The study of a text should not only take into account aspects of the historical context that are exclusively intellectual. The available vocabularies are used by authors have empirical referents that go beyond the discursive level, or, as Ellen Meiskins Wood points out, "the questions confronting any political thinker ... are posed not only by explicit political controversies, and not only at the level of philosophy or high politics, but also by the social pressures and tensions that shape human interactions outside the political arena and beyond the world of texts" (Woods 2008, 12). Focusing almost exclusively on the questions and the intentions of political thinkers, the 'Cambridge School' neglects that a set of interrelated ideas is not only an explicit contribution to a contemporary controversy but also a perception, a classification and a comprehension of particular

aspects of social reality. Therefore, the analytical scheme suggested by these historians and from Skinner particularly does not represent a theoretical proposal for a solid historicization of the political discourse but rather searching the continuities and discontinuities in linguistic acts "abstracted from the historical process" (Marx & Engels, 1998, 570). In this kind of a-historical approach that disregards the historical determinants and examines the arguments of theorists adopting an internal analysis there is always a danger to transform the texts into "passive vehicles for the expression of our own values and intellectual interests, to be exploited at our own will and to serve our own ideological purposes"(Wood, 2002, 113).

The dangers from this type of approach are noted also by Geoff Kennedy arguing that the analysis that is only focused on the discursive level: "on the fact that politics contains a linguistic character, has overshadowed the non-verbal and non-linguistic—yet still social—aspects of political activity such as ritual, customary regulation, exploitation and resistance to exploitation. As a result, the linguistic is privileged over the non-linguistic, and intellectual contexts take precedence—or are given exclusive priority over—the significance of the social context within which political thought exists. As a result, historical development is characterized in terms of the evolution of discourses and linguistic paradigms that are largely represented as scholarly controversies" (Kennedy, 2008, 46).

Thus, the "Cambridge School's" methodological suggestion for a synchronic study of discursive patterns totally disconnected for their external historical realities does not represent a thoroughgoing research program for the history of political theory. For this reason, Neal Wood, supplementing this analytical scheme, invites the intellectual historians to share the project of a "social history of political ideas" which entails a historical perspective to the immediate historical context of the theorist (Wood, 2002, 115). Adopting this historical approach, the intellectual historian should study the texts of the political theorists in dialectical interaction with the social, political, cultural and economic matrix within which they have been produced. In particular, the intellectual historian should demonstrate the interconnections between the theoretician's ideas and the structures of society namely: the correlation between the internal political forces of society, its economic organization, and the cultural and class divisions which pervade it. This kind of analysis, following Neal Wood's reasoning, "may rescue the study of political theory from stale antiquarianism and sterile abstractionism by restoring the text to where it was conceived and belongs, to

the historical process, one of constant flux and change as well as stability and continuity" (Wood, 2002, 116).

There is however the danger to end up with a crude economic reduction when applying the ideas of Ellen Meiskins Wood and Neal Wood in the practice of intellectual history. Though, this pitfall can be avoided by adopting the concept of the Gramscian hegemony that shifts the focus of the intellectual historian from the mode of production and an exclusive focus on the form of property relations to the existing antagonistic political projects that do exist in a specific social formation and in which the intellectuals are attached, explicitly or not.

Ellen Meiskins Wood has endorsed "that much, if not everything depended on social-property relations" or in other words, from her methodological suggestion is induced implicitly that intellectual historian's view should be informed by the fact of the struggles between producers and appropriators (Wood, 2012, 252). Despite the usefulness of her notion about the necessity of the class reflexives that the intellectual historian should adopt, a counter-proposal to the notion of 'social property relation' - this of hegemonic political project, can be made. A hegemonic project, as Kate Nicholls notes, "can be seen as the implementation of a particular social vision that links cultural beliefs and practices with the real experiences of mass society in the economic, social and political spheres" (Nicholls, 1999, 133). Gaining hegemony implies that a political group, party or social movement can build a political consensus within given power dynamics of a specific society. In other words, the political and economic elites should share similar vision with a significant part of the subaltern classes on how the society works in order a specific political regime to be able to reproduce itself.

More precisely, hegemony as a concept refers the ways that the political is articulated among and across among social classes. Successful hegemonic articulation exists only when a political group or a social class within a given social formation is in a position to present itself as a legitimate political force over other classes without being necessary to resort to forms of coercive power in order to establish itself in the political arena (Gramsci, 1971, 57). Hegemony presupposes a permanent state of antagonism between different political forces that struggle for political legitimacy (Buroway, 2003, 225). This legitimacy is stable only to the extent that this specific economic or political grouping can represent its interests to be identified with the interests of the nation or the supranational entity as whole. Its hegemonic capacity

increases when it is able to improve the material conditions of the groups that has incorporated to its political block.

One of the connective tissues of the hegemonic projects is the ideas that are presented successfully as logical and gain the status of common sense. Though the hegemonic projects do not exhaust themselves in the level of ideas but imply also a political rationality that takes the administration of life and populations as its subject: 'to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this life in order' (Foucault, 1998, 138). The most indicative example of this idea is neoliberalism, in which the logic of a free market economy has been extended over non-economic domains of human social and biological existence, so that we now conceive of a number of life processes, such as family and reproduction, in economic terms. These processes were met also in the cases of the strong states of the interwar period where there was the need for control on behalf of them in order to discipline their citizens according to new authoritarian ethics. So, a proper understanding of what context may mean and how this interact with ideas should take into account the aforementioned processes that are explicitly class projects but cannot be reduced to the economic sphere. An intellectual history that shares this type of sensitivity should be able to decode this interplay between hegemonic projects from above, concomitant discourses and processes of subjectivation and discipline.

An alternative, though complimentary, to Wood's understanding of social history of ideas can be found in Althusser's writings, especially his discussion of Montesquieu in *Politics and History* and Machiavelli in *Machiavelli and Us*. Here, Althusser emphasizes two things. First, the *parti pris* of a given thinker – in this case Montesquieu or Machiavelli. Second, the multiplicity of contradictions constituting a given social formation (although this is obviously more pronounced in some of his more theoretical writings). However, due to Althusser's ask of serious historical investigations, these analyses remain underdeveloped. Nonetheless, we can easily reconstruct what it would mean to combine the *parti pris* of a given thinker with the structured multiplicity of contradictions, namely, that every political theory, every political analysis, is always proposed from a certain position. It is not enough to say that there is a general contradiction between workers and owners of the means of production, or feudal aristocrats and bourgeois entrepreneurs, and that this makes up the context of a given writer. Rather, one has to take into account all of the

contradictions making up the context of a given writer's position – a position which may be contradictory – as well as the writer's position within this set of contradictions. Montesquieu was a noble who combated absolutist tendencies as well as a rising bourgeoisie, not to speak of their convergence. He was also a member of the Parliament of Bordeaux, caught up in local struggles, an intellectual caught up in struggles on the right interpretation of history and the methods for doing so, a landowner, etc.

2.3 Relation between Text and Context

In his book on *Hobbes and Republican Liberty*, Skinner writes that "even the most abstract works of political theory are never above the battle; they are always part of the battle itself" (Skinner, 2008, xv). This is obviously true, but because Skinner limits his focus mainly to the intellectual context, the way in which political theory may take part in battle is never really clear (except for the overly idealist conception that our ideas determine the world of politics). Although far less pronounced, the same can be said to some extent about the work of Wood – not because she leaves out the social context but because her social context and the *parti pris* of a given thinker is way too generic in relation to actual struggles and concrete developments.

Let us instead again turn to Althusser and what he calls 'the situation' or a 'theory of the conjuncture'. By a theory of the conjuncture, Althusser means first of all that a given thinker theoretically takes account of the 'concrete *circumstances*' (Althusser, 2010, 18). Furthermore, "to think *in terms of* the category of conjuncture is not to think *on* the conjuncture, as one would reflect on a set of concrete data. To think under the conjuncture is quite literally to submit to the problem induced and imposed by its case"(Althusser, 2010, 18). To think *under* rather than *on* the conjuncture is to draw up 'the relations of force', 'their contradictory system' that exist at a given moment of the time (although, by definition, always the present) (Althusser, 2010, 18). Because all things exist as relations of force standing in a contradictory relation to one another, there is no neutral ground. Even the position of the writer, the position from where the analysis of forces is carried out, is itself subject the conjuncture with its relations of force. This does not mean that a writer necessarily takes a strong position, which he or she tries to impose upon a given set of relations of force. Rather, it is through an 'objective' and thorough analysis of the relations of force that it

becomes apparent how a given and limited set of positions, including that of the author's, exist.

In this way, a theory under the conjuncture is always situated. However, as already mentioned, it is situated in a very certain sense: "The conjuncture is [...] no mere summary of its elements, or enumeration of diverse circumstances, but *their contradictory system*, which poses the political problem and indicates its historical solution, *ipso facto* rendering it a political objective, a practical task. Therewith, in next to no time, the meaning of all the elements of the conjuncture changes: they become real or potential forces in the struggle for the historical objective, and their relations become *relations of force*" (Althusser, 2010, 19). The analysis of the conjuncture is thus, at first, a theoretical analysis of the existing conjuncture, which, qua being an analysis of the conjuncture as a contradictory system, quickly turns into a practical political task, imposed on those subscribing to the analysis. Therewith, as Althusser puts it, elements analyzed become real or potential forces, which is to say that the analysis becomes strategic in assessing potential allies, enemies, relations of force, ways and means of attack, and so on.

According to Althusser, "everything we have noted happens in a text" (Machiavelli's *The Prince*) (Althusser, 2010, 22). So what is the role of text when it comes to a theory of the conjuncture? What space does it occupy in the arena of politics and political action? As Althusser puts it, "there is not only one place involved – the place of the 'subject' of political practice – but a second: the place of the text which politically deploys or stages this political practice" (Althusser, 2010, 22). The questions thus concern a "dual place or space":

For Machiavelli's text to be politically effective – that is to say, for it to be, in its own fashion, the agent of the political practice it deploys – *it must be inscribed somewhere in the space of this political practice* (Althusser, 2010, 22).

To put it more simply, the text must be addressed to someone. The theory of the conjuncture entails that the text itself as an intervention, "a political act", in the field of struggle, which tries to reconfigure the battle-lines of that field of struggle (Althusser, 2010, 23). This means that the text is partisan, and that it has to be, in its form and vocabulary, strategically aware of how it posits that partisanship most effectively.

Hence, the Althusserian theory of conjuncture along with the Gramscian notion of hegemonic political project can be counter-proposed to the Skinnerian discursive context, because it manufactures concrete circumstances of the conjuncture through social consent.

Another issue that has been raised by Skinner in regard to the relation between text and context is that of historicity, or put it in more precise terms, the dialectic between past and present. Quentin Skinner has explicitly endorsed that one of the main aims of the studies he has conducted is "to explain why such an agent acts as he does" (Skinner, 1978, x). However, this view neglects that in the field of history the research object is not a self-existent reality being external to human consciousness but rather an intellectual attempt to figure out particular aspects of previous historical episodes. Following the historical reasoning of Cambridge historians the application of analytical concepts that arose in previous historical periods to contemporary contexts or the reverse move, the use of contemporary concepts for the understanding of past contexts, is considered as an anachronistic pitfall. This has as an outcome the restriction of the research object of intellectual history to the reconstruction of textual fragments denying the possibility of links between the past and the present since they are understood as irreconcilable realities.

Adopting a different viewpoint which conceives the past and present as an organic totality, Antonio Gramsci counter-proposes that "every history is contemporary history" filtered through historians' a priori theoretical assumptions - a set of categories and a hierarchy of values, which are culturally determined (Gramsci, 1971, 695). In other words, the historical narration "cannot but be written with and for present interests" (Femia, 1981, 128). Rejecting a historiography that purports to exemplify an external objectivity, the Italian philosopher endorses that

"an investigation into a series of facts to discover the relations between them presupposes a 'concept' that permits one to distinguish that series of facts from other possible ones. How can there occur a choice of facts to be adduced as proof of the truth of one's own assumptions if one does not possess a pre-existent criterion of choice? But what will this criterion of choice be, if not something superior to each single fact under investigation? An intuition, a conception, which must be regarded as having a complex history, a process that is to be connected with whole process of the development of culture" (Gramsci, 1995, 283-284).

This conception implies that the intrinsic characteristic of every history is its contemporaneity - meaning the fact that its reconstruction necessarily inheres the interests and the social position of the historian. Therefore, the idea that all history is contemporary history entails that the historian is a political being and thus brings values and concepts to perceive the past that derive from the historical conjuncture that is coming from. A fact for which the historian should be conscious. This unavoidably applies for Skinner's case too. Independently from his intentions, the way he constructs his historical subject reflects his political position within the society he belongs. His sensitivity to find the intellectual antecedents of contemporary republicanism or in contemporary terms, the predecessors of a "third way", his lack of interest about gender aspects in the political texts he examines, the persons that includes in the canon he creates, the lack of examination of texts from the non-western world demonstrates clearly his current position in the existing political order we live in.

In the version of intellectual history that I endorse as an alternative to the Skinnerian epistemology the concepts which have heuristic value may arise both from present and past contexts. The latter option is possible, without the risks of "interpretive violence" and anachronism, when there is a solid contextualization of the texts as the one suggested by Ellen Meiskins Wood and Neal Wood (Walker, 1993, 41). While this methodological maneuver is acknowledging the historicity of the concepts of a text at the same time allows the historian to utilize them for the interpretation of contemporary social phenomena. This is a legitimate epistemological move to the extent that some of the political theory texts have conceptual "residua", namely, analytical abstractions that have successfully conceived historical realities and therefore can contribute to the analysis of other social formations (Adorno, 1973, 78). Adopting this reasoning, it becomes clear that "ideas are not born of other ideas, philosophies of other philosophies" but rather they are intellectual reflections, directly or indirectly, on social issues of the authors time (Gramsci, 1971, 201). For this reason, it is possible to draw analogies between the same social phenomena, though occurring in different historical periods, and the respective intellectual responses to them.

Rejoining to a narrow perspective conceiving history as the succession of self-enclosed events, this viewpoint that I suggest counter-proposes an understanding of it

as a dialectical relationship between past and present in which practices and ideas constitute an indivisible totality.

2.4 The Intellectual

One of the stated aims of Skinner's intellectual history was to move away from the canon of big thinkers and start looking more seriously at lesser well-known figures. These were not merely to be treated as "second-hand dealers in ideas" (to use Hayek's cheeky expression) but deserved proper analysis insofar as they could be seen as 'innovative ideologues' (Hayek, 1960, 371). While the intention is laudable and while Skinner did manage to shift the emphasis somewhat from the established canon of big thinkers, his actual historical analysis still falls short of the intended ambition. The limitations of Skinner's approach do not so much have to do with the thinkers he selects but rather with the yardstick used for measuring whether a thinker is innovative or not. Because he limits his context to the intellectual or discursive context, the criteria for whether a thinker is innovative or not becomes the discourses of subsequent thinkers. A writer is innovative if other writers adopt his definitions of words or forms of legitimizing arguments. In this way, Skinner's analysis remains enclosed within the traditional universe of pure philosophy in which ideas respond to ideas and arguments to arguments.

If the object of analysis is no longer discourse but rather what we have called 'the situation' or 'the conjuncture', the yardstick for assessing what writers counts as worthy of study changes. Here, what matters is not whether a given thinker manages to impact future thinkers but whether he or she manages to have an impact on the situation.

Not only does this shift the criteria for what counts as writers worthy of study, but it also drastically expands the kinds of texts worthy of study. A newspaper article or a public speech may not have the kind of long-term philosophical impact to meet the criteria for a Skinnerian analysis, but it may still be central, even pivotal, to understand a given situation and the way in which it develops. The critiques that were articulated against the liberal order of things in 1930's in Greece on behalf of right-wing intellectuals for a history of political thought in the tradition of Skinner, or Ellen Wood for that matter, but it cannot be denied that they had significant influence on democratic regime of the period; both because they tell us something about how

certain elements of the populace saw the situation after the global financial crisis of 1929 but also because these texts had direct impact on how the liberal institutions collapsed.

When we speak of intellectuals, we should therefore revise the Skinnerian approach by introducing Gramsci's notion of 'organic intellectuals' that are the mediators of the hegemonic projects (Thomas, 2009). Gramsci examined the role of these in the bourgeois integral state and, in particular, in the construction of civil and political hegemony. As Francioni notes, "the question of hegemony and that of the intellectuals are, in a strict sense, indissoluble" (Francioni, 1984, 161). Following Peter Thomas' argument, Gramscian intellectuals operate both within the state and within civil society: "They function not simply as constructors of the 'trenches' that characterize the complexity of a fully developed modern state-formation; with the seemingly 'non-political' organization they undertake in the realm of civil society, they function as points of prestige and attraction for a class's hegemonic project and embody those trenches themselves, as 'functionaries' of the superstructures, or 'agents' of the state in its integral sense as 'organised disequilibria' " (Thomas, 2009, 413).

The broader concept of intellectuals within an 'integral' concept of the state, meaning that the state constitutes a dialectical unity of civil society and political society, had two important consequences on Gramsci's analytical framework. First, it allowed him to go beyond an economically reductive analysis of the intellectuals' question based upon their class background. Rather, he understood intellectuals on the basis of their actual function in the dominant mode of production and its political correlates. Gramsci's class analysis of intellectuals was thus marked by an emphasis on their political position within the existing economic system: "their class position *qua* their social function as intellectuals is only realized to the extent to which they are 'organically' fused with the political aspirations of a class, rather than deduced from their class origins" (Peter Thomas, 2009, 414-415). Second, with the stress upon political organization rather than any specific intellectual activity, Gramsci rejected a theory according to which intellectuals constitute an homogeneous social group distinct from social classes (Thomas, 2009, 415). Thereby, according to the Italian philosopher, "there does not exist any independent class of intellectuals, but every social group has its own stratum of intellectuals, or tends to form one"(Gramsci, 1971, 217). These are the organic intellectuals, who are closely related with a specific social group and who contribute to the reproduction of its economic interests. Nevertheless,

they are not determined by their role in the economic sphere but, rather, they gain their "homogeneity and consciousness of their own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields" (Gramsci, 1971, 135). It is for this reason that the specificity of the organic intellectual is integrally linked to the specificity of the class project from which they emerge (Thomas, 2009, 415).

Summing up, the concept of organic intellectual can be useful in a materialistic understanding of intellectual history, because it can give us a specific account for the political role of intellectuals within a conjuncture as Althusser defines it without resorting to the reductionist pitfall.

Summing up, in *Considerations on Western Marxism*, Perry Anderson argued that for historical materialism to develop it was necessary that the gains by Marxist *historiography* (by which he mainly meant the Anglophone history from below of the likes of Hobsbawm and E.P. Thompson) and the gains by Marxist *theory* (by which he referred to a continental tradition and the likes of Gramsci and Althusser) were brought together (Anderson, 1976, 111-113). In the lectures published as *In the Tracks of Historical Materialism* (from 1983), he repeated this claim (Anderson, 1983, 20). Much has happened since then, and the lessons of history and the lessons of theory have come together and developed in many interesting ways and paved the way for a contemporary Marxism, which more often avoids the dual pitfalls of historicism and theoreticism. Within the field of intellectual history, however, this tendency is paradoxically less pronounced. The above mentioned proposals on how this gap could be bridged tried to deal with the question: How can a Marxian intellectual history be conducted that does not reproduce the pitfalls of empiricism or/and theoretical abstractionism -that in case of Skinner take specifically the form of an ungrounded socially history of ideas- but combines in a productive way a theoretic and sophisticated understanding of how we can do intellectual history without neglecting the historical specific.

2.5 Metaxas Regime, Intellectual History and Historical Sociology

The epistemological Marxist perspective on intellectual history can specifically be fruitful for the study of right-wing intellectuals of the interwar period. The Skinnerian approach does not develop any analytical insight to the relation between the state and the intellectuals, an aspect that should be theorized in the analysis of the texts written

by organic intellectuals of the regimes. The intellectuals of these regimes played a crucial role that is unique compared to previous historical epochs. This specificity has to do with the fact that fascist states that were modern states with a different set of demands. The role that intellectuals undertook in this new conjuncture was dual. On one hand, they were those who designed several of the policies that these states implemented. In the Greek case, there several examples of intellectuals who played an active role in the formation of the state's physiognomy, for example like Koumaros and Mantzoufas, who were responsible for the conception of the legal status of the New State and Babis Alivizatos who was responsible for the fascist transformation of agrarian cooperatives during Metaxas era. On the other hand, there were those who attempted to legitimize the regime in the eyes of the public conducting the propaganda of the regimes. Due to the lack of a developed film industry or of other propaganda means, propaganda in Greece was mainly conducted, though not only, through newspapers, which was the main means of influencing the population. The case of Kathimerini and Georgios Vlachos is an indicative example of how journalism contributed to the stabilization of the Metaxas regime.

The duality of the role that the intellectuals played in the fascist regime does not allow the use of a Skinnerian analysis in order to understand the texts that were an organic part of states. The Marxist analysis provides the necessary conceptual tools to understand not only the texts as such but also the social role of the people in process of the fascist state crafting. An approach that would give the emphasis on the analysis of speeches that were articulated by these intellectuals would provide a very partial understanding of the texts since they aimed to serve a specific political aim. To put it more precisely in the context of the Metaxas regime, the texts of Koumaros on the new legal system of the regime would possibly make no sense if the historical context of the 4th of August regime and the crisis of parliamentarianism that emerged as an outcome of the global economic crisis of 1929 was not taken into account. Thus, a reconstruction of the internal logic of the text itself without the contextualization of the emergence of the Metaxas regime as a response to the dead-end that parliamentarian politics led in 1936 would be at least insufficient. The reconstruction of the wider historical context is then a prerequisite for the understanding of the texts that the organic intellectuals of the regime produced.

These epistemological gaps can be bridged following the methodological proposals that have been put forward through a Marxist perspective. The first proposal that

Ellen Wood and Neal Wood suggest has to do with the concept of social property relations. The Canadian theoreticians endorse that this concept should be the beginning of any analysis of the intellectuals' development of the epoch since it provides a materialist understanding of the social struggles, which is the central theme, directly or not, of most of the texts of political theory. Attempting to provide an introductory explanation of what "social-property relations" means according to Ellen Wood, Kurt Newman argues that the notion "would explain that in class societies (following the advent of the formation of the state), the organization of exploitation—the extraction of surplus—rests on the legal determination of who may own certain kinds of things (such as land and tools and factories) and who may not. There is nothing static or automatic about "social-property relations": ordering terms and legitimating conceits must be regularly renewed, a process that often involves (from the bottom up) violent protest against a given system's brutality and (from the top down) violent suppression of egalitarian agitation. From time to time, new modes of production (or, if one prefers, modes of exploitation) are born" (Newman, 2016). This notion inserts the idea of class struggle in the historical analysis attempting to avoid any a posteriori deterministic understanding of the historical development since the historical change is explained with reference to the power relations of a society and the outcome of the shift of these relations as part of the class struggle. The conceptualization of the texts as interventions in favor or against this process helps by providing the class aspect of the texts but this is not enough for the social anatomy of the specific society within which these texts emerged let alone about the texts as such. More precisely, in regard to my thesis it can be argued that the texts contributed to the establishment of the Metaxas regime that secured the continuation of the capitalist mode of production that was in a dead-end after the collapse of the parliamentary system - among others as outcome of the working-class pressures from below. Thus, Metaxas attempted by establishing its authoritarian regime to secure the social system and its capitalist economic logic by regulating the relations between capital and labor with the forced collaboration between the two under the supervision of the state and without challenging at all the existing economic status quo of the country. Though, this cannot account neither for the specificity of the state form that was established in 1936 under the conditions of a state of exception nor about the consequent discourses of legitimization that emerged. It can be argued that the authoritarian regime prevented and secured the status quo only in the final instance. The Metaxas regime

however retained a relative autonomy in regard to its economic base and also attempted to produce new subjectivities, developments that an approach that focuses exclusively on the property relations cannot grasp. In other words, the class aspect that Woods offers with her approach is necessary but not enough neither to understand the specific state form that emerged during the crisis of 1930's nor about the discourses that emerged between 1936 and 1941 by those intellectuals who supported the regime that aimed to reconstruct the political and not the economic order of Greece.

Metaxas attempted to establish a series of new institutions that substituted the parliamentary rule. The first chapter provides the necessary analytical information about the institutional reforms that Metaxas did in a fascist direction. These includes from the corporative regulation between labor and capital, the House of the Farmer in the agriculture and the new constitution in the central political level. These institutions that the regime attempted to established focused on the political and not the economic level. In other words, the Metaxas regime attempted to introduce a series of institutions that substituted the parliament as the main organ for the expression of the popular will. Thus, Metaxas far from believing that a cancellation of the parliamentarian procedures was enough, offered counter-institutions that proclaimed to mediate in a more genuine way the popular will. This historical context can help to decode the discourse expressed by the intellectuals of the regime that defined the new regime as Laocracy and not as a negation of political freedom through dictatorial means. They believed that freedom was acceptable only to the extent it would not challenge substantially the political institutions of the country that Metaxas had established. In this sense, the historical details that need to be reconstructed as the necessary historical context in which the political ideas correspond could not just be the changed that took place in the level of economy. Thus, it would be misleading at least to reconstruct the debate that took place in regards the institutional reforms in the Metaxas era as something that focused only on the social property relations since it would completely neglect the intentionality of the texts and their political role they played in this conjuncture.

The next step in order to understand properly the historical context of Metaxas' authoritarian democracy is to conceptualize it as an integral state following Gramsci's definition. In 1930 Gramsci introduced the idea of the "integral state". This conception of the capitalist state integrates "civil society," the aforementioned means

of hegemony, with the coercive elements of the state. They are separate methods and functions but are part of a single integrated whole.

As Thomas writes, "Hegemony, then, emerges as a 'consensual' political practice distinct from mere coercion (a dominant means of previous ruling classes) on this terrain of civil society; but, like civil society, integrally linked to the state, hegemony's full meaning only becomes apparent when it is related to its dialectical distinction of coercion" (Thomas, 2009, 144). Bourgeois society as societal form does not use only coercion in order to politically establish itself, but its hegemony consensus in order to be retained needs the force when conditions dictate it. When ideological fails to fulfill its role of legitimizing the political status, the repressive state status apparatus emerges as the reply from above that attempts to stabilize the political derailment.

In its liberal version the civil society is distinct from the state, organized ideally as a realm of liberty, with freedom of religion, association, business activity, conversation and the press. Regarding this chapter the crucial aspect of civil society is this of public sphere and this is where the focus will be. The question that emerges is to what extent it is correct to limit the public sphere to its 'classic' liberal form or to understand it in a normative sense rather than a more neutral, descriptive one? Can one, for example, speak of a fascist public sphere? Did Metaxas fascism eliminate the public sphere tout court, though, or did it just shut down its liberal version? Metaxas regime certainly curtailed and contracted the pre-existing public spheres, not just that of the liberal bourgeoisie (shut down liberal newspapers and magazines) but also that of the labor movement (shut down the main organ of Communist Party of Greece, Rizospastis). It curbed freedom of opinion and speech and freedom of assembly: political parties, free trade unions, cultural circles. Book censorship became also a systematic way to repress antagonistic views to the regime's ideology.

Charles Taylor, who has endorsed that the liberal public sphere is such a key feature of modern society that 'even where it is in fact suppressed or manipulated, it has to be faked' (Taylor, 1992, 221). The question that should be replied though is to which extent when a public sphere has a functionality within an authoritarian society can be described as fake or a non genuine? This makes sense only if someone takes a valid the hypothesis that the civil society in this type of societies are completely absorbed by the state without any degree of autonomy. If though another view is adopted that authoritarian societies unavoidably permitted the development of a public debate

since they had the need for social legitimization and allowed the formation of civic associations since they did not stop to political societies, then it would be make sense to describe this type of development as a fascistized civil society that had its relative autonomy in regards to the state. This view accords, on the one hand, with Dylan Riley's argument that the rise of fascism was triggered by robust civil society with expressed political claims, in the luck of hegemonic parliamentary politics. This is proved by the fact that after the establishment of the fascist regime in Italy the internal conflicts continued, one example was the 1925 –1926's fight between the anticlerical fascists and clerico-conservatives (Forgacs, 2013, 356). The same can be argued for the Metaxas regime. First of all, not the whole bourgeois press was repressed but only those newspapers and journals who either refuse to collaborate with the regime or expressed ideas that were critical of its politics. The consequence was that almost all the newspapers and journals of the bourgeois press continued their function with the exception of the communist orientated publications. Additionally, there was a series of debates that were developed during the Metaxas era among those intellectuals who identified themselves with the ideas of the regime regarding the fascist crafting, Koumaros for instance, or people who were more radical claiming a radical corporatist transformation of the Greek state, like the journal *Nea Politiki*. Also, some intellectuals like Kyrou attempted to put pressure on Metaxas through their own newspapers, in this case *Estia*, to collaborate with Franco during the Spanish Civil War. Not to mention, the Nazist intellectuals and politicians who attempted to overthrow Metaxas from his position as prime minister of Greece on August 1940 and establish a regime that would facilitate the collaboration with the Axis powers (Platis plot). Hence, a relatively open public sphere allowed different debates to develop during the Metaxas regime, despite the fact that their main was not to challenge the political orientation of the regime as such but to put pressure on the political decision-making processes in internal and external issues. This allows us to speak about the existence of a fascist public sphere in the Metaxas regime that should not be identified normatively only with a sphere of dissent, of intellectual debate or placed in opposition to the regime. The disconnection of the concept from the Habermasian normative connotations thus makes easier to see that the public sphere, understood through its changing historical forms and the diverse channels through which it operates, is not inevitably connected to bourgeois parliamentary democracy but equally to other forms of regime that had an equal need for legitimization.

At this point, it will be examined on the role of intellectuals as the actors that contributed to the legitimization and popularization of this type of ideas in the wider public. Gramsci's theoritization of organic intellectuals is the concept that helps to understand the role of the Metaxas intellectual in the process of the fascist state crafting. Metaxas intellectuals were not only specialists but also leaders in a Gramscian sense, so they did not remain just in their field of theoretical specialization, but they play a role in the sphere of politics and praxis. As I have shown in the chapter on *Neon Kratos*, they were radicalized through the 1930's by participating in different far-right political organizations. Most of them were splits from the Royalist camp and studied abroad, mainly in Germany, France and Italy, and became familiar both with conservative ideas and political movements that emerged in the European continent from 1920 and onwards. Back in Greece these people obtained positions within the state apparatus, which was dominated by the two political camps of the Venizelists and Royalists. Most of them lost their belief in parliamentary politics when the global financial crisis hit Greece in the beginning of 1930 and shifted to radical solutions that seemed to be the answer to the existential crisis the country was experiencing. Political solutions like the ones implemented in Italy and Germany were considered as the way to overcome the crisis of the liberal order. Thus, when the Metaxas regime was established these people saw Greek authoritarian as a solution to the dead-end of parliamentarian. They adhered the hegemonic project that was introduced by the Greek dictator despite their partial disagreements with the solutions that were proposed. The crucial issue was the creation of the conditions for a permanent transition to a post-liberal order under Metaxas. Therefore, they aligned with the regime believing they would contribute to the formation of an authoritarian state like those that existed during the same period in the rest of Europe. Thus, these intellectuals aimed at reconstructing the political context of Greece and not its economic base. Their social position in this process played a secondary role compared to their political stance in the re-articulation of a new hegemonic state project as a counterproposal to political liberalism. Hence, these intellectuals brought homogeneity and consciousness of function not only in the sphere of economics but also in the social and political field. The ideas were not reduced to class issues, since the fascist political order aimed at creating an interclass project hence the intellectuals' role was not identical to the service of economic interests. Rather, they attempted to articulate elaborated responses to the organic crisis

of Greek parliamentarianism suggesting a new relationship between the citizens and the state by building a new common sense.

Examining the texts composed by the intellectuals of the regime in order to legitimize the new political order thus needs to be under the light of their characters as hybrid texts that include concepts and ideas from abroad. Since Greece never developed a genuine fascist movement that developed its own ideas, the Greek fascists always look abroad for inspiration. Germany and Italy were the two main examples that were popularized by the Greek fascists as the solutions to the political crisis in Greece even before the Metaxas regime was established. Here, we should differentiate between these intellectuals who endorsed that Greece should imitate ideas and institutions and transplant them in the Greek context and those who believed that this should happen in an eclectic way recognizing the particularities of Greece that would not allow such a direct and linear adoption of ideas and institutions. The latter group, a minority, was largely composed of supporters of Nazi Germany that had affiliations with the German embassy in Athens propagating the alliance of Greece with the forces of the Axis and the transformation of Greece to a Nazi state adopting the same policies that the Third Reich promoted under the rule of Hitler. The other group was more elastic in regard to what is to be done considering that there was a need for change but following a path that corresponded to the organic needs of the nation. In any case, especially after the establishment of the Metaxas regime these ideas became common sense in Greece through the press and the propagandist outlets of the 4th of August regime. For the first time, there was a systematic debate about the political orientation of the regime, discussing the European experience and the policies that were developed abroad as a transitory solution to the post-liberal order of Greece. However, the actors who had a pivotal role within the Metaxas state apparatus were careful enough not take a clear position in favor of the German or Italian political experiments because of the close links of the regime to Britain. Just ahead of World War II, as tensions and the threat of war increased in Europe, the situation was almost exactly the same as before World War I, when Greece had strong pro-German affinities in the government but was depended on Britain for its security. Most observers were anticipating Greece would attempt to remain neutral. Metaxas indeed attempted to maintain strict neutrality, but Italian imperialism eventually led to the war between Greece and Italy. The fragile geopolitical order however did not prevent the theoreticians of the Metaxas regime to adopt concepts from abroad. Thus, the

concept of cultural transfer that was coined by Michel Espagne is a crucial analytical tool for the understanding of the theories that were developed to legitimize of the 4th of August regime on behalf of the organic intellectuals that endorsed the regime (Espagne, 2013). The clearest case of conceptual transfer from abroad can be found in the text by Koumaros and Mantzoufas, which was informed by Gentile and Mussolini's *Doctrine of Fascism*. Notions like the general will for instance influenced the legal pre-texts, which then were used in the construction of a new constitution for Greece, which however was not implemented in the end due to the war with Italy. Of course, not only the ideas but also, the institutions that the regime established following the experiments that were conducted abroad. In other words, the Metaxas regime should be understood as a synthesis of different ideas and institutions that came from abroad and were adopted in a certain way that would not make their foreign origins explicit since the Metaxas regime was and first foremost is a nationalist authoritarian regime.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed to tackle a series of epistemological issues regarding the field of intellectual history. The first part offered few methodological counterproposals to the Skinnerian approach of intellectual history from a Marxist point of view. It challenged the discursive approach that has been proposed by the British historian as a solution in the epistemological orthodoxies that dominated the field in the beginning of his academic career, in the late 1960ies. I endorse that despite its initial claim this approach lacks a proper understanding of what context means in the historical analysis of discourses articulated by political theorists. Ellen Wood and Neal Wood have offered some counter-suggestions how to move forward from Skinner's approach in which the context is understood as solely discursive. Their proposal that the texts of political theorists should be considered as interventions in the debates on social property relations is helpful since this brings onto surface the class aspect of the texts, however, lacks to grasp the rest of the dimensions that a text of political theory may entail beyond its role in the process of class struggle. This approach for example cannot conceive the character of texts as part of wider hegemonic projects in the making that move beyond the economic sphere mostly aiming at building a new biopolitical regime that rearticulates the relations between the people that are governed

and the governors. In this line of reasoning, Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser provide notions that tackle these issues in a more convincing way. The notions of organic intellectuals, hegemony, integral state and conjuncture offer ideas how intellectual history of the 20th century can be conducted without being reductionist and by offering historicist alternatives at the same time. The second part of the chapter is focused on exemplifying these notions through my specific case study of the Metaxas regime. Aim was to rearticulate these notions considering the historical context of Greece between 1936 and 1941. I argue that the context as such needs to be reconstructed based on the interplay between concepts and historical realities. Hence, a series of historical riddles, like the self-definition of Metaxas regime as Laocracy, can be assessed in a way that make sense within the historical context of interwar Europe. Dylan Riley's notion of authoritarian democracy and of a fascist public sphere facilitates further the understanding of the reasoning of the fascists of the interwar period in regard to the Political and the role that these ideas played in the respective political contexts of the fascist regimes. This chapter therefore demonstrated that proper historical understandings of specific ideas can only happen through the reconstruction of historical structures that emerged from within. Thus, historical sociology as an approach functions as the supplementary epistemological viewpoint to intellectual history. This dialectical interplay between the general and the specific provides the proper method not only for the understanding of emergence of specific ideas like the antiparlamentarian ideas that were developed during Metaxas era but also proves to be crucial for the conception of the wider historical reality, which was a constitutive element of the discourse.

Chapter 3: George Vlachos criticism of the Second Hellenic Republic: From Conservatism to Fascism

Abstract

This chapter examines the antiparliamentarian argumentation as it was developed by the editor of *Kathimerini* - one of the central news organs of the Royalists - Georgios Vlachos. The study of his discourse is crucial to the extent that it can be used as an exemplary case of the derailment of the anti-Venizelist fraction towards authoritarian solutions in front of the evolving political crisis that took place since the defeat of the Liberal Party in 1932 as the result of the impact of the Global financial crisis on the fiscal policy of the Greek state. My argument in regards to the antiparliamentarian discourse that was expressed by Georgios Vlachos can be summed up as following: anti-parliamentarism of the period that preceded and in reality prepared the advent of Metaxas' takeover of power was an offspring of the inability of the political elite of the country to articulate a hegemonic project that could ingrate interclass and intraclass demands in a coherent way to overcome the ongoing political crisis and the division of the country in two political camps - the Venizelists and the Royalists. Both parties proved unable to suggest a vision of society along with welfare policies that could prevent the passage of the Second Hellenic Republic to the Metaxas regime of the 4th of August regime. The structural reasons of this advent towards Fascism have to do with the inability of the two dominant parties to develop inclusive political organizations that could absorb the demands from below, the implementation of policies that could relieve the petty bourgeoisie and working class from the imposed austerity policies. In order to demonstrate my argument, I will divide the presentation of Vlachos discourse under examination in three distinct periods. The first one is the period after the defeat of Venizelos in the 1932 elections in which the belief in the parliamentary institutions - although in a critical way - is still endorsed as a solution to the ongoing political crisis. This period lasts until June 1933. The following period there is an explicit criticism towards representative democracy and the adherence of extra-constitutional alternatives to the impasse of parliamentary politics. The last period is the period in which Georgios Vlachos endorsed wholeheartedly the Metaxas regime throughout his life-span as viable and mandatory solution to the National

Schism that pervaded the country in state of emergency conditions. The discourse of Georgios Vlachos is selected for examination to the extent that he is a minor intellectual that resonates in an exemplary way to the reasoning of the Royalist camp that dominated the country politics since 1933 and was the political of Ioannis Metaxas.

3.1 The first period: the defeat of the Venizelos and the reawakening of the National Schism.

Vlachos' discourse in March 1932, before the elections and the defeat of Venizelos, reflects the polarization between the two camps that had occurred after the impact of the global financial crisis on the Greek economy became clear. In his article with the title "Warning" he criticizes the instrumentalization of the electoral law on behalf of Venizelos and his successful attempt to impose a proportional electoral system because of the worrying signals for a defeat in the forthcoming elections of September. The warning has to do with the declaration of Vlachos that the Popular Party will abstain from the elections if Venizelos decides to change the law (Vlachos, 3/3/1932). The change of the electoral system was a common tactic on behalf of the two political camps before the elections to secure victory. It was a maneuver during the whole interwar period indicating both lack of genuine respect on behalf of the political elites of the country for the liberal values and of their inability to form effective policies that could secure clear electoral wins. Few days later, in another article called "About the polarizations" he invokes, a common rhetorical theme, the events of the beginning of the National Schism between 1915 and 1917 to comment on the decent way that the Popular Party would treat Venizelos after his defeat in the forthcoming elections. A behavior that the Liberal Party did not adopt when dealt with the Popular party after the aforementioned events. The reason for such a treatment, Vlachos argues, has to do with the perception of the Popular Party that Greece stands above particular interests of political parties. Otherwise if the leader of the opposition will follow a different policy in regard to Venizelos, the country would be destroyed. This statement by Vlachos would be proved false since the right-wing sections of the Royalist camp after the Plastiras coup in 1933 attempted to impose their politics through violent means and the use of the state to prosecute army officers and other public servants who were attached to Venizelism. In this period, Vlachos was

affiliated with the moderate Tsaldaris, who was the leader of the People's Party, the main political organization of the Royalist camp. He considered then political peace between the two parties as necessary because the intensity of the political polarization was possibly aiding to the emergence of left-wing politics due to the difficult social conditions that the country was experiencing after the collapse of its economy (Vlachos, 22/3/ 1932). In other words, it has become clear to Vlachos - as part of the political establishment - that the existing social conditions potentially could contribute to the strengthening of the Communist Party of Greece. This anti-communist consciousness of the bourgeois world of the country emerged once again as a shared interest and vision in both parties after the crisis of 1931. Vlachos knew that the further dismantling of the political world of the country could lead to social chaos and uncontrolled political instability. The political elites of the country should be unified in order to refute the political threat of communism. The continuation of the intra-elite conflict could prove fatal for the Greek bourgeois world in the new conjuncture. There was a shared fear by the political status quo of the period realizing its own limitation to respond effectively to the post-1929 crisis realities in Greece.

The discussion about the past events is continued in an open letter that Vlachos wrote to the Prime Minister, Venizelos, of the country in April after the characterization of the latter by the former as "psychopath" because he insisted to deal with the events of the National Defeat of 1922 in Turkey. Common arguments are repeated by Vlachos about the ways that Venizelos treated his opponents with an emphasis on the 6 anti-Venizelist officers who were considered responsible for the military defeat and trialed for high treason, convicted, and sentenced to death. Thus, it becomes clear that despite Vlachos' call for peaceful politics that could secure the reproduction of the Greek political, he participated actively and triggered the deepening of the national schism even more through his articles. It was almost impossible to be neutral in this polarized conflict. Vlachos was not an exception to this rule. He returned the accusation to Venizelos and blamed him that since then all his policies are designed having in mind the events of the past and aiming to the continuation of the National Schism (2/4/1932). In these conditions the past proved to "weigh on the brains" of the living political world since the divisions were never overcome. Though in the new polarization modernity had been embedded and new political players entered in the political game. The reality of massive politics without massive parties proved an asymmetry that would define the period until the establishment of the Metaxas

regime. These discourses can be explained not only with reference to the objective realities of the crystallization of opposition between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists as an outcome of the growing dysfunctionality of the political system of the country under the impact of the economic crisis but also to the consequent crisis of self-representation of the political world because of the emerging political instability that led to a reconsideration of the origins of the present crisis. The whole political world turned to the past in order to detect the causes of the unpleasant realities that the country was experiencing at that moment. This process though proved quite ineffective since it did not trigger reflections on behalf of the Greek political world of the period, which could provide practical solutions to the existing problems of the country. They were moves of political self-affirmation in conditions of deep political crisis without the necessary self-reflection that could offer possible alternatives not only to the present but with a future perspective. The politicians of the period were victims of their parochial political structures and mentalities in a world that was changing radically.

Few months before the elections of 1933 Vlachos articulates his first criticisms towards parliamentary life of the country as an incompetent institution to serve its aim, which is to promote the interests of the nation as a totality. The reason behind his criticism has to do with the indecisiveness of the parliament to vote on the important bill for social security, which failed to become a law due to the overwhelming political instability and the reactions provoked by influential lobbies. Even though he blames the members of the parliament as useless people, he continues to believe that the parliament is still the best institution to govern a country because it has a constitution while dictatorships are person-centered institutions depending on the will of the leader. He believes in the case of Greece there is no one who could lead the country in a fascistic experiment because of their low quality. The basic presupposition according to Vlachos in order the parliamentary institution to be viable is that its members are interested in it, something that is not the case for Greece (4/6/1932). Here, Vlachos starts to discuss openly the issue of dictatorship as an alternative to the democratic rule that he rejects though not because of his belief in parliamentarian democracy as such but because of the lack of political leaders that could lead the country in a fascistic experiment. This will be one of the main discursive motives that Vlachos develops commenting on the issue in the forthcoming

years. Still though despite the ongoing political crisis he continued to believe in the need of the parliament because of the lack of realistic political alternatives.

One month before the elections of 1933 Vlachos expresses his opinion on the nature of the military intervention because of the widespread rumors that there would be a coup on the eve of elections from the Venizelists to prevent a winning result for the Royalist camp. He endorses that the coups that took place in the country in the last decades were legitimized by the people because they were an outcome of wide social unrest - something that is not the case now. Vlachos warns the Venizelist officers to suspend such plans because they are doomed to fail (Vlachos 4/8/1932). It becomes clear from Vlachos argumentation that there is not any criticism towards the intervention of army as such but only because of the specific conditions of the conjuncture. This stance makes clear how in both dominant political camps of the interwar period the military intervention is legitimized and how little belief they have in the Greek republic. Army interventions were a basic component of the politics during the interwar period. Both camps Venizelists and Royalists used the army in order to establish their power in periods of crisis since the mid of WWI. Army officers on the other hand gained power and a certain degree of independence in regard to the politicians and have led few coups. Though, these coups had a corrective character aiming to offer temporal political solutions when the political world could not deliver them. The situation went through however a qualitative shift since 1933 where the army officers intervene not only to offer temporal through short-term dictatorships but on the opposite seek to establish their own political regimes cancelling the parliamentary rule for undefined time without aiming to the return to the old political order of things. This was a clear shift since the retired officers who controlled sections of the army autonomized from the political world and aimed to build their own antiparliamentarian regimes. Metaxas and Kondylis was two exemplary cases of this shift.

In a similar line of reasoning like the one that mentioned above, Vlachos few days later, demanded the dissolution of the Venizelist society that was called Military league, a group of middle ranking army officers that were considered responsible for the coup (14/8/1932). This article indicates the crucial role of the Greek army as well in the current politics of the country as a repressive extension of the political system. The inability to articulate a hegemonic proposal the political system in conditions of crisis upgraded the significance of extra parliamentary personalities in the political

developments of the country. The army officers themselves felt the need in turn to intervene in the political sphere to the extent that their professional status was linked to the government that was in power as long as each party used to expel officers that were aligned to the opposition as way to gain the control in the army of the country.

The decision for non-intervention on behalf of the Venizelist fraction in the Greek army in the elections of 1932 was a temporal one. The September election did not provide a stable government and in the new elections of March 1933 that hold in order to provide one the Venizelists lost putting an end to the modernization project of Liberal Party. The political reply that came with the arms on behalf of the Venizelists repressed effectively and the People's party got the state power back. In the new conjuncture after the winning result for the People's Party, Vlachos suggests a historical compromise between the two dominant political parties considering that it would put an end to the long lasting civil war of the country. He suggested that it was necessary the political past to be deleted from the memory of the country that was the triggering force for the continuation of the civil war, a sine qua non condition for a new start for the political affairs of the country. The solution for overcoming the problems of the country for the members of the parliament of both camps is to forget their particular political identities and to start to feel and act like genuine Greeks not as representative of their camps. The new conjuncture for the country necessitates its defense against any particular political interests (8/3/1933). Here in this argumentation the political parties are considered divisive of the national totality and thus a danger for the existence of the nation. His advice to the political world was to forget themselves as actors of specific party's interests that are partial. What is to be done is to behave as national actors. Here in Vlachos' argument, the nation is juxtaposed to the political party, the former represents the national totality, the latter the micro-political partiality.

The dilemma of democracy or dictatorship comes up again under the new government of Tsaldaris. In a rhetorical question that he posed few days later in one of his articles -if the parliamentary system is the one under which the country can be governed effectively- he replied that the country does not have the need of dictatorship neither the abolition of the rights of the Greek people but a strong alliance of the parties of the Royalist camp that should guarantee the social peace (Vlachos 10/3/1933). This was Tsaldaris line which Vlachos reproduced. Adopting the same line of reasoning in one of his next articles he endorses once again parliamentarianism as the best system

for the governance of Greece. Commenting on the arguments made by Plastiras after the failed coup who explicitly endorsed the dictatorship as a solution for the political impasse of the country, Vlachos argued that despite its limitations parliamentarianism is a system and does not depend on the will of one man. Dictatorship has all the defects of parliamentarianism (i.e. corruption, clientelism) without offering any positive element in the way that politics are conducted. Additionally, the Venizelist dictatorship that was established after the defeat of the Greek army in 1922 headed by their leaders, Colonels Plastiras and Gonatas was responsible for the schism that followed acting without any form of public accountability. This experience, Vlachos mentions, should be a banner for the impact that a future dictatorship could have on the political life of the country. The same reasoning applies for the dictatorship imposed by the General Pangalos in 1925. Under the fear that the political instability was putting the country at risk he overthrew the government in a coup and forced President Pavlos Kountoriotis to resign from the Presidency of the Second Hellenic Republic. This type of argumentation reveals also the irony that the pro-Monarchy coalition was a firmer proponent of the democratic regime in the post-1931 era. The Liberal Party - with the exception of few notable figures - had given up any belief in parliamentarianism and was ready to use any means in order to take the power - democratic or not (Vlachos 4/5/1933).

3.2 The need to overcoming the parliamentarian life

The new phase of Vlachos thought in regard to the dilemma democracy or dictatorship starts with the assassination attempt against Eleftherios Venizelos on the 6th of June 1933. The assassination attempt made clear to Vlachos that the schism of the past cannot be bridged within the existing political system and there is the need for alternative political solutions in order prevent the derailment of the country in a civil war. The intensification of the political polarization between the two political coalitions was leading the country to a forthcoming disaster that should be avoided with the adoption of all the necessary measures. The desirable scenario for Vlachos in these new conditions of state of emergency is Tsaldaris, the prime minister of the country, to call a meeting with the participation of all the political leaders of the country and to decide the abolition of people's constitutional rights for their own good announcing it in turn to the whole nation or the other solution is the Royalist coalition

to act by itself extra constitutionally in order to save the country from the ongoing disaster (8/6/1933).

The parliamentary life of the country derailed even further after the Venizelos' assassination attempt. The causes of the deterioration had with the decision of an electoral course and are presented aptly by Koliopoulos: "[the court] invalidated the election of the twenty Thessaloniki members of the chamber, of whom eighteen were Venizelists. The court decided that the electoral law under which the Thessaloniki deputies had been elected was unconstitutional, because it provided for the separate election of Jewish deputies. This law, which was the work of a Venizelist government and aimed at circumscribing Jewish electoral power, had turned Thessaloniki into a Venizelist preserve by neutralising the heavily antiVenizelist Jewish electorate of the city. The repeat election in July 1933, which was conducted after abolishing the separate Jewish electoral colleges, dashed the government's hopes of reducing Venizelist power in a Venizelist stronghold: the Venizelists won all twenty seats. The shock and revulsion caused by the attempt on Venizelos' life had turned even moderate anti-Venizelist public opinion against the government and deprived it of its two Thessaloniki seats" (Koliopoulos 1993, 235-236).

In this context Vlachos developed an elitist critique towards the refugees voters as subversive of the political regime of the country. This was a quite typical critique of the royalists against the masses reflecting the political cleavage that had divided the country since 1915. This reaction against the masses was a common racist discourse articulated by antivenizelism against the newcomers in the country. More precisely he endorsed that refugees adulterate the electoral results because in their vote they think more the past and the tragedy of 1922 than the current performance of the governmental coalitions. Refugees constituted a solid electoral force defining the electoral result with their votes. Their regular vote for the Liberal Party neglected what had been intermediated between the events of 1922 and the current political conditions of 1933. The weight of the past was more crucial in their electoral behavior than the bitter objective realities they were experiencing as an outcome of the imposed policies of Venizelism. For that reason, Vlachos invited the politicians of the Liberal camp to a public debate on the reasons of the disaster in Minor Asia (Vlachos, 9/7/1932). This discourse is indicative of the impasse of the political system of the period. Vlachos and the Venizelist camp deal once more with the debate of the defeat in Minor Asia leaving aside any discussion about the current realities and the

necessary policies to the overcoming of the ongoing economic and political crisis of the country. It shows the lack of realistic alternatives for both parties and their total divorce from the bitter realities that the majority of Greek people were experiencing at that time. This debate between the two parties was a dialogue between two deaf people illustrating the autonomy of the political from the societal level that took place after the crisis of 1931.

Vlachos was not obviously the only one who has observed the impasse of Greek parliamentarianism that amounted to a wide sociopolitical problem. In the beginning of 1934 *Kathimerini*, in which Vlachos was the editor, conducted a series of interviews/ articles with/by prominent members of the political and the intellectual life of the country with the topic "Democracy or Dictatorship", indicative of the problems that the political liberalism was confronting. The articles were published between 6th and 14th of January and covered opinions coming from the whole political spectrum. The introductory article of the newspaper articulates the following argumentation "Does a regime crisis exist? Did parliamentarianism got bankrupt in Greece in order to justify ideas and actions in the direction of the establishment of a new dictatorship or a different regime? Has the common sense been pursued about the inability of the current parliamentary democracy to deliver the vital needs of the nation for its progress and has orientated itself towards another form of regime? And finally, can Greece follow other nations in pursuing the establishment of new regimes in the case it will be diagnosed with the irreversible collapse of the parliamentary foundation of the regime? These questions can be summed up in the following one: "Dictatorship or Parliamentarianism?".

From the people that Vlachos invited to speak about this topic some of them were proponents of the democratic order (Tsaldaris, Sofoulis, Kafantaris, Papanastasiou, Mylonas and Seferiades) while others criticized parliamentarianism endorsing the need for deviations from the constitution in favor of the national interest. Other of the interviewees (Michalakopoulos, Rallis and Kondylis) endorsed the strengthening of the executive power. George Merkouris, the leader of the National Socialist Party of Greece proposed more radical solutions for the ongoing political crisis - the temporal abolition of the parliament, something that was endorsed also by Metaxas. The dictatorship under a charismatic leadership was also proposed (Kondylis, Andreadis, Alexandris), though this figure should of equal stance like Benito Mussolini in order the regime to be viable one (Vlachopoulos, 2012).

George Vlachos also participated in this debate as the editor of the newspaper. He reformulates the dilemma "dictatorship or democracy" and poses the question "what would you prefer? The Greek version of parliamentarianism or the dictatorship as it has been implemented in other countries?". From his argumentation it becomes clear that Vlachos is not against dictatorship in principle, but he considers that in order to be viable it should be imposed with the ways that it has happened to the other European countries. He disagreed with the forms of dictatorship that have been imposed in Greece during the interwar period because these attempts represented as implementations of specific political interests and not the totality of the nation. He admits though that in Greece was no persona that could lead such an attempt. The dictator necessarily will come either from Venizelists or from Royalists that would mean the continuation of the schism. Vlachos proposal for overcoming the political crisis is the extra-constitutional governance of the country with the abolition of the parliament from people coming from both sides of the dominant political camps with a Pan-Hellenic mandate. The proportionality of the parliament with people from all the parties and the pre-electoral program would guarantee that there will be a form of accountability to gain the minimum of social consensus that is necessary for the governance of the country. This new government that will be constituted by maximum ten people in order to be effective, will ask the mandate by the parliament being in power as much as necessary, circumscribing the rights of the people and the freedom of the press. It will govern on behalf of all the parties. The recovery to the elections should be allowed when the political crisis will have ended, and the citizens will have been taught that their freedom does not imply the unfreedom of their fellow citizens (Vlachos, 14/1/1934). This article along with the series of the others that Vlachos wrote for *Kathimerini* indicates the crisis of legitimization of the parliament as the institution that is representative of the nation in the eyes of a big part of the intellectual and political world of the country. It reflects also the general debate that developed in the country during this period in which dictatorship was proposed as a solution when the nation was considered to be in danger. The presupposition of the existence of a charismatic leader that could be the head of this project was the only limitation for many intellectuals and politicians of the country for the establishment of a dictatorial regime. In other words, what intellectuals like Vlachos did not want was a pseudo-fascistic dictatorship like these that were established from 1916 and onwards but were in favor of a serious and genuine Fascist regime like the one in Italy. In other

words, they did not trust the existing political personnel of the country since there was not any movement from below to lead an antiliberal political regime that would put an end to the corrupted parliamentary order.

In an article written two months later, on the anniversary of the Second Hellenic Republic, Vlachos repeated some of the arguments he made in his article on the debate about dictatorship or democracy enriching it with some further insights. He declares that he does not define himself as a democrat because parliamentary democracy in Greece was a foreign institution that was imposed to the country and since its establishment (1924) has shown very low performance. This argument is the typical nationalist argument that was expressed by the conservatives against the liberal order of things. If the regime change would be something dependent on his personal political will and Greece had an influential political figure like Hitler, Mussolini or Kemal, Vlachos would have abolished parliamentarianism giving the governance of the country to him. This could bring back the country in the rails of welfare. In other countries parliamentarianism was a robust system since it emerged after the explosion of social uprisings from below or through military interventions that brought new ideas, new people and new trends. Instead, in Greece parliamentarianism emerged as a coffee house that named wrongly democracy. In the case of the French Revolution after the abolition of the institution of Monarchy, the King and its heirs were sent in the guillotine. In Greece though the abdication of the King in 1924 did imply the continuation of the heredity in politics through the establishment of clientelism. Nothing really changed radically in the political situation of the country after the establishment of the Second Hellenic Republic (25/3/1934). Here in Vlachos analytical scheme a robust democratic regime can be established only if it has been preceded a genuine bourgeois revolution. In Greece this was not the case. The institutions imported from abroad since Greece was a small country that emerged from wars with Ottoman Empire without having experience in the democratic institutions nor the existence of a robust movement from below that claimed the end of the sociopolitical status quo. In other article, Vlachos criticized parliamentarianism not only as inherently corruptive for the Greek context but as also as non-representative of the nation. This inability is related with the fact that the decisions of the lower house of the Greek parliament in which the Royalist coalition dominates are undermined by the contrary decisions of the senate where the Venizelist camp has the majority. The obstruction of the law-making process many

times ended up in the rejection of bills. This meant that the democratic will of the nation was undermined since the Popular Party and its allies had the parliamentary majority. Thus, according to Vlachos the Liberal Party was, among others, also responsible for undermining the democratic institutions of the country (Vlachos 15/4/1934).

In the beginning of 1935 in his account of the last year's political developments of the country Vlachos has realized that the national reconciliation between the two political coalitions will not be possible to be achieved. The tense of the polarization and the non-conciliatory attitude and refusal of Venizelos for comprising policies between the two sides made him to believe that the only solution for the savior of the country is a violent imposition of the royalists to Venizelism establishing a dictatorial regime (1/1/1935). This perception is reinforced -and from this point and after became his firm take on the political proposals for the political future of the country- by the attempted venizelist coup d'état of March 1935 headed by Nikolaos Plastiras. His opinion reflects the wider disintegration of the parliamentary regime that proved to be irreversible. After the coup, a military tribunal was set up that purged from the armed forces many Venizelists and additionally on April 24 ordered the execution of two key Venizelist Generals, Anastasios Papoulias and Miltiadis Koimisis, and one major Stamatis Volanis.

Vlachos considered the executions of the political opponents as inadequate solution to the country's problems because they did not solve the structural causes of the problems that emerged after Plastiras coup. Without disagreeing to any form of violence against the particular people of the Venizelist camp that were guilty by participating in the Plastiras coup, he proposed that only the abolition of parliamentarianism could prevent the reproduction of the national schism and its disastrous effects for the country. The parliament should be abolished, the parties dissolved and the freedom of press to be cancelled. The electorate proved quite immature giving the power to people that destroyed the country with their policies. This period where the parliamentary procedures will be cancelled will provide the opportunity to the Greek people to reach the necessary maturity in order to be able to govern themselves more effectively when parliamentarianism will be reestablished. The directory will be the new institution that will govern the country with similar responsibilities like the directory had during the period after the French that replaced the Committee of Public Safety. The necessary social legitimacy will be achieved

through referenda, fiesta and rituals that will bring the directory closer to the people. Phenomena of abuse of power will be limited because of the strict imposition of law to the people that have been convicted of malfeasance in office. Vlachos ends his article by arguing that in few lines is not possible to build a new Plato's republic (Vlachos 15/3/1935). These few proposals though are prescribing with great accuracy developments that took place a year later after the imposition of Metaxas regime. Metaxas after the abolition of the parliament proceeded exactly to these steps that are described by Vlachos in order to take the power and gain social legitimacy by the Greek people. This shows that Metaxas acted within the accepted value framework of the previous political establishment and the importance of the role of journalism in the decision-making process and the forging of the 4th of August regime's physiognomy. In other words, Metaxas was a byproduct of the contradictions of the second Hellenic republic and its ideas and practices conditioned by the world-perspective of the preceded political world that in many cases he shifted further to the far-right of the political spectrum incorporating ideas and institutions from the synchronous fascist states such as Italy and Portugal. This also indicates the fascistization of the ex-liberals in Greece. The Greek political system in 1935 had stopped to believe in the parliamentarian system as the key institution of the mediation of the general will. They used paradigms for inspirations of their political alternatives, which were coming from the authoritarian states of the period. From Vlachos's words it becomes clear that he was familiar both with the political nature of these regimes and the ways that seek to draw legitimization. This historical procedure can be described in other terms as a transformation of the conservative right to a fascist one. Thus, Metaxas far from being a surprise expressing this transformation of the Greek conservatives, he was a continuation and byproduct of it. The intellectuals like Vlachos were in the forefront of criticism of the liberal order. They exercised pressure to the politicians through their writings to proceed in these changes and diffused these ideas to the wider electorate making them a common discourse.

Vlachos shifts his criticism from the corrupted political personnel of Venizelism to its voters developing an elitist critique of the dangerous role of the masses in the politics. The reason of blaming the Greek people is due to their electoral behavior they brought Venizelos in power several times during the last decades even though his political performance almost destroyed Greece. The elections of 1928 were a crucial shifting point because it dissolved the Zaimi's coalition government of Venizelists and

Royalists between 1926 and 1928, the first political compromising attempt after the national schism of 1915. The vote of the people in 1928's elections legitimized the oligarchic plans of Venizelos, what followed his defeat in 1932. For what happened great responsibility had the Greek people that trusted the party of liberals that was a gang of demagogues. This electoral behavior was a clear indication that the Greek people is sick and this have not changed since the second Plastiras coup. The treatment to this illness is the temporal restriction of their rights that will contribute to the realization of their faults. In Vlachos words: "Greek people is sick. They suffer from Venizelism, a form of gangrene. It should be hospitalized in hospital named dictatorship or directory and to do a serious operation: mutilation of its rights". He suggests as the ideal dictator Tsaldaris, the leader of the Popular Party and to govern with the help of a directorate constituted by three or four people (24/5/1935).

After the elections in the beginning of 1936 where none of the two dominant parties gained the majority, Vlachos called them to form a coalition in order the country to be governed (Vlachos 28/1/1936). After the impasse of the negotiations between the sides, Vlachos recalls his older proposals on the overcoming of the ongoing political crisis. He observes that in neighboring states parliamentary democracy has been abolished something that had led them to progress, order and welfare. Greece is not lucky enough because the past experiences of the dictatorships headed by people who were not genuine leaders creating a disbelief towards this type of regimes. He recalls the idea he proposed after the Plastiras coup of 1935 for the need of a dictatorship from above led by politicians in order to prevent a new coup from below from the army officers. To the extent that the officers cannot form a sustained government that will not reproduce the existing National Schism, the King - George II of Greece - is the only figure that could lead an attempt of overcoming the parliament with a directorate constituted by ten politicians coming from both sides (Vlachos 25/2/1936). This government will not be elected by it be appointed by the King. It will be flexible enough to arrange properly the emerging national issues for a certain period having abolished the people's rights and the freedom of press (Vlachos 26/2/1936). This solution is considered as an emergent one also because of the fragile international order. Vlachos believed rightly that Europe is on the verge of a new European war after the remilitarization of the Rhineland by the German army that took place on 7 March 1936 when German military forces entered the Rhineland. These European realities were alarms for Vlachos in order Greece to shift its focus from the politics of

schism to a national effort that would deal with the needed militarization of the country. In these new conditions Greece should be a unified entity ready to confront the enemies that surrounds it (Vlachos 8/3/1936).

The disclosure of the secret pact between the leader of Liberals - Sofoulis - and the communist Stylianos Sklavainas for a possible agreement between the two sides and the general strike of the tobacco workers and other unions on May 8th 1936 led to the bloody events of May 9th and was the triggering event for Vlachos to add anticommunist criticism in his antiparliamentarian rhetoric. He endorsed the idea that communists should be banned as a political force in Greece and deprived from the right to participate in the elections, to lose their Greek citizenship because they do not believe in the idea of the Greek nation and to be send in USSR where the institution of Soviets is dominant. The Greek state is considered responsible for the violent events of Thessaloniki because it allowed the cultivation of communist ideas that lead to such actions like the strike of the 9th May. Vlachos found the solution to existing problems to the face of Metaxas that considers as a responsible political figure that will ban the Communist Party and regulate the relations between capital and labor in order to prevent future events like these of the recent strikes. These measures though he thinks cannot be implemented effectively within the parliamentary regime, thus he counter-proposes the establishment of a dictatorship (Vlachos 10/5/1936).

After the decision of King to appoint Metaxas prime minister Vlachos suggests him to overturn the parliament in favor of a dictatorship because the nation is experiencing an existential crisis that should overcome in order to continue to exist. He is considered responsible for the destiny of the country enjoying the trust both from the King and the parliament to act outside the framework of constitution. Vlachos argues that the current parliament has been infected by the disease of the communism since the electoral coalition of the communist party of Greece won fifteen seats taking 5.79%, a situation that inheres the potentiality the Communist Party to win the elections under the proportional system. Greece is considered to be on the verge of catastrophe. The continuation of parliamentary life would imply the death of the country. There are also great potentialities in Greece that cannot be fulfilled within the democratic regime and the implementation of the constitution. These potentialities of the country will be fulfilled if there is strong political decision and will (Vlachos 12/5/1936).

Another theme in which Vlachos incorporates in his antiparliamentarian discourse is his critique on people's rights that is considered as the cause for widespread degeneration of Greece's political life. He puts forward the argument that freedom does exist in any type of regime and that all political regimes put restrictions to its citizens. Even in pre-modern non-western societies there is a specific set of rules that is applied that guarantees the terms of societal reproduction. Law puts limits to human behavior in all human societies. In this sense nobody is free living within a society that has always certain rules that are implemented to its citizens. More precisely the freedom of speech and freedom of the press are two principles that are responsible for the bad situation in which the country had ended up. The Greek press is the dominance of minority to the majority since the citizens cannot react to its power to influence the politics of the country and consequently to decide upon their lives. The freedom of the press is dangerous for the safety of the country. The same applies for the freedom of speech that allows the manipulation of the citizens by the political personnel of the country. The freedom of speech ends up having opposite results of its initial aims, enslaving the people. Also, freedom of speech is used by the politicians in order to promote their own interests not the national one's. For these reasons these freedoms should be substituted with a fair strict state that will be liable to manage the rights of the people in a responsible way for their own good (Vlachos, 17/5/1936). This type of argumentation informed the discourse of the Metaxas regime in regard to issue of the rights of the Greek people. The relativization of the differences between parliamentary democracy and authoritarian regimes, the unintended consequences of the collective action within democracy, the oligarchic nature of parliamentary politics in which the parties' privilege particular interests instead of the interests of the nation were quite common in the anti-parliamentarian discourse of the pre-Metaxas era and it continued after the establishment of the Metaxas regime as well. This type of argumentation started from existing problems and contradictions of parliamentarianism and used as critiques for its insufficiency as system to represent the national interest. It shows also that the road to Metaxism ideologically and politically has already been prepared by the political and intellectual elites years ago before its implementation in 1936.

3.3 The era of Metaxas regime

Considering what has already been said it should not be a surprise that the establishment of the 4th of August regime found Vlachos in full agreement. In one of his first speeches, Metaxas announced: "I have decided to hold all the power I need for saving Greece from the catastrophes which threaten her". Thus, the Metaxas dictatorship was born. Vlachos in his first article in *Kathimerini* after the establishment of the regime makes his endorsement of the new political reality clear: "Since the last Tuesday a new state of order has been established in Greece that not only finds agreement in newspapers, but it is to a certain extent responsible for what happened. For few years now, it has proposed and wished the substitution of the parliament by a new strict state that can impose itself to the citizens". Then Vlachos sums up the arguments he has already expressed on the causes of the degeneration of the Greek parliamentary life and the proposals he made in the past about the overcoming of the crisis. He says that it was a great honor for *Kathimerini* the role it played in the configuration of this political outcome because its firmly believes that the government will work in the direction of the national insurrection of the country overcoming the national schism that is responsible to a great extent for the current disastrous conditions that are prevailing (7/8/1936).

The first month of 1937 Vlachos argues again against the political rights and freedoms of Greek people. One source for this non-genuine form of freedom was the role of the leaders of the parties did not allow neither to the rest of the MP's of their parties nor the newspapers to decide and speak freely. This relationship was mutually binding because in turn the leader was committed as well by the electorate to act accordingly to the promises he had given. This type echoes Michels argumentation about the structural inability of contemporary parties to produce democratic structures. The members of the parliament could not vote what they consider good for the nation because they should obey to the decisions of the leader. Press had similar problems because it was controlled by the political elites of the country rendering it unable to articulate a serious critique on the political developments of the country as it ought to do. The Metaxas regime will teach the Greek people what means to be genuinely free and then when the external conditions are mature enough could gain the right again to decide about the politicians that governs him (Vlachos 17/1/1937).

In 28th July 1938 occurred the first and last attempt aimed at overthrowing the Metaxas regime, the coup d'état of Chania that collapsed within a few hours due to poor organization. Vlachos commenting on this development argues that 4th of August regime is one of several authoritarian regimes that this time were dominant in Europe with more than 200.000.000 to be governed by them. This type of governance has guaranteed a genuine form of freedom abolishing the fake liberal order of things. In the post-World War I era the political freedoms emerged as social need for the preservation of the European nations since the occurrence of widespread social uprisings. The form of freedoms and rights that dominated the period after WWI put in danger the existence of the European states and the foundations of family, patria, national interests and church. In this type of argumentation Vlachos evokes typical conservative motifs where the modern mass societies and their organization forms undermined traditional values and ways of life. What he asks implicitly is a controlled form of political organized that can guarantee social peace. This reality that was not possible to be imposed by the dominant political of the parliamentary era is secured by Metaxas regime (Vlachos 31/7/1938).

In the 4th anniversary of Metaxas rule Vlachos endorses the regime as the solution that saved the nation from the forthcoming catastrophe. He argues that the hesitations that some people had towards the regime proved wrong since it succeeded to promote the social peace without violent means (Vlachos 4/8/1940). Few months later, after the Italian army's invasion in Greece, Vlachos in an article that accounts his view on Metaxas career revises and apologizes for his past wrong perception he had developed for him and especially his view to reject the dictatorship as a political solution to the problems that Metaxas repeatedly had endorsed. During the period of the dictatorship the country regenerated and for this fact the only responsible is Metaxas. His admiration for the dictator became even greater when the latter as prime minister of the country on 28th of 1940 rejected the ultimatum handed by Emanuele Grazzi, the Italian ambassador to Greece, from Mussolini that demanded free passage for his troops to occupy unspecified strategic points inside Greek territory. This move made the dictator from prime minister of the country a national leader that occupied the hearts of the Greek people because he saved the country (8/12/1940).

Conclusion

The reconstruction of Vlachos discourse on democracy is a thread from both the reasons of the collapse of the second Hellenic republic and the ways through which Metaxas came into the power and established himself until his death can be detected. His rhetoric on the crisis of parliamentarianism reflected the impasse and the inability of the Greek political elites to formulate a hegemonic project that could create cohesion horizontally between the dominant classes with sustained political coalitions and vertically with parties with organizational structures that could include the subaltern classes. The crisis of 1931 and inability of the Greek political world to deal effectively with its impact proved the shifting point for the unfolding of the spiral instability effects that lead to the establishment of Metaxas regime. This is the historical development can account for the peculiar version of fascism that took place in Greece. It took place from above as a resolution to the impasse of parliamentarianism after the crisis of 1931. Greece did not have the structural similarities that were met in other countries where the basic elements of their social formation had taken a clearer shape. The landed elite stopped to exist as a social class, the political elites were represented in parties without clear class affiliations, the size of working class in other countries did not exist in Greece that was predominantly an agrarian society and the agrarian associations had a limited impact as the issue of the distribution of lands took quite early. This however does not imply that the Metaxas regime did not use ideas, institutions and practices from the fascist regimes abroad, let alone the fact that it did define itself as one of the states of the period that overcame parliamentary democracy and built a different state of order. More precisely, the Greek version of fascism came up as a mature choice when the political system was blocked after the failed intervention of Plastiras coup where the far-right army officers of the Royalist dominated over the parliamentary orientated politicians of the party. Vlachos and his peer journalists observing the growing impasse of the parliamentary politics because of the national schism that has turned themselves to the search of authoritarian political alternatives already from 1933. In this sense their role proved to be crucial not only for the diffusion of the authoritarian solutions to the wider strata but also to the articulation of proposals that were then adopted by Metaxas as solutions for the political problems that he was facing. The texts of Vlachos can be read as a prescription for Metaxas' later political steps forging an authoritarian regime. Though, the dictator did not limit himself to the negative proposals of abolishing the parliament but continued in the direction of creating institutions that

could politicize the masses in a different way. In this sense, Metaxas was both a continuation and overcoming of the conservative right that dominated the political game after the defeat of Venizelos of elections 1932.

Chapter 4: Metaxas antiparliamentarianism: A political trajectory from conservatism to Fascism.

Abstract

This chapter attempts to delineate the basic elements of Metaxas' antiparliamentarian thought. I endorse that Metaxas shifted from a conservative critique of the liberal society to fascism through his experience of involvement in Greek politics during the 1930. The attribute of fascist can be explained with the reference to the fact that not only did he criticize the parliamentary institutions for their inefficiency to express the popular will genuinely, but he attempted, and merely succeeded, to create institutions through which the Greek people, although in a controlled way, could express their will. One of his main interests during the 1930 was the parliament's inability to serve the interests of the nation in ways that would not be a challenge to his existential status. During the first half of his life, for reasons that are linked to his formation that will be examined in the following sub-chapter, he developed a conservative critique of modernity, its values and institutions, defining them as non-genuine forms of political mediation between the elites and the people. Hence, his attachment to traditional institutions like the monarchy. The National Schism between the Liberal and the Popular Party was intensified during the 1930 and turned him to authoritarian solutions that could solve the divisions that were occurring both between and among the elites and the people due to the domination of institutions that did not correspond to the new historical conjuncture. His initial reluctance about the feasibility of dictatorial solutions as effective means that could solve the existing urgent issues of the country, was overcome through the dominance of the Popular Party in the political life of Greece. Metaxas considered the 4th of August Regime as the political solution to the impasse of the country that would reconnect the pieces of social puzzle that modernity and its institutions had produced. This however would not happen through a return to a pre-modern condition where communal forms of socialization dominate but through the building of institutions via which the people would come closer to the leadership of the country, in a genuine way. This claim was also strengthened through the realization of the growing influence of the Greek Communist Party in the country's affairs. The authoritarian politicization that Metaxas forced can be read also as an alternative to the perceived threat of a communist politicization of the subaltern

classes since the political system in Greece was not able to offer solutions to these kind of issues after its collapse.

4.1 The formative years: Rejecting the liberal modernity.

Ioannis Metaxas was born in Ithaca. His family was inscribed in the *Libro d'Oro* of the Ionian islands, previously a Venetian possession, while its roots originated in the Byzantine nobility. During the end of the century, Metaxas detected a degenerative process that the Greek society was undergoing as an outcome of the wave of urbanization at that time (Metaxas 2005, 96-99). The Greek society was losing its soul and the traditional values, which were integral to the normative foundation of the society. His aristocratic origins can, to a certain extent, account for the conservative perspective on the historical shift of the Greek society from a Weberian *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*. This type of conservative criticism was common among the people who were politicized in the last quarter of the 19th century, a period of national integration and its antinomian processes. The wish for a new Greece in which all regions with Greek-speaking communities would become part of the new nation that was in the making, contradicted with his rejection of the full implications that this process implied. The first years of Metaxas' career in the army coincided with this transitory phase of the Greek nation. Thus, at a very young age he got involved with The National Society (Ethniki Etairia) that was a secret Greek nationalist organization created in November 1894 by a number of young nationalist officers and advocates of the Megali Idea. The National Society followed an irredentist concept of Greek nationalism that expressed the goal of establishing a Greek state that would encompass all historically ethnic Greek-inhabited areas. Its aim was to revive the morale of the country and prepare the liberation of Greek people still under the Ottoman Empire, highlighting the main national issues of that period, like the liberation of Crete from the Ottoman Rule and the Macedonian struggle (Vatikiotis 54-55). Metaxas was the one who was responsible for the establishment of the organization's section in Nafplio. During this period, he got inside the circles of King of Greece, Constantine I of Greece, who was the commander-in-chief of the Army of Thessaly in the Greco-Turkish war of 1897. Metaxas was part of the king's staff and from this point and after he became one of the

king's closest collaborators adopting his ideological and political lines. The values he followed during this period of his life become clear in one of the passages in his diary:

"My youth has come to an end. I am 29 years old and I am a mature man. This period starts with the realization of the past deprivations and the decision to fulfill my tasks thoroughly towards god, the fellow people, the king, patria, my lovely family" (Metaxas 2005 I, 489).

Within the period of four years (1899-1903), in which Metaxas studied in the Berlin Academy of War, his Germanophilia was nurtured and he adopted most of the political ideas that accompanied him for the rest of his life. His antiparliamentarian criticism of the period had a conservative nuance endorsing the divine right of the king against any form of representative mediation through modern democratic institutions. The monarchy was considered as the only institutional counterweight to the expansion of the influence of parliamentarianism on all the aspects of social life. Commenting on the bill for the reorganization of the army after the dismal performance of the Hellenic Army in the war of 1897 under King Constantine I, Metaxas endorsed:

"Since the parliamentary institutions failed, King Constantine had the courage to undertake the task of restructuring the state after the defeat, attributing its causes to the involvement of the parliament in the administration of the army.... Apropos issues of principle, there is no middle ground. If it is proved that substitution of the king's administration of the army by the parliament will meet with success then there will be nothing that can stop the expansion of its influence to all the social spheres." (Metaxas 2005 I, 527).

Reflecting soberly on his own social position as an aristocrat, even degraded, and its organic relation with the institution of monarchy Metaxas, like feudal warrior who uncritically owes faith to his feudal lord, endorsed his loyalty to the king, taking a position in favor of his aim to establish his power over the parliament adumbrating the basic shape of the intense polarization in Greek politics between royalists and republicans that took place in the forthcoming decades:

"In this political development I have taken a side long time ago. I am a soldier and a noble and I offer the services of my sword to the king, I dedicate my life and my intellect to him. It is indifferent to me if the king is good or bad, harmful or beneficial. I do not examine if his actions harm or benefit the nation, I follow him blindly in all of his wishes. His wish is a law for me.... I have no other ambitions but to fulfill my duties to my king and his successor... I consider him to be the one who represents my patria, the past, the present and the future of the nation. Whatever stands against him is disgusting for me." (Metaxas 2005, 527).

This connection between his noble identity and the institution of monarchy is justified through using the nationalist historian Konstantine Papanigopoulos' historical scheme that was developed in the study *History of the Greek Nation*, where the Greek nation's history is understood as a continuity from the antiquity to Byzantium and to the Modern Greek state (Voutsaki 2017, 9). Metaxas' emphasis on his class identity, aristocracy, as a class that fought for the crown already back in the middle ages, hence even before the establishment of the modern Greek nation, needs to be understood within the context of the nationalist notion of constructing continuity. In that sense, he legitimizes his contemporary political stance in favor of King Constantine through history and narrated as a historical mission that should be fulfilled:

"Something changed inside me... The war brought me where I belong. I realized what I owe as a soldier and above all as a noble of the Metaxas family. I belong to the aristocracy that fought for the king and the state long before the birth of modern Greece. From its struggles and sacrifices a modern Greece was born. Thus, patria is not Greece that emerged from the liberation struggle of 1821, because I am a member of the Metaxas family that existed before the establishment of the modern Greek state. My family belonged to a patria that was much larger than the current one and that only the King can represent. The history of the patria came from the monarchy we have now. The institution of the monarchy in Greece is not the outcome of a pact but it emerged because of the nation's inner wish that, during the period of Ottoman occupation, anticipated the moment when monarchy would be restored after the disruption due to the fall of Constantinople in 1453."

From this passage Metaxas' legitimizations of his political position in favor of monarchy becomes clear. It helps also to understand where his criticism of parliamentarianism stems from, which will be enhanced in the following decades. The discursive pattern that Metaxas had developed on the non-Greekness of the parliament as an institution and its imported physiognomy has been juxtaposed with the Greek origins of the institution of monarchy. This argumentation was a common theme in the anti-republican conservative camp in Greece during the transitory period of the formation of the Greek state as a reaction to the forces that rejected the institution of monarchy but also in the interwar period where the two camps of Royalists and Venizelists were polarized even further.

In this period, Metaxas' criticism of the parliament should be understood as a complete rejection of modernity and its main political institutions. This initial rejection of modernity will become central in later negotiations to form his own party in 1922. After 1933 however, there will be another shift in his understanding of political modernity, when he will adopt more authoritarian stances in blaming the institutions for not being able to correspond to the needs of the epoch, thus he will claim they should be abolished. Despite the fact that Metaxas defended the necessity to reject the parliament and the party as the main institution of mediation between the people and the rulers, he yet believed that there was the need for alternative ways of articulation of this relation. Metaxas views on parliamentarianism in this sense need to be reconstructed by decoding his relationship with modernity. The clearest indication of his shift from conservatism to fascism is the distinct relation with the institution of monarchy. While in 1900 he was a faithful devotee of King Constantine I, with the establishment of the 4th of August regime, from 1936 and onwards, he developed an antagonistic relationship with his The King's son, George II, who was the successor of the throne and in order to establish his hegemonic rule had established massive institutions like EON.

After his return from Germany in 1904 Metaxas joined the newly formed General Staff Corps. The General Staff of the Army General Command, with greatly expanded authority over the organization, training and equipment of the army, was founded in the same year. During this period Metaxas developed also a friendship with Prince Andrew, the son of King Constantine I. The political situation however did not remain calm since there were many simmering tensions in the Greek society which reeled under the effects of the disastrous Greco-Turkish War of 1897. The Goudi coup of

28th of August 1909, was an event that released these tensions by triggering a series of developments that would determine the character of the Greek society for the next decades. Colonel Nikolaos Zorbas, the key figure of the Military League and having gathered together his troops in the Goudi barracks, issued a pronunciamiento to the government demanding an immediate turnaround for the country and its armed forces since there was a disillusionment with the established political system and the situation in the army, considering that it had not been improved significantly after the defeat of 1897. In political terms, the event led to the arrival of Eleftherios Venizelos from Crete who was the appointed prime minister of the country, a development that put an end to the old political system and gave birth to a new period in the Greek political life, which was going to dominate for several decades: the societal divide between liberal, republican Venizelism and conservative, monarchist anti-Venizelism. In the level of the army, the Military League's demands were limited to an increased military budget, its reorganization and modernization, as well as the dismissal of the Prince from the Army. Although the Theotokis government had increased supplies of arms and munitions, Crown Prince Constantine was also reinstated, who had led the Army as Chief Inspector in the 1897 war. Also, despite existing demands, he has authorized only a few officers to pursue studies in France and Germany. Metaxas, a known royalist, did not support the coup and thus was transferred to Larissa for one year. In 1910 he was appointed by Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, who was expecting to be assigned the post of Minister of Military Affairs, as his adjutant. The next three years Metaxas became a key figure in the two Balkan wars in various crucial positions in the military campaigns, as well as negotiated the military treaties with Bulgaria and Serbia. As a result of the Balkan Wars, Greece's territory enlarged by around 70%.

Following the outbreak of World War I, the prospect of Greece's possible entry into the war emerged. Initially, on 14th of July Venizelos and King Constantine decided reject request from Germany join the war in their side. Venizelos started from this point and after to examine the possibility to join the war with allied powers, but Metaxas expressed twice his objection towards this idea since he believed that without the participation of Romanian with the side of allies this decision was very risky. Few months later on the beginning of January British offered to Greece additionally parts of the Asia Minor. Metaxas once again was negative since he believes that the Greek communities in Turkey would not be safe from the Turkey's reprisals. Venizelos

decided to act by himself ignoring the analysis provided by Metaxas and proposed to the King Greece to enter in the war. This happened when Venizelos, despite Kings objections, offered army corps to the allies when they decided to attack on Gallipoli in February 1915. This led to the resignation of Metaxas from his position in the army.

Not sure about his decisions since one of his most important advisors (Metaxas) abandoned and the Crown's objections to the war Venizelos resign from his position on 21 February 1915. After though the new elections that won in May Venizelos presented his argument in favor of Greece's participation in full terms and gained the consensus with 152 in favor to 102 in 22 September. This move infuriated King Constantine and dismissed him substituting him with Alexandros Zaimis that called upon to form a government.

This dismissal crystallized the division between monarchists and Venizelists, creating what named as "National Schism" that would ghost Greek politics for the following decades until the establishment of Metaxas' regime. In this, Metaxas, who had in the meantime got his position back in the army, was in favor of Greece's neutrality in the WWI. In May and August 1916, Constantine who now took the side of German dictated his General Staff to allow the occupation of the Fort Roupel and parts of by the central powers. The reply on behalf of the Venizelist camp came in August 1916 when Venizelist officers revolted in Thessaloniki leading to the establishment of a separate "Government of National Defense" under the rule Venizelos. The new government, with the allied support, expanded its control over half the country and entered the war on the allies' side.

In this conjuncture, Metaxas becomes the head behind the scenes of the Epistratoi movement that was a royalist paramilitary organization in Greece, the first Greek movement that resembled the organizations of the far-right, which were developing the same period in the rest of Europe (Vatikiotis 2005, 214). The decision of Venizelos to form a separate government in Thessaloniki sparked demonstrations against the allies in Athens. The army showed his power when it was successful in canceling a secret agreement between the King and the allied diplomats. Since the diplomatic means proved ineffective, the allies sent a contingent on 1 December 1916 that met the resistance of Epistratoi, which had evolved to an armed confrontation. The Royalists, the next day after the defeat of the allied contingent, revolted against the Venizelists of the city. The main force was Epistratoi, a massive army movement that was acting as a militia with similar features like the respective fascist movements

of the period: the use of violence, since it had the know-how as retired army officers, a formal structure, their antiparliamentarian stance and petit-bourgeoisie origins. Though, it failed to transform to an autonomous fascist movement because it never developed a discourse and political practices that were challenging the authority of the king. It was a militia dedicated to the reproduction of the king's power and thus remained quite traditionalist in the attempt to succeed its political aims.

Metaxas' political thought during this period, as it becomes clear from his political choices, remains a traditionalist one. Still in 1917 he perceives himself as a soldier whose main duty is to serve the interests of the crown within and outside Greece. His experience in Germany brought him closer to the German culture and values. Thus, the belief in German imperialism and the king as the institution that guarantees social peace in Greece went hand in hand. This perception is on opposed ends to the ideas that were developed during the period of the 4th of August Regime when, on the one hand, he endorsed a sovereign state independent from the interests of Germany and on the other hand, the governance of this state mainly by him assigning to the King a secondary, symbolic role. In this conjuncture of December 1916 Metaxas had the chance being one of the leaders of Epistratoi to transform the movement to a massive radical right and to follow the form of the respective one's in the other European countries, though his traditional mentality and his attachment to the King did not leave space for such developments. This failure was indicative of the general inability of the conservative camp in Greece to develop a distinct political force during this period. This can be explained with reference to the important institutional role of the king in the interior politics of the country, occupying the central hegemonic role within the conservative camp. His traditionalist understanding of politics did not allow the conservative camp to develop into a movementist modernist direction. Additionally, the Greek nationalistic discourse that claimed imperialist expansionary adventures, was not a monopoly of the conservative camp. On the contrary, Venizelos was the main adherent of the implementation of the imperialist ideas of Megali Idea through his foreign policy. Hence, the traditionalist camp failed to articulate a hegemonic discourse that could mobilize the Greek neither on internal nor in external issues. Metaxas' thought during this period therefore should be seen as part of this wider political context of the inability of Royalist camp to develop an effective hegemonic project.

These developments proved to be crucial for the following decades in Greece. The Balkan wars and the nationalist ideology of the Megali Idea along with the other political developments in Greece that were presented, contributed to the changing role of the army in the internal affairs of the country. The increase of the soldiers and their professionalization necessary for the implementation of the expansionary plans of the Greek state transformed them to a factor that became relevant in the political field for both Venizelos and the King. The Schism that took place after the formation of the provisional Venizelos government in Thessaloniki gave rise to a fragile hegemony within Greece that made the use of the army for the two camps necessary to impose their rule. Parliamentary procedures did not prove adequate since they never succeeded to create a historic bloc that would remain relatively stable considering the various shifts that were imposed by the internal and/or external conjuncture. Although, as assessed above, the sections of the army never gained autonomy regarding the two political camps until the day that parliament was delegitimized as the institution representing the political will of Greek citizens. This explains, among other reasons, why a fascist political movement from below, coming from the ranks of the army officers never fully developed in Greece. In the beginning of the 1930s, the moment where the parliament had lost its legitimacy, many crucial figures among the officers -that had become politicians already from the 1920s, after their retirement from the army- got radicalized and were among the main voices that claimed authoritarian solutions, like those which were imposed in other European countries. Metaxas was part of that canon.

Following the Noemvriana, the allies dethroned Constantine I establishing a naval blockade to isolate the areas that the support of the king. This pushed the King to resign on 15th of June 1917. Greece reunified under the son of Constantine I, Alexander and the political leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos. Greece eventually joined fully the war on the side of the allies. King Constantine I left Greece and moved to Switzerland with his family. Metaxas did the same moving first with other Royalists to Corsica and then with his family to Cagliari, Siena and Florence in Italy. He stayed in the exile until 1920.

In exile, Metaxas had a lot of free time to think on the global conjuncture as it was formed after the end of WWI. Despite the defeat of Germany, Metaxas continued to endorse the German imperial viewpoint as the one that would dominate the 20th century, because it would correspond to the new historical needs of the period.

Already one and half years before the war in Ajaccio, he suggested a kind of *Gemeinschaft*, a communitarian way of life where the individual acts following the rules of the group s/he belongs. This type of social life would guarantee genuine freedom for the individual and the group and was strongly expressed by the German society. This model of civilization, as Metaxas claimed, corresponded to the needs of the conjuncture (Metaxas 1969, 401). In this once more Metaxas proves to remain attached to a traditionalist mentality by suggesting the Weberian *Gemeinschaft* as an ideal social bond for the emerging modern societies, something that was anachronistic considering that it did not correspond to the needs of the mechanical type of societies that were emerging and starting to dominate the European continent.

This anachronistic idea can be explained by the fact that the contradictions of modernity had not become clear yet in Greece, the country in which he grew up and was politicized.

His affiliation with the king and his military training in Berlin during the empire, did also not help to grasp the transitory phase that Europe was experiencing during this period. Before the end of the war Metaxas emphasized the necessity of the empires' existence since it was understood as a *sine qua* condition for the continuation of the imperialist rule abroad. The possible victory of the Entente forces would imply new adventures within Europe, especially in regard to the states that would emerge from the dissolution of the empires (Metaxas 1969, 402).

Reflecting on the liberal values that the forces of the Entente adhered, Metaxas endorsed equality as the dominant ideal within the states that dominate the globe, hence he argued that equality had gained the status of a religion and democracy became its deity. The rulers would govern by adulating the masses with the idea of equality, however with the aim to serve their own interests (Metaxas 1969, 404). Equality therefore for Metaxas was a fake, manipulative idea because of the nature of inequality. While the governors were the most powerful and successful, they would pretend that they are equal to the electorate, who is given the power to elect the rulers. For Metaxas the dogma of equality only served to cover the natural order of things, hence he described it as hypocritical (Metaxas 1969, 406-407). Metaxas defined the ideology of liberalism that was proposed by the Entente forces as a form of religion because it offered a new overall worldview to the extent that it embedded a different understanding of modernity compared to the one that was proposed by the German empire. He had a clear understanding that its dominance would signal a different

version of modernity that would be a different societal paradigm, the liberal one: "Humanity enters in a new stage. New civilization is born" (Metaxas 1969, 409). The end of the WWI would signal a steady transition to the acceptance of the basic principles of the ways that the political works in the modern era. In Metaxas' thought it was the liberal order that destroyed the "natural" order of things, meaning the certainties that traditionalism guaranteed: "This condition that moves against the natural order of things creating a sense of uncertainty, doubts about the future, egoism, lack of social solidarity..." (Metaxas 1969, 410). He claims that within the framework of liberalism, the governmental system based on parliamentarianism, attempts to overturn the "natural" order by giving unlimited power to the majority, which leads often to a regime in which a minority rules over the general populace and distorts any genuine representation of the popular will. Metaxas' counter-proposal as a political alternative to the liberal order, is a state that is governed by the 'excellent' of the society and its organization of the polity thus should reflect the existing inequality of the society. In this model, the changes in organization only happen because of a natural process following wider societal changes. Allowing the "excellent" people to rule the whole society is justified because in this way the people would feel secure enough to act without the constraints of uncertainty and it would provide them with the necessary confidence to create the feeling of solidarity and respect among each other. For Metaxas these are the preconditions for a stable political system and the cultivation of civilization. Key feelings enhanced by Metaxas are religiosity and a sense of patriotism that supersedes the limited borders of the nation (Metaxas 1969, 410). These features of the ideal society stayed with him through the different phases of the development of his political thought. What changed though was the authoritarian nuance that was dominant later regarding his vision of the ideal society inspired by the fascist states that had been established throughout Europe in the meantime. At that time however Metaxas still believed that modernity distorted both the institutions and the ideals in which the pre-modern world was based.

In November 1920, after the electoral defeat of Venizelists, Metaxas returned to Greece. With his return he was reinstated in the army as Major General, but since he opposed the continued Greek campaign in Asia Minor, he resigned and went into retirement on the 28th of December 1920.

One year before his return to Greece, still being in Siena, Metaxas reflected more precisely not only about the liberal order but more precisely about the main institution of political modernity - the party. His rhetoric on the political parties is reproducing some of the main arguments that Robert Michels developed in his studies on political parties. It does not come as a surprise to see his argumentation follows the analysis of the German Sociologist since in the catalogue of his library Michels' key study, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* is included in the original German version, as well as in the Italian translation. Hence, a hypothesis is that he read this book while he was in Italy, since the Italian translation had already been published in 1912. His critique on the organization of political parties will remain unchanged throughout the years of his life. The first arguments that he makes is that the main aim of parties is to take power and to dominate over the people. Party principles are just used as the means to succeed their aims, yet are never aims themselves. Further he claims that the struggle for power always undermines all the principles that the parties have been assigned to. Once in power, Metaxas argues, party politicians only aim to satisfy their ego and maintain their mental and material superiority (Metaxas 1969, 414).

In September 1920, one month before his return to Greece, Metaxas developed a reasoning of a macro-historical scope criticizing the way that the political system had functioned in Greece since the establishment of the Greek state in 1821. His main argument and one the themes that were always present in his antiparliamentarian criticism was the lack of the Greek political system with its party politics in representing the Greek nation in a genuine way: "The Greek people, since 1821 and onwards, have never been sovereign" (Metaxas 1969, 414). Sovereign was only a tiny minority within the Greek people that came to power through a clientelist system until 1909 and claimed to represent the totality of the nation. This minority was divided in parties and constituted one class that was opposed to the masses. The sovereignty was exercised by this minority only to serve their own ideas and interests excluding any popular participation. Thus, as Metaxas argues, the masses believed wrongly that a genuine sovereignty was exercised due to their prudent politics. The unpopular policies that were implemented from 1890 and onward dissolved the political ties between the politicians and the masses leading to the coup of 1909 where a new political class was established. The way of governance did not change at all, it was dictatorial as the one of the previous governments. The main difference compared

to the old political class was that it did not develop any social tie with the masses with the result of the people's complete alienation toward their new rulers. The current hostility that was developed toward this new political can be explained with reference to a lack of political legitimacy, which was intensified after unpopular policies being implemented. They did not try to create a political bond with the electorate neither in the local nor in the wider national level. Only in 1916 the Greek people attempted to elect a sovereign government that would represent their interests in a genuine way, however the new political class anticipated a danger of foreign forces collaborating and prevented this development from happening. After that Greece was governed in a dictatorial way by using violent means that guaranteed staying in power (Metaxas 1969, 414-415).

Metaxas claims that there is only one political party in Greece, the bourgeois one that is nationalistic and liberal. He says that this is the only political formation that existed since the beginning of the Greek state. Metaxas explains the foundation of the socialist Labour Party of Greece that was founded two years before, as an outcome of imposed ideas imported from abroad and not deriving from the needs of the "Greek soul". He justified this sort of reasoning arguing that the Greek working class was composed by people that were candidates of the petite bourgeoisie rather than proletarians. For Metaxas there was only one party of Greece, which was divided into different sections with each having a different leader, following however the same program. Metaxas emphasized that this situation actually meant for the electorate that the only difference lied in the choice of the leader and not in distinctively different party programs (Metaxas 1969, 416).

The arguments that Metaxas developed on the political life of Greece and more precisely on its political parties inhere some themes in which his later criticism on parliamentarianism was based on. The first element, which became also common in the following years, was his insistence on his claim that the bourgeois parties could not represent the popular will. The reasons behind this claim changed through the years and were dependent on the different conjunctures in which the argument was articulated. Metaxas view on parties as self-interest organizations that are not interested in serving the national cause remained diachronic. The other theme that was used as an explanation of the inability of political parties to effectively serve the national interests was its foreign character. This argumentation was used both against the Liberal Party and the Communist Party of Greece. This type of argumentation

goes back to the conservative ideology of the 19th century that conceived the liberal transformation of the Greek society as a national danger, as a threat to its existence. The counter-proposal was a Greek state that would be based in institutions and ideas that were established centuries ago like through the king, the feeling of the orthodox religiosity, family and Greekness. These were the main materials that a healthy Greek state should be based on. Thus, this reasoning rejected modernity in its core and the social and political transformations that it implied. It was more a call for the continuation of the traditional order of things rather than a call for the future. Finally, in this type of argumentation we see the division of the Greek nation between the people who govern and the people who are governed, the former conceived as a minority the latter as an undifferentiated mass. This division between the elite and the masses will inform Metaxas' reasoning through all the years of the interwar period. Since then one of the main interests of the Metaxas politics and thought will be subaltern classes and the ways they can be served in benefit of the whole society. In this sense, Metaxas was a populist developing a discourse with the people being in its epicenter by offering a representation of society predominantly antagonistic, divided into two main blocs: the establishment, the power block, versus the underdog, 'the people'. Hence his political efforts were focused on representing the nation in a genuine way in contrast to the rest of the political establishment that considered corrupted.

The royalist as it has been said already after the defeat of Venizelos did not keep the pre-electoral promise and continued the war in Asia Minor. Metaxas in this context was invited by the leadership of the People's party to undertake the military leadership of the Greek army in Asia Minor. He subsequently repeatedly rejected the offers considering that all operations of the Greek army in Turkey are doomed to fail. This situation made him a third pole between the liberals and the royalists and the only significant political player except for the Communist Party that was against the war.

4.2 The acceptance of political modernity: Freethinkers' Party and the Parliamentary politics of 1922-1923.

In this context, after he retired from his career in the Army, Metaxas launched his own party as an alternative to the two main political antagonisms. The foundation of the Freethinkers' Party should be interpreted in this perspective but also as an attempt

to offer a populist alternative that would be able to represent the Greek nation in its totality overcoming the National Schism that divided the country since 1915 (Metaxas 2005, 777-8). Despite its dismissal of parliamentarianism as the organizational principle of the Greek political he had realized that the objective conditions dictated parliamentarianism as the only political solution through which he could influence the internal affairs of the country. Metaxas thus explained that the party had precisely been founded as a parliamentarian alternative for the two significant parties, the Liberals and the Populists, and provided a way out from the political blockade. According to the party manifesto, The Freethinkers aimed to 'replace the methods of the condemned past' (Metaxas 2005, 778). The political step to create a party can be assessed as an implicit acceptance of political modernity, something that will not change until the end of his life. What Metaxas will reconsider after 1933 will be the means of the representation of the popular will of the Greek citizens now not through a political party but through an authoritarian state and new organizational forms attached to it.

The turbulent year of 1923, one year after the defeat of the Greek army, proved bad conjuncture for the launch of his party and did not gain the support he expected. Believing that the forthcoming elections would lead to an abdication of the king he decided to use his old techniques of plotting and endorsed the royalist Leonardopoulos-Gargalidis coup attempt in October 1923, which failed because putschists did not succeed to make inroads in the garrisons of Athens, Thessaloniki or the other major cities, as well as in the overwhelmingly Venizelist Navy. These developments forced him to flee the country again. After the abolition monarchy and the proclamation of the Second Hellenic Republic in March 1924, Metaxas returned to Greece soon after endorsing publicly the acceptance of the new regime. With this he had not only accepted parliamentarianism as a political system but also the abdication of the king as the new conditions of the political game. Indicative of this new reality was his registration in the diary where he describes the announcement of his decision to the party executives: "I have been used to always be sincere. After the results of the referendum I have decided definitely that I will not continue my struggle for the change of the regime, but I will work as a political leader of a party within the political context of this new conditions. I am not willing to lead the Greek people to a civil war and a bloodshed" (Metaxas 2005, 794-795). Another confirmation of his acceptance of the liberal order of politics was the Freethinker's

participation in the elections of 1926. After winning 15,78% of the votes, Metaxas became the Minister of Transport in the "ecumenical government" formed under Alexandros Zaimis.

His faith and dedication to the new political order in Greece can also be induced from his position in the parliamentary discussion over the new constitution of 1927 that established a republican democracy as the form of government (Spyropoulos & Fortsakis 2009, 50). Metaxas endorsed a quite democratic understanding on the way that constitutions are formed arguing that:

"The change in the form of the regimes does not happen because of some predetermined formulations in the constitution. The change in the form of the regimes it is a dynamic product that inheres the intense popular power that none formal or legal limitation can suspend or formalize. When people want and decide with their own power to change the regime there is not any written or unwritten law that can prevent them or to regulate the way they act in regard to this issue. Conversely, when the people want to change the regime there is not a legal form that can impulse them towards this direction. The change of the regimes are popular actions that the statutory documents are just paper barriers. After the action of the people, the constitutional validation follows that defines legally what has happened in a dynamic way. This is one of the lessons of human history and thus should not be ignored" (Benos 2009, 105).

This understanding of the formation of constitutions offered by Metaxas little differs from the Marxist conceptualizations of the period that considered laws and constitutions as the crystallization of the balances of forces of a given society. Also, in this quote there is an implicit acceptance that the democratic constitution of Greece was an outcome of struggles from below if all the constitutions reflect outcomes of social antagonisms.

Metaxas' perception of liberalism was therefore common with the one that dominated within the rest of political system: anticommunist. He accepted the rules of the political game as they had been posed by the two dominant political camps where all ideas and politics were acceptable until the point they were considered to undermine the bourgeois establishment. Indicative of this view of liberal order was his argument within the parliament with Alexandros Papanastasiou, the social-democrat leader of

Agricultural and Labour Party, on the strike on behalf of the tobacco workers in north Greece in June 1917, which ended with 6 killed and 60 injured strikers. Metaxas refused the state's responsibility to intervene in an emerging conflict between the strikers and the bosses because if so, it would be considered as the government intervening in favor of the former. He rejected the objection by Papanastasiou, who argued that the government should have negotiated with the workers, listening to their demands before to the union's call for a strike, endorsing a liberal conception of the state as non-interventionary dealing only a-posteriori with the preservation of the class-balances within the Greek society (Benos 2009, 122-127).

This concern on the preservation of social peace led Metaxas to proceed to an indirect criticism of his past dictatorial political practices. Endorsing the proportional electoral system as the one that guarantees social stability, he argued that:

"We should secure with any cost that the peace within the country is secured. The current intense struggles will not be the same with the ones of the past. Who can guarantee that the struggles will be only among royalists and republicans; There is an emerging dictatorial tendency. The parties claim that they cannot govern by themselves, they have the need of a dictator. This path is very dangerous because we do not know where it leads. After one dictator, a new one comes and there is not a greatest danger nowadays in Greece than the danger of dictatorship that destroys any freedom and kind feeling. I do not believe that this parliament is adopting new electoral systems to promote these ideas and push towards dictatorial solutions. If it acts in this direction it will meet with such a reaction by the Greek people that it will cancel its work. Let's do not forget that the absolute power is a sweet thing but always ends in a bad way" (Benos 2009, 130).

This ironic statement that precedes the future political behavior of Metaxas despite the obvious political opportunism that motivates its articulation since his endorsement of proportional electoral system the statement is also indicative of the new polarization that manifested itself in the Greece society with the emergence of the influential role of the Communist Party of Greece in the political landscape and the increasing hegemony it gained within the ranks of the working class. From now on, the political stakes would have an explicit class aspect, a realization that also occurs in regard to the political system of the country that undertook only a few practical initiatives to overcome the social tensions that are going to emerge.

The ecumenical government of 1926-1928 was succeeded by the Venizelos one that lasted for four years 1928-1932 that collapsed under the pressure of the global financial crisis. The legislative elections of 1932 did not bring a firm winner among the two camps since the People's Party gained the majority in the Lower House while the Liberals won the most seats in the Senate. After the formation of two unstable governments (Tsaldaris and Venizelos) that lasted few months in the new legislative elections that held on 5 March 1933, The pro-monarchist People's Party emerged as the largest party, winning 118 of the 248 seats in Parliament, ending the predominance of Eleftherios Venizelos' Liberal Party.

4.3 Criticizing the second republic: The parliament as an inappropriate institution for the genuine expression of the general will.

The results triggered an attempted coup by Venizelist officers headed by Plastiras aiming to reverse the outcome of the elections. It was a failure and Plastiras was forced into exile. At that point General Plastiras invoked the Mussolini model, suggesting the failure of parliamentary government in the face of the communist threat. This action should not be considered as surprise since Venizelos the leader of the liberal camp few months earlier had recommended amending the constitution by introducing a provision parallel if not similar to the Diktatur Article 48 of the Weimar Republic constitution aiming to strengthen the executive power. The Plastiras coup triggered the polarization of the political game in a way, so that the extremists of the royalist camp would consider authoritarian options as solutions to the parliamentary impasse. Parliamentarianism from this point and after was abandoned by most of the political players who aimed at power. Everybody was realizing that in the new conjuncture the parliament was an ineffective institution to solve the emerging social and political conflicts. Indicative of this change of mentality in regard to the parliament is the intervention of Metaxas in a parliamentary process in December 1933 where in his argument with Tsaldaris he endorsed publicly that: "The parliament lost its status" (Metaxas, 2005, 64). From this point onwards Metaxas acted within the parliamentary procedures aiming though to overturn the regime with military plots and endorsing publicly its non-functionality in the conjuncture.

From the beginning of 1934 Metaxas starts a series of public interventions on the issue of parochialism of the parliament. His first intervention was at the beginning of the year, when he gave an interview to the newspaper *Free Man* (*Eletheros Anthropos*). He argued that the Greek state should abandon the parliament like it did with the golden standard, in order to effectively deal with new issues that have been emerging. While the Greek parliament followed the British example in its conception, the situation became even more complicated due to the national schism that dominated Greek politics since 1915. In order to overcome these problems, Metaxas proposed the establishment of a more stable and powerful executive. He argued that consensus among the political camps would not be able to consolidate since the extremist elements of the camps would split and create a new schism. Thus, he proposed, the solutions should be extra-parliamentarian (Metaxas, 2005, 592-593). In other words, Metaxas at that point considered the modern political institutions of parliamentarianism inappropriate because of their incompatibility with the new conjuncture. In this sense, modernity and its contradictions had been accepted by Metaxas and this is clear even in the temporality of explanations that he offers. As in the past, he only refers to the period of national schism and of the institutions of modernity, which were imported from abroad, where the basic principles of capitalist modernity had been established. In other words, according to Metaxas, modernity needed different institutions that would correspond to the contemporary needs of the Greek society.

The next important denunciation of the parliament by Metaxas was on the 6th of January 1934 in the newspaper *Daily* (*Kathimerini*). This source does not offer information about the reasons why he rejected parliamentarianism, but it provided an overall critique of the political developments in Greece, ideas that will inform his politics until the parliament was abolished and the 4th of August regime established. Therefore, a clearer understanding of Metaxas' view on the conjuncture in Greece necessitates the translation of big segments, especially when assessing the kind of politics, he conducted until the establishment of his authoritarian regime:

"The issue of the political regime is neither a theoretical issue nor one that has to do with what the people believe is ideal ... but a real issue that needs a solution that is dictated by the needs of the conjuncture. Every regime is good when the reasons and the conditions within which it was established are still present. When the conditions

and the circumstances are changed into something completely different, the regime might not be the appropriate one anymore and can be harmful. This is the case with parliamentarianism.

Parliamentarianism was established in the previous century through the rise and the dominance of the middle class [...]. The historical condition of this conjuncture was the dominance of the capitalist system, the free competition of economic interests without any regulating state intervention [...]. The only thing that the capitalist system demanded from a parliamentarian state was non-intervention [...].

Parliamentarianism developed under these conditions and nobody can argue that it did not offer a lot to the society and civilization. But these conditions steadily changed [...]. Capitalism itself abandoned the system of free antagonism – a sine qua non condition of its existence – asking for state intervention (the protection of industry through tariffs etc.). In the same way, the entire society cannot live without the strong intervention of the state nowadays. Additionally, the middle class lost its dominant position and is now dependent on the popular classes.

Thus, the parliamentarian system is totally incapable to correspond to the new problems that have been created. In Greece this situation became more complicated because of the abrupt unification of the Greek people into one state, while being part of different states before. New and old Greece, natives and refugees coming from different historical trajectories, were meant to be integrated politically, socially and economically, something that was not achievable through parliamentarian methods. The schism between Venizelists and Anti-Venizelists [...] is not just a phenomenon of a party struggle. The causes are much deeper and cannot be cured through the parliament [...].

I will give an example for the incapability of parliamentarianism that became clear recently. Parliamentarianism has created three powers within the state that act independently from each other, the legislative, the juridical and the executive one. Each of these powers act towards different directions, since there no power that orientates them to serve the national interest [...].

As we have observed it is totally clear that the problems, both the details and the wider issues that I noted in the beginning, cannot be solved through the parliamentary procedures but through the concentration of state power in the hands of a permanent and stable ruler that will have the popular legitimization. This model will allow all the complicated problems of our national life to be solved and the powers to function in

the direction of serving the general national interest by creating a new order of things that corresponds to the current needs, life and civilization.

If we leave the situation as it is now, parliamentarianism will bring us to the hugs of communism. Hence, we will eventually exit parliamentarianism, but through the doors of communism. Therefore, it is not about finding ways and reasons to maintain parliamentarism, but to decide though which door to exit it, through the door of national state or of communism. Let's choose. It's time to say the truth to the Greek people, because they are the ones who own this house, hence they are the ones to decide." (Metaxas 2005, 594-595).

Metaxas once more framed his critique on parliamentarianism with the argument of its inappropriateness in the current political conjuncture. Adopting a Marxist nuance, he argues that the political regime should be compatible with the economic base and since the base has changed, it is necessary to also change the political superstructure. Thus, this phase of capitalist development necessitates a new political regime that could intervene effectively to the economic and social sphere. The fortune of the middle class is hence connected with the working class because they are present both in the social and political sphere. Therefore, he argues, their policies should also take popular interests into account. In the Greek case the history of parliamentarianism was defined by the national schism, the division between Venizelists and Royalists that referred to distinct social bases. The biggest part of the nation, the electorate of the two camps, was outside the political sphere, not attached to any of the two political formations. Thus, in Gramscian terms the political class of the country could not form neither interclass (division between the two camps) nor intraclass (workers and peasants excluded from the political sphere) hegemony. This was due to lack of political polarization within the parliamentarian system. Other forms of the state would substitute the parliament to effectively deal with the needs of the epoch. The strong executive power is a sine qua non presupposition for an effective state. Metaxas at this stage, had not formed a full analysis of the counter-institutions the new state would have. He asserts that the lack of intraclass hegemony makes the social and political challenge by the communists possible. He considers it as a fact that the parliament cannot function in this new conjuncture, hence he claims that the extra-parliamentary solutions will be unavoidable, either in form of an authoritarian state or a communist one. In his argumentation it becomes clear that the new state

form that he suggests cannot be governed having a wide popular legitimization. He had come to terms with the rules of the political games in modern societies, where necessarily all the forms of political power can speak in the name of the people. Thus, what can be induced also from this type of reasoning is his understanding of the non-representability of the parliamentary institution in the current epoch. His proposals for a new state therefore aim, on the one hand, to integrate successfully the popular classes in a non-communist direction and on the other hand, will be able to represent the Greek nation in a genuine and effective way.

Metaxas shared his ideas on the parliamentary system not only in public but also privately in discussions with other Greek politicians. From his diary we are informed about a conversation on the 12th of January 1934 with Tsaldaris, the leader of the Royalist camp, who had visited Metaxas' house. He expresses in his diary entry on this day that he considers parliamentarianism to be bankrupt and that he will do whatever is necessary to abolish it. Also, he mentions to his note to Tsaldaris that he is not aiming to participate in the government, because he is not satisfied with the mild stance of Tsaldaris' party towards Venizelos and the Venizelists officers (Metaxas, 2005, 80). Against this backdrop it becomes clear that Metaxas' take on the political situation was known to everyone. Politicians, as well as the public, knew in other words that Metaxas was going to use all the possible means in order to undermine the second Greek republic. In the Mid of March, in a political meeting with Dimitrios Maximos, member of the Senate, Tsaldaris, Kondylis, Alexandros Hatzikyriakos and the Minister for Naval Affairs, Metaxas declared once more that he does not think there is a possibility to find a middle ground between the parties and to collaborate effectively in order to overcome the crisis. The only effective solution, he suggested, could be the cancellation of the parliamentary procedures. He informs them that if he gains more power he will ask Tsaldaris to lead an antiparliamentarian initiative that overcomes the legal restrictions imposed by the constitution. Further he says to both Tsaldaris and Maximos that he knows that they do not believe in parliamentarianism but they are willing to do some last attempts to reach an agreement with the opposition (Metaxas, 2005, 91-93). In April, obviously disappointed from the stance of the political personnel of the People's Party, he expresses the idea to lead a counter-revolution for the first time. He argues that a collaboration with other politicians would force him to do compromises and therefore this counter-revolution needed to be led by himself (Metaxas, 2005, 95). However,

Metaxas did not have the necessary power to abolish the parliament by himself only. For that reason, he put the ideas he had already expressed into practice and from May 1934 onwards he advances his contact to General Kondylis, who has been preparing a coup against Venizelist resistance to the army's reforms (Metaxas, 2005, 96-109). The coup however never took place.

Throughout the year Metaxas continued to insist that the only solution to overcome the Greek political crisis is the dictatorship. In October 1934 he met Tsaldaris again and told him to give up believing in the parliament as a solution to the problems of the country. He suggested to avoid new elections because the royalist camp would be defeated since the People's party did not fulfill the main political promises of the previous elections, like for instance to prosecute Venizelos for the Plastiras coup, to abolish the senate and settle the issue with the army officers. Tsaldaris argued that if the royalist parties run as a coalition in the forthcoming elections, there would be a possibility to win. Metaxas however suggested him to lead a coup instead that would abolish the parliament and added that if he is not willing to do it, Metaxas himself would do it. Tsaldaris, being a moderate politician and a convinced parliamentarian, he could not be convinced that what Greece needed was another upheaval over the regime. He strongly believed in the establishment of a good and honest government, hence Metaxas did not convince him to establish a dictatorship or to pass political power to him.

Two main issues polarized the political situation in Greece in 1934. The electoral law and the promotion of army officers, who were affiliated to the People's Party.

Regarding the first issue the royalists attempted to change the law in larger cities to secure a larger return of seats in the coming general elections. Former Venizelist officer and now army minister in the government of Tsaldaris, George Kondylis intervened this year in the list of promotions (Koliopoulos 2006, 240). One of these maneuvers on the electoral system was a bill that was proposed by the People's Party, which institutionalized the province as an electoral district, increasing the possibility to get more seats. Metaxas commented on this bill and declared once more that electoral procedures are not so important since his party, Elethefrones, did not believe that the solution to the complicated political and social issues lied in parliamentary methods (Benos 2009, 205). This type of reasoning continued in another intervention in a parliamentary debate on the electoral law. He suggested that the Greek citizens should intervene by abolishing the constitution with extra-parliamentarian means. He

defended that massive struggles from below could exalt the realm of politics and boost the economic affluence of a country. To demonstrate the validity of his argument Metaxas referred to the French revolution, arguing that the most robust period in France was during the revolution (Benos 2009, 209-210).

The other major political issue at the time was the promotions list of the army, which set the Venizelist machinery in the army and navy in motion and mounted in a coup that aimed at the deterrence of restoration of the crowned democracy (Koliopoulos 2006, 240). The coup was led by Plastiras and failed in its first and crucial phase, when the fleet headed to Crete instead of Thessaloniki, where Venizelos took over leadership of the Movement. The guards in northern Greece rebelled too late, and the ones of the capital were under government's control once again after the onset of the Movement. Venizelists' legitimizing discourse on the coup was framed as a protection of the harassed republic and was just a pretext to establish a one-party rule, and if necessary dictatorship. The government of Tsaldaris reacted and launched a counter-revolution against the Venizelists. Metaxas was hurriedly sworn in as minister without portfolio, while Kondylis rushed to the Venizelist north to suppress the rebellion.

Because of the coup the country declared in a state of emergency and the government "abolished, suspended and amended in a unconstitutional manner all the provisions of the constitution of 1927 concerning the senate and the Judiciary, as well the Universities, civil service and the army" (Spyropoulos & Fortsakis, 2009, 57-60). Venizelos because of these developments was forced into exile and later sentenced to death *in absentia*. Also, many Venizelist army officers fired and were replaced with officers who were supporters of retired general Kondylis. With this move the most important Venizelists officers erased from the army and in that way erased the possibility for the organization of another coup in the future. Factionalism started to be more intense within the royalist camp and precisely among Metaxas and Kondylis, who tried to outbid each other. In order to succeed in this effort, Metaxas adopted a more radical line insisting on the establishment of a dictatorship and the extermination of the Venizelists. Since his demands were not respected, Metaxas announced to Tsaldaris that he could no longer hold the ministry without portfolio in government, which was formed after the coup. He endorsed that since the government overcame the constitution and abolished individual and political rights of the Greek people, a constitutional assembly should be formed (Benos 2009, 216-218). Metaxas claimed

the immediate restoration of Monarch, something that met with disagreement by Tsaldaris and Kondylis who did not want to accelerate the political developments since the scene was already very fragile. This situation made clear that even without the participation of Venizelists in the elections the royalist camp was completely unable to succeed any hegemonic rule.

Soon after the convening of the assembly, Kondylis adopted Metaxas' position and endorsed the restoration of the monarchy through a referendum. They followed him many MP's of the royalist camp in this decision. This shift made the leader of People's party to join the majority of his camp and to support the regimes' change of the regime. The General Kondylis, realizing that in the new conjuncture had secured the consensus of the camp, decided to organize a coup abolishing the Second Hellenic Republic and proclaiming the restoration of Monarchy. This change was validated by a forged referendum that restored officially the monarchy in the country putting an end to the Second Hellenic Republic. The King soon decided to sideline Kondylis because of his dictatorial tendencies and called for new elections in September.

The forthcoming developments that have been presented analytically to the first can be summed to the inability of the two camps to form a government since they were divided internally. Metaxas became now the key figure in the royalist camp after the death of Kondylis and Tsaldaris the next months and hold the position of minister of defense and then Prime Minister with the consensus of the King. At that moment with a parliament to be under dissolution, the communists to March in the Streets and his upgrading as the key political figure of the royalists was much less hesitant to implement his dictatorial plans.

In this wider context of instability because of the pressure from below, King George feeling insecure decided to take radical initiatives by establishing himself as the key political actor of the country leaving aside the idea for a collaboration with the Venizelist camp. This decision would practically imply the reinstatement of key Venizelist officers in the army. Having lost its influence within the army after years in the exile he decided together with Metaxas to abolish the parliamentary regime and establish the 4th of August regime.

However, as it became clear Metaxas was not the only personality who endorsed dictatorial solutions to the political impasse of the country. This type of proposals did not come from the royalist camp only. Venizelists as well suggested or implemented radical extra-parliamentarian solutions from 1933 and onwards. Orchestrating two

coups de facto undermined the parliamentary democracy. Venizelos himself attempted to introduce authoritarian ideas from the Weimar Republic and declared several times publicly his admiration for Benito Mussolini. Some politicians demanded radical changes of parliamentarianism, some others a direct dictatorship. Andreas Michalakopoulos proposed a parliament of 160 MPs and a professional senate. Eletherios Venizelos also proposed an extra-parliamentarian government and his son Sofoklis endorsed the Metaxas coup. From the military section, Plastiras the head of the two coups considered the dictatorship as the best solution to the factionalism that the political parties produced. Thus, far from an exception, Metaxas reflected the wider tendencies of the bourgeois political class in regard to the political governance in Greece in the last years of the second republic before the establishment of the 4th of August regime (Metaxas 2005, 241-242).

4.4 The 4th of August regime: Searching for alternative forms of genuine political representation

The period between 1922 and 1936 is its first political period after his retirement from the army. It can be divided schematically in two parts, where the dividing point was the Plastiras coup of 1933. The unifying motive is that during this phase was that the rules of the political game – as it is played in modern societies, where the political will is mediated through national institutions and political organizations that cannot but speak in the name of the people– were accepted. Elethefrones' political decision to create a party can be read as an implicit acceptance of this reality. His previous political stance was a traditionalist one. He did not accept parties but the institution of monarchy, without the option of electability and legitimization scheme that go back to the Medieval period. Metaxas did not stop to believe in the institution of the King, however in this period he assigned the King another role, a secondary one. He considered it as a supplementary institution to the parliament, which provided stability to the political system when there was the need for it. Compromises like accepting the second Greek republic demonstrated his flexibility and acceptance of the new political order in Greece. The politics of modern era since the arrival of the refugees from Asia Minor in Greece could be conducted only in these terms. Greece entered a new phase of capitalist development and restructuring of its political institutions that fit in the new conjuncture. Metaxas had full consciousness of these changes and adjusted

himself to these. Thus, between 1922 and 1928 Metaxa's party succeeded to capitalize on its insistence to stop the war with Turkey and its will to collaborate with the Venizelist showing a compromising mood after the schism of 1915. Metaxas' party succeeded in other words to occupy a significant space of royalist electorate with its political stance in the post-1922 period. During the following period Metaxas was disengaged from the very active participation in the politics of the country. In the next four years the Venizelists had gained a hegemony, although a temporal one, succeeding to form a coalition constituted by parties coming from the same political family. Metaxas had not any crucial role to play in this period of Venizelist modernization. This fragile hegemony easily broke with the advent of the financial crisis of 1929 and its consequences that became evident in Greece in 1931. The break of the Venizelist hegemonic rule would lead to political uncertainty till the establishment of the 4th of August regime. Metaxas' reply to this fragile conjuncture was firm: dictatorship, the establishment of an extra-parliamentarian institutional arrangement in which personalities from the People's Party will be leading figures. He didn't have a specific form in his mind at this stage. However, he was the only political person from the royalist camp who explicitly endorsed this solution from 1933 and onwards. His antiparliamentarian critique derived from an analysis of the conjuncture of the time. He realized that the parliament was an inappropriate institution to deal effectively with the problems that have been emerged in the Greece society after the appearance of the effects of economic crisis in the country. Metaxas came up with the political diagnosis that the political system of the period neither could articulate an effective hegemonic rule among the political elites nor could it express the demands that have been expressed from below. In the first level, the different political players of the period could not form a coalition with specific ideas on how to deal with the problems of the conjuncture since their personal ambitions in the hegemonic crisis were prioritized over the realization of common solutions. It can be also argued, adopting a more structural analysis, that the political parties in Greece during the interwar period did not prove effective under conditions of hegemonic crisis, since they were leader-centered formations without being able to feel the pressure from below. In the second layer, even though Greece was not a country with strong class polarizations, compared to the cases of Italy or Germany, from 1930's onwards the political issues started to have an explicit class character demanding state interventionists policy that could relief its side-effects to the working-classes due to

the impact of the global financial crisis. The almost-pre-modern structure of the political parties of the country neither could nor were willing to adopt welfare policies that resembled the ones implemented in other European countries of the period. In other words, the political crisis of the interwar period can be interpreted as a structural one where there was an asymmetry among the modern demands from below and the pre-modern traditional character of the political parties of interwar Greece, hence their clientelist nature could not correspond effectively to the needs of the conjuncture. For that reason, Metaxas' intervention always included a concern for the legitimization from below. He had realized that policies and rhetoric which were self-referential could be effective in the new historical conjuncture. The international experiences of authoritarian regimes of the period functioned as exemplar cases how the problem of the country could be solved. Yet, the Greek political parties did not have organizational bases that would allow to imitate the regimes of Italy and Germany. For that reason, fascism in Greece could be implemented only as state-imitative from above with the support of the King. These socio-political parameters due to 1933 when the royalists established themselves in the power, resulted in an antagonism among key political figures to hegemonize their political camp and consequently to implement their political solutions to the national level. Their inability however to articulate effective hegemonic replies to the problems of the conjuncture led them to turn to the army. They used the state machine to cancel or to promote the officers that were affiliated to their camp. The People's Party, which occupied the state machine from 1933 and onwards proceeded to extensive discharges of the Venizelist from the ranks of the army. In parliamentary level the expression of their inability for adequate hegemonic responses was the maneuvering of the electoral laws according to the conjuncture. This card was also played on behalf of the royalists to remain in the power. Metaxas had realized that in this period the consensual means of politics were bankrupted. Thus, from the first Plastiras coup and onwards Metaxas attempted to place himself in a privileged position within the royalist camp. His non-compromising spirit did not allow him to be successful in this process since the deterioration of the political system did not allow a secondary political player to implement radical political solutions. His political antagonist in the party's right wing fraction, Kondylis was more compromising with the reformist parliamentary methods put forward by Tsaldaris, the leader of the People's Party, which was the main political party within the royalist camp. Though as it became clear, Kondylis

had his own authoritarian plans for the future of the country. By neglecting the parliamentary means he organized a coup against Tsaldaris. This was a clear sign of the deep fragmentation within the royalist camp and its inability to offer any realistic political alternative to the ongoing crisis. Metaxas and Kondylis, two ex-army officers with small political parties, gained a lot of influence in parliamentary politics in the post-1933 conjuncture. Both their connections within the army that could protect the royalists from the Venizelists, played a crucial role. On a more structural level, this period of crisis can be seen as a process in which the intensification of the intra-bourgeois struggle for dominance within the hegemonic bloc (encompassing both Venizelists and anti-Venizelists) developed into a crisis of the traditional political structures and instruments of bourgeois hegemony itself. Metaxas after the re-establishment of the monarchy and the death of Kondylis succeeded to place himself in an advantageous position within the royalist camp. First through the position of the minister of defense and then as prime minister of the country. The deaths of key figures of the political landscape offered him the political space he needed to implement his plans directly, also because he enjoyed the support of the King who wanted to establish his authority within the country through its leadership in the Greek army. The invocation of the communist threat that could overturn the bourgeois order despite that it did not correspond to an immediate political danger reflected a potential challenge to the political system since the political parties of the period could not deliver any relief policies for the working classes. The possibility if the communist movement gaining a hegemonic momentum with unexpected results was perceived as a threat scenario, particularly because nobody from the bourgeois political world was willing to seriously deal with the problems of the daily people. The Communist party of Greece was the only influential party who had a modern structure with an organizational base that attempted to deal with the working class and the peasants. This asymmetry in the long term could be proved crucial for the survival of the bourgeois political world. The only solution since the parliament could not deal effectively with these demands was a regulation from above, with an authoritarian way though. Metaxas state's initiative materialized this project to intercept the further political radicalization of the workers and the peasants that did happen from 1931 and onwards. Regarding the workers, he regulated the relations between labor and capital with forced methods and adopted relief policies that improved their conditions slightly. In the level of the organization of workers he changed the leadership of the

General Confederation of the Greek workers transforming it practically to a state institution. Regarding the peasants he regulated their debts at the Agrarian Bank of Greece and replaced the liberal 'Panhellenic Confederation of Farmers' Cooperative Unions' with the state-controlled 'National Confederation of Agrarian Cooperatives of Greece'. Thus, the Metaxas project should be perceived both as overcoming of the intra-bourgeois antagonisms with the establishment of an authoritarian state and as regulation of the social conflict in an authoritarian from above.

The argumentation that is supported and summed up by Metaxas' own words, in his public address after the establishment of the dictatorship:

"The Greek government that was elected after long internal adventures of the Greek nation on January 1936 to restore internal peace and order, proved from the beginning it was unable to provide the country with a government. This inability was also proven recently when due to incurable party conflicts and personal disputes, for which the majority of the working people were indifferent, communism took advantage of the conjuncture. Enjoying the support from different political sides communism threatened the political regime of Greece. In the last few months, communism prepared the social revolution intensively and recently was on the verge of it. The events in Thessaloniki were a preface to it.

[...] Communism took advantage of the economic difficulties of the country that emerged to a great extent because of the bad administration of the past. During this period the different parties who participated in the various governments of the country absorbed themselves in intense fights among each other and focused their actions on the reproduction of clientelist relations in order to gain political power. Communism capitalized on this situation propagating its ideas to workers and the poor classes to overturn the bourgeois state by telling lies. My non-party government since the beginning of April 1936 diagnosed the dangers that exist within the Greek society from the beginning and was always determined to implement all the necessary measures to morally and materially improve the whole society and more precisely the situation of peasants and workers and the poorer classes. [...] In every step that the government took, it was met with the parties' reactions aiming to undermine its status and to obstruct the implementation of its program. The reactions were accompanied by a press that produced demagogic articles, fake and bad news. These factors contributed to a great extent to the subversive attempt of communism. [...] The

government proved to be right also from the fact that on 31st of July a committee of communist MPs came to my office to declare shamelessly that if this government did not abandon its measures – that in reality were in favor of the workers, however their implementation would not push the people to communism – they would "start a general strike until their demands get satisfied".

This is the situation that the government is confronted with. This threat of an immediate social and national catastrophe to the country was detected directly and thus it was considered an imperative task to forestall the manifestation of the subversive revolt [...] For that reason the King declared martial law for the whole country and the dissolution of the parliament.

I invoke the full participation of the Greeks that still believe that our national traditions and civilization should stay unscathed. [...] The Greek people from now on can live and work calm and undistracted and with a feeling of absolute safety. They should firmly believe that the government will establish the political regime and will work under the auspices of the King effectively for the welfare of the Greek society in general and more precisely for the poor and suffering classes.

For that reason, I demand full discipline towards the state that is the necessary savior of the Greek society and without which a genuine freedom cannot exist.

I should declare explicitly that I am determined to eradicate any reaction against this attempt of national regeneration as fast as possible." (Metaxas 2005, 225-227)

Metaxas' address to the Greek people helps us to understand the official reasoning of the establishment of the 4th of August regime. Its antiliberal and anticommunist direction becomes clear. Yet the prosecutions of liberal politicians were moderate compared to what happened to the respective communist ones. The majority of the bourgeoisie, with few exceptions, did not react to Metaxas' dictatorship neither in the beginning nor in the following years. Their reactions are summarized in resolutions, discussions with the embassies of allies and a failed attempt of a minor coup in Crete. Thus, only few of them were sent to exile, a measure that aimed to prevent any significant reaction against the regime. The communists on the other hand that continued their political activity were strongly repressed by advancing the repressive structures that Venizelos regime had established like tortures and exiles. The Minister of Security, Konstantinos Maniadakis, quickly infiltrated and practically dissolved the Communist Party of Greece by seizing its archives and arresting communist

leader Nikos Zachariadis. This way Metaxas implemented his programmatic statements for the repression of political forces that would attempt to undermine its regime.

In regard to the communist threat Metaxas was following the Spanish case. In 1932, Comintern decreed that anti-fascist fronts should be formed internationally. KKE responded to this by creating the People's Front, adopting the anti-fascist popular front policy. An expression of it was the agreement known as the 'Sofoulis-Sklavainas agreement' that been presented in the first chapter. In Spain, PCE was a small party during the initial years of the republic, until it began to grow due to the victory of the Popular Front (of which the communists had been a constituent part) in February 1936. More precisely in the elections of 1936 the PCE had only 14 elected MPs and 50.000 members while the other parties of the front had 177 MPs. The president of the Spanish Republic, Azaña, was not more radical than Sofoulis. However, few months later the civil war broke out. Despite the different compositions of social forces between the two cases, the decomposition of the two political camps could open the possibility for a serious challenge of the political regime from the left. Metaxas clarified his understanding regarding the communist threat and what he meant with his programmatic statements in an interview in the newspaper Kathimerini few days after the establishment of his regime. To the question if his declarations regarding the communist threat were exaggerated, he replied: "[...] I do not endorse that communists would declare the revolution on the 5th of August, dominate and take the power immediately. I say that they would create turbulences in urban centers and steadily in smaller ones. Without realizing, we would enter a revolutionary situation from which we would not be able to exit without a bloodshed [...]. The state would repress the communist movement but this way it would also create heroes and martyrs. The amount of dissatisfied people would increase and would boost the revolutionary psychology and atmosphere among the people. In this scenario the communists would gain the support from conservative workers too. The rest of the parties would also undermine the government believing that the communists would be the successors. But they are wrong because they would be successors only for a short-time period and would play the tragic role of Alexander Kerensky. From this point and after the radical left would play a crucial role in the developments, however as the great historian Ranke has endorsed, they do not dominate conciliatory personalities but representatives of intransigence. Those who have observed the strike on the first

days of August will have realized that the motivation was explicitly political. The communists were terrified by the idea that the government would issue a law for the obligatory arbitration and basic salary. They did not want in any case a non-communist government to benefit the working class. It was a matter of clientele and the communists will never forgive me that I took their clients" (Metaxas 2005, 232).

This statement by Metaxas provides a better analysis of how he perceived the conjuncture and more precisely the role of the communists. Metaxas observed the rise of the Communist Party's influence and the potential danger for the bourgeois political regime of Greece. The danger lied in the two main political camps of the period, which were completely indifferent toward the needs and problems of the working classes. They were not willing to deal in any serious matter with the side-effects of their economic policies, with the exception of the Communist Party, which however was an outsider. In this sense Metaxas is right to emphasize that the crisis of the political world at that period was a failed attempt to establish a hegemonic rule within the country's affairs. The working people's needs since the crisis of 1933 were neglected abandoning any plan for distributive policies. The political elite instead absorbed itself to failed attempts to establish its authority resorting to violent means.

This situation de facto opened a big space for political propagation to any force who was willing to deal rhetorically or through political actions with the dissatisfied electorate. The propaganda could also affect the conservative strata of the working class that was until then attached to one of the two main political parties. A certain amount of the refuge electorate already had been attached to the communist party of Greece from 1932 and onwards. Thus, the Metaxas regime attempted to obstruct the further gain of the hegemonic momentum on behalf of the communist party that was gaining support day by day. His alternative was authoritarian. With the measures of the 4th of August regime, he attempted to give an authoritarian tone to the regulation of the conflict between labor and capital and to the solutions of peasants problems. To the extent that the parliamentary system could not provide solutions to the problems, the other two options were either from above with a dictatorship that would overcome the political divisions of the pasts or with struggles from below that would push the governments to implement social welfare measures opening the political possibilities of the future. Therefore, the establishment of the Metaxas regime can be interpreted as a question of hegemony over the working classes. What the political world was not

willing to do and what the Communist party was aiming to do but was not allowed, was imposed by Metaxas from above. Of course, this does not mean that Metaxas' alternatives were radical or anti-capitalist in any sense, but they regulated the situation in ways that was not possible before retaining the capitalist property relations of the Greek economy.

Metaxas as a response to the crisis of parliamentary regime and having accepted the basic principles of political modernity, he attempted to establish a political regime backed by the popular will, claiming a more comprehensive representation of the Greek people. Additionally, his regime created also a series of institutions that substituted the previous ones of the liberal political order. Hence, in the following part of the chapter, I attempt to demonstrate what Metaxas did in this direction, how he conceived his regime in political and theoretical terms. I propose it should be conceived as an authoritarian political alternative to the previous parliamentary regime, corresponding to the fascist respective regimes of the period in Europe. The fact that it failed to fulfill its political promises should not prevent us to understand it as the Greek example of the authoritarian shift in the interwar period. Not only because theoretically it was legitimized in authoritarian political concepts but also because it proposed and implemented certain institutional alternatives to political liberalism.

In the report that Metaxas sent to the King on the day of the abolition of the parliament, he explains the reasons of the coup and argues that the parliament failed to form an effective lasting government, which was reason why the communists could challenge the status quo of the country. In this sense, the parliament's abolition is considered necessary since it did not fulfill its aims and does not correspond with the national will (Metaxas 1997, 15). He further endorsed in a speech during the conference of Artisans that his government is not constituted by parties and thus belongs to all the Greeks, to the whole nation aiming to regenerate the nation that had been undermined by the parties' interests. Its main objective is to make the Greek think according to the national interest and not in individual terms (Metaxas 1997, 19-20). It becomes clear that from his first public interventions Metaxas attempted to build an image of his government as an one that represents the national interest in a more genuine way compared to the previous parties' politics.

Metaxas justified the cancellation of parliamentary politics using the known argument of its non-correspondence to the needs of the conjuncture by now offering a historical periodization of the relation between capitalism and democracy. Parliamentarianism was the regime of the middle-class and emerged when capitalism was functioning without restrictions. This period lasted between 1830 and 1880. During this period the economy functioned independently from the state, producing the civilization of the 19th century, in which parliamentarianism was integral. The state did not interfere in the activities of industrialists and merchants, the commercial exports, the currency but focused exclusively on the internal affairs related to the state. This period came to an end. In the beginning of the 20th century, capitalism itself abandoned the free economy and demanded the intervention by the state. The first sign of this shift was when the USA stopped the free inflow of human labor, which itself is a commodity. Then capitalism demanded from the state the imposition of tariffs. Several cartels were created, which put an end to free capitalist era. From this point and after the financial destinies of the countries were not anymore dictated by capitalism but by the states. This was intensively the case before the beginning of WWI and continues since then. The economies from this period and after, have been directed by the states. In this new period the parliament has not any significant role to play since it is impossible for a single party to regulate the whole economy. This situation leads to an antagonism because the governance of a country is equated with interference in the private economy. The stakes thus in this era are far greater for the members of the parliament. Greece underwent same processes, were the parties attempted to be in the government in order to control the economy of the country. Under these conditions the parliament was not able to survive and collapsed like in several European countries (Metaxas 1997, 28-30).

This historical modernist interpretation of the non-compatibility of the parliament with the current epoch legitimized the substitution of the parliament with other institutional forms of representation. This was completely clear and conscious to Metaxas. He had realized that despite its authoritarian character the regime should speak in the name of the people and to create alternatives forms of institutional representation. This becomes clear from his understanding on how the political modernity functioned when he argued that: "The collapse of parliamentarianism is not an important damage since the parliamentary system is only one form of the representative canon of the modern societies. There are forms of representations that

can succeed a system when it cannot deliver its promises. In Greece parliamentarianism created only ruins in the last years" (Metaxas 1997, 30). This quote allows us to categorize Metaxas among the fascist. As Dylan Riley (2010) has argued in his study, *The Civic Foundations of Fascism*, the fascists were those who abolished the parliamentarian regimes not because they considered them as democratic but for the opposite reason on the base of the non-representative form. Being modernists accepted that their societies could not function with alternative counter-institutions to the liberal orders. For that reason, they created a series of institutions through which the people could participate through representations in the management of their countries. The fascists continued to speak in the name of the people creating legal orders and legitimizing discourses that corresponded to these new realities. Metaxas as the rest of the authoritarian leaders and theorists of the period disconnected the claim for a genuine representation from the parliamentary structures. He did this because he considered that at a specific moment the parliament could not deliver its promises and to be inclusive of the nation. For that reason, he attempted to establish institutions that could represent the Greek nation in more effective ways. Parliament was considered just one of the representative institutions of modernity and thus it could be substituted with others that still could be speak in the name of the people.

The 4th of August regime was not only self-identified as an anti-parliamentarian one but also as anticommunist. For Metaxas parliamentarianism and communism was also an imported ideology that was incompatible with the "individualistic Greek temperament". The people who became communists in Greece were unemployed and poor and the bourgeois state did not adopt welfare policies to relief them. The collapse of parliamentarianism directed many desperate people to the Communist Party. Many people from the youth became communists because of the lack of ideals within the Greek society after the national catastrophe in Turkey in 1922. Metaxas makes the point that there was a wide crisis of ideological orientation within the Greece society, the future seemed grim for many young people. Communism with its utopianism offered a perspective for a better future, something that the traditional political parties could not offer. Metaxas with its regime also attempted to monopolize the utopian imagination of the Greek people orientating them in an authoritarian vision on how the things should be. In this sense, the Third Hellenic Civilization of Ioannis Metaxas was an ideological project with utopian aspirations, to offer an

ideological horizon to a society that lacked a robust vision for its future. He makes this view very explicit when he mentioned that the main aim of the government is the regeneration of the country, materially and ethically, as well as in a national direction. The national ideology of Metaxism did not have an expansionary direction but an intensive one. With this he means that the imperialist plans of the past had been abandoned once and for all. The focus now of the Metaxas regime was to build a cohesive nationalistic project within the country, where it would politicize or re-politicize the Greek citizens with its own ideals. Metaxas had criticized the imperialist aspirations of Venizelos already from the 1920s, endorsing at that time that his project lacked realism. The developments proved that he was right. For that reason, the Metaxas regime in contrast to other authoritarian regimes of the interwar period never had imperialist aspirations. The enemy was inside and had the names of liberalism and communism. Metaxas submits that Greece will never return to this corrupted past. More precisely he endorsed that: "The government is permanent and a lasting one and will implement its policies until the point to be reorganized fully, to be fully regenerated. The regime will be developed in a new direction, deleting its past and taking a new shape: a new representative system where the working classes, the real representatives of the nation, those who are interested for the people's interests and put the nation above all will participate and those who demagogue successfully the people through the votes and are interested only for the interests of their parties will be excluded" (Metaxas 1997, 20-37). These expressed ideas by Metaxas put an emphasis on his varying forms of representation and indicate the alternatives to the common understanding of representation on his mind that is delineated along anti-liberal paradigms and connected with the professions of the people organized in a corporatist base. According to his conception of representation, the representatives of the working people would deal with issues that are related with their sector not with the totality of the country's problems, since for those issues there are specialists who knew better and would deal more effectively.

Metaxas though was conscious of the difficulties that an attempt of fundamental changes would imply. For this reason, he was careful enough not to do it immediately after the establishment of its regime. The first year of the regime was a transitory one, Metaxas focused on the neutralization of his political adversaries and did a series of minimal corrective steps to gain political legitimization from below. He was not so sure about the strength of his power that he was building day by day selecting his

tactical moves carefully. His first aim was to gain consensus from the King and abroad for his government and to intervene to the institutions to bring them on his side, not only within the state but also outside of it. Thus, when he spoke to the Greek people few months after the establishment of his regime about the corporatist organization, he clarified that one of priorities of his government was: "The careful and gradual associational organization of the society in order to function in the future as the base of a well-studied system of associational representation in the national level, and according to the interests of the nation." (Metaxas 1997, 50). This system will be on the opposite side of parliamentarianism since it will function in favor of the needs of the nation. This institution was considered necessary to be abolished since the current conjuncture needs strong states that do not dependent on the decisions of few MPs. According to Metaxas, this alternative order of things despite the genuine social legitimization from the popular classes, was due to the knowledge of the situation and recognition of the achievements of the government (Metaxas 1997, 57). This dictatorship is neither based on the army nor aims it to be established resorting to violent methods. It is based in the popular will of the Greek people and the trust of the King. The Greek people constitute the current state, while in the previous system the directors of the state were the parties, which were alienated from the people. The legitimization in this new order of things is induced from the manifestations of the popular support that are widespread (Metaxas 1997, 102). One of the main actor of this new organization is considered the working class. Through a proper organization the possibilities of exploitation by the fraud trade union leader are eliminated. It will collaborate with other classes in a way that can articulate their demands without undermining the social peace. Together with the other classes it will be the nucleus for the reorganization of the state in a corporative base. The representatives of the classes - to the extent that they will not challenge the status quo - will serve for national aims of social progress (Metaxas 1997, 81).

The main reasoning behind the new logic of representation is that big social groups should be reconstructed because the state should take the form of the society that it derives from. Within the state only the real forces that exist within the society should be represented. Those who contribute with their labor in the development of the Greek society should be represented. The representatives will come from the class it belongs to and will represent the real material and ethical interests that exist within the society. The representatives cannot come from the parliament because they do not

represent anyone just themselves. Thus, the employers and the workers of all the sectors and the artisans will be reconstituted and organized. Their representatives will constitute the Great Council of National Labor and they will collaborate. The 4th of August regime will not allow the class struggle, the collaboration between the class will be obligatory to revive the country. Then, the organization of the individual professionals and the rest of uncategorized professions will follow. In that way, the whole society will be reorganized according to its existing realities. These representatives of the classes will participate in the national council of professions. The steps for the implementation of this project should be careful because it will be decisive for the future of the Greek people and no mistakes are allowed (Metaxas 1997, 112-113). The representatives of the classes will collaborate with the respective ministers helping them to take the right decisions for the destiny of the classes (Metaxas 1997, 138-139).

It becomes clear for this type of argumentation that Metaxas developed a specific logic of representation, which he was planning to implement when the conditions would allow it. The representatives in this new era will not come from the parties since they are unable to serve the national interests as self-interested political organizations. The vertical representation is abandoned for a horizontal one, each class and profession will have its own representatives that will participate in the great council of labor and then in the national representation. The decision-making process however will be dependent on the ministers who will be those in collaboration with the respective representatives of their ministry and will decide about the specific issues. This way of representation was regarded as a more genuine one compared to the parliamentary one, since the representatives would negotiate issues related to the specific interests of the specific classes they represent. It also becomes clear that Metaxas feels the need to speak in the name of the people. The new regime articulates the aim to represent the Greek people in a more effective and genuine way. The interests of the Greek people in this understanding are understood solely on an economic basis, since the organization of the future state would be determined following the criterion of class. The people would have to decide through their representatives on issues related to their profession and only. The executive decisions on the issues will be taken by the ministers who will be specialists on the issues of their ministries. Thus, the totality of the nation that is undivided will be governed on the basis of partial issues decided by specialists. However, the totality breaks again in parts yet

not due to diverting individual interests, but class interests regulated in a way that could not challenge the sociopolitical status quo. This organization of the Greek society is a nativist one since it derives from the specific formation of the Greek society as it has been shaped now. Thus, the institutions that will be established are not anachronistic like the ones of the parliament, corresponding to different historical periods and to different national contexts. Parliamentarianism was an imported institution from England. Metaxas' institutional initiative aimed to be Greek and to serve the national interests as they have been crystallized in the post-1933 conjuncture. This outlook also helps us to understand better his take on the perceived communist threat to the country. It can be argued that he considered it as a real threat, even if it was not an immediate one, since his political proposal is based on an understanding of the society to be composed by different contradictory economic interests that should be regulated. He proposed this plan to prevent the derailment of the country in an uncontrolled revolutionary situation. He firmly believed that political modernity should take an authoritarian shape in order to regulate the ongoing social and political conflicts that developed in the country since the completion of its national integration process. In this sense, if Metaxas did not believe that the communist issue was an important one he would not have suggested a political reorganization of the Greek society in a way to eliminate the social ground for future emergence of this danger. In this new conception of politics, the citizens are not allowed to have a reason to vote for the party that is considered as the best option for the promotion of the interest but actually only promotes issues related to their profession. This type of reasoning helps also to understand why it does not make sense to conceive Metaxas as a traditional dictator but as a fascist leader with a specific political project in his mind. He had specific ideas about the reorganization of the Greek society that were not different at all from the respective projects that were developed in similar countries of the interwar Europe. The fact that he did not have the time to materialize his idea because of conjunctural reasons does not mean that it differed substantially from the rest of the European canon at this time. It further does not mean either that his politics were an uncategorized particular Greek authoritative attempt. It was the Greek version of fascism considering the national particularities and structural limitations imposed by the global conjuncture. The reasons that these plans were not materialized are explained by Metaxas in one of the speeches he gave to the Association of National Technical University of Athens, where he argues that:

"Since all the social groups are part of the state, thus also the association of the National Technical University of Athens, you should contribute as much as you can to the process of state building. Though it is true that the legislature has not been developed to that point in order to make provision for the different social groups in a way to serve the national aims. Me and my colleagues preferred the things to be developed by themselves considering that we have realized that the Greek society welcomes our initiatives. We did not push the things further. The day will come when your participation in the state through the legislature will happen. Thus, the groups and the associations who do not contribute to the welfare of the nation are not conceivable. Since the state has moral and national aims every group moves against the state should be dissolved [...] Admittedly, we could have done more in order to develop Greece in technical terms, our program has a lot of imperfections. You should understand though that we found Greece in a weak situation where its border could not prevent anyone from offending our country [...] In this new conjuncture Greece ... should secure its borders... This is where we spent the available money we had as Greece" (Metaxas 1997, 184-185).

It becomes clear that already from May in 1937 the focus of the Greek state was on the protection of its national borders, investing state money to the army equipment. Even if Metaxas was referring to the projects of public investments in infrastructures, these projects could easily be applied for all the other state initiatives that were not fulfilled as they were promised in the beginning. Metaxas was acting day by day according to what he considered as priorities. Since he established a series of measures for the workers and peasants his focus from mid-1937 and onwards was mainly abroad. The communist organizations were dissolved, and the bourgeois were completely unable to challenge its authority. Thus, the internal danger was wiped out. The issue from now was the protection of the country from the imperialist tendencies of the powers of the Axis.

In the criticism that Metaxas articulated against liberalism and parties he added that they did not respect the rights of the King who were constitutional. In this sense, they did not respect the popular will that is crystallized in the constitution of the country. Also, the separation of powers was not respected since they overlapped. The parties on the other hand contributed to the division of the national totality that existed

unified as such. The parties and liberalism since they did not correspond to Greek physiognomy and could not grow naturally within the Greek context were imported from abroad. The people who represented with the parties were part of the political elite. The division that was imposed through the domination of the parties can account for the national catastrophes that had happened in the country since the midst of the 19th century. Metaxas reconstructs the defeats in the wars that took place during the process of national integration of the country as catastrophes that could be explained with the divisive effects of party politics. The first example he mentions is the Cretan Revolt of 1866 during which there were several governments that succeeded one after the other. The second example he puts forward is the 1878 Macedonian Revolution where the Greek population of Macedonia to opposed the annexation to Greater Bulgaria and Metaxas mentioned again that the Greek army and navy was once more not ready for the confrontation. He cites the crisis of 1878 in Eastern Rumelia, where the Greek army was again unprepared. The last two events he mentions were those in which he participated as an officer of the Greek army, the defeat of 1897 in the war with Ottoman Empire and the Balkan War in 1912. These episodes are reconstructed as failures that took place because of the establishment of parliamentary rule. Also inn regards to the internal affairs parliamentarianism was considered catastrophic. Greece remained a poor country that led many people from the native population to move to the USA during the first two decades of the twentieth century, in order to find a job for survival. In the aftermath of WWI Greece was divided. Coups followed one after the other. Greece's esteem outside its borders was undermined. Metaxas then, in his declarations of 1934, refers on the need for the abolition of parliamentarianism and goes through with the abolishment in 1936 when he considered the conditions mature enough for this step. With the 4th of August regime there is a stable government under the leadership of one person that belongs to the whole nation. The nation is now an undivided totality and provides its leader with support. Everyone in this new situation put aside his own individualism and devote himself to this new national effort that is the building of the Third Hellenic Civilization (Metaxas 1997, 248-253). In this narration, the whole past of modern Greece is reconstructed as a series of failures for which the parliamentarian system was the main responsible factor, and which was established in Greece in the midst of the 19th century. This type of argumentation is used in order to extrapolate the conclusion that the prehistory of

Greece was dominated only by catastrophes and the real regeneration of the country started with the establishment of the 4th of August regime.

In another criticism of liberalism that Metaxas developed in his speech in the associations in Patra, he argued against individualism considering it a fiction of the 19th century's dominant ideology. He argued that only groups not individuals exist in societies. People live within wider social relations. They work in groups and produce collectively and for that reason they develop a similar ideology and common interests. The previous order of things ignored this basic reality and treated the social body as potential individual votes not as a society organized in groups. With the 4th of August regime groups are not outside the state anymore but they are organic part of it. Their legal relation towards the state is considered an open question and is meant to be decided in the near future.

At the agricultural conference in Larissa, Metaxas developed further his thoughts on how mediation between the people and the power in this new post-liberal era should be designated. He mentions in the beginning of his speech that since the establishment of the regime there was a direct contact with the people through his speeches where all the issues related to the Greek people were presented. The same happened with the minister of the government that traveled through the city and discussed the issues that were relevant to their ministries with the people. Another indirect way is through and organized specialized conferences that started already in 1936, like the conference on Tobacco in Kavala, the agricultural conference in Thessaloniki and the conference of Tobacco workers in Piraeus. In these conferences were claimed to be spaces of participation as not all Greeks participated but their representatives that differ substantially from the parliamentarians, since they were members of the class they represent and not the party. Additionally, the participation in the conferences was instrumentalized in order to deliver binding mandates with specific aims and short-term duration. Although this was not their job but they are free citizens that willingly represent their class. In this sense, they are representatives of the Greek people. This system according to Metaxas is planned to expand further. The government in that way comes closer with the people directly through the trips of its ministers and indirectly through their representatives. This new regulation of representation guarantees that the government will remain outside the influence of the parties and will represent the totality of the Greek people (Metaxas 1997, 298-299).

Having developed these thoughts Metaxas expands further his take on the agrarian cooperatives, precisely at the opening of the School of Agrarian cooperatives. He advises the peasants to participate actively in the agrarian cooperatives showing solidarity among each other since they have the same needs being part of the same class. They should struggle together in order to improve the conditions of their lives. The only way to succeed in their aims as farmers is to get involved with cooperations. The previous attempts to create effective cooperatives successfully according to their aims was blocked by the political parties because there were conflicting interests among the two organizations. The cooperation was seen as a horizontal connection for people of the same class while the party is a horizontal one that connects people from different class backgrounds. He recognizes that not every farmer needs to get involved in the cooperations since the cooperative ideology has not been developed in the same way throughout the country. The school was founded in order to prepare the future members of the cooperations to be ready to deal with these deficiencies of the cooperative system in its current form (Metaxas 1997, 428-429).

Conclusion

Summing up, it could be argued that Metaxas developed a thorough critique of political modernity and its institutions and theoreticized specific counterproposals about the ways that the popular will can be expressed in its regime. Political modernity first of all was criticized for its divisive nature in regard to the national totality. The parties and the parliament divided the people and alienated individuals that had the aim to promote their individual interests. This political perception and its institutions dissolved the social body that since always existed within social groups a process that was disrupted through the march of modernity. More precisely, these general tendencies were formulated as a conservative critique of modernity that took a specific shape within the Greek context with the establishment of imported institutions from abroad. The parliament could not express the popular will since it neglected the constitutional rights of the King. Additionally, it could account for the national disaster of Greece in the national wars in the process of national integration where the country could not deal effectively in regard to the foreign threats since it was divided in political camps. The situation deteriorated completely from 1934 and onwards. Already then Metaxas articulated his opinion on the need for the abolition of

the parliament because he asserted that it could not deliver its political promises, opening the way for the communists to challenge the status quo. The bourgeois self-absorbed the issues related to their own reproduction and ignored the demands from below, especially those articulated by the popular classes, something that was not the case for the communists who gained political ground intervening in the political conjuncture of the parliamentary crisis. Metaxas established its regime as a response to these developments. The 4th of August regime attempted to substitute liberal policies and propose a new relation of the citizens with the state. Parties were abolished, and communists sent to prison. In return, Metaxas regulated the relations among labor and capital and canceled the peasant's debts, as well as established new counter-institutions to represent the farmers. He insisted in a direction of a corporatist regulation of the Greek society where the representation would have a horizontal form and the people would be develop forms of organization on the basis of their professions. Parliamentarianism on the opposite was a form of vertical relation of the people with power. This form of representation that Metaxas proposed reduced the politics to a technocratic regulation where issues related to their professions were central. Metaxas considered his model a more genuine one since parliamentarianism could neither deal with the problems of the people from below nor could it provide a stable government that was capable of dealing effectively with the fragile global order of the period and its dangers that were imposed on the Greek nation. The 4th of August regime was also perceived as an attempt to re-launch the settings of the Greek nationalist on a new radical ground. It did neither follow the imperialist nor the racist direction of authoritarian states, like the case of Italy for instance, for reasons that had to do with the historicity of the Greek conservative right and its role within the political landscape of the country as its was formed within the two first decades of the century. The values that were posed in the epicenter of this project were religion, family and patria and the devotion to the institution of monarchy. Features that were not very different from the fascist experiment of Francisco Franco in Spain. With this attempt Metaxas aimed to re-politicize the social body in authoritarian terms preventing any possibly derailment of the social body to the communist ideology that had entrenched both with the workers and specific sections of the Greek state. Metaxas wanted the workers and the peasants for him not for the communists. The methods of politicization that he proposed were modern. The organization of the people in state-controlled unions and cooperatives was one of the mains of the people.

In the same logic EON was established, the organization of the youth that Metaxas founded in 1936. The response to liberalism was the participation of the people in massive organizations that are controlled by the state and can contribute to the strengthening of the 4th of August state. This process would contribute to the politicization of the people in nationalistic direction without challenging the status quo as it was re-established by Metaxas. Thus, we should perceive the Metaxas regime as an authoritarian state initiative that did not use only violence to establish itself but also mechanisms of political consensus. The fact that Metaxas failed to implement his ideas on the organization of state in a corporatist direction does neither mean they lacked an ideology nor that his state was an uncategorized peculiarity of the interwar period. Metaxas had both a solid ideology and the wish to build an anti-liberal order, the reasons that were not fulfilled were structural conditions imposed from the geopolitical order of the period and the problematic finance of the country. He proceeded to institutional reforms carefully in a way that would not bring turbulence within the country and in its diplomatic relations with the states that were related closely this period. Thus, it can be argued that the 4th of August regime was a respective Greek example of the variation of the anti-liberal and anticommunist state initiatives that emerged in the interwar period. Its differentiations had to do with the peculiarities of the Greek social formation as it was shaped from 1870's and onwards not with Metaxas' insufficient fascist ideology.

In this chapter, I attempted to present Metaxas' ambivalent relation with modernity by periodizing his life in four distinct but dialectically interlinked phases. The first period was his formative one where the nationalist wars and his relation to the King were the two dominant features. His social background as a decadent aristocrat contributed to these specific choices. The army at the time was one of the few promising careers within the Greek state for people without a wealthy family background. Unavoidably his conservative origins facilitated the process of his identification with the King who was the head of the army. His political outlook was then shaped by these affiliations. He rejected modernity and its political institutions and endorsed the institution of monarchy from a conservative point of view as the institution that could express the national totality itself. Parliament was an imported institution that was imposed on Greece from outside, distorting the natural order of society and politics. Monarchy was the institution that corresponded to the Greek physiognomy since it had survived through the centuries. His values also formed his geopolitical attachment to imperial

Germany, especially through his studies in the turn of century. Its defeat meant for him the dissolution of the traditional and the passage to the era of individualism.

His second phase coincides with the acceptance of modernity after his decision to get involved actively in the politics of the country after the Greece's defeat in the war with Turkey. He realized that the only way to influence the destiny of Greece was through parliamentary means. Therefore, he established his own party Eleftherofrones. He accepted additionally the uncrown republic after the abdication of the King of Greece. His party enjoyed success in the elections of 1926, which capitalized on his insistence to withdraw the Greek army from the war in Asian Minor. This stance made him one of the few central players in the Greek political centre who opposed firmly the imperialist expansionary plans of Greek nationalism. It differentiated him also from the rest of the royalist camp, which was responsible for the continuation of the march from the 1920 and onwards, a division that will follow him during his entire political career and will define his relations with rest of the royalist political leaders. His participation in the coalition of 1926 contributed to the stabilization of the political system after the divisive politics of the previous period. At the same time however, a divided royalist camp without any specific positive vision for the society allowed Venizelism to articulate an own hegemonic project that disrupted when Greece abandonment the gold standard in April 1932.

The impact of the global crisis of 1929 in the country, that will be crystallized from 1931 and onwards and the way that the political world handled it, forces him to reject his until then, for almost a decade, consistent parliamentary stance. After the end of 1933, Metaxas argues extra-parliamentary solutions under the hegemony of the royalist camp. His critique however was now a modernist one. The parliament was inappropriate because it could not correspond to the needs of the conjuncture. The definitive event for his active re-involvement in the political scene of Greece was the coup in 1933. The democratic means of persuasion were enforced using guns. A new revival of schism took place and the political polarization was intensified. His main antagonism within the royalist camp in the process of the abolition of the parliament was Kondylis. There was also an initiative for a coup organized by both Metaxas and Kondylis, however it was never fulfilled. In the new conjuncture the political elite was divided and could not deliver any effective policies to relief the lower classes. The division was both among the parties and within of them. The structure of its organization was another serious reason for the non-articulation of effective

hegemonic politics that could calm the turbulences of their period. Due to a traditional structure only clientilistic reciprocations were provided, a tactic that was reduced because of the ongoing political and economic crisis. Metaxas planned to outflank the moderate leader of the People's Party, the main party of the royalist camp, and established a non-liberal order only after the return of the King in Greece. George I marginalized both Papagos and Kondylis and promoted Metaxas as his right hand, assigning him the responsibility of the Greek army. The deaths of important political figures together with the challenges that were imposed by the Communist Party of Greece were the conjunctural reasons that allowed him to establish his regime.

The 4th of August regime is a hegemonic project that is launched by Metaxas in order to unify the people by politicizing them with authoritarian terms. Violence and institutions of consensus were used for the establishment of this fascist regime. Violence in form of the repression of the left-wing dissidents and mechanisms of consensus for the social body, which did not a priori reject these state initiatives. Metaxas rejected vertical liberation and political mediation that connected the parties and the people for a horizontal level, where the people of the same profession could collaborate to negotiate their claims sending representatives to conferences and the state organs. Metaxas and his intellectuals still endorsed the claim for representation in a new anti-liberal basis, where the people would participate in the political sphere yet in a way that would not challenge the regime. His project focused mainly on the peasants and workers. These were the classes that were harmed by the liberal order that dominated the political sphere before the establishment of the 4th of August regime. From now on, the workers and peasants could feel the relief of the state from the measures that the government had adopted to engage more actively in the new political society that was emerging. Their organizations were supervised by the state now and were contributing to the new political order. Nothing was planned to be outside but was meant to be an organic part, aiding the attempt at national regeneration. These initiatives were made under the presupposition to create a more genuine representation of the Greek people. Hence, it can be considered a populist regime that was putting social majority in the epicenter of its rhetoric. The people now were not individuals anymore but an undifferentiated totality with its own organizations that was enabled to collectively demand their claims. The danger now was the liberal order that was established in the beginning of the century and was collapsing with the rise of protectionism, while the communists were claiming a new

political system and had a utopian vision for the future. In this sense, the Metaxas regime was an authoritarian response to the challenges that were posed by the communist movement in Greece. Metaxas' project attempted to provide solutions in authoritarian terms to all failures of liberalism. The narrative was framed along the lines of Greece being re-born from the ashes of the liberal marching in the new through the building of the third Hellenic civilization. The solutions that the regime provided now were modern due to the building of massive institutions. Monarchy had a rather symbolic role and was the institution where the political power was referring to as the ultimate authority. Modernity and its contradictions had been accepted, the solutions then corresponded to this new era, hence were modern yet authoritarian.

To finalize the chapter, the question that remains pressing and needs to be replied briefly is if Metaxas was a fascist or not. The simple reply is yes. My assessment of his politics as fascist are not deriving only from the fact that he abolished the parliament, changed the content of the existing institutions and built new ones but that continued to refer to the people as the ultimate source of legitimization of the regime. Additionally, he perceived his regime as anti-liberal and anti-communist, where the ideological settings of the state resettled. The new main values were patria, religion and family, translated through a new conception of Greekness that was in the epicenter of the Metaxist ideology. Nationalism was crucial and in the forefront of the Metaxist discourse. It cannot be categorized as imperialist and racist but exclusionary for those who were considered as subversive elements of the state order. Parties were dissolved, among others also those of fascist and nazist inspiration. The people coming from these parties contributed to the 4th of August regime if it adhered to its ideology. Anything foreign, even coming from the similar political ideology was expelled as soon as it was related to Metaxas' state. Political challenges were neutralized both on the far-left and the far-right. All forces that were working within crucial governmental or state positions and adhered publicly to the imperialist tendencies of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were expelled immediately. In this sense, Metaxas was a genuine fascist not allowing any challenger of his hegemony – neither from the right nor the left. All the plots organized by Greek Nazis to undermine Metaxas' authority were rooted out by Maniatakis, the head of the internal security services of the 4th of August regime. The nation now was fully represented through the state and its institutions only. In contrast with the previous liberal order, following Metaxas' reasoning, the new state was a sovereign one defending its borders

and its status against all the external enemies. His rejection of complicity with Italian imperialism after its invasion of the Greek border should be approached from this perspective. Metaxas as the leader of a fascist state with its own ideology and aims could not surrender in any other state even if it was of the same political family. He endorsed his borders, fighting and winning the Italian as an outcome of his insistence on the ideology of national independence and sovereignty for the Greek state. It was the least he could do as a primer minister who aimed to restore the social order internally and the status of the country abroad. Ironically, the 4th of August fell victim to the imperialist tendencies of the two main authoritarian states of the interwar period, proving that geopolitical interests were much crucial in the decision making than close political ideologies.

Chapter 5

Neon Kratos: Towards an authoritarian democracy?

This chapter focuses exclusively on the political argumentation that is presented in the pages of the journal by its organic intellectuals and attempts to offer the key ideas that informed the ideology of the Metaxas regime. The nature of the argumentation took the shape of a critique of the liberal institutions and the communist ideology and offered also positive formulations about anti-liberal order of things that Metaxas established with his regime. Thus, The first part of this chapter focuses on the critiques articulated by the intellectuals of the regime toward liberalism and communism, the two political opponents ideologies that the regime fought against, while the second part focuses on the more positive aspects of the philosophical foundations of the Metaxas regime that are expressed by the texts of Nicolas Koumaros and Dimitris Mantzoufas, who were the two legal advisers of the fascist leader. In the texts of the latter the basic elements of the new legal are presented, as well as political order that the regime attempted to establish; a process that was interrupted by the outbreak of WWII. Thus, far from lacking a specific ideology the regime attempted to forge a new distinct post-liberal state apparatus with a robust ideological core. Sources of inspiration were the respective elaboration in fascist Italy. In other words, the ideology of the Metaxas regime was formed in discussion with the European intellectual developments of the period, making it a part of the wider authoritarian experience of the interwar period. Firstly, I will proceed to a brief presentation of the intellectuals who wrote for *Neon Kratos*, the most prominent theoretical journal of the Metaxas regime and then I will assess some features of the publication before the exposition of the antiparliamentarian argumentation that was articulated in the journal.

5.1 *Neon Kratos'* organic intellectuals.

Neon Kratos was founded in 1937 and its last issue published in 1941. It was a monthly review that published 42 issues in total. Its chief editor was the prominent intellectual Aristos Kambanis, who was a journalist, historian and literary critique. Aristos Kambanis was born in 1883 and studied Philology at the University of

Athens. The first review that he wrote for was *To Periodikon mas* (1900-1902) and the philological review *Akritas* (1904- 1906) followed, whose editor was his friend, the poet Sotiris Skipis (Stamos, 2013, 5-6). Kambanis in the beginning of his career endorsed ideas deriving from the socialist ideology, something that radically changed when the political polarization between Royalists and Venizelists emerged taking the side of the former. Kambanis' shift from the left to far-right was not a unique one following the tendency of many intellectuals that obliged to take sides as the modernity and its political ideologies was taking shape in the country. This happened only after the second decade of the 20th century in Greece.

Kambanis became then editor of a literary journal, *O Pan* (1908-1909). In 1916 Kambanis already had changed towards more conservative ideas joining the royalists and developing a network with the intellectual and political figures of the camp. In the editorships of the journals, magazines and newspapers (*Ellinika Chronika* (1916), *I Protevous* (1921-1922)), he undertook additionally to his intellectual interests expressed also his opinion on the political developments of the country. Having taken the royalist side after the national schism and the defeat in Turkey in 1922 Kambanis' newspaper was shut down and left as a political exile in Egypt. He returned three years later in the country and became editor of the royalist newspaper *Proia*. Over the years and especially after the polarization that followed the financial crisis of 1931 Kambanis radicalized politically endorsing the establishment of Metaxas' regime something that repaid with the editorship of the journal *Neon Kratos* and his appointment as Professor at the Panteios School of Political Sciences (Stamos 2013, 7-10). He was chosen by the regime as the chief editor of the *Neon Kratos* because of his network with intellectuals of the interwar period facilitating collaborations with people who were not explicit exponents of the dictatorship. After the end of the regime he became a collaborationist with the German occupation forces.

After an intervention of Metaxas, the dictator's son-in-law Georgios Mantzoufas started to participate in the editorial team of the journal, who became a professor of Civic Law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki without incurring any kind of punishment for his political stance during the Metaxas era. Mantzoufas started his academic career with an appointment at Athens University of Economics and Business, in the chair of Civic Law, through the intervention of Metaxas. Nikolaos Koumaros professor of Law at the University of Athens with the title "General

principles of the New State" was the other member of journal's editorial board. Being a good friend of Georgios Mantzoufas, he was appointed also to the University of Athens after an intervention by the dictator (Linardatos, 1996, 148). His intervention made his appointment as a non-permanent professor (έκτακτος καθηγητής) in the School of Law possible.

In 1939 Dimitris Vezanis, who was a tutor (υφηγητής) of general politics, was a candidate for the same position along with Koumaros. Both however were not considered suitable for the position initially. However, the counterproposal of Kyriakos Varvaresos, the dean of the school, to propose Koumaros as a candidate for the position of assistant professor for the upcoming election was accepted. After Metaxas intervention the deputy minister of education Spentzas issued emergency law 1755 that the non-permanent professor of the chair changed to a permanent one without any other process. With this suggestion Metaxas bypassed the process of the election with the royal decree 14/17.6.1939 and appointed Koumaros as a non-paid assistant professor in the permanent chair of the General Theory of the State. Then with the royal decree 25.8/5.9.1939 Koumaros was appointed as paid assistant professor in the empty permanent position in the chair of General Theory of the State and the Basic Principles and Developments of the Contemporary Regimes and few months later he was appointed as permanent professor with the new royal decree 25.6/5.7.1940 (Kaskarelis, 2015, 93).

Koumaros graduated with a PhD in 1931 from the department of Law of the University of Bordeaux. The title of his thesis was *Le Role de la volonté dans l'acte juridique. Étude critique de la conception classique* (Koumaros, 1931). This paper along with the other studies of him will be presented in the next chapter. After the end of dictatorship he was fired due to the protests for his illegal appointment both by students and professors of the Law School of the University of Athens.

Evangelos Kyriakis was another notable contributor to Neon Kratos. He was a journalist and lawyer and he had established along with Sitsa Karaiskaki and Kyriakos Karamanos the publishing house Nea Gennea (New Generation) having as its symbol the Minoan double-bitted axe which then was used by the National Youth Organization. Being an admirer of Hitler's regime, he translated for his publishing house, between other nazist books, the diaries of Joseph Goebbels, *Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei. Eine historische Darstellung in Tagebuchblättern* (Goebbels, 1942). He was also a founding member of the Nazi organization "Organization National

Sovereign State" (Organosi Ethniko Kyriaxo Kratos) (Kyriakis, 2018). It is no coincidence that the leader of this nazist organization was the minister of interior in Metaxas' regime, Theodoros Skylakakis. Also, this organization is joined by N. Kourkoulakos, who was a retired monarchist army officer, imprisoned in Görlitz during WWI and head of the Security Battalion in Patra during the Axis occupation and the General Fessopoulos, staunch anticommunist and ex-head of the newly founded National Intelligence Service. Kyriakis wrote also for the far right newspapers *State* and *National Socialist* along with the royalist one *Kathimerini*. In 1934 he published two lectures titled "New Orientations" commenting on the political developments in Greece with the publishing house of O.E.E.K. In 1937 he published the anticommunist study *Marxist Utopias*. In 1938 he published also the study *War or Peace* in which he analyzed the conditions in Europe before the outbreak of WWII. During the German occupation he wrote for the propagandist magazine *European Echo* (*Ευρωπαϊκή Ηχώ*) in Berlin that published articles on art, war and literature. In 1943 Kyriakis became the political editor of the national socialist magazine *20th Century* (*Εικοστός Αιώνας*) in which the head editor was Aristos Kabanis. In 1944 he left Greece for Berlin since he was convicted as a collaborationist and was killed during a bombing by the allies the same year (Kyriakis, 2018).

Demetrius Vezanis, a non-permanent professor of Politology and Constitutional Law in Panteion University, was another important contributor to the fascist journal. He studied in the Law School of the University of Athens and he conducted postgraduate studies in the Political Sciences at the University of Munich, where he obtained a PhD in 1927 (Paparygafallou & Spyros, 2013, 21-22). The title of his dissertation was *Dietzels Individualismus und Sozialismus: ein Beitrag zur Sozialphilosophie* (Vezanis, 1927). He was elected also as a tutor of General Politology in 1932 in the School of Law in the University of Athens and in 1948 he became a non-permanent professor in the same position. He was also prefect in the prefecture of Arta between 1930 and 1931 and he was also a director of the Social Insurance Institute between 1936 and 1948.

Before the establishment of Metaxas' regime he was a regular contributor to the *The National Socialist* (O ethnikosocialistis), a newspaper that was published by a national socialist party, Organization of National Socialists (Organosi Ethnikofronon Sosialiston) headed by Iakovos Diamantopoulos. He was also a prominent member of the organization Nationalist League (Ethnikistos Syndesmos). In the postwar context,

he participated in the parliamentary elections which were held on 31 March 1946 being a candidate with the Party X, an institutional successor of the Organization X, a notorious paramilitary militia of the extreme right set up during the Axis Occupation of Greece.

Evangelos Lebesis, a professor of sociology in Panteion University and journalist wrote also for Neon Kratos. He studied sociology in the University of Frankfurt writing a PhD thesis with the title *Ideen zur Soziologie des Griechentums* but he did not defend it in the end because of economic difficulties he met and made him leave Germany (Meletopoulos, 1999, 10). One of the professors in Frankfurt that influenced him significantly was the German sociologist Franz Oppenheimer. He was invited as auditor to attend courses in France (Sorbonne) and in Italy. In the latter he was chased by the Black Shirts and was arrested. After this experience he returned to Greece in 1930 permanently. Since then he worked as a journalist until 1938 and for a year between 1931 and 1932, he became a professor of sociology at Panteion University. Between 1931 and 1935 he worked as a journalist and few years as an editor of the magazine *Economic Mailman* (Οικονομικός Ταχυδρόμος). From 1935 to 1937 he was the main editor of the weekly newspaper *New Day* (Νέα Ημέρα). During the Metaxas dictatorship he was appointed as a public servant in the Ministry of Press and Tourism, and one year later in the Bank of Agriculture as head of the department of Press and Studies that was renamed in 1939 into Press and Propaganda. In political terms, he started as anarchist and before the establishment of Metaxas' regime he was a supporter of Eleftherios Venizelos' party (Meletopoulos, 1999, 13). He collaborated with the regime without articulating any critique against it during the period of its existence. The rest of his life he continued to work in different posts in the public sector, as a tutor in different institutions and as a publicist. He died in 1968.

Two important royalist newspaper editors also contributed to the journal. Georgios Vlachos, editor of the newspaper *Kathimerini* and Achilleas Kyrou, editor of *Estia*. The former was a prominent journalist of the royalist camp during the whole interwar era and one of the exponents of Metaxas regime. He studied law and initially worked for the National Bank of Greece. His career in the world of letters started with the publication of the literary journal *Panathinaia*. In 1919 published the newspaper *Kathimerini* that became one of the main organs of the Royalist camp during the interwar era. Further analysis of his thought and of the ways he legitimized the

dictatorship of the 4th of August regime can be found in the distinct chapter on his antiparliamentarian propaganda during the 1930's (Vlachos, 1990).

Achilleas Kyrou was a publisher and editor of newspapers. He studied physics and mathematics at the University of Athens but dedicated himself to journalism. He took over the editorship of the newspaper *Estia* along with his brother after the death of his father who was until then the journal's main editor. The newspaper adopted a staunch royalist position and was shut down three times during the interwar period because of that. Already in the first day of 1934 he published an article endorsing the need for the implementation of a fascist regime in Greece in the front-page of the *Estia*. The same year together with Theodoros Skylakakis, a retired army officer, who then became minister of interior during the Metaxas regime, Euaggelos Kyriakis founded the Nazi organization O.E.E.K that published the daily newspaper *State* (*Kratos*). He supported the Metaxas regime from its beginning, writing often both for *Neolaia* and *Neon Kratos*. Kyrou became also a member of the Higher Adviser Council of Spiritual mobilization together with Kostis Bastias, Nikos Kitsikis, Chancellor of the Polytechnic University of Athens. In February 1938, in an article in *Estia*, he endorsed publicly the need of the 4th of August regime to collaborate with the nationalists of Franco. This manifesto was signed by 60 prominent intellectuals of the interwar period like Kostis Palamas, Grigorios Xenopoulos, Georgios Streit, Georgios Vlachos, Nikolaos Louvaris and Alexandros Philadelphs. In that way Kyrou attempted to pressure Metaxas to put an end to the collaboration with the republicans. During the Axe occupation in Greece Kyrou became one of the sponsors and members of the anticommunist organization X led by General Grivas.

Another contributor from the royalist camp was Georgios Drosos, a journalist and politician. He studied economics in Marseille. During the interwar period worked as a journalist for various Athenian newspapers and after the end of the war he was elected into the Greek parliament with the People's Party during the legislative elections in 1946.

5.2 The physiognomy of the review

The topics of their articles related to political analysis, juridical and ideological issues. Neon Kratos was a political, social, philosophical, historical and artistic monthly review which published 43 issues. The title of the journal was relevant to the regime's proclamation to build a new state as an antidote to the old bourgeois political world. The general thematic categories in which the articles can be classified are the following: Politics, Political Theory, History-Archeology-Folklore, Education, Culture, Economy, Language and Technology. In total, 185 people contributed to the journal, writing 3840 pages (Andreiomenos, 2010).

The review was not a propagandist organ in the strict sense. It published articles written by the ministers and deputy ministers of the dictatorship reproducing in that way the regime's viewpoints. However, the journal attempted to attract intellectuals who had not direct but eclectic affinities with its ideology. This can be understood in the context of the regime's deliberate effort to construct a historic block seeking to integrate people from different social groups who did not explicitly adopt its ideological and political program. Of course, central aim of the journal was the gradual ideological alignment of these intellectuals to the regime's political line. Its autarchic view on the sphere of ideas is obvious from the following editorial statement: " 'The Neon Kratos' will attempt to eliminate all ideas whose domination, even ephemeral, would break down our social bonds in order to transform the society into hordes of people. It will attempt to create a philosophy which will serve the human life, an art which will not womanize but will civilize and improve the human being. It will not be an art replicating unquestioningly the old forms or mimicking the aesthetic and intellectual trends of the cosmopolitan café of the West. It will not be an art which will not correspond to our needs. It will not be a groundless art" (Editorial/Neon Kratos, 1939, 6).

However, recognizing its political limits and the many times politically harmless theoretical orientation of the bourgeois intellectuals, the dictatorship left room for views not fully coinciding with the central tenets of its ideology. The regime knew that there was no serious reason to start rivalries since no one of them did react negatively to its political program. For this reason, the statement of the famous poet Odysseas Elytis comes as no surprise: "I do not know exactly why but the regime's censorship did not consider us dangerous, perhaps due to its ignorance, and it did not

cause troubles to our multiple activities" (Elytis 1987, 371). In this light, Kambanis' rigid declaration regarding the regimes' standards for the "paradigmatic intellectual" should not be interpreted in a strict sense: "The intellectuals who do not 'speculate', following the Ioannis Metaxas' monumental dictum, should put themselves in the service of majority [...] Philosophy which does not promote the life is not philosophy. Science which disturbs the underpinnings of the society is not science. It is not [science] when it stands out of the state or against it" (Neon Kratos, 1938, 378).

The tasks and the values of the review summarized in its first editorial were: "a) The interpretation and explanation of the values and ideology which imposed the last year's political and social change: the establishment of the '4th of August' State, b) The defense of values, which had been condemned by the materialists of our century, especially national ideals, as they have been epitomized by Ioannis Metaxas, c) The total suppression and elimination of any idea seeking to endanger the nation's existence, and the revival of our old traditions and values, which ensure our national continuity" (Editorial/ Neon Kratos, 1939, 1).

5.3 Antiparliamentarian arguments in the review of Neon Kratos

The following will be a presentation of antiparliamentarism, a central aspect of the regimes' ideology. For that reasons I will focus my analysis mainly on legal texts of the journal or on articles that develop similar argumentation. The intellectuals of the regime reconstruct the previous historical periods of modern Greece teleological as a sequel of successive national tragedies because of the establishment of the liberal ideology and its consequent institutional forms like this of bourgeois parliament. In this light, Aristos Kambanis, the main editor of the journal, argues that "the history of parliamentarism in Greece consists in a series of national humiliations and economic bankrupts. The 4th of August regime was established in order to put an end in the spiritual and material bankruptcies, in the social turbulences, in the lack of stability" (Neon Kratos, 1938, 262). One cause that explains these national catastrophes is the structural asymmetry that exists between the vulgar ethics of the Greek people and the parliamentary institution which have been transcribed from the British context. According to this reasoning, the British parliament was an institutional outcome of deep and long-lasting historical processes. In contrary, the Greek society is an inappropriate context for the proper function of the parliamentary institution. The fact

that the Greek nation was part of the Ottoman Empire explains the blockage of the Greek society's passage to modernity. While the rest nations followed a smooth path towards modernity gaining the right to universal suffrage, such as France, in Greece this process was violently imposed from above. Greek people were not enough cultivated to handle in a proper way the right to vote having the bigger average of illiterate people in Europe (Neon Kratos, 1937, 212). So, a modern institution was applied to a premodern society producing a social chaos. This distorted historical process did not produce only uncultivated masses that were unable to elect the proper governors for them but also a supine bourgeoisie class. This contributed decisively to the formation of the peculiar physiognomy of the Greek parliamentarism. The absence of a robust bourgeoisie class made impossible the function of parliament and parties in a way similar to that of Western societies. Therefore, the disfigurements of the Greek political system with emergence of the clientist system, the patronage, the corruption, the vote buying and the electoral fraud were unavoidable consequences of the adoption of a "foreign" institution.

In more concrete historical terms, Aristos Kambanis detects both the reform of election law and the establishment of the "dedilomeni principle" as the birthday of the Greek parliamentary system and beginning of national woes: the "declared [confidence of Parliament]" put in practice in August, 1875, obliging the king to appoint the leader of the party with a plurality of parliamentary votes as the Prime Minister (Neon Kratos, 1938, 147). Kambanis considered that this morbid logic of universal suffrage of the 19th century's constitutions have been transmitted also to the constitutions of the new century and thus should be abolished. The death of the parliamentary signaled the beginning of a new glorious epoch with the nation having a powerful government. The new constitution of the country according to his vision "will not be a romantic one. It will germinate from the spiritual ground of the country, it will not be a hyperborean plant unable to adapt to our ethical temperament" (Neon Kratos, 1937, 216).

Kambanis develops his argumentation using explicitly the antiparliamentarian ideas of Anastasios Vyzantios, an important publicist of the 19th century. Vyzantios was the editor of the prestigious newspaper *New Day* which was published in Trieste for almost sixty years (1855-1912). Its arguments against the parliamentary institution was similar to those developed by French monarchists of the same period as Paul Déroulède, who was the leader of nationalist league, Ligue des patriotes (Bohotis,

2003, 109). Kambanis uses arguments developed by Vyzantios in 1867, three years after the draft of the constitution of 1864 which signaled the transition from constitutional monarchy to a crowd democracy and the establishment of the principle of popular sovereignty. In this political conjuncture Vyzantios writes articles which promote the empowerment of the executive power under the leadership and the control of the King and the simultaneous weakening of the representative institutions and the rights of popular intervention (Bohotis, 2003, 112). More precisely, Greek society, according to the *New Day*, needs a political system which corresponds to the particular economic and ethical conditions of Greece. The existing problems of Greek nation cannot be solved with the solutions that the parliamentary system gives. The parliamentary delegates coming from the provinces of Greece are people who defend the particular interests of their region without carrying about the national interests at all. Also, they are usually people whose skills and spiritual horizons were similar to the average of the people they represented. In addition, the supporters of the various governments did not engage seriously with the national problems of the country but only with the issues of their region being unable to understand their complexity with the result to accept uncritically the key political decisions the governments made. These realities are destructive for the national life for two reasons. Firstly, because there is no freedom to the degree that people are unable to control issues of crucial importance for the nation. Thus, the real decision makers of the national policies are the political oligarchies who are in the parliament. Secondly, the legislative power lacks the authority it should have. Being the majority of the national delegates mediocrities have as consequence the deprivation of substantial political power to the regime (Bohotis, 2003, 118).

Aiming to make an argument that legitimizes the fascist antiparliamentarian physiognomy of Metaxas' regime Kambanis recalls an argumentation that was articulated by Vyzantios, a supporter of the crown of the previous century whose central political vision was the restoration of the monarchy. In other words, the nature of the argumentation used by Kambanis derives from the ideological repertoire of the conservative right which seeks mainly to reserve the traditional political status quo rejecting any participation of the masses into politics. This fact demonstrates the limited political and ideological horizons for some of the adherents of the regime. However, as I will show in the following pages, it was not so for everyone inasmuch

other intellectuals considered the participation of the masses as a precondition for the stability and the further strengthening of the fascist regime.

The type of Kambanis' argumentation can be traced back to the historicist tradition of the 19th century. More specifically, it presents many similarities with the argument that Friedrich Carl von Savigny made regarding the creation of a unified legal code for Germany in the beginning of the 19th century. Savigny, responding to Anton Thibaut who considered that such a reform was necessary, argued in the pamphlet *Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft* that such a codification of the law would have an adverse effect (Savigny, 1814). He rejects the need of this reform considering that the social relations are regulated successfully from the existing Roman law. The implementation of a unified legal code which follows the standards of the French civic law cannot guarantee the successful regulation of the social life because being formalist and abstract is extrinsic from the specific historical realities of the German society (Lavranou, 2007, 8). Savigny criticizes the formalism of the tradition of the Enlightenment from which the arguments of Thibaut derive and its modern theories of natural law because of the general judgment criteria they presuppose. These general criteria and the consequent values of universal validity they claim universality being indifferent to the specific social context for which they apply. The abstraction of these from the specific historical realities indicates the form, the generality of the form, as the main criterion for the evaluation of the particular. The abstract form of this type of theories according to Savigny is responsible for their inefficiency to conceive their research objects namely the particular social relations they are engaged with. Their epistemological fallacy of the formalist theories is that they attempt to conceive the particular content using a general form something that leads to the non-conception of the historicity of the particular phenomena under examination exactly because of the constant projection of the form to the content. Therefore, Savigny's argumentation aims to the configuration of a particularistic theory that will be able to follow the contentual development of the historical context that intends to conceive (Lavranou, 2007, 21-22).

The discourse regarding the incompatible relation between the institution of the parliament and the Greek mentalité was not the only macrohistorical structuralist interpretations that the regime's intellectuals offered. Another common rhetorical pattern was the global crisis of economic liberalism which generated, according to

them, the imperative need for the change of the pillar of its political expression namely the parliament. The underlying presupposition of this reasoning was that the political regimes correspond to the conditions within which they have been emerged. When these conditions change it is necessary to substitute the institutions of the previous socioeconomic order with new institutional forms that can meet the contemporary needs of the society. Using the Marxist terminology, there was a structural asymmetry between the economic base and the political superstructure that the regime should bring regulate. The solution can only come through a strong statist intervention that will be able to control the economic sphere. From a historical point of view, parliamentarianism was created by the emergence of the bourgeois middle classes as a defensive political institution in their struggle against feudalism (Neon Kratos, 1937, 7). The dominance of capitalist form of production, as an outcome of the dominance of bourgeoisie, imposed the free antagonism in the realm of economy and the existence of the parliamentary form of politics. However, after the crisis of 1929 the very capitalism renounced the realities of the free market economy and sought shelter to state's intervention for its regulation. Theologos Nikoloudis, the Greek sub-minister of Press and Tourism, which despite its modest name was a fully operating ministry of propaganda during the 4th of August regime, was entirely conscious regarding this reality. In the first issue of the Neon Kratos he declares:

"The change that the 4th of August Regime imposed can be explained with the reference both to national and international causes. The international causes are related to the global crisis of the modern state during the postwar period. The mechanical civilization of the 19th century cannot be applied to the modern conditions. The implantation of the British parliamentarianism to the Greek context was a big mistake... Now the humanity attempts to overcome itself. The new political system of the various states is the negation of the bankrupted system, the negation of the so-called liberalism of the 19th century and its principles ... From this global crisis it was not possible for Greece to be the exception ... Instead of liberalism in Greece we confronted disorder, a corrupted parliament and opaque dealings ... Metaxas put an end to all these depressing, desperate situations one year before the 4th of August... Basic principle of the state is its sovereignty. It is a totalitarian state" (Neon Kratos, 1937, 1-4).

The same argument is reproduced, with a Spenglerian phraseology, by Achilleas Kyrou in his article with the characteristic title, "The meaning of our epoch" (Neon Kratos, 1937, 109). The contemporary epoch is one in which radical changes in the realms of customs, ideas and politics take place. In other words, Kyrou speaks about a change of paradigm that occurred in the way that modern societies organized themselves. Greece closely follows the spirit of the epoch changing the bourgeois regime with a new autarchic state. This change would have a meaning only if the citizens of the country had conscious of it and participated in its formation. The new regimes' main responsibility should be the remedy of the destructive results of liberalism. Its crisis produced the need for statist interventionism. Though instead this process to conduce to the advance of social cohesion it generated social confusion because of the limited power the state had (Neon Kratos, 1937, 8). Also, the science being unable to fulfill its initial promises for world happiness and peace produced exactly the opposite results, the greatest global poverty of all time. The mechanic civilization that liberalism created was also responsible for the poisoning of the human ethics. It killed the religion neglecting the significance of the human spirituality and counter-proposed a vulgar materialism (Neon Kratos, 1937, 8). Having analyzed the antinomies of the modernity using Spengler's ideas, he makes then a clear connection between these changes and the establishment of the new type of regimes considering that "We should take these events, which are unquestionable, into account when we want to appreciate the changes that these new national sovereign regimes imposed both to the external appearance and inner hypostasis of the civilized world. The fact that these regimes exist now throughout Europe, this phenomenon can be neither automatic nor accidental. The duration that all these regimes demonstrate, the magnificent internal and foreign achievements, the progress of its people testify that they have been established by the soul of their people" (Neon Kratos, 1937, 11).

Grigoris Bamias' argumentation conforms to the aforementioned discursive motif. Bamias along with the later undersecretary of the cooperatives Charalabos Alivizatos were prominent party members of the Agrarian Party of Greece, a party of socialist orientation who joined the Popular Front later in 1936 that was proposed by the Communist Party of Greece. It is not by coincidence that this argument is developed by someone who was an ex agrarian socialist intellectual (Alexatos, 2012, 6). Avoiding any kind of idealist explanation he develops a Marxist critique consistent

with his political origins of the 19th century's liberal order. He begins his article "The bankruptcy of parliamentarianism" rejecting the dominant interpretations of the retreat of the parliamentarian institution which promoted the low quality of the electorate as a central explanatory cause of this phenomenon. The basic reason according to him lies in the abruptness in the conditions of production because of new technologies that appeared. This new production in turn produced an important intensification of the social differentiation and social conflict between the classes after the revolutions of 1848. This process reached its apogee during the 1930s (Neon Kratos, 1938, 196). However, the existing divisions in the social sphere expanded to the political level where parties emerged that represented special economic and social interests which made the formation of governments impossible. The political presence of Metaxas gave solution to the political chaos of Greece. He took the country's fate into his own hands, he ostracized the political parties, united the decomposed parts of the national organism providing a new stable autarchic orientation to Greece (Neon Kratos, 1938, 199). Bamias' case is someone that develops his reasoning using Marxist arguments to interpret the crisis of liberalism. However, he suggests authoritarian solutions to it. This kind of political shifts (from communism to fascism and vice versa) should not surprise as the interwar period in Greece was characterized by political fluidity and the many homologies that were shared by the centre, left and right regarding the visions of political power.

Political instability and the erosion of traditional values were not the only two reasons that made liberalism dangerous for the Greek nation. An additional reason was the fact that it opened the door to communism. The regimes' intellectuals considered that there was a dialectic relationship between liberalism and communism. The first reason that explains this close relationship is the fact that the two main political parties had divided national life into two broad conflicting camps. This situation left room for the emergence of communism which took advantage of the contradictions that this division produced getting into the parliament. The unsolved social issues that arose due to the capitalist mode of production created a political space in which the communist movement used to stabilize its presence. In addition, communism and parliamentarianism had a common denominator; both of them were foreign derivatives that poisoned the Greek soul. Despite their differences - communism promoted materialism and parliamentarianism promoted individualism - they undermined the sacred national ideals and alienated the Greek youth. Therefore,

mission of the New State was to trample communism both as a set of ideas and as a movement. If communism was cultivated by a weak political system, the political response was a strong state namely that of 4th of August. The national disease of Communism will be eliminated because the new state is able to offer a decisive political alternative to the social issues that are feeding its dynamic. There will be an autarchic political regulation that will remedy the objective causes that are responsible for its emergence. The state will decisively intervene providing substantial solutions to the problems of workers and peasants pushing the employers to do sacrifices. In that way, it will promote the necessary collaboration between capital and labor for the regeneration of Greek nation. Metaxas' intellectuals assigned also great importance to the reconstitution of the national imaginary raising from the nation's morale, improving national education and securing respect for the country internationally. The strength necessary for the general mobilization was to be drawn from a return "to the roots and sources" an indication of the intellectuals' predilection for the "beautiful Greek tradition" which came side by side with the rejection of foreign influences (Sarandis, 2009, 49).

It could be said, in other terms, that the regime's eyes regarding the political reconstruction of the country were turning to the future while its vision for the national moral regeneration was looking back to the past. However, the idea that communism was going hand in hand with liberalism was not something that only Metaxas' intellectuals promoted. In the general attack that the European conservative thought of interwar period unleashed on the emancipatory function of Enlightenment, liberalism and socialism were revealed to have common enemies. According to their cultural critics, liberalism and socialism both sinned by a way of similar humanism, a similar universalism, a similar utilitarianism (Sternhell, 1996, 20). In this line of reasoning is indicative a revealing passage from Carl Schmitt's essay, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, in which he stressed the indissoluble connection between Marxism and democracy, which derived from their common materialist character: "If one has followed the bourgeois into economic terrain, the one must also follow him into democracy and parliamentarianism" (Schmitt, 1998, 73).

Another aspect of liberalism which the regime's intellectuals criticized in their studies was the civil and political rights established by the French Revolution (Neon Kratos, 1938, p. 397). Their aim is to relativize the universal grounds in which they have been founded considering that the conditions within which they have been

emerged differ radically from the sociopolitical realities of the 1930ies. This differentiated background necessitates their radical reorientation because in their current distorted form it is not possible to meet the needs of the historical conjuncture. More specifically in relation to voting rights they consider it not as a political issue connected with the expression of the general will but as a strictly technical issue that can be changed depending on the historical context (Neon Kratos, 1938, 791). That conception meant that the political rights do not have universal validity but a relative one that means that they are not real rights but political tasks. The state is the only interpreter of the national will that can decide when these rights can be used or not (Neon Kratos, 1938, 417). Therefore, the deprivation of the right to vote is neither a deprivation of a natural right nor means the deprivation of the individual freedom. If the aforementioned statement was valid it would mean that the women who have not the right to vote are not free citizens, a view that no one to date has supported (Neon Kratos, 1938, 793). In this light, the voting right and the function of the parliament depend on their social utility for which only the state can decide. Now, there are not individual rights but state's rights to the degree that totality of the state presupposes and is above from the individuals which cannot challenge (Neon Kratos, 1937, 333).

The similarities of the visions regarding the rights between the regimes' intellectuals and the Mussolinian regime are more than obvious. It becomes clear following the argumentation on the individual rights that Mussolini develops in his pamphlet *The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism*: "Anti-individualistic, the Fascist conception of life stresses the importance of the State and accepts the individual only in so far as his interests coincide with those of the State, which stands for the conscience and the universal, will of man as a historic entity. Fascism reasserts the rights of the State as expressing the real essence of the individual. And if liberty is to be the attribute of living men and not of abstract dummies invented by individualistic liberalism, then Fascism stands for liberty, and for the only liberty worth having, the liberty of the State and of the individual within the State" (Mussolini, 1976, 14).

The foreign imposition of the liberal political order in the Greek context had destructive results for the national life. This can be explained with the reference to the fact that it crossed with the hyperbole and the corruption, defining features of the Greek people's culture. The regime's intellectuals attempted to advance a discourse of truth which cultivated a collective sense of guilt. Many years of individual hedonism

under the regime of liberalism had to be brought to a rapid end. This could happen only with the imposition of a strong autarchic state. During this time period the rights lost their initial genuine meaning transforming into distorted destructive realities for the nation. Panos Sotiropoulos, a journalist, promoting this disciplining discourse which combines fear and alleged scientific truth considered that "the exercised individual rights transformed radically contributing to the ruination of Greek society and the subversion of the independency and sovereignty of the Greek state. The content of individual freedom changed and in the new conditions means anarchy. Economic freedom means now exploitation. Political freedom means corruption. High-ranking public offices mean enrichment and hedonism. The right to vote and to stand as a candidate means bribing. The freedom of religion means the abjection of Orthodox Christianity" (Neon Kratos, 1937, 223). There is no distinction for the asymmetrical responsibilities of the governed and the governing in the account of the national degenerative process that the regimes' intellectuals offered. The nation is represented as a single, unruptured totality, which is responsible for its own fate. In this line of reasoning, Sotiropoulos considers that "the Greek nation should realize that it is responsible for this situation. We are responsible for this, we are guilty of sinning against ourselves, our descendants and our ancestors ... In the question, 'Who is responsible?', the only true response is 'All of us'. Realizing our responsibilities and reacting against ourselves, we should repudiate the ideas we had that were produced by the historical conditions that the corrupted parliamentarianism imposed. We should shake the parliamentarian pests from our back that were drinking our blood for many decades and to collaborate under the leadership of Metaxas' charismatic figure in order to create a better tomorrow" (Neon Kratos, 1937, 224-226). The authoritarian state in this perspective was conceived as kind of punishment for the past sins that Greek nation had committed during the epoch of liberalism. Thus, the regimes intellectuals promoted an understanding supporting: "Accept your punishment because you deserve it". Moralism was the indispensable companion of the justification of the authoritarian rule.

However, despite their polemic against the political legacy of the French Revolution, the regimes' intellectuals showed particular sensitivity for the preservation of a fundamental civil right namely the right to private property. The right to private ownership should continue to be one of the central coordinates of the national life because it is the most important precondition for the prosperity of the

Greek society (Neon Kratos, 1937, 333). This perception, though, was not an innovative one as far as all the authoritarian regimes of the interwar period promoted it as one of the central axes of their political platforms. Italian Fascism understood private ownership as a full right of use rather than as a right to abuse, remained one of the fundamental coordinates of the regime. Also, private enterprise considered as the irreplaceable and essential motor of the economy remained intact (Pollard, 1986, 86). The same case was also true for the Nazi regime of Germany. Private property in the industry of the Third Reich remained untouched. Hardly any nationalizations of private firms occurred there. In addition, there were few enterprises newly created as state-run firms (Buchheim & Schernre, 2006, 390-391). Given these realities anyone can have serious doubts about the validity of the anti-capitalist and anti-plutocratic rhetoric that these regimes developed. It was more a populist tactic to gain legitimacy from below rather than any serious challenge to the central pillars of the capitalist mode of production.

5.4 Towards a genuine representation of the General Will.

Now I will proceed to the presentation of the criticisms that were expressed by the regime's intellectuals regarding the incapacity of the parliament to express the nation and to some of the suggestions they made for an "authentic" representation of the general will. For that reason, I will focus mainly on the articles of Mantzoufas, Koumaros and Drosos who articulate the most relevant arguments in relation to these issues.

Georgios Drosos begins his study "Theory and Application of the doctrine of Popular Sovereignty" posing two questions under examination. The first one is if there is a genuine application of the popular sovereignty in the parliamentary system, and the second one, closely linked with the former, is if it is expressing the interests of the governed when it is theoretically applied (Neon Kratos, 1938, 400). His response to the first question is negative considering that in the parliamentary elections neither the relative majority nor the absolute majority of the population of a country are expressed. Practically that means that the application of the majoritarian methods in the elections do not allow the minority to express itself (Neon Kratos, 1938, 403). On the other hand, when proportional methods are applied in the elections there is a possibility that the party loses the majority of votes because of the way the

seats are distributed. Thus, the conclusion he draws is that there will be a genuine expression of the popular will through elections because there is the possibility for a party to govern without having the majority of the votes. In that way, the majority that theoretically rules is often a minority (Neon Kratos, 1938, 404).

The political systems that follow the proportional methods to elect the representatives have some additional problems that prevent the genuine expression of the popular will. In order to be elected the representatives must participate in parties and their participation is decided by the leader of the party. That means that they are not chosen by the people but by the leader of the party (Neon Kratos, 1938, 406). Also, the expression of the general will through the representative mechanisms loses its real content and arrives in a distorted form in the parliament. After that process it is possible that the party does not gain the majority of the votes, which leads to coalition governments that consequently make the legislative function in the parliamentary system more difficult (Neon Kratos, 1938, 407).

The aforementioned problems become clear mainly after the end of the electoral process. However, there are many problems also during the pre-elections period. The first one is that in systems that apply proportional representation voters cannot choose to vote for candidates of different parties. The second one is that candidates are not able to participate through different electoral lists. Last but not least, the ideological struggle between the different parties that occur in order to win the election and the struggle between the candidates of the same party in order to be elected confuse the voters that have no clear ideas for any of the two (Neon Kratos, 1938, 408).

Drosos shifts his attention from the problems of electoral systems to the voters of the parliamentary democracies. He argues that the real application of the doctrine of national sovereignty should mean the participation of all members of the nation in the elections. In addition, the nation is not limited only to the members that are able to vote but includes also the past and the coming generations. However, the modern parliamentarian systems do not share the aforementioned views, something that leads Drosos to claim that in this type of systems the "national sovereignty is only a part of the people" pushing its majority to the margins of the social life (Neon Kratos, 1938, 410).

Another major limitation of the parliamentary representative democracy is the nurture of corruption. One of the reasons that explain this process is the absence of the

principle of imperative mandate (Neon Kratos, 1938, 537). Imperative mandate is a principle according to which parliamentary deputies can only enact policies in accordance with concretely transmitted preference by their electors. The absence of this principle practically means that the delegates in the parliament are able to do whatever they want once they are elected ignoring totally the popular claims. The application of that principle is the only mean that can guarantee a genuine expression of the popular will. Its non-application means that people that govern are the governing and not the governed (Neon Kratos, 1938, 538).

After having presented the structural limitations of the parliamentary democracy that makes a genuine expression of popular will impossible Drosos proceeds to the articulation of a decisionist argument. To make his argument plausible, as first step, he relativizes the principle of freedom supporting that it does not exist in absolute terms even in the liberal regimes where there are many restrictions regarding the human behavior. Therefore, in the discussion of popular sovereignty the issue of freedom is not a relevant one because in all the type of regimes there is an aspect that has not a universal value, but it depends always on the context within which it is developing. The real question according to Drosos is if the interests of the people are expressed in a genuine way, if there is a general happiness. In this light, the central issue that should concern both the legal theory and the daily politics is not the topic of self-governance but the subject of the quality of the power, if it serves the interests of the people or not (Neon Kratos, 1938, 677-678).

The next topic that Drosos discusses is the one of the candidates of parliamentary elections. The first point with which he is engaged is the deterrent conditions for the participation of notable people under which elections occur. The expectations that the masses have of the candidates and their commitments to the principles of the party with which they participate in the elections does not leave enough room for moves on behalf of them that can serve national aims. Contrary, they are pushed both from their supporters and the other party members to be engaged with special interests (Neon Kratos, 1938, 678-679). This leads to the abstention of notable people from a serious engagement with the political life of the country and promotes personalities who have only the charisma of the rhetoric, that are able only to persuade the masses to vote for them without carrying about the people's interests. Thus, being mediocrities is the outcome of the participation of the majority of the people in parliamentary life (Neon Kratos, 1938, 680).

After the examination of the quality of delegates Drosos proceeds to the examination of the quality of voters. He considers that the modern complicated conditions of life do not permit free decisions regarding the election of the national delegates for the parliament. The issues with which the delegates are engaged are very technical and complicated and thus the voters are unable to understand them and to decide about them. Thus, most of the time voters are fooled by the delegates who present constructed complicated realities to the masses in order to serve their own interests (Neon Kratos, 1938, 682). Drosos for that reason believes that it should not be permitted to everyone to vote. He finishes his study, although by avoiding to take clear position regarding the issue of the proper regime for Greece (Neon Kratos, 1938, 684).

Mantzoufas and Koumaros begin their article "The basic constitutional principles of the New State" referring to the constitution of the country. They attempt to define the continuities between the previous constitutional order and the changes that the new regime imposed. King George II on August 4, 1936 suspended the articles 5,6,10,11,12,14,20 and 95 of the constitution of 1911 declaring a state of emergency (Neon Kratos, 1938, 761). The same day the King also order the dissolution of the parliament avoiding though to hold elections within 45 days as the article 37 demanded. This move, despite its obvious unconstitutional nature, was considered by both as a legitimized action that produced new law (Neon Kratos, 1938, 762). In other words, they struggled to find legal foundations for the 4th of August regime. In their account, Greece continued to have a constitution with some articles dispended and without a parliament. The decisions of the King established a new regime, a new political order. This new political reality is legitimized by the explicit support it has from below (Neon Kratos, 1938, 763). From a historical point of view, it is legitimized because it eradicated the old-fashioned institution of the parliament that was not compatible with needs of the conjuncture. It attempts to create a new order using as first material the Greek culture, avoiding the transcription of foreign institutions as the previous regimes did. Even though it occurred after the initiative of one man it can be said that it was a popular revolution because it incarnated the popular will from which it was supported (Neon Kratos, 1938, 764).

Their main body of their argumentation regarding the failure of the parliament to express the genuine popular will reproduces exactly the ideas of Drosos that have already been mentioned. In this line of reasoning they elaborate more on the idea that

the parliamentary democracy does not express the general will of the people but the particular interests of the parties' candidates. They consider that in representative democracies there is always an exclusively organized élite determining the will of the disorganized majority and not the other way around. They contest radically that political representation has those inherent characteristics. The choice of a member of parliament does not depend at all on the free expression of an electoral preference on the part of the individual voter, but rather on the organizational capacity with which a political force or an electoral committee are able to assert themselves on the electoral market. There is no meaning to be under the delusion as to the political sovereignty of the voter. His freedom of choice is limited to a confined field prepared by the organized minority which select the candidates not on the basis of criteria attentive to the greatest representative capacity of the electorate, but rather according to the guarantees that he offers regarding the consolidation of power at the head of the same minority that has put him forward as a candidate. The sovereign of the people in the parliamentary systems lasts only one day - on the day of the elections (Neon Kratos, 1938, 773). From this argumentation the result is drawn that there should not be an equation between individual freedom and political freedom. Democracy does not derive necessarily from universal suffrage elections (Neon Kratos, 1938, 774).

Having deconstructed the myths of the supposed expression of the general will under the parliamentarian regimes they proceed to the presentation of their perception regarding "The genuine democratic principle under the 4th of August Regime" elections (Neon Kratos, 1938, 775). The first epistemological distinction they make is between democracy and republic. With the term democracy/ Laokratia they clarify that they mean the source of the political power and not the institutions through which it is expressed. In other words, Mantzoufas and Koumaros do not equate the means of the expression of the political will with the sources of its legitimacy. They reject the idea that the genuine expression of the democratic principle is expressed through the institution of the parliament. Main aim of the democratic system is the service of the interests of the nation. The majority does not draw its ethical and legal value just from the fact that it is a majority and thus can prevail over the minority. The real democratic principle cannot be founded only in its numeric power as a majority. This would mean despotism.

In order to avoid such a case, the will of each member of society should be inspired by the national interest. Only then the sum of the wills can be considered as a

general will. The general will has not a quantitative content but a qualitative one. With this presupposition it can serve the general interest of the totality. The idea that the sources of all powers derive from the nation does not mean from several people but rather from the general will, whose aim is the service of the general interest. Thus, the democratic principle means the service of the national interest elections (Neon Kratos, 1938, 776). In this reconstruction the theoreticians of Metaxas do some epistemological tricks in their attempt to legitimize the dictatorial rule. The first move is that they deliberately neglect to say that in a republic the majority is limited, under a written constitution safeguarding the rights of the individual and the minority. But exactly because the idea of the republic means a constitutionally limited government, they choose to define the Metaxas regime as democratic in order to avoid the commitments that a republic implies. The second step they made is that they follow the distorted version of Rousseau's idea of the general will that Mussolini first adopted. In his pamphlet *The Doctrine of Fascism* the Italian dictator gives a specific qualitative meaning to the content of the concept of the general will legitimizing his authoritarian power: "Fascism is therefore opposed to that form of democracy which equates a nation to the majority, lowering it to the level of the largest number; but it is the purest form of democracy if the nation be considered as it should be from the point of view of quality rather than quantity" (Mussolini, 1976, 16). Any majoritarian content of concept of the general will is rejected in the name of the qualitative aspects it implies. Thus, democracy has a qualitative content meaning the espousal of the general will.

In this light, the national will is the categorical imperative that is both the source of all powers and of all the commitments of governed and governors. Using the aforementioned analytical clarifications Mantzoufas and Koumaros make a new distinction between people and nation. The first one describes the amount of people living in a country in a specific historical moment and the other conceives the people who are living in a specific moment in a country but also the past and the following generations (Neon Kratos, 1938, 782). Thus, the article 21 of the constitution which declares that all the powers derive from the nation and on which the regime bases its legitimacy does not define as nation the people who vote but the general national will of the people (Neon Kratos, 1938, 783). This understanding does not imply in any sense that the regime of the 4th of August is not democratic. This misunderstanding is produced because of the dominant confusion between the

concepts of republic and democracy. The article 21 in which the regime is founded refers to the source of the power, not to the institutional mediations of it. The principle of the majority rule is a historical and not a sacred construction, therefore it can change when it is not considered useful (Neon Kratos, 1938, 791).

The logical consequence of this reasoning means that a government of one man could be democratic to express the national general will. The will of the government does not have any value as expression of the individual will of the ones who govern but only as a will that aims to serve the national interest (Neon Kratos, 1938, 800). For that reason, they believe that "The regime in its effort to implement this new type of society, materializes at the same time the genuine democratic principle. Drawing its legitimacy from the nation, it takes the claims of the masses very seriously and attempts to come into close contact with them. In that process the government realizes that its policies have popular legitimacy through the rewards it receives. Its close contact with the Greek people and the acceptance it receives prove that it acts in accordance with the spirit of popular sovereignty" (Neon Kratos, 1938, 802). The public support it receives in the everyday contact with the masses is a much safer indication for genuine expression of the popular will than the participation of the masses in the electoral process every four years. The expression of the popular will under the regime of the 4th of August occurs in transparent terms and not with the secret ballot of parliamentary democracy. Also, there is not any reaction against the policies of the government, and this is another important sign of the legitimacy it has (Neon Kratos, 1938, 805).

Then they proceed to an analytic presentation of the structure of the 4th of August regime and the ways with which the political power is exercised. The next step is to make forecasts for the coming future declaring that "regarding the issue of the popular representation it is difficult to make forecasts about how it will be organized in the future. The existing tendencies have shown that there will be a representation of the people according to the criterion of their class ... If the state will be transformed to a corporatist one it is not clear. It is sure that the form of the regime will be an outcome of the needs of the conjuncture" (Neon Kratos, 1938, 818).

Conclusion

The intellectuals that wrote for the semi-official journal of the 4th of August Regime promoted a critique of liberal and communist political order and at the same time offered an ideological rudimentary diagram of fascist principles in which the New State should be based on. Their ideas about the New State were analytic enough because the political project of Metaxas was in the making. More specific ideas about the new legal reality were provided by Nicolaos Koumaros in the new constitution that was written in 1941 under the direction of Ioannis Metaxas. This issue is developed further in the chapter that discusses the ideological formation of Nicolaos Coumaros. The lack of positive articulation of ideas on the specific character of the New State thus had to do with the uncompleted political realities that accompanied its formation process. The priorities were different for the Greek authoritarian state of Metaxas compared to the other authoritarian states of the interwar period because of the different temporality of its imposition that coincided with the years before the outbreak of the WWII that forced the Greek state to invest a lot of energies to the preparations for the forthcoming war. This feature along with the lack of social support from below made Metaxas to be excessively cautious regarding the fascist reforms that it promoted. This however does not mean that the role of the intellectuals was secondary or unimportant to the case of the fascist state building. Most of them, as it became clear from their biographies, were familiar with fascist ideas and additionally had a rich political experience participating actively in the political parties of the interwar period and after the crisis of parliamentary democracy in Nazist or Fascist political organizations. In other words, they shifted from the conservative to the radical right even before the establishment of Metaxas regime. Their radical rhetoric though was adjusted to the aims of the new political regime with which they were aligned. This is indicative for the character of the regime as well. Metaxas chose to forge the ideology of its regime with people who were familiar with the doctrines of Fascism and Nazism and their consequent political realities. They were the intellectuals who belonged mainly to the conservative royalist camp and realized during the 1930's that parliamentary democracy in the new conditions of the post-1929 era is not functional anymore. Thus, a new form of a political contract needed to be signed between the people and the state. Their political experience as members of extra-parliamentarian right wing organizations offered the political capital that was necessary for their new political roles in the authoritarian state building of Ioannis

Metaxas. The cultural capital they had either as journalists or university professors was used as source for the ideological forging of the political identity of the 4th of August regime. They contributed to this process believing that Metaxas was the Greek version of authoritarian political regulation that was met in Europe after the global economic crisis of 1929. The direct reference to the other authoritarian states of the period was not common because the 4th of August regime was, as all the respective European cases, first and foremost a radical nationalist experience that attempted to establish a state that was defined around a new notion of Greekness which was based on the principle of anticommunism, meaning a new citizenship which excluded political dissidents and a distinct ideological foundation that implied the creation of a new national civilization. This though did not mean that the intellectuals of the regime did not use ideas from abroad in order to legitimize the regime in Greece. It happened though in an implicit way as it is demonstrated in the chapter on Koumaros' ideological formation. They were careful enough in order to retain the "Greek" character of the new political institutions that the regime established. Their political commitment though did not stop with the collapse of the Metaxas regime after the invasion of the Axis forces. As it became clear from their biographies most of them participated actively in the later political conflicts and polarizations during the occupation and the postwar period. The dividing line was between those intellectuals who collaborated with the Nazi regime that was established in Athens and those that were organized in nationalist resistant groups against the Axis power. Those who collaborated with the Nazis were forced to leave Greece, at least for a certain period of time, for instance in the cases of Euaggelos Kyriakis and Sitsa Karaiskaki. Those who were organized in nationalist and anticommunist groups like the Organization X became organic part of the post-war state apparatus either adopting a political role or as state intellectuals expressing the interests of the post-WWII status quo in Greece transformed to Cold War ideological warriors.

Chapter 6: Nikos Koumaros: From Duguism to Fascism

Abstract

Two of the questions that emerge from the arguments that have been presented until now is if the texts by Coumaros and Mantzoufas, that describe the fundamental principles of the "new state" and were used as the preparatory pull of ideas informing the key reasoning of the forthcoming constitution, were a) desultory and lacking theoretical cohesion or an outcome of an ongoing plan with specific targeting and b) if these texts implied a concrete political direction like the programmatic texts of other fascist states like the *The Doctrine of Fascism* written by Benito Mussolini and Giovanni Gentile? My argument regarding the first question is the following: Far from being texts among other prescriptive analyses on what is to be done in the new conjuncture these texts are fundamental because they describe the principles of the new state and for that reason should be read together with three other texts from which the main arguments derive that have been presented in a detailed form. These are two: the books by Nicolas Coumaros on the social contract (*About Social Contract* and *On Social Contract*), which partly derives from elaborations that have been made in his thesis (*Le Rôle de la volonté dans l'acte juridique*) conducted under the supervision of Roger Bonnard at the University of Bordeaux- and his short text under the title *Stato and Nazione nel Regime Fascista*. Regarding the second question, reading the text "The basic constitutional principles of the new state" and other minor texts along with the three aforementioned studies makes clear that the political vision that the Metaxas regime had in regard to the new state was informed by the Italian fascist paradigm in theoretical terms. Koumaros' selection as the main mastermind of the new state can be explained with the reference to the fact that he was familiar with the developed debate on the legal foundation of the authoritarian state and at the same time proponent of fascist Italy. It was a decision that was related to the anti-individualistic ideology of Metaxas. Since there were only groups that amounted to a national undifferentiated totality there was the need for a theory that could conceptualize this new political reality effectively. This also indicates the political orientation of the Metaxas regime, which far from being another dictatorship, one of the many that have been emerged during the interwar period in Greece, was a fascist regime that adopted institutions and ideas by the other respective authoritarian states

of the period. In Koumaros' texts, that conceptually informed to a certain extent the constitution of the 4th of August regime, elements that constructed his a posteriori fascistic legitimizing discourse on the new state can be found. For that reason, I consider it necessary to present some of the arguments that proved to have informed the texts on 'the principles of the New State'. I will present briefly some arguments made by Koumaros on Rousseau's theory of social contract in his relevant studies and the main ideas on the state and nation in fascist Italy that are exhibited in the pamphlet *Stato and Nazione nel Regime Fascista* aiming to show in a clearer way the ideas that underpinned the basic legal texts of the Metaxas regime. The reason why Rousseau is selected as the main figure of presentation is because he was one the key theoreticians whose work was used to develop his arguments in his texts that were published in the journal *Neon Kratos*. He promotes a very specific reading of Rousseau already from his dilogy on the social contract that allows a totalitarian reading of his work and that he uses then to legitimize the 4th of August regime. His understanding of Rousseau was combined with the conception of state and nation producing a peculiar ideological amalgam that informed the political principles of the New State. This leads us to rethink the nature of the Metaxas regime and to revise the argumentation that the regime endorsed, hence that it did not adopt ideas coming from the respective states of Germany or Italy. I argue that both ideas and institutions were adopted by the authoritarian regimes of the period yet not in a direct but in an eclectic way, which allowed the regime to retain a "Greek" physiognomy. The argumentation that endorses the opposite- the non-fascist nature of the Metaxas regime- neglects that these regimes were above all nationalistic regimes that focused on promoting a new specific form of national identity that did not give room to explicit recognition of their hybrid political nature. This should not prevent us from searching for the historically specific mixing of ideas and institutions that took place between the different authoritarian regimes of the period. This will allow us to reexamine substantially their nature and revise the dominant historiographic tendency that claims for a non-genuine fascist regime leaving aside the transfer of ideas and institutions that occurred between Greek and the rest authoritarian regimes of the period, a crucial process that forged their political identity.

6.1 Duguism in the era of the French Third Republic: Leon Duguit and his pupil Roger Bonnard

Before the examination of the content of Koumaros studies, the following will first focus on a presentation of Roger Bonnard's theory and politics. Bonnard was a professor of public law in the University of Bordeaux and Koumaros' supervisor. In 1940 he was appointed as the rector of his university and legal advisor of the Vichy government. This context will shed light to the context in which Koumaros studied and possibly can account for the ideas he developed later.

Koumaros defended his thesis in the beginning of the 1930's, a period in which the French political regime faced a systemic challenge from below. As Chris Millington notes: " Parliamentary scandals, the onset of the global financial crisis in France and the instability of government coalitions reinvigorated the Republic's foes. Antiparliamentarianism, previously the preserve of extremist groups and relatively isolated thinkers, entered the mainstream press and society at large. The riots of 6 February 1934, in which thousands of members of nationalist leagues and war veterans forced the government to resign, polarized French politics. Membership of the leagues rocketed. They attracted hundreds of thousands of French men and women into mass organizations that sought the overthrow of the Republican system. The exemplar of this growth, Colonel Francis de La Rocque's paramilitary organization the Croix de Feu, and its successor, the Parti social français (PSF), became the largest political group in French history. While a violent seizure of power did not take place, large sectors of society engaged with and supported the extreme right's agenda. Alarmed at what they saw as the attempted 'fascist' coup of February 1934, the extreme and parliamentary left joined forces in the Popular Front" (Millington 2012, 2).

Roger Bonnard was a pupil of Leon Duguit who was appointed to the chair of the constitutional law at the University of Bordeaux in 1892 and became the central figure of the department developing a distinct objectivist theory of public and constitutional law (Malherbe 1996, 276). Leon Duguit was one of the rare figures that in the early 19th century became globally known outside his country and the European continent. This has to do with the heretic way he epistemologically attempted to found public law under the influence of the newly established sociology,

a decision that challenged radically many of the methodological premises of the field (Laborde 2000, 101). He attempted to challenge two narratives on the conceptualizations of the French and Germany legal theory of the people's rule. Hence, the ways, in other words, that have legitimized popular sovereignty. The French legal theory had adopted the metaphysical Rousseauian concept of "popular sovereignty" while the German theory did the same with the Jhering's idea of 'self-limitation' of the state. Both conceptualizations were considered metaphysical, thus he counter-proposed an empirical foundation of the principles that legitimate a state as representative of the people. The fictions that were inherited to these traditions did not leave space for non-mystified legitimization of the state and consequently of the public law (Laborde 2000, 103).

Both conceptualizations according to Duguit provided an a priori right of the state to be considered as sovereign. In an almost Marxist take Duguit proposed that state was nothing more than the expression of a society divided in rulers and ruled. In this sense, the legitimization of the state could not derive from itself since the state expressed the will of the governors. In other words, it could be an internal legitimization since it was self-referential. For that reason, Duguit proposed that the state gains its legitimization from the reality of social solidarity that exists de facto in the society and thus determines the rules of law and explains the reason why they should be implemented (Laborde 2000, 103). Roger Bonnard summarizing Leon Duguit's conception of sociological law argued that "these rules, beginning as mere social rules, develop into rules of law when 'the man of individual consciousness' considers it necessary to assure their observance by a socially organized sanction. The primary fact in the realm of law therefore is not the subjective right but the objective rule of law springing from social relationships. This conception led Duguit to reject the German theory of the law as creation of the state, a sovereignty subject only to its own limitation. He insisted that experience shows law to be anterior and external to the state, which because of its nature may itself be limited by law" (Bonnard 1930, 272)

Duguit developed this theory of law based on the idea of social solidarity under the influence of the sociologist Emile Durkheim who was one of his colleagues in the University of Boudreaux. In his attempt to form a theory that would be in juxtaposition with this of his Maurice Hariou he turned to the field of sociology that had positivistic underpinnings aiming to transcend the epistemological and political

dilemma between the individual and the community. In other words, his theory was an effort to establish a conceptualization where modernity and tradition would be combined in a way that the societal bond was secured (Laborde 2000, 104). Observing the social reality that tends to reproduce through the development of social solidarity Duguit proposed that the state draws its legitimation from this fact as such, does not limit itself but it is limited externally from the bonds of social solidarity that ought to forge through its function. The state is not above the law, it fulfills the law through its actions. Thus far from being a metaphysical entity that stands above the people state has a functional character aiming to serve the public interest. In this understanding, the people who work in the state they are not more than public officers and the state nothing more than a complex of public services. The idea of public service according to Duguit was concluded in 'the foundation and the limit of governmental power. And thereby I have completed my theory of the state' (Laborde 2000, 105).

Having conceived the state as the performer and modulator of social solidarity Duguit suggested that the best way to fulfill its roles was through a decentralized and syndicalist form (Laborde 2000, 106). Duguit considered the occupational associations as the tool through which social harmony could be achieved, hence they had an ethical dimension and not just a functional one. Thus, according to Duguit associations were 'the essential element of our social structure ..., a moral authority which dominates the life of its members ... [and] ... a source of life sui generi' (Laborde 2000, 107). Deprived from the class connotations that the Marxist left had assigned to associations in the conceptualization of the French legal scholar provided an organic content, endorsing that they bridge the gap between the society and the individual in a better way. People participate through the local level in politics and represent their social interests in more genuine way. (Laborde 2000, 108). His analysis though, against its a posteriori appropriation - was perceived by him as a system that could contribute to the enrichment of the democratic nature of the republic attempting to transcend the metaphysical foundations of Rousseauian theory where the individual was annihilated through its reduction to the community (Laborde 2000, 111).

Duguit's ideas were formed mainly during the first three decades and reflected the contradictions of the French third republic. After his death many of his pupils that were exponents of his work drifted to the right of the political spectrum, disengaging

from the democratic connotations that underpinned his corporatist understanding of politics, a shift that reflected the organic crisis that the French state has gone through in the 1930's. Leon Duguit was criticized because he did not offer any metaphysical alternative to the foundation of the state and thus in the French republic after attacking the notions of the French sovereign nation and the German personality of the state. Many liberal legal theorists like Joseph Barthélemy and Henry Berthélemy who have endorsed in the past the Duguit conceptions of law and state in the conjuncture perceived politics as disruptive of the administrative function of the state (Dyson 1980, 148).

The same use of his theories was made by Roger Bonnard as well. His intellectual trajectory from liberalism to fascism condensates the radicalization of the French politics that took place during the 1930. He was one of the many liberals that the impasse of parliamentarianism led him to search political solutions to the paradigms of Nazism and Fascism. He studied law in the University of Bordeaux and then received from the same university his PhD in Political Science and in Economics titling, "La repression disciplinaire des fautes commises par les fonctionnaires public". After a short period that he spent in the University of Rennes he returned back to the University of Bordeaux and became professor of Public and Comparative Law and considered as a continuator and successor of Leon Duguit's thought (Malhebre 1996, 274). In 1940 when then Petain became the head of the government that was formed in June was appointed dean of the university of Bordeaux and hold the position until to be replaced by his deputy Henri Vizioz in 1944 (Fabre 2001, 274).

A brief examination of the titles of his studies and how they changed through the time of his academic career vindicates his shift to the radical right both in terms of theory and politics. The books *Le contrôle juridictionnel de l'administration*, *Précis élémentaire de droit administratif*, *Précis élémentaire de public*, *Les règlements des assemblées législatives de la France depuis 1789* that were written between 1925 and 1934 are legal studies that relevant to his position as professor of Public and Comparative law adopting Leon Duguit's epistemological principles as foundation for his studies. Though, since then till his retirement (1944) his studies have an explicit political character obtaining the form of conjunctural interventions. Their main is to elaborate theoretical and political alternatives for the transformation of the liberal political order towards an authoritarian direction since the former had collapsed.

These studies are the *Le droit et l'état dans la doctrine nationale-socialiste*, *Syndicalisme, corporatisme et état corporatif*, *La guerre de 1939-1940 et le droit public*, *Les actes constitutionnels de 1940*. As it becomes clear by their titles, they are conjunctural studies and that their topics are related to new anti-liberal conceptualizations of the state, as well as political developments that dominated the European and French political sphere since the beginning of the 1930. The first one is an attempt to present the doctrine of German Nationalism Socialism. The next one that was written in the following year, 1937, is an intervention on the debate of corporatist regulation that dominated the French public sphere during 1930. The last one examines the French Constitutional Law of 1940. This included the bills that were voted into law on 10 July 1940 establishing the Vichy Regime. All the power derives from now on from the Prime Minister Pétain. The rewriting of the constitution practically abolished the Third Republic, its legal foundations and its powers.

Where should one search for the causes of this shift in Bonnard's writings? The reasons that explain such an emphatic shift lie in the events of the Paris riots of 6 February 1934 and the events that preceded them. The Paris events of 6 February were the bloodiest riots that have happened in Paris since the Paris Commune. Ten of thousands of protesters from the far-right to the far left marched on the French Parliament that was in a session, although they were obstructed by the police violently with result of 14 people being killed. The social unrest continued, and the following days 12 more people were killed during the protests. The context was the inability of the French government by adopting deflationary to stop the effects of the global financial crisis in the economy of the country, which crystallized in the political level in the inability of the parties to form a sustainable government (Jenkins & Millington 2015, 1). These events determined the political climate in the following years until the formation of the Petain government and produced a political polarization which delegitimized trust toward the liberal institutions as representative of the French nation. Solutions were searched in political alternatives that negated the liberal paradigm not only by politicians but also by intellectuals that were disillusioned now about the possibilities of sustainability of the third French republic.

These events were not a mere reflection of the contradictions of the Third Republic itself but the outcome of the impact of the global economic crisis of 1929 on the political liberal institutions of the France. Roger Bonnad's shift should be interpreted as an outcome of this historical developments, the inability of the existing political

institutions to function effectively in the new conditions of economic crisis. As an intellectual that was devoted to Duguit's epistemological paradigm of an objectivism of social phenomena, he searched for solutions outside France since the existing political framework had stopped forms of solidarity, the legitimizing source of the institutions. An observation of the external political realities of the post-1929 France provided the sense of an intense social polarization between the different social groups and parties. This led to the examination of political options that could secure the necessary solidarity for the renewal of social bond that had been dissolved. In other words, Roger Bonnard's shift can be read also as an offspring of the extension of Duguit's theory into the new historical realities. From his position as an intellectual his politics were an outcome of his epistemological beliefs and not vice versa. The lack of any metaphysical normative foundation of the social reality led him to a cynic support to realistic solutions outside France that could guarantee what his country had deprived. Additionally, the theory of Duguit regarding the associations did make sense only within the liberal framework of the French Republic. They considered to offer an enrichment of its politics with the active participation of the social groups in the governance of the country. In other words, it was a theory that presupposed a liberal order that to some extent was functional. The structural crisis that the French state was experiencing and its inability to secure social peace led to the examination of solidarity solutions that will be imposed from above with force.

The first case that he believed that could be followed in France as a paradigmatic example securing the solidarity among the social body was of Nazi Germany. Its totalitarian conception of the relation between the individual and the state where the former is subsumed to the latter. In the introduction of his book *Le droit et l'état dans la doctrine nationale-socialiste* he declares that his study discusses the nationalist socialist doctrine as it has been presented by Reinhard Höhn and Ulrich Scheuner (Bonnard 1939, 2). The former was one of the few foremost Nazi theoreticians of public law and political science and has been appointed in the prestigious chair of public law at the University of Berlin not due to his scholarship in jurisprudence but to his position as an SS officer in the security service (Hueck 2003, 78). He rejected in this theory that he developed the notion of state's personality as a liberal metaphysical construction because it implied that those who exercise its power are its executive organs. Germany's political power rests exclusively on its leader, who is not an organ of the state but the leader of the national community, hence a personification

(Neumann 2003, 151). The latter was a Nazi professor of constitutional law. Already in 1934, in one of his articles he "had justified the legitimacy and the legality of the Nazi seizure of power and their departure from the principles of the liberal constitutional state. As a loyal Nazi party member, he defended the overcoming of individualism by the notion of the community and people" (Küng 2008, 487). These ideas are developed analytically in this study by Roger Bonnard and were considered as a political antidote to the crisis of liberalism that France was experiencing this period.

Corporatism was also suggested by him as a possible solution to the maladies of French liberalism. In his next book *Syndicalisme, corporatisme et état corporatif* he argued that corporatism was a form of interventionism, which sought to conciliate individual economic interests with the collective general interest. In an article that sums up the positions he developed in this study, he is arguing for an corporatist version of politics. Commenting on the creation of the office of corn he argues that: "There is not any doubt that the office is a state organism [...] But this public institution benefits from an extensive decentralization. This is an outcome of the fact that the members of the organs in power are not appointed by the government but elected by the economic and other communities that they represent. Decentralization also depends on the decision-making powers they have, and the financial and budgetary autonomy granted to them. In short, among the different types of public institutions that are differentiated by their degree of decentralization, the office of corn, certainly belongs to the most decentralized type. This is how one can say that his intervention represents corporatism and not statism. It is truly an autonomous body to which the state assign functions to make the economy to run on behalf of the state substituting it" (Bonnard 1937b, 207). Following Duguit's vision of decentralization he envisages it as the solution of the existing ineffective statism in which the corporate bodies, by being truly autonomous, can substitute effectively the function of the central economy. Duguit is used again but in a distorted way. Here the liberal political and economic order had been vanished. Corporatist regulation is proposed not a supplement to the liberal order but as a solution to the political conflicts of the period in France. In that way, Bonnard after the presentation of Nazi conceptions of the relation between the individual and the political power, he proceeded to present the corporatist regulation as it had been developed in Italy and Romania. These books were theoretical interventions through which he aimed to open

the debate in France on the anti-liberal political options that had been promoted in other post-liberal state entities of the period. Of course, his interest was not simply an intellectual attempt to push similar type of solution to crisis of parliamentary politics in France as well.

In the conjuncture of the Petain government, he became a collaborationist of the regime, announcing it in *Revue de droit public*, the most prestigious journal of public law in the interwar France, in which he was the main editor. In its first number that appeared after an interruption caused because of the regime change, Bonnard decided to align the journal with the collaborationists: "with our 'chief', Marshal Petain, France has a guide of incomparable and almost superhuman wisdom and mastery of thought, who will keep us erring and will lead us on the path of the truth" (Marrus & Paxton 1981, 139). Liberalism was considered both as theory and practice as a discredited political tradition. It was substituted by the regime of Vichy France that was perceived as a safer political regime in the conjuncture of WWII. Bonnard summed up these new developments in the opening of the Bordeaux Law Faculty from the position of rector endorsing in front of his students that: "We invited to turn back to the acceptance of authority. So we must detach ourselves from that old ideology that has perpetuated itself as a dogma since Rousseau: the democratic prejudice that holds that, in every domain, individuals govern themselves, so that, obeying only themselves, they remain as free as before" (Marrus & Paxton 1981, 139). The concept of the individual rights were suspended in favor of the general interest that was expressed by Petain. Similar claims about the nature of the democratic regimes made in the new publication of his study on the administrative law, *Precis de droit administratif* suggesting that: "Democracy is a political regime that is not suitable for all the nations because it inheres dangers". In its position is counter-proposed a authoritarian regime that allows the development of "a sacrificed and devoted life for the common good that democratic regime because of its nature cannot impose" (Bonnard 1943, 17-18).

More analytically he developed his ideas about the new constitutional reality of France, the Constitutional Law of 1940 that established the Vichy Regime, in his study *Les actes constitutionnels de 1940* that published in 1942. This study explains thoroughly the logic of the new constitutions, its origins and its functions and articulates a severe critique towards parliamentarianism. It defines the new regime an authoritarian one that succeeded democracy and that could not function in the new

conjuncture after the national revolution of General Petain (Bonnard 1942, 24). The democratic regime collapsed and the national revolution came as a natural outcome in order to fix the deficiencies of the previous political order (Bonnard 1942, 42). Bonnard argues for a degenerated past political order by demonstrating the irreversible vices of the democratic regime. The legitimacy of the new regime derives de facto by the emerging sociopolitical reality and not by abstract metaphysical ideas as this of democratic rule. General Petain is legitimized not by the national assembly but by the qualities of his personality themselves "being the miracle that came to save France" (Bonnard 1942, 26). To avoid a degeneration of the new political order into a new form of distorted bureaucracy Petain must invite the moral elites and the intellectuals to contribute to the run of the new state rejecting individualism, liberalism and the past institutions. Petain has the responsibility in the new conjuncture to restructure the state that French patriotism dictates him as a key task.

Roger Bonnard, through the journal he edited, endorsed also the anti-Jewish laws with the tone of objectivist science that Duguit had endorsed. He was familiar with the Nazi dogma on race since 1936 when he wrote the study on the German legal order of the Third Reich. So, his urge towards his colleagues in 1941 to adopt a legal analysis that will be in favor of the interests of "our new Weltanschauung" should be not surprising (Marrus & Paxton 1981, 139). Key figures from the legal world of France supported the new anti-Jewish laws that were established. By adopting an apolitical legalistic approach to the new realities, ended up endorsing them. E.-H. Perreau, honorary professor at the Toulouse Law Faculty, Gaston Geze co-editor, together with Roger Bonnard, of *Revue de droit public* despite the fact that were critical of the content of these laws adopted an objectivist stance in their studies considering that scientific and the political level were two discrete and incompatible areas (Marrus & Paxton 1981, 139). As it becomes clear from these cases Bonnard and his journal far from being an exception in the support, explicit or implicit, of the new legal order of Vichy regime they were part of a general tendency of the specialists of the law that did not challenge by adopting a positivist approach the new legal realities that were established after the collapse of the Third Republic.

Summing up, Roger Bonnard as a pupil of Duguit, adopted an epistemological objectivism that accompanied him until the end of his professional and political career. France and its political life however could not provide the social solidarity from 1934 and onwards that was considered the main feature to renew social bonds

since its parliamentarianism was experiencing an ongoing crisis. This reality forced the French professor to turn his eyes to different political paradigms that have secured social solidarity even with authoritarian means. His two books on the political dogma of Nazism and corporatist regulation were examinations of these other paradigms that seem to be more compatible with the needs of the French political conjuncture. He presented the respective topics to endorse publicly yet in an implicit way his criticism towards the liberal regime. Parliamentarianism could not deal effectively with the problems of the current French social life. However, it was not a surprise that he wholeheartedly adhered to the new government, that he prepared ideologically through his writings. Objectivism was now enriched with some metaphysical concepts like the one of the charismatic leaders. The support for the new political order paid back with prestigious positions within the academic and political life. His trajectory can be summed as a shift from organized liberalism to fascism. This changed was crystallized when he became one of the key organic intellectuals of the Vichy regime.

6.2 Nikolaos Koumaros: Leon Duguit, Jean-Jaques Rousseau and Italian Fascism.

His pupil Nikolaos Koumaros followed a similar trajectory. The presentation of some key aspects of Duguit and Bonnard's work helps to understand the thought of one of the main theoreticians of the 4th of August regime. Him and his supervisor transformed to fascists, losing any faith in the liberal order. After his studies in France in the end of 1920 he realized like many others that it was still not possible to use the same political tools as before in the post-1929 conjuncture. His visits in countries like Italy helped to shape this rejection of liberal politics. The presentation of Duguit's thought contributes to decode some basic aspects of the political implications of the law tradition that he became indoctrinated with. Roger Bonnard's intellectual trajectory was presented on the other hand to show what happened to a certain part of the French legal thought when parliamentarianism stopped to work.

In his thesis, *Le Rôle de la volonté dans l'acte juridique. Étude critique de la conception classique* that was conducted under the supervision of Roger Bonnard, Koumaros strictly adopted this method and focused on the research interests of Leon Duguit and his supervisor. The topic focused on one of the main themes of Duguit's epistemological innovation, his reconsideration "of the predominant idea that juridical

acts were the result of assertions of the wills of the authors of the acts, or what was commonly called the *Willenstheorie*" (Mirow 2010, 201). In Duguit's view, which is also shared by Koumaros, "metaphysical ideas about law and its critiques had to follow from empirical scientific observations about the law, rather precede such observations" (Mirow 2010, 201). It is not accidental that he inscribes his dissertation in the memory of Leon Duguit that he names as his "beloved teacher". According to Roger Bonnard's introduction to Koumaros thesis, its topic focused on "the presentation of the contradictions in the ways the classic conception perceives the private law and then the exceptions that it implies, all the fictions that are inherited precisely in this understanding and the solutions to these contradictions. We will find a fine critique of the technique of the private law. Then the author is focusing on the public law, in a powerful shortcut, exposes the difficulties that are raised by the classic doctrine because it forced the concepts that we found today, the personality and sovereignty of the state" (Koumaros 1931, ii). Here Koumaros follows strictly the conception of the critique of the currents debates on legitimization as they were posed by Leon Duguit and then reproduced by his supervisor Roger Bonnard.

The question that then has to be raised is: How does Nikolaos Coumaros continue to adopt Duguit and Bonnard's theory of the state throughout his career and end up reinserting the concept of the general will, although it has been rejected in his doctoral thesis exactly because of the utilization of these theories? The reply lies in his encounter with the fascist theory of state and nation and the need to find a new holistic legitimizing discourse on the new state as it was conceived by Metaxas in the specific conjuncture in Greece. Nikolaos Coumaros, being familiar with the case of fascist Italy and the legal theories of its legitimization, had realized that there was the need of a populist discourse in which democracy as such was not rejected but the specific version of parliamentary democracy and hence its decision to continue to speak in the name of the popular will. This can merely be explained with reference to the idealist theoretical foundations of fascist Italy. More precisely Actual idealism proposed as a theory by Giovanni Gentile the key philosopher of Italian Fascism. With this conceptualization he attempted to cure the lack of agency in the philosophical discourses of his epoch by endorsing that thinking as an act depends on itself.

This type of theoritization was fully compatible with metaphysical concepts deriving from Rousseau's repertoire. More precisely many theorists who endorsed the theory of

Gentile adopted a similar conceptualization of the general will with this of Rousseau. Rousseau and many philosophers his epoch believed that a common educational system can create a common value system for the participants. That would contribute to the harmonic coordination of the society since the wills of individuals will coincide. This idea was appropriated by the fascists and obtained the name "totalitarian democracy" (Talmon 1960, 29, 43-45) It was defined as "democratic" since it emerged from the internal will of the people that was also binding them in a community, which was expressed in the face of the state.

When, in 1932, Gentile wrote the preamble to the *Dottrina del fascismo* that was to become the formal statement of Fascist doctrine, he spoke of the "most genuine form of democracy" as that which "finds expression at those times when the consciousness and will of the few, even of one, manifests itself in the consciousness and will of all" (Mussolini 1935, 14-15). Gentile endorsing a decade later his fascist theorization he insisted that it was possible for a leader to be able to express the political will of a community since the two wills can be identical.

Within the social science literature of the period that concerns us, one of the central claims, around which most of the discussion focused on, was that "democracy," the way it had been perceived was problematic. The representative democracy was not really representative, since it reflected the interests of the politicians and the economic elites who successfully had achieved to manipulate the electorate who considered an undifferentiated mass. This mass had little in common since the individual's interests could not coincide. There was no correspondence between the class position of the voters and the class affiliations of parties they voted for. Thus, the elections with the individual vote, in the Fascist logic, most of the times ended up being a periodic activity that could not express the interests of the people, who participated (Gregor 2006, 120).

James Gregor decoding the fascist reasoning on parliamentarianism argues that: "The general voter tends to be ignorant of issues, uncertain of his or her interests, incompetent in dealing with them even if known, more comfortable in a disciplined environment that makes few demands on his or her limited capabilities, and, often, subject to the moral suasion of articulate and self-possessed political leaders. The consequence, Fascist theoreticians maintained, was the "incontrovertible scientific fact" that all political communities were governed overtly or covertly by one or another "political elite." In times of mortal peril, when a community faces crises that

threaten its very survival, a "rotation of elites" takes place—and a revolutionary cadre has the historic opportunity of marshaling populations to their purpose in the effort to resolve challenges. Out of a population in crisis, the new elite collects around itself a revolutionary aristocracy—which serves as the vanguard of systemic change. In such circumstances, the riveting of attention on a critical common concern creates that “harmony of interests” out of which a "general" or "transcendental" will arise—on which a "Fascist democracy" rests" (Gregor 2006, 121)

In the Gentilean logic more precisely, a true democracy can exist only under a fascist regime since they are the only regimes that exist with a political leader who is able to lead the community to fulfill its historical role, to make them to realize their common will that coincides with his of that is expressed by him (Gentile 1955, 30-31)

Koumaros' knowledge of the Italian fascist theory of the state is clear not only through the writing of the short pamphlet on the Italian doctrine state and nation but also by the several citations in his book *Social Contract of Fascist Legal Theorists*. Giorgio Del Vecchio who taught philosophy of law at the Rome University and was a member of the Italian Fascist Party since 1921, then rector (1925-7) and dean of the university (1930-8) was one of the main references in his book *About Social Contract* (Gramsci 2011, 542). Vilfredo Pareto who criticized fiercely liberal democracies in his study *The Transformation of Democracy* and admirer of Mussolini is also cited in this book. The fascist historian Carlo Curcio, who wrote the Statuto del 1938 del Partito Nazionale Fascista is mentioned several times as well. The most important reference from the Italian fascists intellectuals of the interwar period is of Sergio Panunzio and his study *Teoria generale dello stato Fascista*. In the note, Koumaros mentions this study and clarifies that in the study of Panunzio *Teoria generale dello stato Fascista* the relation between Fascism and the democratic principle can be detected. The name of Panunzio is cited when Koumaros presents the ways in which the social contract is still one of the constituting principles of modern politics even in regimes which have not been established through elections. He argues that "today wider consensus is considered to be the natural way for the constitution of the modern society and the expression of the value of the social and political institutions hence, everybody instinctively is referred to this consensus to the extent that it provides values for the institutions and renders them sacred. The common sense is so permeated by this principle that even the revolutions that have imposed themselves violently use the argument that they naturally did not question that those principles

express the general will. Their power is established, most of the times, through elections or referendums, in order to gain political legitimacy. The social majority is so necessary that the revolutions many times attempt to gain majority through electoral fraud in order to present themselves as legitimate or through procedures that secure the consensus by the citizens. Having said that the modern dictatorial regimes in Germany and Italy, which overturned the democratic regimes, claim that their politics are not standing against the democratic principle to the extent that the power of the dictators derives from the general will."

This passage makes clear that Koumaros, who became later the main legal scholar of the Metaxas regime, knew very well that modern dictatorships need theoretical and political legitimization. The first could be achieved through a new theoretical elaboration of the relation of the state and nation, a task which he undertook. The second through the building of new institutions, an attempt that was initiated by the regime but stopped because of the outburst of the WWII.

It is helpful at this point to note that Sergio Panunzio's conception of Rousseau's general will was a quite important notion for the formation of his political outlook as for the tradition of Gentilians. Both paradigms were known to Koumaros and to certain extent can account for his political outlook and his writings during Metaxas era that sustained the main body of texts that informed its legal apparatus. Just as it is the case with supporters of the Gentilean actualism, Sergio Panunzio's discussion of J. J. Rousseau's conception of the "general will" it is conceived as this of a community with a common destiny (Panunzio 1933, 22-23).

Koumaros was familiar with these theoretical and political developments as it becomes clear through the references and citations of his book, as well as the ideas he develops in his texts published in *Neon Kratos* along with the short pamphlet on Italian fascism. From the reconstruction that preceded it becomes clear what type of conceptualization of nation and state the New State adopted and why it claimed to be a new genuine democratic regime in contrast with those that gained their legitimacy through the degenerated parliament. This appropriation of the concept of democracy should be interpreted as a populist claim expressed by the authoritarian regimes to represent the nation. Parliamentary politics because of their driving politics were mainly conducted through the parties that represented their fractioned interests. The fascists not only claimed that the new established political regime would represent the people in a more genuine way but created the necessary institutions through which the

representation could happen. This was not a claim that was limited only to Italy but met in other fascistic experiments. Let's not forget that the bourgeois democracy was a rather recent phenomenon and most of the times its function was characterized by several limitations and thus was not identified only with parliamentary politics. It should be described as a loose concept that had quite different connotations according to each context. In that sense, fascism came to represent a new formulation for the relation between the nation and the state, or better claimed a more genuine representation of nation through the fascist state in the emerging crisis of parliamentary politics during the interwar period.

Koumaros had realized this specific nature of modern politics that can function only as a formula of governance that necessarily needs legitimacy. The fascist analytical repertoire provided him the necessary tools for the legitimization of the new political conjuncture in Greece. Since he undertook his role as the legal advisor of the dictator Metaxas he implemented some of these elaborations in his texts on the *New State*. It should be noted however that in his book *About the Social Contract*, which was published in 1960, all the citations and the mentions in the fascist authors that exist in the first book *On the Social Contract*, published in 1936, have been erased. This possibly implies that he had revised his earlier intellectual and political affiliation with fascist Italy. Though, in this study his thoughts on the work of Rousseau are developed and it becomes the main focus of his argument on the French philosopher, which he will reconstruct. In terms of content the former focuses more on the more recent theories of social contract and the latter on its conceptualization by the classic authors. The focus is just on Rousseau to the extent that his work is considered a source for writings in the Metaxist era. Rousseau- as noted before- was the main theoretician from the classic period, whose work- along with the fascist theoreticians- was used to legitimize the Greek fascist experiment.

In contrast to the rest of the authors with whom Koumaros is dealing in his study *About the Social Contract* Rousseau's work occupies a whole chapter because he considers that the Rousseauian theory differs substantially from the rest of the classical theories of social contract (Koumaros 1960, 103). He starts by discussing the conceptualization of the natural condition that Rousseau developed in the study *Discourse on Inequality*, arguing that it was not a historical account but rather a conceptual invention from which the analysis can start, a hypothesis (Koumaros 1960, 115-116). According to Rousseau the natural human does not exist, it is just a

hypothesis since the civilization was always part of the human development. Thus, the only human that exists is the human within the society (Koumaros 1960, 117). Then, Koumaros argues that Rousseau's politics are inextricably linked with his theory about ethics. More precisely, the epicenter of his theory of ethics is his concept of the moral consciousness. The human being according to Rousseau does not have only senses but also rationality, acts according to rational planning and thus he is free. Human beings act because they have will. This gives him the right to act freely. The human action, again to what Hobbes has argued, aims the promotion of good. Humans are innately good-intentioned. This does not mean though that they always act like that. Many times, their actions are characterized by corruption but the reason of such a behavior lies to their social environment (Koumaros 1960, 121,2,3). Koumaros argues that Rousseau induces his argument on the goodness of human beings a posteriori to the extent that if the people were evil the moral consciousness would be an exception and not the rule (Koumaros 1960, 125).

These metaphysical beliefs along with some psychological features of the human beings can account for the existence of the moral conscience. The psychological elements are the love of self along with empathy. The combination of the latter produces a first rudimentary sense of moral consciousness pushing the people to realize that they should act egoistically so long as they do not harm their fellow beings. This implies that the ethical issue according to Rousseau is a social one (Koumaros 1960, 126). Through the development of life this rudimentary sense of consciousness becomes more complicated and the element of rationality dominates. The consciousness is neither rationale nor sentiment but a kind of intuition. This kind of intuition struggles against the passions (Koumaros 1960, 133). Humans are conscious beings that are free. This freedom can be guaranteed when the people do act according to the wills of other people. This is however a negative definition of freedom. Its positive aspect consists in its synchronization with the laws. Being free implies a subject that is a master of himself (Koumaros 1960, 134). The absolute form of freedom is when it is identified with the exercise of virtue (Koumaros 1960, 135). Genuine freedom means when the human being acts according to the laws of the external and internal nature because it implies that he acts incarnating the virtue. Koumaros then, having presented his theory of ethics, examines his theory of social contract. The main interest of the study "is not to the issue of origins of the state and law but their foundation, not how power and law emerged but what it is that

legitimizes them, and which is the criterion that legitimizes the society and law" (Koumaros 1960, 139). Thus, Rousseau's study is neither a sociological nor a historical one but a study of the philosophy of law.

The concept of the general will in Rousseau's work is the one which Koumaros examines next and that he considers the epicenter of his political theory (Koumaros 1960, 144). Through this concept the French philosopher attempts to give solution to the central contradiction between the individual and the social totality, the individual freedom and the obedience to the rules. Koumaros rejects two mainstream interpretations of the general will that was dominant in the literature. The first one is the one that equates the general will with the additions of the individuals wills of the people that exist within a society. The second one is the one that neglects the individuals wills and promotes an external reality as the one that embodies and thus expresses the different wills of the people like the entity of the state. The general will in Rousseau is identified with the moral consciousness or more precisely it is certain version of the appearance of moral consciousness meaning that it is the moral consciousness as it is expressed in the political society, it is the consciousness of the virtuous citizen (Koumaros 1960, 157). To the extent that the general will as moral consciousness is reduced to the political consciousness and considering that the moral consciousness dictates to the human beings the rules of moral law can be induced that the general will is identified with the legal consciousness because it dictates the rules of the law, which has been called by Rousseau the rules of the natural law. In this sense, the subject of the general will is this natural law that is conceived as dynamic to the extent that it changes according to the progress of ethics as it is shaped through the historical experience that is gained by living in human societies. According to this understanding it becomes clear that the general will is not a quantitative but a qualitative concept (Koumaros 1960, 158). Following this understanding it becomes clear that the subject of the general will is an individual that is deprived of his passions and is not dependent on the conjuncture (Koumaros 1960, 159). This individual becomes a law maker at the same time because he is a citizen and free subject since, he obeys to the laws he created. The metaphysics of the general will creates psychological ties between the members of the community, a sense of solidarity. In that way the state becomes a genuine democratic society constituted by free people because they practice in a daily base through the participation in the political life of the community. If then the hypothesis that the general will inspires all the citizens is

valid, it would also imply that the general will becomes a will of everyone and in that way the contradiction between the individual and the state is resolved (Koumaros 1960, 160). This understanding produces a dialectical unity which identifies the individuals with the state. Rousseau knowing that this is just an ideology that works more as an ideal rather as reality, to the extent that it is impossible for all the humans to express the general will. He suggests that education as the mean through which the humanity will reach closer to this normative situation. Thus, the French philosopher privileges as the main task of the state the education of its citizens for their cultivation for this mission (Koumaros 1960, 161).

Rousseau produced this theory not as a philosophical exercise but aiming to implement these ideas into specific political realities. This interest, according to Koumaros, made him connect the concept of the general will with the concept of the general interest. That meant that the general will is the individual will that aims to serve the general interest. The normative demand in this conception of political society is that everyone should act according to the general interest that is a *sine qua non* condition for the harmonic coexistence of the society. Rousseau additionally relates the general interest with the love of the patria (Koumaros 1960, 164-165).

In the next section of the presentation of Rousseau's theory of social contract Koumaros examines the ways with which the general will is expressed politically. Rousseau, having diagnosed that the people do not act always according to the general will, renders the existence of governments and laws necessary. Law is the expression of the general will (Koumaros 1960, 193). The law makers of the society is the majority to the extent that not everyone can be a law maker. Though, Koumaros clarifies that Rousseau does not equate the opinion of the many with the general will because the former is a qualitative and not a quantitative concept and thus means that not necessarily the majority expresses the general will. Rousseau promotes democracy and elections for practical reasons as a realistic choice and not as a logical derivative of the concept of the general will (Koumaros 1960, 195). Elections is considered as the only practical medium through which the general will can be diagnosed but not expressed. Elections may or may not indicate which decision should be made to be compatible with the general will. In the same sense the majority is not making the law but rather only indicates in which direction the general will lies. The general will is independent from the electoral outcome. This practically means that also the minority could be forming the general will for the society.

Then Koumaros discusses the conceptual distinction that exists in Rousseau's political theory between republic and democracy. The first implies a form of state, a form of sovereignty and the second is identified with the form of governance. Not every state is a republic but only those states that express the general will. This distinction implies that republic can be combined with different forms of governance not only with that of democracy which is just one between many others. The crucial issue according to Rousseau's political theory is the general will is expressed, meaning that states should be as close as possible to the ideal of republic (Koumaros 1960, 202-203). The ideal republic for Rousseau is aristocracy because it is unnatural that the majority governs, and the minority is governed (Koumaros 1960, 204, 205). Rousseau then rejects the division between the powers because he considers that the general will and sovereignty are identical. The executive power is a derivative of the sovereignty. He also rejects the principle of popular delegation. In the question how the first government will emerge to the extent that government is appointed according to an action of the executive power, Rousseau suggests the legislative power to transform itself to an executive power.

It becomes clear, through this presentation of Koumaros' understanding of Rousseau, how this reading can easily be compatible with an authoritarian version of governance and legitimization. Without examining which of these arguments can be valid from a Rousseauian perspective to the extent that his study on social contract is open to many interpretations, this specific reading provides the ground for legitimizing a form of politics that is against liberal parliamentarianism. More precisely, the disjunction between the general will and the institutions that can express them, the idea that governance is conducted by aristocracy, the interpretation of the general will as beyond the individual will transforming it from a quantitative to a qualitative concept and its equitation with the patria are the epistemological techniques that were used by Koumaros in the texts he wrote for *Neon Kratos* in order to legitimize the authoritarian rule of Metaxas. This specific reading of Rousseau along with Italian fascist political theory of the time provided the intellectual ground that could be used in order to overcome the liberal conception of politics. This reading of Rousseau was not very different from the fascists' theoreticians used in order to legitimize the Italian fascist experiment. There was however a clear instrumentalization of his work for the needs of the political conjuncture. Both regimes realized that in modernity politics can only be conducted in the name of people. The general will was the concept that was the

one that proved useful in this aim. Even if the means of its expression were different from the liberal order considered to be proved more genuine in the conditions of exception where the parliament stopped to function effectively for the majority of the people. The charismatic leaders were the political antidote to this widespread crisis of the political. They could govern through the institutions they built the populaces of their countries more effectively and in a more genuine way than the divisionary party politics of the previous era. In this process democracy could not be abandoned as concept to the extent that this would mean a governance by an oligarchy, something not very different from liberal party politics. There new meanings were invested in this concept that could be compatible with the conditions of the post-liberal era. Authoritarian techniques were considered just as complimentary tools for the effective way of the expression of the general will.

The clear endorsement of fascist theory of political rule by Nicolas Koumaros becomes clear in his short pamphlet written in 1934 under the title *Stato e Nazione nel regime fascista*. In this book he formulates some basic ideas that have informed the fascist Italian state in regard to the relation between the state and the nation. The reasons for the writing of this study are not clear since it was written two years before the establishment of the regime. A hypothesis could be that Koumaros was related with George Merkouris the leader of a far-right organization named Greek National Socialist Party and the person who represented the party at the Fascist international meeting in Montreux on December 16/17 of 1934. He was adherent of both Italian Fascism and German Nazism. Though, this book independent of the reasons for his composition testifies Koumaros political preferences and his familiarity with the fascist dogma. These realities were known to Metaxas before he hired him as his personal legal advisor and assigned him with the task to compose the basic principles that would inform the New State. It is also indicative for the intentions of Metaxas to establish the new regime on principles that were adopted by other authoritarian regimes of the period. This proves that the inspiration of Metaxas for the regime in the making was closer in terms of principles to authoritarian states of the period rather to premodern dictatorships of the past centuries. More precisely, it should be described as an institutional and ideological bricolage of political initiatives and ideas that emerged in other European countries of the interwar because of the crisis of the liberal order rending it part of the political canon of the period rather than an exception.

In the first page Koumaros starts his study recognizing that the world in this period is not just experiencing an economic crisis but also a crisis of the state. This crisis should be seen under a dual prism, a theoretical and political one. The first one refers to its nature, its essence. The second one refers to the political features of the state. The Greek legal theorist thinks that it is of great importance for the conjuncture to study the ways in which Fascism has solved these two aforementioned issues. The study of the conception of the nation on behalf of the fascist Italian regime is required because it makes clear that reforms of the Italian revolution are crystallized in the new idea of the state. He cites Mussolini's idea that the stronghold of the fascist doctrine fulfills its essence within the state equating fascism with the state (Koumaros 1934, 3-4). He adds, along the line of argumentation of the fascist leader, that there is nothing outside the state, but everything is included in it. Then Koumaros argues that the whole fascist doctrine around the state is summarized in the gentilean expression of the "ethical state" that can be analyzed in two levels, its concept and its function. The fascist state according to Koumaros should be categorized under the label of an organistic conception that is a spiritual one. In the totality of spiritual origins, the individuals can be conceived as part of it and not as separate entities. Citing Mussolini and reproducing his idea, he emphasizes that the fascist state is a spiritual and moral one that gives a specific political, juridical and moral shape to the nation. Koumaros presents his argument and additionally mentions Alfredo Rocco, who argues for a state that stands beyond the individuals, is superior to them, hence where individuals are subordinated (Koumaros 1934, 6).

Regarding its function the state's economy goes hand in hand with ethics, the two aspects are inseparable. The essence of its ethics is summed in the fact that put limits to the freedom in order to achieve different (Koumaros 1934, 7). The egoism in this understanding of ethics is sacrificed for the advancement of the totality that is the nation (Koumaros 1934, 8). The law in this form of state is used to promote social pacifism. Fascism does not attempt to demolish the barriers between the economic and the legal sphere, but it attempts to integrate them into the state. This process is fulfilled through the intervention of the state to promote the interests of the nation. This is its main difference from the liberal state that abstains from regulating the material and spiritual development of the society recording only a posteriori the results of this process (Koumaros 1934, 9). This process ends up making the distinction between the state and the nation impossible to the extent that the one

dissolves into the other (Koumaros 1934, 12). In the fascist dogma the nation finds its destination within the state, it is its absolute expression (Koumaros 1934, 13).

This understanding between the state and that nation that is elaborated here informed the texts that Koumaros wrote as the legal advisor of the New State. In this conception, the nation and the state are two inseparable entities. Koumaros does not use the term of the ethical state explicitly in order not to seem like a replication of the fascist dogma but utilizes all the conceptual derivatives from the fascist dogma as it had been summed up in the text "La Dottrina del Fascismo" written by Mussolini and Gentile. A careful reading of the principles of the new state makes clear that relation between the state and the nation that Metaxas endorses is the one that has been presented in this text by Koumaros which is in fact a summary of the text of Gentile and Mussolini. Here, the individuals do not have rights that challenge the rights of the state. Additionally, the liberal conception of the individual is rejected. The individuals are expressed through the nation that find its destination through the state. This conceptualization provided Metaxas with the antiliberal analytical tools for the new conjuncture. Even if not direct, it was an eclectic re-inscription in the context of Greece that had the need to legitimize its new authoritarian constitutional order established by the fourth of August regime. The Italian fascist paradigm of nation and state was used because it was closer to the ideology of the Metaxas which did not promote racial connotations in the new conceptions of citizenship that was promoted by its regime. The individual in this perception existed only in its relation to the state not as a separate entity. Its foundation was a metaphysical one to the extent that the nation had spiritual connotations that were fulfilled through a strong authoritarian state. Koumaros proved to be the proper person to provide a systematic version of this conceptual skeleton in the new conjuncture. He was the one who knew well the theoretical developments within Italy that were adjusted to the Greek new political realities of the dictatorship. Rousseau and the different versions of the Italian dogma of Fascism were used as the main conceptual tools that gave shape to the legal foundation of the 4th of August regime. They reflected the need of the Metaxas regime to be legitimized in the name of the Greek people. The populist aspirations of the regime to represent the Greek nation in a more genuine way compared to the previous degenerated political establishment codified in the new principles of the state that were informed from the analytical repertoire of Italian Fascism rendering to the 4th of August regime the local version of the fascist panorama of the interwar period.

Conclusion

Summing up, in this chapter I attempted to present the ideas that informed Koumaros text in the semi-formal journal of the regime named Neon Kratos. Its inspirations were a combination of ideas derived from Rousseau's work and Italian fascism. Despite its late ideas Koumaros was not always a persona that believed in authoritarian solutions to the emerging political problems. As it was shown, despite his study with a professor that then became one of the central legal figures around the Petain government, the ideas that he developed in his doctoral studies can be ascribed to the liberal political theory of the period. His main influence during the late twenties was Leon Duguit, a figure that was on the left of the liberalism to the extent that he suggested interventionist solutions for the promotion of social cohesion that was undermined by the free market. Roger Bonnard adhered also to Duguit's epistemic paradigm until the beginning of the 1930. The impact of the global economic crisis of 1929 in the politics of the two countries made both to turn to authoritarian solutions for its overcoming. Duguit's method of the a posteriori observation of social reality in order to induce legal rules proved fatal in the new conjuncture of 1930 which did not provide any sense of social solidarity but divisionary politics that could not serve the interests of the social majorities. This can explain their deviation from liberal theories and political solutions. Roger Bonnard adopted ideas closer to the paradigm of national socialism, Nicolaos Koumaros ideas derived from the Italian Fascist paradigm. His positivism shifted to a metaphysical conception of the nation and the state to the extent the 4th of August regime need a metaphysical conception that could incorporate in it the notion of the general will. This divergence can be explained with reference to the different political contexts. Petain was a collaborationist with the Nazi regime and Metaxas ideology did not endorse the Nazi racial theory to the extent that his aim was to reconstruct the Greek state according to the principles of the collectivistic nationalism. This ideology privileged an organic conception of the state where the individual will did not exist outside, but the former embodied them.

Nikolaos Koumaros gave specific legal shape with his texts to the collectivist nationalistic inspirations of Ioannis Metaxas. It was a mixture of ideas that derived from elaborations of classic political theory with a focus on Rousseau's theory of social contract and Italian fascism. The former, while rejected by Koumaros during

his PhD because of the metaphysical theory he endorsed, was used in a eclectic way exactly because of the feature of its theory in the new conjuncture of newly established dictatorship. These analytical tools provided a conceptual corpus that the regime could use to legitimize its existence speaking in the name of the people, something that was considered necessary to the extent that it came from above and not from a movement from below. These theories allowed the regime to define itself as a laocracy in which the one who rules are the people even if their general will is expressed through the General Ioannis Metaxas, who was de facto legitimized. These ideas were combined with institutions (for example the constitution that was produced by Koumaros and that allowed to the people to vote) that were implemented fully because of external events like the war with Italy. These realities render the Metaxas regime as part of the general developments of the interwar period where several authoritarian regimes in Europe, in response to the crisis of liberalism, appeared as offering new theories of political belonging and new forms of institutional representation as solutions and alternatives to parliamentarism and its ideology.

Chapter 7: The role of the women within the Metaxas regime: From Mothers of the nation to genuine citizens?

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the propaganda that "The 4th of August Regime" used for the Greek women's mobilization in the Metaxas' fascist statecraft. I argue that the regime's propaganda instead of contributing to the formation of a stable normative image of the "new fascist woman", promoted different, and in some way contradictory, representations of the proper "woman" determined in the last instance by the different historical conjunctures. Given this allegation Metaxas regime propagated three ideal types of "good" women that corresponded to three distinct historical conjunctures. The first role was performed successfully when women stayed inside the house acting as housewives and corresponded to a period of social order, between the establishment of the Metaxas regime and the Italian invasion in Albania on March 7, 1939. The second ideal type of the proper woman was the one who was not only responsible for the household but at same time contributed, as far as she could, to the nationally burning issue of war, which was closely linked to the hybrid period before the full involvement of Greece in the WWII. The last one dictates the absolute devotion of women to the service of the Greek nation and is related to a state of exception that is the Greco-Italian war, which marks the irrevocable full-scale involvement of Greece in the WWII. The outcome of this process was that despite the initial aspirations of regimes' propaganda -that aimed to the maintenance of the traditional role for the Greek women primarily as wives who give birth - the national mobilization for the cause of WWII thrust them into new roles, previously unthinkable. These new roles were closely linked to the public sphere unsettling the fascist symbolic order of gender representation and far from establishing gender lines, confused them.

7.1 Conceptual Elaborations

The periodization that I suggest and the accompanying women's representations neither correspond to a precise reproduction of reality per se nor presupposes that regime's ideology regarding the women's role of the society was without

contradictions. The utilization of this schematization has mainly an analytical aim, to capture better the object under examination. The Weberian concept of ideal type that I use can be useful analytical device to conceive clearer the policies of the regime regarding the women's population that did not have a consistent character but were dependent from the various historical conjunctures (Weber, 1949, 90). Adopting this category of pure forms does not imply that the contradictions that are an integral part will be ignored. On the contrary, there will be an attempt to demonstrate the antinomies that each ideal type inheres that, in the final instance, reflects the very contradictory policies of the regime's approach to women's issue. The tension between a traditionalist and "modernizing" rhetoric, though, was not an idiosyncratic feature of Metaxas' regime. Ernesto Laclau has defined it as one of the general components of the fascist state arguing that: "Fascism, far from being the typical ideological expression of the most conservative and reactionary sectors of the dominant classes was, on the contrary, one of the possible ways of articulating the popular-democratic interpellations into political discourse" (Laclau, 1997, 111). Therefore, the 4th of August regime, far from being an anomaly, was part of this general pattern.

Thread guide for the development of this argument will be the critical examination of the discourse that the regime produced for the propagation of its aims. For my analysis I will use articles that have been published in the main magazine of the youth of the regime *Neolaia* (Youth). This type of magazines were integral part of the "fascist public sphere" that Metaxas' dictatorship developed because of its need for popular legitimization. Emphasizing the integral unity between the individual and the national state and restricting significantly the autonomy of the private sphere, the regime attempted to reshape the role and the importance of the public sphere. The people were obliged by the regime to be more political present in various public spaces by participating in the open theatre of public politics. Indispensable aspect of this fascist public sphere was the aestheticization of politics, certainly though to a smaller extent compared with other authoritarian regimes of the same period. Within the Greek context the limited use of the art for cause of political mobilization has to do with the quite undeveloped forms of the means of communication, developments that took place only after the end of WWII.

What the fascist aestheticization of politics through propaganda means served? One possible explanation of the function of the introduction of art into politics consists in the naturalization of the uneven modernization of the societies that the

fascist regimes promoted, meaning the neutralization of emancipatory content of modern politics through the technology and the economy. More precisely, this implied that fascism did not aim to an end of the political modernity as such but rather it sought to mobilize the masses without providing them the opportunity through this process to put into doubt the reproductive terms of these regimes. A feature that differentiates the fascist regime with previous authoritarian forms of political arrangement (conservative version of politics) that aimed to promote the exclusion of the masses from politics.

In the context of the totalitarian fascist state, propaganda was the way through which the relation between the relationship between the National State and the individual was prescribed. Here ideology should be understood as a process of interpellation. What does this mean practically? It implies that discourses contributed to the formation of the new subjectivities that the Metaxas regime attempted to forge. The representations that the regime put forwards were on the one hand a projection of how new citizens should act in each conjuncture they found themselves in and in the new exceptional circumstances. On the other hand, they made a step further, they orientated the ways of seeing towards the future, pushing the social imaginary to think in terms of an utopian society that have superseded the existing divisions of the capitalist society, a society in which the class struggle have substituted by the national homogeneity.

Let's focus firstly on the Althusserian concept of interpellation. Louis Althusser in his study "Lenin and Philosophy" and other essays seeks to elaborate a more concrete version of theory of ideology that goes beyond the quite abstract analytical dichotomy of base-superstructure (Althusser, 1971). The issue that he attempts to tackle is the ways in which the ideology disciplines the individualities successfully for the aims of capitalist reproduction. In other words, he attempts to comprehend in which terms the superstructure safeguards the capitalist mode of production. Regarding this process Althusser suggests two theses: "Thesis 1: Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their conditions of existence ... Thesis 2: Ideology has a material existence" (Althusser, 1971, 153, 155).

The first thesis is combined with his conceptualization of the subjectivity, how the individual becomes subjects. As he suggests: "[T]he subject acts insofar as he is acted by the following system...: ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices governed by a material ritual, which [sic]

practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness according to his belief"(Althusser, 1971, 170). Does this theory imply that historical actors have zero importance? Not at all. They are analytical and historical presuppositions for his theory, however, the subjectivity of each subject is always-already in existence; that is, every individual exists in and through subject categories that precede him/her. The process with which the individuals becoming subjects is a process of interpellation. The process of interpellation is accomplished by means of a general framework of centering, which Althusser describes in terms of an absolute subject around whom an infinity of individuals/subjects is interpellated (Resch, 1992, 190). He takes religion as a classic case of this process. In our case this can be substituted with the new fascist nationalist ideology that was addressed to individuals in order to transform them into authoritarian subjects. This process was dominated by the central position of the New state, exemplified by its leader - Ioannis Metaxas, who was the *Other absolute subject*. A reciprocal relation of mutual recognition exists between this absolute Subject and individual subjects. The relation between the Subject and the subjects may be understood as a "mirror-connection" or, more precisely, "[a] double mirror-connection such that it *subjects* the subjects to the Subject, while giving them in the Subject in which each subject can contemplate his own image (present and future), the *guarantee* that this really concerns them and Him, . . ." (Althusser, 1971, 18)..

Althusser argues that the process happens at the same time by noting that "the existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing" (Althusser, 1971, 175). In other words, this process is simultaneous "ideology (that) has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to making it clear that individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects, which necessarily leads us to one last proposition: individuals are always-already subjects" (Althusser, 1971, 176).

Althusser endorses that the individual is becoming subject through practices and rituals that are integral part of material institutions in which everybody is part of them and in that way secured the reproduction of the existing relation of productions. In the New State one of the central institutions that worked along these lines was the youth of the regime, EON. Does the process of interpellation in a deterministic way position the social subjects? No, it does not, since many times it is unsuccessful and when it succeeds after struggle and

contestation between the social agents and structures. That means that the ideology of the regime was not internalized effectively by everyone and when it happened most of the times it happened under the threat of violence, like tortures. Additionally, there was also the case that the Metaxas regime managed to promote a successful diffusion of its ideology despite their aims, because of external factors like the invasion of Italian army into Greece that legitimized its existence because of the state's management of the imperialist threat. Was the process of interpellation - regarding its form - a static one? Absolutely not, there was a dynamic process between the ideology of the regime and the different conjunctures. The Greek fascist regime, as the rest authoritarian regimes of the period, did not develop a consistent ideological program but a flexible one to be adaptable to the different conjunctures. In this light, we can name the ideology of the regime a conjunctural one.

Continuing my reasoning regarding the role of ideological discursive practices within the Metaxas regime I argue that its function had not only negative sense namely the attempt to produce authoritarian subjectivities but also a positive one that was the projection of its utopian aspirations. Fredric Jameson in his study *The Political Unconscious* supports the idea that "all class consciousness-or in other words, all ideology in the strongest, including the most exclusive forms of ruling-class consciousness just as much as that of oppositional or oppressed classes- is in its very nature utopian" (Jameson, 2002, 280). Could the fascist ideology of Metaxas regime, or the fascist ideology in general, be an exception to this rule? As part of the modernist paradigm fascism as political projects had inherently to its nature the idea of radical utopian transformation of liberal societies and a series of suggestions for the transcendence of their antinomies.

This Utopian impulse in Metaxas regime was translated into the substitution of the degenerated class society by a new national community in which the identity and way of thinking of the new citizen will not be defined by its class position but by the sense of feeling Greek and to devote themselves unconditionally to the process of fascist statecrafting. This was an effort to transcend the antinomies of modernity with an

authoritarian way. This had to do with the emergence of issues like the capitalist crisis, the demands posed by the labor movement, the emergence of the new-middle classes, the women's movement and the inability of the successive parliamentary governments to provide persuasive solutions to these because of the ongoing economic crisis. The response of the Metaxas regime was the national unity of the Greek people and a pressure towards all these groups to deprive all their special features and to be synchronized according to the national needs. In other words, the utopia of the Metaxas regime was this of a harmonic national community that superseded the previous divisions that pervaded the society with the simultaneous rejection of all the bourgeois institutions that constituted the former political order and their substitution by other authoritarian that would secure the new imposed realities. This utopian project inhered also an aspect of an ethical regeneration drawing to glorious ancient past of Greece opposed to the moral collapse of the previous social political status quo.

7.2 EON's political role.

EON was a unique institution for the standards of the Greek society aiming to integrate and reeducate the whole youth of the country. It is founded with the aim to "mold and reshape mentally and psychologically and train psychically the Greek children according to the ethical, social and political orientation of the state of the 4th of August regime" (Petridis 2000, 33). The main aim of EON was the education of the youth according to the ideas and expectations of the regime through their investment of their time in their activities that would end up in egalitarian socialization of its members. It meant a shift time investment of the youth from the education and family to the activities of EON. It was an interclass project included people from all the classes. In that sense its character was to homogenize the youth and to forge a specific national identity that will be based in ideals of the 4th of August regime. In other words, it was a project that attempted to shape a new type of antiliberal citizenship.

This process implied that EON had undertaken the responsibility of socialization of the youth through a massive institution resembling to the similar totalitarian experiments that have taken place in the same period in the other parts of Europe. By adopting this type of imitative, EON produced the opposite results of what the official ideology of the regime declared that was focused, among others, on the strengthening of the two traditional institutions that related to the Greek national identity, the family and the orthodox church. This was happening simply because these policies undermined the ways and the roles of these institutions in the shaping of the youth. Until this point both institutions played a crucial role in the way that Greeks obtained their national consciousness. This reality with EON changed since the needs of the nation in the new conjuncture needed active citizens of both genders that would participate actively in the making of the Third Hellenic Civilization, in massive and public terms. The state now substituted the role of the traditional institutions in the ways that the youth was socialized actively unmaking the key division between the public and the private sphere that dominated the Greek society until this time. This new type of massive socialization triggered a series of changes in the ways that women were perceived, and, in the ways, they acted as wives, mothers and housewives. This forged a new ideal of women participating actively in the shaping of the nation.

The key problem that regime confronted by adopting this type of policies had to do with the radical challenge of the traditionalist way that women used to be socialized in the pre-Metaxas era. The private sphere (house and family) and the church were the key institutions through which women got a sense of their roles and social expectations. The new practices that were promoted through EON in this sense did not only challenge the control of the parents towards the girls but also introduced new ways of dressing (military uniforms), the physical training and their socialization with men. Thus, these new realities rearranged the female presence in the public sphere, challenging the dominant values of the Greek patriarchic society through the symbolic appropriation of attributes that until then were considered exclusively male (Vasilaki, 2008, 82-83)

The church's influence in the socialization of the youth was also undermined. Metaxas, during the years of his government, decided to ban all the antagonistic institutions that were challenging his authoritarian project. This did not take place only in the level of political parties where all the organizations from the far left to the far right were considered illegal, but also in regard to the institutions that were related to the youth. For this reason, the scouts that were under the influence of the King were abolished together with the two youths that the orthodox was controlling (Vasilaki,2008, 85)

The reason that the Metaxas regime developed a contradictory vision between tradition and modernity about women is due to the totalitarian vision of the society that the authoritarian regimes of the interwar period adopted, in which all the members of the society were assigned with specific roles that should perform towards the progress and welfare of these states. The totalitarian regimes of the interwar period developed a unique vision for the members of their societies with new social obligations and tasks that would contribute to the practical overcoming of the previous liberal order building an utopian society. In this perspective, women should perform their traditional role as mothers, housewives and educators and at the same time overcome them by working outside the private sphere, performing their social duties as citizens and becoming soldiers when the conjuncture necessitates it.

7.3 Affectionate Mothers or Devoted Fascist Citizens?

The Metaxist discourse on women as it can be easily induced from what has been mentioned so far, has a contradictory character invoking both traditional and modern motifs on their social tasks. Though, this shift between the two has historical roots and are dependent on the conjuncture. The balance towards the one or the other are dictated by the national needs that are defined both by internal and external causes. In regard to the traditionalist argumentation, for example the return to behaviors that are considered exclusively "Greek" it is endorsed. Two basic components of

the Greek female identity are considered motherhood and family. Adopting this line of reasoning Aimilia Velissaropoulou in her article "The household, factor of welfare for the nation" she wrote for the magazine of EON "Neolaia" argues that WWI brought seismic shifts in the traditional roles of the genders. Women started to participate in protests and expressed political demands. The shifts that occurred in the daily practices of people are responsible for the fact that women forgot their traditional roles, their mission, which was to be a mothers and housewives, and which was assigned by God. The war sent a big proportion of the male population to fight in the barricades, something that obliged several women to substituted them in their daily tasks. This is how the fist massive participation of the women occurred in the labor market. When the war finished and the men returned, they expected a restoration of the previous order of things. However, this was not possible since women in the meantime had articulated a series of demands that claimed the equation between the two genders. In France, when women were faced with the attempt to get fired in the public sector, they formed associations to defend women's rights in the labor market. The money that was gained, gave women access to privileges that made them to leave the house and developed new ways of life and socialization. Women neglected their household that was not limited to cooking or cleaning but included also the nurturing of the children. These are the tasks that the 4th of August regime will oblige women to undertake, focusing on the restoration of the institutions of religion, patria and family. EON will contribute to the making of responsible housewives, wo are able to serve their nation by keeping their household properly, something that the previous liberal regime undermined (Neolaia 12/11/1938). This article however was written two years before the outbreak of the WWII, when the domestic life of the country was stable. Thus, the discourse should be perceived as one that attempts to interpellate the female population in conditions of social stability.

On the other hand, the ideologues of the regime were calling women to perform roles that were challenging the traditional tasks that the previous order of things had assigned them. Sitsa Karaïskaki an exponent

of Germany who had adopted the ideological imperatives developed by the Nazi state was glorifying, for example, the significance of the role of the women in the war. She became a regular contributor of the magazine *Neolaia*, having her own column where she was answering letters at "Selida ton Koritsion" ("The Girls' Page") and advising young girls with ideas in alignment with the ideology of the Metaxas regime, related both to the private and public life.

In her article "In our Watch" written in November 1940 after the Italian invasion in the country, Sitsa Karaiskaki calls Greek women to deliver their historical mission as soldiers in the non-front line. Further she argues that these are historical moments that provide the Greek race with an opportunity to show its big potentialities. She compares this momentum with a past similar national experience that was the Battle of Thermopyles between Greek cities and the Persian Empire. In these new exceptional conditions - Greco-Italian War- Greek women could play a very important role in the outcome of the battle. The invasion of the Italian army put the existential status of the Greek nation in danger. Women in this conjuncture should be calm, to use their foresight, to offer a relief to the people who are around and to provide affection and love. If the soldiers have the knowledge that such women are in the non-front line, they will fight with a greater decisiveness, so Karaiskaki. Thus, she endorses the role of the women as a quite crucial one in this conjuncture, since they have been transformed to soldiers in the non-front line. Defending a country like Greece that is a symbol of civilization for the rest of the world, there is no other solution than to fight with a sense of self-sacrifice in order to prove that the contemporary Greeks are equal with their ancestors. In that way the Greeks will fulfill the mission that has been assigned by the current leader and father of Greece, Metaxas, to save the country from the Italian invasion (*Neolaia*, 9/11/1940).

In another article, Karaiskaki invites young women to act as responsible citizens despite their young age. As Greek women the conjuncture demands, so she puts forward, to fulfill the ideal of Platos' *Republic*, which implies to behave like virtuous citizens that is a sine qua non condition for the formation of a robust regime (*Neolaia*, 27/1/1940).

Through this process it becomes clear that what the Metaxas regime attempted to do contradicted with its own physiognomy, since it could not have the consciousness of tradition, which it was technically creating and that presupposed the historically existed modern society like in Greece during the 1930s. Outside its intentions the

Metaxas regime 'modernized' the role of the women within the Greek society without intending to do it. In sociological terms, this was an outcome of the unintended consequences of collective action of the Metaxas regime (Vasilaki, 2008, 88).

This outcome though is inextricably linked with the nature of the fascist regimes of the interwar period. They were political formations that extensively used a discursive conservative rhetoric against the political heritage of enlightenment and modernity being part of this condition at the same time, something that led them to adopt modern institutions that aimed to cultivate the consensus from below transforming their citizens to disciplined subjects that shared the political vision of these authoritarian regimes. The 4th of August regime was not an exception to this general tendency of interwar fascism. Not only did it create similar institutions, to the extent that the objective conditions allowed it, but adhered the ideological dogmas of these regimes making it part of the right-wing authoritarianism of interwar period.

The Modernist elements of the Metaxist discourse regarding women was the focus on the female labor and their active participation in the fascist statecraft. The adherence of women's open access to all types of work and the discourse on the participation of the New Woman in the political realities of the country has strong similarities with demands that were expressed by the Greek feminist movement of the interwar period (Vasilaki, 2008, 88). This indicates that the Metaxas regime did not completely reject the demands from below that were articulated by the Greek feminists of the liberal era but adjusted them to the authoritarian context and content of its regime. In other words, it was the continuation of modernity with authoritarian means. The woman in the Metaxas era owed obedience and the reproduction of the traditional way of life although women's expanded role in the public sphere provided a modern character to its content.

A crucial point for a better understanding of the regime's ideology that should be clarified is that invoke of the tradition in its discourse aimed to contribute to the regeneration of the nation. As Mark Antliff has noted in regard to the contradictory nature of the fascist regimes that adopted a regenerative nationalism in order to "reinvigorate body politics the fascists looked beyond a decadent present to past eras, but they did not advocate a nostalgic return to a pre-modern condition. Instead, they sought to incorporate qualities associated with past eras into the creation of a radically new society, fully integrated to with twentieth century industrialism and technology. Fascists selectively plundered their historical past for moments reflective of the values

they wished to inculcate for their radical transformation of national consciousness and public institutions through the creation of institutions of massive mobilization" (Antliff 2002, 150).

Historicizing the discourse on women that was produced in the magazine *Neolaia*, it can be argued that during the first few months of the circulation of the magazine there is an emphasis on the traditional role of the woman. This is the period ahead of the kickoff of World War II, hence between October 1938, when the magazine was published for first time and September 1939, when Germany invaded Poland. In this period, the regime still focuses a lot on internal issues of the country. The ideologues attempted to build an image of the woman/mother that contributes to the forging of the nation through her performance in the traditional roles as the nurturer of children, the housewife taking care of the household and the wife, who provides emotional support to her husband. These tasks are considered roles that women should perform to serve the new Greek nation that is in the making. Thus, these roles are considered "Greek" that are opposed to the foreign "Western culture" and "foreign customs" that had undermined the pillars of the Greek society in the past, hence family and religion. The main two ideologies that are considered as non-Greek and were responsible for this kind of ethical degeneration are liberal feminism and bolshevism. The type of feminism that is accepted is the one that can contribute to the nation. Bolshevism is rejected as a non-Greek product that has been produced in a different context and its ideology has destroyed the traditional values of human civilization. These roles relate to the biology of the women that differs substantially from these of men and has their origins in the ancient societies. The type of progress that the modernist ideologies brought undermined the national unity and led to social divisions that the Metaxas regime will overcome with its policies. In her article "The woman: priestess of the family and the nation" Sitsa Karaiskaki summarizes the ideological motives of the regime on the role of women. The making of a new Greek nation state, she argues, educates the new woman because it is an indispensable part of the efforts of national regeneration. She rejects that the role of the women is undermined in the national states compared to the respective liberal ones, referring with the former to the authoritarian regimes of the interwar period. This cannot happen because, for their regeneration, this form of states are based equally to men and women assigning them yet with different roles. The Greek woman will serve the nation following the rules that derive from her nature and the skills she has. The woman under the Metaxas

differs substantially compared to what was happening before because she does not follow foreign patterns and trends but thinks and acts according to the ideology of the Greek civilization. The struggles that the feminist movement gave for the right to vote should be indifferent for the Greek women. The focus now should be to accompany the efforts of men with their work. The new woman is also assigned the task to bring the people back to God, making them again spiritual and believers (Neolaia, 1939, 971).

After September 1939 the focus on the public role of the women is increasing. New tasks were assigned to women that had to do with the conjuncture of WWII. Metaxas and the ideologues of the regime started to focus their propagandistic discourse on the preparation of the Greek people for a possible war. So along with the priority of internal policy of forging subjectivities that will be compatible with the new state of order, there is also a growing preoccupation of the regime to transform its citizens to fighters that are ready to sacrifice their lives for the nation. Indicative of the new momentum is the article written by Ad. Papadimas entitled "The actions of the women in conditions of war". He argues that the new war has assigned a significant role to women in regard to the war. German, French, Finish, Polish women contributed in the first months of the war equally to men in the battle fields. Even though in recent years women contributed in wars mainly as nurses, this was not the same for the previous epochs where women had more active role in the battlefield. In this war as well, women were not only assigned to health services but substituted men in the public services and in many cases in military industries and the military operations. The people that were not involved in the battle field, in conditions of war, were called "cowards". This could not be said for women that contribute equally to the army services of their countries with the men. For that reason, the future generation will glorify them as it was happening now with the men (Neolaia 1940, 471).

In 1940 articles on knitting techniques for clothes that would be necessary in the war and advises about the management of the household in conditions of war are increasing. The attention now is on the role of women in the back line as providers of material and emotional support to the men in the battlefield and children in the house. Sitsa Kairaskai, in another article, glorifies the principle of the sacrifice and perceives it as a Greek value that had helped the nation significantly in difficult moments in the

past. Thus, the Greek women should be ready to sacrifice themselves for the advancement of the social totality (Neolaia 1940, 852).

The principle of the sacrifice is cultivated through the patriotic cult of the death of Nikis Perakaki, a female aviator that was killed during her military training. The Metaxas regime created a cult of the fallen soldiers and exploited it, strengthened its essentially heroic aspect, attempted to transform it to a central element of public life and an important medium of its political culture. Metaxas in this ideological direction argued that "when you will be called to serve the country, you should know that sacrifice is an organic part of it because the nations are growing only when the citizens have adopted the sense of self-sacrifice and in any moment in their life in the case it will be asked are ready to give their life for the nation having decided that this is the right thing to do". This is what Niki did for her nation, sacrificed herself as a member of EON for the nation. This the example that whole youth should follow (Neolaia 1940, 1419).

The last period starts with the Greco-Italian War and lasts from October 1940 to April 1941, when Neolaia publishes its last issue. From this point and after the focus is on the war and the tasks of the citizens in the conditions of exception. The exclusive focus on the household now is considered as a betrayal to the extent that the needs of the country have changed. The main discursive motto of the regime is "Freedom or Death". The citizens should be sacrificed to serve the nation. There is a shift from the representation of the mother as a housewife to the mother of the soldier that must do whatever is necessary to help her son to win in the battle. The mothers of the soldiers are depicted as Spartan women, who would do the same as the Spartan mother did in the past being the symbol of sacrificial love and support (Neolaia 1940, 255). Additionally, there are historical accounts that reconstruct the role of Greek women in wars. In an article that is titled "Greek women that fought for freedom", Giofyllis argues that the current involvement of the Greek women in WWII is nothing new since it had happened several times in the past. He notes that in fights in the mountains of Pindus with the Italian army, Greek women played an equally important role in the defeat of the enemy. The same happened in Crete where women formed armed units to fight the Italians. The only thing these women do is to follow the paradigm of past generations that they sacrificed when there was the need for the nation (Neolaia 1940, 275). In this type of argumentation, the nationalist narration that detects a line of continuity between the Greek Modern state and the antiquity and

Byzantine is reproduced implicitly. Greece is considered an eternal entity geographically situated in the area that is called Hellas today. The glory past of the nation is often recalled as a source of inspiration for the Greeks that fought in WWII.

Conclusion

Women were in the epicenter of the Metaxist propaganda as bearers and practitioners of the regime's ideology. This attempt had a contradictory result: it tried to instill traditional roles with modern institutional techniques something that many times ended up in having the opposite of the expected results. Women for the first time in modern Greek history participated in the public sphere massively, socialized outside their homes and families. This experience was only one aspect of the contradictory process that the regime enforced. The ideological discourses and practices that were adopted by the regime were adjustable to the different historical conjunctures that the Metaxas regime passed through. The female tasks were changing in relation with the shifting needs of the nation. The mobilization of the Greek female population in the context of the World War II proved an experience that subverted the dominant gender roles within the Greek society to the extent that the assigned tasks were identical to these of men. In the new conjuncture they did not substitute men in the back-line performing the tasks and roles that before the war men performed but in many cases, they participated actively in the battlefields as soldiers. It can be firmly be said that these experiences proved crucial for the following moments of female engagement with warfare state of exceptions (Axis Occupation & Civil War). This contradictory experience was a Greek particularity. Similar developments took place in the other authoritarian regimes of the interwar period that attempted to mobilize the native female populations. Women found themselves within modern institutions of massive socialization and mobilization propagated with traditional ideas. Fascist regimes selectively plundered their historical past for moments reflective of the values they wished to inculcate for their radical transformation of national consciousness through the creation and advancement of institutions of massive mobilization. EON was one of the many similar stories that took place in the interwar period, where women were politicized under these conditions, experiencing unexpectedly interim moments of

freedom leaving from strict supervision of their families since these states expected to join the political body in authoritarian terms.

Conclusion

This thesis attempted to offer a new interpretation of the Metaxas regime and to present its antiparliamentarian that was an integral part of its ideology. It was argued that the Metaxas regime, despite the incomplete character of political reforms, can be categorized with the label of fascist regimes following Dylan Riley's argumentation. Following his argumentation, it is suggested that the 4th of August regime was an imposition of an authoritarian regime from above that attempted to forge the intraclass and interclass hegemonic rule that the bourgeois regime failed to do. In order to embed its authority it developed, to extent that it could build his own, anti-liberal institutions in order for the Greek nation to be expressed in a more genuine way. Despite the limitation of its project, it can be argued that this was the Greek fascist version of authoritarian regimes of the interwar period, since it abolished the previous political order and attempted to establish a new one. It was a traditionalist fascist experiment that drew its legitimacy from the traditional institutions of family, church and the monarchy but at the same time created modern totalitarian institutions like these of EON and the Houses of the Farmers, where different social groups could participate in massive terms.

Then I proceeded to an exposition of some methodological insights in regard to the field of intellectuals from a Marxist perspective attempting to offer proposals on the ways that the ideas that the regime produced could be approached in an effective way. I attempted to overcome the Scylla and Charybdis of discursive idealism of Skinnerianism and the economic reductionism of Woods through some epistemological proposals that derive from Antonio Gramsci's work. The notions of organic intellectuals, hegemony, integral state and conjuncture offer ideas how intellectual history of the 20th century can be conducted without being a reductionist or idealist approach and by offering historicist alternatives at the same time. Thus, a theoretical reconstruction that will lead to the understanding of the historical specificities is needed. Then the historical specificities should be reconstructed in a way that the discourse that is produced makes sense. In the context of Metaxas, the attempt to build an authoritarian democracy, even unfinished, the emerging fascist public sphere and its organic intellectuals were some of the realities that provided the necessary context within which the antiparliamentarian discourse can be understood.

This dissertation has discussed in chapters on the content of the discourse that was produced by organic intellectuals of the regime. The first one of this series of chapters decodes the discourse that George Vlachos, one of the prominent intellectuals of the regime developed before and after the establishment of Metaxas regime. His arguments illustrated the existential crisis that the bourgeois world was experiencing before the 4th of August 1936. Already back in 1934, realizing the impasse of the parliamentary politics, he was proposing extra-constitutional solutions to overcome the crisis. With the establishment of the regime he became one of the many ideologues who endorsed the Metaxist governance until the end of prime minister's life. The next chapter examined the antiparliamentarian discourse of Metaxas as it developed after the turn of the 19th century until the end of his life. He was a conservative monarchist, who developed a career in the army being one of the protégés of the crown. The establishment of liberal realities that opposed to his own conservative political ideology made him to reject parliamentarianism as destructive for the nation's life. The political defeat of the royalist camp in the post-1922 conjuncture forced him to accept the new rules of the political game. Thus, he formed his own party, Eletherfrones, participating in the new political struggles that emerged. This reality changed in 1933 when the guns sidelines the parliamentary methods. He endorsed an antiparliamentarian critique considering the parliament as an ineffective institution to deal with the social needs that were emerged in the new conjuncture. The ideas that he developed with the establishment of his regime were providing some, yet incomplete, authoritarian replies to problems of political modernity. The parties now did not have any social need and thus they substituted by forms of corporatist intervention. The political representation in his view, to have a more genuine expression, should be conducted through the corporations bringing together people from the same profession. Individualism was abandoned for more holistic approaches of the nation where the political community was an undivided totality. The other two chapters dealt with organic intellectuals of the regime that criticized the parliament in a systematic way. The focus is on the journal of *Neon Kratos*, a key theoretical organ of the regime. Their elaborations remained unfinished but provided key directions for the future of the regime. Koumaros' texts were inspired by the writings of Italian fascists' writings and offered the ideological foundation that the regime needed. It was antiliberal holistic approach where the nation was subsumed under the state. They defined the Metaxas regime as Laocracy claiming a more

genuine representation of the nation. It claimed authenticity in the political realm, a feature that all the authoritarian political regimes of the era had. The last chapter goes back again to the political realities of the historical period between 1936 and 1941 and sheds light to the impact of the discourse that the regime developed on the female population. Reclaiming on the one hand the traditional role for women within the Greek society and on the other hand by developing a discourse and practices that transformed them to modern subjectivities that for first time occupied a public role in the political affairs of the country, the regime found itself in a contradictory position. This had to do with antinomian character of the nature of these regimes. The traditionalist discourses and the modernist political practices provided a distinct political physiognomy that many times has produced the opposite results of their initial political planning.

The analysis that presented aimed to discuss again certain aspects of the literature on the Metaxas regime posing new questions and using analytical tools deriving from different theoretical traditions. Defining the Metaxas regime as an authoritarian democracy in the making that emerged as an outcome of the hegemonic crisis of parliamentary politics allowed the understanding of the critique that was articulated towards political liberalism as an antiparliamentarian one that aimed to delegitimize its status opening the way to alternative forms of discourses that claimed a genuine representation of the people. Additionally, it was clarified further the role of the intellectuals in the process of the fascist state-crafting. The organic intellectuals of the regime on the one hand systematized discourses against the liberal order in the level of political theory that in turn were crystallized in specific institutions of the regime. On the other hand, propagate the new political order contributing to its normalization. The theories that were did not derive from a specific political or theoretical tradition but was an amalgam of the different paradigms. The same applies to the institutions that the regime builded. Metaxas aimed to create in terms of rhetoric a new antiliberal political reality that would not borrow from foreign paradigms even if they are coming from states from the same political family. This was not possible since there was wide interaction between the different states both in the level of diplomacy and this of ideas. Thus, Metaxas regime could not be a purely "Greek regime". It was also true though that Metaxas as a fascist nationalist was not interested to imitate neither the ideological nor the institutional attempts of the other authoritarian states believing in the particularity of the Greek nation and its own history that did not allow adoption

of foreign models. Also, aiming to endorse a stable regime his actions were not motivated by ideals but from realistic approaches. The steps he did in the political arena aimed to solve specific emergent problems that were emerging since his climbing in the highest institutional position of the country. He was careful enough in order not to produce turbulence in the political and social spheres since the regime lacked a movement from below that supported his attempt. This though does not mean that he did not attempt to gain the consensus through the policies and the institutions he established. He did not believe in any return in the old political order of things since it was considered as a suicidal step for the nation. Thus, what existed for him as a political possibility was a future antiliberal polity that will be based on the principles he promoted. Despite the return to the past for the ideological inspiration of its regime, at the political level he knew that his orientation should be in the future. Considering its limitation, internal and external, Metaxas' attempt was the only one who from the several constitutional deviations of the interwar era that aimed to overcome the traditional political establishment of the country following the antiliberal path that dictated by the cases of Germany, Portugal, Italy and Germany. Metaxas as all the people acted within the conditions he found himself, exceeding them many times and other times determined them. The sole certainty is that he left a complicated regime with his death that many aspects of it remain until today unresearched, leaving the space open for many future studies that could shed further light to Metaxas' political riddle. This one was effort in this direction.

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