




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Monitoring Media Pluralism in Europe: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor 2017 in the European Union, FYROM, Serbia & Turkey

Country Report: Turkey

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




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1. ABOUT THE PROJECT

1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT

The Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) is a research tool that was designed to identify potential risks to media pluralism in the Member States of the European Union. This narrative report has been produced within the framework of the second EU-wide implementation of the MPM, carried out in 2017. The implementation was conducted in 28 EU Member States, Serbia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM) and Turkey with the support of a grant awarded by the European Union to the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF) at the European University Institute.

1.2 METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

The CMPF cooperated with experienced, independent national researchers to carry out the data collection and to author the narrative reports, except in the cases of Malta and Italy where data collection was carried out centrally by the CMPF team. The research is based on a standardised questionnaire and apposite guidelines that were developed by the CMPF. The data collection was carried out between June and December 2017.

In Turkey, the CMPF partnered with Yasemin Inceoglu, Ceren Sozeri and Tirse Erbayasal Filibeli, who conducted the data collection and annotated the variables in the questionnaire and interviewed relevant experts. The scores assessing the risks for media pluralism were provided by the CMPF and calculated according to the algorithm developed by the Centre itself. The national report was reviewed by CMPF staff. Moreover, to ensure accurate and reliable findings, a group of national experts in each country reviewed the answers to particularly evaluative questions (see Annexe II for the list of experts).

Risks to media pluralism are examined in four main thematic areas, which are considered to capture the main areas of risk for media pluralism and media freedom: Basic Protection, Market Plurality, Political Independence and Social Inclusiveness. The results are based on the assessment of a number of indicators for each thematic area (see Figure 1 below).

Basic Protection	Market Plurality	Political Independence	Social Inclusiveness
Protection of freedom of expression	Transparency of media ownership	Political control over media outlets	Access to media for minorities
Protection of right to information	Media ownership concentration (horizontal)	Editorial autonomy	Access to media for local/regional communities and for community media
Journalistic profession, standards and protection	Cross-media concentration of ownership and competition enforcement	Media and democratic electoral process	Access to media for people with disabilities
Independence and effectiveness of the media authority	Commercial & owner influence over editorial content	State regulation of resources and support to media sector	Access to media for women
Universal reach of traditional media and access to the Internet	Media viability	Independence of PSM governance and funding	Media literacy

The results for each domain and indicator are presented on a scale from 0 to 100%. Scores between 0 and 33% are considered low risk, 34 to 66% are medium risk, while those between 67 and 100% are high risk. On the level of indicators, scores of 0 were rated 3% and scores of 100 were rated 97% by default, to avoid an assessment of total absence or certainty of risk. For more information on MPM methodology, see the CMPF report “Monitoring Media Pluralism in Europe: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor 2016 in EU-28, Montenegro and Turkey”, <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/46786>



Disclaimer: The content of the report does not necessarily reflect the views of the CMPF or the EC, but represents the views of the national country team that carried out the data collection and authored the report. Due to updates and refinements in the questionnaire, the MPM2017 scores may not be fully comparable with MPM2016 ones. For more details, see the CMPF report on MPM2017, soon available on <http://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/>



2. INTRODUCTION

Turkey obtained the status of European Union candidate country in 1999 and accession negotiations started in October 2005. The government has adopted some progressive legal reforms such as the right to information act, and the right to broadcast languages traditionally used by Turkish citizen in their daily lives in accordance with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) standards since 2004. However, as pointed out in 2014 and 2015 ECHR Progress Reports on Turkey, serious backsliding has been observed on freedom of expression and press both online and offline. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Nils Muižnieks pointed out the concerns regarding the restrictive policies over freedom of expression and media freedom particularly risen after the 15 July coup attempt. On 6th July 2017 the European Parliament voted to suspend accession talks with Turkey.

The country has a population of 80.810.525, as of 2017.¹ The official language is Turkish. Even though the country is not socially and culturally homogeneous, only Armenians, Greeks and Jews are recognized as ethnic minorities regarding to the Treaty of Lausanne. Since 1965, there is no official data on the size of the minority population in Turkey. The research of the private agency KONDA (Research and Consultancy) entitled “ The Social Structure in Turkey” in 2006 gives detailed information about the estimated population of minority groups and indicates Kurds as the largest ethnic minority group, the Alevi as the largest religious minority group.

On July 20 2016, after the failed coup attempt, a three- month state of emergency had been declared and since then, Turkey has been ruled under the state of emergency by decrees. The government can easily pass bills that have the force of law. As of today, more than 110 thousands civil servants were dismissed on the grounds of orchestrating the failed coup. According to the Platform for Independent Journalism P24 at least 153 media workers are in jail, 200 media outlets are shut down as of March 15, 2018².

Besides the state of emergency, on April 16, 2017, Turkey’s constitutional referendum was held and the amendments that would transform the country from parliamentary democracy into a presidential system had been accepted. With the new constitution, the powers of the president have been expanded.

The economic situation also leads to a new crisis. The economic growth recorded the lowest rate of last decade. The Turkish lira fell to a new record day by day against the US dollar and Euro. Recently, the prominent credit rating agencies downgraded the country’s credit ratings due to raising risk premium. Besides, the government threatened frequently to hold a referendum on whether to continue EU membership negotiations due to the critics on human rights violations in the EC’s annual Progress Report.

The economic crisis and the worst performance of the Turkish Lira have affected the media market not only in terms of declining of advertising revenues but also increasing paper costs. The dailies importing paper are having difficulty with the rise of the currency. On the other hand, the study by Interpress Media Services reveals that nearly 100 countries watch Turkish TV dramas and Turkey ranks after the U.S. as second in the world in the drama export with \$350 million in revenue.³

1 Turkish Statistical Institute, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=30567>

2 Platform for Independent Journalism (P24), "Journalists in State of Emergency - 127", 14.03.2018, <http://platform24.org/en/articles/598/journalists-in-state-of-emergency---127>

3 Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey ranks second in TV drama export, 30.09.2017, <http://www.hurriyetsayfasi.com/turkey-ranks-second-in-tv-drama-export-120144>



3. RESULTS FROM THE DATA COLLECTION: ASSESSMENT OF THE RISKS TO MEDIA PLURALISM

Turkey's risk scores are the highest for many indicators for media pluralism in 2017. Over the past two years, the country turned into the world's biggest prison for journalists according to the 2017 World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders⁴. Aftermath of the coup-attempt on July 15, 2016, the government has used excessive powers under the state of emergency, to purge of media outlets and to silence dissident journalists. According to the Platform for Independent Journalism P24 (see above) at least 153 media workers are in jail, about 200 media outlets (including community and minority media) are closed as of March 15, 2018.

Cancellation of press cards (about one thousands), and accreditation implementation became new barriers for journalistic profession in the country. The Journalist Unions of Turkey announced that more than 10 thousands journalists are jobless; thousands still reporting are oppressed, censored, and under threat.

The most watched TV channels and most read newspapers owners are politically affiliated with the government. Besides the loss of editorial autonomy in mainstream media outlets; the government controls the media over the media owners via "carrot" i.e public procurements and "stick" i.e tax fines tactics".

The independence and neutrality of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) was contested more than ever before. There is no transparency on media ownership and market shares data, which should be ensured by RTÜK. During the referendum process in 2016, an emergency decree removed the powers of the Supreme Board of Election to sanction on private televisions to provide impartial coverage .

The PSM Turkish Radio Television Corporation (TRT) and official news agency, Anadolu Agency (AA) functioned as the government's tool same as it ever was.

There is no policy on the gender equality in media. Current regulations on media literacy and access to media for people with disabilities are not implemented effectively and policies on those issues need to be better developed.

4 RSF, "Journalism engulfed by the purge", 2017, <https://rsf.org/en/turkey>




Turkey: Media Pluralism Risk Areas



3.1 BASIC PROTECTION (81% - HIGH RISK)

The Basic Protection indicators represent the regulatory backbone of the media sector in every contemporary democracy. They measure a number of potential areas of risk, including the existence and effectiveness of the implementation of regulatory safeguards for freedom of expression and the right to information; the status of journalists in each country, including their protection and ability to work; the independence and effectiveness of the national regulatory bodies that have competence to regulate the media sector; and the reach of traditional media and access to the Internet.



The indicator on Protection of freedom of expression scores high risk (81%). The Anti-terror Law (TMK, no. 3713 of 1991) and the related articles of Turkish Penal Code (TCK) are interpreted and applied in ways that impede the freedom of expression of members of Parliament, academics and journalists. The journalists are mostly charged with “being a member of an armed organization”, “propagandizing for an illegal organization”, “forming illegal organization”, “participating in the coup” and “targeting unity of the state and integrity of the country” over TMK and TCK.

The citizens have the right to apply to the Constitutional Court if there has been an abuse of their constitutional rights. On January 11, 2018, the Constitutional Court found in the criminal case of academics and columnists Mehmet Altan and Şahin Alpay that their rights were being violated by pre-trial detention and ruled that they should be released. The 27th High Criminal Court in Istanbul declined to implement the decision by the Constitutional Court. Altan’s appeal to the 27th High Court decision was rejected as well.

In 2017, The ECtHR fined Turkey 1,500 Euros in total in the files of two applicants for “violating freedom of expression” however; the Court did not render any verdict about Turkey in terms of arbitrary arrest of the journalists and their isolation for months yet.

Under the state of emergency, August 17, 2017 the Telecommunications and Communication Presidency were shut down by decree no.690 allegedly infiltrated by Gulenists and served as a hub of illegal wiretapping over the years⁵ and all authority was carried out to the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) Since last April, the world’s biggest online information source Wikipedia has been blocked because it refused to remove unflattering references to Turkey’s relationship with Syrian militants and state-sponsored terrorists. As a result officials simply banned the whole site. Wikipedia is just one of 127,000 websites blocked in Turkey in addition to 95,000 pages, like social media accounts, blog posts and articles that are also blocked on websites⁶.

The indicator on Protection of right to information scores at the top of high risk (91%). The Law on Right to Information has too many ambiguous exemptions such as state secrets, the economic interests of the state, state intelligence, administrative investigations, and judicial investigations and prosecutions. In 2014, the amendment to

5 Yeşil, Sözeri and Khazraee, “Turkey’s Internet Policy after the Coup Attempt: The Emergence of a Distributed Network of Online Suppression and Surveillance”, Internet Policy Observatory, 2017, http://globalnetpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Turkey1_v6-1.pdf

6 Patrick Kingsley, “Turks Click Away, but Wikipedia Is Gone”, The New York Times, 10.06.2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/10/world/europe/turkey-wikipedia-ban-recep-tayyip-erdogan.html>




the Law on State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) expanded the powers of MİT towards accessing all personal data without a court order. The National Intelligence Agency (MİT) was tied to president by state of emergency decrees on Aug. 25, 2017.

The indicator on Journalistic profession, standards and protection shows high risk (75%). Even though there is no legal restriction to become a journalist, cancellation of press cards, shutting down of media organizations and accreditation implementation have become new barriers for the journalistic profession in the country. The unionization rate declined to under 2%. The pro-Kurdish Free Journalists Association was shut down with many Kurdish media organization by a decree on November 12, 2016⁷. P24 has updated its list of journalists in prison in Turkey, because almost everyday new ones enter and some of them are released, as of March 15, there are at least 154 journalists either in pre-trial detention or serving prison sentences in country's prisons⁸.

The indicator on Independence and effectiveness of the media authority scores high risk (80 %). In October, 2017, the third largest party HDP's quota handed over to the AKP in the composition of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK). In the aftermath of the coup attempt, the government issued decrees-laws ordering the closure of 46 TV channels and radio stations, predominantly for alleged links to the Gülen movement. 23 out of 39 TV channels and radio channels broadcasting in Kurdish language have been closed without a court decision or a license cancellation by RTÜK. The European Commission highlighted the concerns about the independence and neutrality of RTÜK in its 2016 Turkey Progress Report⁹.

3.2 MARKET PLURALITY (54% MEDIUM RISK)

The Market Plurality indicators examine the existence and effectiveness of the implementation of transparency and disclosure provisions with regard to media ownership. In addition, they assess the existence and effectiveness of regulatory safeguards to prevent horizontal and cross-media concentration of ownership and the role of competition enforcement and State aid control in protecting media pluralism. Moreover, they seek to evaluate the viability of the media market under examination as well as whether and if so, to what extent commercial forces, including media owners and advertisers, influence editorial decision-making.



7 Platform for Independent Journalism (P24), "Journalists in State of Emergency – 28", 13 November 2016, <http://platform24.org/en/articles/418/journalists-in-state-of-emergency---28>

8 Platform for Independent Journalism (P24), "Journalists in State of Emergency - 127", 14.03.2018, <http://platform24.org/en/articles/598/journalists-in-state-of-emergency---127>

9 EC, Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2016 Report, 09.11.2016, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_turkey.pdf



The indicator on Transparency of media ownership scores medium risk (50%) The Law No.6112 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Media Services obliges the media companies to notify their identification details to RTÜK and make them available on their web sites. However, without the shareholders' information, these details do not ensure transparency of actual ownership structures of media companies. Media company owners and their shares can be found on the Trade Registry Gazette online archive if the company's and shareholders whole names are known.

The indicator on Media ownership concentration scores medium risk (42%). There is no audited and transparent data on media market share in Turkey. Even though, the protection of competition has been overseen through advertising revenues and other sponsorships by RTÜK, according to the law No.6112. However, so far no information on percentages has been published. The request of information on market shares - based on within the Right to Information Act - presented by the country team to RTÜK was denied on the grounds of "trade secret".

The indicator on Cross-media concentration of ownership and competition enforcement scores medium risk (38 %). Law No. 6112 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their Media Services provides for rules aiming at preventing cross-media concentration but just in the audio-visual sector. There is no limitation in print and online media. The monopolisation is prevented via commercial communication revenues limit, which is thirty percent. A large slice feeds the TV sector; the newspapers' revenues gradually decrease while online media can get more shares from the advertising pie. However, online media outlets largely coincide with major media groups in Turkey. 10 out of 15 online news portals with a high audience are web sites of print or TV outlets¹⁰.

The indicator on Commercial & owner influence over editorial content indicators shows high risk (71%). Many journalists are jobless or working under unsecured working conditions under huge risk. On the other hand, the journalists from mainstream media are more pessimistic about the future of journalism in Turkey due to widespread censorship and self-censorship. According to the Journalists Union of Turkey, more than 10 thousands journalists are unemployed¹¹. The Press labour law no.5953 and the self -regulation mechanisms failed to protect editorial independence and journalistic autonomy.

The indicator on Media Viability scores high risk (70%). According to the Association of Advertising Agencies, TV and online advertising are consistently raising while the newspapers is in decline for the last few years. Audio-visual sector took more than 50 % from total advertising revenues at least for 10 years. Under high-pressure climate, alternative and independent news organizations are financially very weak. Developing new sources like crowdsourcing are very difficult and including the risk of being target of the government or pro-government media. They try to survive by motivating the readers to subscribe and/or to buy daily print versions as an act of solidarity.


10 RSF Media Ownership Monitor in Turkey 2016, "Political Affiliations", <https://turkey.mom-rsf.org/en/findings/political-affiliations/>

11 European Federation of Journalists, "Turkey: Organising journalists under the state of emergency", 01.12.2016, <https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2016/12/01/turkey-organising-journalists-under-the-state-of-emergency/>



3.3 POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE (91% HIGH RISK)

The Political Independence indicators assess the existence and effectiveness of regulatory safeguards against political bias and political control over the media outlets, news agencies and distribution networks. They are also concerned with the existence and effectiveness of self-regulation in ensuring editorial independence. Moreover, they seek to evaluate the influence of the State (and, more generally, of political power) over the functioning of the media market and the independence of public service media.



The indicator on Political independence of media scores high risk (88%). 7 of the 10 most read dailies and most watched TV channels belong to owners who are politically affiliated with the government.¹² The dissident pro-Kurdish political party HDP members are banned in all TV news and discussion programs¹³. The big media groups are controlled by the government via their owners. For example one of the owners Ethem Sancak, said he’s “in love” with Erdoğan and would sacrifice his family for him, and has admitted that the reason of his entrance to the media sector was to support him. Then he was elected by Erdoğan to the Central Decision and Executive Board (MKYK) of the ruling party on May 22, 2017. Recently, he sold his media outlets to the “prison friend” in 1999 of Erdoğan¹⁴.

The indicator on Editorial autonomy scores the highest risk (97%). The prominent case of the political interference with media content is Cumhuriyet daily trial. 17 journalists and executives of the daily are on trial, five of them stayed in jail for months, the editor-in- chief was released after 495 days on charges of aiding a terrorist organisation through the news contents and columns. In the indictment against Cumhuriyet, there are accusations such as “changing the paper’s editorial policy”, preparing “violent and divisive news” and “interviewing leaders of terrorist organisations”. Six journalists including columnists Ahmet Altan, Mehmet Altan and Nazlı Ilıcak were sentenced to life in prison on the grounds of alleged role in failed coup attempt via just their TV appearances and newspaper columns.

The indicator on Media and democratic electoral process scores also high risk (82 %). The Supreme Election Board’s (YSK) monitoring task of private TV channels was removed by the state of emergency decree no.687 on February 9, 2017 during Turkey’s referendum campaign on constitutional changes. The YSK cannot be able to penalize channels that do not comply with impartial coverage and political parties equal access to the media. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights - Limited Referendum Observation Mission monitoring findings showed that three out of the five monitored television stations, including the public TRT1, favoured the ‘Yes’ campaign. The ‘Yes’ campaign featured prominently in both public and private media, with 76 per cent of total airtime on television and 77.5 percent of space in the press, predominantly positive in tone, whereas the ‘No’ campaign received only 23.5

12 RSF Media Ownership Monitor in Turkey 2016, “Political Affiliations”, <https://turkey.mom-rsf.org/en/findings/political-affiliations/>
13 Ece Algan, “Media in Turkey before, during and after the referendum”, Open Democracy, 02.06.2017, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/ece-algan/media-in-turkey-before-during-and-after-referendum>
14 Hurriyet Daily News, “Erdoğan renews AKP’s A-team with greater youth presence”, 21.05.2017, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-renews-akps-a-team-with-greater-youth-presence--113357>




per cent of total airtime and space, mostly neutral in tone¹⁵.

The indicator on State regulation of resources and support to the media sector is the second one in this area that scores the highest possible risk (97%). The official advertisement (advertising paid by governments and state-owned institutions and companies) are distributed by The Directorate General of Press Advertisement (BİK). However, BİK has the power to prohibit advertisements to any publication it deems to have violated media ethics. Such sanction can create a censorship effect due to the state-dependent structure of the agency.

The indicator on Independence of PSM governance and funding scores high risk (92%). TRT (state TV channel) was defined as an “impartial public legal entity” in the Constitution. However, there is no legal safeguard for appointment and dismissal procedures for Director General of the PSM. On May 12, 2017, the director general of TRT was resigned by saying “considered it to be necessary”. Then, İbrahim Eren was elected in July 2017. He was one of the former directors general of pro-government TV channel ATV and also a high school friend of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s son, Bilal Erdoğan.

3.4 SOCIAL INCLUSIVENESS (78% - HIGH RISK)

The Social Inclusiveness indicators are concerned with access to media by various groups in society. The indicators assess regulatory and policy safeguards for community media, and for access to media by minorities, local and regional communities, women and people with disabilities. In addition to access to media by specific groups, the media literacy context is important for the state of media pluralism. The Social Inclusiveness area therefore also examines the country’s media literacy environment, as well as the digital skills of the overall population.



The indicator on Access to media for minorities scores high risk (97%). The 2001 constitutional amendments removed the restrictions on the use of ‘language prohibited by law’ in expressing and disseminating ideas in media. To implement the reforms, a new regulation came into force on January 25, 2004, allowing private broadcasting in minority languages at the national level for the first time. As a result of the reforms, on June 7, 2004, the Turkish Radio-Television Corporation (TRT) started to broadcast in five minority languages and dialects (Zaza and Kurmanci dialects of Kurdish language, Arabic, Bosnian and Circassian languages). The minority expert consulted by the country team stressed that minority groups in Turkey do not have proper access to public or private media. Besides, there are no PSM channels for legally recognized minority groups (Greeks, Armenians, Jews). In 2016, IMC TV (nationwide TV channel) had programming hours dedicated to Armenians but IMC TV was shut down under the emergency statutory decree issued a time after the failed coup attempt. Besides, in 2016, with several TV channels, a channel belonging to the largest religious minority Alevi was shut down.¹⁶

15 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2017. Turkey, Constitutional Referendum, 16 April 2017: Needs Assessment Mission Report, 08.03.2017, <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/303691>

16 “12 TV, 11 radyo kanalı kapatıldı” [12 TV 11 radio channels had been shut down], <http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/>



The indicator on Access to media for local/regional communities and for community media scores high risk (69%). The law No.6112 on the establishment of radio and television enterprises and their Media Services, (Article 3) grants regional and local media access to media platforms. Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) is tasked with allocating licenses and permits for terrestrial, satellite and cable broadcasting; supervising broadcasting content; and imposing sanctions. Under the previous law no. 3984, RTÜK imposed heavy sanctions against dissident and minority media and suspended the broadcasting of local, regional and national operators thousands times.¹⁷ In practice, even though implementation of law no. 6112, there are still unfair sanctions against community media. Especially, after the failed coup attempt, over 150 TV and radio channels had been closed with the decrees under the state of emergency, including local and regional TV and radio channels as Van TV, Can Erzincan TV etc.

In 2014, the Internet Law No.5651 was amended, broadening the scope of administrative online blocking and allowing the authorities to access user data without a warrant. Today, the community online news outlets are constantly targeted and blocked by the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK).

Additionally, in Turkey there are no direct subsidies for commercial broadcasting companies, only the official advertisements and announcements distributed by BI K (Directorate General of Press Advertisement) construct important sources of revenue for small, independent and local press. But, according to the regulation, published by the Official Gazette on October 5 2016, article 39/2, newspapers should be published in Turkish for getting subsidies from the Directorate General of Press Advertisement (Basın İlan Kurumu-BİK).¹⁸ This regulation was amended two times after October 2016, but there is no change on the relevant article 39/2. For this reason, it is hard to say that the state subsidies are distributed to local and regional media outlets in fair and transparent manner.

The indicator on Access to media for people with disabilities scores high risk (64%). A recent regulation (2014) requires PSM channels to provide subtitles for deaf people for 30% of all the programs in three years, for 50% of all the programs in five years; and private TV channels for 20% of all the programs in three years, for 40% of all the programs in five years. However, no steps have been taken to implement this regulation. Additionally, both PSM and private TV channels should send statistical data to RTÜK (Radio and Television Supreme Council) in the first three months of each year. This regulation does not include any article on audio-description.

The indicator on Access to media for women scores high risk (82%). In Turkey PSM do not have any gender equality policy and also there is no woman on the PSM's Board of Directors. The share of women among members of management boards of private TV companies is unknown. There is no accurate data. According to Global Media Monitoring Project 2015 Report in Turkey just 19% of the news staff and 17% of the reporters are women.¹⁹

The indicator on Media Literacy shows high risk (79%). In 2006, a protocol on media literacy had been signed by the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) and the Ministry of Education (MEB) for establishing media literacy elective courses in secondary schools. These courses are supposed to mainly focus on training of children on utilization of media and protecting them from the harmful effects of media outlets, not on developing their digital skills.

turkiye/607682/12_TV_11_radyo_kanali_kapatildi.html

17 Radyo ve Televizyon Yayıncılığı Sektör Raporu RTÜK, [Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) Sectoral Report] 2014:17.

18 <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/10/20161005-19.htm>

19 Who make news?, GMMP Report 2015, http://cdn.agilitycms.com/who-makes-the-news/Imported/reports_2015/global/gmmp_global_report_en.pdf

4. CONCLUSIONS

Turkey leads the ranks of the worst countries for media pluralism and media freedom in European countries. According to the ReportersWithout Borders 2017 World Press Freedom Index, Turkey is ranked 155 and is described as “the world’s biggest prison for media personnel”. In Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2018 report Turkey’s status declined from Partly Free to Not Free. After July 15, 2016 Coup-attempt and under state of emergency which extended six times since July 20, 2016, about 200 media outlets including community and minority media outlets were shut-down, about one thousands press cards were cancelled. As of March 15, 2018 153 journalists are in jail. The Journalists Union of Turkey stated that more than 10 thousands journalists are unemployed.

The government is criminalizing journalism by using the Anti-terror Law and the Penal Code to aim to create a chilling effect on journalists. The Cumhuriyet daily’s trial is the most prominent case that journalists and executives imprisoned for changing editorial policy.

Self-censorship is very widespread in the media exercising political and economic control over the media owners. Last year, the constitutional referendum process showed how media unfairly covered the political debates. The government should safeguard the independence of media authority and redesign it with the participation of journalist associations, media representatives, academics and audience. The media authority should be transparent and ensure accurate and up-to-date data on media ownership and market concentration.

There is no effective self-regulatory system to protect editorial independence from political interference due to ideological polarization.

Collaborative efforts are urgently needed to protect journalists that are faced with overwhelming attacks and sanctions.

Additionally, there are no policies on media literacy, access to media for people with disabilities or on gender equality in media. Necessary regulations and policies need to be developed and implemented urgently.



ANNEXE 1. COUNTRY TEAM

First name	Last name	Position	Institution	MPM2016 CT Leader (please indicate with X)
Yasemin	Giritli İnceğlu	Prof. Dr.		X
Ceren	Sözeri	Associate Prof. Dr.	Galatasaray University	
Tirşe	Erbaysal Filibeli	Assitant. Prof. Dr.	Bahçeşehir University	

ANNEXE 2. GROUP OF EXPERTS

First name	Last name	Position	Institution
Yaman	Akdeniz	Prof.	Bilgi University
İsmet Özdal	Demirdöğen	Member of Board	RTÜK - Radio-TV Supreme Council
Gülsin	Harman	Member of IPI Turkey committee	IPI - International Press Institute
Işık	Mater	Head of the association	The Alternative Informatics Association
Yonca	Cingöz	International Relations Coordinator	The Turkish Publishers Association (TPA)



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