Globalization and Transatlantic Security

edited by
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The Transatlantic Programme was established in Autumn 2000, thanks to a generous grant from BP.

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On 10 June 2005, the Transatlantic Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute hosted a one-day workshop on ‘Globalization and Transatlantic Security’. The underlying rationale for the meeting was that globalization potentially advances degrees of transatlantic integration and interdependence while simultaneously generating points of disagreement between Europe and the North America. Even as globalization would appear to preserve the indivisible character of transatlantic security, in recent years the United States and Europe have nevertheless clashed over threat perceptions and the appropriate responses to them. The purpose of the workshop was to assess the degree to which conflicting interpretations of globalization and its consequences bear on transatlantic relations, particularly in the field of security.

Two watershed events potentially serve as reference points for the issues under consideration: the Cold War’s end and the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001. On the face of it, both events have changed the strategic environment in which the transatlantic relationship operates—in terms of the global balance of capabilities, threat perceptions, the scope for international trade and regulatory agreements, and the sophistication and availability of weapons technology. While some of these changes have been associated with interdependence or globalization, key features of today’s security landscape are the consequences of ongoing processes of exchange and evolution that stretch back centuries. By placing each of the proposed themes in historical perspective, the workshop organizers asked the paper writers to address what is new in either our post-Cold War or post-9/11 security environment, and equally, what is not new. By taking stock of the current state of affairs in selected issue areas, we hoped to draw conclusions around one core question: Will the
transatlantic partnership continue to organize and anchor the responses of industrialized democracies to global crises as it did during much of the 20th century?

Many high-profile debates about globalization are impoverished or oversimplified between hyperglobalizers and their critics. On the one hand, globalization-enthusiasts see the demise of the state and the emergence of a global marketplace. On the other, sceptics argue that globalization is nothing new and its alleged effects a smoke screen that conceals the real face of the international economy. By contrast, the workshop participants took a more nuanced, and less polemical view. Globalization is a driving force behind rapid changes that are reshaping transatlantic relations. But its effects are complex and contingent, not universal or uniform. We define globalization as:

[...] a process (or a set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions —assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact— generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.1

As a consequence of these processes, there is a widespread perception that the world is shaped into a largely shared social space and that events in one region of the world can have profound consequences for individuals and groups in far away places. Because of globalization, the level of interconnectedness of the international system increases in a striking way.

Several papers and much of the discussion cast serious doubt over whether the transatlantic relationship would endure in the familiar form we have come to recognize since the close of World War II. The erosion of democratic institutions in the United States, sharp divisions between Europeans and their American counterparts over the utility of force to achieve justice, the lack of common interests similarly evident to those that prevailed during the Cold War, and the rise of more powerful states on the global stage would all seem to imply a downgrading of importance for the transatlantic relationship. Although some participants did point to two rounds of NATO expansion, the EU’s most significant enlargement to date, and the ever-expanding transatlantic economic relationship as signs of a continuing and robust partnership, this was not the majority view and such areas of cooperation were not necessarily expected to characterize the relationship going forward.

A second area of intense discussion was the role that globalization has played in facilitating the changes under consideration. Although in some issue areas the

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traditional hallmarks of globalization (including lower transport and communication costs, increased trade and mobile capital) were central to outcomes, in other issue areas it appeared that politics was prior. A fair summary of the impact of globalization would perhaps suggest that the rise of international markets in particular was affording formerly lesser developed countries with more opportunities just at a moment when a range of international institutions, particularly those with roots in Western industrialized democracies, was failing to adapt. The workshop organizers had refrained from providing a fixed definition of globalization in the expectation that the appropriate definition would vary according to the issue area. And indeed, this hands-off approach allowed a broad discussion concerning not only the rise of certain kinds of markets but also regarding the influence of norms, perceptions, and business strategies in light of changed structural conditions in the global economy.

Turning to the specific papers, the morning session was organized around themes in political economy while the afternoon session dealt with a range of issues more political in nature. Deborah Avant’s paper (written in collaboration with Lee Sigelman) deals with the increasing use of private security companies (PSCs), particularly by the United States. Using an institutional approach to understanding the sources of the democratic peace, the authors test whether the reliance on PSCs affects transparency, accountability and audience costs. The authors find that indeed because the media scrutinizes PSCs less thoroughly than regular troops, because PSCs can often be used without Congressional oversight and because publics respond somewhat differently to casualties among contractors than among regular troops, the longer term consequence of using PSCs could hamper democratic institutions. The erosion of democratic institutions in the United States could in turn harm transatlantic relations in so far as trust becomes harder to sustain.

Rachel Epstein’s paper provides an assessment the recent transatlantic defence industry consolidation, both within Europe and in the United States. In response to the post-Cold War environment in which the global demand for arms has decreased and European governments in particular have chosen to pursue common economic goals at the expense of defence spending, defence firms have exploited aspects of globalization as a means to survive. Seeking out institutional investors to fund their operations, winning greater autonomy from their home governments, denationalizing brands as a way of expanding market share, exporting, offsetting and engaging in cross-national co-development, production and organization are all firm strategies that the rise of globalization has facilitated. Although such trends at first would appear to favour firm power over state power, some of the discussion centred around whether states do not also win from the increasing marketization between governments and defence contractors. Finally, the paper speculates about what kinds of political
arrangements are necessary to adapt to changes in the defence industrial base, particularly its increasingly global reach.

Turning away from the role of private actors in supplying security, Frank Gavin’s paper explores the extent to which current fears about nuclear proliferation are either new or justified in light of the historical record. Using both governmental archival and media sources, Gavin concludes that although there may be serious and warranted concerns about proliferation today, such fears are not new and neither is the dramatic discourse that accompanies them. Gavin concludes that while structural realists within IR are probably too optimistic about the consequences of nuclear proliferation, policy makers tend to be overly pessimistic. For although the acquisition by some states of nuclear weapons could certainly undermine a certain balance of power that currently prevails, nuclear proliferation in the past has never sparked a new flood of proliferators as policy discourse sometimes implies. Moreover, those states that have eventually acquired the weapons have tended to be conservative with their use, still leaving the United States as the only country that has ever used nuclear weapons in combat. One important question raised by the paper, however, is whether in an age of globalization nuclear proliferation becomes more or less likely—either among states, or perhaps more important, among non-state actors.

Jean Yves Haine takes as a starting point that the essence of the European integration project was based on creating a more ‘globalized’ Europe, while at the same time mixing protectionist policies and trade agreements with the rest of the world. The peaceful change of 1989 opened an era of unprecedented globalization that benefited liberal democracies politically and economically. However, Dr. Haine’s main argument is that globalization is a mixed blessing for Europe as an international actor. He argues that the strategic awakenings of Europe could be short lived. European answers to the constraints of security globalization are mostly institutional, the current crisis of European institutions could lead to a phase of stand still, paralysis and even decline of Europe’s strategic role. Trust among members and loyalty to the institutions, two key components of the integration endeavour, have been seriously damaged. In his view, it is likely that the Union will become even more divided, inward-looking, risk-averse and status-quo oriented than it was before. The third wave of security globalization, i.e. the shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific, could lead to Europe’s strategic oblivion.

Martha Finnemore explains that contemporary disputes over the use of force have often been portrayed as a transatlantic debate over rising US unilateralism. She explains that, on closer inspection, these debates look less like a conflict between unilateralism and multilateralism than a conflict over what, exactly, multilateralism means and what the shared rules that govern use of force are (or should be). Similarly, she shows that the gap in views on the use of force is not only, or perhaps even primarily, a transatlantic one. There are many gaps in
views on this question, gaps within Europe, gaps within the US, gaps across the
international system. Her paper surveys these gaps, using public opinion data. It
then explores two issues underlying these disputes. One is how multilateral rules
accommodate power disparities and changing distributions of power. The other
involves the way ineffectiveness undermines the legitimacy of multilateral rules.
Empowerment of new actors and ineffectiveness of existing rules provide fertile
ground for changes in multilateralism.

Pascal Vennesson asks: why, how, and to what extent does globalization
shape conceptions of military power in the US and in Europe? He argues that the
impact of globalization on strategy is likely to depend on military adaptation. The
goal of his paper is to identify and comprehend the varied responses of
strategists in the US and in Europe to the increasing demands of globalization on
military power. When confronted to globalization, Vennesson argues, policy
makers and military leaders do not sit passively. They strive to adapt and remain
relevant, and their responses to the demands of globalization is a crucial, but
neglected, factor. Specifically, he shows that strategists can adapt to globalization
in four different ways:

1. Strategists can accommodate the demands of globalization on the military’s
core competency, and redefine the armed forces’ roles and missions;
2. Strategists can refuse to accommodate, and attempt to shape globalization
instead;
3. Strategists can define a new desired equilibrium between military power’s
functional imperative and globalization; or
4. Strategists can allow the existing balance to prevail.

Since in the same State, each military service—the army, the air force and the
navy, and other services like the Marine Corps in the US or the Gendarmerie in
France—adapt to globalization in different ways, the coordination of national
strategy, and even more so the coordination of the use of force within NATO,
becomes much more difficult.

Finally, Celeste Wallander assesses whether globalization had affected those
international institutions that the Western community of states had long relied
upon to provide a venue for discussion and action in light of security concerns.
She begins with the observation that in the economic sphere, the relationship
between standard features of globalization such as increasing trade or capital
mobility and international institutions is mutually reinforcing: as globalization
intensifies, institutional density has tended to keep pace. At the same time, even
as international institutions have generally attempted to manage globalization,
they have also played an important role in facilitating it. This observation leads
to a puzzle that motivates much of the rest of the paper: if economic institutions
have been so quick to adapt, why have similarly challenged security institutions
failed to do so? NATO in particular, which had experienced some success in
incorporating new members in the 1990s and early 2000s, was having much more difficulty remaining relevant to the ‘war on terror’. A brief review of constructivist, liberal institutionalist and realist theories yielded few satisfying conclusions, particularly as relatively little research to date has focussed on the sources of multilateral institutional change.
A central feature of transatlantic relations is the democratic nature of the states involved. Toward the end of the 20th century a widely shared set of expectations about how democratic states, particularly mature democratic states, make decisions and interact with one another generated hope for continued peace and stability in the transatlantic relationship.1 Lipson summarized this consensus, identifying transparency, continuity, audience costs, and constitutionalism as key attributes of the foreign policy processes of mature democracies that, by enhancing trust among these democracies, diminish the likelihood that they will fight with one another—an outcome known as the ‘democratic peace’.2

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2 The literature on the democratic peace has expressed a variety of rationales for the outcome. Some focus more on liberal ideas, others on the institutions that make up democracy. Here we focus on the institutional arguments said to promote the democratic peace. These arguments have also been prominent in the growing literature on rational theories of war—particularly those that focus on audience costs, or the costs leader pay for reneging on their promises. Indeed, Lipson merges these two in his argument that the institutional bases of democracies make them more effective ‘contracting’ partners. See Lipson, *Reliable Partners*. See Bruce Russett, ‘Why Democratic Peace?’ in Michael Brown, ed. *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996) for a review of the variety of explanations. John Owen makes the case for the importance of liberalism as both ideas and institutions. See John
Globalization, often taken to mean increasing trade and communication flows, was commonly seen as enhancing interdependence among the transatlantic partners and thus the expectation that the relationship would grow ever more stable. Globalization, however, refers to more than simply interdependence. It involves the rise of unorganized and stateless forces, ‘the powerful but uncoordinated consequences of individual behaviour and technological change’. These forces have led to increasingly intense economic exchange, information flows, and marketization. Exemplifying the latter is the growing participation of commercial firms in the financing and delivery of a wide range of security services that had been the sole province of the state since the mid-19th century. During the 1990s and into this century, a robust market for force emerged alongside and intertwined with state military forces.

A widely held, albeit often implicit, assumption of much theory and research in international relations in general, but particularly in the literature on the democratic peace, is that states rely on military organizations rather than hired guns to project force. The question addressed here is whether the attributes identified to promote trust among democracies remain strong when states rely on private forces instead of, or in addition to, public ones. If states’ growing reliance on the market to satisfy security needs affects the transparency, continuity, audience costs, and constitutionalism of their foreign policy processes, then the market for force could have implications for trust among the democracies that make up the transatlantic relationship—and at the extreme perhaps even for the democratic peace.

We find no logic in the democratic peace literature to suggest that the use of market forces should have an obvious impact on the continuity of regimes. The use of market forces may, however, reduce transparency, respect for constitutionalism, and audience costs. Focusing on the US, we offer an early assessment of the impact of the market for force by comparing it to traditional security processes in terms of transparency, respect for constitutionalism, and audience costs. Our findings, though preliminary, indicate that the shift to market-supplied security lowers transparency and constitutionalism. The impact... continued


of private security options on audience costs, though more ambiguous, points to changes that weaken audience costs, which merit further analysis. Overall, then, we conclude that the use of private security by the United States threatens to weaken institutional mechanisms that enhance trust between the US and Europe.

Globalization and the market for force

Though there have been a variety of more immediate supply and demand pressure that have led to the growth of a market for force, the material and social pressures and challenges associated with globalization have been important components of both and the resulting market for force is itself emerging as a global phenomenon. Many analysts have focused on the economic effects of globalization, but the revised interests and values associated with globalization have led to security concerns as well. Common conceptions of globalization refer to a ‘shift in the spatial reach of social action and organization toward the interregional or intercontinental scale’. This shift promised to change people’s material well-being and the relevant collectivity with whom they identify—both of which should affect their security concerns and goals. The variety of ‘new’ security issues bandied about in recent years—including environmental security, economic security, and human security—may be attributable to the increased social connectedness among peoples in different parts of the world. This connectedness is made possible by new

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6 The concomitant thawing of the Cold War and end of apartheid led to downsizing in many militaries and supply pressures. Growing demand includes increasing pressures among developing states and the unexpected need to commit US troops abroad during the 1990s.


technologies as well as the ease with which people now move from place to place. As disorder in one part of the world has combined with new information and transportation technologies to threaten life and property elsewhere, security concerns have become increasingly diffuse, transforming the meaning of borders as well as their defence.¹⁰

The new threat environment has been heralded (from the right and the left alike) as carrying with it new forms of warfare and the merging of security with a variety of other economic and political interests.¹¹ ‘National’ security has become difficult to distinguish from international or global security and the lines between internal and external security have blurred. This is recognized no less by moralists who feel a responsibility to intervene abroad in order to help quell violence than by pragmatists who worry about economic disruptions or by realists who worry about breeding grounds for terrorists. When criminal networks not only produce social ‘bads’ such as drugs and prostitution, but also provide funding for terror, the internal governance of far-flung territories becomes a national security concern.

Ideational shifts—particularly belief in the superiority of market-based solutions to collective problems—have led states to view the private sector as an obvious response to new security demands.¹² In the US and Britain, governments have looked increasingly to markets for solutions to problems of various sorts.¹³ Arguing that government-run social programmes generated inefficiencies and that financing them required incentive-sapping taxation and inflationary budget deficits, conservatives ‘viewed retrenchment not as a necessary evil but as a necessary good’.¹⁴ Initially associated in the 1980s with the powerful conservative coalitions in the US and the UK, the privatization movement spread with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the ensuing privatization of state-owned industries across Europe, and the promotion of these principles

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12 Another ‘obvious’ solution, at least in the 1990s, was multilateral institutions. Why markets and not multilateral solutions have taken hold is an interesting question.

13 This movement began to take hold as Margaret Thatcher took office in 1979. See Madsen Pirie, Dismantling the State (Dallas: National Center for Policy Analysis, 1985); John Donahue, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means (Basic Books, 1989).

GLOBALIZATION, PRIVATE SECURITY, AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other international financial institutions. ‘Private’ has come to denote competition, efficiency, and effectiveness, while ‘public’ now connotes bureaucracy, lack of imagination, expense, and backwardness.\(^{15}\) The prevalence of privatization ideas has led governments to turn over numerous functions to private entities and to establish market-type mechanisms, such as competition over authority to do certain jobs, within public agencies that deal with a wide array of foreign and domestic governance issues.

Debates about the future of defence in the US demonstrate the embrace of market options for security.\(^{16}\) The US, it is argued, as the sole remaining superpower must leap ahead technologically, identify its next peer competitor, and enhance its capacity to keep order in important, but less than vital, arenas.\(^{17}\) Maintaining stability includes combating illicit by-products of globalization such as organized crime, drugs, and terrorism as well as enforcing emerging global norms about human rights and encouraging democratization.\(^{18}\) Given these

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16 Not all states feel exactly the same global pressures, and not all are so eager to choose private solutions—indeed, there is much evidence that politics (particularly the military reaction to private security companies and the strength of coalitions associated with privatization more generally) within countries has a significant impact on the degree to which governments respond to these challenges with privatization—but the challenges posed by making the most of technology and reacting to a variety of disorders—and the increasing use of private security companies to meet these challenges—are associated with globalization.


imperatives, advocates of privatization view increased reliance on market-based approaches as the logical response.\textsuperscript{19} Through privatization, it is argued, the US can capitalize on civilian information technology and the efficiency of markets to manage security in a complex world with fewer troops.\textsuperscript{20}

Global forces have also made it easier for the private sector to supply security services. Many private security companies (PSCs) exist as almost virtual companies, relying on a small cadre of full-time employees and a very large database with which to staff contracts. The Internet makes it easy to maintain ties among retired military personnel; the speed of air travel and the availability of global communications enable firms to assemble and deploy teams of contract employees quickly; and the diffusion of professional information helps retired troops from different countries work together.

Most importantly, the increased demand for and supply of private security have created a market for force that operates outside the control of any state and is itself a precipitating global force. The market for force has not replaced state militaries, but exists alongside the state system even as it operates on a global scale. The supply of force on a global scale feeds back into processes that further enhance globalization by providing tools with which private actors can achieve security without relying on states.

The scope of this market has been abundantly clear during the ongoing hostilities in Iraq. When the US defeated the Iraqi Army in 2003, at least one out of every ten personnel deployed to the theatre were civilians employed by PSCs performing functions (logistics, operational support of equipment, weapons, and information systems, and training) formerly done by soldiers. As lawlessness followed the fall of Saddam Hussein and US forces were stretched thin, an ‘army’ of PSCs surged into the country—to train the Iraqi police force, the Iraqi army, and a private Iraqi force to guard government facilities and oil fields, and to protect expatriates working in the country. It was estimated that in mid-2004, more than 20,000 private security personnel, mostly retired military or police from countries as varied as Fiji, Israel, Nepal, South Africa, the United Kingdom,

\textit{… continued}
and the United States and employed by some 25 different PSCs were working for the US government, the British government, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), private firms, and international non-governmental organizations in Iraq.\textsuperscript{21}

**Market forces, democracies, and the use of force**

There is more than one way to organize for the projection of force. Imagine a continuum ranging from universal conscription at one extreme—where every citizen is obligated to serve in the military—through a voluntary force in the middle—where rules and limits govern the terms of service for those who enlist—to purely market contracts at the other extreme.\textsuperscript{22} Historically rulers have often relied on the market for forces at different times. Feudal lords supplemented their forces with contracted labour from the beginning of the 12\textsuperscript{th} century, and from the end of the 13\textsuperscript{th} century through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 virtually all force was allocated through the market. Even in the modern system of states the British ‘rented’ Hessian forces during the American Revolution. From the French Revolution through the end of the Cold War, however, reliance on conscripted or volunteer citizen armies grew throughout much of the world.\textsuperscript{23} Focusing on the modern era, most analysts have truncated the continuum by considering only the first half of it, thereby treating military forces as an intrinsic part of the state.

\textsuperscript{21} In a letter to Ike Skelton (the ranking Democrat on the House Committee on Armed Services) dated 4 May 2004, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld estimated that some 20,000 private security personnel were working in Iraq and attached a list of 60 PSCs. The letter and list are available at: \texttt{<http://www.house.gov/skelton/pr040504a.htm>}. This list, however, does not include companies like Vinnell and MPRI, which were known to have personnel in the country training the Iraqi Army. It also does not include CACI, known to have personnel in the country working as interrogators at military prisons. This estimate came in the wake of a variety of estimates from a variety of sources, but several former members of the CPA as well as military personnel who worked in Iraq claim that no one really knows how many private security personnel are in the country. Interviews in Washington, DC with former CPA officials, March 2004, May 2004, July 2004, and with military officers returned from Iraq, May 2004, June 2004, July 2004.


The connection between citizenship and military service grew in conjunction with Enlightenment ideas about the social contract, or implied agreement between ruler and ruled. These ideas are also fundamental to the growth of democracy, for if all citizens share in sovereignty, then the defence of sovereignty is to be shared by all. It is thus not surprising that analyses of democracy and the democratic peace have generally assumed that military force is raised and governed by the state. The recent growth of the security market, however, poses two central questions. First, how will the increasing use of markets to allocate force affect the functioning of democracy? Second, will changes in the way democracies function, especially in the security arena, undermine the potential for trust among democracies and thus imperil the democratic peace?

The institutionalist logic underlying much of the democratic peace literature suggests ways in which market-based security tools might affect the functioning of democracies. Institutionalists treat the state as existing to provide collective goods that markets alone would fail to provide. Foremost among these goods is security. Assuming that states are made up of ‘appropriate’ (that is legitimate, capable, and coherent) institutions, Williamson argues that states are crucial for the provision of ‘sovereign transactions’, foremost among which is defence. Contracts for such services are likely to be expensive and/or risky (the latter because service may not be provided or may be provided in ways that serve private rather than the public interest). If, notwithstanding the expense and risk, such services are privatized, certain consequences can be anticipated.

In the first place, the use of private security should be less transparent than reliance on the military. Transparency is considered a key mechanism through which states can be held accountable to their citizens as well as a tool through which other states and their citizens can learn about a state in ways that produce more accurate perceptions and greater trust and cooperation. Private contracts for security should be expected to be less transparent than using troops for several reasons. For one thing, private security mobilization should work through different process and thereby avoid the institutional mechanisms that democracies have developed to ensure transparency. These mechanisms can

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range from media alerts to access to information. For example, reporters covering the Pentagon may not be attuned to deployments of contractors, and casualty figures may exclude contract personnel. Differences between the information available for tracking public institutions and private firms should also be expected. Even in highly sensitive policy arenas like security policy, democracies often have procedures (e.g., the Freedom of Information Act in the US) that guarantee public access to information that is deemed relevant to the public good. Private firms, however, are assumed to operate in a market environment and the rules governing their information sharing recognize necessary proprietary secrecy. Finally, information on the government is collected and accessed more or less centrally. Another way that transparency may be reduced (somewhat paradoxically) is that what information is available on private security firms is more diffuse and thus hard to collect and aggregate. For instance, in 2004 even as analysts were decrying the lack of information about CACI’s provision of interrogators at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, CACI itself was advertising on its website for interrogators to serve in Iraq. The information was not so much secret as it was hard to amass. Nonetheless, when information is hard to gather, transparency is reduced.

Privatization may also affect constitutionalism by disrupting established processes for making and implementing policy. 28 These processes obviously take different forms in different countries, but every mature democracy relies on standard processes that bind decision makers and reduce the potential for capricious action. Known and accessible political processes that disperse power in established ways build an inertia into policymaking that makes outcomes more predictable. These processes, however, may not extend to issuing contracts. If they do not, and the process of contracting avoids key veto points in the policymaking process, power may become centralized in ways that go well beyond normal constitutional limits. This could happen in several ways. For example, the use of contractors rather than military personnel could enable one portion of government to pursue policy without going through normal channels, or government leaders could encourage contracts between private security companies and foreign governments or other entities and thereby avoid government involvement altogether—what has been called ‘foreign policy by

proxy’. Either way, privatization should open the door to avenues for bypassing constitutionalism.

The impact of contracting also depends on the extent to which and the manner in which PSCs affect the audience costs or accountability associated with security policy. Fearon argues that audience costs are a key component of the democratic peace. Leaders who promise to use force but then back down face political costs at home and thus are likely to follow through on their threats. By invoking the national honour, democratic leaders signal that they are serious; if they then back down, they subject themselves to domestic punishment for vacillation. Leaders of other countries understand this dynamic and thus receive clearer signals from democracies than from other types of regime. Clear signalling reduces the security dilemma—the possibility that one country’s defence preparations will be taken by another as a prelude to attack—and thus lessens the chances for conflict. Of course, leaders also face serious domestic costs for going to war, and these costs may be higher in democracies than elsewhere. Public sensitivity to the deaths of citizen-soldiers is one of the most fundamental of these costs, raising the bar for the use of force. In democracies, then, leaders face costs for war that should make them reluctant to go to war unless they see no alternative—and thus less likely to threaten to use force in the first place. But once they have invoked the national honour, the audience costs incurred by backing down should make them more likely to follow through.

How might the use of PSCs affect audience costs? Using PSCs to bolster national deployments can lower the troop levels required to carry out an operation. This could be perceived as lowering costs and making it easier to appeal for public support—for reporting about missions frequently focuses on the number of troops needed or involved. Using PSCs, whose employees are

32 Kant, Doyle, Lipson. This is not always taken as an advantage. Indeed, Eliot Cohen argues that democratic, particularly conscripted, forces are so poorly suited for small wars that (by definition) they are not crucial to the national interest. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers.
33 Fearon, Fearon, Leeds, Lipson.
34 Allowing PSCs to contract directly with foreign governments removes the need for congressional approval—and thus public support—altogether.
simply working rather than ‘serving’, may also lower sensitivity to costs and thereby allow leaders to use force for less important missions. Lower costs, however, may also feed back into the audience costs leaders face for vacillating. The use of PSCs may be seen as less reflective of the national honour than the use of troops and thus be perceived as less of a demonstration of national commitment.

Each of the aforementioned consequences of greater reliance on PSCs seems plausible, but to date little systematic evidence has been marshalled to assess which, if any, of them is actually operative. Accordingly, we now examine these interpretations more closely, assessing the transparency, constitutionalism, and audience costs of private security options versus those associated with reliance on traditional forces.

**Transparency**

We consider the impact of private security options on transparency by first comparing the processes by which the Congress, interested citizens, and foreign governments can obtain information about the activities of troops versus private security companies. We then compare media coverage of US troops and private security companies in two similar incidents of captivity and over time in a single conflict.

Avoiding the mobilization of military machinery sidesteps many institutionalized mechanisms that foster public awareness of foreign policy decisions and their implementation. Compared to the fanfare that accompanies deployments of military forces abroad, deployments of private security teams

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may pass virtually unnoticed. Major newspapers assign correspondents to the
Pentagon and more locally based newspapers routinely cover military bases and
the families that are attached to them. Thus, coverage of military deployments is
virtually automatic. PSCs, however, attract none of this regular national
coverage, and the fact that they may send people from many different parts of
the US and from many different countries abroad to service a contract makes
them less prone to local media coverage. Though the attraction of bad news may
draw media coverage if something goes wrong, it may be harder for the media
even to find out that something has gone wrong if they are not covering the
deployments in the first place. As noted above, even casualty figures focus on
troops and typically do not include contractors, thereby reducing the
transparency of the human costs of war. The casualty figures released by the
Pentagon for the war in Iraq have routinely omitted contractor casualties.36
Taken together, these considerations imply that PSCs working for the
government abroad should be less likely to generate the same kind of media
coverage as troops would.

Citizens also have less capacity to gain access to details about the use of PSCs
and the policies that surround it. Because PSCs are private firms, they can assert
control over proprietary information about the terms of their contracts, their
operations, and their policies that reduces the access of journalists, NGOs, and
other interested parties. In some cases, this proprietary privilege can be abused.
For instance, in the recent furore over the contract of a Halliburton subsidiary,
Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), to repair oil fields in Iraq, significant portions
of a Pentagon audit sent to the international monitoring board were blacked out.
By law, commercially sensitive information must be concealed when government
documents are released. Thus, the Pentagon sent the report to KBR before
sending it out and KBR claimed that it was permissible to black out not only
proprietary information but also statements ‘that we believe are factually
incorrect or misleading and could be used by a competitor to damage KBR’s
ability to win and negotiate new work’.37 Even when they are not abused,
proprietary limits on information can reduce the transparency of government

36 The Brookings Institution has monitored all the figures the Pentagon regularly releases on Iraq
and compiled them for easy access. See ‘Iraq Index: Tracking Reconstruction and Security in
Post-Saddam Iraq’, <http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex>. These figures are hard to parse
for PSC deaths. There are figures for non-Iraqi civilian deaths in Iraq based on independent
research. See <http://www.icasualties.com>. Some of these figures are compiled by the US
Department of Labour based on insurance claims (companies contracting with the US
government are required by the Defense Base Act to provide insurance for their employees).

policy. For example, because of these concerns, contracts with PSCs are not subject to FOIA requests.\textsuperscript{38}

Partly because of these blocks on information, even when PSCs are known to be involved in an operation, it may prove difficult or impossible to ferret out information about what they are doing. By contrast, when military units are deployed, it is through commitments and procedures that are standard, long-established, familiar, and subject to domestic and international legal strictures. Contracts, on the other hand, come in many shapes and sizes, and it is a much greater burden to try to piece together a picture of what is involved. In sum, less extensive media coverage and the proprietary blockage of information involving PSCs have an obvious potential to reduce the transparency of PSCs relative to that of traditional military forces.

To inform our assessment the transparency of military and PSC operations, we examined patterns of news coverage. In one portion of that analysis, we considered coverage of military personnel versus contractors in captivity. In February 2003, three contractors who worked for the US via California Microwave Systems (CMS), Keith Stansell, Marc Gonsalves, and Thomas Howes, were taken hostage by the ‘Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia’ (FARC) in Columbia.\textsuperscript{39} According to the Lexis-Nexis database, during the fifteen months immediately following their capture, a total of just 65 articles in US media, and 76 overall, mentioned ‘hostage’, ‘Colombia’, and ‘contractor’.\textsuperscript{40} Even fewer (21) used these terms within the articles’ titles or lead paragraphs, and just 30 even mentioned the hostages’ names. Contrast this with the coverage of the American hostages, Shoshana Johnson and Jessica Lynch, who were captured in Operation Iraqi Freedom. During the twenty-two \textit{days} of her captivity, Shoshana Johnson was mentioned in 98 articles (excluding articles about the rescue itself), and the terms ‘Shoshana’, ‘Johnson’, and ‘Iraq’ in the full text over the January 2003–March 2004 time period yielded 360 hits. During Jessica Lynch’s seven \textit{days} of captivity, 36 articles contained her name (excluding news of the rescue itself) and the terms ‘Jessica’, ‘Lynch’, and ‘Iraq’ in full text over the January 2003–March 2004 time period yielded more than 1,000 articles.\textsuperscript{41}


\textsuperscript{40} Of the 76 articles mentioning the hostages, 65 were from US papers.

\textsuperscript{41} Thanks to Katie Tobin for compiling these figures.
Though provocative, this comparison does not constitute an ideal test of differential media attention to contractors and soldiers, for, among other things, both of the hostages in Operation Iraqi Freedom were women and much greater national attention was directed at the Iraqi conflict than the Columbian drug war. Nonetheless, the media coverage patterns in these episodes do convey an initial indication of the differential transparency of PSC versus military operations and personnel.

To gain a better perspective on this difference, let us consider newspaper coverage of PSCs versus troops in Iraq. Figure 1 shows the month-by-month number of articles in the *New York Times*, January 2003 through June 2004, in which either the military or private security companies were mentioned.

![Figure 1: News coverage of the military versus PSCs](image)

During the period in question, coverage of the military obviously dwarfed that of PSCs. That is a difference well worth noting, but it must be borne in mind that there were many more troops than private security personnel in Iraq during this period. However, adjusting the coverage figures to reflect that difference is no simple matter. Although the Pentagon releases data on the number of troops in Iraq each month, no one appears to have a firm count of the numbers of...
private security personnel in Iraq. In May of 2004, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld did state that there were approximately 20,000 private security personnel in Iraq.\textsuperscript{42} Taking that as a rough measure of the number of private security personnel, and knowing that the average number of troops in Iraq during the 15-month period was 134,000, we calculate that there were about 6.5 troops for every private security person in Iraq and thus divide the number of articles on troops by 6.5 as a rough control for the difference in sheer numbers.

The time trend shown in Figure 2 reveals that even when we take the number of military and PSC participants into account, using a very conservative estimate of the numbers of PSC personnel, the volume of news coverage devoted to contractors was far outdistanced by that received by troops. The only times that

\textbf{Figure 2}

\textit{Normalized news coverage of the military versus PSCs}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{Normalized news coverage of the military versus PSCs}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{42} This is a very controversial figure. It is not clear what kind of forces Rumsfeld was referring to in this estimate. With it he listed a number of companies operating in Iraq, but this list excluded many companies known to be in Iraq performing security duties; for instance, it did not include DynCorp, CACI, MPRI, and others. Some speculated that Rumsfeld was referring only to companies providing personal security details. If that were the case and one were to add contractors supporting US troops and weapons systems and providing security training, the total number of security contractors, the number would be closer to 40,000. Of course, given the transnational basis of PSCs, we cannot know how many of these personnel were Americans.
the volume of coverage of private security personnel amounted to more than a blip on the media’s radar screen were when sensational events occurred that involved PSC employees. In April of 2004, just after four contract employees of Blackwater, USA were killed and mutilated in Fallujah, coverage of PSC employees approached that of troops, controlling for the raw number of each. During the following two months, coverage of PSCs continued to be relatively high, due to allegations that contractors from CACI and Titan were involved in the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. More generally, though, under ‘normal’ circumstances, PSCs were conspicuous by their absence from media reporting on the Iraq conflict.

**Constitutionalism**

To assess the impact of privatization on constitutionalism, we consider the impact of contracting with PSCs or allowing PSCs to contract directly with foreign governments or other entities on the relative power of the legislative and executive branches and the associated number of veto points in the policy process.

The executive branch enjoys numerous advantages in military policy decision making, but contracting enhances these advantages in ways that should make it easier to alter policy quickly. The executive branch, not Congress, hires contractors. Although Congress approves the military budget, it does not approve—or often even know about—individual decisions for contracts. Information about contracts is held, and oversight of contracts is conducted, almost exclusively by the executive branch.

Of course, the executive branch dominates information and oversight of the military as well. Even so, Congress has several avenues of influence—over military personnel, over funds for the military, over the structure of the service branches and the processes by which the military does its business, and over the deployment of US troops. Congressional authority over personnel ranges


from limiting the size of the military to regulating and restricting how soldiers can be deployed to structuring chains of command to approving promotions.\textsuperscript{45} Congressional appropriations decisions also frequently come with restrictions on the use of the money that regulates policy. Among the most important tools at Congress’ disposal is its ability to structure incentives within the services—requirements for entry, criteria for promotion, and so on.\textsuperscript{46} And finally, as a consequence of the War Power Resolution, the president must consult Congress and seek its approval to deploy US military forces in conflict zones.\textsuperscript{47}

This set of tools provides Congress with an effective means of controlling military policy.\textsuperscript{48} These tools, however, are of much less use for controlling contractors. Congress has much less capacity to control private security personnel. Though Congress retains its power of the purse in the use of contractors, it is more difficult to use this authority to direct contractors. As the recent experience in Iraq has demonstrated, contracts for security services can be even routed through other parts of the federal bureaucracy (the Interior or Commerce Department, for instance) in a way that masks their military impact.\textsuperscript{49} Also, it is much more difficult for either the legislative or the executive branch to affect the internal processes of private firms. Accordingly, the government’s control over contractors rests almost exclusively in the contract itself—and Congress has little to say about the contract.\textsuperscript{50}

… continued …


\textsuperscript{47} Michaels, ‘Beyond Accountability’, p. 1059.


\textsuperscript{49} Prison interrogators at Abu Ghrarib were hired through a Department of Interior contract. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr. and Ellen McCarthy, ‘Private Sector Has Firm Role in the Pentagon’, \textit{Washington Post}, 9 June 2004.

Congress’ access to information about contractors is highly circumscribed. In instances of contracted foreign military training, for example, the annual consolidated report on military assistance and sales does not include information about who is conducting the training. Thus, members of Congress who are interested in conducting oversight of individual firms may not even know which PSCs Congress should be overseeing. The executive can use this advantage to evade congressional restrictions on US actions. For instance, Congress often limits US involvement in a conflict by stipulating a ceiling on the number of US troops. By employing contractors, the executive can increase de facto US involvement. Sometimes Congress innovates by stipulating an upper limit on the number of contractors, but PSCs can evade this restriction by hiring more local or third-party national personnel. More generally, there are many ways to circumvent even the limited mechanisms that Congress possesses to control military training by PSCs. The availability of private contractors concentrates power in the hands of those in charge of hiring, dispersing funds to, and overseeing the contractor—generally the executive branch.

By contrast, it is relatively easy for members of Congress to find out which military units are responsible for conducting which training, and it is difficult to ignore congressional troop ceilings. Indeed, Congress has devised many procedures for receiving information about the military and it continuously directs the military on a long-term basis. As a consequence, its access to information about military operations and its ability to influence the behaviour of military personnel far outstrip its access and influence vis-à-vis PSCs.

Direct contracts between foreign governments and PSCs further advantage the executive branch relative to Congress. As stipulated in the International Transfer of Arms Regulations (ITAR) of the Arms Control Export Act, contracts for the export of military services must be licensed by the State Department’s Office of Defence Trade Controls. Many executive offices have input into this process, but the ITAR stipulates that Congress is to be notified only if a contract exceeds $50 million. Vinnell became the first US firm to sell military training directly to a foreign government, when in 1975 it signed a $77 million contract to train Saudi Arabian forces to defend Saudi oil fields. That contract received much congressional scrutiny and debate. Since then, contracts for over $50 million have been rare, even though the export of military services has grown

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51 Lumpe, ‘US Foreign Military Training’.
53 <http://www.pmdtc.org/reference.htm#ITAR>
precipitously. For instance, the US licensed MPRI to provide advice and training to the Croatian government in 1994. President Tudjman received many of the advantages of US military assistance—indeed he touted the contract as evidence of the alliance between the US and Croatia—\(^5^5\) but the contract flew under Congress’ radar screen. Had the US opted to send military trainers to Croatia in 1994, that decision could not have fallen outside congressional purview, and given the tense politics surrounding the Balkans crisis, it likely would have sparked intense debate.\(^5^6\)

In effect, then, contracting makes policy subject more to post-hoc analysis of results—or ‘fire alarm’ oversight—than to abidance by particular processes.\(^5^7\) Irrespective of whether Congress is satisfied with exercising oversight after the fact, the shift toward such oversight certainly should inform our expectations about trust between democracies. The greater the number of veto points, the more predictable policy becomes. If the number of veto points decreases and the ease of policy change increases as a consequence of greater reliance upon PSCs, then it should be increasingly difficult to generate trust among democracies.\(^5^8\)

**Audience costs**

Rationalist theories of war and the recent literature on the democratic peace—particularly that which focuses on the institutional nature of democracies which leads them to be good contracting partners—focus on both the costs of war and the audience costs of vacillation as means of enforcing the leader’s accountability.\(^5^9\) Political leaders are assumed to be attuned to cost of war and to avoid threatening the use of force lightly. From these assumptions it follows that, other things being equal, the higher these costs, the more leaders must do to justify their policy and that leaders who do make threats will then be punished with audience costs if they subsequently back down.

One of the key costs that leaders pay for war-prone behaviour is casualties—the human costs of war.\(^6^0\) A potential effect of relying on private security forces would be to reduce this cost. One way for this to happen is via lack of

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56 Deborah Avant, ‘Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?’, *Security Studies*.
58 Leeds, Lipson.
59 See footnote 2.
information about the human cost when PSCs are used. As noted earlier, whereas military casualties are closely tracked and extensively covered in the media, are private security casualties may not be. The human costs of private security are less known than those of military casualties.

The pertinent differences may extend well beyond the gap in information about military versus private security casualties. The general public may care more about the deaths of soldiers, who are serving out a sense of patriotic duty, than of private security operatives, who are motivated by profit. This possibility is widely recognized in policy analyses of private security and is reflected in the expectations of policymakers. In addition to the assumption that the use of PSCs lowers the political costs of conflict, it can also be argued that increasing reliance on PSCs lessens the importance of maintaining the national honour by following through on involvement in a conflict situation. In that case, the audience costs of vacillation may be lower with private soldiers than would be the case with regular troops.

To explore these possibilities, we designed an experiment that was embedded within a general population survey conducted by Knowledge Networks.61 Four randomly selected sub-samples, each consisting of 200 respondents drawn from a demographically representative sample of the US population at large, were asked to read a simulated news story. Those in one group, which constituted the control group, read a story, unrelated to the Iraqi conflict, which focused on the rapid growth of the federal bureaucracy; those in the second group read a story about the deaths of American soldiers in Iraq; those in the third group read the same story, but with the casualties identified as private security guards rather than soldiers; and those in the fourth group read a story that followed the same script as the one read by those in the third group, but with more background information about the private security industry.

After reading one of the stories, the respondents answered a series of questions about their emotional state, whether they supported the decision for the war, whether they thought the war was worth it, how they thought the war was going, and whether they thought those that died were motivated by patriotic service, doing their job, or material gain. Our aim was to cast light on whether members of the general public view the motivation of regular and private soldiers differently and whether they react differently to their deaths—as measured by both their emotional state and their feelings about the war.

Strong differences emerged in perceptions of the motivations of soldiers and contractors. Only 8% of those who read a story about soldiers dying thought

61 The survey experiment was made possible by Time-Sharing Experiments in the Social Sciences, whose support we gratefully acknowledge; see: <http://www.experimentcentral.org>. 

these soldiers had been motivated by material gain; 39% said they had been motivated to do their job; and 53% said their motivation had been to serve their country. This distribution of attributions closely matched that recorded by the control group of those who had read an unrelated story. By contrast, 27% of those who had read about contract soldiers dying ascribed their motivation to material gain and only 23% saw it as a matter of serving their country; as can be seen in Table 1, the likelihood of citing material gain as the contractors’ motivation was greater among respondents for whom we provided background information about PSCs. In sum, respondents were more likely to see soldiers as motivated by patriotism than private contract employees, and the more information they had about PSCs, the more likely they were to see contractors as motivated by material gain.

The distinction that respondents drew between the motivations of soldiers and those of contractors did not carry over to their emotional reactions to the simulated news stories they read. As can be seen in Table 2, substantial differences emerged between those who read about anyone dying and those in

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**Table 1**

Perceptions of soldier/contractor motivations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Iraq…</th>
<th>Story read</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…for material gain</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…because it was their job</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…to serve their country</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2**

Emotional reactions to the stories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean Score</th>
<th>Story read</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (happy) to 4 (sad) scale</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (angry) to 4 (calm) scale</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the control group who read an unrelated article, but emotional reactions were virtually identical irrespective of whether the casualties were identified as soldiers or contractors. In either case, more than nine out of ten of those who had read about the deaths of Americans claimed to feel sad as a result, and approximately three out of four described themselves as angry. The counterpart percentages were significantly lower for respondents in the control group; reading about waste in the federal bureaucracy saddened and angered many respondents, but not nearly as many who experienced those emotions after reading about American deaths in Iraq.

Table 3 indicates an absence of any major differences in support for US involvement in Iraq and in evaluations of how well the situation there was going between those who read about soldiers dying and those who read about contractors dying. The very fact that these assessments were not more positive among those who read about deaths among contractors rather than among soldiers should occasion surprise among those who would expect the use of contractors to decrease political costs. Furthermore, to the very modest extent that these groups differed in their responses to these three questions, those who read about the deaths of soldiers tended to be somewhat more likely to say that going to war was a good thing, that it was worth it, and that the war was going well. Thus, our experimental results suggest that rather than exacting political costs, news of soldiers’ deaths may, if anything, produce small political benefits that stories of contractors do not. Accordingly these data provide some empirical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean Score</th>
<th>Story read</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Soldier</th>
<th>Contractor</th>
<th>Contractor, elaborated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (the right thing) to 4 (not the right thing) scale</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (worth it) to 4 (not worth it) scale</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (not going very well) to 4 (going very well) scale</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
support for the idea that casualties among military personnel do not always exact political costs and may even provide rally around the flag effects. 62

Although rally around the flag effects are not well understood, studies of how people use inferences to make political judgments suggest ways in which soldiers’ deaths might register somewhat differently in the mass public than contractors’ deaths. 63 The deaths of soldiers may communicate a message to the public about the importance and legitimacy of a mission—invoking symbols of sacrifice, patriotism, and national interest—and about the importance of sticking it out to honour and validate the commitment of those who have fallen. The deaths of private soldiers, though, seem less likely to have the same symbolic potency—indeed, they may elicit different feelings altogether. Our data provide some initial, albeit very modest, empirical support for this interpretation.

These responses also shed some light on the audience costs that could be associated with policy vacillation when using PSCs rather than the US military. If news of the deaths of private security personnel does not prompt the same rally psychology as news of the deaths of soldiers, it may also be less likely to engender audience costs for vacillation. Thus, PSCs may provide a tool with which the nation can employ force, but without the same degree of commitment. Although our data provide only weak evidence on behalf of this possibility, it remains a possibility that warrants further investigation.

62 Bruce Jentleson, ‘The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1992) and Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) both claim limits to causality effects. Our data support their general findings but not the mechanisms that either posits. Jentelson claims that casualty sensitivity depends on the nature of the mission but sees the public as remaining sensitive to nation building experiments—of which Iraq is one. Feaver and Gelpi argue that public support depends on leaders’ willingness to carry efforts on to victory—something the Bush administration has pledged and thus our data does support; however, they also suggest that people with greater social contact with the military should be more sensitive to casualties. We found no difference based on our respondent’s veteran status or contact with the military. On rally around the flag effects, see John Oneal and Anna Bryan, ‘The Rally “Round the Flag’s” Effect on US Foreign Policy Crises 1950–1985’, Political Behavior, Vol. 17, No. 4 (December 1995); Richard Hermann, Phil Tetlock and P. Visser, ‘Mass Public Decisions on Going to War: A Cognitive-interactionist Framework’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, 553–574.

What do the combination of considerably reduced transparency and a slightly reduced rally effects suggest more broadly about audience costs? Because the use of PSCs garners less attention than the use of troops, this tool has the potential to reduce the political costs of using force—not because most people care less about private soldiers’ deaths, but because people know less about them. Furthermore, given the less transparent process, PSCs provide an additional tool through which decisions to use force can be taken without public commitment. Finally, the deaths of private security personnel do not appear to contribute to national commitment; they are simply seen as an occasion of sadness. The more tenuous link between private soldiers’ deaths and national commitment may thus lessen audience costs from vacillation. If this is the case, it is one more piece of evidence suggesting erosion in the processes that engender trust among democracies.

**Conclusion and implications for the transatlantic relationship**

Contracting with PSCs should be expected to work differently than raising and deploying military forces. The process should be less transparent, reduce the number of veto points, and decrease audience costs. Here we have examined some evidence that provides some support for these expectations. We first described a variety of ways in which the use of PSCs might reduce transparency. By comparing the number of articles that mention troops versus PSCs we also demonstrated that at least by one measure, the reduction in transparency is quite large. We then compared congressional and presidential controls on the use of troops versus PSCs and suggested that the use of PSCs advantages the executive branch and reduces the number of veto points an action must endure. Finally, we assessed audience costs by comparing people’s reaction to military versus private security deaths. Though the results of this comparison were mixed, they nonetheless suggest that using PSCs has some modest potential to diminish the audience costs associated with using force.

Our empirical analysis only probes institutional arguments for the democratic peace. If the democratic peace is the result of shared democratic norms that govern the use of force or liberal ideas that cause democracies to see events the same way, the use of PSCs would not be expected to engender the same changes.64 Similarly, if democracy is only a small portion of the transatlantic relationship, or if as critics argue, the democratic peace is

insignificant, subjective, or otherwise misguided, changes in these institutional processes should be less important. To the degree that one finds the institutional arguments persuasive, however, our evidence suggests that using PSCs may foster important changes between the US and its European partners and the relationship between this phenomenon and democratic practices is worthy of further investigation.

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Globalization has ostensibly changed the competence of states—increasing their capacity to govern in some areas, diminishing it others.¹ In keeping with Cerny’s formulation, analysts of post-Cold War defence industry restructuring tend to argue that globalization potentially undermines the state’s ability to provide certain public goods, including defence, at a level of expenditure acceptable to publics.² Rapidly changing technologies and the consequent increasing start-up costs for weapons design and production suggest that national defence competence is largely an economies of scale problem for all but the wealthiest states with the biggest markets. Thus for Europe’s mid-range powers in particular, globalization would seem to pose special challenges in the military-security sphere because forces of globalization, including the rise of increasingly competitive markets, dual-use technologies and lower transport and communication costs, have rendered the preservation of nationally-based defence industries untenable.

This paper takes a different view, both of globalization and its consequences for defence planning in Europe and the United States. Rather than specifying globalization as a series of independent variables that act on states to constrain


policy choice and ultimately shift power from the national level to the ‘depoliticized global space’. I argue that globalization is a process that defence firms have exploited in order to ensure their continuing access to a growing range of consumers. Globalization thus refers to defence firms’ efforts to position themselves throughout global markets, to reorganize their production and recast their branding in ways that conceal their primary national affiliations, and to seek out new sources of international finance, most notably from institutional investors.

Viewing globalization as a strategy rather than as a set of independent factors, I seek to highlight the political choices that underpin what are conventionally understood as autonomous forces. The consequence of such choices, both by states and by firms, has been the significant denationalization of the defence industry in Europe and a more modest denationalization in the United States. ‘Denationalization’ refers to the maketization and depoliticization of state-defence firm relations in which states divest themselves of the defence industry, fail to keep defence firms within national boundaries, and use competitive international tenders in their procurement procedures. I will argue, however, that in most cases firms prefer these forms of denationalization and have employed a range strategies precisely to advance the role of markets, as opposed to political relationships, in the way they do business.

Defence industry denationalization began with a series of political events and decisions stemming from the Cold War’s end (1989–1991). In the intervening period, however, firms have taken the lead. In light of smaller, post-Cold War defence budgets, firms have forged consolidations, developed cross-national research and production networks, sought out new markets, and reduced their dependence on national political relationships as a source of contracts. State support for firm-led restructuring has been uneven, varying from sizable subsidies for industry consolidation in the United States to government reluctance to finally divest from partially state-owned firms in France, Spain and Italy. States have been more consistent in their export promotion policies. For although they vary with respect to how far they are willing to allow defence industry denationalization to evolve, governments tend to agree that the export option relieves pressure on state budgets and preserves domestic employment


even if it also imperils future military missions and contributes to a global levelling of technological capacity.

In much of what follows, I present the major trends in defence industry restructuring in Europe and the United States since the end of the Cold War. I argue that among the most important developments is that firms have used globalization as a strategy and that defence industries are increasingly denationalized as a result. Denationalization is a more remarkable feature of European outcomes than of American ones, but in both settings there is significant variation across industries and countries. I begin by placing post-Cold War restructuring in historical context to establish what is new about the most recent period in which state-firm relations have undergone significant marketization. I then detail the political decisions of the early 1990s that led to defence industry consolidation in the United States and subsequently in Europe. Third I argue that the diminishing demand for weapons systems that spurred consolidation also set firms on a path of pursuing globalization. New firm strategies for survival have in turn weakened defence industries’ political ties to their states of origin. Thus in this section I also detail what defence firm denationalization looks like in both Europe and the United States. Fourth I review some of the possible public policy implications of restructuring and denationalization, particularly for defence planning, export controls and proliferation, and democratic accountability. Finally, I conclude by outlining potential avenues for future research.

**Putting the defence firm in historical context**

If defence firms currently appear to have more latitude in globalizing their operations independent of state strategy than previously, it is probably only because the proximity of Cold War political control has made it seem so. Historically, state-firm relations have undergone multiple shifts in which states have exercised more or less authority over weapons producers depending on the international strategic context, states’ ability to control arms flows or take a financial interest in firms, and domestic economic priorities. Trade-offs between cultivating the security of supply on the one hand and financing weapons procurement on the other are normally competing considerations that governments have long had to navigate.

Beginning in Renaissance Europe, virtually no state was able to achieve armaments self sufficiency. Even if some countries did not have to import all of their warships, artillery, ammunition and arms from abroad, they nevertheless had to import at least some of the raw materials necessary to manufacture such goods. Although political authorities did what they could to increase their military autarky by establishing and financing their own manufacturing capacities
(in cannon foundries and shipbuilding works, for example) they also supported the rise of private producers. The growth of private suppliers in turn created a new set of dilemmas for states. For even as privately-owned firms were able to manufacture better quality arms at lower prices, they were only able to do so in the context of an emerging regional market in which regimes were as dependent on their enemies as on their allies for the means to fight wars.\(^5\) And although political authorities did make efforts as early as the 15\(^{\text{th}}\) century to limit exports and technology diffusion, in part by increasing domestic production runs through their own orders, autarkic ambitions usually gave way to economic efficiency, at least until the ‘New Mercantilism’ of the early 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century.\(^6\)

The period leading up to World War I was similarly characterized by intensive international arms dealing, just as trade generally was on the rise. Prussian privatization of some of its arms production, particularly to Alfred Krupp in 1859, was one of several developments that signalled the prioritization of commercial interests over military-strategic considerations.\(^7\) While Britain forbade any restrictions on the arms trade except in war time, merchants such as Krupp and Maxim took full advantage of the increasingly liberal milieu by supplying both sides of the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War, and World War I. Surprisingly, the international trade in weapons was of even less concern to states in the late 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century than the growth of domestic armaments monopolies that threatened to use their position to trap governments into buying high—which is why, according to Manchester and Moravcsik, militaries would sometimes seek out foreign suppliers over domestic ones.\(^8\)

At the close of World War II and moving into the Cold War, European powers took new precautions to protect national prerogatives over defence research, weapons production and procurement.\(^9\) The United States, in cooperation with both Western Europe and Japan, also established the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) in 1949 that was intended to prevent the export of military-relevant technology to the


Soviet bloc, including at that time China. The COCOM export control regime stayed in place until 1994.

From the outset of European integration, arms manufacturing was among the most protected of industries. Beginning with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, defence contractors were excluded from trade liberalization in Europe. Because political leaders deemed national security a strategic concern, they refused to subject arms production to the common market. The insistence on national capacity was a disappointment to the United States in particular, which had hoped that a more ‘rational division of labour’ would emerge to assist in out-arming the Soviet Union at lower cost. The national approach to weapons production was affirmed as late as 1992 when the Amsterdam Treaty preserved Article 223 (renamed Article 296) as a guiding principle in defence industry organization, excluding weapons manufacturing from common market regulation. Moreover, although there was considerable defence industry consolidation through the Cold War, it mostly took place within national boundaries rather than across them, again illustrating the primacy of military-strategic objectives at the expense of budgetary considerations.

To a certain extent, then, the most recent decoupling of defence firms from their national-political bases may appear to be a return to former times in which, for reasons linked to perceptions of a relatively benign strategic context, commercial interests enjoy relative power. While I would not argue that recent trends in security privatization or defence denationalization are entirely new, I nevertheless contend that some features of the post-Cold War setting either represent major shifts or indeed are historically unprecedented. In the current period, cross national mergers, co-development and production, the exploitation of dual-use technologies for product diversification, and the growing role of institutional investors in financing defence firms and shaping their corporate


governance all contribute to denationalization. It is possible that re-nationalization will always remain an option as it did following the Napoleonic wars or World War I. However, given the extent of structural change underway and also mindful of how difficult the reversal of other features of globalization appear to be (most notably capital account liberalization) it is likely that the current round of denationalization will have significant and enduring political consequences.

The causes of defence industry restructuring

The end of the Cold War, American defence industry consolidation, the changing nature of defence technology, and new European priorities concerning monetary union reversed earlier trends favouring nationally organized defence industrial and technological bases (DITB) in Europe. The end of the bipolar standoff meant shrinking markets for arms the world over. In response, the US government subsidized consolidation among American companies. At a series of meetings between US Department of Defence officials and defence company CEOs in 1993 that have since been dubbed the ‘last supper’, the US government made it clear that not everyone would survive the downturn. This ushered in a period of aggressive marketing in international arms sales, the reduction in number of firms through mergers, and substantial US government assistance in financing consolidation.

In keeping with the theory that defence firms have in the meantime taken the lead in restructuring in ways that advance their prospects for survival, significant over capacity now characterizes the US market according to some analysts. The post-Cold War restructuring effort has two dimensions. On the one hand, both government and industry would appear to have downsized war fighting and military production capacities during the 1990s in ways that reflected a more benign strategic environment. Industry consolidation has left the US market with just three mega contractors—Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon—while several other Cold War firms, including McDonnel Douglas, Rockwell and Hughes, no longer exist. Many more companies that formerly had operations in both civilian and defence sectors have sold their subsidiaries dedicated to the latter. In addition, by the year 2000, the US government had closed over one hundred military bases and overall military spending was somewhat down from

most Cold War levels in real terms. The military-security apparatus had also been reduced by over two million jobs.¹⁴

On the other hand, however, despite significant restructuring, defence firms have experienced very little in the way of diminished government contracts. Notably, not a single production line was closed between the end of the Cold War and 1999.¹⁵ While the number of mergers has been impressive, defence industry consolidation has typically not implied firm restructuring, the elimination of redundant facilities or the substantial drawing down of work forces. The Clinton administration had intended to encourage sweeping rationalization—both financial and organizational—when it introduced its ‘pro-consolidation merger policy’ in 1993. Within a few years however, when it was discovered that government funds meant to cover the costs of the restructuring were mostly accruing to firms rather than to marginalized workers, Congress began to object. In light of new auditing and spending restrictions placed on government subsidies to defence manufacturers in transition, it became more cost effective for firms to simply lobby for more contracts rather than to move forward with further downsizing. The US Congress placed additional restrictions on consolidation and downsizing by invoking anti-trust law, which, although possibly warranted for maintaining competitiveness in the US market, was more likely motivated by local economic and electoral concerns.¹⁶

The failings of Clinton-era restructuring and conversion to create new economies of scale notwithstanding, the emergence of ever larger defence firms in the United States set off a similar wave of consolidations in Europe. Out of fear that they would be too small to compete, European firms and governments alike sought out new strategies, for the first time on a highly integrated cross-national basis. Part of the impetus came from the convergence criteria for monetary union and the imperative to bring government spending under control. Although defence industry restructuring has been underway in Europe since 1985, the intense period of consolidation began in the mid-1990s such that by 2002, there were only three major contractors left in the European market. The multinational enterprises EADS, BAE Systems, and Thales dominated European military electronics and aviation by 2002, with land systems and ship


¹⁵ Gholz and Sapolsky explain that production lines refer to facilities that build particular weapons platforms, which may exclude some arms such as munitions or other ‘subassemblies’ (parts, components, radars). See their article, ‘Restructuring the US Defense Industry’, 5, FNI and 22.

building undergoing restructuring on the national level that was expected to lead to further transnational consolidation, as well.\textsuperscript{17}

Prior to the firm-led rationalization that would ultimately refashion Europe’s defence-industrial landscape into what it is today, European governments attempted integration according to a political logic. France, Britain, Germany, Spain, Sweden and Italy committed in December 1997 to consolidating their national champions through greater integration and restructuring in an enterprise that would have been called European Aerospace Defence Company (EADC). The deal fell apart, however, because of competition for jurisdiction over certain spheres of production and over the ownership structure. This last point concerned the role of shareholders in an enterprise that might still in part be state owned by several of the participating countries, including France, Italy and Spain.\textsuperscript{18}

Massive consolidation did take place shortly after the failure of EADC, but with politics trailing rather than leading. British-dominated BAE Systems came close to merging with Germany’s Dasa but opportunistically changed course and merged with Marconi in the United States instead, permanently damaging relations between BAE Systems and its would-be German partner. In keeping with European defence firms’ fears that merging on unequal footing would essentially mean being overtaken, BAE Systems was then excluded from further European consolidation because it had grown too powerful. As Dasa contemplated merging with the recently privatized Spanish CASA, the German firm simultaneously pursued plans with France’s Aerospatiale. The end result was EADS, the first ‘European champion’, in this instance from Germany, France and on a smaller scale Spain. Specializing in civil and military aviation and space technology (including Airbus), EADS is potentially poised to compete with its American counterparts.

Although industry led, the making of EADS was not free from political authority. The French and Spanish governments both took significant steps in divesting themselves of these traditionally state-owned defence industries, but their withdrawal was not complete. With France and Spain being shareholders in the new enterprise, both came under pressure to renounce excessive political interference but at the same time are not legally bound to abide that commitment. Moreover, political sensibilities may circumscribe the economies

\textsuperscript{17} A German merger of HDW and ThyssenKrupp shipyards was reported to set the stage for creating a larger European enterprise for naval shipbuilding. See ‘ThyssenKrupp and HDW take first step down the aisle: Firms sign non-binding declaration of intent’, \textit{Lloyd’s List}, 18 May 2004.

\textsuperscript{18} Schmitt, \textit{From cooperation}, 31–2.
of scale that participants hope to realize. The political imperative to geographically balance production among Germany, France and Spain will limit market based rationalization. And because common market law does not cover defence industries, EADS will not be subject to European norms governing labour law reconciliation.19 This could further complicate the enterprise’s efforts to operate as a coherent entity, restricting basic business decisions such as shifts in production.

**Globalization as a strategy**

Globalization has at times been construed as a series of autonomous forces stemming from technological innovation. Growing volumes of mobile capital, increased levels of trade, new migration flows and higher speed communications are among the cited consequences.20 Once put in place, capital mobility, trade, migration and communications may indeed shift states’ perceptions of the costs associated with embracing these trends as opposed to trying to control them. But in defence industry restructuring, at least, the features of globalization have more often been the instruments of survival than the disciplinarians of firms.

Rather than conclude that the forces of globalization compel states to adopt particular policies or trap firms into globally-oriented strategies, I argue that permissive trade rules, the new availability of mobile capital and rapidly advancing dual-use technologies provide firms with unprecedented opportunities. Firms’ exploitation of the new rules of globalization take at least four forms:

1. The reorganization of ownership and production internationally;
2. The engagement of inter-firm and cross national co-development, co-production and licensing;
3. The financing of operations with institutional investors and the denationalization of brands; and
4. The diversification into dual-use technologies.

There is undoubtedly significant variation in the degree to which firms have undertaken globalizing strategies depending on the sector, the country and the corporate leadership in question. Although uneven outcomes may call into question my characterization of current trends as ‘denationalizing’, such variation also corroborates another central claim of this paper—that globalization is a chosen strategy rather than uniform constraint.

Globalizing ownership and production

The UK has gone further than any other country in assisting firms in establishing a global presence and in opening the UK defence market to foreign participation and ownership. BAE Systems (formerly British Aerospace) in particular has expanded its European presence through Sweden and Italy, is the most firmly established European firm in the US defence market, and in addition owns stakes in South Korea, South Africa and Australia. Pursuing ‘efficiency’ and ‘value for money’ ahead of a traditional national industrial policy, the prime contractors for the bulk of UK weapons programmes have since 1999 been mostly American and European, but not British.

Although both France and Germany have traditionally been more nationally oriented in their approach to weapons production and procurement, even they have succumbed to major shifts, most notably the creation of European Aeronautic Defence & Space (EADS) a mostly Franco-German transnational merger. French firms have also expanded their global reach through investments in the UK, Brazil and South Korea, while gaining greater access to more markets through joint ventures in the United States and Australia. Both Germany’s Rheinmetall and Italy’s Finmeccanica, like other European firms, have tried to reduce their dependence on their respective governments’ procurement policies by pursuing cross-national acquisitions in Europe and by establishing ties to defence firms in the United States. With respect to this form of denationalization—that is, foreign ownership in firms and truly competitive tenders on a global scale—the United States still lags far behind. In 2002, for example, of the almost $100 billion in contracts that went to the Pentagon’s 20 biggest suppliers, more than 98 percent of the spending was lavished on US firms. Nevertheless, a number of European firms, including BAE Systems, Thales, EADS and AgustaWestland are positioning themselves for greater access to the American market.

22 Mark Odell and Jean Eaglesham, ‘Lowering defences: Britain throws the doors open to foreign contractors, but are the rules of the game clear enough?’ Financial Times, 28 May 2004, 13.
23 James, ‘Comparing European Responses’, 124–126.
**Cross-national and inter-firm collaboration**

In addition to cross ownership, firms have been increasingly eager to engage in more deeply integrative strategies of co-development, co-production and licensing since the end of the Cold War. There are a number of reasons for this. In light of shrinking defence budgets, it is a buyer’s market. Offsets—in which defence firms trade a sale for guarantees of production contracts in the buying state—have become more common. But in addition, because defence technologies are increasingly expensive to develop, inter-firm cooperation has become an attractive way to spread risk. Finally, although many states do hold competitive tenders for defence equipment (particularly those European states that have forsaken domestic capacity but also the UK) it is still perceived to be advantageous to team up with firms that have ready access to additional markets. Firms such as Finmeccanica and EADS have pursued joint ventures mostly on the European or transatlantic market. BAE Systems and Thales (formerly Thomson-CSF) have done that, but have also expanded their reach to the Middle East, Latin American and Asia.

**‘Escaping the state’s embrace’ and brand denationalization**

In this new atmosphere of increasingly marketized relations between defence firms and states, it is the latter that have pushed the trend further forward with varying degrees of state acquiescence. Where states have traditionally tried to exercise more control, firms are trying to win their corporate freedom. The French state has, since before World War II, held at least partial stakes across a range of firms, including Thales (defence and civil electronics), DCN (the French naval group), EADS, Giat Industries (ground weapons), and Snecma (aero-engines group). Since the late 1990s, however, successive governments have been under pressure—mostly from corporate executives—to privatize major portions of the biggest concerns. Responding to CEO suggestions that ‘our status as a public company is not favourable to making alliances with quoted companies’

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French politicians have conceded that ‘We are convinced that the process of “Europeanization” of the defence industry … should continue’.”

States have consequently privatized large shares of previously nationalized industries. The Italian state divested itself of all but 32 percent of Finmeccanica in 2000. Fincantieri (shipbuilding) remained in the Italian state’s hands, however. The Spanish state had also partially divested itself of CASA (an aeronautics manufacturing group) before the EADS merger, although the Spanish state still owns 5.5 percent of EADS through the industrial holding company SEPI. In France, Thales and France’s Aerospatiale that joined EADS had undergone partial privatization by the early 2000s. But in the run-up to the French referendum on the European constitution, possible privatization deals were being put on hold—in defence and in other sectors, as well. Thales CEO Denis Ranque’s plans to embark on a possible merger with a foreign firm (such as Finmeccanica) were blocked by the French government because it was deemed unpopular with French labour unions. Decisions about the corporate leadership of EADS were also put on hold in light of the ‘no’ campaign’s concerns about the loss of ownership and control over strategic sectors and jobs.

In addition to trying to rid themselves of state ownership, defence firm executives are also faced with increasingly powerful institutional investors, which have in turn affected restructuring and business strategy. One possible consequence of shareholder interest has been the effort to gain access to more

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29 On Finmeccanica’s privatization, see Tony Barber, ‘Finmeccanica chief gets tough’, Financial Times, 7 June 2004.

30 In 2005, the French government also began setting the stage for new privatizations starting with the merger of two French defence aerospace companies, Snecma (jet engines) and Sagem (an electronics group). Meanwhile, DaimlerChrysler was urging the French government to give up its stake in EADS. See The Economist, ‘Taking aim, again: Europe’s defence industry’, 5 March 2005.


markets by denationalizing brands. BAE Systems has been the most effective at penetrating the US market, for example, by adopting ‘an American persona in order to compete there’. EADS, Thales and AgustaWestland have emulated BAE, hiring American executives with experience in the some of the biggest US defence contractors or in some cases with work histories in the Pentagon or Capitol Hill. Another possible consequence of institutional investor power is the longer-term marginalization of labour. Firms’ globalizing strategies have resulted in the reduction in percentage terms revenues that firms receive from their ‘home governments’. The globalization in organization and production as well as the denationalization of firm identity has led to a corresponding globalization in markets.

**Diversification into dual-use technologies**

A final method that firms have used to ensure their survival in an era of defence spending downturns is the diversification into dual use technologies. States have at times provided assistance in this, especially as the multiple applications of certain communications technologies have become increasingly clear. Rather than benefiting from ‘spin-off’ that transferred military research into civilian use, ‘spin-on’ is more likely in which civilian innovations are deployable for defence purposes. The emergence of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) and ‘network-centric warfare’ (NCW) is believed by some analysts to mark a more technologically sophisticated phase in which those persons conducting a war are

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33 Spiegel, ‘Navy deal will test Pentagon’s priorities’.
34 Spiegel, ‘Navy deal will test Pentagon priorities’; Thales has pursued this strategy in the UK by acquiring Britain’s Racal and maintaining the local workforce. Italy Finmeccanica has done the same thing in Britain by buying Westland helicopters from GKN. See *The Economist*, ‘Taking aim, again’.
36 The US Department of Defence is a bigger buyer of BAE Systems’ good than the UK Ministry of Defence. For Thales, only 28 percent of its revenues come from France, while 31 percent come from the rest of Europe. The Middle East and Asia account for the rest. See James, ‘Comparing European Responses’, 128–129. The same is true for Finmeccanica in Italy.
increasingly remote from the battlefield. Although it seems likely that the ‘war on terror’ will provide at least some defence firms with lucrative contracts into the foreseeable future, it is worth noting that even after September 11 and the ensuing conflicts in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Iraq and elsewhere, we have witnessed an overall decline in the incidence of war since 1990. If the global decline in conflict continues, the pursuit of dual-use technologies could become an increasingly important strategy for firms.

**Defence industry denationalization and its consequences**

Defence firm denationalization poses both opportunities and threats. In Europe, whether the marketization of relations between states and firms either bolsters or undermines European security depends on Europe’s political response to globalizing strategies. National governments are no longer necessarily the biggest purchasers of systems and components originating in a given country. Cross-national defence industry integration is increasingly the norm. States prefer to foster quality and price competition at the expense of supply self-sufficiency. Firms are ever more keen to pursue global market share rather than political favouritism as a means of survival.

All of these trends present an opportunity for European security in so far as defence industry integration could reduce overcapacity, increase competitive efficiency and diminish costs. Most important, it could provide an integrated industrial base that transcends long-standing political conflicts over juste retour, security of supply and information, and even definitions of national interest. Defence industry integration could therefore provide the material base for a


40 The potential for such gains now is even greater than it was during the Cold War within NATO. There was of course significant defence coordination among NATO members, but most of Europe’s two million troops were nevertheless organized around the principle of territorial defence. NATO realized few efficiency gains as a consequence of their cooperation, especially vis-à-vis the United States. Overall, the Europeans spent proportionately more on personnel than on research and investment than the United States, while the latter was continually engaged in perfecting force projection capabilities. Thus the defence capabilities gap between Europe and the United States was long in the making. See David S. Yost, ‘The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union’, *Survival*, 42:4 (Winter 2000–01), 97–128.
uniform and enforceable export code and a centralized procurement policy based on a pan-European conception of security. The subordination of economic trends to political priorities would provide the EU with increased bargaining power vis-à-vis the United States and enhance Europe’s capacity to defend its territory at home and interests abroad. In this regard, the Europeans could count themselves among the lucky, for not even Japan, the second largest economy in the world, has as promising an array of defence production and procurement options as do the Europeans. Indeed, long experience in pushing regional integration forward and creating supranational institutions that could be refashioned for foreign and security policy coordination leave Europe uniquely poised to exploit globalization and the relative power to be gained from new economies of scale. 41

But whether defence industry integration has a fortifying effect on European security is inextricably linked to whether European institutions develop channels of political authority that adequately harness globalizing trends—and herein lies the threat. Against the backdrop of continuing marketization of the armaments sector, Europe’s failure to exercise political control at a commensurate, supranational level promises to make all European states worse off. Ballooning start-up costs (linked to technological changes), short production runs and cross-national consolidations increases the relative costs of maintaining nationally-based production, which in turn diminishes the willingness of politicians and publics to sustain arms industries on a domestic level. Giving up domestic production, however, also necessarily means yielding political authority over issues of historically vital concern to states—export codes, weapons sales as a tool of foreign policy, and procurement according to national needs. 42 Moreover, jettisoning weapons development may dampen technological competitiveness and cut into long-term job growth—a concern that currently tends to outweigh military security considerations in the minds of policy makers. If on the one hand states forego their domestic capabilities and political authority but simultaneously fail to replace it with anything else, Europeans will lose relative power in the international system and experience a diminishing capacity to defend their territory at home or to follow through on foreign policy goals abroad.

41 Paul Milford points out that whereas European powers already engage in cross-national production networks with one another in defence (and to a lesser extent with the United States) such arrangements in the Asian context remain ‘unthinkable’. See his chapter in Kirshner, ed. Globalization and National Security (New York, Routledge, 2006).

For the United States, the denationalization of state-firm relations has meant the growing power of US defence contractors to act autonomously on the international market more than it has implied a restructuring of defence firm ownership, although US firms have, like their European counterparts, sought out additional partners abroad to increase market share in the face of slowing orders. US firms have been more successful than their European counterparts in winning foreign contracts. As already noted, US firms win about half of European contracts, while European firms scarcely win any in the United States. Another way to demonstrate a similar trend is to assess the proportion of a country’s imports and exports. Over the 10 year period spanning from 1993 to 2003, the UK exported 215 systems and imported 66 while France exported 316 systems and imported 21. In sharp contrast over the same period, the United States exported 1087 systems and imported only 63. Government support for US exports was particularly vigorous under the Clinton administration with new sales to Taiwan, Indonesia, the Middle East and Latin America that were heavily subsidized by the US taxpayer. Although some advisors, including an Arms Export Task Force, argued that economic considerations should not be weighed more heavily than foreign policy goals, that advice was ignored. Even in the post-9/11 period, US policy has been marked by less caution on exports rather than more. In order to assist countries in the war against terror, the US government has supported new arms exports to countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The enduring relative national orientation of US firms does necessarily mean ultimate state control. If scholars like Gholz and Sapolsky and Markusen are correct, American defence contractors and their shareholders have manipulated defence policy and procurement since the end of the Cold War resulting in levels of overcapacity never witnessed at the close of any other war. With technological complexity of weapons has also come a new role for firms in explaining their systems’ applications, and, according to some, a more powerful place in defence planning. Finally, following the consolidations in the United States, erstwhile competitive firms merged on a portfolio-expansion basis

43 These and additional figures are from the SIPRI database ‘FIRST’ available at: <http://first.sipri.org/>.
45 Gholz and Sapolsky, ‘Restructuring the US Defense Industry’; Markusen, ‘How We Lost the Peace Dividend’.
46 For the US, see Markusen, ‘How We Lost the Peace Dividend’, 92; on the UK, see Dunne, ‘The Globalisation of Arms Production and Trade’, 5; and in France see Markusen, ‘Should We Welcome a Transnational Defense Industry?’, 37.
resulting in larger firms and a less competitive market, potentially shifting power from the government to industry, even in what should be a buyer’s market.

The globalizing defence firm poses additional challenges to states beyond the basic issue of whether industry is setting national security policy in inappropriate ways. Proliferation and technological levelling are major public policy concerns, not just because of aggressive export policies but also because of increasingly integrative cross-national co-development and co-production arrangements. On at least one occasion, a US defence contractor (in this case Lockheed-Martin) actually used the prior export of its F-16s to unsavoury regimes as a reason to develop the F-22. Dual-use technology has obvious proliferation implications, for just as with nuclear technology, its peaceful application is difficult to ensure.

Conclusions and future research

Relative to the Cold War, the last fifteen years has been a period of rapid change in defence budgets, defence industry organization and in state-firm relations within the military-security field. In Europe, defence firms have tried to globalize their operations in order to gain competitiveness vis-à-vis their American counterparts. Symptoms of the globalizing strategy have included cross-national mergers and acquisitions, increasingly integrative forms of co-development and production, attempts to appeal to institutional investors, distancing from national identity, and the diversification into dual-use technologies. Some of these changes, the consolidations in particular, may signal the beginnings of a more unified defence industrial base with less wasteful redundancy and overcapacity. But the EU still needs to develop channels of political authority at the supranational level to advance a common procurement policy, export policy and even defence planning policy to fully exploit industrial restructuring and to ensure that such changes do not create additional political problems globally, especially with respect to proliferation.

The defence industrial restructuring process in the United States of the last decade and a half is also characterized by a kind of denationalization in which US firms are, like their European counterparts, entering into cross-national production agreements with foreign partners while they lobby for export contracts. A prioritization of commercial interests that began under the Clinton administration has not abated under George W. Bush, even in the wake of 9/11 when one might have expected concerns about technology proliferation to again

assume centre stage. This fact, in addition to continuing overcapacity in the US market, weapons makers’ direct participation in procurement and significant taxpayer subsidies for US arms exports, suggests that defence industry denationalization in the United States should also refer to the possible policy making capture by defence firms that have grown more powerful by virtue of their consolidation. Cross-national or regional variation in state-firm relations, particularly along the themes of denationalization and public policy capture, might prove to be among the most promising avenues for future research stemming from my initial findings.

Taken in historical perspective, the arms industry today is in important respects not more globalized that it was from the mid-19th century up until the outbreak of World War I—at least in terms of security of supply. Then, as now, virtually every state depended on weapons, components, technologies, raw materials or financing from abroad to mount their defences. And then, as now, commercial interests were put before military-security concerns such that weapons manufacturers, however unanticipated, ended up arming both sides of military conflicts to the detriment of the societies to which those manufacturers owed their existence. In the case of today’s defence industrial base, however, the fact that we may have faced a similar situation before is hardly cause for calm. Without stronger assertion of political authority over defence firms, both in Europe and the United States, we really will begin to miss the Cold War.
In a world where little agreement exists on anything in international politics, most US policymakers and pundits share a deeply held belief that further nuclear proliferation would be a terrible thing. When asked during the first 2004 presidential debate to name ‘the most serious threat’ to America’s security, both John Kerry and George W. Bush gave the same answer: ‘nuclear proliferation’.¹ Most analysts agree that we are now at a critical moment, whereby further proliferation could unleash a domino effect or a chain reaction that could double or triple the membership in the nuclear club. According to one esteemed group of experts, ‘(T)he world has arrived at a nuclear tipping point.’² Finally, it is widely postulated that the dynamics of the post-Cold War era, and particularly the post 9/11 world, make nuclear proliferation more terrifying and harder to solve than ever before. According to the Bush administration’s national security doctrine, new rogue states differ from the Soviet Union in their ‘nature and motivations’, their ‘determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world’s strongest states’, and their far greater willingness to ‘use weapons of mass destruction against us…’³ In this unquestioned view, the

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antediluvian world of the bipolar struggle between communists and capitalists offers no lessons.

These views largely have gone unchallenged within the policy world. While wide differences of opinion exist about how to slow and even reverse nuclear proliferation, few policymakers and pundits doubt that it should be a priority, if not the main concern, of US and world policy during this age of globalization, to which other geopolitical issues should be subsumed. Most are pessimistic, both about the possibilities for retarding proliferation and the consequences for US interests and world peace if the number of nuclear weapons states increase. Robust and radical new policies have been suggested to meet these challenges. Few think the lessons of the cold war have any relevance to our current concerns.

Unlike policymakers, however, international relations scholars have debated strenuously whether further nuclear proliferation is good or bad. The so-called optimists, led by Kenneth Waltz, argue that the powerful deterrent effects of nuclear weapons actually stabilize international politics by decreasing the chance of interstate war. Because states maximize their self-interest, it makes little sense for them to risk their own destruction in pursuit of aggressive goals abroad. In this view, nuclear proliferation is not to be feared, and in some cases, it should be actively encouraged.

The so-called pessimists, on the other hand, utilize organization and bureaucratic politics theories to demonstrate that states are not always unitary and do not always pursue their best interests. It is important to point out, however, that these scholars are by no means ‘pessimists’ compared to the policy debate. Scholars such as Scott Sagan do not dispute the powerful deterrent effects of well thought out nuclear strategies based upon survivable second strike forces and secure, reliable command and control procedures. Rather, ‘pessimists’ in the IR world claim that parochial bureaucratic clashes (such as those between military and civilian sectors) and organizational imperatives can produce nuclear force structures and strategies that are vulnerable to pre-emption, accidental launches, or unauthorized use.4

These arguments—both within the policy and academic communities—must not simply be accepted at face value. Issues of nuclear proliferation—particularly in terms of US policy—are more complex than either the policy or scholarly discussions would allow, and some of the most basic arguments in these debates remain open to question. Policymakers often overstate the dangers to the United States when describing the current dynamics of nuclear proliferation. For

their part, scholars overestimate the stabilizing influence of nuclear weapons on world politics. Yet, both debates share one basic flaw that burdens all their assessment of current and future nuclear proliferation dynamics: a misreading of the history of nuclear politics during the Cold War.

Ironically, this essay criticizes the policy debate for being too pessimistic, and the scholarly debate (including the so-called pessimists) for being too optimistic. This analysis will probably not satisfy either group. Unfortunately, no simple or parsimonious explanation of the causes for and effects of nuclear proliferation exists, nor is it always obvious how it affects US interests and what should be done about it. Even if policymakers and scholars agreed that slowing or halting nuclear proliferation should be a top priority, they have not come to terms with the fact that past history demonstrates the enormous difficulty of constructing a coherent, logical, non-proliferation policy that is not riddled with contradictions nor undermines key geopolitical goals.

One thing is clear. As the admittedly thin historical record reveals, confronting proliferation requires complex and often painful policy tradeoffs. Both policymakers and IR scholars have tended to look at nuclear proliferation through an a-political lens. Why nuclear weapons spread, how it affects international stability, and what options are open to the US only becomes clear when the larger political, and particularly geopolitical, context is considered.

What follows here is only suggestive, not proscriptive, and much more scholarly work needs to be done. This essay discusses the shortcomings in the policy debate, analyzes flaws in the scholarly debate, and lays out the difficulties any US administration would face in crafting a logical, effective nuclear non-proliferation policy.

The policy debate over nuclear proliferation

Have the dynamics of international security—and in particular, nuclear proliferation—been transformed by the transition from the Cold War to the so-called age of globalization, as is often contended by policymakers and pundits? The Bush doctrine flatly states that the US currently faces a security environment that is far more ‘complex and dangerous’ that it faced during the Cold War, especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis. There are three claims that are often made to prove this point. First, the types of threats we face are new. Second, we are at a key moment, or ‘tipping point’, whereby one new nuclear nation could unleash a ‘chain reaction’ of many more. And third, that the nature of the regimes actively seeking nuclear weapons—so-called rogue regimes—makes the issue of nuclear proliferation far more dangerous than it has been in the past. The history of nuclear politics, particularly during the Cold War, undermines each of these arguments.
First, many of the nuclear threats that concern the United States in the post-9/11 world are nowhere near as new as we think. As early as 1946, a prominent US nuclear scientist warned that:

In any room where a file case can be stored, in any district of a great city, near any key building or installation, a determined effort can secrete a bomb capable of killing a hundred thousand people and laying waste every ordinary structure within a mile.\(^5\)

The CIA began warning about the dangers of the covert introduction of nuclear weapons into the US only months after the Soviets detonated a nuclear device.\(^6\) Catastrophic terrorism was a concern of US policymakers since at least the Nixon administration, when even so-called ‘dirty bombs’ were a worry. As an aide to Henry Kissinger wrote, ‘Nuclear raw materials … if captured by terrorists, can be made into crude atomic bombs or exploded to cause contamination. This is a real threat, not science fiction.’\(^7\) Two years earlier, an NSC staff wrote analyzing ‘terrorist actions against nuclear installations, or involving nuclear material’. Similar to today, the report emphasized the psychological effects of the ‘panic’ that would follow such and attack, and argued that ‘we are not in a very strong position’ to deal with these situations.\(^8\) Countless documents reveal that today’s fears over nuclear terrorism, dirty bombs, and covert weapons certainly existed throughout the Cold War. The fear of a war with the Soviets or the PRC was simply far greater and more important.

What about the second great concern of policymakers: the fear that if one or two pivotal nations are allowed to develop nuclear weapons, it could unleash an unstoppable wave of new proliferation. According to the former US State Department Director of Policy Planning, Mitchell Reiss, ‘in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear “tipping point”, where many

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countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic.\footnote{9}

The idea of a nuclear tipping point, chain reaction, or ‘domino’ effect, however, is by no means new. Consider the following headline: ‘Many Nations Ready to Break into Nuclear Club.’ Was this a recent newspaper article? In fact, the headline was taken from the front page of the \textit{Washington Post} from June 1981.\footnote{10} Similar articles could be found from almost any year since at least the early 1960s, as the fears of a nuclear ‘tipping point’ or domino dynamic have persisted for decades.

Consider one of the most compelling examples: in the aftermath of China’s detonation of an atomic bomb in October, 1964, there were widespread fears of a nuclear ‘domino’ effect, and that nothing could be done to stop other countries from following in China’s atomic footsteps:

A succession of Chinese tests followed by an Indian decision to ‘go nuclear’ may rapidly change Japanese attitudes. Indonesia, despite its low level of technical competency, has ambitions and would be spurred on by the Chinese and Indian examples. And evidence of serious Indonesian intent would undoubtedly lead the Australians to try to get nuclear help in some form from the UK and the US … the effects would be felt more widely. Israel, Sweden, Germany, and other potential nuclear countries far from China and India would be affected by proliferation in Asia.\footnote{11}

Another report predicted:

[t]hat at least eleven nations (India, Japan, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Canada, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania and Yugoslavia) have or will soon have the capability of making nuclear weapons, given the requisite national decision. Within the foreseeable future … the number will grow substantially. The Union


of South Africa, the United Arab Republic, Spain, Brazil and Mexico may be included.12

A top-secret, blue ribbon committee established to craft the US response contended that:

[T]he recent Chinese nuclear explosion has increased the urgency and complexity of this problem by creating strong pressures to develop independent nuclear forces, which, in turn, could strongly influence the plans of other potential nuclear powers.13

The most alarming factor about this and other official predictions of ‘tipping points’ and ‘dominos’ is how wrong they were. Writing in 1985, the National Intelligence Council pointed out that for ‘almost thirty years the Intelligence Community has been writing about which nations might next get the bomb’. All of these estimates based their largely pessimistic and ultimately incorrect estimates on factors such as the increased ‘access to fissile materials’, improved technical capabilities in countries, the likelihood of ‘chain reactions’ or a ‘scramble’ to proliferation when ‘even one additional state demonstrates a nuclear capability’.

The most striking characteristic of the present-day nuclear proliferation scene is that that, despite the alarms rung by past Estimates, no additional overt proliferation of nuclear weapons has actually occurred since China tested its bomb in 1964.

While ‘some proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities and other major proliferation-related developments have taken place in the past two decades’, they did not have ‘the damaging, system wide impacts that the Intelligence community generally anticipated they would’.14

In fact, there has never been a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation, nor is there compelling evidence that this will ever occur. If anything, the opposite has transpired—a dramatic shrinking of the pool of potential proliferators. Proliferation pressures were far greater during the Cold War. In the 1960s, at least twenty-one countries either had or were considering nuclear weapons research programmes. The list ranged from western democracies like Australia

and Sweden to communist countries such as Yugoslavia and China to regional powers such as Brazil, South Africa, and India. By 2004, only eight countries were known to have nuclear weapons. It is essential to note that even those ‘rogue’ states who are/were a great concern to policymakers—Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea—began their nuclear weapons programmes during the 1970s and 1980s, before the Cold War ended.\(^\text{15}\) As far as we know, no nation has started a new nuclear weapons programme since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Another important argument made by today’s policymakers is that the nature of today’s nuclear aspirants is different fundamentally from previous threats and requires special consideration. Their malevolence, despotic rule, and aggressive international designs of these states, it is often claimed, make the concept of nuclear deterrence irrelevant or obsolete. Once again, it is far-fetched to claim this is a new concern. Consider the analysis by Fred Ikle in 1965:

> If the spread of nuclear weapons continues beyond the middle powers, it will probably lead someday to owners of nuclear weapons who cannot be deterred because they feel they have nothing to lose—a ‘nuclear proletariat’ which has nothing to lose but its nuclear weapons. People fanatically dedicated to some revolutionary cause may have no concern for the survival of their country… To carry out such ‘nuclear anarchism’ or acts of personal revenge, modern delivery systems would not be needed; it would suffice if the weapons could be sneak[ed] close enough to a target clandestinely.\(^\text{16}\)

Such concerns are not new. The United States dreaded the Soviet Union’s acquisition of the bomb. Stalin’s Russia was a murderous regime, and the Soviets had been aggressive before they tested an atomic bomb. Their behaviour after the 1949 test seemed to realize the Truman administration’s worst fears, as their puppet, North Korea, attacked the South without any apparent worry over the US response. During the winter of 1950–51—arguably the most dangerous period of the Cold War—the United States was convinced that nuclear weapons had so emboldened the Soviet Union that a third world war was inevitable.\(^\text{17}\) Within a few years, however, the relationship stabilized. As will be discussed below, nuclear weapons had a contradictory effect on the US-Soviet relationship:


while inducing caution at times, nuclear weapons both created their own crises and often made them more unpredictable and risky. There is no evidence, however, that possessing nuclear weapons made the Soviets more aggressive than they would have been otherwise.

An even more instructive case is the People’s Republic of China, who in 1964 was may have been the most ‘rogue’ state in modern history. Mao pursued bizarre and despotic domestic policies that led to the death of tens of millions of China’s citizens. The PRC had been pursuing an aggressive foreign policy before they tested atomic weapons, including attacking India, fighting the United States directly in Korea and by proxy in Vietnam, and nearly going to war over the Taiwan straights. Mao made a series of highly irresponsible statements about the PRC surviving and even thriving in a nuclear war. No country in modern history—not Iraq, Iran or even North Korea—gave US policymakers more reason to fear their nuclearization that China.18

What happened? Within five years, the United States and China began a covert dialogue, and in less than a decade, began an anti-Soviet alliance that put great pressure on Russia and helped bring the Cold War to an end favourable to the United States. China had and continues to have a robust foreign policy. Despite its ‘rogue’ nature, however, China did not become reckless or expansionist. If anything, China’s foreign policy became calmer and geopolitics in East Asia stabilized after it acquired these weapons.

Which raises an interesting thought: could it be those states that are the most despotic and ‘roguish’—those states whose very legitimacy is questioned by the international community—that have the highest motivation to acquire nuclear weapons? While always unwise to extrapolate from a single case, the behaviour of the PRC would seem to indicate that once ‘rogues’ acquire the international legitimacy and security that comes with nuclear weapons, perhaps they will be more inclined to forgo aggressive international behaviour. Several members of the nuclear club are countries who live in regions or came to statehood in ways that make them feel particularly vulnerable to claims against their legitimacy: the PRC, an India and Pakistan created out of civil war, Israel, and of course, an artificially divided Korea. Is it possible that the ‘legitimacy’ conferred by nuclear weapons acquisition could lead to a ‘maturing’ effect, moderating a rouge’s international behaviour? Furthermore, the security provided by the nuclear deterrent may allow nervous states to rest easy.

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It is unclear what effect, if any, regime type has on a state’s behaviour with nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{19} And it could be argued that nuclearization by Germany, Japan, and especially Taiwan—all open, tolerant, market-oriented liberal democracies—would be far more destabilizing to world politics, and more threatening to US interests, than Iran or North Korea’s nuclear weapons programmes.

What about the argument that rogues are more likely to use nuclear weapons, as is demonstrated by Iraq’s willingness to use chemical weapons on both Iranian soldiers and its own Kurdish citizens? This is certainly a worry, yet it is hard to know whether using other WMDs would lead to nuclear use. The United States is the only state has actually used nuclear weapons against another country. Furthermore, unlike countries like China and Israel, the United States does not have a no-first use strategy (as will be discussed below). The two other states that are suspected of using chemical weapons on the battlefield in the nuclear age—Egypt in its war in Yemen and the Soviets in Afghanistan—have not used nuclear weapons, nor were they cast out of the international community.\textsuperscript{20}

The key point is that policymakers have both overestimated and oversimplified the dangers presented to both world politics and US interests by nuclear proliferation. None of these threats are new, tipping points, dominos, or ‘epidemics’ are non-existent, and most regimes, no matter how odious, want nuclear weapons primarily for security.\textsuperscript{21} If anything, by focusing on the threat of ‘rogue’ states, policymakers have underestimated the potentially far more destabilizing effect of proliferation in non-rogue states like Germany, Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and especially Taiwan. Does this mean we should feel sanguine about the prospects of nuclear proliferation, as is often implied by many scholars? As we will see below, the answer is no.

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\underline{\textsuperscript{19} For the best case that regime type matters, and for one of the most perceptive analyses of nuclear proliferation, see Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), pp. 681–687.}

\underline{\textsuperscript{20} For information on Egypt and the Soviet Union’s suspected use of chemical weapons on the battlefield, see Monterey Institute of International Studies, ‘Chronology of State Use and Biological and Chemical Weapons Control’, accessed at: <http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/pastuse.htm>.}

\underline{\textsuperscript{21} I have not brought up perhaps the most worrisome fear—the spectre of terrorists using nuclear weapons. This is a very important issue that is beyond the scope of this paper. I will only point out that it is by no means evident that such groups can acquire and maintain such weapons, and that even if they did, they would use them in a indiscriminate, suicidal manner. Even if nuclear non-state actors is a pressing concern, it is intellectually dishonest to conflate this issue with concern over how rogue regimes would act with these weapons.}
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The scholarly debate over nuclear proliferation

Has the scholarly debate done a better job of capturing the complexities of nuclear proliferation dynamics? In particular, has the debate in the international relations field done a better job of characterizing the past, and in particular, the lessons from the Cold War?

There are two initial points to make about the scholarly argument, which, like many arguments about proliferation, are somewhat contradictory. Optimists often claim that US policymakers always thought nuclear proliferation was a bad thing that had to be stopped is simply not true. Up until the mid-1960s, there were top US policymakers who thought, at worst, proliferation was unstoppable and it was pointless to alienate potential friends by trying to prevent it. Others went further, suggesting we actively support proliferation. This is clear in individual cases. President Dwight D. Eisenhower even went so far as to consider a West Germany with nuclear weapons an inevitability, a fact that played a large part in the Khrushchev’s decisions to initiate the Berlin and Cuba crises between 1958 and 1962.22 The Kennedy administration, supposedly the first truly anti-proliferation administration, debated whether to help France with its nuclear programme on three different occasions.23 Policymakers debated whether to help India, and did less to halt the Israeli programme than is often contended.24

It was only when the People’s Republic of China detonated an atomic device that official policy positions swung towards a more robust and proactive anti-proliferation stance, although even then there were those who did not think it was worth paying serious political capital to attempt the impossible.25

The second, somewhat contradictory point is that the optimists’ position are somewhat naive, given how widespread fears of nuclear proliferation is among the US public and top US policymakers. This does not mean that scholars should subsume their analysis to popular thinking. It is important to recognize, however, that no credible top US policymaker has or will advocate the optimist

position anytime soon. This highlights a key difference between the concerns of policymakers and international relations theorists that helps explain why their respective debates have been so disconnected. Consider Richard Betts comment on Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realist argument that nuclear proliferation could stabilize international politics by inducing caution among states.

High quality theory is not necessarily a direct guide to good policy. In the scientifically rickety world of social science, any theory that predicts, say, 90 percent of outcomes on some important matter is an amazingly good theory. The Waltz argument may be in that category in the overwhelming majority of cases, new nuclear states may be more cautious and remain deterred by each other. In the world of policy, on the other hand, people do not marvel at all the cases where nuclear weapons will make the world safer, but worry about the exceptions where things will go wrong.26

There is a more fundamental problem, however, with the scholarly debate about nuclear proliferation: its characterization of nuclear weapons dynamics during the Cold War. Much of the recent IR scholarship on international stability, and the effects proliferation might have, are connected to the notion of the Cold War as the ‘Long Peace’. This idea—first laid out by John Lewis Gaddis and expanded upon by John Mearsheimer—tries to answer an important puzzle: why didn’t the intense ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States lead to war? Or, what factors led to the longest period of great power peace in modern history?27

According the Long Peace view, two factors created stability and prevented direct great power war. The first was the bipolar structure of power between the Soviets and the US, which should have dampened nuclear proliferation pressures. More important, at least for this discussion, was the cautionary effect of nuclear weapons. Absent nuclear weapons, it was argued that the political conflicts between the United States and Soviets during the Cold War most likely would have mushroomed into armed clashes and perhaps even world war at some point. The devastating effect of nuclear weapons, however, gave both sides pause, as few (if any) political goals were worth the risk of mutual annihilation. There was some disagreement as to when this ‘deterrent’ effect kicked in: for


some, the mere existence of nuclear weapons, or a minimal deterrent by both countries, was enough to prevent war; for others, a survivable second strike forces with secure command and control capabilities were required; as analysts considered America’s extended deterrent commitments, a minority believed that some measure of US nuclear superiority was required. All these views, however, were rooted in a shared notion: the possession of nuclear weapons by both the United States and the Soviets stabilized the international system and ‘deterred’ great power war.

These widely held view of nuclear dynamics during the Cold War are critical because they inform so much scholarly discussion of proliferation in the 21st century. In fact, most pessimists do not challenge these assumptions and base their critique on organizational and bureaucratic factors. Both assertions, however—that bipolarity will stifle proliferation, and that nuclear weapons stabilized the international system during the Cold War, are open to question.

**Nuclear weapons and the long peace**

According to the realist scholar Ben Frankel, ‘bipolarity inhibits the spread of nuclear weapons while multipolarity induces their proliferation.’ Writing in 1993, Frankel predicted that end of the bipolar Cold War meant that ‘nuclear arms proliferation will likely intensify in the 1990s and beyond, and that the owners of these weapons will likely brandish them more openly to advance their political objectives.’ Why? According to Frankel, the ‘inherent complexity of multipolar architecture dooms multipolar systems to instability, making them susceptible to crisis and war.’ Frankel claims that the ‘end of bipolarity means that superpower guarantees—the most effective instrument to moderate the effects of systemic characteristics—will be reduced and weakened.’

There are reasons to question whether the system was, in fact, bipolar, as recent scholarship has shown that the neither the Western nor Eastern alliance were as monolithic as they appeared. France and Great Britain often balanced against West Germany, and France and West Germany often tried to balance against the United States. Furthermore, there were times when the

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superpowers went above the heads of their allies because of shared interests, such as limiting German military power. Furthermore, bipolar dynamics did not prevent China, India, South Africa or Israel from developing nuclear weapons for reasons that went beyond the Cold war. Nor is it clear that bipolarity did anything to lessen the possibilities of acute crises in Korea, the Taiwan Straights, Berlin, or Cuba during the Cold War.

The most important point, however, is that the majority of nuclear proliferation occurred within the bipolar system, as mentioned earlier. The multipolar or unipolar system that has emerged since the end of the Cold War has actually witnessed a significant retrenchment of nuclear weapons programmes.

The so-called ‘nuclear revolution’ argument to describe nuclear dynamics during the Cold War is more compelling. The costs of a nuclear war to both the United States and the Soviet Union were so great that each side should have showed great caution in pursuing their geopolitical ends. Without war or a believable threat of war, neither power had much leverage to change the status quo. The risks were too great to threaten the other’s vital interests. This meant that in the regions that mattered—Europe in particular—power politics were essentially stable. The nuclear revolution forced the United States and the Soviet Union to carry out their battles with means—propaganda, proxy wars, limited conflicts—which did not threaten the world with extinction.

This way of seeing the Cold War has a certain effect on the way we understand nuclear politics today. If nuclear weapons stabilized international politics in the past, then American policymakers can be relatively sanguine about the prospects of nuclear proliferation in the future. The United States should permit advanced industrial states like Germany and Japan—who could deploy a survivable second-strike force rather quickly—to go nuclear. And it should not be overly concerned if less advanced states successfully deploy nuclear forces.

There is no doubt that the nuclear revolution had a sobering affect on the leadership of both sides. But at the same time, it is now clear that the nuclear revolution often encouraged crises and made them less stable than they might have been in a non-nuclear world.

The nuclear revolution destabilized international politics in several important ways. First, nuclear weapons nullified other, more traditional forms of power, such as conventional forces and economic strength. The nuclear revolution gave the Soviet Union the ability to cancel out America’s enormous economic, technological, and even moral advantages. For forty years, a backward state with a GNP one-third of the US’s competed on an equal plane in the world. This would have been unthinkable before 1945. The nuclear revolution provided great power status on the cheap, which upended the rules of balance of power politics. The same is true today—the United States would never worry about such geopolitically minor states such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea if not for
their nuclear weapons. Is international politics stabilized when such small, economically weak states can play on an almost level playing field with advanced, wealthy democracies?

The nuclear revolution also changed military calculations in potentially dangerous ways. It has long been understood that in a nuclear environment, the side that went first would gain an overwhelming military advantage. This meant that strategies of pre-emption, and even preventive war, were enormously tempting in a crisis. New scholarship reveals that both the United States and the Soviet Union considered attacking China’s nuclear weapons programme before the PRC deployed a strategic nuclear force.\(^30\) Furthermore, NATO’s strategy throughout the 1950s was explicitly based on the advantages of pre-emption.\(^31\) A military strategy based on attacking hard, fast, and most importantly, first, does not give diplomats much time or leeway to end a crisis. Even into the 1970s and 1980s, long after strategic parity had been established, analysts in both the United States and Soviet Union supported nuclear force structures and strategies that only made sense for a first strike.

In theory, these types of instability—the delicate balance of terror—should have disappeared between the Soviets and Americans during the late 1950s, when it was clear that strategic parity was around the corner. But in fact, this was the most dangerous period of the cold war. Despite being seriously outgunned in the strategic nuclear arena, Khrushchev threatened Western interests in Berlin and Cuba with bold threats of war. And despite its overwhelming military and economic superiority, the Western Alliance took these threats seriously.\(^32\) Why were the Soviets so brazen and NATO so cautious?

The nuclear revolution produced a dangerous dilemma—in a nuclear crisis, how likely you are to risk the use of nuclear weapons may be more important than the number or types of weapons you possess. In other words, the balance of objective military power may be a less important factor in a crisis than the more subjective balance of resolve. One side, or both sides, might decide to—as Thomas Schelling put it—manipulate the risk inherent in nuclear confrontations in order to accomplish important political goals.\(^33\)

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31 Marc Trachtenberg, 'The Nuclearization of NATO', in *History and Strategy*, p. 162.

32 For idea that the balance of resolve was 'crucial' to the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis, see Marc Trachtenberg, 'The Cuban Missile Crisis', in *History and Strategy*, p. 258.

In pre-nuclear crises, the most important issue was your adversary’s capabilities. If two countries—A and B—had clashing political interests, each side would size up the balance of power and calculate its chances of prevailing in a war if diplomacy broke down. If country A assessed country B’s military strength and found itself hopelessly outgunned, it would usually back down before a crisis got out of control. Of course, country A could always miscalculate—comparing relative military strength is difficult, and intelligence can be bad. Furthermore, a novel new technology or strategy might make the risk seem worthwhile or change the balance in a sudden fashion. Or a country might feel like it had little choice—consider Japan before the Second World War. But under normal circumstances, if country A only had only 50 tanks, and country B has 500 tanks, and tanks were what really mattered on the battlefield, then it should be obvious to both sides that country B has the upper hand in any dispute. Country A would have a hard time bluffing in such an environment, because if its bluff were called Country B would clean its clock. The dangers of war through miscalculation, though present, should have been limited.

Consider the same political crisis between country A and B in the nuclear world, except now country A has 50 deliverable thermonuclear weapons while B has 500. What does this numerical advantage mean in a crisis? Even if 10 or 5 or just one of country A’s weapons hit country B, it would be a catastrophe that must be avoided at all costs. Naturally, this makes country B cautious, sober, and reluctant to engage in any type of dispute that could lead to war with country A. Perhaps country A can exploit this type of caution. In a conflict, if country A could show itself more likely to use its nuclear weapons—to have greater resolve—then country B might back down, despite its numerical superiority. In such an environment, winning the balance of resolve—taking risks and acting irresponsibly—is rewarded, where in the pre-nuclear world it was punished. Resolve is far more subjective than capabilities. As Thomas Schelling spelled out four decades ago, this can lead to both sides engaging competitions in risk taking. Obviously, it is far easier to miscalculate in a world where resolve, and not the balance of power, is the key factor.34

The Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises are instructive. In 1962 the United States had a high degree of certainty that it could carry out a devastating first strike against the Soviets with little damage to itself. Yet President Kennedy was extremely cautious throughout these crises, despite the fact that Soviet’s were aggressively challenging core American interests. For example, the President

came very close to publicly agreeing to remove American missiles from Turkey, an outcome that might have shaken the Western Alliance to its core. Khrushchev’s gambits, conceivable only in the nuclear age, nearly forced the stronger and more responsible power to choose between initiating military actions that could lead to a nuclear war or accepting an overwhelming geopolitical defeat. There is new evidence that the Nixon administration attempted something similar, initiating a nuclear alert to demonstrate his resolve over Vietnam.  

The nuclear revolution had another destabilizing affect on world politics. Since a nuclear world put a premium on resolve and credibility of commitment, geopolitical calculations were often distorted in strange ways. Think of how different American policy would have been in a wide range of situations in a non-nuclear world. Based on simple calculations of the balance of power, losing South Korea, Vietnam, or even Berlin may not have been considered disastrous. None of these entities really added to America’s material strength, nor would they have added to the strength of the Soviet bloc. In a non-nuclear world, the United States would have down little to defend these territories. But in each of these crises, American policymakers were obsessed with demonstrating resolve in order to prove that American commitments to geopolitically more important regions were credible. A struggle dominated by resolve rather than capabilities is far more prone to blackmail, miscalculations, and over commitments. In essence, these destabilizing crises were caused by the dynamics of nuclear weapons.

Crafting a successful nuclear non-proliferation policy

There is great disagreement about the motivations behind nuclear proliferation and its consequences for US security and international stability. If, however, a consensus was reached that halting nuclear proliferation should be a high priority, what policies should the United States adopt? It turns out that crafting a coherent, successful non-proliferation strategy is extraordinarily difficult. The history of America’s efforts to limit the worldwide spread of atomic weapons is replete with painful tradeoffs and contradictions.

The first point to make is the obvious one—what right does the United States have to interfere in the most important issue faced by any state: how to provide for its own security? For the most part, states that have acquired nuclear weapons all live in extremely dangerous neighbourhoods. As much as we loathe Iran’s nuclear programme, it is important to remember that it was started in the

1970s when the Shah was in power. Iran is situated in the most unstable and dangerous region in the world. It bordered a nuclear-armed Soviet Union and an erratic Pakistan, fought a murderous war with Iraq, had hostile relations with Saudi Arabia, has been threatened by a nuclear-armed Israel, and is within striking distance of a nuclear India and China. The United States, the most powerful country in the world has threatened ‘regime’ change, policies it has successfully implemented on both its eastern and western neighbours. This is not to justify Iran’s programmes or policies. It would be shocking (and even irresponsible), however, if Iran had not considered doing whatever it could to protect itself from such threats, even if it included acquiring weapons of mass destruction. How credible is the US demand that Iran halt these efforts?

US policy has been more sensitive to this issue in the past. It was understood that India—facing an aggressive, nuclear-armed China—and Israel, surrounded by hostile countries—had good reason to acquire nuclear weapons. This did not mean we supported these efforts—we did not. Though our policy towards neither country was always consistent, it was eventually recognized, however, that there was little point in wasting lots of political capital and needlessly alienating nations who were probably going to construct nuclear weapons programmes, regardless of what we said or did.

This brings up a related point. By the 1970s, most US policymakers had realized that nuclear weapons were unusable, and therefore of little or no military or political value. An effective strategy would have been to tell prospective proliferators not to waste their time and money and earn the world’s opprobrium by building something of such limited value. Instead, by focusing so much attention on the horrors of nuclear weapons, we are sending the message that the threat of nuclear proliferation guarantees American attention. The more political capital that is spent preventing proliferation, the more attractive these weapons could become to smaller powers. If a state as backwards and dysfunctional as North Korea can scare and transfixed the foreign policy elite of the most powerful country on the globe with a handful of rudimentary weapons, it will be almost impossible for the United States to convince the rest of the world that these weapons have no use or value.

Would the United States be better off appeasing or punishing potential proliferators? Despite the wide gap between these politics, the United States has and continues to implement both, seemingly contradictory philosophies in its non-proliferation policies.

If you still decide non-proliferation should be a priority, you face two immediate decisions. Do you construct a blanket, no-exceptions non-proliferation strategy, or work each country case by case? And second, do you pursue appeasement and conciliation, or do you punish proliferators? US policy has pursued different versions of each, with mixed results.
Both debates emerged in the 1960s in the aftermath of China’s 1964 atomic detonation. Many US officials felt that countries like India and Japan had good reasons to go nuclear, and could allow such programmes while being against proliferation in general. If regime type was the standard used to decide who could be allowed to go nuclear, there was little point in trying to stop Sweden, a neutral, peaceful democracy, from developing its weapons system. Arms control professionals, on the other hand, advocated a blanket approach, arguing that granting any exceptions would undermine an effective non-proliferation regime.

The Bush administration appears to have taken a country specific policy, based upon the domestic orientation and international behaviour of the regime.\textsuperscript{36} There are dangers to this approach, however. First, tolerating Pakistan’s nuclear programme appears hypocritical. Second, would there be any more disturbing nuclear proliferation threat than if Taiwan acquired or developed its own atomic weapons? Taiwan has a healthy democracy, a thriving open market economy, and a dangerous security environment. Yet a nuclear Taiwan could incite a war with the PRC that would pull the United States into the conflict. Japan and South Korea’s nuclearization would also be destabilizing. But under the current ‘anti-rogue’ doctrine, how could we justify any effort to reverse a decision by any of these East Asian countries to go nuclear? And what if democratic Germany decided to go nuclear?

The second policy decision that has to be made is whether to pursue carrots—or to put it less kindly, appeasement—or sticks, i.e. punishment, when trying to prevent a country from acquiring nuclear weapons. Both the United States and the Soviets considered pre-empting the PRC’s nuclear facilities during the 1960s. The United States also considered a policy of carrots, including admitting the PRC into the UN The United States tugged back and forth between negotiations and punishment in our policies towards both India and Pakistan, with little effect. The current administration also struggles with this, using negotiations for Libya, punishment against Iraq, and an uncertain mixture of both towards North Korea.

Neither policy is fool proof. Negotiations can make the United States appear weak. Threatening a state that is considering going nuclear, however provides a great incentive to acquire the bomb, if only to protect itself from American pressure. Short of war, neither policy is likely to work with a state determined to develop atomic weapons. A final difficulty comes after a state has ignored US wishes and developed nuclear weapons. Should the United States pursue a

punitive policy, if only to deter future proliferators, or move on and normalize relations, as we have with India and Pakistan?

If a nuclear non-proliferation policy has any hopes of being successful, the United States must confront complex strategic questions. The most important decision involves US security commitments. If the United States asks a nation to forgo nuclear weapons, we may be asked to provide protection to them. If they face a potentially hostile, nuclear enemy, they may need to be included under our nuclear umbrella. We were able to squelch West German ambitions for nuclear weapons during the 1960s because of our commitment to defend them against the Soviets, backed up by hundreds of thousands of conventional troops, short, medium, and long-range nuclear weapons, and a strategy that allowed for using atomic weapons quickly and massively if necessary. In areas where we with similar military commitments—Japan, South Korea, and more ambiguously, Taiwan—our leverage over nuclear aspirations is strong.

This is a double-edged sword, however. First, there are countries where we thought it was not in our security interests to offer guarantees and/or the state in question was uninterested in our protection. India was the perfect case in point: as much as we tried to keep India out of the nuclear game, we were not willing to make the kind of commitments necessary for India’s security, for fear that we would be dragged into a war involving China and/or Pakistan. For a state to give up its nuclear weapons programme, it must see real evidence that we will protect them. This can lead to endless commitments, which might involve us in unwanted conflicts, force us to chose sides, and/or water down are most important security commitments.

Many of the security commitments—in central Europe, Korea, Japan, Taiwan—we currently have are anachronistic relics of the Cold War. Why have these military relationships persisted, long after the major threat has subsided? After all, the Soviet Union has disappeared, and most of these countries have the economic wherewithal to provide for their own protection. Protecting these allies from expansive totalitarian states was only one aspect of the American Cold War commitment to these countries. The United States also sought, in varying degrees in each case, to restrain the protected state from unilateral action that could destabilize international politics, and as time went on, prevent it from developing nuclear weapons. As part of the bargain, these states were protected by the American nuclear umbrella, a commitment that was strengthened by large deployments of US conventional (or in Taiwan’s case, naval) forces.

We are required to maintain these military commitments indefinitely, even if the United States has an interesting in reducing or even eliminating them. This dynamic comes into play in East Asia every time we think about altering our military arrangements. Taiwan, South Korea, and even Japan have made noises about going nuclear on several occasions from the 1960s through the current
period whenever the strategic landscape changes: For obvious reasons, this aspect of America’s cold war alliances was vastly underplayed in public rhetoric. Each of these countries—particularly Japan and West Germany—sacrificed a large measure of their ability to pursue an independent foreign policy, and most importantly, promised not to develop weapons of mass destruction. This made the nature of the American ‘alliance’ with these countries far more complicated than we had once thought. There was often an adversarial component to these relationships. West Germany and Japan (and South Korea and Taiwan) both exploited the implied threat of pursuing independent policies in order to pressure the United States to protect their interests.

To make these military commitments meaningful, to give US promises to protect ‘teeth’, US strategy dictates that it will use its nuclear weapons, even if it must go first. It also needs to maintain a nuclear force posture that is large enough to satisfy the demands of these commitments; in other words, it must go beyond the demands of a simple ‘existential’ deterrent to an ‘extended’ deterrents. This creates another obvious dilemma. In order to prevent nuclear proliferation, the United States must be willing to maintain large nuclear forces and to use them.

Yet arms control advocates insist that reducing (and eventually eliminating) the US nuclear stockpile is absolutely essential to our non-proliferation policy. Furthermore, non-proliferation advocates have called on the United States for years to embrace a ‘no-first use’ pledge. These arguments are compelling. If the United States reduced its stockpile, and promised never to use nuclear weapons first, it would send a powerful signal to the international community and dampen pressures on others to acquire these weapons. It might further deligitimize the political and military utility of these weapons, demonstrating that the US considered them unusable and thereby worthless.

As US policymakers discovered in the 1960s, however, a smaller US strategic force would not only weaken the extended deterrent; it would ‘make it easier’ for small countries to become a ‘first rank nuclear power’. When devising policies to prevent Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons, it was considered critical to ‘maintain a clearly superior US nuclear capability in Asia’. The same applies to the NFU doctrine. During the Cold War, it was the state willingness of the US to use their nuclear weapons against superior conventional forces that made their security commitments so valuable to their allies. Embracing an NFU might

37 ‘Problems Concerning Alternative Courses of Action’, NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, box 1, p. 3, LBJL.
weaken these commitments and make non-nuclear allies more apt to acquire their own weapons.

National missile defence carries similar contradictions. On one hand, a light ABM system might be effective against small and mid-power states, raising the bar to becoming an effective nuclear state too high for all but the greatest powers to reach. This argument was made in the wake of the PRC’s nuclear test in 1964, when it was contended that a US ABM deployment would ‘decrease US vulnerabilities to possible Chinese threats of attack and thereby enhance the credibility of our [US] commitments to Japan and other friendly nations.’ An ABM system would be an ‘alternative to expensive’ security ‘guarantees to discourage Nth country’ proliferation. It could also enhance a strategy of nuclear superiority needed to extend deterrence to non-nuclear powers.

A National Missile defence however, could encourage proliferation by protecting the United States while exposing non-nuclear powers not protected by the system. It could also inspire offensive counter-measures by current nuclear powers, reigniting an offensive nuclear arms race. Finally, the message that nuclear weapons were ‘useless’ would be undermined if the United States responded to proliferation by ‘minor powers’ by deploying a technologically sophisticated, multi-billion dollar defence system.

Perhaps the most important conundrum, however, is how to balance geopolitical interests with the goal of preventing nuclear spread. We were aware that Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons during the 1980s, yet looked away as this unstable, erratic regime in the heart of the Islamic world moved forward on their atomic programme. Pakistan also served as the base for arming rebels who successful fought the Russians in Afghanistan and helped hasten the demise of the Soviet Union. This was a complex, difficult tradeoff. In order to eliminate proliferation pressures in West Germany and Japan during the 1960s, the United States had to cooperate with a bitter enemy—the Soviet Union—to restrain close friends. There is little in either the current policy or scholarly debate that captures the subtle and often painful calculations that emerge when confronting the spread of nuclear weapons.


40 Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Minutes of Discussion, 13–14 December 1965, NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, p. 7, LBJL.
Conclusion

This essay has been critical of both the policy and scholarly debate over the how nuclear proliferation affects world politics and US interests. The policymakers are too pessimistic. There has never been a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation, nor is there compelling evidence that this will ever occur. Most regimes—even odious ones—want nuclear weapons for purely deterrent or defensive purposes. Once they acquired these weapons, none of these regimes have become markedly more belligerent, than they had in the past; in fact, there is evidence they have calmed down.

The scholarly debate, on the other hand, is too optimistic—even among so-called pessimists. While nuclear weapons can stabilize international politics by promoting caution, they can also change the dynamic of a crisis in dangerous ways. Furthermore, the unique nature of these weapons, and the requirement that states demonstrate resolve and commitment, can create crises that never would have emerged in a non-nuclear world.

Both debates share two flaws. First, both misunderstand or misrepresent the history of nuclear politics, particularly the Cold War. Despite the claims of both camps, the Cold War provides many lessons that could make for better policy today. It is important that we get this history right. Second, neither debate captures the complex and at times contradictory trade-offs—including fundamental geopolitical calculations—that must go into any assessment of how to confront the spread of nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, this essay provides little in the way of conclusions or advice. As we have seen, the dynamics of nuclear proliferation—and its affect on world politics and US interests—pull in different directions. There is no single, parsimonious explanation. All is not lost, however. The question of nuclear proliferation policy provides an important opportunity—the chance to combine historical work with social science theory and pressing policy concerns. The world of the historian, the international relations theorist, and the policymaker are often separated by yawning gaps of methodology, institutional culture, and contrasting professional interests. Policy professionals, however, desperately need the framework provided by theorists to make sense of nuclear proliferation. Abstract theories, whose goal is parsimony, need to account for how the world actually works. Historical work, I would suggest, can help bridge
this gap. These difficult and important issues provide a real opportunity for these different fields to cooperate, to produce better, more relevant scholarship, and guide more effective policy.

41 Historians, better than most, understand the extraordinarily difficult circumstances policymakers find themselves in. Historians understand how difficult prediction and generalization are that they may have a particular sympathy for the complex and at times overwhelming difficulties government officials face forecasting future events. As John Lewis Gaddis recently wrote, the historian’s task is ‘to interpret the past for the purpose of the present with a view to managing the future but to do so without suspending the capacity to assess the particular circumstances in which one might have to act, or the relevance of past actions to them… Part of historical consciousness is the ability to see differences as well as similarities, to understand that generalizations do not always hold in particular circumstances.’ John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Globalization and European Security: Myopic Awakening or Inevitable Oblivion?

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Introduction

The essence of the European integration project was based on creating a more ‘globalized’ Europe, while in the same time mixing protectionist policies and trade agreements with the rest of the world. If globalization is about integrating economies and societies, opening borders, creating interdependence, integrating policies, Europe was indeed its embodiment. The peaceful change of 1989 opened an era of unprecedented globalization that benefited liberal democracies politically and economically. The information technology revolution, and the so-called ‘new economy’ based on it, produced decade-long economic growth that helped the European integration process, inside with the Euro and outside with enlargement.

Yet some caveats are in order. First, the logic of getting together was aimed at becoming stronger for the outside world. After all, it was the fear of Asian economies, especially Japan that prompted efforts to create the Euro. Second, from the start, Europe’s common market was diversely appreciated within Europe itself. France’s attachment to a specific social model and status in Europe, Germany’s willingness to pay for the first and to accept the second—what Stanley Hoffmann has called the balance of imbalance—was the key foundation of the original project.¹ For Paris, Europe was merely one among many means to

¹ ‘For France, the permanent worry about German power led to the highly original strategy of West European integration, which I have described as balancing through bandwagoning.’ Hoffmann Stanley, ‘French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe’, in Keohane Robert
a French end; for Berlin, it was the only German mean to a European end. Without adopting a neo-realist view of the European Union, it must be recognized that the original understanding was weak, though regularly reaffirmed and enlarged. Thus, European integration was also about competing state sovereignties.

Third, this endeavour took place under very specific security circumstances, i.e. the Cold War where economy and security were separated, the first under the Commission supervision, the second under the American umbrella. This division has several effects: it allowed Western Europe to focus on economic growth without spending too much on security; it kept under control the destabilizing effect of state competition, it brought opportunities without real responsibilities. In other words, the process of integration was supposed to be only about benefits without serious challenges. This is why the United States constantly supported it. Seen from Washington, the Monnet idea was exactly the right approach at the right time. It was supposed to bring Europe together, make it stronger, yet ultimately under the influence of the United States. This is

(continued)
also why in France, globalization was perceived as an Anglo-Saxon plot aimed at the French model.

Last, but not least, this European project was supposed to end conflicts and wars in Europe. Civilian by nature, the European integration process has led to a ‘security-community’ among European members in which the use of force for resolving disputes has become obsolete. The integration process was a negation of geopolitical rivalries from which Europe has suffered so much. The constructivist interpretation of the European Union where Europe past is Europe’s enemy underlines accurately the willingness to create a post-modern, collective group of states. Yet, in foreign policy, the spill-over effect, identified by Ernst B. Haas, was limited. The first initiatives of the 1970s were fairly minimal; only the Maastricht Treaty was seen as a first breakthrough, however modest. Foreign policy is not an area where the logic of integration can easily replace the logic of collective action. The intergovernmental nature of foreign policy cooperation remained the basic rule of the game. This basic reality explained the creation of a second pillar of the Union, dedicated to a common foreign policy, but at Maastricht, defence issues were postponed sine die. This constructivist interpretation tends however to underestimate the geopolitical context that allowed members States to focus on the civilian integration. Without American nuclear umbrella and its role as a ‘pacifier’, Europe’s integration project would not have been possible.

This short background illustrates how significant was the end of the Cold War for Europe. From a sheltered and protected entity, Europe rediscovered new frontiers, new neighbours, new responsibilities and ultimately a new

(continued)
internal balance. This first wave of security globalization was regional in focus and transatlantic in effect: the incapacity to manage the Balkans wars and the belated interventions of NATO, i.e. US power, was the basis for the elusive quest of European security and autonomy that started at Saint-Malo between France and the United Kingdom. The second wave was even more radical: the 9/11 attacks against the United States were a tectonic event. For Washington, they changed the world, for Europe, they changed America. This security environment revolution in the US led to an international security agenda that degraded the position of Europe: from first place, it fell to a third, while the Middle East and Asia became the first two priorities. This change of ranking was traumatic for Europe whose perceptions about world order were increasingly divergent from those of Washington. This second globalization, and more specifically the US reaction to it, led to the current effort of creating a genuine European security actor, with very limited successes however. In both instances, Washington’s shadow, intra-European differences, domestic factors and national priorities were far more important than security requirements. The interplay between Europe’s institutions bureaucratic process, national governments priorities and local dynamics are not conducive to an adaptation to changed security requirements.  

Yet, there is a specific European willingness to learn from past mistakes which is consubstantial with the European project. For each failure, there has been a new ambition: the 1957 Treaty of Rome was partly a reaction to the collapse of the EDC; the European exchange rate mechanism was introduced after the oil shocks of the 1970s. After Bosnia and Kosovo came the first acknowledgment of EU military inadequacies and the launching of the St-Malo process; after Iraq, came a genuine European Security Strategy and a new activism in world affairs. Here lies the paradox but also the strength of this process: learning by doing may be a frustrating way of moving forward, but progress has nonetheless been considerable during the last five years. As we shall see however, these tentative strategic awakenings of Europe could be short lived. Precisely because European answers to the constraints of security globalization are largely institutional, the current crisis of European institutions could lead to a phase of stand still, paralysis and even decline of Europe’s strategic role. Trust among members and loyalty to the institutions, two key components of the integration endeavour, have been seriously damaged in the last couple of years. Trust between states, between European citizens and European institutions and among European citizens and European institutions and among European citizens and European institutions and among European  

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7 This is not new. From 1954 onwards, every single debate about European security was framed through political and domestic lenses rather than from international security requirements. The EU world is first and foremost a bureaucratic one, that functions under Gr. Allison’s model 2 and 3, very rarely under the rational, even bounded, of model 1.
institutions has dramatically decreased as it was already clear in the last elections for the European Parliament and made obvious by the referendum results in France and even more in the Netherlands. In such a context, it is likely that the Union will become even more divided, inward-looking, risk-averse and status-quo oriented than it was before. The third wave of security globalization, i.e. the shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific, could lead to Europe’s strategic oblivion.

From a security point of view, globalization is here understood as an increased interdependence of risks and threats, their answers and their consequences. This is nothing specifically new. The increased globalization at the turning of the last century has pushed the US to abandon its traditional isolationism. Indeed, wars have been global, and what had happened in a remote Yugoslavian city in 1914 had dramatic impact into Africa. This interdependence was at the core of W. Wilson’s 14 points: any local conflict could escalate into major world wars and, for this reason, democracy, rule of law and international organisations were supposed to mitigate, contain and even resolve the consequences of this first globalization. The development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles had set a second stage in this process by reducing time and distances. Today’s globalization displays however one unprecedented characteristic. With 9/11, the combination of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism constitutes a new phenomenon, whereby individuals or small groups could potentially acquire means of mass destruction that were before the monopoly of state actors. This feature means that international security is no longer a linear state-to-state interplay but has also acquired a new layer inside state actors. This multi-tier dimension represents the distinctive element of contemporary security.

The first part of this paper will address European attempts to strategic relevance, from the Balkans wars to the 9/11 attacks. It will then review the

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8 On this, see among others De Wilde Jaap, Saved from Oblivion: interdependence theory in the first half of the 20th century, Aldershot, 1991.

9 As President McKinley stated in 1901 ‘God and man have linked the nations together. No nation can longer be indifferent to any other. Isolation is no longer possible or desirable.’ Quoted in Fromkin David, In the Time of the Americans, New York: Vintage Books, 1995, p. 30.


11 The sheer power of nuclear weapons has led some early analysts to consider the nuclear age as fundamentally new. Bernard Brodie, ’This weapon brings us, in short, to the end of strategy as we have known it.’ Quoted in Newhouse John, The Nuclear Age: From Hiroshima to Star Wars, London: Michael Joseph, 1989, p. 114.
transatlantic crisis that led to the Solana Document and its implementation or more precisely the lack of it. Finally, it will offer some interpretations about Europe’s incapacity to become a genuine security actor and underline some new characteristics of the transatlantic partnership. It will do so in an empirical rather than in a theoretical manner.

**ESDP: responsibility without autonomy**

The story behind ESDP is one of reactive and protracted attempts to adapt to changing security conditions. The security dimension of the European Union shifted from a shield offered by Washington to the constraints of an imposed autonomy. After 40 years of American protection, Europe’s emancipation was inevitable. The security guarantee provided by Washington remained, yet the end of the Soviet threat meant ultimately the end of European dependency in security and defence.\(^{12}\) Moreover, armies in Western Europe were built on collective and territorial defence. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, collective security and intervention abroad became the new principles of European security. The question was how to implement European responsibility without weakening the Atlantic partnership. The management of German reunification provided the first answer to this crucial issue. The integration of the unified Germany within NATO, an option actively advocated by Washington and accepted, against all expectations, by Moscow, made it possible not only to maintain cohesion between the Germans and Americans but also to consolidate the NATO monopoly on European security issues.\(^{13}\)

At the beginning of the 1990s, the European security landscape had a somewhat schizophrenic appearance. On the one hand, the Union as a political entity was taking its first steps on the international scene but without its own defence capability; on the other, NATO remained the essential security instrument in Europe but had a new political vocation vis-à-vis its former


enemies in the East. These changed circumstances prevented the re-nationalization of defence instruments in Europe, safeguarded the essential part of the transatlantic relationship and preserved American influence in Europe, but left unanswered several contradictions. On the European side, the concept of a European defence identity was at odds with the reduced budgets and peace dividends demanded by public opinion. Across the Atlantic, the end of the Cold War called for a redefinition of America’s role in Europe and of Europe’s place in American strategy, which in turn involved a review of NATO’s mission and partnership. Most importantly, this first extension of the security framework was perceived as an enlargement of the ‘democratic peace’ that the European Union embodied particularly well. In other words, it was seen as a win-win situation, where the only question was how and when to allow Eastern Europe countries into the Union. From a European point of view, it was not a security issue per se, but a matter of technicalities that the Commission should fix.  

14 In that sense, the enlargement process was the only answer the Union could give to its new neighbourhood. Yet, as realist theories would have predicted, these countries put their security agenda before their economic integration. NATO enlargement thus came first, the European Union membership second. This process essentially transformed NATO from a collective defence organization into a collective security institution based on common democratic values.  

15 It did not decrease American support for greater European autonomy but it placed Russia at the core of the US administration’s diplomacy in the second part of the 1990s.  

**The Balkans’ trauma**

Ultimately, external events imposed their own significance. The driving factor behind the European Union’s security developments was the need to address the challenges of the Balkans wars that threatened the rationale and credibility of the whole integration process. The Bosnian crises demonstrated that Europe’s values had to be defended and actively promoted in its neighbourhood, where a humanitarian catastrophe was unfolding on European television screens. The impact of the Balkans tragedy was absolutely crucial to shifting public opinion throughout Europe in favour of a more coordinated approach among European

14 The same approach presided with Turkey whose the strategic dimension was not addressed.


countries. It seemed absurd, if not revolting, to multiply European directives addressing every detail of economic daily life of Europe while at the same time disregarding atrocities in Sarajevo. To put it differently, the conflicts in the Balkans forced Europe to rediscover ‘the need for geopolitics’. 17

This crisis was instrumental in bringing European governments together. The initial disagreements and the worsening of the conflict that these allowed demonstrated the ineffectiveness of national alternatives. 18 Neither France nor the United Kingdom nor Germany could have successfully handled the crisis on its own. Collective action, including with the United States, became the condition for success. The first test of European security became a transatlantic issue. On that level, the ‘hour of Europe’ was certainly premature. Yet for Washington, the break-up of Yugoslavia seemed senseless and irresponsible, and the ethnic mix too complex for any intervention to be decisive. In the absence of clear strategic interests, Washington refused to become involved in the conflict. 19 Only when the credibility of the Atlantic institution itself became at risk did Washington reluctantly and minimally decide to commit itself to resolve the crisis.

The Kosovo conflict confirmed Europe’s military shortcomings and the ambiguities of America’s international position. The conflict that was supposed to be short became protracted; it gave rise to major tensions within the Alliance by putting the Europeans in an ambiguous situation: on the one hand the inadequacy of their means made them dependent on the US effort; on the other, consensual political control within the Alliance gave them a droit de regard over 99 per cent of the targets selected by Washington for air strikes. Whereas the European allies carried out only about 40 per cent of the strikes, the latent crisis within the Alliance stemmed from the fact that while the Americans had great technological superiority in the air, consensual decisions were necessary to obtain approval for most of the sorties carried out—807 out of 976—against targets in addition to those initially planned. 20 Without making an effort to improve its military capabilities, Europe’s influence over US strategy would remain minimal and its responsibility would continue to be limited. An effort to


18 The limits of international law in cases of civil war, the inadequacy of traditional peacekeeping instruments and the outbreak of real violence in Europe following forty years of political but peaceful confrontation, all contributed to the Europeans’ inability to judge the scale of the conflict. The best account is Gow James, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.


20 These figures are from Peters John E. et al., European Contributions to Operation Allied Force, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001, p. 25.
improve Europe’s military capability had become essential if the strategic
decoupling of a Europe that was lagging behind technologically was to be
avoided; yet doing so would raise fears of the political decoupling of a more
autonomous Europe. In other words, fighting alongside America had become a
difficult task. Kosovo revealed Europe strategic inadequacies vis-à-vis potential
conflicts in its neighbourhood but also and most importantly, the obsolescence
of its armed forces compared to those of the United States.

Several lessons were drawn by European leaders. The first was the evident
inadequacy of defence institutions founded on a territorial defence system. 21 The
defining by WEU of ‘Petersberg tasks’ was a first expression of the new strategic
environment but the reorganisation of military forces, begun in June 1992 by
WEU and in December of the same year by NATO, to focus on force projection
and the management of far-off crises, was a much more difficult endeavour. The
second was the requirement to acquire and develop a strategic culture and an
organisation that can anticipate events. Without a credible threat to use force,
there could be no effective collective security. Third, the reappearance of war in
Europe demonstrated the gap between the reality of the effective power of a few
large European countries and the European Community’s decision-making
framework. The security risks resulting from the disintegration of Yugoslavia
were not strategic. Whereas European security had been a matter of necessity
during the Cold War, it was now a matter of voluntary choice. Taking account of
that reality was to become a necessary condition for any common European
defence policy, and at the same time it set its limits. What is more, the ultimate
decision to use armed force and accept the attendant risks is basically a national
prerogative. In times of crisis, international institutions do matter less, sovereign
power more. This renewed importance of national sovereignty marked the limits
of the institutional changes that were triggered at Saint-Malo. If ESDP was about
the avoidance of a new Srebrenica in Europe—a catastrophe that public opinion
in Europe deemed unacceptable—one, the answer was mostly institutional through
intergovernmental, i.e. bilateral process.

The transatlantic shadow over ESDP

The Saint-Malo agreement, and its Europeanization six months later at the
Cologne Summit, was a political response to this security crisis. Domestic politics
and most importantly the transatlantic variable have shaped the content of the

21 Bozo Frédéric, ‘Organisations de sécurité et insécurité en Europe’, Politique étrangère, no. 2,
agreement. European security was seen through political lenses, especially ones focused on the relationship vis-à-vis NATO. It represented the meeting point of two evolutions. On the one hand, the French position vis-à-vis NATO had evolved substantially after Bosnia. The French President, particularly sensitive to military affairs, initiated a noticeable rapprochement with NATO.\(^{22}\) In the same time, Great Britain was aware of the limitations of the exercise in rebalancing the Atlantic Alliance (the European Security and Defence Identity of January 1994), so long as it was seen by the US Congress as merely a way of reducing US involvement in Europe. As part of a wider European policy, the Blair government’s strategy considered that only through the Union could the Europeans’ military means be enhanced. Even before the dramatic illustration provided by Kosovo, the British Prime Minister had concluded that if this imbalance continued it would imperil the very foundation of the Atlantic partnership. The way to save the Alliance was via Europe. London, in a dramatic departure from its previous policies, reconsidered its veto position on Europe’s responsibility for its own security. The language used at the St-Malo summit, which referred to a ‘capacity for autonomous action’, represented a compromise between these two developments: the St-Malo declaration should be read as a turning point in London’s approach to Europe as much as a French concession to Atlantic legitimacy.\(^{23}\) For one, Europe was becoming a way to exert influence, and for the other the Alliance was the designated framework of European autonomy.

Others factors have shaped the implementation of the Saint-Malo process. The Helsinki Headline goal\(^{24}\) was about new military capacities to implement the


\(^{23}\) The Saint-Malo declaration stated that: ‘The European Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises... In strengthening the solidarity between the members states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members’ (emphasis added). For a good analysis of this agreement, see Howorth Jolyon, ‘Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative’, *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 33–55.

\(^{24}\) In December 1999, the Helsinki summit set out the Headline Goal objectives. The aim was to put at the Union’s disposal forces capable of carrying out all the Petersberg missions, including the most demanding, in operations up to army corps level, i.e. 50,000 to 60,000 troops. Member states undertook, by 2003, to deploy forces ‘militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat
peace-keeping and crisis management operations that were then commonly accepted as legitimate duties beyond borders for the Union. First, the missions themselves translate a European projection of values with a clear emphasis on projecting stability and democratic peace rather than waging wars against enemies. Second, the means are mostly civilian with a clear emphasis on soft power, i.e. economic incentives and trade agreement. Even in the military areas, police forces and civilian personnel were a crucial part of the European approach. Indeed, the first ‘autonomous’ mission of the EU was a police mission in Bosnia.

In this sense, the adaptation to international security is more Wilsonian than it may look: But it is a specific European Wilsonism based on two distinct genuine security policies towards the immediate and extending neighbourhood: an approach aimed, first and foremost, at stabilisation, based mainly on fostering regional cooperation and broad partnerships; and an approach aimed at integration: bringing neighbouring countries directly into the EU through a bilateral process based on ‘conditionality’. The more successful the first strategy of stabilisation has been, the greater has been the likelihood that it leads to the second strategy of integration. It also based on common belief in the democratic peace dynamic: by extending the Union’s norms, rules, opportunities and constraints to successive applicants, the Union has made instability and conflict on the continent ever less likely. This transformation effort was thus limited to countries willing to change, and severely constrained by the lack of strategic understanding with other powers. Vis-à-vis Russia for example, coordination of foreign policies has been extremely limited.\(^{25}\) This is, of course, even truer when Washington is involved. In other words, the genuine strategic relationship remains national, not European.

Lastly, in a neo-realist framework, the lack of threat against Europe in the 1990s allows for a common consensus to emerge on soft security issues, failed states and humanitarian tasks. The aim was to contain the destabilizing effects of this regional globalization: breeding-grounds for diseases, refugee flows, arms-

\(^{25}\) The Union has been extremely slow to initiate a genuine security dialogue with Russia. See for example Lynch Dov, ‘Russia faces Europe’, *Chaillot Paper* 60, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, May 2003.
trafficking, transnational crime, and regional instability. But even in this narrow security sense, European ‘responsibility to protect’ was minimal. The claimed autonomy was thus reduced to this soft power approach; for the use of force, America’s shadow was still overwhelming. Because this quest for autonomy was related so closely to the relationship with the United States, the events of 9/11 and the new agenda set up unilaterally by Washington were traumatic to Europe.

The 9/11 revolution and its consequences

With the 9/11 attacks, the perception of globalization as largely positive factor in international security changed dramatically. Globalization creates wealth but it also carries global problems and risks. Environmental challenges such as global warming, worldwide diseases such as AIDS or epidemic such as SARS, or computer viruses, cannot be effectively tackled without the collective involvement of the international community. Globalization also creates tensions and conflicts. Economic crises, failed governance, ethnic violence and religious antagonism are amplified by the gap between the haves and the have-nots. These dividing lines cross the old geopolitical system based on territories and sovereignty. The latter sources of conflicts are not new, and not more numerous or bloodier than before, but their impact today is quite different. Violent signs of discontent, like the first attack on the World Trade Centre or the attempt to target the Eiffel Tower, went relatively ignored. With 11 September 2001, this ambiguity was over. Modern ‘hyper-terrorism’ is orchestrated by relatively small groups of people using unsophisticated weapons to achieve mass casualties. Because they used easily available modern technologies offered by open societies, these groups did not have to rely on substantial structural and logistical support. Modern terrorism has thrown up an unprecedented combination of non-state actors with easily available capabilities to inflict mass destruction or disruption. By comparison with the visible but superficial attacks that used to be the norm (for example, assassinations or bombing small targets such as a nightclub or bus), some terrorist groups now aim at mass casualties and mass disruption. This means that what was previously a worst-case scenario is now a possibility; what was once unthinkable has now to be contemplated, and what was once an acceptable level of risk has now become unacceptable. This phenomenon has thus radically changed the perception about globalization as a benign and positive force. Yet, the perception was not the same on both side of the Atlantic.

26 The expression is used by Heisbourg François, Hyperterrorisme, la nouvelle guerre, Paris: Odile Jacob, 2003.
The US military approach

The recurrent privilege of the United States was that the tragedy of power politics was for the most part a remote reality that existed only in foreign and remote places, rarely an emergency lived from inside. With the fall of the Twin Towers, America rediscovered a dangerous world and responded boldly. In launching a ‘Global War on Terror’, it declared simply that the world had entered a new era. The 9/11 attacks fundamentally changed the calculus of risks in Washington and altered its foreign policy. Global in its essence, the war against terror reveals the new US role in the world as it was envisaged in the National Security Strategy of September 2002. The working assumption of the NSS document underlines America’s indisputable hegemony around the world. But this unparalleled hegemonic position, once a source of questioning if not a motive for inaction, became a welcome reality that needed to be maintained to discourage other nations from challenging US power. It set a clear objective of continuing American military superiority where no state is to be allowed to equal the United States. But this embracing of hegemony followed paradoxically from a sudden, unprecedented and now exposed vulnerability. From this starting point, the US strategy identified threats in the combination of terrorism, tyranny and technology, i.e. weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The combination of these ‘three Ts’ made the security environment more complex and dangerous. Thus, at its core, the NSS document called for the United States to use its ‘unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence’ to establish ‘a balance of power that favours human freedom’. A combination of unparalleled supremacy that should stay unchallenged and a global perception of the new threats formed the basis of the Bush doctrine.

Some officials in the first Bush administration advanced the idea, promoted well before September 2001, that the expansion of democratic regimes was the only definitive solution that would prevent other terrorist attacks. According to its neo-conservative advocates, regime change was ultimately the best guarantee against terror. Their objective was to democratise the entire Middle East, even if it meant imposing democracy by force. By linking the type of regime with the source of proliferation and the threat of terrorism, the Bush administration


28 The phrase ‘balance of power that promotes freedom’ belongs to Condoleezza Rice. In April 2002, she observed that ‘an earthquake of the magnitude of 9/11 can shift the tectonic plates of international politics … this is a period not just of grave danger, but of enormous opportunity … a period akin to 1945 to 1947, when American leadership expanded the number of free and democratic states—Japan and Germany.’ Quoted by Fitzgerald Frances, ‘Bush & the World’, *The New York Review of Books*, 26 September 2002.
basically endorsed an extended agenda of overthrowing failed and/or rogue states. The US thus determined that the most important way to defend itself against terrorist attack was to intervene abroad to tackle what was perceived as the root cause of international terrorism: lack of freedom. President George W. Bush stated: ‘Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe, because in the long run stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.’\(^{29}\) The ‘war on terror’ formula denoted a willingness to export to the outside world the fight against terrorism. It conferred on the Bush administration a new paradigm through which every problem in the world arena had to be assessed. America was at war and, taking advantage of its supremacy, it intended to wage it on its own terms, following its own agenda, defining friends and foes by the sole criterion of their stance in the war on terrorism, and proclaiming a sovereign right to attack and change any regime that harboured terrorists. This combination of hegemony and regime change made all the difference between a prudent, realist policy of adjustments and a preventive doctrine whereby US hegemony would be used to win, not to manage, the ‘war on terror’.\(^{30}\) Briefly put, Washington wanted to impose its own model of globalization to the rest of the world. The United States addressed the problem of hyper-terrorism using very classic means of military power projection through strategic pre-emption, and aiming at geopolitical map redrawing through regime change. This was the essence of Bush’s ‘Wilsonism with boots’\(^{31}\).

**The European comprehensive approach**

For Europe, the situation was quite different. The US, as a single nation and dominant power with massive military might, can take decisive steps and frame international issues in a way that the European Union, with 25 sovereign member states, cannot. Europe does not have this capacity of shaping the outside world for several reasons: military weaknesses, shadow of a colonial past, memories of world wars, including the Cold one, experiences with ‘local’ terrorists activities and an inward-looking agenda are among these factors. Most

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29 Remarks at the 20\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, 6 November 2003.


importantly however, the threat of international terrorism is perceived as external as well as internal. In this sense, globalization is lived from inside far more sensitively than in the US. In that respect, Europe’s vulnerabilities are even more demanding than those faced by the US. Given the openness of Europe’s economy and its central geopolitical situation, borders are extremely porous. Border controls are under-equipped, and the Schengen arrangements mean that between many European countries there are no border controls. Once inside the EU, people and goods can move freely. Nearly 5 million commercial vehicles of over 3.5 tons circulate on European roads each day. There are 41,435 landings and take-offs per day at Europe’s airports. Numerous inland waterways traverse capitals and cities throughout Europe. As an example of the vulnerabilities involved, the maritime challenge is serious. Europe’s coastline is 89,000 km long. The European Sea Ports Organisation (ESPO) has identified 1,116 container and passenger ports in Europe. Rotterdam, the largest seaport by volume in the world, moves 322 million tons of cargo annually—the equivalent of about 10,000 containers leaving the port on any given day. An attack on a major port could cause large-scale disruption of European economies. To underline the problem, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that 5.8 billion tons of goods were traded by sea in 2001, over 80 per cent of world trade by volume. This trade was carried by over 46,000 vessels servicing nearly 4,000 ports throughout the world. While the majority of bulk shipments carried by the world’s fleet of 23,281 bulk/general cargo vessels are relatively inert materials such as iron ore, coal, grains, bauxite/alumina and rock phosphate, some cargoes are hazardous, and in the wrong hands could do harm, such as ammonium nitrate—a fertiliser, but also a powerful explosive.

A number of the many countries in close vicinity to the EU, in Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, have chronic problems of instability. Traditionally, the EU tried to address security problems in its vicinity by integrating countries into the Union. But the Neighbourhood policy adopted in 2003 recognized this approach was not feasible for all. The aim was to promote the emergence of a ‘ring of friends’ across Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, bound together by shared values, open markets and borders, and enhanced cooperation in such areas as research, transport, energy, conflict

32 The fear that terrorists could exploit the container transport system for their ends was confirmed on 18 October 2001 when port authorities in the southern Italian port of Gioia Tauro discovered a stowaway within a shipping container complete with bed, heater, toilet facilities and water. The man had a satellite phone, a lap-top computer, and airport security passes and an airline mechanic’s certificate valid for airports in New York, Newark, Los Angeles and Chicago.
prevention and law enforcement. As we shall see, the strategy of ‘preventive engagement’ encapsulates the European way of dealing with instability, including humanitarian assistance, policing operations, enhancement of the rule of law, economic aid, and if necessary the rapid availability of troops. From Kosovo to Afghanistan, instability has already provoked military responses from European countries. But significant and persistent regional problems in close proximity to the EU, like Moldova, North Africa and the Caucasus demand a proactive policy that so far the EU is not able to provide in a consistent and efficient manner.

Moreover, the nature of Islamist terrorism has different features for Europe. Terrorism is not a new problem. Indeed, EU members have plenty of experience of it. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, terrorist groups such as ETA, the Irish Republican Army, Action Directe, the Red Brigades and the Red Army Faction were active in Europe. Palestinian and Libyan terrorists also carried out attacks in Europe. Because of their desire to win people over to their cause, most were restrained in their willingness to use unlimited violence. As one expert argued, the terrorists wanted ‘many people watching, but not many people dead’. Terrorist campaigns such as those of the IRA and ETA were based mostly on regular but relatively small attacks. Indeed, regularity was part of their strategy. Counter-terrorism experts learned to discern patterns and to profile terrorists. Yet, with hyper-terrorism several new characteristics were revealed.

Recent arrests in Europe show that most suspected terrorists were either legal immigrants, sometimes using loopholes in national legislation to obtain extended stays in European territory, or simply European nationals with legal documents. In these circumstances, it is difficult to monitor people without violating civil liberties. The nature of Islamist groups in Europe has also changed. Several were active before 9/11. Most were associated with a specific cause linked to their countries of origin. For example, the PKK in Germany was related only to the Kurd issue in Turkey, and was not banned until violence was used in Germany in 1993. The FIS and GIA were closely linked to Algeria. In that sense, these groups were not that different from the separatist groups within the European landscape, such as ETA and the IRA. Now, however, Islamist groups in Europe have ceased to use their country of origin as their point of reference, and have instead turned to an idealized and abstract conception of a universal Islam. From diaspora-based movements aimed at nationalist issues, new groups have


turned to an ideological radicalization that takes the form of a transnational Islam divorced from its country of origin. This mechanism is notably at play where a second or third generation of young people have lost their connection with the diaspora. The identification process is not built on specific historical and geographical roots, but rather through the sense of belonging to a universal Umma, the Muslim community. In taking this universalist view of Islam, very few Muslims in Europe appear to have been inspired to mobilize by Middle Eastern conflicts, with the notable recent exception of Iraq. Moreover, terrorism recruitment is a very complex phenomenon, especially in Europe where young radical jihadists seem to be more a product of a Westernized Islam than of traditional Middle Eastern politics. In other words, international terrorism is not a dark feature brought from an outside globalization, it is a product of an inside interdependence. In a word, for Europe, absolute security is even more impossible than for the US.

This characteristic is thus driving a specific approach to counter-terrorism that is largely different than the American war on terror. In the EU terminology, the fight against terrorism encapsulates a comprehensive approach where military action has not the central role. Europeans generally do not support the idea of a 'war on terror', and tend to characterise the American approach as over-reactive and militarily driven. Europeans worry greatly about terrorist bombings on their soil, but many think that the US approach concentrates too much on averting terrorist attacks in the short-term and not enough on the long-term political challenge of militant Islamist terrorism. Terrorism in Europe is a relevant issue for home and justice affairs, not Ministries of Defence. Yet, this approach has

35 Olivier Roy has noted: 'Most radicalized Muslim youth in Europe are western educated, often in technical or scientific fields. Very few come out of traditional madrasa and most experience a period of fully Westernized life, before becoming “born-again Muslims” in European mosques or jails.' Roy Olivier, 'EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?', The National Interest, Spring 2003.

36 There is no active top-down organisational push to increase al-Qaeda’s membership. The pressure came from the bottom up. Sageman Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press 2004.

37 On this difference, see Howard Michael, 'What’s in a Name?: How to Fight Terrorism', Foreign Affairs, January, 2002 / February, 2002; Block Ludo, 'European Counter-Terrorism Culture And Methodology', Terrorism Monitor, Volume 3, Issue 8, April, 2005 and Keohane Daniel, The EU and counter-terrorism, Center for European Reform, May 2005.

38 In November 2004, the EU’s interior and justice ministers, who work together in the justice and home affairs (JHA) council, agreed on a five-year plan known as the 'Hague programme'. The plan covers all aspects of their security and justice co-operation, and is supposed to be implemented by 2010. EU governments have agreed that by 2008 a national police officer will have the right to access information held by law enforcement agencies in
severe limits. First, the willingness of some terrorists to die in their attack blunts the effect of a criminal justice system based on deterrence through punishment and other traditional negotiation methods. Secondly, an al-Qaeda-style terrorist cell is hard to combat with traditional domestic law enforcement. Until they perpetrate their planned attack, terrorists are largely invisible and non-criminal in nature. Although their intent is criminal, their initial activities are probably not. Planning processes are not easily visible to law enforcement agencies. Shifting the burden of proof to intentions rather than hard evidence represents a serious challenge for the judiciary system. Thirdly, coordination efforts among national services and between EU members remain weak.

**The clash over Iraq**

This difference in framing the challenges of globalization between the US and Europe took a dramatic turn with the war in Iraq. Without going into the details of this transatlantic crisis, the divergence behind the war on Iraq are telling examples of divergent perception about globalization of international security. The strategic reasons to wage a preventive war against Iraq seemed evident to the Bush administration. Disarmament, regime change and democracy in the Middle East were reinforcing arguments for the President. Most importantly, it seemed that waging a war became an objective in itself to send to the world a message of strength, credibility and power. The case presented to the international community was however confusing. Generally, the United States tends to colour strategic necessities with an idealistic blend. With Iraq, it was the other way around. Washington shaded its main objective of regime change with strategic motives linked to disarmament and terrorism. Contrary to a basic realist analysis, the White House tended to attribute to Saddam Hussein malicious intentions first and hypothetical capabilities second. Reversing this order of priorities, most Europeans focused on current capabilities, while disregarding past behaviour. They were more or less ready to recognize the remote threat that a nuclear Iraq was likely to pose for the region in the future, but they did not support regime change by force, something that seemed to

(continued)
them too provocative a gesture in a country that had nothing to do with 11 September. In other words, Saddam Hussein was indeed a confirmed liar but ultimately he was not a danger. Precisely because Iraq was a war of choice, not a conflict of necessity, and because military victory was preordained, the debate evolved rapidly from the particular case to general principles, from Saddam’s disarmament to Washington’s use of force, from the opportunity of a UN second resolution to the relevance of the UN itself, from a specific demand of assistance by Turkey to NATO’s raison d’être. Of course, personal diplomacy, or more precisely the lack of it, played an aggravating role and deal opportunities between Europe and the United States were missed. 40

The crisis however was not only transatlantic, it was also intra-European. The Union’s attitude was thus essentially reactive: if it had set out its own definition of ‘material breach’ of Resolution 1441, specified the conditions under which force might be used and laid down a precise timetable for action, it would have been able to foresee events and to strengthen its position in Washington. Instead, EU foreign ministers decided to formally hand over the Iraqi affair to the UN, without addressing the strategic case at hand. By doing so, they in fact gave a free hand to the permanent European members of the UN Security Council, France and Great Britain, i.e., the two countries with the most opposite views vis-à-vis the United States. Not very surprisingly, London and Paris decided to focus on UN legitimacy, while ignoring the European framework. In this configuration, the Union was thus irrelevant. This painful reality contrasted with the ambition expressed at the Convention for a bigger role of the EU in foreign and security policies. The Convention, which began in 2002, was established to prepare for the consequences of the enlargement to 10 new countries poised to become official members by May 2004. Such a big bang

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40 For a detailed review, see Gordon Philip H. and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq, Washington:, Brookings Institution Book, McGraw-Hill, 2004, esp. pp. 155–182. Yet, this account does not mention the near Christmas deal whereby France proposed at the end of December that if the US wanted to go to war, it should do so under Resolution 1441 and not under a second UN Security Council resolution. In that case, the French would agree to disagree. The idea was to go for a Kosovo scenario, where no formal vote would have taken place. True, France, before 1441, was adamant about a two-step process. But by mid-January, Chirac realized that the Americans had already made up their mind. To my knowledge, only Stanley Hoffmann and Anne-Marie Slaughter have mentioned this event in the US. On this episode, see ‘Freedom Fries: The French-American Rift Over Iraq’, 22 May 2003, available at: <http://www.ciaonet.org/special_section/iraq_review/ciao/pi_www_03.pdf>. For a French source, see Cantaloube Thomas et Henri Vernet, Chirac contre Bush : l’autre guerre, Paris, Lattès, 2004. On the transatlantic dimension, see Pond Elizabeth, Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003 and Haine Jean-Yves, Les États-Unis ont-ils besoin d’alliés ?, Paris, Payot, 2004.
increased the diversity of the Union and complicated even further the already arcane decision-making process at the EU level. Building a consensus at 25 could lead the Union into minimal and delayed measures, confusion and inaction. In foreign and security policy, the Union’s Constitution has envisaged several ways for avoiding these pitfalls, notably in proposing the creation of a Union’s Minister for Foreign Affairs who would coordinate national positions and represent the Union abroad. This ambition of a more coherent and active Europe in foreign and security policies contrasted heavily with the display of divisions during the Iraqi crisis.

From a broad perspective, a classic divide ran at the core of the transatlantic community whose main characteristic is the heterogeneity of its members. In the present circumstances, the US is clearly the revisionist power while Europe is mainly a status quo group. European countries gradually absorbed the main result of the end of the Cold war, the peaceful reunification of Europe. In the process, they have to invent a new political body legitimate enough to represent 450 million people but flexible enough to act effectively and efficiently. Their chief problem is currently one of organisation among them. By contrast, the United States has become the revisionist power in the world, mainly because after 11 September it cannot bear the status quo any more. Its chief concern lies in insecurity inside other states. The first gap is as old as international politics, but raises nonetheless significant problems for an alliance, and NATO is no different in that respect. For the status quo powers, it raises the entrapment dilemma where they could be asked to participate in a war that they did not want. For the revisionist actor, it is the opposite, the chain-gang dilemma, where the allies are seen as slowing factors and obstacles to its autonomy. Beyond Iraq, different perception about globalization of security across the Atlantic meant the essential irrelevance of NATO.

41 This classic distinction was first formulated in 1946 by Morgenthau Hans, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946.

42 As R. Haas noted, ‘The countries of the European Union like to work out their differences within certain clear rules. But the rest of the world doesn’t play by those rules. Europe often treats the rest of the world as if it were a candidate for EU enlargement.’ Fidler Stephen, ‘Washington ‘dove’ frustrated by Europe’, Financial Times, 9 March 2003.

At last a strategy, alas not a real one

The European Security Strategy of December 2003 was not a reaction to 9/11, but to the transatlantic divide. As it was the case with Bosnia and Kosovo, the major impetus for change came through the transatlantic lenses. An inward-looking Europe was no longer possible when America was engaged in a global agenda that had serious direct or indirect consequences for the Union. The opening premise of the document ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, is a basic recognition that ‘… the European Union is inevitably a global actor… Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’ 44 In short, the Union could not have postponed its strategic dimension any longer, it could not anymore seem to be a ‘pole of indifference’, especially when the ‘pole of power’, i.e. the United States, was engaged in a global and revolutionary agenda in world affairs. 45

Soft power plus

Originally drafted by Javier Solana, the High Representative for CFSP, the document has two significant characteristics. First, it is a threat-driven document, a dimension never addressed as such by the Union. The document identifies five major threats: international terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, failed states, and organized crime. In such an environment, the Union recognized that the traditional form of defence—territorial line in a Cold War fashion—is a thing of the past. The first line of defence now lies abroad. If this analysis may sound familiar in comparison to the US National Security Strategy of September 2002, the message to Washington is in fact seriously nuanced. First, Europe is at peace, not at war. Even if the possibility of an al-Qaeda attack against the territory of the Union is duly underlined, the document is not a call for arms or an appeal for homeland defence. If the security threats are similar, their management however is not. In the Union’s view, addressing these threats cannot be limited to military force: while not excluding it, the Union intends to take a broader approach, combining the political and the economic, the civil and the military. Regarding terrorism, there will be no effective solution that is not global. Regarding WMD proliferation, strengthening international regimes and progressive conditionality remain the best toll to counter proliferation. Without excluding the use of force, the Union clearly rejects a strategy of preventive

44 European Security, A secure Europe in a better world, Brussels, December 2003.
strike. Lastly, while the Union recognises that ‘failed’ or failing states—not ‘rogue’, a category that does not exist in EU terminology—is a major source of instability, it advocates the extension of good governance rather than regime change. Briefly put, for the Union, the world is indeed more dangerous, but it is also more complex.47

Second, the strategy builds on the Union’s *acquis* and identity in security policy, i.e. the heritage of the end of the Cold War and from the Balkan wars. It is based on three pillars—extending the zone of security around Europe, strengthening the international order and countering the abovementioned threats—and two key concepts—‘preventive engagement’ and ‘effective multilateralism’. The first refers to the Union’s approach to stability and nation-building which is far more comprehensive than the military method favoured by Washington. It includes police personnel—the Union has a reserve of 5000 police force that could be sent abroad—, civil administration and civil protection officials and civilian authorities and justice officers to strengthen the rule of law. In that respect, five member states have recently agreed to set up a European gendarmerie, that will be able to conduct peace-keeping operations that do not require the advanced skills of soldiers but are too dangerous for NGOs. According to the French Defence Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, who sponsored the project, ‘in all crises, the purely military phase is systematically followed by a civilian-military phase where the aspect of maintaining order becomes

46 In a declaration agreed in May, the Union has set up its strategy vis-à-vis WMD proliferation: ‘Political and diplomatic preventative measures (multilateral treaties and export control regimes) and resort to the competent international organizations (IAEA, OPCW, etc.) form the first line of defence. When these measures (including political dialogue and diplomatic pressure) have failed, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) could be envisioned. The UN Security Council should play a central role.’ Available at: <http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76328.pdf>.

47 A report by a Group of Personalities for the European Commission, *Research for a Secure Europe*, recently commented: ‘These threats are more diverse, less visible and less predictable than those Europe faced during the Cold War… They can evolve rapidly. They may or may not include a military dimension, are often asymmetric, and can threaten the security of Member States both from outside and inside EU territory. In general, these threats are multi-faceted and interrelated… Since current threats ignore national borders and can damage European interests at home and abroad, the distinction between external and internal security becomes increasingly blurred… Military instruments can and do play a role, but in most cases intelligence, police, judicial, economic, financial, scientific and diplomatic means will be at least as important.’ *Research for a Secure Europe*, Report of the Group of Personalities in the Field of Security Research, European Communities 2004.
increasingly important. The idea is to bridge the gap between military and civilian EU peace-keeping operations and to provide the EU or any other international force with a military police force, specialised in crisis management. This strategy of ‘preventive engagement’ encapsulates the European way of dealing with instability that includes rapid deployment of troops, humanitarian assistance, policing operations, enhancement of the rule of law and economic aid. There lies the Union’s added value and a specific know-how, a dimension that is lacking in the US arsenal where, as Condoleezza Rice once said, 82nd Airborne soldiers are not supposed to help kids go to kindergarten. European troops do. This US weakness is Europe’s strength.

The second concept—‘effective multilateralism’—captures the essence of the Union’s ruled-based security culture. The security strategy stresses that ‘the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.’ Having suffered more than any continent from domination attempts by one actor against the others, from what was called universal monarchy and balance of power politics, secret diplomacy and the major wars that followed, the Union is keen to stress the core fundamental values of the UN charter based on the sovereignty of its units and the legitimacy of collective action. Because the true meaning of international norms and rules lies in the definition of what is and what is not permissible in the international arena, the Union reaffirms that, as a matter of principles, the UN Security Council should remain the forum for legitimizing the use of force. But it recognizes that rules also need enforcement. ‘We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.’ The ‘effectiveness’ element implies that in emergency situations immediate actions are not always compatible with a formal application of international public law. The Kosovo precedent and the Iraqi preventive war are the unwritten references of what is allowed and what is not. Yet, between June and December 2003, the compromise found between the English insistence on ‘effective’ policies and German traditional interest to UN multilateralism shifted to Berlin’s advantage. This change is partly due to the new enthusiasm of France towards the UN, partly to European public opinion preference for UN legitimacy.

48 This European Gendarmerie Force will consist of 800 men, based in Italy, and should be deployable on the ground within a maximum of 30 days. It should be operational by end 2005.

The limits of European strategic ambitions

Beyond the wording of the European security strategy, the reality of Europe as a strategic actor is quite different that the practice of the United States. Europe paid just lip service to the spread of democracy. By opposing regime change, it underlines the pre-eminence of stability over democratisation. By refusing pre-emption, it relies on diplomacy and preventive engagement to solve international crises. By stressing effective multilateralism, the Union relies more on international institutions than on its own capacity for actions. Even in this narrow role, the Union’s strategic ambitions are severely limited for several reasons.

First, there is no real consensus on how to respond to the challenges of globalization. The common denominator for EU external action remains humanitarian challenge. As stated in the European Union’s paper for the United Nations High-level Panel:

[T]he actual or threatened failure of state institutions is a matter of concern to the entire international community. While the primary responsibility for preventing the failure of institutions lies with the sovereign governments in question, the EU believes that when governments are unwilling or unable to meet their responsibilities in this regard, the attendant risks can most effectively be addressed through early and determined multilateral engagement with the government or regime in question, initially on issues of governance, economic management and human rights, and then, should it prove necessary, through coercive means, including, as a last resort, the legitimate authorisation of military intervention. In cases where there is a serious risk of large-scale loss of life, ethnic cleansing and acts amounting of genocide, the responsibility of the international community to intervene, in accordance with international law, to protect human life and dignity, security and peace, is particularly strong.50

Yet, when an actual genocide did occur, the capacity of the Union to act is limited. The recent case of the Darfur tragedy is a telling example of the gap between rhetoric and actions.

Leaving aside this moral duty to protect and to ensure ‘human security’, the reference to ‘failing states’ in the European Security Strategy is generic and not very well related to security risks. The Strategy says:


In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand... Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world-wide: their activities in central or southeast Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. However, it does not spell out exactly in what way regional problems foment ‘new threats’ that endanger the security of European citizens and therefore require responses. The case of Afghanistan did show that weak or collapsed states could be safe havens for terrorist groups. But it is not clear why a failed state is more a threat than a relatively stable authoritarian regime. The record shows that for terrorism, a country like Morocco is far more ‘dangerous’ than a country like Somalia. If Somalia was used as a transhipment point or safe haven by terrorists attacks against Western targets, a truly failed state, as Somalia clearly is, is not an ideal environment for a terrorist group. Terrorist networks, like mafias, appear to flourish where states are governed badly, rather than not at all. The lawlessness of a collapsed state increases terrorists vulnerability to the most common crimes of chaos, kidnapping, extortion, blackmail and assassination. By contrast, a stable monarchy like Morocco was a fertile ground for terrorist recruits. After the Madrid bombing, Spanish authorities discovered several al-Qaeda affiliated cells composed mainly of Moroccans. One cell, made up mostly of Moroccans and Algerians, came together in late 2002 and early 2003 with the goal of committing terrorist attacks against Western targets. Yet such configuration is not taken into account per se, only through national counter-terrorism measures. In this respect, stability remains the first priority.

Second, the European institutional adaptation for an active role has reached its limits. Without even mentioning the precarious exercise of the ratification of the Constitution, from a security point of view, the precarious balance between small and large states and between the Commission and the Council put a premium on national diplomacy and policies to the detriment of EU cohesion. Moreover, with the new 10 countries, 75 million people who have lived under Soviet domination now join the ‘old’ Europe. These countries have a different, if not divergent, security culture and heritage. They tend to consider that ‘old threats’ from the Cold War are more important than the ‘new’ threats from 9/11. Moreover, some members are still officially neutral, some have barely an army while others have a nuclear deterrent and world influence. The sheer heterogeneity of the Union’s members means that decisions in foreign and defence policy are extremely difficult to take. The voice of Europe is more often than not diluted in a multiplicity of national diplomatic solos that seem cacophonous if not inconsistent. By its very nature, the Union will remain for the

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foreseeable future a very peculiar strategic actor who ultimately has to delegate the decision to use force to national government. 53 This specific constraint means that a security strategy will first of all remain a mirror of the lowest common denominator among member states or an endeavour decided by the big Three. Moreover, the shadow of the Iraqi crisis and the Tervueren controversy is still haunting the Union decision-making process. In other words, local competition for status is far more important than required adaptation to global challenges. In the current context, an essential glue of this endeavour is crucially lacking, i.e. the loyalty to the Union in A. Hirshman’s sense. For the foreseeable future, the internal dimension of the EU will remain more important than its external responsibilities. In that sense, the Union is still an inward-looking group of states.

Third, the precarious balance between realism and idealism is not resolved inside the Union. Of course, every foreign policy initiative contains both dimensions, and there is always a fake antagonism between these two poles. Nonetheless, for the Union, these two dimensions represent national sensitivities. The risks of disagreements and divisions inside the Union are thus real. For example, the deliberately vague notion of ‘preventive’ engagement carries a message of a more proactive Europe but at the same time, it solemnly echoed UN principles. If humanitarian tasks are obvious examples of uncontroversial preventive actions, a UN mandate is not deemed as an obligation since for the intervention in Kosovo—perceived as legitimate by a majority of EU members. However, some European countries have introduced the concept of pre-emption in their doctrinal thinking and their official doctrine. 54 So it seems odd that the wording ‘pre-emption’ was ultimately changed. Behind this debate lies the old controversy about UN Article 51 range of application and the elusive notion of immediate danger. A crucial test of this latent controversy about the use of force, among Europeans as well as vis-à-vis the United States, will come sooner than later in the case of Iran’s willingness to acquire nuclear weapons. The new assertiveness of the Union regarding the Iranian nuclear programme was a good indicator of the progress achieved. The point however is that there is no consensus about the use of force in the Union. The consequence is that Europe by and large remains a status-quo oriented international actor.

53 As noted by Fr. Heisbourg, ‘The EU cannot have a proper security strategy as long as decisions on the use of force rest in the hands of its member governments.’ Heisbourg François, ‘The “European Security Strategy” is not a security strategy’, in Everts Steven and al., A European Way of War, Center for European Reform, 2004, p. 28.

54 France has recognized the concept of pre-emption in her last Loi de Programmation militaire.
Fourth, military capabilities are not shaped for a more active role of Europe, being regional or global. As far as the Union is concerned, its incapacity to reform its defence structure is well known. ESDP capabilities are still lagging behind. The original objective set at Helsinki, up to 60,000 troops deployable within 60 days, has not been met. It is true however that a significant number of European troops are deployed all over the world for national, EU, NATO or UN missions. The point was to offer at the disposal of the Union a reserve of forces, not additional hating on national forces. Several problems have plagued the Helsinki Headline Goal. First, it was merely a quantitative target designed after the Bosnian experience, and therefore, ill-suited to today’s new strategic imperatives. Second, it was just a catalogue of forces, only a tiny percentage of which were actually rapidly deployable. Third, if deficiencies were identified, there were no real incentives to remedy them. Efforts on capabilities had to shift from the quantitative to the qualitative. In other words, a very brief overview of ESDP capabilities efforts demonstrates that the Union is process-oriented rather than actual outputs focused.

One of the last EU initiative reveals this new priority. The Battle-Group initiative, a direct result of the Artemis operations in Congo in 2003, is based on a ‘quick-in, quick-out’ capability to restore order, especially in Africa. It would be done so ‘explicitly but not exclusively’ under a UN Security Council mandate. In the second stage, African peace-keepers are supposed to take on. This strategy of quick-fixing and devolution is however difficult to put in practice: it is not obvious at all why battle-groups would be the adequate force package for such operations; entry force will not be that quick, especially with current strategic lift; exit may be delayed by many months and the African Union would not likely be able to come up with sufficient peace-keepers afterwards. Today in Congo, the UN mission has about 16,000 members, making it the largest of the organization’s peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the political consensus in Europe for an African role is in fact limited as the passivity in Darfur has revealed all too clearly. The efficiency of the Battle-Group concept will however depends on the actual transformation of European security forces. Military transformation in Europe means essentially two things. The first is the end of conscription and the strategic culture of territorial defence. Conscription is still in place in many countries, heavy infantry units are still far too numerous, obsolete

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55 Battle groups of 1,500 troops, including support and service support elements, represent a more flexible force package capable of higher-intensity operations. Deployable within 5 days, they will be fully manned, equipped and trained, and have sufficient strategic lift assets. Member states have committed themselves to deliver 13 of them by 2007, with 9 of them being multinational, including Norway. This new target of nearly 20,000 men amounts to a third of the previous headline goal.
equipment overabundant, strategic lift still lacking. This aspect demands first and foremost political will and strategic clarity. For now, in a majority of European countries, both are lacking. The second aspect is the actual transformation process to introduce modern warfare techniques into European forces. The lack of adequate capabilities severely restricts the room of manoeuvre in any escalation scenario. Effective C4ISR capabilities are an absolute requirement in that respect. Currently in Europe, only a handful of countries have started to introduce Network Centric Enabled capabilities in their arsenal, notably France and the United Kingdom. The chief obstacle in this effort is not the availability of European technology; it is the level of defence budget. Transformation is about spending better and more efficiently, which means on the short term spending more. Yet, any increase in defence budget is a political non-starter in most European countries. For now, in any hostile environment, the risks of casualties and the range of acceptable collateral damages remain too high. This led inevitably to a risk-averse Europe.

Last but not least, the relationship with Washington remains the key political variable in the recent strategic awakening of Europe to the challenges of globalization. The ESS was first and foremost a political document aimed at bridging the gap inside European members but most importantly with the United States. As it was the case with the Balkans crisis, the new security globalization after 9/11 was seen firstly through the eyes of Washington. The crisis in Iraq has clearly revealed that positioning towards the United States was more important than the strategic case of Iraq. Bandwagoning, balancing, hiding were determined not on the merit of the case at hand, but regarding affinities or defiance vis-à-vis Washington. This is not surprising regarding the history of dependency of Europe to the United States. Every European member, small or large, wants to cultivate its own special relationship with the United States. The coordination of the diplomatic services of EU members as well as the reinforcement of the EU representation in Washington could dramatically enhance the influence of Europe, provided of course that the administration is also ready and willing to engage and to listen. But this a step that most European


countries do not want to implement. In other words, the Union as a forum ceases to exist once Washington is involved. The hegemonic stability influence that the dominant power has projected to Europe has left an important heritage that was difficult to break. Europe is obsessed with America, and tends to see world problems through Washington’s lenses. To put it briefly, for America 9/11 has changed the world, for Europe it has changed America. In that sense, the strategic awakening of Europe is still myopic.

NATO in a globalized world?

Europe may be more strategically conscious but it remains stability focused, inward-looking, process-oriented and risk-averse. On the other hand, for the US, the experience of spreading democracy by force has been far more difficult than previously assessed by the neo-conservatives. War-fighting capabilities were not easily transferable to peace-keeping and state-building efforts; the costs in human and economic terms of the occupation became rapidly exorbitant; the going alone policy weakened the US international position. Despite the success of the Iraqi election of 30 January 2005, Washington continues to face a Vietnam-like dilemma: the more it acts, the more it is likely to provoke opposition. Moreover, the heartland constituency of President Bush is not primarily interested in foreign affairs and calls for a progressive withdrawal are likely to increase. The last six months have seen a departure from the most radical and revolutionary neoconservative ideas, yet paradoxically spreading democracy has become the only rationale for waging the war of choice against Iraq. With the re-engagement into NATO politics in Istanbul in June, and the President’s trip in Germany and in Brussels, there was a clear willingness to build new bridges with traditional allies. If the Presidential rhetoric has not changed, as it was clear at the last State of the Union address, the new emphasis on diplomacy has signalled however a significant adjustment in its strategic outlook. With the traditional Kissinger-Scowcroft type of realists back at the top of the administration, policy options vis-à-vis Iran or the Israeli-Palestinian peace process have been reassessed. In other words, a U-turn in doctrine is unlikely, but a shift in practice did occur.

With a more strategically conscious Europe and a more pragmatic America, conditions should be set for a more constructive transatlantic partnership. To achieve it, shared strategic assessments, mutually reinforcing capabilities and

59 As an example, the coverage of the last US President election in Europe was unprecedented. Yet, a far more important Ukrainian Presidential election was hold in the same time, with no interest from Europe.
fulfilled commitments on common missions are necessary preconditions. Yet, the changing nature of NATO has to be recognized. Compare to the 1990s, it seems that transatlantic relations have lost their specificity. Transatlantic affairs have radically changed in the sense that they mirror agreements and disagreements about the world order rather than expressing mutual interests. It took ten years to transform the Alliance from collective defence to collective security. Unity was a necessity in the first framework, a condition for action in the second. Some scholars like Kissinger may regret the loss of this special partnership, but precisely because NATO went global, agreements about world order are a necessary precondition for the functioning of the Alliance. Since global politics determines the level of the transatlantic partnership, it is manifest that the US and Europe cannot agree on everything everywhere, precisely because the determinants are no longer limited to a specific problem. If it is unrealistic to expect complete agreement, it is also unrealistic to refuse common actions because of disagreements on a specific issue. Where the former do exist, the latter cannot become an obstacle for common efforts. In short, the transatlantic community must learn how to disagree.

Conversely, Europe must learn how to agree. In this respect, globalization challenges are diversely perceived throughout Europe. The specific approach of enlargement has in fact changed the main foundations of the European project. Internal competition, openness and closure to economic globalization, the rebirth of nationalism brought the war in Iraq, the national priorities produced by the 9/11 and 11/3 attacks and the domestic crises in several key European countries will likely put the Union into a long and difficult introspective exercise. The current crisis runs the risk to push the Union to the point of strategic oblivion.
Changing Perceptions
about the Utility of Force
in a Globalizing World

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Introduction

The American-led Iraq war that began in 2003 has generated intense discussion about when it is legitimate to use force and what force can effectively accomplish. Often this debate is portrayed as a breakdown in consensus, with the US charting a new unilateralist course that undermines existing multilateral understandings of how force should be used. Often, too, the debate is portrayed as a transatlantic one in which Europeans (notably France, supported by Germany) are leading the multilateralist defence against growing US unilateralism.

Both portrayals are overblown and simplistic. While the US is resisting current multilateral rules in some spheres, it is actively promoting more and more intrusive rules in others (e.g. trade) Further, the US has usually opposed multilateral rules it does not like, not with unilateralism, but with alternative forms of multilateralism. This has been true even of an administration as suspicious of the existing multilateral rules as the current Bush administration. Thus, if the UN will not approve military action in Kosovo, the US goes through NATO (under Clinton). If the US thinks the NPT is not working, it works through the Nuclear Suppliers Group or sets up a Proliferation Security Initiative (under Bush). Similarly, the perception of a large ‘transatlantic gap’ in allies’ attitudes toward use of force is overstated. There has been transatlantic

* I am grateful to participants in the European University Institute’s workshop on ‘Globalization and Transnational Security’, particularly to Chiara de Franco, for helpful comments. Remaining errors are, of course, my own.
agreement on many uses of force in recent years. Europeans were active participants in the 1991 Gulf war, with the French among those patrolling the no-fly zone in Iraq in the years after the war, and the Kosovo action was supported by all members of NATO. The ‘gap’ in the Kosovo case was not a transatlantic one, but a gap between the transatlantic alliance and Russia.

Current debates over use of force look less like a fight between unilateralism and multilateralism than a fight over what, exactly multilateralism means and what the shared rules that govern use of force are (or should be). Similarly, the gap in views on use of force is not only, or perhaps even primarily, a transatlantic one. There are many gaps in views on this question, gaps within Europe, gaps within the US, gaps across the international system. This is hardly an unusual state of affairs in world politics. Disagreements about when force should be used and can be used effectively are the norm, not the exception, historically. The more interesting questions for us as analysts are: what, exactly, are these disagreements about and how deep do they run since it is only by understanding these that we can assess prospects for cooperation on shared goals.

To begin to answer some of these questions this paper explores the contours of contemporary disagreements on uses of force to identify some of the most relevant disagreements on use of force issues. Geographically, this brief survey identifies four important gaps and discusses some of the issues driving them. I then offer some conceptual tools for thinking about why these gaps exist and what is fuelling these arguments. Much of the disagreement about use of force can be understood as relating to two broad problems. One is the nature of multilateral rules and the ways they accommodate power. While multilateral rules are broadly accepted, actors disagree strongly about what they mean and what they require, particularly in the face of huge power asymmetries. Second, and related, actors often frame arguments about the legitimacy of force as if it were divorced from effectiveness and vice versa. Legitimacy and effectiveness are deeply intertwined. Understanding how this is so potentially offers some ways to reframe conversations in a more productive way.

Gaps, gaps, everywhere: disagreements about use of force

Harmonized, much less unison, world opinion about exactly when and how force should be used has been hard to come by over the centuries. Contemporary politics is not unusual in its discord on this topic. Episodes of widespread support for force, such as we saw in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, are as unusual as the 9/11 terrorist provocation for that action. Most uses of military force by most states are controversial among at least some parties. In contemporary politics I see at least four ‘gaps’ or ongoing disagreements about use of force issues that have the potential to shape global
norms in significant ways. In addition to a transatlantic gap, there is an intra-
Europe gap, and intra-US gap, and at least one large global gap between the
world’s biggest states (US, China, India, maybe Russia) and others.

**Gap 1: the transatlantic gap**

Disagreements between the US and its European allies over when force should
be used are hardly new. They existed even during the Cold War. The Suez crisis,
for example, rivals the recent Iraq crisis in the depth of anger and distrust it
created within the alliance, particularly between the Americans and the French,
but with some roles curiously reversed. In that case, ironically, it was the
Europeans using force against a sovereign state, bypassing the Security Council,
and the US that took the matter to the UN. After the Cold War, serious
disagreements began to surface in the mid-1990s, over the issue of how to deal
with threats from what Americans called ‘rogue’ states, specifically Cuba, Iran,
Iraq, Libya, North Korea. (Lake, 1994) Iraq, in particular, was a focal point
because of the ongoing need to manage that sanctions regime. By the mid-1990s,
both sides agreed that sanctions were unlikely to bring down the Saddam
Hussein’s regime or radically change his policies but could not agree on an
alternative approach. Europeans were inclined toward policies of engagement;
Americans, in this case supported by Britain, were much more willing to use
coercion and did so, for example in Operation Desert Fox, sparking protests
from the French and others. 2 The initial result of the 11 September attacks was
to paper over this split. NATO invoked Article V within hours and the biggest
problem faced initially by the allies was that the Europeans wanted to send more
troops to Afghanistan than Washington was prepared to accept. (Gordon and
Shapiro, 2004: 2)

Differences arising from the US war against Iraq are obviously much more
complex that I can deal with here, but in basic contour they boil down to some
common types of disagreement. Americans perceived a much more serious
threat from Iraq than did France or Germany; Americans are more able to use
force to address problems and more willing to do so; Americans, and the Bush
Administration in particular were much less confident in the ability of non-
forceful tools, such as UN weapons inspectors, to protect them from threats.

1 Anthony Lake, Clinton’s National Security Council Advisor, initially termed these ‘backlash
states’.

2 For more on the UK role, why it sided with the US in this controversy and what it might mean
for evolving norms on force, see Grey 2002.
These three issues—threat perception, power capabilities, and effectiveness of multilateral institutions—have shaped the transatlantic debate.

These differences show up, not just in government policy but in public opinion.

- American publics are more willing than Europeans to use military force for a variety of purposes: to prevent a terrorist attacks, stop nuclear proliferation, defend a NATO ally.\(^3\)

- While Europeans and Americans generally agree in their assessments of major threats, Americans believe they are more likely to be the target of a terror attack.\(^4\)

- Fifty-four percent of Americans agree with the proposition that the best way to ensure peace is through military strength; only 28% of Europeans do.

- Seventy-two percent of Europeans believe the war in Iraq has increased the threat of terrorism; only forty-nine percent of Americans share this view. However 26% of Americans believe the war in Iraq has decreased the threat of terrorism; only 5% of Europeans agree.

- Eight-two percent of Americans believe that under some conditions, force is necessary to obtain justice; only 41% of Europeans agree.\(^5\)

- When asked about power capabilities, 71% of Europeans believe the EU should become a superpower like the United States. However, only 47% withdraw that support if superpower status requires greater expenditure.\(^6\)

- Fifty-nine percent of Americans believe it is justified to bypass the United Nations when vital interests of their country are involved, although 44% of Europeans also agreed with this statement about their countries.\(^7\) However majorities in both the US and Europe believe international approval of

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\(^5\) *Transatlantic Trends 2004*, p. 11.

\(^6\) *Transatlantic Trends 2004*, p. 6.

\(^7\) *Transatlantic Trends 2004*, p. 13.
some kind would be essential before using military force in a future Iraq-like situation.\textsuperscript{8}

\textbf{Gap 2: the intra-European gap}

While there are clear transatlantic differences on the use of force, there are also important differences within the European Union that have become clear, not only in the dispute over Iraq but in the efforts to negotiate a common security and defence policy. Governments differ, with Britain and many of the eastern countries having different approaches than France, Germany, and the Nordics. They have differed both in their willingness (also ability) to project force, but also in their view of the appropriate relationship among multilateral institutions projecting force. Blair has had a much more globalist view of force projection than has France, for example, and Britain’s policies toward CSDP and NATO, toward procurement, and general willingness to deploy have reflected this view. (Howorth 2003–04)

Public also differ, both across countries and from their governments, in their views on appropriate use of force.

- When asked whether war is sometimes necessary to secure justice, support ranged from 69\% in the UK and 53\% in Netherlands to 25\% in Spain.
- Only 24\% of Poles approve of their government’s deployment of troops in Iraq; 28\% of Portuguese and 21\% of Slovenians similarly disapprove of their own deployments. By contrast, Dutch approval is 58\%.\textsuperscript{9}
- Europeans are divided over whether it is justified to bypass the UN when vital interests are at stake. While 44\% believe bypassing would be justified, 49\% disagree. Differences between European countries are significant, ranging from 58\% of Dutch supporting such a bypass to only 37\% of Italians.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{Gap 3: the intra-American gap}

The 2004 US election revealed deep splits in the American public on many issues between what have colloquially become known as the ‘red’ and ‘blue’ factions of

\textsuperscript{8} Transatlantic Trends 2004, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{10} Transatlantic Trends 2004.
the country. ‘Polarized’, is the word often used in the press to describe US opinion, and use of force issues are among the most polarizing.

- Public attitudes on national security issues have become more strongly associated with party affiliation than they were in the late 1990s when these issues barely registered as correlates of partisanship. Now, they are twice as likely as economic or social issues to shape party identification.  

- Increasing numbers of Republicans believe that military strength, rather than good diplomacy, is the best way to ensure peace. The percentage endorsing diplomacy as the better strategy has dropped from 46% in 1999 to 32% in 2004. Views among Democrats are shifting in the opposite direction. In the 1990s roughly 60% of Democrats endorsed diplomacy as the best way to ensure peace; that figure rose to 76% in 2004.

- Americans overall are cautiously supportive of at least the occasional use of force against countries that may seriously threaten but have not attacked the US (60%) but views vary strongly with party affiliation. Conservatives support such preemptive force by margins ranging from 69–89%. Democrats oppose it by margins of 54–67%.

- Republicans are much less likely than Democrats to believe that UN approval is required before using force (26% to versus 81%) although 46% of Republicans believe it is essential to secure approval from European allies; 77% of Democrats share this belief.

- Americans continue to be split, largely on party lines, about whether the war in Iraq was the right decision. Conservatives support it by margins of 72–94%; Democrats oppose by 61–87%. Overall, 49% say it was the right decision; 44% say it was the wrong choice.

- A strong majority supports a wider role for the UN and believes the United States should be more willing to take decisions to the UN even if

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14 Transatlantic Trends 2004, p. 27.
that means the US will have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice.\textsuperscript{16} However, partisanship colours these views. Democrats view strengthening the UN as a higher foreign policy priority than do Republican (89–53%). Party leaders are more split. Ninety percent of Democratic leaders agreed that strengthening the UN should be an important policy goal: only 43% of Republican leaders did and 55% opposed it.\textsuperscript{17}

Institutions of the US government are not split the way the public is. While the presidential election was decided on a 51–48% vote, Republicans control both the executive and legislative branches. The recent election returned the Bush administration for another term and increased Republican majorities in both houses of Congress. Further, Republican leaders have stronger partisan views than the public generally.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, unlike the EU, internal splits in the US have not influenced policy in marked ways in recent years, however they suggest caution when projecting current policies into the future.

**Gap 4: global splits**

The transatlantic community is hardly the sole arbiter of global norms on use of force. Other states have strong views on these questions and have been able to make those views felt on a variety of issues. Both China and Russia have been critical of transatlantic enthusiasm for use of force to accomplish various humanitarian missions. Both fear, with some reason, that making human rights violations a legitimate excuse for external military intervention will cause problems for them in places like Tibet, Taiwan, and Chechnya. The Chinese have been particularly vocal in their opposition to what they view as attempts to limit state sovereignty on humanitarian grounds.\textsuperscript{19} Developing countries like India and Pakistan argue strongly that the current nuclear regime, as embodied in the NPT, is an unfair attempt by the nuclear ‘haves’ to keep the ‘have-nots’


\textsuperscript{19} See, for example, <http://ee.china-embassy.org/eng/zggk/zxgwjjs/t110315.htm>; <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjjg/gis/gizzyhy/2594/2602/t15218.htm> for Chinese arguments about the Kosovo intervention.
down. Failure of the ‘haves’ to reduce their nuclear arsenals as stipulated in the


treaty have compounded resentment as became glaringly obvious during the


recent negotiations over NPT renewal. Debates over the International Criminal

Court also reveal global ‘gaps’. While the US has been painted as the chief

obstructionist in transatlantic debates over the ICC, it has important company in

China, India, and Russia, none of which has ratified the treaty.20 The fact that the

ICC treaty negotiations bypassed the UN Security Council—the body held up by

many ICC supporters in other fora as the necessary arbiter of legitimacy—raises

some interesting questions about the role of multilateral institutions in

legitimizing use of force issues. How multilateral can the ICC be if it bypassed the

Security Council and four of the world’s biggest states? (van Oudenaren 2003)

Global opinion surveys show very strong support for the United Nations

generally but also strong support for UN reforms, particularly for adding new

members to the Security Council. Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil receive the

most support. Publics in most countries also support modifications to the UN

veto. Among 23 countries surveyed, publics in all but two supported the idea of

allowing the Security Council to override the veto of a permanent member. Publics in permanent member states were reminded that their own country

would lose the absolute veto. They were asked if they would support a rules

change such that ‘if a decision were supported by all other members, no one

member, not even (your country), could veto the decision.’ Interestingly, 57% of

Americans polled favoured giving up the absolute veto; 56% of Britons, and a

plurality (48%) of Chinese agreed (36% opposed). Overall, citizens in 21 countries

favoured such a rules change (16 by majorities, 5 by pluralities). Citizens in only

two countries were not supportive: France and Russia. The French were evenly

divided (44% in favour, 43% opposed); Russians were weakly opposed (25% in

favour, 29% opposed with 46% not answering).21

Disagreements about use of force issues are thus far more complex than a

simply transatlantic divide. Divisions exist concerning the appropriate goals of

force (for example, whether it can be used to secure justice or humanitarian

protection), whether multilateral authorization is required and if so, by what

body (the UN or NATO), and whether it is effective (for example whether it will

deter proliferators or reduce terrorism). The remainder of the paper offers two

arguments that might help us think about these differences conceptually. First, I

examine debates over multilateralism and argue that controversy is best

understood, not as a debate over unilateralism versus multilateralism, but as a


21 BBC WorldPoll, 22 March 2005,

debate over what the multilateral rules should be and specifically how they should accommodate power disparities. Second and related, I explore debates over legitimacy of use of force and how legitimacy might be related to effectiveness. Debates about the UN, for example, often turn on whether its procedures will actually work—whether they will bring about the results members say they want. Effectiveness is not irrelevant to legitimacy, and I explore how this interplay might operate.

**Multilateralism**

Much of the literature on globalization treats it an economic and technological phenomenon. Globalization is understood to be about growing interdependence as markets develop worldwide scope and technologies reduce the transaction costs formerly created by distance. However, globalization also has an ideational and normative component. Values and cultural norms diffuse along with markets and technology. Multilateralism is one such norm of international behaviour that has successfully ‘gone global’ with sweeping results. It pervades virtually all aspects of international politics, including use of force. 22

Much of the current debate about use of force has centred around the issues of multilateralism and rule-following. The unprecedented power disparities that now exist between the US and all other states, coupled with a variety of policy moves by American administrations in the last decade, have given rise to fears of US unilateralism—fears of a US that increasingly ‘goes it alone’ and does not play by the multilateral rules that have been developed since 1945.

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What, exactly, is multilateralism and how would we know it if we saw it? In the scholarly literature, multilateralism is generally understood to have two dimensions, one quantitative, the other one qualitative. Multilateralism entails acting in concert with two or more other states. This much is obvious just from the semantics. If unilateralism is acting alone then logically, multilateralism must be acting with others. By implication, too, the more others one acts with, the more multilateral the action and states often boast about the number of partners in their action as proof of its legitimacy and multilateral character. The Bush administration, for example, has been quick to mention the 30-odd countries involved in the 2003 Iraq action and takes pains to discuss its actions there as acts of ‘a coalition’.

However, multilateralism is more than a numbers game. If it were only that, ‘coalitions of the willing’ would be perfectly acceptable as would action by groups of countries most of whose participation is completely symbolic either because they are too small, too weak, or too unwilling to contribute significantly. Multilateralism is more than just concerted action with some number of partners. Those partners have to act in particular ways, specifically they have to acting according to some set of generalized rules or principles. Contemporary multilateralism implies a relationship among partners that is based on rules rather than simple power. Those rules, norms, principles apply regardless of power capabilities, individual country interests, or convenience of circumstances. It is this qualitative dimension of multilateralism makes is a distinct form of political action.

Since 1945 and particularly since 1989, multilateralism has become an increasingly important guiding principle for legitimate political action. An enormous, and increasingly powerful, multilateral trade architecture has grown up around general free trade principles, notably the principle of according ‘most-favoured nation status’ multilaterally, to all members of a trade group. Multilateral rules have also mushroomed in the area of use of force. Multilateral

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laws of war have become more elaborate and more widely recognized. Multilateral treaties on arms control have proliferated now exist in many flavours—nuclear, biological, chemical, missiles, landmines. Deployments of force through and by multilateral organizations have increased in number and size.

However multilateralism has a couple of features that are notable for our purposes. First, multilateralism entails some degree of great power restraint. Within a multilateral arrangement Great Powers cannot do just anything they want. They restrain themselves to conform with the generally accepted rules of the multilateral structure. Second, and related, multilateralism entails an odd form of equality. Multilateral action is governed by general, impersonal rules. These rules apply to everyone equally. Big states, little states—they all have to play by the same set of rules.

These two features—Great Power restraint and equality under the rules—are an important part of what legitimates multilateral arrangements and make them broadly popular, particularly with publics and smaller states. However, it would be a mistake to think that Great Power acquiescence to multilateral rules is altruism of any kind. Strong states restrain themselves and play by multilateral rules out of self-interest. After all, Great Powers usually get to write the rules in these multilateral arrangements, and they write rules that on balance benefit themselves. The US, for example, has written, many of the free trade rules and, as a strong economy, benefits disproportionately from that regime. Similarly, the US was an original author of the UN Charter and gave itself a veto in doing so. Despite this, weaker states often value the predictability in Great Power behaviour that comes with rule-governed behaviour, even if those rules favour the strong. This combination of utility and legitimacy has contributed to multilateralism’s rapid spread in the past 50 years.

True unilateralism, in the sense of acting alone and ignoring others, is not a viable policy for most states most of the time. It is not a viable policy for the United States. In addition to its normative legitimacy, multilateralism is useful. Functionally, states simply cannot do the things they want to do unilaterally. They cannot have a robust economy unilaterally. They cannot protect themselves against proliferating nuclear weapons unilaterally. They cannot accomplish the complex work of running a modern country without the regularity, predictability, and coordination provided by multilateral rules.

However, the rise of multilateralism and rule-based behaviour does not eliminate disagreement—far from it. Actors in any rules-based system, domestic or international, argue constantly about what the rules are, what they should be, and what they mean for behaviour in any particular situation. Much of the transatlantic debate has taken this form. For example, in the Iraq crisis, much turned on issues like what constituted ‘material breach’ of UN resolutions and what was meant by ‘serious consequences’. The US use of alternative
multilateral fora (NATO instead of the UN, NSG or PSI instead of NPT or IAEA) is revealing. An argument that says, ‘I won’t play by the rules’ is a political loser. It is much more palatable and effective politically to fight rules with rules and argue, ‘I am playing by the rules; they just aren’t your rules, and your rules are wrong (or ineffective).’ Two issues in particular lie beneath much of the debate we see. The first concerns the ways in which multilateral rules do (or do not) accommodate power disparities. The second concerns the effectiveness of current rules.

Accommodating power disparities

One frequent source of friction in debates over use of force is the huge disparities in states’ ability to project force. Everybody playing by the same rules concerning use of force sounds lovely, but if, as a practical matter, only a few states can wield force effectively the rules need to come to some accommodation of those states, both as necessary enforcers of rules and as possible threats to others. Much of the debate in the ‘gaps’ described earlier hinges on this issue. The US has been explicit that its unique power projection abilities and worldwide military presence creates unique concerns evidenced, for example, in its elaborate system of bilateral agreements to protect its military personnel from foreign or ICC prosecution. Others, notably France, have been articulate about the need to use multilateral rules to constrain American ‘hyperpower’. However, if rules and multilateralism become no more than tools for the weak to use to coerce and constrain the strong, they will be resisted and ultimately rejected.

There is a notion, most commonly articulated in legal circles, that sovereign equality is incompatible with rules that recognize power asymmetries. Political scientists will quickly recognize the fallacy here. Equality of sovereigns is a legal phenomenon, and juridical equality is only one aspect of sovereignty. Other aspects of sovereignty play a crucial role in any rules governing sovereign states. For example, empirical sovereignty—the ability to actually exercise control over people, territory and resources—plays a central role in way rules are made, the way they are enforced, and what they actually say.

Recognition of the need to accommodate power in multilateral rules is hardly new. It was central, for example, in one of the earliest multilateral arrangements, the Concert of Europe. That was explicitly a great powers’ club that operated, in part, according to a double-edged rule: first, that no great power would act along

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but second, that no great power would be left behind or isolated. The latter was crucial since without it there was no reason for a great power to join the Concert.

Most enduring multilateral arrangements show some accommodation to power asymmetries. The UN Charter does. Vetoes are one obvious mechanism by which power asymmetries are accommodated and interests of strong are protected. The international financial institution do, and there is clear understanding within those institutions that multilateral rules that disregard power will be both ineffective and illegitimate.

There are a variety of ways to accommodate power within multilateral rules. Substantively, mutually agreed upon rules might specify unequal treatment according to some general, objective criterion. For example, the international financial institutions distribute votes based on wealth and contributions; the Security Council specifies five members who get permanent seats and vetoes. One problem with substantive specification of unequal treatment is that distributions of power in the world often change faster than institutional rules. One might well ask, for example, whether the countries that have the UN veto are still the right powers to be accommodated. This is certainly one of the issues at stake in the ‘global gap’, and much of UN reform debate is about whether vetoes have gotten out of wack with contemporary distribution of power and whether they adequately represent the world of the 21st century. The NPT similarly contains substantive recognition of power asymmetries, explicitly recognizing nuclear haves and have-nots. It, too, has come under pressure as have-nots become more technologically sophisticated and capable of acquiring weapons technology. The IFIs have a system of quota review to help substantive power recognition (vote distribution) stay somewhat aligned with economic reality. Few security institutions have similar built-in review systems and this stickiness has been a source of conflict (or ‘gaps’).

One could also accommodate power procedurally, by allowing the powerful disproportionate say in writing the rules. Often this happens by naturally in the security realm either because the powerful take an interest in some issue and draft rules or because rules are drafted within a body such as the Security Council where the strong have institutionalized power. However, procedures like those used in the drafting of the landmines ban treaty which bypassed the UN Security Council will be suspect. While the Mine Ban Treaty has the quantitative legitimacy that comes with numbers (it has 122 signatories), non-signatories (which include the world’s largest states and militaries—the US, China, Russia, India) have objected to its failure to conform to shared principles of legitimate procedure, procedures which recognize the disproportionate power of these states.

Of course, one reason to accommodate the powerful in a multilateral system is simply that the rules will not be effective without the support or at least
acquiescence of powerful states. However multilateral rules can be ineffective, with or without the support of the strong. I turn next to this issue.

Effectiveness and legitimacy of force

One persistent source of tension on use of force issues involves the effectiveness of multilateral rules. When multilateral rules do not produce desired outcomes, people start asking hard questions which eventually take a toll on the legitimacy of those rules. This was a persistent problem with various UN Iraq policies. The sanctions programme produced humanitarian outcomes unacceptable to many, and the US, in particular, was not persuaded that the weapons inspection programme were actually disarming the regime. It has also been a problem in many humanitarian crises. Failure of multilateral rules to produce effective responses to disasters in Rwanda and in Darfur (most would say the AU response is woefully inadequate) have made a sham of the proclaimed ‘responsibility to protect’ in the eyes of many, including UN staff.

Asking about the effectiveness of force only begs the question: ‘Effective for what?’ Effectiveness always must have a referent. One cannot assess the effectiveness of force without understanding its purpose or goals. States and other actors differ in their opinions about the purposes for which force can be effective and when they think it should be used. This is hardly surprising, nor is it new. Disagreements about whether and when to use force have always been central to security politics. Conceptually and logically, though, these disagreements can focus on different aspects of use of force and unpacking these differences, we can see a variety of dimensions of potential disagreement. Understanding these different possible foci will help us better parse the debates we are now seeing.

Different goals. Whether force is useful depends on what one wants to accomplish. Two actors might have very different perceptions about the utility of force that are easily explained by the fact that they have very different goals. If state A wants to maintain lucrative commercial ties to state B but state C is more concerned about B’s stability in the face of civil unrest, A and C are likely to disagree about the role force should play in their respective policies. Force, or threats of force, might be useless or even counterproductive for accomplishing actor A’s goals but essential for securing actor B’s.

States often have private goals that differ from publicly-stated ones, and the fact that public goals are not achieved may not be good evidence that private goals were not met. For example, one common interpretation of the failure to intervene in Rwanda is that, far from failing, multilateral rules served states’ goals perfectly. No state wanted to intervene in Rwanda and the rules allowed
them to dither and obfuscate so they did not have to do so. Any assessment of effectiveness would have to take these unstated goals into account.

Predicted consequences. Even if states agree on objectives, there is often uncertainty and disagreement about the consequences of force. Unintended consequences of force are common, and actors know this. Military actions often go awry. Even if one kills exactly the people one planned and destroys or captures exactly the machinery or infrastructure one planned, calculating the political effects of force is difficult. Death and destruction may create martyrs and resistance rather than submission. States had different views, for example, about the likely consequences of toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Bush administration believed those using force would be greeted as liberators. Others, both inside and outside the US, were less sure. Believing the liberator prediction would logically incline one much more toward a belief in the utility of force in that case. Scepticism logically leads to a different conclusion.

Legitimacy. The effectiveness of force for any actor is not objectively-dictated given; it depends heavily on the subjective perceptions and evaluations of others. These evaluations are much broader in scope than simple assessments of information and likely consequences, discussed above. These evaluations are also normative. Whether others view force as desirable, appropriate, or necessary determines whether they will support, oppose or acquiesce to its use and those reactions will shape the effects of force on the ground and the kinds of social outcomes force creates. These judgements might have several components. Actors often support (or oppose) force and regard it as ‘good’ if they gain in some self-regarding way—they gain territory, eliminate undesirable people, increase political control. However the ‘goodness’ of force may also be judged in another sense. Most uses of force are accompanied by a great deal of debate, not just about what people want but about what is right. Goodness in the sense of rightness or oughtness is a crucial component of actors’ judgements about force and reactions to its use by others. This oughtness or rightness is at the heart of force’s legitimacy.

Legitimate action accords with recognized rules, standards, principles, or laws. Many scholars have focused on the effects of legitimacy on those using force—the ‘compliance pull’ it creates (Franck) and the sense it engenders that rules ‘ought to be obeyed’. (Hurd) However, legitimacy effects action by shaping

27 ‘Triumph of Evil’ BBC/Frontline video.

audience judgements, too. Because they are widely shared, such rules and principles become ‘social facts’ and shape audience notions about when force ‘ought’ to be used, and audience reactions reflect these judgements. Legitimacy is rarely absolute or uncontested; very often it is a matter of degree. The degree of legitimacy of an action, in this case a use of force, depends on the degree of consensus about its ‘oughtness’ or ‘rightness’. Such shared judgements are not naturally occurring phenomena and legitimacy is rarely obvious or unproblematic. It has to be consciously constructed. Actors spend a great deal of time attempting to shape judgements of others about what actions are legitimate. Consequently, every use of force leaves a long trail of justification in its wake as forcers try to connect their actions with shared notions of justice—shared notions of oughtness or rightness in using force.

The effectiveness of force is a function of its legitimacy. Of course, if one simply wants to destroy or kill, the legitimacy of bombs and bullets is not going to change their physical effects on buildings or bodies. However, simple killing and destruction are rarely the chief goal of political leaders using force. Force is usually the means to some other end in social life and attempts to use force alone for social control and social influence have not fared well over the long term. Force must be coupled with legitimacy for maximum effect. Legitimacy is important because it creates some degree of support for, or at least acquiescence to, those using force. Legitimate force attracts allies, contributions, and approval from outsiders and diminishes resistance in targets of force. We rarely like being the target of force (or threats of it), but if we see that force as legitimate we are less likely to resist. Illegitimate force has the opposite effect. It galvanizes opposition, often forceful opposition. It damages the forcer’s reputation among peers and creates resentment, if not rebellion, in the target.

However, the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy runs both directions. Yes, legitimacy makes force more effective but effectiveness also enhances legitimacy. The cynic’s version of this is, ‘nothing succeeds like success’ but the aphorism reveals something important for our purposes. Very often states agree on goals but not about how to achieve them. If force is shown to be successful or effective at achieving goals, its use is more likely to be seen as legitimate. Conversely, if experience suggests that force does not produce desired results (or does so only at unacceptable costs), it loses legitimacy. Economic sanctions, a form of coercion if not outright force, certainly have become more suspect in recent years for these reasons in large part on efficacy grounds—they often hurt people they are supposed to help and often fail to produce the desired behaviour changes in their target. The 1990s sanctions against Iraq were only a particularly spectacular and well-publicized case of sanctions of dubious efficacy carried out at very high human cost.

Of course, judgements of success can be contested. They often are. In the Iraq sanctions case, sanctioners disagreed about whether containing the regime’s
behaviour counted as success and over whether, in fact, the regime was being contained. Not only was there inadequate intelligence to judge either issue, but sanctioners had different goals vis-à-vis the regime, disagreeing about whether containment was sufficient or whether regime collapse was the real measure of success. Judgments about unacceptable costs also change. For example, civilian casualties weigh more heavily in the calculations of most democratic militaries than they did 50 or 100 years ago. They also weigh more heavily in the judgements of those observing or suffering force as the outcry by over the high-altitude bombing in Kosovo suggests.\(^{29}\) But to the degree there is agreement that force can help achieve some goal, it becomes more legitimate; agreement to the contrary tends to delegitimate. Note, too, that assessments of legitimacy often change over time in part as a result of their effectiveness. Military action to remove Saddam Hussein from Iraq in 1991 was controversial at the time it was being contemplated, much more controversial than the 2002 action, and commanded only narrow approval by the US Congress. The perceived effectiveness of the 1991 military action at rolling back Iraqi forces from Kuwait with relatively few of the dire consequences predicted by opponents helped turn the 1991 action into a positive exemplar of ‘good’ use of force during the subsequent 2002 debates. Had the effects of the 1991 action been more obviously negative—had it prompted mass demonstrations that unseated regimes in the region, for example, or had it resulted in massive civilian casualties as the armies moved through Kuwait and Iraq—the ‘goodness’ and legitimacy of that action would have been less and the 2002 debates may have gone differently.\(^{30}\)

Legitimacy (or lack thereof) is not an inherent or objective property of forceful action. Legitimacy is subjective and, indeed, intersubjective. Force is made legitimate (or not) by those of us observing, suffering, and ultimately judging it. Not surprisingly, people often do not agree on when force is legitimate. Forceful action to topple a regime or save a threatened population, for example, might be entirely legitimate in the view of the invader but draw mixed views from the local population, other governments, other publics, and international organizations. Some of these judges will be more consequential


\(^{30}\) Of course, one can make a case now that the 1991 action resulted in long-term stationing of Western, mostly US, forces in the Gulf (notably in Saudi Arabia) and that this did, in fact, radicalize local populations and create terrorism including events of 11 September 2001. However, this lesson seems to have been ‘learned’ or drawn only by some and not others. Which lessons get drawn from the past by which actors and why would be an interesting topic for discussion.
than others in influencing the ultimate effects of force, and states calculate carefully about the likely acceptance (or not) of their actions.

As we analyze the various disagreements or 'gaps' in views on force, it is worth recognizing what, exactly is in dispute. Rarely is the debate about multilateralism versus unilateralism. Multilateralism is widely accepted as the most legitimate form of political action and most states most of the time go out of their way to conform to multilateral rules. Disagreements on over use of force are largely happening within this multilateral framework and they are broadly of three types. Debates are often about what current multilateral rules mean and what they demand of states; they are about whether multilateral rules are effective; and they are about how multilateral rules can be changed.

Conclusions

Multilateral rules about use of force are constantly changing. The debates we are now seeing, both within and among the Atlantic allies as well as globally are primarily about what these rules should be. As new threats arise and old ones linger, inadequately treated by existing rules, pressure for change mounts and countries craft new visions of 'good' rules for use of force. Two issues, in particular, seem central to changes currently under discussion. The first is how to accommodate changes in the distribution of power. Much of this conversation in the transatlantic community has centred on dealing with US power and the power asymmetries it creates. However, within the US concerns are as strong, probably stronger, about how to deal with changing power in Asia particularly with the rise of China and India. Both have been incompletely integrated into multilateral institutions governing use of force. China has only recently and gingerly become involved in peacekeeping on a tiny scale. (It sent 40 peacekeepers to Timor.) It remains outside of the ICC and only joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group last year. India has been an enthusiastic proponent of peacekeeping but its nuclear posture keeps it outside of that regime structure. Figuring out multilateral rules to accommodate 21st century power structures is a pressing task.

Second, to remain legitimate, multilateral rules have to be at least moderately effective. Rules that do not produce at least modest progress toward desired results will be abandoned. In the security realm, the absence of rules to deal effectively with terrorism using WMD will be a persistent source of friction with the United States which perceives a real and pressing threat. Unimpressive results from humanitarian interventions or, perhaps worse, persistent failures to intervene at all, will continue to prompt calls for new rules, perhaps including broader powers for the UN and other international organizations to use force.
References


Globalization and Military Power: The Politics of Military Adaptation in the US and in Europe

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Introduction: military power in a globalized environment

Why, how, and to what extent does globalization shape conceptions of military power in the US and in Europe? Over the years, globalization has transformed social trends and national policies. States, cultures, ethnic nationalism, urban development, welfare policies and social inequalities have all been affected in various ways. Globalizing dynamics have also changed security. The 11 September 2001 attacks, for example, showed that terrorists could use globalization to strike, and the subsequent campaign against terrorists groups was dubbed globalization’s first war. Globalization seems to ease the spread of

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1 I thank Raffaella Del Sarto and the workshop participants for their comments on a previous version of this paper, as well as Fabian Breuer and Ursula Schroeder for superb research assistance. I gratefully acknowledge the material and intellectual support of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute.


weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. It affects armaments firms, which in turn transforms procurement policies. Military institutions do not escape from globalization-induced constraints, which allegedly ‘[…] alter the viability of armed force as an instrument of public policy (and affect) the role, morale, coherence, and effectiveness of armed forces.’ In today’s international environment, security and defence policies cannot be adequately understood without taking globalization into account. Yet, we know little about the impact of globalization on strategy, i.e. its influence on how policy-makers plan to employ military force.

This is unfortunate since globalization appears to influence strategy-making in puzzling ways. The interdependence of economies seems to make war counterproductive, but before the 2003 war in Iraq, some investment bankers maintained that the ‘likeliest scenario is a short, successful war’ which ‘might actually be good for the world economy: it will eliminate today’s mood of uncertainty, boost government spending, and push oil prices lower in the medium term as new Iraqi production comes on stream.’ In some cases, globalization reduces the capacity for military action, while in others it provides new, unsettling, opportunities for using force. Taiwanese decision-makers, for example, might believe that Beijing’s leaders, constrained by globalization, especially trade and international opinion in the perspective of the 2008 Olympic games, would ultimately discard the use of force. But Chinese strategists might consider that, thanks to the globalized environment, they can exploit Taiwan’s dependence and achieve their political goals through coercion by undersea blockade instead of invasion. Because it can destabilize strategy making and blur mutual perceptions of the utility of force, globalization is a non-military factor

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that might affect China and Taiwan’s strategic choices. Even if military power has not remained immune to globalization dynamics, we do not know which aspects of military power has been affected, to what degree, and why.

Why does globalization affect strategy in conflicting ways? I argue that the impact of globalization on strategy is likely to depend on military adaptation. The goal of this paper is to identify and comprehend the varied responses of strategists in the US and in Europe to the increasing demands of globalization on military power. When confronted to globalization, policy makers and military leaders do not sit passively. They strive to adapt and remain relevant, and their responses to the demands of globalization is a crucial, but neglected, factor. Richard Rosecrance, who argued that the rise of the trading state in the 1980s, and of the virtual state in the 1990s, undermined military power, conceded that ‘interdependence only constrains national policy if leaders accept and agree to work within its limits.’ What happens to military power if strategists accept to think and act within the limits of globalization? And what happens if they refuse to do so? Borrowing from James Rosenau’s attempt to schematize political adaptation, I show that strategists can adapt to globalization in four different ways:

1. Strategists can accommodate the demands of globalization on the military’s core competency, and redefine the armed forces’ roles and missions;
2. Strategists can refuse to accommodate, and attempt to shape globalization instead;
3. Strategists can define a new desired equilibrium between military power’s functional imperative and globalization; or
4. Strategists can allow the existing balance to prevail.

In the same State, the army, the air force and the navy (and other services like the Marine Corps in the US or the Gendarmerie in France) might react to globalization in opposite ways, making the coordination of national strategy more difficult. To explain why and how strategists cope with globalization as a challenge to military power, I focus both on globalization-induced stresses and

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strains, and on policy-makers’ efforts to adapt to them. Specifically, I examine their beliefs about how they plan to achieve their political objectives militarily, and their ideas about how to conduct military operations. I ask if, and to what extent, they think in terms of the potential impact of globalization when they plan for the employment of military power. The following questions guide my empirical inquiry: Are strategists aware of globalization dynamics, and do they worry about their consequences on strategy? Do they take globalization into account when they design military doctrine? If so, do they scale down their tactical, operational and strategic ambitions, or do they innovate to take advantage of it? Overall, I argue that globalization is a neglected systemic non-military factor that can affect conception of force employment. It shakes common beliefs regarding the use of force, and can reshape norms about warfare. In addition, it compels strategists to tackle non-military issues and to coordinate their action with other state bureaucracies. The resulting planning becomes more complex and challenging.

This project is part of a broader puzzle, which revolves around the continuing relevance and flexibility of military power. Why is it that militaries succeed in assimilating new constrains and new issues, rather than disappearing or being rebuffed by other actors in their efforts to cope with them? How is it that military power remains relevant? The military is an old institution, with deep roots in the origins of the state. As an entity, it has successfully adapted to many different changes in its environment. At times, military power has been caught in a dead end: its destructive capacity ceased to translate into political gains. But even in a nuclear context, ‘[…] military power remains more flexible than many people expected.’

My intention is to probe this flexibility of military power in the face of globalization-induced constrains.

This paper proceeds in three steps. First, I highlight the empirical and theoretical importance of the impact of globalization on strategy, and I provide a working definition, and an operationalization of globalization. Second, I sketch a framework for analyzing military adaptation to globalization. I explain why this framework, inspired by James Rosenau’s study of political adaptation, is a useful starting point to make sense of the adaptation of military institutions in a systematic way. Third, I illustrate the plausibility of this framework by focusing on military adaptation to globalization in the US and in Europe, specifically in France, Germany and the UK, and I derive some broader implications for Transatlantic relations, and for the study of military power.

Military power in a globalized world

What is globalization?

Globalization is:

[...] a process (or a set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions—assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact—generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.13

As a consequence of these processes, there is a widespread perception that the world is shaped into a largely shared social space and that events in one region of the world can have profound consequences for individuals and groups in far away places. Because of globalization, the level of interconnectedness of the international system increases in a striking way. The sheer magnitude and diversity of these exchanges are significant, as well as the extent to which they penetrate into virtually all social, economic and cultural groups and into almost all geographic areas within these polities.14 This increase in the numbers and variety of exchanges is not only the outcome of economic life and technological change, but the consequence of both states’ and non-state actors’ choices and behaviour which tolerate or encourage these exchanges. In particular, three system-wide processes affect the interaction capacity of the international system. First, the transformations of the international economy favour the creation of a unique world market for goods, services, capital and labour. Second, technologies facilitate transportation, contribute to the rapid diffusion of information, and increase the role of the global media, particularly television. Third, globally shared norms expand gradually. In a shrinking world, cultural value systems are increasingly exposed to the dynamics of a globalizing international system. Moral and emotional globalization matters. As a consequence of these dynamics, the international space has been shrinking, and the interactions are more and more frequent between the societies of the ‘global village’.15 Local events can have major, rapid, global consequences. In short, while its various dimensions and its impact are in dispute, globalization leads to a


growing interaction capacity of the international system worldwide. As a systemic phenomenon, globalization is analytically distinct from the distribution of capabilities in the international system, and it is distinct from unit level processes as well.

Many high-profile debates about globalization are impoverished face to face between hyperglobalizers and their critics. On the one hand, globalization-enthusiasts see the demise of the sate and the emergence of a global marketplace. On the other, sceptics argue that globalization is nothing new and its alleged effects a smoke screen which conceals the real face of the international economy. By contrast, I take a more nuanced and less polemical view. Globalization is indeed a driving force behind rapid changes that are reshaping military organizations, technology and doctrines. But its effects on strategy are complex and contingent, not universal or uniform. I focus on the different ways strategists adapt to a more interconnected, but highly uncertain world. Looking at globalization in the context of transatlantic dynamics is especially relevant because many analysts have taken Europe as an example of advanced globalization, and US-Europe relations as deeply interdependent. The European experience in economic integration and governance change is particularly relevant to get a sense of globalization’s impact more broadly. Europe is a case of both long-standing and deep regional economic integration, and an example of particular political and institutional responses to that integration. Kathleen MacNamara, for example, explained that Europe is laboratory to get a better understanding the relations between globalization and governance.


States and European institutions still make important economic choices, and convergence is not a foregone conclusion. Europeanization and globalization are two distinct phenomena, but they are linked.

**Globalization and the sources of military power**

Strategists have long been aware that system-wide dynamics can have an impact on military power. As Albert Wohlstetter explained in the late 1960s:

> [T]he increasing ease of communication and transport in the future should not be taken as simply irenic, leading to harmony and peace. On the contrary, it means an extension of the ‘neighbourhood’ to more remote areas, and such larger neighbourhoods need not mean neighbourliness any more than the small ones. The possibilities of coercion as well as cooperation increase.20

Four dimensions of globalization could affect strategists’ choices:

1. Changes in trade patterns;
2. Technological change—particularly in the field of communications and transport;
3. Changes in international and multilateral norms and institutions—such as the rise of a norm of justified intervention; and
4. The change and weakening of territory-based national political institutions and states.

Most analysts of the impact of globalization on military power tend to black box the military. They assume that strategists are transmission belts, and that it is enough to focus on constraints and outcomes to explain globalization’s influence or lack thereof. The bulk of the literature on trade and war is coherent with this systemic framework.21 The input (trade) and the output (war) have been repeatedly correlated with one another, but the black box of actors’ perceptions

(continued)
and adaptation has barely been opened. 22 Because of this primer on structural factors, the resulting hypotheses neglect policy makers’ perceptions, and have little to say about the political and organizational processes by which political and military leaders instrumentalize globalization, innovate, or suffer from its consequences. 23 These approaches leave under theorized why and how military doctrines take the forms that they do in a globalized environment. This missing link is often crucial in the existing explanations, but more as an assumption than as an empirical question. Only by examining policymakers’ adaptation will it become possible to evaluate broad statements about the impact of globalization. Finally, the ‘second image reversed’ literature maintains a clear-cut conceptual and empirical distinction between national and international systems, and downplays the overlap between the two. This rigid distinction should be relaxed. Military institutions are, on the one hand, the embodiment of the internal characteristics of a national state, and yet they are internationally and transnationally embedded as well. The military is both distinct from, and part of, its international and social environment.

Conceptions of force employment are not uniform among military institutions. This is because strategic and doctrinal choices do not follow only a functional imperative. 24 Most of the existing works devoted to the determinants of military doctrines and strategy underlie two clusters of variables and mechanisms: on the one hand, the distribution of power in the international system (including variations in geographical location, threats, etc.) and, on the other, unit-level factors, notably perceptual and organizational biases, but also regime types. 25 I identify globalization as an important, but under estimated,
determinant of these variations, and I show that this systemic non-military factor can shape their conceptions of force employment. Potentially, globalization can affect the operational, logistical, social and technological dimensions of strategy. To what extent is it a determinant of strategy? And if it does, through which social and political processes? To answer these questions, it is important, first, to identify the core professional competency of the social group (here, the military) confronted to globalization in order to get a better grasp of the changing requirement which confronts strategists, and to explain their adaptive behaviour. I focus on conceptions of force employment and I envision the soldier as strategist. Second, since globalization is routinely presented and analyzed as a constraint on policy-makers, I explain how and why strategists deal with constraints the way they do.

**Military adaptation: a framework for analysis**

To understand why and how the military adapt to globalization, we need to know the preferences and the objective of military leaders. Rather than assuming these preferences or identifying them inductively, I deduce different types of military preference from a framework. This framework has originally been elaborated by James Rosenau to examine the adaptation of nation-states’ foreign policies to interdependence. Partially inspired by Karl Deutsch, this is a

(continued)
rare attempt to problematize political adaptation. I reformulate his framework to explain specifically how strategists plan to use force given the globalization-induced constraints on their action. This framework is heuristic from an empirical and a theoretical standpoint. Empirically, this framework raises the problem of the variety of military responses to globalization. Instead of assuming that globalization will generate a unique military answer, this approach identifies different types of military adaptation. Some will lead to a decline of high-intensity warfare employment, while others will favour that type of force employment, and yet others will transform the uses of force. We will use this framework to guide the empirical enquiry, to stimulate new findings and suggest interpretations. Theoretically, this framework seeks to contribute to the literature on the impact of globalization by focusing on the receiving end: the agents—here military leaders—confronted to systemic processes.

**What is military adaptation?**

To understand why and how strategists adapt to globalization, we need to identify the ways in which they define the relation between the military’s main professional role and its environment, here globalization. They seek to define the role of the military as an institution, and the role of the profession of arms, in this context. The framework that we use facilitates the empirical identification of those perceptions. Militaries are adapting entities when they cope with globalization while keeping their core competence within what strategists consider as acceptable limits. The military’s core competence is its fundamental function, the management of violence, and acceptable limits mean that the military can maintain its basic characteristics or alter them through the choices and procedures of its members. How well or poorly strategists cope with globalization challenges to their integrity and core competency? For strategists, globalization is a source of uncertainty. They might not be sure of its impact on


military power. Policy-makers have different conceptions of how globalization will unfold, and they form an image of how the military doctrine that they favour will prevent the consequence of globalization from unfolding to the detriment of the essential aspects of the ‘management of violence’ as they see it. They develop a conception of how their preferred military doctrine will alter the situation in such a way that the military organization will remain relevant and be able to fulfil what they see as its core mission. As a stimulus to adaptive behaviour, the image that strategists have of globalization is as important as the change that globalization actually provokes.  

_Four types of military adaptation_

In the making of strategy, military officers and civilian policy-makers strike a balance between, on the one hand, internal demands—keep and develop the core competency of the military as defined above—, and, on the other, external demands which stem from globalization. The sources of strategists’ responses to globalization is to be found in the priority that they give to the two types of demands: internal-functional demands (the military’s professional role) and external-system level demands (globalization). Strategists perceive the need for a balance between these two demands, and they develop a general orientation toward globalization. Their general orientation define how their professional core competency (the internal demand) and globalization (their external environment) do, and ought to, relate to each other, both in the immediate present and in the long run. Their conception of the equilibrium between these demands originates in the history, culture and capacity of each military institution, and specifically of each military service (army, navy or air force).

I simplify Rosenau’s approach by focusing on two types of demands, the military’s core competency and globalization, and I elaborate the specific case of military adaptation to complement the political adaptation model which focuses originally on foreign policy. I use a spare definition of the professional core competency of the military officer by considering that as an expert in the

31 Ibid., 51.

32 On this logic at the nation-state level, James N. Rosenau, _The Study of Political Adaptation_ (London: Pinter, 1981), 10–11. Strategists are confronted to other kinds of external demands as well, namely the threats to the society’s security and the transformation of the society itself. My argument focuses on globalization, but a complete picture would have to take threats and societal changes into account.

'management of violence' (Lasswell) his/her craft is: '(1) the organizing, equipping, and training of (military) force; (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat.' As Samuel Huntington explains, 'The direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer.' To identify empirically this general orientation, I seek answers to the following questions:

1. Core competence and operational identity: what are the preferred characteristics of force employment? What is the service’s core operational competence? Do military leaders emphasize their war function ('radical professionalism')? Do they share a civilianized conception of their profession, admitting the diversity of military missions: military, diplomatic, humanitarian, etc. ('pragmatic professionalism')?

2. Globalization: for military leaders, what is globalization? Do they take it into account? How do military leaders see its implications on the core competency of the military and on the operational identity of their service?

When we combine military leaders’ image of internal requirements related to their professional core competency, and their perception of globalization-induced requirements, we can identify four types of adaptation which build upon Rosenau’s work. First, strategists might perceive that the demands of globalization trump the demands of the military’s core competency. They accept globalization’s constrains and adjust the management of violence accordingly (acquiescent military adaptation). Second, strategists might perceive the demands of the military’s core competency as more important than the requirements of globalization (intransigent military adaptation). Third, strategists might estimate that it is both possible and beneficial to find an equilibrium between internal and external demands (either promotive or preservative military adaptation). In sum, four paths are available to adaptive strategists:

1. The military’s core competency accommodates the demands of globalization;

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2. Strategists refuse to accommodate, and attempt to shape globalization instead;
3. Some new desired equilibrium between military power’s functional imperative and globalization is sought;
4. Or the existing balance is allowed to prevail. In what follows, I characterize each of these paths.

Table 1 summarizes the conflicting demands of globalization and of the military’s core competency in the different types of military adaptation.

**Table 1**

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<tr>
<th>Patterns of military adaptation</th>
<th>Demands emanating from globalization</th>
<th>Demands emanating from the military’s core competency</th>
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<tr>
<td>Acquiescent</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>Intransigent</td>
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+ strategists responsive to demands of globalization and/or to demands of the military’s core competency either because the changes and demands are intense or because their intensity is perceived to be increasing.

– strategists less responsive to demands of globalization and/or to demands of the military’s core competency either because the changes and demands are not sufficiently intense or because their intensity is perceived to be decreasing.

Once institutionalized, the general orientation toward the globalized environment of the service becomes all-encompassing and exclusive. This predisposition to strike a particular balance between internal and external demands helps strategists to define their preferences, to identify what constitutes a significant issue, and to select the appropriate courses of action. Since it contributes to the definition of the military’s professional identity, it is relatively constant—although under certain condition it can change, these changes are rather infrequent—and held collectively by service members. A minority can contest this dominant orientation in the service, but this minority is usually too
weak to modify the status quo.  

Strategists’ perception and assessment of the impact of globalization is shaped by their general orientation. The adaptive equilibrium affects the services preferred way to use force. My unit of analysis is neither the nation-state, nor the military as a whole, but each military service. The question of whether there is only one type of military adaptation, or several, in a nation-state at any given time is an important empirical question. But I do not assume such homogeneity. It might well be that, within the same nation-state, different military organization adapt in different ways to globalization. If so, it is important to understand the various logic of adaptation and ponder their compatibility, as well as the tensions and conflicts generated by these efforts. These four types of adaptation are not just labels describing static situations. They refer to political processes by which strategists define their position and bargain in the political system to make it prevail.

How do we know each type of adaptation when we see one? In what follows, building on Rosenau’s work, I summarize the main characteristics of each type of military adaptation. These summaries are not empirical description, but attempt to define each process in the abstract, even though in his original formulation Rosenau uses induction. In identifying each type of adaptation, my goal is to facilitate the empirical analysis of military adaptations. Finally, it is important to clarify what remains outside the scope of this paper. My goal is not to explain where do these general orientations come from. This is an important question, but my research focuses on the consequences of these institutionalized types of adaptation, not on their causes.

In sum, the military adaptive framework is a useful starting point to analyze the impact of globalization on strategy for two reasons. First, this approach acknowledges that several strategic responses to globalization are possible, and it

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38 While I do not examine the causes of these types of adaptation, three factors would be worth considering: the loss-of-strength gradient of each type of military power (notably air, naval, land power), the military’s perception of its role and of its professional identity, and the military’s perception of its legitimacy in the society. The loss-of-strength gradient is the amount by which the strength of a polity (but of a certain type of military power as well) diminishes per movement away from its base. Boulding identified what he called the law of diminishing strength: ‘[…] the further from home any nation has to operate, the longer will be its lines of communication, and the less strength it can put in the field’. Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense. A General Theory (1st ed. 1962), (New York Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 230–231. See also: Quincy Wright, A Study of War (1st ed. 1942), (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983, abridged edition), 331–336. On the sources of the preservative adaptation of the US Army, Thomas Lindemann, ‘Faire la guerre, mais laquelle? Les institutions militaires des États-Unis entre identités bureaucratic et préférences stratégiques’, Revue française de science politique, 53 (5), October 2003, 684–690.
helps to characterize what some of those responses might be. This is important, since most of the conventional hypotheses often assume only one type of outcome. Different military adaptations provide different answers to a common set of questions: Is globalization a source of strain for military power, and what can be done about it? What strategic requirements should be implemented? Second, the adaptive framework puts strategists' conceptions of military power front and centre. It provides an incentive to examine carefully both their perceptions of globalization and their effort to cope with its consequences.

The politics of acquiescent military adaptation

The politics of acquiescent military adaptation occurs when strategists acknowledge that globalization puts constraints of such magnitude on military power that they have no other choice but to revise profoundly the military's core competency. They make the management of violence consistent with the changes and demands that emanate from the external environment. Strategists are ready to adjust drastically and to live with these demands. They believe, rightly or wrongly, that they do not have the capacity to alter the demands of globalization, and that they cannot keep the core of military competency intact. In such a situation, strategists do not have to be particularly innovative or wide ranging in the making of strategy, even though they might have to engineer shrewd organizational reforms. They heed to the demands of the external environment and they see no need to design a creative military doctrine or to develop new sources of military power. The foreign policy of such a country can remain active, but the management of violence as such ceases to be one of its component. In the case of acquiescent military adaptation, policy-makers' perceptions and behaviours regarding military power are close to the liberal and constructivist views. The model of complex interdependence of Keohane and Nye, for example, predicts that over time military force appears 'devalued', its utility 'declines', its role becomes 'negligible'. The widespread resistance by people in poor, weak countries, the uncertain and possibly negative effects on the achievement of economic goals and the growing domestic opinion opposed to the human costs of the use of force, they argue, lead to an acquiescent adaptation. Similarly, for James Rosenau:

The norms governing the conduct of politics in the multi-centric world have evolved so as to diminish the utility of force, compelling

most of its actors to confine the threat of actual use of force to those situation that arise in the state-centric world of international politics.  

He argues that as world politics becomes increasingly turbulent, ‘responses involving force will diminish.’

**The politics of intransigent military adaptation**

When they pursue a politics of intransigent military adaptation, strategists do not alter the management of violence to respond to the demands of globalization, quite the opposite. They strive to make sure that globalization accommodates their preferences, and their strategic choices. Unwilling to accommodate globalization, they refuse to accept any fluctuation in their core competences. They are unwilling to bargain over the acceptable limits to military power. The core competencies of the military are perceived as too important to be negotiable, and to compromise. Institutions and norms associated with the military are so powerful, so perceived as essential, and so inflexible in their core orientation that strategists believe that they can safely ignore globalization. This skewed, unyielding, form of adaptation is based on a shared commitment to make the external environment compatible with the demands of the management of violence. No matter how hard the strategic task might appear to be, strategists will remain undeterred. Their conception of their professional role, and their positive social image, accustom them to assert their demands and to find ways to circumvent hostility and resistance.

Innovative and uncompromising strategists make a significant effort to cope creatively with any developments abroad that may in the long run pose a threat to their core competency and their capacity to use military power. Intransigent militaries have to be innovative and wide-ranging in their policies. Strategists need change, flexibility, and single-mindedness of purpose, and they are ever ready to develop new forms of military power. Alliances, norms, and other international obligations are not welcomed because they may alter the core competency of the management of violence. Temporary coalitions and the need to redefine the laws of war might be considered appropriate. Trade-offs are


involved, however: eager to provide military solutions to globalization strains, intransigent strategists might develop biased assessments and promote risk-taking behaviour.

The politics of promotive military adaptation
When confronted to globalization-induced constrains, strategists can keep a certain freedom of action. If this is the case, promotive military adaptation is what they might try to encourage. They can promote changes to reach a new balance between the core competency of the management of violence and globalization. They believe that globalization, while important, does not create intense new demands. The desired balance stem from their interpretation of fundamental values and historical experience of the armed forces, and by the long term objectives that they assign to the military. Strategists want to change both: they are willing to accept some fluctuation in military power, but they also believe that, within certain limits, they can shape their environment. To maintain their capacity for action, strategists will not ignore the niceties of diplomatic protocol or the need to reaffirm their basic international obligations. However, they might exaggerate their capacity to get a measure of control over the equilibrium that prevails between their core professional competence and globalization. In this context, the influence of strategists might fluctuate and the scope of military power might vary as their resources are reallocated between external and internal needs. Military institutions go through periodical formulating of innovative policies designed to break the existing patterns. Their concern would be how the immediate circumstances of globalization may affect the realization of a long-run equilibrium for the management of violence.

The politics of preservative military adaptation
When intense and conflictual demands arise from both the management of violence and globalization, policy-makers might follow a preservative military adaptation. They are confronted to a difficult negotiation to minimize the fluctuation of the core competency of the military. Their freedom of choice is strictly limited, and they cannot rely on long-term objectives. Strategists’ main goal is to exist within the limits of the management of violence and of globalization, and they seek to maintain the existing equilibrium between them. The military’s professional identity prevents the acquiescence to globalization demands, but (relatively) limited resources prevent the emergence of intransigent and promotive orientations. Strategists live with, rather than change, the limitations inherent to a globalized international system. They present their preferences and choices as being pragmatic, without pre-determined long-range goals. The immediate dimensions and practical consequences of the use of force is of paramount importance.
Military adaptations in Europe and in the US

Do strategists perceive globalization? If so, do they care? This is not obvious. After all, military leaders might worry about the threat and the technical characteristic of military power and ignore globalization altogether. Are strategists conscious of globalization? Do they explicitly relate globalization to force employment? Specifically, I examine strategists responses to four dimensions of globalization:

1. Changes in trade patterns;
2. Technological change—particularly in the field of communications and transport;
3. Changes in international and multilateral norms and institutions, such as the rise of a norm of justified intervention; and
4. Change and weakening of territory-based national political institutions and states.

A preliminary survey of military thinking in Europe and in the US shows that strategists have been conscious indeed of the impact of globalization on military power, and take globalization into account in their conceptions of force employment.

Preservative military adaptation: the US army

Confronted to the demands of globalization, US Army leaders have settled, somewhat uncomfortably, for a preservative military adaptation that has generated conflict and disagreement within the Department of Defence and beyond. For army strategists, like Antulio Echevarria, despite its importance, globalization does not alter the nature of war. Clausewitz remains as relevant as ever. Clausewitz’s theoretical concept ‘[…] is more suitable for understanding the nature of war in today’s global environment than any of the alternatives…’

The war against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups of global reach, he argues, shows that globalization does not mean the end of decisive warfare or of major wars among states. Globalization reinforces the role of politics in the definition of the purpose of war and its conduct. ‘[…] Both sides are using war as a political


instrument, that is, they are subordinating its conduct to the achievement of political ends.'\textsuperscript{44} Thanks to globalization technology and dynamics political leaders on both sides can communicate their intentions to their subordinates and they believe that they can influence the course of events during every phase of military operation. ‘[…] Political direction of a campaign can span time and distance to influence the smallest of details…’\textsuperscript{45} Brute force remains a key aspect of the war against terrorist groups.

Time and again from the early 1990s until now, the US army expressed its deep scepticism about humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{46} An extreme reluctance to move away from a focus on big conventional wars, the constant objective to use and overwhelming force, the resistance to political oversight and the uncompromising reliance on technology have shaped the peacekeeping doctrine and practice of the US army.\textsuperscript{47} The Weinberger-Powell doctrine explicitly formulated in 1984 had a profound impact, even when the decision to intervene was finally made, for example in Somalia.\textsuperscript{48} Similarly, during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, general Wesley Clark (himself an army general socialized by Vietnam and favourable to the Weinberger-Powell doctrine) has been confronted to the scepticism and resistance of the army chief of staff to the deployment of Apache helicopters and, even more, to the idea of an army intervention on the ground.\textsuperscript{49}

Because of globalization, education and skill increased regularly since the 1950s, and as a consequence individuals question authority and make governing

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 13.  
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{47} Robert Cassidy, Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Doctrine and Practice after the Cold War (Wesport, Conn: Praeger Publishers, 2004).  
more difficult at the state level and at the international level. This questioning of authority takes place in military organizations as well. The rank and files do not necessarily accept to be put in any situation. They discuss the legitimacy of missions, the ways in which they are conducted, and complain openly about the inadequacy of their equipment. The armed forces, incorporating more and more skilful soldiers, are less and less usable political instruments. However, military organizations in general, and the US army in particular, use these personnel’s skills and transform them in force multipliers. The US army is ready to tolerate some individual contestation, and a delegation of authority to lower echelons, to preserve its tactical and operational effectiveness. Individual skills are as important for military effectiveness as technological sophistication. A high level of military skill is a key factor that explain that against a less skilled adversary the use of force is likely to be faster, and the casualty rate lower. Hence, the globalization-induced rise of individual skills can facilitate, not hinder, the utility of the army. Finally, chance and friction are as important as before. Army strategists are critical of policy-makers would believe that regarding combat new thinking should replace the old. Some technologies might be different, but fundamental tactical and operational principles remain valid. Detailed analysis of the first Gulf war, operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and operation Iraqi Freedom emphasized the continuing importance of classical principles of force employment. Overall, the army can preserve its core competence in the new context, despite the demands of globalization.

However, the globalized context and a strong conventional combat professional identity, mean that the army’s room of manoeuvre is narrow. First, army strategists admit that some characteristic of globalization make the use of conventional military power sometimes dubious. In a globalized operational environment, the Clausewitzian notion of centre of gravity has a limited applicability. Echevarria explains that al-Qaeda’s centre of gravity might be its


ideological core, its hate of apostasy and its vision of a pan-Islamic empire. ‘Yet, ideology is a difficult target to hit militarily.’ Only if combined with other elements of power will military power be efficient. Since their professional identity is strongly combat oriented, US army leaders remain deeply reluctant to acquiesce to globalization demands and fully endorse peacekeeping missions for example. Army leaders have argued that peacekeeping is a mission so different from high-intensity warfare and demands skills so specific that it would require retraining before troops they change missions. Finally, Army strategists think that the military’s capacity to shape the globalized environment is limited. For example, they do not believe that globalization-induced technologies can lift the fog of war.

Contrary to what pundits have predicted, Echevarria explains … globalization and the spread of information technologies still have not eliminated the elements of chance and uncertainty in war. Indeed, globalization and the spread of information technology increase confusion and the role of chance. The US army’s preservative military adaptation does not imply an absence of change. General Dennis J. Reimer, army chief of staff, decided to transform the army into a new fighting force that would be ‘much more strategically and operationally mobile’, and would be capable to ‘move ground capabilities anywhere around the globe in a short period of time.’ This reform remains controversial and the army is affected by globalization-induced tensions.

**Intransigent military adaptation: the US air force**

Strategists can also refuse outright to accommodate the demands of globalization, and attempt to shape their environment instead. Instead of focusing on globalization-induced vulnerabilities, some analysts note that ‘[… ] the current DOD planning system appears to be … focused on inventing a new


peer competitor and fighting him in classic wars. The leadership of the US air force copes with globalization in the framework of an intransigent adaptation. Air force leaders believe that US air power has been progressing steadily since the 1960s and has reached the stage in which it can make a major contribution to high-intensity warfare. Stealth technology, high accuracy and battlespace awareness give American air power a unique capacity to neutralize an enemy’s military means. Accuracy is particularly needed in asymmetric conflict. The diversity of conflict and the fact that globalization increases inequalities and put heterogeneous actors in relation change the requirement of military power.

Air power has benefited from globalization-induced communication and information technologies. Furthermore, fast and decisive military actions are more and more required. Mobility and accuracy become crucial factors. Defence departments sponsor research to find solutions to different challenges: detection of ground movements, all weather all time vision capacity, vision through buildings and foliages, increasing range of artillery, mine detection, resistance to jamming efforts, sensors coordination, or the increasing use of robots. Air power’s speed, range and flexibility fit well the globalized strategic environment.

From an air power strategy standpoint, globalization and the growing complexity of states and societies means an increase number of potentially efficient targets. This does not necessarily mean an increased vulnerability, but in some cases more redundancy and, therefore, more robustness. Air power can take as targets different ‘nodes’ making social interconnections possible. The adversary’s capacity for information, command and control is a valuable target. The expected effects are not necessarily destructions, but interferences. Military organizations care about the global architecture of their communication. Because of technological developments, air power might effectively create major strategic effect making it, according to its supporters, the weapon of choice in a globalized environment. According to colonel John Warden’s, the air campaign

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should consider the enemy as a system.\textsuperscript{62} Targeting critical nodes disrupt the network and the adversary’s warfighting capability is severely curtailed. In sum, as the name of the US Air Force doctrine indicates, ‘global reach, global power’, air power is supposed to produce its effect rapidly, and given the existing projection capabilities at great distances. Air force leaders believe that they have the capacity to shape globalization. For example, the introduction of the B2 stealth bomber in 1988 gave the US air force an intercontinental capacity to launch accurate attacks and to surprise any adversary anywhere in the world. Air force leaders have also been committed to think in terms of expeditionary air force and to emphasize the projection capacity of the service from bases in the US or abroad.\textsuperscript{63}

Air power can be affected by globalization dynamics, but the US Air force intransigent adaptation is based on innovative policies. For example, with the rise of new global norms about human rights, and growing concerns about casualties in military actions, globalization produces conflicting norms. Military organizations seek maximum accuracy to minimize unintended damages and these efforts transform military power and the use of force.\textsuperscript{64} First, the use of air power, like the Kosovo air campaign, can be prompted by humanitarian concerns.\textsuperscript{65} Second, concern over collateral damage can be extremely high. Missing a target and provoking inadvertently a disaster reverberates quickly in a globalized environment and undermine the confidence in air power’s capacity to respect a rising norm against such damages. One again, air force leaders were sure that they could use air power without any unacceptable fluctuation in their core competences. During the operation ‘Deliberate Force’ in Bosnia (1995), a tight control was exercised on the application of air power: centralized control of each weapon’s desired mean point of impact, check of attack axis, time of day or night, aircraft system limitations, munitions capabilities, and possible secondary effects, and careful battle damage assessment.\textsuperscript{66} In sum, air force leaders believe that they can circumvent globalization-induced constrains. Technological sophistication, speed, global reach, flexibility and the promise of accuracy give air power a special appeal in a globalized strategic context. This does not mean that

\begin{itemize}
  \item John Warden III, \textit{The Air Campaign. Planning for Combat} (1\textsuperscript{st} ed. 1988), (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989).
  \item \textit{Ibid.}, 176.
\end{itemize}
the air force intransigent adaptation is without problems. The capacity to incorporate smoothly some demands of globalization and to shape others can reach its limits. First, because the expectation of zero collateral damage might be an unreachable goal. Second, because air force leaders might also be willing to use air power in a more destructive way creating other norms that would contradict the norms usually associated with globalization.

**Promotive military adaptations: the British and French armed forces**

In the UK, since 1998, the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and follow-up White Papers, as well as a ‘New Chapter’ of the SDR, subjected the armed forces to a comprehensive overhaul of its structures, capabilities and doctrines. The British armed forces have incorporated the need to change their conduct of operations according to a new strategic environment that includes globalization-induced factors. However, the fundamentals of the British defence doctrine—the war-fighting ethos, the manoeuvrist approach, the decentralization of command—, have remained essentially unchanged. The dominant British conception of force employment strike a new balance between a core war-fighting capacity and deterrent function that remain, and the inclusion of a series of new risks, like mass migration, ethnic tensions, instability, proliferation, and environmental changes. Strategic and operational planning documents include all four dimensions of globalization relevant for military adaptation: changes in trade patterns, technological change particularly in the fields of communication and transport, changes in international and multilateral norms and institutions, and change and weakening of territory-based national political institutions. For example, in the Strategic Defence Review, securing the supply of raw materials, above all oil, and protecting British foreign investments are perceived as vital. Both the SDR and the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre’s Strategic Trends mention the potentially disruptive effect of fast-moving technological change and the military embraces modern communication technologies and put an emphasis on Network Enabled Capacities (NEC). In sum, the UK has taken into account globalization-related risks and trends and attempted to re-model its armed forces to take on new challenges. Yet, the British military system retained a nuclear deterrent capability and a defence mission that includes the possibility of high-intensity warfare. Due to this hybrid nature, and its effort to promote a new balance, the British defence transformation process fits the promotive military adaptation model.

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67 This section on British armed forces benefited from the excellent work of Ursula Schroeder.
Confronted to globalization, the French army have implemented a promotive adaptation. During the 1990s, the French army launched a major effort to develop a new and original doctrine. The missions of the army were at the core of this doctrinal change. The numerous involvement of the French army in various operations since the end of the Cold War lead to a major effort to rethink the new contexts of intervention, on peacekeeping and peacemaking and on the changing nature of the armed forces’ missions. On 1 January 1999, the army created the Command for doctrine and superior military education. This doctrinal renewal, particularly at the operational level, is an effort by the army to define and codify an expertise allowing for a controlled use of force in reaction to globalization-induced social and technological trends. This doctrinal renewal expresses a critique of the idea that technology could solve every issue related to the use of force today. The document *L’action des forces terrestres au contact des réalités* published in 2000 emphasized not only the need for a controlled use of the force, but also the need for several principles of action (decision, multinationality, information, etc.) and some specific knowledge and capacity to use force. This doctrine is closed to the indirect approach logic, as defined by Basil Liddell Hart, and it is often accompanied by a critique of Clausewitz’s ideas. Violence control is designed to strike the logics of violence without systematic resort to armed combat. If the use of force only means technologically sophisticated stand-off
strikes, army officers note, it leads to the denial of ground forces specificities, or worse to give to these forces a marginal role.\textsuperscript{72}

The French army also reformulated the ethic of the profession of arms.\textsuperscript{73} The army staff document \textit{L'exercice du métier des armes dans l'armée de terre: fondements et principes} (1999) explains that some principles of the profession of arms remain unchanged, while others have been altered. ‘Force remains force’, but this capacity to impose a will, by constrain if need be, takes place in a world in which modern weapons have an awesome destruction capacity, and in a civilization in which the respect of human life is a cardinal value. As a consequence, force should be rigorously sufficient and proportionate to the expected goals. It should be strictly adapted to the goal which is often the establishment of peace. Therefore, deterrent behaviours should be dominant, instead of total war and destruction.\textsuperscript{74}

\textbf{Acquiescent military adaptation: the German armed forces}\textsuperscript{75}

During the last decade, the German armed forces underwent a process of profound transformation.\textsuperscript{76} Beyond the controversial and symbolic, debate about the persistence of conscription, both the conceptions about the uses of force and the format of the armed forces changed. The overall identity of the German armed forces is shaped by the notion of ‘civilian power’.\textsuperscript{77} With the end

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{75} This section benefited from the excellent work of Ursula Schroeder.
of the Cold War, policy-makers and soldiers perceived that the Bundeswehr’s predominant task of territorial defence lost its relevance, which led to a fierce debate over its future mission and tasks. The conflictual public debate about the legitimacy of ‘out-of-area’ interventions of the armed forces was legally settled by the 12 July 1994 decision of the Federal Court of Justice. The court allowed the armed forces to operate outside the NATO-area. I explore the type of adaptation that the strategists of the Bundeswehr have pursued by looking at core planning documents, public statements, and the re-organization of the German force posture. I argue that the German armed forces have followed an acquiescent type of adaptation. The Bundeswehr has accommodated the demands of the changed environmental conditions into the military’s core competency, and redefined the armed forces’ roles and missions accordingly.

The German debate about the necessary post-Cold War reforms of the Bundeswehr got off in the late 1990s. Initiated by the red-green coalition government in 1998, a Wehrstrukturkommission—an independent commission on ‘Common Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr’—was established in 1999. Tasked with reviewing the size, structure, mission, training and equipment of the Bundeswehr under conditions of a changed threat environment and a comprehensive and widened security concept, its 179-page report was tabled in May 2000 (von Weizsäcker 2000). In parallel, a series of opposition party planning papers and drafts originating from the German Ministry of Defence itself became public. The report of the Weizsaecker-Commission, named after its chair, remains the most comprehensive and relevant to date. Perhaps the most striking recommendation of the Weizsaecker Commission was to acknowledge the de-territorialization of Germany’s security, and to advocate a significant change in the mission of the armed forces. The Commission advised a u-turn on the issue of national territorial defence, arguing that the armed forces should be oriented towards ‘participation in crisis prevention and crisis management’ as its most likely tasks. Hence, the Bundeswehr should be

(continued)

eds., Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).


prepared primarily for this mission in terms of size, structure, armament and equipment. As a standard, it should be capable ‘to participate in up to two crisis response operations simultaneously and indefinitely.’ The implementation of these goals would give the Air Force and the Navy larger proportions of manpower levels of the services than at present, while the ‘Army will become smaller in both absolute and relative terms. Compared with the present levels and structures, the Army is the service in which the need for change is greatest.’

Furthermore, the Commission presented a comprehensive notion of security that focused on the protection of human beings against essential threats. It therefore argued that development politics is also a part of the German security policy. The Commission reiterated the need for economic security in stating Germany is part of an interdependent system of economic interactions and depends on the import of certain goods, particularly raw materials like oil and gas: ‘as the second-largest trade nation of the world, the FRG has an elementary interest in the functioning of an open global economic order and free maritime traffic.’

The Defence Policy Guidelines of 1992 and 2003 confirmed this adaptation of the German armed forces.\footnote{The Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (VPR) [Defence Policy Guidelines] are core strategic documents that remain the authoritative conceptual backbone of the German defence policy. They establish the principles of defence policy, define the mission of the Bundeswehr, prioritise its tasks and provide guidelines for the capabilities of the armed forces of the future. The VPR constitute the basis of the subsequent planning documents such as the implementation-oriented ‘Konzeption der Bundeswehr’ or the ‘Bundeswehrplan’ of the Generalinspekteur (Chief of Staff). Defence Policy Guidelines were prepared in 1972, 1979, 1992 and 2003. Until 2003, their planning horizon was 10–15 years, while the 2003 VPR emphasised that in times of rapid technological and political change, this strategic document has to be continuously rewritten and further developed.} The first Defence Policy Guidelines after the end of the Cold War were introduced in November 1992 (Bundesminister der Verteidigung Volker Ruehe, 1992). They mentioned explicitly globalization-induced dynamics:

[I]n an interdependent world, all states are vulnerable: underdeveloped states because of their weakness and highly developed industrial nations because of their delicate structures. Every form of international destabilisation damages the social and economic progress, destroys potential for development, brings about migratory movements, destroys resources, abets processes of radicalisation and fosters violence.

Beyond the potential military implication of these types of threats and risks, the ‘negative impact on the economic and financial capability of the industrial states’
matter just as much. Precautionary politics thus has to take the ‘interdependence of regional and global developments’ into account. ‘Risks have to be countered where they emerge.’ Therefore, ‘under the new security-political conditions, security policies cannot be narrowed down geographically or substantively.’ Among vital security interests, the Defence Policy Guidelines mentioned the ‘maintenance of free world trade and unhindered access to markets and commodities in the whole world in the framework of a just global economic order’.

The latest Defence Policy Guidelines were promulgated in May 2003 (Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Peter Struck 2003). Its often-quoted argument is that Germany’s security will be defended at home, in Europe, but also in other areas of the world, e.g. ‘at the Hindu Kush’.81 In general, the Defence Policy Guidelines for a Changed Security Environment argued that the ‘security situation has changed fundamentally.’ Therefore, defence purposes had to include:

[T]he prevention of conflicts and crises, the common management of crises, and post-crisis rehabilitation. Accordingly, defence can no longer be narrowed down to geographical boundaries, but contributes to safeguarding our security wherever it is in jeopardy.

Among the risks and opportunities these Guidelines explained that ‘due to its high volume of foreign trade and the related special dependence on vulnerable transport routes and means, the German economy is exposed to additional hazards.’82

The implementation documents of these broad guidelines show that globalization-induced characteristics are part of the strategic planning process. The Bundeswehr in 2002 – The Current Situation and Perspectives provides an overview of the Bundeswehr situation and recognizes that ‘the Bundeswehr has meanwhile become an army in action.’ Hence, a fundamental renewal of its structure is unavoidable and indeed, ‘a milestone on Germany’s path to the 21st century’. The nature of the security environment is one in which ‘Germany cannot hold its own simply because of the efficiency of its state system in a world characterised by globalization, cross-border challenges and chances and international competition for advantages in sites.’ (p. 2) This global reach is not confined to official document, but widely shared by the German public,

81 ‘Unsere Sicherheit wird nicht nur, aber auch am Hindukusch verteidigt, wenn sich dort Bedrohungen für unser Land wie im Fall international organisierter Terroristen formieren.’ Regierungserklärung zur Reform der Bundeswehr, 11/3/2004. The Hindu Kush is a chain of mountains in the North of Afghanistan.

particularly the younger generation. Among the 16–25 age cohort, it is largely
taken for granted that interventions abroad is a normal part of the military
profession (91%), and that it makes it interesting (66%). Humanitarian aid is
considered a major characteristic of the military mission (89%). Furthermore,
both political and military leaders emphasize the need for common action,
multinational deployments and interoperability.

Finally, a significant technological transformation is globalizing the reach of
the German armed forces. The current Defence Policy Guidelines prioritise those
sub-capabilities that the Bundeswehr does not have at present, but needs to
execute international crisis management missions. This implies particularly
capabilities for strategic deployment, global reconnaissance and efficient,
interoperable command and control systems and means. These capabilities
basically tally with the capability categories considered by the Defence
Capabilities Initiative (DCI) that NATO adopted in April 1999. In the area of
strategic deployment and global reconnaissance, the Marine has recently started
the process to ‘de-regionalise’ its operational planning. It successfully expanded
its strategic and tactical reach into international waters. With the new multi-use
Fregatten Sachsenklasse F 124 and the five new Korvetten K 130 particularly
envisioned for use near the coast lines during complex crisis management
missions, the Einsatzgruppenversorger ETRUS 702 logistic support and strategic
deployment capability and last but not least the new submarine U-212—one of
the most advanced conventional submarine in the world as regards global
reconnaissance and propulsion technologies—the Marine is well on the way to
globalize its military reach. The Air force on the other hand benefits from the
European A 400M military Airbus project that will provide strategic deployment
capacities for the Bundeswehr—that has so far been renting planes from the
Ukrainians, with varying success. In current planning documents, Germany
envisioned to buy 60 A 400M. Lastly, the SAR-Lupe (SAR magnifier) is a

Leonhard, ‘Quelle attractivité du métier militaire en Allemagne ?’, Les Champs de Mars-

84 Paul Klein, ‘Vers des armées postnationales ?’, in: Bernard Boëne, Christopher Dandeker,
ed., Les armées en Europe (Paris: La découverte, 1998), 161–169; Bernhard Fleckenstein,
‘Germany: Forerunner of a Postnational Military?’, in: Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams,
David R. Segal, eds., The Postmodern Military. Armed Forces after the Cold War (Oxford:

conference Federal Minister of Defence, Dr. Peter Struck, Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr, General
Wolfgang Schneiderhan, 13 January 2004; ‘Transformation militaire. Réussir le changement
dans les mentalités – Entretien avec le lieutenant général Dirk Böcker, chef d’état-major
reconnaissance-satellite-system developed in conjunction with the French Helios II system that enables the Bundeswehr to produce independent national imaging intelligence.

In the command and control area, the project *Infanterist der Zukunft* [Infantry of the Future] refers to process of introducing network-enabled capabilities into the Army. Since 2004, the Infantry has added network-enabled equipment to its armaments that include palmtops, GPS-systems, laser guided and thermal imaging equipment. The new *SATCOM Bw Stufe 2* refers to a new satellite-based communications-system that enables self-sustaining and flexible forms of communication during operations. In sum, the Bundeswehr has rapidly moved from a defensive force posture to a status that has been termed ‘Bundeswehr in action.’ This constitutes a major change in the traditional procurement policy of the Bundeswehr based on heavy and mechanised territorial defence.

In sum, the German armed forces have been characterized by the politics of acquiescent adaptation to globalization-induced dynamics. First, strategists invoked globalization repeatedly when planning to define the missions and tasks of the armed forces. Second, all four globalization-induced changed outlined above (trade dependency, international norm, information and communication technologies, weakening of territory-based authority) figured in German strategic planning since the early 1990s. Finally, while not excluding the actual use of force, the crisis management missions envisioned show the prevalence of a broad security concept. 86 For example, in the 2002 electoral campaign, both Chancellor Schröder and his challenger Bavarian Minister President Stoiber made clear that Germany’s role in a military operation against Iraq would not be active military participation. 87

**Conclusion: military adaptation and changing perceptions of the utility of force**

This paper shows that the impact of globalization on military power is worth considering in a systematic way. Specifically, I argue that the influence of globalization on strategy depends on military adaptation. Strategists’ preferences


and policy choices regarding the demands of globalization vary from acquiescence to intransigence. By black boxing the military and assuming a uniform set of strategic responses, instead of making them problematic, most of the existing hypotheses can be misleading because they are too indiscriminate. Liberals are right to emphasize that globalization constrains strategy, but in some cases it is as much a source of opportunity, and a stimulus for the strategic imagination, and in others it creates a new balance between external demands and military tasks and missions. While it is true that military organizations act as a pressure group and try to justify their existence by grabbing any rationale at their disposal, their professional duty at the request of political leaders is to design strategic solutions especially in seemingly intractable situations. Realists seriously underestimate the impact of globalization on strategy-making, but they rightly point out that it can generate vulnerabilities and provide military leaders with rationale to bolster their claim for more resources. Strategists usually concur with realists’ pessimistic assessment of the strategic consequences of globalization. Finally, constructivists judiciously take norms seriously: the rise of norms constraining the use of force is associated with globalization dynamics and it affects force employment. However, norms are diverse and might conflict with one another: a total war norm can be a product of globalization as well. Each of these possibilities depends on the ways in which military institutions adapt to the demands of globalization: this is the key causal nexus and the most significant empirical question.

By examining strategic responses to globalization, this paper contributes to the larger debates on the influence of globalization on security, and on the sources of military power. A growing body of research probes and documents the impact of globalization on security. For example, David Rowe showed that before 1914 the expansion of world trade progressively constrained the abilities of the European powers to mobilize their resources for security purposes. 88 Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth explained that globalization had a significant impact on Soviet strategies and contributed to the end of the Cold War. 89 In the 1990s, globalization transformed United Nations peace operations, and attitudes toward free trade influence US leaders decisions to engage, contain and use force. 90 Military adaptation can play a key role in all of these processes.

Finally, this analysis contributes to the broader debate of the sources of military doctrines and conceptions of force employment. While the existing body of research on the sources of military doctrine focus largely on the balance of power or unit-level variables, I identify globalization, combined with military adaptation, as a significant source of variation in conceptions of military power. I examine peacetime conceptions of force employment, and instead of defining a priori a specific set of contingencies as the most significant aspect of military power, I problematize this as an empirical question that varies from one type of military adaptation to the other. Given the demands of globalization, it is important to ask why do some militaries focus on some tasks and missions, while others make different choices. Finally, I emphasize the diversity of military services’ responses to a similar challenge. This is coherent with, and complements, the recent wave of scholarship on military power that puts an emphasis on explicit consideration of how forces should and would be used. 91

Further research could take several directions. First, it is important to get a better understanding of where military adaptive orientations come from, and why they change. What conditions must be present for strategists to adhere to acquiescent, intransigent, promotive, or preservative orientations? Why does one set of adaptive orientation, rather than another, prevails in a military institution? While I do not provide a detailed answer to these questions, three factors are worth examining: the loss-of-strength gradient of each type of military power (notably air, naval, land power), the military’s perception of its role and of its professional identity, and the military’s perception of its legitimacy in the society. 92 Second, comparisons with other globalizations, like the so-called first globalization before 1914, as well as with periods of decline in interdependence should also be fruitful. Finally, it would be useful to maximize the diversity of strategists’ responses to looking at non Western militaries’ adaptations to globalization.

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92 The loss-of-strength gradient is the amount by which the strength of a polity (but of a certain type of military power as well) diminishes per movement away from its base. Boulding identified what he called the law of diminishing strength: ‘[...] the further from home any nation has to operate, the longer will be its lines of communication, and the less strength it can put in the field’, Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense. A General Theory (1st ed. 1962), (New York Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 230–231. See also: Quincy Wright, A Study of War (1st ed. 1942), (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983, abridged edition), 331–336.
Ultimately, there is no evidence that all strategists, and all of them in the same way, believe that because of globalization, the world is now too complex and military power irrelevant. Contrary to Rosenau’s assessment in his more recent work, it is far from obvious that ‘[Neither] high-tech weapons [nor] conventional forces can be very effective when directed toward ... interdependent economies.’93 In fact, time and again, some strategists—but not all of them—reached the opposite conclusion. The more economies are interdependent, the more opportunities they see for potentially devastating uses of force, or threats of force perceived as credible. One should not underestimate the variety of strategic answers to the constraints of globalization, and acknowledge instead the disturbing, but awesome, ingenuity of those who adapt the management of violence to achieve political aims.

International Institutions
in a Globalizing World:
Implications for
Transatlantic Security

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Exploring the relationship between globalization and international institutions on first glance seems too easy a case to make to warrant a conference paper. International institutions, whatever their specific origins or effects may be, both arise from global dynamics as a response to them, and play a role in the management of globalization. Globalization can (and has) occurred without international institutions, and international institutions have been created in international politics in periods of low globalization (for example, the Concert of Europe in the early 19th century). But for the most part the last 150 years or so in international relations has seen the correlation of periods of globalization and the creation of international institutions, and the relationship between the emergence of international institutions after the Second World War and the rise of globalization. Globalization creates a demand for institutions as well as a willingness on the part of some states to supply them, and reliance on institutions lowers the barriers of national sovereignty which control (or impede, depending on your normative perspective) globalization.

The relationship between of globalization and institutions that is so clear in the economic and financial sphere is less obvious and synergistic in the security field, however. The demand for security institutions has tended to be driven more by threat than collective action or coordination and distribution challenges, and the supply of security institutions is assumed to have been driven more by power than problem-solving design or ideas. As a result, assessing the relationships among globalization, institutions, and transatlantic security requires a closer look at the basic aspects of each, both in their contemporary forms and in historical perspective.
Given that ‘globalization’ is contested in both scholarly and policy spheres, I begin by outlining a basic conception of globalization, without taking a position on whether globalization is a new phenomenon. I then review what we understand in the international relations field about international institutions: their origins, effects, and how they evolve. I assess what we think we know about how institutions may enable the US and Europe to cope with an array of security challenges created or complicated by globalization. In the final section, I explore what kind of evidence we would need to research to assess whether international institutions help Europe and the US to manage those challenges. The ultimate goal is to assess in particular whether existing institutions have been or can be adapted to better support transatlantic cooperation in meeting the security challenges of transatlantic security cooperation arising from contemporary globalization.

Globalism and globalization

A productive analysis of globalization and international institutions requires recognizing that globalization is multidimensional, that it has political and social as well as economic forms, that it can increase and decrease over time, and that it represents a bundle of relationships and processes rather than a static condition. ³

Keohane and Nye’s conceptualization of globalism, globalization, and deglobalization does this well. Globalism is a condition of ‘networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances’. ⁴ Interdependence, they note, is a quality of the relationships between two entities, whereas globalism is a quality

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of the international system. We can speak of interdependence between the US and Europe, for example, but not globalism between the US and Europe.

Globalization, in turn, is defined as an increase in globalism, and deglobalization is a decrease in globalism. Networks of interdependence can be economic, primarily flows of capital and goods. This is the common popular understanding of globalization today. Economic globalization may, in turn, result in international integration if states open their borders to international economic flows. But globalization is not integration: globalization is a feature of the global system that may result in the greater integration of individual countries into global networks.

Globalism can be military, environmental, or socio-cultural as well. Just as economic globalism involves flows of goods, services, and capital, military globalism involves long distance networks of interdependence involving threats or challenges to defence or military security. Environmental globalism involves materials including biological diseases such as the bubonic plague, SARS, or HIV which are transmitted across multicontinental distances. Social and cultural globalism involves the movement of ideas, information, knowledge, and beliefs. This can entail simple or discrete pieces of knowledge—such as instant global access to images of the attack on the World Trade Center—to systems of belief—such as the transnational networks of belief and commitment created by al-Qaeda.

Globalization and deglobalization are themselves often the result of changes in technology and costs. Military globalism in the 20th century was a result of the invention of long range aircraft and of ballistic missiles. Contemporary globalization is the result of advances in information technology, primarily the Internet. Future deglobalization may well be the result of the rising costs of energy sources based on fossil fuels. Deglobalization in 1914 was most directly caused by the fracturing of economic networks by World War I, but it was sustained after the war by the high costs of economic international financial exchange and international trade.

Globalization is a source of opportunities and challenges in international relations. It can increase the resources and power available to a state either directly (by increasing the state’s military capabilities or the assets available to the state, such as colonial possessions), or indirectly (through taxation of successful economic activities or its citizens). The prospect of such resources and power may come to define a state’s national interests or objectives. That is, while a country may find itself in a position whereby it does not naturally benefit from the opportunities of globalization, the achievement of that opportunity shapes the definition and pursuit of foreign policy.

However, globalism is not only about opportunities, it is also about challenges. Increases in networks of interdependencies of economics, military,
environment, or socio-cultural factors challenge existing social and political institutions, and especially their ability to regulate and control the lives and behaviours of citizens. Throughout history increases in globalism have challenged states by creating transnational relationships and opportunities that do not fit well with existing state structures, by creating transnational problems which states may not be well-equipped to handle, and by creating conditions which may challenge the legitimacy or authority of existing states. 3

A state, or rather the political leadership that controls it, can respond by adapting well to the new challenges. 4 It can develop new capacities for dealing with new areas of economic policy, for example, a ministry for industry along with a ministry for agriculture. It can build defences appropriate to the new military challenges the country faces. It can cooperate with the governments of other countries to create international institutions to manage transnational global challenges, such as unregulated financial flows or criminal networks.

While globalism as a general phenomenon cannot be prevented by any given government, often a state can erect barriers to globalism’s networks of interdependence. States can make the national currency nonconvertible, and tax or even prohibit imports. State can require foreign importers to buy and sell only with state agencies in order to control economic activity within the country and the value of its currency. While a state cannot prevent globalism or globalization, it can take action to insulate, to some degree, the country from their effects. Globalism challenges a state to craft a foreign policy that manages the negative effects arising from vulnerability to globalism’s destabilizing influences, while taking advantages of globalism’s positive effects.

Globalism also affects international relations by affecting states and societies themselves. Changes in globalism can alter the balance of social, economic, and political power and interests within states. Economic globalization can create new economic winners, who might seek to change the political conditions under which they exercise their commercial activities. Increasing transnational financial flows may undermine a state’s control of monetary policy in favour of private investors who have their own objectives, while changing trading partners may challenge the importance of old allies. The availability of information about events abroad may confound the ability of governments to remain impervious to societal pressures in foreign policy, as we have seen in the effects of public opinion on pressures for humanitarian intervention.

3 Soros, 2002, p. 3.
Globalization is a feature of the international system, but like other features of the system—power or incomplete information, for example—governance mechanisms can change its effects on nation-states. The choice of whether and how to embrace or limit globalization can therefore be shaped by the availability, effectiveness, or legitimacy of international institutions. Are the benefits of sustaining globalization great enough to justify investing in international institutions? Do institutions exist that are effective in managing globalization challenges? Can existing institutions be adapted to manage new challenges and opportunities? Do key states agree on the role of institutions, and are they willing to invest in them?

**International institutions and global security**

International institutions are sets of rules and convergent expectations, often connected to organizations, existing at the international, transnational, or global levels. They vary in formality from conventions (such as sovereignty) to regimes (such as non-proliferation) to organizations (such as NATO). They can be inclusive and have few membership criteria (such as the United Nations), or exclusive with more or less strict membership criteria (such as the G8). They can be designed to manage a single objective (such as preventing nuclear proliferation), to manage a set of objectives or problems within a single issue area (such as development), or to manage related multiple issue areas with the objective of a more encompassing objective (such as European integration). They may vary in the degree to which they constrain member action or sanction member behaviour: institutions may facilitate cooperation, but they may be dysfunctional, and they may well be instruments of the powerful.

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7 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’, *International Organization*, (Winter 2005), 59, pp. 39–75, at pp. 57–58. Although the point is perhaps not key to the subject of this paper, it is worth noting that international institutions are not
As in the case of globalization, it is important to begin with a conception of international institutions that does not preclude issue areas, such as security, nor assume the effectiveness or existence of institutions where they might play a role in managing international challenges or opportunities. It is also important not to build into the definition assumptions about their purpose or function, since doing so would preclude building in variation in the origins, evolution, or effects of institutions. That is, a statement such as ‘international institutions are created by states to manage uncertainty’, or ‘international institutions are instruments of powerful states to manage threats’ should be theoretical propositions, not part of the definition. The definition of institutions should be able to encompass rules and practices that evolved out of practice—authorization of peacekeeping missions under the UN General Assembly during the Cold War, for example—as well as institutions created through deliberate design and negotiation—the arguably dysfunctional United Nations Security Council, for example. Whether institutions arise through power, choice, or by practice, and by which of these mechanisms they adapt or evolve, should be addressed by theory, not ruled out in the definition.

Because the study of institutions began in the fields of trade, development, and related economic and social issues, for many years there was little serious research on the existence or role of international institutions in security. There was, of course, a great deal of research on security organizations such as alliances. This work was either largely atheoretical, focusing on the functions and policies of NATO, for example, or it was strictly in a realist vein, assuming that security institutions are an appendage in one way or another of power and that they did not warrant investigation as a dependent variable (i.e. an outcome that could vary in any way different than the balance of power), and certainly not as an independent variable (i.e. as a causal force that could have any effect different from that of the underlying balance of power).

Because the analytical development of regime and institutional theory was advanced primarily in non-security scholarly circles and developed based in large measure on economic and contractual approaches to social choice, when

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exclusively inter-governmental. Early research and analysis of institutions focused on state-based international organizations, but just as there are state, civil society, and business institutions within countries, there are state, civil society, and business institutions at the international and transnational level. For example, in the issue area of HIV/AIDS alone there are not only the major UN organizations (UNAIDS, UNICEF, WHO, the Global Fund), but also the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, and Doctors Without Borders.

institutional theory challenged the dominant neorealist paradigm, one of the counter-arguments of neorealist scholars was that institutional theory could at best address a subset of (less important) international relations peculiar to the economic/contractual paradigm. This ‘relative gains’ argument was an attempt to limit institutional theory to a narrow area within the field, and to establish that at best it addressed a special case of international relations in which absolute gains prevailed.\(^9\) The implication was that perhaps under conditions of the Cold War where the western allies were more worried about the Soviet threat than about one another, they could cooperate within narrow parameters to optimize economic and social relations among like-minded countries. But for truly important issues—that is, the security realm—institutions would be irrelevant or merely an instrument of powerful states.

In fact, there is no analytical basis to these claims. While it is true that in cases of zero-sum relationships there is nothing to cooperate for, it is far from the case that all security issues are zero-sum, and it is by no means the case that economic or social issues are exclusively positive sum. While it may be true that security issues more often involve zero-sum stakes, it is not intrinsically true and zero-sum relations can characterize economic and social issues as well, so there is no a priori basis for ruling out the relevance of institutional theory in security relations. And while it is true that in security relations the consequences of being exploited (cooperation in the face of non-cooperation by other countries) can be more costly, costliness is a quantitative measure, not a qualitative one, and therefore cannot itself be the basis for a qualitative distinction between security and non-security issues with respect to cooperation or institutions.\(^10\)

If we widen the scope of inquiry from whether and how institutions may affect strategies, choice, and through them outcomes in international relations to whether and how institutions may affect the interests, preferences, goals, and understandings of societies and political leaders, it becomes even more apparent that an adequate assessment cannot rule out international institutions in the security area \textit{a priori}. Even if it were true, for example, that fear of being exploited prevented states from cooperating to pursue common interests, it would remain important to understand and explain the sources of national interests. Unless one were willing to reduce national interests to pure domestic


politics and societal sources—with no interaction with the international system and no room for normative aspects—international institutions would have to be part of an inquiry into explaining security relations. That is, even if all that mattered in international security relations were power and interests, as the realist tradition holds, and international institutions did not alter how states pursue what they want, we still would need to understand why they want what they want.

To assess anything more specific on the potential impact of institutions on power, interests, strategies, values, and outcomes in the security area, we need to turn to the three broad approaches to international theory: realism, contractual liberalism, and constructivism.

**Realism**

It is not quite the case that realist approaches preclude the study of international institutions, despite the impression one might form from reading articles by the tradition’s leading theorists. Kenneth Waltz, for example, continues to dismiss the potential for independent effects, and to predict NATO’s demise years after the Cold War.\(^\text{11}\)

However, if institutions are not absent from most realist scholarship on security, they are highly constrained and tied to power. Stephen Walt’s *Origins of Alliances* is, after all, a theory of alliances, which are institutions. In Walt’s structural theory alliances are a function of the distribution of power, and are the result of strategies of balancing power, as predicted by his mentor’s theory. As a result, alliances-as-institutions do not have independent effects on strategies, interests, or outcomes.

Nonetheless, some of the leading scholars of NATO have been realists, which seems odd for a theoretical tradition in which alliances come down to being epiphenomena of underlying power relationships. Robert Art, for example, is a leading scholar of American foreign and security policy, and of NATO.\(^\text{12}\) His work takes power as key to foreign policy interests, relations, and outcomes, but he also takes seriously the impact that NATO itself has had on transatlantic relations at different points in time during the Cold War, and how the demise of NATO would affect transatlantic and American security (negatively, in his

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analysis) were it to disappear after the Cold War. In his view, alliances such as NATO can have an effect on foreign policy and international relations if they are useful to the powerful countries involved, but alliances do not constrain or shape countries’ interests or strategies. Art’s conception of institutions in the security realm parallels nicely Robert Gilpin’s conception of the role of international economic or financial institutions: they arise from the interest and capacity of hegemons in their instrumental value for managing hegemony, without constraining the hegemons and without altering their underlying power, interests, or strategies.13

So there is some scope in some realist work for a highly instrumental role for institutions and they can affect security issues, although not in strictly structural approaches. Explaining the existence or impact of institutions is cast in terms of the interests and capabilities of the major powers (or in the case of contemporary transatlantic relations, of the United States as the single global power).

Institutional effectiveness, therefore, is expected insofar as institutions meet the interests and advance the power of the most powerful country(ies) in the international system. Since reliance on institutions and compliance with their rules and procedures takes place in an anarchic international system—a system in which there is no world government or higher sovereign authority than states—international law and institutions are a matter of voluntary adherence and compliance. While weak states may choose to comply because they cannot achieve their objectives through power, or because they are compelled to do so for fear of punishment by powerful states, powerful states will not comply or be constrained unless their interests are being served. International institutions, that is, become simply another arena for playing out classic national interests and balance of power politics.

Realists can point, of course, the US unilateralism in the war against Iraq, as evidence for this view. (John Bolton, one is tempted to suspect, is a realist’s dream come true in the ongoing intellectual battle between realists and institutionalists). Other evidence would include abrogation of the ABM Treaty and US attempts to deal with non-proliferation and Iran beyond the rules and processes of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In all these cases, when institutions constrained US options to deal with priority security issues as the country’s leadership preferred, the US was able to act alone, outside institutions, and in contradiction with their rules and procedures.


**Institutionalism**

Like realist theory, institutional theory explains the existence of international institutions in terms of their usefulness and effectiveness. Unlike realist theory, however, institutionalism does not assume that power plays as overwhelming a role in defining states interests or interactions. Drawn from liberal traditions of political and economic theory, institutional theory allows for a wider variety of interests. By allowing that variation, institutional theory allows for a greater range of common as well as conflicting interests.

In this approach, scholars argue that some security challenges and threats can only be met through cooperative effort. The list is long: non-proliferation, counterterrorism, transnational crime, ethnic conflicts, humanitarian crises, global health pandemics, failed states, and drug trafficking among them. Because of the nature of these 21st century security threats and challenges, the actions of any one state alone will not effectively deal with the problem and contribute to stability and security. Therefore, states may seek to cooperate on these issues, and to do so, they will create and rely upon international institutions.

The key is that there are incentives for states to commit to rules in the short-term to obtain the long-term benefits of cooperation. The reason for international institutions is to enable countries to cooperate for their long-term self-interest. When there is a temptation to act unilaterally for narrow selfish interest in the short-term, that is, international institutions are a mechanism of self-discipline for self-interest.

If realist approaches see institutions in light of the pursuit of power, institutional theories see institutions in light of the pursuit of problem-solving. Of course, one type of problem is being powerful insofar as power contributes to security. But security is not always—or perhaps even often—guaranteed by power. In the contemporary world, the United States may be uniquely powerful, but it also particularly insecure relative to the threat of global terrorism rooted in the transnational reach and ambitions of al Qaeda. Even during the Cold War, the nature of nuclear weapons had inspired a shift in scholarly understanding of the relationship between power and security: mutual vulnerability to nuclear attack meant that the United States and Soviet Union were not necessarily more secure as they increased their nuclear arsenals.

If one allows that there can be a mix of common and conflicting interests in the security field, and that power and security do not map into a perfect causal relationship, the puzzle becomes under what conditions can states better realize

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14 The realist scholar Robert Jervis made this point better than anyone, to this day. Robert Jervis (1978) 'Cooperation under the security dilemma’, *World Politics* (30)2: 167–214.
their security objectives through international institutions. In my own work, I argue that:

• Given common interests and costly or ineffective use of force, greater uncertainty increases the value of institutions to states for choosing efficient and effective security strategies.

• Because security problems and the conditions needed to solve them vary, variation in institutional form and function matters. States will choose cooperative strategies when institutions are available with the appropriate form and function for collaboration, coordination, assurance, and linkage problems.

• Institutions will be effective in producing security cooperation when they have the appropriate forms for solving the relevant security problem and when there are formal or informal connections among them. 15

For institutional theories, therefore, the question of whether states turn to institutions in the security realm, including the specific question of the effects of globalization on institutions in transatlantic security, comes down to institutional effectiveness. In realist theories, states will rely on institutions if they match with realities of power. In institutional theories, states will rely on institutions if they are a reliable mechanism for realizing long-term security interests through cooperation by effectively overcoming obstacles to an array of security problems.

The key to institutional effectiveness in this understanding, therefore, is variation, institutional adaptation, and the fit of forums to security challenges. For example, in some cases of international conflict, conditions call for peacekeeping, while in others conditions require peace enforcement. This is recognized in the UN Charter, in the distinction between Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations. It would be—and in the case of Bosnia in fact was—ineffective and even disastrous to use peacekeeping methods when peace enforcement was what was required. In Iraq, there are multiple tasks for peace and security in Iraq and no one policy or institution can meet them all. It is not a matter of either-or: either the UN, or the US-led coalition. It is a matter of the UN and the coalition, each doing the tasks it is suited for, and which are required under current conditions, given the goal of a self-governing Iraq with the resources for the country to make it a contributor to peace and security.

From an institutional perspective, the problem of transatlantic security cooperation is about the lack of fit between security problems requiring

cooperation, and the availability or adaptability of international institutions that could support cooperation. For this body of theory, for example, we would expect the fundamental reason for the US unilateral war in Iraq was not an unwillingness of the US to be constrained and its ability to act alone because of its hegemonic power, but the failure of global and transatlantic security institutions to effectively manage the uncertainty of Iraq’s WMD programmes.\footnote{Alternatively, institutionalists might argue that the Bush Administration is wrong-headed in not understanding the value of multilateralism and institutions for sustaining self-interested foreign policies over the long run. See Lisa L. Martin, ‘Multilateral Organizations after the US-Iraq War of 2003’, paper prepared for Impact and Consequences of the US-Iraq War, (World Scientific Publishing, forthcoming). However, to fall back on an explanatory argument that leaders in the US are mistaken or myopic—however true it might or might not be—is outside the institutionalist theory and thus is not a very satisfactory, explanation.}

**Constructivism**

Realist and institutional theory disagree on why states may find international institutions useful and effective, but they have a common approach to the challenge of explaining state behaviour and international outcomes. Both theoretical traditions assume instrumental rationality on the part of states, and in particular the predominance of strategic choice. Both assume that the condition of anarchy (absence of supranational government) in the international system makes cooperation difficult. Both assume that national interests—or preferences—are relatively fixed by the need to pursue power/security, or that national preferences are determined by domestic level variables not affected by the international system, and thus can be treated as given, fixed, or ‘exogenous’.

Theories within constructivism approach the puzzle of state reliance on international institutions and the question of the effects of institutions from an entirely different set of premises. Because ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ there is no premise that security cooperation is inherently more difficult or puzzling than cooperation for economic or social benefits. Social choice is guided by norms, practices, and the logic of appropriateness, rather than calculation of material cost-benefit trade-offs in strategic interaction with other states.

Most importantly, while in realist theory international institutions have an effect on state behaviour and international outcomes by reinforcing or supporting the exercise of power and consequent national interest, and in institutional theory by altering the strategic environment through changes in information/uncertainty, in constructivism international institutions have a causal effect on behaviour and outcomes more directly, by altering state preferences, interests, and/or identities. Through socialization, practice, and
interaction, institutions establish and diffuse norms, create expectations, and affect how states as international social actors understand themselves and the social environment of the international system.

For a rational (or contractual) institutionalist, the hypothesized effect of the nuclear non-proliferation regime on cooperation lies in the effectiveness of the regime in creating transparency about member states nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions, and creates disincentives for defection through a system of sanctions. In constructivist approaches, the hypothesized effect of the NPT regime is through creating an expectation of non-nuclear weapons state status, and the practice of reassuring members of this status quo norm through regular inspections. Inspections for a contractual institutionalist are a way for cooperative states to signal assurance of their benign intentions, but also to catch malign defectors. The deterrence and sanction-triggering aspects of inspections are in constructivist theories not the causal key to institutional effectiveness. Instead, institutional effects and effectiveness are produced by the diffusion of non-proliferation norms as developed in the practices of the regime, including inspections. This is why, for example, the failure of nuclear weapons states to disarm as required by the treaty is viewed more seriously as a reason for the regime’s ineffectiveness than it is by realists or most contractual institutionalists.17

Different theorists within constructivism focus on various mechanisms of socialization: communicative action, persuasion, social influence. International institutions facilitate socialization through a variety of processes ranging from soft diffusion of internalized norms to tougher socialization akin to sanctioning, such as shaming.18 As in contractual institutionalism, then, we would expect that institutions would vary in their effectiveness in altering state interests and behaviour. Recognizing that constructivist theories do not necessarily view security cooperation as inherently puzzling and requiring explanation, it is

17 Although not a theoretical constructivist this is reflected in Joseph Cirrincione (editor), Repairing the Regime, (New York: Routledge, 2000).
nonetheless useful to recognize that constructivist theories (at least those accepting positivism) and contractual institutionalism are akin in expecting that variation in institutional form will have an impact on state behaviour and international outcomes. Dimensions of variation include inclusiveness and exclusiveness of membership, global vs. regional institutions, hard and soft rules/norms/laws, and the interaction of institutional features with domestic political institutions.¹⁹ In the contractual institutional case the causal path lies through strategies; in the constructivist case the causal path lies through interests/identities.

Returning to the common puzzle of why international institutions failed to produce security cooperation on Iraq in 2002–2003, constructivist approaches might identify the failure of the United Nations as a socialization mechanism. The UN is a very broad, weak, and diverse institution, with very weak norms. After all, in its history the UN has sustained among its leading members former empires, and former empires which have even in recent times invaded sovereign countries without sanction or consequence.

However, that seems rather a weak explanation, since sometimes UN norms do prove effective and do create a presumption that national security must be pursued in compliance with international law. What one might note is that the UN created norms, identities, and roles for states under the specific historical conditions of the post-World War II world. These included a ‘first among equals’ inequality in the UN Security Council, by which the five permanent members can veto any resolution. That privilege has become over time an internalized aspect of the P5 countries’ identities, and seen as part of their national interests. That is, freedom of action is not merely instrumental to what the P5 want, it is part of what they want to preserve as an aspect of their status and power. The US perhaps violated the UN Charter in its unilateral intervention against Iraq not despite the UN, but because of the UN, in an act to assert its special freedom of action. ²⁰


²⁰ What about Russia, China, France, and Great Britain? The latter two, one could argue, are more strongly and immediately socialized by their membership in the European Union. On China and Russia, it seems likely that both would ignore UN law to intervene in case of a threat to their status or identity, say over Taiwan or Georgia.
Security globalization and institutions

The discussion in the previous sections suggests that the key to the role of institutions for security cooperation is whether existing institutions either match or can evolve to meet (through design or not) new transatlantic security challenges in a globalizing world. It is worth thinking through the relationship between globalization and institutions in the security area more explicitly.

Recall that globalization poses three challenges to states on the international level. Globalization presents:

1. Opportunities for power;
2. Challenges to the functioning of the nation-state on the international level;
3. Changes in domestic political, economic, and social orders. How might international institutions affect or interact with each of these in the security area?

While it is perhaps overstating the qualitative distinction, it is striking that globalization in the security realm is, to a greater degree than globalization in the economic realm, about the appearances of qualitatively new threats, challenges, and problems. Certain security issues are, of course, an extension of Cold War threats, such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The increased threat potential of the spread of WMD is not about new technologies or shifts in political orders, but about the end of bipolarity and increased political diversity, opportunity, and uncertainty with the break-up of the Soviet Union.

But the security threats of globalization that dominate international politics and state interactions at the international level are primarily about qualitatively new phenomena at a global scale that are the result of changes in technology or political constraints. Global terrorism is a function of globalized modern technology (financial, communications, and ideational) as well as the destructive effects of globalization which has in part been the source of the phenomenon of failed states. Similarly, transnational criminal networks engaged in trafficking in commodities or persons—whether related to terrorist groups or not—are able to operate by exploiting post-Cold War changes in immigration regimes, border controls, political alliances, and global economic integration.

That the question of democratic development of countries on a global scale is considered to be a legitimate issue of security policy in both the United States and Europe (although there may be a substantial gap in how leaderships in Europe and the US define acceptable and reasonable instruments for advancing democracy globally) is a result of political, military, economic, and cultural globalization. If it were not the case that technology and related networks of interdependence mean that the performance and resilience of states across the globe can affect the security of other states (as, for example, in the case of non-democratic Afghanistan or authoritarian China), democracy would not likely be
a mainstream in the security policies of the US and Europe, and might remain relegated to the realm of normative or humanitarian excursions in foreign policy.\textsuperscript{21} And while globalized security challenges such as ethnic conflicts, cases of potential humanitarian or genocide crises, and health threats such as the global AIDS pandemic are not solely phenomenon of the post-Cold War globalizing world, their global profile is a result of the broader processes of political, economic, and technological integration of the late 20\textsuperscript{th} and early 21\textsuperscript{st} centuries.

Therefore, what is interesting and new about globalization and institutions is not power, or obstacles to cooperation, or shared expectations and norms. The essence of something interesting and worth thinking about in the connection of globalization and institutions in the security realm is the common element of new power relationships, new challenges, new developments in the nature of state interests and identities. It is the potential for a shock to the system, and state response, that is key.\textsuperscript{22}

The fundamental question of interest, then, is something that to only varying degrees the three theoretical traditions were developed to answer particularly well: how do international institutions—or do international institutions—enable states and societies to manage and benefit from change in the international system? Not incremental change, but qualitatively new, unexpected, system-shattering change and challenge to national security, and even to the nature of the nation-state.

For realist theory, since institutions are largely epiphenomena of power, it is not surprising that we would expect fundamentally new challenges to elicit state responses based primarily of national power and on the international distribution of power. Other than NATO, international institutions in the security area, from a realist point of view, do not really reflect or enable US power, and therefore they quickly become irrelevant to key globalized security challenges, whether it be the failed state and terrorist haven of Afghanistan or the suspected WMD-seeking and threatening authoritarian regional power of Iraq. From a realist perspective, the key to security in a globalized world is not really the nature of the globalized security issues, but the response of countries, based on the international balance of power, to challenges, old or new. Realists may (and do) disagree about whether existing institutions (primarily NATO, but


also the NPT and the UN Security Council) serve American interests and power, but they agree that if they do not, the institutions become irrelevant.  

For contractual institutionalists, in theory the existence of new problems or challenges should pose little problem for theories of cooperation. Although globalized security may pose very new problems for cooperation and may increase uncertainty (increasing in principle the demand for international institutions in order to mitigate the constraints on cooperation), because institutional theory is rooted in the premise that institutions are a functional response to the demand for solving cooperation problems, a well-articulated contractual theory of institutions should be able to incorporate new security challenges and work out predictions about state policies and the expected effectiveness and adaptability of institutions.

In fact, however, contractual institutional theory is very poorly developed when it comes to questions of change and the relative effectiveness of existing (or for that matter, potential hypothetical alternative) international institutions. My own attempt to develop such a dimension to contractual institutional theory by building on institutional variation was largely inductive, if informed by deductive theory.  

With few exceptions, institutional theory remains limited to propositions about the origins of institutions by working backwards from their existing features, and has failed to develop a theory of the effectiveness or evolution of institutions under conditions of change and new challenge.

To the extent that contractual institutional theory might suggest expected effects or effectiveness of existing institutions, it comes back to existing institutional features and their accidental fit with new globalization security challenges. In the face of transnational terrorism, for example, NATO has found a new (if limited) lease on institutional life because the military training and integration central to preparing for war against the Soviet Union has proven (imperfectly) useful for military missions in Afghanistan and the Balkans. Similarly, the UN’s peacekeeping functions with a mandate from the General Assembly have been transferred as an instrument of the UN Security Council, with the effect of somewhat greater authority and resources. And perhaps the

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26 This is clear in the most comprehensive review of institutional theory, Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, ‘Theories and empirical studies of international institutions’, *International Organization*, 52(4), (Autumn 1998), pp. 729–757.
best example of all, the relatively weak and ‘soft’ security institution of the OSCE has become more significant in Europe because of its presumption of inclusiveness and its relative specialization in issues relating to elections and democratization, which unexpectedly have moved closer to the centre of US and European security policies.27

Because constructivism begins from a different set of premises and presumptions to explaining international outcomes, it has key advantages in addressing the question of the role of international institutions in enabling states to cope with new globalized security challenges and problems. The core puzzle for constructivism is how social actors’ interests and identities change, through socialization, diffusion of norms, interaction, and other processes by which actors at the national or subnational level define interests and/or identities. In this sense, insofar as international institutions address or incorporate changes in the nature of security threats of challenges in a globalizing world, theories in the constructivist tradition can more readily propose (subject to empirical exploration) how changed understandings, values, norms, and expectations of what is necessary, appropriate, or desirable may diffuse to member states. For example, to what extent did international institutions affect the growing consensus that treats HIV/AIDS as a security issue?28 Specific propositions—that more inclusive institutions will be more effective in diffusing ideas to a larger number of states which can then more effectively cooperate to cope with new globalized security threats, or that specific mechanisms of socialization can adapt to understandings that enable states to incorporate new globalized security challenges—can be drawn out in detail.

However, while constructivist theories have a leg up on realist or contractual institutional approaches in starting from the premise of change, they do not explain or address the sources of institutional fit or change to adapt to new security challenges arising from globalization itself. As in the case of contractual institutionalism, we are left with the proposition that if existing international institutions have features which fit well with new challenges, they can enable

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27 A related question would be whether international institutions exacerbate the negative or destabilizing effects of globalization. Joseph Stiglitz argues in the case of the IMF, many of the financial crises and development setbacks of the 1990s were not primarily the failures of national governments to cooperate and manage globalization with the support of international institutions, but were caused by dogmatic and inappropriate IMF rules and programmes. For an excellent assessment of his critique see Barry Eichengreen, ‘The Globalization Wars’, Foreign Affairs, (July/August 2002), 81/4, pp. 157.

states to cope (through socialization and shifts in shared understanding, rather than through shifts in functional problem solving) with new challenges. For example, one might expect that if new security challenges in a globalized world have the character of requiring a greater degree of coordinated joint action because of the truly common nature of certain security threats, such as the destabilizing effects of the spread of HIV/AIDS, then the existence of maximally inclusive institutions which are more developed in the socialization processes of back-patting than in conditionality, then states will be better able to cooperate to meet such new challenges.

In contrast, the norms underpinning the institution of nuclear non-proliferation are severely strained and contested. Therefore, we should expect that the value of the non-proliferation regime for helping states to cope with the daunting new challenges of proliferation will not be as great from a constructivist perspective. Given the centrality of norms and shared understandings underlying not only cooperation, but the interests of state and non-state actors, it should be clear that we would expect institutions to fail to play a role in supporting cooperation in the face of new security challenges.

That is useful to understand, and may prove a guide to thinking about the potential for transatlantic security cooperation. But what about the vast majority of new security challenges posed by globalization for which no existing institutions exist as a Cold War legacy: transnational terrorism, failed states, criminal trafficking, and environmental threats to development? Does constructivism offer much more than contractual institutionalism’s modified functionalism or realism’s power-is-all answer for when institutions will be created or evolved to cope effectively with new globalization security challenges? Research has shown that change happens, that institutions play a role in the mechanisms of change, and that change occurs not only because of changes in circumstances, power, or information, but through changes in understanding or belief.29 In the absence of hypotheses or arguments about when institutions facilitate change in this manner (and when they do not), we are left with a better understanding that institutions may play a role in supporting transatlantic cooperation for coping with the effects of globalization on security threats and challenges, but without a understanding of when to expect that they will.

Globalization, institutions, and transatlantic security: implications for policy

The question motivating this paper in the beginning was whether international institutions are facilitating transatlantic cooperation on security problems in an era of globalization. Which international institutions best meet the realities of power, problem-solving, and common interests for advancing cooperation to meet the challenges of security in a globalizing world? Transnational terrorism, WMD proliferation, ethnic conflicts, humanitarian crises, failed states, and environmental and health pathologies are common transatlantic security challenges arising from globalization on which transatlantic cooperation varies, and where international institutions might facilitate cooperation.

This brief survey suggests that existing institutions neither are well-designed nor function well to enable states to cope with the new nature of the challenges. The institution where the US has felt itself most comfortable with how power and purpose mesh for coping with security problems is NATO, and NATO is of very limited usefulness for coping with new security challenges. It has adapted more than realists expected for European security challenges such as democratic transitions, but it has not adapted to new global challenges or roles. Whether NATO is becoming irrelevant to security policy because of unipolarity or institutional dysfunction will probably animate realist-institutionalist debates for at least a decade, but NATO’s increasing irrelevance is becoming clear.

On institutional dysfunction, it is not surprising that institutions created to cope with security in a Cold War context are not appropriate for new conditions or challenges. But from a rational institutional point of view it is surprising that states seem so unwilling to invest in adapting and evolving institutions, given how valuable they have been in the past for important security problems. For all its weaknesses, the UN did evolve a functional peacekeeping regime, and it played a role in defusing multiple Cold War confrontations. The UN has basic rules, practices, and experience for a wide array of cooperative military intervention supported by economic and humanitarian assistance programmes. Its effectiveness has been seriously undermined, however, because its members have simply not overcome competitive political positions necessary for institutional reform involving the UN Security Council or creating standing interventionary capacity. For all the growth in nuclear weapons and delivery systems during the Cold War, the nuclear non-proliferation regime did slow the spread of nuclear weapons technology, and not just among the easy cases: think of South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina. The NPT regime, including the IAEA and various supplier agreements, might in principle be adapted to address the dynamics of proliferation that have developed as a result of globalization, including transnational actors as agents of proliferation. The obstacles to adapting the non-proliferation regime are not technical, they are political, and involve agreement on the basic non-proliferation bargain, the reasons why
countries such as Iran seek nuclear capability, and the obligations as well as responsibilities of the major nuclear powers.

Given the experience and successes of long-term multilateralism in the security field, why are states not investing in adapting or evolving institutions? From a rationalist perspective, the policy recommendations are relatively clear: improve information and transparency where distrust is a constraint on cooperation, enhance sanctioning capacity where defection is the problem, establish focal points where distributional competition prevents stable agreement. There are many reports on how to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, how to modernize the UN Security Council, how to create a rapid reaction capacity to prevent humanitarian crises and ethnic conflict.30

Realists might argue that in the absence of bipolarity the US lacks incentives to invest in institutions, and without leadership the investment will not be made. The implication, if that was the correct diagnosis, would be that European countries should recognize that any success in creating or adapting institutions for effectively coping with common security challenges in a globalizing world will require bowing to the need to make sure that any such new or adapted institutions meet American requirements of power and effectiveness. The process may be collegial, diplomatic, and in the best traditions of the transatlantic community, but American leadership and preferences would be the implication of the diagnosis.

That is not a comfortable conclusion, neither for Europeans, nor for Americans inclined to prefer transatlantic cooperation for security. But if adapting to American understandings of institutional power and effectiveness is not the correct remedy because it is not the correct diagnosis, the alternative explanation would appear to lie in constructivist insights: that the reasons for the failures of transatlantic cooperation through new or adapted security institutions lie in the disjuncture between American and European (recognizing of course that there is considerable diversity within Europe) interests, values, and identities. That is, what we face is not a failure of cooperation in the face of common security interests, but the lack of common security interests on which to base cooperation.

The constructivist remedy might be for Europe to engage the US in order to socialize it to modern 21st century understandings and ideas about how globalization shapes security interests in a way to favour common definitions and understandings. Or, alternatively, for the US to engage Europe in a similar

process to socialize Europe to American identity. Neither seems likely to appeal to either side of the transatlantic community.

The more pragmatic policy implication is that before the US and Europe engage in further rounds of seeking to create or adapt institutions, the members of the transatlantic community need to be much more clear-headed and honest about whether there are in fact common interests upon which to base cooperation. Iraq, Iran, Kyoto, China, and other recent issues may inspire pessimism and an unwillingness to face the potential for fundamental differences. But the implications of institutional theory from three very different theoretical traditions is quite clear that there is no getting around the fundamental question of national interests and values, however they are formed, as the basis for international security cooperation.

A research agenda

Do the contemporary obstacles to transatlantic cooperation for global security lie in the institutions, in institutional theory, or the absence of common interests and values in the transatlantic relations? I have suggested that the problem may lie in all three, which is not much help in constructing a sound research agenda that is also policy relevant. However, this discussion has made it clear that for all their different expectations about cooperation and understandings of the conditions under which it occurs in international affairs, the main scholarly approaches to security cooperation at some point expect common interests to play some role in serving as a basis for cooperative behaviour.

This suggests that before looking at whether variation in institutions or the power behind institutions explain current limits to transatlantic cooperation, any research that is to satisfy either scholarly or policy requirements needs to tackle the question of the interests of the players involved. Whether those interests are defined in terms of power, or whether they emerge from domestic politics or from international interaction and socialization processes, any inquiry into transatlantic security cooperation has to get the foundations right first, and those foundations lie in the definition of state/society interests. If it is the case that interests diverge significantly, thus precluding cooperation, it suggests that the potential role for institutions in transatlantic relations in coping with globalization lies in the area of constructivist inquiry: socialization processes to create common interests and understandings. And if research suggests that the countries and societies that make up the transatlantic community—and particularly the US on the one hand and European countries on the other—are similar in terms of the interests they hold or understand, scholarly and policy attention reasonably should then focus on questions of institutional design, adaptation, and effectiveness, as well as the role of national power in state strategies.
A research design is required to establish the fundamental case on whether it is common or diverging interests and understandings that prevail in transatlantic relations. We need to seriously explore societal beliefs and attitudes about security and the challenges or issues arising from globalization using interviews of leading officials and politicians on those issues. Without evidence on what national interests and values are on each side of the Atlantic, publications arguing that non-cooperation is due to unipolarity, lack of leadership, institutional dysfunction, or divergent values are more a reflection of the author’s pre-existing theoretical loyalties than a serious assessment of the puzzle.