Coping with Complexity. An Organizational Perspective on European Security Governance

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Abstract
How does the European Union respond to a rapidly changing security environment that is increasingly characterised by challenges cutting across the traditional divide between internal and external security? This paper traces the emergence of comprehensive security concepts at the EU level and their subsequent translation into organizational practices. It puts forward a research strategy to analyse whether, how and to what extent the new post-Cold War security concepts have had an impact on traditional ways of providing security in Europe. Complementing current research on European security policies, the paper focuses on their organizational underpinnings to study the governance of complex security issues in the EU. Building on institutionalist theories of organizational change, the paper contends that the dynamics of organizational innovation within the European security architecture lead to outcomes that differ from the comprehensive security concepts developed at the political level. A brief analysis of recent developments in the EU’s counter-terrorism architecture illustrates the complex dynamics of innovation in the European system of security governance.

Keywords
security/internal; security/external; EU governance; institutionalism; organizational change
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**Introduction**

The end of the Cold War made a recalibration of traditional security concepts in Europe possible. During the last decade, policy-makers and researchers moved away from the traditional Cold War security agenda with its focus on strategic deterrence and conventional large-scale warfare and embraced wider notions of security. Across Europe, policy-makers developed security agendas characterized by their emphasis on a new breed of complex and often diffuse security challenges. Today, terrorism heads the lists of security priorities, followed by the challenges of organized crime, the spread of infectious diseases, nationalist conflicts, regional instability and state failure as well as risks emerging as results of large-scale environmental degradation.

The European security research community debated these developments from various angles and theoretical perspectives. Research in the Copenhagen School framework analysed logics of ‘securitization’ and ‘desecuritization’ to figure out how various issues enter and exit security agendas (Wæver 1995; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998). Didier Bigo and his colleagues analysed the driving forces behind securitizing acts and pointed to security professionals as main actors responsible for placing new issues on the security agenda (Bigo 2000: 173; 2001: 93f). Lastly, against the fierce criticism of traditional security analysts wary of compromising the intellectual coherence of the concept of security (Baldwin 1997), critical security studies scholars put forward normative criteria for developing a post-Cold War security agenda: they argued for shifting the focus of the new security agendas to non-military issues like human rights violations, environmental degradation, social injustice or economic deprivation (Krause and Williams 1997; Wyn Jones 1999).

Today, these often contentious debates about the broadening, widening or deepening of security concepts have quieted down and security agendas all over Europe now routinely feature a wide variety of ‘complex’ or ‘non-traditional’ security challenges. As shown later, two characteristics distinguish these new challenges from conventional notions of security: often transnational and transversal in nature, they transcend both state borders and the separation of domestic and external security provision. Threats such as organized crime and terrorism are increasingly transnational in scope, since they frequently involve transnational networks of non-state actors and both stem from and impact on more than one state at a time. At the same time, some complex security challenges have both a domestic and an international dimension and thus traverse the boundaries between internal and external security. Yet while a comparatively large research site deals with recent and ongoing changes of security concepts and the move towards a comprehensive security agenda in Europe, less analyses have traced their translation into new security practices and orders. In this paper, I aim to fill this gap and take a step beyond the outlined discussions of change in European concepts of security: I provide a research strategy to analyse whether, how and to what extent the new security strategies have had an impact on traditional ways of providing security in Europe.

Since the transnational and transversal quality of the new security challenges significantly erodes the efficiency of national responses to them, the research strategy of this paper focuses on the case of the emerging security order at the EU level. The case of the EU is interesting since it developed its new security architecture explicitly as a mechanism to harmonize and – to some extent – integrate national security policies in the face of transnational security challenges. The EU first developed intra-European internal security policies in the mid-1990s, after the Schengen Convention abolished internal border controls and enabled the free
movement of persons between the Member States. Later, it added elements of an external security architecture to its institutional structure and in 2003 finally adopted a comprehensive European Security Strategy (ESS) (Council of the European Union 2003). The ESS explicitly acknowledges the multidimensional and boundary-transcending nature of new security risks in the post-Cold War order. Merging the challenges of organized crime, failing states, the availability of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism into one single panorama of insecurities facing the EU, the Strategy argues that “the post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked” (ibid.: 2). The ESS further adopts a comprehensive perspective on security provision and calls for a “mixture of instruments” to tackle the new threats, arguing that the EU was “particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations” (ibid.: 7).

Yet how far did these conceptual deliberations about the need for comprehensive security impact on the actual organization of European security provision? Taking the observation of a change in current security agendas and concepts as a starting point, this paper lays out a research strategy to explore whether and to what extent the EU has translated its comprehensive concepts of security into practice.

Put in relation to current security research, my take on the analysis of European security speaks to several ongoing debates. First, it focuses on the ‘horizontal transformation’ of the changing post-Cold War security architecture and hereby provides a strategy to bridge the internal/external divide in current security research. More specifically, it adds conceptual and empirical depth to recent inquiries into the convergence of internal and external security. In contrast to arguments that pre-suppose the ‘merging’ or ‘blurring’ of internal and external security in the new security order (Bigo 2001, Pastore 2001), the paper analyses precisely this emerging interface of internal and external security provision to come to more specific conclusions about its nature and scope. Lastly, the study adopts a theoretical framework developed principally for the analysis of political organizations and firms to the security sector, hereby adding theoretical scope to the field of security studies.

The paper proceeds in the following way: in its first section, it briefly discusses current research on European security and explains the rationale for extending the ‘governance turn’ in EU integration research to the security field. The subsequent main conceptual section of the paper makes the case for an additional ‘organizational turn’ and sets out a research framework for explaining innovation and change in the European security sector based on neo-institutionalist theories of organizational change. Subsequently, I show that – contrary to assumptions that the EU would be an ‘easy case’ when it comes to the development of horizontal and comprehensive forms of security governance – high-level political concepts have remained divorced from ongoing projects of innovation and change at the organizational level. I illustrate this argument by two brief case studies and finally develop some indications for further research.

Towards a Governance Turn in Studies of European Security

Researchers dealing with the emergence and transformation of the European security architecture have approached the topic from different analytical starting points. The following section discusses two sets of literatures in view of their uses for the exploration of innovation and change in the European security order.

The first set of literature deals explicitly with institutional and political questions of European security. Analyses of the EU’s external security and defence policies explain their historical emergence either as a result of inter-state bargaining and changed domestic interests, or as results of external shocks. The latter ‘external shocks’-explanations of the rise of EU-level
security policies argue that the experience of military powerlessness in the face of the collapse of Yugoslavia served as a wake-up call or critical juncture to bring about European security integration (see for instance Joetze 2000). Nonetheless one can argue that - as recently seen in the case of the war against Iraq - external shocks equally serve to severely weaken the EU’s resolve to develop a common foreign and security policy. ‘Domestic politics’-explanations on the other hand point to a shift in French and British national security interests to explain the creation of the political window of opportunity that led to the breakthrough for a European security policy in St. Malo in 1998 (see Biscop 1999; Howorth 2000). These policy shifts do not have to be the outcome of a changed view towards the European Union. Rather, for instance in the case of the UK the government was no longer certain that the U.S. would underwrite European security in the same way as during the Cold War and hence accepted the creation of the ESDP in order to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance in the long run (see Howorth 2000: 33f, also Dover 2005). Frequently, analysts use a combination of both arguments to explain the recent integrative drive towards the European security architecture and stress the multi-causality of its emergence (for an overview see Bono 2002; Howorth 2000).

A similar picture emerges for analyses of cooperation in the field of European internal security. Generally though, literature dealing with the institutionalization of EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) is still relatively scarce. Exceptions are the historical overviews provided by Müller (2003) and Occhipinti (2003). Further, Monar (2001a;b;c), den Boer and Wallace (2000) as well as den Boer and Monar (2002) analyzed current developments within the third pillar of the European institutional framework. Here, explanations for the recent ‘lightning speed’ of policy integration in this field frequently point to the emergence of a security vacuum within the territory of the European Union: after the implementation of the intra-European ‘area of free movement’ through the Schengen agreement, internal security actors in the EU had to take compensatory measures to counter trans-border organized crime and terrorism. In the internal security field, recent moves towards EU security integration are thus both attributed to external shocks – for instance the recent terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 and March 11 2004 – and to the new security challenges that arise from the territorial integration of the European Union into an area of free movement.

In sum, most analyses focus on how national-level decisions influenced the establishment of an EU-level security architecture and trace both its historical origins and the different driving forces leading up to its creation. Research in this vein determines the mix of factors that caused the renewed integrative drive in the field after so many years of leaving security questions outside the remit of the European project. Hence, analyses focus on the question of how the vertical harmonization and integration of national security policies into a European framework became possible. Analytically, studies have emphasised efforts of “intensive trans-governmentalism” (Wallace 2001) in the process of security integration, rather than exploring the functioning of the system of EU security governance itself. And so far, explanations of the emergence of a European security architecture are frequently limited to single-case studies of one particular aspect of European security policy. Comprehensive cross-field analyses of how the European Union deals with transversal and complex security issues are rare. Overall, the literature on European security has remained sectorally divided into analyses covering the establishment of either internal or external security institutions. It is therefore not ideally placed to capture the emergence of comprehensive and cross-pillar policy responses to transversal and cross-cutting threats.

The second research tradition relevant to my analysis of the emerging EU-level security order belongs to the field of European integration theories (see Rosamond 2000; Wiener and Diez 2004 for overviews). Here, particularly research that follows the recent ‘governance-turn’ has the scope to shed light upon the scope of innovation and change in the European security
architecture. Moving beyond the assumptions of neo-functional or intergovernmental integration theories that understood EU integration either as a deterministic process (see Haas 1958) or as driven by Member States’ national interests and actions (see Moravcsik 1998), current research on the European Union has shifted to analyses of how the EU works as a decision-making system. This “new orthodoxy” (Hix 1998: 40) understands the EU as an emerging political system and analyses it as a unique system of “multi-level governance” (Hooghe and Marks 2001). Governance-turn scholars pose questions that turn away from a causal analysis of the origins of integration towards exploring innovation and change within the emerging EU polity. I hold that this understanding of political decision-making in the European Union as a “stable system of transnational governance outside the framework of the state” (Wallace 2005: 491) is a useful starting point also for the analysis of EU security governance (see Krahmann 2003; Webber and Croft et al. 2004 for a similar approach). So far though, questions of institutional performance – or how European external and internal security cooperation behaves ‘in action’ – have not been a major research site, a gap this paper wishes to fill.

The conceptual origins of the governance school primarily lie within the field of public policy analysis. Here, governance generally describes the overall setting, application and enforcement of rules that guide the distribution of public goods. This can be accomplished through policy coordination within markets, hierarchies or networks (see further Scharpf 1993; Powell 1990). In analyses of EU governance, the latter concept of policy coordination through horizontal networks has gained explanatory prominence. And many scholars have voiced the argument that formal and informal forms of horizontal networking represent one of the most characteristic features of the emerging political system of the European Union (see Christiansen and Piattoni 2003; Kohler-Koch 1999; Eberlein and Grande 2005). In contrast to the hierarchical control-model of the traditional interventionist state, network governance rests on flexible and polycentric modes of negotiations in networks of public and private actors. Decision-making is disaggregated into horizontal interactions of actors within networks that operate in distinct sub-systems (see further Kenis and Schneider 1991; Rhodes 1996; Thatcher 1998). Political decisions and negotiations within this type of stable horizontal networks are expected to be based on trust and problem-solving modes of communication, thereby facilitating the achievement of consensual outcomes (see Börzel 1998: 262). Contrasting the new governance approaches to the concept of government, Mayntz (2004: 4f) has argued that their main difference consists in their distinctive approaches to the solution of collective problems. In contrast to traditional actor-centric theories of government with their focus on intentional political intervention and their emphasis on the state as central instrument of political steering, governance emphasises the horizontal regulation of collective problems within complex structures. In this reading, governance approaches foreground the analysis of horizontal and fragmented forms of coordination among diverse sets of actors, while the traditional analysis of political decision-making moves to the background.

Often, network-governance perspectives implicitly assume that horizontal and non-hierarchical forms of policy coordination are better adapted to the solution of complex collective problems and the provision of public goods than traditional forms of government. In the field of International Relations scholarship, some authors have gone so far as to assume that governance may be an altogether better form of political coordination than government: “one might even argue, given all the noxious policies governments pursue, that governance without government is in some ways preferable to governments that are capable of governance” (Rosenau 1992: 5; similar Slaughter 2004). Yet, network governance approaches have in parts left unexplained why and how the decentralization and horizontalization of decision-making should produce more efficient forms of political coordination than
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government. This concentration on the positive effects of regulation in horizontal networks has led some scholars to criticise the implicit bias towards efficiency with respect to decision-making processes and effectiveness as regards policy-outcomes (see for instance Jachtenfuchs 2001). The merit of the governance turn in European integration theory is thus to place the analysis of the EU as a political system firmly on the current research agenda. Yet, future research within the governance paradigm needs to determine how, and particularly how well, the portrayed new forms of multi-actor and multi-level forms of coordination in the European Union function and what their constraints are.

The rationale for the subsequent research strategy derives from the previous discussion of the merits and constraints of the above two sets of literatures dealing with European security and European integration respectively. In the following, this paper sets out to provide an analytical framework to complement the predominant ‘external shocks’ and intergovernmental bargaining arguments explaining the origins of EU security cooperation. Taking the governance turn, it moves the emphasis from the intergovernmental origins of European security integration to the question of how the system of EU security governance works in practice. Hence, I focus on the transformation of the European security sector itself, rather than on the political decisions leading up to its creation. This step enables me to move the initially posed question of how comprehensive security concepts translate into actual institutional change to the centre of my analysis. Secondly, I extend current research in the governance perspective: In contrast to the assumption made in the governance literature that horizontal governance would improve the efficiency of decision-making, I introduce neo-institutionalist theories of organizational change to account for imperfect forms of decision-making and organization in horizontal governance settings. Thus, I shift the level of analysis from political concepts to EU-level organizations and their responses to a changed security environment. This focus on the organizational level should improve our understanding of the actual “processes that translate political action into institutional change” (March and Olsen 2005: 21).

The Case for an Organizational Approach to Security Governance

The following section outlines the ‘organizational approach’ put forward in this paper to analytically complement the governance-turn taken in European integration research. The governance-approach principally serves as an organizing framework to understand the fragmentation of political decision-making in the EU to a proliferating number of actors on multiple levels. Hereby, it enables the analysis of both vertical and horizontal interactions in an EU political system characterized more and more by complex decision-making. The general advantage of adding an organizational perspective to the governance approach is the close attention to the nuts and bolts of the continuously evolving security architecture that it enables. I hold that it is on this middle ground of organizational structures that we can observe the translation – or the failure of translation – of conceptual change on a higher political level into new forms of security provision.

Complementing the discussed research on European security, the paper first outlines the new research questions raised by the advent of complex security challenges and argues that the chosen focus on the organizational underpinnings of security governance in Europe helps to bridge the internal/external divide in security research. The chapter then develops the argument that external incentives for change are not directly translated into policy change. Rather, their impact is mediated by specific institutional arrangements that influence

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1 The term ‘security sector’ is used as a pragmatic organizational definition denoting the organizations and institutions tasked with designing and implementing security policy at the EU level.
dynamics of change and innovation in the European political system. Subsequently, the section specifies how organizations respond to external pressures for change by mapping two generic organizational strategies of innovation.

**Internal and External Security: Bridging the Gap**

Current security agendas across Europe specifically emphasise the relevance of ‘new’ or ‘non-traditional’ security challenges. Moving away from the strategic challenges of the Cold War era, security issues covered for instance by the European Security Strategy include the menace of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, illicit migration and drug trafficking as well as the manifold political, military and humanitarian challenges that arise from weak and failing states and the security vacuum they leave behind. These security issues share certain characteristics: first of all, most of them cut across national boundaries and affect more than one state at the same time. Additionally, it has become increasingly unclear into which political sphere – and thus into which agency’s responsibility – some of these challenges fall. Particularly networked and transnational forms of terrorism, organized crime and trafficking cross the established boundaries of domestic and external security. As a result, for instance the divisions between domestic and external intelligence agencies in the fight against terrorism, or between police and military actors involved in counter-drug operations, look increasingly futile. In response to the rise in relevance of the outlined cross-cutting challenges, European security concepts stress comprehensive policy solutions that call for the cooperation of all involved actors across agency and departmental divides (see for instance Council of the European Union 2003; 2005; European Commission 2001a).

In order to analyse the impact of the new comprehensive security agenda on actual security provision in Europe, the research problem is split up into two research questions: how does the increasing transversality of security risks affect tasks and activities of individual domestic and external security agencies and how does it influence their relationship? Do security agencies that encounter transversal security challenges change and expand their mandates and capabilities in line with the new tasks? Do they compete or complement each other? Current case research on security in Europe remains compartmentalized: it mostly focuses on either domestic or external security institutions and their responses to the new security agenda. Little research specifically engages with the question of how cross-cutting security challenges impact on the relationship between different internal and external security agencies. A first wave of literature on the impact of a converging security agenda on traditional security institutions accordingly emphasised its implications for individual security institutions. Andreas and Price (2001) – similar to arguments advanced by Bigo (2000) – stress the outward expansion of policing into the international realm. Arguing that we are witnessing a progressive “militarization of policing” as well as a “domestication of soldiering” (Andreas and Price 2001: 31), they empirically illustrate this claim with cases of U.S. military hardware conversion for police use and with the U.S. military taking over a variety of military operations ‘other than war’. Also Lutterbeck (2005) describes changes within police and military organizations in response to complex security challenges and similarly points to the militarization and transnationalisation of policing as well as to military participation in internal security and the general expansion of gendarmerie-type forces (see also Lutterbeck 2004). Even less research focuses on the changing relations between different security institutions as a consequence of a converging security agenda. With the exception of an empirical paper on internal-external security policy coordination in the EU (Pastore 2001), emerging literature on this question offers proposals on how security institutions should react. For instance Borchert (2004) argues that since transversal threats require multi-agency and
comprehensive security-political answers, European security institutions should undergo a fundamental reform, a transformation based on the idea of security-political networks among all involved actors (ibid.: 33). Networked security threats have to be countered by similarly ‘networked security capabilities’ able to pursue coordinated and comprehensive strategies to counter the new security risks (see Borchert 2006).

Hence, although first analyses in this area do cover different aspects of the questions of how security institutions deal with transversal threats, they have so far mostly remained limited to illustrating and cataloguing individual aspects of the governance of complex security challenges. The research framework of this paper attempts to systematize and substantiate existing research on the effects of cross-cutting security challenges. It complements descriptive or normative approaches to the problem by applying theory-led predictions about processes of organizational change and innovation to the European security field. The paper focuses its analysis on the organizational underpinnings of European security policies to both provide a way out of the divided research traditions on internal and external security and to develop answers to the posed research question that go beyond anecdotal evidence of convergence between security sectors. It argues that research on the organizational level contributes to analysing the activities and interactions of all agencies involved in a specific cross-cutting policy issue, quite apart from their initial sectoral affiliation, and thus goes beyond an exclusive focus on single sectors. Corroborating this argument, Moerth and Britz (2004: 959) point out in their study on armaments cooperation in the EU that the identification and study of cross-pillar issues has been one of the big advantages of their own organizational approach to European integration. Additionally, the paper holds that by analysing the extent to which security organizations transcend their traditional radius of action or change their patterns of relationships with other agencies, we move closer to substantively answering the question of whether the new security environment has had any decisive impact on actual security provision. For the case of cross-pillar security provision in Europe with its competing and shifting set of involved organizations, the task is now to “attend to how the dynamics of change can be understood in terms of the organization, interaction and collisions among competing institutional structures, norms, rules, identities, and practices” (March and Olsen 2005: 17).

Institutional Constraints to Organizational Change

In order to apply institutionalist theories of organizational change to the governance of European security, the following section discusses their main tenets and contrasts them to the assumptions of rational design. The latter theories principally assume that “rational leaders with clear objectives develop policies and then design or reform institutions as rational organizational instruments for implementing those policies” (Olsen 2002: 585). Deviating from these premises, the paper specifies the general insights of institutionalism into three constraints to organizational change. These illustrate how specific institutional arrangements within a policy field mediate the impact of external shocks and constrain processes of organizational innovation.

In a rational design perspective, the origin of political institutions is understood to be unconstrained by rules and institutional patterns, their creation is seen as the act of an “unmoved mover, or an unruled ruler, or a noninstitutionalised designer of institutions from whose founding decisions institutions emerge” (Offe 2001: 365). Yet, as Offe argues further, “if we look more closely at how actors respond to the challenge of having to generate new rules and mechanisms of co-ordination due to some perceived insufficiency of existing ones, the creationist hypothesis of classical political theory is certainly not supported” (ibid.: 366). Starting from this observation, the ‘new institutionalism in organizational analysis’
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Hall and Taylor 1996; Jepperson 1991) sheds light on how social choices are mediated and channelled by institutional arrangements within and among organizations. Research in this area focuses on the characteristics of “avoidance, discretion and overlooking” (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 358) displayed by modern organizations. It argues that institutional change does not normally imply the convergence of an institutional order towards an ‘optimum solution’, and that organizational adaptation “does not necessarily improve efficiency and survival” (March and Olsen 2005: 13). In contrast to Weberian concepts of modern organizations as embodiments of rationality, effectiveness and efficiency in the control of social life that lead in the long run to the ever-more efficient structuring of modern society and bureaucracy (Weber 1922), case research in an institutionalist tradition has shown organizations to be conflictual, polycentric and loosely coupled rather than coherent, hierarchical and tightly coupled units (Brunsson and Olsen 1998: 17).

An institutionalist approach thus supplements rational, functionalist and instrumental ideas about “consequential action, exogenous preferences and efficient histories of organizational action” with concepts of “rule- and identity-based action, inefficient histories and institutional robustness” (March and Olsen 1998: 969). Institutional legacies are understood as constitutive of identities and preferences (Jepperson 1991: 146f; Daase and Cedermann 2003): institutions do not just constrain options, they establish the very criteria by which people discover their preferences. Seen from this perspective, political institutions are theorized as being relatively robust against deliberate reform, since institutional development depends not only on satisfying current environmental and political conditions, but to a rather large extent on the institution’s history, cultural legacies and internal dynamics (March and Olsen 1998: 955). It follows that the process of institutionalization within a field does not imply the ‘adaptive custom-fitting of particular organizations to specific settings’, but is understood as a process of diffusing rules and structures not necessarily well adapted to the environmental surroundings (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Quite on the contrary, through instances of ‘normative selection’, organizations “may be created and supported for reasons of legitimacy and normative fit, rather than efficient output; they may be created not for what they do, but for what they are – for what they represent symbolically and the values they embody” (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 703; see also Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Scott 1992). Three specific impediments to organizational innovation flow from this exposition of core institutionalist ideas.

First of all, organizational change is never straightforward in that “intentions seldom control action” (Weick 2001: 37). The outcome of direct interventions into organizational structures may run directly counter to the actors’ intentions, since the complexity of the process makes it impossible to fully control the outcome of design projects. Hence, if “people construct one-time intentional, deliberated designs, [they] construct entities that are imposed on social settings that they neither control nor fully understand” (ibid.: 88). This means that even if features of international institutions were chosen by deliberation and rational calculation, their outcome might still not be intended (see Schelling 1978, Wendt 2001: 1036).

The second constraint follows from the institutionalist premise that organizations adapt to their normative environments, rather than to the functional requirements of specific tasks. Sometimes, institutions “adopt new institutional practices not because it advances the means-ends efficiency of the organization but because it enhances the social legitimacy of the organization or its participants” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 949). Meyer and Rowan (1977: 343) found that as a consequence, organizational activities often deviate from organizational blueprints and are sometimes only loosely coupled to formal organizational structures. This phenomenon can lead to the creation of high-profile and highly legitimate institutional venues that nevertheless remain devoid of substantive organizational activities. In these cases, work-
level interactions are increasingly carried out in informal channels outside the newly created symbolic organisational structures.

Third, innovating organisations – following Levinthal and March’s (1993: 97) argument – are likely to pursue compartmentalized and myopic learning strategies. Resulting from structural divisions within and among organisations, these strategies privilege short-term and ‘near-neighbourhood’ learning that takes place within organisational units and sub-units over the development of longer-term and comprehensive problem-solving strategies. Organisational actors, working within compartmentalized and autonomously acting subunits (Levinthal and March 1993: 98), draw attention primarily to problems and policy-options lying within their own specific areas of expertise and specialisation. Problems such as complex security challenges that fall between jurisdictions and cut across organisational boundaries are accordingly at a disadvantage in the competition for policy attention (see Scharpf 1986: 181f).

**Two Trajectories of Organisational Innovation**

How do organisations innovate and change despite the outlined constraints to organisational design? The assumption that sedimented institutional arrangements influence the capacity of organisations to adapt to environmental changes does not presuppose organisational immobility. Quite on the contrary, organisations do change continually, “routinely, easily and responsively” (March 1981: 563). Yet the direction of change cannot ordinarily be controlled, since “organisations rarely do what they are told to do” (ibid.). Institutionalist theories predict that organisational re-structuring often occurs in an incremental fashion (Lindblom 1959) and remains inherently conservative (March 1981: 565). Rapid preference reversals in response to environmental change are seen as unlikely (Lanzara 1998: 10; 20). Strategies for innovation chosen by organisations are thus likely to involve the improvisation with and rearrangement of existing organisational resources and units, rather than the demolition of old organisational forms and the creation of new organisational structures from scratch.

The literature identifies two likely strategies of organisational innovation: using terminology introduced by March (1991: 71), these are distinguished into “the exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties”. The essence of exploitative adaptation is the “refinement and extension of existing competences”, while March characterizes exploration as a form of organisational adaptation through experimenting with new alternatives (ibid.: 85). Exploitative strategies have more predictable but higher short-term costs and returns. Explorative moves have a high likelihood of negative short-term returns, with positive results due only in the future. Organisations under pressure to change will thus initially be biased against the exploration of new strategies, since returns are less certain. Yet, in situations of turbulent environmental change, the exploration of new organisational solutions becomes necessary to ensure the long-term survival of the organization: “any system that engages only in exploitation will become obsolescent in a changing world, and (…) any system that engages only in exploration will never realize the potential gains of its discoveries” (March and Olsen 2005: 16).

Genschel’s (1997) distinction between the strategies of *patching up* and *transposition* of organisational structures mirrors March’s two logics of organisational change. Patching-up refers to the search for new solutions by locally ameliorating inefficiencies without centrally changing the overall structure of the organization. This strategy is limited to fixing holes in institutional arrangements by for instance establishing new small-scale organizational task-forces, while challenging neither the established privileges of the different actors involved nor the overall policy-frame. In this way, conflicts prevalent within the institutional structure are allowed to remain latent, since “patching up diffuses conflict by allowing for inconsistency” (Genschel 1997: 55). The logic of patching-up, while mostly conservative and risk-averse,
also has an explorative dimension to it: even local changes of existing arrangements can in the long run re-focus the tasks and aims of an organization, since actors explore new solutions – even if only on a limited scale. The logic of transposition, on the other hand, is a clearly exploitative strategy of adaptation that expands existing competences into new fields. In contrast to the strategy of adapting organizational structures by installing new bridging arrangements among established procedures, the logic of transposition refers to a conservative reappraisal of existing arrangements to see whether and where they can be successfully re-employed: “the strategy of transposition reuses the sunk costs of an old institution for a new purpose” (Genschel 1997: 59). Here, the existence of certain capabilities and fields of expertise is converted into an inclination to discover goals these abilities might serve (Levitt and March 1988: 319). This strategy can be characterised as solution-, not problem-driven, since organizational activities are driven by available, not necessarily by efficient solutions to observable problems. Both logics of change, although more often than not incremental and local in impact, and constrained by established rules and legacies, have the power to over time fundamentally alter the landscape of an organizational field.

Overall, institutionalist theories of organizational change provide a basis for exploring the gap between higher-level political concepts and their realization within an organizational field. In contrast to theories that predict the success of deliberate forms of institutional design, institutionalists highlight the likelihood that top-down initiatives for change are refracted and mediated through complex institutional forms: “very rarely, if ever, does an organization begin action by perceiving a problem, then define this problem carefully, next generate possible actions solely because they might solve the stated problem, and finally, select a single course of action solely on the ground that it ought to be the best way to solve the problem” (Starbuck 1982: 16).

The Governance of Complex Security Issues in Europe

What do the above assumptions about forms and constraints of organizational innovation and change tell us about the translation of comprehensive security concepts into practice? The following step develops the outlined tenets of institutionalist organization theory into more specific predictions about innovation and change in the developing European security order. In a second step, these are illustrated with two brief examples of innovation taken from the EU’s fight against terrorism.

Constrained Innovation in the European Security Order

Complementing classical intergovernmental research on the evolution of European security policies, the particular take of this paper focuses on innovation and change at the organizational level of the system of European security governance. The following paragraphs apply this theoretical take to analyses of European security and distil the previous discussion of core institutionalist assumptions into more specific predictions about constraints and trajectories of innovation in the case of European security governance. I first differentiate between structural and norms-based constraints to the development of a comprehensive European security order. Then, I specify two intertwined trajectories of innovation that drive its construction.

The structural constraints to the comprehensive governance of security issues in the EU are palpable. I contend that the development of a comprehensive response to cross-cutting security issues at the European level is weakened by the organizational design of the European security architecture: policy-making in the EU is divided into policy sub-systems that are subordinate to different sets of decision-making rules. Security policies are subsumed under either first-, second- or third-pillar decision-making systems and their respective
political and bureaucratic hierarchies. Because of each pillar’s distinct internal organizational structure, the EU’s pillarised structure of security governance provides per se little incentive for devising comprehensive policy responses. Quite on the contrary, since the organizational design of the EU’s decision-making system encourages tasks and solutions to be passed up and down the ‘line’ of each pillar I predict that answers to today’s complex security challenges are developed in a stove-piped and compartmentalized manner. And since the development of policy solutions to complex security challenges can thus take place in different parallel sites, it should result in diverse and competing sets of outcomes. Competition between individual solutions is likely.

The prediction that norms-based constraints impact on the development of a comprehensive system of European security governance is less visible than the influence of the EU’s structural constraints. They derive from the institutionalist assumption that organizational innovation does not necessarily follow a problem-solving strategy, but rather reflects the normative demands of its political environment. I thus predict that the design of the European security architecture is shaped not only by efficiency considerations, but also by choices that follow considerations of what is deemed politically legitimate. I contend that the complex and often contentious nature of security-political decisions in the decision-making system of the EU’s mostly intergovernmental security architecture makes the development of highly legitimate, but mostly symbolic, organizational solutions to cross-cutting policy problems likely.

Both norms-based and structural factors constrain the trajectories of innovation that drive the construction of the new European security order. According to Olsen’s (2002: 596) characterization, the institutionalization of the European Union follows two intertwined logics of innovation, one bottom-up and one top-down. The European Union, Olsen argued, has “a history of founding acts and deliberate institution-building, as well as informal and gradual evolution where common practices have been codified into formal legal institutions.” I expect that during the creation and development of the European security order, this duality of the two organizational logics of change is omnipresent and perhaps its main defining characteristic. The first strategy of top-down and deliberate institution-building mirrors the notion of explorative innovation, while the second, bottom-up, strategy of gradually reorienting institutional structures towards new goals follows mostly exploitative patterns of innovation.

In cases where longer-standing institutional structures re-organize to incorporate new tasks and mandates, I predict the prevalence of exploitative and incremental forms of innovation. These strategies of incrementally transposing existing EU capabilities in exploitative processes of innovation run the risk of leading to myopic, not comprehensive, solutions. Explorative strategies of organizational innovation, on the other hand, are expected to be pursued through political design projects in which new structures are created from scratch or old ones actively ‘patched-up’ to fulfil new tasks. Explorative and top-down strategies of innovation pursued by political actors in the European security order are likely to lead to the establishment of symbolic organizational forms. In sum, I expect gradual ‘bottom-up’ innovation in the EU security field to co-exist with instances of deliberate – although sometimes symbolic – forms of organizational design.

EU Counter-Terrorism: Top-down and Bottom-up Innovation

Two brief case studies exemplify different trajectories of innovation and their constraints within the system of European security governance. The following examples of top-down and bottom-up innovation draw on empirical research conducted in the field of EU counter-terrorism policies. The brief studies illustrate the process through which recent calls for
comprehensive and coordinated EU policy-responses to transnational terrorism (see Council of the European Union 2003; 2004a; 2005) were translated into practice. The first illustration draws on European policy responses to the terror attacks of September 11 2001 and March 11 2004 to highlight a case of bottom-up innovation. Clearly, the ‘external shocks’ of 9/11 and 3/11 set in motion processes of policy change in the European security order. Yet, the paper contends that although the two turning point events did influence the speed of policy developments in the field, they did not predefine the shape and substance of the policy responses. ‘External shocks’ arguments can thus explain only the initial impetus for the process of institutionalizing an EU counter-terrorism policy, but not its specific shape. A closer look at the origins of major EU counter-terrorist policy initiatives adopted immediately after 9/11 or 3/11 shows that in large part, these had already been under discussion or even in planning before the events. Hence, the specific substance of post-9/11 policy initiatives was not an outcome of top-down design. Quite on the contrary, the current content of EU counter-terrorism policies is based on policy proposals that had already been on the shelves within the Council’s and Commission’s respective bureaucracies. Initiatives for substantive policies in this case moved upwards from the work- to the political level. Salient examples for this argument are for instance the policy proposals made at the ‘Extraordinary European Council Meeting’ on 21 September 2001. These included a series of new counter-terrorist measures such as the establishment of a European Arrest Warrant, a common definition of terrorism, a call for the ratification of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the establishment of Joint Investigative Teams, and the setting-up of Eurojust, a permanent network of judicial authorities in the EU. Yet, all of these major components of the EU’s post-9/11 strategy had already been under discussion in the EU institutions previous to 9/11: the Commission had already worked on a legislative proposal for a ‘Framework Decision on a European Arrest Warrant’ (European Commission 2001b: 3), the Joint Investigative Teams had been part and parcel of the not yet ratified Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance (Council of the European Union 2000, Art. 13), and also the approximation of definitions of and penalties for terrorist offences in all Member States had been included in a recommendation of the European Parliament before 9/11 (European Parliament 2001). After the second ‘external shock’ of March 11 2004, the EU continued with its adopted path. As a response to the Madrid attacks, the Council “urged the finalization of work on existing measures” (Council of the European Union 2004b: 5), while the Commission argued similarly that it did “not believe that the right answer to these attacks is proposing new legal instruments or new institutions” (European Commission 2004: 1). In sum, the development and expansion of EU counter-terrorist policies followed a trajectory of exploitative innovation: the EU expanded existing capabilities in the criminal justice sphere and fast-tracked projects already in the planning stage.

In addition to being a process driven by bottom-up policy initiatives, the EU’s policy response to terrorism is a case of a ‘solutions looking for problems’-trajectory of innovation. In this perspective, the events of 9/11 and 3/11 provided a window of opportunity for security actors on the EU level to advance their own organizational interests (see den Boer 2003b: 195 for a similar assessment). Particularly in the third pillar’s criminal justice sphere, some counter-terrorist initiatives additionally reflect a larger interest of security actors to create coherence among criminal justice and law enforcement procedures in the Union. To corroborate this argument, the civil liberties watchdog organization ‘Statewatch’ analysed the 57 counter-terrorist proposals on the table at the EU Council in March 2004. It found that of these “almost half bear little or no relation to tackling terrorist attacks like those in Spain (…) Rather, these proposals concern existing EU mechanisms or initiatives on general matters relating to police, judicial cooperation or immigration control” (Statewatch 2004: 2f).
Traditionally, the EU Member States have treated terrorism as a criminal issue with implications mainly for domestic security policies and relatively little relevance for external security. The outlined exploitative expansion of already existing Justice and Home Affairs policies consolidated this trend: EU counter-terrorism policies remained mostly in the hands of internal security actors, while external security policies were left at the margins of the debate. And despite calls to further develop the contribution of the European Security and Defence Policy to the fight against terrorism (Council of the European Union 2004a: 3); and to link police, military, judicial and intelligence means into a coherent counter-terrorist strategy (Council of the European Union 2003: 8), the Union’s second pillar contribution to counter-terrorism has taken a backseat in relation to the dominant internal security frame.

On the other hand, this strong undercurrent of incremental policy innovation in the third pillar was set off by a series of high-profile political initiatives aimed at providing a better infrastructure for countering terrorism at the EU level. One example that showcases this type of policy innovation ‘from above’ is the decision to establish an EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in March 2004. The second brief study accordingly illustrates a case of top-down innovation and highlights the challenges of deliberate institutional design projects. Already before the Madrid terrorist attacks of March 2004, the general lack of coordination between the Union’s domestic and external counter-terrorism measures had been an item of debate. And similarly to the case outlined before, this external event accelerated developments and forced the Member States to overcome initial divisions over where and how to establish a coordinating position within the EU’s institutional structure. Choosing between the options of either a horizontal cross-pillar counter-terrorism committee or a counter-terrorism coordinator in the Commission or the Council, in March 2004, the EU quickly decided to appoint Gijs de Vries as the first Council-based ‘EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator’.

Yet from the start, the Coordinator’s position in the institutional web of the Union’s counter-terrorism policies was a difficult one and he had to overcome resistance towards his coordinative functions from the work-level. Directly answerable to Secretary General/High Representative Javier Solana, he was placed in a second-pillar context, although EU counter-terrorism measures mostly consist of third-pillar policies. Thus situated somewhat uneasily within the complex institutional structure of EU counter-terrorism policies, his tasks were initially debated in terms that “tended to emphasise what he should not do” (House of Lords 2005: 26). Additionally, tensions erupted between the public perception of his role and his actual competences. Initially hailed by the media as a ‘Mr Anti-Terror’ for Europe or even as the new European ‘Anti-Terror Tsar’, a closer look at his mandate and powers shows a different reality. Established as the result of a political compromise among Member States, his rather vague mandate is to coordinate the Council’s work in combating terrorism and to “maintain an overview of all the instruments at the Union’s disposal with a view to regular reporting to the Council and effective follow-up of Council decisions” (Council of the European Union 2004a: 14). Neither his relatively marginal resources nor his severely limited competences pose a serious threat to already established institutional structures: the Coordinator’s office is staffed with only one additional person that substantively supports his work. And, although de Vries is a highly visible figure in the media, he does not have executive powers of his own, since “there is no new decision-making capacity that has been created when this post was created”, he argued himself (House of Lords 2005: 64). Thus limited in his tasks to keeping an overview of the Council’s activities and ‘blaming and shaming’ non-compliant EU Member States, the substance of his coordinative endeavours remains mostly symbolic. Rather than qualifying as a new departure for EU counter-terrorism policy, the new position can be characterized as a symbolic political gesture to heighten the profile of EU counter-terrorism efforts and to assuage publicly voiced concerns about the
efficiency of EU counter-terrorism coordination. While it was deemed politically opportune to create a high-level and publicly visible coordinating structure, the coordinator – according to some observers – was “deliberately kept a weak player” (Interview, European Council, March 2005). Created as the result of a top-down political decision and an explorative innovation strategy, the new coordination post overall serves as an example of a mostly symbolic organizational structure that remains only loosely coupled to the day-to-day work of EU counter-terrorism.

What do these two illustrative examples of innovation in the EU tell us about the initially posed question of whether and to what extent the EU had translated its comprehensive security concepts into organizational practices? Contrasting prevalent ‘external shocks’-based or intergovernmental explanations of policy dynamics in the European security field, this paper emphasised the co-existence of parallel and sometimes conflicting trajectories of innovation. The first study illustrated that security actors were able to exploit turning point events and the subsequent high-level policy initiatives as windows of opportunity to further their own fields of influence: when tasked with implementing specific new projects and aims, actors responded within the realm of their own competence base and with substantive proposals mostly drawn from policy options that had already been on the table. The second study highlighted that top-level policy initiatives with high public visibility were prone to remain symbolic in scope and de-coupled from the realities of every-day interactions at the work-level. These intertwined yet contradictory trajectories of organizational innovation and change in the European security field illustrated that the translation of comprehensive security concepts into European-level organizational practices often proceeded incrementally, rather than through deliberate design. As a result, a gap emerges between security strategies and corresponding organizational practices at the EU level.

**Scope and Limits of Convergence: Future Research Challenges**

The proposed research framework aims to facilitate comprehensive empirical analyses of how the European Union deals with an increasingly complex security agenda. Yet, apart from providing a research strategy to analyse complex and ‘messy’ forms of horizontal security governance in Europe, the paper’s central issues lead on to a number of larger questions about the transformation of security in the post-Cold War era. The first potential future research trajectory concerns both normative and constitutional limits to the convergence of internal and external security that results from an increasingly transversal and transnational threat agenda. The second research trajectory links the empirical analysis of shifts in traditional forms of security provision to a potentially fundamental transformation of the Westphalian system of states through changes in one of its constituent elements, the state’s monopoly of legitimate coercion.

The first of these questions touches upon larger normative challenges posed by the observed processes of innovation in the security field. Future research should pay attention to the normative issues that arise from enhanced cross-sectoral policy-making in the security field. Contrasting the assumption that moves towards an ever more closely coordinated web of security services are necessary to counter transversal and transnational security challenges, there is a difficult trade-off to be made between the requirements of efficiency on the one and the constitutional separation between the tasks of the different arms of the state monopoly on violence on the other hand. A ‘convergence agenda’ aimed at establishing horizontal forms of security governance potentially runs afoul of this principle of separating the domestic and external security spheres. Hence, security research has to account for both opportunities and challenges that an abandonment of the separation of coercive tasks produces: to what extent would the creation of ever closer ties between different security agencies be a welcome
escape from today’s problems of a fragmented and compartmentalized sector? At the same time, where are the limits to joining-up the internal and external security forces at the disposal of the nation-state?

Second, future research should specify to what extent the horizontal convergence of security concepts – and to some extent practices – has the potential to more generally confound the traditional order of national security. The divide between anarchy and order in the international system of states and its analogous distinction of internal and external security agencies is arguably a most fateful one for the study of security. The divide presupposes fundamentally different paradigms for interactions taking place in the international and in the domestic spheres of states: in the domestic arena of the sovereign state, the enduring condition of anarchy and the conflictual nature of the international system of states are set off by concepts of rule-based and non-violent forms of politics. In analogy to this distinction, two functionally different types of security organizations emerged in the modern state and took on different sets of tasks and capabilities: the military, for purposes of national defence, and the police forces, responsible for ensuring the internal order of the society. Yet, the rise of a transversal and transnational security agenda has triggered a transformation of this clear assignment of security threats and responses to either the external or the domestic sphere. At this moment in time, it is still too early to conclusively answer whether and how the convergence of internal and external security agendas influences the traditional link between the state and its monopoly on violence. Future research though could fruitfully assess the consequences of the blurring of lines between the domestic and international security environments for the traditional order of the nation-state and, more generally, for the international system of states.
Bibliography


