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DEPARTMENT
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SCIENCES

Tracing Cultural Change in the
Reproduction of Intolerance:
“Secularism”, “Islamism” and others in Turkey’s
Experience of Democratization

Metin Koca

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Florence, 16 January 2020

European University Institute
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Abstract:

How do cultural resources such as values and beliefs, and their functions in ideology-making, change? In the democratization literature, the value-based approach to culture seeks cultural change based on values. However, the combination of this approach with value-surveys fails to consider several ways in which *change* may unfold between cultural periods. Instead, this study will delve into a history of conversational texts, which are endogenously grounded within culture, capable of demonstrating culture in action and reflecting what is collective about culture as it operates through dialectical encounters. I focus on change in three landscapes of culture in Turkey, which have witnessed some of the most persistent stories of the unequal relationship between the *self* and the *other*.

These landscapes may be identified as follows: i) “LGBT” and the entertainment sector, ii) “women” and clothing, iii) “Alevi” and funerals. In the first case-study, I examine the re-making of (in)tolerance on the borders of the entertainment sector, during a period in which the visible representations of LGBT identity were gradually integrated into the competing mass value-systems. Secondly, I will examine the unchaining of interlocutors’ clothing rights and freedoms from their first-order values, as these interlocutors have recognized new discursive possibilities and constraints. Finally, I will focus on the intolerance, commonly rationalized by means of the politics of recognition and assimilation, against some syncretic religious traditions developed within *Alevilik*.

Bringing together all these landscapes, my conclusion addresses the broader dispute over the role of values, tolerance and recognition in democracy. I will conclude that democracy may not require an agreement on foundational values; but an acknowledgement of the disagreements over values before negotiating the rest—e.g. rights and freedoms. Though tolerance has limits and risks, whereas recognition has certain merits, they have different functions at such times of multifaceted cultural contestations.

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1. Introduction

How do cultural resources such as values and beliefs, and their functions in ideology-making, change in time? The value-based approach to culture takes “values”¹ as the core of “cultures”. Therefore, the followers of this approach in the democratization literature have been keen to define a value-system as the benchmark of transition to a “democratic culture”. Coupled with the understanding that democracy is foundationally dependent on agreement on a set of common values, advancements in the survey method like extended cross-sectional and cross-temporal surveys have led value-surveys to dominate the study of cultural change in this literature.² Since then, the studies based on value-surveys have discussed whether full-fledged democracies witness “culture wars”, or whether “semi-democracies” witness more cultural polarization compared to their “authoritarian” counterparts. In the meantime, some “cultures”—e.g. “Islamic culture”—were labelled as exceptionally recalcitrant towards “change”,³ whereas some value-systems—e.g. that of “progressives” and “conservatives”—were labelled as irreconcilable competitors.

This study will problematize the combination of the value-based approach with value-surveys, while addressing the aforementioned question of cultural change. I claim that a persistent expression of clashing values does not rule out the possibility of ‘meaningful’ cultural change, as the expression of a value tends to be restrained, optimized, or entirely disconnected from action depending on the social context. Context—i.e. the situatedness of meanings—is

¹ Though there are different definitions of “values” in the literature, these definitions are commonly centered on what ‘people’ want. Therefore, according to the value-based approach to culture, values signify *desires* towards which actions are oriented.

² see Steven Hitlin and Jane Allyn Piliavin, “Values: Reviving a Dormant Concept,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 30, no. 1 (2004): 359–93, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110640>.

³ see Pippa Norris and Inglehart Ronald, “Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ Thesis,” *Comparative Sociology* 1 (December 1, 2002): 235–63, <https://doi.org/10.1163/156913302100418592>. Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values,” *American Sociological Review*, 2000, 19–51.

read by the ‘relational’ *self* that is both a product and a re-maker of the culture. Therefore, this research will focus on social contexts dialogically formed between the *self* and the *other*. With this aim in mind, I will focus on *change* by travelling through numerous landscapes of culture where “intolerance”—in the shifting temporal, relational senses of the term—has been repeatedly rationalized, yet intended to say different *things*, negotiated in different terms and given different responses. Keeping an eye on these changes is necessary, since they have implications for the possibility of democracy during a cultural contestation.

My approach will be based on conversational interactions, which may be defined as “the voices and actions that constitute the relational space among actors”.⁴ After analyzing some unique ways in which change may unfold in the flow of a conversation, I will argue that value-surveys fail to grasp these changes, notably due to their reliance on exogenously imposed social contexts, limited speech acts, and the explicit expression of cultural resources prior to social action. Moreover, research based on cross-temporal value-surveys has specific problems, due to its tendency to seek change through pre-defined concepts and directions (*e.g.* a teleology of democratization). Instead, this study will delve into a history of conversational texts, which are endogenously grounded within culture, capable of demonstrating culture in action, and reflecting what is collective about culture, as it operates through dialectical encounters.

A key part of the literature that I will problematize tends to take “cultures” as *entities*, whereas I will take them as *processes*. The contemporary narrative on cultural clashes relies on a notion of clear-cut, monolithic culture zones that meet one another only to remain the same—“destroy the *other* or vanish!” Contrary to this understanding, I will emphasize that the medium of a conversation is capable of projecting common playing fields where seemingly different worlds operate in interaction, not only in the making of confrontations, but also in the sharing

⁴ Susan Cotts Watkins and Ann Swidler, “Conversations Into Texts: A Method for Studying Public Culture,” *California Center for Population Research*, December 1, 2006, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3zx0t0j5>, p2.

of common spaces where intended and unintended transmissions take place. As such, confrontation may often serve as a process of accommodation, and consequently, it may lead to the re-casting of some seemingly persistent cultural resources. Instead of examining a cultural resource in isolation, such as values *per se*, I will defend an examination of the ways through which a cultural resource is translated into a (cultural) period—i.e. *unsettled* (e.g. ideology-making) and *settled* (e.g. habitual) periods,⁵ during which the usage of cultural resources radically differs.

My methodological approach will be a qualitative event-based approach, which allows for (1) cross-checking the multiple accounts of *incidents*, (2) keeping track of some references to meaningful silences in these accounts, (3) making cross-temporal comparisons in dialogue with the meanings in texts or silences, and (4) distinguishing between *exploratory*, *evaluative* and *retroactive* conversations, which tend to differ in terms of participants, conversational settings and outputs. As a part of my methodological explanations, I will also employ a negative heuristic—i.e. a ‘quantitative’ event-based approach. As I will demonstrate in the methodology section, bringing together a quantitative event-based dataset with a democracy index may easily suggest that, in a roughly sketched map of Middle East, the “semi-democratic” or “democratic” countries have more “social hostilities involving religion”, compared to many “authoritarian” countries of the region (*see* CH4.1.3). That said, I will demonstrate that this approach represents a pitfall for the study of culture, not only because the incidents may not always be recorded, but also because the absence of an incident may not mean that the experience is one of a *settled* cultural period, where no “hostility” is perceived by the agents.

This research will focus on three landscapes of culture in Turkey—i) “women” and clothing; ii) “LGBT” and the entertainment sector; iii) “Alevi” and funerals. For decades, if

⁵ Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 2 (April 1, 1986): 273–86, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2095521>.

not centuries, these landscapes of culture have brought the authoritative claims of some hegemonic ideologies with social groups designated as *others*, who have dealt with these authorities in unique ways, commonly in an unequal relationship. It is also not uncommon, in these landscapes, for *others* to make their own *others*. In this sense, talking in the name of “women”, “LGBT” and “Alevi” may often mean an act of gatekeeping, which leads to tensions at the gate of identity. Furthermore, in contemporary Turkey these landscapes of culture are playing a key role in the making of some competing hegemonic ideologies. I focus on two of those ideologies, named “Secularism” and “Islamism”, and often mistaken—by academics, politicians and journalists—as dogmatic categories, instead of a dyadic relationship which was made to represent a contestation over ‘our’⁶ values, as well as a meeting through which ‘our’ cultural resources are being re-cast.

Taken together, the cultural activity in these landscapes contributes to the contemporary grand debate on how “democracy” is to be understood in the course of the ongoing struggles concerning the sharing of public spaces, the re-operationalization of value-systems, the re-casting of belief-systems, the intersection of identities, the new expressions of social classes, and the management of unequal relationships (e.g. tolerance; recognition; conflict). As a consequence, they all relate to the re-making of ideologies—e.g. that of “Islamism” in the “post-Islamist” era of diversified Islamic movements and individualized religiosity, and “Secularism” as the defense of all-the-rest as opposed to the hegemony of a single value-system.

Beginning with some puzzling conversations in these historically significant landscapes, I will examine (1) the differentiation between first-order and second-order values, and concomitantly, the unchaining of ‘our’ rights and freedoms from ‘our’ first-order values; (2) the integration of a once-demonized group into the competing mass value-systems; and (3) the

⁶ Throughout the research, the connotations ‘our’ and ‘we’ are meant to include both the *self* and the *other*.

clash between a minority belief-system and the identity politics relating to it, with repercussions for the fault-line between tolerance and recognition. I will highlight cultural change in these landscapes, especially in relation to the surrounding processes of reproduction, which, I will claim, cannot be isolated from the ways in which change unfolds.

In a nutshell, this research has four goals. First, and most broadly, it aims to offer insight into the ongoing disputes on the cultural prerequisites of democracy. In the light of my analysis regarding the different ways values may be translated into ideology, I conclude that democracy may not require agreement on a set of foundational values; but an acknowledgement of disagreement on values before negotiating the rest—e.g. rules of appropriateness, rights and freedoms—in shared spaces. Secondly and relatedly, this research describes some historically contingent representations of recognition and tolerance. In the meantime, it points to various points of intersection and cleavages between the very ideas of recognition and tolerance. The necessary acknowledgement of disagreement on values indicates the merit of recognition. That said, while clarifying some limitations and risks based on my case studies, I will conclude that ‘replacing’ tolerance with recognition would lead to its own crisis in ‘our’ unequal relationships.

Thirdly, by re-configuring some archival sources in accordance with their conversational qualities, this research aims to offer a new approach to the transdisciplinary study of cultural change in Turkey. Amid the dominance of great power politics in research agendas concerning the region, I was greatly motivated by the many rarely-heard speakers who I believe can be more thoroughly followed in the literature, with all the constraints, opportunities and confusions they reveal. Finally, by demonstrating how micro-level conversations might hinge upon the most powerful, authoritative speeches, this research addresses a relatively new—i.e. post-linguistic turn—research agenda of Cultural Sociology. In this vein, it pays attention to cultures in action, as they fascinatingly turn “what otherwise might

be a babble of cultural voices into a semiotically coherent and politically ordered field of differences”.⁷

⁷ William H. Sewell Jr, “The Concep(s) of Culture,” in *Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn* (New York: Routledge, 2005), p92.

2. Puzzle: Conversations on Change

This research aims to follow the marks of change in a culture that seems to have reproduced itself. My starting point is a set of conversational texts, which shall offer a hint as to how *change*, as a theme, may appear in a dialogically formed social context. As this starting point suggests, conversations—in the form of exchanged (written or oral) texts—will constitute the building block of my methodological and theoretical approach to the study of cultural reproduction. Methodologically, I will use the strength of conversations to shed light on the weakness of value-surveys in terms of grasping how cultural resources, such as values and beliefs, and their functions in ideology-making, might change in time. Theoretically, I will demonstrate how the flow of a conversation, given its capacity to manifest culture in action, may easily challenge the concepts of culture that take cultures as *entities* instead of *processes*.

To examine some unique processual experiences in which change may unfold, I will delve into a history of conversations. The research will specifically focus on three landscapes of culture in Turkey, which may be roughly identified as follows: i) “LGBT” and the entertainment sector; ii) “women” and clothing; and iii) “Alevi” and funerals. At the core of my research are the landscapes of culture, instead of pre-defined, abstract, de-contextualized and somewhat timeless concepts that may be argued to rule over each of these broad landscapes (e.g. sectarianism, sexism, “religious” and “secular” ideologies). To support my choice in favor of the former, I will examine how the latter approach hinders the ability of students to read through some *natural* social contexts, in which change appears in a culturally meaningful manner.

I focus especially on these three landscapes of culture because they have witnessed some of the most persistent stories of the unequal relationship between the *self* and the *other*. They contain some crystal-clear snapshots that allow us to make sense of the neighboring landscapes of culture, which could (and should) be imagined. On the one hand, these snapshots serve as

key reference-points during the ideological contestations over *who* owns the true religion, the true morality, the purest form of ‘culture’ or the ruling capacity. On the other hand, they include some of the most nuanced relationships of tolerance, and some of the deadliest rationalizations of intolerance. As well as the processes of reproduction, all these sites of culture make sense of the many discontinuities they have crystallized.

For centuries after the battle of Chaldiran (1514), some relatively unknown—yet stereotypically despised—religious rituals were able to survive, in the isolation of certain villages in the mountains of Anatolia. As history progressed, the carriers of these different, and also differentiating rituals were labelled by the *self* or the *other* as “Kızılbaş”, “Rafizî”, “Alevî” or as a “heterodox (Islamic) community”. Following the urbanization processes after the 1950s, some Alevîs’ funeral rituals began to symbolize an acculturation process—i.e. the acculturation of the mosque funeral in urban settings. Alongside demanding tolerance of Sunni Muslims at mosques, the vast majority of Alevîs began carrying the flag of “Secularism,”⁸ together with marxism(s), as part of great power politics. From the 1960s to the 1980s, many Alevîs complained that they were not welcome at mosques, unlike Sunni Muslims. In the meantime, several incidents surfaced that were likely to offend them, for example during their funeral organizations, a core activity that most people are involved in planning at least once in life.

As of the 1990s, some Alevî communities’ expectations concerning mosques have fundamentally differed, as they came to the conclusion that their politics of tolerance had failed. Accordingly, they re-configured their funerals in a manner that would provoke a new tension between the belief system, *Alevîlik*,⁹ and the new identity politics, *Alevîsm*.¹⁰ It is through the

⁸ With a capital ‘S’, I will refer only to the state secularism at a given moment, whereas the alternative understandings of secularism, which may or may not be critical of the former, will be denoted with lower case ‘s’.

⁹ Alevîlik signifies the belief-system of Alevîs, in the form of a religion, sect or philosophy.

¹⁰ An extraordinary political consciousness that is attached to *Alevîlik*.

see Elise Massicard, “Alevî Hareketinin Siyasallaşması,” *İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları*, 2007.

landscape of funerals that one can follow where ‘we’—i.e. both the *self* and the *other*—have reached in ‘our’ history of sectarianism.

Another landscape of culture that always had a say over the neighboring landscapes, as well as in relation to some abstract ideological contestations over gender and morality, was the entertainment sector. Some of the earliest visible representations of “LGBT” identity (alternatively, LGBTT, LGBTI, LGBTQ, LGBTI+) arguably appeared among performance artists—e.g. *köçek*, *çengi*, *kolbaşı*, *tavşan oğlanı*. At the very least, the trans sex workers of Istanbul’s *Ülker Street*, in the face of a deadly attack (1996), defended the legitimacy of their existence by amalgamating their identities with that of the *köçeks* of the Ottoman past.¹¹ Taken together, their ‘entertainment’ activities have been key to their survival since Ottoman times. As early as the 16th century, the sector began to represent a space in which these visible representations have not just been tolerated by the authorities, but also occasionally needed and appreciated as ‘natural’ entities.

However, at the same time, the sector represented a space of exclusion, which was realized by the members of the LGBT activism that developed after the 1990s. Accordingly, the sector crystallizes exclusion whenever it is organized and re-organized unilaterally by a higher authority. Moreover, the inclusivity of the sector indicates where tolerance ends in practice for LGBT people—e.g. a trans sex worker’s willingness to leave the sector in order to join another one, such as the public sector. It is through the landscape of the entertainment sector that one can follow how these boundaries have been pushed back and forth by the different visible representations of LGBT identity, as well as their interlocutors and the authoritative claims they advance.

¹¹ see Pinar Selek, *Maskeler Süvariler Gaclar. Ülker Sokak: Bir Alt Kültürün Dışlanma Mekanı* (Ayizi Kitap, 2014).

Thirdly, women's clothing must be studied, at the least because for centuries the dominant cultural mindset took clothing as an infallible indicator of personality. According to the Ottoman system of *millet*, clothes were to act as the fundamental boundary-markers between some pre-recognized religious communities.¹² As a crucial aspect of the millet system, the 'personalities' of clothes were given and forcefully preserved by the state, or at least that was the commitment.

The clothing revolutions led by Ottoman modernism, as well as the Secularist Republic, changed people's clothes several times. However, the competing ideology-makers of these historical episodes shared the received wisdom about the formative role of clothing in constructing a society. In the ideological contestation that followed the foundation of the Republic, women's clothing was still perceived as a central moral issue, a very quickly-changing fashion, a symbol of social development or backwardness, and a reflection of women's "legitimate" environment. It is through this landscape that one can follow whether 'we' re-made 'our' relationship with such alternative ideals, and if so, how.

In a nutshell, all these sites of culture contribute to the contemporary grand debate on how "democracy" is to be understood in the course of ongoing struggles concerning the sharing of public spaces (e.g. the clothes deemed appropriate in a neighborhood), the re-operationalization of value-systems (e.g. the unchaining of 'our' rights from 'our' values), the re-casting of belief-systems (e.g. changing funeral rituals), the intersection of identities (e.g. "headscarved workers"; "AK LGBT"), the new expressions of social classes (e.g. "Anti-capitalist Muslims"; middle class Islamism), and finally the re-making of ideologies and the management of unequal relationships.

¹² see Karen Barkey, "Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 19, no. 1–2 (2005): 5–19.

2.1. “LGBT Pride” and Police Officers on Streets vs. Erdoğan and Bülent Ersoy at Iftar

Having focused on some boundary moments in conversational texts, I will question, for example, how *unsettling* an unprecedented question may be for a government’s ideology. The participants of a public parade, “LGBT Pride”, asked the head of the government, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, why he denounced them in moral terms and ordered the police to interfere with their parade, while on the exact same morally loaded Ramadan day, he and his wife Emine Erdoğan had an *iftar*¹³ with a transsexual singer, Bülent Ersoy, as known as the “trans-diva” of the country. Without the appearance of a voice to bring together these two snapshots, the tear-gas that the police officers threw would do nothing more than underpin the already well-repeated argument that the ideology of the government, formed as an extension of the historical repertoire of Islamism, is undoubtedly antagonistic, and beyond antagonism, intolerant towards LGBT. However, by pointing out an exception to this narrative, some participants of the parade—no matter how vulnerable they may be within the given authority structure¹⁴—could push for the re-evaluation of a hegemonic ideology, “Islamism”.

In response, the supporters of Erdoğan, among whom were his advisors and the pro-government media organs, had to come up with a rationalization of tolerance. Some denied seeing Bülent Ersoy as “a transsexual” on the basis that she was “much more” than that. Accordingly, she was taken as an indisputable talent, a religious conservative, or simply a ‘reality’ of Turkey. Some other defenders of the government used the moment to “prove” that “transsexuals” have in fact become freer under the rule of the AKP government. However, having problematized such explicit references to the ‘free transsexuality’ of Ersoy, some other

¹³ “The evening meal eaten by Muslims after the sun has gone down during Ramadan”. “Iftar,” in *Cambridge Online Dictionary* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/iftar>.

¹⁴ This was possible amidst the broader social polarization and some, albeit limited, open channels of communication, through which the speakers of a broader “left-wing” opposition made sure that their interlocutor—i.e. the government circle—pays attention to the contradiction.

pro-government circles would be skeptical of any emphasis on LGBT as a marker of identity. Erdoğan remained silent during this in-group discussion. Nevertheless, silence within this context should also be taken as an answer, albeit vague. As the (at least) two pro-Erdoğan claims did not overlap, a further contestation would take place: one between the pro and anti-parade representations of LGBT, and another between the clashing anti-parade claims.

Many of those who speak in the name of Islam will deny that they tolerate LGBT people. The cross-temporal value-surveys continue to reach this intuitive conclusion,¹⁵ just as the ideology-makers keep repeating, “we cannot tolerate what Allah forbids”.¹⁶ However, the fundamental question here turns out to be more nuanced than these explicit uses of discourse. The following question must be asked: have the self-proclaimed Islamists begun to tolerate ‘these people’, *not* by putting up with their LGBT identity, but by ignoring or sidestepping their demonstration of some apparent markers of LGBT identity? If these authorities rationalize making such a distinction between “being only an LGBT person” and “being more than an LGBT person”, what may be the implications of this *implicit tolerance* in the entertainment sector, which signifies the traditional labor sector of LGBT people? On the flip side, what may be the implications of this argument in, say, the public sector where LGBT employees cannot be easily visible? After all, Bülent Ersoy, who never hid her trans-identity but expressed it only in certain well-negotiated forms, was not marked as “a transsexual” in the abovementioned

¹⁵ see Inglehart on World Values Surveys: “We do not have time-series data on attitudes toward homosexuality from any Islamic society because our Islamic colleagues were extremely reluctant to even ask about this topic. With considerable effort, we were able to obtain readings at a single time point for ten Islamic societies and found the following percentages saying that homosexuality is never justifiable: Bangladesh, 99; Egypt, 99; Jordan, 98; Pakistan, 96; Indonesia, 95; Iran, 94; Algeria, 93; Azerbaijan, 89; Turkey, 84; and Albania, 68. [...] [it] is clear that there cannot have been much movement toward growing tolerance of homosexuality in most of these countries.”

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹⁶ This phrase was used by Hayrettin Karaman and Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü among others.

context. On the contrary, she was often appreciated for the foundational ‘conservative’ values that she defended in the gaze of the authorities.

That said, in accordance with the given limits of appropriateness, which visible representatives of LGBT identity would consent¹⁷ to take on this role of acting as “more than an LGBT person”? After all, the question comes down to the first-order values one represents, once s/he becomes visible. Clearly, what opened a relatively safe space of tolerance for Ersoy is what fundamentally clashes with the aim of an “LGBT Pride” parade—i.e. the respectful recognition of a standalone LGBT identity. On the one hand, this process pushes the carriers of the identity to negotiate their in-group differences, especially in terms of their alternative approaches to the broader ideological repertoires they face. On the other hand, it suggests that “LGBT” appears as a point of re-evaluation for the makers of hegemonic ideologies, such as those of “the right” and “the left”, which, I will claim, previously blamed one another for being too soft on “sexual perversion”. Having participated in these contestations, “LGBT” can no longer be taken merely as a matter of sub-culture. Instead, I will offer a relational perspective that takes “LGBT” as a many-voiced identity, the alternative visible representations of which have been integrated into the mass political struggles over values in Turkey.

2.2. Cübbeli Ahmet Hoca at His Daughter’s Wedding

In the next landscape that I observe—i.e. women and clothing, the flow of the conversations went beyond the ideology-makers’ first-order values. What if, for example, the daughter of the most famous teacher of a religious community, *Ismailağa Cemaati*, wants to have her wedding in an allegedly “Western-style” wedding dress, contrary to what her father has preached for many decades? In this case, Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü—as known as Cübbeli Ahmet Hoca—was challenged by the mismatch between his first-order values and the preferences of someone from

¹⁷ i.e. in the Gramscian sense of the term.

his very close social circle. Sometime after the wedding ceremony, Ünlü publicized his disappointment with his daughter Yüsrâ's dress. That said, he emphasized that enforcement would not be a solution even if as his daughter she does not embrace "hijab"—i.e. the true form of tesettür¹⁸ according to Ünlü and the rest of *Ismailağa Cemaati*. Having dismissed the idea of forcing the youth to behave in accordance with "the Islamic values", Ünlü defined the main task as making young people embrace these values. Ultimately, in the face of her own religious values, it would be Yüsrâ who would take the burden of her own behavior.

This conversation clearly includes Ünlü's definition of his foundational values; but it goes beyond these values. Ünlü makes a normative, ethical claim when he puts forward what ought to be done in these cases. (1) He explained how he sadly turned his back on his daughter during the wedding. (2) He admitted that he was not fully successful in educating his close social circle in this respect. (3) Having said that, he did not see enforcement as a solution, since the practice of these values does not make sense as long as they are not fully internalized by the practitioner. (4) By emphasizing the individual responsibility that the belief-system places on its carriers, he reminded the public of his own 'proper' wedding. (5) He preached that Muslims should "interfere with the wrong" if they can, by means of a "balanced" action, such as conveying the message of Allah, or at least having an inward opposition. (6) Finally, Ünlü invited Muslims to pray for the fellow believers who have not yet embraced all the ideals of Islam.

As this context-dependent evaluation suggests, the expression of first-order values in a decontextualized setting tends to differ from the operationalization of these values in action. The survey method falls short in this endeavor of making sense of different social contexts. For example, according to the survey of the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research,

¹⁸ en. Islamic veiling.

which is one of the most recent surveys on the subject, only half of the respondents agreed that “it is up to a woman to dress whichever way she wants”.¹⁹ However, the survey lacked a thorough examination of the cognitive processes that the respondents may have undergone during their very limited speech acts. For example, in the responses, it remains unexplored what kind of an imagined ‘authority’ it is that should restrict women’s clothing—e.g. a court, a parent, a religious value of the self.

The survey conducted by Toprak and Çarkoğlu could construct more clear social contexts.²⁰ The head-covering ban was posed as an explicit legal question; the headscarf was presented as a command of religion; and interference with the others’ clothing was asked as a potentially different social matter, which may be taken as an ethical question. Nevertheless, the cross-temporal approach of Toprak and Çarkoğlu examined change only by asking the same questions twice in a seven-year period. In other words, it was not made to examine how each of these questions may have lost or gained significance in time. This is part of my aim in delving into a history of conversations. This history should demonstrate how the formulation of some key questions differed in time.

For example, the ethical question that was available in Ünlü’s speech has prevailed in some mass debates in the meantime. Recently, many ‘religious conservatives’ of the old generation mentioned their disappointment with the most recent generation’s conduct of *tesettür*. Given the new fashion and style that influenced the appearance of *tesettür*, they shared their doubts regarding the sincerity of some fellow practitioners of religion—e.g. those that bring together “style”, “fashion” and *tesettür*. Accordingly, the critiques have diagnosed the problem as a fake conduct of certain practices without the accompaniment of the necessary

¹⁹ Mansoor Moaddel, “The Birthplace of the Arab Spring: Values and Perceptions of Tunisians and A Comparative Assessment of Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Pakistani, Saudi, Tunisian, and Turkish Publics” (University of Michigan Population Studies Center, December 2013), 57, 97.

²⁰ Ali Carkoglu and Binnaz Toprak, *Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey* (TESEV Publications, 2007).

element of belief. The flow of these conversations, however, obliged them to re-evaluate their approach to those who do not share the value-system they put forward in the name of Islam. If the problem is the lack of sincere belief, to what extent and in which form should “pressure” be an option? In this way, it turns out to be a question of tolerance, though the form of tolerance that emanates from these strong expressions of first-order values would be, at most, a *tolerance without relativism*.

A similar ethical concern, which necessitates going beyond one’s first-order values without renouncing these values, also leads to the re-making of Secularism. In late-2013, CHP²¹ did not oppose the de-facto lifting of the head-covering ban in the parliament. In the parliamentary session on the subject, CHP MP Şafak Pavey made a historic speech, which was aimed at carrying Secularism beyond one’s own and others’ already irreconcilable first-order values. Pavey did not hide her own values in this speech, but she implied that Secularism should go beyond any parochial value-system. Accordingly, Pavey’s concern was “oppression” instead of others’ clothes. After many years of defending the head-covering ban staunchly, CHP ceased their opposition to the lifting of the ban.

Moreover, the women whose clothing an authority²² has intervened to alter have begun to campaign with the slogan, “do not meddle with my cloth” (tr. kıyafetime karışma). Clearly, the tension lies between the agency of these women and the hegemonic ideologies that imagine an ideal-type woman, with ideal clothes that are to ‘coherently’ represent her personality. Taken together, I will discuss how all these conversations challenge a dominant cultural mindset pertaining to women’s clothing. Surviving the Ottoman *millet* system as well as various

²¹ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (en. Republican People’s Party)

²² This authority may still appear on the street, at school, in the family or the parliament. I will examine how, in the recent past, it has appeared as a minister, a police officer, a member of parliament, a teacher or a random stranger.

‘clothing revolutions’, this dominant mindset objectified clothing as an infallible precursor of personality. For the first time in ‘our’ history, clothes may have been deposed from this position.

2.3. Alevis’ Discussion over the Re-formulation of Funeral Rituals

Lastly, I will focus on a cultural landscape which exemplifies the self-conscious re-operationalization of one’s rituals in the face of an existential threat. For the sake of a politics of recognition, one might attempt to deconstruct and reconstruct a cultural institution that was once pretty much habitualized in one’s mind. What would happen, for example, if some members of a religious community raise their voices to ask the other believers to stop having their funerals in the way to which they have been accustomed? This happened in the Alevi community in the aftermath of the identity-turn of the early-1990s.

Approximately four decades before this moment, the urbanization process the community underwent made a substantial part of the urban Alevis accustomed to mosque funerals.²³ Many Alevis, among whom were the active politicians and some of the most vocal thinkers of their time, settled for this acculturation in the large cities, as they did not think of institutionalizing their funerals in any unique way—i.e. any way alternative to that of Sunni Muslims. Instead, they followed a politics of tolerance, through which they demanded their funeral proceedings to be undertaken by the religious personnel in the same way Sunni Muslims could require (*e.g.* washing and enshrouding body, performing funeral prayer, reading salâ²⁴ for the funeral). At the time, the ideology-makers who spoke in the name of Alevis often reiterated that the mosque was also their place of worship, as they were also Muslims. Their

²³ That said, others either continued to hold their funerals in their hometowns, or in front of their apartments in cities.

²⁴ Salâ is a form in Turkish religious music. The word originates from the Arabic word for the Islamic prayer, *salat* or *salah*. In the literature of Turkish music, alongside being a representation of mosque music, salâ may be read in *tasavvufî* lodges such as *tekkes*. Depending on its time and place, salâ may take different forms. Among them may be exemplified morning salâ, friday salâ, and funeral salâ. Nuri Ozcan, “Salâ صلاة,” in *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (Türk Diyanet Vakfı: İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2009).

criticism was rather that the official Diyanet²⁵ personnel consisted of Sunni Muslims. During mosque funerals, Alevi were occasionally harassed by these religious personnel. In response, many Alevi called for the state, in the name of Secularism, to re-structure Diyanet so that *Alevilik* can be institutionally recognized as a “sect of Islam”.

Though Alevi did not experience a contradiction between the ongoing practice of mosque funerals and their belief-system, an unprecedented wave of identity-consciousness triggered their fears of assimilation at the outset of the 1990s. Thereafter, for many, demanding and bestowing tolerance were to be taken as the two faces of the same assimilationism. As an attempt to “revive” *Alevilik*, the new institutions of *Alevism* (e.g. civic foundations and associations) configured a place of worship, *cemevi*,²⁶ to function in urban settings. Even though the historical legitimacy of *cemevi* has been defended by all the mainstream organizations that Alevi established, some of the re-cast *cemevi* rituals brought these organizations into thorny contestation between the new politics of identity and the old—supposedly timeless—belief-system.

The tension in this setting is twofold. Firstly, the state institutions pressurized Alevi to come up with a single definition of *Alevilik*. The claim of the state, which has been merged with a wide range of ideological positions,²⁷ is that *Alevilik* should have a clear-cut definition in order for it to be recognized. Secondly, this pressure from the state further exacerbates the

²⁵ I will use the name as an abbreviation for Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (en. Directorate of Religious Affairs).

²⁶ Pronounced as “djemevi”, and literally means “a house of gathering”.

²⁷ In this regard, an argument in the name of nationalism, such as that of Yusuf Halaçoğlu, might not differ in essence from an argument in the name of Islamism, such as that of Abdülaziz Bayındır. Halaçoğlu, who served as *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (en. Nationalist Action Party) MP and the chairman of Türk Tarih Kurumu (en. Turkish Historical Society), argues that recognizing *Alevilik* as “a separate religion” would be a matter of “fitne” (en. unrest). Abdülaziz Bayındır, who is a professor of Islamic law at Istanbul University, asked Alevi to define if they are an Islamic sect, a separate religion or else: “then we can talk [about recognition]”. In both cases, Alevi are pushed to come up with a single definition.

see Emin Avundukluoglu, “Fitne Sokmaya Çalışıyorlar,” *Anadolu Ajansı*, October 25, 2014,

<https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/bremenin-alevilik-karari-tamamen-siyasi/107706>.

Abdulaziz Bayindir, *Alevilik* (Süleymaniye Vakfı, 2011), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oR1DyWCR00o>.

internal contestations of Alevilik that the Alevi communities had already experienced following the identity-turn, by challenging one another as to the definition of the ‘true’ Alevilik. Amid destructive conversations about their identity, labels prevailed: “assimilationists”, “statists”, “separatists”.

Between the cleavages, the Alevi citizens of Turkey have been organizing their funerals in ways that may easily challenge these clear-cut differences. Mosque has become the place of worship for the assimilated Alevis, and cemevi has become the place of worship for the Alevis who managed to differentiate their religious space from that of others in urban centers. That said, what about those who want to have their funerals at a cemevi, while requesting a mosque only read salâ for these funerals? What about those who have two separate funeral ceremonies, one at a mosque and one at a cemevi? Apart from the fact they are the ones who deal with the residues of all the above-mentioned cultural processes, who are *they*: the ones whom the politics of recognition will save, or the ones who need to follow a politics of tolerance? Will they be the ones who destroy the binary opposition between recognition and tolerance, or the new black sheep? The cultural process Alevis underwent demonstrates how the turn from a settled cultural period to a period of ideology-making may create some very different senses of the same practice (e.g. having requests from mosques).

2.4. The Role of Dialectics in Cultural Change

Common to all the cultural processes I have so far described is the indispensable role that *dialectics* play in the direction of these processes, but also in ‘our’ (un)awareness of change and continuity. The relationship of one with the other determines the properties of the process they undergo—i.e. whether they proceed together in the route of a settled cultural period, or whether one wakes the other up from the habit with a move that unsettles the ground for the ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and provokes the cognitive capacity of the *self* or the *other* for more ideological thought.

In all these periods, one uses one's cultural resources as parts of a "tool-kit"²⁸. However, the use of the tools differs significantly from one period to another. As the components of the tool-kit are subject to assembly, disassembly and transformation, culture operates as a *process* where meanings, repertoires, scripts and the discourses of activities are intrinsically linked to historical time.²⁹ The transition from one period to another is not merely an introspective and conscious choice, but often a necessary consequence of one's access to structural (material) "resources",³⁰ and at an ideational level, one's perception of social context—i.e. that of the relational *self*.³¹

Cultural change surfaces in the transition from one period to another. That said, the change may be tacitly noticeable or verbally expressible only at some moments in a cultural period. The following chapter will focus on some boundary moments that are likely to render change traceable. Because this is where the culture flows, I will continue to seek cultural change in the dialectic between the *self* and the *other*.

²⁸ Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 2 (April 1, 1986): 273–86, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2095521>.

²⁹ Patricia M. Greenfield, "Culture as Process: Empirical Methods for Cultural Psychology," in *Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology: Theory and Method* (Allyn & Bacon, 1997), p303-304.

³⁰ See for a material sense of the term: William H. Sewell Jr, "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1992, 1–29.

³¹ This understanding of social context does not match the way the concept has been defined, for example, in Social Sequence Analysis, which limits the social context to "the phenomena surrounding a case" (see Abbott 1995). In the way I have used the term in the introduction, it extends into the reflexive processes within which a participant construes these surroundings. Reflexivity is key to one's understanding of one's position in a social structure, and one's ability to develop strategies of action (i.e. ideology-making) in response. Andrew Abbott, "Sequence Analysis: New Methods for Old Ideas," *Annual Review of Sociology* 21, no. 1 (1995): 93–113, p94.

2.5. Cultural Periods: Change and Continuity as Mental Challenges

Our universe is in full crisis. The order of words no longer corresponds to the order of things: whereas the former still insists on following a traditional system, the latter seems to be mostly characterized by disorder and discontinuity, or so science tells us. Our feelings and emotions have been frozen into stereotypical expressions that have nothing to do with our reality. Social laws still rest on orderly systems that hardly reflect the social instability of our time. In other words, language offers us a representation of the phenomenal world that has nothing to do with the one we encounter on a daily basis.³²

This research traces *change* in *continuity*. This is a difficult mental process, as continuity refers to the consistent existence of something over time, whereas change signifies newness that suddenly or gradually appears. One is processual reproduction, the other is interruption, a pause or a juncture, and hence the re-casting of some pre-existing structures. That said, continuity and change are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they may go together in remarkable or subtle ways.

It is subtle if, for instance, a traditional form of expression settles on differentiated meanings under differentiated conditions.³³ This process may underpin what Eco referred to as the widening discrepancy between “the order of words” and “the order of things”. Aristotle referred to this process in his critique of sophism, as he described a fundamental reasoning error that arises “from an unnoticed shift in the meaning of terms used within an argument”.³⁴ Accordingly, the meanings may change without notice that a statement, utterance or an expression may be used to signify things that are different to those it signified previously.

³² Umberto Eco, *Opera Aperta* (Harvard University Press, 1989), p141.

³³ see how the Afro-Cuban expressive culture of *rumba* and its general associations have been “reinvented” with new meanings under variegated social contexts.

Robin Moore, “The Commercial Rumba: Afro-Cuban Arts as International Popular Culture,” *Latin American Music Review/Revista de Música Latinoamericana* 16, no. 2 (1995): 165–198, p178.

³⁴ Frans H. van Eemeren, *Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse: Fifty Contributions to the Development of Pragma-Dialectics* (Springer, 2015), p8.

In a *settled*³⁵ cultural period however, the participants tend to be too undisturbed to feel any need to review their dispositions. This is because these dispositions may appear in the form of habits, in a manner so that their doers will comfortably miss their shifting representative functions. Deleuze was among those who argued that habit never leads to a true repetition, since, in some situations, the same action comes with a different intent, and in others, a different action comes with the same intent.³⁶ Even though variation hides beneath unquestioned repetition, the process obscures one's awareness of the element of change.

Another element that hinders one's awareness of change might be one's reliance on an exterior formalization, while making sense of a repetitive language.³⁷ Reliance on an exterior logic misses the point that everything in the language, including repetitions, may signify change: the meaning is only in the present, hidden only in the ordinary uses, and beyond the reach of any exogenous technical, scientific specialty.³⁸ The words one uses may be from others, but the "evaluative tone" of these words reflects one's own way of assimilating, reworking, and re-accentuating—i.e. polyphony (many-voicedness) according to Bakhtin.³⁹ In the same vein, Peggy Phelan argued that "performance" is only in the present, and therefore, cannot be represented, recorded, or reproduced.⁴⁰

Questioning some of the most "serious"⁴¹ speech acts, Foucault had a similar interest in discontinuities in language. In his explanation of the many discontinuities that "Western culture" experienced during its shift to modernity, Foucault's key argument was that language was displaced away from its "representative functions", as the mode of the word was

³⁵ Ann Swidler, *Talk of Love: How Culture Matters* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 89-111.

³⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (London and New York: Continuum, 1994), 5.

³⁷ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (John Wiley & Sons, 2009), par 11-12, 66.

³⁸ Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 8-12.

³⁹ Mikhail Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986), 89.

⁴⁰ Peggy Phelan, *Unmarked: The Politics of Performance* (Routledge, 2003).

⁴¹ Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Routledge, 2014), xx.

transformed by the “sounds” that composed it.⁴² The process indicated a de-coupling of the word and its very being. In other words, this transformation did not originate in some discursive quality intrinsic to the language itself but was led by the power relations beyond it. Relatedly, Foucault argued that the birth of philology was initially hidden to “Western consciousness”—unlike the well-noticed shifts in biology and economics. This was because of the inevitability of thinking through the discourse of one’s own language, which raises its own barrier against one’s awareness of what might have appeared beyond it:

As one is in the act of discoursing, how is one to know – unless by means of some obscure indices that can interpret only with difficulty and badly – that language (the very language one is using) is acquiring a dimension irreducible to pure discursivity?⁴³

This unawareness brings me to another transitory mental process, which is where discourse begins to lose its significance in the human mind. During a repetition, the tie between the practice and the discourse behind it may be loosened. A once-conscious act may turn out to be re-made in the form of a habit, hence the loss of the reflexive tone behind it. In this case, no more thought would be needed in the repetition of the practice: “you do it, you do it, and you do it; then you become it”, as Catharine MacKinnon quoted from a woman coerced into pornography.⁴⁴ Perceived continuities, routines and the lack of threat tend to create habitual cultural periods. When culture is fully in place—i.e. undoubted and undisturbed—it is more difficult to notice how it functions, which is why it remains a methodological challenge for any student of culture. If “the order of things” is re-cast through such pre-reflexive⁴⁵ or tacitly

⁴² Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (Routledge, 2002), 305-330.

⁴³ Foucault, *The Order of Things.*, 307.

⁴⁴ Catharine A. MacKinnon, *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State* (Harvard University Press, 1989), 123. See for an analysis of this statement in relation to habitual mental processes: Clare Chambers, “Masculine Domination, Radical Feminism and Change,” *Feminist Theory* 6, no. 3 (2005): 325–346.

⁴⁵ Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology* (Stanford University Press, 1990), p108.

reflexive⁴⁶ processes, it means that the occurrence of cultural change is beyond one's idea of things. This is how an agent might lose one's awareness, or at the very least, one's idea of change in and around oneself. Though this process beyond reflexivity is missed by the realist notions of agency, among them that of Margaret Archer, it was captured by the *habitus* of Bourdieu.⁴⁷

Such processes may indicate strong cultural institutions, such as a latent ideology, the meanings of which would not be accessible to those whose performances are likely to appear in the form of habits. Because the ambiguities that underlie habitual periods tend to be meaningful only to a few, it should be this few who trigger a moment to 'wake' the others from the habit.⁴⁸ In other words, one provokes one's interlocutors to develop an insight into the cultural institutions functioning in the background of their minds. Once in a simultaneous public debate in Turkey and Egypt, this provocation was depicted in a popular slogan: "Muslim, don't sleep!"⁴⁹ Accordingly, one would not be an "Islamist", but at most a Muslim if s/he lost ideological alertness.

All moral crises are triggered at a key moment in which one realizes the direction of, or a need for a cultural change. For example, MacKinnon's interviewee reached a stage of self-awareness somewhere before or during the dialogue with MacKinnon, which pulled her back to a conscious examination of herself, through which she could explicitly evaluate her own experience of undergoing a pre-reflexive or tacitly reflexive process. This is how a settled

⁴⁶ see "practical consciousness" on p57, Anthony Giddens, "Agency, Structure," in *Central Problems in Social Theory* (Springer, 1979), 49–95.

⁴⁷ Sadiya Akram, "Fully Unconscious and Prone to Habit: The Characteristics of Agency in the Structure and Agency Dialectic," *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 43, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 45–65, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12002>.

⁴⁸ Orlando Patterson, "The Mechanisms of Cultural Reproduction: Explaining the Puzzle of Persistence," in *Handbook of Cultural Sociology*, Hall & Grindstaff eds (Routledge, 2010), 141-142.

⁴⁹ "Mass Protests in Turkey against Egypt Death Sentences" (İnsani Yardım Vakfı, April 29, 2014), <http://www.ihh.org.tr/en/main/activity/volunteer-activities/3/mass-protests-in-turkey-against-egypt-death-s/2281>.

cultural period may be problematized for the first time. In itself, one's awareness of the problem indicates cultural change, as it indicates a moment of boundary.

As opposed to the structuralist approach, Rose argued that these cultural periods are triggered by the agents who actively manipulate the symbols behind them.⁵⁰ Certainly, there are moments that wake one up despite one's willingness to continue sleeping, but these moments of boundary are not passively reflected. As an example, I shall take the study of the history of sectarianism in Islam—i.e. a case in which either the element of temporality, or the key role of social agency has often been missed. The Ottoman state refused to tolerate Seyyid (Battal) Gazi shrine⁵¹ after the 16th century, even though it had shared 'some kind' of *gaza spirit*⁵² since its foundation. What has changed then at this moment in which it was problematized? Cemal Kafadar demonstrated that the Ottoman state became unprecedentedly self-conscious in the making of its ideological formation of Sunni Orthodoxy. In the same (17th) century, this dialogic context that nurtured sectarianism was also a contribution of the dervishes of the Seyyid Shrine who represented "Shia Bektaşî", which they had not explicitly named back in the 13th century.⁵³

Even though various *gaza spirits* existed long before this moment, they did not take the unsettling shape they took later. On the contrary, the Ottoman state and the Bektaşî order had "started this adventure in some harmony and cooperation but ended up as the two opposing poles of the Ottoman religio-political culture".⁵⁴ The new disagreement was relevant to the geopolitical clash of the "Sunni" Ottoman and the "Shia" Safavid. That said, this process was

⁵⁰ Sonya O. Rose, "Cultural Analysis and Moral Discourses: Episodes, Continuities, and Transformations," in Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Eds.) *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1999), p221-222.

⁵¹ Seyyid Battal Ghazi was a mythical warrior who campaigned against Byzantines.

⁵² "Ghaza [tr. Gazi] spirit" signifies a mythical belief in holy war.

⁵³ Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Univ of California Press, 1995), 92.

⁵⁴ Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*, 98.

not led by some self-structured cultural symbols, but by the transitory stages of consciousness, through which the agents formed some historically contingent understandings of being Sunni and Shia.

At such boundary moments, a previously used expression may be consciously reiterated for new purposes.⁵⁵ In order to exemplify this moment that challenges the “immobilization” of the text, Deleuze invoked Borges’ ability to describe “a real book”, Don Quixote, as though it was written by Pierre Menard, an imaginary author.⁵⁶ A calculation of this kind may be described as part of an explicit ideology-making process—i.e. “doing philosophy” in Deleuze’s terminology.⁵⁷ Feeling disturbed in the face of a situation triggers the need to develop new strategies. Therefore, it may trigger one’s formulation of the inherited ideological repertoire in a different way. Change and continuity would go hand in hand at this moment when a new strategy of action is produced for the new chapter of a seemingly ongoing problem. This stage of re-evaluation is inevitably a self-conscious, reflexive mental process.

Finally, the element of change may also be overlooked in these explicit ideology-making processes, at least because the speakers may be so busy with a lasting stalemate, in which they lack the means to evaluate what may have changed in the common playing field. At the very least, their mental state may not be ready to face any cognitive dissonance amid the flowing contestation over some of their staunchly embraced knowledge claims. In the course of a conversation, the interlocutors may not realize how many things they take from one

⁵⁵ Jeffrey Prager, “American Political Culture and the Shifting Meaning of Race,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 10, no. 1 (January 1, 1987): 62–81, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1987.9993556>.

See the transformation of the concept of Mana in different hands: Matt Tomlinson and Ty P. Kāwika Tengan, *New Mana: Transformations of a Classic Concept in Pacific Languages and Cultures*, 2016.

⁵⁶ Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*., pxxii.

⁵⁷ David Neil, “The Uses of Anachronism: Deleuze’s History of the Subject,” *Philosophy Today*, August 1, 1998, <https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday199842420>.

another. This situation may be relevant to the above-mentioned description of Eco in the sense that the “order of words” may not be ready to dare to face the puzzling “order of things”.

In all the above-mentioned situations, the speakers have to *explore*, *evaluate* and *retroact* to deal with the change within and around themselves. They explore the new conditions by entering a boundary moment; they evaluate these moments; they respond to others’ evaluations; they refer to the past occurrences and bring together the past, the current, the self and the other. These meetings with ‘change’ will constitute the building blocks of my methodological approach.

3. Research question

This study examines how cultural resources, such as values and beliefs, change as they are translated in a series of periods, such as ideology-making or habitual processes. In particular, I question how the voices behind the dyadic relationship of “Secularism” and “Islamism” in Turkey made, negotiated, and re-made their authoritative claims⁵⁸ in relation to the *other*, while in response the *other* engages with the same ideological repertoires or goes beyond them.

I focus on numerous sites of culture where “intolerance”—in the shifting temporal, relational senses of the term—has been repeatedly rationalized in one form or another. According to this understanding, what determines (in)tolerance is the dialogue between the one tolerating and the one to be tolerated. These agents are, to begin with, distinguishable in accordance with their relative positions in an authority structure that makes them face one another. This authority structure provides the ‘powerful’ *self* with the tools to determine the terms of tolerance. That said, it never guarantees that the *other* gives consent to these terms. If the latter does not accept the conditions of tolerance, the authority either re-visits the terms of tolerance that it previously put forward, or it must end up rationalizing intolerance. Here is where the agency of the *other* lies: no authority can tolerate those who do not want tolerance, as they will do what is necessary to push the borders for more (e.g. recognition).

This research will examine these relational and temporal dimensions of tolerance in three landscapes of culture, which include contestations over women’s clothing, Alevis’ funerals, and LGBT persons’ lives on the borders of the entertainment sector.⁵⁹ The following

⁵⁸ By authoritative claim, I refer to any discourse that posits social action—i.e. what to do and what not to do in a given/taken social setting. (In)tolerance is a matter of authoritative claim. As this research will analyze, it is a set of authoritative claims which lays down when someone’s clothes should be interfered with in public; who is qualified to have a salâ or a funeral prayer from a mosque upon one’s death; and which sectors of work are appropriate for a transgender person.

⁵⁹ I use these markers of identity—i.e. women, Alevis and LGBT—in relationship to their disputed antecedents and successors, no matter if they are self-proclaimed, exogenously objectified by force, or intersubjectively shared.

section will present an overview of some popular claims over reproduction and change in Turkey.

3.1. Arguments over Cultural Reproduction in Turkey

Change can only make sense with a prior understanding of the processes of reproduction⁶⁰. The notions of reproduction I will analyze in this section are concerned with the question of whether the *self*, the *other*, or the way of managing their diversity has ever changed in Turkey. In this context, I will focus primarily on the argument that “intolerance” remains essentially the same, in a manner that bypasses some differentiated social structures,⁶¹ varied forms of political regime,⁶² socioeconomic mobility⁶³ and altered ecological environments⁶⁴.

According to Ayhan Kaya’s conclusion in his study on “the myth of tolerance”, the state’s attitude towards whom it defines as the other seems to have been reproduced, no matter who spoke in the name of the state over centuries:

[T]here has been continuity between modern Turkey and the Ottoman Empire in terms of the management of ethno-cultural

⁶⁰ Patterson, “The Mechanisms of Cultural Reproduction: Explaining the Puzzle of Persistence.”, p149.

⁶¹ see this snapshot from 1976: Ergun Ozbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton University Press, 2015). Ozbudun empirically demonstrates that rapid economic growth, coupled with increasing “political participation”, led to autonomous, instrumental, and class-based activities that weakened some deferential and communal-based structures.

⁶² Despite short-term interruptions (e.g. the banning of political parties till the opening of their successors) or structural constraints (e.g. the shadow of the military over politics), a multi-party system could be sustained since 1950.

⁶³ Nilufer Gole, “Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites,” *Middle East Journal* 51, no. 1 (January 1, 1997): 46–58.

Gul Berna Ozcan and Hasan Turunc, “Economic Liberalization and Class Dynamics in Turkey: New Business Groups and Islamic Mobilization.,” *Insight Turkey* 13, no. 3 (2011).

Ersin Kalaycioglu, “Politics of Conservatism in Turkey,” *Turkish Studies* 8, no. 2 (June 1, 2007): 233–52, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683840701312211>, p238.

⁶⁴ see three snapshots, from 1985, 2002 and 2017: Michael N. Danielson and Rusen Keles, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization: Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, (Holmes & Meier Pub, 1985).

Sencer Ayata, “The New Middle Class and the Joys of Suburbia,” *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey*, 2002, 25–42.

Bulent Guner, “Türkiye’de Kent-Kent Göçü Üzerine Bazı Değerlendirmeler,” *Mediterranean Journal of Humanities*, (2) 1, 2017, 205–12.

Accordingly, urbanization has reached unprecedented levels. Hand in hand with urbanization, the fertility rate has dramatically decreased. Moreover, the new social trend has turned out to be migration from one urban space to another. That said, the cities have been fragmented in accordance with the perceived class or cultural identities.

and religious diversity, and the tradition of tolerance since the imperial ascendancy of the 16th century [...] As long as these groups pay their tributes to the Turkish state and accept their subaltern and secondary position, they are tolerated. Otherwise, these groups will be inclined to encounter further ontological challenges.⁶⁵

Not only have the hegemonic ideologies that have an authoritative say in the management of diversity been reproduced, but also their targets—i.e. culturally or religiously different groups. Accordingly, a set of self-proclaimed or exogenously imposed identities, their antecedents, successors, derivatives and extensions seem to continue to challenge one another for centuries. Seasoned historian Halil İnalçık argues that as opposed to the (modernist) project, “we” could not turn out to be totally different, even though “we” changed. This change, however, further exacerbated the tension: “let us admit it or not: we are in the face of a culture and identity problem that is heavier than usual”.⁶⁶ İnalçık interpreted this episode as a cultural contestation between the hegemonic “Turk-Islam synthesis” and its critiques. Right before the third term of the AKP government, Toprak *et. al.* labelled “seculars” (tr. laikler) as “the new others” of Anatolia.⁶⁷ The others may have changed in the course of history, but the identity-making based on *Other* seems to have been reproduced.

The ideological hardliners tend to share the idea that both themselves and the others remain the same in essence, with more or less power. In this context, change was a major point of controversy in the last two decades: “former Islamist” Erdoğan came to power in 2002 by insisting that he took off “the shirt of Islamism” (tr. Milli Görüş gömleği). While his critiques were discussing if he had ever “changed”, Erdoğan stressed that he “did not change, but made

⁶⁵ Ayhan Kaya, *Europeanization and Tolerance in Turkey: The Myth of Toleration, Identities and Modernities in Europe* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 3-14.

⁶⁶ Halil İnalçık, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Osmanlı,” *Doğu Batı*, no. 5 (May 1998): 11–21, p13.

⁶⁷ Binnaz Toprak et al., *Din ve Muhafazakarlık Ekseninde Ötekileştirilenler* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2009), p36-39.

progress”. In response, his opponents repeatedly referred to ‘the free elections trap’: accordingly, Erdoğan and his “Islamist” cadres would use the democratic system to overturn it.

They were suspicious of both Erdoğan and the ones—i.e. mainly the so-called liberals—who were convinced that his stance had changed. During “the Marches for the Republic” (tr. Cumhuriyet Mitingleri) held against Erdoğan in 2007, Tuncay Özkan, the chief organizer of the march, summarized what brought together them: “Before everything, they stole our Allah. First we will take our Allah back”. According to them, “Islamists” were trying to ‘own’ the religion, but they clearly also made Secularism lay claim to the religion—hence the clash.

Subsequently, in academia the literature on “post-Islamism” gained weight in “liberal” defense of the then Erdoğan government. This literature focused in particular on the “democratizing” moves of the policy-makers and elites in the government circles.⁶⁸ The claims were more likely to be based on trusting the leadership than on studying the micro-level aspects of the mass debate. Nearly a decade later, based on what they saw in the policies of the government, some of the former allies abandoned the cause—e.g. the ones I included in the last footnote.

Erdoğan’s long-term opponents have claimed to have been proven right, whereas those former allies of Erdoğan were to declare either that Erdoğan changed once again, or that they were simply mistaken in terms of the notion of change they relied upon—the latter position is relatively rare.⁶⁹ This time, the argument that gained weight in this public debate was that

⁶⁸ see Ihsan Yilmaz, “Influence of Pluralism and Electoral Participation on the Transformation of Turkish Islamism,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, December 1, 2008). Ihsan D. Dagi, “Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey,” *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 13, no. 2 (June 1, 2004): 135–51, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1066992042000244290>.

⁶⁹ see the criticism of “liberals” in this vein: Murat Sevinc, “İnsan ve Toplum, Kendi Eder Kendi Bulur...,” *Diken*, April 7, 2015, <http://www.diken.com.tr/insan-ve-toplum-kendi-eder-kendi-bulur/>.

‘Islamism is simply Islamism’, in the sense that it remains stubborn in relation to change. For example, Nuray Mert, who explicitly withdrew her support from the AKP government after 2009, argued in 2013 that the Islamists, who once “reinvented themselves as ‘conservative democrats’ under the roof of the AKP, turned back to the Islamist ideology”⁷⁰.

In reaction to the ‘revival’ of Islamism, some ideological positions that previously did not include a claim to “Secularism” have been revised by their makers. For example, the edited volume of *İleri Haber*, a source of the People’s Communist Party of Turkey (HTKP), included a collection of essays that underlines how Secularism has obtained the capacity to encompass all aspects of the ‘revolutionary struggle’ in Turkey.⁷¹ Many of these ideology-makers expressed the view that in defense of Secularism, they should not be hesitant to come together with others, including “even Kemalists”.

In a similar vein, CHP MP Hüseyin Aygün, who closer to these strands of Marxism compared to many other CHP MPs, expressed self-criticism by saying that the distance of “socialists” from Secularism has handed the concept into the hands of the military junta, which, he claimed, eventually led the ideology to be emptied after 1980.⁷² Cenk Saraçoğlu called on the readers of Marxism to readjust the formerly secondary position of Secularism in their ideological repertoires.⁷³ Soyer justified this re-making as follows:

Because AKP’s attacks are not limited to the ones against secularism, but extending into a vast field from work life to women’s rights, secularism has turned out to be a battlefield that predestines the war on this vast field. In other words, the struggle

see Özkırımlı’s evaluation of the changing position of the likes of Dagi and Mahcupyan: “Umut Ozkirimli on Twitter: ‘@tkucukcan + mucadeleyi. referandumda evet dedik, bugün baris icin yaziyoruz. biz bu noktaya geldiysek, ihsan dagi, etyen bile akp’yi +,’” Twitter, June 2, 2013, <https://twitter.com/UOzkirimli/status/341266062031065088>.

⁷⁰ Nuray Mert, “The Demise of Post-Islamist Politics,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, 22 Jul 2013,

<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/nuray-mert/the-demise-of-post-islamist-politics-51133>, par 3.

⁷¹ Can Soyer, ed., *İleri Yazılar - Türkiye’nin Laiklik Kavgası* (İstanbul: İleri Kitaplığı Yayınevi, 2017).

⁷² Huseyin Aygun, “Laiklik,” *BirGün*, April 28, 2016, <https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/laiklik-110374.html>.

⁷³ Cenk Saracoglu, “2016 Türkiye’si’nde Solun Laiklikle İmtihanı,” in *İleri Yazılar - Türkiye’nin Laiklik Kavgası*, ed. Can Soyer (İstanbul: İleri Kitaplığı Yayınevi, 2017), 107–14, p113.

for secularism is no more just a demand for secularism, but also an existential prerequisite of equality, freedom, justice and enlightenment.⁷⁴

In a similar fashion, Ergin Yıldızoğlu argued that there were many Turkeys in the past—e.g. that of labor and capital, LGBT people and homophobes, men and women. According to him, these multiple struggles have recently been pulled into a grand battle between only “two Turkeys”—that is, between “Secularism” and “Political Islam”, between “liberal democracy” (i.e. a dimension of Secularism in Yıldızoğlu’s terminology) and those who oppose its principles.⁷⁵

To many eyes, “change” under these conditions seems like the name of an illusion, between the loosening and the tightening of the mechanisms of reproduction. This notion of reproduction owes part of its power to repetitive explanation of the problems, irrespective of any differentiation of these problems in detail. For example, Alevis could not get their religious status recognized, despite decades-long efforts they made in the multiparty regime, through which they continually reminded the state authority that its main pillar is Secularism. In their daily lives, they continued to report that they could still be subject to stereotypes centuries old concerning their values, rituals, lifestyles and belief systems. Reported incidents from the 1960s—e.g. in which imams occasionally refused to implement the funeral procedure for Alevis—are frequently recalled in the 2010s. The popular “right-wing” argument of the Cold War’s proxy wars, “salâ shall not be read for Communists/Alevis”, is still among the oft-cited knowledge claims. That said, those who repeat, as well as those who have to listen to this knowledge claim, have not so far questioned whether “reading” always signified the same

⁷⁴ Can Soyer, “Türkiye’nin Laiklik Kavgası,” in *İleri Yazılar - Türkiye’nin Laiklik Kavgası*, ed. Can Soyer (İstanbul: İleri Kitaplığı Yayınevi, 2017), 7–21.

⁷⁵ Ergin Yıldızoğlu, “İki Türkiye Var,” *Cumhuriyet*, July 27, 2017, p9.

action, whereas the expectations Alevis have had of mosques have radically differed in the last couple of decades.

In the same logic, the clashes over clothing also represent a process of reproduction. Put broadly, clothing has been taken by the state, since the reign of Murat III (1546-1595), as a fundamental matter of social order and development. Alongside its significance in the eyes of the state authorities, it seems to have remained a fundamental matter of authoritative claim in the micro-level authority structures, such as those of family and neighborhood. In the early-1950s, a group of women were attacked by strangers (i.e. “Ticanis”) due to their clothing preferences. Throughout the 2000s, some incidents provoked the ideology-makers to remember what happened in the 1950s.⁷⁶ For this reason, by the time Şerif Mardin mentioned “neighborhood pressure”⁷⁷ in an interview (2008), the term was suddenly autonomized from its academic context, and became a popular reference-point in the public debate.⁷⁸ That said, it is yet to be examined whether ‘we’ discuss today’s clothing problem in the way we did in the 1950s.

Furthermore, amid these contestations, the repertoire of tolerance often needs to be dated back to hundreds of years ago. On any subject, one of the most unsurprising ways of putting forward the idea of tolerance is to base the argument, for the sake of legitimacy, on some cherry-picked references from a selection of historical sources, such as Yusuf Has Hacip’s (11th century) *Kutadgu Bilig*, Ahmet Yesevi (12th century), Babai Dervishes, Hacı Bektaş-ı

⁷⁶ see a few snapshots: Rauf Tamer, “O kafa...,” *Posta*, 8 Jan 2017.

Rıza Zelyut, “Televizyondaki Ticaniler,” *Güneş*, 9 Feb 2012.

Zeynep Gogus, “Ticaniler Hortlarken,” *Hürriyet*, 14 June 2008

Kerem Yıldırım, “Atatürk’e saldıran meczup Ticiani tarikatından mı?,” *Aydınlık*, 31 Jul 2017, par 12.

Halime Kokce, “Ticaniler, Aczimendiler...Ama Artık Yemezler,” *Star*, August 3, 2017.

⁷⁷ Yonca Cingoz, “Prof. Şerif Mardin: ‘Mahalle Baskısı Gözleyerek Yapılıyor,’” *Radikal*, May 24, 2008, <<http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/prof-serif-mardin-mahalle-baskisi-gozleyerek-yapiliyor-879310>>.

⁷⁸ see Ahmet Tellioglu, “Bana dinciler baskı yapıyor dedirtemezsiniz!,” *Birgün*, 6 Jan 2009.

Veli's (13th century) *Vilayet-name*, Yunus Emre and Rumî (13th century) among others⁷⁹—let alone the need to add *Ehl-i Sünnet* above all else. They have been retained as the principal reference-points in intellectual statements, artistic expressions, political slogans and senses of humor.

These references suggest that things somehow worked better in the past. Such arguments are not only made by an authoritative *self*, but occasionally in the name of a marginalized *other*. For example, by emphasizing the inapplicability of “hetero/homo[sexual] binary” to the classical Ottoman times, some students of post-colonialism imply—without necessarily openly arguing—that the local codes of the pre-colonial past, where the essence of the culture putatively lies, should be the ones to resolve the contestations on sex and gender in non-Western contexts.⁸⁰ Accordingly, before all else, the concepts of “sex” and “gender” represent some impositions of a “Western” mindset. In other words, the implication of these studies is that some representations of the past should be kept alive or reborn, given that they are the vital parts of a solution for today's problems; whereas the “Western” solutions exacerbate the problem. Therefore, conversations about the management of ‘our’ current diversity tends to oblige ‘us’, the interlocutors, to stay with the past—i.e. not simply engaging with the past as a “second thought”, unlike the way it seems to work in “the West”⁸¹.

In public parades, university canteens, coffee-houses, barbershops, taxis and the new social media platforms, references to the past tend to dominate ‘our’ conversations on the

⁷⁹ see an exhaustive collection of this cross-referencing in defense of tolerance: Onur Bilge Kula, *Anadolu'da Çoğulculuk ve Tolerans* (İş Bankası: 2011).

⁸⁰ Joseph Massad, *Islam in Liberalism* (University of Chicago Press, 2015), p227-230.

Joseph Massad, “Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World,” *Public Culture* 14, no. 2 (2002): 361–385.

see these critical analyses of the attitude to idealize or demonize the ideologies of the past: Dennis Altman, “Rupture or Continuity? The Internationalization of Gay Identities,” *Social Text*, no. 48 (1996): 77–94, p79-80. Serkan Delice, “Osmanlı'yı Bugün Nasıl Tefsir Ediyoruz? Tarih ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Üzerine Düşünceler,” in *Cinsiyet Halleri: Türkiye'de Toplumsal Cinsiyetin Kesişim Sınırları* (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 2008), 72.

⁸¹ Barry Schwartz, “Culture and Collective Memory: Comparative Perspectives,” *Handbook of Cultural Sociology*, 2010, 619–628, 623.

management of ‘our’ diversity. ‘Our’ common culture necessitates ‘us’ to link today’s strategies with the alternative repertoires of the past. Mahmut II, Abdülhamid II, Atatürk or Özal: none of them has been left alone in the texts of history. None of them could ever be “historicized”,⁸² as ‘we’ urge them to talk for the present. That said, because ‘we’ pay little attention to the ways in which these signifiers’ representative functions may have fluctuated in the course of history, ‘we’ mistake them for constants capable of shedding light on the shifting moment. Clearly, this dominating repetition blurs the scene of the culture that flows.

3.2. The Status of Continuity in the Value-based Approach to Culture

Tracing change in apparent continuity is a particularly difficult mental process, as my introduction should have suggested. No paradigmatic, theoretical or methodological approaches to continuity are exempt from such cognitive challenges. In this part, I will illustrate some problems of concept formation and interpretation in the study of cultural change by taking into account the status of continuity in two intersecting literatures—the broad literature on value-change, and more specifically, the democratization literature,⁸³ which evidences a particular interest in cultural change in Turkey, *inter alia*.

To begin with, these studies tend to name some value-systems so as to make sense of ‘persistence’ in the landscapes of culture I introduced above. These value-systems are conceptualized in numerous ways, such as moralism, sectarianism, patriarchy, traditional values, *versus* self-expression values and secular values. Amid Turkey’s transgenerational

⁸² I use the term in the sense Gadamer used it. As opposed to the objectivist tradition of 19th century historicism, Gadamer emphasized on a “fusion” of horizons, which brings together the historical situation of the interpreter with that of the past text.

Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, vol. 2 (London ; New York: Continuum, 2004), p303.

⁸³ By referring to “democratization literature”, I refer narrowly to the collection of studies that question the pre-conditions of democracy, the “persistence” of authoritarianism and the transition processes of countries and “cultures” between democracy and authoritarianism.

experience, the lasting relevance of these concepts is often taken to indicate the failure to build a “democratic culture”⁸⁴—i.e. yet another patronizing concept.

Contrary to this perspective, I will not rely on any of these conceptual counter-positions in this research. On the contrary, I will touch upon the limits of “measuring” change based on the extent to which any such concept exists in a cultural domain. Instead, what this research suggests is to seek change by starting from the cultural domains—or landscapes, as I call them—where the discourse around such concepts may take place in various forms. Simply put, I suggest ‘we’ keep track of change in the dialogue between authoritative claims and their interlocutors (e.g. followers, challengers, respondents) as the culture flows. In the approach I suggest, the meanings of these concepts will be established *a posteriori*, whereas in the approach I criticize, they have to be defined *a priori*. Before proceeding with this task, in this part I argue that the element of change may not be detected by seeking change in a pre-defined direction. Therefore, the element of change tends to be misplaced in cross-temporal value-surveys, which are intended to measure the change of pre-defined cultural entities in pre-defined directions.

Firstly, in the democratization literature, I will analyze some historical (*e.g.* cultural-turn) and methodological (*e.g.* comparative and statistical) versions of the value-based approach to culture. Then, I demonstrate that the survey-method, which has become a highly favored method for this value-based approach to cultural change, overlooks some key aspects of cognition—notably, the dialogical formation of social context, and the possibility of different conversational settings where cultural resources may appear in alternative (*e.g.* explicit or implicit) forms. I will discuss how these oversights may distort the processes of concept

⁸⁴ Mark Tessler and Ebru Altinoglu, “Political Culture in Turkey: Connections among Attitudes toward Democracy, the Military and Islam,” *Democratization* 11, no. 1 (February 1, 2004): 21–50.
Ronald Inglehart, “Culture and Democracy” in *Samuel P. Huntington and Lawrence E. Harrison, eds., Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 80-98.

formation, data-processing and interpretation. Concurrently, by questioning the interactions between values and other cultural resources, I will elaborate on the limits of seeking cultural change only in some expressed values. As a result, I conclude in this part that it is the ways through which a cultural resource is translated into a period that should be considered in a study of change, rather than a cultural resource such as values *per se*.

3.3. The Uses of Culture in Democratization Literature

Parallel to the respective cultural-turns in Sociology and Political Science, including the sub-disciplines of Comparative Politics and International Relations, the democratization literature began problematizing *culture* in an unprecedented way after the 1990s—i.e. the alleged ‘slowdown’ of the third wave of democratization. Since then, this trend in the democratization literature has been instantiated predominantly, (1) by the research designs that take “culture” as an *entity* which facilitates/inhibits a democratization process; and (2) by research designs that measure “cultural change” through value-surveys.

The democratization literature is—or ought to be—one of cultural change, as it examines some deeply changing structures, modes of thought and behavior. However, any questioning of progress beyond the annually awarded⁸⁵ labels of “democratic”, “semi-democratic” and “authoritarian” has been relatively rare in the literature, since it is paradigmatically taken for granted that “democratic” is the good end, “semi-democratic” is stuck somewhere on a bumpy road, and “authoritarian” represents a dead-end. Even though a case at hand may be considered to be *a process*, this process is predominantly based on a linear continuum. Congruently, culture is taken as a process, only for those (e.g. countries) that continuously follow a pre-defined teleology.⁸⁶ Therefore, the cases apparently stuck in between

⁸⁵ I refer to the periodically published democracy indices.

⁸⁶ see Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 5–21, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0003>.

some two points on the continuum are often taken as the cases at “standstill”⁸⁷—i.e. “a condition in which all movement or activity has stopped”.⁸⁸

To overcome this inability to take into account any kind of change other than the ones that fit into the pre-defined notions of democratization, many discussions, which I will not be scrutinizing in detail, have been initiated. For example, Schlumberger among others called for new typologies, so that students can make sense of the transitions from one ‘non-democracy’ to another.⁸⁹ The idea of “liberalization without democracy” was introduced as part of similar efforts. Going further beyond this call, Hinnebusch *inter alia* criticized current operationalizations of the concept of democracy on the basis that the use of the democracy-autocracy dichotomy “obscures” both the variations and the similarities between regimes.⁹⁰

Despite the definitional limits, the need for a definition is commonly accepted in the literature. Accordingly, several democracy indices aim to quantify and measure the key components of democracy, whereas the academic studies rely on their varying (e.g. maximalistic and minimalistic) operational definitions of the concept. For example, comparativists tend to make sense of the data that they take from indices by processing it with a cross-sectional comparative logic of inference. This means comparing less democratic cases (*i.e.* state-level) with more democratic ones, and then making sense of the ‘democracy gap’ by emphasizing countries’ remaining characteristic differences. Among these characteristic differences, students take into account some pre-defined “cultural variables”.⁹¹ The so-called

⁸⁷ Georg Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World, Third edition, Dilemmas in World Politics* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2008), p55-78.

⁸⁸ “Standstill,” in *Cambridge Online Dictionary* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/standstill>.

⁸⁹ Oliver Schlumberger, “The Arab Middle East and the Question of Democratization: Some Critical Remarks,” *Democratization* 7, no. 4 (2000): 104–132, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340008403686>.

⁹⁰ Raymond Hinnebusch, “Toward a Historical Sociology of State Formation in the Middle East,” *Middle East Critique* 19, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 201–16, 201.

⁹¹ M. Steven Fish, “Islam and Authoritarianism,” *World Politics* 55, no. 1 (2002): 4–37.

Manus I. Midlarsky, “Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and the Democratic Peace,” *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 3 (1998): 485–511.

“Islamic” or “Middle Eastern” cultural exceptionalism in the literature has been a result of this form of research design.⁹²

3.3.1. *Culture as Entity or Process*

The short-sightedness of this research design is primarily in its use of culture as a synchronic marker, which undermines the cultural experience of societies as *processes*, by naming their cultures as *entities*. This synchronic use of concepts as part of the comparative method was seldom disputed.⁹³ In this vein, “Islamic” often meant Islamic everywhere anytime in an *aggregatable* sense, just because its carriers could be denoted identically as “Islamic”⁹⁴, or the in-group differences in “Islamic” were assumed to be *comparable* at any given point in time because being “Islamic” should have been a strong enough common denominator for them to lead to the same consequences.⁹⁵ For example, it was within this context that Turkey was commonly regarded as the exception of an exception—i.e. the exception as a democracy of “Muslims”, contrary to the exceptional resistance of “Muslims” to democracy.⁹⁶ In all these cases, culture acts as a synchronic entity that should be named before being studied.

Indeed, research agendas have a significant role in the way culture is understood. A cultural element was recognized in the functioning of democracies long-ago,⁹⁷ however the

Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, *Culture and Politics : A Comparative Approach* (Routledge, 2016), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315575452>.

⁹² see p125 for an overview in Raymond Hinnebusch, “Political Culture, Modernization, and Islam,” in *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications*, ed. Nils August Butenschøn, Uri Davis, and Manuel Sarkis Hassassian (Syracuse University Press, 2000).

⁹³ Stefano Bartolini, “On Time and Comparative Research,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 5, no. 2 (1993): 131–167.

⁹⁴ For example, Fish relied on this marker of identity in his comparisons between “Muslims” and “non-Muslims”.

M. Steven Fish, *Are Muslims Distinctive?: A Look at the Evidence* (Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁹⁵ Jonathan Fox, “Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6, no. 2 (June 1, 2000): 1–24.

⁹⁶ Hinnebusch, “Toward a Historical Sociology of State Formation in the Middle East.”, 210.

Haldun Gulalp, “Enlightenment by Fiat: Secularization and Democracy in Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 41, no. 3 (May 1, 2005): 351–72, 358.

Bernard Lewis, “Why Turkey Is the Only Muslim Democracy,” *Middle East Quarterly*, 1 Mar 1994.

⁹⁷ Dahl, R. A., *A Preface to Economic Democracy* (University of California Press: 1986), 49.

focal point of this more recent cultural-turn was not to understand change but persistence.⁹⁸ This turn to “culture” was therefore meant to be the answer for the processes of reproduction in the aftermath of the cold war. Accordingly, change fitted well into rational-choice theories that relied on structural patterns (e.g. urbanization, industrialization), whereas reproduction was left to culturalism. In this reasoning the premise has been, if the structural variables do not demonstrate any clear progress towards democratization, it must be a cultural variable which led to the failure. Therefore, the “persistence of authoritarianism”, in which the rational-choice theories seemed to have lost their explanatory power, was to be associated with “survival”, “traditional values”,⁹⁹ and other similar cultural entities.¹⁰⁰ In sum, for explanations of the failure of democratic teleology, the cultural markers were to be emphasized as a last resort.¹⁰¹ Therefore, the idea of culture has been introduced into the literature not to explain change, but persistence.

3.3.2. *Democratic Culture*

A repercussion of this culturalist research agenda is the concept of “democratic culture”, which represents a blueprint for the ideal culture. As such, democratic culture is also an entity, not a process. This concept was operationalized in various ways, such as a success/failure story of religions¹⁰² or “cultural nations”;¹⁰³ a passport where only some cultures of proper Western

⁹⁸ Culture was taken as “persistence”, “return”, “revival” or “resurgence”. These terms have often been used interchangeably to refer to the reappearance of certain phenomena in their old, but also somehow timeless format.

⁹⁹ Inglehart and Baker, “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values.”

¹⁰⁰ Norris and Ronald, “Islamic Culture and Democracy.”

¹⁰¹ As such, see Huntington’s emphasis of the element of “culture”.

Samuel P. Huntington, “After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave,” *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 4 (1997): p5-6.

¹⁰² An early representation of this effort was made by Griffith et.al who referred to the theological corpuses of Christianity and Judaism, which they regarded to be “not only desirable, but perhaps even necessary to democratic survival”.

Ernest S. Griffith, John Plamenatz, and J. Roland Pennock, “Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium.,” *American Political Science Review* 50, no. 01 (March 1956): 101–137, p103.

¹⁰³ Arash Abizadeh, “Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation? Four Arguments,” *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 3 (September 2002): 495–509, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305540200028X>.

experience can enter;¹⁰⁴ or a set of de-contextualized labels attached to the ideals of the concept of democracy and its opposite, authoritarianism, on timeless grounds. Accordingly, a democratic culture should be, among other things, “modern”, “liberal”, “generous”, “tolerant”, “autonomous”, “secular-rational”, and “self-expressive”.¹⁰⁵ Because processes are not of interest in this act of tagging democratic culture, what each of these labels may have meant in any spacio-temporal setting tends to remain unquestioned—hence taken as ‘given’—in the literature.

Therefore, the “culture” of this school falls short of accounting for any of the debates in which these labels acquire a temporal dimension. For instance, it could not help students question the state of “the secular age” in Western Democracies, which has been taken by Charles Taylor as the social imaginary of an age and not a naked truth beyond time.¹⁰⁶ In the same vein, it did not help them engage with the argument of Habermas that “the secular Western society” has entered a phase of “post-secularity”—an episode where people remain secular, but religion becomes relevant in unprecedented ways.¹⁰⁷

In both Habermas’ and Taylor’s senses of the new moment, the question of democracy has been rendered as one of *tolerance*—i.e. an old concept in a new setting. In this new setting, many actors, from courts to parliaments, have rationalized intolerance by sticking to an

¹⁰⁴ This claim was based on the argument that democracy is impossible to fully replicate with “no Feudalism, no Renaissance, no Reformation, no Enlightenment, French Revolution, [and] liberalism” (Huntington 1991: 299). Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, The Julian J. Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture Series, v. 4 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

¹⁰⁵ Some of these labels that have been attached to democracy and democratic culture may be summarized as follows: Griffith et. al. 1956: “modern”; Lipset 1959: “Secular political culture”; Almond and Verba 1965: “generosity”; Inglehart and Norris 2003: “Secular-rational” and “self-expression values”; Gibson et.al. 1992: “a healthy dose of tolerance”.

Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” *The American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (1959): 69–105.

James L. Gibson, Raymond M. Duch, and Kent L. Tedin, “Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union,” *The Journal of Politics* 54, no. 2 (1992): 329–71.

¹⁰⁶ Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Harvard University Press, 2007).

¹⁰⁷ Jurgen Habermas, “Notes on a Post-Secular Society,” Signandsight, 18 June 2008, <<http://www.signandsight.com/features/1714.html>>.

alternative concept of democracy. According to some ideology-makers, the democratic regimes shall be more assertive to put a clear limit on tolerance: “Democracy and autonomy go together [...] these considerations set limits to toleration”.¹⁰⁸ According to others, democracy cannot survive without tolerance. On the one hand, many students emphasize that tolerance is offensive to the ideals of liberal democracy in an age of differences;¹⁰⁹ on the other hand, some claim that “the liberal zealotry” has created its own forms of short-sightedness.¹¹⁰ As the flow of these conversations suggests, culture—i.e. “democratic” or not—is *not* a Leibnizian monad,¹¹¹ such that its components (e.g. tolerance as a value, autonomy as a capacity) are *not* indivisible.

3.3.3. *Shared Values for a Democratic Culture*

The alleged indivisibility of “democratic culture” provokes the question of whether a democratic culture requires a single package of values. Without assuming that democracy requires agreement on values, it would already be meaningless to focus on “democratic culture” based on values. Therefore, in congruence with this assumption, students study the relationship between democracy and various value-sets, such as “postmaterialist values” which seem to go hand in hand with the core values of liberalism.¹¹² As a part of these efforts to sketch out the value-system that is conducive to democracy, the students of World Values Survey (WVS) have come up with “self-expression values” as opposed to “survival values”. According to Inglehart and Welzel, the self-expression values are “extremely important in the emergence and flourishing of democracy”.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Richard J. Arneson and Ian Shapiro, “Democratic Autonomy and Religious Freedom: A Critique of Wisconsin v. Yoder,” in *Democracy’s Place*, ed. Ian Shapiro (Cornell University Press, 1996), p137.

¹⁰⁹ see, for an overview of these arguments: Olli-Pekka Vainio and Aku Visala, “Tolerance or Recognition? What Can We Expect?,” *Open Theology* 2, no. 1 (2016).

¹¹⁰ Alfred Stepan and Charles Taylor, *Boundaries of Toleration* (Columbia University Press, 2014), p3-4.

¹¹¹ Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Critical Perspectives on World Politics (Boulder, Colo ; London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p7.

¹¹² see Ronald Inglehart, “Mapping Global Values,” *Comparative Sociology* 5, no. 2–3 (January 1, 2006): 115–36, <https://doi.org/10.1163/156913306778667401>.

¹¹³ “Findings and Insights: Aspirations for Democracy,” World Values Survey, 2015, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>.

Nearly two decades before the cultural-turn that I have described, Almond and Verba argued that the meeting of “traditional” and “modern” cultures in Britain paved the way for a third culture, which was one of diversity and persuasion.¹¹⁴ Although their argument was centred on “attitudes”, they occasionally combined “attitudes” with “values” without making an elaborate description of the relationship between the two. As such, their research suggested that “shared social values and attitudes” underpinned the British and the US democracies as opposed to Germany, Italy and Mexico which suffered from partisanship, apparently due to the lack of such values.¹¹⁵

Their aim was neither to make an exhaustive list of values required by the concept of democracy, nor to examine the ideational and the material sources of those values. Instead, they compared these five countries to figure out which cultural characteristics that they claimed to measure were specific to the relatively democratic ones. Consequently, they emphasized the interpersonal value of generosity as conducive to a participant, “civic culture” that favours democracy. In Almond and Verba’s narrative, the values such as generosity and trust must have acted as second-order values which constitute a common culture. As such, the second-order values were supposed to help the “modern” and the “traditional” coexist in spite of their contradicting foundational values.¹¹⁶

Research based on the categories of WVS, such as “self-expression” and “survival”, challenged Almond and Verba’s narrative in several ways, which they themselves “revisited” as well.¹¹⁷ However, while doing so, the researchers did not take into account how values may

see also Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, “Changing Mass Priorities: The Link between Modernization and Democracy,” *Perspectives on Politics* 8, no. 2 (2010): 551–67, p559, p561.

¹¹⁴ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Sage Publications, 1989), p6.

¹¹⁵ Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, p243.

¹¹⁶ see Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, p23-28.

¹¹⁷ see Russell J. Dalton and Christian Welzel, *The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

be processed in the light of other cultural resources. Therefore, the interpretations based on those categories blend together values that possibly act as second-order values, and values that may be recognized by their owners as parochial ones. For example, on the axis of survival versus self-expression values, the respondents are claimed to clash depending on their levels of (dis)agreement on the statements such as, “a woman does not have to have children in order to be fulfilled”; “I favour emphasis on the development of technology”; “I have signed a petition to protect the environment”; “homosexuality is sometimes justifiable”. As such, according to Inglehart and Welzel, carrying self-expression values meant carrying the democratic culture by means of “tolerance of foreigners, gays and lesbians”, “gender equality” and “environmental protection”.¹¹⁸

Clearly, this interpretation suggests that one is not likely to rationalize a kind of tolerance towards “homosexuals” if s/he does not agree with the statement that “homosexuality is justifiable”. Similarly, it suggests that the same person cannot come to terms with “a homosexual” based on another value. According to the same logic, one would probably not accommodate others whom s/he may label as “unfulfilled” in a particular social context. To conclude, this interpretation leaves no room to imagine a society where democracy could be possible despite such instances of disagreement on values. In the way it has been argued, the self-expression values do not resolve this puzzle of heterogeneity, since a democracy based on this argument would not leave any space for any other way of expressing agreement to disagree.

3.3.4. *Cultural Change through Value-Surveys*

These arguments bring me to the status of continuity in value-surveys. To begin with, the survey method has been widely preferred as a means of making sense of the above-mentioned labels in the form of value-systems. By adding time to the aforementioned

¹¹⁸ “Findings and Insights: Cultural Map,” World Values Survey, 2015, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>, par 6. Inglehart and Welzel, “Changing Mass Priorities.”, footnote 10, p564.

conceptual baggage, cross-temporal and cross-sectional value-surveys became popular as a primary source behind the indices of democracy, a source for conducting cross-cultural comparisons, and a unit for measuring “cultures” in the light of an ideal, democratic culture. Some of the most popularly used sources are: in Social Psychology, Hofstede’s Values Survey Module and Rokeach Value Survey; and in Sociology and Political Science, WVS led principally by Inglehart.

Recently, value-surveys have been used in the literature to explain if cultures can be compatible with the prerequisites of democracy,¹¹⁹ or whether a given culture is changing in the direction of democracy or its derivatives.¹²⁰ In a manner complementary to the use of labels I examined in the previous section, these surveys claim to measure the extent to which “tolerance of foreigners”, “gender-equality”, or some other “democratic convictions” are desired in a society. This mode of inquiry is often encouraged in the concluding sections of the synchronic comparative configurations—e.g.: “the question of why Islamic regimes tend to be disproportionately autocratic remains open”.¹²¹ After all, cross-temporal surveys added time to the concepts they inherited from the broader literature.

In this search for cultural change, the terms of change do not emanate from within the studied cultures. On the contrary, they are “known” beforehand from outside—hence the criticism of “Eurocentrism” and “strict linearity”.¹²² For example, using the WVS, Norris and

¹¹⁹ Mark Tessler, “Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries,” *Comparative Politics* 34, no. 3 (2002): 337–54, <https://doi.org/10.2307/4146957>.

¹²⁰ Norris and Ronald, “Islamic Culture and Democracy.”

Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “The True Clash of Civilizations,” *Foreign Policy*, 2003, 63–70.

Amaney A. Jamal, “Reassessing Support for Islam and Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence from Egypt and Jordan,” *World Affairs*, 2006, 51–63.

Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*.

¹²¹ Fox, “Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions?”, p16.

¹²² Zi Wang, “Modernization, Value-Change, and Gender Inequality in Japan: Japanese Exceptionalism or Theoretical Inadequacy?,” in *Multi-Faced Transformations: Challenges and Studies*, ed. Elena Danilova, Matej Makarovic, and Alina Zubkovich (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), p183.

Inglehart questioned which cultures were more resistant to change towards “gender equality”. As a result, they argued that “Muslim countries not only lag behind the West but behind all other societies as well”.¹²³ According to their conclusion, the industrialized “Islamic societies” were changing more quickly compared to the other Islamic societies, but the change was still slow, say compared to “South Asia”.

This research outcome is not necessarily false, but it is true only to the extent that the practices and the speeches of the respondents are in line with each other, and in line with what the survey researchers meant by “gender equality”. Arguably, the term has acquired a dimension so that many speakers feel the need to express their “strong support” for it, even though they do not necessarily put this support into genuine practice,¹²⁴ whereas many others reject the term when they hear it, predominantly because it seems to have been imposed from “the West”.¹²⁵

Among numerous problems with the aforementioned representation of the survey method,¹²⁶ the broadest problem I shall emphasize is the idea that cultural change is measurable through the repetition of a standard forced-choice survey across various times and locations. For the sake of producing a quantifiable data, value-surveys consist of some so-called de-contextualized questions with severely restrict speech acts, despite including a vocabulary which cannot carry any context-independent meaning. Just as no conversation can ever be context-free,¹²⁷ in this case it is the conduct of the survey which imposes a context of its own.

Immanuel Wallerstein, “Eurocentrism and Its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science,” *Sociological Bulletin* 46, no. 1 (1997): 21–39, p25.

¹²³ Inglehart and Norris, “The True Clash of Civilizations”, p68.

¹²⁴ see how, in a Western context, women still need to “undo” gender to be accepted in male dominated environments: Abigail Powell, Barbara Bagilhole, and Andrew Dainty, “How Women Engineers Do and Undo Gender: Consequences for Gender Equality,” *Gender, Work & Organization* 16, no. 4 (2009): 411–28.

¹²⁵ see Sonya Fernandez, “The Crusade over the Bodies of Women,” *Patterns of Prejudice* 43, no. 3–4 (July 1, 2009): 269–86, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220903109185>.

¹²⁶ Thomas Hurtienne and Götz Kaufmann, “Methodological Biases. Inglehart’s World Value Survey and Q Methodology,” *Journal of Human Subjectivity* 9, no. 2 (2011), p22.

¹²⁷ Emanuel A. Schegloff, “Whose Text? Whose Context?,” *Discourse & Society* 8, no. 2 (1997): 165–187.

In other words, the setting in which the respondents express themselves is never de-contextualized, but in fact contextualized through the impositions of the questioner.

In surveys, the social context is imposed primarily by researchers: the configuration of the questions, the order and the way they are asked, the pre-determined response-limits are among the constitutive factors. All these factors potentially distort the meanings that the respondent draws from the questions, and the meanings that the researcher draws from the responses. Contrary to the assumption that there is a “social contract”¹²⁸ between researchers and respondents, a question and answer is never self-explanatory, and the highly restricted speech acts tend to leave their meanings immature. Especially because value-surveys are intended to deal with highly abstract concepts instead of some simply comprehensible statements (e.g. the name of the political party one votes for), their validity relies heavily on the approximations of a group of so-called “cultural experts”¹²⁹—e.g. academics, journalists, translators, research centers, survey companies. They are the ones who negotiate the cross-cultural content of surveys between one another, translate questions, convert arguments to fit the different storage formats of different societies, communicate with the respondents and give feedback to a broader community.

Despite such experts being the ones who make surveys in practice, and hence ultimately the ones who impose the social context—i.e. the universe of meanings in which the respondents are situated to talk—very little has so far been written to critically assess their personal status, or that of the intermediaries with whom they work. By going beyond the de-politicizing technocratic references to their *expertise*, their role in the meaning-making of cultural

¹²⁸ Aaron V. Cicourel, “Interviews, Surveys, and the Problem of Ecological Validity,” *The American Sociologist* 17, no. 1 (1982): 12.

¹²⁹ see Kaiping Peng, Richard E. Nisbett, and Nancy YC Wong, “Validity Problems Comparing Values across Cultures and Possible Solutions.,” *Psychological Methods* 2, no. 4 (1997), p329.
Tomasz Lenartowicz and Kendall Roth, “The Selection of Key Informants in IB Cross-Cultural Studies,” *MIR: Management International Review* 44, no. 1 (2004): 23–51.

representations should therefore be taken into account. In this sense, their undertaking of sociological research is not different from that of an anthropologist in terms of having a personal role in the making of the research outcome.

However, whereas the auto-biographic dimension of anthropological writing is well-emphasized and disputed,¹³⁰ the so-called context-free tone blurs this dimension of the role of survey researchers. In this vein, Cicourel discusses how “culture” matters in surveys:

Sociologists are sensitive to the fact that many problems are associated with the way questionnaires are administered, coded, and organized for analysis. But they are insensitive to the information processing problems associated with these tasks. Because so many surveys are done in the same culture in which the researchers also are native, and because we gradually have socialized our respondents to be fairly docile to the demands of surveys [...] we have little knowledge about the social practices of survey research within field settings and within research centers where the analysis takes place.¹³¹

Even though Cicourel well-described sociologists’ tendency to see little point in challenging the routine use of the survey-method, he may have exaggerated the benefits of being native. What matters is not just having more or less knowledge of the social conditions in “the same culture”, but also the culture-bound relations in which this knowledge is embedded. In this vein, the power relations are not overcome when the survey researchers are native in any sense of the term. On the contrary, given that the response patterns are highly dependent on, for example, the wording of questions,¹³² a local questioner who is familiar with the ties between the cognitive processes and the speech acts of the “native” may be inclined, intentionally or not, to

¹³⁰ Tamas Hofer, “Anthropologists and Native Ethnographers in Central European Villages: Comparative Notes on the Professional Personality of Two Disciplines,” *Current Anthropology* 9, no. 4 (October 1, 1968): 311–15, <https://doi.org/10.1086/200902>.

Akbar S. Ahmed, *Toward Islamic Anthropology: Definition, Dogma, and Directions* (International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), 1986), 26.

¹³¹ Aaron V. Cicourel, “Interviews, Surveys, and the Problem of Ecological Validity,” *The American Sociologist* 17, no. 1 (1982): 11–20, 16.

¹³² William Foddy, *Constructing Questions for Interviews and Questionnaires: Theory and Practice in Social Research* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p5-6.

Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences* (University of Chicago Press, 2010), 29-31.

take the answers in a certain targeted way. The assumption that questioners are “cooperative communicators”¹³³ is yet to be disputed in survey research.

What I suggest, based on these arguments, is an approach that does not ignore the potentially toxic relationship between questioners and respondents. In the next section, I will defend an approach that is capable of observing conversational settings that are configured during the *natural* operation of culture, with its own restrictions and opportunities for interlocutors. In order to elaborate on this point, I ask the following questions to illustrate some possibilities in a dialogic social context, to which value-surveys turn a blind eye: How differently would one approach *something*, if this *something* is not marked for her/him, explicitly in a certain manner? How might a group of people approach differences in an environment where their value orientations are not explicitly counter-posed? How differently might a value be expressed? Which tools, alongside or apart from values, may one take from one’s tool-kit of culture? Beginning with the next part, I will touch upon these questions in the course of this thesis.

3.3.5. *An Introduction to the Context: Value-Surveys, Values and the Periods Beyond*

Before laying down the methodology of my research, I will clarify some limits of the value-based approach in a variety of social contexts. Firstly, considering a social context where values do not serve as the chief drivers of culture, I will touch upon some moments of (dis)connection between the expression of values and the culture in action. Secondly, I will argue that the survey setting, in which values have been conveyed explicitly, may not necessarily be representative of their operationalization elsewhere.

¹³³ Norbert Schwarz, “Judgment in a Social Context: Biases, Shortcomings, and the Logic of Conversation,” in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, ed. Mark P. Zanna, vol. 26 (Academic Press, 1994), 123–62, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601\(08\)60153-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60153-7).

As to the question of how differently values may interact with the other cultural resources, I shall begin with a specific social context, such as the one in which “Islamists” sacrificed some of their values in face of the modern technology. In 2015 at the picnic of the Ensar Foundation, a government-linked religious association, Professor of Islamic Law Hayrettin Karaman, known as one of the most highly and consistently praised guides of the AKP leadership, recalled his dialogue with his grandfather many decades before: “My grandfather once told me that he would kill me if I ever went to cinema—not simply ‘beat me’, but kill me!”¹³⁴ Karaman quoted his grandfather, as he saw the cellphones and tablets in the hands of the younger participants of the picnic.

At this moment, he shared the way he revised his grandfather’s intolerance on this issue:

[B]ut we cannot make you leave them. If I tried [to force you on that], you would leave me alone instead of leaving these devices. I know it from myself [...] I always found a way to go to cinema.

In his speech, despite having explicitly described “these devices” as “the inventions of dajjal,”¹³⁵ Karaman told the participants to instrumentalize them for ideological ends: “make them full of the words of Allah, given that you cannot leave them”. In this position, the ideology was to be re-configured in accordance with the compelling new conditions, which was described by Karaman as the appetite for using new technological devices.

Karaman’s view that technology should be instrumentalized even though it is evil has been shared by many other popular teachers of Islam in Turkey and elsewhere, who do not necessarily make peace with Karaman on other issues. For instance, Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü, also known as Cübbeli Ahmet Hoca of *Ismailağa Cemaati* (*en.* The Religious Community of Ismailağa), has occasionally been criticized within and outside his religious community for

¹³⁴ “Hayrettin Karaman’ın 2015-Ensar Pikniği Konuşması (Teknoloji Bağımlılığı ve İmam-Hatipli Bilinci)”, accessed April 4, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cwsiybailTs>.

¹³⁵ An evil figure in Islamic eschatology.

heavily using TV programmes and internet-based channels to send his messages. Having noted that technology became “a religious duty against irreligious propaganda”, Ünlü has justified the ideological change as follows:

We have been compelled [by the evil] to use these devices [...] By using these channels, we have to reach people who look for a cure to their problems; otherwise they will not find us on their own.

Even though Ünlü refused to see any intrinsic virtue in technology, he stressed that it has turned out to be necessary in order to prevent more of ‘the vice’. In a similar fashion, *Fatih Medreseleri* (en. Fatih Muslim Seminaries), a group that has also associated itself with İsmailağa Cemaati¹³⁶, justified technology for their followers with the following words: “a Muslim should be able to overturn the projects that, while nobody is noticing, invite people to secularization”.¹³⁷ These arguments were in line with a massive trend in the making of Islamism. In this vein, Yavuz explained how the five largest communities of the *Nakşibendi* Islamist Strand¹³⁸ used technology effectively in Turkey such that they owned some of the largest media channels.¹³⁹ Invoking those whom he called “Sunni Arab Fundamentalists”, Bassam Tibi defined this massive revision as one that de-couples the use of technology from its underlying values.¹⁴⁰ Though technology does not represent any value for them, they have begun to justify its use in ideological terms. The context-dependent ideology-making processes occurring at the expense of values may be sought elsewhere, from the decreasing fertility rates, to the rising average age

¹³⁶ Even though they have been explicitly dismissed by some other members of İsmailağa. “İsmailağa Cemaati’nden Fatih Medreseleri İçin Uyarı!,” *Timeturk*, January 7, 2013, <https://www.timeturk.com/tr/2013/01/07/mahmut-efendi-den-medrese-aciklamasi.html>.

¹³⁷ “Teknoloji ve Müslüman,” *İsmailaga.com.tr*, accessed August 27, 2015, <http://www.ismailaga.com.tr/teknoloji-ve-musulman.html>.

¹³⁸ Some notable examples are the religious communities of Süleymancılar, İskenderpaşa, Erenköy, İsmailağa, and Menzil.

¹³⁹ M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p141-143.

¹⁴⁰ Bassam Tibi, “The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technology,” *Fundamentalisms and Society*, 1993, 73–102, P74.

of marriage, to the increasing levels of education among Muslim women. They all suggest that de-contextualized value orders suggest little about the operation of cultural practice.

In this vein, the approach that takes values as the core of culture misses some crucial aspects of cognition. I will elaborate on this point with the following study on sectarianism. Immediately after the execution of so-called Iran-backed Shia leader Nimr al-Nimr by the Saudi Government, a survey conducted in five Middle Eastern countries, asked how “favorable” the sample population felt Saudi Arabia and Iran were towards them. According to the finding, the majority of the respondents labelled the country from their own sect as “more favorable” to them.¹⁴¹ That said, it remains ambiguous what ‘favorability’ may imply in terms of the existence of sectarianism in the region, at least because the setting in which the respondents spoke did not suffice to clarify its definition.

It may mean that there is “a sectarian divide” in the region, as was suggested by the interpreter of the survey, but then, what this sectarianism suggest in a given spatiotemporal setting will remain unclear. This ambiguity is because it remains unknown at which point in time the forced choices in this survey will meet the real-life conditions of a respondent: what does it mean to make a choice between “Saudi Arabia” and “Iran”? What kind of situations that fits the design of the survey may one ever face in life—i.e. a) detecting what counts as “Saudi Arabia” and “Iran”; b) expressing an opinion on them; and c) making this choice a practice in a manner that contributes to “a sectarian divide”? How do we make use, in practice, of the words we are pushed to choose in the survey—*e.g.* in which way will we make use of “favor”? After the survey project, these questions were matters of pure speculation.

¹⁴¹ Jacob Poushter, “The Middle East’s Sectarian Divide on Views of Saudi Arabia, Iran,” *Pew Research Center*, January 7, 2016, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/07/the-middle-east-s-sectarian-divide-on-views-of-saudi-arabia-iran/>.

It is the survey researcher who pulls the respondent on to the playing field. In the above-mentioned case, it is the design of the survey which invites the respondents to play with the vocabulary of sectarianism. In this case, people who may never have anything to do with “Iran” or “Saudi Arabia” have been kept busy with these words and pushed to form and express an opinion on them. This imposition of the discursive framing is definitely not specific to this particular value-survey I refer to here, but rather inherent in the survey approach. WVS does not have a different function when it pushes the respondents to deal with the discourse, “homosexuality is never justifiable”.¹⁴² The same problem appears when the respondents are asked to say which style of clothing from six representations¹⁴³ is “appropriate for women in public”. By asking this question, the survey researchers pushed the respondents to form and express opinions in favor of exclusion. Ignoring this aspect of the method means ignoring the ultimately exogenous social context imposed, by the research-design, on the cognitive processes that the respondents go through.

¹⁴² Ronald F. Inglehart, *Cultural Evolution: People’s Motivations Are Changing, and Reshaping the World* (Cambridge University Press, 2018), p88.

¹⁴³ These six representations were described by the research design extrinsically on a scale of “conservatism”. Jacob Poushter, “How People in Muslim Countries Prefer Women to Dress in Public,” *Pew Research Center*, January 8, 2014, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/08/what-is-appropriate-attire-for-women-in-muslim-countries/>.

4. Cultural Change through Conversational Texts

Concomitant to the critique I have so far made, the primary sources I choose for my research are conversations, the interconnected strengths of which may be summarized as follows. Firstly, conversational texts are endogenously-grounded, and are therefore capable of reflecting social contexts from the point of view of the *insiders* of a culture.¹⁴⁴ In a conversational text, the interlocutors talk in a dialogically informed social context, wherein they present their own agendas in their own ways with no ‘artificial’ interference.

This approach does not exclude surveys or interviews, given that they should also be taken as conversations—albeit possibly within limited parameters. Every piece of social research relies on a social context, but many of them do not rely on the context formed endogenously in the studied culture.¹⁴⁵ As I have already argued, the survey approach cannot escape from the question of whose context that is being considered. Interviews also rely on a social context. Accordingly, an able interviewer can exploit an interview by simulating a particular situation reliably, so that the interviewee can follow the conversational implicature and talk more or less accurately in relation to the research subject of the interviewer. That said, the flow of interviews is also likely to be ultimately determined in accordance with the agenda of the interviewer, which is not necessarily the agenda of the interviewee.

Exogenous context is a challenge for students of conversational texts as well, but this challenge occurs in a different and, I believe, less problematic manner. For example, there may be some shared elements in a conversation which only the participants will know, and not mention explicitly within the confines of that conversation. Even though these elements may be obvious for a person overhearing, s/he shall still make an attempt to impose a context in

¹⁴⁴ Susan Cotts Watkins and Ann Swidler, “Conversations into Texts: A Method for Studying Public Culture,” *California Center for Population Research*, 1 Dec 2006, <<http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3zx0t0j5>>.

¹⁴⁵ Emanuel A. Schegloff, “Whose Text? Whose Context?,” *Discourse & Society* 8, no. 2 (1997): 165–187.

order to make meaning. Otherwise, s/he would miss a key component of the conversation. This is a limitation, however it is less problematic than the above-mentioned impositions of exogenous context, because it is a challenge only for the analyst, and not for the participants in the conversation.¹⁴⁶

As opposed to alternatives, conversational texts allow students to delve into the local players' conversations as their culture operates. Though the difficulty of this approach lies in the lack of means to 'push' the interlocutors to keep conversing along the track of one's own research agenda, I claim that this may be a fruitful difficulty. It is fruitful at least because a research problem that the insiders of a culture care about is likely to be meaningful for their culture. Entering this natural flow of a culture seems to be the only way to reach some parameters within which *change* and *continuity* begin to make sense. Thus, a study of conversations has the potential to pave the way for new conversations in the culture it originates from.

Relatedly, going beyond the atomistic notions of culture, conversational texts capture what is collective about cultures. So far, I have repeatedly argued that a social context is always dialogically formed. This argument has been digested from an enormous body of literature, starting from Hegelian idealism in philosophy, Adorno's *Negative Dialectics* in political science, Martin Buber's *I-Thou* theme in psychotherapy, Bakhtin's *dialogism*, Ricoeur's hermeneutic phenomenology, and the poststructuralist critique of Saussure's *langue*. Apart from their differences, common to all is the understanding that the formation of consciousness lies in *the between*,¹⁴⁷ instead of in one's isolated psyches.¹⁴⁸ "Subject" is not constructed from

¹⁴⁶ William Turnbull, *Language in Action: Psychological Models of Conversation* (Psychology Press, 2003), p176.

¹⁴⁷ Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man* (Routledge, 1947).

Paul Ricoeur, Charles E. Reagan, and David Stewart, "Existence and Hermeneutics," in *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work* (Beacon Press, 1978), p101.

¹⁴⁸ i.e. a route to consciousness that depends, according to Adorno, on non-identitarian thought in "contradictions" against the reality of "suffering"; to Hegel, on the dialectical structure of "experience"; to Bakhtin, on the "dialogic context" between voices.

within, instead one's own existence always relies on the position of others. Having been formed in the between, conversational texts reflect the dialectic structure between these interlinked pieces that form, de-form and re-form a culture. They represent this social link between different voices which otherwise seem 'noise-proof'/impermeable to one another.

Indifference to these social links is a common misconception in the study of culture(s), as suggested by the exclusive imagining of "cultural zones", "civilizations", and a world of "multiculturalism" where cultures are commonly taken as separate, frozen entities in isolated locations.¹⁴⁹ Ideologically, the modernist paradigm has advanced a teleological image that made sense of the contact as a conflictual one between the pre-modern and the modern; whereas some of the so-called postmodernist counterarguments tend to see *everyone* making their claims on grounds of irresolvable relativity, which implies that any conversation is meaningless.¹⁵⁰

A consequence of this misleading take on culture is the imagination of multiple worlds—e.g. a world of "Secularists" in isolation from the alternative world of "Islamists" or "Evangelicals", or a world of "progressives" versus that of "conservatives". The contemporary narrative of "culture wars" tends to rely on this notion of clear-cut cultural monoliths that meet one another only to remain the same. As opposed to these understandings, the medium of a conversation is capable of projecting the common playing field where seemingly different worlds operate in interaction, not only in the making of conflicts and subsequent power relations, but also in the sharing of common spaces where intended and unintended transmissions take place. This argument may be summarized in Amira Mittermaier's following

¹⁴⁹ Gertrude Himmelfarb, *One Nation, Two Cultures: A Searching Examination of American Society in the Aftermath of Our Cultural Revolution* (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2010).

James Davison Hunter, "An Uneasy Co-Existence," *Society* 51, no. 2 (February 21, 2014): 120–25, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-014-9750-9>.

James Davison Hunter, "The Culture War and the Sacred/Secular Divide: The Problem of Pluralism and Weak Hegemony," *Social Research* 76, no. 4 (December 1, 2009): 1307–22.

Samuel P. Huntington and Lawrence E. Harrison, eds., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

¹⁵⁰ Terry Eagleton, *Hope without Optimism* (University of Virginia Press, 2015), p3-4.

words: “thinking Islam dialogically means proceeding from neither Islam nor the ‘secular’ as a given”.¹⁵¹

4.1. Methodology

In this part, I will address two fundamental methodological questions. These are: (1) how to determine the snapshots through which conversations representative of the cultural processes involving (in)tolerance can be captured; and (2) how to make sense of these conversations in relation to one another. I will develop a qualitative event-based approach, which allows multiple accounts of incidents to be cross-checked, keeping track of some references to meaningful silences in these accounts, and making cross-temporal comparisons in dialogue with these meanings in texts or silences. In conclusion, based on my previous analysis of *change* and *continuity* as mental challenges,¹⁵² I will focus on three types of conversations—notably, *exploratory*, *evaluative* and *retroactive* conversations.

4.1.1. Event-based Approach

I choose to follow, primarily but not exclusively, an event-based approach. This emphasis on events stems from my objective of getting as close as possible to the shortest time scale in which the minimal/micro-sociological representations of cultural practice occur.¹⁵³ Having already suggested that there are no limits to the dialogic (social) context, the task here is to delve into some of those key moments that are likely to be representative of the formulations of “intolerance”. As well as demonstrating the repercussions of the legally rationalized forms of intolerance, events may also uncover some other social aspects of intolerance.

¹⁵¹ Amira Mittermaier, “Trading with God: Islam, Calculation, Excess,” in *A Companion to the Anthropology of Religion* (John Wiley & Sons, 2015), p280.

¹⁵² see CH2.5, entitled “Cultural Periods: Change and Continuity as Mental Challenges”.

¹⁵³ Carter T. Butts, “A Relational Event Framework for Social Action,” *Sociological Methodology* 38 (2008): 155-156.

In selecting those moments, I relied primarily on the records of *incidents*, which constitute a fundamental part of ‘our’ collective memory.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, these records have some limits. For example, I rarely had access to the entirety of an incident. And even though I obtained, for example, all camera footages or sound recordings, I would oppose the idea of taking them and myself as disengaged observers.¹⁵⁵ Therefore, I relied on the individual or collective impressions/memories,¹⁵⁶ primarily of the conversing parties, and secondarily of those who by overhearing participate in the same incident, from different standpoints. I focused on the ideology-making processes during, or in the aftermath of these incidents.

The sites of culture I have chosen—i.e. “women” and clothing, “Alevis” and funerals, “LGBT” and the entertainment sector—have witnessed contestation over a long time-span. The ideological polarization of these sites provokes the speakers to make the incidents be heard and cross-checked more consistently. In order to examine these processes of knowledge production and verification, I relied on a variety of sources such as police and court records, newspapers, magazines, and if available, personal records. Social polarization is of assistance here, if nowhere else, because it ensures that any act that may refer to the dispute is likely to be explicitly problematized.

¹⁵⁴ See how the interlocutors recall incidents in some different conversations on intolerance: Anna Triandafyllidou and Hara Kouki, “Muslim Immigrants and the Greek Nation: The Emergence of Nationalist Intolerance,” *Ethnicities* 13, no. 6 (December 1, 2013): 709–28.

R. G. Maharaj et al., “Critical Incidents Contributing to the Initiation of Substance Use and Abuse among Women Attending Drug Rehabilitation Centres in Trinidad and Tobago,” *West Indian Medical Journal* 54, no. 1 (January 2005): 51–58.

Stephen Tomsen and Kevin Markwell, “Violence, Cultural Display and the Suspension of Sexual Prejudice,” *Sexuality & Culture* 13, no. 4 (2009): 201–217.

Harold L. Nixon and Wilma J. Henry, “White Students at the Black University: Their Experiences Regarding Acts of Racial Intolerance,” *Equity & Excellence in Education* 25, no. 2–4 (1991): 121–123.

¹⁵⁵ see Ricoeur on “the paradigm of recording”, Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting* (University of Chicago Press, 2004), p162.

¹⁵⁶ William Hirst and Gerald Echterhoff, “Remembering in Conversations: The Social Sharing and Reshaping of Memories,” *Annual Review of Psychology* 63, no. 1 (2012): 55–79, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100340>.

That said, this assistance is available only if the knowledge production concerning an incident is not monopolized. In this sense, it was highly important for me follow the ‘heretics’ of their time—e.g. the Islamist magazines of the early-1950s; the LGBT magazines that were published after the late-1980s; or the social media channels critical of the AKP government throughout the 2010s. For example, this is how I could access multiple accounts of the obstacles raised against women in relation to their clothing in the 1880s, the 1950s or in the 2010s. In a similar vein, I could gather data regarding the first publicized incidents—i.e. throughout the 1960s—in which some officers of Diyanet refused to conduct the funeral procedure for Alevi citizens, as well as the most recent such incidents in the 2010s.

Among the three landscapes, a key exception is the relatively late advent of public awareness about the problems of “LGBT” people. This in itself is a significant indication of cultural change. In this case, my analysis was centered on the incidents that have been problematized in the new, unsettled cultural period—e.g. the cases of murder after sex workers have become ‘visible’ in the gaze of civilians; the dismissal of LGBT people in the public sector, which turned out to be a matter of legal as well as social dispute. That said, recent oral history studies¹⁵⁷ gave me an insight into the way some undocumented incidents of the past may be re-called and problematized by virtue of the recently accessible ideological repertoires.

Even in an unsettled cultural period, where for example women’s clothing attracts watchful eyes in public, the incidents may not always be well-documented. For instance, this lack of data may be due to the privacy of the matter in some social contexts—e.g. the bonds in a family. It may also be due to the one-sided reporting of what happened—e.g. the murdered trans sex workers often lacked the means to document their own account of the incidents of

¹⁵⁷ *80’lerde Lubunya Olmak* (İzmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2012).
90’larda Lubunya Olmak (İzmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2013).

murder. Given these limitations, my aim was to take some snapshots from all available incidents that enter the mass debate, without claiming that these incidents are exhaustive of the experience in the society.

That said, they should be exhaustive of the experience that could explicitly or implicitly be mentioned in the mass debate. Therefore, my horizon is limited by the cultural horizon of the contesting parties in the mass debate, who have an idea of what to problematize in public. In this vein, I will keep track of the changing problematization of allegedly similar issues. The starting point of my approach was to flesh out some key matters of dispute, which I have already elaborated at the very outset of the research (*see* CH2 “Conversations on Change”).

The introduction should have also provided an insight into the boundary moments on which I focus. Accordingly, my analysis in the chapter entitled women and clothing is centered on the incidents that were documented after the *de-facto* lifting of the head-covering ban (2013), which also corresponds to the political climate after the third-term of the AKP government. My analysis in the chapter entitled Alevi and funerals is based on the incidents that were documented after the late-2000s, which represents a period following the spread of *cemevleri*, the intensification of the thorny controversies over the ‘true’ definition of Alevilik, the changed authority structures prompted by Alevism, and the varied relationship of Alevi with the institutions through which Islam is practiced. Lastly, my analysis in the chapter entitled LGBT and the entertainment sector covers the incidents throughout the late-2000s and the 2010s, which displayed some new cleavages between the alternative visible representations of LGBT identity in the form of sex workers, entertainers or public employees.

4.1.2. *Cross-checking the Multiple Accounts*

The multiplicity of accounts of an incident do not necessarily damage the reliability of any of these accounts, on the contrary, it helps researchers gain a thorough understanding of

how the parties that participate in the incident make their meanings. My aim here is neither to say whether a ‘testimony’ is trustworthy, nor which of the multiple accounts is correct. The conversing parties conduct enough of these fact-checking efforts, despite the confines of authority structures. My aim is rather to present how differently discourse over the same practice may be formed.

Because one cannot perform intolerance without meaning it, such an act is always dependent on being explained by the parties involved. This explanation relies on any of the diverse ideological processes of rationalization, intellectualization, reflection and contemplation.¹⁵⁸ In the setting of a conversation, the parties make their own meanings as to why intolerance constituted their relationship. Because this is an endeavor that both the one who rationalizes intolerance and the one who feels offended contribute to, it is of utmost importance to capture some easily differentiable accounts of this interaction. Such meaning-making processes ensure that this research is not written so as to label one “intolerant” before one admittedly rationalizes intolerance in one’s own words. In the same vein, no one can tolerate another’s behavior, if the latter does not settle for a relationship of tolerance. The dialogical approach I follow has the ability to comprehend this relational nature of tolerance.

Incidents not only display the practices of intolerance, they are also actively recalled in the future as reference-points. For example, among those incidents recorded relating to women’s clothing in the 1880s, the 1950s and the 2010s, the most recent provoke ‘us’ to recall what had happened in the past, despite the very different social conditions that surrounded them. Given that the ideology-making processes are actively in place to make sense of incidents as parts of a wholly meaningful universe, an incident rarely remains a standalone matter. For instance, support for the head-covering ban was based on the *amalgamation* of the ban with a

¹⁵⁸ See for its implications for relativism: Mehdi Amin Razavi and David Ambuel, *Philosophy, Religion, and the Question of Intolerance* (SUNY Press, 1997), xiii-xiv.

set of other incidents, such as those who were attacked for not fasting, those who were demonized for wearing open-clothes, and those people who, in Former President Demirel's account, could not enjoy their freedom to *not* pray alongside those who performed their freedom of religion. Whereas the proponents of the head-covering ban perceived the above-mentioned incidents in connection with one another, many opponents of the ban (e.g. the "liberal" argument) saw no connection between these sets of incidents.

Relatedly, ideology-makers often do not categorize incidents in the same way, even across different times. Because I also aim to uncover change in these interrelationships between ideology-making processes, I refuse to implement any exogenous standard of categorization on incidents. Concomitantly, I also do not take the incidents as though they always stand in the same way in 'our' collective memory. These shifting meanings of an incident hint at cultural change. For example, I will discuss the changing place of the concept of agency (*vis-à-vis* responsibility) in the re-making of Secularism (*see* 'agency' in CH6 Women and Clothing).

4.1.3. *Negative Heuristic: Cultural Analysis based on the Quantification of "Incidents"*

A pitfall in this event-based approach would be to attempt a 'measuring' of intolerance based on a quantification of incidents. This would be a pitfall for the study of culture, not only because the incidents may not always be recorded, but also because the absence of incidents may not mean that the experience is simply one of a settled cultural period. Pew Research Center's Social Hostilities Index (SHI) is a useful example within this context. The Index aims to measure the level of social hostilities involving religion, by counting incidents based on some categories deemed relevant to the notion of social hostility. The index does not fall into the pitfall of trying to count how many of which incident occurred. However, it still aims to quantify the data from each country based on whether some *types* of incidents occurred within a given

time-period. The mistaken assumption of SHI is that it claims to measure the levels of social hostilities based on the occurrence of incidents.


To begin with, the research team is confident that, irrespective of the differences between countries in terms of transparency, they can collect data from 198 countries by relying on “more than a dozen published cross-national sources”.¹⁵⁹ When complemented with a democracy index, SHI indicates that “full democracies” are less prone to “social hostilities”.¹⁶⁰ This conclusion suggests that SHI successfully gathered sufficient data from “authoritarian” countries, where the incidents may have otherwise been missed due to a lack of transparency.

That said, my implementation of the same data (2007-2013) on 20 countries in a roughly sketched map of the Middle East demonstrated a more questionable result in terms of the operation of culture. According to the result, the relatively democratic/democratizing¹⁶¹ of 20 Middle Eastern countries—i.e. Turkey, Israel, Lebanon and post-uprising Tunisia—could not get close to the threshold that signifies “low” level of social hostility (*see* Figure-I). On the contrary, many of the authoritarian countries in the region were on the “low” side. In other words, according to the correlation, the more democratic a country is in the Middle East, the more “social hostilities” from which it tends to suffer.

¹⁵⁹ “Latest Trends in Religious Restrictions and Hostilities | Pew Research Center,” February 26, 2015, <https://www.pewforum.org/2015/02/26/religious-hostilities/>, p34.

¹⁶⁰ “Five Key Questions Answered on the Link between Peace & Religion” (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015), 20, <<http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Peace-and-Religion-Report.pdf>>.

¹⁶¹ I use this connotation with the caveat that, for once, I have to set aside my previous critique on the teleological implications and the definitional problems in the democratization literature. For the sake of following SHI’s other couplings with democracy indices, I relied on two democracy indices: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and V-Dem. Although the values depicted in Figure-I are based on EIU, I did not find any noteworthy difference between the two results.



Eschewing any search for a causal link in this correlation, I shall demonstrate why the quantitative event-based approach will not capture how culture operates. This example is based on the pre and post-uprising Tunisia and Libya. The rates of social hostility in both countries is among the lowest in 2010—i.e. one year before the uprisings. Suddenly, within a year, both countries seemed to have moved towards the high end of the chart.

After the new constitution, Tunisia’s democracy did not lead to any notable decrease in its social hostility ratings. On the contrary, the Ben Ali era looks like an unreachable goal in retrospect. This finding is not reliable, at least because Tunisia did not develop these “social hostilities involving religion”, including their ideational or material roots, within only one year.¹⁶² The correlation suggests rather that the social hostilities, in the way the index defined

¹⁶² see Marion Boulby, “The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia since Independence,” *Third World Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (April 1, 1988): 590–614, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436598808420073>.

Nadia Marzouki, “From People to Citizens in Tunisia,” *Middle East Report* 259 (2011): 16–19, par 10.

Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, “Moderation through Exclusion? The Journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from Fundamentalist to Conservative Party,” *Democratization* 20, no. 5 (August 1, 2013): 857–75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.801255>, 861.

them, were not made explicit before the uprisings. Within this context, the event-based quantitative approach misses some decades-long incubation periods, which constitute some of the most fundamental cultural tensions in Tunisia.¹⁶³

4.1.4. *Meanings in Silences*

The challenge of silences has appeared in the last example. A fundamental methodological challenge in historiography is that the records of non-problematized processes—be them the relationships of “tolerance”, “peace” or “coexistence”—are not as accessible as the sources of *negative* incidents—e.g. “intolerance”, “war” or any other kind of conflict. Simply put, it is often the lack of incidents—i.e. routines and habits—which signifies ‘harmony’. As Bryant puts it in the context of the Ottoman society, the everyday life practices are likely to be absent in the records, “as opposed to the ‘events’ that construct archives and define historical study”.¹⁶⁴ I think this challenge partly stems from the lack of means of making sense of silences. With an awareness of this limit, I aim to capture the instances where silence means a lot to the conversing parties.

A silence does not necessarily represent an absence of meaning. They are empirical materials—just as sounds are—to indicate peaceful routines, or represent some relatively subtle relationships of power, which appear “most often as silence or muffled subtext”.¹⁶⁵ In this study, I suggest exploring silences through the meanings made of them in some surrounding conversational texts. I engaged in such an exploration when I underlined the question of those who asked Erdoğan why he was silent towards a visible representation of LGBT identity in one

¹⁶³ see Ruth Mas, “Compelling the Muslim Subject: Memory as Post-Colonial Violence and the Public Performativity of ‘Secular and Cultural Islam,’” *The Muslim World* 96, no. 4 (October 17, 2006): 585–616. Also see, Fabio Merone, “Enduring Class Struggle in Tunisia: The Fight for Identity beyond Political Islam,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 74–87.

¹⁶⁴ Rebecca Bryant, “Introduction: Everyday Coexistence in the Post-Ottoman Space,” in *Post-Ottoman Coexistence: Sharing Space in the Shadow of Conflict*, Ed. Rebecca Bryant, 2016, 1–38, 5.

¹⁶⁵ Lisa A. Mazzei, “Inhabited Silences: In Pursuit of a Muffled Subtext,” *Qualitative Inquiry* 9, no. 3 (June 1, 2003): 355–68, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800403009003002>, 355.

case (i.e. the iftar with Ersoy), whereas he was loudly opposed to another visible representation (i.e. the LGBT Pride parade in Taksim square). Was this silence fully meaningless, or was it aimed at promoting the visibility of the *other* in one particular way, which is not supposed to be spoken in order to function? In any case, the implications of silence for tolerance shall be analyzed.

The case of Gözde Kansu also illustrates how silence shall be analyzed in this study. Kansu lost her job when then minister Hüseyin Çelik denigrated her “open-cloth” on a TV show. After the incident, when conversing with journalist Ayşe Arman, Kansu agreed with Arman’s argument that she was cherry-picked in a media landscape where many others were wearing “more open clothes” without any interference. Based on this conversation, the silence in these other cases became meaningful, and even a prerequisite to exploring what happened to trigger Kansu’s dismissal.

Moreover, intolerance may be hidden in silences as well. Many Alevi citizens who recently complained that salâ was not read by mosque personnel for their deceased family member, meant that this officer refused to use the word “cemevi” as a part of the salâ. The families insisted that the word should be used, because their funeral would take place at a cemevi, whereas the mosque was perceived as the place to announce, in a religious musical form, this funeral for their fellow Muslims. In these cases, the Diyanet officers defined the border of tolerance as the beginning of a silence.

4.1.5. *Cross-temporal Comparisons*

A fundamental task underpinning the comparative method is the necessity to establish a thorough understanding of comparability. Because the comparative configuration risks imposing the categories of one particular case onto another, it is criticized by seasoned field experts and anthropologists, and heavily cautioned against by some comparativists who also

conduct field research.¹⁶⁶ In this research, without establishing any comparative configuration exogenous to the culture I study, I relied on the comparative skills of the conversing parties who often express a view on today versus the past, here versus there, and the *self* versus the *other*.

Therefore, this research travels in time, constantly going to the past and coming back to the moment. Because what gives an event its historicity is not just its occurrence but also its later representations, it was through the representations that I decided where to seek cultural change. This method acknowledges, in Ricoeur's terminology, that "everything" starts from "testimonies", and not from archives. That said, one does not just make claims on the past by saying, "I was there". Instead, thanks to the light one's ideology casts on a historical episode, s/he may say with great surety, "read the history if you don't believe me". Clearly, this is one of those irresolvable confrontations between "intending the truth of history" and "the intention of being faithful to memory".¹⁶⁷ History and memory are interwoven, despite the confrontation between them.

I explained previously that it seems rational for many people to perceive a process of cultural reproduction, 'given' that the same things seem to happen again and again. I hinted as to how, for example, the Ticanis remain essential in 'our' conversations after 70 years, especially when the matter of dispute turns out to be aggression against women for their clothing preferences (or say, aggression against Atatürk's statues). This repetition obliged me to go back to the archives to check the extent to which what happened in the early-1950s is similar to what happens today. What did the women, who were attacked for their clothing

¹⁶⁶ Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Harvard University Press, 1996), 8-12.

Asef Bayat, "Studying Middle Eastern Societies: Imperatives and Modalities of Thinking Comparatively," *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 35, no. 2 (2001): 151-58, 154.

Laurence Whitehead, *Democratization* (Oxford University Press, 2002),

<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199253285.001.0001/acprof-9780199253289>, 191.

¹⁶⁷ Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting* (University of Chicago Press, 2004), 147.

preferences, say back at the time, and what do they say now? How did the ideology-makers of the past discuss the matter, and how do they discuss it at the moment?

The store of conversational texts from the early-1950s is accessible through the newspapers where the incidents were covered, narrativized and argued over (e.g. Akşam, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Yeni Sabah); the court records (e.g. the Ticani files); the minutes of parliamentary debates (e.g. over the law on the protection of Atatürk); the declarations from public protests (e.g. the parades against Ticani aggression, organized by women and student associations); the first so-called “women’s magazines” (e.g. Resimli Hayat); and the Islamist magazines of the time (e.g. Büyük Doğu, Sebilürreşad).

I was not able to conduct a fully systematic research in the sense that some of the sources are easier to follow than others (e.g. Cumhuriyet and Milliyet have well-coded search databases, whereas Akşam and Yeni Sabah must be searched manually). That said, despite not being wholly exhaustive, the available snapshots allowed me to figure out some key contradictions between ‘then’ and ‘now’, especially in terms of who speaks in the name of women; how s/he speaks; which ideological repertoire s/he adopts; and how s/he makes use of the cultural resources s/he has.

Though the contexts, structures and agents clearly differ in fundamental ways—arguably in a manner that renders them incomparable—between these episodes what makes them parts of a comparison is those interlocutors who see some corresponding patterns in them. Given that the idea of cultural reproduction relies on these arguments and the explicit or implicit agreements upon them, the idea of cultural change can make sense only in dialogue with them.

My position as a researcher is no different than that of any of the parties conversing on the subject: we all make arguments over change and continuity, in part based on a historiographical approach, and partly on ‘our’ individual or collective memory. My effort,

within this context, is to bring to the forefront more of the relevant data, so that the ongoing contestations make a new sense in terms of signifying cultural change.

4.1.6. *Exploratory, Evaluative and Retroactive Conversations*

Based on my theoretical and methodological explanations, I consider three types of conversation, which are separate yet interrelated in various ways. The participants, the settings or the outputs tend to vary in accordance with the type of conversation. Accordingly, I will firstly take into account *exploratory conversations*, which take place in a discrete setting where “intolerance”—i.e. perceived as such by the ‘intolerant’, the addressee, or both—is put into action. These conversations are likely to appear during micro-level *incidents*, where the interlocutors share a relatively narrow physical environment.

The interlocutors in these conversations are often unknown to one another—e.g. a man who asks for a funeral salâ from the muezzin of a mosque in his neighborhood; a woman who is attacked by a stranger on the street. Usually, the speakers of an exploratory conversation must deal with some extraordinary circumstances, for which they are not well-prepared. A key defining feature of these conversations is that they are based on some initial reactions to situations, such as frustration, anger, sudden physical or verbal tension.

Because the strategies of action in this speech type are likely to be developed in a hurry, the thought processes tend to be unstable, unexpected and possibly disconnected from prior thinking. In this sense, they serve as the imperfect representations of some widely accessible ideological repertoires. Additionally, in exploratory conversations, the speakers exercise disruptive role performances. By means of a spoken language, they tend to argue in an interruptive manner, which arguably constitutes the social action in its very natural form.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ see Erving Goffman, *Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face-to-Face Behavior* (Routledge, 2017).
Dmitri Nikulin, *Dialectic and Dialogue* (Stanford University Press, 2010).

By contrast, *evaluative conversations* are not limited to a narrowly delimited environment. These conversations may take place in the form of books, presentations, or detailed, prepared speeches on an issue. This setting may be called dialectical instead of dialogical, given that the conversing parties do not have disruptive role performances, even though they respond to one another. These conversations are the products of some conscious thought processes, in which the conversing parties have enough time and space to make their most coherent arguments.

Though everyone may participate in an evaluative conversation, the more significant examples of these conversations are those between some relatively powerful actors that make, re-make and represent ideologies in public—e.g. civil society movements, academics, journalists, politicians or courts. In these conversations, the conversing parties tend to combine their arguments with those of like-minded others. By examining such evaluative conversations, I aimed to follow the fusion, as well as the polarization of arguments in public debates.

In this research, I believe the exploratory conversations were exhaustive of the (alleged) content of all recorded and broadly communicated incidents. Ideally, there should be no selection bias in the exploratory conversations on which I focused. However, I shall admit that this is a very difficult task to undertake in an archival research. In order to keep the bias at an insignificant level, I used a wide array of archival material which, as I noted before, includes police and court records, newspapers, magazines and if available, personal records. The arguments over each incident, in which the speakers tend to make cross-references between the past and the present, helped me implement a snowball technique to reach more and more incidents.

On the other hand, throughout the research I had to question on which set of evaluative conversations I should be focusing. During this dynamic process, I prioritized conversations

about the boundary moments I laid down in the introduction of this research—e.g. (1) which arguments the ‘vanguards’ of Secularism used when they stopped opposing the lifting of the head-covering ban; (2) how the religious communities reacted to the generational change in the operationalization of Islamic veil; (3) how the Alevi communities discussed their changing funeral rituals, between one another and together with the state institutions; (4) how the pro-government “Islamists” distinguished between some different visible representations of LGBT identity.

Moreover, I was also interested in these speakers’ evaluations of the incidents in which the exploratory conversations took place, for example, how the preachers reacted to what was said, in the name of Islam, by these men who attacked women for their “open-clothes”. These conversations did not just include some rationalizations of intolerance that were made in the face of incidents, they also included some evaluations of silences, ‘non-incidents’, and the implicit or explicit forms of tolerance that filled in the moments that surround incidents.

In the case of evaluative conversations, I focused especially on some relatively powerful ideology-making circles. Given this limitation, I had to take into account a third type of conversation between, on the one hand the relatively ‘ordinary’ speakers of exploratory conversations, and on the other hand the ‘coherent’ knowledge-claims which were put forward during evaluative conversations. As I noted above, speakers are likely to be unprepared for an exploratory conversation. However, they can re-consider their positions in time, as the others’ claims on the subject matter tend to provoke them. I labelled these re-considerations of the past retroactive conversations—e.g. (1) how this Alevi family reacted, after being criticized by fellow believers for having made demands of a mosque; (2) what Ayşegül Terzi argued one week after she was kicked by a stranger given the public attention to her case; (3) how some LGBT people discussed the fault-line between them after realizing that one faces intolerance

and the other does not. Thanks to the retroactive conversations, I could observe the actors who participated in exploratory conversations with their more detailed, revised arguments.

4.1.7. *Naming the Identities*

The aim of this research is *not* to find out the most accurate name for any group of identities, or to classify them under certain categories. I am interested rather in the clashing claims of ownership over any marker of identity as they appear in the landscapes at which I looked. In other words, throughout any conversation that I ‘overheard’, my objective was to capture the disagreements over the definitions of the *self* and the *other*.

I preferred not to use my own labels to distinguish between various forms that ‘X’ took in a conversation. Though it was not necessarily the case, many of the conversations I focused on already provided an insight into the different forms that ‘X’ can take. For example, based on their different claims on Islam at a critical juncture, the following actors may easily be differentiated: an “Islamist”¹⁶⁹ politician who sees in Islam a modern political ideology but not a constant armed struggle; the “Jihadist” attacker of a nightclub who sees physical violence and militancy in Islam; and a “secular Muslim” who may not problematize going to this nightclub. They do not have to be classified in this research in order to make sense within the context of the attack on Reina Nightclub. In the same vein, during the parliamentary debates over the lifting of head-covering ban in late-2013, the “secularists” whose defense of Secularism was more akin to “Anglo-model secularism” could be distinguished from the “secularists” whose views are more in line with “French Laïcité”. After all, they all have a claim of ownership over Secularism.

¹⁶⁹ Many Islamists did not initially like the term “Islamism”—they wanted simply to be called “Muslims”. Nevertheless, having recognized that all Muslims do not make the same political ideology out of Islam, many of them later decided to embrace “Islamism” in the long-run: today, many leading ideology-makers organize marches and panels, and write books in the name of Islamism.

My policy of naming also applies to “LGBT”, “women” and “Alevi”, including their arguable sub-identities, derivatives, antecedents, successors and possible extensions. A trans sex worker who associates herself with Ottoman *köçeks* constructs her own relationship with the history, whereas many other transgender people may not see any tie between this past and the present. The distinction between “Alevi” and “Bektaş” is also one that depends on the way agents construe the *self*, the *other*, the past and the present during their ideology-making processes. In this vein, my approach clearly differs from that of a historian who tends to search for the answers in archives. Furthermore, in this study a self-proclaimed “travesti” was called a “travesti”, without doubt as to whether this was a marker of sexual behavior, or sexual or gender identity.¹⁷⁰ I also did not problematize whether s/he should *actually* be called “trans” in terms of gender.

Finally, identities are not always taken by the *self*. The Alevi who had problems in mosques throughout the Cold War did not necessarily state that they were Alevi. For example, during the funeral of Bektaş, the imam suspected that Bektaş might have been an Alevi, just because his name was “Bektaş”. Similarly, many “knew” that legendary folk musician Neşet Ertaş was an “Abdal”, which signifies a cultural identity closely related to Alevilik, even though Ertaş never named his own identity due to his lifelong effort to not arrest the *other* while defining the *self*. He was just a *garip* (literal eng. strange, abandoned, lonely) on the mountain of *gönül* (literal eng. heart). That said, because many of ‘us’ were sure that this was a unique representation of the Abdal tradition, his state-led mosque funeral turned out to be a mass controversy.

¹⁷⁰ My approach was more in line with the publications of *Pembe Hayat*, which often used the signifier “travesti and trans people”, although some other sources criticized this preference.

5. LGBT & the Entertainment Sector

This chapter analyzes the integration of the visible representations of “LGBT” identity into mass political struggles over values. Accordingly, in contemporary Turkey, what “LGBT” might be made to oppose is likely to be what many others also oppose—e.g. the “militaristic” state, the “patriarchal” microcosmic authority of shopkeepers (tr. “esnaf kültürü”), the “capitalist” commodification of LGBT people in sex and show businesses, the “Ottoman” hamman culture, the reactionary politics of “Islamism”, the heteronormativity of “Kemalism”, the gender essentialism of “orthodox feminism”, and the identity blindness of “orthodox marxism”. Just as each or a combination of these keywords are opposable for many, they are defensible for others, including some of those who also speak in the name of an LGBT community. In this context, I argue that the reservoir of arguments by means of which LGBT people can claim their visibility has diversified unprecedentedly. As such, their different approaches to an authoritative claim receive some very different responses, from implicit tolerance to direct interference.

In the landscapes of the entertainment and public sectors, the outcome of this dialogue tends to be dependent on the variety of identities that may become visible alongside “LGBT”. In other words, what matters is the properties of the subject that becomes visible. For example, alongside carrying the markers of a sexual identity, what other symbols does s/he carry? What is the subject’s approach to the authoritative institutions that s/he faces, from the notion of “common values” to the judgements of state institutions? In the face of these institutions, how does s/he express her/himself—e.g. as a carrier of a private or a public identity, as a sinner or a proud activist? Does s/he follow the ‘traditional route’ and in the best case scenario work as an entertainer, or does s/he try to make one’s own way as a civil servant? As an employee, how does s/he interact with the authoritative claims—notably, the *meritocratic*, *identitarian* or *secretive* claims—that rule over one’s workplace?

By demonstrating how these questions have begun to draw the borders of tolerance, I will conclude that the cultural process entails a shift, from the question of what “LGBT” is, to the question of what it is against. On the one hand, the process renders the constructions of “LGBT community” less cohesive than ever; on the other hand, it helps the conflicting visible representations of LGBT identity obtain some agency in mass political struggles taking place in the country. Instead of focusing on LGBT community merely as an isolated sub-culture, the future studies should focus on the broader social links that LGBT people have established.

Before proceeding with this analysis, I will examine the concept of visible representation which, I claim, should be disentangled from the assumption that ‘more’ visibility brings ‘more’ political power, and hence self-representation. At the outset, based on a cross-temporal analysis of the visible representations of LGBT sex workers, I will hint as to how ‘increased visibility’ may bring its own challenges. Accordingly, what “the travesti prostitute” represents could not be determined by the hitherto hidden but now visible sex workers, but by the lookers that objectify them. Contrary to the assumption, the lookers instrumentalized the sex workers’ visibility not just to target, kidnap and murder them more easily, but also to develop and reproduce some clear-cut frames that justify all these acts. Within this context, I will problematize the role some stereotypical narratives have played in the recent court proceedings, especially in the context of the legal interpretations of “unjust provocation”.

The next set of exploratory conversations will examine the public sector, beginning with the travesti and transsexual applicants to the Turkish Employment Agency (tr. İŞKUR), who were authoritatively labelled as inappropriate for any work other than sex work. The negative stereotypes of travesties and transsexuals, coupled with their almost uncontrollable visibility, tend to disqualify them at the earliest job interview. However, some others—e.g. lesbians, gays and bisexuals—could make it to the negotiation table. In this context, I will examine the interactions between three major authoritative claims—notably, the *identitarian*, *meritocratic*

and *secretive* claims, based on which the visible representations of LGBT have been negotiated in the public sector.

In this part, I will argue that the ‘LGBT-hostile’ identitarian claim has lost some ground in legal interpretation. Having said that, I will also demonstrate how the courts continue to rely on disciplinary administrative actions to measure the potentially negative impact of one’s sexual activity on one’s work. Accordingly, “being LGBT” can no longer constitute the legal basis for the dismissal of an employee, but “acting as LGBT” may well be considered a “justifiable” reason. At the end of this part, I will conclude that the employees of the public sector align their merit-based, ‘public’ and ‘secret’ qualities differently, depending on their branches of government and the communicative possibilities they have.

In the final set of exploratory conversations, I will examine how the visibility of LGBT identity has been negotiated in the entertainment sector, which traditionally includes the most ‘tolerable’ visible representations of LGBT identity. Here, I will examine how the entertainment sector crystalizes a fault-line between some clashing visible representations of LGBT. Some of these representations were banned, whereas others remain visible. Regarding this discrepancy, I argue that the AKP government tends to primarily restrict the visible representations of LGBT identity which it found to be critical of its political establishment. Beginning with the illuminating case of *Boston Gay Men’s Chorus*, my analysis will distinguish between those voices that challenge the hierarchical implications of tolerance, and others that periodically negotiate their visibility with the higher authorities of the sector. This process of negotiation requires one either to ‘theatrically’ obscure one’s already well-known identity, or to personalize this identity explicitly as being opposed to the social claims of “LGBT activism”.

Relatedly, in the first part of evaluative conversations, I analyze how “Islamists” have begun to rationalize tolerance towards some visible representations of LGBT. Though the

leading ideology-makers reiterate, that “which Allah forbids can never be tolerated”, I will argue that their approach to visible representations of LGBT identity radically differ, from one case to another. Before deciding how to react to an LGBT person, they focus on the multiple identities that this person carries alongside one’s sexual or gender identity. This person’s visibility may be justifiable, depending especially on his/her position vis-à-vis some key authoritative institutions, such as the notions of “common values” and “public morals”. In a nutshell, the mainstream current of Islamism has developed a kind of *implicit tolerance*, which consists of the occasional denial that it sees an LGBT person as such. In this way, a ‘theatrically’ obscured visible representation of LGBT could receive a positive response from the ‘theatrically’ blind authority. On the one hand, this approach is still not offering tolerance to “LGBT” on a textual level. On the other hand, it requires a thorough, discursive examination of who is to be marked as “LGBT”. In the eyes of this authority, the “Islamophobic” LGBT activists should take the blame.

The next part will focus on the retroactive conversations between these ‘tolerable’ and ‘intolerable’ visible representations of LGBT identity. In this part, I will argue that these representations have fundamentally different approaches to authority and the society. The former has fulfilled all the pre-conditions of tolerance, whereas the latter has problematized the idea of remaining at the bottom of a hierarchical relationship. In more depth, I will discuss how the interlocutors share the understanding that the former fits into the repertoire of religious “conservatism”, whereas the latter integrates with left-wing “revolutionaries”. I will seek the key aspects of this divergence in alternative politics of recognition, alternative approaches to “common values”, and alternative politics of visibility. Though the two ‘camps’ have clearly been counter-posed, this part also touches upon the relatively subtle clashes within each camp. In this vein, I will emphasize those who, despite not using the repertoire of “conservatives”, expressed skepticism about the strategic usefulness of *uncompromising visibility*. Within the

context of resistance and activism, this has turned out to be a debate in which broader “left-wing” activists participate.

Finally, I analyze a series of evaluative conversations regarding the integration of LGBT activism into fractured “left-wing” politics. Clearly, the ultimate common concern manifests as a conservative neoliberal hegemony that imposes its first-order values as “the common values”. Therefore, this coalition of the ‘otherized’ factions envisioned the active participation of LGBT activists in the left-wing opposition parties, some of which previously closed their doors to LGBT activism. In due course, the activists have become an indispensable part of university clubs, various civil society organizations and the mass left-wing events, such as May 1 marches. On the other hand, this integration also brings the existential crisis of the “left-wing politics” into LGBT activism. The crisis primarily relates to the divided ideological priorities, as well as the common confusion about the most effective ways to cope with an aggressive, conservative hegemony—e.g. “the culture of shopkeepers”. Amid the confusion led by the successive AKP governments, the mainstream opposition parties had to re-visit their ‘weak’ spots in the eyes of the electorate. Accordingly, one of the first things to hide was LGBT candidates.

5.1. Subjectivity, Visibility and Representation: “center-right, center-left and the underground”

[T]here is a dismaying similarity in the beliefs generated about the political efficacy of visible representation. The dangerous complicity between progressives dedicated to visibility politics and conservatives patrolling the borders of museums, movie houses, and mainstream broadcasting is based on their mutual belief that representations can be treated as “real truths” and guarded or championed accordingly. Both sides believe that greater visibility of the hitherto under-represented leads to enhanced political power [...] [B]oth groups [...] mistake the relation between real and representational.¹⁷¹

In order to de-construct the assumption that increased visibility brings enhanced self-representation, Peggy Phelan re-visited cultural theory, feminist theories of representation and psychic theory. Accordingly, a relationship between a “looker” and a “given to be seen” may be taken as a relationship between the *self* and the *other*. In such a relationship, taking more and more images/words of the hitherto underrepresented arrests and fixes this “other”. Because a representation can never be “real” in the sense that it can never be totalizing, multiple readings will be possible over the visible representation of the other. Therefore, it is untenable to assume that the representation will ever match the real. Amid the proliferation of discourses, this world—i.e. one of historically unequal, *marked* relationships—will push the visible representation to face a master narrative, which will no longer let the hitherto underrepresented escape from the power of the fixed definition. In this relationship, *subjectivity* can only lie in the ability to disappear from the gaze of authority, where necessary.

Based on this theoretical starting-point, my aim in this part is to put the visible representations of “LGBT” into historical context. While disentangling *subjectivity*, *visibility* and *representation*, I will rely on some key snapshots from the history of Turkey. To begin with, in 1966 writer Halit Çapın classified the night clubs of Istanbul in a humorous way as

¹⁷¹ Peggy Phelan, *Unmarked: The Politics of Performance* (Routledge, 2003), p2.

follows: I) the ones on the center-right; II) the ones on the center-left; and III) the ones below the ground. The ones on the right played some American style “brainwashing” songs in English, whereas the ones on the left played Turkish folk songs predominantly about the collectivization of farms for brothers and sisters. Strangely enough, the places on the left were full of center-right people and vice versa. As to those in the third category—i.e. those below the ground, Çapın underlined that they were not predictable at all (tr. “sağı solu belli olmayanlar”). This last category consisted of some groups who could not be understood in life, such as “third-class artists”, “second-class brothel girls”, “first-class homosexuals” and “the low-income policemen”.¹⁷²

Though the “homosexuals” were invisible to many civilian eyes in daily life, they were ‘there’ in terms of representation, since (1) they were unable to vanish from the sight of the low-income policemen;¹⁷³ and (2) the mainstream media channels were interested in their “mysterious” stories. In other words, the ideology of the visible did not let them speak for themselves, but they were already *marked* by the gaze of the authorities. Those authorities, who talk through the language of “the right” and “the left”, already claimed to know what these groups consisted of, and where they originated from. Accordingly, the leading ideology-makers commonly considered the “homosexuals”, which at the time indicated pretty much anyone who did not fit the sexual norms,¹⁷⁴ to be an evil consequence of the rival mainstream ideology.

One group who spoke in the name of Secularism held the Ottoman pre-modernity and the ongoing religious bigotry responsible for “homosexuality”. Historian Refik Ahmet Sevengil, who often touched upon the subject, criticized the Ottoman rulers for their soft measures against the spread of “uranism”—an old term that meant (especially male)

¹⁷² Halit Capin, “Gece Kulüpleri,” *Milliyet Haftasonu İlavesi*, May 29, 1966.

Halit Capin, “Garibhaneler,” *Milliyet Haftasonu İlavesi*, June 12, 1966.

¹⁷³ Halit Capin, “Polis Baskın Yapınca Yerli Caroussel Revüsü Dağıldı,” *Milliyet Sanat Eğlence*, October 14, 1966.

¹⁷⁴ It included heterosexual “*gacıvari*” travesties, as well as homosexual “*laçovari*” men.

homosexuality.¹⁷⁵ Back at the time, the performance arts were the primary livelihood for a group whose later representations were to be marked as “homosexuals”. Between the 16th and the 19th centuries, it was the field of life where the ‘non-hetero’—i.e. in the lately imported sense of the term—clearly had a visible representation, in the form of “*tavşan oğlanı*”, “*köçek*”, “*çengi*”, or “*kolbaşı*”. They were actors, if not identities in the sense of the 21st century.¹⁷⁶

These representations were not just tolerated for the most part, but also openly needed and even appreciated, at least within the context of a theatrical performance. Therefore, in the cosmopolitan setting of Istanbul, the groups could remain very well-organized for a long period of time. The *çengis* (en. women dancers) had their unions in Ayvansaray and the Hammam of Tahtakale.¹⁷⁷ In accordance with the profession’s structure of authority, an individual team of *çengi* (tr. *çengi kolu*) was led by a *kolbaşı*, which indicated the rank a *çengi* would possibly reach after many years of work. When a *kolbaşı* decided to hire a young girl, she was expected to live in *kolbaşı*’s home and receive an education *kolbaşı* deemed appropriate. It was also *kolbaşı* who bargained with outsiders on behalf of *çengis*. Some vague or apparent markers of ‘homosexual’ relationships were later inferred—by historians, politicians or storytellers—from the then artistic repertoire of *çengi* groups, who participated in a wide-range of entertainment activities such as bridal showers (tr. *kına geceleri*), weddings, bear dances, drinking parties featuring music (tr. *oturak alemleri*) and women’s hammam meetings (e.g. the 40th day bath after childbirth).

¹⁷⁵ Refik Ahmet Sevengil, “Şehvi Raks - Köçekler - Tavşan Oğlanlar,” in *İstanbul Nasıl Eğleniyordu?* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 71.

¹⁷⁶ Carole S. Vance, “Anthropology Rediscovered Sexuality: A Theoretical Comment,” in *Culture, Society and Sexuality* (Routledge, 2007), 57–74.

¹⁷⁷ Ergun Hıçılmaz, *Çengiler, Köçekler, Dönmeler, Lez’olar...* (İstanbul: Cep Kitapları, 1991), p34.

Reşad Ekrem Kocu, “Eski İstanbul’da Çengiler,” *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası*, no. 7 (August 1970): 27–31, p28.

Köçeks¹⁷⁸ were also interchangeably called *çengi*.¹⁷⁹ The famous *köçek groups* were well-organized as the regular employees of *Gedikli Meyhaneler* (sing. meyhane / en. literal, regular winehouses), which operated based on a special permit issued by the state.¹⁸⁰ While some of these köçek groups were hired by a single meyhane, the most talented often toured between these places.¹⁸¹ They also acted as an important part of the entertainment activities that the Ottoman leaders organized to welcome their visitors. For such important days, some rulers, such as Sultan Aziz, established köçek/çengi teams of their own¹⁸².

Based on the records of a *subaşı*,¹⁸³ Evliya Çelebi wrote that Istanbul had 500 “*esnâf-ı hîzan-ı dilberan*” (en. passive male homosexuals) as of 1633. Alongside the members of some *tekke* (en. religious lodge) organizations, this group allegedly included some young (tr. *civelekler*) and old Janissaries, whom Mehmet Halife accused of publicly engaging in homosexual intercourse.¹⁸⁴ Many other writings from the time suggest that *livâta*, a customary connotation for homosexual activity, was clearly considered a sin,¹⁸⁵ but in “the age of beloveds”,¹⁸⁶ only occasionally surveilled in the flow of the settled culture. After all, life in the school of *Enderun*—i.e. devoid of women—and *Harem*—i.e. devoid of men—relied upon the daily routine of same-sex relations.

¹⁷⁸ Köçek is a male belly-dancer with traditional women’s clothes. The note that they wore traditional women’s clothes, however, does not finalize the question of whether they desired to represent women.

¹⁷⁹ see “*çenginâme*” of Enderunlu Fazıl in Murat Bardakci, *Osmanlı’da Seks* (Istanbul: İnkılap, 2005), p146.

¹⁸⁰ Resad Ekrem Kocu, *Eski İstanbul’da Meyhaneler ve Meyhane Köçekleri* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2002), p14-18.

¹⁸¹ Z. Melek, “Eski Devirlerde Köçekler ve Çengiler,” *Resimli Tarih Mecmuası*, November 1953, 2705–29.

¹⁸² Hıçılmaz, *Çengiler, Köçekler, Dönmeler, Lez’olar...*, p26.

¹⁸³ In the Ottoman administrative system, *subaşı* was the officer in charge of the security of the cities.

¹⁸⁴ Mehmet Halife, *Tarih-i Gilmani* (Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1986).

¹⁸⁵ see a brief history of the bans against köçek practice, beginning with the 16th century: Mustafa Avcı, “Shifts in Sexual Desire: Bans on Dancing Boys (Köçeks) throughout Ottoman Modernity (1800s–1920s),” *Middle Eastern Studies* 53, no. 5 (September 3, 2017): 762–8

“Bir Hatunda 1 Şeytan, Bir Oğlanda 18 Şeytan Var,” *#tarih dergi*, no. 4 (September 2014): 35.

Dror Ze’Evi, *Producing Desire: Changing Sexual Discourse in the Ottoman Middle East, 1500-1900*, vol. 52 (Univ of California Press, 2006).

Gokcen Ezber, “Edebiyatımızdan Geçen LGBTT,” *Gokcenezber.Com* (blog), August 2014,

<http://www.gokcenezber.com/2014/08/edebiyatimizdan-gecen-lgbtt>.

¹⁸⁶ Walter G. Andrews and Mehmet Kalpakli, *The Age of Beloveds: Love and the Beloved in Early-Modern Ottoman and European Culture and Society* (Duke University Press, 2005), p174, p270.

Therefore, some leading thinkers of the Republic criticized this Ottoman mindset for considering “homosexuality” to be natural and inevitable. These thinkers thought it was totally preventable with a social re-configuration led by the principles of Secularism. For example, according to Çetin Altan, homosexuality was more common in the religiously conservative towns, because the microcosmic authorities of these towns did not let men and women freely show their “natural feelings”.¹⁸⁷ If women were given the power to be visible, homosexuality would become extinct. After making exactly the same claim, İlhan Selçuk added that many people ‘chose’ homosexuality due to their economic needs.¹⁸⁸ Therefore, the barriers against a welfare state should be lifted, so that the homosexual people could return to their ‘normal condition’. Furthermore, İsmail Cem problematized the capital behind this sex market, which, in his own words, cared about income regardless of its “destructive effects” on the society.¹⁸⁹ Cem’s cousin, fashion-designer Cemil İpekçi, who describes himself as a “conservative homosexual”, later explained why İsmail Cem and other family members never despised him: “I did not do anything that they would be ashamed of [...] [M]y private life was not in sight”.¹⁹⁰

In response to these arguments as to the reasons for this “perversion”, the media that dispersed the ideas of Islamism defended the Ottoman harem culture, despite admitting that some ‘problematic’ incidents may have taken place in the harem.¹⁹¹ In this vein, the thinkers on “the right” staunchly opposed the allegations of homosexuality against the Ottoman rulers. For example, Peyami Safa bashed a professor who argued that Baltacı Mehmet Pasha was a “passive homosexual”. Safa got especially angry for the professor’s use of this “dirty word” to

¹⁸⁷ Cetin Altan, “Vampirler ve Ötesi,” *Milliyet*, February 16, 1960.

¹⁸⁸ İlhan Selçuk, “Eşcinsel?,” *Cumhuriyet*, November 1, 1981.

¹⁸⁹ İsmail Cem, “Savaş Değil Para Yapın...,” *Milliyet*, September 15, 1970.

¹⁹⁰ Canan Danyildiz, “Erkek Miyim Kadın Miyim Bilmiyorum!,” *Posta*, May 22, 2016, <https://www.posta.com.tr/erkek-miyim-kadin-miyim-bilmiyorum-344166>.

¹⁹¹ İlhan Bardakci, “Harem ve Kadına Dair,” *İktibas*, February 12, 1983.

Vahit Cabuk, “Osmanlı Haremi,” *Milli Gençlik*, May 1977.

Emine Senlikoglu, “Osmanlı’da Harem ve ‘8 Mart Kadınlar Günü,’” *Mektup*, April 1996.

label such a significant historical figure.¹⁹² According to Safa, homosexuality was the consequence of a moral decay that was caused by the neglect of religious education after the 1930s¹⁹³. He was not the only one who held the ‘limited’ religious education in the Republic responsible. Others criticized Secularism more openly by making the causal claim that “secular democracies” raised some undomesticated generations who were unaware of moral values.¹⁹⁴

Demonized by both “the left” and “the right”, the remnants of *köçek* and *çengi* could become visible only in parts of the rural Anatolia,¹⁹⁵ or “below the ground” of metropolitan cities. Metin And, who wrote extensively and authoritatively on *köçek* and *çengi* groups in modern Turkey, defined this visible representation as one which is to be carried in rural areas for the lower classes.¹⁹⁶ On the other hand, the 80s’ travesties later conveyed how they watched, from below the ground, the proud and unstoppable appearances of Zeki Müren¹⁹⁷ and Bülent Ersoy¹⁹⁸ in the entertainment sector, in front of millions.¹⁹⁹ The two historic figures represented “the homosexuals” in a new fashion. That said notwithstanding their newness, they were not alien to those who carried some marks of the old performance arts. Within this context, writer Pınar Selek conveyed how the oldest travesti of the Ülker Street²⁰⁰ often recalled her childhood

¹⁹² Peyami Safa, “Mânevi Savunma Refleksi,” *Milliyet*, February 16, 1955.

¹⁹³ Peyami Safa, “Allah Korkusu Kalmayınca...,” *Milliyet*, January 17, 1956.

¹⁹⁴ “Kavramlar: Lûtilik,” *İktibas*, October 1993.

“Federal Almanya’da Ahlak Buhranı: Bu Nesil İstikbal Vadetmiyor,” *Yeniden Milli Mücadele* 4, no. 169 (May 1, 1973).

Celal Yildirim, “Medeni Geçinen Ülkeler Nereye Gidiyor,” *Müslüman Sesi* 24, no. 477–478 (January 1985).

Zeliha Yavuz, “Canavar Medeniyetin Çirkin Yüzü..!,” *Mektup*, no. 70 (November 1990).

Nevin Kayacan, “Dinsizliğin Ektiği Eşcinsellerle Söyleşi,” *Mektup*, no. 70 (November 1990).

Unal Emiroglu, “Eşcinsellerin Katılımı ve Laiklik Söylemi,” *Yörünge*, July 13, 1997.

Ali Bulac, “Eşcinseller,” in *Din ve Modernizm* (İstanbul: Çıra Yayınları, 2012), 132–38, p135.

¹⁹⁵ Saadet Ozen, “Feleğin Dansçıları,” *Atlas*, no. 93 (December 2000): 88–96.

¹⁹⁶ Metin And, “Çengiler ve Köçekler,” *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası*, no. 2 (March 1968): 25–29, p29.

see also, Brittany Giselle Haynes, “Performing Modernity in Turkey: Conflicts of Masculinity, Sexuality, and the Köçek Dancer,” 2014, p3-11.

¹⁹⁷ Then called a “homosexual”, later to be called a “drag-queen” or a “travesti”.

¹⁹⁸ Then called a “homosexual”, later to be called a “transsexual”.

¹⁹⁹ Alongside Müren and Ersoy, they watched Funda Lisa, Serbülent Sultan and some others.

see the memories of Ahu, Belgin, Bennu, and Demet: *80’lerde Lubunya Olmak* (İzmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2012), p18, p24, p59-61, p95, p130.

²⁰⁰ A historic street in Istanbul, where a large group of travesties, as a sub-cultural community, lived for some years. In 1996, they were forcefully displaced from the street.

memory of performing the köçek dance in a small central-Anatolian city, Kırşehir.²⁰¹ By the 1990s, a new topic of debate in the mainstream media concerned the stars of the “post-köçek era”: Fatih Ürek, Aydın, Serdar Ortaç, Rober Hatemo.²⁰²

The debate outside the mainstream media was much broader. Many “homosexuals” did not see any possibility for subjectivity in being the *köçeks* of a post-köçek era. They were keen to declare their independence of the historical baggage of this sector. Accordingly, they desired to (1) become visible outside rural environments or the underground; (2) leave the ‘cage’ of the entertainment sector; (3) get rid of the hammam and harem origins of their selves; (4) publicly react to the violence that was then predominantly committed by the police—i.e. not *civilians*, most of whom not only did not see a lonely “prostitute”, but also feared the mysterious “homosexual terror”. In the aftermath of the 1980s identity-turn, these agents, who would later constitute clashing visible representations of “LGBT”, manifested and negotiated their in-group differences for the first time. Hereby, I refer to “LGBT” as a by-product of the efforts to construct one comprehensive marker of identity, which was needed for the representation of a common political and social movement.²⁰³ However, apart from signifying this particular context of identity formation, “LGBT” can rarely be taken as a monolithic body.

The following part will begin examining this many-voicedness of LGBT identity, *not* exclusively monolithic blocks of “lesbians”, “gays”, “bisexuals”, and “transsexuals” as it surfaced throughout the 1990s, but within each marker that has been represented differently in

²⁰¹ Pinar Selek, *Maskeler Süvariler Gacılar. Ülker Sokak: Bir Alt Kültürün Dışlanma Mekanı* (Ayizi Kitap, 2014), p90.

see also a story about the köçek dance of a travesti, nicknamed *Öküz Bakışlı* Mehmet, with legendary folk musician Neşet Ertaş in Ankara, some time before Ertaş became well-known: *80’lerde Lubunya Olmak* (İzmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2012), p175.

²⁰² see the conversation between researcher Yiğithan Yenicioğlu and interviewer Onur Baştürk: Onur Basturk, “Ekranada Post Köçek Trendi!,” *Negatif*, no. 43 (July 1998): 27–29.

²⁰³ This description should not mean that “LGBT” is the only way to name the common identity of this movement. In the course of the chapter, I will explain how some members refused a subject-centered approach, and instead defined the movement as a movement against homophobia, biphobia and transphobia.

the gaze of the authorities. Accordingly, the first part of the exploratory conversations will question the puzzle of the LGBT sex workers who have turned out to be unprecedentedly visible in the gaze of the civilians. As I will argue in the next part, facing the other civilians turned out to be destructive in some ways. Before proceeding to discuss this, I end this part with Peggy Phelan, with whom I opened:

Gaining visibility for the politically under-represented without scrutinising the power of who is required to display what to whom is an impoverished political agenda.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁴ Phelan, *Unmarked*, p26.

5.2. Exploratory Conversations (I): LGBTs' (Un)tolerated Visible Representations

5.2.1. *The Visible Representations of the Sex Worker*

Between 2008 and 2018, 49 trans and gender diverse people have reportedly been murdered in Turkey.²⁰⁵ The vast majority of the murdered were travesti and transsexual sex workers. Of all these cases, very few reliable conversations were left, given that the only witnesses to these conversations are likely to be the murderers. Moreover, the lawyers of the murdered—i.e. likely to be the members of the LGBT associations—often argued that the state officials did not work hard enough to double-check the murderer's accounts, let alone some cases of murder that the officials could not identify.

The content of the conversations is of utmost importance for the court processes, as these conversations often lead to a series of legal consequences, such as the reduction of a penalty. Therefore, it is significant to underline that in these legal cases, a set of stereotypical narratives helped the murderers convince the courts of the existence of an “unjust provocation” behind aggression.²⁰⁶ These narratives take impetus from the predominantly despised visible representations of transgender sex workers. In order to convince the legal practitioners of their goodwill, the aggressors rationalized their acts by relying on the vocabulary concerning how dangerous and promiscuous “travesti prostitutes” can be.

To begin with, some aggressors' attempts to manipulate the true content of incidents revealed their deep-rooted knowledge regarding the usefulness of such stereotypical narratives. Like many other travesti murderers, Emrah Ş., the murderer of Irem, claimed that Irem asked him to act “passively” during the sexual intercourse. However, his lie was uncovered when the forensic medicine report validated that Irem had already undergone a testicle removal surgery

²⁰⁵ “The Trans Murder Monitoring (TMM): IDAHOT 2016 - Update” (Transgender Europe (TGEU), May 12, 2016), <http://transrespect.org/en/idahot-2016-tmm-update>.

“2018’de 4 trans cinayeti işlendi,” *Gazete Duvar*, 20 Nov 2018, <https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/gundem/2018/11/20/turkiye-avrupada-en-cok-trans-cinayeti-islenen-ulke>.

²⁰⁶ e.g. the cases of Ahmet Öztürk and Abdülbaki Koşar among others.

before this incident.²⁰⁷ Similarly, as was documented in an ongoing legal case, Ashkan K. testified that he killed a sex worker, Roman, during a fight which started when he noticed that she was a travesti. According to his testimony, he then wanted his money back, but Roman refused to comply with this command. Yet other records cast doubt on the accuracy of this account. According to these records, on the same night he attacked two women and a taxi driver with the aim of extortion.²⁰⁸ In this series of extortion attempts, Roman may well have been a relatively easy target for the murderer, since he knew he would easily be able to put the blame on Roman's sexual identity and field of work.

Common to these 49 cases was that the aggressors demanded sentence reductions by making an almost identical set of statements. Among their well-regurgitated sentences were the following: (1) "he offered me homosexual intercourse";²⁰⁹ (2) "I got angry, as I realized that he was a man only after he undressed";²¹⁰ (3) "when I saw he was a man, I wanted my money back but he refused";²¹¹ (4) "during the sexual intercourse, he told me that it was his turn to be 'active'".²¹² Furthermore, the aggressors often justified their deadly attacks based on yet another commonsense knowledge-claim, that travesties and transsexuals are dangerous people by definition: "I did not mean to kill him, but the fight went bad". Contrary to these well-memorized narratives, some decades ago—i.e. when sex workers were not as visible, such cases

²⁰⁷ Nail Kahraman, "İrem'in katil sanığını yakacak rapor," *Hürriyet*, 26 Jan 2011.

²⁰⁸ Ali Aksoyer, "Travestiyi öldüren şüpheli iki kadını gasp etmeye çalışırken yakalandı," *Hürriyet*, 9 Mar 2018.

²⁰⁹ "Bornova'da Nefret Cinayeti, Bahane Tanıdık: İlişki Teklifi," Kaos GL Haber Portalı, 30 Sep 2014, <http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=17632>.

"İskenceyi, 'ders Vermek İstedik' Diye Savundular!," Kaos GL Haber Portalı, 10 Aug 2017, <http://www.kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=24349>.

see also the murderers of Çağla Ç., Abdülbaki K. ve Melek K.

²¹⁰ "Kadın sandım' diyerek saldırdı," odatv.com, 6 Nov 2014, <https://odatv.com/kadin-sandim-diyerek-saldirdi-0611141200.html>.

²¹¹ "Kadın olmadığını öğrenince...", Habertürk, 25 Apr 2014,

<https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/942428-kadin-olmadigini-ogrenince>

²¹² *LGBT Davaları: AIHM, Yargıtay ve Danıştay İçtihatları* (İstanbul: SPoD Sosyal Politikalar Cinsiyet Kimliği ve Cinsel Yönelim Çalışmaları Derneği, 2012), p73.

2015 LGBTİ'lerin Hukuk ve Adalete Erişimi (İstanbul: SPoD Sosyal Politikalar Cinsiyet Kimliği ve Cinsel Yönelim Çalışmaları Derneği, 2016), p59.

of murder were likely to have highly mysterious and somewhat unexpected causes,²¹³ such as jealousy,²¹⁴ financial disagreement²¹⁵ and in-group conflict.²¹⁶ This diversity implies that, at that time, the murderers did not have access to available stereotypes that may have helped them justify their acts.

Indeed, the survivors of similar attacks can make their counter-claims against these stereotypical narratives. According to the survivors' accounts, an attack is likely to be triggered after unsuccessful rape attempts. For example, Bahar, the survivor of an attack in the Maltepe district of Istanbul, claimed that she was attacked because she refused to follow the orders of a group of rapists²¹⁷. Similarly, a sex worker, Yeliz, made a deal with Mehmet C. but was then beaten and raped by three of his friends.²¹⁸ Serap, who was also a sex worker, was attacked by a former customer, since she stopped answering his calls.²¹⁹ Avşa argued that she was heavily beaten by an officer who had sexually harassed her in the past.²²⁰ Similarly, Selahattin G. kidnapped E.K. by threatening her life. In the meantime, he not only attempted to rape her, but he also seized E.K.'s money and ring.²²¹ Threats were predominantly based on the argument that doing sex work necessitates submitting to any demand, because a sex worker is already involved in a 'degrading' business for money.

²¹³ "Bir Cinayet Aydınlandı," *Milliyet*, June 19, 1957.

"Bir Kahveci Odasında Ölü Bulundu," *Cumhuriyet*, August 27, 1953.

"Bir Kaatil Yakalandı," *Cumhuriyet*, September 12, 1968.

"Büyükada'da Ağaca Asılı Bulunan Cesetlerin Kimlikleri...," *Cumhuriyet*, July 10, 1972.

²¹⁴ "Kan Çekti," *Milliyet*, May 26, 1959.

²¹⁵ "Bir Cinsî Sapık Feci Şekilde Öldürüldü," *Cumhuriyet*, March 10, 1963.

²¹⁶ "Dolmabahçe Cinayeti," *Milliyet*, October 23, 1952.

"İzmir'de 2 Faili Meçhul Cinayet Dün Aydınlandı," *Cumhuriyet*, August 24, 1966.

²¹⁷ "Maltepe'deki Transfobik Saldırlara Protesto," Kaos GL Haber Portalı, February 20, 2012,

<http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=10648>.

²¹⁸ Soner Kocaer, "Ağaca bağlayıp tecavüz ettiler," *Hürriyet*, April 15, 2011,

<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/agaca-baglayip-tecavuz-ettiler-17554501>.

²¹⁹ "Corum'da Silahlı Saldırıya Uğrayan Trans Seks İşçisine Barodan Ayrımcılık!," Kaos GL Haber Portalı, October 10, 2014, <http://www.kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=17693>.

²²⁰ Yıldız Tar, "Açlık Grevindeki Trans Mahpus: Ölmek İstemiyorum!," Kaos GL Haber Portalı, April 10, 2014, <http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=16303>.

²²¹ "Sizofreni' Bahane, Transfobi Şahane!," Kaos GL Haber Portalı, March 4, 2014, <http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=15971>.

These victims reported that the threats they received were consistently based on a set of roles or characteristic features associated with their identities. Some survivors shared the impression that LGBT people are especially targeted, since it is much easier to develop a narrative that renders them guilty. As an illustration, Bihter, a trans woman from Ankara, was asked by a group of strangers to give some “money for fuel”. When she refused to give away her wallet, the man leaned towards Bihter’s lips and gasped: “I will give you 20 liras, f. you and kill you [and take it all back]”.²²² Just like Bihter, A.O. was threatened by a gang on the basis of her visible representation as a travesti: “you are a travesti, so you must have lots of money”. Kemal Örddek, the founder of Red Umbrella for Sexual Health and Human Rights Association, described how a gang, which not only sexually assaulted Örddek but also forced him to go to a cash machine, tried to bargain with the police officers while in custody:

Sir, he invited us to his home, you know these homos [tr. ibneler] [...] we understand each other, right?”²²³

In order to deter transgender groups from living in certain neighborhoods, some gangs targeted them exclusively.²²⁴ Throughout the 2000s, many travesties and transsexuals reported that they were fined by the police whenever they were visible on the streets. Because their appearance is invariably associated with sex work—which is outlawed except for a group of ‘licensed’ biological women—the police officers rarely need to prove that a trans person is in fact caught in action.

²²² Omer Akpınar, “Trans Kadına Sallamalı Saldırı: Kafayı Kolla Kızım!,” Kaos GL Haber Portalı, April 28, 2015, <http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=19280>.

²²³ Cicek Tahaoglu, “LGBTİ Aktivistine Evinde Saldırı: ‘Nasılsa Serbest Kalırız, Sen Düşün,’” Kaos GL Haber Portalı, July 8, 2015, <http://www.kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=19802>.

²²⁴ “Transları Hedef Alan Gaspçılar Tutuklandı,” Kaos GL Haber Portalı, January 26, 2017, <http://www.kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=22916>.

see also the cases on the gangs in the Eryaman, Esat and Kurtuluş districts of Ankara: *LGBT Davaları: AIHM, Yargıtay ve Danıştay İçtihatları*, vol. 1 (İstanbul: SPOD Sosyal Politikalar Cinsiyet Kimliği ve Cinsel Yönelim Çalışmaları Derneği, 2012), p75.

The speech acts based on such stereotypes were likely to bring special treatment. As an illustration, on the one hand, Cem B., who killed Derya during his unexcused extortion attempt, was sentenced to life imprisonment;²²⁵ on the other hand, Ramazan S., who killed Seda and later claimed that he got angry for being offered homosexual intercourse, had a reduced sentence due to “the possibility that [his story] is true”.²²⁶ The very same justification helped Fikret O. have a reduced sentence for the murder of Saim Kayhanmete, a businessman of queer identity somewhat ambivalently treated by the public opinion²²⁷. The victim’s offer of homosexual intercourse was considered by the court an unjust provocation, even though the killer was proven to have registered himself on a gay dating site, where he finally met Kayhanmete after meeting some other gay men.²²⁸ As the highest legal interpretation regarding the foundations of unjust provocation, some decisions of the Court of Cassation were problematized by LGBT associations.²²⁹ These associations commonly argue that many LGBT people do not appeal to the courts, as they do not have faith in the legal system.

Having said that, the records also demonstrate that, although not on a systematic basis, some recent court decisions were not disappointing from the victims’ perspectives. Despite that the aggressors consistently relying on the courts’ traditional take on “unjust provocation” or “sexual intercourse in its natural form”, the court processes do not always meet their expectations. For example, although Selahattin G. was set free one day after the incident on the basis that he had chronic schizophrenia, he was later sentenced to 16 years in prison. After

²²⁵ “Travestiye Öldürüne Ömür Boyu Hapis,” *Sondakika.com*, 2 Nov 2011, <https://www.sondakika.com/haber/haber-travestiye-oldurune-omur-boyu-hapis-3100666>.

²²⁶ “Oldurulen ‘Travesti’yse, Mahkeme’den Ceza İndirimi!,” *Kaos GL Haber Portalı*, 4 Jun 2014, <http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=16768>.

²²⁷ see for a scrutinization of the debate over Kayhanmete’s identity: Perin E. Gurel, *The Limits of Westernization: A Cultural History of America in Turkey* (Columbia University Press, 2017).

²²⁸ “Gay İş Adamını Öldüren Sanığa 18 Yıl Hapis,” *Lambdaistanbul*, 3 Apr 2008, <http://www.lambdaistanbul.org/s/medya/gay-is-adamini-olduren-saniga-18-yil-hapis/>.

²²⁹ see the case Abdülbaki K.: *LGBT Davaları: AIHM, Yargıtay ve Danıştay İçtihatları*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: SPoD Sosyal Politikalar Cinsiyet Kimliği ve Cinsel Yönelim Çalışmaları Derneği, 2012), p78.

Ali Erol, “Eşcinsel Öldürenin Halinden Yargıtay Anlar!”, *Kaos GL Haber Portalı*, 21 Feb 2013, <http://www.kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=13555>.

describing the verdict as a “fair” one, E.K.’s lawyer Ahmet Toköz stressed that this decision would be “a response to those who do not consider trans women as equal citizens”.²³⁰ The gang members who attacked A.O. during their extortion attempt were sentenced up to 12 years in prison. In her evaluation, A.O. wittily commented that, for the first time in her life, it was not herself who was to be punished by the court.²³¹ A.O.’s lawyer Ahmet Çevik expressed his appreciation of the legal process, as it was not distorted by the perception that “travesties lie”— i.e. a perception which, Çevik underlined, usually influences the judgements.

The gang members who attacked Kemal Ördek were found guilty of sexual assault, theft, threat, insult and deprivation of liberty, which in total amounted to a 20-year sentence. Ördek described the court decision as an impartial one: “[the criminals] tried to devalue me with my ‘LGBT activist’ and ‘sex worker’ identities”, but their strategy clearly failed.²³² Roşin’s father and his two uncles, who killed Roşin for his homosexual orientation, were sentenced to life imprisonment. They appealed to the Court of Cassation, but the latter approved the local court’s decision. The murderers of Melek K. and Çağla Ç., who argued that they committed the crime due to the “unjust provocation” of being offered homosexual intercourse, were sentenced to life imprisonment as well.²³³ In the same vein, the Court of Cassation corrected a local court’s problematic interpretation of unjust provocation.²³⁴

Based on an examination of these court decisions according to their dates, I shall note that the legal interpretation of unjust provocation has not changed consistently in one direction.

²³⁰ “Trans Kadına İşkence Yapan Saldırgana 16 Yıl Hapis,” Kaos GL Haber Portalı, August 20, 2015, <http://www.kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=20053>.

²³¹ Yıldız Tar, “Trans Kadına Gaspa 12’şer Yıl Hapis Cezası,” Kaos GL Haber Portalı, April 14, 2016, <http://www.kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=21510>.

²³² Yıldız Tar, “Kemal Ördek’e Cinsel Saldırı Davasında Hapis Cezası,” Kaos GL Haber Portalı, November 17, 2016, <http://www.kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=22523>.

²³³ “LGBT Davaları: AIHM, Yargıtay ve Danıştay İçtihatları” (SPoD Sosyal Politikalar Cinsiyet Kimliği ve Cinsel Yönelim Çalışmaları Derneği, November 2012), p77.

Yasemin Oz, “Legal Report: Turkey,” in *Study on Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity* (COWI: The Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2012), p23.

²³⁴ E.N. 2011/1668, K.N. 2012/4593 (Yargıtay 1. Ceza Dairesi, June 5, 2012).

In other words, these decisions are not only random, but they also lack a common logic, the establishment of which would require a comprehensive ideology-making process. On the flip side, I conclude that the ‘increased’ visibility of travesti and trans sex workers helped the civilian aggressors develop some common ways to target them more systematically. Their repetition of the same stereotypes suggest that they have a clear idea of what to say and what not to say against their victims. I will come back to this point with a group of sex workers’ retroactive conversations, concerning the drawbacks associated with the policy of *uncompromising visibility*.

5.2.2. *The Visible Representations of the Public Employee*

At a time in which the visible representations of travesti and transsexual sex workers caused them to be demonized, targeted, surveilled, kidnapped or killed more easily, a group raised their voices in an unprecedented manner:

Everyone thought we were prostituting for easy money, and that we were constantly kicking up a fuss. We, as the Association of *Pembe Hayat*, organize events to destroy these perceptions. We said, “we want to be public employees”.²³⁵

With their public declaration in front of the Turkish Employment Agency (tr. İŞKUR), Buse Kılıçkaya and her friends “confused” many people, including the policemen who formed a barricade between the building and these applicants, as if they would attack the building.²³⁶ Despite the fact that the Agency never responded to any of their applications, they were keen to register for the preparatory courses that the Agency opened. They were sufficiently motivated, such that one of them managed to be the first-ranking student of a course program, however she was not offered a job in return. No transparent mechanism has been established whatsoever to prevent identity-based discrimination in job interviews. However, after being

²³⁵ “Merhaba,” *Pembe Hayat*, no. 2 (March 2007): 1.

²³⁶ Buse Kılıçkaya, “3 Mart Dünya Seks İşçileri Günü,” *Lubunya* 5 (March 1, 2010): p18.

accepted for a job in the public sector, some LGBT people could negotiate the conditions in which they worked. This part explores some interactions between the claims—notably the identitarian, meritocratic and secretive claims, based on which some visible representations of LGBT have been negotiated in the public sector.

Before proceeding to discuss, I shall question who would be eligible to negotiate the borders of tolerance. Simply put, those whom the authority marks as LGBT at first glance may lose their opportunity to negotiate. Aiming to understand the experience of LGBT public officers, a recent (2017) survey of Kaos-GL could reach only five transgender people in a sample of 80 LGBT people.²³⁷ Transgender individuals' low chance to be employed in the public sector should be relevant to the uncontrollable visibility of some images—e.g. related to one's physical appearance, voice, medical records or identity card—which, in the eyes of the authorities, tend to represent an indefensibly “unstable” and “promiscuous” personality, hence “immorality”. Commonly, the very few trans respondents to the annually conducted Kaos-GL surveys mentioned their fear of being noticed in the office. A teacher worries, “the information about my previous identity may be disclosed anytime soon”. A career employee recalls how his colleagues always made fun of transgender people: “I don't know what may happen if they notice that I am a trans”.²³⁸

In terms of managing the appearances of the self and the other, the public sector has turned out to be the theater for a set of authoritative claims. Though these claims have some oblique points of intersection that the following parts shall hint, they may be differentiated basically as follows: 1) the identitarian claim—i.e. those whose identity threatens the “public morals” (tr. genel ahlak) should be dismissed, as s/he will sooner or later toxify the workplace;

²³⁷ “Türkiye’de Kamu Çalışanı Lezbiyen, Gey, Biseksüel, Trans ve İntersekslerin Durumu” (Kaos GL Derneği, February 10, 2018), <http://www.kaosgldernegi.org/yayindetay.php?id=207>.

²³⁸ “Türkiye’de Kamu Çalışanı Lezbiyen, Gey, Biseksüel, Trans ve İntersekslerin Durumu.”, p24.

2) the meritocratic claim—i.e. one who likes one’s country most is the one who does one’s job best (popularly phrased in tr. “vatanını en çok seven işini en iyi yapandır”); 3) the secretive claim—i.e. those who do not offend the eye must not be cherry-picked. Depending on the conversational settings (e.g. a legal dispute, an administrative conflict, an ordinary chat) as well as the cultural resources of the interacting parties, any of these basic categories may prevail over the others.

I argue, however, that the identitarian claim has recently lost ground in legal interpretations concerning the visibility of LGBT identity, whereas the meritocratic and the secretive claims tend to prevail in accordance with these interpretations. Accordingly, the recent court decisions have made it clear that an employee cannot be dismissed on the basis of one’s sexual orientation. That said, they have ruled that one’s dismissal can be legally justified if s/he had an administrative (disciplinary) punishment for a sexual activity with negative repercussions on one’s work. In short, “being LGBT” is no longer regarded as a sufficient reason for dismissal, but “acting as LGBT” may well be considered a reason. Aware of this nuance, some administrations have re-operationalized their disciplinary precautions regarding LGBT employees (e.g. imposing fines under the label of disorderly activity instead of sexual orientation), so that they can circumvent the new legal constraints against discrimination.

To begin with, some recent court proceedings suggest that the identitarian claim has lost some of its power. For example, the law on elementary and middle school teachers, dating back to 1930, was revised in 2014 by the Council of State in an unprecedented way. This law stipulates that any teacher should be dismissed in cases of “unchastity” (tr. iffetsizlik), irrespective of whether it appears at school.²³⁹ The law remains a reference-point behind the

²³⁹ “İlk ve Orta Tedrisat Muallimleri Hakkında 1/631 Numaralı Kanunun Lahiyası [...]” (TBMM, May 14, 1930), No.243, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d03/c020/tbmm03020074ss0243.pdf>, p23, articles 26-27.

dismissal of many teachers, including some of those who were reported as LGBT. In 2014, a teacher who was dismissed from their teaching position due to their sexual orientation won a lawsuit in the 12th Chamber of the Council of State. In its reasoning, the court refused to focus on the teacher's sexual orientation or private sexual activity. Instead, it questioned whether the teacher's sexual orientation interfered with his work. In this vein, what it scrutinized was the teacher's activity, firstly at school and secondly in the off-hours with one's students. On the basis that there was no such evidence against the teacher, the court argued that the administrative action and the local court decision violated the principle of respect for family and private life.²⁴⁰

Moreover, other cases from the same period, including even those in which the courts made their decisions in favor of a dismissal, suggest that the meritocratic claim has begun to override the identitarian take on the visible representations of LGBT. Back in 2006, the administrative court approved the dismissal of a gay worker. However, the court made it explicit in its reasoning that the worker was dismissed not for his sexual orientation, but for reflecting his sexual activity in his work in a manner that negatively affected the latter.²⁴¹ Similarly, an investigation was opened against an allegedly gay professor at the Tunceli University on account that he had homosexual intercourse with some of his students in exchange for higher grades. With an official declaration, Tunceli Education and Science Workers' Union (tr. Eğitim-Sen) summarized the basis of the investigation as the professor's exploitation of the hierarchical relationship between him and his students.²⁴²

²⁴⁰ No. 2014/7169 (Danıştay 12. Daire October 7, 2014), <http://kazanci.com.tr/gunluk/12d-2011-750.htm>.

²⁴¹ Oya Aydın, "Eşcinsel Olma' İştten Haklı Çıkarma Sebebi Değil," *Bianet.org*, 21 Oct 2006, <https://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/86816-calisma-hayatinda-escinsellik>.

²⁴² "Universiteyi Karıştıran İddia!," *Habertürk*, July 25, 2014, <https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/973970-universiteyi-karistiran-iddia>.

Also running contrary to the identitarian claim, the Constitutional Court recently ruled that hate speeches include labelling any sexual orientation as “perversion”.²⁴³ In certain court decisions, “sexual orientation” has been explicitly mentioned among the grounds to be protected against discrimination.²⁴⁴ These arguments were based on a wide array of national and international sources, such as the fundamental principles of the Constitution of 1982 (i.e. Articles 10, 13, 20), European Convention on Human Rights (i.e. Articles 8, 14), more than 50 ECtHR decisions concerning “sexual orientation”, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (i.e. Articles 2, 26), the interpretations of the UN Human Rights Council, and the general comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (i.e. Comments 14, 15, 18).

Despite these court decisions that in principle stand against discrimination based on LGBT status, to breach the secretive claim risks poisoning relations at a workplace in a manner that ends up bypassing the above-mentioned legal constraints. For example, given that the courts reject the cases based merely on the identitarian claim, some LGBT-hostile administrations began re-framing their arguments around incidents. Therefore, most of the ongoing cases, such as that of the soldiers who were dismissed from the military due to being involved in “unnatural sexual intercourse” (tr. gayri tabii mukarenet),²⁴⁵ the 4 municipal workers who were fired for having homosexual intercourse in their off-hours,²⁴⁶ and the 2 workers who were dismissed from their positions at the credit and dormitories institution,²⁴⁷

²⁴³ Sinem Hun, No. 2013/5356 (Anayasa Mahkemesi May 8, 2014), <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2013/5356>, p7.

²⁴⁴ Ahmet Şancı, No. 2012/29 (Anayasa Mahkemesi November 5, 2014).
Sahin Karaman, No. 2012/1205 (Anayasa Mahkemesi May 8, 2014).

Mehmet Fatih Yiğit ve Diğerleri, No. 2014/16838 (Anayasa Mahkemesi September 9, 2015).

²⁴⁵ “AYM’den ‘eşcinsel asker’ kararı,” NTV, February 20, 2018, https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/aymden-escinsel-askerin-tskdan-atilmasiyla-ilgili-karar,FzEG85_0sUawDxAKKS_vXg.

²⁴⁶ “Eşcinsel ilişki yaşayan çöpcüler[...],” Internethaber.com, October 22, 2018, <https://www.internethaber.com/escinsel-iliski-yasayan-copculer-hakimi-gorunce-bakin-ne-dedi-1912832h.htm>.

²⁴⁷ “Gerekçe Eşcinsel İlişki; Kamu Kurumu, Çalışanını İşten Çıkardı!,” T24, January 3, 2017, <https://t24.com.tr/haber/gerekce-escinsel-iliski-kamu-kurumu-calisanini-isten-cikardi,380927>.

have all been based on incidents (e.g. acting as LGBT) instead of identities (e.g. being LGBT). In short, the secretive claim is based on the bargain that one can work as a lesbian, gay, bisexual or transsexual person, as long as s/he does not get caught ‘in action’.

In this vein, a teacher who offered homosexual intercourse to the janitor of the same school was fired due to his “unchastity”. Upon the teacher’s application, the Constitutional Court concluded that he could not return to the teaching position, because he was documented by the school administration while “carelessly” (tr. “özenli sayılamayacak şekilde”) publicizing the elements of his sexual life.²⁴⁸ In another case, a police officer was first fined and then fired due to the uncovering of his sexual orientation which, contrary to the above-mentioned teacher, he did not publicize himself. His account of the disciplinary fine imposed on him was as follows:

The inspectors told me, “we know that homosexuality does not happen after birth. Allah created you this way²⁴⁹ [...] [But] we will downgrade you [...] Otherwise, some people might try to dismiss you later. We make this endeavor for you.” [They said it] but this is a sham fight [tr. danişıklı dövüş]. The same things happened to all the friends who have been dismissed.²⁵⁰

The officer was not fired straightforwardly, since in this case the court may have returned him to his former position due to his clear disciplinary record. Instead, before dismissing him, the inspectors penalized him on the basis that his gayness became an action antithetical to the rules of “chastity”. On this ground, his application to the administrative court was also rejected. In these two decisions, the courts explicitly concluded that the teaching and law enforcement institutions require more strict limitations on the privacy of employees.

²⁴⁸ Z. A., No. 2013/2928 (Anayasa Mahkemesi October 18, 2017), <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/Basvurular/tr/pdf/2013-2928.pdf>, p12 (no.74).

²⁴⁹ The inspector made this argument, because the gay police officer was well-known for his religious personality.

²⁵⁰ Burcu Karakas, “‘Beni İfşa Etiler, Allah Da Onların Açıklarını İfşa Etsin,’” *Milliyet*, March 9, 2014, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-beni-ifsa-ettiler-allah-da/pazar/haberdetay/09.03.2014/1848624/default.htm>.

Due to the fact that reporting another's sexual activity may easily lead to that person's dismissal, surveillance has become an instrument among the rival political factions at these institutions. In 2010, numerous unsigned reports were submitted against a group of students of the Naval Academy. According to these reports, a group of students had engaged in homosexual activity, which the Commander of the Academy, Türker Ertürk, refused to investigate.²⁵¹ These reports were made public at a time when the military institutions were under the heavy pressure from politically driven legal cases, namely *Ergenekon* and *Sledgehammer*. Within this context, the reports and some related private documents were publicized by media channels of the then pro-investigation coalition, *Akit's Habervaktim* and the Gülen Movement's *Zaman* Website,²⁵² which commonly argued that the military should be purified from these 'immoral', 'pro-coup', 'irreligious' groups. Some years later, Türker Ertürk explained how he protected his students, ironically on *Akit TV* which had itself accused Ertürk in this case. Ertürk's explanation was as follows:

After we checked these students' academic and social standings, we noticed that they were our best students [...] the aim [of the reporters] was clear: it was a purge [led by the Gülenists].²⁵³

Ertürk underlined that they fired a student who was involved in homosexual activity. However, based on the reports that it was not an individual case, but one that related to a whole group of 40 students, Ertürk did not allow the investigation to be broadened: "I will not ask, and I will not let anyone ask that kind of a question to my students".

²⁵¹ Ali Daglar, "Bizde gay yok," *Hürriyet*, August 14, 2010, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/bizde-gay-yok-15552210>.

Fatih Akkaya, "Peki Bu Ne?," *Habervaktim*, August 14, 2010, <https://www.habervaktim.com/haber/136514/peki-bu-ne.html>.

²⁵² "LGBT Örgütleri Vakit Hakkında Suç Duyurusu Yaptı," *Bianet*, April 16, 2010, <https://www.bianet.org/bianet/toplumsal-cinsiyet/121376-lgbt-orgutleri-vakit-hakkinda-suc-duyurusu-yapti>.

²⁵³ Ankebut Sayfası, *Akit TV, Fetö ve Güncel Konular*. (E. Tuğamiral Türker Ertürk, Yusuf Ozan Demir, Muharrem Çoşkun), accessed February 18, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xIM-f-5RnZM>, min22.00-28.00.

What ultimately determines the repercussions of such sexual identities, orientations or behaviors is the dialogue between administrators and employees. During a conference on the limits of LGBT visibility, a public employee at the Ministry of Culture illustrated her experience of openly sharing her sexual orientation with her colleagues: “everybody remained silent, and the subject was never opened again”.²⁵⁴ Depending on one’s take on this dialogue, the attitude of the colleagues was either non-recognition, or tolerance by means of ignoring. In any case, it was less troubling than facing dismissal. At least, those like Mine who, sometime in the mid-1990s, lost her accountancy job due to her lesbian identity make this argument: “when I look at the situation now, [I think] the ones [that came after us] are so comfortable”.²⁵⁵

In conclusion, the LGBT-hostile identitarian claim has lost some ground in legal interpretations, whereas the courts continue to rely on administrative disciplinary actions to measure the potentially negative impact of one’s sexual activity on one’s work. Therefore, depending on the branch of the public sector in which they work and the communicative possibilities they have, the public employees align their merit-based and secretive qualities differently. In the next part, I will examine how the visibility of LGBT identity has been negotiated in the entertainment sector. It is not only the sector that has traditionally been the most tolerant of all towards LGBT employees, but also the sector that clearly demonstrates how LGBT people may clash with one another in terms of approaching an authoritative claim.

²⁵⁴ *Kadın Olma Halleri* (Ankara: Kaos GL, 2009), p28.

²⁵⁵ “Ve Hayat Akıp Giderken: Mine,” in *90’larda Lubunya Olmak* (İzmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2013), p48-49.

5.3. Exploratory Conversations (II): The Visible Representations of the Entertainer

This part analyzes the contemporary cases of (in)tolerance within the landscape of the entertainment sector. As AKP gradually dominated the authoritative institutions of the sector, many commentators argued that this domination on the part of “Islamists” would lead to some unprecedentedly severe restrictions against LGBT people. This part suggests that this argument needs refinement. Accordingly, I argue that the AKP government tends to restrict only the visible representations of LGBT it found to be critical of its political establishment. These critical visible representations primarily consisted of the ‘flag-carriers’ of LGBT, who followed an explicit politics of recognition that consciously challenged the hierarchical implications of tolerance. On the other hand, those others who personalized or ‘theatrically’ obscured their visible representations of LGBT were able to combine the tolerance of the authoritative institutions with a unique politics of recognition, albeit limited with their individual identities. However, they could find a balance between tolerance and recognition only by means of negotiating periodically re-adjusted prerequisites of tolerance with the authority.

Firstly, I will elaborate on the difference between the concerts of the Boston Gay Men’s Chorus and Elton John. Whereas the former was interfered as a result of an organized culturalist campaign, the latter passed off pretty much unremarkably. In this context, I will demonstrate how the selective perception of the authority relies on the explicit discourse of the other. Then, I will examine how the personalized or ‘theatrically’ obscured visible representations of LGBT have been settled in the sector as the ‘tolerable’ ones. Accordingly, by contrasting the differences between the visibilities of *Fatih Ürek*, *Huysuz Virjin*, *VJ Bülent*, *Kerimcan Durmaz*, *Nil Makaracı* and the *Avlu TV* series *among others*, I will distinguish between voices that are openly critical of the establishment of the authoritative institutions, versus the voices that send subtly critical or explicitly laudatory messages to these institutions.

5.3.1. *Boston Gay Men's Chorus versus Elton John*

To begin with, I take the Istanbul concert of Boston Gay Men's Chorus as a key example of the distinction between the 'intolerable' and the 'tolerable' visible representations of LGBT identity. In response to the Chorus which declared itself as "the first gay chorus to perform across the Middle East",²⁵⁶ some newspapers, such as *Yeni Şafak*, *Yeni Akit* and *Vahdet*, launched a campaign against the event. The campaign underlined that the program contradicts with the "values", "history" and the "culture" of the society. On this basis, it would be provocative in "a Muslim country", especially "during the month of Ramadan".²⁵⁷ The problem for *Group Zorlu*, the organizer of the concert, was its reputation in the watchful eyes of the Erdoğan government, as it relied on the government for the bulk of its businesses. As a result, Zorlu contacted the Chorus to inform them about some new conditions. According to these conditions, which the Chorus later publicized, the concert was not to take place during Ramadan. Moreover, the Chorus would have to drop "Gay" from its title.²⁵⁸

At the very least because "Boston Men's Chorus" would not sound as amazing, the Chorus members refused these conditions. Eventually, Zorlu terminated the contract at the expense of a significant amount of compensation. Later, the Chorus accepted another invitation, which came from Boğaziçi University LGBTI Group, for a free concert on the day on which the Zorlu concert had initially been scheduled. Although the financial supporter of this "immoral" activity was searched for by the likes of Director Ihsan Karaman of Medeniyet

²⁵⁶ "2015 Middle East Tour," Boston Gay Men's Chorus, January 7, 2015, <https://www.bgmc.org/2015/07/01/2015-middle-east-tour>.

²⁵⁷ "PSM'deki Boston Gay Men's Chorus Konseri İptal Edilsin," Change.org, 2015, <https://www.change.org/p/e%C5%9Ffinselli%C4%9Fi-me%C5%9Frula%C5%9Ft%C4%B1rmak-ve-yaymak-i%C3%A7in-yap%C4%B1lacak-27-haziran-20-00da-zorlu-psm-deki-boston-gay-men-s-chorus-konseri-iptal-edilsin%20%E2%80%93%20http://www.yenisafak.com/hayat/zorludaki-gay-konseri-iptal-edildi-2135248>.

²⁵⁸ "İptal Edilen Boston Gay Korosu Konserinin Perde Arkası," Diken, October 19, 2015, <http://www.diken.com.tr/zorlunun-iptal-ettigi-boston-gay-korusu-konserinin-perde-arkasi-erdogan-boyle-istedi/>.

University,²⁵⁹ it was clarified that the organization was made possible by the compensation fee Zorlu would have to pay. The next address of İhsan Karaman, also known as the son of theology professor Hayrettin Karaman, was to the followers of Boğaziçi University: “say NO to the gay concert at Boğaziçi!”²⁶⁰

A group of students from Boğaziçi University made a declaration after Karaman’s address. Having made the argument that Islam forbids interference with anyone’s privacy, they described what they opposed as the visibility of the Chorus in “the public space”.²⁶¹ With a similar claim on the public space, Karaman stressed that he did not intend to target any gay individual in their privacy: “personally, I can only pray for them to recover from this disease”.²⁶² In response, Madır Öktiş and Beren Aziz, two members of the Boğaziçi LGBTI Group refused to stay behind closed doors: “At school, at business, at Parliament: we will be everywhere.” Eventually, the concert took place. However, because it happened without an explicit rationalization of tolerance, it did not give comfort to potential organizers of future similar events.

A key question that appears in this context is what kind of organizations may be deemed ‘similar’ to this one. Clearly, the selective perception of the pro-cancellation campaign was based on its obsession with the label “gay” as a standalone marker of collective identity. Just as the authorities have been unexceptionally intolerant concerning the appearance of LGBT

²⁵⁹ “M. İHSAN KARAMAN on Twitter: ‘Boğaziçi Üniversitesinde ÜCRETSİZ gay korusu konseri! Bu rezaletin arkasındaki ahlak düşmanları açıklanmalı! Gaylerin sponsoru KİM?,’” Twitter, June 13, 2015, <https://twitter.com/mikaraman/status/609739080092491776>.

²⁶⁰ “M. İHSAN KARAMAN on Twitter: ‘@boun_otk nin binlerce takipçisinin,eşcinselliği meşru ve sevimli gösterme oyunlarına tepkisini bekliyoruz!Boğaziçi’nde gay konserine HAYIR!,’” Twitter, June 14, 2015, <https://twitter.com/mikaraman/status/610060099512627200>.

²⁶¹ “Boğaziçi’li Öğrencilerden Sapkın Gruba Protesto,” Hayder.org.tr, June 2015, <http://www.hayder.org.tr/bogazicili-ogrencilerden-sapkin-gruba-protesto-2729-haber.html>.

²⁶² “Boğaziçi, sapkın gruba kucak açtı,” *Yeni Akit*, June 19, 2015, <https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/bogazici-sapkin-gruba-kucak-acti-75529.html>.

flags on Taksim Square—i.e. “the heart of Istanbul”²⁶³, they considered the marker “gay” to be existentially dangerous for the ascendancy of their social norms. On the flip side, due to this selective perception, they did not pay attention to previous events of well-known gay artists, such as Elton John and George Michael, as these artists did not appear only and explicitly as “gay” in their announcements. At least by not carrying a flag in the name of LGBT, many well-known Turkish LGBT people, from fashion designer Cemil Ipekçi to ‘trans diva’ Bülent Ersoy, have already secured their places in the entertainment sector.

For the very same reason, the authorities did not pay attention to the broadcasting of the TV series, *Avlu*, which was in fact adapted from the popular American web-TV series, *Orange is the New Black*, exploring *inter alia* lesbian relationships in a women’s prison. However, actress Nil Makaracı was dismissed from the project by the time she, as a self-declared lesbian, explicitly marked the series as an LGBT-friendly one. After her dismissal, Makaracı reported what she was told by the producer:

They say, “you talked to the LGBTs, shared photos [and] wrote something about lesbianness. I told you not to talk about this matter.”²⁶⁴

According to Makaracı, the markers of LGBT were already apparent in the project, from the short hairs of the characters, to the selection of a women’s prison as the main place where the story takes place.²⁶⁵ However, in this argument, she clearly failed to distinguish between producing an explicit discourse and putting on display some images with implicit meanings. The latter remains obscure, fluid and unfinalizable, as it appears without a clear sub-text.

²⁶³ see “Bülent Arıncı: ‘Güpegündüz çırlıçıplak hale gelip...,’” CNN Türk, July 2, 2015, <https://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/bulent-arinc-gupegunduz-cirilciplak-hale-gelip>.

²⁶⁴ Ruya Salik, “Nil Makaracı, Cinsel Yönelimi Sebebiyle Diziden Kovulduğunu İddia Etti,” *Milliyet molatik*, March 23, 2018, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Nil-Makaraci--cinsel-yoneliimi-sebebiyle-diziden-kovulduğunu-iddia-etti-molatik-7390/>.

²⁶⁵ #Özgürüz, *Nil Makaracı: Demet Evgar Beni Susturmaya Çalıştı*, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3F--pj_VIV0.

These cases shed light on the reason behind the problematization of the concert of Boston Gay Men’s Chorus. What triggered the reaction was not that the Chorus consisted of gay people. In this particular case, the authoritative claim arose after it was declared—collectively by the official account of the Chorus and then the Turkish media—that a chorus with the word “gay” in its title would have its first concert, interchangeably in “the Muslim world” or “the Middle East”, at “the month of Ramadan”. These keywords denoted an intersubjectively shared remoteness—hence the common emphases placed on them. The conversation was not meant just to challenge an authority; but way before that moment, it was to consolidate some babble of voices into a semiotically coherent, self-conscious authority. In other words, it constructed an authority for the sake of these words.

5.3.2. *‘Theatrically’ Obscured Visible Representation of LGBT*

Turkey has had many trans artists who were labelled “the first trans star”. This is because on the one hand it is always sensational to be the “first” in the sector, and on the other hand their sexual identities were somehow re-adjusted in the course of their careers. Contrary to the experience of Boston Gay Men’s Chorus, the entertainment sector represents more of a landscape of tolerance than any other. Accordingly, the most tolerable visible representations of LGBT identity appear as singers, makeup models, dancers, showmen, publicity agents or fashion-designers. Those professions, a primary aim of which is to entertain customers, have been considered “gay jobs”. Therefore, the entertainment sector remains ideal for LGBT people who settled for this stereotyped visible representation. However, in order maintain their positions as the objects of tolerance, these entertainers must re-adjust their performances periodically according to the authoritative feedback they receive. Recently, some of them have begun to refuse to comply with some of the commands, whereas the other ‘great pretenders’ continue to dance with authority.

After many years of stereotypically ‘feminine’ performance (e.g. low-neck, slim-fit and transparent dresses, a stereotypically feminine body posture and hand gestures), Fatih Ürek appeared in his next project as a stereotypical ‘masculine’ man (e.g. formal suit and full-beard in a macho posture) who apparently becomes bored with “geisha” women’s submissive attitudes.²⁶⁶ Çiğdem Sonkurt, his image-maker for this project, stated that the main idea was proposed by Ürek himself. According to Ürek, all these appearances meant nothing other than different theatrical roles, which he undertook based on “customers’ demands”.

On the flip side, even in this moment of ‘masculine’ performance, he did not hesitate to associate his appearance with those whom one may describe as ‘gay artists’: “they say I look like Elton John.”²⁶⁷ Ürek’s visibility relied on this obscure depiction of his identity, which he often revealed but never decisively confirmed. In return, the authority pretended not to see what it already knows about Ürek’s previous visible representations.

Some complementary sources from this period suggest that Ürek was negotiating his visibility with Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) and the state-led Turkish Radio Television (TRT). To begin with, the time-period in which he changed his appearance was also one in which RTÜK began fining some popular TV programs more heavily for the appearance of their participants. This was especially the case for programs that included “bad” role-models for children—e.g. those that did not fit some heteronormative codes—which were targeted by RTÜK. For example, in 2007, Seyfi Dursunoğlu’s seasoned performances as a *zenne*²⁶⁸ (en. drag-queen), named *Huysuz Virjin*, were eventually removed from TV on the basis that he was

²⁶⁶ “Fatih Ürek’i erkeksileştiren modacı,” Habertürk, August 2, 2009, <https://www.haberturk.com/haber/haber/162638-fatih-urekierkeksilestiren-modaci>.

²⁶⁷ “En harbi erkek, Fatih Ürek!,” Medyafaresi.com, September 9, 2008, <http://www.medyafaresi.com/haber/en-harbi-erkek-fatih-urek-iste-unlu-sarkicinin-yeni-sakalli/17351>.

²⁶⁸ Some defined his performances as that of a travesti instead of a *zenne*, given the alternative interpretation that a *zenne* is a man whose ‘masculine’ appearance is not supposed to be fully hidden in a ‘feminine’ posture.

wearing women's clothes and making obscene jokes.²⁶⁹ In the following years, in order to take part in advertisements he was supposed to act as *Seyfi* instead of *Huysuz*.²⁷⁰ In 2008, the singer Aydın (also known as Kuşum Aydın), who was known for his 'feminine' acts very similar to those of Fatih Ürek, had to end his TV program as well.²⁷¹ Meanwhile, actor Tuğrul Tülek declared that he was fired from his position at TRT's channel for children, *TRT Çocuk*, on the basis that he acted as "a gay man" in a TV series at *Kanal D*.²⁷²

Similarly, the famous video jockey of *Kral TV*, VJ Bülent, was fired arguably because he did not follow the "advice" of the managers to grow a beard so as to hide his sexual orientation. He later declared that he sacrificed his job so that he could keep his free-will: "probably I am hairier than everybody else, but I had to tell [them] that I have no beard".²⁷³ Within this broader context of pressure, Ürek questioned, during a conversation on *Star TV*, why *TRT* was not showing his activities either:

I do not understand why I do not appear on TRT. I want to know which standards I do not fit into. [I want to know] why they think I am dangerous [...] I work in this country, I pay my taxes!²⁷⁴

Contrary to VJ Bülent, Ürek looked for the authority to negotiate its rules of appropriateness with him. By wearing a veil of ignorance, Ürek made clear that he did not intend to challenge the authority, but to learn the conditions under which it would tolerate his visibility.

²⁶⁹ "RTÜK'ten 'Huysuz Virjin'e darbe," Haber7, November 2, 2007,

<http://www.haber7.com/medya/haber/277922-rtukten-huysuz-virjine-darbe>.

²⁷⁰ Ali Eyuboglu, "RTÜK, Huysuz Virjin'i Nasıl Seyfi Bey Yaptı?," *Milliyet*, November 2, 2007,

<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/rtuk--huysuz-virjin-i-nasil-seyfi-bey-yapti--magazin-966926/>.

²⁷¹ Armagan Caglayan, "Benim Gibi Ahlaklısı Var Mı?," *Radikal*, June 21, 2015,

https://www.medyatava.com/haber/kusum-aydin-seninle-program-yaparsam-kanalim-kapanir-dediler_125777.

²⁷² "'Gay' karakteri oynadı, TRT'den atıldı," *Radikal*, June 12, 2010,

http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/gay_karakter_i_oynadi_trtden_atildi-1002197/.

²⁷³ Helin Avsar, "Cinsel tercihim yüzünden kovuldum," *Habertürk*, December 6, 2009,

<https://www.haberturk.com/medya/haber/191140-cinsel-tercihim-yuzunden-kovuldum>.

²⁷⁴ "Fatih Ürek çok kırgın," *Mynet Haber*, August 4, 2009, <https://www.mynet.com/fatih-urek-cok-kirgin-110100463626>.

By the same token, Fatih Ürek could continue to take part in the traditional mass media by keeping an eye on the periodically re-negotiated limits, unlike Seyfi Dursunoğlu, who, as an artist that already “hung up his boots”,²⁷⁵ continued to criticize the authoritative claims on his appearance. In 2018, with his popular TV show on *Kanal D*, Ürek won the best morning-show award in the 45th *Pantene Golden Butterfly Awards*. Meanwhile, he managed to carry on with the fluidity of his performative acts.

He kept moving back and forth between ‘gay’ and ‘masculine’ men—or maybe some altogether different social-types which the narrow-minded observers missed. In this period, some commentators tried to understand why Ürek was occasionally returning to his ‘garish’ femininity.²⁷⁶ Before everyone else, one of the first image-makers behind Ürek’s masculine appearance commented on his unstoppable shifts: “I do not understand why he returned to his previous appearance”.²⁷⁷ A commentator, Melis Alphan expressed this confusion with a question: “does everybody eventually return to one’s essence?”²⁷⁸

Contrary to the wording of this question, Ürek’s activity clearly conveyed the message that gender is not a matter of essence, but as Bayramoğlu read through Judith Butler’s terms, an imitation of the enforced social conventions.²⁷⁹ Ürek’s approach to gender was very different to that of, for example, Rüzgar Erkoçlar who had sex reassignment surgery after attaining popularity as a woman actress. As opposed to Ürek’s continuously fluid gender performances, Erkoçlar straightforwardly embraced a stereotypical man’s vocabulary after his sex

²⁷⁵ Ece Ulusum, “Beyaz saçlı Huysuz Virjin!,” *Habertürk*, April 14, 2016, <https://www.haberturk.com/magazin/roportajlar/haber/1225977-seyfi-dursun-hayatim-cok-guzel-gecti-diyemiyorum>.

²⁷⁶ “Fatih Ürek imajını da değiştirdi,” *Ensonhaber*, July 15, 2015, <https://www.ensonhaber.com/fatih-urek-imajini-da-degistirdi-2015-07-15.html>.

²⁷⁷ “Fatih neden eski haline döndü anlamadım,” *Habertürk*, October 7, 2008, <https://www.haberturk.com/haber/haber/105054-fatih-neden-eski-haline-dondu-anlamadim>.

²⁷⁸ Melis Alphan, “Değişim (Fatih Ürek),” *Hürriyet Kelebek*, June 22, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kelebek/magazin/degisim-fatih-urek-40120829>.

²⁷⁹ Yener Bayramoğlu, “Fatih Ürek ve Aydın’ın Cinsiyet Performansı,” *Bianet*, July 11, 2009, <http://www.bianet.org/biamag/toplumsal-cinsiyet/115785-fatih-urek-ve-aydin-in-cinsiyet-performansi>.

reassignment—e.g. “one should not trust women”.²⁸⁰ Even though Ürek’s “gay” identity has clearly been well-known, his visible representation remains fluid, such that he publicizes his desire to be a “father”, and in the following speech act he describes his identity as “asexual” and “nongendered”.²⁸¹

Although like Ürek, Aydın tried to perform “the masculine man” in some of his newer projects, he had to end his TV career. Instead of the intolerance of any cultural claim-owner however, this outcome was primarily due to Aydın’s gradually decreased ‘market value’. Some years after abandoning TV channels, he declared the main reason behind his retirement: “two of my shows have been cancelled, because my face was deformed” due to an allergy developed in the aftermath of facial filling.²⁸² His new appearance was not appreciated by his followers in the entertainment sector.

Although meeting the conditions of tolerance seems to be a necessary condition to enter the market, it is not a sufficient condition to succeed in it. In this case, the cultural authority acts as the sieve, which one should pass through before facing the authority of the market. On the flip side, the actors have to align what may attract the attention of a target population with the cultural boundary of tolerable attractions.

5.3.3. *The Authoritative Institutions of Market and Culture: The Case of Acun Ilıcalı*

This relationship between authoritative claims put forward in the name of culture and market often brought the gate-keepers of these fields together. In the entertainment sector, Acun Ilıcalı, the owner of the relatively new “entertainment TV” named TV8, and the most steadily rising media icon of the AKP-era, coupled his success in getting high ratings with his special

²⁸⁰ “Rüzgar Erkoçlar: ‘Kadına Güvenilmez’ - Magazin Haberleri,” *Sözcü*, March 15, 2017, <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/hayatim/magazin-haberleri/ruzgar-erkoclar-kadina-guvenilmez/>.

²⁸¹ “Fatih Ürek’ten ‘cinsiyet’ açıklaması,” *Habertürk*, August 15, 2016, <https://www.haberturk.com/magazin/fiskos/haber/1282101-fatih-urekten-cinsiyet-aciklamasi>.

²⁸² “Kuşum Aydın: Televizyon kariyerim bitti,” *CNN Türk*, October 17, 2018, <https://www.cnnturk.com/magazin/kusum-aydin-televizyon-kariyerim-bitti>.

ties with Erdoğan. In a university panel, Ilıcalı declared that he votes for Erdoğan, which he recalled later: “I told it because I am a sincere person [tr. içi dışı bir]”.²⁸³ Ilıcalı described his relationship with Erdoğan as a personal one rather than a political one:

He likes me a lot. I like him a lot too [...] we see each other a few times a year. I sometimes ask for his opinion”.²⁸⁴

Exceptionally, TV8 stopped its dance show on the day President Erdoğan’s mother Tenzile Erdoğan passed away.

Questioned on the matter, Ilıcalı argued that he did not get any reward for being close to Erdoğan. In reaction, he emphasized that TV8 stands at the top in terms of RTÜK’s fines: “they treat all TV channels equally”.²⁸⁵ As a matter of fact, TV8 was heavily fined by RTÜK due to the clothes of a group of children who participated in the above-mentioned dance show. The TV was also fined for the appearance of a belly-dancer right after a whirling dervish, due to the sequence’s “incompatibility with the values of the society”.²⁸⁶ For the same reason, the talent show of TV8 was fined because of a participant’s use of the phrase “Allah Baba” (en. God the Father).²⁸⁷

In his defense, however, Ilıcalı missed the key point that the symbolic significance of RTÜK does not lie in the amount of its fines, but in its claim of legitimacy behind these fines. Ilıcalı never put into doubt RTÜK’s legitimacy, but for the sake of high ratings, he *mistakenly* breached RTÜK’s rules on an occasional basis. Being treated “equally”, he readily complied with these imposed rules of appropriateness. Previously, when Ilıcalı’s show on STAR TV was

²⁸³ CNN Türk, *Acun Ilıcalı’dan Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan Sorusuna Cevap*, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8rBeK0Hjqus>.

²⁸⁴ “Acun Ilıcalı eleştirilere cevap verdi!,” Habertürk, October 29, 2011, <https://www.haberturk.com/medya/haber/683643-acun-ilicali-elestirilere-cevap-verdi>, par6-7.

²⁸⁵ CNN Türk, *Acun Ilıcalı’dan Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan Sorusuna Cevap*.

²⁸⁶ “Acun Ilıcalı’ya dansöz şoku,” *Yenisöz Gazetesi*, May 21, 2016.

²⁸⁷ “RTÜK’ten TV8’e 1 milyon lira ‘Allah Baba’ cezası,” Evrensel.net, February 1, 2018, <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/344601/rtukten-tv8e-1-milyon-lira-allah-baba-cezasi>.

fined, he reportedly visited RTÜK to negotiate the decision with the board members.²⁸⁸ As an openly pro-Erdoğan TV programmer who appreciates President’s opinions on the matter, he stressed that they—i.e. the producers—should take into account “these rules” set by the regulatory institutions. In this vein, he was in agreement with the criticism that some dancers’ clothes were too “sexy” and “erotic” in the dance show on TV8: “I am going to consider this criticism. [We] should address people without pushing the boundaries”.²⁸⁹ Upon the question of why the music show on TV8 never included a Kurdish song, Ilıcalı admitted that they deliberately prevented it, since “our shows are centered on entertainment, and [therefore] they should be distanced to these controversial subjects”.²⁹⁰ Unlike other mass TV channels, Ilıcalı’s TV8 could escape such “controversial subjects” by not broadcasting any news whatsoever.

5.3.4. *Striving for Tolerance: The Case of Kerimcan Durmaz*

Having accepted the legitimacy behind “these boundaries”, Ilıcalı led several projects that included some visible representations of LGBT. Clearly, Ilıcalı has the ‘common sense’ that customers want to see LGBT people on their screens, but not as teachers, doctors, lawyers or police officers.²⁹¹ For example, since the establishment of the first private channels, trans people appeared on TV series predominantly in the form of hitchhiking sex workers.²⁹² As this ‘common sense’ allows, Kerimcan Durmaz, whose appearance clearly contradicts the heteronormative stereotypes about men (e.g. men’s distaste for eyebrow plucking, make-up and plastic surgery), turned out to be a popular figure as a jury member in the fashion show on TV8, named *This is My Style*. As of 2017, Durmaz not only reached more than 2 million Instagram

²⁸⁸ “Acun Rekor Cezadan Sonra Soluğu RTÜKte Aldı!,” *Posta*, December 9, 2013, <https://www.posta.com.tr/acun-rekor-cezadan-sonra-solugu-rtukte-aldi-207973>.

²⁸⁹ “Acun Ilıcalı eleştirilere cevap verdi!”, par14.

²⁹⁰ “Acun Ilıcalı eleştirilere cevap verdi!”, par15.

²⁹¹ see the conversation between Çağla Akalın, Esmeray, Didem Soylu and Buse Kılıçkaya: Aysun Oner, “Türkiye’de Trans Oyuncu Olmak,” *KAOS GL*, June 2018, 23-30, p25.

²⁹² see “Medyanın Lanetlileri: İlkin,” in *90’larda Lubunya Olmak* (İzmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2013), p267.

followers, but also began earning a monthly income of nearly 500 thousand Turkish Liras²⁹³— i.e. some ten times more than that of a senior engineer, which many members of a popular online forum comically pretended to be shocked about.²⁹⁴

Just like many other carriers of this identity in the entertainment sector, Durmaz was careful with the given boundaries. To appease the authorities, he re-adjusted his visibility several times in the course of his career. In this context, he stopped spreading the videos of his “twerk” dance, which he initially became famous for:

twerk is now [associated with] eroticism... I do not have such a life.²⁹⁵

When the interviewer asked what had changed in the meantime, Durmaz concluded that one must “get a grip on oneself in order to live in this country”,²⁹⁶ which may be an inappropriate statement to explicitly articulate. In this vein, Durmaz was constantly guided by his more experienced forerunners. For example, Fatih Ürek reproached Durmaz on account that he has not been careful enough in public: “I [repeatedly] tell him, ‘a few words that may come out of your mouth will sink you!’”²⁹⁷

After he was attacked by a mob in the city of Samsun, Durmaz was careful enough to avoid politicizing the attack as a matter of LGBT visibility. To begin with, he did not generalize the attack as a representation of “homophobia”, or any other concept prioritized in the repertoire of LGBT activism. Instead, following the incident, Durmaz disappeared for several weeks. In

²⁹³ “Kerimcan Durmaz’ın Aylık Kazancı Şaşırttı,” CNN Türk, November 27, 2017,

<https://www.cnnturk.com/magazin/kerimcan-durmazin-aylik-kazanci-sasirtti?page=2>.

²⁹⁴ The first of these posts: xxspecter, “kerimcan durmaz,” *ekşi sözlük*, October 24, 2018,

<https://eksisozluk.com/entry/82615385>.

²⁹⁵ Hakan Gence, “Tek rakibim Türk Hava Yolları!,” *Hürriyet Kelebek*, December 13, 2017,

<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kelebek/hurriyet-pazar/tek-rakibim-turk-hava-yollari-40672735>, par2.

²⁹⁶ Gence, “Tek rakibim Türk Hava Yolları!,” par3.

²⁹⁷ Tulay Demir Oktay, “Fatih Ürek: Kerimcan’ı ilk gördüğümde ‘Bu ne ya’ dedim,” *Hürriyet Kelebek*, November 6, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kelebek/magazin/fatih-urek-sanat-dunyasinda-kimse-bes-para-etmez-40635744>.

response to the speculation that Ilıcalı sacked him on the basis that he triggers public hatred by encouraging homosexuality,²⁹⁸ the producer of the show, Haluk Şirin, declared that neither TV8 nor he himself fired Durmaz. Şirin disclosed why Durmaz disappeared in the meantime:

I shall answer if Kerimcan Durmaz wants to appear on TV after this discriminatory and totally unjust act of violence: No, he does not!²⁹⁹

Finally, Durmaz declared that he moved to Milano for a couple of weeks in order to recover psychologically. In his declaration, he explained in his own words what hurt his mental health. He did not place the blame on the justice system, heteronormative social codes or the conservative identity of the inhabitants of the Black Sea region, but a group of aggressors' misrepresentation of some public values:

It seems nonsensical to me that I was attacked as a person who does not harm anybody, whereas all those child abusers and rapist scums are all around us. By the way, our legal process has started. I have faith in the justice [system] in our country. And I refer [those who attacked me] to Allah.³⁰⁰

In his later summary of the attack, Durmaz mentioned how some people were jealous of his success. Alongside his success, thanks in part to the depoliticizing way he handled this attack, he could keep up with his music and fashion shows at nightclubs and TVs.

However, as of the summer of 2019, Durmaz made a big mistake by pushing the wrong button and uploading his masturbation video on Instagram. Arguably, Fatih Ürek was right about his previous warnings. Durmaz was quick enough to declare that it was a grave mistake which taught him "the importance of the concept of family"³⁰¹. Although nobody understood

²⁹⁸ "Acun Ilıcalı, Kerimcan Durmaz'ı Kovdu! Peki Neden?," *televizyongazetesi.com*, December 4, 2016, <https://televizyongazetesi.com/acun-ilicali-kerimcan-durmazi-kovdu-peki-neden/89220>.

²⁹⁹ "Kerimcan Durmaz 'İşte Benim Stilim'den Kovuldu Mu?," *Milliyet*, December 7, 2016, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/kerimcan-durmaz-iste-benim-magazin-2357704/>.

³⁰⁰ "Kerimcan Durmaz Samsun'daki Saldırı Sonrasında İlk Kez Açıklama Yaptı," *Sözcü*, December 14, 2016, <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/hayatim/magazin-haberleri/kerimcan-durmaz-samsundaki-saldiri-sonrasinda-ilk-kez-aciklama-yapti/>.

³⁰¹ *Magazin Burada, Kerimcan Durmaz Skandal Videoyu Kabul Ederek Sessizliğini Bozdu*, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJLc_1E81tI.

what it was about the concept of family, this statement was yet another representation of Durmaz's conservatism.

5.4. Evaluative Conversations (I): Islamism's Implicit Tolerance

On the same day that the participants of the LGBT Pride Parade were tear-gassed by the police (i.e. 2016 Summer), President Tayyip Erdoğan and his wife Emine Erdoğan were to have a dinner with the famous “trans diva”, Bülent Ersoy. Undoubtedly, Bülent Ersoy had many different stories, statuses and identities, but it is this particular context which has led to the cherry-picking of her very well-known transgender background. Many have inferred a contradiction between, on the one hand the ideology of Erdoğan's political regime which interfered with an LGBT parade for the sake of “public decency”, and on the other hand Erdoğan's choice to share the same table with Ersoy during the *iftar* of a Ramadan day.

This choice on the part of Erdoğan was not necessarily an ideologically minded act in itself, unless the supporters of the LGBT parade ideologized it for their “Islamist” interlocutors. In this context, their questions relied on an intersubjectively shared sense of incompatibility. Clearly, the interlocutors share some sense of contradiction, since they are not ignorant of each other's ideological repertoires. On this matter, the repertoire of Islamism is so well-known, such that even the conductors of value-surveys have been afraid to ask questions on sexuality in “Islamic Societies”.³⁰² Before asking their interlocutors to explain what was different between Ersoy and the participants in the LGBT Pride parade, the critics surely knew that it was not unsurprising for a person who talk in the name of Islamism to perceive some incoherence in Bülent Ersoy's valued position within the government circles.

³⁰² see Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Here came the in-group contestations: when Ersoy wore a headscarf for her TV show's program on the Night of Destiny (tr. Kadir Gecesi),³⁰³ anchorman Erkan Tan of Beyaz TV reproached to "the religious and conservatives" from within their group:

This is really enough [...] [for] conservatives. I do not tell you to condemn [Ersoy], but at least do not applaud this! By applauding, you make it legitimate and reasonable [...] There is a verse in Quran about her situation, but neither does the Diyanet, nor do the leaders talk about it! I cannot believe it is only me who is saying these words.³⁰⁴

Ersoy's ties with the "conservative democratic" government were disputed several times in the media. However, Erdoğan has not stepped back. According to Erdoğan's speeches about Ersoy, she deserved to be cited as a role-model in response to the artists who participated in the Gezi Protests. Moreover, Ersoy was a religious conservative, who tries to perform her religious duties in a manner such that she could frequently attend the Ramadan meetings that the government organized.

While the dinner was being disputed by the opposition media channels, Erdoğan preferred not to talk about the matter. However, in order to rationalize Erdoğan's act, the hardline defenders of Erdoğan had to develop an account of this particular case. Mahmut Övür defended it as a sign that Erdoğan's Turkey would be "Everybody's Turkey".³⁰⁵ Daily Sabah, the English-speaking edition of Sabah, described Ersoy as "a symbol for the increased tolerance for LGBT figures in Turkey over the years".³⁰⁶ This explanation not only puzzled the participants in the parade, but also puzzled some of those pro-government ideologues that have been supporting Erdoğan for his religious conservatism. Among them, *Habervaktim*

³⁰³ i.e. the night when the verses of Quran were revealed to Prophet Muhammad.

³⁰⁴ Beyaz TV, *Erkan Tan'dan dindar ve muhafazakar kesime Bülent Ersoy çıkışı*, 2014, <http://beyazgazete.com/video/webtv/televizyon-40/erkan-tan-dan-dindar-ve-muhafazakar-kesime-bulent-ersoy-cikisi-420944.html>.

³⁰⁵ Mahmut Övür, "Herkesin Türkiye'sine doğru," Sabah, July 13, 2014, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/ovur/2014/07/13/herkesin-turkiyesine-dogru>.

³⁰⁶ "Transsexual Singer Bülent Ersoy Attends Iftar Dinner Hosted by President Erdoğan," Daily Sabah, June 20, 2016, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/06/20/transsexual-singer-bulent-ersoy-attends-iftar-dinner-hosted-by-president-erdogan>.

approached the interpretation of Daily Sabah with a grain of salt: “it is remarkable how Daily Sabah especially emphasized on Ersoy’s transsexuality”³⁰⁷. The problem for *Habervaktim* did not seem to be that “a transsexual” was invited for the iftar organization. Instead, the problem was that Ersoy was labelled as “a transsexual” by Daily Sabah. Although of the Islamist newspapers, *Yeni Akit* remained the most distanced from Ersoy, even this newspaper defended Ersoy against the “obsession” of her left-wing critics, such as Cumhuriyet Newspaper.³⁰⁸

Just like *Habervaktim*, many others consciously preferred to not see Ersoy as a transsexual. In this context, seeing does not refer to the ability to discern visually, but it refers to the meaning-making processes after reflection. A journalist and the former spokesperson of Erdoğan’s prime ministry, Akif Beki, underlined that Ersoy is “much more than a ‘trans star’”.³⁰⁹ Clearly, this is one of those meritocratic claims that have become a competing argument in the landscape of the public sector. As Beki later revealed, he was quite disturbed with the ‘LGBT propaganda’ in famous Netflix series, contrary to what Ersoy’s visible representation meant for him.³¹⁰

As these speech acts suggest, the primary way of justifying Erdoğan’s action without falling into any ideological contradiction was stressing that Ersoy is not *simply* a transsexual. As a result, they occasionally prioritized some other—i.e. more desirable—markers of identity that Ersoy carried. Alongside her amazing career, which she began as a biological man and continued as a trans woman, Ersoy’s management of her visible representation served as a source of rationalization for tolerance. Her dialogue with the authorities made it possible that, for example, Sabah Newspaper labelled her news of marriage as a disgrace, whereas on the

³⁰⁷ “Daily Sabah’tan İlginç Bülent Ersoy Haberi,” *Habervaktim*, June 20, 2016, <https://www.habervaktim.com/haber/474300/daily-sabahtan-ilginç-bulent-ersoy-haberi.html>.

³⁰⁸ “Cumhuriyet’in Bülent Ersoy takıntısı,” *Yeni Akit*, April 8, 2018, <https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/cumhuriyetin-bulent-ersoy-takintisi-446049.html>.

³⁰⁹ Akif Beki, “Bülent Ersoy’lu İftarı Çözdünüz Mü?,” *Hürriyet*, June 21, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/akif-beki/bulent-ersoylu-iftari-cozdunuz-mu-40120529>.

³¹⁰ Akif Beki, “Netflix, Akit’e Hak Verdiriyor!,” *Karar Gazetesi*, July 25, 2019.

very same day, ATV (owned by the same group) was to broadcast a movie in which Ersoy acted.³¹¹

This was because over some decades she could convince many others of the variety of her identities. Among other identities, her religious personality was well-emphasized through her emotional reciting of the call for prayer, her visiting of shrines, her declaration that she prays 5 times a day, her fasting during Ramadan, and her promise that she will bequeath half of her estate to the Turkish Religious Foundation (tr. Türk Diyanet Vakfı).

These conversations re-cast the border of tolerance for some ideological circles, which have continued to speak in the name of Islamism. Although it is repeatedly said by the mainstream currents of Islamism that LGBTness is “never tolerable”,³¹² it was justifiable to implicitly tolerate an LGBT figure as long as one does not leave the moral ground that their hegemonic ideology prescribes. In this context, Özlem Albayrak from *Yeni Şafak*, which disperses the agenda of the mainstream current of Islamism, wrote that the “conservative” LGBT voters of AKP are more virtuous than those who vote for the party merely due to its neoliberal economic policies.³¹³ After analyzing the “interestingly contradictory” personalities of Bülent Ersoy, Albayrak emphasized that many citizens who do not want to rent their houses to transsexuals hypocritically like Ersoy.³¹⁴ That said, because she also criticized some contradictions that Ersoy carried, her solution to this hypocrisy was inconclusive.

Professor Hayrettin Karaman, whose religious knowledge-claims have been influential among government members, responded to a mail coming from a “Muslim homosexual” firstly

³¹¹ Koray Duzgoren, “Çatışma Kışkırtıcılığında Medya 'Rezalet'leri!..,” *Sözleşme*, May 1998.

³¹² Hayrettin Karaman, “Eşcinselle iyi (hoşgörülü) bakamayız,” *Yeni Şafak*, July 6, 2017, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/hayrettinkaraman/escinsele-iyi-hosgorulu-bakamayiz-2038820>.

³¹³ Ozlem Albayrak, “Sinan Çetin, Cemil İpekçi, AK Parti,” *Yeni Şafak*, January 26, 2008, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ozlemalbayrak/sinan-cetin-cemil-ipekci-ak-parti-9016>.

³¹⁴ Ozlem Albayrak, “Bülent Ersoy ve Bam Telleri,” *Yeni Şafak*, March 1, 2008, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ozlemalbayrak/bulent-ersoy-ve-bam-telleri-9608>.

by noting that he seemed like a pious person. Then, Karaman continued: “There are issues, events, attitudes, deficiencies and possibilities that test everyone in this life”.³¹⁵ Then, he encouraged his interlocutor to be patient enough to refrain from any homosexual intercourse, just as all other Muslims try to refrain themselves from committing the sin of *zina* (en. adultery).

In due course, many teachers of religion preached that one should not despise a Muslim LGBT person who is aware that s/he is being tested in terms of Islam. Among the teachers in the Ismailağa religious community, Cübbeli Ahmet Hoca repeatedly preached that Islam commands one to not exclude any fellow believer for their sins. According to Ünlü, one can have a “neighborly” or a “friendly” relationship with an LGBT person as long as this person admits the religious boundaries:

They are just like the normal society. Whatever your relationship is with those who commit adultery or take alcohol, it is the same [with LGBT]. You pay a visit to them to offer your condolences in times of death, to support in times of sickness, [...] bring food to their home [...] They are not lepers whom you should not get close to [...]³¹⁶

During another speech to a mosque community, Ünlü told a story that had allegedly taken place between “a taxi driver” and “a travesti”. According to the story, the taxi driver, who was listening to Ünlü’s speech on the radio, turned off the radio he realized that the passenger was “a travesti”. Suddenly, the travesti got angry: “why have you turned it off?! Am I an infidel?!”.³¹⁷ The main point of this narrative, according to Ünlü, was that one must never despise another, since nobody could ever know who would end up being a better Muslim at the end of the divine test. On the other hand, this call for tolerance should be taken together with Ünlü’s rationalization of intolerance against those LGBTs who refuse to see any shame in their

³¹⁵ Hayrettin Karaman, “Soru Cevap (485): Eşcinsellik Hakkında,” hayrettinkaraman.net, accessed February 19, 2019, <http://www.hayrettinkaraman.net/sc/00485.htm>.

³¹⁶ Flash TV, *Eşcinsellik Hastalık Mıdır, Eşcinsellerin Durumu - Cübbeli Ahmet Hoca*, 2013, <https://www.dailymotion.com/video/xuo4pw>.

³¹⁷ cubbelliahmethoca.tv, *Travesti Anısı Cübbeli Ahmet Hoca*, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UOw3Vsbb3jc>.

status. In this context, Ünlü concludes that the border of the tolerable diversity shall be drawn between the LGBT who admits one's sin and the LGBT that is proud to attend a public parade with an LGBT flag. The latter is not tolerable at all: "may Allah make them extinct!"³¹⁸

In the same vein, writer Ismail Kılıçarslan of the *Yeni Şafak* newspaper advised religious people to hate "the sins instead of the sinners". Until he saw the slogans and the placards, which he called purely Islamophobic, Kılıçarslan was against police intervention in the LGBT Pride parade. Having been harshly criticized by some of his followers for his 'tolerance', he reiterated, just as Emine Şenlikoğlu had been saying for many years,³¹⁹ that fellow believers should not exclude the LGBT "sinners" in order not to push these sinners to the "enemies of Islam".³²⁰ With the latter label, Kılıçarslan clearly meant the organizers of the LGBT Pride parade. This is why Kılıçarslan *among others* is highly interested in the changing approach to gender among conservative youth, such as can be seen in an Imam Hatip class in which half of the students are fanatics of the South Korean pop band, *BTS*, which symbolizes a non-gendered appearance.³²¹ Having paid attention to similar developments, Diyanet decided to appoint "spiritual advisors" to a wide array of places, from prisons to student dormitories. Diyanet encourages them to not discriminate their advisees based on "sexual orientation".³²²

³¹⁸ Cubbeli Ahmet Hoca, *Eşcinsellik Günahı İle İnsan Kâfir Olmaz Ama Günahı Meşrulaştırmak İçin Yürüyüş Yapmamak Lazım!*, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OaeBDB-KUdc>.

³¹⁹ Emine Senlikoglu, "Eşcinselliğin Bilinmeyen Yüzü," March 15, 2013, http://www.eminesenlikoglu.org/14904_Escinselligin-bilinmeyen-yuzu.html.

"Kurtulmak İstiyoruz," *Mektup*, no. 247 (April 2010).

³²⁰ Ismail Kılıçarslan, "Zor, çok zor bir yazı," *Yeni Şafak*, June 30, 2015, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ismailkilarclan/zor-cok-zor-bir-yazi-2014753>.

³²¹ Ismail Kılıçarslan, "K-Pop, BTS, army ve Z kuşağının halleri," *Yeni Şafak*, February 12, 2019, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ismailkilarclan/k-pop-bts-army-ve-z-kusaginin-halleri-2049263>.

"Ercan Yıldırım on Twitter: 'Bu grubu ben de kızımdan duymuştum; İmam Hatip'te sınıf ikiye bölünmüş Bts'ciler ve ondan nefret edenler. Mesele önemli: x-y-z kuşaklarını şimdi küçümseyebiliriz ama geleceği bunlar şekillendirecek! <https://t.co/bVkJQWMRX8h>,'" Twitter, February 12, 2019, <https://twitter.com/Ercnyldrm1/status/1095221985397870592>.

³²² Meltem Ozgenc, "Manevi danışmanların hizmet kuralları: Cinsel yönelimlere duyarlı olacaklar," *Hürriyet*, September 12, 2018.

According to this position, the ideological stance of the parade and the ideological stance of the likes of Ersoy were fundamentally different, as the former seemed anti-religious in terms of method (i.e. uncompromising visibility) and rhetoric (“whose public morals?”). In this vein, Mevlüt Tezel from Sabah Newspaper appreciated Ersoy for both being honest about her sexual orientation and distancing herself from the LGBT Pride parades.³²³ Erdoğan rationalized a conditional, negative tolerance:

These radicals [tr. “marjinaler”] whom, we observe, come around from time to time on the streets of Beyoğlu as well [...] [if they] keep their propriety [tr. “edepleriyle durdukları sürece”], they can remain one of the colors of this country. But if they resort to pressure, aggression, violence, and intolerance [tr. tahammülsüzlük] against those who are not like them, sorry but [in this case] we will hold them by their ears and throw them where they belong.³²⁴

According to this authoritative position, the participants in the parade represented themselves as a bunch of LGBTs, contrary to Ersoy’s multidimensional visible representation. Therefore, the authority was not willing to make effort to open any room for justification of their visibility. Despite not justifying them, it opened some room for their existence: the courts have not closed the LGBT associations on the pre-condition that they will not “encourage” homosexuality—as though sexual orientation is a matter of persuasion.

In other words, the authority has not (yet) “thrown them where they belong”. This decision may be naïvely considered to be a result of the democratic convictions of the government. However, based on the record of this ‘power-hungry’ government, it is more likely that the decision stems from a calculation about the allegedly negative public image of LGBT

³²³ Mevlüt Tezel, “Erdoğan’ın iftarına katılmak linç sebebi oldu,” *Sabah*, June 24, 2016, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/gunaydin/sb-mevlut-tezel/2016/06/24/erdoganin-iftarina-katilmak-linc-sebebi-oldu>.

³²⁴ Haber Meydani, *Erdoğan: Beyoğlundaki Marjinaler Rahat Durmazlarsa Kulaklarından Tutar,ait Oldukları Yere Fırlatırız*, 23 Mar 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k7LWuLns8g>.

activism. According to this calculation, the visibility of LGBT activists will decrease the popular support for AKP's main alternative (see CH5.6). Eventually, intolerance might follow the conclusive 'victory' of Erdoğan.³²⁵ That being said, intolerance has already come in various ways, given that this rationalization of negative tolerance has already received a negative response from the activists. This is because they do not demand any form of tolerance. On the contrary, they have many things to say explicitly against this ruling normative order.

³²⁵ A fundamental problem with 'negative' tolerance is that it tends to appear as the result of a *modus vivendi*, the lifetime of which is likely to depend on the changing balance of power. For example, Castro described the Spanish tolerance of the Middle Age as one that lost its power when one of the parties ceased to inspire fear. A fundamental limit in such prudential takes on tolerance is their implication that the parties are eager to remain as they were. In other words, it signifies a regime with the participation of several caste-like systems, until one of them loses ground. In this sense, the Ottoman Millet System was also one of negative tolerance. Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione, eds., *The Culture of Toleration in Diverse Societies: Reasonable Tolerance*, OAPEN Library (Manchester ; New York: Manchester University Press, 2003), p3. Americo Castro, *The Spaniards: An Introduction to Their History* (University of California Press, 1985), p504. see Sossie Kasbarian, "The Istanbul Armenians: Negotiating Coexistence," in *Post-Ottoman Coexistence: Sharing Space in the Shadow of Conflict* (Berghahn Books, 2016), 2011, p211. see also Robert M. Hayden et al., *Antagonistic Tolerance: Competitive Sharing of Religious Sites and Spaces* (Routledge, 2016).

5.5. Retroactive Conversations: The Appearance of the *Other* in “this culture”

If the people, who pave the way for all these [bad] experiences [of transgender individuals], see me as a fantastic [character]; if they designate me, make me feel my monstrosity [tr. ucubeliğimi] and wretchedness [tr. zavallılığımı]; if they approach to me abhorringly, [...] then, indeed, I must be the queen of this fantastic world. Then I will be the goddess of beauty, the queen, the princess, the duchess, the madam, Aphrodite. You are already not giving me another chance.

Gani Met³²⁶

In her evaluation, Gani Met describes how she ended up being herself. Her experience includes imprisonment in sex work, and an obligation to fit into certain stereotypical forms of being travesti. In the face of these constraints, she admittedly resigned herself to the performative roles imposed on her identity by the authorities. Despite having suspicions as to whether she can be called an activist,³²⁷ Gani Met found her own ways to challenge the authorities that deny seeing her as a woman:

Then, on the streets, I will shout at your face “ayol abla...ayol abla”³²⁸ in a manner to multiply the behaviors specific to women with 3, so that [my performance] reaches a fantastic level.

Dealing with men who aims to prove their “manliness” on sex workers, she explains how she is coping with violence on a daily basis. She criticizes many who ignore her experience, including some “activist individuals that talk and write nonsense” without paying attention to what transsexuals feel under the given constraints. Finally, she calls on others to learn that travesties and transsexuals are at the bottom end of the hierarchy, even in the LGBT community.

As the variety of outcomes in the entertainment and public sectors demonstrate, the contestation has not just been one of LGBT versus others. On the contrary, it has been primarily between the divergent expressions of being LGBT. From Ersoy to the hijabi transgender people living in the ‘ultra-conservative’ Keçiören district of Ankara, some *sui generis* visible

³²⁶ Gani Met, “Dağınık Düşüncelerim,” *Lubunya*, no. 10 (June 2012): 33–36.

³²⁷ Buse Kilickaya, “LGBT Aktivistlere Sorduk,” *Lubunya*, no. 8 (November 2011), p16.

³²⁸ i.e. a stereotypically ultra-feminine way of addressing people. In English, it literally means “hey sister!”

representations of LGBT seem to have fitted into the ideological repertoire of Islamism. Based on an examination of these divergent takes on the visibility of LGBT, this part analyzes a series of retroactive conversations. Accordingly, I argue that the disagreements are no longer centered on what LGBT stands for, but on what it should be against. Some crystallized disagreements with regard to this issue of contention render the “LGBT community” less cohesive than ever. Therefore, the identity-building processes have inevitably become target-centered rather than subject-centered.

In 2010, “a gay man” wrote an open letter in reaction to Bülent Ersoy: “if Ersoy had been defending gay rights for 35 years, we would not be in a miserable situation today [...] I do not forgive Ersoy for my rights [*tr. hakkını helal etmemek*]”.³²⁹ After the marriage of Bülent Ersoy, writer Can Çavuşoğlu asked why it would be necessary for gay people to undergo a physical operation in order to marry: “if it is available for Ersoy, why not available for us?”³³⁰ Despite having won her own recognition struggles, firstly for a pink identity card—i.e. the card for legally recognized women—and secondly for trans individuals’ right to marry, Ersoy did not develop a more far-reaching repertoire of activism on behalf of a broader LGBT community.

On the contrary, her consistent visible representation in the same photo frames as ‘right-wing’ leaders, from Özal to Erdoğan, has damaged Ersoy’s image among many activists, whose organizations have been speaking in the name of ‘left-wing’ ideologies. Journalist Michelle Demisevich, who is also a seasoned LGBT activist, suggested that Erdoğan would never have dinner with a trans other than Ersoy. According to her, they had dinner for a key reason: “they

³²⁹ “Bülent Ersoy’a bir gay olarak hakkımı helal etmiyorum,” T24, November 16, 2010, <https://t24.com.tr/haber/bulent-ersoya-bir-gay-olarak-hakkimi-helal-etmiyorum,111615>.

³³⁰ Can Cavusoglu, “Bülent Ersoy’a Var Da Bize Yok Mu?,” Kaos GL, January 7, 2014, <http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=15544>.

have something in common—they are both rulers in their own domains”.³³¹ Esmeray, who, after 5 years of sex work, became a vendor of stuffed mussels and a stand-up comedian, made the nuclear claim: “Bülent Ersoy is transsexual up to the extent that Michael Jackson is black”.³³²

5.5.1. *Alternative Politics of Recognition*

Trans woman Asya Özgür stresses that she will not “like” or “respect” Ersoy before Ersoy does ‘something’ in support of “her fellow beings”. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether Ersoy sees her trans background as a public identity—only if this was the case could it have been voiced in reference to a larger community. Ersoy was already very famous when she decided on her sex reassignment. Therefore, she admitted that it would be a major subject in the country.³³³ Her medical record and her well-publicized efforts to re-define her clothing, voice and language in the aftermath of the operation clearly made her a ‘trans’ in the eyes of the trans communities. However, she never associated her own identity with any publicly shared label. She did not take part in any of the in-group debates over the label “LGBT”. If she had a decades-long effort for a public identity, it was an effort to be known as a conservative, upper-class Ottoman woman³³⁴. Pinar Ögünç summarized Ersoy’s case at its best in the very first issue of *Lubunya*: “what we name as *us* is not one-piece”.³³⁵

³³¹ Ayse Arman, “Trans Olduğu İçin Mi Kimse Sesini Çıkarmadı Bu Vahşi Cinayete!,” *Hürriyet*, August 16, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/ayse-arman/trans-oldugu-icin-mi-kimse-sesini-cikarmadi-bu-vahsi-cinayete-40196999>.

³³² Pinar Ogunc, “‘Michael Jackson Ne Kadar Siyahsa Bülent Ersoy o Kadar Transeksüel,’” *Kaos GL*, August 7, 2007, <http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=1307>.

³³³ When the clerkship examination of the Ministry of Justice included the question of when Ersoy had her surgery, she commented: “of course it can be asked. I am a senior artist, who performs art inside and outside the borders of Turkey, and, I am one whose knowledge cannot be replaced”. see İzzet Çapa’ya konuştu,” *Habertürk*, January 3, 2012, <https://www.haberturk.com/magazin/ozel-roportajlar/haber/702386-deniz-gezmis-gazoz-alirdi-ben-ona-sarki-soylerdim>.

³³⁴ Rustem Ertug Altinay, “Reconstructing the Transgendered Self as a Muslim, Nationalist, Upper-Class Woman: The Case of Bulent Ersoy,” *WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (2008): 210–229, p219.

³³⁵ Pinar Ogunc, “Fevkaladenin Fevkinde Bir Trans Öyküsü,” *Lubunya*, no. 1 (January 2007), p38.

Though she has been criticized by the LGBT associations on the basis that she did not say a single word in favor of their struggle, she raised her voice for recognition by developing a delicate way of doing so.³³⁶ In the aftermath of her sex reassignment in 1981, she was subject to harsh criticism. This spotlight effect resulted in two short-term prison sentences: one for insulting a judge, and one for attacking a journalist. In this period, Ersoy attended some of the court hearings and public interviews with her new skirts and high-heel shoes. In an interview, she noted that she was so happy for being put into the women’s prison, such that she almost forgot that she had been sentenced.³³⁷ When she wanted her “pink identity” as a part of her politics of recognition, the 2nd Chamber of the Court of Cassation rejected it with the following argument:

It is not right to seek a solution on grounds of emotions, because the law [...] is intolerant [*tr. müsamahasız*] in case of mistakes. The desperation of a person who lost one’s virility, yet could not become a woman, [should be] pitied by all. But no opportunities can be created by leaving aside the law.³³⁸

More directly, judge Erdoğan Gökçe warned the lawyer of Ersoy: “the rule *laissez faire laissez passer* does not apply here!”³³⁹ In June 1981, among other transgender artists of the time, Ersoy was banned from acting onstage by the military leadership.³⁴⁰ The ban lasted for 7 years. Concerning these lost years, she asked: “what can be more important than a person’s freedom? Who will seek my rights?”³⁴¹ Before all else, some LGBT—then “homosexual”—artists got

³³⁶ see “[Ersoy] destabilized categories, both real and textual”. Basak Ertur & Alisa Lebow, “Coup de Genre: The Trials and Tribulations of Bülent Ersoy”, *Theory Event* 17 (1), 2014, p3.

³³⁷ “Bülent Ersoy Hapishane’de,” *Zamantika*, accessed February 16, 2016, <http://www.zamantika.com/1980ler/bulent-ersoy-hapishanede-1982>.

³³⁸ No. 1986/651K. (Yargıtay 2. Daire March 27, 1986).

see for the opposite views among judges, alongside the conclusion of the case: Evsen, Hande. *Bir Cinsiyet Değişikliği Reddi Kararında Öne Sürülen Hukuki Nedenlerin İncelenmesi*. (no date). Retrieved from <http://www.umut.org.tr/UserFiles/Files/Document/document_12%20Ekim-II-4.docx>

³³⁹ “Bülent Ersoy’un Kadın Olmadığına Karar Verildi,” *Cumhuriyet*, September 7, 1982.

³⁴⁰ “Eşcinsel Şarkıcıların Hiçbiri Sahneye Çıkmayacak,” *Cumhuriyet*, June 13, 1981.

³⁴¹ İzzet Capa, “Bülent Ersoy Röportajının Hiçbir Yerde Yayınlanmamış Bölümleri,” *Gecce*, July 31, 2017, <https://www.gecce.com.tr/yazarlar/izzet-capa/bulent-ersoy-roportajinin-hicbir-yerde-yayinlanmamis-bolumleri>.

Ufuk Guldemir, “Ersoy: Gün Gelir, Savunma Hakkı Herkese Lazım Olur,” *Cumhuriyet*, August 14, 1986.

angry with Ersoy, whom they criticized for intimidating the authorities.³⁴² Two years after the abovementioned court decision, in 1988, Ersoy could acquire her pink card, which followed then President Turgut Özal's initiative to amend the law.³⁴³ It was the first legal arrangement concerning transsexuals.

In the following decades, Ersoy did not refrain from seeking her rights in her own ways. She sued those who used stereotypes against her sexual identity, like singer Eylül Metin who called her "hepatitis B".³⁴⁴ She has been outspoken in the AKP era as well as the past: when she declared for the first time that she votes for AKP, her main reason was the promise of the government to "take revenge from Kenan Evren", the head of the 1980 military coup.³⁴⁵ At the time, her defense of AKP was not unconditional either. For instance, AKP's 'formerly leftist' minister of culture, Ertuğrul Günay, described in 2009 how "confusing" the 1980s were:

Bülent Ersoy was awarded as the best woman singer [...] it was that kind of an absurd, dramatic, confusing period.

By describing Günay's words as "zealotry", Ersoy called him to resign from his ministerial post. She added:

I would also like to remind the philosophy of Rumi: "come whoever you are".³⁴⁶

³⁴² Deniz Som, "Eşcinsel Şarkıcılar Avrupa Hazırlığı Yapıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, June 14, 1981.

"Eşcinsel Şarkıcılar Hakkındaki Takibat Sürüyor," *Cumhuriyet*, June 16, 1981.

Mehmed Kemal, "Eşcinsel Şarkıcılar," *Cumhuriyet*, August 14, 1981.

³⁴³ Michael R. Will and Bilge Öztan, "Hukukun Sebebiyet Verdiği Bir Acı: Transseksüellerin Hukuki Durumu," *Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* 43, no. 1–4 (1993): 227–268.

³⁴⁴ "Bülent Ersoy, Kendisine Hepatit B Diyen Şarkıcı Eylül Metin'i Affetmedi," *Sabah*, May 16, 2018, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/magazin/2018/05/16/bulent-ersoy-kendisine-hepatit-b-diyen-sarkici-eylul-metini-affetmedi?paging=1>.

³⁴⁵ "Bülent Ersoy Intikam İstiyor!," *Internethaber.com*, September 28, 2012, <https://www.internethaber.com/bulent-ersoy-intikam-istiyor-464866h.htm>.

³⁴⁶ "Bülent Ersoy, Ertuğrul Günay'ı istifaya çağırdı," *Beşiktaş Postası*, May 9, 2009, <https://www.besiktaspostasi.com/bulent-ersoy-ertugrul-gunayi-istifaya-cagirdi/>.

In contemporary Turkey, the Rumi quotes, which have become autonomous from the literary debate over what Rumi actually meant, are used to demand tolerance toward unorthodox ways of life. Ersoy's politics of recognition did not rule out the idea of tolerance.

Clearly however, calling for tolerance with a Rumi quote is quite different from calling for recognition with an LGBT parade. With this reference, Ersoy explicitly recognized the hierarchical position between the one to tolerate and the one to be tolerated, given that being able to say "come whoever you are" implies the power not to say it.³⁴⁷ Connectedly, by directing this quote to those powerful ones who are in a position to welcome or threaten differences, the speaker also recognizes that her identity may be incompatible with some "common values". In this call for tolerance, the difference should be tolerated as long as it is not a threat to the dominant value-system.

Therefore, for many years Ersoy claimed that the visibility of people with different sexual orientations would never represent a threat for the broader society. *Threat* within this context was expressed by Ersoy as tempting others to question their sexual orientations:

If I gave you trillions [...] and ask you to put yourself into this position, [...] would any heterosexual man attempt to do it? [...] If you pretend to be affected, it means that you carry these feelings inside.³⁴⁸

Because the sexual orientation of a minority cannot put the dominant heteronormative structures in danger, these sexual orientations should be tolerated. In this call for tolerance, the one who is entitled to be tolerated would, in return, be supposed to come to terms with the "common values" in a way: "our common denominator is the existence of music".³⁴⁹ In this context, Ersoy never hesitated to use the religious repertoire in her life: she commented openly about what

³⁴⁷ A recently popularized, humorous sentence reflects the authority that the Rumi quotes are based on: "I am not Rumi, so you don't come"; "If Rumi saw these people, he would say 'you don't come'".

³⁴⁸ Ahmet Tulgar, "Musikiden Özür Diliyorum," *Milliyet*, May 30, 2004,

<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2004/05/30/pazar/axpaz01.html>.

³⁴⁹ Ersoy reiterated this argument in her response to Ertuğrul Günay.

would be a sin and a good deed; she repeatedly mentioned her fear of Allah; she prayed several times in public or on TV, and she broke her Ramadan fast on TV even though on one occasion it was not the right time in Istanbul.³⁵⁰

5.5.2. *Alternative Approaches to “Common Values”*

Her critics’ defense of LGBT activism stands in stark contrast to Ersoy’s position in terms of approaching the notion of common values and the hierarchy it implies. Kaos-GL asked a group of “trans activists” about Ersoy’s publicized intention to bequeath her assets to the Turkish Religious Foundation (tr. Türk Diyanet Vakfı).³⁵¹ In response, Tuna Şahin argued that Ersoy was in love with her murderer. Şahin added, “[Ersoy] confesses her sins because she is afraid of death”.

Şahin’s point that Ersoy was confessing her sins may have been grounded in a constant pressure Ersoy acknowledged. Ersoy stressed in an interview that she was afraid of death, firstly because she does not know whether people would speak about her sex reassignment or her music after her death. This is a fear which, Ersoy says, she developed in the aftermath of the death of an iconic drag-queen, Zeki Müren: “they attacked him when he was not in a position to defend himself”. Secondly on a more transcendental level, since her childhood which she recalls in this context, Ersoy has been constantly suspicious as to whether she commits a sin.³⁵²

If Ersoy shares the moral claims of the Turkish Religious Foundation, which unequivocally describes sex reassignment as a sin, it is possible to infer that Ersoy sees herself as a sinner. Within this context, Doğa Asi Çevik commented on Ersoy’s decision: “this

³⁵⁰ “Paris Saatiyle Oruç Açtı,” *Hürriyet Kelebek*, September 18, 2007, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kelebek/paris-saatiyle-oruc-acti-7307928>.

³⁵¹ Umut Guner, “Bülent Ersoy’un mirasına dikel!”, Kaos GL, 11 Dec 2014.

<<http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=18224>>

³⁵² Capa, “Bülent Ersoy Röportajının Hiçbir Yerde Yayınlanmamış Bölümleri.”

institution, which Ersoy feeds with money, will strengthen its LGBTphobia”. Halil Kandok, a blogger who writes extensively on the problems of LGBT, questioned what Ersoy’s act symbolizes: “does not it [i.e. Ersoy’s testament] mean saying that LGBTness is a sin, and [therefore] you can curse us?”³⁵³

Clearly, this alternative expression of LGBT either dismisses the existence of shared values or refuses to follow the existing shared values in the society. On the contrary, its primary aim is to construct its own agency against the otherwise untouchable, dominant narrative of shared values. Hayat Kırbaş, a sex worker who nicknamed herself “dishonourable”, wrote in the magazine *Lubunya*:

[...] where is my honor, who is honourable? [...] the honor did not employ us. I could not be a burglar either [...] SO, SHOULD I HAVE REMAINED HUNGRY? [...] I lost my honor, [and] I will not find it. I will not be the honor of anyone!³⁵⁴

Embracing the socially despised markers of an identity has several implications. To begin with, it means that Kırbaş no longer looks for a relationship of tolerance, in which she may be tolerated at the expense of being condemned. Her goal of recognition is only realizable with the normalization of the markers of this identity—i.e. not as an identity alongside others, or one to be occasionally masked by others. Just like Kırbaş, the speakers in the abovementioned Kaos-GL project did not problematize their ‘shamelessness’ in a social structure that they oppose. Whenever they find a chance to talk to those who condemn them for their existence, they refuse to kneel down to the superior authority. Given that all regimes of tolerance are based on such hierarchical relationships, they do not settle for the idea of tolerance—i.e. not ‘anymore’, at

³⁵³ Halil Kandok, “‘Bülent Ersoy’un Kolay Seçimi,’” *Radikal* (blog), December 10, 2014, <http://blog.radikal.com.tr/lgbt/bulent-ersoyun-kolay-secimi-82123>.”

³⁵⁴ Hayat Kirbas, “İki Bacağımın Arasındaki Apak Namus,” *Lubunya* 4 (November 2009): 1.

least for Kırbaş, because her story implies that she may have been different if she was allowed to have another life when it was meaningful.

By the same token, this argument tends to refuse any socially negotiated appearance. In other words, it opposes hiding or making obscure any elements of a fundamental identity in public space—e.g. at a workplace. On the contrary, these elements should be fully publicized, since the ruling homophobia and transphobia can be challenged only by facing and resisting them. With this aim in mind, many activists join or organize street protests with slogans that explicitly challenge the moral claims that, they think, nurture heteronormativity: “Gay-Trans hand in hand, towards the immoral revolution”.³⁵⁵ They question the sources of morality and naturalness: “who decides what is unnatural?”³⁵⁶ Moreover, just as Umut Güner from Kaos-GL illustrates, many of these activists are keen to go to the “rural areas” to converse with those who think LGBT people are sinners or sick.³⁵⁷ Amidst this identity war, they clearly take the strategies of action embraced by the likes of Ersoy as counterproductive efforts.

Clearly, Ersoy’s engagement with the notion of shared values is very different. While using a consistently religious repertoire, Ersoy never tried to justify her sex reassignment in the name of Islam. She made a special effort not to challenge such dominant religious knowledge-claims. Furthermore, in those moments when she became visible, she occasionally politicized her religious repertoire to position herself alongside ‘the orthodoxy’ as opposed to the symbols of the *other*. For example, after the assassination of the Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink, she reacted against those who made a campaign around the slogan “we are all Hrant, we are all Armenians”: “I am the Muslim daughter of a Muslim family, I am not Armenian”. Those who

³⁵⁵ This was written on a placard prepared for the LGBT Pride Day: “İbne Dönme El Ele, Ahlaksız Devrime”. In a manner to challenge the moral system, many LGBTs embraced the two Turkish words “İbne” [en. homo] and “dönme” [en. trans], which have defamatory or libelous connotations elsewhere.

³⁵⁶ see the speech of Oktay Cerit: Buse Kilickaya, Buse Kilickaya, “LGBT Aktivistlere Sorduk,” *Lubunya*, no. 8 (November 2011).

³⁵⁷ see the speech of Umut Güner: Buse Kilickaya, “LGBT Aktivistlere Sorduk,” *Lubunya*, no. 8 (November 2011).

were eager to reproduce this slogan quoted Ersoy numerous times, such that they would stop questioning, at least for once, whether she could have ever become a “daughter”. At the time Ersoy was differentiating herself from Hrant Dink, the activists of *Pembe Hayat*, *Lambda-Istanbul* and *Kaos-GL* were mourning Dink’s loss.

Occasionally, Ersoy appeared as an “Ottoman”, thanks to her musical and conversational performances. Sometimes she represented a “conservative” in accordance with her publicized religious activities as well as the religious repertoire she politicized. But above all, she acted as a “woman” who embraced some stereotypical aspects of being a woman. Bouncing between these identities, she was arguably honest enough to depict an incoherent picture of herself. For example, she played the “nationalist” with her claim to not be an Armenian, but after a while her “motherhood” prevailed over her nationalism at a time when many soldiers were returning dead or wounded from the military operations in South-East Turkey. At this emotional moment, she declared that she would not send her son to the military service if she had one. In response, the then minister, Binali Yıldırım, mocked Ersoy with a smily face: “No worries, there is no such possibility”.³⁵⁸

Simply put, Ersoy intermingled her divergent identities with her other, more acceptable or even desirable identities. When some activists criticized her for wearing fur, she responded:

Quran orders us to benefit from animals’ meat, milk and skin [...] It is a sin to question the balance in the universe. I do not fear anybody other than Allah. Who are these animal lovers?!³⁵⁹

Even though Ersoy’s stance may seem uniquely individual at first glance, it would be a mistake to think that this moral position is an outlier among the many expressions of LGBT in Turkey.

³⁵⁸ Abdulkadir Selvi, “Bülent Ersoy’un Rejime İkinci Müdahalesi,” *Yeni Şafak*, February 27, 2008, <https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/bulent-ersoyun-rejime-ikinci-mudahalesi-102423>.

³⁵⁹ “Bülent Ersoy’dan Ömür Gedik’e Çok Sert ‘kürk’ Cevabı,” *Gazete Vatan*, March 1, 2016, <http://www.gazetevatan.com/bulent-ersoy-dan-omur-gedik-e-cok-sert-kurk-cevabi-920137-magazin/>.

According to a local³⁶⁰ survey conducted with 116 transgender participants from Istanbul, 56% of these respondents recognized their identity as a “sin”, and 39.7% reported that they thought at one point in their life that they would go to “the hell”.³⁶¹ In other words, many of them had a moral consciousness that pushed them to find a balance between being LGBT and following a life in accordance with their received wisdoms, including their knowledge of religion. As a result, some of them move to atheism as they learned to lose the faith that curses them, whereas some others deal with their sins through their unique ways of communicating with divine rule.³⁶²

As an example of the latter, Utku Uysal, a popular “trans singer” of Istanbul night-life, explained how she made her only mistake “against Allah”:

It was a religious mistake [...] it should not have happened, but it happened. I feel very good in the way I am [...] I asked the greatest Islamic scholars, they said that even a nose surgery would be a great sin [...] but we have our own will³⁶³.

The argumentation seems unstable, but it is not. Uysal admits that her sex reassignment was wrong in religious terms, but at the same time stresses that she is very happy with some other virtues that her sin brought. Uysal makes the distinction that most of the participants of the above-mentioned survey shared: they believe that they are sinners, but they do not accept that they are sick. Having uncovered the dissonance between being happy with the way she exists and feeling guilty about its religious consequences, Uysal explained why she does not want to have a sexual life anymore:

³⁶⁰ The wording of the survey was determined fully in accordance with the local context. The survey included many keywords that an LGBT outside the context of Istanbul would have a difficulty in understanding.

³⁶¹ “İt İti Isırmaz: Bir Alan Araştırması, İstanbul’da Yaşayan Trans Kadınların Sorunları” (Lambdistanbul, 2010), p17-18.

³⁶² Tarik Bereket and Barry D. Adam, “Navigating Islam and Same-Sex Liaisons Among Men in Turkey,” *Journal of Homosexuality* 55, no. 2 (August 14, 2008): 204–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00918360802129428>.

³⁶³ Sirin Sever, “Herkesin Hayran Olduğu İnsanlar Bana Hayran - Röportaj Haberleri,” *Sabah*, March 28, 2010, https://www.sabah.com.tr/pazar/roportaj/2010/03/28/ben_insan_olmayi_ogrendim.

[This is] because I believe that it is not right! [...] From now on, a little bit of work must be done for Allah.

As a trade off, losing one's sexual life is a pre-requisite for enjoying one's gender identity as a believer. Similarly, Mustafa, from the "Muslim homosexuals" association called Meşcid, blamed the LGBT associations: "to be a homosexual is not a preference, but to live a homosexual life is a preference".³⁶⁴ Clearly, these two arguments were in congruence with the advice of Professor Hayrettin Karaman, who called for the LGBT "sinners" to not let their sexual desires push them to commit a sinful act (recall "Evaluative Conversations [1]"). Uysal's explanation is also very similar to that of Kerimcan Durmaz, who removed his "twerk" videos from his social media accounts in order to curb the eroticism of his visible representation (recall "the case of Kerimcan Durmaz").

In his appearances after the attack, Kerimcan Durmaz made his moral position clear: he has put his appreciation of President Erdoğan on display, just like his boss, Acun Ilıcalı.³⁶⁵ Durmaz declared that he prays, fasts, and reads Quran in his free time: "I won't let anybody say anything against my conservatism".³⁶⁶ He underlined that he has a delicate "policy of morality", through which he keeps checking where to stop making expressions. In response to a commentator who blamed him for 'playing around' the values of the society, Durmaz reacted: "do not confuse me with the others [some other LGBT people] on social media!"³⁶⁷

Concerning the critique that Durmaz was not supported by LGBT associations such as Kaos-GL, Yunus Emre Demir explained why their organizations will never defend

³⁶⁴ Esra Acikgoz, "Müslüman Da Eşcinsel Olabilir...", *Gazete Vatan*, October 20, 2013, <http://www.gazetevatan.com/musluman-da-escinsel-olabilir----577432-gundem/>.

³⁶⁵ "Kerimcan Durmaz'dan Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'a kutlama mesajı!", *superhabertv*, February 27, 2018, <https://www.superhaber.tv/kerimcan-durmazdan-cumhurbaskani-erdogana-kutlama-mesaji-haber-96395>.

³⁶⁶ "Namaz Kılıp Oruç Tutuyorum," *Sabah*, October 25, 2016, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/magazin/2016/10/25/kerimcan-durmaz-gercek-hayatimi-yansitsam-yer-yerinden-oynar?paging=2>.

³⁶⁷ Soylemezsem Olmaz, *Kerimcan Durmaz Canlı Yayına Bağlandı, Erhan Nacar İle Yüzleşti!*, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5beloGZbCYY>.

“capitalism’s rusted approach to art” which polishes the likes of Durmaz. According to Demir, Durmaz is nothing but a visible representation of obedience:

Kerimcan will stand up [...] At worst case scenario, with the money he saved, he will stay in America for 3 months [...] But the issue is much greater than Kerimcan. The issue is the possibility that this *lubunya* [en. slang, passive male homosexual] waiter, who works at the place where Kerimcan takes the stage, may be beaten and may not be able to stand up as easily as Kerimcan will do [...] Kerimcan’s homosexuality does not make him one of us.³⁶⁸

He emphasizes that the “conservative make-up” of Durmaz does not justify the attack against him. However, he concludes, they should defend the gayness of Durmaz, not only from the aggressors but also from the reactionary (tr. “gerici”) capitalist system that Durmaz represents.

Fashion-designer Barbaros Şansal generalized the same argument:

It is still almost impossible for two gays to hold their hands [...] on Istiklal Street. Hate killing and homophobia do not stop at all. But there is no problem if you are rich and famous with powerful friends.³⁶⁹

Because the subject-centered identity-building (e.g. the “LGBT Movement”) misleadingly counted the likes of Durmaz in the group, as well as alienating the non-LGBT defenders of this anti-capitalist and anti-heteronormative ideology, the Kaos-GL team has begun defining their movement not as an LGBT movement, but as a movement against homophobia and transphobia.

A popular friend of Durmaz from “capitalism’s rusted” entertainment sector, Selin Ciğerci, who had sex reassignment surgery, made public her ‘policy of morality’ in a similar manner. In her explanation, Ciğerci especially emphasized her city of origin, Konya, which is known for its ultra-conservative outlook:

I am from Konya. Just like them, I do not like wearing revealing clothes and exhibitionism. For this reason, women like me so much. Some

³⁶⁸ Yunus Emre Demir, “Kerimcan Durmaz’a Dair...,” Kaos GL, December 5, 2016,

<http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=22606>.

³⁶⁹ Barbaros Sansal, “Gelin Ulan Buraya i...Ler,” *#tarih dergi*, no. 4 (September 2014): 52–53.

mothers [...] write to me, “my child follows you. I did not initially let him/her do so, but then, I watched you as well and I like you too”.³⁷⁰

Emphasizing the same moral sensitivity, Nedim Uzun, a trans woman singer as known as Madam Marika, harshly criticized the LGBT Pride parades and their organizers. In a spontaneous conversation on a street at the Beyoğlu district of Istanbul, Uzun explained the reason behind her defense of Erdoğan’s restriction of the LGBT Pride parades:

If you give lots of freedom, these transsexuals will go to the Istiklal Street³⁷¹ and have sex there in public. Look at the Gay Pride marches, they open their breasts and arses [...] This is not the freedom I want. This is immoral.

“Trans queen” Seyhan Soylu was probably the first who considered the idea of being nude in public, so that she can get ‘undeniably’ visible in the eyes of the authority.³⁷² Some decades later, a group of activists put this idea into practice. This representation of visibility was completely contradictory to the visibility of the likes of Uzun. In defense of this new visible representation, Uzun condemns her own past record as well.

As “an Ottoman woman” just like Ersoy, Nedim Uzun stressed that many of those who speak in the name of LGBT insult her during her concerts: “they ask me like, ‘you are despised by [the AKP], how can you support them?’” Uzun claimed that she was beaten by a pro-CHP group, just because she asked them if any president before Erdoğan ever had dinner with a transsexual. She recalled: “I remember how the CHP members were running away from us!” Belgin, a trans sex worker on the Abanoz Street in the 1970s, insisted on the same point: “Abanoz was closed for the first time under the rule of [CHP leader] Ecevit”.³⁷³

³⁷⁰ Cengiz Semercioglu, “Selin Ciğerci İle Gökhan Çıra Merak Edilenleri Anlattı,” *Hürriyet Kelebek*, December 16, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kelebek/magazin/selin-cigerci-ile-gokhan-cira-merak-edilenleri-anlatti-40680158>.

³⁷¹ A central street in Istanbul, where LGBT Pride parades take place.

³⁷² “Yılmaz’a Poşetli Dilekçe: Sisi’den,” *Cumhuriyet*, July 7, 1991.

³⁷³ *80’lerde Lubunya Olmak* (İzmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2012), p70-71.

In one of her later speeches, Uzun declared that she became a member of “AK LGBT”, formed by a group of LGBT people who sympathize with AKP. Marika’s moralist claims were very much appreciated by the interviewers on Ahsen TV, who have become famous for their provocative approach during street interviews in which they push their interviewees to be convinced of the ascendancy of what they claim to be the rule of Islam. After Madam Marika finished her 10-minute-long speech with little interruption, the interviewer told her: “I really appreciate your attitude here!”

A couple of weeks before the Municipal Elections of 2019, Madam Marika and the visible representations of LGBT she criticizes faced off once again. A day after a TV debate in which the CHP candidate for the Beyoğlu Municipality (Istanbul) promised “equal rights” for the “LGBT”, the presenter of this TV program, journalist Çağlar Cilara, had to resign from TV5—i.e. the TV channel of Saadet Party, which is the descendant of Refah Party. This decision was forced by a campaign led by some AKP supporters who blamed Saadet Party for “selling out” the Islamism of the Refah tradition. Interestingly however, a week later Madam Marika appeared as the announcer on the election-stand of AKP in the Beyoğlu district. With a travesti friend,³⁷⁴ she asked the citizens to vote for the AKP. Given that the AKP members on the stand let her talk, Çağlar Cilara reacted: “why have you gotten me into trouble, if you would do something like that[?!]”³⁷⁵

5.5.3. *Alternative Politics of Visibility*

Without breaching the confines of “common values”, Ersoy has defended the meritocratic claim in favor of LGBT people in her field of work. In the TV programme *Popstar*

³⁷⁴ Marika described her and her friend, in Turkish, pejoratively as “yan sanayi kadın”.

³⁷⁵ “Çağlar Cilara on Twitter: ‘Madem böyle bir şey yapacaktınız benim başımı niye yediniz’ <https://t.co/E8BOgvRblz>”, Twitter, accessed March 20, 2019, <https://twitter.com/caglarcilara/status/1108278857055027201>.

Alaturka, Ersoy had a severe verbal conflict with her colleague, Ebru Gündeş, due to her identitarian claim which led to the elimination of a ‘possibly’ gay contestant:

- Ersoy: If Allah gave him these feelings, what is it to you? Are we here to deal with what is below the contestants’ belts?
- Gündeş: He would have been a wrong role-model for the Turkish society [...] It does not seem right to me, given that we have so many young people.
- [...]
- Ersoy: You are a role-model as well!
- Gündeş: Yes, we are! [...] With our good and bad behaviors, we are role-models as well.
- Ersoy: Okay! So, everyone has characteristic features, some of which are to be taken as a guide, whereas some others are not [...] That guy was treated unfairly here! [...] He was singing very well! Are you able to sleep well after refusing him?! [*yelling*]
- Gündeş: Vallahi, I sleep very well.
- Ersoy: How come do you sleep well?! I cannot! [*throws the microphone away*]³⁷⁶

In this defense of the merit-based approach, Ersoy did not dismiss the concept of common values. Instead, she argued that everyone has ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sides in accordance with a set of public values. Therefore, the basis of her meritocracy is that the ones who fulfill their tasks at their workplaces should not be dismissed due to some potentially improper, secondary aspects of their personality.

This claim on meritocracy hints at an alternative politics of visibility as well. Accordingly, one may not put forward the markers of one’s LGBT identity as a priority in the workplace, even if s/he does not hide them either. The contestant, whom Ersoy defends, did not limit his visibility, but at the same time, he exhibited other marks that closely relate to his work—*e.g.* “singing very well”. His multivocal appearance made possible a ‘religious conservative’ defense of his work, which, albeit indirectly, accepted his visible representation

³⁷⁶ Star TV, *Popstar’da Bülent Ersoy ve Ebru Gündeş’in Kavgası*, 2006, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FeQA28bXlzo>.

of LGBT. Within this context, the way Ersoy defends the contestant merges with some other in-group criticisms of the politics of uncompromising visibility.

A series of interviews conducted by Aysun Öner revealed that some LGBT employees consciously oppose forming a visible representation based on their LGBTness. For example, an interviewee, Bora, reproached fellow gays and lesbians who do not prioritize their expertise in their workplaces just as, Bora argued, most heterosexuals do.³⁷⁷ Otherwise, he emphasized, LGBT people will never be able to overcome minority pressure. This argument is not reducible to the secretive claim in the sense that it does not require an LGBT person to hide one's LGBTness. Instead, it calls for the LGBT person to be 'professional enough' to not keep becoming visible based on the markers of this single identity. Congruently, the annual (2016 & 2017) surveys of Kaos-GL suggest that a clear majority of LGBT public employees interpret the way their jobs were described them gender neutrally, in the sense that they did not notice any overt or covert criteria which may discourage LGBT people from applying.³⁷⁸

In a broader study, Öner examined the strategies through which LGBT employees cope with discrimination based on sexual orientation at their workplaces. In this context, she described a group of LGBT employees as "indirectly open". According to the analysis, those indirectly open employees become visible as LGBT people only when they think a relevant subject is triggered in their conversations. In most other instances, they prefer not to expose any details of their 'private' lives, within which they also tend to consider their sexual or gender

³⁷⁷ Aysun Oner, "Beyaz Yakalı Lezbiyen ve Gey Bireylerin İş Yerinde Karşılaştıkları Cinsel Yönelim Ayrımcılığının Etkileri," *Mesleki Sağlık ve Güvenlik Dergisi (MSG)* 17, no. 64 (November 14, 2017), p32.

³⁷⁸ Melek Goregenli, *Türkiye'de Kamu Çalışanı Lezbiyen, Gey, Biseksüel, Trans ve İntersekslerin Durumu 2017* (Ankara: Kaos GL, 2018), p17.

Melek Goregenli and Yasemin Oz, *Türkiye'de Kamu Çalışanı Lezbiyen, Gey, Biseksüel, Trans ve İntersekslerin Durumu* (Ankara: Kaos GL, 2016), p18.

identities. Öner suggests that this policy of indirect visibility is “like a preliminary preparation” for direct-openness.³⁷⁹

However, contrary to what Öner’s approximation may suggest, these policies of visibility do not necessarily represent the somewhat coordinated stages of a single “struggle”. This is why LGBT people talk about the very different political purposes by virtue of which they follow these policies. Accordingly, the same policy of visibility may be practiced with different aims—e.g. the aim of resistance or accommodation. For the LGBT employees whose ultimate goal is to resist the authority structures around themselves, “indirect openness” is likely to be followed as a matter of compulsion,³⁸⁰ whereas those like Bora, who opposes the idea of resistance, it seems to be an ideal choice. The problem Bora faces is that he can become an open-target for the authorities due to the activities of the ‘recalcitrant’ LGBT people. At its best, the ‘recalcitrant’ approach was put forth by a gay member of the online forum, *memurlar.net*, where thousands of public employees meet. Refusing to be ‘careful’ with the visibility of his sexual identity at his workplace, the forum member wrote: “I don’t care what anybody thinks [of me]. On the contrary, I will hit them in the eye [with my identity]”.³⁸¹

Ersoy repeatedly dismissed the idea of resistance. She never preferred to participate in any kind of street activism, about which most members of the LGBT associations have been passionate. When the Gezi Protests have erupted with the participation of LGBT associations alongside others, Ersoy asked them a question: “don’t we feel uncomfortable about many things in life?” In her following sentence, she gave her advice to the protesters:

³⁷⁹ Aysun Oner, *Beyaz Yakalı Eşcinseller: İşyerinde Cinsel Yönelim Ayrımcılığı ve Mücadele Stratejileri* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015), p182-183.

³⁸⁰ Umut Guner, “‘İşyerinde Açılmamak Tercih Değil Zorunluluk,’” Kaos GL Haber Portalı, January 11, 2016, <http://www.kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=20869>.

³⁸¹ koseku, “Eşcinsel Biri Memuriyetten Atılır Mı?,” *Memurlar.Net (Forum)*, January 15, 2016, <https://forum.memurlar.net/konu/2173018/>.

Some things may seem wrong to you. Seek your rights in the ballot-box, not in laying waste [to the streets].³⁸²

As this emphasis on the ballot-box is one of the most stereotypical arguments of ‘center-right’ politicians, Then PM Erdoğan publicly appreciated Ersoy’s speech.³⁸³ Clearly, seeking one’s rights at the ballot-box also implied seeking one’s rights through a peaceful negotiation with those who succeed at the ballot-box. Ersoy’s good relations with the governments, beginning with President Turgut Özal and the Özal brothers’ TV channel in the early-1990s, have proven the usefulness of this strategy on her side. Belgin explained how the Özal government behaved differently to Ersoy and other trans people at that time: “there was torture and beating under the rule of Özal [...] Mrs. Özal [i.e. Turgut Özal’s wife Semra Özal] protected her daughter, but she crushed us”.³⁸⁴

The new implicit toleration, which requires one to have some desirable identities alongside LGBT, emanates from a model of relationship. It relies on the visible representation of an inward-looking LGBT person, who has a tension within oneself instead of a tension with the society. If s/he is a sex worker, s/he should be the one who has admittedly been in moral decay. If s/he is working in the entertainment sector, s/he should be the one that respects the legitimacy of the likes of RTÜK, TRT and other higher authorities. If s/he is a public employee, s/he should be one who does not carry any political motivation to put into question the authority structure of the workplace. As a national, s/he should be one who is aware that the national security is and will always be of utmost importance.

Fashion-designer Cemil Ipekçi, who describes himself as a “conservative gay”, could continue to appear on the pro-government TV channels, even after he began to criticize the

³⁸² “Bülent Ersoy’dan Gezi Parkı çıkışı,” Haber7, June 13, 2013, <http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/1038331-bulent-ersoydan-gezi-parki-cikisi>.

³⁸³ “Erdoğan, Bülent Ersoy’u Da Örnek Gösterdi,” HaberFedai, June 14, 2013, <http://www.haberfedai.com/haber/116/erdogan-bulent-ersoyu-da-ornek-gosterdi>.

³⁸⁴ *80’lerde Lubunya Olmak* (İzmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2012), p84.

government in some respects. On the other hand, fashion-designer Barbaros Şansal, whose ‘sharp tongue’ intersected with his gay identity, had to leave the country. As Şansal was asked on a social media platform, Twitter, about this alleged discrepancy between his and Ipekçi’s living conditions, Şansal explained: “he is a conservative, whereas I am a revolutionary gay”.³⁸⁵ Social psychologist Melek Göregenli, who has also been an advisor of Kaos-GL, diagnoses the core problem behind sexism as “conservatism” which, she claims, nurtures “nationalism” and “religious fundamentalism” among other dangers. According to Göregenli, this conservatism represents a clichéd film in which the leading man is “always Turkish, Sunni, male and heterosexual”.³⁸⁶ Clearly, the struggles of those who aim at negotiating and following the rules of appropriateness, and those who aim to breach, resist and ultimately de-construct these rules not only differ, but frequently clash.

That said, some disagreements, albeit subtle, over ‘visibility’ have appeared within the context of resistance. Many LGBT people, especially trans sex workers, have begun to re-evaluate the strategic usefulness of the policy of uncompromising visibility. This is at least because they suspect—as I also have suggested—that their increased visibility has led them to suffer from some unprecedentedly dangerous methods of surveillance and target acquisition. Accordingly, uncompromising visibility may not be a useful form of resistance, as it may uncover the fragility of the hitherto unseen agent, who may have owed some of their power to their ‘mysterious’ position. Three members of the *Lubunya* magazine—“S”, “D” and “I”—had an illuminating discussion on this matter:

D: There was no violence in the past. I have been a travesti for 16 years. There was no such violence [in Ankara] when I began working as a sex worker [...] There was no killing.

³⁸⁵ Barbaros Şansal (@barbarosansalfn), 29 Sep 2018, @taylan_h21, “O muhafazakar, ben ise devrimci eşcinselim”.

³⁸⁶ Ali Erol, “Nefret Söylemine Maruz Kalıyorlarmış. İbnelerden Nefret Ediyoruz, Var Mı Ötesi,” Kaos GL Haber Portalı, November 23, 2018, <http://www.kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=27113>.

[...]

S: There was always police violence, but you are right that there was no social violence [...] After we established our associations, [...] we said, “let’s go to the police and make a complaint” whenever someone raised his hand against us. Those who were frightened of us began seeing us as weak, and [therefore] they began attacking us [...] They have learnt that we are so fragile. I think this is very dangerous.³⁸⁷

Before RTÜK’s recent restrictions on the visibility of travesties and transsexuals, many TV programmes, such as those of Reha Muhtar and Savaş Ay, publicized these people for their “degraded”, “dirty”, but also “interesting” lives. Ironically, in the aftermath of the RTÜK fines, such negative representations have also been limited in the mainstream media.³⁸⁸ Most importantly, these broadcastings publicized the vulnerability of a community after many years of story-telling based on members of this community being seen as dangerous. Before the age of transparency, “homosexuals” appeared *only* as serial killers,³⁸⁹ gangsters,³⁹⁰ psychopaths,³⁹¹ bandits,³⁹² or rapists³⁹³ that anyone—including cheap murderers and ‘transphobes’—would like to stay away from.

At a conference on the opportunities and the risks of visibility, the participants shared the sense that, in the given circumstances, it is strategically best to be visible only in some circumstances—e.g. only to some people.³⁹⁴ In her conversation with journalist Zeynep Ekim Elbaşı, Esmeray admitted that their increased visibility could not be translated into legal

³⁸⁷ “Zaman Cınnet Zamanı: S, D, İ ve Ö İle Söyleşi,” *Lubunya*, no. 4 (November 2009): 11–14.

³⁸⁸ see “Medyanın Lanetlileri: Esmeray,” in *90’larda Lubunya Olmak* (İzmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2013), p269-270.

³⁸⁹ see “Çumra monster” in the city of Konya: “Çumra canavarının dördüncü kurbanı da bulundu,” *Cumhuriyet*, April 1, 1967.

³⁹⁰ see “homosexual gangster” Aladağ: “İstanbul Polisi Pusuda,” *Cumhuriyet*, August 13, 1969.

³⁹¹ Recep Doksat, “Transvestitismus,” *Milliyet*, April 29, 1958.

Haydar Dumen, “Kişisel ve Toplumsal Yönden Zararlı,” *Milliyet*, December 19, 1965.

³⁹² “Taşkıyla Cıvarı Soyguncuların Karargâhı Oldu,” *Cumhuriyet*, August 7, 1963.

“Cinsi Sapık Yankesici Dün Tevkif Edildi,” *Milliyet*, May 2, 1958.

“1962’nin 2. Cinayetini de Bir Cinsi Sapık İşledi,” *Cumhuriyet*, February 3, 1962.

³⁹³ “2’si Kardeş, 3 Kaatil,” *Milliyet*, January 31, 1971.

³⁹⁴ *Kadın Olma Halleri* (Ankara: Kaos GL, 2009), p30.

rights.³⁹⁵ During a debate between the activists of different LGBT associations, Belgin Çelik, from *Pembe Hayat*, recalled her friend who was not hired despite having succeeded to attain the highest rank in the İŞKUR course:

[we] encourage them to [...] attend these exams, but the state deceives us. And it turns out that we deceive the trans people [with false promises].

Based on the already well-disputed experience of violence brought about by ‘secrecy’,³⁹⁶ activists have begun to acknowledge that ‘visibility’ also paved the way to a specific mode of violence, which uses it against them. In this vein, researcher Volkan Yılmaz mentioned an unprecedented danger that looms as a consequence of LGBT people’s increased visibility. The danger is that homophobia, which has become more vocal in the face of a more visible LGBT advocacy, might also try to re-cast the legal mechanisms for its own interests.³⁹⁷

Erdem Gür, from *Siyah Pembe Üçgen*, described how they were lost in the “vicious cycle” of press releases, parades, and protests with placards. Gür made the following point, which, he emphasized, all “opposition groups” should consider:

We hesitate to be active in places that are dominated by the culture of shopkeepers (tr. esnaf kültürü). This is because we fear that they may react as if [...] we struggle against them [...] When we say, “our struggle is against masculinity in these places”, we fear that it may be misunderstood and turn out to mean, “our struggle is against you”.³⁹⁸

Clearly, in the face of the given power imbalance between them and this ‘culture’ they resist, the methods of activism are at a deadlock. These strategic calculations on the part of LGBT

³⁹⁵ Zeynep Ekim Elbasi, “Görünürlük çok arttı ama halen edinilmiş hiçbir hakkımız yok,” *Agos*, July 5, 2013, <http://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/5228/gorunurluk-cok-artti-ama-halen-edinilmis-hicbir-hakkimiz-yok>.

³⁹⁶ Mahmut Sefik Nil, “Bu Kültürde Eşcinsel Olmak: Çekingenlik ve Saldırganlık Sarmalında Eşcinsel Hayatlar,” *Kaos GL*, March 2003, 13-18, p16.

³⁹⁷ Volkan Yılmaz, “LGBT Meselesinde Siyasi Tehditler ve Olanaklar,” *Bianet*, July 21, 2012, <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/diger/139812-lgbt-meselesinde-siyasi-tehditler-ve-olanaklar>.

³⁹⁸ see the speech of Erdem Gür: Buse Kilickaya, “LGBT Aktivistlere Sorduk,” *Lubunya*, November 2011.

activists may bridge some of their policies of visibility with those of the LGBT people who settled for negotiating with authority. Even though their political motivations ultimately diverge, these different approaches to visibility may have to be combined in some unique ways. This is, however, not a methodological question that only LGBT activists have faced. To examine the conversations between those who have faced the same question, I shall analyze the broader ideological channels into which the LGBT activism has gradually been integrated.

5.6. Evaluative Conversations (II): “Left-Wing” and Like-minded LGBT People

In order to elaborate on the activists’ evaluations of the “culture of shopkeepers”, this part focuses on developing networks of political parties, grassroots groups and their coalitions. In the previous evaluative conversations (I), I analyzed how the visible representation of Bülent Ersoy pushed the “Islamists” to fine-tune their approach to the LGBT “sinners”. Similarly, in this part, I examine how the visible representation of the activists encouraged the development of a common sensitivity in fractured “left-wing” politics. These activists, who began their activities at home and continued in the university campuses and the corridors of “left-wing” parties,³⁹⁹ pushed all these circles to re-evaluate their ideological repertoires, from marxism to secularism. This process of re-making, however, prompted significant problems concerning the perceived hegemony of the “culture of shopkeepers”, and the contested priorities in left-wing politics against this culture.

In 1986, Ahmet Necdet Sezer was among the members of the 2nd Chamber of the Court of Cassation, who denied the “pink identity” to Ersoy. Later, Sezer would not only become the

³⁹⁹ e.g. *Toplumsal Araştırmalar Vakfı (TAV)* and *Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (ÖDP)* led by Ufuk Uras; *İnsan Hakları Derneği (IHD)*; İbrahim Eren’s club *Yeşil Bizans*, and Eren’s political party, *Radikal Demokrat Yeşiller Partisi* (en. Green Party), *HADEP*.

“Bütün Lubunyalar Toplandık: Öner,” in *90’larda Lubunya Olmak* (İzmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2013), p118-119, p130.

“Bütün Lubunyalar Toplandık: Mine,” in *90’larda Lubunya Olmak* (İzmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2013), p137. *80’lerde Lubunya Olmak* (İzmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2012), p135-136.

president of the Republic of Turkey (2000-2007), but he would also become, as a president, a primary gate-keeper of Secularism (i.e. state secularism) in response to the re-visionism of the first AKP government. As a fundamental part of Sezer’s ideological thought, his value-laden understanding of Secularism never included a reaction against what many self-proclaimed secularists of the young generation began problematizing as “heteronormativity”.

These new ideology-makers hold a conservative hegemony responsible for many ‘evils’, including heteronormativity. A part of this narrative was clearly inherited from the previous line of defence of Secularism (e.g. women’s rights, the perils of ‘religious bigotry’), whereas another part re-configured the line (e.g. the question of ‘gender’). Accordingly, what brought them together with the LGBT activists against “this culture” is their awareness of the possibility that a homosexual couple, as well as a heterosexual one, may be beaten for holding hands on street. A trans woman, as well as a biological woman, may be dismissed from her job due to her “unchastity”. Or a homosexual man, as well as a heterosexual man, may be condemned in public for his extra-marital affair—i.e. his “private life”. Meanwhile, the LGBT activists made clear that the ‘rainbow’ has many colors, from those who struggle against poverty,⁴⁰⁰ to the student who was labelled as an “infidel” by his classmate for not attending the Qur’an course.⁴⁰¹ This is the culture of “shopkeepers”, the point of intersection of “aggression” and “bigotry”.

In 2004, MP Orhan Eraslan became one of the first CHP members—if not the first—to publicly meet the members of an LGBT association, *Lambda-Istanbul*. In this meeting, the demands of the Lambda members included the lifting of the obstacles that push them into sex

⁴⁰⁰ Volkan Yılmaz, “Sosyal Vatandaşlık Etrafında: İttifakın Olanakları Üzerine,” *Kaos GL*, April 2010, 20-21.

⁴⁰¹ Semen Yonsel Saygun, “Sınıfımıza Gökkuşağının Bütün Renklerini Sokmanın Zamanıdır,” *Kaos GL*, August 2017, 10-11.

see Öner’s description of the wide-range of social issues that were taken into account by the members of *Lambda-Istanbul*: “Bütün Lubunyalılar Toplandık: Öner”, p125.

work, and the re-consideration of the legal interpretation of “unjust provocation”.⁴⁰² As fellow AKP members of the parliament, as well as the pro-AKP media, referred to Eraslan with a series of denigrating labels, Eraslan defended himself with a cautious statement:

Being a democrat means, however, to listen to those who are different, and to reflect on them. The fact that I agreed to meet them does not mean I agree with their demands.⁴⁰³

Then leader Deniz Baykal of CHP tended to remain silent on this matter. However, one year later, Baykal responded to an allegation made by Bülent Ersoy by mocking her medical record: “this is a hormone-fed lie”.⁴⁰⁴ Using a similarly pejorative language, Kemal Anadol, a senior member of CHP, labelled the politics of AKP as that of a “political travesti”, in the sense that the AKP leaders kept wearing the ‘clothes’ of ideologies that they did not really represent. At the time, such negative connotations provoked many LGBT activists to discuss whether CHP was their friend in a two-party parliament, or just another foe alongside AKP. As a humorous part of the 2007 LGBT Pride parade, the activists declared Deniz Baykal the winner of the “hormone-fed tomato award”.⁴⁰⁵

However, in the aftermath of parliamentary elections (2011), CHP, somewhat refreshed by a group of younger members, demanded sexual orientation and identity be explicitly written into the constitutional clause on the principle of equality.⁴⁰⁶ When the LGBT associations, *Kaos-GL* and *Pembe Hayat*, visited the parliament in January 2012, CHP greeted them, this

⁴⁰² “Eşcinseller Taleplerini Meclis’e Taşdı,” *Hürriyet*, May 24, 2004,

<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/escinseller-taleplerini-meclise-tasidi-38606919>.

⁴⁰³ Pinar Ilkcaracan, *Deconstructing Sexuality in the Middle East: Challenges and Discourses* (Routledge, 2016), p59.

⁴⁰⁴ Fahir Arikan, “Bülent Ersoy’un söyledikleri kuyruklu değil hormonlu yalan,” *Hürriyet*, 7 Sep 2005,

<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/bulent-ersoy-un-soyledikleri-kuyruklu-degil-hormonlu-yalan-348006>.

⁴⁰⁵ “Eşcinseller Ayrımcılığa Karşı Yürüdü,” *Lambdaistanbul*, October 9, 2007,

<http://www.lambdaistanbul.org/s/medya/escinseller-ayrimciliga-karsi-yurudu/>.

⁴⁰⁶ “BDP ve CHP, Anayasada eşcinsellere eşit hak istedi,” T24, May 14, 2012, <https://t24.com.tr/haber/bdp-ve-chp-anayasada-escinsellere-esit-hak-istedi,203845>.

time with 8 MPs and a clearer political will.⁴⁰⁷ Alongside a senior member, Rıza Türmen,⁴⁰⁸ the group predominantly consisted of the MPs of the new-generation, like Şafak Pavey, who in the parliament would later deliver an attention-grabbing defense of Secularism in the name of the ‘minority’ (see CH.6, entitled “Women and Clothing”). CHP members never missed subsequent LGBT Pride parades. During the LGBT Pride parade of 2015, MP Mahmut Tanal of CHP climbed atop the police water cannon vehicle to try to stop the intervention into the parade.

As has been acknowledged by the Kaos-GL team, the Gezi Protests (2013) acted as the primary catalyst for the LGBT activists’ integration into this broader political spectrum.⁴⁰⁹ Before ‘Gezi’, the association had been organized only in Ankara, Istanbul, İzmir, Eskişehir and Diyarbakır, whereas after ‘Gezi’, its activity expanded to many other cities, from Edirne to Kars. From its emphasis on union rights to its labor-centered street activism, the association’s strategies of action were already very similar to left-wing organizations.⁴¹⁰ A long way has been travelled since the late-1980s. Since then, the LGBT activists were gradually accepted into broader left-wing politics:

when I attended a meeting of the Association of Human Rights (tr. İHD) for the first time, they reacted against me, “what are these homos [tr. ibneler] doing here?” But maybe, we were much more revolutionary compared to them.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁷ “LGBT Dernek Temsilcileri CHP İle Görüştü,” Kaos GL Haber Portalı, January 12, 2012, <http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=10337>.

⁴⁰⁸ Türmen is a former judge of the European Court of Human Rights.

⁴⁰⁹ Funda Cantek, “Herhangi Bir Toplumsal Kesimin Özgür Olmadığı Bir Toplumda Aslında Hiç Kimse Özgür Değildir.,” *Mülkiye Dergisi* 37, no. 4 (2013): 223–230, p225.

⁴¹⁰ KAOS GL, “İşçilerin Eşcinselliğini, Eşcinsellerin İşçiliğini Saklamak Zorunda Kalmayacağı bir Çalışma ve Sosyal Hayatı Hedefliyoruz,” *Mesleki Sağlık ve Güvenlik Dergisi (MSG)* 17, no. 65 (February 9, 2018), <https://www.ttb.org.tr/dergi/index.php/msg/article/view/598>.

⁴¹¹ see Ebru’s comments: Berat Guncikan, “Eğer İHD Olmasaydı...,” *Cumhuriyet Pazar*, July 16, 2006, p5.

In May 2001, neither the labor unions nor the left-wing groups were happy when the members of LGBT associations attended the march.⁴¹² A decade later, the anarchist fellows themselves were carrying the LGBT flags alongside others in the front row.

Having said that, orthodox marxists maintained their criticism of sex work. In these marches, the visible representation of ‘the sex worker’ has still been the least acceptable of all. Şevval, a trans activist, was highly disappointed after their meetings with the labor union DISK, which she criticizes for reproducing radical feminist and orthodox marxist language.⁴¹³ According to this repertoire, even though those who were admittedly forced into sex work should be taken as the victims to be saved, the other, ‘liberal’ sex workers are among the enemies that commodify the woman’s body. Clearly, the denigrated status of sex work is not unique to a singular ideological position, which may be partly why the visibility of sex workers has not made them less vulnerable in most social contexts. In this context, Tuna Erdem suggested the LGBT activists should not take feminism as a “natural ally”.⁴¹⁴

In the course of these re-evaluations, a group of LGBT activists were able to become candidates to stand as MPs. In 2017, the CHP members of the Avcılar district of Istanbul elected their first “openly trans delegate”, Niler Albayrak, who was also an MP candidate from the same political party.⁴¹⁵ Albayrak declared that CHP’s policy would be centered on defending the “otherized” groups, which include the victims of what they define as the heterosexist ideology or the heteronormative system. In the same vein, trans woman Deva Özenen became an MP candidate from the newly founded political party of Emine Ülker Tarhan, a former

⁴¹² Funda Senol Cantek, “KAOS GL: ‘Herhangi Bir Toplumsal Kesimin Özgür Olmadığı Bir Toplumda Aslında Kimse Özgür Değildir.’” *Mülkiye Dergisi* 37, no. 4 (2013): 223–30, p225.

⁴¹³ “Bütün Lubunyalar Toplandık: Şevval,” in *90’larda Lubunya Olmak* (Izmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2013), p149-150.

⁴¹⁴ Tuna Erdem, “Feminizm ve Queer Düşmanlığı,” *Lubunya*, no. 8 (November 2011), p34.

⁴¹⁵ İhsan Dortkardes, “CHP’nin İlk Trans Delegatesi,” *Hürriyet*, October 10, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/chpnin-ilk-trans-delegesesi-40605527>.

investigating judge of the Court of Cassation.⁴¹⁶ Barış Sulu, who openly identifies as gay, became an MP candidate for HDP.⁴¹⁷ Sulu noted that he chose HDP, as the members of this party were with the LGBT activists “since the beginning”.⁴¹⁸ For the sake of their uncompromising visibility, the LGBT associations consciously refused to be subsumed by any political party, but were always open to bilateral agreements and side deals.

Alongside its focus on the “Kurdish Problem” (tr. Kürt Sorunu), HDP prioritized LGBT activism and feminism, as it aimed to transform into “the party of Turkey”⁴¹⁹ for all disadvantaged groups. It did not take long for many LGBT activists to enter the city organizations of HDP, with which they had already collaborated in the past, in *HADEP*, *DTP* and *BDP*. At its best, an indication of this agreement was the conversation between Elçin Kurbanoğlu and Buse Kılıçkaya from *Lubunya*:

As a result, I am a human rights activist [and not just a trans] [...] I am a Kurdish trans, an Alevi trans, a socialist trans [...] Just as we said “we are all Hrant Dink” [and] “we are all Alevi” when their time came, it is important, today, to be able to say “we are all trans”.⁴²⁰

Despite some conservative critiques of this agreement from within HDP⁴²¹ and PKK,⁴²² the activists could develop their dialogue with the party offices in the metropolitan areas, as well

⁴¹⁶ Yıldız Tar, “Trans Kadın Anadolu Partisi’nden Milletvekili Adayı Oldu,” Kaos GL Haber Portalı, April 7, 2015, <http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=19134>.

⁴¹⁷ Yıldız Tar, “HDP’den Eşcinsel Milletvekili Adayı,” Kaos GL Haber Portalı, April 7, 2015, <http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=19133>.

⁴¹⁸ “LGBTİ Aday Neden HDP’de Siyaset Yaptığını Anlattı,” CNN Türk, May 25, 2015, <https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/lgbti-aday-neden-hdpde-siyaset-yaptigini-anlatti>.

⁴¹⁹ “HDP Eş Başkanı Demirtaş: ‘PKK’nın Siyasi Uzantısı, Siyasi Kolu Değiliz,” euronews, October 9, 2015, <https://tr.euronews.com/2015/10/09/hdp-es-baskani-demirtaspkk-nin-siyasi-uzantisi-siyasi-kolu-degiliz>.

⁴²⁰ Elcin Kurbanoglu, “Bu Naz’a, Derya’ya, Ya Da Buse’ye Yönelik Bir Saldırı Değil,” *Lubunya* 8 (November 2011).

⁴²¹ “LGBT: Altan Tan bayraklarımızı gördükten sonra yüzünü bize dönmedi,” Radikal, March 25, 2015, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/lgbt-altan-tan-bayraklarimizi-gordukten-sonra-yuzunu-bize-donmedi-1321354/>.

⁴²² Rusen Cakir, “Cemil Bayik Ile Soylesi, Tam Metin,” August 20, 2014, <http://rusencakir.com/Cemil-Bayik-ile-soylesi-20-Agustos-2014-Tam-metin/2839>.

“HDP’den PKK’lı Cemil Bayik’a ‘Marjinal’ Tepkisi,” Haberler.com, August 24, 2014, <https://www.haberler.com/hdp-den-pkk-li-cemil-bayik-a-marjinal-6411012-haber/>.

as the leading members of the party, such as former president Selahattin Demirtaş and MP Ertuğrul Kürkçü.

Not only was the LGBT associations' agreement with the Kurdish political movement, or this movement's relationship with PKK⁴²³ problematized by the pro-government media and "conservative" LGBT people, it was also questioned by others in the opposition LGBT community. Some have been seeking the background to this agreement in the external funders of the LGBT associations, such as the Soros Foundations and some foreign countries' embassies. Clearly, however, this is not a new cleavage. In the mid-1990s, the idea of struggling alongside the 'Kurdish separatists' became a hotly contested topic in LGBT activism. Ibrahim Eren, an openly gay man who aimed to form a green party in Turkey, was at the center of these contestations. Eren was highly praised at the time, as he was the one who used his club *Yeşil Bizans* to bring together many gay, lesbian and bisexual activists for the first time.⁴²⁴ For some time, Eren was the only visible gay activist, whereas others masked themselves.⁴²⁵ His party was to support conscientious objection in defense of anti-militarism.

Eren, however, refused to bring together his gay activism with the politics of *HADEP*, the political party which had close ties with PKK. On the contrary, when the flag of Turkey was taken down in the congress of *HADEP*, Eren harshly criticized some fellow LGBT activists whom he thought to have toxified the LGBT struggle with separatism. Moreover, according to Kandiyoti, "a leading male gay activist" (likely to be Eren himself) hung a flag of Turkey at the door of Claudia Roth, the representative of the German Green Party in Istanbul, who was also famous for her LGBT activism alongside her ties to *HADEP*.⁴²⁶ Arguably, this act was intended

⁴²³ Oray Egin, "Bir köşede yalnız," *Habertürk*, May 22, 2018, <https://www.haberturk.com/yazarlar/oray-egin/1977977-bir-kosedeyalniz>.

⁴²⁴ "Bütün Lubunyalılar Toplandık: Şevval", p244.

⁴²⁵ Idil Engindeniz, "80'lerden Günümüze Eşcinsel Hareketin Medya İlişkisi," *Kaos GL*, October 29, 2011, <http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=9906>.

⁴²⁶ Deniz Kandiyoti, "Pink Card Blues: Trouble and Strife at the Crossroads of Gender," *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey*, 2002, 277–293, p289.

to convey the message that Roth must not act as an undercover imperialist, whose aim would not be the well-being of LGBT people but the dissolution of Turkey. Eren's project failed, since the members of the community could not meet on a common ground.⁴²⁷

Despite their awareness of the repercussions of this historical baggage, neither the MP candidates nor those other LGBT people who applied for candidacy criticized one another as members of rival parties. Instead, they publicly expressed their appreciation at seeing other openly LGBT candidates. If only because none of these candidates had a realistic chance of being elected—i.e. given their standings on the party-lists—they were there primarily to strengthen the visible representation of LGBT activism. For the very same reason, they did not distinguish between the few political parties which invited them. For example, Özenen was an HDP candidate for a municipal assembly in 2014, a year before she became an MP candidate for CHP. When they are under the watchful eyes of others, such as those times in which they find an opportunity to express themselves on the mainstream media channels, the activists continue to follow the policy of focusing on their common denominators.

That said, the fractured left-wing politics in which the LGBT activists have obtained some agency, is not likely to open more room for these activists without transferring its own existential crisis onto them. This crisis partly relates to these movements' confusion with the hegemonic culture, with which they must deal from inside. Amidst this fundamental crisis, those LGBT activists who “waste time” by campaigning for the issues of “secondary” importance (e.g. gender-neutral toilets) have often been criticized by the other left-wing activists, as they arguably mask the “primary struggle”. As I noted, in elections of June 2015, HDP and CHP *inter alia* had LGBT candidates. However, this diversity was more circumscribed in the subsequent elections because the decision-makers of these parties

⁴²⁷ see “Bütün Lubunyalar Toplandık: Ali,” in *90'larda Lubunya Olmak* (Izmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2013), p152. “İktidarın Sopası: İlker,” in *90'larda Lubunya Olmak* (Izmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2013), p225.

concluded that the LGBT candidates were likely to be a deterrent factor in the eyes of the “conservative electorate”.⁴²⁸

In snap-elections in November 2015, neither HDP nor CHP had any openly LGBT candidates. Some have speculated that criticism of PKK leader Cemil Bayık diverted the policy of HDP.⁴²⁹ Beyond pure speculation, empirical evidence can be found, according to which HDP limited its promotion of LGBT activism to the metropolitan areas, with a few exceptions in the rural South-East where “conservative Kurds” are in a majority.⁴³⁰ This situation may well have resulted from a calculation on the part of HDP to keep its “conservative Kurdish” voter-base, on whom the AKP and South-Eastern Islamists *Hüda-Par* play as well. For example, in 2016 in Diyarbakır, the HDP-led panel on “LGBT” was eventually cancelled by the organizers, due to a mass campaign against the panel on social media.⁴³¹

After a similar process of strategic calculation, the decision-makers of CHP concluded that the Erdoğan government only gains power when “the culture of shopkeepers” is in dispute. Instead, CHP decided to prioritise its propaganda against the economic aspect of this culture. Though both parties kept their LGBT members in some of their city organizations, they clearly have doubts about the strategic usefulness of uncompromising visibility. In 2018, the two parties removed some key sections from their election bulletins that previously included the word “LGBT”.⁴³² In their campaigns for the presidential elections, neither the CHP candidate

⁴²⁸ Here comes the social significance of value-surveys.

⁴²⁹ “HDP, Eşcinsel Adaylardan Neden Vazgeçti?,” Haberler.com, September 20, 2015, <https://www.haberler.com/hdp-escinsel-adaylardan-neden-vazgecti-7709485-haberi/>

⁴³⁰ Mahmut Licali, “Mahalle Baskısı... HDP’de LGBT Aday Yok,” *Cumhuriyet*, September 20, 2015, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/372979/Mahalle_baskisi..._HDP_de_LGBT_aday_yok.html.

⁴³¹ “Karaman’da Ensar’ın Önüne Yatanlar Diyarbakır’da Ahlak Bekçisi!,” April 9, 2016, <https://www.abcgazetesi.com/guncel/karamanda-ensarin-onune-yatanlar-diyarbakirda-ahlak-bekcisi-12834h/haber-12834>.

“Sahabeler Şehri ağır tepkisi LGBT panelini iptal mi ettirdi?,” Diyarbakır Söz, April 9, 2016, <http://www.diyarbakirsoz.com/diyarbakir/sahabeler-sehri-agir-tepkisi-lgbt-panelini-iptal-mi-ettirdi-151250>.

⁴³² Ali Erol, “CHP ve HDP: Nefret Suçları Cezasız Kalmayacak,” Kaos GL Haber Portalı, June 1, 2018, <http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=25945>.

Muharrem Ince nor the HDP candidate Selahattin Demirtaş sent a message explicitly to “LGBT” people. While re-orienting part of their visibility, the first thing to hide was “LGBT” as a single marker of identity.

Despite such constraints, LGBT activists are still active and trying to transfer their knowledge to ‘like-minded others’. In the panels, meetings and marches organized by these opposition parties as well as university clubs and various civil society associations,⁴³³ the activists share their concerns about discrimination on the street, in custody, at work and school. On the flip side, just like the LGBT activists who problematized discrimination as a part of left-wing politics, Bülent Ersoy could share her primary concern in the ‘breakfast for artists’ organized by then PM Erdoğan: “I am a person who travels a lot. We want the artists to be able to use the VIP [facilities at the airports]”.⁴³⁴ Even though these concerns clearly differ, all these agents have managed to integrate themselves into a broad ideological spectrum which finally pays attention to their arguments. They have established some key social links, which are likely to be missed by the studies that focus on them merely as an isolated sub-culture.

⁴³³ As much as these institutions could remain intact after the post-coup decrees in the force of law (tr. KHK).

⁴³⁴ “Bülent Ersoy’dan şaşirtan talep,” Habertürk, February 22, 2010, <https://www.haberturk.com/polemik/haber/208489-bulent-ersoydan-sasirtan-talep>.

6. Women & Clothing

This chapter analyzes the unchaining of ‘our’ clothing rights from ‘our’ first-order values pertaining to clothing. I suggest that an exclusive feature of the current⁴³⁵ debates over clothing is the ethical content which depends on the expression of a set of second-order values, concerned with managing difference instead of imposing ideal-types, theological, scientific or other ideological truth-claims. Irrespective of whether the interlocutors ‘like’ to go beyond the scope of their foundational values, they have been convinced by the necessity of re-visiting the question of what would be appropriate in the conduct of their relations with other value-systems.

First, I will emphasize that since the early Ottoman times, clothing has been taken by the state as a value-laden matter of social order and/or development. Accordingly, clothing patterns were taken as the markers of some pre-defined social groups (e.g. religious communities in the Millet System). Following the Ottoman modernization process, some rival ideological representations, struggling for hegemony in the state, continued to share the notion that one’s clothing marked one’s identity. In other words, the wearer of a cloth was assumed to carry the clear-cut personality that was assigned for this cloth. The properties of personality were exogenously objectified, and their re-evaluation was to be made from above the wearer. During Tanzimat and Meşrutiyet Reforms, the rival ideological positions merged in their making of authoritative claims over *clothing*; despite the fact that they clashed over the meaning of *clothes*.

Within this context, I demonstrate that the problematization of clothing was not produced by one hegemonic ideology or the other, but shared in their common cultural mindset—i.e. the common playing field where they operated. The Clothing Revolution

⁴³⁵ i.e. in the aftermath of the de-facto lifting of the head-covering ban.

challenged the value-system of its past. In other words, its makers rationalized intolerance against the intolerance of their past. Having said that, it did not mean to challenge the state's value-laden take on clothing. On the contrary, in pursuit of making some "Secular national values" ascendant, the state authority reproduced the mindset that one's cloth would be a mirror of one's personal stance vis-à-vis the competing ideal-types.

Upon assessment of this historical baggage, I will argue that this cultural mindset, which transcends the rivalry of ideologies and changing authority structures, has recently been challenged in unprecedented ways. To begin with, in contemporary incidents intolerance has been rationalized almost always in reference to *contextuality*. Accordingly, instead of reducing their authoritative claims to some essential features of clothes, the authorities have relied on a set of contextual elements, such as the time, the place and the manners in which a piece of cloth appeared. This argumentation differs from those knowledge claims based merely on the context-free properties of clothes. Among these past knowledge claims were the rationalization of intolerance against *şapka* (en. hat) on the basis that it represents "blasphemy" (tr. küfür), or the intolerance against *peçe* (en. niqab, full-face veil) on the basis that it represents pre-modernity.

On the one hand, this shift implies cultural change as it indicates that some new spaces, albeit isolated, have been left free for others' clothes to appear. On the other hand, it suggests a process of cultural reproduction in the sense that the moral condition that a cloth was previously claimed to represent may have been somewhat well-reproduced. Therefore, in this first part I shall clarify the coupling of the context-dependent arguments with the insistently reproduced claims over the essential features of clothes.

This tension between the claims on morality and social context will be the focal point of evaluative conversations. In this part, I argue that the carriers of the abovementioned

ideological repertoires have realized cultural change in some key respects. This change includes a re-casting of Secularism in terms of recognizing (1) the agency of *türban*-wearers together with the burden of responsibility it loads on them; (2) the need to re-visit some elements of the ideological amalgam previously made to rationalize the head-covering ban; the re-casting of Islamism in terms of recognizing (3) the temporal element by means of which a cloth makes sense; and (4) the belief-system's need for those who may refuse to follow the rules of *tesettür*, given the otherwise “disappointing” in-group practice of such foundational values. Most importantly, because these changes made it discursively possible for a “*türban*-wearer” to defend human rights in the “Secularist” sense of the term, and a hijabi to be “immoral” in the “Islamist” sense of the term, clothing has been deposed from the position of acting as an infallible precursor of personality.

Furthermore, concerned with a set of relevant ethical questions, the ideology-makers seem to have admitted that their arguments cannot be based merely on a statement of their first-order values. Despite talking about the foundational values of themselves and others, they had to go further to touch upon the necessity of managing some ties between these values and their discontents. In this vein, they rely on their understanding of a set of second-order values, such as freedom of conscience, which they think will ultimately promote their first-order values.

The retroactive conversations suggest that the women who recently faced some authoritative claims over their clothes have tried to reclaim their agency in various ways. Firstly, they have frequently been asked their opinions (e.g. in mass media channels, public parades or other meetings), which facilitated their participation in ideological contestation. In these conversations, where they recalled the incidents, they staunchly defended their own ways of life. More importantly, while doing so, none of them described their choice of clothing as “the true one”, but a respectable one among others. They did not denounce another way of life in order to justify the ones they chose. They did not associate the intolerance they faced with any

other identity as a whole—be it a religion or a value-system. They made their rights-based positions explicit, by not only denouncing the authoritative claim over their clothing preference, but also by refusing to make their own authoritative claims on what should be legitimate to wear in a given social setting. Therefore, they have something to say against the gate-keepers of hegemonic ideologies.

Finally, the chapter questions if this ethical content was accessible in the snapshots from a past, yet relevant historical episode. With this aim, I examine the oft-recalled Ticani attacks (in the early-1950s) on women due to their allegedly open-clothes. In this part, I argue that the women who were then attacked were not needed as interlocutors in the ideology-making processes. This is because the issue was deemed a matter of defending the ideal-type woman of a hegemonic imaginary, which was not necessarily inclusive of the individual experience of those who faced an authoritative claim over their clothes. In this context, “women” could have a voice so long as they purified their arguments of their individual stories. I conclude that at the time, the clothing issue was commonly taken as a war of ideal-types rather than empirical-types.

6.1. Clothing as a Matter of Cultural Mindset

The studies on the “headscarf” or “türban” ban have not yet scrutinized the issue as one dimension of some further-reaching authoritative claims over clothing. Limiting the question to the head-covering ban firstly risks reducing the subject to state policy, even though the state authority is clearly not the sole determinant of the rationalization behind such restrictions. Secondly, this limit disconnects the ban from other fields of restriction that may have been deemed relevant to the head-covering ban. In my opinion, the (de)construction of these relevancies in the human mind indicates some significant cultural processes, to which students of cultural change should pay attention.

In this sense, I find it noteworthy that conversations on the head-covering ban usually ended up being wider debates about the obstacles set against women, such as the somewhat systematic argument that their allegedly ‘open-clothes’ should be interfered with as a matter of public decency. In other words, the public debate on the head-covering ban inevitably merged with other limits on dressing in public, which render it a broader *clothing problem*. Yet a broader category of clothing problem cannot be conclusively isolated from the other potential subjects either, because its usage triggers an even wider repertoire of communal pressures, extending towards numerous fields’ logics of appropriateness. I will name the outcomes of these ideological processes as *amalgams*, for they amalgamate some symbols which would otherwise be irrelevant to one another.

These works of amalgamation explain why the public discussion in the 2000s was positioned on a dialectic between the legally grounded head-covering ban, and the socially grounded “neighborhood pressure” (tr. mahalle baskısı). If one aimed to rationalize the former, s/he would often emphasize the existence of the latter. The latter was associated with the intolerance of an essentially conservative value-system, whereas the former in return, by means of Secularism, was intended to overturn this system. On the one hand, the head-covering ban

was to be fundamentally imposed by the state. On the other hand, some neighborhood-level dress codes were to be implemented by different micro-mechanisms of authority, which have a “conservative” take on public decency. These two conflicting claims, however, underpinned one another by casting a fundamental role for clothing in the making of the society and gender.

The dominant culture reproduces itself whenever this contestation surfaces, as it leaves no room for the contesters to think of challenging one another with respect to, say, gender essentialism. Instead, they constructed this common playing field mutually to contest one another only what the ideal women wear, do and say.⁴³⁶ Considering the totality of these seemingly conflicting but essentially merging authoritative claims over clothing, I refuse to analyze intolerance merely against some isolated preferences—whether to wear skirts or scarves. Instead of developing yet another parochial vision, I will explore the shared cultural mindset that amalgamates clothing with all the other aspects of social life. My intention was perfectly depicted in the title of a study by Cihan Aktaş, “Kılık-Kıyafet ve İktidar” (en. Appearance-Dress and Rulership). That said, the content of Aktaş’s study largely did not scrutinize the relationship between the above-mentioned, seemingly conflicting but essentially merging authoritative claims. Instead, what Aktaş did was to problematize the “rulership” of the “Westernist” ideology that informed the late-Ottoman modernization project and Secularism of the Republic. Though she has a point in her own terms, this focal point renders her study a parochial one that seeks the exercise of rulership only in the state authority, and only as a property of a given form of modernism.

On the contrary, my starting point is that this fundamental cultural mindset is grasped only through a dialectic reading. The policies that were made in the name of the Clothing

⁴³⁶ Historically, secularism in the West did not either challenge, but came up with an alternative organization of gender essentialism.
Joan Wallach Scott, *Sex and Secularism* (Princeton University Press, 2018).

Revolution (1925) may only be understood as a direct response to the deep-seated Ottoman understanding of clothing. Though the ideology behind the revolution was closely related to the rulers' perception of "universal modernity" and the requirements of nation-state building processes, their rationalization of intolerance—e.g. Şapka Law—was not merely imported from the West. In this vein, I will analyze some cognitive processes that the ruling elite underwent in their rationalizations of intolerance against fez and hijab. I argue, based on my analysis of the arguments of Falih Rıfkı Atay and Niyazi Berkes, that these cognitive processes include the şapka wearers' fear of being marked as infidels alongside the carriers of fez. Clearly, the ruling elite rationalized intolerance against fez at least because they perceived an existential threat which came from the markers of identity inherited from the past. In sum, the "Clothing Revolution" was not rationalized for its own sake, but in response to historical baggage to which some competing authoritative claims previously contributed.

By the same token, the contemporary public marches led by the women who have been interfered with for their clothing preferences, can make sense in relation to the 1990s and the 2000s mass debate over the role of subjectivity in headscarf usage. In this vein, as a result of my cross-temporal analysis, I will argue that women's possible individual perspectives on clothing were not perceived to be a noteworthy matter of agency in the early-1950s' ideological contestation—i.e. a period in which some members of the *Ticani* movement were attacking women for their clothes. Contrary to this historical episode, the women in the contemporary cases have reclaimed their agency with a series of unique ethical arguments. In this process, they seem to have inherited a notion of subjectivity from the previous mass debates on the head-covering ban. This is how many covered and uncovered women could come together in the contemporary public marches, entitled "do not meddle with my cloth". These transmissions underlie the re-making of the cultural mindset, which contains but also goes beyond ideological counter-positions. Given that the opposite-poles tend to pull each other onto a common playing

field, the most fundamental question of cultural change shall be the extent to which this playing field shifted as the dialogue proceeded.

In the following part, based on a review of the historiography of this landscape, I initially describe this common cultural mindset as one that identified clothing as a fundamental social matter. Accordingly, dresses were more than dresses, as they had their own personalities regardless of the subjective meanings that may be attached to them by those who wear them. Therefore, the clothing of the self and the other were to be regulated by the self, by the law enforcers at public places, by the husband, the father or the mother in family, by the teachers at school, or by anybody who occasionally claimed such rulership in the neighborhood.⁴³⁷ Clothes had to be regulated in accordance with what they were meant to symbolize on their wearer. I describe the fundamental aspect of this cultural mindset as the rejection of contextuality in dresses: some given dresses, be them *fez*, *şapka* or *hijab*, would be forbidden for some given groups, be them Muslims, Christians or the citizens of Turkish Republic.

6.1.1. *Clothing in the Ottoman “Millet” System: Tolerance and Its Limits*

Nor any infidel be allowed to wear fine clothes.⁴³⁸

Dresses served as an immediate marker of boundary in the Ottoman system.⁴³⁹ In this system, all *millets* (i.e. religious communities) had their individual dress codes. The state guaranteed that the clothing traditions of each religious community would differ, and the difference would be *forcefully* preserved. Although in the 16th century the millet system was not as clear-cut as it later became, the first well-known clothing regulation was made by Murat III (1546-1595) as

⁴³⁷ The neighborhood denoted a key authority structure in the Ottoman social model.

⁴³⁸ Order to the Qadi of Istanbul (1568), in Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 1984), p38.

⁴³⁹ Karen Barkey, “Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model,” *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 19, no. 1–2 (2005): 5–19, p16.

a response to the increased similarities between the dresses of Muslims and non-Muslims.⁴⁴⁰

According to the ideology behind this problematization, religious differences should be made explicit at first glance.⁴⁴¹

In this understanding, which was reproduced by the following rulers, the upper hand was granted to the Muslim symbols. Non-Muslim communities would wear ‘their own’ costumes, but as a reflection of the regime’s identity, it was forbidden for a non-Muslim to wear some materials deemed higher quality, such as silk. For example, non-Muslim men were obliged to wear hats instead of turbans (tr. *sarıık*), defined as a symbol of Muslimness. They were also not allowed to wear white and green colors that symbolized the status of the Muslim *tebaa*. Within such boundaries, the pre-recognized authority structures of non-Muslim communities were to determine their own rules of appropriateness. According to Zilfi, the authorities of non-Muslim communities were in agreement with the higher authority of the state in terms of promoting some clear-cut physical differences between religious communities.⁴⁴² Therefore, for a long time the system worked well as a system of tolerance.

Wearing clothes designated to another millet was a matter of political punishment (tr. *siyaset cezası*), which is a special category in Ottoman Customary Law, including very severe punishments up to the death penalty. According to the register of important public affairs (tr. *mühimme defteri*) dated 1556, three Muslims were penalized with political punishment after they were caught in theft “in qafirs’ hats and clothes”.⁴⁴³ The crime of theft and wearing “qafir’s

⁴⁴⁰ Yavuz Ercan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Gayrimüslimlerin Giyim, Mesken ve Davranış Hukuku”, *OTAM* (1) 1990, p118.

See for this ideology of differentiation: Cihan Aktas, *Kılık Kıyafet ve İktidar* (İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları), 2006, p48.

⁴⁴¹ Namık Sinan Turan, “16. Yüzyıldan 19. Yüzyılın Sonuna Dek Osmanlı Devletinde Gayri Müslimlerin Kılık Kıyafetlerine Dair Düzenlemeler,” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 60, no. 4 (2005), p241-242.

⁴⁴² Madeline C. Zilfi, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Kölelik ve Kadınlar (1700-1840)* (Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2018), p60-61.

⁴⁴³ Yavuz Ercan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Gayrimüslimlerin Giyim, Mesken ve Davranış Hukuku”, *OTAM* (1) 1990, p118.

clothes” was not precisely separated in the proceedings of the judgement.⁴⁴⁴ However, given that political punishment was very rarely considered as an option for the crime of theft,⁴⁴⁵ this heavy punishment may have been due primarily to the way *other’s* clothes were instrumentalized in this case. A decree that was issued in 1577 made clear that political punishment would be the consequence of breaching the rules about clothing.⁴⁴⁶

Even during the time of political openings (e.g. the Tulip Age, or the modernist re-makings of Selim III), the rulers aim to reproduce the restrictions with renewed decrees. For instance, despite garnering some popularity for his loose attitude to the matter, İbrahim Pasha eventually had to interfere with the somewhat tightened clothes of women during the Tulip Age.⁴⁴⁷ During the rule of Selim III, a decree (1791) emphasized that tailors who ignored the clothing law would be hung in front of their stores.⁴⁴⁸ Between 1815 and 1820, Governor Abdullah Pasha of Sidon (i.e. Lebanon and Palestine) was able to impose, for the first time in the history of Acre, the “traditional” Ottoman dress-codes on Non-Muslims⁴⁴⁹.

6.1.2. *Clothing in Ottoman Modernization: A Matter of Social Order and Development*

The Ottoman Modernization changed many things, but not the deterministic status of clothing in the cultural mindset. Though the state’s choice of clothes changed in due course, the pre-assigned role of clothing as a marker of social boundary remained. Because clothing patterns were to signify social order and development, they were to be pre-determined. If this

⁴⁴⁴ Ercan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Gayrimüslimlerin Giyim, Mesken ve Davranış Hukuku.”

⁴⁴⁵ Exceptionally, thieves were penalized with political punishment only if they committed theft multiple times. see Mehmet Akif Aydın, “Ceza,” in *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (Türk Diyanet Vakfı: İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi), p480.

⁴⁴⁶ Ahmet Refik, *On Altıncı Asırda İstanbul Hayatı* (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1935), p51.

Also in Ercan, a different version of the same source was cited: Ercan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Gayrimüslimlerin Giyim, Mesken ve Davranış Hukuku,” footnote 7.

⁴⁴⁷ Refik Ahmet Sevengil, “Lâle Devrinde Kadınların Giyim ve İncelikleri,” in *İstanbul Nasıl Eğleniyordu?*, 4th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 103–5.

⁴⁴⁸ Resat Ekrem Kocu, *Tarihimizde Garip Vakalar* (Doğan Kitap, 2003), p64.

⁴⁴⁹ Thomas Philipp, *Acre: The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City, 1730-1831* (Columbia University Press, 2001), p183.

policy failed in the short run, it was supposed to be corrected later. As some key conversations from the Tanzimat, Meşrutiyet and post-war years suggest, many of the protagonists and the antagonists of “modernization” shared at least the understanding that clothing was key to the visible representations of the *self* and the *other*. Therefore, the competing ideal-types of this era included explicit references to clothes.

Beginning in the mid-19th century, the rulers began to rationalize the removal of some clothes that they previously considered to be appropriate. As a symbol of Ottoman modernization, the state-led imposition of *fez*, which replaced men’s turbans (tr. *sarıık*) and rounded crowncaps (tr. *şubara*), was intended to bring some symbolic refreshment to the weakening Ottoman army.⁴⁵⁰ Because the matter of dispute was not just the development of the army but society as a whole, this policy justified replacing the old clothes with some new ones in the civic life as well. Within this context, a comparison between two tailors’ books of orders—one from 1854 and the other from 1873—demonstrate a rapid “Westernization” in upper-class women’s dresses in Istanbul.⁴⁵¹ According to Cevdet Pasha, this ‘decay’ was triggered by Egyptian high society, which took the lead in bringing Western fashion into Istanbul.⁴⁵² Furthermore, as a rare opportunity for the art historians who study lower classes, a similar transformation was documented through the wedding dresses of a wide social circle.⁴⁵³

Though the state authority itself paved the way for this broader change, it tried to keep an eye on these changes. Accordingly, the rulers of Tanzimat enabled Muslim students to go to Europe for education. However, they restricted these travels for young female students whom

⁴⁵⁰ Serap Kavas, “‘Wardrobe Modernity’: Western Attire as a Tool of Modernization in Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 51, no. 4 (July 4, 2015): 515–39, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2014.979802>, p521-522.

⁴⁵¹ Hulya Tezcan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Son Yüzyılında Kadın Kıyafetlerinde Batılılaşma,” *Sanat Dünyamız*, no. 37 (1988).

⁴⁵² Murat Bardakci, “Ahlâkı Kim Bozdu?,” in *Osmanlı’da Seks* (Istanbul: İnkılap, 2005), p243.

⁴⁵³ Nancy Micklewright, “Late-Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Wedding Costumes as Indicators of Social Change,” *Muqarnas* 6 (1989): 161–174.

they deemed too immature to embrace the value of veiling.⁴⁵⁴ In the 1870s, a type of black hijab called *zar* spread in Istanbul,⁴⁵⁵ which then ruler Abdülhamit II initially banned for fear of religious assimilation (i.e. it made Muslim women look like Orthodox Christian women) and security risks (i.e. the surveillance of illegal activity).⁴⁵⁶ Even though the palace initially wanted to deter Muslim women from using *zar*, it faced several limitations, such as the unaffordable price of *ferace*,⁴⁵⁷ which was intended to replace *zar*, and some tradesmen's attempts to convince the sultan to lift the ban on *zar*.⁴⁵⁸ An incident in which two women's *feraces* were ripped off by a group of vagrants also attracted public attention to this matter.⁴⁵⁹ Eventually, the decision of Abdülhamit II was to ban *ferace* and to instead re-legalize hijab in a different style.

That said, the geographic scope of this instability should not be exaggerated. Historians of daily life underline that women of rural Anatolia remained indifferent to both *zar* and *ferace*, as their traditional clothes were already different to those relatively new alternatives popularized in the cosmopolitan space of Istanbul.⁴⁶⁰ In the same vein, the homogenizing dress codes of the state were not as visible in the heterogeneity of the Balkans, Cyprus and the Rum

⁴⁵⁴ Aynur Erdogan, "Tanzimat Döneminde Modern Bilim Algısı," *Sosyoloji Dergisi* 3, no. 26 (2013): 1–31, 12.

⁴⁵⁵ It is difficult to conclude whether the spread of *zar* was contradictory or complementary to the rise of Western fashion among Istanbul's upper-class Muslim women: one argument is that *zar* served these women to hide their relatively open clothes and heavy make-up in public, as it helped them hide any other appearance underneath. Another argument is that the spread of hijab was a repercussion of the transition of Western fashion from Empire to Art Nouveau.

see Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de Yeni Hayat-İnkılap ve Travma 1908-1928* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2017), p235. Louise W. Mackie, "Ottoman Kaftans with an Italian Identity," *Ottoman Costumes from Textile to Identity*, Edited by S. Faroqhi, CK Neumann, 2004, 219–230.

⁴⁵⁶ Fanny Davis, *Osmanlı Hanımı: 1718'den 1918'e Bir Toplumsal Tarih* (Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2006), p219.

⁴⁵⁷ Yasemin Avcı, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Tanzimat Döneminde 'Otoriter Modernleşme' ve Kadının Özgürleşmesi Meselesi [Authoritarian Modernity' in the Ottoman Empire in the Tanzimat Period and the Question of Women's Liberation]," *Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi OTAM* 21, no. 21 (2007): 1-18, p9.

⁴⁵⁸ Sermet Muhtar Alus, "II. Abdülhamid Devrinde Kadın Kıyafetleri," *Resimli Tarih Mecmuası* 2, no. 13 (1951), p541.

⁴⁵⁹ Davis, *Osmanlı Hanımı*, p219.

⁴⁶⁰ Kudret Emiroglu, *Gündelik Hayatımızın Tarihi* (Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2002), p214.

see also Osman Hamdi Bey and Marie De Launay, *1873 Yılında Türkiye'de Halk Giysileri: Elbise-i Osmaniyeye*, trans. Erol Üyepazarcı (Sabancı Üniversitesi, 1999).

Islands either.⁴⁶¹ Though this diversity does not suffice to argue that the state explicitly rationalized tolerance for some pre-selected cultural zones, it suggests, at the very least, that the state did not problematize clothing attitudes equally in different spaces. As his decree suggests, Abdülhamit II would not have banned the hijab had he not come across these “hijabi women” while going to the mosque of Teşvikiye.

In sum, even though certain clothes appeared and disappeared in an inconsistent manner, the social role attached to clothing remained intact after the mid-19th century. Accordingly, clothing was perceived by the Ottoman rulers as a significant marker of social order and development. As such, different clothes were made to represent different progressive or conservative social values. The Sultans struggled to manage the clothing attitudes by periodically negotiating restrictions upon them. Periodically, the new clothes, just like the old ones, were matched by the higher authority with pre-defined social groups.

6.1.3. *Clothing as an Infallible Precursor of Personality*

Meşrutiyet brought a new set of controversies concerning clothes. Though my aim is not to scrutinize these controversies in detail, I shall refer to some key conversations of the time, which indicate the reproduction of the cultural mindset that conferred a formative role on clothing in the making of the society. While clothes were under dispute in this period, the social significance of clothing was taken for granted by the competing ideologies. For example, the Meşrutiyet expressionism was predominantly shaped around ‘new’ clothes for a new model of society. The old zar and çarşaf (hijabs) were out-of-fashion according to some carriers of the new “*Milli Moda*” (en. national fashion), such as Writer Zehra Hakkı of Sedat Simavi’s magazine, *İnci*:

⁴⁶¹ Madeline C. Zilfi, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Kölelik ve Kadınlar (1700-1840)* (Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2018), p60.

then, like those [men], women should be civilized in terms of clothing as well as ideation”⁴⁶²

Other magazines, such as *Hürriyet-i Fikriye*, *Serbest Fikir* and *Styanet*, also propagated “Turkish women” to be “unchained” from the hijab. In response, writer Aksekili Ahmed Hamdi of *Sebilürreşad* Magazine argued that it was a slander campaign, led mainly by “Arab Christian writers” against “Muslim women”.⁴⁶³

According to Aksekili, those who were unchained from *tesettür* consisted of a small group of “free lovers”. Emine Seher Ali simply called them “irreligious” in her article in the magazine *Kadınlar Dünyası*.⁴⁶⁴ The other writers of *Kadınlar Dünyası* problematized the use of niqab (tr. peçe), which they thought did not have any place in Islam. According to them, a compulsory “national dress code” (kıyafet-i milli) should have been determined once and for all.⁴⁶⁵ Fatma Aliye, who was one of the first feminists⁴⁶⁶ of the post-Tanzimat era, also established many of her claims upon an ideal type, “the women of Islam”.⁴⁶⁷ In the conversations between these thinkers, ideal-types were under dispute—e.g. whether “Muslim women” shall remove *tesettür* for the sake of “development”.

⁴⁶² Zafer Toprak, “Tesettürden Telebbüse Ya Da Çarşaf Veya Elbise – ‘Milli Moda’ ve Çarşaf,” *Tombak*, no. 19 (1998): 52–63.

⁴⁶³ Aksekili Ahmed Hamdi, “Bilinmesi Elzem Hakikatler, (1332) [1914]” in *İsmail Kara ed. Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi 2* (Dergah Yayınları, 2017), p827–37.

see also Ayşe Meliha, “Müslüman Kadını Hürdür ve Mesuttur”, *Sebilürreşad* 11, no 282 (05 Feb 1914): p345.

⁴⁶⁴ Emine Seher Ali, “Tesettür Meselesi (12 Mar 1329 [1914], Kadınlar Dünyası No.39),” in *Feminizm Kitabı: Osmanlı’dan 21. Yüzyıla Seçme Metinler Ed. Hülya Osmanağaoğlu* (Ankara: dipnot yayınları, 2015), 67.

⁴⁶⁵ Serpil Cakir, “Kadınlar Dünyası’nda Giyim,” in *Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2010), 249–260.

⁴⁶⁶ Fatma Aliye was not a self-proclaimed feminist, as she rejected the Eurocentrism of the then dominant first-wave feminism. However, Aliye’s efforts in the field of women’s studies may well be considered under the historical trajectory of feminism.

⁴⁶⁷ Though Fatma Aliye also wrote about the real-world problems of women between “tradition” and “faith”, she constructed ideal-type characters in response to Western feminists and some “francophone Turks”, whom she claimed to lack the knowledge of the true Islam. Among her “women of Islam” were happy concubines (tr. cariye) and hijabi women who, thanks to their hijab, could freely have conversations with men in public.

Fatma Aliye, *Nisvan-ı İslam (1309) [İslam Kadınları (1892)]* (İstanbul: inkılab basım yayım, 2009), p9, 16, 39, 51. see also Sahika Karaca, “Fatma Âliye Hanım’ın Türk Kadın Haklarının Düşünsel Temellerine Katkıları,” *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, no. 31 (2011): 93.

As the use of the tags such as *inter alia* “free lovers”, “the woman of Islam” and “the national fashion” suggests, clothing was of utmost importance in the construction of ideal-types. These ideal-types were described, compared and contrasted via the media. This typological approach remained popular during the post-war-years (1918 onwards).⁴⁶⁸ For example, the magazine *Haftalık Mecmua* conducted an extensive survey in 1927 to sketch the ideal-type woman that its predominantly male readers would prefer to marry.⁴⁶⁹ As was suggested by the general function of ideal-types, those women described in the magazine were envisaged as not to carrying any contradiction in terms of the different aspects of their personality. Within this context, their clothes were always expected to fit the rest of their characteristic features. For example, Feriha Hanım preferred “alafranga” (i.e. European style) clothes, while having a “free life” and being able to deal with multiple men. Nevire Hanım always desired to have fancy clothes, like those of actresses, so she would do anything to reach fame and fashion. Bedia Nuri Hanım was a hardworking student who spent her free time in a library or laboratory, and therefore her clothes were extremely simple such that it was difficult to distinguish her from men. In all these descriptions, clothing was the *infallible precursor* of personality.

With the upper hand of the state authority, this mass debate on clothes was reproduced in the aftermath of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey (1923), the founding ideology of which also defined clothing as a pre-requisite of social development. As Baker examined it, fez was one key example, since in less than a century its meaning was altered from being a proclamation of “modernization” to a symbol of “orthodoxy” and “conservatism”.⁴⁷⁰ This

⁴⁶⁸ see for a thorough analysis, Elif Mahir Metinsoy, *Mütareke Dönemi İstanbulu’nda Moda ve Kadın 1918-1923* (Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2014), p28.

see, for example, the publications of İtisâm: Halide Nusret Kazimi, “Müslüman kadını nasıl olmalı?”, *İtisâm*, no 29 (12 Jun 1919): p255, <http://katalog.idp.org.tr/yazilar/onizleme/62199/musluman-kadini-nasil-olmali>.

Hafız Baki, “Mağlubiyetimizi Dinsizlik ve Adem-i Tesettürde Aramalıyız”, *İtisâm*, no 41 (12 Sep 1919): p445, <http://katalog.idp.org.tr/yazilar/62278/maglubiyetimizi-dinsizlik-ve-adem-i-tesetturde-aramaliyiz>.

Emin Hakkı, “Tesettür, Fuhuş ve Esbab-ı Fuhuş”, *İtisâm*, no 42 (18 Sep 1919): p453, <http://katalog.idp.org.tr/yazilar/62281/tesettur-fuhus-ve-esbab-i-fuhus>.

⁴⁶⁹ Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye’de Yeni Hayat-İnkılap ve Travma 1908-1928* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2017), p148-157.

⁴⁷⁰ Patricia L. Baker, “The Fez in Turkey: A Symbol of Modernization?,” *Costume* 20 (July 18, 2013): 72–85, p72.

alteration in the meaning of fez was not simply imposed by the state or the then dissidents but shared in their dialogue. In other words, in the 1920s' political climate, not many were heard claiming fez as a symbol of modernization, since it represented bigotry for the "progressive"⁴⁷¹ just as it represented tradition for the "conservative".⁴⁷²

6.1.4. *The Rationalization of Intolerance: How to Defend a Clothing Revolution*

The ideology behind the "Clothing Revolution" was often reiterated and came to be known as a long-standing knowledge-claim of Kemalism: the outside of a head must show at first glance that the inside of the head can change. According to this claim, change of appearance would pave the way for change of ideation.⁴⁷³ This part explores the social ground on which the ruling-elite rationalized intolerance against certain types of clothes.

In order to establish a developmentalist state after the technological failure of the Ottoman system, the ideology-makers of the Republic aimed to trigger an all-encompassing cultural transformation, beginning with the replacement of some key symbols of the old culture. Fez was the old culture; şapka would be the new one. Fez was a hat for the era of institutionalized heterogeneity, şapka would be the hat for the era of institutionalized homogeneity. In defense of this clothing ideology from the 1930s, the didactic National Holiday broadcastings on official radio and TV repeatedly denigrated the variety of clothes in the

⁴⁷¹ Atatürk used in *Nutuk* the words "ignorance" (tr. cehil), "heedlessness" (tr. gaflet) and "fanaticism" (tr. taassup) for fez.

⁴⁷² See Sebilürreşad's defense of şapka ban for Muslims, together with its defense of fez against the claim that fez belongs to the Rum millet, *Sebilürreşâd* 24, no. 616 (September 11, 1924).

⁴⁷³ Falih Rifki Atay described, it is not a matter of hat but a matter of head ["bu başlık değil, baş davası idi"]. Similarly, Niyazi Berkes argued that a key step of leading to a revolution in the minds of the people was to prove the ability to change the accessories they wear on their heads.

Falih Rifki Atay, *Çankaya* (Pozitif Yayıncılık, 2008).

Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002), p547-548.

The description of the şapka law, as Refik Koraltan brought to the parliament in 1925: "Though not having any significance [in the rest of the world], the hat problem is of special value for Turkey, determined to join the family of civilized nations". see Yucel Ozkaya, "Atatürk Biyografisinden Sayfalar: 1923-1928," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, no. 16 (1989).

See the snapshot from many years later, an intellectual's echoing of a quote allegedly of Atatürk, "nothing will change as long as the inside of a head remains the same": Metin Erksan, "Fötr Şapka ve Kasket," *Cumhuriyet*, July 22, 1997, p2.

Ottoman past as “a noisy confusion” (tr. “kıyafet curcunası”),⁴⁷⁴ or “clothing inequality” (tr. “kıyafet müsavatsızlığı”).⁴⁷⁵ The institutional dualism of Tanzimat Modernism, which signified the coexistence of medreses with modern schools—hence the “religious knowledge” with the “secular knowledge”—would be replaced by the ideological monopoly of the latter⁴⁷⁶. According to Ülken, this “new life” required “new values”.⁴⁷⁷

As Secularism in Turkey’s modern nation-state was meant to remove many of the old religious classes, the Ottoman dress codes that made explicit the religious differences were to be fought, not only in terms of shape but also substance. As to the latter, many defendants of “the clothing revolution” justified one-type-fits-all dresses as a necessary step against the compartmentalization of people based on their “non-national” (tr. “gayrimilli”) and “primitive” (tr. “iptidai”) identities.⁴⁷⁸ Because the Ottoman doctrine on how to perceive dress statuses would not be forgotten suddenly, any remaining *fez* or *hijab* would lead to the reproduction of their social implications. For example, in contrast to *fez*, *şapka* was seen to represent the Levantines in the late-Ottoman period. Therefore, *fez* had to be forbidden so that *şapka* would be *autonomized* from its particularistic identity.

In his memoir, Falih Rıfkı Atay, who was close to the state-elite throughout the 1930s, recalled that in the Ottoman times the worst of non-Muslims were called “the infidel with

⁴⁷⁴ see one reiteration of this well-repeated description. Kemal Demirer, “Kılık Kıyafet” (TRT Arşiv, 1982).

⁴⁷⁵ see a snapshot of the term’s use in parliamentary debates: “Din Âlimleri Yetiştirmek: Dinî Kısve Yasağı,” *Sebilürreşâd* 6, no. 144 (February 1953): p300.

⁴⁷⁶ Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türk Tefekkürü Tarihi* (Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1982), p17-18.

Kemal Karpat, “Modern Eğitim ve Toplumsal - Felsefi Değişim,” in *İslam’ın Siyasallaşması* (Timaş Yayınları, 2013), 156–64.

⁴⁷⁷ see Ülken’s description of these “new” national values: Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türk Tefekkürü Tarihi*, p309. see also, Ipek Kamacı, “The Cultural Policies of Turkish Republic during the Establishment of Nation State (1923-1938)” (PhD Thesis, Bilkent University, 2000).

⁴⁷⁸ The adjective “non-national” (tr. *gayrimilli*) was as popular as the adjective “primitive” (tr. *iptidai*). Their opposites were defined as “civilized” (tr. *asrî*), “national” (tr. *milli*), and “international” (tr. *beynelmilel*). see the arguments on the particularistic identity that *fez* was believed to connote: Mumtaz Turhan, “Fasıl VIII: Kültür Değişmelerinin Umumi Bir Tahlili,” in *Kültür Değişmeleri: Sosyal Psikolojik Bakımdan Bir Tetkik*, 2015, 167.

şapka” (tr. şapkalı gâvur). Having kept in mind the symbolic location of şapka in the late-Ottoman times, Atay recalled this connotation to imply that legalizing şapka for Muslims would not suffice to deconstruct its otherized position among Muslims. Within this context, Atay made reference to chronicler Lütfi Efendi to recall that people “almost lynched” the two officers who, as the Sultan ordered, wore the reformed jackets and pants in public, on a Ramadan Day in 1828.⁴⁷⁹ Atay concurrently reminded his interlocutors of how they began wearing şapka in public: “I remember it very well: [...] they began chasing us when they saw us with şapka. We also heard the compliment, ‘infidels’”.⁴⁸⁰

In the same vein, Niyazi Berkes felt a need to refer to the previous Meşrutiyet controversies while justifying the succeeding clothing revolution. Accordingly, Berkes recalled that in the mid-19th century, the Turkish students who studied in Europe were labelled as infidels in the country just because they reportedly began wearing şapka.⁴⁸¹ As these arguments of Atay and Berkes suggest, a remarkable fear of the ruling-elite was that those men who began wearing şapka, and those women who uncovered would seem less religious than those who may have maintained the clothes from the Ottoman past. Therefore, having obtained the necessary means of authority, the ruling-elite rationalized intolerance against these clothes, albeit in different ways for hijab versus fez.

Their strategy of action with respect to hijab was more complicated than their strategy against fez. As the examples of fez and şapka suggest, the imposition of change always began with men. That said, in both historical episodes, the focus shifted to women in a somewhat ambivalent manner. Frequently revised decrees in the Ottoman times and the thorny debates over the hijab in the late Ottoman period and the early years of the Republic suggest that policy-

⁴⁷⁹ Atay, *Çankaya*, p541.

⁴⁸⁰ Atay, *Çankaya*, p548.

⁴⁸¹ Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002), p547.

makers were often confused with the clothes assigned for women. Clearly, the peculiarity of women's status in the value-system and the contested ideological prospects of future social development played a fundamental role in this ambiguity. Women's clothing was perceived as a central moral issue, a very quickly-changing fashion, a symbol of social development, and at the same time a reflection of women's legitimate ecological environment, the limits of which the new regime problematized from scratch.

These complications in women's clothing were why, in the aftermath of the şapka revolution, intolerance towards *peçe* (en. niqab, full-face veil) and *çarşaf* (en. black hijab) did not rely on any strictly defined legal criteria. They were not banned with a law. Ruling Party CHP's 4th Congress concluded a set of reasons as to why—unlike *fez*—*peçe* and *çarşaf* were not a matter of legal prohibition: (1) neither *çarşaf* nor *peçe* was worn in the rural sphere; (2) in the urban sphere, half of the women had already “left behind” these clothes; (3) the rest was expected to change their habits when they meet further education.⁴⁸² Skeptical of these predictions, some members of Congress embraced the relatively nuanced argument that *çarşaf* had economic consequences,⁴⁸³ and was hence tolerable; whereas *peçe* was based on the ideologically motivated hiding of the faces of women as opposed to the fundamental ideals of Republic, and hence was intolerable. In response to such critiques, in 1935, the banning of *peçe* and *çarşaf* was encouraged with an administrative order from the Ministry of Interior, calling on local authorities to open proceedings.⁴⁸⁴ However, because these proceedings did not rely on any clear legal guidelines, some very different conducts emerged⁴⁸⁵.

⁴⁸² Kemal Yakut, “Tek Parti Döneminde Peçe ve Çarşaf,” *Tarih ve Toplum* (220), 2002, p28.

⁴⁸³ Recall the tradesmen's abovementioned dialogue with Sultan Abdülhamid.

⁴⁸⁴ Ali Dikici, “II. Meşrutiyet'ten Cumhuriyete Miras Kalan İç Güvenlik Anlayışı ve Türk Polis Teşkilatı”, *Türk İdare Dergisi* (479), 2014, p102.

⁴⁸⁵ Yakut, “Tek Parti Döneminde Peçe ve Çarşaf”, p30-31.

The state did not criminalize the usage of peçe and çarşaf in public, but systematically emphasized its ideal-type woman as an uncovered one. Women's clothing was defined by Mustafa Kemal as a building block of the project of cultural transformation. He argued in his historic speech on 25 August 1925 that "a civilized nation's women" should not hide their faces and eyes or turn their back to men. In the same speech, he announced that the Turkish society deserved "civilized" and "international" clothes. Clearly, the then ruling elite's perception of the standard of civilization was the driving force behind such claims. On 6 September 1925, based on the statement that "all civil servants' clothes [should be] the same as the clothes common and general in the civilized nations", the cabinet's decree with the force of law forbade women to cover in state buildings, and ordered male civil servants outside these buildings to greet one another with a specified gesture by using şapka.⁴⁸⁶

⁴⁸⁶ Kamuran Ozdemir, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Şapka Devrimi ve Tepkiler," *Unpublished Master's Thesis, Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü*, 2007, 51.

6.2. Clothing in Contemporary Turkey: Türban, Headscarf and Women

The Clothing Revolution has been a reference point because for decades it remained a building block of the institutionalized value-system behind Secularism. In the way it was defined and imposed in the 1930s, “the standard of civilization” remained at the center of argumentation, such that the court decisions throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s justified a head-covering ban in universities by referring to this ideology as “the essence of Secularism”.

Tolerance towards these clothes was re-cast in the 1980s in a way that meant the state courts began to differentiate between those women who covered themselves in rural areas “in a traditional manner”, and those women who covered themselves despite that they got “enough education to uncover”.⁴⁸⁷ Whereas the former was to be tolerated, the latter was perceived as a deliberate political act against the fundamentals of Secularism. This argument led to the well-reproduced⁴⁸⁸ contextual distinction, between “headscarf” (tr. başörtüsü) and “türban”. According to the producers of this dichotomy, headscarf was traditional and habitual, destined to doom in time—hence, not to be tolerated, whereas türban was a reaction against modernity and a conscious stance taken against the fundamental codes of the Republic—hence, to be intolerated. This discursive difference between türban and headscarf was also complemented with images, which many speakers used to differentiate between “türban” and “başörtüsü” from afar. Türban’s “needle”, together with its “urban” and “fashionable” visible representation, gave itself away.

⁴⁸⁷No. 1983/142/2788 (Danıştay December 20, 1983).: “Yeterli eğitim görmemiş bazı kızlarımız, hiçbir özel düşünceleri olmaksızın, içinde yaşadıkları çevrenin gelenek ve göreneklerinin etkisi altında başlarını örtmektedirler. Ancak, bu konuda kendi çevrelerinin baskısına veya gelenek ve göreneklerine boyun eğmeyecek ölçüde eğitim gören bazı kız ve kadınlarımızın sırf laik Cumhuriyet ilkelerine karşı çıkarak, dine dayalı bir devlet düzenini benimsediklerini göstermek amacıyla başlarını örttükleri bilinmektedir”.

⁴⁸⁸ see the reproduction of the term at two critical junctures, 1997 and 2002: Salih Bayram, “Reporting Hijab in Turkey: Shifts in the Pro- and Anti-Ban Discourses,” *Turkish Studies* 10, no. 4 (December 1, 2009): 511–38.

The Council of State's decision on 20 December 1983, which approved of the ban that the High Board of Education had put into force, was based on this separation.⁴⁸⁹ Former PM and President Süleyman Demirel put forward the de-politicization of *türban* as a pre-requisite for the lifting of the ban: "all types of headscarves should be free at universities, but *türban* is different".⁴⁹⁰ Then Deputy Chairman Yekta Güngör Özden of the Constitutional Court underlined that the state had not interfered with women's clothes on the streets, but "at state institutions such as universities", and the court would be "loyal to the laws of Revolution which regulate the clothes of Turkish women".⁴⁹¹ Common to these defenses was that the problem was not taken to be the headscarf *per se*, but the context within which it appeared.

İlhan Selçuk was among those who differentiated between "headscarf" (tr. *başörtüsü*) and "*türban*". To İlhan Selçuk, headscarf was of "the pure belief", whereas *türban* was of "the political ambition". The latter was the manifestation of a collective Islamist reaction against the Republic, and therefore, not a matter of individual freedom.⁴⁹² That said, Selçuk's reasoning was circular in the sense that any demand to wear a headscarf in the "public space" would be identified as a political activity, rendering the headscarf a *türban*. *Başörtüsü*, in this context, was the name of not demanding re-configuration of the public space.

These defenses of the ban bounced between Secularism as 'a value-system' with Secularism as 'neutrality' above all particularities. On the one hand, they relied on the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights that the state may be entitled to restrict the wearing of headscarves with the aim of "upholding the principles of secularism and neutrality of the civil service".⁴⁹³ On the other hand, they rationalized that the state should protect itself from those

⁴⁸⁹ see Necip Bilge, "Üniversitelerde Modern Başörtüsü," *Cumhuriyet*, June 25, 1984.

⁴⁹⁰ Refet Ballı, "Türban Sorunu", 23 Mar 1993, *Milliyet*, p9.

⁴⁹¹ "Türbana İzin Yok", *Cumhuriyet*, 1 Nov 1990, p1.

⁴⁹² İlhan Selçuk, "Başörtüsü ve Türban," *Cumhuriyet*, May 5, 1999, p2.

⁴⁹³ *Kurtulmuş v. Turkey* (European Court of Human Rights January 24, 2006).

against “Secular Values” (tr. Laik değerler).⁴⁹⁴ Though this value-laden position determined the state’s approach to rights and restrictions in a vaguely defined “public space” (e.g. universities, military buildings, courts and the parliament), the visibility of türban was pretty much untouched in the rest of the social scene.

6.2.1. *Ideology-Making as the Amalgamation of Symbols*

Here come the amalgamation processes. According to many pro-ban politicians, bureaucrats⁴⁹⁵ and academics⁴⁹⁶ of the time, the regulation of clothes was substantively inseparable from the democratic rights of women, such as inheritance and property rights, monogamy, the equality of men and women as witnesses before the court, and women’s right to divorce. Therefore, the inseparability of these rights from the clothes of women rendered defending türban a challenge against the democratic rights of women.

According to this view, it was a contradiction to wear türban, and at the same time, say, defend the equality of men and women. This amalgamation of türban with many other issues was common in the defenses of the head-covering ban. For example, Bahriye Üçok discussed “the türban issue” with special reference to a collection of other incidents, such as a student and a worker who were killed for not fasting; a student who was beaten by his teacher for not waking up to the morning prayer; an Alevi teacher who was pushed to declare his sect; a group of female students who were not allowed to take physical education; and the opening of praying rooms at mid-schools.⁴⁹⁷ According to Üçok, these examples suggested that it was a systematic

⁴⁹⁴ Necdet Subasi, “On Religious School(er)s: The Modern Resources of Theological Heritage”, *Değerler Eğitimi Dergisi* 2, sy 6 (01 Nisan 2004): 116-32, p118.

⁴⁹⁵ see Director Ali Güner at a school in Bilecik: Evin Goktas, “Halk Eğitimi Merkezinde Başörtü Skandalı,” *Milliyet*, February 19, 1995, p3.

⁴⁹⁶ Abadan Unat, “Başörtü: Eşitsizlik İçin Baskı,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 6, 1987, p1.

Meryem Koray, “Acınası Bir Özgürlük Çağrısı,” *Cumhuriyet*, February 12, 1990, p2.

⁴⁹⁷ Bahriye Uçok, “Adım Adım İlerleyen Kara Tehlike,” *Milliyet*, March 1, 1993, p11.

attack against Secularism, which, she claimed, was why the türban issue should not be analyzed as a standalone matter of freedom.

Many others held that türban cannot be considered a simple matter of freedom, given that at the same time pop singer Merdağ Çağ was not permitted to have her concert in Yozgat by the Head of Yozgat National Education because she wore a “low-neck” outfit. It was also noteworthy that another singer, Sevim Nur, had to change her clothing for the same concert.⁴⁹⁸ Not only cases in Turkey, but also outside the country were closely tied to the head-covering ban. In 2003, Özdemir İnce published news from France with the title, “they burned the woman who wore a mini-skirt”.⁴⁹⁹ Accordingly, türban was responsible for the aggression against women who wore “open-clothes”.

An assumption based on this amalgam was that one’s appearance would constitute the first step for one to become an appropriate defender of women’s rights. In line with this assumption, then PM Tansu Çiller was heavily criticized for attending an award-ceremony in which men and women were ordered to sit separately in the room. Journalist Şükran Ketenci (Soner) pointed out “the contradiction” that Çiller wore some “clothes of the most modern type”, but also attended an event that subordinated women.⁵⁰⁰ Çiller’s clothes, not matching her ideology, led to a cognitive dissonance for Soner and others.

Uğur Mumcu was one of the most influential thinkers who opposed taking the head-covering ban as a standalone matter. He opposed the head-covering ban not because he saw it as a naïve demand for human rights, but because according to him the problem was much deeper.⁵⁰¹ Mumcu argued that the threat in Turkey was led by a coalition of Saudi financial

⁴⁹⁸ Oral Calislar, “Milli Eğitim Müdürü Karakelle,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 29, 1997, p4.

⁴⁹⁹ Ozdemir Ince, “Evet, mini etekli kızı yaktılar!”, *Hürriyet*, 20 Nisan 2004, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/evet-mini-etekli-kizi-yaktilar-219031>.

⁵⁰⁰ Sukran Ketenci, “Çiller-Kadın-Demokrasi,” *Cumhuriyet*, August 31, 1993.

⁵⁰¹ Ugur Mumcu, “Türban Yasası,” *Cumhuriyet*, November 20, 1988.

consortiums with some “go-getter businessmen”; Western states that supported Islamization against the threat of Communism; Turkish liberals whom he did not see as genuine liberals; and “the so-called conservative and nationalist political addresses”. He pejoratively described this network as an incoherent coalition: “Rosewater...after shave...green skullcap...Rolex watch...round-trimmed beard...[Islamic] cloak and Davidoff cigars”.⁵⁰²

This perspective became one that many others would reproduce in the following years.⁵⁰³ In his arguments, Mumcu almost always referred to what he saw as contradictory. He often made fun of “liberal pilgrims” (tr. liberal hacı) which he thought to be an oxymoron.⁵⁰⁴ As he thought these categories to be mutually exclusive, he asked how President Özal could be a “Kemalist”, an “Islamist” and a “liberal” at the same time.⁵⁰⁵ Yet another contradiction was between the commands of Islam and rights demands in the name of religious freedom. Accordingly, he argued that Islam ordered hijab and not simply headscarf: “If the Islamic rules are to be applied, it is not enough for them to cover their heads with türban; they must go to university [...] with hijabs”.⁵⁰⁶ The call for “headscarf freedom” was not the full picture.

Because the primary representatives of this perspective, including Mumcu, were assassinated within a decade between the early 1990s and the early 2000s,⁵⁰⁷ the amalgams they made were further strengthened with a set of conspiracy theories, which tied these ‘officially unidentified’ murders to türban, human rights violations and some international projects to Islamize Turkey in a certain manner.

⁵⁰² Uğur Mumcu, “Türban Yasası”, *Cumhuriyet*, 20 Nov 1988.

⁵⁰³ see Güldal Okuducu making the same argument a decade after Mumcu. Turey Kose, “Ülkede Mini [...]”, *Cumhuriyet*, January 11, 1997.

⁵⁰⁴ Uğur Mumcu, “Liberal Hacı!”, *Cumhuriyet*, July 22, 1988.

⁵⁰⁵ Uğur Mumcu, “Renkler”, *Cumhuriyet*, July 24, 1988.

Uğur Mumcu, “O Gün”, *Cumhuriyet*, July 28, 1988.

Uğur Mumcu, “Panzehir”, *Cumhuriyet*, September 11, 1988.

⁵⁰⁶ Uğur Mumcu, “Türban ve Cilbab”, *Cumhuriyet*, December 6, 1988.

⁵⁰⁷ Among them were Bahriye Üçok, Uğur Mumcu, Turan Dursun and Ahmet Taner Kışlalı.

These amalgams prevailed in the conversation over the head-covering ban: the ban was not simply about a head-cover but the *unfreedom* it represented. For instance, Former President Süleyman Demirel argued with a group of students at Erciyes University, many of whom openly criticized his views in favor of the interpretation of high courts that limited the use of headscarves in public institutions:

- Demirel: If you want to change the constitution, this [*i.e.* trying to enter public institutions with headscarves] is not the way to do it. According to the constitution, Turkey is a secular [tr. laik] state, which was described [as] the separation of religion and state [...] Still, [other Muslim countries] have admitted that Islam is lived at its best in Turkey.
- *Objection from some students, one of whom yells more loudly:* We cannot live our religion[...]
- Demirel: In Turkey, does anyone say anything against the one who prays five times a day?! You should not say anything against the one who does not pray either! [*applauded vociferously by other students in support of Demirel*]⁵⁰⁸.

Although the subject of the discussion was clearly delimited as “the headscarf issue”, in the course of a dialogue, Demirel tied this subject was tied to another field—*i.e.* freedom of *not* praying—since he clearly perceived a connection between the two. The vociferous applause in his favor clearly indicated that he was not alone in this route of argumentation. Having created such interrelationships, those who opposed the visibility of the Islamic veil in public institutions have questioned whether it would be easy to display the symbols of *other* religions in public institutions. They argued that the headscarf would not be a matter of religious freedom as long as this freedom was not explicitly guaranteed for other varieties of faith—not just other religions, but the alternative relationships with Islam as well.

Even though the connotation of “other religions in public institutions” was often accompanied by suppositions rather than an actual experience (*e.g.* “if I was a Buddhist or a Jew,

⁵⁰⁸ Genc Bakis, *Süleyman Demirel Başörtüsü Sorusu* (Kanal D, 2006), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i52dQaQ9Ick>.

we would have a conflict in the public institutions”), these suppositions were meant to signify the speaker’s perception of being subject to intolerance in some other spheres of life. Once, writing his memory of how a Jewish man at a consulate was trying to hide his kippah under a hat, former executive director Melih Meriç of Habertürk Newspaper argued by the same token:

we invited them to our citizenship [centuries ago], but now they
fear from us. A country in which a kippah should be hidden under
a hat, and a türban under a toupee is [...] tragic [...].

Through this line of argumentation, he implied that either *all* should be free from external pressures, or *none* should be limitless.

This position could be stretched further to a point on the authority structure between the ‘majority’ and the ‘minority’ belief-systems. Mustafa Akaydın, the former director of Akdeniz University and the former mayor of Antalya from CHP, described his notion of Secularism in this context:

It would not be a problem to allow türban if we were not a Muslim country [...] [T]o my university, a Jew should be able to enter with a kippah, but a Muslim should not be able to enter with a türban, since the latter would lead to [public] pressure in a Muslim country.⁵⁰⁹

After this statement, Akaydın warned his audience so that his argument would not be manipulated: “if those who wear kippah consisted of 20% of the students, I would ban it too!”

Even though their arguments were nothing to do with the headscarf *per se*, these emphases on a wider range of pressures were meant to note that the freedom to wear headscarves in public institutions would *not* mean a triumph of freedom for others. Demirel’s reference to the “freedom of not praying” merged with these emphases on the freedom of not

⁵⁰⁹ “Kıpalı Da Girer, Başörtülüler Asla,” *Haber 7*, February 5, 2008.

wearing headscarves. Accordingly, allowing headscarves in public institutions would lead to greater pressure on Muslim women to wear headscarves. In other words, any wearer of *türban* would represent a social group that defends the indispensability of the Islamic veil. Therefore, she should be held responsible for the social group to which she seems to belong. She was either forced to wear a *türban*, or she forces—by means of her visibility—the other Muslim women to wear it.

6.2.2. *The Claims over Subjectivity in Clothing*

Claiming that “*türban* can neither be modern nor contemporary”, Uğur Mumcu refused to interpret the issue as a matter of women’s agency.⁵¹⁰ As opposed to the abovementioned amalgamations, some thinkers perceived the head-covering ban as a breach of the subjectivity of individuals. The “essence” of religion was not the focal point of their argument, at least because religion does not exist as an entity independent of one’s experience of it. Therefore, they focused on what one makes of religion.

In this vein, Journalist Örsan Öymen was among the first to argue that the link between modernity and clothing had long been misinterpreted.⁵¹¹ Contrary to the arguments that equated pre-modernity with the Islamic veil, Nilüfer Göle argued that “the Islamist identity” recently shaped around veiling has been tied to “Western modernity”.⁵¹² Using a similar vocabulary, Journalist Taha Akyol argued that the use of *türban* reflected a case-specific modernization process, as the wearers of *türban* in the urban setting wanted to leave home, get education and obtain some kind of autonomy in public.⁵¹³ According to Pınar Selek, by means of *tesettür*, the debate on women brought to the surface a deeply-established social configuration which

⁵¹⁰ Uğur Mumcu, “*Türban ve Cilbab*”, *Cumhuriyet*, 6 Dec 1988.

⁵¹¹ Orsan Öymen, “*Çağdaş Uygarlık ve Barbarlık*,” *Milliyet*, 7 June 1986.

⁵¹² Nilufer Gole, *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling* (University of Michigan Press, 1996), p3, p50.

⁵¹³ Taha Akyol, *Modernleşme Sürecinde Türban* (İstanbul: Nesil Yayınları, 2008), 55-62.

rendered women the objects of conflicting patriarchal proposals: “our bodies are still not ours”.⁵¹⁴

Clearly, many of these thinkers did not call themselves Islamists or religious conservatives. They did not claim that Islam—i.e. a given interpretation of Islam—would solve the ongoing/upcoming political problems. Despite the fact that some popular figures among them tended to ally⁵¹⁵ with the Erdoğan government on a range of highly polarizing issues⁵¹⁶ including opposition to the head-covering ban, they did not consider headscarf to be an unquestionable “religious command”, unlike the Islamist thinkers like Abdurrahman Dilipak or Ali Bulaç. For them, the issue was rather a matter of individual value-judgement.⁵¹⁷ Furthermore, some of them staunchly defended a conception of secularism, alternative to the Secularism of “the secularists”. Willingly or not, they were often called liberals on the political spectrum.

I have already noted that in response to these “liberal” views, the defendants of the head-covering ban refused to see türban as a matter of subjectivity. Head-covering was indicative of a structural domination over women, therefore, the ban was irrelevant to women’s agency. Accordingly, women who wear türban did not speak with their individual voices, as türban already had an autonomous meaning which transcends its carriers’ sub-altern position. From Professor Ahmet Taner Kışlalı to Former CHP MP Necla Arat, many shared the argument that

⁵¹⁴ Gulsen Iseri and Tacim Acik, “Kadın Hakları Açısından Zor Konu: Hayrünnisa Gül’ün Başörtüsü,” *BirGün*, 25 Aug 2007.

⁵¹⁵ Atilla Yayla, “AK Parti’nin Liberallerle Zor ama Zorunlu İlişkisi”, *Liberal.org.tr*, 09 Mar 2008, <http://www.liberal.org.tr/sayfa/ak-partinin-liberallerle-zor-ama-zorunlu-iliskisi-atilla-yayla,340.php>.

⁵¹⁶ Among them were the Referendum of 2010, and the handling of *Ergenekon* and *Sledgehammer* Cases.

⁵¹⁷ Kursad Kahramanoglu, “Türban insan hakkı mı?”, *BirGün*, 23 Jan 2008.

see a debate on this difference, between Etyen Mahcupyan and Ali Bulaç: Meryem Koray, “Caanım kadınlar...,” *BirGün*, 16 Dec 2011.

the türban's objective meaning was unfreedom.⁵¹⁸ Arat called it a "voluntary serfdom" of those women "unconscious" of the meaning of freedom.⁵¹⁹

This common argument was represented in Cumhuriyet Newspaper's historic defense of the head-covering ban, where a hijabi woman was speaking with a man's voice: "of course I decide myself what to wear". When, in 2005, then Head of the Parliament and AKP MP Bülent Arınç stated that he doesn't "denigrate" hijabis due to their choices, Journalist Hikmet Çetinkaya replied to Arınç that "these women" were covered by force, not by their free-will. Çetinkaya underlined that those who denigrate women were "those that regard these clothes [i.e. hijab] as appropriate for women".⁵²⁰ Researcher and Cumhuriyet Writer Oktay Ekinci reiterated the argument that it was men who covered women at first in history⁵²¹.

By defending the lifting of the head-covering ban, "liberals" were falling into the trap.⁵²² As I noted before, according to Mumcu, it was a matter of religious exploitation led by "the Arabesque-Liberal" ideology that aimed to re-design Turkey.⁵²³ In this context, liberals were to be criticized for lobbying in the West in favor of Islamism. They were targeted not only due to what they said in opposition the head-covering ban, but also due to their silence or dubiousness regarding the human rights violations led by the AKP government. In this vein, İlhan Arsel called for the liberal women to raise their voices, given that the ones whose agency they respected would not even let them say "f" [i.e. the first step of saying "freedom"] in the

⁵¹⁸ Ahmet Taner Kislali, "RP Rejimin Neresinde?," *Cumhuriyet*, February 19, 1997, p3.

Turey Kose, "Ülkede Mini Genelevler Oluşturuldu", *Cumhuriyet*, 11 Jan 1997, p6.

see Leyla Tavşanoğlu's conversation with Necla Arat: Leyla Tavşanoğlu, "Üniversiteler Şeriat Kıskaçında", *Cumhuriyet*, 29 Sep 1996, p1-8.

Hulusi Metin, "Başörtüsü Bahane", *Cumhuriyet*, 3 Jan 1997, p2.

⁵¹⁹ Necla Arat, "Türbanlı Demokrasi'ye Doğru", *Bizim Gazete*, 18 Nov 1996, par3.

⁵²⁰ Hikmet Cetinkaya, "1 Mayıs'ın Ardından", *Cumhuriyet*, 3 May 2005, p5.

⁵²¹ Oktay Ekinci, "Türbanı Kadınlara Erkekler Taktı," *Cumhuriyet*, November 27, 2002, p6.

⁵²² A key example of such conversations: Turkan Saylan, "Laiklik ve Terör," *Cumhuriyet*, October 8, 2001, p2, par 10.

⁵²³ Uğur Mumcu, "Türban ve Cilbab", *Cumhuriyet*, 6 Dec 1988.

future.⁵²⁴ Referring to a fetva from the Mufti of Bursa, which advised women to not resist their husbands in cases where their husbands beat them, Melih Pekdemir warned “the liberals” who prioritized the lifting of the head-covering ban: “as long as you are silent [...], you are not pro-freedom, but literally fools”.⁵²⁵ Professor Meryem Koray supported the lifting of the head-covering ban, but she was insistently critical of “the holy alliance” between “liberals-conservatives-Islamists [tr. dinciler]” whom, she claimed, paved the way for the hegemony of religious communities in the state.⁵²⁶

After a decade, Mine Söğüt *inter alia* continued to criticize “liberals” who ignored the potentially poisonous power relations in the society, while insistently understanding the head-covering ban as a standalone matter of human rights:

The ‘carefree’ liberals, who underestimated Secularism and defended those who made politics with Islamic references as though they were the defendants of human rights, were telling the ‘anxious’ seculars until yesterday: “what can happen, do you think they will cover your head when they come to power?” Now, nobody asks anything to one another.⁵²⁷

Referring to a student who told his mother that their teacher “likes the headscarved students more”, Linguist Sevgi Özel, a strong protagonist of a “Secular” education programme, held the same group of liberals responsible for what happens ‘now’.⁵²⁸

Due to their ambivalent love/hate relationship with the AKP government, a wide range of liberal representations has lost ground in both opposition and the government circles.⁵²⁹

⁵²⁴ İlhan Arsel, “Susan Kadınlarımız...,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 9, 2002, p2.

See also, Necla Arat, “Değişmeyen Öz”, *Bizim Gazete*, 3 Feb 1997.

⁵²⁵ Melih Pekdemir, “Kadınların dayak yeme özgürlüğü...”, *BirGün*, 26 Sep 2011, <https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/kadinlarin-dayak-yeme-ozgurlugu-14998.html>.

⁵²⁶ Meryem Koray, “Türban-kadın-eşitlik”, *BirGün*, 01 Oct 2010, <https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/turban-kadin-esitlik-15492.html>.

⁵²⁷ Mine Sogut, “Pembe Bir Otobüs Nereye Gider?,” *Cumhuriyet*, September 20, 2017.

⁵²⁸ Sevgi Özel, “Laik Eğitim Neden Gerekli?,” *Cumhuriyet*, 20 Jun 2014.

⁵²⁹ My argument is based on the disappearance of their voices from the mainstream public debates. My claim may be exemplified by (1) the disappearance of once pro-government liberal organizations such as “Young Civilians” (tr. Genç Siviller); (2) the opposition leaders’ only half-hearted support for the release of jailed

However, this antagonism towards them does not mean that some parts of their vocabulary did not leave any residues in conversations of the others. Having been digested and de-contextualized from the past ‘wrongdoings’ of its previous users, I shall argue that the vocabulary of agency matters more than ever in contemporary conversations.

“liberals” such as Ahmet Altan and Nazlı Ilıcak; (3) the in-group controversy over Cumhuriyet Newspaper’s publication of Altan’s article in August 2018; (4) a mass controversy which led to the firing of Nuray Mert from the same newspaper; (5) the narrative as to how Cengiz Çandar ended up leaving Turkey after spending a decade defending the AKP government’s “democratizing” moves.

6.3. Exploratory Conversations after the Lifting of the Ban

Turkey entered the AKP Government's first term with the historical baggage described above. In the latest phases of this era, the state's long-term modernist ideology has been challenged in several ways by a somewhat "Islamist", or purportedly "Muslim Democratic" government. The ban was de-facto lifted during the third-term of AKP. Even "Secularist CHP" did not oppose the lifting of the ban in the parliament. That said, the controversy over women's clothing has not been resolved. In this period, women's clothing was under contestation not only as a legacy of the state-led head-covering ban, but also through a set of other incidents in which women were targeted for their clothing preferences.

The following parts will question these more recent cases of intolerance, which appeared toward the end of the third-term of AKP government in the aftermath of the de-facto lifting of the head-covering ban. I have shown in the previous part that in various structures of authority, through one or the other ideological repertoire, clothing has been construed in Turkey as a fundamental matter of social order and development. Clothing attitudes breached the borders of tolerance by the time they provoked the various authorities' senses of the properties of a given cloth.

The following chapter will firstly demonstrate, in part as a sign of cultural reproduction, that the many authorities may still appear randomly or systematically at any level—micro, meso or macro—at nighttime or daytime, in parks or schools or on public transportation, on media or the parliament to interfere with a woman's cloth. That said, in this part I will firstly argue that the content of authoritative claims differs in terms of the element of contextuality. This element leads the recent rationalizations of intolerance to implicitly recognize a new, albeit segregated space for others' clothes. This shift has implications for the subordination of first-order values in the debate over clothing.

6.3.1. *Intolerance Rationalized in Reference to the Context*

A member of the security personnel of Maçka Park (the district of Şişli, İstanbul) warned Çağla Köse when she left one of the public toilets: “I cannot let you hang around here with these clothes”. Köse reacted: “who are you to say this?!” As the people around them noticed the loud conversation, they interfered to defend Köse.⁵³⁰ Eventually, Security Personnel Savaş İ. called the police. Some days later, suspended from his work, Savaş İ. explained why he went to warn Köse. According to him, a woman with a little child had told him that this woman (i.e. Köse) was sitting near the toilet with “her body-parts open”. To them, Köse was not a good role-model for children in the park. As this case also suggests, I argue that the recent rationalizations of intolerance have been predominantly based on contextual elements, such as time, the place and manner in which a cloth appears.

A similar case was reported in İzmir’s district of Alsancak, between a police officer and two women, Derya Kılıç and Seray Gürer, who were sexually assaulted late at night. Kılıç told the police officer, whom they saw on the corner of a street, that one of the two men on a motorbike touched her from behind. However, the police officer began criticizing them: “given that you wear these clothes and hang around at this time, what they did is nothing [tr. “az bile yapmışlar”]”.⁵³¹ Kılıç claimed that the officer also insulted them: “bitches”. Kılıç began swearing, until the officer forcefully made her lie prostrate and left her with a broken leg. Kılıç’s allegation of insult has been denied by the officer and his wife.⁵³² According to the officer and his wife, who for some reason claimed to know what had happened, the officer just told the women to go to the police station, given that he would not be able to leave his position at that moment. In the officer’s own account of the case, Kılıç insulted him before he used force. He

⁵³⁰ *Maçka Parkı’ndaki Olayla İlgili Açıklama* (Video Haber, 31 Jul 2017), retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BrN4B9ThUK0>.

⁵³¹ Ali Ekber Erturk, “İzmir’deki ‘Kadınlara Polis Yumruğu’ Skandalında Yeni Gelişme,” *Sözcü*, August 12, 2017.

⁵³² Gözde Naz Uysal, “Yardım istediği polisten dayak yedi... O polisin eşi de konuştu...”, *Hürriyet*, 13 Aug 2017.

especially referred to the bottles of beer that Kılıç and Gürer were carrying on the street. He clearly referred to the bottles as a sign that the women breached some rules of appropriateness on that street.

Some other incidents suggest that women do not have to be out late at night to face possible assault due to their clothes. The context-dependent rationalization of intolerance considers many things alongside timing. For example, Ayşegül Terzi remembers nothing as to why a man she did not know kicked her on the bus. In his testimony, the perpetrator Abdullah Çakıroğlu said that he could not put up with Terzi's clothing, which was "disrespectful to the others on the bus". Çakıroğlu's lawyer claimed that Terzi's cloth was "suggestive" in the sense that "she sprawled out on two seats despite that she had a mini-skirt".⁵³³ Their claim was that there were customary rules to be followed in public transportation. Almost the same happened to Asena Melisa Sağlam, who was beaten on a minibus by a stranger, who began his insults with a question: "are you not ashamed of wearing these clothes during Ramadan?"

A high-school student, Fatma Dilara Aslıhan was also attacked on a minibus by another woman, just because she was going to school with a headscarf. While Aslıhan was talking to a retired teacher of physics about her classes, the aggressor pulled Aslıhan's headscarf from behind, and ordered her not to go to school with the headscarf. The aggressor was sure that any school must have certain rules of conduct, including a dress-code of its own. When Director Yadigar İzmirli banned "mini-skirts" in İstanbul Aydın University, she was relying on the symmetric opposite of the same 'procedural' knowledge-claim: "Just as judges wear robes because their job necessitates it, the academics should be careful with their clothes as well".⁵³⁴

⁵³³ "mini etekle otobüse binip ikili koltuğu kaplayacak şekilde eteği kısa olduğu halde yayılarak oturduğu."

"Tekmeci Saldırganın Avukatından Küstah Savunma", *Hürriyet*, 13 Oct 2017, <<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/tekmeci-saldirganin-avukatindan-akilalmaz-savunma-40608896>>

⁵³⁴ "Mini eteği yasaklayan rektör: Akademisyen öğrenciye örnek olmalı", *Cumhuriyet*, 22 Dec 2014, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/egitim/169345/Mini_eteği_yasaklayan_rektor_Akademisyen_ogrenciye_ornek_olmalı.html.

İzmirli argued that the issue within this context was not relevant to “freedoms” in any way: they can do anything they want in their off-hours. Similarly, during a trial, judge Mehmet Yoylu did not open the session, as he thought that the skirt that one of the lawyers wore was too short, and therefore “inappropriate for the practice of law”.⁵³⁵

In Middle East Technical University (METU), 2 “students wearing headscarves”⁵³⁶ were protested against by a group. From a very short distance—i.e. less than a meter, the protesters directed their cardboard placards, which contained a huge arrow directed at the two women, and the following note: “warning: there is Cemaat here”.⁵³⁷ One of the two women yelled: “can you go away?!” A protester replied: “show your ID, or you will go away!” Later on, another protester made the authoritative speech: “we do not allow religious communities (tr. cemaatler) to work at METU”. Eventually, the two women left the area amidst slogans against religious obscurantism.

On their twitter page, the protesters declared: “we have fired the *Cemaat* members, who force the newly registered students, with lies and slanders, to stay in their dormitories”.⁵³⁸ The group especially emphasized that their reaction was not against the two women’s headscarves:

the fact that METU students do not have any problem with
headscarf is best known by our headscarved friends.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁵ “Etek boyu tartışması Meclis’e taşındı,” odatv.com, May 29, 2019, <https://odatv.com/etek-boyu-tartismasi-meclise-tasindi-29051913.html>.

⁵³⁶ This is the description of the media that criticized the protest. For the protesting students, it was not a simple headscarf, but a provocation which instrumentalized headscarf. For the protesters, they were not students, given that they did not show their IDs.

⁵³⁷ The word cemaat (en. Jamaat, literally, “religious community”) was often used to refer to the Gülenists in this period.

⁵³⁸ “Odtuogrencileri on Twitter: “Yeni kayıt olan öğrencileri iftiralarla, yalanlarla kendi yurtlarında kalmaya zorlayan cemaat üyelerini ODTÜ’den kovduk.”,” Twitter, September 5, 2013.”

⁵³⁹ “ODTÜ’de Yalan ve Provakasyon Tutmayacak!,” Muhalefet, September 5, 2013, <http://muhalefet.org/haber-odtude-yalan-ve-provakasyon-tutmayacak-12-7572.aspx#>, par 8.

The problem, for them, was that the women were agitating against the conditions of the METU dormitories. In other words, it was a manipulation to forward new students to the dormitories of a religious foundation. The protesters' context-based argument clearly differentiated between the students as "the Cemaat members" and the students as "headscarved friends".

Gözde Kansu was dismissed from a TV project in the aftermath of then minister Hüseyin Çelik's denigration of her cloth. One second after delivering the caveat, "we do not interfere with anybody's clothing", Çelik added: "but this is inappropriate!" (tr. "ama olmaz bu kardeşim ya!"). In his following speech act, the interviewer interrupted Çelik:

-Interviewer: Now they will say that you interfere with people's clothes.
-Çelik: In public TV channels all over the world, there is a sensitivity over this [dress codes]. We do not interfere with anybody's cloth [*reiterated for the second time*]. But if you wear something almost like a night outfit [tr. gece kıyafeti], can you present a popular TV show? Would it be welcome? Nowhere in the world it would be welcome.⁵⁴⁰

Kansu was presenting the program on a public channel, ATV, at 20:00 on a Saturday. Right after Çelik's comment, Kansu lost her job. Though the production company declared that its decision was nothing to do with Kansu's cloth or the minister's comments, it also underlined that Kansu was fired because her "manners" and "style of presentation" did not fit the project.⁵⁴¹

Before everybody else, Kansu did not believe the explanation:

[The recording] lasted for 7 hours. Everyone [in the casting team] said 'marvelous!'. Director Caner Erdem told, 'that's it!' They [...] said 'you will be our discovery in [the sector of] presentation.'⁵⁴²

Kansu's "night outfit" was targeted by the minister, as he thought that 8 P.M. was not late enough for her cloth to appear.

⁵⁴⁰ *Ne Var Ne Yok* (Beyaz TV, 6 Oct 2013), retrieved from <http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x15s82h>.

⁵⁴¹ "Gözde Kansu'yu Neden Kovduk," *Hürriyet*, October 10, 2013.

⁵⁴² Tr. "Ertesi gün de programı çektik, 7 saat sürdü. Herkes, 'Şahane! Şahane' dedi. Yönetmen Caner Erdem, 'İşte bu!' dedi. Hatta aralarında, 'Sen bizim sunuculuktaki keşfimiz olacaksınız!'" diye konuştular.

In this period, women's appearance also served as a justification for sexual abusers. Abusers often blamed their victims for their clothes at the given time or place in which sexual abuse took place. In Sağlam's case, the footage did not make clear whether the act was due to the perpetrator Ercan Kızılateş being uncomfortable with Sağlam's clothing, or whether he initially tried to molest her and then attacked her because Sağlam's response was not positive. Though both Kızılateş and Sağlam mentioned the above-mentioned conversation in which Kızılateş reprehends Sağlam due to her clothing on "the Ramadan day", the expert opinion, based on the camera footages, was that they did not even talk to one another before the attack. Instead, Kızılateş "caressed" Sağlam's hair.⁵⁴³ It was likely that Kızılateş tried to mask his sexual harassment with a claim against Sağlam's cloth.

Similarly, in some other cases the perpetrators aimed to excuse their acts of sexual abuse with arguments centered around women's clothing. One such example was that of P.Ö. from Esenyurt, who was sexually abused on a street, and then beaten for having intolerably open clothes.⁵⁴⁴ When a janitor sexually harassed some students at the Atatürk Anatolian High School in Bahçeşehir, the director of the school mentioned the tightness of some students' clothes. In another case, S.Ç. was arrested for sexually harassing a university student. During the trial, S.Ç.'s family members reportedly yelled at the harassed woman: "if you dress there like prostitutes do, these things will happen to you".⁵⁴⁵ In these cases, the perpetrators clearly tried to divert the attention to clothing, because they thought it would depict a more justifiable social interpretation of their acts, and congruently, a negative social image of their victims.

⁵⁴³ "Şortlu Kadına Minibüste Saldıran Ercan Kızılateş Hakkında Karar Verildi," *Cumhuriyet*, September 12, 2017, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/822212/Sortlu_kadina_minibuste_saldiran_Ercan_Kizilates_hak_kinda_karar_verildi.html.

⁵⁴⁴ "İstanbul Esenyurt'ta taciz etti, dövdü!," *Yeni Akit*, August 17, 2017, <https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/istanbul-esenyurtta-taciz-etti-dovdu-367963.html>.

⁵⁴⁵ "Üniversiteli Kadını Tacizden Tutuklanan Adamın Yakınları [...]", *Diken*, 30 Jan 2018.

To sum up, in these cases, the aggressors referred to the conditions through which clothes appeared. Wearing a certain type of cloth could not be problematized *per se*, but wearing this cloth at this hour, in this manner, on this street/park or on late-night/prime-time was problematized. Intolerance in these cases differs from intolerance against *peçe* on the basis that it represents pre-modernity; or intolerance against *şapka* on the basis that it represents blasphemy. The recent arguments instead resemble the 1990s' and the 2000s' relatively unpopular procedural argument that the headscarf would be 'tolerable' as long as it does not appear on the head of a doctor who would be obliged to wear surgical balaclava.

As long as it was a "night-outfit" for the night—i.e. not an outfit for prime-time on TV, a cloth with a "cleavage" seemed tolerable even for the seasoned member of Islamist parties. This reasoning was why Minister Çelik kept repeating that they do not interfere with anybody's cloth, one second before he actually interfered. This authoritative claim is identical to those who censor billboards⁵⁴⁶ and dummies⁵⁴⁷ by arguing that the public appearance of "women's underwear" would threaten public decency: "you can whatever you want in private, but the children will see this billboard in day-time".

The cultural change here is neither based on a shift in the moral standards that a cloth is believed to represent, nor on the ultimately value-based understanding of "public decency". It is in the implicit acknowledgement that a cloth, no matter the extent to which it is valued or despised, should have a right to appear in a specific field that it is appropriate for. Those who proclaim authority justify giving space, albeit limited and contested, for the existence of difference. As such, the clash emanates from the imposition of parochial values in the name of common rules of appropriateness.

⁵⁴⁶ "Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi'nde reklam sansürü," *Hürriyet*, 30 May 2013, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/yildiz-teknik-universitesinde-reklam-sansuru-23397693>.

⁵⁴⁷ "İç giyim mağazasının cansız mankenlerini protesto edecek," *CNN Türk*, 14 Jun 2017, <https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/ic-giyim-magazasinin-cansiz-mankenlerini-protesto-edecek>.

6.4. Evaluative Conversations (I): Ethical Concerns in the Re-making of Secularism

In the previous part I analyzed the most recent cases where intolerance was rationalized, communicated and put into practice. In all these cases, clothes were classified and objectified in accordance with a specified role. Moreover, I have tried to demonstrate that any arguably misplaced representation of a cloth may face intolerance of a minister, security guard or another random ‘authority’ in the neighborhood. They all come with the argument that some social contexts necessitate keeping an eye on clothing.

That said, the previous part also demonstrated that these rationalizations of intolerance are not exhaustive of a cloth’s allegedly essential character. On the contrary, intolerance in these cases was based on a set of conditions through which the cloth appears. These arguments imply that a zone of freedom has been acknowledged for others’ clothes to appear. In this part I analyze some contestations over this zone that ‘admittedly’ has to go beyond one’s first-order values.

6.4.1. Agency Brings Responsibility

During the session on the lifting of the head-covering ban for MPs (late-2013), Secularism was *not* reproduced by CHP in the form of opposition to the lifting of the ban. The decision resulted from strategic calculations (i.e. AKP would exploit it in the aftermath of the Gezi Protests) and ideological ambivalence (i.e. alternative arguments between CHP members over the way to define and defend Secularism). Within this context, the defense of Secularism was re-cast by CHP MP Şafak Pavey in a historic parliamentary speech. In her speech, Pavey revisited Secularism by admitting the agency of MPs with türban, which many ideology-makers of Secularism previously denied türban wearers. That said, alongside recognizing their agency, her understanding of Secularism put responsibility on the owners of agency:

Indeed I have great concerns about the future of Secularism in my country, but my concern is not in the symbols squeezed between lipstick and türban [...] All freedoms are at the same time a

responsibility. I have great expectations from MPs with türban. I expect them to explain to me why my country is the 120th in terms of women's rights [...] [and] why the average of women's rights in 57 Islamic countries combined do not meet Taiwan, which is not even a UN member. Now, it is the responsibility of you to turn türban from a human rights violation to a human rights gain.

In short, agency brings responsibility. The türban-wearing agents shall be held responsible for the failures in which they take part in. Describing women with türban as “victims but not innocents”,⁵⁴⁸ this new defense of Secularism developed a way of recognizing the agency behind headscarf, without romanticizing its relevance to human rights. In this sense, Pavey was somewhat provocative in her evaluation of who has the agency, and hence the responsibility in AKP: “[...] and as of now, I believe that the uncovered ‘showcase’ MPs of AKP should return their seats to the real owners of these seats.”

Accordingly, “an MP with a headscarf” should be questioned, for instance, on whether she defends others' rights as she once defended one's own headscarf. As such, Pavey could keep some of the amalgams that were made in the name of Secularism in the past. Accordingly, she described her identity by means of these amalgams: “we are the ones who were burned in Sivas⁵⁴⁹, shot in Gezi, [& the ones] whose houses are marked. We are the ones who are punished for one's own way of life”. Pavey explained why, within this social context, she directly referred to “MPs with headscarves”:

I talk to you as a person who were obliged to wear türban for many years, in geographies that you did not go even as tourists. In Afghanistan, Yemen, Iran... I talk to you as a woman deputy, who was hindered, by a male deputy, from wearing pants in Parliament [...] I talk to you as a woman, whose non-existing legs [*Pavey is disabled*] has been turned by men into a political conversation.

⁵⁴⁸ Deniz Alan Held, “Mağdur ama Masum değil: Türkiye’de Türban Meselesi”, *Indigo*, 1 Feb 2016.

⁵⁴⁹ In 1993, a mob in the city of Sivas staged an arson attack and killed 35 people inside a hotel, most of whom were known for their Alevi identities.

Pavey did not put forward her own values in the name of Secularism; instead, she defined Secularism as an instrument to prevent the hegemony of any value-system over the other. In this context, she was not concerned with the isolated first-order values of her interlocutors, but the coexistence of the relations between different value-systems in a broader, shared social space. In this vein, she emphasized her concern: “I am not afraid of the türban on the head of a police [officer]; I am afraid of the future of violence that the police promise me”.

6.4.2. *Secularism Devoid of Parochial Values*

Pavey was the first of many others who would later follow the same line of argumentation, concerned *not* with values of one’s own and others, but with the possibility of making them coexist in a shared space. For example, Writer and Actress Gülse Birsal wrote an open letter to Minister of Family and Social Policies, Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya, whom Birsal called her “sister and schoolmate”. In this open letter, Birsal asked Minister to try to stop the government members’ denigration of “women’s clothing and laughter”. Instead, Birsal asked them to focus on some “common” problems that she believed the government should have been busy with: “violence against women has reached at its peak [...] early-marriages are encouraged [...] [and] students have been left to the dormitories of illegal foundations”.⁵⁵⁰

Birsal also argued elsewhere that the narratives over the clash of “covered” and “uncovered” were nothing but a “huge balloon”. Once upon a time, she was surrounded by a group of people who wanted to take photos with her, while she was shopping at a bazaar in İzmir. Among these people was a hijabi woman who asked Birsal a question: “given that we won’t be able to take a photo, may I at least kiss you?” Birsal initially thought that the woman did not want to take a photo with Birsal, because she was wearing shorts and a sundress. However, as the conversation flowed, Birsal realized that it was the contrary: the hijabi woman

⁵⁵⁰ “Gülse Birsal’den Aile Bakanı Kaya’ya: Kız kardeşim...,” *BirGün*, 25 May 2016, <https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/gulse-birsal-den-aile-bakani-kaya-ya-kiz-kardesim-113434.html>.

thought that Birsal would not want to take a photo with her due to her hijab. Having resolved this crisis of pre-judgements, Birsal underlined that the polarization does not exist in “real-life”.⁵⁵¹

This approach focuses on the question of how to manage the social ties between different values. At this moment, one talks about one’s own and others’ values and beliefs; yet s/he always has to go further to touch upon the mutual social setting in which they all share a common responsibility. In this vein, CHP MP Zeynep Altıok underlined her position towards the head-covering ban on adults:

Even though I think türban is the most fundamental icon of gender discrimination, [I] defend and respect the freedom of clothing and thought for every individual who turns 18.⁵⁵²

Similar to Altıok, Pavey went beyond her first-order values in her emphasis that a female police officer should be able to wear türban, since the problem is not what a police officer wears, but what this officer may force others to do. Within this context, Pavey made the caveat that male police officers never had to cloth themselves in a certain manner to prove that they defend an oppressive ideology. Having disintegrated the two pieces, Pavey’s concern was with oppression, not a cloth.

Despite keeping many of the amalgams as they had been previously made, Pavey’s take on Secularism was not appreciated by some who reproduced the old-school value-laden arguments. This objection came about primarily because Pavey denied judging a personality based on the person’s wearing of “lipstick” or “türban”. In other words, she attempted to deconstruct the long-standing claim that the outside of a head reflects the inside of it (*recall* the

⁵⁵¹ Gulse Birsal, “Aynı Fotoğrafta Birlikte Gülümsemek,” *Hürriyet*, August 30, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/gulse-birsal/harvard-deneyinin-cok-tuhaf-sonuclari-40212178>.

⁵⁵² However, against the lifting of the ban in mid-schools, Altıok refused to set aside her first-order values. Zeynep Altıok Akatlı, “Çocukluk,” *Sosyal Demokrat Dergi* (blog), 20 Nov 2014, <http://www.sosyaldemokratdergi.org/zeynep-altiok-akatli-cocukluk/>, par12.

arguments of Atay and Berkes). In response, seasoned journalist Işık Kansu of Cumhuriyet Newspaper criticized Pavey for ignoring the symbols that Secularism previously deemed dangerous.⁵⁵³ In this context, Kansu was disturbed by Pavey’s defense of female police officers’ right to wear *türban*.

Işık Kansu also criticized Pavey for referring to Secularism with the word “*sekülerizm*” instead of “*laiklik*”. It has been a recent debate among the students of Secularism that the Anglo-model secularism would be called “*sekülerizm*”, whereas the French model is to be called “*laiklik*” (fr. *Laïcité*). As such, using the word *sekülerizm* may be inferred as a rejection of the long-standing defense of *laiklik* in Turkey. In the repertoire of ideologues, “*sekülerizm*” often meant non-interference with religion, whereas “*laiklik*” was the name for the state control and regulation of the religious sphere, deemed potentially dangerous. By using the word *sekülerizm*, according to her in-group critiques Pavey sold out *laiklik*.

As she stopped reflecting on Secularism as a representation of her first-order values, Pavey’s speech was centered on explaining how Secularism would also protect a covered girl who kisses her boyfriend in the park. She clearly mentioned this girl as someone who does something wrong in accordance with her own value-system.⁵⁵⁴ In this context, she revisited Secularism as a promise of protection for those carriers of contradiction. Like all the other arguments I examined above, this argument also challenged the determinism of one’s parochial values in the conversation over others’ rights.

⁵⁵³ Işık Kansu, “Şükürler olsun!”, *Cumhuriyet*, 12 Aug 2017.

⁵⁵⁴ The speakers of contesting value-systems seem very similar when it comes to expressing antipathy towards contradictions—e.g. this woman who wear jeans together with a headscarf; the hijabi who holds her boyfriend’s hand in public; the person that combines *türban* with heavy make-up or high-heels; the Muslim who celebrates the new year on January 1; the Muslim that takes alcohol for 11 months but Ramadan; the one that covers her hair only in graveyards or holy shrines. None of these empirical types fit into the ideals of hegemonic ideologies.

6.4.3. *Secularism “to protect headscarves too”*

Pavey was not the only member of CHP who re-cast Secularism in this manner. CHP MP Tuncay Özkan, who led “Republic Protests” (tr. Cumhuriyet Mitingleri) in which millions of people participated, recently reviewed some of his former statements in favor of the head-covering ban:

But I watched my speeches later on, I realized that I was so harsh [...] Now I am more mature that I can say I am sorry if I frightened the conservative people [...] I was not aware that women with headscarves were not allowed to the military barracks. A mother’s son becomes a lieutenant. They don’t let the mother in. This is fascism. This is cruelty. [...] I made self-criticism in the last 6 years. Thank God, everyone in this country does not share the same ideas.⁵⁵⁵

This series of evaluation continued with the CHP leadership’s exclusion of Former MPs who had previously taken an uncompromising position against the lifting of the head-covering ban. Among these MPs were Necla Arat, Canan Aritman and Nur Serter who led “the rooms of persuasion”—i.e. where the headscarved students were interrogated and “convinced” to open their hairs in universities. In addition to the party members who begun to criticize them for distancing CHP to the “real problems” of Turkey, and hence underpinning the hegemony of the Erdoğan regime, head of CHP Kılıçdaroğlu re-evaluated the previous policies: “in the past, there were mistakes in our language”.⁵⁵⁶

The current party leadership repeatedly stated that CHP does not intend to bring back the headscarf ban at any level. During the 2018 Presidential Campaign, CHP Candidate Muharrem İnce reiterated the following statement: “wherever you want to wear a headscarf, be it at home, on the street or in the state, you can do so!” After a decade-long contestation over

⁵⁵⁵ “Tuncay Özkan: ‘Çıktığım günden beri o insanlardan özür diliyorum,’” *Oda Tv*, 6 Mar 2016.

⁵⁵⁶ “Kılıçdaroğlu: CHP’de Başörtülü Milletvekili Neden Olmasın,” *16punto*, March 21, 2019, <http://16punto.com/kilicdaroglu-basortu-yasagi-dogru-degildi-chpde-basortulu-vekil-neden-olmasin>.

the true definition of Secularism,⁵⁵⁷ these snapshots suggest that the contesters have become accustomed to the once problematized publicity of headscarf.

6 years after the Republic Protests, a distinctive feature of the Gezi Protests was the symbol of “secular students” holding umbrellas for “the conservative protesters” so that they could pray under the rain. On the public forums, the participants in the Gezi Protests staunchly defended “those participants with *türban*” against the ones who saw a contradiction in this snapshot.⁵⁵⁸ In a manner to challenge the old pro-ban tendency to amalgamate “*türban*” with the violation of women’s democratic rights,⁵⁵⁹ the new argument was that wearing *türban* would not necessarily symbolize turning a blind eye on human rights issues.

On the other hand, “the Kabataş Case” of the Gezi Protests has become a toxic subject. Journalist Elif Çakır wrote it as a case of harassment enacted by some “half-nude men” against “a headscarved woman with her baby”. Relying on a forensic report, Then PM Erdoğan repeatedly referred to this incident to denigrate the protests as an anti-religious one. However, the video footage of the incident aroused mass controversy concerning the validity of the incident. In response to the publicly expressed doubts prompted by the footage, Elif Çakır declared that it was not her task to prove that the incident actually occurred. Instead, she described her position as that of a simple journalist who relied on the so-called victim’s statements. Çakır’s Lawyer, Fidel Okan, later argued that the so-called victim Zehra Develioğlu exaggerated a reciprocal taunt up to the level of an unrealistic story of harassment.⁵⁶⁰ When a

⁵⁵⁷ i.e. nearly a decade after then CHP Leader Baykal’s well-disputed “hijab opening”.

“Çarşafa rozet takanlara...”, *soL Haber Portalı*, 25 Nov 2008, <http://haber.sol.org.tr/sabah-sabah/carsafa-rozet-takanlara-haberi-231>.

⁵⁵⁸ “taksim gezi parkı işgaline katılan *türbanlı kız*,” *ekşi sözlük*, last access on 3 Sep 2018, <https://eksisozluk.com/taksim-gezi-parki-iskaline-katilan-turbanli-kiz--3853231?a=nice&p=2>.

⁵⁵⁹ Recall the section on p16, entitled “Ideology-making as the Amalgamation of Various Symbols: *Türban*, Headscarf and more”.

⁵⁶⁰ “Elif Çakır’ın avukatı Fidel Okan: Kabataş olayı kurgu ve düzmece”, *Radikal*, 27 Şubat 2015, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/elif_cakirin_avukati_fidel_okan_kabatas_olayi_kurgu_ve_duzmece-1302431/.

pro-government journalist, Cem Küçük, noted that it was “a mismanaged fabrication”, another pro-government journalist, Abdülkadir Selvi, bashed Küçük for indirectly calling Erdoğan a liar.⁵⁶¹

Apart from the highly contested case of Kabataş, head-covering was not problematized in any way during Gezi Protests. On the contrary, “the anti-capitalist Muslims” in particular turned out to be a symbol of the protests, as they crystallized the alternative argument that “neighborhood pressure” hides beneath social classes in the neighborhood. In other words, their appearance recalled the left-wing argument that the ‘real’ tension was not between “Islamic bourgeoisie” and “Secular bourgeoisie”.⁵⁶² Nearly a decade after its historic propaganda against the lifting of the ban, on 1 May 2018, Cumhuriyet Newspaper presented the Labor Day Celebrations in Ankara with the photo of a covered woman, holding a flag of the Socialist Party of the Proletariat (SEP).

Amid the debates on whether “Islamism” established its cultural hegemony, Cumhuriyet writer Deniz Yıldırım asked why the pro-government media was ignoring the protests led by the workers of the make-up company Flormar, “most of whom are headscarved”. Yıldırım answered his own question:

[I]t is because, in the ‘culture’ [of the government], there is no place for a headscarved worker who seeks justice.⁵⁶³

In the 2019 municipal elections, both the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) and CHP had headscarved candidates whom, indeed, the parties did not label as “headscarved”. Accordingly,

⁵⁶¹ “Abdülkadir Selvi’den ‘Kabataş kurguydu’ diyen Cem Küçük’e: Kurguları Erdoğan mı yaptı?”, *T24*, 27 Oct 2015, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/abdulkadir-selviden-kabatas-kurguydu-diyen-cem-kucuke-kurgulari-erdogan-mi-yapti,314320>.

⁵⁶² Ali Simsek, “Hayat Tarzı İhbarcılığı Ya Da Mahalledeki Sınıfı Unutmak,” *BirGün*, July 17, 2009. Aylin Gocmen, “Bana paradoksunu söyle...,” *BirGün*, October 23, 2010, <https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/bana-paradoksunu-soyle-4125.html>.

⁵⁶³ Deniz Yıldırım, “Kültürel İktidar,” *Cumhuriyet*, 26 Dec 2018, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/koseyazisi/1181658/Kulturel_iktidar.html.

Fatma Akın was a “a textile worker”, and Hilal Ülkü Türedi was “the 18-year-old daughter of a farmer”. The leaders of both parties justified their unprecedented decisions by emphasizing that one’s identity is not exhausted by one’s headscarf. Contrary to the authoritative claims of the past, this did not take the cloth as an all-encompassing indication of personality.

Back in 2016, a police raid into Cumhuriyet Newspaper was protested against by the readers of the newspaper. Yeni Akit Newspaper, never polite towards any non-Islamist and most other Islamists, called it “a theatre” when Cumhuriyet published a photo of some “covered”, old women among protesters.⁵⁶⁴ Contrary to my argument in this part, one may maintain that this new perspective was of some relevance to the changes in the administrative structure of the newspaper. In 2014, the management of Cumhuriyet Newspaper was taken over by some so-called “liberals” led by Journalist Murat Sabuncu. The critiques of this transition said that the “Kemalist” Cumhuriyet of İlhan Selçuk and Mustafa Balbay was captured by these “liberals”—hence the shift in its narrative on the headscarf. That said, my argument is that the sympathy towards the image of *covered women opposing the government* was not entirely explainable by the “liberal” directors of Cumhuriyet. On the contrary, Balbay himself mentioned the shift in his own words:

In the past, we gave our türban-wearing sisters the pip; now, we
give them our hands.⁵⁶⁵

This revision was in congruence with that of popular journalist Mehmet Ali Birand who, back in 2012, was sure that the headscarf had become ordinary in the media landscape.⁵⁶⁶ In the last

⁵⁶⁴ “Cumhuriyet’in ‘başörtü’ tiyatrosu,” Yeni Akit, 1 Nov 2016.

⁵⁶⁵ Nur Banu Kocaaslan, “CHP’li Balbay: Eskiden Türbanlı Kardeşlerimizin Canını Sıkıyorduk, Şimdi Elini Sıkıyoruz,” *Diken* (blog), 13 May 2015, <http://www.diken.com.tr/chpli-balbay-eskiden-turbanli-kardeslerimizin-canini-sikiyorduk-simdi-elini>.

⁵⁶⁶ *Mehmet Ali Birand’ın Bahsettiği Başörtülü Kız “Kübranur Uslu”* (Bugün TV, 2012), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kn502wWXNRs>.

interview before his death, Birand promoted the hiring of Kübranur Uslu as “the first headscarved reporter” of Kanal D.

Last but not least, headscarved women have been more than welcome in the recent parades entitled “don’t meddle with my cloth” (tr. *kıyafetime karışma*). They have been invited to stand in the photo frames, as their participation would challenge the perception that the parades consisted of a defense of a particular set of clothes. A similar approach has been embraced by a newly founded platform, *Yalnız Yürümeyeceksin* (en. “You will not walk alone”), which aims to help women who cannot remove their headscarves due to family pressure. In response to the assumption that they support the head-covering ban, the members of the platform declared: “No, we are also against the policies of removing headscarf by means of force”.⁵⁶⁷ As this common theme of opposition to interference suggests, these organizations have been meant to form a shared voice for women irrespective of their different first-order values. For sure, this new discourse has its implications for feminism’s historical tension between holding responsible the ‘culture’ versus the ‘nature’ of patriarchy.

⁵⁶⁷ Buse Vurdu, “Başörtülerini çıkaran kadınların hikayesi: Yalnız yürümeyeceksin,” *Evrensel*, 22 Sep 2018, <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/361882/basortulerini-cikaran-kadinlarin-hikayesi-yalniz-yurumeyeceksin>.

6.5. Evaluative Conversations (II): Ethical Concerns in the Re-making of Islamism

The state that Erdoğan calls “New Turkey” invests in cultural projects that correspond with a set of values that are not shared by others, as the dialectical approach I adopt should have made clear thus far. The government stopped funding some spheres of activity (e.g. cultural events, educational programs) that it associated with those recalcitrant value-systems, such as that of “Kemalism”, or broadly, modernism. However, in the course of this war of hegemony, its ideology-makers have been pushed to re-evaluate ‘tolerance’, primarily for reasons that relate to the management of their own value-system. Accordingly, the re-making of Islamism has been pushed by sociological changes that these gate-keepers admittedly could not manipulate in accordance with a perfectionist sense of their value-system.

6.5.1. Revisiting Tolerance in Family

The wedding of preacher Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü’s daughter has given a hint as to how a ‘proper’ Islamist may react, when one’s first-order values are challenged by those to whom one has inescapable ties. When Ünlü’s daughter appeared in the wedding with a somewhat ‘stylish’ wedding dress, many, including the fellow members of İsmailağa Religious Community, criticized Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü for letting his daughter, first, lead a mixed-sex wedding gathering, and second, wear a “religiously prohibited” dress for the wedding. Ünlü did not explicitly problematize the wedding ritual during the ceremony. On the contrary, he made a short speech in the ceremony, which Erdoğan and some ministers also attended.

However, after the wedding, he declared that he did not approve of his daughter Yüstra’s clothing choice. He underlined that even some of the greatest teachers of religion could not educate their own children; and that they, the teachers of religion, could not make the society fully embrace hijab. Nevertheless, most importantly, Ünlü underlined that it is ultimately the responsibility of his daughter to behave in accordance with her religious values. On the one hand, Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü did not interfere with his daughter’s cloth; on the other, Yüstra Ünlü

did not raise her voice against her father's public argumentation against her practice. In this exchange, Ünlü tolerated his daughter by means of non-interference, just as his daughter was publicly silent towards the possibly reprehensible terms of tolerance she faced. Generally speaking, the authoritative voices behind Islamism⁵⁶⁸ seem to have agreed that women should comply with their husbands'/parents' preferences within the confines of tesettür.⁵⁶⁹ This was a principle that Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü explicitly defended in his speech after the wedding, though he admittedly could not educate his daughter in this respect.

In this context, the timely ethical question that appears is what to do in case one's addressee does not comply with one's instructions about tesettür. In their evaluative conversations on this question, the preachers of the mainstream religious communities agreed that "pressure", in the sense of interfering with one's will, is not a means of resolving such disagreements. On the contrary, they set forward that the value-system indicates a set of "legitimate" ways for the discontents to exit its confines.

Süleymaniye Foundation's fetva website laid down that Muslims should continue to inform their close social circles about the commands of Islam regarding tesettür. That said, on conveying the message, the fetva underlined that force must not be an option, because religion cannot be practiced without intent.⁵⁷⁰ At the micro level, many conservative families began to share the same understanding. For example, a woman who eventually removed her headscarf described the way her "radical Islamic family" had approached to her so that she could embrace hijab:

⁵⁶⁸ From the former ones, such as Mehmed Zahid Kotku, Mahmud Es'ad Coşan and Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan to the more recent ones, such as Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü, Nureddin Yıldız, Abdülaziz Bayındır and Hayrettin Karaman.

⁵⁶⁹ This "right of the husband" is considered to be valid only if his request is in line with the rules of tesettür. "Kadın kocasının hangi emirlerine itaat etmek zorundadır?", *Hikmet.Net* (blog), 06 Aug 2015, <http://hikmet.net/kadin-kocasinin-hangi-emirlerine-itaat-etmek-zorundadir/>.

⁵⁷⁰ "Eşime ve çocuklarıma dini yaşamaları için baskı yapabilir miyim?", *Fetva.net*, 19 Aug 2009, <http://www.fetva.net/yazili-fetvalar/esime-ve-cocuklarima-dini-yasamalari-icin-baski-yapabilir-miyim.html>.

Let us not make so much pressure on her, so that she does not end up opening her head.⁵⁷¹

In the same vein, having argued that Islam does not prescribe a legal punishment for most moral issues, Mustafa İslamoğlu described the breach of tesettür as a matter of “morality”, hence not reversible by means of enforcement.⁵⁷²

Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü calls for men to “be extremely patient” before “beating their wives”, which he describes as a last resort in face of highly exceptional cases, such as “the breaches of honor”.⁵⁷³ Some teachers altogether refuse to interpret Surah an-Nisa (verse 34) as a command “to beat” one’s wife, whereas those like Ünlü in the other camp reiterate the point that “brute force” is not the way to react towards “most disagreements” over clothing. As he explained in the context of his daughter’s wedding, his reaction consisted of turning his back to her during the ceremony. With this act, he claimed to show the command of Allah, at least by means of gestures. Also, by means of words, he later reminded us of his own “proper” wedding. Moreover, he publicly prayed for those like his daughter, so that they eventually embrace hijab.

In cases where the disagreement over clothing persists in a family, Nureddin Yıldız advises men to consider divorce. Because Yıldız interprets divorce as a unilateral option for men, he criticizes the civil code for rendering it very difficult.⁵⁷⁴ He implies that these “difficult” conditions encourage men to cheat on their wives. Having mentioned religious divorce as a solution, Abdülaziz Bayındır made the caveat that divorce in accordance with Islamic Law is not easy for men either, due to “the heavy obligations” it imposes on them.⁵⁷⁵ Whereas Nihat

⁵⁷¹ Busra Cebeci, “Babam Açıldığını Duyarsa, Kardeşimi de Üniversiteye Göndermez,” *Bianet.Org*, 11 Feb 2018, par38.

⁵⁷² Mustafa İslamoğlu, *Tesettür Yazıları* (İstanbul: Düşün Yayıncılık, 2013), p48.

⁵⁷³ Mehmet Cengiz, *Cübbeli Ahmet Hoca Karı Koca Hakları Sohbeti*, 28 Jul 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kQHivLrHS5k>.

⁵⁷⁴ see Nureddin Yıldız, *Kadının Giyimine Kocası Karışabilir Mi?* (Fetva Meclisi, 2013), <https://www.fetvameclisi.com/fetva-kadının-giyimine-kocasi-karisabilir-mi-31487.html>.

⁵⁷⁵ Abdülaziz Bayındır, “Günümüzde Karı-Koca İhtilafının Sebepleri”, *Süleymaniye Vakfı*, 29 Sep 2009, <http://www.suleymaniyevakfi.org/arastirmalar/gunumuzde-kari-koca-ihtilafinin-sebepleri.html>.

Hatipoğlu equates religious and official divorce, the others strongly disagree with this argument.⁵⁷⁶ Despite the differences in this respect, all these lines of argumentation merged on the point that the value-system indicates a route of exit for those unwilling to stay in its confines. They simply offer divorce as a way to *otherize* those who had previously been mistaken as the *self*.

6.5.2. *Tolerance towards Others*

Beyond family, the timely question is whether Muslims have a duty to exercise physical force over a stranger due to her clothing. In this vein, the media channels of Islamists—e.g. Star, Sabah, Yeni Şafak, Yeni Akit—commonly refer to the aggressors, whom I have mentioned throughout the exploratory conversations, as mentally ill people. These channels published without redaction interior minister Süleyman Soylu’s statement that “violence against a woman” is unjustifiable, no matter she wears “a headscarf or a mini-skirt”.⁵⁷⁷ In the same vein, they did not problematize judge Mehmet Yoşlu’s suspension from work following his reaction to the lawyer for her “mini-skirt”. Moreover, they also shared minister of justice Abdülhamit Gül’s criticism of Yoşlu: “it is unacceptable that [...] the judge is busy with the clothing of the lawyer instead of the legal case”.⁵⁷⁸ They dismissed the representational quality of the cases of violence that were well-documented. In other words, according to them, these acts were just individual cases that do not represent Islam’s true authoritative claims on the subject matter.

In case the records of an incident were not fully clear, they sought to falsify them. For example, some of those speakers called the Maçka incident bogus, because they claimed no one would interfere with a woman’s open-clothes in Maçka, next to Nişantaşı “where every second

⁵⁷⁶ Faruk Kose, “Nihat Hatipoğlu’nun talak fetvası üzerine...”, *Habervaktim*, 01 Aug 2012, <https://www.habervaktim.com/yazar/52991/nihat-hatipoglundun-talak-fetvasi-uzerine.html>.

⁵⁷⁷ “Soylu: Kadına şiddet kabul edilemez”, *Yeni Şafak*, 02 Mar 2017, <https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/soylu-kadina-siddet-kabul-edilemez-2622317>.

⁵⁷⁸ “Bakan Gül tepki göstermişti! O hakim görevden uzaklaştırıldı,” *Haber7*, May 29, 2019, <http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/2865001-bakan-gul-tepki-gostermisti-o-hakim-gorevden-uzaklastirildi>.

person wears shorts”.⁵⁷⁹ Having claimed that most of these incidents were just fabricated or exaggerated, they focused on the ways these incidents may have been used to provoke mass protests and upheavals against the religious circles, “just as in time of Ticanis”.⁵⁸⁰ In order to prove how tolerant Islamists are, journalist İsmail Kılıçarslan of Yeni Şafak, who worked for 10 years in the then “Milli Görüş” TV channel named Kanal 7, recalled that he managed to have colleagues who wore “mini-skirts” alongside those others—i.e. “Alevi”, “Kurds” and “even Christians and Atheists”.⁵⁸¹ Kılıçarslan asked if any covered woman, other than the cleaning ladies, was employed in the Secularist camp.

Intentionally or not, Kılıçarslan’s story summarizes the flow of culture for the members of the Nakshibendi and the Nur orders, who accommodated some difference while struggling to be influential bankers, statesmen, tradesmen and media patrons.⁵⁸² Even Abdurrahman Dilipak, who explicitly calls himself “intolerant” in relation to this matter, noted that his team in Kanal D consisted of women. His policy in this environment was to not stay in the same room with his women colleagues: “even if it is winter time, I do not close my door. If they close

⁵⁷⁹ Halime Kokce, “Ticaniler, Aczimendiler...Ama Artık Yemezler”, *Star*, 3 Aug 2017, par2. Levent Albayrak, “Parkta Kirli Oyun”, *Akşam*, 6 Aug 2017.

⁵⁸⁰ Zeynep Ciftci, “Tesettür faciası değil ‘yalan haber’ faciası”, *Yeni Şafak*, 18 Dec 2006, <https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/tesettur-faciasi-degil-yalan-haber-faciasi-20099>.

“Yalan haberin belgesi”, *Yeni Şafak*, 19 Dec 2006, <https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/yalan-haberin-belgesi-20255>.

“Öğrenciye kezzap yalan çıktı”, *Yeni Şafak*, 14 Feb 2008, <https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/ogrenciye-kezzap-yalan-cikti-99784>.

Sinan Kaya, “Müdire Hanım’a kirli kumpas”, *Yeni Akit*, 21 Feb 2015, <https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/mudire-hanima-kirli-kumpas-53300.html>.

Zekeriya Say, “‘Beyoğlu’nu geri alacağız!’ dansı...”, *Yeni Akit*, 04 Aug 2017, <https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/yazarlar/zekeriya-say/beyoglunu-geri-alacagiz-dansi-20480.html>.

Burak Battal, “Yalancılara boyun eğmeyiz”, *Yeni Akit*, 25 Sep 2017, <https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/yalancilara-boyun-egmeyiz-379728.html>.

“İşte Ak Parti’deki O İstifanın Gerçek Sebebi”, *Adayorum*, 20 Sep 2017, <http://www.adayorum.com/iste-ak-parti-deki-o-istifanin-gercek-nedeni.html>.

⁵⁸¹ İsmail Kılıçarslan, “Maçı nerde kaybediyoruz?”, *Yeni Şafak*, 04 Jul 2015.

⁵⁸² Faik Bulut, *Tarikat Sermayesinin Yükselişi* (Doruk Yayınları, 1997).

Serif Mardin, “Islam in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century in Turkey,” in *Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey* (Syracuse University Press, 2006), 261–97.

the door, I will open it and leave the room”.⁵⁸³ During his interview with Helin Avşar, Dilipak appreciated Avşar’s choice of cloth. If she wore a “low-neck” cloth, Dilipak would either refuse to stay in the same environment, or he would ask Avşar to cover her body.

These strategies of partial accommodation are clearly based on some pre-defined categories of otherness (e.g. “uncovered women”, “Alevi”, “Christians” etc.). In accordance with these categories, the above-mentioned speakers agree that Muslims should warn one another about the commands of their religion. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that they must not interfere with the clothing preferences of others, as long as the latter does not symbolize a “threat”—i.e. yet another matter of speculation. In this vein, then prime minister Binali Yıldırım made his own authoritative speech while evaluating the mental state of Çakıroğlu, who kicked Terzi:

What he did is not what a normal person would do. You may not like [the way somebody is dressed]. Then you [normally] mutter... If this man’s previous record is scrutinized, the fact that he has [mental] problems will surface. His behaviors are strange. He smiles and so on...⁵⁸⁴

Binali Yıldırım admits that one does not have to appreciate the clothes of another, though he also implies that one is not obliged to turn a blind eye to the clothes of others. Taken together, he just corrects what he would do if he were Çakıroğlu on that bus. If he were Çakıroğlu, he would mutter.

It was with the same line of argument that they dismissed the association of Islamism with ISIS’ new-year’s-eve attack at Reina Nightclub. After campaigning for a couple of weeks with the slogan, “Muslims should not celebrate Noel”, the opponents of the new-year

⁵⁸³ Helin Avşar, “Seninle odada yalnız kalmam,” Habertürk, 4 Oct 2009, <https://www.haberturk.com/polemik/haber/176836-seninle-odada-yalniz-kalmam>.

⁵⁸⁴ “Hoşuna gitmeyebilir, mırıldanırsın”, T24, 22 Sep 2016, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/basbakan-yildirim-sortlu-kadina-tekme-yorumu-hosuna-gitmeyebilir-mirildanirsin,361030>.

celebrations claimed that they were wholeheartedly against this attack. They made it public, in the aftermath of the attack, that their aim was not to interfere but to remind what a Muslim must (not) do. Ali Karahasanoglu of Yeni Akit argues that what “we” do is nothing beyond saying “hey mate, if you take alcohol, your health will be worsened. Also, taking alcohol is forbidden according to our religion! But it is up to you!”⁵⁸⁵ Their aim was to convey their message in the form of muttering or talking to “a mate”, whereas the ISIS’ particular way of conveying its message was different.

According to Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü, there was no difference between attacking a “place of worship” and a “place of entertainment”. In this instance, Ünlü recalled his dialogue with a pious man who had a desire to attack a bar. When Ünlü asked him for how long he had been pious, the man counted: “approximately 10 years”. Ünlü responded to the man: “so, according to your understanding, somebody should have killed you 11 years ago”. In his Friday preaches, Ünlü repeatedly told his followers that they “cannot despise” women who do not follow the rules of tesettür: “the hijabi may end up undressing, whereas the nude may end up repenting”.⁵⁸⁶ He advised his listeners to focus on where they end up in terms of their relationship with religion.

Clearly, all these examples suggest that the abovementioned ideology-makers support a set of responses to those who do not wear “proper” clothes. Some defended warning them, whereas others defended mumbling and muttering about them, or making some passive aggression felt. The mainstream current of Islamism just opposes going beyond these measures, though these measures are likely to be denounced as “neighborhood pressure” by others. What

⁵⁸⁵ Ali Karahasanoglu, “‘Hayat tarzı.. Hayat tarzı..’ Paranoyak iseniz, biz ne yapalım?”, *Yeni Akit*, 05 Ocak 2017.

⁵⁸⁶ Tesvik ci, *Kadının Başı Açık Diye Onu Da Hakir Göremezsin, Sonunun Ne Olacağını Bilemezsin*, accessed September 5, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8VHm4IG4Unk>.

more can be done for the sake of the belief-system remains an open question, given that many others oppose “correcting” themselves after muttering.

6.5.3. *Trade-off: The Imposition of Practice, or Sincere Belief*

Reiterating the argument that a Muslim has a duty to warn others for their misconduct, the ideology-makers of Islamism seem to have kept their long-standing claims as to what an “ideal” Islamic setting would consist of. Es’ad Coşan preached long ago that Muslims should interfere to stop “the sinners”, if those who do *not* commit the sin are in the majority in a given setting.⁵⁸⁷ Some decades later (2012), Özlem Albayrak argued that the dualism between “shorts” and “headscarves” was nothing but a consequence of the political climate created by the head-covering ban. Albayrak underlined that, in this period, Islamists had to “borrow liberal arguments” to defend freedom for all on equal footing.

However, the conditions have changed, as the ban has finally been lifted. In this context, concerning the dress codes of high schools, Albayrak stressed that these “balanced” arguments should be challenged “if necessary”—i.e. in accordance with the conservative values of the government (tr. “serde muhafazakarlık var”).⁵⁸⁸ According to Albayrak, for the time being, both shorts and headscarves should be permitted in high schools, given that the only feasible alternative is to forbid both. Therefore, she *hypothetically* suggests that others’ clothes may be restricted if they breach the authority’s sense of appropriateness in certain places. Clearly, this argument resembles the way the microcosmic authorities of some neighborhoods proclaim the “conservative” identity of “their” neighborhoods. Accordingly, women should pay attention to what they wear, should they visit these areas.

⁵⁸⁷ Mahmud Esad Cosan, Cuma Sohbeti - İyiliği Emretme, Kötülüğü Engelleme Görevi (Akra, 1993), <http://www.esadcosankulliyati.com/arsiv/cuma/c930331.html>.

⁵⁸⁸ Özlem Albayrak, “Kılık-kıyafet, başörtüsü, şort!”, *Yeni Şafak*, 30 Nov 2012, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ozlemalbayrak/kilik-kiyafet-baortusu-ort-35183>.

On the other hand, because these restrictions unmoor one's conduct from one's belief, some thinkers construed them as a threat to the belief-system. Despite emphasizing that Islam does not allow anyone to claim, "my body & my choice" (i.e. given that the body belongs to Allah), Mustafa İslamoğlu underlined that it would be "a cruelty" to interfere with people's clothes by means of law enforcement. According to him, the issue is one of belief-system, and as such, relevant to "conscience" instead of "police".⁵⁸⁹

A recipe with these ingredients—i.e. an essentialist categorical approach and the need to accommodate difference—would be to set free the conscience of non-believers, lapsed believers among traditional Muslims, and "bad" Muslims who are aware of their sins. This notion of tolerance would require each group to clearly recognize its own status vis-à-vis the terms of reference pre-defined by the authority, the utmost desire of which is to have monopoly over the definition and the operationalization of Islam. In this context, it should be noted that the ideology-makers, such as Abdülaziz Bayındır, Mustafa İslamoğlu and Hayrettin Karaman, define the precondition of an "Islamic State" to be its character as a safe space for "non-believers" as well as believers. Hayrettin Karaman describes an Islamic State as a model in which non-Muslims should have a right "to keep" their own clothes. However, it should be strictly forbidden for them to imitate Muslims, and vice versa.⁵⁹⁰ This is a rationalization of tolerance without relativism, which, these ideology-makers assume, will protect both the belief-system and the "legitimate" free space for divergent social practices of others.

6.5.4. *The Temporality of Clothes*

This idea of tolerance tends to miss the slippery question of what counts as imitation (tr. teşebbüh, taklit). This question has turned out to be an open dispute that challenges the clear-

⁵⁸⁹ Mustafa İslamoğlu, "Maksada Gelelim", *Mustafaislamoglu.com*, 23 Feb 2008, <https://mustafaislamoglu.com/maksada-gelelim/>.

⁵⁹⁰ Hayrettin Karaman, "İslâm Ülkesinde Gayr-İ Müslim Vatandaşlar (Ehlü'z-Zimmeh)," *Yeni Şafak*, August 5, 2018.

cut categories regarding the self and the others. For example, Abdulmuizz Fida, the teacher of Islam in a web-based religious community, re-evaluated the changing status of wedding dresses as follows:

Even though Women's white wedding dresses came from Christianity, it no longer makes you look like an infidel. It is because most Muslim women wear it now [...] Wearing şapka in early Republican Era was a sign of being an infidel. Now, although it is still not appreciated, it won't face *tekfir*.⁵⁹¹

The sources of İskenderpaşa Religious Community also argue that şapka has turned out to be a customary practice, hence not a matter of imitation anymore.⁵⁹² With a similar take on “customs”, it justifies women's opening of their hair in some public settings.⁵⁹³ As this line of argumentation implies, the status of a cloth always consists in the inevitably changing social circumstances.

The Refah and the successive AKP cadres had to make the same argument to rationalize the peace they had with the tie (tr. kravat).⁵⁹⁴ After some decades of being accustomed to a tie, Erdoğan, who ended up being a ‘conservative’ of ties, gave a tie to PM Alexis Tsipras of Greece as “a present”, just because Tsipras did not fulfill his ‘task’ of wearing one in formal settings.⁵⁹⁵ Fethullah Gülen, at a time (2008) when his arguments were not only public but also popular and authoritative, preached that a Muslim who dresses like a non-Muslim would *not* necessarily turn out to be an infidel. However, according to Gülen, the intention to look alike would signify *küfür* (en. blasphemy) *per se*.⁵⁹⁶ Female Preacher Emine Gümüş Böke of the Istanbul Mufti

⁵⁹¹ Abdulmuizz Fida, “Gelinlik Giymek Caiz Mi?,” *Kur'an ve Sünnetten Delillerle Soru - Cevap*, 13 Jul 2010, <https://www.islam-tr.net/konu/gelinlik-giymek-caiz-mi.16078>.

⁵⁹² “Tesettür ve Mahremiyetle İlgili Konular,” *İskenderpaşa*, accessed 4 Sep 2018, <http://www.iskenderpasa.com/27B6E20E-0454-41A4-8E76-98E99716C992.aspx>, par23.

⁵⁹³ “Baş Açık Olarak Gezmek Caiz Midir?,” *İskenderpaşa*, accessed September 4, 2018, <http://www.iskenderpasa.com/27B6E20E-0454-41A4-8E76-98E99716C992.aspx>.

⁵⁹⁴ see the evaluation of Abdullah Gürsoy in Sevinc Dogan, *Mahalledeki AKP: Parti İşleyişi, Taban Mobilizasyonu ve Siyasal Yabancılaşma* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016), p173.

⁵⁹⁵ Because Tsipras did not wear this tie in their following meeting, Erdoğan asked him where his tie was.

⁵⁹⁶ “Gülen'den kılık kıyafet uyarısı!”, *Milliyet*, 13 Jun 2008, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/gulen-den-kiyafet-uyarisi--siyaset-876037>.

Office described this red-line as the intention to carry “the symbols of other religions”.⁵⁹⁷ These sources united on the point that Islam does not dictate a certain type of cloth, as the types are made and re-made in relationship with a set of temporal and spatial settings.

As a timely precaution against “imitation”, many have recently developed ways to differentiate their dress in a socially recognizable way from that of others—i.e. non-Muslims or the Muslims who are *not* considered to be devout enough. A wide range of ‘Islamic fashion shows’ has begun to serve this cause by claiming to design ‘appropriately stylish’ clothes, such as the so-called Islamic wedding dresses. With the condition that they do not “commercialize” clothing in a manner that would “breach the borders of religion”, Karaman defended these attempts to put together more likable clothes appropriate to the compelling new conditions.⁵⁹⁸ Having acknowledged that there may be mixed weddings where one “has to” attend, Karaman states that women should comply with “the rules of tesettür” at these gatherings.⁵⁹⁹ He did not specify any category of wedding dresses, as he thinks that there is room for free-choice within the borders of tesettür. In this case, even though the definition of tesettür is deemed clearly time-independent, it has been the temporal element that prevails in one’s evaluation of whether a certain cloth fits into the rules of appropriateness. Accordingly, these guidelines connote that a cloth may not always be what it used to be.

Recently, however, this inescapable temporal dimension paved the way for a mass social change in the conduct of tesettür—i.e. an unwanted change for many. Throughout the 2000s, many “conservative” publications, from those of Yeni Şafak to Zaman, contained articles that aimed at guiding “conservative women” about the alternative ways to combine their clothes in

⁵⁹⁷ Emine Gumus Boke, “İslam Hukuku’nda Kıyâfet-Örtünme ve Kıyâfetler Üzerindeki Resim ve Yazıların Durumu,” *The Journal of Kırıkkale Islamic Sciences Faculty* 2, no. 3 (2017): p27.

⁵⁹⁸ Hayrettin Karaman, “Tesettür ve Kıyâfet”, accessed on 15 Aug 2018, par4, <http://www.hayrettinkaraman.net/yazi/hayat/0487.htm>.

⁵⁹⁹ Hayrettin Karaman, “(076) Dinimize Göre Düğün Nasıl Olmalıdır?,” accessed 10 Aug 2018, <http://www.hayrettinkaraman.net/sc/00076.htm>.

a “stylish way”.⁶⁰⁰ In the meantime, Islamist cloth-designers became unprecedentedly vocal in discussing one another’s approach to tesettür while producing new clothes for “the conservative women”.⁶⁰¹

At this point, the conversation turned out to be one that empties some of the abovementioned claims against relativism. This is because it remains undefinable where the authority lies to develop the clear-cut authoritative claims that, on the one hand, will define the terms of “imitation”, “adjustment” and “threat”, and on the other hand, will resolve the tensions over the flow of culture that pushes for a re-definition of clothing patterns. Who decides what has become “customary”?

6.5.5. *Saving the Belief-System*

Never mind managing others’ clothes, these circles admittedly lost control of the differing “conservative” motives behind clothing⁶⁰². Some leading figures dismissed the attempts to make Islamic fashion and style, as the aim of tesettür is to cover oneself against all kinds of public attraction. Crucially, *Yeni Akit* published the following note in one of its reports on the subject:

With their style, the second-generation headscarved women drew a rebuff from the first-generation.⁶⁰³

⁶⁰⁰ Ayse Olgun, “Genç nesil tesettür: Daha özgür daha spor”, *Yeni Şafak*, 28 Jan 2007, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yenisafakpazar/genç-nesil-tesettur-daha-ozgur-daha-spor-26773>.

Yusuf Ziya Comert, “Erkekler şık olabilir kadınlar dursun hele”, *Yeni Şafak*, 10 Feb 2007, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yemel/erkekler-sik-olabilir-kadinlar-dursun-hele-28101>.

Ayşe Olgun, “Ortadoğu’nun gözü pardösülerimizde”, *Yeni Şafak*, 29 Apr 2007, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yenisafakpazar/ortadogunun-gozu-pardosulerimizde-42863>.

Ayşe Olgun, “Alsak Alsak Ne Alsak?”, *Yeni Şafak*, 13 May 2007, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yenisafakpazar/alsak-alsak-ne-alsak-45070>.

“Haşema, bu yaz plajlara damga vuracak”, *Yeni Şafak*, 29 Jun 2008, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yenisafakpazar/hasema-bu-yaz-plajlara-damga-vuracak-125791>.

⁶⁰¹ Kubra & Busra, “‘Pantolon giyme’ dediğim için müşteriyi kaçırdım”, *Yeni Şafak*, 12 Haziran 2011, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yenisafakpazar/pantolon-giyme-dedigim-icin-musteriyi-kacirdim-324010>.

⁶⁰² Resul Tosun, “Başörtüsü tek ölçü değildir”, *Star.com.tr*, 13 Ağustos 2017, <http://www.star.com.tr/yazar/basortusu-tek-olcu-degildir-yazi-1245632/>.

⁶⁰³ “İşte günümüzdeki ‘çeyrek tesettür’ anlayışı!”, *Yeni Akit*, last access on 23 Aug 2018, <http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/foto-galeri/iste-gunumuzdeki-ceyrek-tesettur-anlayisi-1084>.

This publication pessimistically admitted that the old argument about “the nudes of the high society” has turned out to be popular in the mass public: “we saw so many of those who wear hijab but also do embarrassing things”.⁶⁰⁴ Clearly, this new social condition deposed clothing from the position of acting as an infallible precursor of personality.

In the meantime, *Yeni Akit* referred to a series of news to criticize some ‘seemingly conservative’ women for their inappropriate activities, such as a headscarved woman who received a marriage proposal in a nightclub.⁶⁰⁵ In the same time-period, many others wrote about the recent generation of “conservative men” getting married to “uncovered women”, and the recent generation of “headscarved women” who do not very much like the narrow-mindedness of “conservative men”. In line with these “pessimistic” scenarios, psychiatrist Sefa Saygılı and Diyanet member Ülfet Görgülü were concerned with the ways through which “conservatives” became “sexualized” in the metropolitan life. This life, according to Saygılı, has led people to escape from “small towns’ neighborhood pressure”⁶⁰⁶.

Moreover, the neighborhoods that carried a “conservative identity” have diverged away from each other in terms of their clothing preferences. For example, the upper-middle class Çukurambar district of Ankara demonstrated how the AKP MPs, conservative bureaucrats and the government’s favorite building contractors came together to form a zone of “conservative” high culture, full of meeting-points for like-minded people—e.g. cafés, restaurants, mosques, helal houses, bookstores, and the AKP headquarters. Though the conservative image of Çukurambar has been put on display *inter alia* by cafés that refuse to sell alcoholic beverages, these cafés also began to exhibit a new public space in which upper-middle class conservative

⁶⁰⁴ “İşte günümüzdeki ‘çeyrek tesettür’ anlayışı!”, par55.

⁶⁰⁵ “Başörtüsüne Zulüm! Gece Kulübünde Rezil Teklif,” *Yeni Akit*, 15 Nov 2018.

⁶⁰⁶ Enis Tayman, “Artık tesettürlü eşler de aldatıyor!”, *Tempo*, 03 May 2008, <http://www.gazetevatan.com/artik--tesetturlu-esler--de-aldatiyor--176246-yasam/>.
“Mahremiyet ve Aile” (*Diyanet Aylık Dergi*, January 2015), p5.

women began putting together headscarf and fashion. A tesettür shop in Çukurambar advertises: “this year, the unicolored combinations are especially trendy”.⁶⁰⁷ According to Al Jazeera, Turkey is the biggest spender of the global market of “Islamic fashion”, which, by 2023, is expected to reach \$361 billion.⁶⁰⁸

Emine Şenlikoğlu, a seasoned protagonist of tesettür in “the first-generation”, argues that a woman must not cover her head if she also “wears pants”, “crosses her legs in a café [...] with a cigarette in her hand”.⁶⁰⁹ Having underlined that *nobody forces* these women to cover, Şenlikoğlu asked them why they “pretend”. She also repeatedly criticized “the conservative media” for censoring what she calls full-tesettür: “the conservatives do not like women with real tesettür”.⁶¹⁰ During a conversation between two well-known women who write on the sociology of Islam, Fatma Barbarosoğlu explained to Nazife Şişman how the “Muslim TV channels” of the 1990s paved the way for this differentiated approach to tesettür. Accordingly, the headscarved presenters, who began to appear on the screen on a daily basis, inevitably felt the need to wear a new cloth every other day.⁶¹¹

The transformed images of these “conservative women” influenced many housewives. Abdurrahman Dilipak noted that “these deformations” were led by the explosion in the use of headscarf.⁶¹² Dilipak added:

⁶⁰⁷ Aksu Akcaoglu, *Zarif ve Dinen Makbûl: Muhafazakâr Üst-Orta Sınıf Habitusu* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018), p111-112, p44-45, p72-80.

⁶⁰⁸ Meera Navlakha, “Why Muslim Fashion Is Taking Over the Luxury World,” *Vice* (blog), July 22, 2019, https://www.vice.com/en_in/article/evyejj/why-muslim-fashion-is-taking-over-the-luxury-world.

⁶⁰⁹ “Emine Şenlikoğlu’ndan tesettür tepkisi”, *Yeni Akit*, 21 Jan 2015, <http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/video/emine-senlikoglundan-tesettur-tepkisi-1730.html>.

⁶¹⁰ “Emine Şenlikoğlu: Gerçek tesettürlüyü muhafazakarlar istemiyor”, *Milli Gazete*, 30 Nov 2017, <https://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/1429667/emine-senlikoglu-gercek-tesetturluyu-muhafazakarlar-istemiyor>.

⁶¹¹ Fatma Barbarosoglu, *Kamusal Alanda Başörtülüler* (İstanbul: Profil, 2015), p114-115.

⁶¹² “Dandik tesettür’e İslami kesimden tepkiler”, *Haber7*, 22 Aug 2010, <http://www.haber7.com/yasam/haber/590957-dandik-tesetture-islami-kesimden-tepkiler>.

When I see them, I tell [myself] that I wish they either gave up on this [contradictory] state or gave up on the headscarf.⁶¹³

Having described tesettür as “the prioritization of women’s personality over their femininity”,⁶¹⁴ Mustafa İslamoğlu argued that “this issue of headscarf” has been diluted, not by the pro-ban “non-Muslim Turks”,⁶¹⁵ but by the carriers of “tradition” who promoted tesettür as men’s protection from women.⁶¹⁶ In a manner deserving of İslamoğlu’s criticism, member Metin Balkanlıoğlu of İsmailağa Religious Community was mediatized due to his rude reaction to the covered women who breach “the honor of tesettür”:

Cover yourself properly! Don’t play with my religion!⁶¹⁷

The Association of Furkan published articles to warn Muslims with the argument that their usage of “trendy” headscarves has turned out to be a matter of culture at the expense of belief. Amidst “this toxic fashion” among religious people, “hijab has turned out to be the black wreath at the door of Capitalism”.⁶¹⁸

The Islamist Magazine of Vuslat went further, explicitly criticizing Tayyip Erdoğan’s wife Emine Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül’s wife Hayrünnisa Gül for deforming tesettür.⁶¹⁹ Referring to the AKP Ministers’ wives, who once felt obliged to make-up for their public appearances, Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal noted that this obligation may have finally turned into an embrace. However, as opposed to the pessimism depicted in Vuslat, Tuksal concluded from within the Islamist community: “the community has relaxed with all these things. I don’t think

⁶¹³ Hazal Ozvaris, “‘Dilipak: Keşke bu halden veya başörtülerinden vazgeçseler...’”, *t24.com.tr*, 13 Ağustos 2013, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/hayrunnisa-gul-tesetturun-icini-bosaltti-emine-erdoganin-kiyafeti-yozlasti/236698>.

⁶¹⁴ Mustafa İslamoğlu, *Tesettür Yazıları* (İstanbul: Düşün Yayıncılık, 2013), p15-19.

⁶¹⁵ Mustafa İslamoğlu, *Tesettür Yazıları*, p111-114.

⁶¹⁶ Mustafa İslamoğlu, *Tesettür Yazıları*, p37.

⁶¹⁷ “İsmailağacı Vali Kardeşinin Seviyesi: Böyle Mi Olmalı Tesettür, Gelen Öpsün, Giden Yalasin”, *Diken* (blog), 11 Sep 2017, <http://www.diken.com.tr/ismailagaci-vali-kardesinin-seviyesi-boyle-mi-olmali-tesettur-gelen-opsun-giden-yalasin>.

⁶¹⁸ Abdullah Kibritci, “Çarşaf Karşıtı Dindar?”, *Furkan Derneği*, 10 Jan 2011,

<http://furkanderneği.blogspot.com/2011/01/carsaf-karsiti-dindar.html>.

⁶¹⁹ “Modanın Kurbanı Tesettür”, *Vuslat*, 1434 [2013].

Erdoğan would [criticize] make-up anymore”.⁶²⁰ Clearly, Vuslat, *among others*, was not as optimistic as Tuksal about this ‘relaxation’.

Despite their wide-ranging criticisms, the critics could offer little strategy other than expressing their obligation “to make the youth learn religion properly”—setting aside the disagreements on who knows religion properly. A study conducted by sociologist Özlem Avcı suggested that it would be a very difficult task, given that there are “76 different types of covering” in a single religious community: “[we] do not criticize them, but they criticize one another”.⁶²¹ In 2017, President Tayyip Erdoğan expressed a similar concern, though it was probably not the same as that of Vuslat’s criticism of the Erdoğan family:

Our generation is the latest witness of [...] local values [tr. mahalli değerler]. A significant portion of new generations has been deprived of this richness. Based on one’s clothing, one’s shoes, one’s hat [and] one’s body posture, if we cannot figure out which culture one belongs to, it means that we are in the clutches of cultural drought.⁶²²

This quote was followed by Erdoğan’s manifesto for his “2023 vision”, which he described as a project of cultural reconstruction. Operationally, there was not much of substance in his speech, beyond making “the youth” listen to “the artisan” for “real art and science”; struggling against the toxic effects of internet, TV and especially social media; investing in new TV projects and to a lesser extent literature; and developing cultural centers such as Yunus Emre Institute and Turkish Maarif Foundation. In this speech, the question left unanswered was how

⁶²⁰ Hazal Ozvaris, “AKP’li Kadınlar Erdoğan’ı Masal Dinler Gibi Dinliyor,” *T24*, 24 Feb 2015, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/17-25-aralik-cemaatin-hukumeti-devirme-girisimi-tapeler-dogru-teror-orgutu-suclamasi-agir,288335>.

⁶²¹ Baris Ince, “Dindar nesil yetiştirme konusunda cemaatle AKP arasında kriz çıkacak”, *BirGün*, 20 Feb 2012, <https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/dindar-nesil-yetistirme-konusunda-cemaatle-akp-arasinda-kriz-cikacak-60721.html>.

Özlem Avcı, *İki dünya arasında: İstanbul’da dindar üniversite gençliği* (İletişim, 2012).

⁶²² “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan 3. Milli Kültür Şurası’na katıldı”, *Yeni Şafak*, 03 Mar 2017, <https://www.yenisafak.com/hayat/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-3-milli-kultur-surasina-katildi-2622567>, par11.

“Erdoğan: Kıyafetten kültürü çıkaramıyorsak kültürel kuraklığın pençesindeyiz demektir”, *Cumhuriyet*, 03 Mar 2017.

this project would manage to overcome a wide range of disappointments with one monolithic cultural imagination.

In conclusion, ideology-making has been triggered by the new, unsettling trends in the (mis)conduct of the values that Islamists consider Islam's exclusive content. According to the sources to whom I have referred, these first-order values should be re-operationalized in many ways. In the meantime, they had to emphasize that the carriers of these values must refrain from pushing others to imitation. The solution is quite the contrary: it is to look differently at those who do not align themselves with these values. However, for this task to be successful, some breathing space must be given to the others, so that they do not have to play "the Islamist" in order to get a job, win a tender, or walk on the street. For the sake of securing the value-system, the clothing rights of others should be disconnected from the first-order values of Islamism.

In this struggle to secure the value-system, a confusing question is how to re-order the very different claims on Islam. Among these claims are that of (1) the Erdoğan government, which bases its discourse on value-laden claims; (2) those that have injected some kind of "fashion" into the conservative dress-codes; (3) those that oppose some or all segments of this fashion; (4) and those that oppose anything other than their own proposals. In this vein, it should not be seen as a coincidence that many religious communities have already begun to disagree with this Islamist government, which they wholeheartedly supported in the recent past. Today, they half-heartedly continue to support the government, as they do not want "Secularists" to return to power.

6.6. Retroactive Conversations: The Question of Agency

Although the label “ideology-maker” might have so far referred misleadingly to a very influential, somewhat famous and well-heard class of elites, I describe ideology-making as a mental process in which everyone participates (*see* CH2.5). This part will go further by demonstrating how significant some previously unheard voices might become in the ideology-making processes of hegemonic ideologies. As such, this section examines a set of arguments through which the women whose clothing an authority has intervened to alter have defended themselves. After examining how they evaluate their objectification, I will examine how they aim to reclaim their agency by talking to the hegemonic ideologies. Finally, I will question if their arguments were as remarkable in a previous episode of Turkey’s democratization experience.

Terzi, who was kicked by the stranger on the bus, evaluated what she later heard from others:

According to what I heard from the witnesses, he said, “she is a devil, she has to die” [...] He wants to kill [me]. Why would you [decide] to kill someone in two minutes? Why would you want to kill somebody you do not know, [...] [somebody] with whom you did not argue or fight in any way? I have many questions to ask.

The perpetrator Abdullah Çakıroğlu knew her by means of his ideology. He did not have to know Terzi in person, as his ideology informed him as to whom Terzi was. Having claimed that everything happened in accordance with the Islamic Law, Çakıroğlu rationalized his act:

She had a short skirt [...] I lost myself, as I thought that she trampled on the values of our society and the country we live in [...] My moral side over-weighted.⁶²³

⁶²³ “Tekmecinin ifadesi!,” *Yeni Akit*, September 21, 2016, <https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/tekmecinin-ifadesi-214020.html>.

In his defense, he oscillated between rationalizing his action and declaring some symptoms of his mental illness. He and his lawyer were keen to convince others that he was mentally ill, but also that Terzi definitely behaved against public decency. In other words, he emphasized that he should have refrained from attacking Terzi, but it was not because Terzi did not deserve a warning.

In Fatma Dilara Aslıhan's case, it was certain that she was attacked not as a stranger but as an "Islamist", which was the only property she carried in the eyes of the aggressor. Soon after she entered the minibus on Kadıköy-Kartal line (İstanbul), her headscarf was pulled by another woman, sitting in the back row. After pulling Aslıhan's headscarf, the woman continued yelling:

This is the reality [...] you are terrorists [...] you and your green capital killed all these enlightened people [tr. aydınlar].

Aslıhan was the embodiment of Islamism, rather than an individual or a high-school student who would have neither enough time nor maturity to comprehend the gravity of these issues. Puzzled by how many things a headscarf might mean, Aslıhan's mother asked: "can anybody be judged only with this [showing her own headscarf]? I just condemn it".⁶²⁴

As these cases suggest, intolerance has often been rationalized with no need to have any prior knowledge of others' personality. In these cases, the aggressors' own ideology, often in complicity with the silence of bystanders, defined the meaning of the given cloth. In other words, the outstanding authority, which appeared out of nowhere, objectified the meaning of the cloth by symbolic or physical force.

⁶²⁴ "yahu şundan dolayı (başörtüsünü gösteriyor) bir insan yargılanabilir mi? Kınıyorum" Beyaz TV, *Fatma Dilara Aslıhan Yiğit'in Annesi Konuştu*, 16 Feb 2017.

In Maçka Park, as the indictment of the prosecutor verified, the security personnel member Savaş İ. reproached Köse with the following words:

[People like] you wear these clothes and then blame the security personnel when somebody rapes.⁶²⁵

For sure, this reference to “the people like Köse” had nothing to do with Köse as an individual, but with the way Savaş İ. perceived her social type by means of her clothing preference. To Köse, it was an act of discrimination, and a breach of freedom of belief and thought. To the crowd gathered there to defend Köse, Savaş İ. should be punished. One guy yelled at the others who supported Köse, “don’t be so naïve! As long as you don’t crush their heads, they will bedevil you [tr. sonra çıkıyorlar tepenize]”.⁶²⁶

Because Terzi was not as lucky as Köse, who was at least defended by the crowd around her, Terzi blamed all the people who witnessed Çakıroğlu’s attack: “I want to call so many people to account”. Aslıhan, whose headscarf was pulled off by a woman who was a stranger, also blamed the people on the minibus, because they did not do anything to stop the aggressor. Asena Melisa Sağlam recalled that the passengers on the minibus in fact defended the aggressor when he began reproaching Sağlam for the cloth she chose for the Ramadan day.⁶²⁷ In these cases, the people around them were somewhat complicit in the meaning imposed by the aggressors on the clothes of Terzi and Sağlam.

It is not just the owners of these authoritative claims who believe that the other loses personality at a certain point. Such incidents may easily convince the victims to believe that

⁶²⁵ “Maçka Parkı’ndaki Kıyafet Davasında Genç Kadın İçin Şok Karar”, *Hürriyet*, October 6, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/macka-parkindaki-kiyafet-tartismasinda-genc-kadina-dava-soku-40601404>.

⁶²⁶ Her Telden, *Maçka Parkı’nda Kıyafet Gerginliği*, 30 Jul 2017, retrieved from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zf3ArchBvVA&feature=youtu.be>.

⁶²⁷ DHA, *Asena Melisa Sağlam Röportajı*, 21 Jun 2017.

they themselves lack subjectivity. Ipek Atcan, kicked by a stranger for crossing her legs with a skirt at a metro station, later said:

I am angry with myself before all else. ‘You should not have kept quiet’ I tell myself [...] Then I am angry at those who surrounded me. But what could they have done when I was silent? ⁶²⁸

Realizing the moment that one’s own agency is in danger, all the above-mentioned people, who shared a commonality in facing intolerance, made an effort to reclaim their agency. Their self-conscious efforts indicate a noteworthy cultural change that the following part will explore.

6.6.1. *Women who Reclaim their Agency: Rights-based Claims on Tolerance*

With the attendance of Köse, a public march was organized in Maçka Park. A foundation named “Progressive Women” (tr. İlerici Kadınlar) defined the ideology behind this incident as the one that masked child abuse in a pro-government religious foundation: “this is the Islamist [tr. dinci], reactionary and Jihadist mentality”.⁶²⁹ CHP MP Selina Doğan evaluated the incident: “they target the secular fraction [of the society]”.⁶³⁰ The march included many similar slogans, the commonality of which was their amalgamation of the incident with a broader ideological struggle.

Though Köse was there to listen to all these speeches, the evaluation included in these speeches may or may not have reflected Köse’s own narrative of the problem. Köse, however, explicitly embraced one form of argumentation. This was the personalized rhetoric which prevailed in the march: “hands off my body”; “my cloth is not your concern”. In her short speech, Köse did not describe her choice of clothing as ‘the true one’, but a respectable one among others. She did not denounce another way of life in order to justify her own preferences.

⁶²⁸ Ipek Atcan, “Metrodaki Olaya İstinaden,” *Günün İçinden Bıdılar* (blog), November 28, 2016, <http://gununicindenbidilar.com/2016/11/28/metrodaki-olaya-istinaden>.

⁶²⁹ *Maçka Parkı’ndaki Özel Güvenlik Tacizine İlerici Kadınlar’dan Tepki (Video)*, 2017, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/video/video/792639/Macka_Parki_ndaki_ozel_guvenlik_tacizine_ilerici_Kadinlar_dan_tepki.html.

⁶³⁰ Dilek Sen, “Kadınlardan Tacize Büyük Tepki: Kıyafetimden Sana Ne,” *Cumhuriyet*, July 30, 2017.

She did not associate any other identity with the incident—be it a religion, a value-system or a political ideology. In her speech, she rather challenged the authorities with a personal statement: “Neither police nor anybody else, no one can interfere with anything of mine”. She also made explicit her limit: “I cannot either interfere with anybody else’s clothing”.⁶³¹ She not only denounced the authoritative claim over her own clothing, but also refused to make her own authoritative claim as to what is right to wear. Sharing her suspicion that she may have been interfered with because she is a lesbian, she concluded: “Lesbians will not be silent”.

Fatma Dilara Aslıhan, whose headscarf was pulled off by a stranger, also developed an ethical argument, notwithstanding that she was not an adult in legal terms:

My message to the society is that they should value each person really equally, without making any discrimination, between the covered, the uncovered, the hijabi, the very-open-clothed. She can be their own daughter, she can be young or old, it does not matter [...] Is not it a mission of humanity? I have intense feelings right now [tr. “şu an gerçekten çok değişmişim”], seriously, I am sorry [asks for the interview to be ended]⁶³².

Aslıhan also used her social media account to share more of these statements: “you will learn in this country how to respect beliefs and unbelief, covers and openness”.⁶³³ Aslıhan’s father declared that he warned the politicians who called him after the incident: “they have to correct this issue [...] they must not increase the tension in the society [tr. toplumu germek]”. In the same vein, Ayşegül Terzi reacted against Çakıroğlu’s authoritative claim:

⁶³¹ “Bu ülkede ne polis ne bir başkası hiçbir şeye karışamaz. Ben de kimsenin kıyafetine karışamam. Savcılığa gidip şikâyetçi olacağım. Aynı beyefendi gazetecilere ‘Kızlar lezbiyendi’ demiş. Söylüyoruz; eşcinseller susmayacak.”

⁶³² “Topluma mesajım şu olacak, gerçekten de hiçbir ayırım yapılmadan, kapalı açığı çarşafı çok açığı olsun, herkese aynı derecede önem vermeleri, kendi kızı çocuğu, büyüğü küçüğü farketmez [...] insanlık görevi değil mi bu? Ciddi anlamda şu an çok değişmişim, özür dilerim.”

TV Net, *Minibüste Saldırıya Uğrayan Başörtülü Kız ve Babası Konuştu* (16 Feb 2017), accessed on Youtube, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C9OvDdvggWo&feature=youtu.be>.

⁶³³ “fatmadilaraygt on Twitter: ‘Bu ülkede inançlara, inançsızlığa, başörtüsüne ya da açıklığa saygı duymayı öğreneceksiniz.’” Twitter, February 13, 2017.

He says, 'I kick if I see any open part in a woman's body'. Who are you? What is your status [tr. sıfatın ne]?⁶³⁴

Gözde Kansu, fired from ATV after Minister Çelik's comments on her cloth, described how it is always women who are targeted by the authorities and sacrificed by the observers:

Nobody wanted to behave in contradiction with the political will [of the government]. This is so clear. The easiest [option] was to victimize me. Again, a woman...⁶³⁵

Asena Melisa Sağlam and Ayşegül Terzi continued to criticize the officers who were supposed to defend them. Sağlam finally understood why "reality shows" on TV were so popular:

The justice system, the police, the law does not protect them. They try to solve their problems on their own.⁶³⁶

Terzi mentioned how her father had to find and submit to the police the footage from the camera on the bus. The police thought that the footage he first submitted was not very clear, and asked Terzi's father to verify whether there were more cameras there. Terzi got angry, as "it was not even 1 kilometer between the police station and the location of the incident": "you have the car, go check yourself!" Both Terzi and Sağlam reported that they got angry when the officers repeatedly asked them if they really have a complaint against the perpetrators. They surely defended their agency, but they were deeply disappointed to see that their agency was not recognized by many others.

⁶³⁴ 'Ben çıkar çıkmaz, kadında açık yer görürsem tekmelerim.' Peki sen kimsin neye karışıyorsun? Ne sıfatın var?"

see "Otobüste Darp Edilen Ayşegül Terzi İlk Kez Konuştu," *CNN Türk*, September 27, 2016, <https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/otobuste-darp-edilen-aysegul-terzi-ilk-kez-konustu>.

⁶³⁵ "Kimse dekolteme laf eden siyasi iradenin aksine davranmak istemedi. Çok açık bu. En kolayı da beni kurban etmekte, ettiler. Yine bir kadını..."

Ayşe Arman, "Kovulan sunucu Kansu: Göğüslerim küçük ama dert oldular memleketel," *T24*, October 10, 2013, <https://t24.com.tr/haber/dekolteli-sunucu-gozde-kansu-kurban-olarak-beni-sectiler-yine-bir-kadini,241591>.

⁶³⁶ "masenasaglam on Twitter: 'Birlik olalım, duyarlı olalım! Hakkımızı bize vermiyorlarsa da hakkımızın, bizim gerçekten hakkımız olduğunu anlatalım! Susmayalım!'" Twitter, September 12, 2017.

While reclaiming their agency, they did not necessarily go against the norms that they construed in the society. Köse, for example, underlined that she knew what the norm was:

I still do not understand the ground on which [Savaş İ.] called the police. Am I a maniac that I would open my breasts in front of people?⁶³⁷

Ayşegül Terzi stated that she does not have a problem with the publicity of religious norms. Accordingly, the problem was the misinterpretation of these norms by the likes of Çakıroğlu. Reading some offensive messages that she received on social media after the incident, Terzi blamed Çakıroğlu and the others for “instrumentalizing” religion: “I really wonder if they read anything about it”.⁶³⁸ Asena Melisa Sağlam could not easily decide whether she should care about the normative aspect of her cloth on the Ramadan day:

[My jumpsuit] had a cleavage in front, but my bag was hung there. Would he be disturbed... [*she cuts off the sentence*] But also, who would think if her/his cloth disturbs someone else?⁶³⁹

Sağlam forced herself to stop her calculation as to the moral condition of her cloth. Gözde Kansu was sure that there was no discrepancy between any social norm and her cloth. She first responded to Çelik: “He calls my cloth ‘night outfit’. Of course! Should I have presented it with a jean and tshirt?” Then, she added:

I am a young person in my 30s, and I dress myself this way. And I think there is no abnormality in that. I will continue dressing myself this way. Even defending [myself like that] looks weird to

⁶³⁷ “Maçka Parkı’ndaki Kadın Konuştu,” *CNN Türk*, July 30, 2017,

<https://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/macka-parkindaki-kadin-konustu>.

⁶³⁸ “Bunu yazan bir kadın, inanabiliyor musunuz? Dini her şeye alet etmeye çalışıyorlar ama acaba açıp okumuşlar mı? Hesap sormak istediğim o kadar çok insan var ki...”

⁶³⁹ “Tulum şeklinde, bir önde hani dekoltesi vardı, fakat çantam önüme asılıydı yani, hani onunla rahatsız olacağını...Yani zaten kim düşünür ki bir insan rahatsız olur mu diye?”

“Darp Edilen Üniversiteli Kız Konuştu,” *Hürriyet*, June 21, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/video/sort-giydigi-icin-darp-edilen-universiteli-kiz-konustu-40497133>.

me. In my opinion, debating the cleavage of somebody else's cloth is embarrassing.⁶⁴⁰

As she promised, Kansu continued wearing clothes she liked. She could also continue working in the same industry, at least because authoritative claims based on contextual elements also lead to some kind of randomness. Deciding whether the interaction between a cloth and its carrier's manner and timing fit together tolerably is never a mechanistic process. As she agreed in her conversation with Journalist Ayşe Arman, there have been so many presenters with arguably "more"⁶⁴¹ open-clothes on TV,⁶⁴² but Kansu was somehow randomly targeted in Minister Çelik's perception of the context.

Despite the fact that she was fired from the abovementioned show at ATV, Kansu continued to take part in other TV projects. One of the latest of those projects, in 2018, took place again in ATV, which remains a media source loyal to the government. In April 2018, Journalist Oğuzhan Toracı of Sabah Newspaper, also led by the owner of ATV, conducted an interview with Kansu that focused primarily on her personality traits, recent projects, but also on "violence against women". Concerning the latter, she noted that she was never subject to physical violence, despite having "experienced psychological and verbal violence"—she did not give any further details.

Neither Kansu nor Toracı mentioned the previous authoritative claim over Kansu's "low-neck" cloth. That said, in case it is relevant for *anyone*, the photos of the interview

⁶⁴⁰ "Ben 30'larında genç bir insanım ve böyle giyiniyorum. Bunda da bir anormallik olmadığını düşünüyorum. Böyle giyinmeye de devam edeceğim. Bunu savunmak bile bana tuhaf geliyor. Birilerinin dekoltesini tartışmak, bence utanç verici bir şey."

Ayşe Arman, "Kurban olarak beni seçtiler... Yine bir kadını!," *Hürriyet*, October 10, 2013, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kurban-olarak-beni-sectiler-yine-bir-kadini-24890635>.

⁶⁴¹ Though I do not employ any unit of measurement by imitating the role of the policemen of clothing, Arman's evaluation makes sense within the given context.

⁶⁴² - Bir sürü popçu, çok daha frapan kıyafetler giyiyor. Giysinler de... Ama neden piyango sana çıktı?" - Özel bir sebebi olduğunu sanmıyorum. Bana denk geldi. Bence burada, mesele sadece dekolte de değil. Bir kadının, bu kadar enerjik olması, hayat dolu olması, kendine güvenmesi, hareketli olması hoşlarına gitmedi. Demek ki bazılarının kafasında farklı bir kadın konsepti var, istiyorlar ki kadın hep ağır olsun...

depicted Kansu in a shirt with the top two buttons left open.⁶⁴³ Silently, Kansu reclaimed her agency, at least in part. After 5 years, she spoke about psychological and verbal violence against women. She spoke on the very same media channel that had interfered with her cloth. She spoke in the clothes and the manner she preferred.

Just like Kansu, Sağlam insisted that she would continue wearing her skirts: “we must not fear, we must not hesitate”.⁶⁴⁴ The pop singer Gülşen did exactly the same when she was warned by the presenter about her socks during a concert in Ordu. Having noted their conversation during the concert, Gülşen advised the mayor of Ordu, who was also among the participants, to not work with this presenter anymore.⁶⁴⁵ In the same vein, the pop singer Hadise protested the censorship implemented by Radio and Television Supreme Council (tr. RTÜK) of her music video due to her cloth. Wearing the same cloth in her next concert, Hadise declared:

If Turkey is a democracy, my video should not be censored [...]

I do not fear from anything. I am a free artist, I will behave as I wish.⁶⁴⁶

Aslıhan also declared that nobody would be able to remove her headscarf. On the other hand, Terzi publicly expressed her hesitancy to wear shorts anymore. Though most of these women could manage to do so, one’s return to one’s own clothes is arguably the hardest step in regaining agency. Examining the Ticani attacks of the early-1950s, the following part will seek the agency of the women who were attacked at the time.

⁶⁴³ Oguzhan Toraci, “Gözde Kansu: Hayat Bana Yokuşta Stiletto İle Koşmayı Öğretti - Magazin Haberleri,” *Sabah*, 22 Apr 2018, <<https://www.sabah.com.tr/magazin/2018/04/22/hayat-bana-yokusta-stiletto-ile-kosmayi-ogretti>>.

⁶⁴⁴ “BBC 100 Women on Twitter: ‘@masenasaglam was attacked on a minibus in Istanbul for wearing shorts. It’s the first time she’s travelled on one since.’” Twitter, 16 Oct 2017, <https://twitter.com/BBC100women/status/919896539346194432>.

⁶⁴⁵ “Gülşen Sunucuya Sinirlendi,” *Milliyet*, 26 Jul 2018, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/gulsen-sunucuya-sinirlendi-magazin-2713417/>.

⁶⁴⁶ “Ben Atatürk çocuğuyum,” *Oda Tv*, 19 Mar 2018, <https://odatv.com/rtuk-ceza-verirse-verir-19031819.html>.

6.7. Back to the 1950s: Where were “the Women” during Ticiani Attacks?

A series of accusations were made against Ticianis. The primary accusation was the breaking of the statues of Atatürk. Nevertheless, among other accusations were allegations that they attacked women whom they thought appeared in inappropriate clothes. Ticianis clearly had some authoritative claims over clothing. These claims were clear from their in-group meetings, in which their preachers labelled the wearers of şapka as “infidels”;⁶⁴⁷ to their court statements, in which the likes of Sadık Demirtepe summarized the aim as “giving religion to those without one and giving an underpant to those without one”.⁶⁴⁸

Several incidents were reported in this vein. For instance, some aggressors randomly appeared and threw razors on the arms or the legs of women whom they saw with “open-clothes”, such as blouses and skirts, predominantly in parts of Ankara (Ulus, Yenışehir) and İstanbul (Şehzadebaşı). Clothing prevailed in the Ticiani discourse in such a way that in this period, Fahri Nevruzoglu began labelling them as “an underpant sect” (tr. don mezhebi).⁶⁴⁹

In this part I argue that the women who were attacked by Ticianis, or who were suspected to be Ticianis, were not vocal by means of their own voice, but through a given repertoire of ideal-type women. To begin with, the perceived significance of the Ticiani aggression towards women should be questioned, especially in comparison with other acts they committed. I take the national press of the time to be the most important source in seeking an answer to this question.⁶⁵⁰ For example, a well-detailed chronology (1965) prepared by the editorial board of Cumhuriyet Newspaper on “[Religious] Reactionist Movements” (tr. Gericilik Hareketleri) did not touch upon Ticianis’ attacks on women in this period. In this chronology the early 1950s

⁶⁴⁷ “Denizli’de Ticiani Ayini Yapanlar,” *Milliyet*, March 24, 1952, p3.

⁶⁴⁸ Tr. “Dinsizlere din, donsuzlara don vermek”

see, “Bir Ticiani Mahkemedede Yeni Bir Hadise Çıkardı,” *Milliyet*, March 28, 1952, p1.

⁶⁴⁹ Fahri Nevruzoglu, “Bir Yobazın Hezeyanları,” *Milliyet*, March 29, 1952, p3.

⁶⁵⁰ See, for the ways newspapers could shape mass politics in the 1950s: Ali Fuat Basgil, *27 Mayıs ihtilali ve sebepleri* (Kubbealti, 1966), p190.

consisted of the Ticanis who broke the statues of Atatürk; the Ticani members who were caught conducting rituals or secret meetings; and the Ticanis who attempted to assassinate journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman.⁶⁵¹ In this period, many public marches were organized in the cities where Atatürk statues were targeted.⁶⁵² The news coverage of the Ticani activities was predominantly based on these attacks on statues.

Having examined this period in which Ticanis were active, or the period that covers the immediate aftermath of their dissolution, I was unable to find any statement—that is, in mainstream newspapers or magazines of any ideological orientation, in women’s magazines, in political party meetings and public marches—made by any of the women directly attacked by Ticanis. On the flip side, it was relatively easy to trace the statements of statue-makers, as to how they saw the Ticani threat, whether they thought their profession could have a future, and how they dealt with nudity in statues.⁶⁵³

Because absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, I shall underline that the silence of these women does *not* suffice to suggest that their victimization was not considered to be a significant matter. Accordingly, I examined some complementary data in which the significance of such incidents was touched upon. As a result of this analysis, I will argue that these moments were the ones where an ideal style of clothing was to be defended. The women who were attacked did not speak for themselves, but many others, often those in various positions of ideology-making in the media, the civil society or the parliament, spoke in the name of these women. First and foremost, it was the Union of Turkish Women (tr. Türk Kadınlar Birliği) that produced an ideological discourse in the name of the women:

⁶⁵¹ “Gericilik Hareketleri,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 18, 1965, p1-p7.

⁶⁵² “Gençlik, Heykele Yapılan Tecavüzü Heyecanla Tel’in Etti,” *Akşam*, March 6, 1951., p2.

“Heykele Tecavüz: Konya’da Büyük Bir Miting Yapıldı,” *Akşam*, March 10, 1951.

⁶⁵³ “Röportaj: Türkiye’de Heykelleri Döken Tek Sanatkâr,” *Milliyet*, March 13, 1953, p2.

From the newspapers, we have been following with hatred that they want women to cover themselves with hijab and confine themselves in the house, men to wear fez instead of şapka, [and] tekkes and medreses to be re-opened. Turkish women believe that Turkish Reforms (tr. “Türk inkılabları”) would bring our nation to the standard of civilized nations [...]⁶⁵⁴

This declaration ended with the statement that the Union is “convinced this statement is a translation of the feelings of all Turkish women”. In such representations, women were taken as a monolithic body of political discourse, with no room for individual experience. Therefore, it was an ideal-type which prevailed within this context. This ideal-type woman did not just have a claim as to the right clothes. She also made claims on the places of worship, the mediums of education and the roots of Turkish reforms.

In defense of women’s clothing freedom, many raised their voices. These voices however, were purified of the unique statements of individuals. This was at least because the attacks were not considered to target individuals, but the ideals of Republic. Before all else, then minister of interior Halil İbrahim Özyörük uncovered “the meaning” (tr. manâ) of dealing with these activities: “[it is] the preservation of our reforms (tr. inkılap) that made us reach the level of a civilized society”.⁶⁵⁵ Therefore, these voices focused on reproducing the ideal-type woman of this civilized society. The ideal-type was narrativized as a collective voice of “youth”, “our daughters” or “women who work”.

One key illustration of these narratives was a set of interviews conducted by Cemaleddin Bildik in *Akşam*, entitled with the question “what do our daughters say?”⁶⁵⁶ These interviews were intended to ask some young students, in a female student dormitory, their thoughts about the claims against their clothes, such as the shorts that they were about to wear during the following National Holiday Celebrations. In reaction to these claims, none of the students had

⁶⁵⁴ “Kadınlar Birliğinin Beyannameesi,” *Cumhuriyet*, March 20, 1951, p1-5.

⁶⁵⁵ “İnkılap Düşmanı Ticanilik Kökünden Tasfiye Edilecek,” *Milliyet*, July 17, 1951, p3.

⁶⁵⁶ Cemaleddin Bildik, “Kızlarımız Ne Diyorlar?,” *Akşam*, May 2, 1951, p3-4.

an individual approach; instead, they had broader claims over what would be the ideal cloth for women:

- Bildik: What would you say? What would you do if you were hindered from going out uncovered, with short skirts and open legs?
- Student 1: It is over! One of the Atatürk Reforms is sparing women from the state of bogeyman (tr. umacı vaziyet), and dressing them with civilized clothes [...] Replacing these clothes [...] with baggy-trousers (tr. şalvarlar) that cover our legs [...] would be the acceptance of backwardness [...]
- Student 2: If the ones [who wanted us to cover ourselves] asked first the opinions of their wives, and if they have, their daughters. Unarguably, neither his daughter nor his wife would embrace [the idea].
- Student 3: If he was single, he would never say his desire [...]
- B: Why?
- S3: So simple! It is because he would not be able to find any woman to agree with him, and he would remain single!

The “umacı vaziyet” of hijab, which was transmitted to the student as a tag, was well-repeated at the time, from the religious knowledge-claims⁶⁵⁷ to political slogans. In this social climate, Ticani attacks were denoted as a revolt against the ideals of Clothing Revolution. They were considered the symmetric opposite of the Revolution’s authoritative claim on ideal clothing.

Concomitantly, the representation of hijabi women was to be denigrated in order to defend the image of uncovered women attacked by the Ticanis. In this vein, cherry-picking “the black hijabs” worn by the women in court hearings was common in media reports. The men’s beards and hats and the women’s hijabs were chosen to be a key matter in the framing of this news.⁶⁵⁸ With reference to their dyed, round-trimmed beards and black hijabs, the alleged

⁶⁵⁷ Neset Çagatay, “Kadının Örtünmesi (Tesettür)”, *Din Yolu* 1, no 3 (05 Apr 1956): p8-9.

⁶⁵⁸ “Cezaevindeki Ticanilerin Sakalları Kesildi,” *Akşam*, August 4, 1951, p1.

“Adliye’de Yeni Bir Ticani Hadisesi,” *Milliyet*, March 18, 1951, p1-p5.

“Atatürk Düşmanlarına Karşı Gençliğin Asil İnfiali,” *Milliyet*, June 26, 1951, p3.

members of the Ticani movement were described in some media coverages to have a “weird appearance”.⁶⁵⁹

The association of the appearance of hijab, fez or sarık (en. men’s turban) with the Ticani ideology caused various misunderstandings. For example, in Mahmutpaşa, a group of university students ordered two men with sarık—i.e. an old man and a teenager—to remove their sarıks. When the old man, Mohammad, refused to follow this command, the university students ripped off their sarıks based on the preconception that they were Ticani members. The aggressors calmed down only after Mohammad yelled that they were Syrians.⁶⁶⁰ Almost the same happened to the brother of former president Husni al-Za’im of Syria, Salahâddin Al-Za’im, who was arrested as a Ticani suspect in Ankara for breaching the Şapka Law.⁶⁶¹ On another occasion, “a man with a round-trimmed beard” and “a hijabi woman” were caught when they got close to a statue of Atatürk.⁶⁶² The analytical distinction between Ticanis and the other religious organizations, such as the members of Büyük Doğu, were rarely emphasized in the mainstream media.⁶⁶³ Any breach of the Şapka Law was likely to be classified under the label of Ticani activities.⁶⁶⁴

In the intellectual landscape of this period, “the educated women” was expected to fit certain ideological criteria determined by the ideal-type. From Şevket Rado—i.e. the director of one of the first women’s magazines (*Resimli Hayat*) in the history of Republic—to Vâlâ Nurettin—i.e. a consistent advocate of the enlightenment paradigm in the media, an ideology-maker who often touched upon the role of women in society, and a writer who used female

⁶⁵⁹ “Ticanilerin Duruşması,” *Milliyet*, August 24, 1951, p1.

⁶⁶⁰ “Bir Suriyeli Hoca Yanlışlığa Kurban Gidiyordu,” *Milliyet*, June 30, 1951, p2.

⁶⁶¹ “Hüsnü Zaim’in Kardeşi Ankara’da Ticani Zanniyle Emniyete Götürüldü,” *Milliyet*, August 7, 1951, p3.

⁶⁶² “Şehrimizde Alınan Tertibat,” *Milliyet*, July 1, 1951, p3.

⁶⁶³ “Ticaniler Hakkında İzmir Savcısının Beyanâtı,” *Milliyet*, June 29, 1951, p3.

⁶⁶⁴ “Şapka Kanununa Aykırı Hareket Edenler,” *Akşam*, March 9, 1951, p1-2.

names for some of his pieces⁶⁶⁵—the ideology-makers of this period made clear Secularism’s expectations of women.

Vâlâ Nurettin argued that Turkish women should be more strongly indoctrinated with the principles of Revolution. Because women did not have enough education in Turkey, the young generations were transmitted a corrupt notion of how women should be:

Women should not pollute our national landscape with hijabs [...] Whereas the women of other nations further develop their houses and works, Eastern Women with the hijab move back and forth in a clumsy manner in all aspects of life [tr. her sahada bilgisizlik, beceriksizlik ediyor].⁶⁶⁶

Having rationalized the argument that women could wear anything but “the symbols of backwardness”, Nurettin underlined that this argument did not contain any pressure. According to him, any more toleration would be exploited by “the *hacıağa*”⁶⁶⁷ who wants to enjoy *harem* life with “four birdbrained women”.⁶⁶⁸ Nurettin also shared the disappointment of “honest Muslims” with “a hijabi woman” selling a religious newspaper on a bridge in Istanbul. He concluded that the “Turkish womanhood” did not deserve being reinstated as a “black-bogey”.⁶⁶⁹ Last but not least, Vâlâ Nurettin reproduced the construct of symmetric opposition between hijab and the clothes Ticanis attacked. In response to the *Yeni Sabah* writer Kadircan Kafli, who criticized Nurettin for “provoking intellectuals” against hijabi women,⁶⁷⁰ Nurettin

⁶⁶⁵ One of the names he used was Hatice Süreyya. Another name close to Nurettin is Nihal Karamağralı, one of the first woman scriptwriters in Republic, who either co-authored her work *Casuslar* with Vâlâ Nurettin, or speculatively, she was simply Nurettin with yet another nickname. see “Kadın Eli Değmiş Polisiyeler,” *Radikal*, March 31, 2006, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/kitap/kadin-eli-degmis-polisiyeler-858132/>.

⁶⁶⁶ Vala Nurettin, “Şanlı Mevkiimizi Kazanmağa Yeni Bir Fırsat,” *Cumhuriyet*, March 21, 1956, p2.

⁶⁶⁷ i.e. pejoratively, a type of graceless and imprudent man who begins to spend a fortune after moving to a large city from his small town.

⁶⁶⁸ *Ibid*, par7.

⁶⁶⁹ “[N]ur gibi Türk kadınılığı tekrar karakoncoloslaşamaz”.

Vala Nurettin, “Bu Bid’atler Kimsenin Hoşuna Gitmiyor,” *Akşam*, April 23, 1951.

⁶⁷⁰ Kadircan Kafli, “Camide Tüllü Kadın,” *Yeni Sabah*, July 10, 1954, p2, par2.

referred to the Ticani attack on a woman in Istanbul and asked the likes of Kaflı not to encourage those who want to interfere with civilized women.⁶⁷¹

Şevket Rado had a different approach to the intolerance rationalized by the Clothing Revolution. To him, the most important question was not whether people wore şapka or fez. What was of utmost importance was whether people had the economic means to purchase these clothes.⁶⁷² That said, Rado himself was a reproducer of the enlightenment paradigm and Secularism's ideal-type woman. For example, he caricatured the critics of Clothing Revolution with the following ironic statement:

Atatürk made a mistake! By taking out our red fez and making us wear şapka, he made us look like Europeans. But there are people among us who want to look ridiculous. Why would you rectify those who want to look ridiculous?⁶⁷³

By contrasting Egyptian and Turkish women—i.e. the former struggling to get their political rights recognized and the latter already having these rights—Şevket Rado stated his disappointment with “some [women in Turkey] who have a desire to go backward by not giving the civilization the credit it deserves”.⁶⁷⁴ Rado's magazine for women, *Resimli Hayat*, did not touch upon any of these ideological contestations, as it took the image of a civilized woman to be a settled one. Ignoring the ‘flawed’ illustrations of women, *Resimli Hayat* wrote about the images of the ideal-type.

None of these arguments were outliers at the moment they were made. Editor Nadir Nadi of Cumhuriyet Newspaper reported during his visit in the Aegean that “many women covered their faces with niqab, because their clothes were interfered [by reactionists]”.⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁷¹ Vala Nurettin, “İrticaa ‘hınk!’ Dememeli!,” *Cumhuriyet*, July 13, 1954, p2.

⁶⁷² Şevket Rado, “Politika Bir Kenarda Dursun,” *Akşam*, March 27, 1951, p2.

⁶⁷³ Şevket Rado, “Atatürk'ün Hataları,” *Akşam*, March 16, 1951, p2.

⁶⁷⁴ Şevket Rado, “Sözün Gelişi: İleri-Geri,” *Akşam*, 23 Mar1951, p2.

⁶⁷⁵ Nadir Nadi, “Var Mı Yok Mu?,” *Cumhuriyet*, March 24, 1951, p3.

Despite making the caveat that these were “individual cases”, Nadi argued that they should still have been taken seriously by the Menderes Government, so that Ticanis would not dare to cover more women. Nadi also examined Ticanis’ attacks on women within the context of the Clothing Revolution. According to him, it was not enough to put into force a law on the protection of the memory of Atatürk [i.e. to protect the statues]; on the contrary, the state should have empowered its implementation of the Clothing Law alongside the Law on the Alphabet.⁶⁷⁶

Reproducing the argument that Turkish women were not yet educated in the ideal sense of the term, Bedii Faik called on the women to wake-up against the Ticani threat:

Where are you? Why don’t you defend the reforms that gave rights to womanhood?

Referring to some cases of sexual harassment that targeted women for their clothes, *Her Gün* Editor in Chief Mehmet Faruk Gürtunca addressed women:

True that the state is the guard of Reforms. However, you, Turkish housewomen, you [should] be the guard of Reforms as well.

In a similar vein, Burhan Felek argued that it was due to neglect on the part of the pro-revolutionary forces, if Ticanis were still in favor of the veil.⁶⁷⁷

Responding to a similar wave of criticism regarding the government’s soft measures against breach of these laws, then prime minister Menderes asked public opinion to help sustain freedom of belief, and to accordingly have faith in the popular support for the principles of Secularism.⁶⁷⁸ In this speech, Menderes described democracy as a regime of tolerance (tr. tahammül rejimi). Whereas Yeni Sabah Editor in Chief Sefa Kılıçlıoğlu backed Menderes’ take on tolerance, Akşam and Cumhuriyet writers, as well as the members of the National Union of Turkish Students (tr. Milli Türk Talebe Birliği) criticized Menderes for underestimating the

⁶⁷⁶ Nadir Nadi, “Atatürk Kanunu,” *Cumhuriyet*, July 17, 1951, p3.

⁶⁷⁷ Burhan Felek, “Traş,” *Cumhuriyet*, August 7, 1951, p3.

⁶⁷⁸ “İrtica Hareketleri,” *Akşam*, March 18, 1951, p1-2.

gravity of these “religious reactionist” threats. According to them, this was not a matter of tolerance but a conflict to define the ascendant values of the society.

From Eşref Edip to Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, many Islamist thinkers of the time also refused to interpret this episode as a matter of tolerance. They construed it as a conflict over who would shape the society. To begin with, the Islamist Magazine of Sebilürreşad, in which Eşref Edip had the primary role, described the abovementioned acts of social hostility as a product of some “insane” people (tr. meczup).⁶⁷⁹ Having suspected that Ticanis in Ankara may not have followed the obligations set by Tijanis in Morocco, which the magazine was interested in exploring,⁶⁸⁰ Sebilürreşad refused to enter the controversy between the critics of Democratic Party versus the likes of Zafer Newspaper which aimed to uncover “the secret ties” between the Ticani leader and the CHP leadership.

Instead, what Sebilürreşad problematized was the propaganda against hijab. Accordingly, the magazine published an open letter that condemned Cumhuriyet Newspaper for its survey project that described hijab as a matter of “ignorance” (tr. cahil) and “bigotry” (tr. yobaz, örümcek kafalı).⁶⁸¹ Based on its counter-claim that “95%” of Turkish society was Muslim, Sebilürreşad repeatedly asked how a minority could rule over the majority in a democracy.⁶⁸² The previous era (tr. “devr-i sabık”) was one in which the CHP governments operationalized Secularism as antagonism against the religious institutions of Muslims.⁶⁸³ As such, Secularism made the society lose its cultural essence.

In a similar vein, in his visits to Anatolian cities, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek often mentioned that the first generation of the Republic was brought up “rootless” (tr. köksüz) in a manner

⁶⁷⁹ “Hadiseler: Ticanî Meselesi,” *Sebilürreşâd* 5, no. 106 (July 1951): p94.

⁶⁸⁰ “Ticani Tarikatının Esasları,” *Sebilürreşâd* 4, no. 89 (October 1950): p218.

⁶⁸¹ Mustafa Dovez, “Çarşaf Meselesi: Cumhuriyet Gazetesi’nin Tuttuğu Hatalı Yol,” *Sebilürreşâd* 9, no. 218 (April 1956): p287.

⁶⁸² “Sözün Özü,” *Sebilürreşâd* 1, no. 5 (June 1948): p67.

⁶⁸³ “Millete İtap Etmeyiniz,” *Sebilürreşâd* 5, no. 104 (June 1951): p51.

“lacking personality” (tr. şahsiyetsiz).⁶⁸⁴ To him, the roots of the society were cut off by the Kemalist ideology, leaving the youth’s mind captive.⁶⁸⁵ Beginning with the early Ottoman period, he classified the history in four ages, the last two of which were the period of “imitation”, that is the Ottoman modernization, and the Republican period of “total impersonality and the era of captivity to the West”.⁶⁸⁶ His definition of the *Büyük Doğu* Islamist struggle was to re-construct “the gold mine of our soul”, which he claimed the founders of the Republic “made rusty and turned into a tinplate”.⁶⁸⁷

The Magazine of Hareket shared the same pessimism about, for example, (1) Cahid Okurer’s description of the “insincere” city-life, where “this woman” who holds one’s hand will end up in the bed of somebody else she will soon meet;⁶⁸⁸ (2) Nurettin Topçu’s analyses of how the enemies of Muslim values “captured” the youth step by step, leading the society to lose its essence.⁶⁸⁹ Cevat Rifat Atilhan described the agency that “undressed our girls” as “the hands of the invisible enemy”.⁶⁹⁰ Clearly, the shared element in these narratives was the positioning of the individual as a passive carrier of grand ideologies. Under such conditions, it did not make sense to set aside the competing ideal-type women and ask the empirical women what they thought about the issue.

⁶⁸⁴ Necip Fazil Kısakurek, “Büyük Doğu Cemiyeti Kayseri Şubesinin Açılış Hitabesi” (Büyük Doğu Dergisi, February 17, 1950), p19.

⁶⁸⁵ Necip Fazil Kısakurek, “Kütahya Hitabesi” (Büyük Doğu Dergisi, February 2, 1951), p46.

⁶⁸⁶ Necip Fazil Kısakurek, “İzmit’in Büyük Doğu Cemiyeti” (Büyük Doğu Yayınları, 2004), p189-190.

⁶⁸⁷ Necip Fazil Kısakurek, “Tavşanlı’da Verilen Açılış Hitabesi” (Büyük Doğu Dergisi, November 10, 1950), p34.

⁶⁸⁸ Cahid Okurer, “Samimiyetini Kaybeden Şehir,” *Hareket*, December 1, 1952.

⁶⁸⁹ Nurettin Topcu, “Mesuliyet Hareketi,” *Hareket*, December 1, 1952, p8–9.

Nurettin Topcu, “Şahsiyet,” *Hareket*, January 2, 1953, p3.

⁶⁹⁰ Cevat Rifat Atilhan, “Kızlarımızı Çırlıçiplak Teşhir Medeniyet Değil Vahşetin En Bayağısıdır!,” *Hür Adam* 1, no. 16 (October 27, 1950), p1.

7. Alevi & Funerals

This chapter examines a new rationalization of intolerance, which brings together the politics of recognition and assimilation against some syncretic religious traditions developed within Alevilik. By examining the problems Alevi have recently encountered during their funerals, I will question where ‘we’ have reached in ‘our’ history of sectarianism. While the politics of recognition and assimilation seem to have been in conflict since the 1980s identity-turn, their opposite-poles have begun to make similar claims against the syncretic rituals many Alevi acculturated after urbanization.

This flow of urban culture has occasionally been disdained by both sides, as they tend to challenge one another on grounds of *essentialism*, which obliges them to have an exclusive claim on what Alevilik *is* (e.g. a sect of Islam; a religion in itself; a culture; or a philosophy). As such, essentialism brings these sides together to problematize certain funeral practices which they claim, on the one hand, serve non-recognition—hence “assimilation”; and on the other, introduce heterodoxy—hence “heresy”—into the dominant Sunni Islam.

Before proceeding to scrutinize cultural change in the landscape of funerals, I will make a brief description of *salâ*⁶⁹¹ as a matter of Turkish Islamic tradition, instead of the theology of Islam. Having become a part of this tradition after their mass migration to urban centers, the Alevi communities followed a somewhat immature mixture of the politics of recognition and tolerance. However, after the identity-turn of the 1980s, they had explicit disagreements over the alternative forms of recognition that they were to demand—e.g. the representation of Alevilik within Diyanet as a sect of Islam; the abolition of Diyanet for a ‘true’ Secularism; the

⁶⁹¹ Salâ is a form in Turkish religious music. A funeral sala is always followed by an announcement as to the details of the funeral, such as the address and the time of the funeral.

Nuri Ozcan, “Salâ صلا” in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Türk Diyanet Vakfı: İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2009 (36), p. 15-16.

institutionalization of Alevilik as the symmetric opposite of Diyanet. Amid disagreements, however, many ideology-makers commonly blame the politics of tolerance, as it has arguably led to the assimilation of an urbanized generation.

Based on this historical baggage, I will analyze the recorded incidents relating to Alevi's funerals, in which some Alevi felt offended, and explain why. While examining the *exploratory conversations* that take place in each incident, I will divide them into two groups: (1) the incidents in which Alevi encountered problems while having the funeral salâ read from mosques; (2) the incidents in which Alevi citizens became the objects of a state funeral ceremony which is organized in accordance with Diyanet's interpretation of (Sunni) Islam. In these incidents, Alevi have manifested some unprecedented forms of religiosity.

Those Alevi in the first group have taken a syncretic approach to religious and cultural institutions by combining two attitudes that were never combined before. On the one hand, despite the averseness of the imams, they insisted that the funeral salâ should be read from a mosque in their neighborhood. On the other hand, they insisted that their funerals would take place at a cemevi, instead of a mosque. Officials have responded to this attitude in two ways. Firstly, the religious personnel were ordered by Diyanet to read the salâ. Secondly, however, they were also ordered by Diyanet to refuse to use the word "cemevi" during the relevant section of the salâ. In sum, Diyanet's religious personnel read the salâ for Alevi; but they do so without fully announcing where their funerals will take place. Within this context, I will argue that the knowledge-claim, "salâ is not read for Alevi", meant different things throughout the Alevi's transgenerational funeral experience.

As regards the second group of cases, I will demonstrate that almost all Alevi families who were asked to hold a state funeral ceremony preferred to have their funerals at a cemevi, regardless of the disincentives such as the lack of state-level participation in cemevi funerals.

That said, most of these families also consented to have a second funeral in the form of an official ceremony, at a mosque or another central place where Diyanet's personnel were supposed to perform the funeral prayer. The state representatives, who tend to disappear during cemevi funerals, became visible in these official ceremonies.

In *evaluative conversations* I examine several debates concerning funerals, primarily between the ideology-makers of Alevism. This part demonstrates that a new tension between the religious identity and the religious doctrine lays the groundwork for clashing views on the changing funeral cultures of Alevis. Accordingly, the refusal to conduct mosque funerals has been justified primarily in terms of identity politics, instead of the belief-system. In this context, Alevis have a fundamental disagreement on the question of the extent to which identity politics shall prevail over the belief. The state-led assimilationist policies, such as building mosques in Alevi villages, have triggered an unsettled cultural period in the Alevi communities. This alertness against assimilation feeds the identity politics, arguably at the expense of certain practices justified in terms of the belief-system.

On the flip side, I will also touch upon some key conversations between these ideology-makers, the government and other anti-recognition actors such as some popular teachers and theologians of Islam who oppose the recognition of Alevilik for various reasons. These actors push the Alevi associations to come up with a clear-cut definition of Alevilik. The implication of their arguments is that cemevi can be recognized as a place of worship only if Alevis admit that their religion does not have anything to do with Islam. In this context, they oppose all syncretic approaches, either by calling for assimilation (i.e. Alevilik as a temporary and faulty cultural representation of Islam), or by calling for total separation (i.e. Alevilik as a separate religion). Taken together, I argue that the clash between the politics of assimilation and recognition merges in a common framework of essentialism. In this framework, the clash has

been based on totalistic claims over ‘what Alevilik is’, as an innately existing category on a timeless ground.

In the third and last section, which is composed of what I call *retroactive conversations*, I analyze conversations between (1) the Alevi who requested salâ from mosques; (2) the Alevi who consented to have two funerals; and (3) their critics who often blamed them for serving the project of assimilation. The essentialist framework makes clear marks on the retroactive conversations. Alevi who requested salâ from mosques have been criticized from a two-way essentialist standpoint, which consists of arguing that Alevi should not demand anything from mosques, given that they are either not Muslims or never pray at mosques; and that those Alevi who go to mosques serve to the assimilation of Alevi, hence supporting the enemies of ‘the genuine Alevilik’ that struggles against non-recognition. After presenting these claims, I will conclude that tolerance will remain relevant amid these cultural contestations, even if a form of the politics of recognition succeeds.

7.1. Between Tolerance and Recognition: Alevi’ Changing Relationship with Mosque Funerals

The massacres of Kahramanmaraş (1978) and Çorum (1980) were triggered by the slogans, “the funeral prayer cannot be conducted for Alevi/Communists”,⁶⁹² and “the salâ is not (to be) read for Alevi/Communists”.⁶⁹³ As these massacres are commemorated every year, the slogans are also recalled in order to refer to the reproduction of intolerance against Alevi. Therefore, the landscape of funerals represents the ‘stillness’ of sectarian tensions. That being said, I shall discuss some stark differences between the old and the new snapshots in this landscape.

To begin with, the historical trajectory of Alevilik may be sought in the literature with a special focus on four relational processes: Alevi’ relationship with the state; with one

⁶⁹² Tr. “Alevi’nin cenaze namazı kılınmaz”.

⁶⁹³ Tr. “Alevi’nin salâsı okunmaz”.

another; with religion; and with the other social forces. It was through the conjunction of these relational processes that Alevis found themselves in new social contexts and acted accordingly. These transgenerational processes have been summarized in the academic literature under the headings of urbanization,⁶⁹⁴ secularization,⁶⁹⁵ Europeanization,⁶⁹⁶ politicization,⁶⁹⁷ and revitalization.⁶⁹⁸

All these processes offered new opportunities and imposed new restrictions. In particular, I shall note that Alevis began migrating to the urban centers in Turkey or Europe in large groups—often in larger groups than the Sunni migrants, since Alevis did not feel secure when they were dispersed.⁶⁹⁹ After the beginning of mass migration in the 1960s, they either stopped their ritualistic cem-meetings altogether, or kept them secret.⁷⁰⁰ This secrecy was not just a product of fear; but also a reproducer of the already distorted image of Alevilik outside their social circles.⁷⁰¹ Before urbanization, Alevis had to conduct their cem-meetings with great caution in many parts of the country. For example, among the neighboring Sunni villages, the inhabitants of an Alevi village in Kozak Downhill, close to Izmir's Bergama district, held cem-

⁶⁹⁴ Kemal H. Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization* (Cambridge University Press, 1976). Sencer Ayata, "Migrants and Changing Urban Periphery: Social Relations, Cultural Diversity and the Public Space in Istanbul's New Neighbourhoods," *International Migration* 46, no. 3 (2008): 27–64.

⁶⁹⁵ Markus Dressler, "Religio-Secular Metamorphoses: The Re-Making of Turkish Alevism," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 76, no. 2 (2008): 280–311.

⁶⁹⁶ Ayhan Kaya, *Europeanization and Tolerance in Turkey: The Myth of Toleration* (Springer, 2013).

Esra Ozyurek, "'The Light of the Alevi Fire Was Lit in Germany and Then Spread to Turkey': A Transnational Debate on the Boundaries of Islam," *Turkish Studies* 10, no. 2 (2009): 233–253.

Kivanc Ulusoy, "The 'Europeanization' of the Religious Cleavage in Turkey: The Case of the Alevis," *Mediterranean Politics* 18, no. 2 (July 1, 2013): 294–310, doi:10.1080/13629395.2013.799346.

⁶⁹⁷ Tahire Erman and Emrah Göker, "Alevi Politics in Contemporary Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 4 (2000): 99–118.

⁶⁹⁸ Reha Camuroglu, "Alevi Revivalism in Turkey," *Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives*, 1998, 79–84.

Martin Van Bruinessen, "Kurds, Turks and the Alevi Revival in Turkey," *Middle East Report*, 1996, 7–10.

⁶⁹⁹ Ibrahim Agah Cubukcu, "Sünnilere Kapalılık," *Milliyet*, 19 Jun 1966, p2.

⁷⁰⁰ Kemal H. Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization* (Cambridge University Press, 1976), p225-230.

⁷⁰¹ see from these years, a conversation—between a dede and a journalist—that reflected this distorted image, Husniye Balkanlı, "Hacı Bektaş Köyünde Görüp İşittiklerim," *Milliyet*, 13 Dec 1953, p2.

meetings in great secrecy by keeping watch on the borders of the village.⁷⁰² Amid these constraints, many Alevis decided to migrate to the urban centers.

Immigration was a general trend beyond this particularistic explanation. That said, Alevis' immigration was particularly noteworthy in the sense that the rural cities with large Alevi populations, such as Sivas, Kars, Erzincan and Tunceli, were "the champions of migration" by 1990.⁷⁰³ This mass migration also explains why Alevis had some influential political figures in the large cities, such as Istanbul and Ankara, and why they later had their most well-organized ideology-making associations in these large cities, alongside the European capitals.

The new urban context deeply affected Alevis' cem-meetings. Firstly, having less and less cem-meetings meant that many Alevis left their environments of worship behind. Lacking the environmental means to conduct their funerals as they did in the rural past, many Alevis began to have their funerals at mosques.⁷⁰⁴ Some had their funerals in front of their apartments, despite the limitations of these medium-rise buildings compared to the traditional village houses, where many Alevi groups had made their funeral preparations in their hometowns.⁷⁰⁵

Leaving the environment of worship behind meant very quick secularization as well. In time, many Alevis forgot their rituals. The succeeding generation was not born into a practicing culture.⁷⁰⁶ Relatedly, their religious leaders, *ocak dedes*, faced the danger of extinction in time, because less and less *dedesoylu* candidates appeared to undertake the duties of a dede. The

⁷⁰² Hasan Harmanci, "İnsan Yiyen Aleviler," *HasanHarmanci* (blog), 2012, <http://hasanharmanci.blogcu.com/insan-yiyen-aleviler/11717097>.

⁷⁰³ Rafet Ballı, "İstanbul'u Doğu Yönetiyor", *Milliyet*, 6 Oct 1990, p18.

⁷⁰⁴ In the same period, some families were going back to their hometowns for funerals.

⁷⁰⁵ Aslı Buyukokutan, "Muğla Yöresi Alevî Türkmenlerinde Ölümle İlgili İnanç ve Pratikler," *Türklük Bilimi Araştırmaları* 21, no. 21 (2007): 63–86, p69.

⁷⁰⁶ "Aleviliğe Ne Oluyor?," *Yeni Gündem*, August 23, 1987.

Alevi communities did not have sufficient means to educate Alevis in accordance with the strict traditional hierarchy of the institution of *dedelik*.

The sociological process of secularization was also underpinned by the political ideology of Secularism, which Alevis embraced in the multi-party system. In the Ottoman times, Alevis relied on the institution of *dedelik* to resolve their internal disputes, since they did not want to be judged by Qadis—i.e. the magistrates of Shari’a Courts. However, a few decades after the foundation of the Republic, the courts of Secularism, which were supposed to consider them equal citizens, became legitimate in their eyes.⁷⁰⁷ Their leftism during the cold war also disillusioned them from the traditional hierarchy of Alevilik.⁷⁰⁸

7.1.1. *Intolerance as the Old Problem of Mosque Funerals*

The fundamental problems Alevis had with Diyanet was contextualized in this period in their mosque funerals. They were often insulted during preaches,⁷⁰⁹ sometimes their bodies were not washed before the funeral,⁷¹⁰ sometimes the *salâ* was not read,⁷¹¹ or a funeral prayer was not performed.⁷¹² So as not to be exposed and alienated, many of them hid their identities.⁷¹³

⁷⁰⁷ see the interview with Nüket Esen in Alper Gormus *et.al.*, “Alevilik Tarihe Karışıyor: Cem Ayinleri Mahzun...”, *Nokta*, 27 Sep 1987, p30-31.

⁷⁰⁸ See the de-legitimizing interpretation of *Hakullah*, a fee that is paid to the travelling dedes when they visit a village.

Umit Kaftancıoğlu, “Hakullah: Bektaşiliğin Gölgesinde Sömürü,” *Su Yayınları*, 2003, also published back in August 1972.

Also see how Aşık Mahzuni Şerif, a very influential “ashik” in both Alevi and left-wing political circles, criticized the “backward” traditions of his own community. Fikret Otyam, “Hu Dost: ‘Sana Cevabımdır’...”, *Cumhuriyet*, 18 Oct 1963, p7.

⁷⁰⁹ “İmam Alevilere Hakaret Yüzünden Linç Ediliyordu”, *Cumhuriyet*, 14 Jun 1965, p6.

⁷¹⁰ “Hoca, Alevi İşçinin Cenazesini Yıkamadı”, *Milliyet*, 31 Jan 1968, p3.

⁷¹¹ In this period, Alevis and marxists shared the same fate.

see the funeral of former mayor Fikri Sönmez of Fatsa (1985): Erhan Ozturk, “‘Müslüman Değil’ Diye Salasını Okumadılar,” *Sabah*, April 24, 2010.

Erhan Ozturk, “Terzi Fikri, 25 Yıl Sonra Hakkıyla Anıldı,” *Sabah*, May 6, 2010.

⁷¹² Cafer Ates, “Diyanet İşleri Başkanına Açık Mektup,” *Cumhuriyet*, July 12, 1976, p7.

Nurcan Demirtas, “Haksızlığa İsyân,” *Milliyet*, November 20, 1990, p3, p16.

⁷¹³ Ayşe Adli, “Hüseyin Elmas ile sözlü tarih görüşmesi” (Bilim ve Sanat Vakfı (BISAV) and İstanbul Kalkınma Ajansı (İSTKA), September 8, 2016), <http://dspace.sozlutarih.org.tr/handle/20.500.11834/3409>, the recording between 3.00.00 and 3.09.00.

Many funerals were actually held without informing the imam about the religious orientation of the deceased.

That said, sometimes it was the religious personnel who themselves detected some signs of Alevilik. One example was the funeral of Bektaş Akkol in Malatya (1968). In this case, the religious personnel of the hospital (tr. hastane hocası) explicitly asked if the deceased was an Alevi or Sunni,⁷¹⁴ because he was suspicious of the name of the deceased: “Bektaş”. This case is indicative of why for many years Alevi parents frequently gave their children names that do not signify Alevilik.⁷¹⁵ Additionally, the hometown of the deceased was also a factor that an imam occasionally took into account.⁷¹⁶

Right after the massacre of Maraş, former minister and MP Turan Güneş of CHP mentioned his disappointment, given that “in our country today, even our funeral ceremonies are made separately”.⁷¹⁷ According to Güneş, shared funeral ceremonies represented the value of coexistence. After four decades, it is difficult to find a problematization of separate funeral ceremonies in Turkey. Even though some ideas of recognition were apparent—albeit immature—at the time,⁷¹⁸ Alevis demanded tolerance during funerals, given that they did not see any problem with mosque funerals in terms of their belief-system. In other words, they desired their funerals to be held in the same as could be demanded by Sunni citizens.

⁷¹⁴ “Hoca, Alevi İçşinin Cenazesini Yıkamadı”, *Milliyet*, 31 Jan 1968, p3.

⁷¹⁵ Binnaz Toprak et al., “Din ve Muhafazakarlık Ekseninde Ötekileştirilenler,” İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2009, p53-54.

⁷¹⁶ Uğras Ulas Tol, “Alevi Olmak: Alevilerin Dilinden Ayrımcılık Hikayeleri,” *Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği*, 2005, p38.

⁷¹⁷ “Güneş’in Konuşması,” *Milliyet*, December 27, 1978, p9.

⁷¹⁸ see “Anayasa’nın Birinci Müzakeresi Bitti,” *Milliyet*, April 26, 1961, p5.

“Alevi Gençler Bildiri Yayınlandı,” *Milliyet*, May 1, 1963, p1.

“Milli Eğitim Bakanı: Mezhep Mücadeleleri Toplumumuz İçin Büyük Tehlikedir,” *Milliyet*, July 21, 1963, p1-p7.

“Aleviler Adına Demirel’e Çekilen Telgraf,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 11, 1966, p7.

“Devlet Bakanı [...],” *Milliyet*, June 17, 1966, p7.

The funeral salâ was a particular question from the point of view of Sunni Islam. Just as they do today, many theologians kept claiming at the time that salâ was just a tradition based on Turkish religious music: not a religious duty (tr. farz), not obligatory (tr. vacip), and not based on the doings and sayings (tr. sünnet) of Prophet Muhammed. The carriers of this Sufi tradition also felt offended when some theologians defined salâ as an illicit novelty (tr. haram bid'at). And yet, it became a key element of the *settled* Anatolian culture of Islam, in a manner that transcends sectarian boundaries. According to its Sunni supporters, salâ was not a harmful tradition, even though it did not exist at the time of the Prophet. Its main aim was to make announcements in the neighborhood—e.g. about funeral dates, or the eternal love for Prophet Muhammed. As such, refusing to read the salâ for Alevis meant not conducting a ritual, which was disputable in terms of Sunni Islam, for a group on the basis that they were not Sunni Muslims.

In conclusion, for some decades after mass urbanization, the mosque became the 'given' for many Alevi citizens, as they had already begun to have their funerals at mosques within the social setting of urban life. There was no standard place of worship for Alevis in the urban centers, and their hometown was often too far away to transport a funeral. Even after the building of mosques became a state policy in their villages, Alevis did not necessarily problematize the mosque funerals, but the authority of Diyanet and its role in the denigration of Alevis' relationship with the faith. For example, the villagers of Izmir's village of Bademler, which was among those villages in which the post-1980-coup governments planned to build a mosque, protested against the plan with the following words:

We do not want a mosque. If it is built, nobody will go there except for the funeral prayers.⁷¹⁹

⁷¹⁹ "Bademler'in Camisi Yok, Tiyatrosu Var," *Nokta*, September 27, 1987, p33.

After the 1980s' identity-turn, the state policy of building mosques in the Alevi villages, as well as the organization of the first cemevis in urban settings, shifted the focus of the problem from tolerance to assimilation, difference and recognition.

7.1.2. Assimilation as the New Problem of Mosque Funerals

Since the 1980s, Alevi have re-considered their relationship with the politics of social class and cultural identity.⁷²⁰ Even though the class-dimension did not fully disappear in this post-cold-war period, it was re-shaped in relation to the question of ethnocultural and religious identities.⁷²¹ For example, "Kurdish Alevi" claimed their intersectional identity, as opposed to the former identity-constructions based on locality (tr. *hemşehrilik*).⁷²² The European Alevi communities in particular played a key role in the transformation from political activism to cultural reclamation. With the newly established networks, Alevilik has been re-made as a public religion.⁷²³

The shift from the appearance of Alevilik in the political landscape (the 1960s), to the identity-turn of the 1980s was not a linear process. By the late 1990s, Alevi were reporting that they were highly disillusioned by the 'unproductive' political affairs.⁷²⁴ As a building-block of cultural reclamation against assimilationism, they re-configured their environment of

⁷²⁰ Karin Vorhoff, "'Let's Reclaim Our History and Culture!' -Imagining Alevi Community in Contemporary Turkey," *Welt Des Islams* 38 (1998): 220–252.

Ozlem Goner, "The Transformation of the Alevi Collective Identity", *Cultural Dynamics*, Vol: 17, No: 2, 2005, 107-134.

⁷²¹ Erman, Tahire and Emrah Göker "Alevi Politics in Contemporary Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies* (36) (4), 2000: 99–118.

Ayşe Ayata, "The Emergence of Identity Politics in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 17 (1997): 59–73, p.30

⁷²² Martin van Bruinessen, 'Aslini İnkâr Eden Haramzadedir!: The Debate on the Ethnic Identity of the Kurdish Alevi', in K. Kehl-Bodrogi et al. (eds.), *Syncretic Religious Communities in the Near East* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997). Ayşe Betül Celik, "Alevi, Kurds and Hemşehris: Alevi Kurdish Revival in the Nineties," *The Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview*, Leiden, Brill, 2003, 141–157, p143.

⁷²³ Sehiban Sahin, "The Rise of Alevism as a Public Religion," *Current Sociology* 53, no. 3 (May 1, 2005): 465–85.

⁷²⁴ Rusen Cakir and Ihsan Yilmaz, "Siyasetten Kopuyorlar," *Milliyet*, August 19, 2001.

Cem TV, *Prof Dr İzzettin Doğan Aihm Basın Açıklaması*, 3 May 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIIWqxSHA4s>, minute: 17.00-18.00.

worship in the urban setting, establishing the first cemevi buildings in the large or symbolically significant cities.

That said, in due course the authority structures of Alevilik changed under the ideology-making processes of “Alevism”.⁷²⁵ The rituals in the cemevis, the differentiated duties of the new *cemevi dedes*,⁷²⁶ and the relationship of cemevis with, on the one hand, the religious institutions of *ocaks*, and on the other, the civil society organizations, foundations, associations and federations became matters of in-group contestation.⁷²⁷ This polarization had its repercussions for Alevis’ differentiated defense of Secularism. Should Alevis be represented in Diyanet, or should Diyanet be abolished altogether? Must Alevis demand recognition in the name of Secularism, in which Diyanet has played a key role; or must they defend another kind of secularism? How should Alevilik be defined in relation to the ‘official Islam’ in Turkey? After the identity-turn, the disagreements over these questions became more explicit than ever.

State funeral ceremonies, as the representations of the ‘official Islam’ in Turkey, were also problematized for the first time in 21st century. The chronological record of state funerals suggests that before the foundation and the spread of cemevis, the sectarian dimension of state funeral ceremonies was not problematized in public. The mosque was the given for all funerals—except for that of the believers of other Abrahamic religions, who are much less likely to be an object of state funeral ceremonies, given that so few of them, if any, served as

⁷²⁵ Elise Massicard, “Alevi Hareketinin Siyasallaşması,” *İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları*, 2007, p21-22.

⁷²⁶ Markus Dressler, “The Modern Dede: Changing Parameters for Religious Authority in Contemporary Turkish Alevism,” in *Speaking for Islam, Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies*, ed. Gudrun Kramer and Martin Sokefeld (Brill, 2014), 269–294.

Martin Sokefeld, “Alevi Dedes in the German Diaspora: The Transformation of a Religious Institution,” *Zeitschrift Für Ethnologie*, 2002, 163–186.

⁷²⁷ Ali Yaman, “Anadolu Alevileri’nde Otoritenin El Değiştirmesi: Dedelik Kurumundan Kültürel Organizasyonlara,” in *Bilgi Toplumunda Alevilik*, 2003, 331–356.

soldiers or statesmen.⁷²⁸ The ‘common sense’ necessitated having these ceremonies at a mosque, chosen in accordance with the neighborhood where the family of the deceased live.⁷²⁹

Before the foundation of cemevis, the main problem that Alevis shared about state funeral ceremonies was the other participants’ use of right-wing nationalist symbols (e.g. ‘grey-wolf’ hand gestures) and the somewhat politically-loaded religious slogans, such as “ya Allah Bismillah, Allah-u Ekber” [tr. Tekbir], as they were also seen and heard by Alevis when they were attacked by mobs.⁷³⁰ Approximately a decade after the spread of cemevi funerals, the criticism towards state funeral ceremonies was based on more fundamental issues, such as the role of Diyanet in these official ceremonies, and the inability of Alevis to conduct an official ceremony at cemevis. In this vein, the funeral of Murat Taş (2009) became the first publicly problematized state funeral ceremony. Afterwards, the content of state funerals would not be isolated from the wider claims of the Alevi communities, which began to problematize mosque funerals, be them ‘ordinary’ or ‘official’ funeral ceremonies.

Even though deep disagreements surfaced over the way to re-configure religious and cultural institutions, Alevis commonly agreed that they should not remain an isolated cultural group.⁷³¹ Also, because they agreed that the current and the past crises signify some successive chapters of the same problem, repeating well-known phrases—e.g. “salâ is not to be read for Alevis—have continued to play a key role in anchoring today’s problems with the past episodes.

⁷²⁸ Recently, the state funeral ceremony was organized at Hagia Yorgi Church for İlyâ Banogo, a Turkish Korean war veteran of Rum descent; at Virgin Mary Armenian Church for Arut Köse, a Turkish Korean war veteran of Armenian descent; and at Mor Abraham Monastery in Mardin for Yusuf Kurt, a Syriac “civilian martyr”.

⁷²⁹ These funerals take place primarily in Istanbul or Ankara. For example, in Istanbul, if the person is located on the Anatolian side, his/her funeral takes place in the Selimiye Mosque in Üsküdar, or Erenköy Galip Paşa Mosque. On the European side, it either takes place in the Ataköy 5. Kısım Mosque, or the Levent Mosque.

⁷³⁰ Meral Tamer, “Şehit Ailelerini Dinlemeliyiz,” *Milliyet*, September 12, 2006, p6.

⁷³¹ Researcher Cemal Şener described this moment as the renaissance of Alevism in 1995.

Cemal Şener, “Çoksesli Rönesans,” *Milliyet*, July 4, 1995, p23.

see also, Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, Barbara Kellner Heinkele, and Anke Otter Beaujean, *Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East: Collected Papers Od the International Symposium “Alevism in Turkey and Comparable Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East in the Past and Present” Berlin, 14-17 April 1995* (BRILL, 1997).

Although many leaders of this politics of recognition refuse to demand salâ from mosques, the expression continues to serve their ideology as a meaningful way of anchoring the problem of today with the baggage of history.

In this period, the bureaucrats of Diyanet have insistently claimed to read salâ for the funerals of “all Muslims”, which is intended by Diyanet to include Alevis as well as Sunnis. That being said, if the Alevis’ expectations from a funeral proceeding have fundamentally differed since the 1990s, to what extent could it be possible for this complaint to represent the same story? Having been deprived of the funeral salâ is something that Alevis problematized, both before and after Alevi revivalism, because the meaning of not reading the salâ has shifted. Before revivalism, it was a problem of intolerance. After revivalism, it has become a problem of assimilation.

7.2. Exploratory Conversations (I): “Salâ is not to be read for Alevis”

In this part, I firstly scrutinize the cases in which Alevi citizens had problems with official religious personnel about the procedure of their funeral organizations. Even though the seemingly timeless expression, “salâ is not to be read for Alevis”, has been well-repeated within the specific context of these cases, I claim that the acts which this expression signifies have gradually changed after the normalization of cemevi funerals among Alevis. In this vein, I firstly clarify that in the recent cases, salâ was read one way or another, notwithstanding several implications of discrimination during this process.

In these cases, the border of tolerance has been sketched by the religious personnel around the use of the word “cemevi” during the salâ. Furthermore, the families were particularly offended by the aversion that the religious personnel had to reading the salâ. These Alevis have combined two attitudes that were never combined before: (1) they insisted that a salâ should be read; (2) they still had their funerals at a cemevi.

As I demonstrate in the following chapters, these features of the incidents determine the flow of conversations in certain ways. Firstly, the requests made by Alevis of mosques seem to be contradictory to the claims made on behalf of “Alevi revivalism”. Therefore, the Alevis who still request a ritualistic performance from mosques have been condemned by many other Alevis, including some of the most influential organizations of Alevi communities. Secondly, however, these requests should not mean that these people are ‘assimilated’. On the contrary, the Alevis in these cases were keen to have their funerals at cemevis, as opposed to the ‘assimilated’ Alevis who only go to mosques. These two points will constitute my analysis of the following parts, which are evaluative and retroactive conversations.

The relatives of Nurten Mirzeler in the city of Adana wanted her death to be announced with a *salâ*. For the funeral, Mirzeler was brought back to Adana from Germany. However, after their meeting with Imam Musa Oğuz Tarhan of the Camii Şerifi Mosque, the family claimed that the imam refused to read the *salâ* on account that it is “not to be read for Alevis”. Soon after this argument, the imam faced a group of neighbors at the lodging building of the mosque. He told them that he in fact read the *salâ* in the morning—i.e. when the neighbors “may have been sleeping”. The sister of the deceased asked the imam: “can you swear on God that you read it?”—she reported that the imam preferred silence.⁷³² Eventually, rejecting the allegations of discrimination, the imam read the *salâ* “once again”. “Some circles from outside our neighborhood want to drag me into a political field”,⁷³³ the imam told the press when this incident was publicized. Later, a woman from the neighborhood claimed that the same imam

⁷³² “Adana’da Sela Krizi,” *Günaydın Gazetesi*, March 10, 2015, <http://www.gunaydingazetesi.com.tr/adanada-sela-krizi/39893>.

⁷³³ “İmam: ‘Alevilerin Selası Mı Olur?’ Şeklinde Bir Söz Sarfetmedim,” *Haberler*, March 9, 2015, <http://www.haberler.com/imam-alevilerin-selasi-mi-olur-seklinde-bir-soz-7054530-haberi>.

did not read the funeral salâ for her Alevi husband either: “this imam is discriminatory. Eventually, we found another imam”.⁷³⁴

However, other similar incidents suggest that more has been at play than the personal attributes of the imams. Taken together, they suggest that the religious personnel read the salâ with some restrictions. In Izmir, the imam of the Bilali Habeşi Mosque accepted the request for the salâ to be read for an Alevi citizen. With the salâ, the family wanted the funeral place to be heard. The funeral was to take place at a cemevi. Nevertheless, the imam made the caveat that the order from Diyanet had clearly forbidden using the word cemevi during salâ. Hasan Külekçi, a relative of the deceased, asked three different mosques, but he got the same answer from all of them.⁷³⁵ He explained what eventually happened: “we had to go from door to door to tell everyone where the funeral would take place”.⁷³⁶ In an anonymous case, a woman, whose grandmother had passed away, explained their experience in similar words:

The imam told [my father] that he would announce, “the funeral will take place from the *house*” [i.e. using the word ‘ev’, without using ‘cem’]. My father replied, “you will tell this and everybody will come to our house, and then they will have to go back to the cemevi. Our house is at the opposite direction of the cemevi”. [...] The imam insisted [...], and my father eventually told, “then do not read the salâ. I don’t want it”.⁷³⁷

Just as Külekçi reported from 3 different mosques, similar incidents were recorded at different mosques. Upon 21-year-old Çağrı Türker’s death in Nazilli’s Pınarbaşı neighborhood, his uncle asked the imam of the Hacışerif Mosque, İbrahim Hoca, to read salâ for the deceased.

⁷³⁴ “İmam: ‘Alevilerin Selası mı Olur?’ Şeklinde Bir Söz Sarfetmedim”.

⁷³⁵ “Diyanet, İmamlara Sela Verirken Cemevi Demeyin Talimatı Verdi’ İddiası,” T24, June 26, 2016, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/diyanet-imamlara-sela-verirken-cemevi-demeyin-talimati-verdi-iddiasi,347169>.

⁷³⁶ “Ölen Alevi Kadın İçin İmamdanda Cemevisiz Sela,” *Kazete: Özgür Kadının Sesi*, June 26, 2016, <http://kazete.com.tr/haber/-olen-alevi-kadin-icin-imamdan-cemevisiz-sela-48495>.

⁷³⁷ Aykan Erdemir et al., “Türkiye’de Alevi Olmak,” *Alevi Kültür Dernekleri & Alevi Enstitüsü*, 2010, p229.

The imam replied, “if the funeral takes place at the cemevi, you have to go to the municipality for the announcement. It is not about us, not about the mosque”.⁷³⁸ Disagreeing with the imam, Türker’s uncle went to the mufti⁷³⁹ to ask for the justification of this policy. He reported mufti’s words cautiously:

I do not want to accuse him wrongly, but he literally said “not necessary, the salâ is not important”.⁷⁴⁰

Türker’s uncle asked the mufti if he would say the same had his child died. After he left the mufti’s office, the imam called him back, and said that he would read the salâ for Türker. However, the imam refused to announce that the funeral would take place in “the cemevi of Pınarbaşı”. Instead, he suggested: “let us say only that the funeral will take place in Pınarbaşı”. As a result, he read the salâ without referring to the place the funeral would take place.

The mufti of Izmir, Necati Topaloğlu, explained the policy of *Diyanet*:

According to Islam, cemevi is not a place of worship, but a house of culture. According to our culture and tradition, also in our history [...], the places of worship are the mosques. All the rest are the centers of culture. [...] Our policy is not something specific against them [i.e. cemevi]. So, it is not that we do not read the salâ.

This argument is a repetition of what Former President Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz of Diyanet said in 1995: Alevilik is a culture; neither a sect, nor a religion.⁷⁴¹ Clearly, this statement reduces cemevi to the official position of Nakshibendi and Nur lodges. Ali Bardakoğlu, the former president of Diyanet between 2003 and 2010, also defined cemevis as places of a mystical

⁷³⁸ Erdal Savaş, “Alevi Gencin Cenazesi Tartışma Doğurdu,” *Nazilli*, December 13, 2016, <http://nazillinews.com/alevi-gencin-cenazesi-tartisma-dogurdu>.

⁷³⁹ A mufti is a Muslim legal expert appointed to certain places by Diyanet to give rulings on religious matters.

⁷⁴⁰ Erdal Savaş, “Alevi gencin cenazesi tartışma doğurdu”.

⁷⁴¹ Rusen Cakir, “Değişim Sürecinde Alevi Hareketi: Gözler Devlette,” *Milliyet*, July 12, 1995, p23.

culture: “neither playing *ney*, nor the rite of whirling, nor the rite of cem, [...] they cannot be counted equal to *namaz*”.⁷⁴²

One month later, another imam, Harun Gür, was claimed to have refused to read the salâ for V.T. with the following argument: “V.T. never came to the mosque. Salâ is not read for Alevi” —because they do not pray at mosque.⁷⁴³ Özgür Aydın from ANF News reported that this argument between the relatives of V.T. and the imam followed the imam’s refusal of a written application made by the relatives. This report was denied very quickly, not only by the imam but also by Diyanet. Supporting its personnel, Diyanet declared that, instead of the imam, a “voluntary officer” read the salâ. The practice was documented in the security cameras of the mosque.⁷⁴⁴ According to the imam, the real reason was that he was not at the mosque at the time of the delivery of the request: “eventually the salâ was read [by someone else]. A salâ does not have to be read by the imams”.⁷⁴⁵ Many of the relatives of V.T. did not hear the salâ, including his neighbor Cevdet Doğan, who was the person that went to the mosque to request V.T.’s salâ:

They say that the salâ was read only once, very shortly and with many of its parts missing. Nobody heard it, including me⁷⁴⁶.

The “voluntary officer”, who was in fact a vendor of birdseeds in the bazaar, said that he missed some parts of the salâ due to haste. As a part of the salâ, he did not announce that the funeral

⁷⁴² Namaz (Ar. Salaat) means Islamic prayer in Turkish.

Onder Yılmaz, “Prof. Bardakoğlu: Alevilerin Talebi Siyasi,” *Milliyet*, November 6, 2005, p18.

⁷⁴³ “İzmir’de İmam ölen kişinin Alevi diye selasını okumadı”, *Cumhuriyet*, 22 Jan 2016, <http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/468330/izmir_de_imam_olen_kisi_Alevi_diye_sela_okumadi.html#>

⁷⁴⁴ “Basın Açıklaması” (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, January 23, 2016), <http://www.diyamet.gov.tr/tr/icerik/basin-aciklamasi/30475>.

⁷⁴⁵ Mustafa Oguz, “İzmir’de Sela Krizi,” *Hürriyet*, January 23, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/izmirde-sela-krizi-40044168>.

⁷⁴⁶ Mustafa Oğuz, “İzmir’de Sela Krizi”.

would take place at the cemevi. Moreover, he also “forgot” to say, “may God rest his soul” [tr. Allah rahmet eylesin].

The Mayor of Çiğli, who has been an Alevi, described this as “the mentality that says ‘salâ is not to be read for Alevis’”:

They use our taxes for the expenditure of mosques, but they do not even read a salâ for us.⁷⁴⁷

Taken together, in all these cases, the salâ was read one way or another. However, in none of them was the word cemevi used. In all these cases, even though the religious personnel (imams and muftis) did not seem enthusiastic about reading it, they read the salâ when the families insisted, which in part explains why these incidents were well-publicized. The salâ was read one way or another, because the Diyanet policy has clearly been in favor of reading it for Alevis. In order to demonstrate its stance on this policy, Diyanet opened an investigation into the case of Mirzeler in Adana, and the case of V.T. in Izmir. In these investigations, it reiterated that the salâ of Alevis should be read from mosques. Correspondingly, in these cases Diyanet aimed to make clear that the salâ was eventually read. The Mufti of Adana, Arif Gökçe, introduced this investigation by underlining that “an Imam must be insane to say ‘salâ is not read for Alevis’”.⁷⁴⁸ Of V.T.’s funeral, Diyanet declared that “the claim that a citizen’s salâ was not read because he was an Alevi is not true at all”.⁷⁴⁹ According to Diyanet, these claims were nothing more than lies that aimed to polarize the society. After all, the institution concluded these investigations in favor of its personnel.

⁷⁴⁷ “İzmir’de İmam Ölen Kişinin Alevi Diye Selasını Okumadı,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 22, 2016.

⁷⁴⁸ “Alevilerin selası okunur mu?,” *Cumhuriyet*, 9 Mar 2016, <http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/229904/_Alevilerin_selasi_okunur_mu_.html#>

⁷⁴⁹ “Basın Açıklaması”, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 23 Jan 2016.

However, despite the official position of Diyanet, these conversations between Alevi and imams suggest that the Diyanet personnel tend to look for excuses not to read the salâ for Alevi. As I noted above, in the cases of Türker, Mirzeler and V.T., the idea of practicing salâ was initially problematized by the imams and/or muftis. The latter denied only a part of these conversations. Even though they may not have rejected the demand, they always made some arguments that irritated the families, even after reading the salâ. For example, having been called back by the imam after his meeting with the mufti, Türker's uncle guessed that the imam changed his policy of not reading the salâ, "probably because he was ordered by the *mufti*".⁷⁵⁰ In other words, he maintained his criticism, "given that" the policy change was due to pressure instead of the imam's sense of self-responsibility.

Similarly, in Mirzeler's case, the sister of Mirzeler noted that the imam later came to their house to ask for his apology to be accepted. However, Mirzeler's sister was disturbed about the way the imam was making excuses even during his apology. For example, he said that he was not obliged to read the salâ, because the day of the request was in fact his day off. Therefore, he noted, he wanted to read the salâ just as part of his own "charity" [tr. *hayrına*], and not out of any duty.⁷⁵¹ In V.T.'s case, the imam's excuse for not reading the salâ was that he was not at the mosque. On the one hand, the personalized content of these justifications, once again, suggest that the imams were clearly ordered by Diyanet to have the salâ read. On the other hand, it is also clear that the families were offended when they saw the reluctance of the religious personnel in proceeding to read the funeral salâ. They want to be welcome, not just for a salâ to be read.

An incident in the little district of Havza revealed this element of averseness, which all the other cases implied. In this case, the imam asked the neighbor of the deceased to wait with

⁷⁵⁰ Erdal Savas, "Alevi gencin cenazesi tartışma doğurdu".

⁷⁵¹ "İmam: 'Alevilerin Selası mı Olur?' Şeklinde Bir Söz Sarfetmedim", Haberler, 9 Mar 2015.

the deceased for about an hour, until he would join them to hold the funeral. In this period, the neighbor of the deceased, just by chance, saw the imam while entering the mufti's office. He decided to listen to the conversation "secretly", from the doorway. In this meeting, the imam was asking if he should hold the funeral of "a Kızılbaş" (i.e. Alevi, highly derogatory for some). In response, the mufti ordered the imam to check if the neighborhood would "revolt" in case he refuses to hold the funeral (tr. "eğer mahalle ayaklanacaksa").⁷⁵² Should he feel that the neighbors would raise their voices, he should hold the funeral. On the other hand, if they seemed silent enough, then the imam would not hold the funeral. Furthermore, the mufti ordered the imam not to perform a funeral prayer in any case, even though he implemented the other funeral procedures. Having felt offended, the neighbor of the deceased told the imam not to hold the funeral.

In all these cases, it was apparent that the families insisted that a salâ should be read, while the neighborhood reacted if this demand was refused. Taken together, these incidents suggest that the reaction of the neighborhood may have decided the way the religious personnel eventually behaved. Though they feel the social costs, many Alevis keep some mosque rituals without sacrificing cemevis in urban settings. They are neither assimilated nor 'deculturated'—by deculturation, I mean the efforts to purify rituals from the marks of the recent past.

7.3. Exploratory Conversations (II): State Funeral Ceremony for Alevis

This part will focus on Alevis who had two separate funerals, instead of one as usual. The Alevi people who reportedly had two funerals (*i.e.* one at a cemevi, and one at a mosque) are likely to be state personnel for whom the Council of Ministers decide to organize a state ceremony. An official ceremony has not yet taken place at a cemevi. If the deceased is an Alevi, then the

⁷⁵² "Havza'da Yaşanan Bir Cenaze Vakası," in *Alevi Olmak: Alevilerin Dilinden Ayrımcılık Hikayeleri* (Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği, 2005), p33-34.

body of the deceased is transported to the place of the state funeral ceremony: this place is often a mosque, but sometimes another location such as a major square, or a governorship building. In these cases, one of the arguments in favor of a second funeral ceremony is that cemevis are not officially recognized places of worship. A second argument, which does not necessarily cohere with the first, is that this second gathering is not a religious ritual, but an official ceremony that is supposed to take place at an officially recognized place. Both arguments are empirically false as I will demonstrate. That said, what I am primarily interested in is the basis for the problematization of this procedure.

State funeral ceremonies rarely⁷⁵³ take place at cemevis. As a soldier in the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), Murat Taş was killed by PKK⁷⁵⁴ in Eruh, in 2009. Since he was an Alevi, his family brought the body of Taş to the Istanbul Alibeyköy Cemevi for the funeral. By the time the *dede*⁷⁵⁵ of the cemevi finished his introductory speech to begin the funeral prayer, a person who introduced himself as a lieutenant-colonel reportedly approached the family and told them that “the official ceremony” would take place in the Ataköy Mosque. The family did not question the plan.

In 2012, Lieutenant-colonel Ali Tatar, who committed suicide in response to being (re)arrested having been accused of being a member of a terrorist organization called “Ergenekon” in the military, also had two funerals. His body was brought first to the Karacaahmet Cemevi in Istanbul, and the following day to the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara for the official ceremony. The funerals of Özkan Ateşli, who died in Foça in 2012 in a PKK bomb-attack, took place first at the Haramidere Cemevi in Istanbul, and then at the Ataköy Mosque. After the funeral prayer at the cemevi, Ateşli’s relatives told the dede that Ateşli would be

⁷⁵³ Putting aside the case of Gendarmerie Private Ozan Aslan, which I will emphasize, this adverb of frequency may be replaced with “never”.

⁷⁵⁴ Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (en. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party)

⁷⁵⁵ Dede is the spiritual leader of Alevis.

carried to the mosque by the soldiers. In his own words, the dede “did not have a status to say anything against it”.⁷⁵⁶

The state institutions other than TAF are not talkative on this matter. However, when they do so, they produce two contradictory arguments in favor of this policy. The first argument has been that official ceremonies are not religious activities. Accordingly, the religious ritual in these cases takes place at a cemevi, and the official ceremony later takes place somewhere else as a non-religious act. The conversational records demonstrate that this argument is empirically false, as it ignores the fact that the funeral prayer is always performed during these official ceremonies. Furthermore, this argument ignores how Sunni state personnel can combine the state funeral ceremony with their religious duties. If the state funeral ceremony was not taken simultaneously as a religious activity, they would also have a separate state funeral ceremony, upon their funerals at mosques.

The second argument is that cemevis are not officially recognized places of worship, and therefore a state funeral ceremony cannot be organized at these places. This argument is also empirically wrong. The officials initially offer a mosque for these ceremonies; but alternatively, they can forward them to other places such as major squares, especially when families oppose going to a mosque. Uğur Sağdıç’s funeral, who was killed by PKK in Beytüşşebap in 2012, took place at the Turhal Square of Republic in Tokat, after the ‘unofficial’ funeral at the Yavşanlı Cemevi. In accordance with Diyanet’s understanding of a proper funeral, Sağdıç’s funeral prayer was performed on the square, which indeed has not been a place of worship. Similarly, Kenan Ceylan’s official ceremony took place in front of the district governorship, after the other funeral at the Zile Cemevi. In front of the governorship, Ahmet Erdem, the mufti of Tokat, performed the funeral prayer. Clearly, the religious personnel of

⁷⁵⁶ “Alevi Şehide İki Tören,” *Radikal*, August 11, 2012, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/alevi-sehide-iki-toren-1096880>.

Diyanet do not have any problem with performing a funeral prayer in places that are not officially recognized as places of worship.

During the conversations, the critics repeatedly noted that official ceremonies are made as religious rituals. Otherwise, it would not be a major problem. At Sağdıç's funeral, the funeral prayer was performed on the square, in the way it is performed at any mosque. Coupled with hundreds of participants, several high-level state officials and AKP MPs were there to pray for Sağdıç. Opposing this practice there, CHP MP and Former Chief Public Prosecutor İlhan Cihaner, who was one of the few participants of both funerals, described this moment as the surfacing of "the contradiction between the state and Secularism":

If you make the official ceremony at the square of Municipality, how come do you perform a funeral prayer? Is not the prayer a religious ritual?⁷⁵⁷

These ceremonies manifested that Diyanet's role has been deeply embedded in the regulation of state funeral ceremonies. No matter the place of the official ceremony, it included a religious practice that the state found to be appropriate.

Another problematized aspect of these cases is the lack of state-level participation in cemevi funerals. State officials prefer to participate in official ceremonies, rather than in cemevi funerals. Several cases suggest that government representatives are reluctant to go to cemevis, at least because they have been afraid of protests. This has already been the case for Alevi prisoners, whose cemevi funerals the police do not attend, but it is noteworthy that the families of 'martyrs' suffer from similar problems. For Uğur Sağdıç, state-level participation at the cemevi was little to none: only the governor of Tokat was there on behalf of the government,

⁷⁵⁷ İlhan Cihaner, "Namaz Dini Bir Ritüel Değil Mi?" (CHP Arşiv), accessed November 19, 2017, <http://arsiv.chp.org.tr/?p=84493>.
see also, "Cihaner: 'Ölüme Yolladığınızda Dinini Sordunuz Mu?," *BirGün*, September 6, 2012.

though many participants looked for an elected member of the government. After this funeral, Sađdıç was brought to the Turhal Municipality Square for a state funeral ceremony. As opposed to the cemevi funeral, this time the mayors and several district governors were present alongside several MPs. Exceptionally, Gendarmerie Private Ozan Aslan's family insisted that the state funeral ceremony for Aslan should take place at the Kadıköy Cemevi. As the order of the family was eventually followed by the officers, Aslan's funeral became the first state funeral ceremony organized at a cemevi. However, only the military personnel attended it on behalf of the state.

Regarding Oktay Durak's funeral, who was killed in an ISIS attack, the head of Alevi Culture Associations Dođan Demir conveyed that the officials of District Gendarmerie Command asked Durak's family if it would be possible for Durak's funeral to be conducted at the command building, instead of the hometown of Durak. They made this request because Durak's hometown, Yozgat's Çukurören village, was "an Alevi village", and the officials were afraid that people would protest against the government.⁷⁵⁸ As the family did not accept this excuse, the funeral took place on the village square in Çukurören.

This perception that the Alevi population has been more critical of the government also had consequences in the funeral of Gendarmerie Lieutenant Ali Alkan. Even though Ali Alkan and his family were "Sunni Muslims", they were labelled as Alevis because Ali's brother Mehmet Alkan, who also served in the military as a lieutenant colonel, criticized President Erdoğan during the funeral.⁷⁵⁹ The Alkan family not only declared that they were Sunnis, but also underlined that these claims were nothing more than disrespect to Alevi people. In this

⁷⁵⁸ "Şehit Olan Alevi Askerin Cenazesi İle İlgili Açıklama," *Koz: Aylık Haber Aktüel Dergisi*, December 23, 2016, <http://www.kocaelikoz.com/sehit-olan-alevi-askerin-cenazesi-ile-ilgili-aciklama/6218>.

⁷⁵⁹ What triggered these speculations were also on the social media. A twitter hashtag, "#Lieutenant Colonel is Alevi" [tr. Yarbay Alevi], quickly turned out to be the 'top trend' in twitter. Eventually the family had to deny the allegations.

conversation, the family felt being pushed to declare their sect, as if being Alevi was an accusation.

After Özkan Ateşli's funeral, CHP MP Ali Serindağ submitted a parliamentary question. He asked for the reasons behind the lack of state-level participation at the cemevi funeral. Minister İsmet Yılmaz of National Defense responded that the Garrison Command participated in the cemevi funeral on behalf of the state.⁷⁶⁰ However, participation at the mosque funeral of Ateşli went far beyond that: then President Abdullah Gül sent a wreath to the mosque, and many high-level officials were present at the mosque. Among them were then Minister for EU Affairs Egemen Bağış, Governor Hüseyin Avni and Mayor Kadir Topbaş of Istanbul, Chief Hüseyin Çapkın of Police, and Admiral Bülent Bostanoğlu of the Fleet. Inevitably, many speakers compared the participation between these soldiers' funerals at cemevis and mosques.

With an official statement, TAF declared that, being "loyal to the Article 2 of the constitution" (i.e. Secular State), it "took the consent of the [Ateşli] family" for the second funeral at the mosque.⁷⁶¹ Even though the consent of the family was a key factor, the criticism was made regardless of the consent of the family, given that the families were under serious constraints. The first criticism was that the state actually asked the family if it would be possible to organize a ceremony at the mosque. This was a manifestation of the official religion of the state, hidden behind its claim over Secularism. Even though the family did not oppose the proposal of the authorities, this case triggered a problematization of the authorities' understanding of Secularism. Secondly, the participation of the Garrison Command was not enough to represent the state, at least because the problematized course of funerals provoked comparisons between the participation at cemevis and mosques. Ateşli's funeral at a cemevi

⁷⁶⁰ Levent İcgen, "TSK Cemevindeki Törene Katılmış," *Vatan*, December 3, 2012.

⁷⁶¹ "TSK: Camide Tören İçin Ailenin 'olur'unu Aldık," *NTV*, August 13, 2012.

was not attended by any high-level state officials, including Ateşli's high commander, Navy Admiral Bülent Bostanoğlu.

The funeral of Neşet Ertaş, who described himself as the *other*⁷⁶² while all else recognized him as the master of the Anatolian folk music, aroused a similar controversy. Ertaş, who practiced the Abdal musical tradition of Alevilik, had a mosque funeral in which many high-ranking state representatives competed against each other to be visible in the front row. Given that then PM Erdoğan and other ministers were among the participants in the funeral, which became a state ceremony in practice, a security cordon was set up between the statesmen and others. Despite having refused the 'honorary' title of *state artist* on the basis that he was singing with the society, Ertaş had a funeral which was organized in accordance with the state protocol.

Ertaş never described the kind of funeral he preferred, just as he never spoke in a self-centric manner throughout his life. That said, the government made its position clear against those who claimed that he should have had his funeral at a cemevi. Amid this tension, before conducting his funeral prayer, the imam asked the community an unprecedented question that surprised theologians before all else: "do you bear witness that he was a Muslim?"

7.4. Evaluative Conversations: Alevi's Expressions of Cultural Change

Considering the previous conversations, my aim in this part is to capture some key ideology-making processes. First and foremost, I analyze the ideology-makers' conversations over cemevi funerals. Secondly, I will examine the implications of the contested position of Alevilik vis-à-vis Islam. These debates take place within the Alevi communities, as well as between the

⁷⁶² see CH 4.1.7 entitled *Naming the Identities*, p74.

Alevi communities and the government, Diyanet, and others, such as Sunni teachers of Islam who oppose the recognition of Alevilik.

The recent ideology-making processes are led primarily by members of organizations that Alevis established for their politics of recognition. Though they all support a politics of recognition, these institutions are not necessarily in line with one another. On the contrary, they have severe disagreements. Some of these ideology-makers prioritize the inherited religious institutions of Alevilik, such as *ocaks*,⁷⁶³ whereas others prioritize cemevis led primarily by civil society organizations, associations or federations. The conversations between them have been of utmost importance due to their widened representative quality after the 1990s identity-turn. The largest of these organizations is the Alevi-Bektashi Federation (ABF) and the Federation of Alevi Foundations (AVF). Under their umbrellas, many foundations have been active, among them are the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association (i.e. under the umbrella of ABF), and CEM Foundation (i.e. under the umbrella of AVF).

My sources here will be a series of documented conversations, which may be grounded on direct (i.e. dialogical) or indirect (i.e. dialectical) encounters. A dialogical setting I focused on is a television debate on CNN Türk,⁷⁶⁴ where a discussion about funerals took place between then head of AVF Doğan Bermek, head of ABF Baki Düzgün, dede Hüseyin Dedekargınoğlu of the Ocak of Dede Garkın, and research scholar Ayşe Acar who was also the then executive editor of CEM Radio of CEM Foundation. At the same time, I will also focus on the previous interviews of president İzzettin Doğan of CEM Foundation, the publications of the above-mentioned organizations, and the academics and research scholars who discussed the changing landscape of funerals.

⁷⁶³ An Ocak denotes an institutionalized family line in Alevilik.

⁷⁶⁴ Sirin Payzin, *Ne Oluyor: Alevilerin Talepleri* (CNN Türk, 21 Jan 2016), <https://www.cnnturk.com/tv-cnn-turk/arsiv/ne-oluyor/alevilerin-talepleri>.

Regarding Alevi's departure from mosques, the ideology-makers have been divided on a series of subjects. In this part, I question in particular the ideological relationship they see between their collective identity and their religious doctrine. Even though the speakers tend to share a consensus on the necessary role of identity in the politics of recognition, some of these ideology-makers argue that the elements of identity-politics should be clearly differentiated from the theological foundation of Alevilik. Others, however, push for some radical revisions in the belief-system, hand in hand with their understanding of the requirements of recognition.

Though all these voices agree that *cemevis* should be recognized as Alevi's place of worship, CEM Foundation (and AVF) also approves of the practice of having funerals at mosques. This is primarily because their members do not justify *cemevi* funerals in terms of the belief-system, but in terms of identity. In this vein, many speakers, including İzzettin Doğan, argued that *cemevi* funerals would not be needed when the sociological reasons that justify identity-politics cease to exist.

On the other hand, the members of ABF staunchly oppose this argument. Many defendants of the politics of recognition have become antagonistic towards the idea of mosque funeral for Alevi, as they think any request made of mosques ends up underpinning the decades-long project of assimilation. As was noticed by these clashing representations of Alevism, the polarization has been exploited in several ways by the anti-recognition speakers, such as the governments, Diyanet and some leading ideology-makers of Islamism.⁷⁶⁵ Firstly, as a pre-condition for recognition, they put pressure on the Alevi organizations to *precisely* define what Alevilik is. Moreover, by referring to the contestations within Alevilik, they tend to delegitimize the demands of these organizations. Taken together, I conclude that all these

⁷⁶⁵ "Alevi Aydınları Patladı: Diyanet Bizi Bölmeye Çalışıyor," *Nokta*, December 1991.

conversations over the recognition/assimilation of Alevilik have been made on grounds of essentialism.

7.4.1. *Cultural Change: Religious Identity or Religious Doctrine?*

In a TV debate on CNN Türk, the dede of the *Ocak* of Dede Garkın, Hüseyin Dedekargınoğlu explained his understanding of the cultural change behind Alevi funerals:

In essence, a funeral takes place neither at a mosque, nor at a cemevi. The funeral takes place on the *musalla* stone.⁷⁶⁶ But we, Alevis, bring them to our cemevis, since our identities are rejected, and we are ignored. It is the surfacing of an identity. Otherwise, a cem prayer is not conducted around a deceased person.

Through this argumentation, Dedekargınoğlu recognized the social construction of a new ideological relationship, between the religious identity and the religious doctrine. By amalgamating the alienation of the Alevi identity with the re-configuration of funerary rituals, Dedekargınoğlu made the caveat that this move does not have a theological basis.

Similar arguments have been made by the members of CEM Foundation. During his conversation with journalist Mustafa Karaalioğlu, president İzzettin Doğan's evaluation was in line with Dedekargınoğlu. According to Doğan, this cultural change was *only* due to the problems Alevis experience in mosques:

I was so neutral towards the issue of holding funerals at cemevis.
[I was saying,] “there are mosques here!” [tr. “yahu camiler var!”]
... They said, “there are imams who do not hold our funerals”.

⁷⁶⁶ Musalla stone is placed in the courtyard of mosques and cemevis. It is a shared element at these places of worship. On the basis that the stone is never placed inside the buildings but outside them, it may be argued that funerals are actually not taking place at mosques or cemevis.

Imams sometimes say, “firstly learn how to pray [before asking me to pray for you]”.⁷⁶⁷

Dedekarginođlu and Dođan share the argument that holding funerals at cemevis is not necessary: the funerals can take place at mosques as well, since mosques have a *musalla* stone, which should be enough for a funeral. That said, both speakers recognized that the problems Alevis face at mosques push them to have their funerals at cemevis.

This common feeling of being alienated has been entirely shared by the Alevis of different political orientations, even though the extension of their arguments would contradict. HDP MP and Researcher Ali Kenanođlu referred to some of these acts of hostility, from the imams’ refusal to hold the funerals of Alevis, to some insults during funerals. Among these traumatic examples is the unplugging of the fridge that the deceased’s body was to be placed inside. Based on this conspiracy, the enemies of Alevis tried to make popular the stories of how non-Muslim bodies rust after death. Kenanođlu concluded:

[we are glad that] cemevis have been built and we have been saved from this humiliation.⁷⁶⁸

Based on a similar experience, Ergin Dođru, Former Provincial Head in the Party of Democratic Regions (DBP), suggested that Alevilik should develop a new model, in accordance with its “essence”.⁷⁶⁹ This call for the re-designing of cemevi rituals was made in 1997 by Derviş Tur, the former head of Dedes Assembly of European Federation of Alevi Communities. Himself being a migrant in Germany, Tur reported that “they” realized in 1985 that many young Turks were jailed in Germany:

⁷⁶⁷ see the question no:6 in Mustafa Karaalioglu, “İzzettin Dođan: ‘Derdimizi Siyasilere Anlatamadık,’” *Yeni Şafak*, January 17, 2001.

⁷⁶⁸ Ali Kenanoglu, “Alevi Cenazesi,” *Evrensel*, January 17, 2013, <https://www.evrensel.net/yazi/46647/alevi-cenazesi>.

⁷⁶⁹ Ergin Dogru, “Kentleşen Aleviliđin Sorunları,” *Radikal* (blog), October 1, 2013, <http://blog.radikal.com.tr/din/kentlesen-aleviligin-sorunlari-37768>.

We have realized that most of them were Alevis. We said among us, ‘the Sunnis built their mosques, the Jews have their synagogues, and the Christians have their churches. Where will [our] children go?’ [...] Then we decided to act urgently.⁷⁷⁰

Throughout the 1980s, this was a popular argument among Alevi dedes. Dede Baki Dalak from Sivas often underlined that, “in the past”—i.e. the period in which Alevis were born into a practicing culture—there was “no single bit of crime” in the villages where Alevis lived. According to him, crime rates have increased, since Alevis forgot the essence of Alevilik.⁷⁷¹ By emphasizing similar problems Alevis face in public, many ideology-makers proposed their own essentialist programs to revise the cultural institutions of Alevilik.

7.4.2. *How to Re-Model Alevilik: Competing Essentialisms*

On behalf of the Austria-based Federation of Alevi Communities, Dede Ercan Sinci stated that they actively work for the removal of “non-Alevi components” from funeral rituals.⁷⁷² In the TV channel founded by the European Alevi Unions Confederation (AABK), Yol TV, speakers insistently invited Alevis to do things self-consciously “in an Alevi way”. Denmark-based Federation of Alevi Communities called on Alevis not to request anything from mosques:

Most [imams] [tr. “*hocalar*”] refused washing the deceased bodies of Alevis by saying, “you do not come when you are alive, but you bring your dead”, whereas some saw [our mosque funerals] as a source of income, or a way to assimilate Alevis. This problem lasted until the foundation of the Alevi associations, and in some regions it persists. As of now, our Alevi institutions should make the service of funerals on their own. [Our] funerals

⁷⁷⁰ Ozcan Ercan, “Yeni Nesil Uğruna,” *Milliyet*, October 28, 1997, p4.

⁷⁷¹ “Geçmiş Artık Masal Gibi,” *Nokta*, September 27, 1987, p28.

⁷⁷² “AABF 9. Olağan Genel Kurulu Gerçekleşti,” *Aleviten Österreich*, April 26, 2014, <http://www.aleviten.com/index.php/tr/anasayfa/78-haberler/103-aabf-9-olagan-genel-kurulu-gerceklesti>.

should take place in accordance with Alevi propriety, and should not be handed over to mosques [and] imams.⁷⁷³

Alongside this argumentation, dede Hüseyin Gazi Metin from the Federation prepared a guide on how to manage funerals in accordance with “Alevi propriety” [tr. Alevi erkani].

These attempts to re-model Alevilik also triggered a reaction against some cemevis that were performing funeral ceremonies in different ways. The Alevi Cultural Center of Basel, among others, warned other cemevis that Alevilik would be assimilated into Sunni Islam, if they continued to turn their back on the “essence” of Alevilik while conducting their funerals.⁷⁷⁴

A more radical expression of essentialism was the “movement of returning to the essence”, which was introduced by Co-Chair Barış Aydın of the Union of Revolutionary Alevis. The movement did not just strictly forbid the option of mosque funerals for Alevis, but also in a detailed way it set out what to do in cemevis in order to return to the essence.⁷⁷⁵ Among the ‘necessary steps’ were the removal of pictures of Ali and Atatürk from cemevis, since the former introduced Sharia Law, and the latter banned the Alevi lodges. In the same declaration, Alevis were called on to stop reading Quran in cemevi funerals. They would also have to standardize the color of the cloth laid on coffins: red instead of green, “given” that green resembles Sharia. Finally, the coffin should not face towards the qibla⁷⁷⁶ (tr. kible), but towards the participants.

These attempts in the name of the essence of Alevilik are a ‘strategic necessity’ for many (i.e. in the way the concept has been used in post-colonialism). The strategic essentialism in the

⁷⁷³ “Alevi-Bektaşî İnançında Cenaze Hizmetleri” (Danimarka Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu, n.d.), accessed May 3, 2016.

⁷⁷⁴ “Anadolu Aleviliğinde Cenaze ve Kırk Lokması” (Basel ve Çevresi Alevi Kültür Merkezi, n.d.), accessed May 3, 2016.

⁷⁷⁵ Barış Aydın, “Aleviler Özüne Dönmeli,” Anadolu Işığı, June 23, 2016,

<http://www.anadoluisigi.org/alevik/aleviler-ozune-donmeli>.

⁷⁷⁶ The direction of Mecca.

ideology-making process has been regarded by its producers as a vital element of reaction against assimilation. According to their almost identical expressions of the context of assimilation, the process began when Alevi had to hide their identities in public. The process deepened when, in the urban centers, they were pressured to attend Friday prayers; fast in Ramadan just as Sunnis do; take compulsory religion courses in accordance with Diyanet's monopoly over religion; and indeed, hold funerals in the way Sunnis did.⁷⁷⁷

The makers of these attempts explicitly recognized that their agenda was politically-driven. However, a polarizing subject among the ideology-makers is the extent to which religious rituals, such as the ones that take place during funerals, should be politicized. In the aforementioned TV debate on CNN Türk, even though all Alevi leaders admitted that political activism was needed alongside the practice of faith, they fundamentally disagreed on the limit of politics in cemevis. Former chairman of AVF, and head of the Ocak of Alevi Thought, Doğan Bermek, emphasized the point that politics should never enter cemevis:

I cannot let politics leak into my faith; otherwise it is Emevism⁷⁷⁸.

Together with Dedekargınoğlu and Bermek, Ayşe Acar from the Ocak of Baba Mansur defended a strict separation between the political field, where Alevi associations struggle to get their identities recognized, and the theological field where the institution of *dedelik* works in its own traditional hierarchy. In this context, Acar introduced a caveat: “the sociology of these issues should not be confused with the tradition of faith”. Dedekargınoğlu concluded that not

⁷⁷⁷ *Gelin Canlar Bir Olalım: Alevilerin Dilinden Ayrımcılık Hikayeleri* (Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği, 2005), in which a thousand Alevi citizens' expressions of assimilation and alienation have been published. Also see “Türkiye’de Alevilere Yönelik Dini Ayrımcılık Hakkında Beyanlar,” in *Türkiye’de Dini Ayrımcılık Raporu* (Mazlumder, 2008), p338-368.

⁷⁷⁸ The term “Emevism” (tr. Emevicilik) is popular in the ideological repertoire of Secularism in Turkey, since it signifies ‘the poisoning of religion with political ambitions’. Therefore, in this repertoire, Emevism is often equated with Islamism.

only politics but also politicians must not enter cemevis as long as they carry a political aim behind this act.

In the dialogical setting of this debate, their interlocutor was Baki Düzgün, the President of the Alevi-Bektashi Federation and a member of the Ocak of Baba Mansur. Düzgün reacted *angrily*—in a manner condemned by other participants—against the contextualization of these arguments about cemevi funerals. According to Düzgün, cemevi funerals should not be regarded as a politicization of religious ritual:

When people hold their funerals at mosques, nobody puts it into question [by labelling it as a political act]; but when we have our funerals at cemevis, it is bad that even an Alevi [e.g. Acar, Bermek and Dedekargınoğlu] puts it into question.

Here, Düzgün constructed a symmetry between mosque and cemevi funerals: both are political, or none should be labelled as politically driven acts. The other participants' rejection of this argument was closely related to their interpretation of Secularism. According to them, the separation between politics and religion should also be applicable to the landscape of a funeral. Düzgün had a claim over Secularism as well, but he refused to see cemevi funerals as a political activity. Instead, he implied that cemevi funerals must eventually enter a period of settled culture—i.e. habitualized and undisputed.

Dedekargınoğlu opposed the symmetry that Düzgün assumed between the ritual forms in mosques and cemevis:

[In Alevilik] dedes never deal with the burial procedure of a deceased. Imposing this procedure on dedes is a result of the urbanization, [...] [and it mistakenly] equates the dede with a mosque [imam] [tr. “hoca”]. An ocak dede in Alevilik is not an equivalent of a mosque imam [...] Each ocak's dede is [in principle] equal to the president of Diyanet.

This causal claim between urbanization and the ‘mistaken’ symmetry has removed many of the once “heterodoxic” properties of Alevilik. In response to the likes of Dedekarginoğlu, some ideology-makers claim that urbanization necessitates the re-configuration of religious practices. For example, according to Fuat Bozkurt, the duties of dedes cannot remain untouched in the urban social setting. At the least, this is because dedes no more meet the needs of urbanized Alevis:

The old tales and legends hold no interest for modern Alevi youth, who regard them as mere superstitious fabrications.⁷⁷⁹

Therefore, Bozkurt has been interested in the question of what kind of revised education dedes should take, so that they would not only conduct congregational meetings, but also “be capable of conducting marriage and funeral services”.⁷⁸⁰

Referring to this approach in an article, Dedekarginoğlu underlines that the executives of Alevi foundations, who are the ones that regulate cemevis, aim to replace *ocak dedes* with *cemevi dedes*. Dedekarginoğlu continues:

Even though they do not know much about the Alevi belief-system [...] these executives claim that *ocak dedes* are uneducated and ignorant.⁷⁸¹

The hierarchical structure of Alevilik has been put into question on many occasions. Beginning in the late 1960s, many of the young generation of Alevis rejected the traditional hierarchy with the ideological repertoire of marxism. As late as 2006, the division was clear when Veliyettin Ulusoy declared himself as the *postnişin*⁷⁸² of Dervish Lodge of Hacibektaş, on account that he

⁷⁷⁹ Fuat Bozkurt, “State-Community Relations in the Restructuring of Alevism,” in *Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives*, ed. Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Ozdalga, and Catharina Raudvere (Routledge, 2005), p101.

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p102.

⁷⁸¹ Hüseyin Dedekarginoglu, “Dedelik Kurumu ve Sürek Anlayışı,” in *II. Uluslararası Tarihten Bugüne Alevilik Sempozyumu*, ed. Aykan Erdemir et al. (Ankara: Cem Vakfı, 2010), p204.

⁷⁸² The central authority of a religious lodge.

descends from Hacıbektaş. Some Alevi described this act as a “Sharia-minded” one, as they thought this hierarchy resembled the religious communities of Nur, or more specifically, the Gülen movement.⁷⁸³ Finally, a clash between *ocak dedes* and *cemevi dedes* has been triggered as a result of the re-organization processes.

On the politicization of funerals, another key question is whose funeral should be held at cemevis. Acar, Dedekarginoğlu and Bermek criticized some political groups’ flag-carrying in cemevis, whereas Düzgün emphasized that everybody who demands a cemevi funeral should be able to have it. Acar warns that among these political groups are organizations that are officially designated as terrorist organizations, such as DHKP-C.⁷⁸⁴ Referring to Berkin Elvan’s funeral, who died at the age of 13 with a rubber bullet fired by a police officer during the Gezi Protests, she offers an account of how terrorists tried to dominate the funeral process, at Okmeydanı Cemevi, with their political rituals. She asked Alevi to be careful about such activities, as political opponents instrumentalize these incidents against Alevi.⁷⁸⁵ In this way, Acar justifies the temporary decision made by the police to prevent Elvan’s funeral from taking place at the Okmeydanı Cemevi. In contrast, Baki Düzgün was antagonistic to any kind of state involvement in the ‘internal’ processes of Alevilik. Unexpectedly, Düzgün criticized his interlocutors for being “the Alevi of the state”.

Following the crisis over V.T.’s funeral, president Elif Bakır of the Foundation of Karabağlar Pir Sultan Abdal declared, “even the existence of Diyanet shows that this state is not democratic and secular”.⁷⁸⁶ Bakır called on the Alevi organizations to “unrecognize the

⁷⁸³ Aydın Hasan, “Aleviler Arasında ‘Pir’ Tartışması Başladı,” *Milliyet*, August 19, 2006, p16.

⁷⁸⁴ DHKP-C is the abbreviation for “The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front”.

⁷⁸⁵ see also the debate between Former Minister of Health Osman Durmuş and then President of ABF Ali Balkız: “İbretle İzliyoruz”, *Cumhuriyet*, 28 Jan 2001, p7.

⁷⁸⁶ Ozgur Aydın, “İzmir Alevi Kurumları: Kendi Yaşam Alanlarımızı Kurmalıyız,” *ANF News*, January 26, 2016, <http://anfturkce.net/toplum/izmir-alevi-kurumlari-kendi-yasam-alanlarimizi-kurmaliyiz-63568>, par 4.

state” just as it does not recognize Alevilik. Süleyman Deprem, the dede of the ocak of Sinemili, also reacted:

This state is not our state. Alevis have to establish a system and a life that fits their way [tr. yol] and propriety [tr. erkan]⁷⁸⁷.

Head Ismet Erbulak of Izmir Democratic Alevi Association asked all Alevis to question “what Alevis are still doing in this state”.⁷⁸⁸

Previously, İzzettin Doğan mentioned his wonderment over why “politically motivated funerals” kept coming from all over the country, especially from prisons, to some specific cemevis, such as Gazi and Okmeydanı cemevis. During his interview with Journalist Mustafa Karaalioğlu in 2001, his description of the ambiguity was as follows:

Perhaps some of these people [who had been brought] were Sunni; but eventually most were Atheists. An Atheist cannot be Sunni or Alevi.

Doğan claimed that these funerals may have been sent to further alienate Alevis from the broader society by depicting them as criminals. Doğan’s desire for integration clearly contradicted the politics of difference practiced by others. That said, just as Baki Düzgün argued, İzzettin Doğan admitted that those who want to have a funeral organization at a cemevi should be able to do so, no matter their religion or political status. The fundamental difference between their arguments is that Doğan called on the security institutions to investigate why some militant groups “politicize cemevis”. That said, at some critical junctures, AVF had to reconsider how reliable the security institutions may be.

⁷⁸⁷ Ozgur Aydin, “İzmir Alevi kurumları: Kendi yaşam alanlarımızı kurmalıyız”, par 5.

⁷⁸⁸ Ozgur Aydin, “İzmir Alevi kurumları: Kendi yaşam alanlarımızı kurmalıyız”, par 8.

7.4.1. *Assimilationism Re-considered in State Funeral Ceremonies*

In the first stages of the two-funeral procedure, which was necessitated by the organizers of state funeral ceremonies, the conversations between the critics and the state institutions revealed a lack of information on both sides. Those querying the situation did not know why they were supposed to hold another funeral, apart from their cemevi funerals. The regulations were vague, and the government was out of reach.

Following the funeral of Murat Taş (2009), several Alevi associations asked the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to explain the reasons behind this implementation. AVF wrote a letter to the Turkish Armed Forces, asking if the problem emanates from the lack of official recognition of cemevi. In this letter, the Federation made it clear that it was ready to put the blame on the other government departments rather than the TAF. TAF replied that the Garrison Commands undertake the organization of *only* the military activity during state funeral ceremonies, leaving “all religious aspects of the funeral to the family”.⁷⁸⁹ TAF did not mention any other government institutions in the making of official ceremonies. In the aftermath of this conversation, AVF declared that the answer of TAF was satisfactory to them. In a nutshell, AVF read the TAF response as an approval of them having later funerals of Alevi soldiers at cemevis, as long as their families preferred it that way.

However, the procedure was not that simple, as the amendment of the regulation on state funeral ceremonies made clear in 2013. In time, the flow of the conversations reflected more ideological-thinking on the subject, with clearer counter-positioning of interlocutors. As such, those querying the situation were no longer curious but openly critical, whereas the government made its position apparent in opposition to the critics by amending the regulation on state funeral ceremonies.

⁷⁸⁹ “Genelkurmay’dan Alevi Açılımı,” Oda Tv, October 8, 2009, <http://odatv.com/genelkurmaydan-alevi-acilimi-0810091200.html>.

With the 2013 amendment, the AKP government handled the problem in its own way. Accordingly, Diyanet was appointed as the new member of the organizational committee of state funerals.⁷⁹⁰ The amendment was justified on the ground that it would help take into consideration “the religious sensitivities” in state funerals.⁷⁹¹ With this amendment, the actor behind the ‘religious aspects’ of funerals has been clarified as Diyanet. Clearly, it would not be the families who determine the religious aspects of official ceremonies. The problem with the involvement of Diyanet has been that the institution was not designed to represent a religious sensitivity other than its own: from the era of Former President Elmalı to today, Alevis have had fundamental problems with Diyanet. This amendment of the regulation was meant to make explicit a previously implicit religious particularism behind official ceremonies.

Between the two above-mentioned TAF declarations (i.e. after the funerals of Murat Taş in 2009 and Kenan Ceylan in 2015), a comparison reveals the subtle transformation in the self-identity of TAF vis-à-vis the issue. This comparison suggests that the declaration after Ceylan’s funeral is different to the previous response sent to the Federation of Alevi Associations. The response previously made by TAF spoke on behalf of the state and underlined that the religious aspects of funerals would only be decided by the family. On the contrary, in the later declaration TAF no longer dealt with the question of why there could not be a single state funeral ceremony at a cemevi. On this occasion, TAF only aimed to exonerate its own institution: it made clear that it had its officials at both ceremonies, as it sees both ceremonies as equally valid. Contrary to the first declaration, which implied that the whole problem was a misunderstanding (*i.e.* it was the family that requested another ceremony at the mosque), the second declaration did not

⁷⁹⁰ “Devlet Cenaze Törenleri Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik” (Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey], No. 28726, August 2, 2013), <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/08/20130802-2.htm>.

⁷⁹¹ Aydın Hasan, “Devlet Cenaze Törenine Dini Ayar,” *Milliyet*, August 2, 2013, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/devlet-cenaze-torenine-dini-ayar/gundem/detay/1745101/default.htm>.

deny the existence of the problem, but rejected the alleged complicity of TAF in it: “TAF attends the cemevi funerals”.

Even before the 2013 amendment made by the government, the regulation was not simply between the garrisons’ military roles and the families’ religious desires. The previous regulation had stipulated the collaboration of several institutions in the making of the funeral ceremonies. Under the presidency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate General of Protocol, these institutions were the Garrison Commands of the TAF, the Ministry of Interior, and Governorships and Municipalities where the funeral would take place.⁷⁹² Even though the role of the TAF only related to the military activity, the regulation did not clarify how the religious aspect of ceremonies would be determined. In a nutshell, the pre-2013 regulation did not take into account the matter clearly, arguably because before the funeral of Murat Taş no one problematized the (then implicit) ideological codes of state funeral ceremonies.

7.4.2. *The Military and Secularism: An Interrelationship to be Deconstructed?*

This whole process has challenged a deep-seated relationship, which many Alevi ideologues have seen, between Secularism and TAF as a norm-carrier. Some ideology-makers note that they should no longer rely on the military for “the preservation of Secularism”. Sometime after the family of Murat Taş informed the dede of the cemevi that Taş would be carried to the mosque, dede Hüseyin Güzelgüz articulated the reproach:

Given that even the military behaves like this, the sincerity [behind “the Alevi opening”⁷⁹³] should be questioned.⁷⁹⁴

⁷⁹² “Devlet Cenaze Törenleri Yönetmeliği” (Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey], December 2, 2006), No. 26364, Article 5.

⁷⁹³ “Alevi Opening” is a label that was used by the AKP government, as a statement of political will to alleviate the problems that Alevis face due to their identities in Turkey.

⁷⁹⁴ “Alevi Şehide Sünni Tören,” *T24*, September 13, 2009, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/alevi-sehide-sunni-toren,52761>. This piece was published originally in Taraf Newspaper.

The dede's emphasis, "even the military", was due to the institution's identity as a vanguard of Turkey's Secularism and a force against sectarianism. In the same vein, in the aftermath of Özkan Ateşli's cemevi funeral, admiral Bülent Bostanoğlu, who did not attend Ateşli's cemevi funeral, was harshly criticized. Among these critics, journalist Nedim Şener wrote that admiral Bostanoğlu left behind a soldier under his command.⁷⁹⁵

According to Şener, it was proof that "the Alevi-opening" of the state was stillborn. Former president Murtaza Demir of ABF described the mosque funeral of Kenan Ceylan as a "heartbreaking" moment. In his open letter to the military commanders, Demir was critical:

If you ask me, you should have opposed the impact of sectarianism on the military posts. Your precious [tr. "Sizin sarı öküzünüz"] was the concept of secularism. You should not have let it go [...] [But] given that you could not stand up against 'pressures': while embracing the rally for building mosques at the military barracks, you at least should have said, "let us build a couple of cemevis as well; let us not produce separatism and discrimination". Have you ever said that? During the process of 'Ramadan feasts', have you ever remembered the Alevi soldiers who had Muharrem Fast? [H]ave you ever joined them to break a fast?

The critics were reproachful of the military, not in the form of a reaction to the other, but in the form of expressing some feelings of disappointment and disillusionment towards a partner. The behavior of other state institutions was not surprising to them, but 'the complicity' of the military was far more noteworthy—i.e. in Demir's terms, "heartbreaking".

⁷⁹⁵ Nedim Sener, "Alevi Açılımının Ruhuna Fatih," August 15, 2012, <http://www.posta.com.tr/alevi-aciliminin-ruhuna-fatih-nedim-sener-yazisi-135351>.

Following Kenan Ceylan's funeral, the TAF made a more comprehensive statement about its interpretation of these funerals:

As TAF, we never see our children as Turkish, Circassian, Bosnian, Kurdish, Alevi, Sunni or non-Muslim, and we never tolerate seeing them as such [...] Such an understanding, approach, or order cannot exist in TAF. The funerals of [...] [our] martyrs are organized [...] at the places that they demand, no matter what their religious beliefs are. For our martyr [...] Kenan Ceylan, the first ceremony was made at 11:30 at the cemevi with the participation of military officials, and the second ceremony was made at 12:45 at the Government House. The statement in the news that the TAF officials did not attend the funeral at the cemevi is inappropriate and incorrect⁷⁹⁶.

This declaration did not respond to all the above-mentioned criticisms, firstly because TAF preferred to make a statement, not on behalf of the state, but only in the name of its own institution. In this context, it is clear that like the critics, TAF differentiated itself from other state institutions. Therefore, it preferred not to talk about the government's approach towards cemevi funerals. Secondly, because TAF did not speak on behalf of the state, it did not explain why the high-level state officers do not participate in funerals at cemevis.

7.5. Retroactive Conversations: Essentialism and Its Discontents

The essentialist framework, which the evaluative conversations have been placed on by the politicians of assimilation and recognition, has clear marks on some retroactive conversations. This part firstly demonstrates that the Alevis who requested the funeral salâ from mosques have been criticized from an essentialist standpoint. From this standpoint, the following claims were made: (1) Alevis should not demand anything from mosques, given that they are either not

⁷⁹⁶ Ugur Ergan, "Genelkurmay'dan Açıklama: Alevi Şehitlerin Cenaze Törenlerine Katılmadığı Doğru Değil," *Hürriyet*, August 27, 2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/genelkurmay-dan-aciklama-alevi-sehitlerin-cenaze-torenlerine-katilinmadigi-dogru-degil-29923128>.

Muslims or never pray at mosques, (2) Alevi who go to mosques serve a project of assimilation; and (3) Alevi who see cemevis as a place of worship must sever their ties, not just with mosques, but also with Islam. After presenting the rationalization of intolerance based on these essentialist claims, I argue that essentialism ignores key aspects of the flow of a heterodox culture, which inevitably contradicts with the language of ‘authorities’.

Sinan Işık, who sued Turkey in the ECtHR on the basis that he was not allowed to change the section of religion in his identity card from “Islam” to “Alevi”, has rationalized intolerance against the syncretic approaches among Alevi. Following the case of Mirzeler in Adana (see *exploratory conversations*), Sinan Işık reacted against the Mirzeler family by defending the imam. He talked based on an essentialist claim as to what Islam and Alevilik are:

The attitude of imam is eminently Islamic. If you are an Alevi, what are you doing at a mosque? I wish all imams did the same thing! I am sure, all the Islamist assimilators will take advantage of this incident, they will condemn the imam vigorously, say that Alevi are sincere Muslims, and maybe as a lesson to all, they will even pay the imam off.⁷⁹⁷

It is not difficult to find a similar line of argumentation elsewhere. For example, in response to V.T.’s case, dede Mustafa Aslan of Narlıdere Cemevi in Izmir said that “it is wrong for Alevi people to demand anything from mosques”, even though he also emphasized that the mosque should have met this demand no matter what.⁷⁹⁸ Kemal Mutlu, the head of the Association of People from Dersim, noted that it is “out of question” that Alevi are not supposed to go to mosques.⁷⁹⁹

⁷⁹⁷ Sinan Işık, “Tüm Duyarlı Aleviler Bu İmama Destek Olmalı,” March 8, 2015.

⁷⁹⁸ Ozgur Aydın, “İzmir Alevi kurumları: Kendi yaşam alanlarımızı kurmalıyız”, par 6.

⁷⁹⁹ Ozgur Aydın, “İzmir Alevi kurumları: Kendi yaşam alanlarımızı kurmalıyız”, par 7.

After the same funeral, dede Baki Güngör of Kırklar Cemevi called on Alevi people not to demand ‘anything’ from mosques:

The [imam] is doing what is necessary in his belief [...] Every single Alevi who goes to mosque is who is to behave with Sunni-Hanefi belief. Every single Alevi who goes to mosque is who is to settle for all insults against Alevi people till today, given that s/he is subject to the [imam] there. We, Alevis, do not pray behind Sunni [imams].⁸⁰⁰

None of these speakers would deny that Alevis had mosque funerals for many decades in urban settings, but to them this was only a manifestation of the process of assimilation and alienation. In this sense, the components of mosque funerals should not have been settled in the culture of Alevis. Instead, all Alevis should have problematized these practices after the foundation of cemevis. When the mayor of the Maltepe district of Istanbul, Ali Kılıç, who is also a CHP member, declared that he attends the Friday prayers at mosques as well as the cem-meetings at cemevis, he was heavily criticized for the same reason: “his comment constitutes a step to assimilation”.⁸⁰¹

A cross-temporal comparison suggests that these arguments make a misplaced claim on anti-assimilationism. Alevis’ experience of assimilationist policies, as the speakers commonly mention, has been based on several pillars. The first pillar was that Alevis lost their ties with their environment of worship. Connectedly, in the urban centers, many Alevis had to follow the rituals of Sunni Islam so as not to be alienated in their new social environments. Throughout the 1980s, the state complemented this activity by intensifying its policy of building mosques in Alevis’ villages. Many Alevis either converted to Sunni Islam in due course,⁸⁰² or they have

⁸⁰⁰ Baki Gungor, *Alevilerin Selası Okunmaz Diyen Cami Hocasına Verilen Cevap*, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZYku8C3M3x8>.

⁸⁰¹ Ismail Sacli, “Hem Camiye, Hem Cemevine Gidilir Mi?,” *Habercem*, May 20, 2016, <http://habercem.com/m/haber.php?id=125654>.

⁸⁰² see Alper Oktem, “Burdur’a Yerleşmiş Senirkent Alevileri,” *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 196 (2000): 43–49.

forgotten their own rituals. Since then, the members of both ABF and the AVF tend to report their discomfort with the ‘lack of knowledge’ of Alevi citizens about their religion.⁸⁰³

However, these characteristic features of the process of assimilation do not suffice to explain any of the demands blamed by the aforementioned speakers. First and foremost, from the funeral of Mirzeler to that of V.T., none of these cases were mosque funerals. On the contrary, they were cemevi funerals that the Alevi citizens wanted to be announced from a mosque with the funeral salâ. Therefore, it is not that these Alevis lost contact with the developments concerning the re-organization of cemevis. It is rather that they mixed some mosque rituals with their cemevi rituals, both of which they evaluated just as the Alevi associations evaluate. By integrating their past cultural experiences with their current life, they complemented their cemevi funerals with the salâ, which is not a theological property of Sunni Islam but a tradition of Turkish religious music. This interest of Alevis may not be a coincidence, given that the makam [en. the system of melody] of the funeral salâ is *hüseynî*, which is the tonic that represents a building block of the Alevi-Bektashi musical culture in Anatolia.⁸⁰⁴ By requesting the salâ, they clearly did not “pray behind a Sunni imam”. They are not alienated from the broader Alevi community.

The reasons behind their demands vary. Some of them absolutely saw the salâ as a valuable cultural performance. For example, following the mufti’s claim that “salâ is not important”, Türker’s uncle asked the mufti if he would say the same if his child died. With this question, he did not differentiate between the mufti being a Sunni and himself being an Alevi. Some others, on the other hand, saw the salâ as a means of informing the neighborhood about the news and the details about a funeral. In their ecological environment in the urban centers,

⁸⁰³ see Zeynep Alemdar and Rana Birden Çorbacıoğlu, “Alevis and the Turkish State,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 10, no. 4 (2012): 117–124, p121.

⁸⁰⁴ Seyit Yore, “The Musical Codes of Alevi-Bektashi Culture,” *Türk Kültürü ve Hacı Bektaş Velî Araştırma Dergisi*, no. 60 (2011): 234.

Alevis have contact with the Sunni population. It is for this reason that the salâ has become a way to inform the neighbors. In order for their Sunni neighbors to hear them, some Alevis ask the municipalities to announce the details of funerals, whereas others ask the neighborhood mosques to make this announcement, in the form of a religious musical expression.

For the same reason, it was not always the relatives of the deceased, but occasionally the Sunni neighbors who themselves asked the religious personnel to read the salâ. For them, this was a way of showing their respect for the deceased. In V.T.'s case, it was his neighbors who insisted that the salâ should be read. From this point of view, it does not matter if the deceased is a Sunni, an Alevi or a Jew. In an incident that writer Yılmaz Özdil described,⁸⁰⁵ the community of the Hisarönü Mosque in İzmir requested the imam to announce the death of their neighbor, Basmacı Yusuf. Basmacı Yusuf was a Jewish citizen, who put cartons in front of his store across from the mosque, so that the people could use them in case the mosque was full. This was why, in time, Yusuf had so many friends in the mosque community. Their request for the announcement, however, was refused by Diyanet on account that he was not a Muslim. With this request, the mosque community did not mean to assimilate Yusuf in a religious belief he did not share. Neither did they try to dilute the theological corpus of Islam. By relying on a religious tradition, they simply wanted to pay their respects to Yusuf.

In the case of Alevi state personnel who had two funerals, the families also manifested a syncretic approach. Only Durak's family insisted that the funeral should take place in the village square. Their demand was eventually accepted by the authorities. In all the other cases, the families accepted the officers' proposals. After Özkan Ateşli's funeral, his family reacted to speculation that had put into question their consent to the transfer of Ateşli's body to the mosque after the cemevi funeral. Here, the claims of Ali Kenanoğlu, the chairman of the Hubyar

⁸⁰⁵ Yılmaz Özdil, "Cenazede Şopen Mi Çalsak İtri Mi?," *Sözcü*, April 20, 2016, <http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/yazarlar/yilmaz-ozdil/cenazede-sopen-mi-calsak-itri-mi-1192428>.

Sultan Alevi Cultural Association, were responded to by the members of Ateşli family. Upon speaking with the dede of the cemevi, Kenanoğlu stated that the family wanted the official ceremony to take place in the cemevi, and yet the soldiers did not accept:

[N]either did the family nor did us have consent, but there was nothing we could do.⁸⁰⁶

This claim was denied by the brother of Ateşli, who underlined that the two-funeral program was made the day before, with the consent of the family:

The mosque is the house of God, just as the cemevi is [...] The decision was not taken by force. They told us that [the official ceremony] would take place here [at the mosque], and we accepted.⁸⁰⁷

In conclusion, what should be underlined is the difference between the assimilationism that has become a state policy, and the multiple identities that Türker's uncle, or Ateşli's brother manifest alongside many other Alevis. Whereas the former aims to isolate cemevi as a cultural institution, the latter clearly see cemevi as a place of worship. The former dismisses the religious doctrine that cemevi is based upon, whereas the latter embraces it. Whereas the former is happy to read the funeral salâ for an Alevi only if s/he has a mosque funeral, the latter is happy if the word cemevi is used in the funeral salâ. Whereas the former is keen to categorize Alevilik—by means of the language of 'orthodoxy'—either as a separate religion or just an imperfect cultural form of Islam, the latter practices religion without fitting into any of these clear-cut categories.

⁸⁰⁶ "Alevi Şehide Camide Zoraki Tören İddiası," İnternet Haber, August 10, 2012, <http://www.internethaber.com/alevi-sehide-camide-zoraki-toren-iddiasi-450732h.htm>.

⁸⁰⁷ "Alevi Şehide İki Tören", Radikal, 11 Aug 2012.

These syncretic practices also differ from the potentially hegemonic projects, such as the “mosque-cemevi project” which Fethullah Gülen patronized with the collaboration of the head of CEM Foundation İzzettin Doğan. The plan was to build a single place which includes a mosque and a cemevi, separated only with a public soup kitchen. Although this project was presented as a defense of the Anatolian syncretism, the building was in fact located in an Alevi neighborhood, Tuzluçayır. Therefore, its appeal to the Sunni population was “nearly unthinkable”.⁸⁰⁸ In other words, the project was not meant to consider, for example Sunni students who prefer cemevi courses of the traditional music instrument, named *saz* or *bağlama*, which Alevis use in their religious rituals. As such, the “mosque-cemevi” resembled Alevis’ experience of assimilationism, given that many Alevi villages already had mosques in the last couple of decades, whereas so few of the Sunni-majority neighborhoods had a cemevi.⁸⁰⁹ Undeniably, Gülen’s previous speeches against certain Alevi groups underpinned these negative impressions as well.

In summary, the syncretic practices of Alevi citizens, which should not be confused with the policies and the projects imposed from above, suggest that the well-reiterated question, “what is Alevilik”, should have a very easy answer: the question is wrong. As long as essentialism rules over the contestations between recognition and assimilation, both ‘solutions’ will bring their own crises into the life of Alevis. As Pınar Ecevitoglu argued,⁸¹⁰ the language of the state or other ‘authorities’, which manifests a passion to define, inevitably contradicts with the language of heterodoxy, and hence the language of Alevilik.

⁸⁰⁸ Ozlem Goner, *Turkish National Identity and Its Outsiders: Memories of State Violence in Dersim* (London: Routledge, 2017), p181.

⁸⁰⁹ An exception was the village Çankaya in Erzincan. The village, which had 300 Alevi and 700 Sunni inhabitants, finally had its cemevi in 1998.

“Cami ve Cemevi Birarada,” *Hürriyet*, August 26, 1998.

⁸¹⁰ Pınar Ecevitoglu, “Aleviliği Tanımlamanın Dayanılmaz Siyasal Cazibesi,” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 66, no. 03 (2011): 137–56.

8. Conclusion

Through the traces of conversational texts, this research has examined some unique ways in which cultural resources and the functions of these resources in ideology-making might change. These changes cannot be detected by means of value-surveys, primarily due to their reliance on exogenously imposed social contexts, limited speech acts, and the explicit expression of cultural resources prior to social action. In the same vein, they cannot be grasped by means of the value-based approach to culture, at least because a culture in action does not consist of an expression of values. Above all, these cultural changes are missed by the broader culturalist paradigm, as they can only be understood by considering the dialectical encounters that mirror culture in action, in the face of changing structural challenges and opportunities.

In particular, I examined how the voices that (re)produced “Secularism” and “Islamism” in Turkey have (re)made their authoritative claims in relation to the *other*, whereas the *other* either engaged with the same repertoires, or went beyond them. The conversational texts, which I selected and examined by using a qualitative event-based analysis, have implications for both opportunities and constraints in the flow of ‘our’ culture. Although the research is based on words, it aimed to make sense of silences by searching their meanings elsewhere, in the form of speech acts between the *self* and the *other*. Having followed this approach especially in a climate of cultural contestations, I limited the content of the research to the cultural horizon of the arguing parties. Overall, ‘our’ cultural horizon includes all those things we could talk, argue, agree and fight about; things that we began and stopped talking about; and things that we recalled and problematized later, even though we could not notice them in the past.

In conclusion, I shall summarize and integrate the empirical findings of the research, while focusing on the broader disputes over the role of values in democracy, and the merits and limits of tolerance. In addition, by bringing together a set of snapshots from some surrounding landscapes of culture which relate to the landscapes I have scrutinized in depth, I will make

suggestions for future research. To conclude, I suggest that democracy, as a regime of popular self-government where rights and freedoms are to be protected by an alert and talkative citizenry, may not require agreement on values; but an acknowledgement of the disagreements over values before negotiating the rest—e.g. rules of appropriateness, rights, freedoms and duties.

8.1. The Re-operationalization of Values

My aim in this research was not to question how political/legal institutions remained or changed, but how the cultural foundation for their future is in the making. The common theme in my case-studies was the re-operationalization of values in ideology-making. In this vein, I examined how Alevis re-evaluate the meaning of mosque funerals, as many of them developed a new identity consciousness in line with a politics of recognition (CH7.1). In response to their demands of recognition, the state authority, as it has been represented in funeral organizations, aimed to make clear that it gets along well with a form of Alevilik that could be assimilated into “Islam”—i.e. one that defines mosque as its only place of worship (CH7.2, CH7.3).

Similarly, a form of “Islamism” has been made to rationalize tolerance towards LGBT people, even if they are open or only theatrically obscure about their sexual identities, with the precondition that they distance themselves from a series of “Islamophobic” public activities, such as the LGBT Pride parades (CH5.4). These decisions to accept the hitherto unacceptable goes hand in hand with the development of a broader “left-wing” opposition, in which the LGBT activists have begun to participate, against a cultural hegemony of conservative “aggression” and “bigotry” (CH5.6). In both landscapes, the *other* is to be embraced depending on its affirmation of and contribution to the parochial values of the *self*.

Although this change gives many “Alevis” and “LGBT people” a space to choose what they stand for, it remains limited in the sense that a clear distinction between the authorities’

first-order values and others' rights and freedoms has not been materialized. In this vein, I explained that Alevis, who does not come up with a single definition of Alevilik that meets the authorities' value-laden criteria, could not make their places of worship recognized by the government. Very similarly, I questioned how the authorities' parochial values keep determining their approach to a gay employee in the public sector, a murdered sex worker, or a transgender entertainer whose visibility is under investigation (CH5.2, CH5.3). Clearly, many people do not consent to be bound by an agreement in which they will be 'tolerated' as objects of pity (e.g. "sinners"). On the contrary, their struggle is to be recognized as equal rights holders (CH5.5, CH7.1.2).

On the other hand, in the chapter entitled "women and clothing", I claimed that values have been re-operationalized in a more comprehensive manner, going beyond the domination of such parochial values. In this landscape, an authority—e.g. a minister, a court, one's own parents or a random stranger—may still raise its voice to interfere with women's clothing preferences. It may rationalize its action in the name of a hegemonic ideology, be it "Islamism" or "Secularism". On the other hand, as I have also demonstrated, the same ideological repertoires have acquired a new dimension, as many of their users came to the conclusion that intervening in others' clothes on the basis of one's parochial values would be wrong (CH6.4, CH6.5). The ethical arguments of the women who aim to reclaim their agency after experiencing intervention are also in line with this cultural change (CH6.6). Moreover, a significant aspect of this change is that the individual voices of these women are better heard in ideology-making processes compared to a previous episode (CH6.1, CH6.7). Taken together, those arguments pave the way for the construction of a common awareness regarding the distinction between one's first-order values and others' rights and freedoms.

The re-makers of these contested ideologies claim to have inherited the values that they consider to be foundational—e.g. the cases of Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü and Şafak Pavey among

many others in CH6.4.1 and CH6.5.3. Nonetheless, at the same time, they rationalize the need for a limited tolerance—i.e. one without ‘relativism’—in the conduct of their relationship with others’ values. This limited tolerance does not necessarily stop dialogue but renders it meaningful primarily as a matter of second-order values. Therefore, a theological claim of the *self* is not likely to be respected by the *other*; whereas a claim based upon the acknowledgement of their different values has the ability to trigger new and potentially productive discussions.

8.2. Democracy beyond Shared Values

Because openly acknowledging the disagreement tends to be more productive in the setting where relativism is unachievable, the flow of conversations in Turkey encourage the interlocutors to problematize even the most subtle impositions of others’ first-order values in the name of “rules of appropriateness”. In all the problematized incidents I have examined, some rules were set forward and imposed in various ways; but they were also disputed, challenged and rejected if possible, when they did not pass the test of parochiality in shared spaces (CH5.2, CH5.3, CH6.3, CH7.2, CH7.3). The boundary moments, such as the disputed incidents and the ensuing debates over them, as I have examined, are a step on the way to decontaminating common rules from parochial values. A separation between them is necessary to begin talking about a democratic system of rights, freedoms and duties.

Indeed, second-order values are linked to first-order values, in the sense that the latter are not supposed to be sacrificed for the sake of the former. Because they originate from the first-order values of the *self*, they cannot be produced together with the *other* who does not represent the value-system. In this sense, contrary to what liberal arguments in political theory tend to envision, a common ground cannot be established by trying to construct an allegedly neutral, ‘higher’ moral standard. In the same vein, the claims based on a value-based approach to democratic culture, as exemplified by WVS, fall short of imagining heterogeneity in the form

of different and even conflicting ways to express and justify ‘agreement to disagree’ (CH3.3.2, CH3.3.3).

Contrary to these approaches, I argued that a common ground might be possible if the clashing value-systems follow their own routes in order to justify, in their own terms, the necessity of forming a system of peaceful coexistence, or at least partial accommodation. For example, the mass political struggles over values helped the rival hegemonic ideologies cultivate empathy towards one or the other visible representation of “LGBT” (CH5.1). Similarly, it was the fear of “losing the sincere belief” that pushed some ideology-makers of “Islamism” to dismiss the idea of “neighborhood pressure” to make their values represented by others (CH6.5.3). Arguably because interference is not acceptable anymore in terms of the relevant ideological repertoires, the authorities that randomly appear to interfere with women’s clothing try to justify their acts by making explicit references to contextual elements (CH6.3.1).

Amid these ongoing contestations, the lesson in Turkey is that any attempt to reject the *other*’s difference may end up being worse for ‘our’ own foundational values. A clear repercussion of this idea is the negative reaction of the new-generation of “Secularists” towards the former defenders of the head-covering ban (CH6.4.2, CH6.4.3). Another repercussion of it is the evaluation of the previous-generation “Islamists” about the “fake” new carriers of their value-system (CH6.5.5). Finally, the women whose clothes were interfered with have made an agreement on the point that neither them nor others deserve interference (CH6.6.1). While denouncing the authoritative claims over their clothing, they refused to make their own authoritative claims as to what is right to wear.

In a nutshell, all these agents try to save their own values by going beyond their own value-systems. At least in terms of clothing, those who speak in the name of a parochial value-system have acknowledged the necessity of preserving a space of freedom between the *self* and

the *other*. A space, in a physical (e.g. others' neighborhood) or symbolic form (e.g. others' argument), is needed for the sake of the preservation of one's self-identity, if not for the sake of the others' comfort.

8.3. “Western Values” and Democracy in Comparative Perspective

This case is relevant to the transnational dispute over whether democracy requires a single package of values to survive. In this vein, some Western democracies witnessed the use of state secularism as the marker of an ascendant value-system. From courts to politicians, many speakers repeatedly refer to the need for shared values. Determined to protect the value-system from “intruders”, the protagonists of this idea tend to tie these values to a marker of monolithic national identity (e.g. “French values”). That being said, the label is far from an analytical concept, since it does not offer an insight into the contradictory representations of these “French values”—e.g. from those that opposed same-sex marriage on the basis that it would necessarily lead to the legalization of polygamous and incestuous marriages, to those who are keen to detect and problematize homophobic, transphobic and biphobic social encounters. Instead of resolving any such question, the claim on so-called national values works only to further alienate the migrant communities, who carry ‘alien’ passports.

In the same context, the “problem of Islam” has been exacerbated in these countries. This problem has not become one of women's clothing in the UK, whereas it has been made a problem of women's clothing in France. Commonly in the West however, “Islam” has become the signifier of an identity-crisis, whereby the myths of national identity were reconstructed through simultaneous references to the verses of Quran and the cultural or ethnic characteristics of immigrants, as if the former finds its embodiment in the latter. Amidst this struggle, further research is needed to examine the extent to which interlocutors in these conversations keep track of the difference between their parochial values and the common rules and rights.

The course of these contestations in the West will be significant for the future of ideologies in Turkey, at least because the ideological repertoires will be in constant transmission, just as they were in the past. Despite the notion of secularism having begun to acquire a new dimension in Turkey, it shall be noted that its future content will always necessitate keeping an eye on the local cases in Europe. In this vein, the value-laden understanding of secularism in France may steer Turkish Secularism away from the “French” understanding of the concept. However, other similar developments in the West may also gradually weaken the newly appearing possibilities in Turkey—e.g. the possibility of reading “Secularism” as a principle that should regulate the relationship between parochial value-systems, instead of trying to impose a parochial ethical view of its own in the so-called public space. On the flip side, defining secularism and democracy as “Western” ideas may also further strengthen the culturalist and nativist statements put forward in Turkey in the name of Islam and/or Turkishness.

8.4. Blurred Boundaries

The flow of ‘our’ conversations in Turkey suggests that some dialectical encounters can still blur the putatively clear-cut boundaries between clashing identities. Those blurred boundaries signify a step to breaking the social segregation between the *self* and the *other*. In other words, some new discursive possibilities have appeared to shift the dynamics of polarization. For example, by adopting a new language of intersectionality, the “left-wing” parties decided to have a few headscarved candidates as “workers” and “farmers”, without sacrificing their defense of “Secularism”. In reaction, Erdoğan’s government seems to have turned a blind eye on its “headscarved sisters” (tr. başörtülü bacılar), especially if these women acted as workers who prioritize their labor rights (*see* ‘Flormar’ protests on CH6.4.3).

Given that clothing seems to have lost its position of acting as the infallible precursor of personality (CH6.1, CH6.2), further research is needed to test whether the meetings between

different clothes have less likelihood of being taken, by their wearers, as an outright contestation between the *self* and the *other*. This moment may be the last stage before reaching a *settled* cultural period. Such a period comes with another *unsettled* cultural period, in which the social classes in these ‘well-clothed’ ideological neighborhoods may appear in unprecedented forms.

The boundaries have been blurred also in the other landscapes that I analyzed. Even though the ideology-makers of “Islamism” repeat their antagonism against “LGBT”, many of them have begun to distinguish clearly between the visible representations of LGBT identity that *contradict* and *fit into* their social project. While those who fit into the project are to be ‘friended’, how the former are to be approached is a key question for the future of democracy in Turkey.

In line with this categorization, the visible representations of LGBT identity have diversified unprecedentedly in terms of their alternative politics of recognition and visibility, and approaches to “common values” (CH5.5). As such, the subject-centered identity-building (e.g. “LGBT Movement”) seems to have lost its analytical power. Because the key question is not anymore ‘who we are’ but ‘what we are against’, LGBT people will have a say as parts of the broader ideological struggles. In this context, I shall reiterate my suggestion that future research should focus more on the social links that various visible representations of “LGBT” have established.

Another illustration of how dialectical encounters blurred the boundaries is the re-configuration of *cemevi* and *mosque* in the eyes of Alevis. By founding cemevis, the Alevi communities adjusted their relationship with mosque communities, which they entered after their migration to the urban centers. While embracing cemevi in urban settings however, a group of them retained some elements that they acculturated during their recent experience with mosques. Combining the rituals of mosque and cemevi is at odds with the ways in which the

Alevi belief-system is being recast elsewhere. Both the politics of assimilation and recognition shape Alevilik in accordance with their clashing interests, whereas the Alevis who keep carrying the marks of heterodoxy are being forced into a subaltern position.

8.5. Recognition without Tolerance

The language of orthodoxy, which is well-established in the state bureaucracy and the pro-government ideological repertoire, pushes Alevis to establish an indisputable authority structure. According to the government, this is a pre-condition of recognition. In this project, the newly founded Alevi associations—or the ‘winners’ among them—are supposed to not only manage the flow of the culture of Alevis, but also define and freeze the relationship between Islam, the Alevi identity and the cultural institutions that operationalize this identity for its carriers. Tolerance is possible with inaction or disregard, whereas, in such a relationship, recognition might tie the future of Alevilik to the affirmation of the state authority. Although recognition constitutes the core of the necessary acknowledgement of disagreement on values, and it has certain other merits such as its underpinning of self-esteem and mutual legal personalities, it does not necessarily escape the problem of hierarchy for which tolerance is criticized about.

By looking at the landscape of funerals, I have kept track of the double-sided rationalization of intolerance against some syncretic Alevi traditions. As long as essentialism rules over the contestations between recognition and assimilation, the problem of many Alevis will not be resolved (CH7.2, CH7.5). Clearly, essentialism falls short of considering how cultural practices might be re-shaped by a multitude of factors, such as neighborly relations; identity-politics; or religious doctrine (CH7.4). Cemevi acts as a place of worship for Alevis who are not assimilated, whereas it acts as a center of culture for Sunni students who prefer cemevi courses on the folk (musical) instrument, *saz*. The Alevi traditions constitute a key part of these students’ cultural resources, notwithstanding their different religious sects.

Similarly, mosque acts as a place of worship for Sunni Muslims, whereas it might be acting as a center of culture for an Alevi citizen who makes a request for the funeral salâ to be read, so that one's Sunni neighbors hear the details of a funeral alongside certain forms of traditional religious music. Neglecting this differentiated integration of the components of 'our' culture will lead to an imposition of false conditions on 'our' relationship of recognition. Amid such multifaceted cultural practices, which cannot be precisely defined once and for all, the concept of tolerance will be needed.

In this context, further research is needed about the negative impact of essentialism on the recognition mechanisms and the experience of multiculturalism in democracies. For example, Kenan Malik has demonstrated how, in Birmingham, the policies based on recognizing each group as a monolithic block caused the failure of multiculturalism. According to Malik, the failure was because "anyone who fell outside these defined communities was effectively excluded from the multicultural process altogether".⁸¹¹ Similarly, in a multicultural Turkey, although recognition is a must to secure the legal status of Alevilik, the pursuit of recognition without tolerance would bring its own crises into the life of Alevi.

⁸¹¹ Kenan Malik, "The Failure of Multiculturalism: Community versus Society in Europe," *Foreign Aff.* 94 (2015): p26.

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Appendix: Acronyms and Abbreviations

AABK	Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu (en. European Alevi Unions Confederation)
ABF	Alevi-Bektaşî Federasyonu (en. Alevi-Bektashi Federation)
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (en. Justice and Development Party)
AVF	Alevi Vakıfları Federasyonu (en. The Federation of Alevi Associations)
BDP	Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (en. Peace and Democracy Party)
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (en. Republican People's Party)
DBP	Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi (en. The Party of Democratic Regions)
DHKP-C	Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (en. Revolutionary People's Liberation Front)
DISK	Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konf. (en. Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions)
Diyamet	Diyamet İşleri Başkanlığı (en. Directorate of Religious Affairs)
DTP	Demokratik Toplum Partisi (en. Democratic Society Party)
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
ECTHR	European Court of Human Rights
HADEP	Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (en. People's Democracy Party)
HDP	Halkların Demokratik Partisi (en. Peoples' Democratic Party)
HTKP	Halkın Türkiye Komünist Partisi (en. The People's Communist Party of Turkey)
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ar. Dawlat al-'Irāq al-'Islāmiyyah)
İHD	İnsan Hakları Derneği (en. The Association of Human Rights)
İŞKUR	Türkiye İş Kurumu (en. Turkish Employment Agency)
LGBT	Lezbiyen, Gey, Biseksüel, Transgender (en. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender)
METU	Middle East Technical University
RTÜK	Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu (en. Radio and Television Supreme Council)
SHI	Social Hostilities Index
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (en. Kurdistan Workers' Party)
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces (tr. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK)
TKP	Türkiye Komünist Partisi (en. Communist Party of Turkey)
TRT	Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu (en. Turkish Radio Television)
UN	United Nations
WVS	World Values Survey