Between Force and Legitimacy: 
The Worldview of Robert Cooper

Frank Foley
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), directed by Stefano Bartolini since September 2006, is home to a large post-doctoral programme. Created in 1992, it aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society.

The Centre hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.

Details of this and the other research of the Centre can be found on:
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/

Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/

The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).
Abstract
Advisor to Javier Solana and a Director General at the European Council, Robert Cooper argues for an assertive European stance against threats while at the same time emphasising the importance of gaining international legitimacy for the EU’s actions abroad. This paper outlines how elements of a colonialist worldview inform the first part of Cooper’s proposed response to threats—force, pre-emptive if necessary, against terrorists and potentially aggressive ‘modern’ states. Yet Cooper is keenly aware that force by itself is unlikely to foster benign long term changes in unstable or potentially threatening parts of the world. Drawing on what he views as the ‘postmodern’ European achievement of peace and order between nations, Cooper argues that Europe and the West should strive to win legitimacy for their actions by consulting deeply with other countries and by making extensive financial and security commitments to the unstable regions where they intervene military. Fashioning a combination of realist, liberal and constructivist ideas, Cooper’s broadly coherent worldview is nevertheless marked by tensions between his conceptions of force and legitimacy. Demonstrating Cooper’s significant influence on the European Security Strategy, the paper concludes that the tensions in his thinking are significant not only for his individual worldview but also for an understanding of the conflicting impulses shaping the development of European foreign policy today.

Keywords
Robert Cooper; EU; foreign policy; European Security Strategy; force; legitimacy; neo-colonialism; realism; liberalism; constructivism
Introduction: Robert Cooper and the Dilemma of Post-Modern Europe

Although he is largely unknown to European publics, Robert Cooper, Director-General of the European Council’s external and military affairs secretariat, has an important influence on the formation of European foreign policy. As a UK official, he was reputed to have been a key influence on Prime Minister Blair’s decision to support the development of a European defence policy in 1998. Under the political responsibility of Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Cooper’s was the main pen behind the first draft of the European Security Strategy, made public in June 2003. Through an analysis of Cooper’s essays, this paper sheds light on his political worldview and the frames through which he perceives and labels international events and actors. I argue that Robert Cooper is important for an understanding of European worldviews and that this has both empirical and theoretical significance. The paper shows Cooper’s influence on the European Security Strategy as a case study of how an individual’s ideas can make a difference to policy formation. Allowing for the effects of his institutional position and the changing international environment, the case of Cooper can be taken as support for the theoretical position that ideational factors have a significant impact on foreign policymaking. I also show that Cooper’s writings are a multifaceted body of thought, which reflect not just his own concerns, but also the dilemmas facing European foreign policymakers generally as they try to interpret and shape Europe’s role in the world. Cooper perceives areas of chaos and disorder outside of the EU which he believes could destabilise the European zone of peace. In proposing a response to these threats, Cooper is especially concerned with defining the role of force and examining the importance of international legitimacy. I argue that although Cooper elaborates his ideas with some rigor, there is a tension between his conceptions of force and legitimacy which remains unresolved and is significant for European worldviews.

Robert Cooper was brought up in Britain and Kenya, returning from Nairobi to the UK to study Politics, Philosophy and Economics at Oxford University in 1966. After spending a year studying International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania in the United States, he joined the UK Diplomatic Service in 1970 and served in British embassies in New York, Tokyo, Brussels and Bonn. His Foreign Office career was divided broadly between Asian and European affairs. During the 1990s, he was Director for Asia at the Foreign Office and Deputy Secretary for Defence and Overseas Affairs in Tony Blair’s Cabinet Office. In 2001-2002 he was Special Representative for the British Government on Afghanistan. In autumn 2002, he left the UK administration to become Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. Cooper’s section of the European Council Secretariat performs three main roles. It provides agendas and advice on foreign policy for the Presidency of the European Council; this function is assumed in rotation by member state governments for a period of six-months each. Its second role is to provide administrative support and advice to the High Representative for the CFSP. Thirdly, it helps to manage EU operations—mainly civilian, but also some military operations—in conjunction with member states or NATO. Although he ‘maintain[s] an interest’ in operations, Robert Cooper’s main role is to provide advice to, and occasionally write papers for, Javier Solana and the Council Presidencies. He also acts as an interlocutor for the EU with third countries and substitutes for Javier Solana at EU ‘troika’ meetings with foreign governments (Interview with Robert Cooper: 2006).

1 This paper is one of a collection of six related RSCAS working papers (EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/07 to EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/12, inclusive). Earlier versions of these papers were presented at the workshop ‘European Worldviews: Ideas and the European Union in World Politics’, European University Institute–Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, 6 June 2006. For an overall presentation of the research project, see Pascal Vennesson, Introduction to ‘European Worldviews: Ideas and the EU in World Politics’, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 07_07. I thank Raffaella del Sarto, the participants to the workshop, as well as Robert Cooper, Virginie Guiraudon, Ulrich Krötz and Pascal Vennesson for their helpful comments.

Apart from performing these high-level functions as an EU official, Robert Cooper is a prolific author of essays and articles, written in a personal capacity, on international politics. My main sources in this paper are a long essay published by Cooper in 2000 and his 2003 book, *The Breaking of Nations*. Also important for this study are two articles on imperialism, (2002a & 2005), and an interview conducted by the author with Mr. Cooper in March 2006 (Interview: 2006). This analysis of Robert Cooper’s worldview draws on the operationalisation and research questions suggested by the ‘operational code’ literature (Venesson, 2007). In his classic article on this approach, Alexander George argues that decision-makers must simplify and structure the complexity of the world in order to cope with it (1969: 200). Robert Cooper’s body of published work certainly bears out this claim. Apart from Henry Kissinger and a few other possible exceptions, it is rare that a serving policymaker lays out a schema of philosophical, instrumental and other general beliefs in the systematic and explicit manner in which Cooper has in his book. To elucidate the particular blend of ideas that Cooper fashions, I show how different aspects of his worldview correspond to ideas found in a variety of International Relations theories. Apart from his educational background in Politics, Philosophy and International Relations, we know from his writings that Cooper has read some IR theory and a good deal of theory-influenced literature on policy issues. For him, the main divide among theories of International Relations is between ‘realism’ and ‘liberal internationalism’ He refers to Machiavelli, Morgenthau and Kissinger when discussing realism, while Woodrow Wilson is his main reference point for liberal internationalism (2005: 25, 33-34). However, Cooper also recognises a third set of ideas—‘the post-modern perspective’—and endorses Christopher Coker’s argument that ideas and ‘identity’ play an important role in contemporary international relations (1998, 58-59). His other reading has included the American diplomat George Kennan, the scholar and sometimes US government advisor Philip Bobbitt and ‘quite a lot of history’ (Interview: 2006). I show that Cooper draws on concepts and arguments associated with realism, liberalism and constructivism in International Relations theory. This does not just refer to the IR theory perspectives cited above, but also to more refined theories in Political Science, such as liberal institutionalism and Alexander Wendt’s constructivism. Whether he has read such work or reached similar conclusions on the basis of other sources, some of Cooper’s ideas do correspond with these theories. We can get a clearer understanding of the distinctive blend of ideas that Cooper fashions by keeping such theoretical categories in mind.

This paper is divided into three main sections. I begin with a consideration of Cooper’s philosophical beliefs about the nature of international relations, including his division of the world into three categories and his threat assessment. The second section of the paper analyses his European ‘self-image’, his views on the utility of certain foreign policy instruments and his proposals on how Europe should use these tools in its strategic response to key threats. The third and final section examines Cooper’s influence on the European Security Strategy, which can be seen mainly in the document’s threat assessment and in important parts of the strategic response that it recommends.

**The Nature of International Politics**

**Three ‘Worlds’: Chaos, Anarchy & Order**

Cooper’s pamphlet, *The Postmodern State and the World Order* (2000), argues that while the world was ‘a single whole’ during the Cold War, there is no single ordering principle (such as anarchy) systematically underpinning international relations since 1989. Instead, there are three ‘worlds’ that...
operate on the basic of three different logics. First, there is what Cooper calls the ‘pre-modern’ world, comprising weak or failed states (‘pre-states’) that do not fulfil Max Weber’s criterion of having a legitimate monopoly on the use of force. Recent examples of this ‘post-imperial chaos’ include Somalia, Afghanistan and Liberia (2000: 10). Second, there is the ‘modern world’, comprising properly functioning states that strongly value their sovereignty and stress the separation of domestic and foreign affairs, with a prohibition on external interference in the domestic. As ‘modern’ states are prepared to use force against each other, order in this world rests on a balance of power or on the presence of ‘hegemonic states’ which favour the status quo. Cooper argues, on the basis of realist logic, that in the modern world, which makes up the greater part of the international system, ‘anarchy remains the underlying reality in the security field’ (2000: 12, 29). States such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, India and China are ‘modern’ states in Cooper’s categorisation. The role of imperial governance is central to Cooper’s understanding of the historical evolution of the pre-modern and modern spheres. Empire was far from perfect, he says, but ‘it has frequently been better that the chaos and barbarism that it replaced.’ (2001: 24-25). Indeed, the choice for the ancient and medieval worlds, according to Cooper, was ‘between empire and chaos’: ‘Those within the empire had order, culture, civilisation. Outside the empire were barbarians, chaos and disorder’ (2000: 4, 11). In short: first there was chaos, then ‘chaos is tamed by empire’ and then ‘empires are broken up by nationalism’ (2003a: 76).

While pre-modern states are in chaos and modern states operate in a world of structured anarchy, the European Union and to a lesser extent, Canada and Japan, constitute a third, more orderly zone in Cooper’s thinking—the postmodern world (2000: 27-28). Responding to increasing international interdependence, postmodern states break down the domestic/foreign affairs distinction and enable mutual interference in each others ‘internal’ affairs, says Cooper. As such states reject the option of using force against each other, security within the postmodern sphere is based on ‘transparency, mutual openness… and mutual vulnerability’. Now writing like a convinced liberal, Cooper hails the mix of international commitments, self-imposed constraints, confidence-building measures and mutual surveillance that has allowed states to see through ‘the fog of mistrust and deception… that the others might not, in fact, be planning to attack them’ (2000: 17-20). This corresponds to neo-liberal institutionalism, which stresses how reciprocity and mutual surveillance, among other elements, can enable ‘information rich’ international regimes to function (Keohane, 1989). In his 2003 essay on ‘the conditions of peace’, Cooper argues that while economic interdependence and the hugely destructive effects of modern war do not make peace inevitable, they do partly explain the ‘profound change’ from previous eras whereby peace is now a ‘policy goal’ for ‘the developed world’ (2003a: 111-12).

Cooper’s emphasis on international institutions and his linking of economic interdependence and peace are not the only liberal elements of his writing. He criticises interpretations of international politics which emphasise ‘supposedly unchanged geopolitical verities’, insisting instead on ‘the primacy of the domestic sphere’ and that ‘real change in foreign policy comes from domestic change’ (2003a: 103, 108). This places him at odds with structural realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, who claim that the most important changes in world politics result from structural shifts at the level of the international system (Waltz, 1979). Cooper modifies liberal democratic-peace theory, concluding that democracies are not necessarily less aggressive than other political systems, but they are more predictable—an element which tends to favour international stability and peace, he believes (2005: 25-26; Interview: 2006). This emphasis on the impact of states’ domestic politics on the international scene reflects liberal thinking (Doyle, 1995: 180-84). Cooper’s threefold division of the world is based to a large extent on state’s domestic characteristics, leading him to the conclusion that: ‘The kind of world we have depends on the kinds of states that compose it’ (2000: 42).

Although the United States is ultimately a ‘modern’ state in Cooper’s framework, he sees the superpower as a special case. In 2000, he simply expressed his doubts that America could be described as postmodern given its aversion to mutual transparency and multilateral checks on its freedom of action (2000: 27). By 2003, following the attacks of 9/11, two US-led wars, and in the context of fierce transatlantic debate and disagreement, Cooper gave a longer and more considered analysis of America’s status. Although he maintained his view that the US was a ‘modern’ state, he now
emphasised that America had, in a sense, ‘invented’ the postmodern world by providing it with a security guarantee. While the United States remained outside the postmodern system, he wrote, the superpower stood ‘above it, as its guardian’ (2003a: 44-45). In contrast to this respectful view of Europe’s main ally, Cooper’s view of pre-modern and the vast majority of modern states has elements of what the operational code literature calls the ‘colony image.’ Here, the subject perceives the target actor as (1) weaker, (2) culturally inferior and (3) an opportunity to exploit (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995: 425-26). The first two elements are present in Cooper’s thinking. Cooper sees pre-modern and modern states as weaker, and if not culturally inferior, then certainly politically inferior. His division of the world into three zones, culminating in the European postmodern system, makes this point clearly. He frames pre-modern states as places of ‘chaos’ while modern states only operate ‘the laws of the jungle’ as they ‘still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself’ (2000: 39). It is obvious to Cooper that pre-modern and modern states are inferior to postmodern Europe and he is not embarrassed to say it, at least in his essays, if not in his statements as an EU official. Indeed, his framing of these states as places of ‘chaos’ or as ‘the jungle’ strikes a different chord to the language of ‘partnership’ found in EU documents and contractual agreements with third countries (see Grugel, 2004: 607-08). He believes that ‘the opportunities, perhaps even the need for colonisation is as great as it ever was in the nineteenth century’ (2002a). As we will see, however, the potential ‘colonial’ responses proposed in Cooper’s writings are not opportunities for exploitation. Nevertheless, the elements of the ‘colony image’—or a colonialist worldview—in Cooper’s framing of states are important for understanding a further set of assumptions about actors in international relations found in his writings. It is obvious to Cooper that one part of the world acts and the other part of the world is acted upon. Referring to the ‘pre-modern chaos’, for example, he asks: ‘What should we do with that?’ (2000: 39). But who are ‘we’? This is more than just an academic question since ‘we’ are the ones who define the threats and take action in response. Europe and America are central to this ‘we’ that Cooper is writing for. The group may be seen as ‘the civilised world’, which Cooper also refers to. Where is this civilised world? It is that part of the world that relies on America for its defence (2000: 27). The countries of Central and Eastern Europe joined this group when they rewrote their laws to conform to European standards. ‘This represents the spread of civilisation and good governance in lasting form,’ Cooper writes (2003b). Elements of a colonialist worldview inform Robert Cooper’s framing of the ‘pre-modern’ and ‘modern’ worlds as inferior political entities in contrast to Europe and ‘the civilised world’, all of which helps to establish the former as spheres for intervention by the latter.

**Key Threats to Europe**

In Cooper’s view of the world, ‘there is a zone of safety in Europe, and outside it a zone of danger, and then a zone of chaos’ (2000, 34). He introduces the notion of ‘globalisation’ in the 2003 edition of his main essay, warning that it brings the three zones together in ways that are threatening to European security (2003a: 55). First, there is the danger from the chaotic pre-modern world. Writing in 2000, Cooper warned of ‘non-state actors, notably drug, crime or terrorist syndicates… [using] pre-modern bases for attacks on the more orderly parts of the world’ (2000: 11-12). The 2001 terrorist attacks on America bore out this expectation. In the post 9/11 context, Cooper published a new version of his argument which went further, adding that ‘if terrorists use biological or nuclear weapons, the effects could be devastating.’ ‘Open societies make this easy’, he claims (2003a: 77). This points to a world in which ‘for the first time since the middle ages, individuals or groups will possess destructive power that puts them on equal terms with the state… This will not (I hope) come within our lifetime, but eventually the logic of technology and society will assert itself,’ he warns (2003b). Cooper believes that although Europe may be able to stop the spread of chaos in failed states, ‘it may prove more difficult to deal with chaos in its own suburbs and declining industrial towns’ (2003a: x). Read in the

---

4 In the 2003 edition, the question is changed to: ‘What should be done with that?’ (my emphasis).
context of his later remarks (2003a: 77), this comment on urban ‘chaos’ is almost certainly a reference to the presence of terrorists in European cities.

The second major threat to Europe arises from a further spread of nuclear or other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) among the states of the ‘modern’ world. Were a further number of modern states to acquire WMD, ‘we would be living in a radically different world…[of] nuclear armed anarchy,’ says Cooper. A world with many ‘independent states, each capable of destroying the other, and some capable of destroying the world’ would be ‘the nightmare of the modern’, he warns. In such a scenario, modern states could threaten Europe or America with WMD (2003a: 62-64). In the short term, Cooper is particularly concerned about Middle Eastern states competing for access to weapons of mass destruction. In his 2003 book, he mentioned WMD proliferation as ‘the origin—in part at least—of Gulf War II’ (the invasion of Iraq) (2003a: 62). Speaking in 2006, Cooper was concerned that Iran’s nuclear activity could trigger a broader process of WMD proliferation in Middle East, which he noted was ‘hardly a region of great stability’ (Interview: 2006). Looking into ‘the more distant future’, Cooper’s writings refer to a third potential threat to European interests. There are, he says, ‘powerful states which might under certain circumstances become destabilising actors’. He mentions ‘the largest regional actors’—India, China and Brazil—as examples of potentially destabilising states (2000: 13, 16). In the future, ‘an armed or ambitious China or India could upset the regional balance and threaten European interests’ (2003a: 77). Whether it is the spread of terrorist-fuelled ‘chaos’ or the potential ‘nightmare’ of multiple, WMD-armed modern states, Cooper presents a grim threat assessment in vivid terms. He points to ‘a world in which Western governments are losing control’, ‘states lose the control of the means of violence and people lose control of their futures’ (2003a: viii, ix). In short, Robert Cooper warns that the twenty-first century may be the worst in European history (2003a: vii).

The EU’s History and Role in the World

Cooper’s European Self-Image

Applying Noel Kaplowitz’s concept of ‘national self image’ to the European polity, I examine Cooper’s historical understanding of the EU, as well as what he likes and what disturbs him about contemporary Europe (see Kaplowitz, 1990: 46-52, 76). Cooper believes that the EU polity is unique and has a distinctive contribution to make to world politics, particularly to international stability and peace. ‘Order’ is the highest political virtue in his worldview and postmodern Europe represents for him a ‘greater order’ than is known in the rest of the world (2000: 17). Cooper conceptualises the EU as ‘the most developed example of a postmodern system. It represents security through transparency, and transparency through interdependence’ (2000: 24). How was this possible? Why did European countries cease fighting each other? Here, Cooper poses a question once asked by Karl Deutsch, and his notion of a postmodern community is similar to Deutsch’s oft-cited concept of a ‘security community’ (Deutsch, 1957: 3-4).

In explaining the European peace, the key factor for Cooper is the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons, which ‘froze Europe for 40 years but thereby allowed a breathing space for new ideas and new systems to emerge’. ‘The shared interest of European countries in avoiding nuclear catastrophe has proved enough to overcome the normal strategic logic of mistrust and concealment’, he believes (2000: 2, 18). Secondly, the security guarantee provided by the United States allowed Europeans to develop their new co-operative system without fear of appearing weak in the face of other powers, such as the Soviet Union: ‘If Europeans have been able to develop security through transparency it is because at the back of this there stands America—and security through armed force’ (2003a: 45). Finally, although the EU or NATO is not ‘the reason’ for ‘half a century of peace in Western Europe’, Cooper argues that these institutions have reinforced and sustained mutual transparency and peace through an ongoing ‘socialisation’ of top officials and politicians (2000: 22-24). Cooper’s emphasis on the indispensable role of non-Europeans means that his sympathetic
attitude towards the EU’s achievement never reaches grandiose proportions. He writes ‘in admiration of the men and women who built the European peace and the transatlantic relationship after the Second World War—the only example of a lasting peace between nations’ (2003a: x-xi). The United States is central to the historical understanding which forms the basis of Cooper’s European self-image. As we will see, when Cooper offers policy advice in his writings, he has both Europe and America in mind. He sees his audience as a transatlantic one.

A second factor working against the development of a grandiose European self-image is Cooper’s concern about certain aspects of the EU’s political and social development. He is disturbed by what he regards as European states’ insufficient military capability: ‘It is unsatisfactory that 450 million Europeans rely so much on 250 million Americans to defend them’ (2003a: 165). Worried by what he perceives as a complacent attitude, he says that it is possible to imagine the rise of a regional hegemon in the Gulf or the Pacific that would threaten European interests. If such threats arise, will the West, and Europe in particular, ‘be equipped materially, psychologically and politically to deal with them?’ (2000: 17, 43). He believes that in peaceful, postmodern Europe, the ‘temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological…represents one of the great dangers’ (2000: 39). Thus, Cooper’s priority for the future of Europe is better common defence, not closer integration per se. Dismissing ‘the very small minority’ who seek a European super-state, he believes that the traditional state ‘will remain the fundamental unit of international relations for the foreseeable future’ (2000: 21, 24). The postmodern system is not an embryonic world government—it depends on its constituent states. There is no discussion, only brief mentions, of the EU’s institutions. Instead, Cooper discusses in detail the need for greater European military capability. He argues that by moderately increasing defence spending, reducing duplication and increasing interoperability, European states could increase their collective military capability and their influence over American policy (2003a: 156-163; 168-172). Indeed, Europeans will only be able to sustain the multilateral system that they rightly value by supporting it with more armed strength (2003a: 168). Both his emphasis on military capability and his lack of focus on the institutional aspects of EU foreign policy-making are mirrored by (and perhaps have influenced) Javier Solana, who takes a similar approach to these issues. One may also consider this a ‘European Council’ approach distinct from certain European Commissioners who, by contrast, emphasize the importance of institutional reform and further EU integration, while paying less attention to the expansion of European military capability. Although he admires America, Cooper thinks that ‘the idea of a single country having unrestrained and unrestrainable power is not welcome’ (2003a: 163). Europe must play a greater role in the world, he concludes: ‘we have to harness for good the enormous potential that Europe represents. It will not be enough to leave the world to the United States’ (2003a: xi).

Cooper’s Instrumental Beliefs

Cooper considers the merits of a range of foreign policy instruments available to Europe, from diplomatic activity to the use of force (on instrumental beliefs, see George, 1969: 199; Walker, 1990: 405). Beginning from a somewhat pessimistic starting point, he writes that foreign policy, for the most part, cannot be expected to produce dramatic and lasting change in other countries. His experience as a diplomat tells him that ‘influencing foreigners is difficult’. Often, a major effort is required to make a relatively minor impact on the policies of another country, he remarks (2003a: 114). Considering financial inducements, he writes that development aid can bring ‘some influence’ and trade agreements do ‘provide some leverage during negotiations’ (2003a: 162). However, Cooper is unenthusiastic about the influence of aid and trade, remarking that ‘money may not buy very much’ (2003a: 116-17). Negative financial or diplomatic conditionality is also a double-edged sword, he

thinks. Sanctions are likely to hurt populations rather than rulers, he argues, pointing to the case of Iraq. Pragmatically, Cooper advises that persistent, long term pursuit of limited objectives is most likely to produce a successful impact: ‘Above all, it is sensible to be modest in ones objectives’ (2003a: 117-19). This modest or pessimistic strand of his thought is important to bear in mind when considering his policy recommendations below.

Cooper also doubts the ability of military force to bring about the kinds of changes sought by Western leaders in foreign countries today. ‘War is about changing people’s minds or at least their behaviour’, he writes, but it only ‘occasionally’ produces the long-term changes desired. ‘More often, force is an ineffective way of changing people’s minds,’ while ‘occupation is a cause of enmity’ (2003a: 87, 98, 120). The fundamental problem is that coercion, whether through finance or force, provokes ‘resentment’ rather than encouraging ‘genuine co-operation’. ‘Remove the instrument of coercion,’ says Cooper, ‘and you are likely to lose even the acquiescence’ of foreign actors (2003a: 121). Despite this scepticism about the long-term efficacy of force, Cooper does not oppose the use of force on pacificist or moral grounds. Indeed, as we will see, he argues that force may be necessary to tackle emerging threats. He also explicitly rejects the concept of ‘civilian power’ Europe, which he takes to be an argument for focusing primarily on the development of the EU’s economic and diplomatic instruments (2003a: 160; Duchêne, 1973: 19). It is misleading, he argues, to focus on these aspects of the EU’s power without acknowledging that ‘the outer boundaries of this system were always protected and are still protected today by [American] military force’ (2003a: 160-61). Even though it may often be ineffective in practice, force still ‘matters more than anything else’ in international politics, according to Cooper (2003a: 162). States rely on military force as the ultimate guarantor of their security, even if this force is held in reserve. ‘Power, order and peace grow out of legitimacy’, he writes, ‘but this has all to be backed by force’ (2003a: 150). His conclusion is that force and legitimacy are the two ultimate sources of power (2003a: 88). Insufficient on their own, a combination of the two is essential for the maintenance of order (2003a: 88; 2004: 179). How does Cooper propose to combine the two elements in practice?

**Between Force and Legitimacy: Cooper’s Strategy for Europe and the West**

Cooper’s vivid depiction of a world of potentially radical threats facing Europe is a forceful rhetorical prelude to his argument in favour of an active and potentially radical response. ‘The decent into chaos will not happen quickly’, he writes, ‘There is still time to tackle the problems that will cause it’ (2003a: x). He proposes a two-fold strategy for postmodern Europe’s response to the threats. Firstly, ‘dealing directly with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction’; and secondly, action over the longer-term ‘to solve some of the underlying problems’ (2003a: x). The first part—direct action—is a self-defence mechanism, in which the use of force plays a crucial role. Cooper thinks that if terrorists and a large number of ‘modern’ states acquire WMD, traditional self-defence through deterrence may no longer be viable, leaving Europe and America facing some dangerous threats (2002b; 2003a: 46, 63-64). Were one modern state to use a nuclear weapon, for example, ‘this would give a further spur to proliferation and remove the taboo on further use of nuclear weapons.’ In this context, ‘the only rational policy is to stop the spread [of WMD] in the first place… Hence the doctrine of preventative action in the US National Security Strategy’ (2003a: 64). Cooper stresses that ‘pre-emptive’ or ‘preventative’ military action (he uses the two terms interchangeably) is a means of self-defence similar to the traditional British doctrine of preventing any single power from dominating the European continent (because the UK would have been unable to resist an attack from the resulting superpower). This led to the War of Spanish Succession and the Second World War against Germany (2003a: 64; Interview: 2006). Following this logic, Cooper argues that ‘nuclear weapons make every country potentially too strong to deal with,’ and so preventative action is justified on self-defence grounds here as it was in the previous cases (2003a: 64). Indeed it was his concern about the proliferation of WMD that persuaded him that there was a reasonable case for invading Iraq in 2003 (2006: 3).
The elements of a colonialist worldview in his framing of the pre-modern and modern worlds allow Cooper to argue that ‘double standards’ are necessary to deal with the radical threats that he sees emanating from these areas (2000: 39). At the higher level, postmodern European states and their closest allies can deal with each other ‘on the basis of laws and open co-operative security’ (2000: 39). At the lower levels, however, ‘the postmodern space needs to be able to protect itself,’ he writes. ‘Many states are inherently dangerous and their power can be restrained only by an equal or greater power’ (2003a: 79, 150). Thus, ‘when dealing with more old-fashioned states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era—force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary for those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself’ (2000: 39). In this colony image, therefore, the modern states potentially threatening to Europe are not only ‘inherently dangerous’ and at a lower level of political civilisation. They are also a step back in time. However, if every country adopted a doctrine of pre-emptive action, would the world not degenerate into chaos? Cooper’s response to this objection is simple: ‘a system in which preventative action is required will be stable only under the condition that it is dominated by a single power or a concert of powers.’ Indeed he endorses the US National Security Strategy’s aim to guarantee such a system through the maintenance of American strategic superiority (2003a: 64-65).

It should be noted that Cooper first articulated an argument in favour of a right of ‘pre-emptive attack’ one year before 11 September 2001 and two years before the publication of the US National Security Strategy. However, notwithstanding the fact that his argument for pre-emptive action predates and is distinct from that of the Bush administration, Cooper’s willingness to associate himself with the more hawkish aspects of America’s post-9/11 doctrine distinguishes him from many other Europeans foreign policymakers who are uncomfortable with the concept. He concludes that a ‘concert of powers’—with Europe at its core—should use whatever means necessary, perhaps even pre-emptive force, to meet the dangers posed by terrorists and ‘modern’ states. Calling this a policy of ‘defensive imperialism’—self-defence for an age of new threats—he says that the West’s imposition of regime change in Afghanistan is an example of what he means, although the concept also extends to a right of preventative action (2000: 11; 2002a). From a theoretical perspective, his advocacy of a coercive, ‘defensive imperialism’ adheres to a classical realist framework, whereby the strongest do what they have the power to do, without reference to common international rules and regardless of ‘double standards’ (Zakaria, 1998: 18-19).

However, although it may be necessary in the short term, ‘defensive imperialism’ by itself is an inadequate response to contemporary security dilemmas, in Cooper’s view. He recognises that ‘if too many [military] interventions are required, the costs of sustaining them may be too high’. Furthermore, ‘intervention creates resentment and fear: the cure may spread the disease rather than end it’ (2003a: 78). Such reflections give rise to the second part of Cooper’s proposed response to the threats—a longer-term attempt to address ‘underlying problems’. He suggests that the western concert’s system of forcible, ‘defensive imperialism’ will only last ‘if it is seen as legitimate by a sufficient number of other [international] actors’ (2003a: 65). Indeed ‘legitimising great power rule makes it all the more powerful’ because other countries are more likely to cooperate with a legitimate power (2004: 178; 2003a: 121-22). To gain such legitimacy, the West’s defensive-imperialist system must be accompanied by a second, ‘voluntary’ type of imperialism ‘acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values’, although its raison d’être would be the same now as throughout history. It would be ‘an imperialism, which like all imperialism, aims to bring order and organisation, but which rests today on the voluntary principle’ (2002; 2003: 70).

How could this system of ‘voluntary imperialism’ gain legitimacy for western interventions around the world? Cooper outlines four sources of legitimacy; a concept which he believes is based on a similar rationale to the notion of ‘soft power’, as developed by Joseph Nye (2004: 173). First, legitimacy comes from being a provider of international order and from being a model of social and political success that others might want to imitate (2004: 176-77). Second, western ‘voluntary imperialism’ would gain legitimacy, according to Cooper, through the offering of durable financial

8
and security commitments to disorderly parts of the world. This already happens on a relatively small scale in what he calls the ‘voluntary UN protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo’ with a large financial and military input from the EU (2002a). Turning his attention to another zone of instability, Cooper suggests the establishment of ‘a regional structure in the Middle East with security guarantees from the US or NATO and assistance and market access in the EU, traded against guarantees of good governance [from Middle Eastern states]’. ‘The price is high in time, risk, money and commitment,’ he says, ‘But it may be the price of our own security’ (2003b). The third and ‘most important’ source of legitimacy, according to Cooper, is ‘participation’. ‘Above all’, he writes, the EU’s ‘soft power derives from it’s readiness to offer other’s a seat at the decision-making table.’ (a reference to EU enlargement) (2004: 178). At international level, the United Nations remains the most important source of legitimacy, says Cooper, ‘because it is a forum in which everybody has a voice’ (2004: 177-78). However, Cooper rejects those who he says imply that ‘multilateralism’ means that ‘everything we do must be through the UN’. ‘Multilateralism is much wider than the UN’, he says, citing NATO and the WTO as other important sites of multilateral decision-making (Interview: 2006). In sum, ‘voluntary’ imperialism will be accepted as legitimate if it allows other countries to participate in decision-making about their future. Finally, learning from the postmodern European experience, Cooper says that voluntary imperialism should be about transforming identity: ‘Monnet’s genius was to widen the definition of Us,’ he writes. ‘[Monnet] created a European context’ that both France and Germany could subscribe to. This ‘development of a wider sense of community’ can be achieved through the creation of ‘permanent institutions’, Cooper suggests (2003a: 142-45). In this way, a European type ‘domestication and legitimisation of power’ is possible on an international scale (2003a: 150). Such an extension of the postmodern sphere outside of Europe is the best long term formula for a ‘real international society’ and peace between nations (2003a: 84). Cooper’s use of the domestic analogy as a basis for international peace follows a particular line of liberal thinking (Suganami, 1989: 9-23; Duchêne, 1973: 19-20). Beyond the established theories, his thoughts on identity-transforming cooperation, leading to a ‘real international society’, reflect more recent constructivist departures in IR theory (Wendt, 1992: 412-22).

However, mindful of realist objections to these ideas, Cooper acknowledges that his vision of a postmodern international society is ‘an ultimate and very distant goal.’ He even says that it is ‘probably more of a dream than a realisable goal’ (2003a: 151, 171). The pessimistic strand of Cooper’s thought is important for understanding why he suspects that his ideas for a voluntary imperialism may not be achievable in practice. The investment of extensive financial and security commitments can make a long term difference to other countries, he believes, but how often is the West prepared to make such commitments? Referring to America’s investment in post-war Europe and Japan and the EU’s enlargement, he says: ‘If you are prepared to make that kind of commitment, then you can get some results. But the sort of commitment that we make to more distant countries, where you give some money to NGOs or something like that? … a few million dollars doesn’t buy you a country’ (Interview: 2006) If a contemporary imperialist project relies (even initially) on force, this further complicates matters. ‘Military force still has its uses,’ says Cooper, ‘but running or transforming other people’s countries is not one of them’ (2005: 27). Even if the invading power has good intentions to establish a democracy, ‘what [that power] does is fundamentally undemocratic,’ according to Cooper (2005: 26). The long-term inefficacy of military force in this context and the difficulty of acquiring legitimacy for imperial interventions in today’s world means that imperialism is actually ‘in retreat’, according to Cooper: ‘I think this is being comprehensively demonstrated in Iraq—not that anybody had imperial intentions in Iraq—but if you can’t control Falluja with the most powerful military in the world, then it seems to be a black day for imperialism’ (Interview: 2006). All of this is part of his broader critique of the idea that US military power can be used to promote democracy. Seeking to influence the American debate on this issue in an article published in the National Interest in 2005, Cooper argues that democracy comes from within polities, not from outside intervention: ‘Democracy means rule by the people, and no one else can make their choices for them’ (2005: 34). Cooper also doubts that the spread of democracy or the tackling of global injustices would have much impact on the conditions which give rise to terrorism: ‘However benign the world order,
Given the difficulty of having a significant and long term impact on other countries or on the roots of terrorism, what should Europe and America do in response to the threats they face? Cooper’s response to this dilemma, at the end of his 2003 book, is to fall back to an extent on the first part of his policy programme—direct action in the short term. Warning that his long-term postmodern ‘dream’ of ‘a real international society’ may not be realisable, Cooper says that believing in this dream ‘should not allow wishful thinking to become a substitute for the tough-minded policies required to deal with a world containing gruesome threats, including, perhaps to civilisation itself.’ He advises ‘arming and organising’ in order to survive the uncertain future, ‘while at the same time working for lasting political solutions’ (2003a: 171). How might this work in practice? Developing his proposal for the Middle East, cited earlier, he writes that in the long term, a combination of US force and European cooperative approaches might deal with this ‘area of greatest threat’. That could involve ‘military muscle to clear the way for a political solution involving a kind of imperial penumbra around the European Union’ (2003a: 78-79). This is his most direct suggestion as to how a short-term military intervention by a western ‘concert of powers’ (perhaps pre-emptively) could be accorded the legitimacy that he believes is necessary for its long term viability. However, the idea that a US-European alliance might gain broader international legitimacy for the use of force is at odds with Cooper’s recognition elsewhere that a wider US-led hegemony, including Europe and Japan, ‘would not seem very different to those on the receiving end of its attentions’ (2003a: 84). His bottom line is that the use of force can be reconciled with international legitimacy if a sufficient number of states can be persuaded to support military action. The western concert of powers should try to ‘acquire legitimacy through the UN or some other route,’ he says (Interview: 2006). However, what happens if the West cannot persuade a sufficient number of states to support military action, either through the UN or through their financial and security guarantees to a ‘Middle East regional structure’? Cooper acknowledges that it can be difficult to win international support for military action (Interview: 2006). In practice, there is also a tension between giving states a say in their own future and bringing about the significant change that Cooper wants from his suggested ‘imperial penumbra’ linking the Middle East to Europe. Although Robert Cooper makes an intellectually honest effort to draw out the implications of his ideas, he does not quite resolve the tension between his conceptions of force and legitimacy.

Cooper and the Public Sphere: A Security Strategy for Europe

While the multifaceted nature of Cooper’s thinking has been recognised by many reviewers, considerable controversy has been provoked by his defence of pre-emptive action and ‘double standards’ in international relations and his ideas on new forms of imperialism. Following the publication of a new version of his main essay in early 2002, a Labour MP called Cooper a ‘maniac’ while a Guardian editorial steamed that the advocacy of force and imperialism by a government official was ‘unprecedented and inflammatory’ (Guardian, 2002). Others argued that Cooper had a reasonable argument, which would be more acceptable if he changed his terminology away from the language of imperialism towards an emphasis on the universally ‘empowering’ nature of his project (Chandler, 2002). The debate about military intervention in Iraq was gathering pace at this time and Cooper’s willingness to associate himself with the concept of pre-emptive action won him admirers in America. Robert Kagan drew on Cooper’s ideas to argue that America had to operate ‘doubled standards’ in defiance of international conventions in order to confront the threat posed by rogue states (Kagan, 2002). Max Boot, writing in 2004, applauded Cooper’s defence of a right of pre-emptive attack, although he also acknowledged the latter’s ‘European’ emphasis on the value of multilateralism (Boot, 2004). Cooper’s public response to the transatlantic storm provoked by the debate on Iraq and the US National Security Strategy was to say that Europe should develop its own grand strategy. ‘If Europeans do not like the US National Security Strategy,’ he wrote, ‘they should develop their own rather than complain about it from the sidelines’ (2003: 165). In 2003, Europe did set out its response
to the US security strategy and Cooper was at the centre of the initiative. His was the main pen behind the first draft of the European Security Strategy made public by Javier Solana in June 2003. I examine how Cooper’s ideas manifest themselves in the final version of the strategy which, following a consultation process, was adopted by the member-states of the EU in December 2003. This is a short case study of how an individual’s ideas can translate into official policy, even if some of those ideas run counter to prevailing discourses among policymakers.

Like Cooper’s writings, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*—the final version of the European Security Strategy—seems to reject the idea of an unchanging essence to international relations. Cooper wrote in 2000 that ‘The kind of world we have depends on the kinds of states that compose it’ (2000: 42). A similar formulation appeared in the European Security Strategy (ESS) three years later: ‘The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation’ (10)7. As for Europe itself, the strategy recognises that ‘the United States has played a critical role’ in European peace and integration—a central theme in Cooper’s European self-image (1). It is in the area of threat assessment, however, that Cooper’s most significant influence on the European Security Strategy can be seen. His dual emphasis on terrorism and ‘modern’ WMD-armed states is reflected in the first two (of five) threats to Europe identified in the strategy. Firstly, Al Qaeda’s willingness to use ‘unlimited violence’ is noted as is the ‘frightening scenario’ of terrorists acquiring WMD (3-4). This not only corresponds to the first threat identified in Cooper’s writings, but the ESS also makes the point repeatedly made by Cooper that in such a scenario, ‘a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously only possible for States and armies’ (4). Secondly, the ESS reflects Cooper’s worries about competing WMD-armed states in the Middle East: ‘We are now…entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East’ (3). The fourth threat identified by the European Security Strategy—state failure—also reflects a key concern of Cooper (the ‘pre-modern’ world), as indicated by title of his book, *The Breaking of Nations*. Europe’s strategy invokes the concept of ‘globalisation’ in a way that mirrors Cooper’s writings, stating that ‘in an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand.’ In support of this point, the ESS cites terrorism and humanitarian tragedies that are higher in the consciousness of European publics today because of global communication (6-7). In his 2000 paper, Cooper had made the same point, using the same two examples later cited in the European Security Strategy, and he made the link with globalisation in his 2003 book (2000: 11-12; 2003a: 55).

Influence over threat assessment is significant because a polity’s perception of a threat may determine much about the nature of its response. Those involved in the consultation on the European Security Strategy apparently recognised this. There seems to have been some resistance among the European foreign policy actors consulted to the radical, Cooper-like threat assessment made in the first draft of the ESS. The result is that the first draft’s depiction of the threat is toned down somewhat in the revised version adopted by the EU (Vennesson, 2006, 30-31). Nevertheless, the overall threat picture presented in the final document still looks very much like the international ‘jungle’ identified in Cooper’s writings. Like Cooper, the ESS summarises the main dangers to Europe as an interrelated mix of unrestrained terrorism, the availability of weapons of mass destruction and the weakening of the state system. ‘Taking these different elements together’, it concludes, ‘we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed’ (5). Despite their possible dissonance with prevailing political discourses in Europe and resistance from some policymakers, Cooper’s ideas can be seen very clearly in the threat assessment of the European Security Strategy.

Concerning the policy programme proposed by the ESS in response to these threats, the overall activist tone of the strategy reflects Cooper’s approach. His formulation—‘In a dynamic world the worst policy is to do nothing’ (2003a: 171)—is echoed in the ESS: ‘Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats’ (11). Cooper’s argument on the need for Europe to ‘achieve a robust defence culture’ (2003a: 78), may also have influenced the strategy’s statement that ‘We need to

---

7 References to pages of the final version of the European Security Strategy appear parenthetically in the text.
develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary robust intervention’ (11). Europe’s strategic document reflects Cooper’s thinking in its acceptance that ‘our traditional concept of self-defence...based on the threat of invasion’ is inadequate for ‘the new threats.’ In today’s world, it states, ‘the first line of defence will often be abroad... threat prevention cannot start too early’ (7). The call for ‘pre-emptive engagement’ in the first draft of the European Security Strategy strongly bears the mark of Cooper’s influence (Solana, 2003, 10). Although this phrase was modified following the ESS consultation process, the final version of the strategy still referred to ‘preventative engagement’ to tackle threats early, including the threat posed by WMD proliferation (11). Again, despite some resistance by other actors and the possible dissonance of Cooper’s concept of pre-emption with some European foreign policy discourses, the core elements of his idea can still be perceived in the strategy adopted by the EU. Cooper’s radical threat assessment and his proposals for early and preventative action against these threats, while they might be supported by some, do not reflect the views of all European foreign policy actors and governments. Without Cooper’s distinctive contribution, these two key elements of the European Security Strategy might have been formulated differently.

Beyond these two areas, where the distinctiveness of Cooper’s ideas makes his influence clearly demonstrable, we can also note other areas where he may have had an impact on the ESS although his precise influence is less clear here because the relevant ideas are more commonly held in EU foreign policy circles. For example, the European Security Strategy’s point that an improvement in the EU’s collective military capability would boost its influence over American policy (13) draws on an argument made in Cooper’s writings but is not unique to him (2003a: 167). The strategy’s emphasis on ‘effective multilateralism’ reflects Cooper’s ideas but this approach also has many other adherents in European policy discourse. Indeed, notwithstanding the distinctiveness of his radical threat assessment and suggested pre-emptive response, there are considerable elements of Cooper’s agenda that are close to the centre ground of European policy thinking. His scepticism about the ability of armed intervention to trigger democratic or other significant long-term change reflects a broad European conservatism on this issue shared by most foreign policy makers in the EU. His conception of the conditions of peace is a good articulation of the European polity’s liberal and constructivist understanding of its own history, identity and potential contribution to the world (Vennesson, 2006: 19-20; 23-26). Yet many EU policy makers are also seeking to use tough-minded ‘realist’ categories in their approach to threat identification and strategic response in the post 9/11 world (Vennesson, 2006: 9, 29-30, 37). As such, the tensions in Robert Cooper’s thinking—between force and legitimacy—reflect the struggle of European foreign policy makers generally to articulate realist strategies (against threats in a perceived international jungle) for a ‘postmodern’ European political entity grounded in liberal and constructivist norms of dialogue, conciliation and conflict transformation.

Conclusion

Although he fashions a diverse mix of policy ideas, ranging from the pre-emptive use of force to identity transformation in support of international peace, Robert Cooper’s writings constitute a largely coherent body of thought. There are some shifts in emphasis over time, which can be linked to changing political circumstances, but they remain within the boundaries of his enduring philosophical and instrumental beliefs. For example, in the context of fierce transatlantic divisions during 2002-2003, Cooper was concerned to show the importance of the United States for European security. This argument and his defence of pre-emptive intervention gained him a good deal of political capital in the US. By 2005, he was spending some of this capital by introducing to the American debate a very ‘European’ caution against the idea that democracy can be promoted through force. By this time, he was less ‘Blair’ and more ‘Macmillan’; no longer a committed supporter of US initiatives, but instead assuming an earlier British conception of its role as playing ‘Greece’ to the American ‘Rome’. However, the intellectual basis for his scepticism about American ideas of democracy promotion can be found in his earlier writings. In a second example, Cooper is more pessimistic about the prospects
for a new imperialism in 2006 than he was in 2000 and 2003, perhaps reflecting the rise of intractable post-war insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, however, this pessimistic strand runs through his writings over those six years and is broadly consistent with his overall argument.

Cooper’s decision to frame his argument in the language of imperialism is significant. Showing elements of a colonialist worldview in his framing of international actors, he is attracted to what he sees as the order of empire and concerned by a perceived post-imperial chaos. This framing establishes the pre-modern and modern worlds as spheres of ‘defensive’ neo-imperialist action against the new threats to Europe which are emerging from these murky depths. However, this activist strand of his thought is tempered by the practical experience that such military action often produces resentment, rather than the long-term results desired by the West for its own security. Cooper believes that a doctrine of military intervention needs to be regarded as legitimate by a sufficient number of international actors in order to be effective in the long term. He proposes a second, ‘voluntary’ type of imperialism as a possible means of winning such legitimacy but acknowledges that this may not be achievable in practice. His suggestion that a US-European joint initiative might be able to combine force and legitimacy in an intervention in the Middle East is also at odds with his recognition elsewhere that even a broad western alliance would find it difficult to gain international legitimacy. Although Cooper’s reflections on these potential contradictions in European worldviews bring a number of issues into clearer focus, he does not manage to reconcile his conceptions of force and legitimacy.

We can assess Cooper’s blend of different theoretical ideas from two points of view: the descriptive-explanatory level; and the normative-prescriptive level. Concerning the first level, Cooper refers to the broadly realist concepts of the US security guarantee and nuclear deterrence as explanations for the initial conditions which allowed European states to deal peacefully with each other after 1945. However, Cooper also states that realism is ‘barren and inadequate’ as a ‘description of the way international society functions’ (2005: 25). He appeals a great deal to liberal explanations of the conditions of enduring interstate peace, such as economic interdependence, mutual surveillance and international institutions. His focus on domestic politics and his modified version of democratic peace theory also show the centrality of liberal theories to his understanding of international relations. His belief in the role of ideas in politics and his analysis of the EU’s transformation of states’ identity are both constructivist explanations, but they are not discussed in the same detail as the liberal concepts. Secondly, I refer to the normative-prescriptive level: what theoretical frameworks provide a good basis for decision-makers’ formulation of foreign policy? On one hand, Cooper shows a constructivist-idealistic belief in the possibility of identity transformation and the building of a ‘real international society’. Indeed he refers to himself as a ‘neo-idealistic’ (2003a: 175). He also invokes the liberal ‘domestic analogy’ as a basis for international peace. On the other hand, however, Cooper displays a radical realist awareness of threats and he concludes his book with a call for Europe to arm and organise to face the uncertain future. His defence of pre-emptive strikes and double standards also reflects some realists’ approval for the proposition that the strongest should do what they have the power to do. In sum, without wanting to underestimate the importance of constructivist concepts to Cooper’s long term vision, I would still locate his theoretical centres of gravity in liberalism at the explanatory level, and realism at the prescriptive level.

This paper has shown that Robert Cooper exercised a significant influence over the formation of the European Security Strategy. Nevertheless, Cooper is just one of a number of important actors in European foreign policy. How would a European Union based entirely on Robert Cooper’s worldview act in the international arena? Based on his writings, we can say that Cooper’s Europe values the transatlantic alliance and America’s role in the construction of a European peace. However, it is also a Europe convinced of its own unique contribution to international society and seeking a greater role in the world. Furthermore, it is a Europe sceptical of using military force in an attempt to trigger democratic or other significant long-term change in other countries. At the same time, Cooper’s Europe would hold a radical assessment of the threats facing it and would not shirk from early and
forceful action against these perceived threats. It is here where such a Europe would potentially run into trouble. What happens if it is not possible for Europe both to participate in military action (including pre-emptive action) with its allies and win the international legitimacy that it believes is necessary for the long term viability of such interventions? Europe would presumably fall back on pragmatic responses: in some cases, deciding that force is necessary even if it is perceived as illegitimate by many other international actors; in other cases, eschewing force in the face of opposition from other states. But how would Europe reconcile a more realist stance abroad with the liberal and constructivist norms of its own postmodern polity expressed so clearly in Cooper’s writings? The tensions and contradictions of such a stance would remain; tensions which may be significant for the future development of European foreign policy and which are reflected well in Robert Cooper’s worldview.
Bibliography


Chandler, David. 2002. ‘Imperialism may be out, but aggressive wars and colonial protectorates are back,’ Observer, 14 April.


Cooper, Robert. 2001. ‘The next empire,’ Prospect, October.


Cooper, Robert. 2002b. ‘Grand Strategy’, Prospect (Online version), December.


Cooper, Robert. 2005. ‘Imperial Liberalism,’ The National Interest, 79 (Spring)


Cooper, Robert, 2006. ‘War and democracy,’ Prospect (Online PDF version), June.


Policy in an Evolving International System. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. [Forthcoming; references are to the unpublished manuscript].


