EUI Working Papers
LAW 2007/17

Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing

Ian Loader and Neil Walker
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Abstract
This paper examines the basis on which we might argue that there is a 'transnational' public interest in transnational policing. Is policing beyond the state simply a matter of finding points of overlap between the security interests of different national communities. If so, it appears as a precarious and contingent achievement. But if not, how can we imagine that transnational public interest in thicker terms, as involving a state-transcending common interest? Would this not involve sacrificing the very idea of national security interests, or indeed any security interest based upon communities more local than the transnational level? The paper develops an argument that this need not be the case, and that we can imagine 'thick' security and policing interests at different levels of territorial community simultaneously.

Keywords
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In our age – a global age that is now also an age of terror - transnational policing has become an expanding, diverse and complex field of activity. In the fraught days since 9/11, our political culture has produce a fresh range of rhetoric, regulation and routines that regularly transcends national borders (see, e.g., Chalmers 2004; Günther 2005). As constitutive elements of the ‘war on terror’ launched in response to 9/11, we have witnessed, alongside the unilateral assertion of US security interests and the strengthening of state security institutions, an extension of cross-border surveillance activity and information-sharing, an enhanced role for opaque networks of police and intelligence chiefs in Europe, and the deployment of soldiers, police officers and contracted security guards in post-war ‘peace-keeping’ efforts on the streets of Afghanistan and Iraq (den Boer and Monar 2002; Lyon 2003; Sands 2005). What is more, in many other ways that owe little or nothing to the terrorist threat, transnational policing has over a longer time-frame become an expanding, diverse and complex field of activity, and so an increasingly important dimension of any detailed security map. In the face of criminal organizations and networks who operate across many states, and whose modus operandi involves illicitly trafficking people, drugs, information, nuclear materials or stolen goods across national borders, long-standing international police institutions such as Interpol have been joined, and arguably superseded in importance, by the internationalization of US policing and by the development of new forms of police networking and cross-border cooperation within the European Union – notably in the shape of Europol and, more recently, Eurojust (Nadelman 1993; Anderson et al. 1995; Deflem 2003; Walker 2003). The problem of weak or failing states engaged in armed conflict for the control of territory, or harboring criminal or terrorist groups, has prompted overt and covert police/military interventions by outside states, as well as intermittent UN or EU peacekeeping missions and the harm-alleviating efforts of transnational NGOs (Caygill 2001; Goldsmith 2003; Linden et al. present volume). They have, in addition, provided new opportunities in the burgeoning industry of global private security for transnational security and military firms to promote and sell protective services either to weak and strong states, or to multinational corporations seeking to do business in inhospitable locations (Johnston 2000; Muthien and Taylor 2002; Singer 2003; Avant 2005; Leander 2006; Abrahamson and Williams 2006).

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These developments traverse symbolic as well as territorial boundaries. They signal that a bundle of once clear distinctions – between external and internal security; policing and soldiering; war and crime; state combatants exercising legitimate force and unarmed civilian non-combatants - is fast breaking down (Kaldor 1999; Bigo 2000; Andreas and Price 2001). They also indicate that states acting alone, or solely within their own borders, are no longer a sufficient means of producing security within those borders, still less some more expansive notion of regional or global security. We inhabit a world of multi-level, multi-centred security governance, in which states are joined, criss-crossed and contested by an array of transnational organizations and actors – whether in regional and global governmental bodies, commercial security outfits, or the rapidly expanding range of non-governmental organizations and social movements that compose transnational civil society. It is a world in which policing has, however haltingly and unevenly, been both stretched across the frontiers of states and charged with combating what are often overlapping problems of global organized crime and political violence.

The purpose of this chapter is to address the critical challenge posed by these developments. It acknowledges that there has indeed been and continues to be a shift towards transnational sites and networks of security provision. It also recognizes – indeed insists – that on account of its special receptiveness to security conceived of as a ‘thick’ public good, the state has traditionally possessed and continues to possess a distinctive capacity to deliver a morally defensible form of security (even if in practice it often has not and will not). Yet in stressing the priority of the state in the provision of security as a ‘thick’ public good, we need imply that security beyond the state must in consequence be a ‘thin’ and anaemic affair, nor, alternatively, that the price of transnational thickening must be the loss of the trademark thickness of the state level. That is to say, we need not look at thick, or ‘axiomatic’ (Loader & Walker 2007: ch. 6) security in such zero-sum terms. Rather, the very considerations which underpin our argument at the state level are such that, with the necessary sociological and institutional imagination, we can contemplate at least some degree of complementary thickening in wider sites of political community and in the global arena.

We must stress, however, that unlike the nation state level, the transnational argument remains predominantly aspirational rather than grounded in concrete – if only selectively realized – cultural and ordering configurations. As matters stand, the development in transnational policing and security practice is matched neither by a palpable shift in attitudes towards the proper location of security communities nor by systems of regulation that adequately track these developments. The state, as the traditional community of democratic attachment remains the principal – if by no means any longer the sole - institutional locus of efforts to subject security practices to forms of democratic steering, public scrutiny and human rights protection. This asymmetrical pattern of development can, in turn, encourage opaque, self-corraborating and fugitive sites of public and private power that, in failing to nurture and provided institutional expression for broader public identification with the relevant security projects, simultaneously possess deficits of legitimacy and effectiveness. In asking the question about the thickening of security as a transnational public good, therefore, we must be ever mindful that the very symbiosis of cultural and ordering activity which, as we shall see, is the key to the state’s special role in ‘thickening’ the public good of security, underscores the difficulty of building a similar dynamic beyond the state. Just as the
presence of an affective attachment and a regulatory infrastructure can be mutually reinforcing, so their absence or relative weakness can be mutually debilitating.

Our argument proceeds as follows. First, we set out what we mean by security as a ‘thick’ public good at the state level. Then, taking as our point of departure recent work on the topic of ‘global public goods’ conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme (Kaul et al. 1999a; 2003a), we try to identify the difficulties that arise and the prospects that emerge in seeking to re-conceptualize and deliver policing and security – with their constitutive links to sovereign statehood – as global public goods. We then briefly review five competing models of transnational security in this light, examining the capacity of each to address and offer an adequate resolution of the problems we identify. Having thus specified the merits and deficiencies of each model, we conclude by sketching the outline of our own thicker account of security as a global public good – one that is sociologically tenable as well as normatively robust.

**Policing, the state and thick public goods**

In their classic ‘thin’ economic definition, public goods are simply those that, due to their quality of non-rivalness (i.e. provision to multiple users does not imply additional costs) individuals have a convergent instrumental interest in producing, but which due to various collective action problems (notably, lack of information and free-riding, in particular due to their non-excludability) may nevertheless be under-provided. As we have argued elsewhere (Loader & Walker 2001; 2007), to think of the public good of, or interest in, security in a thicker, more sociological sense is to make two distinct, if connected, claims. In the first place, it involves the claim that security as a public good has a distinctively prominent social dimension. There are two elements to this. To begin with, it involves claiming that there is something of significance in the fact that unlike such purely ‘economic’ public goods as clean air, transport or utilities provision, security has an inherently social foundation. Whereas all public goods, including the merely convergent public goods on which the economic perspective concentrates, obviously require a high degree of social co-ordination and regulation for their successful provision, the public good of security has the added dimension that it addresses a root problem – namely insecurity – that is itself socially generated. In other words, whereas the solution to the ‘problem’ of the absence of public goods is in all cases social, in the case of security the problem itself has a social pedigree. So security refers not only to the provision of the objective measures of safety put in place in the form of police officers, crime prevention equipment, a safety-aware built environment etc. at the level of ‘problem-solution’ but also, and more fundamentally, to the risks and dangers inherent in the social environment.

Furthermore, and providing a second distinctively social dimension, even at the level of ‘problem-solution’ the accomplishment of security as a public good depends not just on the objective safety measures established (which, as noted, itself requires a degree of social coordination and regulation) but also on how the adequacy of these measure is interpreted and experienced by the individual. That is to say, security, again unlike the
classic economic public goods, is not simply a matter of objective provision but also has 
an inherently subjective dimension. Security inheres, finally, in the sense of freedom from care, anxiety, apprehension and alarm of the individual in the face of the social environment and the objective safety measures put in place. And this subjective dimension itself must in some measure be a function of the deeper social relations of the individual. For the degree of security or insecurity a person feels depends upon their perception of the social environment and of the adequacy of safety measures. This perception is itself conditioned both by their accumulated experience of that environment and their general threshold of manageable fear, which in turn is a function of their wider sense of confidence in, and ease with their place within, the social world.

This brings us to the second dimension of our ‘thicker’ sociological analysis – namely the constitutive dimension of security as a public good. For the very idea of public goods presupposes an identifiable ‘public’ that understands itself to possess collective interests, one that evinces a preparedness to put and pursue things in common. Security, we may suggest, is not only a key convergent – or thin - good that individuals, according to the social contract tradition of Hobbes, Locke and others, would choose to pursue collectively for reasons of enlightened self-interest. Because its successful achievement both presupposes and vindicates a degree of social ‘connectedness’ within a population, security also possesses a thicker dimension, being among the goods that enables political community to be made and imagined in this sense. The aspiration for security against internal and external threats is – like common language and common territory – prominent among the matters that help to found and give meaning to people’s sense of peoplehood, a means by which stable communities register and articulate their identity as stable communities engaged together in a common project. Security and by extension policing, because they must assume and may give practical effect to the mutual trust and abstract solidarity that binds together individuals who remain strangers to one another, also provide an important symbolic vernacular and affective register through which this mutual trust and solidarity between strangers comes to be and remains commonly understood as common political community. That is to say, the instrumental and the affective dimensions of security as a public good are symbiotically related and operate in a mutually enforcing dynamic in the very making and sustenance of the collective project of common ‘publicness’.

Yet in introducing these social and cultural dimensions of ‘publicness’ to our framework for understanding the public interest in transnational policing in ways that raise this final possibility, we are confronted and perhaps confounded by a deep socio-historical limitation. There are two sides to this difficulty – if difficulty it is. The first is that the sense of mutual trust, common engagement and general readiness to put things in common has been and remains strongly associated with the nation-state, with expressions of national identity. Moreover, this sense of abstract solidarity, of shared ‘peoplehood’, has been a crucial cultural motivator in both the making of nation-states that embody popular sovereignty, and of the desire to constrain the institutions that compose them (Yack 2003). There has, as Cederman (2001, p. 145) puts it, ‘to be a sense of community, a we-feeling, however “thinly” espoused, for democracy to have any meaning’. This is not, of course, to idealize the state as the fount of all social virtue, or the nation as the motor of modern civilization. The nation state and its security machinery, behind the shield of collective self-interest and cultural solidarity, can also encroach upon individual freedom, reflect and enact the bias of the most powerful,
neglect or suppress other important sources of social knowledge and solidarity, and
mobilize and celebrate an intolerant idea of cultural uniformity (Loader & Walker
2006). This is the dark side of the idea of a national security community, and clearly any
serious politics of security has to find institutional means to address these internal
dangers if it is to vindicate the more positive coupling of security and political
community we have outlined above.

For present purposes, however, the more urgent problem of the state template of
security is external rather than internal. Here the second, flipside of the coin of the state-
centred heritage of political community is that despite the deepening of global
interdependence, the growth of institutions of global governance, and an arguably
greater public consciousness of both these developments, sentiments of trust, loyalty
and abstract solidarity remain ‘stuck’ at national or subnational levels – a stubborn fact
that continues to condition the development of even a relatively mature post-national
political order such as the EU. There appears not to exist, in other words, the common
store of memories, myths, symbols and language around which forms of identification
and belonging can coalesce and take shape at a regional or global level (Held &
McGrew 2002, p. 30). It appears, then, that the bar for imagining and giving
institutional expression to the public interest in this cultural sense has been set at the
level of the nation-state, and cannot easily be dislodged.

In search of the transnational public interest

In a recent statement of cosmopolitan intent David Held has argued – contra the kind of
‘Westphalian fatalism’ alluded to above - that:

The provision of public goods can no longer be equated with state-provided goods
alone. Diverse state and non-state actors shape and contribute to their provision – and
they need to if some of the most profound challenges of globalization are to be met.
Moreover, some core public goods have to be provided regionally and globally if they
are to be provided at all. (Held 2004: 16)

How – in the field of policing and security – can we best make sense of this project?
How might policing be delivered and regulated in these terms? Can we identify - at the
level of normative principle and institutional articulation – a common public interest in
the diverse, multi-site, multi-actor field of transnational policing? It is a formidable
enough task to seek to mobilize what we have elsewhere (Loader & Walker 2007: ch .8)
referred to as the four R’s of civilizing security practice - resources, recognition, rights
and reasons - within the more familiar and favourable terrain of state policing, and to
do so in a sufficiently generous and integrated fashion as to avoid the various and often
linked pathologies of paternalism, consumerism, authoritarianism and fragmentation.
But these difficulties are compounded in a transnational context. Paternalism is
couraged by the introduction of another layer of private and public authority - a
further tier of professional bureaucracy even more remote from the concerns of national
‘demoi’ and even more self-confident in the primacy of its security knowledge and
imperatives (see, e.g., Bigo 2000b; Deflem 2003). Consumerist mindsets and methods
are stimulated by a focus on crimes of an economic or otherwise esoteric nature (e.g.,
art fraud, currency counterfeiting) that are of primary interest to specialist corners of the security market. Authoritarian tendencies may encounter an environment made more receptive by the emphasis upon another set of crimes of which most citizens have only mediated knowledge and which they are consistently informed through the relevant political and professional intermediaries represent threats that are both existential and increasingly urgent (e.g., terrorism, nuclear theft). And fragmentation is encouraged by the *ad hocracy* that attends a set of developments which are diversely demand-driven and which lack a prior sense of political community with which they can connect and a established governance framework to which they are required to adhere (Sheptycki 2002, present volume; Johnston 2006). How might we steer a prudent course through these dangers?

A useful starting point here is the collaborative project conducted under the umbrella of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on ‘global public goods’ (Kaul et al. 1999a; 2003a). This project begins from a standard economic definition of public goods as those whose consumption is ‘non-excludable’ and ‘non-rival’. For all its deficiencies, the very thinness of the initial definition is helpful in highlighting the formidable obstacles that a purely state-centred logic and architecture places before the realization of global transnational goods. Because of the externality and free-riding problems associated with the (market) provision of economically defined public goods, they typically require some mechanism of compulsory collective action if they are to be adequately provided or even provided at all, with the state generally considered as the most appropriate such mechanism. While global public goods share all the elements of domestic public goods, according to Kaul et al. (1999b) they possess the added criteria that their benefits – or, in the case of ‘public bads’, costs – ‘extend across countries and regions, across rich and poor population groups, and even across generations’ (Kaul et al. 2003b: 3). A pollution-free environment and financial stability are cited as examples here, as, importantly, are peace and security.³

Let us try to tease out some of the more detailed implications of this analysis. The gradual shift in the level of optimal provision of public goods to the global level raises opportunities and dangers which are different not only in scale but also in kind from those which pertain where the major and most appropriate site of provision of public goods is the state level. The differences in scale are self-evident. The prize of the successful institutionalization of a mechanism of compulsory collective provision becomes the inclusive and cost-efficient supply of a good at a broader transnational or global level, while the penalty of failure is exclusion, cost-inefficiency and perhaps, in a context where the scope for negative externalities is greatly increased, an unraveling of domestic solutions to problems of collective action, such that some (and perhaps all) states become net losers in the endeavour to secure the benefits of the relevant goods to their respective populations.

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² This is also an important point of reference for Held (2004: ch. 6).
³ In the course of their analysis Kaul et al. make a valuable distinction between ‘final’ global public goods, which are outcomes (such as a pollution free-environment) rather than goods in the standard sense, and what they term ‘intermediate’ global public goods (such as international regimes) which contribute to the production of these outcomes (Kaul et al., 1999c: 13). We might in this vein, describe security as a final global public good and transnational policing as an intermediate good that can, under the right conditions, contribute to its production.
In order fully to appreciate these possibilities, however, we must turn to the differences in kind in the structure of public goods provision as we move from the national to the global. In the classic economic analysis, the alternative and perhaps competing unit of supply of the good in question is either, on the one hand, the market agent supplying the private individual or group of private individuals, or on the other, the ‘club’ – in which a self-defining and so exclusionary group come together to provide for their own consumption at least some of the benefits associated with non-rivalness - of cost-efficient provision of a good whose common supply is no detriment to individual enjoyment. As we move to a context of high transnational interdependence, however, not only do the number of market agents or clubs who are candidate suppliers of the same or overlapping goods exponentially increase, but other states also become relevant as alternative and perhaps competing suppliers of the same or overlapping goods.

The introduction of other states into the equation changes the picture dramatically, for a number of reasons. First, these other states are typically authoritatively constituted in such a way that their role in the solution or creation of collective action problems is, broadly speaking, less easily controlled or influenced by the first state than if they were private or club actors.

Secondly, and again broadly speaking, this matters so much precisely because other states have a greater capacity for action, and so a greater propensity not only to produce security-based public goods, but also to prejudice the first state’s capacity to do likewise, than do other individual or club actors. These prejudicial effects may register within the classic matrix of external security – through aggressive acts of war or their threat by other states directed against the first state, or through a shift in the strategies of self-defence of these other states (e.g. the development of new weapons systems or the forming of new alliances) so as to leave the first state more exposed in terms of its actual and perceived capacity for self-defence (Waltz 1993). Increasingly, however, the power of other states to prejudice the internal security of the first state operates through a logic that is more recognizably one of ‘internal security’; that is to say, through those actual or perceived negative externalities affecting the first state that are consequential upon both the effective and ineffectual development and pursuit of whichever domestic policy agendas of these other states are directed towards their own internal security. For example, these externalities might arise or might at least be perceived to arise for the first state through the displacement effect of the successful repression by other states of certain criminal possibilities in areas such as drugs or organized crime, or of their restrictive approach to asylum applications or other supposedly ‘security-destabilizing’ migratory movements. Conversely, externalities for the first state might arise through the failure of other states to ‘contain’ their own security problems, whether through an ineffective regime of monitoring the international movement of indigenous criminals or inadequate control of cross-border transactions in illicit goods and services, or, more broadly, through social and political polices which lead to the flight or export of persons and groups capable of posing a threat to the internal security of the first state.

Yet, thirdly, the introduction of other states into the internal security equation invites commonalities as well as differences. Also being states, these other states share with the first state the same general raison d’état, the same broad set of priorities and incentives – and importantly underlying this, the same deep cultural orientation or sense of the political imaginary - to be the dominant provider of public goods for their respective populations. Their relationship with the first state, in other words, including those
aspects of the relationship which are potentially antagonistic or competitive, are structured not by their efforts to provide the benefits associated with public goods from different motivations and by different means, as with private agents or clubs, but by their aspirations in an interdependent world to bring the same motives to bear, and to use the same means, for the primary benefit of different populations.

We will return to some of these more detailed points in due course, and in particular will have more to say about the cultural dimension of the state’s production of public goods. For now, it is important simply to register the conclusion of Kaul and her collaborators that in the present institutional configuration of global politics the dangers in the shift from a national to a global context of optimal provision of public goods seem to overshadow the opportunities. They convincingly claim that there is in the world today a ‘serious under-provision of global public goods’ (Kaul et al. 1999b: xxi), a condition they attribute in very general terms to ‘the absence of a global sovereign’ able to assume a central coordinating role (Kaul et al. 1999c: 15) and which on closer inquiry they locate in the combined effect of three crucial gaps. First, there is a jurisdiction gap between global problems that span national frontiers and demand transnational attention and discrete national units and regulatory structures of policy-making. We find, in other words, a mismatch between national policy-makers concerned about losing sovereignty to the market and civil society and the imperatives of an international policy environment, creating chronic difficulties with regard to who is responsible for global issues, particularly externalities. Second, there is a participation gap between those state actors involved in fora of national policy-making and international cooperation and non-state actors in the market and civil society who are likely to be affected by or to represent those affected by relevant decisions but who have little or no hand in their authorship or in holding their authors to account. There has developed, in short, a serious lack of symmetry and congruence between transnational ‘decision-makers’ and ‘decision-takers’ (Held 2004: 13). There exists, thirdly, an incentive gap between the substance of stated national commitments and international agreements and the realities of implementation on-the-ground. The absence of effective supranational authority, coupled with weak or imbalanced incentive structures, means that states and non-state actors will seek to free-ride, or lack the necessary motivation to ‘do their bit’ in tackling global problems (Kaul et al. 1999b: xxvi-xxvii).

If we examine these gaps in the round, we can plainly see the outline of a dynamic of mutual impoverishment of the ordering and the cultural dimensions – the instrumental and the affective – in the transnational and global domains, and we can observe how this produces the linked problems of legitimacy and effectiveness to which we earlier alluded. The combination of a jurisdiction gap with regard to the development of an adequately empowered and regulated institutional apparatus, the participation gap with regard to an adequately and inclusively deliberated upon policy agenda, and a gap in reliable incentives to comply with or cooperate in whatever policies and with and through whatever co-operative structures and implementation agencies as do exist, creates a series of linked problems. Foremost among them are the lack of proper authorization of and support for policing capacity and the failed or selective and unaccountable mobilization of that capacity - problems that patently bear upon both the public acceptability of transnational policing and the quality of its output. Yet we cannot assume that the pathological potential of these ‘gap effects’ will have a positive effect in encouraging the closing of the gaps in question. Rather, the danger is that the problems
become exacerbated just because, as seems likely, attempts to produce global public goods in the presence of these gaps may fail to provide the experience of successful common commitment and to fertilize the grounds of increased trust and confidence apt to overcome the motivation problem responsible for the gaps in the first place.

A simple – too simple – response to the difficulties that Kaul and her collaborators pinpoint is that they are a function of the very instrumental conception of public goods they work with. That instrumental conception always has a problem in identifying the proper boundaries of political community, in locating the optimal level at which the undoubted collective action problems which attend the provision of any non-excludable or difficult-to-exclude goods should be addressed. To explain why people in general should be motivated to put things in common in terms of their individual and sometimes convergent security interests does not explain why any particular combination of people should be sufficiently more motivated than any other overlapping particular combination of people so as to make their common motivation count decisively. The missing explanans, moreover, means that the instrumental conception encounters special problems in accounting for transnational or global co-operation. Faced with the massive datum of state formation, the instrumental conception, notwithstanding its lack of adequate theorization, can take for granted or is bound to acknowledge that for whatever reason and under whatever constraints people have already laid their collective action bets with this or that state, which in cumulative consequence becomes the increasingly credible and dominant source of public security solutions. It then becomes all the more puzzling how and why they might make and respect additional commitments to collective security provision at wider levels of political community other than those commitments which are parasitic on and articulated through the states themselves. On this analysis, the fact that the state and its security interests remain so central to the solution of transnational and global security begins to look like part of the problem – a straitjacket on the prospects of better global security management. But since it is precisely the dead weight of analytical dependence on the building blocks of the state as the default site for addressing collective action problems that suggests the jurisdiction, participation and incentive–based impediments to moving to wider conceptions of security as a public good in the first place, the instrumental argument lies open to the accusation that it has boxed itself into this particular Westphalian corner through the circularity of its reasoning. The basic assumption underscoring the economistic conception of public goods employed by Kaul and her associates, in short, may seem persuasively to suggest just the state-centred and state-limited conclusion they seek to move beyond.

Why this would be too simple a critique, however, is because it depends upon our interpreting as conceptual blindness or prejudice, and dismissing as mere tautology, what may instead and more challengingly be viewed as considered sociologically–grounded judgment. If the answer to a unduly ‘thin’ conception of public goods that is unable to account for any of its particular sites of articulations – in this case transnational or global sites - is to replace it with a thicker sense, we still need to demonstrate why and how the ingredients of that thicker mix might become available at any particular transnational or global sites. How, in other words, does a more socially grounded sense of security as a public good akin to that we have sought to locate at the state level begin to ‘catch on’ in the transnational context? How, if at all, do we conceive of security provision at the transnational level, like the statist template, as a
platform for the achievement of other goods of (transnational) political community? How, if at all, do we conceive of security as an education in transnational society, just as it has this tutorial role in national society? And how, if at all, do security concerns and their treatment help constitute transnational publics alongside similarly constituted national publics? For if we cannot imagine that and how at least some of these things in at least some measure are happening or might happen at the transnational or global level, then we cannot escape the limits of the instrumental conception at the transnational and global level.

The very posing of these questions alerts us to just how difficult it is to answer them with any degree of affirmation. In particular, we cannot simply assume that the problem is one of time-lag, that in due course transnational public sentiment and the structures which feed off and refuel that common feeling will emerge alongside the brave new practice of international security. As we have already noted, there is a wealth of literature that indicates that despite the deepening of global interdependence, the growth of institutions of global governance, and an arguably greater public consciousness of both of these developments, sentiments of trust, loyalty and abstract solidarity remain somewhat ‘stuck’ at national or sub-national levels – something that continues to condition the development of even a relatively mature post-national political order such as the EU (see, e.g., Grimm 1995; Weiler 1999; Haltern 2003. Indeed, it is precisely the imbalance between strong national cultures and weak post-national solidarity that in part explains why the development of such new security institutions as have emerged has often been driven by professional and bureaucratic interests (Deflem 2003; Walker 2003), and why such interests have been able to pursue technocratic security agendas in ways that are remote from popular sentiment and demands, and insulated from any effective form of democratic scrutiny. What is more, to the extent that the development of transnational security does nevertheless register in a deeper cultural sense, it may do so in ways that reinforce rather than supplement nationalist sentiments. Under the combined influence of professional and bureaucratic interests and of the performative effects of a discourse of existential threat, the definition of public interest within the transnational security configuration tends to be presented in terms of narrowly drawn security registers. A strong, exclusionary and threatened sense of we-feeling that trades in xenophobic stereotypes of the criminal tends to develop in consequence, as a key form of corroboration of a police-centred and militaristic politics of security.

But we should of course be careful not to replace conceptual fiat with sociological essentialism. There may be something embedded, but there is certainly nothing inevitable about the present constellation of identities and institutional architecture - nothing that says that they are the only possible medium and outcome of a transnational

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4 Consider, as an instance of this, the following conundrum. Which constituencies – beyond the immediate victims and their families or representatives – are likely to be outraged or moved to action by an abuse or atrocity involving, say, Europol officers or members of a UN peacekeeping mission? Possible answers appear to include: (i) hardly anyone at all; (ii) co-nationals of the victims; (iii) members of transnational human rights organizations; (iv) co-nationals of the officers concerned (v) European or globally conscious citizens ashamed that ‘our’ police have acted in such a way. Our point here is that the answer is currently unlikely to be (v). This does, however, cut two ways. The lack of affective attachment to transnational police organizations makes it less likely that public audiences will seek to deny that ‘our’ police could ever do such a thing, thereby laying the potential ground for a less prejudiced politics of security (Walker 2002).
security politics. It is our task in the remainder of the chapter to explore how other possibilities might be imagined and pursued.

Models of transnational security

In this section, we begin to explore the wider frontiers of the transnational security imaginary by bringing this initial problematization of what a transnational public interest might entail into ‘conversation’ with various models of transnational security. These different models – namely, the state-centric approach, unilateralism, security regimes or communities, global civil society and cosmopolitanism - are drawn from the current literature on international relations and globalization and from the practical circumstances of transnational politics. They have explanatory and normative dimensions – seeking to account both for how the world of transnational relations is presently configured and for what it ought and is likely to become. We can identify the key assumptions underlying these explanatory and normative differences and so usefully situate the various models in relation to one another - and also to our preferred alternative - by reference to the thinness or thickness of their conception of policing and security as public goods at both domestic and transnational levels. This give rises to the range of permutations depicted in Figure 1. Security can (1) be produced as a thin public good at both the state and at the transnational level (as proposed by the UNDP authors, and, as we shall see, by many cosmopolitans). It can (2) be thick at the state level and thin at transnational level (as in various state-centric models and under unilateralism), or else (3) thick at the transnational and thin at the domestic levels (a possibility implicit in some cosmopolitan writing). Or, finally, security can (4) be understood in thick, social and cultural, terms at both the state and transnational levels (a possibility implicit in the some security regime and global civil society models, and more fully developed in our own approach). The models overlap and are not necessarily mutually incompatible, yet each continues to offer a distinctive range of perspectives on the current practice, possibilities and prospects of political arrangements beyond the state, and so of the current practice, problems and prospects of transnational security. Let us consider each in turn.

Figure 1: Dimensions of Trans/national Security

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The state-centric approach

This describes a wide umbrella of positions within the international relations literature, and a still dominant set of attitudes within international relations practice, that have in common an enduring attachment to the state as the sole or main actor in global politics. Such an orientation covers all the main variants of the realist and liberal internationalist schools, and the various hybrids that incorporate elements of both. Traditionally, the distinguishing feature of the realist approach has been its emphasis on the self-interest of state actors, the prevalence of power politics and the consequent ‘anarchy’ of the international system (Bull 1977) – similar to the Hobbesian state of nature but with no credible Leviathan to impose international order. Accordingly, realists see international cooperation as hard to achieve, difficult to maintain and always ultimately dependent upon the balance of state powers and interests. In this picture international institutions and regimes can do little to mitigate the anarchic impulses of the international order.

Whereas realism is commonly regarded as the dominant theory – and even more dominant practice – in the history of international relations, liberalism by contrast has been described as the ‘tradition of optimism’ (Clark 1989: 49-66). Unlike realists, liberal internationalists have tended to believe in the possibility of international peace and order being stably achieved through some harmony or concurrence of interests, or even through the sharing or development of certain ideals concerning the proper conduct of international relations and its proper respect for individual and collective values. For the liberal, the tendency is not to see the interests of states as being purely homogeneous and selfish, but as reflecting more fluid domestic coalitions of interest and preferences and in turn as being more responsive to the fluid coalitions of interests and preferences of other states. Self-interest then, is always mitigated by an enlightened view about the value of cooperation, and perhaps about other more substantive values which different domestic coalitions or segments of domestic coalitions find in common, and peace and order may be stabilized or nurtured through a transnational institutional framework in which success is defined not in terms of the absolute interests of states – even the most powerful states - but in terms of the prospect of ‘positive sum’ gains for all.

For all of their sometimes stark differences of orientation as regards the motivations of actors and the viability of transnational institutions, realists and liberals, as already noted, continue to agree that the dominant actors - in the first and last analyses – remain the states. States are the main source of capacity, the main reference point of legitimacy – thus consigning international institutions to a kind of delegated legitimacy at best – and the main source both of the definition of purposes of security cooperation and of the ...

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5 See in particular the so-called ‘neo-neo debate’ in which neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalists over the course of the 1980s and 1990s gradually converged on a common agenda of debate and priorities, and even began to share some founding premises (see Baldwin 1993).

6 The major difference within this school is between the classic realism typified in the writings of Hans Morgenthau (e.g., 1948) and the structural realism of Kenneth Waltz and his followers (e.g., 1959, 1993). Whereas the former stresses the self-interested character of the states themselves, the latter is more interested in the instability of an international order defined by the absence of an overarching authority and asymmetry of power. However, whether the Hobbesian problem of the international relations is due mainly to the intrinsic ‘nature’ of states or to their coordination problems, the same basically pessimistic conclusions are drawn about the possibility of any framework of international cooperation in which these initial state preferences are qualitatively transformed and deepened by the very process of such cooperation.
wherewithal to guarantee its effectiveness. But whatever their merits under the traditional Westphalian model of the international system, in conditions of exponentially increased transnational exchange there is an inherent instability in both these solutions. Such is the range and volume of interdependence and transnational externalities involved in global security decision-making, and such is the range of decision-making required to address this, that the adequacy of each approach is acutely challenged. The realists have severe problems in locating a stable balance of power to cope with the increasing scope for an anarchy of colliding interests emanating not only from state but also from non-state entities, while the liberal internationalists finds it difficult to locate an institutional framework with sufficiently stable state support, and, in the face of disagreement over ends and the limits of delegated power, with sufficient decision-making economy and implementation capacity to cope with the multifarious problems of interdependence.

This state-centred logic might, for example, help us make sense of the chequered history of Interpol – the most venerable of the extant international policing institutions. Born in 1923 and revived in 1946, Interpol’s enduring record is as an organization of uncertain constitutional status in international law, and, being perennially vulnerable to the indifference and neglect or self-interested exploitation of the states whose expedient resource it is (realism) or who are its contracting principals (liberalism), as an entity that reflects the influence as well as the restrictions and instability in both positions (see, e.g., Anderson 1989). The actual or predicted limitations of each position – realist and liberal - can of course reinforce the claim of the other, and certainly the political history of Interpol has remained resolutely state-centred. But the common limitations of realism and liberalism can also lead in the direction of a number of other, less state-centred approaches to be discussed below.

The new unilateralism

Before we turn to these other approaches, however, we should consider one other possibility – one that is also state-centred, but in the singular rather than the plural. What we are referring to is the new unilateralism registered or advocated by those who see in the demise of Cold War bi-polarity and the rise of the United States as by far the world’s most powerful military actor, the empirical preconditions – and, perhaps, the normative hope – of a new kind of empire. Again, there are a number of variants on a position which sees the United States as having the capacity and the legitimacy to be the ‘world’s policeman’ (perhaps the most telling active metaphor for the gradual merging of internal and external security concerns). At one end of the continuum there is an ultra-realist perspective, which holds the United States entitled to assert and defend its interests wherever they fall, and treats the fate of all other interests as dependent upon non-interference with, or even support for, American priorities (The White House 2002). At the other end of the spectrum is the ‘empire-lite’ brand (Ignatieff 2003), wherein the United States provides a vehicle for spreading certain ‘civilized’ values around the globe. In this second kind of approach, the United States might indeed be projected and viewed as a kind of surrogate for failed or faltering liberal international
institutions from the UN downwards, perhaps simply holding the fort until the structures damaged by Iraq and its aftermath are repaired or replaced. 7

What is true of all variants of the new unilateralism, however, is the aggressively proactive approach of the US in pursuit of its conception of its interest or of the common good. Sometimes the suggestion is made in the context of the new unilateralism or indeed the post 9/11 approach to terror more generally (e.g., Ignatieff, 2003, 2004) that while aggressive assertiveness may indeed be the price of a militaristic approach, a policing-centred approach tends by its nature to be less monocultural and more cooperative. But this must be treated with great caution. To begin with, as already noted, there is an increased blurring of internal and external security mentalities, practices and personnel. Secondly, this is entirely consistent with a logic of empire – or at least of an asymmetrically centred world order - in which external policy tends to be treated simply as the pursuit of the internal policy of the centre in another arena, and, reciprocally, internal policy at the centre is pursued with a view to securing domestic interests against external challenge and threat (Andreas and Price 2001). As regards the foreign arm of domestic security policy, whether it be the overseas activities of the FBI, the DEA (Drugs Enforcement Administration) or the myriad other forms of agency and liaison through which the US establishes a police presence abroad – and by no means only in its Latin American and Caribbean ‘neighbourhood’ - there is much evidence of the direct pursuit through widely dispersed security institutions and networks of domestic US policy agendas in areas such as drugs control, organized crime and illegal immigration (Walker 2003). And, likewise, as regards the domestic arm of foreign policy, the consolidation of previously discrete specialist security capabilities and concerns (Immigration and Naturalization, the Coast Guard, Customs, Federal Emergency management etc.,) after 9/11 in the Department of Homeland Security, alongside the development of a more integrated and robust approach to the legislation of US security interests in compact with the EU and other security areas (Bunyan 2004), on matters such as data on airline passengers, mutual extradition, exchange of evidence and anti-terrorist co-operation, both reflects and facilitates a much more concerted awareness of and prosecution of external interests in internal policy domains.

In this new hybridized world of security there are significant problems with both realist and liberal variants of unilateralism, and indeed with the (more common) perspectives which involve some kind of combination of the two. First, in terms of capacity, this position tends to take a myopic approach towards the nature of power. ‘Hard’ military power and, to a lesser extent, other types of internal security capacity tend to be seen as the key to all power, and there is little or no recognition of other ‘soft’ forms of power – economic, regulatory and cultural - which continue to be dispersed across other sites, and which may indeed be reinforced at these other sites by American security activism and the opposition which this generates (Nye 2002). Secondly, even if military power had not – once again - proven itself to be non-fungible in Iraq, the idea of a single state imposing solutions to the problem of global goods is profoundly lacking in legitimacy. This is most nakedly the case from an ultra-realist position, where the ‘specific order’ of

7 The post 9/11 (and post Hardt and Negri 2000) literature on American empire is voluminous indeed. It ranges not only from the realist to the idealist, but also – and often cross-cutting the realist-idealist division - from the celebratory to the denunciatory, and differs greatly on the degree of central control and unity of purpose which the conduct of empire is claimed to entail. See, for example, Ikenberry (2002), Barber (2003), Mann (2003), Todd (2003), Johnson (2003) and Ferguson (2004).
the United States is treated as pre-emptive of, or at best co-terminus with the ‘general order’ associated with a global conception of the public interest (Marenin 1982). Yet it is also true of a more value-based approach – perhaps even more dangerously so to the extent that this lends messianic support to a greater interventionism. At worst this is merely the export of one set of understandings of how to resolve the problem of global peace and security without any sensitivity to other strategies, models and background cultural propensities. At best it is a kind of ersatz liberal internationalism, with the United States, like the crudest type of hypothetical social contractualist, assuming what the diversity of states and peoples would decide was is in the general interest if only they could overcome their collective action problems – a stance that allows little or no scope for genuine dialogue in order to test and validate, still less generate, that sense of a global public interest (Habermas 2007; Walker 2007).

Security regimes or communities

The distinctiveness of the regime approach lies in its identification of the ways in which states either with certain common interests or common values - again depending upon whether the underlying theoretical orientation is realist or liberal - come together in certain policy areas – such as security, environment, economy or communication – or in certain regional groupings – such as the EU or NAFTA – to provide a framework of common rules of action and decision-making procedures. There is an inherently optimistic flavour to regime theory to the extent that it seeks to move beyond the vast problems of legitimacy and effectiveness when the possibility of developing transnational politics from and beyond national building blocks is considered in the abstract, and instead concentrates on more concrete and more discriminating possibilities and achievements of collaboration and common cause-making (Buzan 1991: chs. 4-5; Little 1997; Adler and Barnett 1998).

However the strength of the regime approach is also its limitation. Even if it could be assumed that there is some kind of equality of representation and influence, and some level of general consideration of the common good as opposed to mere strategic collaboration, within particular regimes – assumptions to which we return below and which are surely more valid in more broadly integrationist and more deeply historically embedded regional regimes (in particular the EU) than in many global policy-specific regimes, and more plausible in areas where resources are more evenly distributed than where there is a significant underlying asymmetry (as with military capacity inside NATO) - the regime approach is always left with a profound problem of the ‘outside’. Regimes can act and understand themselves as universal nations or decentred empires exporting a particular conception of the good (liberal) or certain ‘externalities’ as the cost of the internal preservation of the good (realist) to those who have no voice and little capacity to influence that conception of the good. For example, in its ‘conditionality’ approach to eastward Enlargement and in its ‘neighbourhood’ policy generally in the context of its Justice and Home Affairs policy engine, the EU is vulnerable to the charge that in making secure borders, the suppression of certain kinds of criminality, and the exclusion or return of certain types of undesirable ethnic groups its first priority, it tends to export insecurity as the price of protecting its own security (Anderson and Apap 2002; Guild and Bigo 2002; Pastore 2002; Lindahl 2005, Melossi 2005). More generally, as with the famous ‘democratic peace’ thesis (Doyle 1995;
Brown et al. 1996), by which the ‘separate peace’ established by democratic states is celebrated and preserved, the regime approach can reinforce a process of global ghettoization and a myopic or unreflectively superior approach to the needs of others.

Moreover, just as there are limitations to the effectiveness of modern empires, there are limitations to the effectiveness and legitimacy of regimes even on their own security terms, something that is exacerbated by two additional features of the context within which regimes have emerged. First, regimes may have significant coordination problems or clashes of interest or values with other regimes in adjacent policy areas or other regions – or indeed with other powerful states. One need think only of the deterioration of US–EU relations – at least at the level of ‘high politics’ - in recent years to see how regimes can contribute to a new kind of instability in the post-Cold War balance of power (Kagan 2003). Secondly, given that the success of even the most well embedded ‘postsovereign’ regional or functional regimes to transcend the particular interests of the states within these regimes remains limited and precarious (Morgan 2005), not only can this lead to internal division and asymmetry of influence, but also to under-capacity (Barcelona Report 2004), indiscriminate securitization (Bigo 1996; Huysmans 2006) and the maintenance of an obstinate gap between the development and diversification of supranational internal security practice and its regulation. Notwithstanding the expansion of the EU’s capability in policing and related matters - since the introduction of the Europol office and various flanking forms of cooperation in the Third Pillar of the EU Treaty at Maastricht in 1992; through the embrace new and more penetrative policy instruments and fewer national decision-making vetoes in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice baptized at Amsterdam in 1997; to the attempt (so far unsuccessful) at the overall constitutionalization of the European supranational regime in the early years of the new century (Walker 2004; Guild and Carrera 2005; Kostakopolou 2007) - many observers would testify to the resilience of these problems. For the continuing deep ambivalence of Member States towards putting internal security matters in common over and above purely domestic security imperatives and priorities not only produces a recurrent problem of internal trust and of credible commitments at the political and the professional level. It also, and partly in response to default national parochialism, leads to the accentuation of certain narrow and potentially illiberal and exclusionary frames, whether organized crime, illegal immigration, or, now, terrorism, as a means of mobilizing transnational bias - a trend that favours the prioritization of a narrowly instrumental conception of concurrent security concerns. Here, more than anywhere else in the field of transnational security politics, and precisely because it is more developed than any other area of transnational security politics, we see the re-enactment of the deep struggle, transposed from its original state context, to develop the four R’s of civilizing security practice - resources, recognition, rights and reasons – in

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8 One consequence of this is a continuing propensity to reconceive of security within the EU as a ‘club good’ – something more appropriate to particular groups of closely aligned, integration-friendly countries than to the EU as a whole. This was evident for instance, in the initial Schengen initiative in 1985, undertaken by a small group of countries who wanted to anticipate the general dismantling of border controls within the EU and the new security measures required to deal with a borderless regime. It has very recently resurfaced in the form of the 2005 Prum Convention – an initiative by substantially the same group of ‘core’ EU countries to push ahead with new and potentially wide-reaching forms of cross-border police co-operation and common operations outside the framework of the constitutive treaties of the EU (Balzacq et al. 2006).
the face of and against the pathological tendencies of paternalism, consumerism, authoritarianism and fragmentation.

Global civil society

One further, though partial, response to the capacity, legitimacy and effectiveness problems of the traditional state-centred approach and the unilateralist and regime alternatives to or outgrowths of that approach, lies in the emergence of transnational civil society (Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003). It is now well documented that there has been a huge and spiraling increase both in the quantity and in the quality of influence of international NGOs and other movements of ‘disorganized civil society’ in recent decades (de Burca and Walker 2003; Anheier et al. 2004). Global civil society responds to the democratic or participation deficit in transnational politics in at least four ways. First, it provides forms of representation of interests and values that are not state-centred, but which track and help to generate common or convergent preferences across states. Secondly, international NGOs in particular offer a vital means of monitoring abuses of individual and group rights in the operation of international politics, a function that is especially important in the area of policing and security – as the activities of groups as diverse as Amnesty International, Statewatch and Interrights indicates. Thirdly, global civil society provides a key means for developing the idea of a global ‘public sphere’, a space of communication and interaction within which notions of a global interest may be framed, debated and generated. It thus aspires to remedy the underlying cultural base of the democratic deficit in international relations, the lack of a genuine consciousness and articulation of common interest on which transnational institutions can feed and to which they must respond. Fourthly, global civil society, and the ‘anti-globalization movement’ in particular, claims to offer a prefiguration of an alternative paradigm of world politics – one in which states are no longer the dominant institutions, violence is no longer power’s ‘final analysis’, and/or capital is no longer the dominant transactional logic and policy motor.

Clearly, any serious attempt to think through the possibility of developing a conception of a transnational public interest dedicated to the articulation and implementation of global public goods must take seriously the aspirations and achievements of global civil society. Yet global civil society can only ever be one part of the jigsaw, and indeed unless the other parts are also in place some of the effects of global civil society can be perverse, acting to undermine as much as to advance the best aspirations on which it is based. In the first place, global civil society cannot replace the policy capacity of the present configuration of state and transnational institutions, but only supplement and complement it. And in so doing, it must avoid two opposite dangers. One is of co-option, a danger well documented in the world of both national and international NGO politics. The other is that of negative capacity, the legitimate oppositional role of civil society threatening to descend into a form of critique which cannot articulate a positive counterfactual, or can only do so in the most vaguely utopian terms. This kind of negative capacity, ironically, can lead to a kind of default statism, with all attempts to put transnational interests or values institutionally in common condemned a priori for their lack of democratic credentials. In the second place, transnational civil society must attend to its own legitimacy problems. Direct global democracy is of course not an option, both on account of the scale and the diversity of policy areas and the need for
coordination between them, in which case global civil society movements must be as attentive to their own deliberative procedures and representational capacity as the institutions they monitor and criticize. Thirdly, and cumulatively, global civil society must be concerned with questions of effective implementation. In security politics, as elsewhere, an opposition culture must be seriously engaged with the implementation gap – with the consideration that the ‘evil’ of global politics in the face of unrealized global public goods lies as much in false negatives as it does in false positives; as much in inaction – the failure to translate concerns into policy and policy into normative regulation and normative regulation into effective application – as it does in illegitimate action. This requires an approach that is at once critical and constructive, as willing to support institutions for what they might achieve as pillory them for what they have not, or hold them to account for what they have wrongly pursued and accomplished.

**Cosmopolitanism**

Cosmopolitanism has, since Kant, enjoyed a richly diverse development (Kleingeld, 1999) and been associated at its outer limits with ideas of ‘federal’ global government and citizenship. But most contemporary cosmopolitans do not pitch their ambitions in such terms. Instead, many of today’s cosmopolitans want to emphasize and give precedence to two sorts of developments (Archibugi et al. 1998; Held 2004; cf. Waldron 2000, 2003; Vertovec and Cohen 2002). First, at the level of social ontology and normative theory, they want to stress, against communitarian positions, that an appropriate focus of our attempts to improve the world should be, and increasingly can be, either humanity as a whole or indeed any section of humanity regardless of whether it is bound together by any special ties of affinity. In turn, this is based on a conception of human nature which questions the dominance, and in some cases even the continued relevance, of affective ties rooted in the traditions and practices of particular state and sub-state political communities. Rather, as global circuits of communication and interdependence spread, and as institutions develop to articulate and track these new circuits, this provides a practical context within which transnational ties of trust, loyalty and common cause can be fostered. And it is this new range of transnational institutions that provides a second focus of emphasis. Not, as said, some rigid and utopian notion of universal order framed by a world government, but a strengthening and democratization of the existing mosaic of institutions at global and regional level; with regions such as the EU given great emphasis as much for their role as a prototype of the ‘civilian power’ based possibilities of ‘post-national’ collective action as for their specific contribution to current transnational politics (see, e.g., Zielonka 1998; Cooper 2003). Cosmopolitanism tends, furthermore, to emphasize the strengths of global civil society movements and their role, in symbiosis with the new institutions, in forging new forms of transnational collective identity and solidarity.

There is much that is attractive in the cosmopolitan vision. On the one hand, its emphasis on the needs and aspirations of common humanity – its insistence on regarding ‘nothing human as alien’ (Waldron 2000: 243) – puts the question of global public goods squarely in focus, and does so within a basically optimistic intellectual and

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9 A distinction may be drawn here between strict and moderate cosmopolitans, with only the (less common) former category holding that the community of all human beings is the exclusive reference point for moral community. See, e.g., Kleingeld and Brown (2002).
political framework, one that rejects the sterile dichotomies and stalled understanding associated with a certain type of conceptual or sociological essentialism. On the other hand, the rejection of any simple institutional solutions, or of any complacent sense that new forms of political community will inevitably emerge around these institutions after a decent time-lag, and the stress on the need to nurture forms of popular consciousness in conjunction with institutional development, sits well with the insight that effectiveness and legitimacy are intimately related aspirations, and that effective implementation of global policy – including global security policy - depends on both.

Yet cosmopolitanism remains somewhat predisposed to underplaying the continuing relevance – and value – of national and other local norms of political community, and so of making the opposite error to the kind of preoccupation with national political community that we find in the different variants of the state-centred approach to international relations (Fine and Smith 2003: 484). Certainly, modern cosmopolitans do not want to phase out national institutions. But this seems to be a pragmatic concession – recognition of their embedded influence over and thus indispensability to the development of more robust transnational institutions - rather than an acknowledgment and appreciation of any irreducible value in local political community and the goods which they can articulate and provide. The danger, here, is that it is assumed that because global public goods transcend domestic public goods in scope and jurisdiction, they also eclipse them in intrinsic value, and that the appropriate model is one in which domestic public goods are simply nested within and finally subordinate to the demands of global public goods.

Such an approach would seem to rest upon one or both of two mistakes. In the first place, it may be that, as noted, cosmopolitans simply fail to acknowledge any irreducible value in local community. And in our immediate terms, this translates into a failure to view public goods, including the good of security, as thick socially constitutive and socially vindicatory goods rather than, as we see for instance in the case of Held (2004: ch. 6), as merely convergent or instrumental public goods. Alternatively or additionally - and returning finally to the zero-sum thinking whose challenge we highlighted at the beginning of the chapter - even if the thickness of the domestic good of security is acknowledged, this may be seen as something to regret and to suppress inasmuch as it is thereby concluded or assumed that a parallel conception of cosmopolitan solidarity sufficiently robust to address the common security needs of wider levels of community is automatically ruled out. On this view, the preferred options are either – much as with the UNDP – the promotion of a ‘thin-thin’ conception of security at the state and transnational levels (see Figure 1 above), or else a politics that seeks to build a thick ideal of the public interest at and only at the global level precisely because it is the level that knows no boundaries other than common humanity. Such a conclusion, we would argue, is flawed both as a theoretical understanding of how and why people come to place and retain matters in common and as a practical strategy to draw upon the sources of social capacity and popular legitimacy in building an effective framework for the development of global public goods – including those of policing and security.
Security as a global public good

In the above section, we presented the attempt to cope with increasing interdependence in global politics in general and in global security politics in particular in terms of a continuum marked at either end by solutions which collapse their vision of a viable and legitimate politics into a state-centred approach or into a universalist cosmopolitanism which trumps particular ties and obligations. Each of these positions continues to give insufficient recognition to one of the two key coordinates in any viable and legitimate global politics of security. The other alternatives are also unsatisfactory, though for different reasons. The unilateralist approach merely compounds the problems of the state-centred approach. The regime approach and the civil society suggest important institutional and cultural parts of the jigsaw respectively, but do not solve the whole puzzle.

The way ahead, in our view, and the focus of our closing remarks, is to provide a principled basis, grounded in a proper understanding of the plural structure of public goods, on which to give proper recognition to both levels simultaneously – the universal and the domestic – and from that starting point to begin to imagine the institutional and social developments which would give best effect to that plural structure in terms of the maximization of the net overall state of security. Such a principled basis starts with a reassertion not just of the virtue of the state, but of the necessity of that virtue. Just because the public good of security, unlike some public goods, is about more than the convergence of discrete individual interests but has in addition an inherently social dimension, and just because, in consequence, this social dimension is woven into deep cultural understandings of what it is to constitute a social group as a public, we cannot ignore this deeper sociological dynamic in forging a comprehensive framework. Objective security depends on the social environment, subjective security depends on the quality of social relations, and our basic sense of preparedness to put things in common is partly understood through a security sensibility and vernacular on account of these thick social properties. This, in turn, reinforces the very sense of trust and confidence, and of rootedness in the social world, which is the stuff of (subjective) security as a public good. This is a tightly enmeshed and self-reinforcing set of relations. It both presupposes and consolidates the idea of a resilient unit of political community, and of a sense of location within that political community, the paradigm form and basic level of which remains the state. At this basic level of political community, therefore, the social dimension of security simply cannot be wished away. It may be a matter of regret if that social dimension develops in accordance with a dynamic that encourages paternalistic, authoritarian, consumerist or fragmentary trends, but it cannot be a matter of regret that the inevitable exists in some form or other.

However, and this is our second point of principle, the fact that there remains a strong reinforcing dynamic in support of national political community and national conceptions of security does not mean, as we have said, that we need despair at the possibility of the parallel realization of a global conception of the public good, or that we need conceive of that higher level merely in ‘thin’ convergent terms. We need not, in other words, especially if we are to develop the idea and practice of axiomatic security in the transnational arena, conceive of security between different and overlapping levels of political community in zero or negative sum terms, and so we
need not be resigned as a matter of sociological default to a state-centred conception of security. Indeed, the prevalence of such zero-sum thinking is a sign of how a ‘pervasive’ (rather than axiomatic) conception of security (Loader & Walker 2007: ch. 6) currently structures world politics; either, in the short-term, in the form of the transnational spread of a ‘lowest-common-denominator’ introverted, fear-laden, reactive superficiality in matters of threat perception and management and its attendant police and militarized mindsets, or, of longer-term significance, in the form of a (lop-sided) competition between states seeking to defend their particular homogenous and securitized conception of ontological security, in which one dominant conception of ‘thick’ national or regional security threatens to be imposed on a global scale.

There are a number of reasons why we need not accept this state of affairs and on the basis of which we can transcend such zero-sum calculations. The first takes as its point of departure the purely convergent conception of global public goods. As the ceaseless preoccupation with international security of even the most state-centred realist scholars eloquently indicates, the fact that states have such a strong self-interest in security means that, they are and will always remain willing participants in collaborative strategies notwithstanding the difficulties involved in stabilizing these strategies in institutional terms. Indeed, the problems of stabilization do not arise from a lack of awareness of the interdependence, but rather, from an acute and constant awareness of interdependence coupled with a sometimes unbridled determination to assert one's own national interest in the light of the factors of interdependence. Secondly, as the content of the internal security imperative of states is in all cases strikingly similar, states may be encouraged nevertheless to think of the global public good as something more than the optimal convergence of presumptively diverse individual state interests. Perhaps more so than in any other policy domain all states adhere to the same broad conception of general order – the same appreciation of (and appreciation of their need to respond to) their populations’ desire to live in a state of tranquility and in a context of predictable social relations. Thirdly and relatedly, states may also find common cause in their very understanding of the social quality of the public good of security. Earlier, when discussing alternative ways of providing security, we contrasted the rivalry between states and clubs and private actors on the one hand and the rivalry between different states on the other. For all that their particular interests may differ, states also have a common understanding of the social and public quality of that which they seek to defend, which in turn allows, however unevenly and intermittently, for a greater imaginative openness to the possibility of other sites and levels of social or public ‘added value’ in the accomplishment of security.\(^\text{10}\)

The constancy and priority of international security needs (and the urgency that arises from them) and the ‘mirror effect’ of regarding other states in the process of pursuing these needs (and the empathy which this entails) are clearly important ingredients of

\(^{10}\) To return to the EU example, it is easier to think of ‘European security’ as a holistic social good – as something whose value may increase just by the fact of its being held in common, if one already has a sense of the same process at work in the nurturing of domestic security. Indeed, the very fact that European security ‘makes sense’ in these experiential terms is one of the reasons that the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has been pushed so strongly as a catalyst of EU integration in recent years. Public goods which do not possess that strong social element, such as the provision of utilities, carry less intuitive appeal when relocated at new sites, although by the same token, the fact that they do not possess a thick resonance anywhere else means they are also less likely to provoke strong resistance from those affected by them anywhere else.
being able to configure global security in positive sum terms. But a crucial final reason why we can begin to imagine a thicker transnational conception of security alongside thick individual national conceptions can also be added to the mix and has to do with the very dynamic through which the relationship between sociality and security is produced. Our concern, introduced at the outset, to think about policing and security as thick public goods at the state level, tends to posit a set of relationships that are always already accomplished, and to concentrate instead on avoiding the pathologies and pursuing the promise of its self-reinforcement. What this tends to overlook, and what is by contrast much more apparent and pertinent in the ‘unfinished’ world of international society, is that in the making of political community security possesses a chronological as well as a logical priority. When we talk of the constitutive dimension of security as a public good – as a platform for and an education in society - we are alluding to just that dual sense of priority. In turn, this helps us to think about how central the practices of transnational security are to the very construction of international society, however immature or frustrated such a project might be. It is difficult for us to imagine, and more importantly difficult for global decision-makers to imagine, the effective supply of other global public goods without the stable platform supplied by the global public good of security. Furthermore, it is difficult for us to imagine, and more importantly difficult for global decision-makers to imagine, the very idea of transnational society rather than merely relations between discrete national societies in the absence of the salutary education a common concern for security can provide in bringing together instrumental and affective registers of common action. What is more, the ‘social’ here is always more-or–less rather than either/or. Not only is security necessarily ‘in at the beginning’ of new levels and points of social relations, but just because of its catalytic role, its initial and continuing viability does not depend upon some prior standard of ‘sociality’ or ‘demos’ or ‘culture’ or whatever other basis of affinity or measure of ‘we feeling’ already having been reached, still less upon these not having been reached or having been relinquished elsewhere. Rather than in terms of absolute and mutually exclusive thresholds of viability or success, therefore, the platform-building and societally generative work of security, if successfully initiated, can operate in accordance with an incremental dynamic and with a different momentum in various different sites - national and post-national – simultaneously.

Yet, of course, it would be naïve to assume that, even democratic states, if left to their own devices, will find their way to an optimal conception of the global public good of security in addition to an optimal conception of their own public good. We are claiming something much more modest than that; namely, that states have a multiple and in some measure mutually reinforcing structure of incentives to think of collaboration in protection of their security interests, and that, after a century which has seen such defining state-transcending security events as Hiroshima, the Holocaust, the nuclear arms race, and, now, the rise of network terror (Robertson 1992; Kaldor 2003: 112), they possess some of the common vulnerabilities, value predilections and imaginative tools to think at the same time about the possibility of thicker global model of security too – one in which they understand themselves at least some of the time as representing not just national citizens but also potential ‘citizens of the world’, and where to share a concern for common humanity is both a necessary assumption and a constituent part of a sense of regional or global security.
So we must start with states in building the institutional and social framework necessary for the realization of some thicker notion of the transnational public interest to parallel and complement state public interests. But equally we must not and we need not finish with states. Alongside states, and the bargaining structures and institutions set up between states, we need some kind of influential regional and global fora in which those who are not fettered by state interests and whose voice and ‘citizenship’ is not defined in exclusively statist terms can give fuller rein to their political imaginations and think through the ways in which security may be achieved as a thick public good at the global level. The reasons for this are not just ones of political morality – concerning the increasing demands for a meta-democratic ‘reframing’ of the global order in recognition of these new and old constituencies who are not well represented by states (Fraser 2005). They are also intensely practical. States, we believe, are like any actors who have much invested individually in a particular framework of collective action but who can nevertheless imagine another or additional framework of collective action that might better serve the interests *they hold in common*. That is to say, they may lack the individual will to seek or the collective negotiating dynamic to find the optimal sense of these common interests within the existing framework, yet just because of their awareness of this, they will not necessarily or consistently be averse to the construction or evolution of alternative frameworks which *do* emphasize common rather than merely concurrent interests, and which may provide both the cultural momentum and the adjusted incentive structures to realize these common interests. Indeed, if this were not true in principle, then it would be very hard to understand and explain *existing* developments of international and supranational legal and political regimes that move beyond the thin and unstable logic of realism or other predominantly state-centred structures of control.

It is important here to refrain from issuing institutional wish lists – an activity still more presumptuous in the volatile and precarious world of contemporary transnational security than in the internal structure of the state itself. In the most general terms, however, we would envisage an extension of the conception of anchored pluralism that we have elsewhere developed (Loader & Walker 2006), now looking upwards to transnational society as well as outwards to civil and market society and downwards to sub-state society. The institutional matrix should and for the foreseeable future inevitably will remain anchored in states as the primary motors of common action and sources of institutional initiative both within and beyond their boundaries. But it should be pluralist in its principled and non-negotiable recognition, not least by states themselves, that there are two levels of abstract political community at which we can think of security as a thicker public good that are not reducible to one another but which need different registers of debate and institutional forums for their articulation. At the second level, transnational civil society and regional regimes would be important additional sources of initiative and key participants, as they are already defined in part in terms of their transcendence of national interests. Professional and administrative corps who have become distant from national political contexts but, at their best, not from the thick-security-maximizing occupational ethics which drive situational decision-making in these national contexts, would also, inevitably and potentially productively, be significant players at this level.\(^{11}\) This, of course, would still leave open

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\(^{11}\) In particular, the work and research programme of Sheptycki (present volume) on the idea of a transnational ‘constabulary ethic’ is suggestive here. This is partly driven by the desire to turn the
the large ‘reframing’ question of how to address and resolve the possible tensions between the ‘aggregative’ or convergent tendencies of proposals or approaches arrived at in the purely national and inter-national discourse and fora on the one hand, and the more transcendent proposals and approaches arrived at in regional and global fora on the other. But at least the tension, and the need for its negotiation, should be institutionally recognized on the basis of a principled understanding of the pluralism of levels of the public good of security, none of which can hold a monopoly on ensuring or seeking to optimize the provision of policing as a global public good.

inevitability of high levels of police discretion in transnational theatres into a virtue. But it is also partly based on a sense that the idea of a common constabulary ethic is part of the constitutive self-understanding of security operatives in many different contexts, and that this is driven not just by professional self-interest or self-regard, but by a genuine structural continuity between the dynamics of security-threatening situations across a broad range of national and transnational contexts and a real sense of the value of a common police-craft in repairing these situations.
References


Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing


