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The Post-communist Tripartition, 1996-2004.
Contrasting Actor-centred and Structural
Explanations of Political Change in the Post-
Communist Setting

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Abstract

Since the upheavals of 1989-1991, the post-communist countries have embarked upon three distinct political tracks – one leading to democracy, one to what may best be termed hybrid regime, and one to autocracy. How can this tripartition be explained? Using typological theory, this paper contrasts a general set of actor-centred explanations with a general set of structural explanations. The most notable thing about the post-communist setting turns out to be the striking geographical regularities on the dependent and the independent variables. In essence, both the actor-centred explanations and their structural equivalents elucidate the political pathways of the period 1996-2004. It is very difficult to see how such regularities – to wit the combination of 'intra-subregional' similarities and 'inter-subregional' differences – could be created by actors; rather, their origin must be sought in the structural point of departure

Keywords

Post-communism, typological theory, actors, structures

1. The puzzle of the post-communist tripartition

Once construed as a coherent politico-economic bloc, the post-communist setting is today characterised by some very salient political dividing lines.[1] What is so striking about the variation in political regime forms found in this quarter is its systematic dispersion from a geographical point of view. No Central and Eastern European[2] country has been unable to reach the promised land of democracy since the breakdown of communism. Conversely, no Central Asian country has been unable to withstand the pull of autocracy. Finally, most of the remaining countries have (for the better part of the period) lingered in a hybrid state. In a nutshell, we encounter a geographic tripartition. This brings us to the research problem of this paper: *Which factors account for the systematic combination of intra-subregional similarities and inter-subregional differences in post-communist political regime forms that has locked in since the early-1990s?*

'Intra-subregional' here denotes familiar subregional clusters such as Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the central parts of the former Soviet Union, respectively. 'Inter-subregional' refers to the distinction between these clusters. When speculating about the origins of such dividing lines, the tentative conclusion that comes to mind is a simple one: the political pathways are so similar within each of the three clusters of post-communist countries mentioned above that it questions the causal importance of the actors. To phrase it differently, it seems obvious that the point of departure of these three groups – the factors that tied each cluster together and set the three clusters apart at the outset of the transition – carry critical explanatory weight. Furthermore, it is remarkable how the actors, with a few notable and very interesting exceptions, have not been able to break what almost seem to amount to a 'geographical iron law of post-communist political change'.[3]

This tentative conclusion is interesting because it challenges the actor-centred explanations – normally subsumed under the umbrella of 'Transitology' – that has dominated the study of regime change since the 1980s and that, in various guises,

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[1] See Valerie Bunce, 'The Political Economy of Postsocialism', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 58, No.4, Special Issue, Winter (1999) : p. 760 and Herbert Kitschelt, 'Accounting for Postcommunist Regime Diversity. What Counts as a Good Cause?', in Grzegorz Ekiert & Stephen E. Hanson (eds.), *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 49

[2] Throughout this paper, I use the term 'Central and Eastern Europe' to denote the areas comprised by the three regions of the Baltic States, East-Central Europe and the South-Eastern Balkan (viz. Bulgaria and Romania), i.e., the post-communist countries which – with the exception of the Baltic States – were not part of the Soviet Union or South-Western Balkan.

[3] My formulation. There are some exceptions to the tripartite distribution – we will see this later – and it is therefore not a genuine 'iron law.' I use the phrase merely to convey the fact that the geographical dividing lines, or regularities, are very salient.

presently dominate the literature on post-communism.[4] Also, it is possible to instil the assertion with methodological content by visiting Herbert Kitschelt's influential paper on post-communism from 2003. In that paper, Kitschelt makes a distinction between deeper, structural factors (such as diversity of communist regimes, predicated on variation among precommunist interwar regimes) and shallower, proximate factors (such as the outcome of founding elections, or the power of presidencies in postcommunist constitutions).[5] His point is that the proximate, i.e., actor-centred or institutional explanations, are often too closely linked with the outcome temporally to be causally interesting – at least *vis-à-vis* their 'deeper' equivalents. Hence, they should be construed as causal links in a chain leading from the structural point of departure to the political outcome.

The hypothesis that emerges is thus two-sided: *First, I expect both the actor-centred variables and the structural variables to explain the variation on the dependent variable of political regime forms, at least after the transitional upheavals ebbed away. Second, I expect the structural variables – construed as a 'package' – to explain the variation on the actor-centred 'package'.*

To test these propositions, I will contrast the two approaches in order to examine i) how each of them bear upon the outcome on the dependent variable of post-communist political regime forms and ii) how they bear upon each other in the post-communist setting.

2. Conceptualising the explanandum
Before engaging the reality on the ground, an initial conceptual exercise is required. In this section, I will descend the so-called ladder of abstraction[6] to provide a conceptualisation of democracy that is capable of setting dissimilar countries apart and bringing similar countries together in the post-communist setting. Within the theoretical literature, little disagreement exists with regard to the most abstract definition of democracy. As Larry Diamond[7] has emphasized, most scholars today define democracy

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[4] See, e.g., Michael McFaul, 'The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship. Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World', *World Politics* 54 (2002), Milada Anna Vachudova, *Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism* (Oxford University Press, 2005), M. Steven Fish, 'The Dynamics of Democratic Erosion' in Richard D. Anderson, Jr., M. Steven Fish, Stephen E. Hanson, Philip G. Roeder, *Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy* (Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2001), Lászlo Bruszt, 'Market Making as State Making: Constitutions and Economic Development in Post-communist Eastern Europe', *Constitutional Political Economy* (2002), Anders Åslund, *Post-Communist Economic Revolutions. How Big a Bang?, Creating the Post-Communist Order*, Volume XIV, Number 9 (1992), Jeffrey Sachs, *Poland's Jump to the Market Economy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 1993), M, A. Boycko, Shleifer & R. Vishny, *Privatizing Russia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 1995), Joel S. Hellman, 'The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions', *World Politics*, 50 (1998)
[5] Kitschelt, 'Accounting for Postcommunist Regime Diversity', pp. 74-75.
[6] See Giovanni Sartori, 'Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics', *The American Political Science Review*, 64 (December, 1970) and Robert Adcock & David Collier, 'Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research', *American Political Science Review*, 95:3 (September, 2001) for a more recent elaboration.
[7] Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1999), p. 8.

as a *political regime form*.[8] This understanding of the concept is in line with the tradition reaching back to Joseph Schumpeter.[9]

On the more concrete level, two influential scholars – Robert A. Dahl and Guillermo O'Donnell – have, while staying loyal to Schumpeter's 'realistic' or 'procedural' vein of thinking, elaborated the connotations of the definition to make up for what has been termed Schumpeter's 'electoral fallacy'. Dahl[10] has added the presence of the respective liberal rights of the freedom of expression, the freedom of information, and the freedom of association. O'Donnell[11] has called for the presence of a rule of law capable of upholding these rights. Their common argument is that without these, the electoral rights cannot be exercised effectively.

When adding Dahl's and O'Donnell's 'liberal' requirements to the 'electoral' requirements of Schumpeter, we arrive at two conceptually different sets of rights: 'liberal'/'civil' rights on the one hand and 'electoral'/'political' rights on the other. Because the two dimensions co-vary very systematically on both the global level[12] and in the post-communist setting, I will rely on a one-dimensional classification[13] of the political regime form, i.e., I add up the two attributes and carve out classes along the consequent attribute space.

Using this very simple taxonomic exercise, it is possible to make a distinction between three classes only. At one end of the spectrum, we have the class of 'democracy' or 'liberal democracy', i.e., a political regime form that, on average, safeguards liberal and electoral rights. At the other end of the spectrum, we have the class of 'autocracy' or 'illiberal autocracy', i.e., a political regime form that, on average, does not safeguard liberal and electoral rights. In between, we have the class of 'hybrid regime', i.e., a political regime form that, on average, goes some way towards safeguarding liberal and electoral rights, yet still falls short with regard to the operationalised threshold.

It is not too difficult to group the post-communist states within the classification crafted above. I will let the regime form of the countries be measured by the Freedom House ratings of civil liberties and political rights.[14] But which countries to choose?

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[8] See also David Collier & Steven Levitsky (1997), 'Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research', *World Politics*, 49.3.

[9] Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (Unwin University Books, London, 1974).

[10] Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy* (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1971).

[11] Guillermo A. O'Donnell, 'Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 36 (Spring, 2001).

[12] See Jørgen Møller, 'The Gap between Electoral and Liberal Democracy Revisited. Some Conceptual and Empirical Clarifications', *Acta Politica* (forthcoming in 2007).

[13] See P. F. Lazarsfeld & A. H. Barton, 'Qualitative Measurement in the Social Sciences: Classification, Typologies, and Indices', in D. Lerner & H. D. Lasswell (eds.), *The Policy Sciences*, (Stanford University Press, 1951), esp. pp. 155-165 and pp. 169-180 for the distinction between types and classes.

[14] See the 'Freedom House Country Ratings', *Freedom House*, www.freedomhouse.org. These ratings more or less capture the two sets of rights I have brought together (for an elaboration see Adrian Karatnycky, "Liberty's Advances in a Troubled World', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, Number 1 (January, 2003): p. 102) and they add them up along one dimension in the consequent index. I will let an FH-score of below or equal to 2 denote 'democracy', an FH-score above 2 but below 5.5 denote 'hybrid regime', and an FH-score equal to or above 5.5 denote 'autocracy'. As such, I have departed from the thresholds of the Freedom House's own classification of 'free', 'partly free' and 'not free'. The justification for doing so is that the said classification does not treat the two dimensions (i.e., the electoral and the liberal) as equally important. On this, see Møller, 'The Gap between Electoral and Liberal Democracy Revisited'.

Obviously, it would be preferable to zoom in on the entire population, i.e., to pick all post-communist countries. I have, however, chosen to exclude the ex-Yugoslavian cluster with the sole exception of Slovenia. Two simple reasons justifies this. First, torn by pernicious internecine strife, the foursome of Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Macedonia has followed a very unflattering political path throughout most of the period that interests me here for reasons that are not so much linked to general factors of political change. The causal mechanisms at work in this corner of the post-communist universe are likely to be very idiosyncratic,[15] so to say, and I am in search of more general mechanisms. Second, and more pragmatically, but also importantly, it has proven very hard to get reliable data on in particular Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro with respect to the indicators that interest me. That leaves us with a quite extensive set of 24 countries, from the Czech Republic in the West to Mongolia in the East.

We can now depict the consequent empirical variation in post-communist political regime forms, zooming in on the respective years of 1996 and 2004. These two years have not been chosen for some intrinsic qualities but to elucidate i) the earlier occurrences (1996), and ii) the longer-term[16] developments (2004). I start in 1996 because of what John Gerring terms 'priority'[17], viz., that the cause(s) must predate the effect on the dimension of time. Some of the actor-centred variables that I use have to be measured as late as the mid-1990s, and it is thus problematic to include years prior to this point in time.

Classification 1: Post-communist political regime forms 1996

Democracies	Hybrid regimes	Autocracies
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia	Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine	Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

Classification 2: Post-communist political regime forms 2004

Democracies	Hybrid regimes	Autocracies
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia	Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine	Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

The two classifications demonstrate that the geographical tripartition between democracies, hybrid regimes and autocracies, from which the title of this paper is drawn, has been in existence since the mid-1990s – and has become more clear-cut over time. Let us try to understand why.

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[15] Cf. e.g. Jeffrey S. Kopstein & David A. Reilly's, 'Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World', *World Politics*, 53 (2000) : p. 25.

[16] Needless to say, the notions of short-term and long-term are arbitrary. In the present case, 2004 is long-term considering the time of writing.

[17] John Gerring, *Social Science Methodology. A Criterial Framework*, Cambridge University Press (2001), pp. 125-127.

3. An actor-centred analysis of post-communist political regime forms

According to my reading of the theoretical literature on post-communism, it is dominated by two, somewhat intertwined actor-centred perspectives. I will term the first 'the political competition hypothesis', and the second 'the constitutional engineering hypothesis'. They hold two important postulates about political change in the post-communist setting in common. First, that the important factors shaping the outcome on the political regime form date from the transitional upheavals – not from antecedent structural factors. Second, and partly related, that these constraints were put in place by actors in a relatively voluntaristic way. In what follows I will discuss, operationalise and measure the two variables in turn.

In doing so, I am interested in identifying factors that when present in the post-communist setting theoretically makes for 'democracy' and when absent in the post-communist setting theoretically makes for 'autocracy'. In other words, I will divide each variable into a dichotomous classification on the basis of either the presence of the absence of a particular, theoretically relevant attribute. In this context, a word of caution is pertinent. As Giovanni Sartori has reminded us with respect to classifications,

> '[w]hile the cases can be moved from one class to another, nonetheless a classification imputes permanence and boundedness. If no such imputation is justified, the ever-changeable rank orderings and more sensitive indexes would be more attuned to the real world'.[18]

When I opt for the dichotomous classifications at this point (and, later on, for a typological schema), it is on the basis of the pre-eminent observation outlined in section 2: that the dependent variable is characterised by a very salient tripartition which has been reproduced over time since the mid-1990s. This seems to indicate that the post-communist setting is indeed characterised by stable differences in kind, rather than unstable differences in degree and, by extension, by form rather than formlessness. However, should the empirical analysis of the independent variables show otherwise, i.e., in case the regularities on the dependent variable do not extend to the independent variables, this would undermine the merits of the classificatory and typological schema; at least *vis-à-vis* standard statistical procedures. I will come back to this after having engaged the reality on the ground.

3.1. Two actor-centred explanations

In 1998, M. Steven Fish published the article 'The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World'.[19] The message of this article is both tangible and simple: the properties (i.e., the outcome and the character) of the initial elections after the breakdown of communism laid out the tracks of the concomitant economic reform process. Also, Fish emphasises that the initial elections were not shaped by 'deeper' factors.[20]

In a very interesting overview of the economic and political occurrences after the breakdown of communism, Valerie Bunce[21] both broadens and extends the causal

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[18] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and party systems. A framework for analysis*, Volume 1 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976), p. 147.
[19] M. Steven Fish, 'The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World', *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 12, No. 1, Winter (1998).
[20] Fish, 'The Determinants of Economic Reform', p. 77-78.
[21] Bunce, 'The Political Economy of Postsocialism'.

chain developed by Fish. First, she broadens it by noting that it is not the elections per se, but rather the political competition taking place during and in the immediate aftermath of the communist breakdown that should be perceived as the 'root cause'.[22] Second, she emphasises that economic reform is the best predictor of democratisation. By logical extension, the causal chain leads from the initial elections, as described by Fish, via economic reform to the political regime form.[23]

What emerges is thus an independent variable centred on the attribute of political competition, and in particular the sub-component of the outcome of the initial election.[24] Depending on the existence or non-existence of such competition, a causal chain is set in motion which ultimately results in either democracy or autocracy as the outcome on the dependent variable of the political regime form.

To capture the variable of political competition, I will simply zoom in on Fish's sub-component of 'Who won the initial elections?' This reductionist choice reflects the fact that Fish's quite 'thick' operationalisation of the initial election-variable touches upon a number of other properties that are much too closely linked to the dependent variable to be analytically meaningful for my purposes.[25]

The theoretical expectation is that the presence of a displacement of communist at the first elections (i.e., an oppositional win) favours democracy whereas its absence (i.e., an oppositional defeat) favours autocracy. Fish scoring is very easily converted into a dichotomous classification. The residual category is the absence of displacement (score = 0) whereas any other outcome (score = 1 or 2) indicates some sort of presence of displacement. This leads me to the following operational definition: A *post-communist country experienced a displacement of communist incumbents if it obtained a score of 1 or 2 as reported by M. Steven Fish in 'The Determinants of Economic Reform'*:

Classification 3: Displacement of communists in the first election

+ Displacement	- Displacement
Armenia, Czech R., Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyz R., Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia	Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Next, we have the constitutional hypothesis. It holds that a structure of representation that allows a small, however legitimately elected, group to gather the reins of power in their hands can be perceived as politically detrimental. This explanation has received much attention in the literature on post-communism. Both Timothy Frye[26] and, subsequently, M. Steven Fish[27] have obtained some remarkable results by travelling down this avenue. In what follows, I concentrate on Fish's distinction between

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[22] Bunce, 'The Political Economy of Postsocialism' : p. 787.

[23] Bunce, 'The Political Economy of Postsocialism' : p. 782

[24] Se also Milada Anna Vachudova, *Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism* (Oxford University Press, 2005).

[25] See Fish, 'The Determinants of Economic Reform' : p. 48.

[26] Timothy Frye, 'A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies', *Comparative Political Studies* (October, 1997).

[27] M. Steven Fish, 'Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January, 2006).

legislatures and presidencies (Frye distinguishes between a 'power-concentrating' and a 'power-dispersing' constitution).

Fish has, together with a colleague, created a Parliamentary Power Index, according to which a country receives a relatively high score if relatively much constitutional power is vested in the parliament and a relatively low score if the opposite is the case. In the article "Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies',[28] he employs this index in the context of 25 post-communist countries.

A proponent of parliamentarism, Fish's theoretical expectation is that a high degree of parliamentary power (and hence a weak presidency) should make for democracy whereas a low degree of parliamentary power (and hence a strong presidency) should make for autocracy. This is exactly what he finds, statistically.[29]

Using Fish's index to cover the attribute of a strong legislature, it is solely necessary to employ a general threshold making it possible to provide an overall separation between the presence and absence of the attribute. Fish's Parliamentary Power Index measures the constitutional power of the parliament on a scale from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating stronger legislatures. He emphasises that a country that opted for a strong legislature is one that scored above 0.60 in the PPI.[30] To avoid any accusations of tampering with the thresholds, I will let this cut-off point denote the presence of the theoretical property, i.e., any country that receives a score over 0.60 can be considered to have a strong legislature. Conversely, a score equal to or lower than 0.60 makes for the absence of a strong legislature.

This leads us to the following operational definition: *A country has a strong legislature vested in the constitution if it obtains a general score that equals or is above 0.60 in the Parliamentary Power Index as reported by M. Steven Fish in 'Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies':*

Classification 4: Strong legislatures in the post-communist setting

+ Strong legislature	- Strong legislature
Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

3.2 An actor-centred typological analysis of political change in the post-communist setting, 1996-2004

By now, I have laid bare both the dependent variable of political regime forms and the two independent actor-centred variables. How to test this edifice? I propose to employ typological theory. A typology is a multidimensional and conceptual classification, i.e., it is an ordering on a compound of attributes.[31] Yet the pure ordering of a multi-dimensional property space is merely the descriptive face of typologies.[32] Typologies

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[28] Fish, 'Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies'.

[29] Fish, 'Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies'.

[30] Fish, 'Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies' : p. 18.

[31] See Kenneth D. Bailey, 'Typologies and Taxonomies. An Introduction to Classification Techniques', Series: *Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences* 102 (Sage University, 1994) for an excellent overview of this taxonomic exercise.

[32] See Bailey, 'Typologies and Taxonomies', p. 15 and Alexander George & Andrew Bennett, *Case Study and Theory Development* (MIT Press, 2005).

make for more than descriptive inference; they offer an anchorage for causal inference as well.

 That should not come as a surprise. The one-dimensional classifications – the respective orderings on attributes of which the compound is made up – normally capture a theoretically relevant distinction between the presence and absence of a given factor. Indeed, as has been the case in this paper, the respective attributes are often derived straight from the relevant theoretical literature. In other words, the classes tend to exhaust, in a mutually exclusive way, the possible outcomes on either a dependent or an independent variable.

This means that a typology, or at least a typology formed in this way, necessarily posits something about theoretical relationships within the property space at hand. It delineates the expected pathways within the typology itself. And this is the very point of departure for what is aptly termed 'typological theory'.[33]

Recall that the dependent variable was conceptualised as a trichotomy of political regime forms, a classification entailing a tripartition. Combined with the two dichotomous classifications exhausting the independent variables, a typology consisting of 12 types or cells can be created. I intend to zoom in on the combination of dependent and independent variables at the two earlier mentioned points in time: 1996 and 2004.

Yet before reaching that far, the theoretical expectations must be clarified, i.e., I must provide hypotheses on the expected pathways since the early 1990s. The foundation of this work has already been already been laid in the discussion of the two independent variables. The justifications for including each of the these variables was that when the attribute used to separate the dichotomous classes was present, the variable would theoretically make for democracy and when it was absent, the variable would theoretically make for autocracy.

Furthermore, my preliminary expectation is that the two independent variables will interact strongly, i.e., that we have a situation of 'increasing returns'. First and foremost, a displacement of communist incumbents is likely to facilitate the choice of parliamentarism. Hence, I expect very many of the cases to clump in the two polar types of cell 1 and 12, i.e., the types where i) democracy is combined with the presence of all attributes on the independent variables and ii) autocracy is combined with the absence of all attributes on the independent variables. I will refer to the former polar type as 'actor-induced democracy', as it connotes an actor-based expectation of democracy, and the latter polar type as 'actor-induced autocracy', as it connotes an actor-based expectation of autocracy. The hybrid regimes should logically inhabit the intermediate types close to the diagonal[34] as some attributes will be present (otherwise autocracy is the expected outcome) but some will also be absent (otherwise democracy is the expected outcome).

The full orderings of the post-communist countries on the compounds of attributes – i.e., the full typologies for 1996 and 2004 – are depicted below.

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[33] See George & Bennett, *Case Study and Theory Development*, p. 235.
[34] This is, types 1, 6, 7, and 12.

Figure 1: The full actor-centred typology with empirical referents, 1996[35]

	+Displacement		-Displacement	
	+Leg	-Leg	+Leg	-Leg
+Dem	7			
+Hyb	2	4	4	1
+Aut				6

Figure 2: The full actor-centred typology with empirical referents, 2004

	+Displacement		-Displacement	
	+Leg	-Leg	+Leg	-Leg
+Dem	8		2	
+Hyb	1	2	2	1
+Aut		2		6

Viewed from the higher ground, the analysis confirms the relevance of understanding the post-communist political pathways through the prism of an actor-analysis. The gist of the matter is that the countries have very much come to cluster in the two polar types of 'actor-induced democracy' and 'actor-induced autocracy'. In 1996, thirteen out of 24 countries were situated in the polar types. In 2004, the number had risen to fourteen. Differently said, in the long term almost 60 per cent of the countries end up in the polar types, thus confirming the existence of actor-induced virtuous or vicious political circles.

This also comes out in a robustness-check, I have undertaken by treating the differences on each variable as differences of degree only (viz., employing the raw scores rather than the dichotomous counterparts). Using a statistical K-means analysis of the two independent actor-centred variables and the dependent variable of political regime forms in 1996 and 2004 (specifying a 3-cluster solution), an F-test allows us to see which variables are significant in accounting for differences between the clusters. The 3-cluster solution is meant to reflect the findings of the typological analysis, viz., that the countries mostly clump in the two polar types and in the centre area along the diagonal. All three variables are significant at the 0.01-level (see the figures in appendix 1).

So, may we simply conclude that the actor-based explanations within the literature can account for the identified variation on the dependent variable of the political regime form after the breakdown of communism, at least from the mid-1990s onwards? This

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[35] Dem' is shorthand for the class of 'Democracy'; 'Hyb' is shorthand for the class of 'Hybrid Regime'; 'Aut' is shorthand for the class of 'Autocracy'. Likewise, 'Displacement' is shorthand for the property of 'Displacement of communists in the first election', and 'Leg' is shorthand for the property of 'Strong legislatures in the post-communist setting'

would be as premature as it is tempting. For the actor-based explanations are encumbered with one, very important logical problem.

Recall that both of the explanations discussed in this section (explicitly or implicitly) assume that the room for action is quite wide; they are, so to say, voluntaristic. And with good reason, too. If the choices of the actors merely reflect antecedent (structural) factors, then, at the end of the day, they are spurious.[36] This is exactly where we encounter the one great challenge to the analysis of this section. For empirically, the various types, and in particular the polar types, seem to be very systematically dispersed across space with regard to their empirical referents.

Thus, throughout the period, the type of 'actor-induced democracy' solely houses Central and Eastern European countries. Likewise, the type of 'actor-induced autocracy' solely houses countries situated in the Caucasus or Central Asia, with the lone exception of Belarus. This indicates that the pathways of the actors may have been sealed beforehand – and that the status on the two independent variables as well as the dependent variable merely reflects that. This critique provides the basis for considering a structural corrective to the actor-explanations discussed and tested so far. And this is the subject of the subsequent section.

4. A structural analysis of post-communist political regime forms

Structural factors normally operate on a more abstract level than their actor-centred equivalents because their extension is wider. Hence, it makes sense to identify them within the general study of regime change. According to my reading of the theoretical literature, Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan's *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* from 1996 has captured most of the explanatory market place.

In this section, I will discuss, operationalise and measure three of their structural variables, namely 'the character of the prior regime type', 'international influences', and 'the political economy of legitimacy and coercion'. Needless to say, other factors than these have been pointed to,[37] but the objective of this section is merely to zoom in on a general set of relevant, structural factors. To elaborate, the aim is not to find the 'smoking gun' – *the* independent variable – of post-communist democratisations. Rather, the aim is to examine whether the structural factors, as a whole, can account for the striking post-communist regularities on the dependent variable of the political regime form that I have described.

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[36] See Kitschelt, 'Accounting for Postcommunist Regime Diversity' for an interesting elaboration and discussion of this point.

[37] Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996), for instance, also emphasise a fourth structural factor, which they term 'Stateness'. This variable of 'stateness' targets the complex relationship between state, nation(s), and democratization. The existence of a sovereign state is a prerequisite for democracy while the existence of competing national discourses within the territory makes democratization more difficult. I have, however, chosen to eliminate this variable with reference to Occam's Razor. The property 'ethnic-linguistic homogeneity' is unable to discriminate with regard to the two most important classes of regime forms, viz. democracy and autocracy. Thus, two countries (Estonia and Latvia) remain democracies in spite of the absence of the attribute whereas three countries (Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Tajikistan) are autocracies in spite of the presence of the attribute. This conclusion rests on an initial typological analysis and a subsequent cluster analysis both of which did indeed include this property – due to limited space I cannot include these analyses in this paper, however.

4.1 Three structural explanations

To capture the 'the character of the prior regime type'-variable, Linz & Stepan craft a five-fold typology consisting of the respective types of 'democratic', 'authoritarian', 'totalitarian', 'post-totalitarian', and 'sultanistic'.[38] Also, the 'post-totalitarian' type – the most important one in the post-communist setting – can be divided into the sub-types of 'early', 'frozen', and 'mature'.

This typological exercise is so multi-dimensional that it cannot provide the pivot for a dichotomous classification. Others have tackled this variable in more one-dimensional way, however. In a very interesting analysis of post-communist regime change, Herbert Kitschelt[39] makes a distinction between the respective legacies of i) bureaucratic-authoritarian, ii) national-accommodative, iii) patrimonial communism, and iv) colonial periphery. I will use this ordering to exhaust the variable of the prior regime form.

Theoretically, the dividing line is that which separates a beneficial communist legacy from its opposite number. In other words, the expectation is that the presence of a beneficial communist legacy will facilitate democracy whereas its absence will facilitate autocracy. Kitschelt's dividing line is that between 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' or 'national-accommodative', on the one hand, and 'patrimonial communism' or 'colonial periphery' on the other. Both of the two former inheritances theoretically favour democracy whereas both of the two latter inheritances favour autocracy.

This is thus the threshold that separates the two classes, and it brings us to the following operational definition: *A post-communist country has a beneficial communist legacy when it achieves a score of 2 or 3 as reported by Herbert Kitschelt in 'Accounting for Outcomes of Post-Communist Regime Change'*:

Classification 5: Beneficial communist legacy

+ Beneficial communist legacy	- Beneficial communist legacy
Czech R., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia,	Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz R., Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Next, we have the 'international influences'. In Linz & Stepan's vein of thinking, these spring from three sources: foreign policies, zeitgeist, and diffusion. Many of the contemporary articles on the external context basically identify a form of liberal discursive hegemony as the focal point,[40] the *Zeitgeist* mentioned by Linz & Stepan.

At the end of the day, however, only one external factor seems to hold clear explanatory power with regard to the post-communist setting: EU-conditionality.[41] Instead of assuming that the liberal hegemony will have consequences for all post-communist countries, my assumption here is that this is only so if a given country is

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[38] See Linz & Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 38-66.

[39] Herbert Kitschelt, 'Accounting for Outcomes of Post-Communist Regime Change: Causal Depth or Shallowness in Rival Explanations?', Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta (1999).

[40] E.g. Steven Levitsky & Lucan A. Way, 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April, 2002) : p. 61.

[41] See, e.g., Vachudova, *Europe Undivided*.

either economically or politically dependent upon the EU. Or, in a nutshell, if it has the prospect of becoming an EU-member state.

At the most general level all countries geographically situated in Europe – with the sole exception of the post-Soviet countries not situated along the Baltic coast – has had hopes for EU-membership. In order to avoid the bias of a more particular judgment about the actual probabilities for the various countries, I will cling on to this fact. Hence we operationalise: *A country had prospects for EU-membership after the breakdown of communism if it was situated in Europe geographically, and if it was not Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine or part of the Caucasus*.

Classification 6: Prospects for EU-membership after the breakdown of communism

+ Prospects for EU-membership	- Prospects for EU-membership
Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Finally, there is Linz & Stepan's variable of 'the political economy of legitimacy and coercion'-variable. This is but the contemporary acknowledgment of Martin Seymor Lipset's seminal assertion that "[t]he more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy'.[42] The current version of this argument, what is often termed 'neo-modernization theory', holds that a country may initiate a transition to democracy at any income level – but that once initiated, the future prospects are very much dependent upon the level of economic development.

My expectation is therefore that the presence of a high level of socio-economic development at the outset of the transitions of 1989-91 facilitates democracy whereas its absence facilitates breakdown of democracy, i.e., makes for a movement towards autocracy. 'Neo-modernization theory' is first and foremost represented by Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi.[43] They conclude that "[t]he probability that a democracy will die during any particular year in a country with an income above $4,000 is practically cero'.[44] In gist, above this threshold a democracy that has been established will not come undone due to economic crisis. Thus, and in order not to be accused for tampering with the cut-off points, I will employ this threshold to separate a relatively high level of economic development from a relatively low level of economic development.

Figures for GDP per capita at constant prices (2000 $) at purchasing-power parities (PPP) can be found in the World Bank's *World Development Indicators 2005*. Przeworski & Limongi threshold of $4,000 is based on 1985 PPP USD. I have recalculated the figures using the World Development Indicators 2000 PPP USD, and thus arrived at the number $6,236. This brings us to the following operational definition: *A country had a high level of economic development if its GDP per capita, measured at constant PPP prices, in the first available year of post-communist independence (i.e., preferably within the span of 1989-91) exceeded that indicated by*

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[42] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics* (Heinemann, London, Melbourne, Toronto, 1959), pp. 48-50.

[43] Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, 'Modernization: Theories and Facts', *World Politics*, 49.2 (1997).

[44] Przeworski & Limongi, 'Modernization' : p. 165.

Przeworski & Limongi in 'Modernization' (i.e., USD $6,236) as reported by the World Bank's World Development Indicators 2005.

Classification 7: Economic development at the breakdown of communism[45]

+ Relatively high economic development	- Relatively high economic development
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine	Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

4.2 A structural typological analysis of political change in the post-communist setting, 1996-2004

Mirroring the analysis of the preceding section, I will employ typological theory to analyse the political pathways of post-communism, only this time around from a structural point of view. My preliminary expectation is (again) that good things tend to go together and vice-versa. Needless to say, structural factors do not shape each other over night – and the bold virtuous and vicious circles actor-centred expectations do thus not have a place in this analysis. However, one would still expect e.g. the level of modernization and the character of the communist legacy to have interacted over the past generations.

By implication, in the longer term I expect the cases to clump along the diagonal and in particular in the two polar types of cell 1 and 24, i.e., the types where i) democracy is combined with the presence of all attributes and ii) autocracy is combined with the absence of all attributes. I will refer to the former polar type as 'structural democracy', as it connotes a structural expectation of democracy, and the latter polar type as 'structural autocracy', as it connotes a structural expectation of democracy. The hybrid regimes should logically inhabit the intermediate types close to the diagonal. How does the reality of post-communism conform to these expectations?

Figure 3: The full structural typology with empirical referent, 1996[46]

		+Eco		-Eco	
		+Leg	-Leg	+Leg	-Leg
+Dem	+EU	7			
	-EU				
+Hyb	+EU	1	2		1
	-EU		2		5
+Aut	+EU				
	-EU				6

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[45] The differences in GDP among my countries do not completely match those described in other accounts, e.g. in Kitschelt, 'Accounting for Postcommunist Regime Diversity'. But the data are derived from the World Bank and otherwise seems reliable.
[46] 'Leg' is shorthand for the variable 'Beneficial communist legacy'. 'EU' is shorthand for the variable 'Prospects of EU-membership after the breakdown of communism'. 'Eco' is shorthand for the variable 'High economic development at the breakdown of communism'

Figure 4: The full structural typology with empirical referent, 2004

		+Eco		-Eco	
		+Leg	-Leg	+Leg	-Leg
+Dem	+EU	8	1		
	-EU				1
+Hyb	+EU		1		1
	-EU		1		3
+Aut	+EU				
	-EU		1		7

As figure 3 and 4 shows, the structural analysis gives rise to some quite stark conclusions. It turns out that the independent variables have more or less sealed the longer-term fate of the post-communist countries on the dependent variable of this study: the political regime form. To connect this to the ordering on the compound of attributes, the countries have very much come to cluster within the two polar types of 'structural democracy' and 'structural autocracy', respectively. In 1996, thirteen out of thirteen non-hybrid regimes were found within these two polar types. In 2004, the equivalent numbers were fifteen out of eighteen. In other words, during these two years, only three observations were able to break the structural expectation with regard to the classes of democracy and autocracy; and only one (Mongolia in 2004) did so by lacking more than one attribute.

The pattern is somewhat more confusing with regard to the third class, hybrid regime, but – being intermediate political phenomena – this was only to be expected. Also, only a few hybrid regimes exhibit a clean sheet, i.e., all attributes are either present or absent, on the independent variables.

As a robustness-check, I have once again undertaken a statistical K-means analysis of the three independent structural variables and the dependent variable of political regime forms in 1996 and 2004 specifying a 3-cluster solution. It turns out that all three independent variables clear the conventional thresholds of statistical significance (see the figures in appendix 1), thus reconfirming the conclusions of the typological analysis.

Where does all this leave us? When piecing the typological property space together, we achieve some very strong ammunition against the actor-perspective. In gist, the scope for action may not have been very large once the transitional phase was over. Let me try to elaborate this by relating the actor-based independent variables to the structural independent variables, the subject of the last section.

5. Contrasting actors and structures

The two preceding analyses of post-communist political pathways had one thing in common: they both exposed some striking empirical regularities. Not only was it possible to deliver a very coherent picture of the causal pathways, it was possible to do so from both from a structural and an actor-centred point of view. In a nutshell, the most salient feature of post-communism seems to be the combination of intra-regional similarities and inter-regional differences incarnated by the respective polar types of section 3 and 4. The question therefore becomes: How do the structural and actor-based packages relate to each other? Differently said, Which, if any, is more important causally?

5.1 Piecing the general picture together

To relate the structural variables to their actor-centred counterparts, it makes sense to transform each of these clusters into one dimension – to treat them as 'packages' (i.e., composite indices) as I will term it in this section. Hence, I construe each of the clusters of independent variables as one dimension on which we may either encounter the presence of all attributes, the presence of some but not all attributes or the presence of no attributes. If we combine these two classifications – thus creating an ordering on a compound of attributes – a typology comes into existence, as illustrated in figure 5.

Figure 5: A typology of the combinations on the actor-centred package and the structure-based package

		Actor-based package		
		Full presence	Mixed	Full absence
Structure-based package	Full presence	8		
	Mixed		4	1
	Full absence	1	4	6

One thing is immediately clear. The respective orderings on the two dimensions correlate strongly.[47] No less than fourteen out of 24 countries are found within the two polar types. An additional four falls into the mixed/mixed type, i.e., only six out of 24 countries do not clump along the diagonal of the typology. Notice, furthermore, that five of these six countries fall into types adjacent to polar type 9. In other words, only one country (Moldova) falls into the theoretically illogical types that combine a full presence on one package with a full absence on the other package. I cannot explain the Moldovan aberration but the very fact that it alone defies the general logic of the framework underscores the strength of the explanatory edifice.

Let me demonstrate this with a little detour. In an interesting article on 'Left Libertarian Parties' from 1988, Herbert Kitschelt calculates a "coefficient of reproducibility" (CR), which in the context of two dichotomised variables calculates the percentage of cases that are correctly classified according to the theory tested.[48] The measure is very simple. Kitschelt divide the number of cases that do not belong in the expected types with the full number of cases (N of mistakes / N of cases) and then deduct this proportion from 1. In the present case, the result is a CR = 0.75 – a very high coefficient considering that this edifice taps into no less than five different variables melted into two trichotomous classifications.

In sum, the mutual correspondence is striking. Recall the theoretical expectations connected to the operationalised variables: that all good things go together and vice-versa. This very much turns out to be the case when analysing the interplay between structural and actor-choices. Reflecting on the multicollinearity among

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[47] If we interpret the three values as an ordinal-scale of 1 ('full presence'), 2 ('mixed sheet') and 3 ('full absence'), then the statistical correlation between the two packages – which is significant at the .001-level – finds expression in a Gamma of around 0.882 .

[48] Herbert Kitschelt, 'Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems', *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (1988).

explanatory factors of post-communist political and economic developments, Gregorz Ekiert has phrased it succinctly:

> 'Thus, most of the attempts to determine a limited set of specific causes and to establish simple linear relationships to outcomes are likely to be questionable. The metaphor of vicious and virtuous circles captures much better the relationship among these factors. They interact together in a complex fashion, producing the "increasing returns' that characterize path-dependent development'.[49]

The empirical conclusion of this paper echoes Ekiert. In fact, reaching back to the distribution on the dependent variable, the simultaneous full presence on both packages is a sufficient condition of democracy in both 1996 and 2004 whereas the simultaneous full absence on both packages is a sufficient condition of autocracy in 1996 and 2004.

So, does this mean that it makes little sense to contrast the causal leverage of the two alternative approaches? It does not. As John Gerring[50] has pointed out causality is a concept that implies at least four requirements. First, a theoretical link between cause and effect; second, a corresponding empirical link; third, that the cause antedates the effect; fourth, that other factors are controlled for.

Taken separately, both the structural and the actor-centred variables more or less fulfil each of these criteria (as causes). But notice that much the same can be said about the relationship between the structural variables (as causes) and their actor-centred equivalents (as effects). The structural attributes all predate the actor-centred attributes. The character of the prior regime form, the prospects of EU-membership, and the level of modernization were all measured at a point in time prior to the point at which the displacement of communist in the first election and the constitutional engineering were measured. More fundamentally, the structural attributes were meant to capture phenomena that can be traced far back in time whereas the actor-centred attributes were meant to capture novel phenomena.

Also, the two packages stand in a very systematic empirical relationship, as demonstrated by the analysis of this section. Most stunningly, a full presence of attributes on the structural package fully predicts a full presence of attributes on the actor-centred package, Moldova constituting the sole exception. The relationship is less strong with regard to a mixed sheet and a full absence, yet only six out of 24 countries do not show complete correspondence.

Can we, finally, establish a theoretical link between the two packages? Clearly we cannot establish a causal chain leading from the choices of the actors to the structural attributes because of the already noted position on the dimension of time. But how about a causal chain leading from the structural attributes to the choices of the actors? I will argue that it is very much possible to make the case for such a chain.

Recall that the actor-centred variables such as initial elections and constitutional choice to a large degree capture various aspects of 'open politics' and societal mobilization. It is only logical that the structural point of departure should impact on this. If a modernized society with a partial liberal inheritance and links to Western Europe is in existence – as was the case in Central and Eastern Europe after the breakdown of communism – then competitive politics, including the formation of viable

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[49] Grzegorz Ekiert, 'Patterns of Postcommunist Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe' in Grzegorz Ekiert & Stephen E. Hanson, *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 116.
[50] Gerring, *Social Science Methodology*, p. 129.

parties, is very much to be expected. If, on the other hand, no liberal inheritance, no significant modernization and a virtual isolation from the Western world is a fact of life – as was the case in Central Asia and, albeit to a lesser extent, the Caucasian countries – then competitive politics, including the formation of viable parties, is not to be expected.

Differently said, even though the causal chain may very well work through the actor-centred variables, they are spurious as 'root causes'. This is what Herbert Kitschelt points to when he terms the 'proximate' (i.e. actor-centred or institutional) explanations 'shallow' in contrast to the 'deeper' structural explanations.

Notice how this explanation can account for the most salient aspect of the variance on the dependent variable of the political regime form, to wit the systematic combination of intra-subregional similarities and inter-subregional differences. To elaborate, the notion of voluntaristic action does not fit well with the fact that the eight Central and Eastern European countries have travelled the same path, that the same can be said about the five Central Asian countries, and that the paths of the countries situated between these two extremes, albeit to a lesser extent, also shows kinship. The structural approach, on the other hand, elucidates this pattern quite nicely because each region would logically have a relatively equal structural point of departure.

Finally, a few words on the chosen approach seem appropriate. Needless to say, dichotomising (or trichotomising in the case of the explanandum) variables entails a significant loss of information *vis-à-vis* continuous measures. However, as already emphasised, the existence of striking regularities on the ground warrant the use of typological theory. And, to reiterate, the post-communist setting is indeed characterised by such regularities. In fact, the tripartition that has inspired the title of this thesis extends to the explanans as well as the explanandum, at least when the former is construed as actor-centred and structural 'packages' (i.e., as composite indices).

This equals saying that the former communist bloc is, at the end of the day, best described by differences in kind rather than differences in degree. And this is – *a fortiori* – why using the classificatory logic (and, by extension, the typological schemas) is merited, and not just as a heuristic device, when compared to standard statistical procedures. Combining the actor-centred 'package' and the structural 'package' as a common property space, we end up with two polar types – what could be termed 'democracy guaranteed' and 'autocracy guaranteed' – under which the lion's share of the empirical referents can be subsumed. These polar types capture the most general dividing lines of post-communism and they underline the value of explaining classes of events rather than differences in degree.

6. Conclusions

How it possible to explain the identified tripartition between post-communist political regime forms? In particular, how do we account for the systematic combination of intra-subregional similarities and inter-subregional differences? These were the questions I set out to answer in this paper.

It quickly turned that the most salient fact about the post-communist pathways are the striking regularities we encounter, both from and actor-centred and a structural point of view. But this means that we are left with a Gordian knot. For which set of factors should we pin our faith on? How do we cut the knot?

The empirical conclusion of this paper is a simple one. The actor-centred attributes should be construed as intervening links in a causal chain that leads from the structural

attributes to the political outcome. Structures do not create democracy (or autocracy for that matter); actors do. But the systematic combination of intra-subregional similarities and inter-subregional differences found within the post-communist setting – on the dependent variable, the actor-centred package and the structural package, respectively – can only be explained with reference to the structural attributes. These are the only genuinely independent variables but they kick in via the causal mechanisms of the actor-centred attributes.

As such, the empirical analysis has confirmed the two-fold hypothesis stated at the outset of the paper. In gist, the theoretical claim that arises from this conclusion is that 'increasing returns' characterise not only the relationship *among* the actor-centred and structural variables, respectively, but *between* them as well – what I attempted to illustrate with the metaphors of 'virtuous' and 'vicious' circles.

Notice how this explanatory edifice represents a blow against the actor-centred approaches of e.g. M. Steven Fish (and Transitology for that matter) even though it incorporates and relies on these findings. For the actor-centred approaches do not construe the actor-centred explanations as intervening in nature, rather they see them as the interesting independent variables and emphasise the very wide possibility of choice that the actors have. This paper has argued otherwise and, on this point, the analysis is very much indebted to Kitschelt's ontological distinction between deep (structural) and shallow (proximate) causes.

Appendix 1

A. An actor-centred cluster analysis
F-test statistics for the K-means cluster analysis (three-cluster solution specified).

ANOVA (1996)

	Cluster		Error		F	Sig.
	Mean Square	df	Mean Square	df		
FirstElec	4,013	2	,665	21	6,030	,009
StrLeg	,313	2	,008	21	37,273	,000
FH1996	36,467	2	,281	21	129,797	,000

ANOVA (2004)

	Cluster		Error		F	Sig.
	Mean Square	df	Mean Square	df		
FirstElec	4,000	2	,667	21	6,000	,009
StrLeg	,337	2	,006	21	55,454	,000
FH2000	39,641	2	,327	21	121,084	,000

B. A structural cluster analysis
F-test statistics for the K-means cluster analysis (three-cluster solution specified).

ANOVA (1996)

	Cluster		Error		F	Sig.
	Mean Square	df	Mean Square	df		
BenCom	7,383	2	,249	21	29,626	,000
EU	2,089	2	,085	21	24,643	,000
SocioEco	191360692,695	2	2185156,167	21	87,573	,000
FH1996	24,106	2	1,458	21	16,532	,000

ANOVA (2004)

	Cluster		Error		F	Sig.
	Mean Square	df	Mean Square	df		
BenCom	7,383	2	,249	21	29,626	,000
EU	2,089	2	,085	21	24,643	,000
SocioEco	191360692,695	2	2185156,167	21	87,573	,000
FH2004	29,230	2	2,079	21	14,058	,000