Enlargement and Legitimacy

A Passage from Europe of the Elites to Europe of the Electorates

Dionysia D. TAMVAKI

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of Political and Social Science of the European University Institute

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Abstract

This project focuses on the interrelations between the micro-level of popular attitudes to European integration and the macro-level of elite justifications for pursuing membership. Drawing on extant research on Eastern Enlargement this study develops an approach of ‘theoretical differentiation’ and distinguishes between rationally oriented ‘Utility Maximizing’ entrants (UM) and constructively driven ‘Value Maximizing’ countries (VM). ‘Theoretical differentiation’ in elite attitudes then, becomes the default drive in empirically investigating public support for the EU. First, explaining the dynamics of utilitarian public attitudes, this study ‘differentiates’ the short-term, economic factors from the long-term, elite-driven stimuli that render the UM group of countries more eurosceptic than the VM group. The regression analysis shows that while in both groups short-term support fluctuates with the business cycle, the intensity of long-run support is determined by the set of structural characteristics that identify them as either UM or VM. Similarly, ‘differentiation’ in affective support shows that the latter is a mixture of the long-term disposition towards EU, determined by historical elite attitudes, and the current socialization factors that govern short-run variations. Yet, the affective attitudes of the two groups not only differ in their mean levels of support (i.e. intensity) but also in their responses to direct and indirect socialization stimuli (i.e. fluctuations). In other words, EU enlargement politics and the distinct elite frames they produce increase the stickiness of affective attitudes to European integration and partially regulate the utilitarian public sentiment. Both utilitarian and affective models of EU public opinion were tested at the aggregate level of survey respondents, using Eurobarometer polls from the fifteen ‘old’ member states. OECD data were compiled to control for the economic factors, while original data on the national distribution of EU officials in the Commission and the European Parliament were gathered by the author to control for the EU socialization stimuli.
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INTRODUCTION

1. ENLARGEMENT AND LEGITIMACY: TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN?

After a long period of breath-taking integration in terms of both political depth and territorial breadth, the French ‘non’ and the Dutch ‘nee’ to the new Constitutional Treaty in May and June 2005, activated a pan-European alarm over the growing chasm between an ‘ever-expanding’ Europe of the elites and a ‘socially responsive’ Europe preferred by the electorates. The ambitious enlargement agenda of the Union, which offered dates for opening accession negotiations with Turkey and a candidacy status to the Western Balkans so soon after the unprecedented widening to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), became a core element of the EU’s legitimacy problems. The 2004 expansion to countries with very different political backgrounds and lower average levels of development sparked an intensive debate about the extent to which the Union can accommodate such diversity, and thereby qualify as a rightful authority across old and new member states. There is no doubt that enlargement is in itself evidence of legitimacy, for if the Union were merely an illegitimate political association it would certainly not receive so many membership applications. Yet, enlargement to the East has placed an additional strain on an already weak claim for popular support, given the economic and social discomfort EU conditionality has brought in the ten new member states. Meanwhile, the risk of losing substantial receipts from the EU budget threatens the delicate balance of popular acceptance even in countries that have traditionally been supportive of integration, such as Spain or Portugal.

Taken together, the preceding considerations have rendered enlargement and popular legitimacy key-words in current political discourse and various academic endeavours. Scholarly literature and political debate, nevertheless, link enlargement to legitimacy by means of a specific ‘feedback loop’ while failing to identify other crucial links between the two. On the one hand, Eastern enlargement has been identified as the cause of growing popular dissatisfaction going ‘too far, too fast’. On the other hand, the Union’s cautious steps towards Bulgaria and Romania as well as to further widening have been treated as the effect of the EU’s legitimacy deficit, made explicit via the abovementioned French and Dutch referenda. Yet, the question
left unexplored is how accession negotiations might affect the evolution of public support for the Union. By addressing the latter, this study places enlargement in the field of comparative politics, adding a new range of variables relevant to public opinion. In addition, it offers a tentative answer as to whether the EU can establish itself as a model of a legitimate political order on an enlarged scale, or not.

In essence, this project focuses on the interrelations between the micro-level of popular attitudes to European integration and the macro-level of elite justifications for pursuing membership. The elites, as a ‘strong public’, engage in institutionalised deliberation with EU actors over the desirability of accession and their discourse encompasses decision-making and opinion formation. Citizens, on the other hand, as ‘weak publics’ are the receivers of ‘strong’ elite attitudes to EU membership and accordingly support or discredit their decision to enter the European club (Fraser, 1992; 134). In other words, in the model put forward I renounce the image of ‘responsive politicians’ who adjust their preferences over EU membership on the basis of what the public wants, assuming instead a ‘responsive public’ reacting to what national elites do and how they perceive European integration. After all, membership in the EU is a significant foreign policy option and as such is primarily handled by national political leaders. National elites constitute key socialization agents that systematically structure popular attitudes to European integration— an issue too abstract and even difficult for the average citizen to hold an independent view on.

The purpose behind examining elite attitudes to integration is to improve extant theories of public support for the EU and inductively explain relatively constant differences in public opinion across the various member states. Put simply, macro-level enlargement forces, provide us with the tools for understanding long-term international contrasts in public opinion. National elite attitudes to EU membership contain the clues to the explanation of why utilitarian and affective support has traditionally been higher in some countries than in others. In turn, a correct understanding of the divide between pro-integration and Eurosceptic member states might help us predict the possibility (or impossibility) of overcoming intergovernmental cooperation establishing a consensus on the need for supranational solutions.
2. Contribution to Current Theoretical and Empirical Debates

‘Differentiation’: A Strategic Concept in the Study of Enlargement and Legitimacy

The links I make between the micro-level of popular attitudes and macro-level elite perceptions of accession negotiations result from a systematic application of the analytical tools provided by the literature on ‘differentiation’. The main thrust of the argument advanced is the following: National political elites with different agendas of European integration, generate diverse levels of public support rendering certain countries Europhoric and others Eurosceptic. In other words, the divide between pro-integration and Eurosceptic countries makes better sense when ‘differentiated’ (i.e. utility-oriented and affectively-loaded) elite perceptions of membership are taken into account.

In the euro-jargon ‘differentiation’ constitutes a ‘general term for the possibility of member states to have different rights and obligations with respect to certain common policy areas’ (Kölliker, 2001;127). It is closely linked to enlargement since expansion increases diversity not only in numbers but also in the capabilities and the willingness of member states to take on new tasks of policy integration. Changing membership, changing characteristics, and diverse policy demands and values, make differentiation particularly pertinent. Hence, it is no wonder that ‘differentiation’ emerged on the EU agenda as a theoretical possibility after the first enlargement. In the wake of the Maastricht Treaty ‘differentiation’ came to the fore in the areas of monetary, social, and defence policy. At the same time ‘differentiation’ in the international levels of public support for the EU became apparent through the Danish referendum and the marginal acceptance of the Treaty in the UK. In the aftermath of the 1995 enlargement the Amsterdam Treaty prudently enabled the application of flexibility in the first and third pillars. In the Nice Treaty, in turn, following the violent rioting at the Gothenburg Summit, the scope for ‘differentiation’ was extended to the second pillar so as to accommodate different policy styles and interests, under the pressure of growing ‘differentiation’ in public support for integration, which highlighted the chasm between pro-integration and Eurosceptic member states. Last but not least, the new Constitutional Treaty under article I-43, allowed for ‘enhanced cooperation’ between those willing and capable to take on new tasks of policy integration within the framework of the Union’s non-exclusive competences. On the eve of the Union’s Eastern enlargement and under the
pressure of growing popular disapproval of the EU’s practices, manifest in the Irish electorate’s narrow rejection of the Nice Treaty in spring of 2001, it became apparent that new policy interests and behavioural styles had to be accommodated by means of differentiation.

Notwithstanding the importance that political debate has attributed to differentiation, the scholarly literature in this particular field is underdeveloped. No specific theory on its effect on integration has so far been developed. In addition, extant theories fail to include within their frameworks differentiation as a new explanatory variable. This study, with a view to improving theory-based approaches to enlargement and legitimacy, links differentiation with the dynamics of European integration in the aforementioned areas. More specifically, in the area of enlargement a model of ‘theoretical differentiation’ is advocated within the countries that come under scrutiny and between the enlargement rounds they represent. Echoing theory-oriented research on Eastern enlargement (Schimmelfennig, 2003b ibid, 2001 Sjursen, 2002 Sedelmeier, 2000 Bieler, 2000 Fierke and Wiener, 1999) I allow for a combination of rationalism and constructivism within the three selected case-studies - Britain, Greece and Austria - that delve into all rounds of EU widening prior to that one concluded in 2004 and thereby substitute for the descriptive studies of the past. Material interests and liberal democratic ideas are used concurrently in the explanatory argument of ‘theoretical differentiation’ within the different phases of single enlargement cases, without assuming the causal primacy of either factor from the outset. In essence, both the utilitarian and the ideational motivations and hindrances in the interactions between candidates and incumbents come under scrutiny. On the one hand, the inclusion of both the ‘demand’ and the ‘supply’ side is advocated since national elite attitudes to integration are the product of an exchange of views and a strategic bargain at the domestic and supranational levels. On the other hand, an exclusively rationalist or constructivist framework for enlargement is set aside because it would lead to an unconvincing analysis presenting EU widening as an issue of exclusive cost-benefit calculations where concerns over shared values and common identities are negligent and vice versa. Enlargement, nevertheless, is both a self-interested bargain and an identity building episode as it increases both the economic and cultural diversity of the host organisation.

The comprehensive overview of past enlargement rounds attempted in this study further demonstrates that while neither ideas nor interests should be ignored
simply because they belong to the wrong metatheoretical camp, ‘theoretical
differentiation’ between enlargement rounds is still plausible. Among different
candidates applying at different times, the relative importance of rationalism and
constructivism is distinct, amounting to a victory of one theory over the other. In
particular, an open approach to enlargement preference formation and decision
making is advocated that a) makes systematic arguments about the role of ideas and
interests with respect to different entrants at different points in time, and b) finally
classifies the rationally-minded candidates as Utility Maximisers (UM) and the
constructively-inspired countries as Value Maximisers (VM). Such a novel
classification along the UM-VM continuum, depends on which theoretical
perspective prevails in accounting for the ‘outcome’ of the accession bargain – i.e. the
decision to pursue and grant EU membership- rather than merely its ‘input’- i.e. the
stage of preference formation. All in all, to overcome any truism in arguing that both
material interests and identities matter within individual enlargement episodes this
study detects their relative share between enlargement rounds and traces their distinct
empirical trails rather than their collective presence or absence.

Besides enlargement, ‘differentiation’ becomes the default drive in
theoretically analysing and empirically investigating EU legitimacy. First, in
theoretical terms it becomes apparent that legitimacy should be allowed to vary in
substance, level and degree in the multiple territorial units making up the ever-
expanding EU. Legitimacy should be neither strictly utility-oriented nor exclusively
affective in nature, since different member states have distinctive identities and
different capabilities that cause them to suffer from different sources of legitimacy
deficit. Second, the interaction between the elite and the popular level of legitimacy
for the EU should be taken into account as European integration is not an exclusively
elitist project but requires the consent of those governed to move ahead. Hence, the
study of the interrelationship between elite attitudes to EU membership and popular
support for the integration project is warranted. Third, the distinction between Utility
and Value Maximizing elite motives in pursuing and granting EU membership
becomes functional in accounting for the relatively constant differences in the degree
to which their member publics acknowledge the EU as a rightful authority. Citizens
in Value Maximizing countries in particular, should outperform in terms of utilitarian
and affective support the publics in Utility Maximizing member states, since their
elites’ favourable ideational disposition toward integration can become a ‘reservoir
of good-will’ enabling them to withstand short-term performance and identity crises. In this manner, an argument is made in favour of *diverse geographical legitimation* among the two distinct types of EU entrants with a view to understanding international differentiation in public support for integration and helping to bridge the divide between eurosceptics and europhiles. This means that among the multiple territorial units making up the EU, ‘differentiated’ legitimation strategies should be pursued by UM and VM countries so as to help the former to move closer to the latter in support for European integration.

On the basis of the aforementioned theoretical model, the empirical tenacity of ‘differentiation’ comes under scrutiny through the use of public opinion data from the fifteen ‘old’ member states over a 29-year time span (1973-2002). Notwithstanding the validity of such claims for the current phase of EU widening, it is not analytically possible to focus on Central and Eastern European (CEE) applicants. The fact that the latter have only recently been fully integrated in the EU structures presents us with an insurmountable obstacle. The scarcity of public opinion data makes it hard to substantiate any arguments considering their tendency to diminish or improve EU legitimacy in the aftermath of accession. For that reason, the old fifteen member countries comprise the main subject of inquiry, while hopefully the proposed research framework will permit the identification of ‘lessons’ applicable to the current phase of enlargement. More specifically, in explaining the dynamics of utilitarian and affective public attitudes this study ‘differentiates’ the *short term* economic and socialization factors from the *long-term* elite-driven stimuli of popular support for the EU. Put simply, support for integration is driven by two mechanisms, which operate on different horizons and frequencies. The first mechanism captures the impact of a) current economic variables (for utilitarian support) and b) direct and indirect socialization factors (for affective support i.e. public participation in EP elections) and governs short-term variations in support. The second mechanism reflects a set of structural characteristics of EU countries (i.e. elite attitudes at the time of accession) that eventually identify them as UM or VM. Essentially, the second mechanism affects overall predisposition, determining the long-run path of support, while the first mechanism causes transitory variations in EU support. ‘Differentiation’ in observed support, herewith, shows that the latter is a mixture of the long-term disposition towards EU (determined by historical elite
attitudes) and the current economic and socialization factors that govern short-run variations.

3. FROM ENLARGEMENT HISTORY TO PUBLIC OPINION STATISTICS: COMBINING METHODS AND DATA

To account for the causal link between elite attitudes to integration and the observed level of public support for the Union I breach the qualitative-quantitative divide. In line with most recent work on methodology I renounce the qualitative-quantitative distinction as too schematic and become involved in the interaction of the two kinds of data. More specifically, I move from a qualitative evaluation of elite attitudes to integration at the time of accession to a quantitative analysis of public support for the Union, re-testing and expanding previous findings on EU enlargement and public opinion. First, with a view to checking the validity of the ‘liberal community hypothesis’ (what I call Value Maximization) put forward by Schimmelfennig not only in relation to his intensive case study, Eastern enlargement, but also in relation to his statistical event-history analysis of all earlier enlargement events, I have selected three case studies, Britain, Greece and Austria, which are representative of all major rounds of EU widening prior to the CEE one. The latter will help us decide whether the pertinence and dynamic effect of the ‘liberal community approach’ extends to all entrants, or only to those sharing the structural characteristics of the CEE candidates. In particular, I test and find wanting the proposition that an outsider state’s application for membership in and accession to the EU (granted by the incumbents) primarily relates to its adoption of liberal democratic norms rather than to economic factors. Such Value Maximization – i.e. elites’ attachment to liberal democratic values- is confirmed within politically and economically underdeveloped candidates like Greece, but not across wealthy, old democracies like Britain. Similarly, material interest in welfare and security (i.e. Utility Maximization) is dominant in smaller but powerful countries like Austria that had experienced political instability and could be looking to the EU for normative inspiration. Hence, the three-way comparison between Britain, Greece and Austria reflects the validity of ‘theoretical differentiation’ between Utility Maximizing and Value Maximizing attitudes to EU widening (rather than the one-dimensional pertinence of the liberal community approach) when dealing with different candidates and different time points.
Besides enlarging the theoretical research on EU enlargement the solid qualitative evidence offered by the single cases comes to the rescue of quantitative public opinion studies. A sharper analytical focus is accomplished through applying the findings of the small-\(n\) case studies to the large-\(n\) statistical sample of the fifteen ‘old’ member states. Distinguishing between countries with Utility and Value Maximizing elite attitudes to the EU, we reach a clearer and more nuanced understanding of relatively permanent cross-national differences in both utilitarian and affective public support for the EU. In the statistical analysis undertaken, the formal indicators of utilitarian attitudes on the one hand (i.e. GDP, inflation intra-EU trade etc.), as well as the indicators of affective attitudes on the other (i.e. institutional participation in the Commission, participation in EP elections etc), explain short-run fluctuations in support but cannot provide a satisfactory answer to why differences in the long-run mean levels of support remain more or less constant, irrespective of short-term variations. It becomes apparent in other words that neither the ‘economic calculus’ nor the ‘socialization’ approach that have been the dominant families of explanation for public opinion can account for the distinction between Europhoric and Eurosceptic member states. Such a permanent divide does not depend on an evaluation of the economic consequences of integration nor is it a matter of growing identification with the institutional practices of the EU. Rather, ‘political cues’ grounded in rationally and constructively oriented accession negotiations mediate the effect of economic calculation and socialization. In this manner, quantitative research on public support shifts to a theoretically oriented model backed by illustrative case studies.

Apart from mixing qualitative and quantitative methods with a view to re-testing and expanding extant theories of enlargement and EU public opinion, this study combines historical evidence and survey data. The single case studies on the British, Greek, and Austrian accessions examine the historical evidence at hand using not only secondary sources, such as leading studies by historians, but also primary archival material (in edited and unedited form) and leading actors’ memoirs. Enlargement and UM or VM elite attitudes to it, are explained as the end point of a concrete historical sequence. In a ‘reconstructive or particularizing’ account I show that the UM or VM accession was to be expected in the circumstances in which it occurred (Dessler, 1999;129). In the ensuing statistical analysis of the evolution of public support for the EU after enlargement, I resort to Eurobarometer data as one of
the most widely requested datasets handled by survey data archives, used in scores of publications each year (Reif and Inglehart, 1991; xv). These surveys have been carried out twice a year since the early 1970s by the European Commission and constitute the product of a ‘unique programme of cross-national and cross-temporal research in applied social science’ (Puetz, 2002; 107). The main features that make the EB dataset invaluable are the following. First, its international comparability thanks to the representative samples carried out simultaneously in all member states. Second, the regular repetition of key questions that establishes long and short term trends and thus the possibility for time series. Last but not least, the economic indicators, influencing utilitarian support, are drawn from a variety of relevant databases such as Eurostat and Datastream. The socialization indicators that in turn have an impact on short-run affective support are drawn from original data on Commission and European Parliament officials that were kindly made available to the author by the Personnel and Administration DGs in the aforementioned institutions.

4. OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS

This project is structured in three parts. Part I brings together in a systematic way the insights from the recent literature on EU enlargement. In fact, before delineating the rationalist and constructivist hypotheses on the conditions of EU widening, this study offers a novel definition of enlargement that makes its research focus explicit: i.e. the link between accession negotiations and public support for integration. Enlargement is a tripartite process consisting not only of the ex-ante phase of preference formation and the dum stage of the accession bargain, but also of the ex-post phase where its impact on the Union, the applicants and non-members comes under scrutiny. Using the neglected ex-post dimension of public opinion formation as the main dependent variable, and earlier enlargement phases as the main explanatory factors, this project adds a new, comparative politics perspective to the enlargement debate. In addition, chapter 1 reiterates the basic rationalist and constructivist approaches to the study of CEE widening. Nevertheless, it manages to move beyond the state of the art, applying the tools of ‘differentiation’ to the theoretical treatment of enlargement. In particular, chapter 1 advocates theoretical differentiation within the different phases of single enlargement cases – i.e. a concurrent use of rational and constructivist tools, following Schimmelfennig in his analysis of EU enlargement to Central and Eastern
Europe. At the same time, going beyond the latter’s claims, this study argues in favour of theoretical differentiation *between* the various EU enlargement rounds, exploring the prevalence of each perspective across different applicants, at different times.

In part II, I test the validity of theoretical differentiation *within* Britain, Greece and Austria, and *between* the enlargement rounds they represent. The analysis supports both ‘differentiation’ claims. On the one hand, both material factors and identity concerns account for the tendencies and the controversies *within* each enlargement game. On the other hand, *between* the different applicants and the enlargement rounds they represent, it is possible to distinguish rationally oriented from constructively driven entrants. Chapter 2, for example, in laying out national and EU elite attitudes to Greek membership in the EU, substantiates the pertinence of Value Maximization in accounting for the outcome of the accession game. Even though cost-benefit calculations on security and welfare made up a significant part of member and candidate states’ enlargement preferences, liberal democratic values still constituted the basic rationale for justifying enlargement. Greece’s adherence to democratic ideals was strategically used by national elites to ‘rhetorically entrap’ hesitant EU actors. On the basis of shared community principles no incumbent wanted to stand accused of undermining Greek democracy. Enlargement, therewith, became a value-driven policy rather than an interest-based contract among demand and supply side elites.

In contrast, the British and Austrian accessions analysed in chapters 3 and 4 respectively confirm the efficiency-enhancing function of EU widening and validate the concept of theoretical differentiation *between* different enlargement rounds occurring at different points in time. Liberal democratic norms were included in the motives and inhibitions expressed on both sides of the negotiation table, but were not instrumental in calling the shots of the accession bargain. In Britain, old constitutional democracy and historical attachment to former colonies and the US watered down the European credentials of the country, posing hurdles on the way to Brussels. The accession of Britain into the Community, nevertheless, came to be seen as a way of increasing leverage in the international arena for both the applicant and the incumbents rather than as a matter of shared principles. Welfare-based incentives were in turn, present but not central to shaping state actors’ attitudes to integration as the economic payoff of membership seemed uncertain. In Austria, finally, the
democratic credentials of the country were not an issue and due emphasis was given to the economic opportunities enlargement created for both the supply and demand parts. The relevance of shared democratic principles was marginal in the face of the substantive material benefits expected by cooperation between the Union and its former EFTA partner. Hence, Utility rather than Value Maximization provided a basis for consensus in both the 1995 and 1973 Northern enlargement rounds. All in all, the establishment of theoretical differentiation through the comparative analysis of theoretically under researched enlargement cases has significantly broadened EU enlargement research. Enlargement is in fact embedded in a continuum between Utility and Value Maximizing elite attitudes to integration, as the conclusions of Part II maintain.

In the third and final part of the thesis I explore another empirically neglected aspect of enlargement, its impact on the legitimacy people ascribe to the Union after having gained membership. In fact, before investigating the role of UM and VM elite attitudes to integration in determining the distinct levels of popular support for Europe, I draw a detailed picture of how legitimacy should be perceived in an ever-enlarging European polity. Using the theoretical postulates of intergovernmentalism, federalism and multi-level governance as a blueprint, I make the case for a multi-level model of EU legitimacy. The latter, allows for a full-scale application of all various aspects of legitimacy - direct and indirect, utilitarian and affective - to the EU. In particular, the intimate links the multi-level model establishes between performance and identity-based legitimacy, arguing that policy effectiveness can reinforce a civic sense of belonging to the Union, enable a comprehensive treatment of EU legitimacy much like the one observed at the state level. At the same time the intermingling of utilitarian and affective legitimation factors among the multiple territorial constituencies of an enlarged EU, helps us conceive of a Union exhibiting considerable geographical variation with regard to which legitimation strategy dominates and to what extent. In short, the multi-level model is one which respects the principle of ‘differentiation’.

In the last two chapters of Part III in turn, I put empirical flesh on the theoretical bones of multi-level EU legitimacy. The hypotheses investigated in chapter 6, modify the ‘economic-voting’ model, which has so far guided research on public support for European Integration. Instead of attributing cross-national differences in utilitarian EU support to domestic macroeconomic performance, the
statistical analysis reveals that national economic outcomes are modified by supranational factors such as enlargement politics, which mediate the ‘perceptual screen’ of EU citizens via national elites. Utility Maximizing and Value Maximizing elite attitudes to integration generate distinct mean levels of support for the European project. A normative justification of EU membership, as an occasion for improving domestic institutions by joining a community of shared democratic values, is a powerful determinant of pro-EU attitudes. In ‘Utility Maximizing’ countries, whose elites enter the club for the material benefits of membership, public support fluctuates more, depending on how much national economic conditions improve or deteriorate after accession. Subsequently, in chapter 7, I revisit the empirical literature on affective support for the EU. Building on the ‘socialization’ argument (Inglehart and Rabier, 1978 Inglehart, 1977), which associates the evolution of a ‘we-feeling’ for the Union with an abstract process of social learning that evolves over time, I propose new, more tangible indicators. Using original data on EU officials I investigate the degree to which identification with the EU depends on indirect socialization, i.e. civic participation in the integration process, as manifested by the collective presence of different nationalities in EU institutions. Second, I advocate a direct mode of socialization as measured by the citizens’ share of the vote in European elections. The identity-framing capacity of EU enlargement politics is tested against the aforementioned direct and indirect socialization factors. In particular, the elite classification along the UM-VM axis becomes instrumental in accounting for the relatively constant gap in affective support for integration among EU member states. This means that identification with the EU depends more on how national elites have framed EU membership, first in the supranational and then in the domestic arena, rather than on post-accession socialization per se. Confirming such expectations, the regression analysis reveals that after controlling for a wide set of socializing factors the mean level of support in UM countries is substantially lower than it is in VM countries. In addition, among the UM group socialization relates negatively to affective EU support, showing how impervious they can be to socialization efforts.

Future research can build on these results to theorize how EU identity and performance is cued by national elites. Hence, in the conclusions I not only synthesize the main findings of this study but also suggest avenues for further theoretical and empirical investigation. Last but not least, I evaluate the implications
of my findings for current efforts to bring the EU closer to its citizens, and advocate *diverse geographical legitimation strategies* that will accommodate divergent elite and popular attitudes to integration. All in all, the adoption of nationally distinct legitimation initiatives among UM and VM countries is put forward as a successful antidote to international variation in public support that may bridge the gap between Eurosceptics and Europhiles.
Enlargement has long been treated with neglect in the study of European Integration. The classic theoretical accounts of the 1960s offered rival explanations of how and why regimes of supranational governance develop, but said nothing about their expansion into new territorial units (Deutsch et al, 1957; Haas, 1968; Schmitter, 1969). Enlargement, although it appeared on the EU agenda as early as 1961 with the first applications from Ireland, Denmark and the UK, failed to become a fertile site for theoretical development. This is hardly surprising in view of the historical decline in early integration theory that preceded the European Community’s first enlargement in 1973. In addition, the 1980s expansion from nine to twelve member states coincided with a reorientation of scholarly interest from high-polity to substantive-policy analysis and the adoption of theoretical frameworks from comparative politics, such as neo-corporatism, that did little to further research on polity-building issues like enlargement. Along similar lines, the 1995 enlargement to the former EFTA states occurred amidst a ‘governance’ turn in EU studies, which neglected the polity-building of integration and focused instead on day-to-day, technical policy making. In turn, this substantial shift of focus from grand to mid-range theorizing has inevitably biased the study of EU widening, which is analytically sidelined due to a predominant scholarly interest in the deepening challenge - the gridlock expanded membership poses on EU policy and decision making.\(^1\)

Given its political salience, nevertheless, it is surprising that enlargement has existed for so long in a ‘theoretical vacuum’, attracting no particular set of assumptions about the way in which it operates (Schmitter, 1996; 14). Only recently

\(^1\) The significance of such empirical work is by no means trivial as enlargement indeed does have far reaching implications for both the policy scope of the EU and the decision-making competence of its institutions. For a detailed analysis of the deepening challenge see De Witte, 2002; Nugent, 1992; Preston, 1995.
have a new generation of scholars gone beyond the ‘widening vs. deepening’ dilemma and offered theoretically informed accounts using assumptions from International Relations approaches. In their work, not only does enlargement become a subject for theoretical reflection, but the spectrum of dependent variables also expands. First and foremost, the ‘demand’ side of integration is given equal weight to the ‘supply’ side as applicants’ enlargement politics come under scrutiny (Fioretos, 1997; Mattli, 1999). Similarly, the role of EU institutions (i.e. the Commission) in shaping the process of negotiations is acknowledged and a distinction is drawn between incumbent and EU enlargement politics (Friis, 1998a; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Fierke and Weiner, 1999).

Even so, the current state of the art on EU enlargement suffers from an under-specification of both dependent and independent variables and is insulated from a true comparative research design, which would offer cross-sectional evidence of the theoretical imprint of different enlargement rounds, sharpening up the analysis of this highly important contemporary issue. In an attempt to enhance our conceptual understanding of EU widening this chapter first offers a novel definition of enlargement which divides the process into three stages: the *ex-ante* process of preference formation; the *dum* stage of accession negotiations; and the *ex-post* phase of post-accession effects. On the basis of this tripartite sequence an updated typology of dependent and independent variables is drawn and the contribution of this study to the field established. Only then do the basic rationalist and constructivist assumptions come under scrutiny, and their compatibility with the study of EU enlargement is proved or disconfirmed. In the concluding remarks a case is made for ‘theoretical differentiation’ *within* enlargement episodes and *between* enlargement rounds, allowing the analyst to be more flexible in the analytical tools he/she employs while studying distinct candidates and diverse membership waves.

### 1.1.A DEFINING ENLARGEMENT

The definition proposed in this study views enlargement as a *horizontal geographical expansion* to new member states, which stems from (and subsequently causes) a *vertical institutionalisation* of new organizational norms. However, both the horizontal expansion and the vertical institutionalisation are by no means static and are best conceived as a matter of degree. Enlargement in this sense is a gradual
process including three stages. It begins before the accession negotiations (ex-ante), continues at the negotiation table (dum), and definitely goes on after the signing of the accession treaty (ex-post). The horizontal expansion into new territorial units begins with the expansion of trade to new partners, while the formal institutionalisation starts with the association agreements. Then both the horizontal and vertical aspects evolve to the point of signing the accession treaties. Nevertheless, admission and subsequent ratification by both the entrant and the existing member states, do not signify the end of the enlargement game, for the latter have important implications for both the host organization and the entrants.

By defining enlargement as a process of horizontal territorial expansion resulting from (and subsequently causing) a formal vertical institutionalisation, I acknowledge both the geopolitical significance of the changing EU borders and the importance of the diffusion of the EU institutional norms in the applicant states. At the same time, the impact of vertical institutionalisation on the member states and the organization itself is taken into account. In this sense, the research focus of enlargement is open to new dependent variables originating from a) the area of comparative politics, such as political parties’ orientations and popular consent towards the EU after accession, and, b) the governance approach, i.e. the impact of enlargement on policy making within the EU and the new states. Hence grand theorizing, i.e. understanding what triggers the process of EU territorial expansion, makes room for middle-range theories.

In addition, by specifying three stages in the enlargement process - ex-ante, dum and ex-post - the analyst can move away from a bias inherent in the literature, which associates enlargement with a negotiation game and fails to appreciate the significance of post-enlargement results in European integration. In viewing enlargement as a negotiation game one acknowledges the importance of the pre-accession (ex-ante) period and studies its implications on the dum phase, i.e. on how the accession deal is being negotiated, but nothing informs this approach on the ex-post impact of enlargement. The merit of this broad definition in locating the research focus of this study will be assessed in the following section, where a typology of EU enlargement dependent and independent variables is offered.
1.1.b A Typology of EU Enlargement Variables: Locating the Research Focus

In the study of enlargement, one can distinguish four main dimensions, which generate separate dependent variables, as pointed out by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier in their seminal article ‘Theorizing EU enlargement: research focus, hypotheses and the state of research’. These comprise a) applicants’ enlargement politics, b) member state enlargement politics, c) EU enlargement politics, and, d) the impact of enlargement (2002;504).

If we consider these dependent variables in the tripartite framework of EU enlargement as a process, consisting of *ex-ante*, *dum* and *ex-post* phases, then three major research questions emerge: a) which factors place enlargement on the agenda of the applicants, the incumbents and the EU; b) what are their enlargement politics (i.e. how the negotiations proceed and why incumbents concede to or reject the applicants’ request); and c) what is the impact of enlargement on the EU, the entrant states and non-members? A number of studies have focused on the *ex-ante* phase and the ‘demand’ side of membership, trying to explain under what conditions the applicants seek accession to the EU. Hence, the dynamics of application rather than accession negotiations, constitute the central dependent variable in this strand of enlargement research (Fioretos, 1997 Mattli, 2000 Beiler, 2002 Mattli and Plümper, 2002).

**Table 1.1 Dependent and Independent Variables in the process of EU Enlargement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EX-ANTE</th>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Pre-accession interest by</td>
<td>➢ Enlargement Politics by</td>
<td>➢ The impact of enlargement on</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Applicant states</td>
<td>▪ Non-members</td>
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<td>▪ Member States</td>
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<td>▪ The EU</td>
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Policy POLITY Dimension

An increasing number of those who engage in the enlargement debate nevertheless, pay due attention to the *dum* phase, treating enlargement as a negotiation game (Friis, 1998a *ibid*, 1998b Schimmelfennig, 2001). In their work, the ex-ante phase is taken
as an independent variable determining the outcome of the membership negotiations. EU ex-ante motivations appear as the sole explanatory factors that determine the outcome of the negotiations. Put simply, emphasis is placed on the ‘supply’ side of integration, i.e. on the EU and the incumbents. In Fierke and Weiner (1999), for example, enlargement is part of the EU’s post Cold war identity and the outcome of the accession negotiations with the CEECs depends on the EU’s normative commitments made during the Cold War. Similarly, Sjursen (2002) attributes the outcome of membership negotiations to a ‘kinship-based duty’ guiding EU enlargement politics. Last but not least, Sedelmeier (2000 ibid, 2001) treats enlargement as a function of evoking the EU’s ‘identity of responsibility’ towards the applicant states.

On the other hand there are a few scholars, who, while focusing on the dum phase, use both the applicant and the EU’s ex-ante motivations as determinants of the accession negotiations. In other words, while reflecting on what determines the successful outcome of enlargement negotiations, Schimmelfennig (2001) makes some room for applicant politics dating from before the formal opening of accession negotiations (i.e. ex-ante phase). Recapitulating on the dum phase, it is worth mentioning that besides studies seeking to explain enlargement’s high-polity dimension there are also those concerned with the low policy-dimensions. Put simply, the latter view enlargement as the outcome of the specific policy preferences of certain societal interest groups or institutional actors (Haggard et al.,1993 Sedelmeier,2002).

In light of the preceding reflections on the state of the art in the enlargement literature, it becomes apparent that accession, i.e. the dum phase, is treated as the principal event in the enlargement process. Enlargement, however, as stated elsewhere, has important implications for the host organization, the applicant state and non-members as well. Despite the significance of the ex-post enlargement phase for both the policy and polity future of the EU, only a few studies have treated post accession effects as a dependent variable. Even here, the scholars who have done so, have mainly studied the effects of membership either on the policy sector (Falkner,2000 Börzel,1999 Knill and Lehmkühl,1999) placing them in the ‘Europeanisation literature, or on EU institutions, continuing the widening vs. deepening debate (Vachudova and Moravcsik,2003 Moberg,2002). Even so, there are some who move beyond the policy to a broader polity dimension, talking about
the effect of EU membership on member states’ identity and democratic politics. Risse, for example offers a normative understanding of Europeanisation seeking to understand ‘how it affects collective understandings and loyalties towards the nation-state’ (2001;200 ibid,2002). Anderson (2002), on the other hand, draws on the impact of membership on parliamentary democracy, and the political dynamics that flow from it - that is parliament, executive, judiciary, political parties, systems of interest representation. Last but not least, the existing literature on the ex-post phase accounts for the impact of enlargement on the EU’s foreign policy, a phenomenon Schmitter calls ‘externalisation’ referring to changes in the EU’s relationship with the outside world (1969;161-166). Nevertheless, both externalisation and Europeanisation, be they policy or polity oriented, fail to explicitly connect the impact of EU membership at the national level with the central moment of European Integration: that of application and subsequent negotiations for accession. In other words, the third and final stage in the enlargement process is studied in isolation from its initial phases.

The contribution of this study to the enlargement debate will be to shed light on the neglected ex-post dimension of enlargement, and how it relates to the ex-ante and mainly the dum phase of the accession negotiations. More specifically, the question to be addressed is as follows: ‘do the prevalent elite motivations at the time of accession affect direct popular support for the EU?’ Put simply, the dependent variable, stemming from the polity dimension of the ex-post phase, links the enlargement politics of both the EU and the applicant states with the evolution of public opinion across these entrant countries. In this sense, the present research ‘locates the study of enlargement and its domestic political ingredients in the field of comparative politics’ following the suggestions of Helen Wallace (2002;665) for new avenues in enlargement research. As she rightly points out ‘Whatever the challenge of explaining preferences in both existing and candidate … countries we are faced with the further challenge of comprehending the evolution of public opinion across this same range of countries’. Public opinion may not be the driving force behind a country’s decision to participate in the process of integration, but it nevertheless becomes, a significant point of reference, because it can affect the

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2 For an interesting discussion on Europeanisation and how it relates to a) enlargement as territorial expansion, b) institutional evolution at the EU level, c) adaptation of national and sub-national systems of governance to European wide norms, and d) exporting forms of political organization, see Olsen, 2002.
direction, the speed, and the continuity of such a process after accession (Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996;178-179).

Given the centrality of public opinion to EU integration efforts, one should not disregard mass attitudes when studying enlargement. EU widening, viewed as a formal European Council decision is a legalistic and static perception of reality, which can be very misleading. The heads of state and government give an impetus to European Integration by putting enlargement on the agenda (ex-ante), negotiating, and finally ratifying the Accession Treaty (dum phase). They do not, however, have sole power, over whether the enlargement initiative will succeed or not in the implementation stage by gaining credit among the wider population as a legitimate course of action. In other words, political elites do not have a monopoly on the ex-post phase of enlargement. Hence, attention will be paid to issues of political consent in recognition of the fact that enlargement is a complicated issue that cannot be resolved via admission and subsequent ratification by both the entrant and the existing member states. Notwithstanding the validity of such claims for the most recent phase of EU widening, the absence of relevant empirical data makes it hard to substantiate any arguments considering the CEECs tendency to diminish or improve EU legitimacy in the aftermath of accession. For this reason, past episodes of EU enlargement (from 1973 to 1995) will comprise the main subject of inquiry in the proposed research framework.

Having chosen a dependent variable that adds a comparative politics perspective to the study of enlargement, I do not automatically renounce grand theorizing in that area. On the contrary, following the debate between rational and constructivist approaches, I attempt to distinguish between enlargement rounds where the ex-ante preferences and dum politics of both the EU and the applicants are driven by these different paradigms. Put simply, the initial phases in the process of enlargement, seen from a diverse theoretical perspective, serve as explanatory factors in an attempt to understand significant variations in public support for the EU across countries. In the following section, two approaches making up the rationalist research framework will be presented, with a view to laying out the distinct utility-oriented hypotheses on enlargement advanced by realism and neoliberalism. In the second part, a theoretical migration will be attempted towards a constructivist research project. The modernist and the integrative variant will be outlined, but due emphasis will be given to the latter as it is capable of generating novel hypotheses on
EU enlargement based on value rather than utility concerns. In the concluding section, a critical discussion rejecting theoretical universalism and an exclusive interpretation of EU enlargement via the rationalist or the constructivist lens is presented. As a result, the third and final part of this chapter will make the case for a novel approach to the study of EU enlargement, that of ‘theoretical differentiation’, which advocates the use of diverse theoretical tools to deal with the heterogeneity in both applicants’ objective characteristics and distinct historical contexts.

1.2 The Rationalist Research Programme

1.2. A Realism: EU Enlargement as a Response to Security Concerns

Realism has been the dominant way of conducting theoretical enquiry in International Relations for the last fifty years or so. Stemming from the tremendous struggle against Nazism and the exigencies of the Cold War, it gave due emphasis to the role of military power and the primacy of national security in international affairs. The realist project, as delineated in the writings of Morgenthau (1948), Carr (1964), and Aron (1973) and subsequently revised through the work of Waltz (1979), Gilpin (1981) and Grieco (1988) has generated a variety of assumptions, some of which may prove fruitful in locating the theoretical imprint of EU enlargement politics.

I. Who decides to become an EU member: National Interest in Security

To begin with, at the core of the realist prospectus is the idea that states as rational unitary agents ‘act in terms of interest defined as power’ (Morgenthau, 1948;5). In the competitive realm of international politics power becomes the central tenet of utility maximization. The notion of power, nevertheless, lacks precision in the classical realist tradition and its proper definition remains a matter of controversy (see Gilpin,1981;13 Keohane and Nye,1977;8,11 Keohane,1986;10-11). For Morgenthau, power is both a resource and an ability to influence others’ behaviour. If the latter definition is adopted then any effective action in world politics will automatically involve power, leading to tautological rather than explanatory reasoning. If, however, for the purposes of theorizing enlargement one accepts power as a resource, then the outcome is a more satisfactory assumption of rational states pursuing greater geographical, industrial, military and diplomatic power via
accession. Such scope conditions provide a clue as to the appropriate determinants of power, but still add-up to a multi-faced and vague mosaic. Despite the explicit reluctance of realists to assign power a definite meaning, military preparedness constitutes the most important component of national power. In Morgenthau’s words, ‘what gives the factors of geography, natural resources and industrial capacity their actual importance for the power of a nation is military preparedness’ (1948;114).

The neorealist tradition not only espouses the notion of the primacy of power and security in state motivation, but also theoretically improves it by introducing the notion of anarchy (Waltz,1979;79-128 Hoffmann,1973;54-87). The latter refers to a situation where there is no overarching authority to provide order on a global scale. Anarchy requires states to worry about their relative power, security and survival and these worries condition their behaviour (Grieco,1988;488). In a self-help system of this sort the possession of military power proves remarkably useful, helping states at the very least to seek their own preservation, and at the most to strive for universal domination, as Waltz contends (1979;118). For neorealists, though, international political economy exists alongside military alignment (Gilpin,1987;31). Economic resources as an indispensable tool for the preservation of autonomy and the improvement of security move in the orbit of military power. As Gilpin points out, ‘although economic forces are real and have a profound effect on the distribution of wealth and power in the world, they always work in the context of the political struggle among groups and nations’ (1986;310). In a hierarchy of issues in the international politics agenda, military security comes first.

Under the spell of international anarchy states become sensitive to changes in the distribution of power. Given the survival imperative, states have no choice but to worry about relative capabilities that can be used to obtain absolute advantage. Even though it would be misleading to characterize realism as exclusively concerned with relative rather than absolute gains, still, as Lipson contends, in security matters relative gains bear a greater weight than in economic affairs (1984;15-18). Along these lines, Grieco is right in claiming that in a self-help international context ‘the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities’ (1988;498). Gaps in gains from cooperation increase state uncertainty and fear in an anarchic world (Powell,1991;1311).

3 For a detailed discussion on relative vs. absolute gains see Baldwin,1993;5-6. On relative gains see also Carr,1964;111 Gilpin,1981; 87-88.
The relative gains problem in turn, engenders an interest in balancing the superior power of competing states (Waltz, 1979; 117-27 Walt, 1987). In principle, states prefer *internal balancing*, i.e. individual efforts to improve the national base of power, thereby equalling if not outpacing competitor states in the international arena. States rely on the means they can generate for themselves. When individual efforts do not suffice, nevertheless, states opt for *external balancing* i.e. they attempt to ameliorate their defensive positionality by joining an alliance of states (Grieco, 1988; 499-500, *ibid*, 1990; 10 *ibid*, 1997; 67). Defensive positionality in turn, helps states counter external threats, but also allows them to redress imbalances in alliance gains if they arise. In the EU context, defensive positionality triggers applicants’ bids for membership since the EU alliance allows non-members to counter the rising challenge of potential rivals like Japan. At the same time, nevertheless, EU widening poses a challenge to the realist concern over relative gains, for some incumbents gain far more than the individual applicants. Defensive positionality solves the paradox, allowing hopeful entrants more effective ‘voice opportunities.’ Put simply, the weaker partners, i.e. applicants, by pursuing accession seek to ensure more effective voice opportunities for themselves within the EU, thereby preventing or at least ameliorating the situation of domination by stronger incumbents (Grieco, 1993; 331-332 *ibid*, 1995).

Transferring the core neo-realist propositions to the context of EU enlargement in general and the applicant side in particular, the following Utility Maximizing hypothesis is in line:

*A non member state decides to apply for membership if accession is the only efficient means to balance the superior power or threat of a rival state or to increase its own power.*

**II. How and Why an Applicant Becomes a Member State**

**II.A Interstate Bargaining**

While the realist and neorealist traditions are explicit in accounting for the ex-ante phase of applicant preference formation, they only implicitly indicate how accession negotiations proceed. Having emphasized the primacy of security in international

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4 Defensive positionality is the exact opposite of offensive positionality, which stands for states’ mercantilist desire to maximize the difference in gains arising from cooperation to their own advantage. Grieco, 1988: 499.
politics and the role of military force and economic might in guaranteeing state survival, realism and neorealism propagate a state-centred mode of interaction. Intense interstate bargaining seems to be the natural choice in an international arena where states as unitary actors strive for survival. Yet, strategic bargaining loses focus in the realist approach as it places excessive emphasis on statism (Krasner, 1978; Grieco, 1988). Neorealism, on the other hand, does not presume that states need always be the principal actors. Rather, it passively accepts the growing importance of non-state actors and the extent of transnational activities maintaining the state-centric conception of international politics. Systemic analysis à la Waltz, assumes that the international structure is characterized by a) anarchy and b) a set of interacting units (i.e. states) performing similar functions. Both anarchy and state behaviour are treated as constants rather than as variables, while the sole variable is the distribution of capabilities across states in the international system. Such a systemic variable, i.e. the possession of power in relation to others, alludes to a bargaining phase the outcome of which depends on the relative power of the negotiating parties. In this manner, neorealism can account for the dum phase of accession negotiations focusing on the distribution of state capabilities.

II.B Defining the Role of EU Institutions in the Accession Bargain

Interstate bargaining in turn, determines the occurrence of international cooperation. Cooperation depends on state power rather than on institutional mediation, and as such is harder to achieve and more difficult to maintain. Anarchy and the distribution of power among interacting units impose strict limits on cooperation, that is on the kinds of collective action problems that can be resolved. More specifically, cooperation exists in the case of an imminent threat to state security making the prospect of survival bleak. Institutions may emerge to facilitate international cooperative movements, but they do not develop meaningful authority. Realism and neorealism present a pessimistic analysis of the capabilities of international institutions arguing that the latter affect the prospects for cooperation only marginally. International institutions are considered unable to dampen state security fears effectively, causing states to ascribe little importance to them (Hoffmann, 1973; ibid, 1968). As Keohane points out in his critique, ‘institutionalised patterns of cooperation on the basis of shared purposes do not exist, except as part of a larger
struggle for power’ (Keohane, 1984:7). In essence, state power is exercised in political bargains inside international institutions that function as instruments created to serve state interests (Finnemore and Barnett, 1999:703).

II.C Why incumbents agree to enlargement

Arguing along these lines, the expansion of the EU into new territorial units is viewed as a mechanism for interstate cooperation that fulfils the survival imperatives of the EU incumbents. In the realist tradition, US-Soviet bipolarity constitutes a necessary structural condition for such cooperation, because European powers no longer fear that the greater gains of one will be translated into military force to be used against the others. Enlargement is the landmark of European cooperation that widens the base of interstate interaction to new members. Bipolarity in turn, favours the widening of EU cooperation because it ensures the defensive positionality of member states i.e. it guarantees that relative gains from cooperation will not be used against weaker EU partners (Grieco, 1993:303). The end of superpower bipolarity in the 1980s and the continuous expansion of the EU into new territorial units, nevertheless, form a paradox. European states in the absence of a tangible threat from the communist bloc and the protective wing of the US should go astray, as John Mearsheimer (1991:182-84) contends. Why do EU incumbents widen the base of EU cooperation by taking on board new members in a world where bipolarity has waned?

A satisfactory answer can be given by the neorealist school. The European nations, concerned not about their immediate security but about their relative position in the world economy, chose in the mid to late 1980s to revive the EC in order to counter the continuing economic challenge by the United States, and especially the new and more acute challenge by Japan (Grieco, 1996:284). Hence, the accession of new members constitutes an external balancing act against the superior economic power of rival states, provided that EU incumbents cannot meet these challenges internally (Schimmelfennig, 1999:6 ibid, 2003b:28). More specifically, the neorealist hypothesis over why EU incumbents grant accession to applicants in the dum phase of negotiations is as follows:

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5 Survival does not only refer to national security but also extends to economic affairs. The low politics of economics matter because they secure the high politics of military security.
EU member states respond positively to applicants if enlargement is a necessary and sufficient means to balance the superior power of a rival state or to increase EU power in the international arena.

1.2. B NEOLIBERALISM: EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

I. Who decides to become an EU member: National Interest in Welfare

Moving beyond the inherent pessimism of realism, which plays down the prospects for international cooperation under an ever-present struggle for survival, neoliberalism reinterprets international politics. It shifts attention away from the security dilemmas of individual states towards issues of economic interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1972 *ibid.*, 1977). Reflecting fundamental trends in the global political economy, such as the rapidly increasing potential for trade and investment among industrialized nations since the Second World War, as well as the disorder in the international monetary system after 1970, the neoliberal camp turns over a new page in international relations theory. Issues of economic competitiveness become more pronounced as the Cold War sense of a security threat slackens (Keohane, 1993:271).

To put it in Keohane’s words: ‘Under different systemic conditions states will define their interests differently. For instance, when survival is at stake efforts to maintain autonomy may take precedence over all other activities, but where the environment is relatively benign energies will also be directed to fulfilling other goals’ (1986:194). In essence, anarchy as the central structure of international politics is accepted (Oye, 1986; 1 Aixerold and Keohane, 1985:226). The consequences attributed to it, nevertheless, differ greatly. For neoliberals anarchy is related to institutional cooperation, where the growing interdependence of international political actors pulls the strings. Hence, Keohane calls for a broader systemic theory that incorporates the anarchic notion of structure à la Waltz, but takes interdependence seriously as an additional structural element (1986:18). In this sense neoliberals emphasize the importance of changeable political processes, rather than of immutable anarchic structures (Keohane, 1989:10). They allow for progress in human affairs. As such, the progressive liberal spirit can provide an empirically and heuristically useful way of looking at enlargement politics. In reviewing the effects of the pre-accession phase and the accession negotiations on the *ex-post* evolution of
support for the EU across diverse enlargement rounds, one should allow for variation in the international context rather than see it as irrevocably fixed on questions of survival.

Under complex interdependence, national autonomy is heavily undermined and state cooperation becomes the norm. The global rush to liberalise trade, matched by a significant regionalisation of trade activities via integration agreements such as the EU, ASEAN and Mercosur, give individual countries a high incentive to engage in mutually beneficial policy coordination (Milner, 2002). National self-sufficiency wanes as increasing transborder trade in goods, services and factors creates negative and positive policy externalities, i.e. costs and benefits for important societal groups, falling outside the jurisdiction of individual states (Cooper, 1986; 292-93). Interdependence in this sense refers to interconnectedness across national boundaries, but is not only that. While interconnectedness is limited to situations of mutual benefit, interdependence also points to the costly effects of international transactions (Keohane and Nye, 1977; 9). Examples include protectionist barriers against foreign trade in goods or lax environmental standards that impose costs on foreign nationals and undermine domestic governments’ policy making. Where negative policy externalities cannot be effectively reduced by unilateral action, a high incentive to cooperate arises. Transferring such a dictum to the EU context, it becomes apparent that positive externalities stemming from EU policies, such as an overvalued currency and high welfare standards, do not inevitably lead all applicants to favour accession. Rather, membership constitutes an unambiguous objective in cases where policy-coordination promises to alleviate any negative EU policy externalities (Moravcsik, 1993a; 485-486).

The preceding discussion points to the significance of absolute welfare gains in neoliberal analysis. Relative gains matter ‘albeit usually as part of an attempt to maximize long-term absolute gains’ (Keohane, 1993; 283). In a benign environment where the survival imperative has been removed there is no reason to assume that gains from cooperation will be used against any of the participants by a domineering state. Once the fear of force has been abolished as an instrument of foreign policy, it is not plausible to argue that states worry about the being threatened in the future by the economic gains made by their partners in the present. Liberal democratic states sharing a common interest in maximizing the absolute welfare of their citizens have no incentive to become embroiled in severe conflicts. Herewith, the relative gains
stemming from liberal democracies’ common endeavours do not put excessive strain on negotiating state actors. If a single partner happens to come out relatively better off the whole alliance of liberal democratic states gains as it increases in absolute strength. Applying the neoliberal contentions on absolute gains and economic interdependence to EU enlargement, the hypothesis guiding applicants’ bid for membership is as follows:

*A non-member state seeks accession if the net welfare benefits of EU membership are higher than the costs.*

It should be noted that the hypothesis advanced by liberal intergovernmentalism, the evolution of the neoliberal variant, does not change in content. Absolute welfare gains do matter for the pursuit of membership. What liberal intergovernmentalism adds to an analysis of applicant preferences is a ‘bottom up’ liberal view of politics, in which the demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to state politics (Moravcsik, 1997; 517). More specifically, applicant elites are both empowered and constrained by politically significant domestic groups, which define national interest in terms of economic gains and losses stemming from the widening of EU policy coordination (Milner, 1998; Gourevitch, 1986). On balance, however, neoliberalism and liberal intergovernmentalism can be treated as analytically equal in explaining applicant states’ motivations as they both advance a welfare based explanation.

II. How and Why an Applicant Becomes a Member State

II.A Interstate Bargaining

Moving from the *ex-ante* phase of applicant preference formation to the *dum* stage of interstate negotiations, the neoliberal approach makes room for the liberal intergovernmentalist variant. This approach rather than treating bargaining as an assumption, acknowledges its functional role in determining the outcome of any negotiation game. Such a theoretical restatement of enlargement enjoys greater parsimony, coherence and empirical accuracy than the neoliberal variant, for liberal intergovernmentalism draws a decisive link between the *ex-ante* and *dum* phases of the widening process. The relative intensity of liberal preferences at the national level determines how the membership bargain is struck, reflecting the concessions
and compromises states are willing to make in pursuit of membership so as to satisfy the demands of important societal actors (Moravcsik, 1991, 1993a, 1995).

By bringing in domestic factors, liberal intergovernmentalism modifies the basic rational assumption that states act as self-interested unitary actors. Moravcsik, nevertheless, maintains the unitary action assumption in the case of international bargaining, relaxing it only in the preference formation procedure that precedes interstate negotiations. To put it in his words, ‘States are not unitary in their internal politics’ and their particular objectives arise out of domestic competition among influential political groups. Nevertheless, once state objectives are shaped, ‘states strategize as unitary actors vis-à-vis other states in an effort to realize them’ (Moravcsik, 1998; 22). Success or failure depends on the participants’ relative bargaining power, stemming from relative preference intensity. Hence, enlargement through a liberal intergovernmentalist lens represents a sharp ‘influence effect’ from the incumbents, who can force the applicants to make disproportionate concessions and compromises in exchange for membership (Hirschman, 1945; 17 Vachudova and Moravcsik, 2003; 44-45).

Rational state actors on the supply side enjoy a greater bargaining leverage because the potential gains from expansion into new territorial units do not exceed the costs of maintaining their current status quo. In essence, EU incumbents can skillfully impose their terms on the accession deal because the unilateral alternative is not inferior to the enlargement option. Such a supply threat of zero-sum cooperation is not always an attractive alternative for the demand side, depending on the relative intensity with which EU membership is pursued in the domestic sphere. The higher the consensus on membership application, the higher the perceived benefit from the accession bargain and thereby the greater the leeway for EU incumbents to threaten applicants with non-agreement (Moravcsik, 1993a; 502-503 Raiffa, 1982; 253). Nor can applicants credibly threaten to form alternative alliances excluding recalcitrant EU members. In this manner, liberal intergovernmentalist thinking, with its emphasis on relative bargaining power matched by unilateral and coalitional alternatives to agreement, seems pertinent for the study of EU accession

6 If one considers the creation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as an example of an ‘exclusion threat’ issued in 1960 by future EU applicants, its limited credibility forcefully proves the marginal bargaining power of the demand side. The fact that EFTA members would trade primarily with EU countries rather than with each other shows that the gains from such an alternative coalition were far less than potential EU membership gains (Mattli, 2000; 163).
negotiations.

II.B Defining the Role of EU Institutions in the Accession Bargain

In Moravcsik’s account of history-making negotiations that propel integration, states sit at the centre of the process. Interstate interaction, nevertheless, does not occur within an anarchic environment, but is notably modified by the presence of institutions, as earlier noted by neoliberals. In the liberal intergovernmentalist tradition, then, the unique institutional structure of the EU has a functional role to play as a facilitator of positive sum bargains. Supranational institutions ‘allow for the centralization of collective interstate activities through a concrete and stable organizational structure and a supportive administrative apparatus’ (Abbot and Snidal, 1998; 9). In particular, institutions provide a stable negotiating forum, improve the information flows of governments, specify the terms of state interaction (i.e. decision-making procedures) and subsequently monitor compliance. Centralization, in other words, increases the predictability of interstate bargaining and reduces the risk of unilateral non-compliance (Moravcsik, 1993a; 508, ibid, 1995).

Reflecting on EU widening, one may find the above-mentioned arguments particularly relevant in accounting for both the process and the outcome of accession negotiations (i.e. the dum phase). In treaty-amending agreements between applicants and incumbents, supranational institutions factor in as a functional complement facilitating their pursuit of cooperation. At the request of the Council the Commission prepares its opinion (avis) on the eligibility of each of the applicant states. The Commission’s avis describes in detail the political and economic situation in the applicant country, evaluates its capacity to adopt and implement the acquis, assesses the capacity of the Union to absorb that country and indicate problems that may arise from a country’s membership (Nikolaides, 1997; 11). The opinions constitute the draft negotiating positions of the member states, to be approved unanimously by the Council, once the application for EU membership has been accepted.7 In this sense the Commission officials act as the policy initiators of the grand membership bargain. Yet, although the centralized EU secretariat enjoys some operational independence, this is limited to technical matters and subject to close supervision by rational principals (Abbot and Snidal, 1998; 9). The agency

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7 After consulting the Commission the Council decides by unanimity whether to accept or reject the application.
function of the Commission, in other words, is only responsive to member state demands, corroborating Moravcsik’s emphasis on statism (1993a;507 1998;479-480).

II.C Why incumbents agree to enlargement

The member governments, operating within the Union’s institutional structure, tend to favour further international cooperation provided that it will help them reap absolute gains. As the perceived margin of safety widens, foreign economic competition increases and interdependence becomes a prime symbol over and above national security. National economic welfare reveals itself to be the dominant political goal and governments are highly responsive to domestic demands for a higher standard of living. In this context, EU incumbents favour an expansion in the Union’s membership so long as enlargement will result in advantageous cooperation. A positive enlargement decision depends on whether accession is a remedy rather than a trigger for market failure.

For liberal intergovernmentalists in particular, member governments’ reactions to an accession request depend on the market incentives the prospective entrant offers to powerful domestic economic actors. Power seeking state elites in a ‘two-level’ game build coalitions of support for enlargement among influential domestic groups, while at the international level they bargain hard so as to meet their domestic demands ((Moravcsik,1993b;16-17 Putnam,1988). 8 Changes in the national and global economy alter the costs and benefits of transnational economic exchanges, creating pressure on EU governments to facilitate such exchanges by taking on board prosperous candidates that will boost the Union’s competitiveness and welfare. Perceiving enlargement as an appropriate foreign economic policy the following hypothesis is in line:

In an economically interdependent world, EU members take on board those applicants whose accession guarantees net welfare benefits rather than costs.

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8 For a conceptualisation of cooperation as a two-step process see also Snidal,1986 and Legro,1996.
1.3 EU ENLARGEMENT: A CONSTRUCTIVIST MANIFESTO?

Rationalism does not constitute the only plausible way of theoretically exploring the dynamics of EU enlargement. Security and welfare maximization as well as consequentialist bargaining do not always help the analyst to successfully narrate the tale of accession. As the historical circumstances surrounding membership negotiations change, along with the objective characteristics of wishful applicants, so do the theoretical tools that can generate accurate predictions of who will decide to knock at the EU’s door (ex-ante), and who will finally be admitted (dum). This type of theoretical migration away from rationalist models first appears at the time accession negotiations with the CEECs began. The ‘puzzle of EU enlargement’ laid out so eloquently by Schimmelfennig (2001, 2003b) would only make sense in light of a rival theoretical approach; social constructivism.

Constructivism has established itself as an umbrella term for various approaches emphasizing the causal preponderance of social structures over agents, as well as the central role of collectively held ideas as opposed to material interests.\(^9\) In reading the literature the inescapable conclusion to be drawn is that there is no such thing as a ‘single recipe’ for constructivist research, but an ever-expanding Babel of discordant theoretical propositions (Fearon and Wendt, 2002;56). To tame this polyphony many authors have attempted diverse classifications of constructivist thought. To name but a few, Adler (1997;335-336) distinguishes between four constructivist variants; a modernist, a rule-based, a narrative knowing and a post-modernist one. Similarly, Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner (1998;675-78) see three main groupings a conventional, a critical, and a post-modern one.\(^10\) Building upon their example, I distinguish between a modern and an integrative variant.

Both these approaches highlight the significance of ideational over objective, material factors, pointing to a process of value rather than utility maximization.\(^11\) In my understanding, what distinguishes one from the other, nevertheless, is the content of the maximized values. In the modernist branch the values encapsulate mainly material aspects, that is normative beliefs over what constitutes the best framework


\(^10\) For constructivist research classifications see also: Ruggie,1998;35-36 Adler, 2002;96-98.

for economics or security. In the integrative branch, the content of values refers to the domain of political culture, determining the desirable characteristics of political behaviour among those who constitute a democratic polity. The latter approach demonstrates the causal preponderance of collective political ideas over material interests in the calculative environment of accession negotiations. On the contrary, the modernist version only shows how ideas first constitute and subsequently cause material interests, adding causal depth to rational accounts. The hypotheses the two constructivist branches generate regarding enlargement will be laid out in the following pages.

1.3. A Modernist Portrayal of Constructivism

I. Who decides to become an EU member: National Interest in ‘Rump-Materialism’

Modern constructivism locates the core of national interests far from material facts such as security concerns and welfare gains, in processes of collective identification. Collective identities exclusively guide interest formation by socially constructing state actors’ preferences via shared cognitive schemas (Wendt, 1994; 385). Collective identities, in other words, have an intersubjective quality, i.e. they consist of shared understandings, expectations and knowledge, bearing resemblance to Popper’s World 3, ‘the world of culture, of our languages, our stories, our myths, our explanatory theories’ (Popper, 1982; 118). Intersubjective meanings in turn, empower certain configurations of national interest because they define the social reality in which such interests emerge. More specifically, intersubjective meanings point to an empathetic rather than an instrumental interdependence between the self and the other, showing what unites us against the other. As such, applicants’ interest in enlargement stems from a positive identification with the EU, which is seen as a cognitive extension of each applicant’s self.

The dependence of interests on intersubjectively held ideas gives modernist constructivism its ‘idealist’ gloss. Ideas constitute material interests because, as Wendt claims (1995; 73) ‘material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of the shared knowledge in which they are embedded’. By

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12 Intersubjective reality has a ‘quasi–causal’ effect rendering agents’ action plausible or implausible, acceptable or unacceptable rather than inevitably determining it (Yee, 1996; 97, Adler, 1997; 326-327).
13 see also Wendt 1994; 389 and Wendt, 1999 chapter three.
highlighting the ideational basis of material interests, modern constructivism operates at the intersection between materialism and idealism. The boundaries between the two blend, nevertheless, and it is not easy to tell how the hypotheses constructivism generates may diverge from those emerging from traditionally material approaches. As Wendt points out, while Liberals offer economic interdependence as an explanation for national interest in cooperation, constructivists ‘inquire into the discursive conditions that constitute states that care about free trade and economic growth’ (1999:135). In essence, having such socially constructed interests does not mean that actors are irrational or no longer calculate costs and benefits, as Wendt admits in an earlier essay, but rather that they do so on a higher level of social aggregation (1994:386). Rationality determines the evolution of any shared context of meaning, because actors resist learning identities that are in conflict with their interests in physical security and economic well-being (Fierke and Wiener, 1999:3).

Constructivism of this sort depends on ‘rump materialism’, and does not advocate idealism (Wendt, 1999:96). Rather, ideas are regulated by human purpose and an independently existing physical reality. In this sense, material forces can still have independent effects, defining relative gains and losses and the boundaries of feasible action. To put it in Wendt’s terms, ‘material forces are not constituted solely by social meanings and social meanings are not immune to material effects’ (ibid.;111-112). Hence, the scope of value maximization offered by modernist constructivism is limited. It very much resembles the utility maximization of rational approaches because it is calculative rather than altruistic. Even though ideas constitute actors’ material interests, they do not alter their egoistic cost–benefit expectations. The modernist perspective, therefore, hypothesizes the enlargement preferences of outsiders in accordance, rather than in direct competition with, rational approaches:

*If a non member state identifies with the ‘material’ values and norms of the EU concerning an appropriate framework for security action and market organization then it will strive for membership, provided that the net costs of cooperation do not exceed net gains.*

The provision included in the aforementioned constructivist hypothesis makes it compatible with both rational counterparts delineated in the previous section, because as Moravcsik contends, rationalism does not deny that individuals and
governments espouse ideas consistent with their rational interests and strategies. ‘It denies only that exogenous variation in other sources of those ideas decisively affects ideas and therefore policy’ (1999; 674-675). Ideas should be more than a transmission belt for national economic interest in EU membership if constructivism is to generate distinct observable hypotheses on enlargement. An alternative constructivist framework should focus on ideas that ‘cross-cut’ material interests (Parsons, 2002). The content of these ideas would not shape material interests, but would help actors move beyond purely material concerns. Modern constructivists acknowledge the existence of such ideas, but focus instead on those that constitute material interests so as to prove that their explanatory power cannot be compared to interests as competing social variables (Wendt, 1999; 114).

One might consider post-modern constructivism an ideal candidate for generating distinct hypotheses on the role of ideas in EU enlargement. In postmodernist analyses one observes a radical shift from material factors to language. Postmodernists remain agnostic about material reality and concede too much to ideas and the conceptual world they generate (Campbell, 1992; Walker, 1993). Instead of material structures, a particular kind of knowledge creates the world which we think we see and in which we think we act. This knowledge is to be discovered via narratives and texts, which help us uncover the power structures that create knowledge in the first place (Adler, 2002; 98). Reality, in other words, is not an objective fact but a linguistic convention and ‘performative sentences’, along with ‘speech acts’, enable particular configurations of state interests in the real world (Diez 1999). In post-modern constructivism there is no discussion of the independent effects of material forces on state action.

Despite the tacit connotation that ideas matter for everything, a post-modern analysis cannot be advocated for studying the EU, as the result would be an intertextual rather than an international relations analysis of accession negotiations through its emphasis on ‘semantic instability and interpretive multiplicity’. To put it in Campbell’s words, postmodernism embraces a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of specifying and cataloguing real causes (Yee, 1996; 100; Campbell, 1992; 4). A modernist analysis is thus used instead, with a view to preparing the ground for the integrative constructivist approach.
II. How and Why an Applicant Becomes a Member State

II. A Interstate Socialization vs. Bargaining

In describing the means through which ideas shape collective state identities and interests, modern constructivists employ the concept of ‘socialization’ (Wendt, 1992 Risse, 2000 Johnston, 2001 Checkel, 2000). The latter refers to a top-down diffusion of shared values and cognitive structures which results in the internalisation of norms so that they assume their taken for granted nature, defining the identities, interests and social realities of states. Transferring such a dictum to the context of EU enlargement means that incumbent elites are exposed to the prescriptions embodied in EU norms as the accession negotiations proceed. EU institutions act as ‘teachers’ who define the ‘lesson plan’ for the member state pupils, and the latter, once successfully taught, respond positively to applicants that have internalised the constitutive values and norms of the EU community. Socialization as a process could pave the way for an idealist account in successful contrast to the rational-materialistic framework of the accession bargain. Furthermore, it could also generate distinct predictions on the conditions under which incumbents open the door to EU applicants based more on normative affiliations than interest calculations. The value added of socialization is indisputable and much is owed to modern constructivists for having imported it into the field of international relations. However, the manner in which modern constructivism finally treats the term in relation to bargaining, fails to produce a distinct theory of enlargement negotiations. In any case it is useful to deconstruct the socialization-bargaining affinity of modern constructivism so as to prepare the ground for an alternative constructivist framework to be delineated in the following section.

II. B Why incumbents agree to enlargement

By means of socialization actors conform to norms driven by a logic of appropriateness rather than a logic of consequences. In other words, they try to do the right thing rather than maximize their given preferences (March and

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14 The process of socialization has also be defined as ‘cognitive evolution’ by Adler (1997), ‘cultural Selection’ by Wendt (1999) and ‘diffusion’ by Checkel (1998).
Olsen, 1998; 951 Fearon and Wendt, 2002; 60). Norms function as standards of appropriate behaviour in the sense of ‘good people do X’ and activate rules for people who share these norms via collective identification. These rules in turn specify how actors should act under given circumstances (Fearon, 1997). In order to reach this situation of rule-guided behaviour, nevertheless, a process of ‘arguing’ is required as an essential via-media (Risse, 2002 Risse-Kappen, 1996). Arguing refers to a principled debate heavily based on argumentative rather than manipulative persuasion. While the latter is ‘asocial and lacking in interaction’, the former is a social process of argumentation intended to convince the targeted interlocutors in the absence of overt coercion (Checkel, 2001b: 562). Socialization, though, is not devoid of what bargaining entails, i.e. coercive persuasion (such as threats of non agreement) and instrumental action. Thomas Risse and his research team have shown that the two intermingle, as the first stages in the process of socialization heavily depend on strategic bargaining and coercive persuasion (Risse et al, 1999; 11-14).

Modern constructivists, like Adler and Wendt pay testimony to this, by linking the outcome of socialization, i.e. the change in actors’ preferences, with power - an asset of rational bargaining (Adler, 1997; 337, 341). As Wendt argues,

‘In order for an interaction to succeed, in the sense that actors bring their beliefs enough into line that they can play the same game, each side tries to get the other to see things its way. They do so by rewarding behaviours that support their definition of the situation, and punishing those that do not. Power is the basis for such rewards and punishments…’ (1999: 331).

The outcome, therefore, is an evaluation of how strategic bargaining affects the process of socialization, determining which norms shape the material interests of interacting state actors. In this light, the prediction of modern constructivism on why member states allow a non member to enter is as follows:

Incumbents favour the accession of countries that do not simply share EU values over security and market organization but also have considerable power that substantiates their normative resonance claims.

Put simply, EU incumbents endow with the membership reward like-minded countries that can add to the EU’s power to impose its normative standards on security and market organization on others. In this sense, enlargement is driven by calculative rather than idealistic dynamics, revealing parallel pathways between rationalism and modern constructivism. All in all, modern constructivism adds causal depth to traditional rational accounts by explaining the conceptual developments that
influence a state’s definition of national interest, although it is rationalism that explains both how the enlargement game is enacted and how it is solved (Wendt, 2001: 1027). In this study, nevertheless, attention will be paid to an alternative variant of constructivism that can generate distinct and testable propositions on why and how enlargement occurs.

1.3.b INTEGRATIVE CONSTRUCTIVISM: TREATING IDEAS AS CAUSES

Much of the scholarly writing on the role of ideas in EU enlargement politics coincides with Eastern enlargement. The decision of the EU to open up accession negotiations and subsequently admit the CEECs can hardly be described as an instrumentally rational choice, because the expected costs far outweigh the expected benefits (Schimmelfenning, 2003b: 52-62). A social constructivist perspective, placing emphasis on collective identities based on liberal democratic norms, proved a more natural candidate for theory building. The constructivist variant that emerged from these studies nevertheless merits special attention, because it forcefully accounts for the causal impact of ideas within the instrumental environment of accession negotiations. This ‘integrative approach’ shows how rationalism and constructivism can be combined as analytical devices, and still come up with hypotheses distinct from those of traditionally rational approaches.

The constructivist approach espoused in this study does not seize the middle ground between rationalism and constructivism as the modernist variant. It acknowledges that social actors have both ideal and material interests but insists that there is no one-way relationship between these in the sense that ideas always constitute material interests. On the contrary, the integrative approach emphasises those instances where ideas cause actors to leave aside their immediate material concerns (Hall, 1993). Hence, the basic point of departure for integrative constructivism is not whether rationality plays a role in norm-based behaviour, but the nature of the link between the two (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 271). In the modernist approach constructivism begins the game by emphasizing the role of ideas in constituting material interests, and rationalism resolves it because power accounts for the prevalence of particular configurations of national interests. In the integrative variant, ideas operate within a rationally defined system of national interests and
‘cross-cut’ them. Put simply, in this case, rationalism begins the game and constructivism resolves it.

I. Who decides to become an EU member: National Interest in ‘Rump Idealism’

The sequencing of rationalism and constructivism in a hierarchical two-step model has often been used in norm-oriented research (Fehl, 2004; 367 Muller, 2004; 402-403 Schimmelfennig, 2003b Wendt, 2001). The nature of the sequencing, however, is crucial, for it generates widely distinct hypotheses on the role of ideas in social and political action. ‘Integrative Constructivism’ subverts modernist sequencing, specifying a rational context as a background for collective identification. Hence, the central question the integrative variant addresses is how collective identities matter rather than whether they matter, and how they are constructed. The focus changes from the sources of intersubjectively shared ideas to their effects in strategic interaction (Schimmelfennig, 1999). Ideas are not epiphenomenal but have causal weight in explaining human action because they influence actors’ instrumentality, that is the means they employ to accomplish their interests. Put simply, besides material interests, collectively held ideas provide guidance as to how to achieve sought-after objectives. Following Goldstein and Keohane’s typology, ‘integrative ideas’ are causal beliefs that do not necessarily develop moral value commitments but imply strategies for the attainment of specified goals (1993; 10-11).

Intersubjective beliefs build up a ‘veneer of consensus’ because they are based on values to which everyone feels obliged to pay lip service (Goffman as quoted in Schimmelfennig, 2003a; 157). Such values rise above the content of material interests, referring to widely accepted norms such as respect for human rights and the rule of law as well as support for democratic political participation and representation. However, according to Schimmelfenning, collectively held beliefs on the desirability of EU liberal democratic principles override rational self-interest only in the bargaining phase, and do not affect the phase of preference formation (Schimmelfennig, 1999; 11). To put it in his words ‘at any rate, the enlargement preferences of the member and candidate states reflected self-interested calculations of individual, ‘national utility’, not collective identity, values or norms (2003b; 281).

15 Besides the two-stage division of labour between rationalism and constructivism other modes of combining the two approaches exist. For a detailed discussion see March and Olsen, 1998; 952-954.
This means that no new hypotheses emerge on who decides to become an EU member under the ‘integrative’ variant.

Yet, the present study, building upon the findings based on the CEE enlargement, follows a process of hypothesis construction which respects the sequencing of ‘integrative’ constructivism while distinguishing it from materialist accounts. The basic claim advanced is that under given circumstances collectively held beliefs can successfully complement the rational environment of preference formation, adding an idealistic perspective to existing cost-benefit calculations. More specifically, in cases where applicants exit from a major shock in their domestic political system, they face an increased incentive to allow normative political considerations to penetrate and redefine their material interest in membership. The material perspective does not fade away, but the idealistic will to boost the domestic political culture by joining a democratic community of states helps domestic leaders to build consensus on the desirability of membership, even if there are material costs to be undertaken. EU liberal democratic norms function as ‘road maps’ reducing domestic political uncertainty, and as such are critical to understanding applicants’ interest in enlargement. EU collective democratic identity, in this sense, serves the purpose of guiding applicants’ behaviour by providing not only specific causal patterns but also compelling moral motivations for the pursuit of membership. Thus, under the afore-mentioned conditions, the prediction of integrative constructivism on who decides to become an EU member is as follows:

*If a non member state has an interest in identifying itself with the liberal democratic values of the EU, then it will strive for membership, irrespective of the net benefits or costs accession entails.*

The strategic use of political norms points to a ‘rump idealism’ in which liberal democratic ideas are not treated as the constitutive units of material interests but exist independently of them. Integrative constructivism assigns a causal depth to political norms that *co-exist* with self interest, complementing and partially constraining it. Liberal democratic norms advocate a core of shared moral principles about how people should behave in social, political and economic life for the benefit of the others and of society as a whole and subsequently for their own benefit. Self interest exists but does not grow unchecked (Downs, 1991:164). Rather, rational interest, when combined with liberal, democratic norms, does not overwhelm the values of tolerance and willingness to compromise, both of which are essential to democracy.
The outcome is therefore a quasi-altruistic attitude to enlargement, combining applicant self interest in membership with the liberal democratic norm of cooperation with others, i.e. the incumbents, even in the face of a temporary compromise of net material gains.

II. How and Why an Applicant Becomes a Member State

II.A Interstate Rhetorical Action vs. Bargaining

Turning from the ex-ante stage of applicant preference formation to the dum stage of how and why an applicant becomes a member state the causal status of liberal democratic ideas rises in significance. Collective democratic beliefs no longer complement but cross-cut incumbents’ interest repertoires. Of course isolating ideas as causes is difficult (Yee, 1996:101-103). For that reason the question to be addressed in the EU context is to what extent ideas cause certain outcomes vis-à-vis given material interests. In line with Craig Parsons, the central claim to be made is that ‘where ideas strongly cross-cut lines of shared material interests in a polity, we can isolate individuals’ beliefs most clearly from objective pressures’ (2002:48). In integrative constructivism, ideas operate in a materially determined environment but they do not constitute it, rather they cause it to change.

The mechanism ‘integrative constructivists’ advocate for explaining the diffusion of ideas is ‘rhetorical action’, a hybrid of arguing and bargaining, which demonstrates how arguing as a genuine socialization tool interacts with and affects instrumental bargaining. As, Schimmelfennig convincingly argues, rhetorical action is ‘the strategic use and exchange of arguments based on ideas shared in the environment of the proponents and intended to persuade…the opponents to accept the proponents claim and act accordingly’ (2003b:199). In an ideal continuum between arguing as normative ‘truth seeking’ and bargaining as pragmatic ‘utility seeking’, rhetorical action intervenes by inducing cooperative behaviour via epiphenomenal persuasion rather than any genuine change in the beliefs and interests of rival interlocutors (Risse, 2000;8 Schimmelfennig, 2003b; 201).

Unlike bargaining, which rests on a conflict of pragmatic demands, both arguing and rhetorical action assume a situation of conflict between validity claims. More specifically, actors engage in a debate over the appropriateness (validity) of collectively held beliefs that moves beyond material cost-benefit calculations. In
bargaining, it is the utility functions of the actors that prevail in an exchange of threats, demands and promises (Ulbert et al, 2004; 1). Bargaining therefore assumes a dyadic structure of interaction between proponents and opponents, while both rhetorical and communicative forms of action assume a triadic model including a wider institutional structure that enables or opposes the validity claims of the interlocutors (ibid 10). The crucial distinction between arguing and rhetorical action, however, concerns the predictions on the possible observable outcome of negotiations. Arguing, defined dialectically as communicative action, foresees a reasoned consensus among interlocutors and a substantive change in their interests so that they submit to the better argument (Risse, 2000; 10). On the contrary, rhetorical action predicts a reasoned consensus based on an ‘as if’ change in the beliefs and interests of the opponents. Rhetorical actors induce cooperative behaviour via argumentative persuasion but are not interested in whether the opponents genuinely believe in the rightness of the proponents’ arguments.

When applying the rhetorical perspective to EU enlargement, a definition of its scope conditions is the first step to be taken. When does the distributive problem of granting accession to new members become susceptible to the effects of rhetoric? Once membership negotiations appear on the EU agenda, in the absence of strong material interests and against the will of powerful incumbents, then there is plenty of room for rhetorical manipulation on behalf of the applicants. Under countervailing material circumstances non-member states face an increased incentive to frame their EU membership claims using compelling normative principles (Payne, 2001). Such idealistic arguments have the potential to overcome a materialistic framing of the accession bargain because they refer to shared ideas that are not only intersubjectively espoused by all negotiating parts, but are formally institutionalised as EU treaty norms. Shared institutionalised principles have a strong persuasive function in a community environment, for they impose legitimacy constraints on community members who become concerned about their image. To put it in Schimmelfennig’s words, ‘In a community environment, politics is a struggle over legitimacy, and this struggle is fought out with rhetorical arguments’ (2003b; 208).
II.B Why incumbents agree to enlargement

More specifically, the EU community’s standard of legitimacy is shaped by liberal political norms. The belief in and adherence to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights is confirmed through a series of EU Treaty articles\(^\text{16}\) that publicly certify the normative commitment and ideational credo of all community members. Such an EU legitimacy standard in turn functions as an ‘external constraint’ rather than as a ‘moral imperative’ on existing member states, because they risk being exposed for illegitimate behaviour in the international arena, if they defy institutionalised norms in pursuit of their material self-interest. Therefore, by linking their bid for EU membership with the constitutive values and norms of the community, EU applicants can change the content of bargaining power to include legitimacy rather than utility concerns (Schimmelfennig, 2001:63).

In order to do so, (that is to rhetorically manipulate EU legitimacy and induce incumbents’ compliance with an enlargement), applicant actors use mechanisms of social influence such as shaming (Johnson, 2001:502 Frank, 1990:49). Shaming carries reputational effects because it can harm the good image of EU actors and thereby reduce their status in international politics. The incumbents’ desire to avoid the sense of social disgrace that befalls those who violate internationally accepted norms is not altruistic. Rather, it reflects actors’ egoistic avoidance of social sanctions or the pursuit of social rewards. Even so, the fact that the rhetorical manipulation of community norms ‘cross-cuts’ material interests points to a distinct case of interstate bargaining where it is not the objective power of interlocutors that calls the shots. Normative compliance due to legitimacy concerns transforms rational utility maximization into strategic value maximization. In this light, the hypothesis stemming from the integrative variant of constructivism on why accession negotiations are successfully concluded reads as follows:

\textit{If an applicant shares liberal community values and norms and can successfully employ these as a bargaining tool by inducing legitimacy concerns into existing member states, then it will be admitted even if membership incurs net material costs for the incumbents.}

\(^\text{16}\) Preambles to the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as well as Articles F and O of the TEU.
That is not to say that EU member states will concede to enlargement at any cost. Rather, where the costs do not threaten the existence of the EU and do not fall outside the capabilities of EU incumbents, enlargement will occur (Shannon, 2000; 295). In addition, the more community norms constitute the incumbents’ collective identity, the greater their leverage in the dummy phase of accession negotiations will be.

II.C Defining the Role of EU Institutions in the Accession Bargain

Arguing along these lines, the social influence of community norms increases in an institutionalised environment. In the constructivist tradition, a primary role is assigned to international institutions, which propagate norms that define member state identities and interests. Unlike rational approaches, which praise the efficiency-enhancing functions of institutions in the service of state actors, constructivists make a leap forward, portraying institutions as autonomous actors that define the work states should do, giving the latter meaning and normative value (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; 700). Put simply, institutions, as carriers of norms, values and ideas, have constitutive effects on global, state-centric politics. For constructivists, state agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared beliefs and understandings (Risse, 2004; 599). Institutions, as part of the wider social structure, constitute agents, for they define the conditions, i.e. the rules, under which actors may intervene in the world. Institutional rules, in turn, stemming from collective ideas, beliefs and norms, create a community environment, which paves the way for the use of shaming and rhetorical action (Schimmelfennig, 2003b; 285). In the EU community environment, then, a norm-based justification of enlargement is made possible among strategic actors so long as the latter function under the spell of a normative discourse on EU widening produced and perpetuated by the EEC treaties, Commission opinions and communications to the Council, European Parliament resolutions and member governments’ statements at European Council summits.
Table 1.2 Theoretically Differentiated Hypotheses on EU Enlargement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATIONALISM</th>
<th>Demand side Hypotheses</th>
<th>Supply side Hypotheses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➤ Realism</td>
<td>A non member state decides to apply for membership if accession is the only efficient means to balance the superior power or threat of a rival state or to increase its own power.</td>
<td>EU member states respond positively to applicants if enlargement is a necessary and sufficient means to balance the superior power of a rival state or to increase EU power in the international arena.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➤ Neoliberalism</td>
<td>A non member state seeks accession if the net welfare benefits of EU membership are higher than the costs.</td>
<td>In an economically interdependent world, EU members take on board those applicants whose accession guarantees net welfare benefits rather than costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTEGRATIVE CONSTRUCTIVISM</td>
<td>If a non member state has an interest in identifying with the liberal democratic values of the EU then it will strive for membership, irrespective of the net material benefits or costs accession entails.</td>
<td>If an applicant shares liberal community values and norms and can successfully employ these as a bargaining tool by inducing legitimacy concerns into existing member states, then it will be admitted even if membership incurs net material costs for the incumbents.</td>
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4. CONCLUSIONS: EU ENLARGEMENT- A CASE FOR THEORETICAL DIFFERENTIATION

In overall terms, the theoretical framing of enlargement by means of either rational and/or constructivist variants denotes a departure from a one-theory-fits-all concept of EU membership and paves the way for theoretical differentiation. The richness of the debate on the ‘theoretical vacuum’ facing EU enlargement suggests that a single theoretical device is not enough if the analyst is to come up with a satisfactory operating tool for explaining different applicants and different membership waves. Rather, the theoretical model of EU widening is recast, and theoretical differentiation within single enlargement cases and between enlargement rounds becomes the new modus operandi. On the one hand, material interest in security or welfare and collective identities based on common political values can and shall be used concurrently within individual cases of EU widening. The purpose behind this exercise is not to suggest that rationalism and constructivism could or should be synthesized in one perspective in the study of enlargement. Rather, the basic aim is to put aside a zero-sum interpretation of their relationship and directly engage with questions that cross-cut the rationalist-constructivist boundary as it is commonly
understood (Fearon and Wendt, 2002:52). In this manner, knowledge on EU widening increases because the available analytical model is broadened by examining both economic and political factors across both incumbent and candidate countries.

On the other hand, this study proposes theoretical differentiation between enlargement rounds in order to enable the analyst to overcome any truism in arguing that both material interests and ideas or identities matter within individual enlargement episodes. More specifically, the ‘between’ theoretical differentiation examines whether rationalism and constructivism are partially competing propositions that leave distinct empirical trails across distinct enlargement rounds. In other words, it detects their relative share rather than their collective presence or absence. Hence, the central question to be addressed is under which circumstances, material interests and ideas matter respectively. This is done with a view to establishing an open approach to EU enlargement preference formation and decision making that will produce systematic arguments about the role of identities and/or interests with respect to different applicant countries and time horizons.

The argument advanced echoes the age old debate over ‘differentiated integration’ i.e. the strategies meant to reconcile heterogeneity within the EU (Wallace and Wallace, 1995 Chaltiel, 1995). Differentiation, or a proxy for it, has popped up on the EU agenda whenever discussion has turned to enlargement. Changing membership has brought together countries with diverse capabilities as well as different degree of willingness to attain certain policy objectives. In practical terms ‘differentiation’ becomes a survival strategy for an uninterrupted process of European integration. Likewise, in theoretical terms EU widening encompasses the challenge of differentiation.

Applicants’ socio-economic diversity, matched by distinct historical and political circumstances at the time of accession negotiations, mean that a comprehensive set of common hypotheses stemming from either a strictly rational or an exclusively constructivist approach is both unrealistic and unattainable. Even though there is a ‘hard core’ material interest in EU enlargement that drives non-members to trade their autonomy for prosperity as Mattli claims (2000), it would be theory-stretching to approach the ex-ante phase of all enlargement rounds through the same set of rationalist (i.e. liberal) assumptions. Economic benefits may constitute a centripetal motive for both wealthy and poor applicants. In the latter case, nevertheless, the intensity of material preferences alone cannot warrant a
successful negotiation outcome. To reach that end, the preference reservoir of poor states should not simply include but highlight ideational factors for pursuing membership. If national political and historical circumstances are conducive to seeking normative convergence with the EU family of liberal democratic states, then EU accession may be targeted with greater precision. If, for example, the applicant state is poor but can attribute its economic awkwardness to a chaotic political background, declaring and proving at the same time its commitment to EU democratic ideals, then membership might seem closer than before. This type of ‘rump-idealism’, whether genuinely or strategically employed by the applicant, still points to a thin constructivist rather than a thick rationalist ex-ante phase. Democratic ideas, despite the fact that they exist alongside material concerns, are causally central in the pursuit of membership and can therefore deflect narrow, material self-interest.

Similarly, in the dum phase of negotiations it is also plausible to follow the à la carte philosophy of theoretical differentiation. Due to objective economic differences among candidates it is hard to speculate that the logic of expected consequences prevails in a strategic accession bargain, which is largely impervious to normative claims. If ideas are as epiphenomenal, and economic affairs as causally central as Moravcsik claims (1998), then incumbents would only concede accession to wealthy candidates or to those that can enhance the power position of the EU in the international arena. The reality of EU enlargement, nevertheless, disconfirms rationalist expectations at times by demonstrating that awkward candidates can be admitted through their strategic manipulation of EU liberal democratic norms. This makes sense in an integrative model of social constructivism that acknowledges the importance of material interests in interstate bargaining, but shows how social norms and political values can ‘cross-cut’ these via rhetorical manipulation (Parsons, 2002 Schimmelfennig, 2003b). All in all, to generate more accurate predictions over the ever changing context of accession negotiations, the analyst should not be forced to eat from the same rationalist menu.

The à la carte selection of theoretical tools within enlargement episodes is preferable to the universalist claims made by rational theorists in view of distinctive patterns of material preferences that interact with different patterns of ideational commitment to European values and norms (Green and Shapiro, 1994; 27). At the same time, conflicting motives for pursuing and granting membership cannot be avoided across different candidates and times proving the pertinence of between
theoretical differentiation. By incorporating the latter dimension into enlargement research a more sensible and sensitive path is steered between material preferences and value homogeneity. In particular, where national and EEC value homogeneity is marginal while material interest in enlargement is strong, then rationalism becomes the default drive for explaining the tendencies of the accession game. On the contrary, where national and EEC value homogeneity is prevalent and material interests weak or marginal, constructivism prevails in analytical rigor over rationalism, which is reduced to accounting for enlargement controversies rather than its tendencies. As such, the present study aspires to moving beyond the complementarities of the rationalist constructivist enlargement debate, leading to a classification of EU entrants as either Utility or Value Maximisers depending on whether enlargement occurs as interest-based cooperation or as an identity-based project. The purpose behind such a theoretical exercise is to locate distinct elite attitudes towards the EU at the time of accession and see whether the former can decisively infiltrate public attitudes in the long-run.
TESTING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THEORETICAL DIFFERENTIATION ACROSS GREECE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND AUSTRIA

1. A NOTE ON CASE STUDY SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY

Part II of this study, comprising chapters 2, 3, and 4, evaluates the ‘theoretically differentiated’ hypotheses on EU enlargement across three intensive case studies, Greece, the United Kingdom and Austria. The purpose behind this exercise is partly to generalize the findings specific to Eastern enlargement to earlier rounds of EU widening. Building on the work of Schimmelfennig (1999, 2001, 2003b), I test the implications of constructivism against the rival rationalist explanations for each case. More specifically, the explanatory power of liberal democratic values is juxtaposed with the analytical bite of economic and security factors in accounting for the successful resolution of any single accession game. In doing so, this chapter aims to generate knowledge on the dynamic effects of theoretical differentiation across all major EU enlargements, furthering the debate beyond the often cited CEE and EFTA comparison.

Besides encompassing a wider time span than earlier theoretically informed work on Eastern enlargement, this small-n longitudinal study carefully traces the process of causation and intensively examines the historical evidence at hand. In this sense, it is a powerful test of the reliability and validity of earlier large-n statistical studies regarding enlargement. In fact, it helps us move beyond Schimmelfennig’s probabilistic inference that liberal democratic values are ‘a robustly significant factor in the entire enlargement process of the Western organizations’ while ‘the economic and military control variables prove so little significant that a serious reconsideration of the role of material interests in the enlargement process is not necessary’ (2003b:150). The intensive case studies of Greece, the UK, and Austria show instead that there is no one solution in the relationship between constructivism and rationalism while studying enlargement (in the sense that rationalism begins, and constructivism finishes, the negotiation game). Rather, the intensity of materialist over ideational incentives varies across time and countries enabling the analyst to use
the tools of theoretical differentiation not just within but most importantly between enlargement rounds.

Apart from controlling for enlargement cases that have so far been theoretically sidelined, the three case studies have been chosen as ideal candidates for ‘reasoning by analogy’ (King et al. 1994; 212-213). Not only do they represent all major enlargement waves prior to that concluded in 2004, but they have functioned as leading actors inspiring the applications and the bargaining tactics of the rest of the demandeurs. Hence, even though the three cases studied are not always similar in terms of size with the rest of the countries in their group, the shared timing, common systemic factors surrounding their application, and the classic treatment of applicant countries as ‘waves’ allows us to attribute shared characteristics (i.e. membership preferences and EU actors’ reactions) to each grouping.

Last but not least, a note on methodology and data seems particularly pertinent. In my evaluation of rationalism and constructivism as ‘partially competing and partially complementary sources of hypothesis construction’, I assess the relative importance of various factors, both materialist and ideational, with a view to determining which is responsible for a successful resolution of the accession negotiations game. To begin with, the ‘materialist’ (economic and security) preferences that come under scrutiny refer not only to broad systemic factors, such as trade interdependence and anarchy, but also to sector specific factors concerning agriculture and industry, as well as to country specific security threats. On the other hand, ideational factors include both broad identity considerations that relate to a country’s old statehood or imperial past, and time specific references to EU liberal democratic values. These explanatory variables affecting the decision to enlarge are not just examined across Greece, the UK, and Austria. Rather, I widen the scope of my case studies by considering both the ‘ex-ante’ phase of preference formation and the ‘dum stage’ of accession negotiations. In addition, a further split is made between the ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ side so as to include the dynamics of interaction between applicants and incumbents. In this manner, I redefine the nature and increase the n of my observations. By applying the same enlargement hypotheses not just across different countries but also across different subunits (i.e. both supply and demand side actors), and across different points in time (both the association and the negotiation period) I increase leverage, evaluating as many observable implications of my theory as possible (King et al. 1994; 195, 217-218).
In turn, I use the historical record to test the aforementioned alternative theories of EU enlargement preferences. In Dessler’s terminology I follow a ‘particularizing or reconstructive strategy’ which explains an event ‘by detailing the sequence of happenings leading up to it’ (1999:129). Hereby, the phenomenon under study, i.e. enlargement, is being presented as the final stage of a developmental sequence (Hempel,1965:447). In this sense I am involved in a qualitative plausibility account of secondary and primary sources. More specifically I look at a) studies by historians,  b) leading actors’ memoirs, and c) archival sources, both edited and unedited, and evaluate such documents systematically (though without using a quantitative content analysis, nor a systematic qualitative analysis that involves coding). Hence, I become involved in a reconstruction of the most important factors surrounding the Greek, British and Austrian accession negotiations.

The purpose behind this ‘particularizing’ strategy is to summarize the events surrounding each enlargement and see whether they conform to an exclusively materialist or a predominantly ideational pattern. In those cases where positive identity and political value considerations prevail over material interests on both the demand and supply sides, the entrant will be classified as a Value Maximiser. On the contrary, where security and economic concerns are predominant in pursuing and granting membership, the entrant will be classified as a Utility Maximiser. In this manner ‘explanation is given by finding a satisfactory classification of what seems to require explanation’ (Dray,1959:404). After detailing why and how enlargement came about, an ‘explanation by concept’ is offered and the conceptual scheme pointed to is that of Utility and Value Maximisation. The classification of Greece, Britain and Austria as either Utility or Value Maximisers is then extended by default to the rest of the countries in their widening round. The explanatory significance of this dual interpretation of elite attitudes is established in part III of this study where I examine the impact of a Utility or Value Maximizing political elite tradition on the evolution of public support for European Integration.
2.1 INTRODUCTION

In June 1959 the Greek government submitted a request of Association to the EEC on the basis of the Article 238\(^\text{17}\) of the Treaty of Rome, and became the earliest suitor of the newly established European Community. Sixteen years later, the same Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis, would reactivate the country’s European orientation by submitting a formal application for membership. Matching up the pieces of the Greek enlargement puzzle is not, however, an easy task to undertake. Certainly there were strong economic motives behind Karamanlis’ decision to link the fate of Greece with that of its Western allies. In the aftermath of the Second World War and the Civil strife (1946-1949) the overstretched Greek economy needed a significant boost that could no longer be provided by its American allies (Kazakos, 2001; 248). Similarly, the deep economic recession following the transition from dictatorship to parliamentary democracy warranted Karamanlis’ tilt towards the prosperous Western European block. Yet, the neoliberal focus on economic motivations is not an uncontested candidate in theoretically explaining the Greek choice for Europe. The Cyprus crisis and the Turkish threat in the Aegean show the pertinence of neorealism in accounting for the country’s application. However, the Community’s enlargement to Greece was not a classic marriage of interest. On the ‘demand’ side the material motives were backed by a strong ideational commitment to EEC liberal democratic values. On the supply side the constitutive liberal rules become the default drive for justifying enlargement in the absence of concrete material gains. All in all, the evidence put forward in this chapter substantiates the classification of Greece as a Value Maximiser.

\(^{17}\) Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome reads as follows: ‘The Community may conclude with one or more states or international organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures’.
**DEMAND SIDE MOTIVATIONS FOR SEEKING ACCESSION**

### 2.2 BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS FOR GREEK AGRICULTURE

Much of the domestic debate on the desirability of EU membership would focus on the future of Greek agriculture within the European family of nine and the benefits to be derived from the Common Agricultural Policy. Such an insistence on agricultural matters, dating back to the time of Association, is merely indicative of the significance of agriculture for the Greek economy. Suffice it to mention that in the 1960s it accounted for 22.7 percent of GDP (i.e. almost one quarter), employed as much as 54 percent of the active labour force, and would make up 74.6 percent of its total exports, and one realizes that agriculture constituted a vital source of income and employment (Pepelasis, 1980; 11-12,30).

Beyond the prominence of agriculture in economic affairs, its special structural weaknesses justify the fuss it stirred up between those who would view its adjustment to the CAP as a blessing and those who would perceive it as nothing but a curse. To begin with, cultivated land accounted for 3.5 million hectares (ha), of which 41 percent was mountainous or semi-mountainous, where only a limited number of crops could be grown. At the same time irrigated land represented only 27 percent of the total cultivated area. Given the dry soil and the special climatic conditions, this constrained the expansion of intensive farming. The small size and the fragmentation of farm holdings, in turn, depleted the level of productivity and limited the opportunities for modern mechanized farming. Finally, among these natural handicaps one should take into account the inadequate level of professional skills of the Greek farmers as well as the relatively old farm population. (Efstratoglou, 1983; 87-88).

In view of these hard pressing problems, and given that the countryside formed the electoral backbone of the governing Right, the basic objective of political authorities at the time was to raise and stabilize farm income, increase productivity, and promote the exportation of agricultural products (Verney, 2002; 124). In this respect the main objectives of the CAP set out in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome.  

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18 The main CAP objectives are as follows: a) to increase agricultural production by promoting technical progress and by ensuring rational development of agricultural production and the optimum
suited the purposes of Karamanlis’ government. To begin with, the financial assistance provided via EEC funds and loans constituted the greatest incentive in opting for European integration. The Association agreement had already seen a financial protocol making available loans of 125 million dollars for a five year period available in order to assist Greece in accelerating its rate of economic growth (Association Council, 1975:19). Moving from Association to accession the agrarian population would further benefit from the CAP’s specific funds - i.e. the EAGGF - which would dispense an annual 280 million units of account according to the Commission’s estimates (1976:15). In overall terms, as Marinos (1978) and Zolotas (1976) point out in their respective studies, Greece would obtain an estimated 440 million dollars per annum for improvements in the agrarian sector through the Community’s funds and banks.

Ample funding would in turn prove instrumental in accelerating the modernization of Greek agriculture. More specifically, the Guidance section of the EAGGF would provide the agrarian population with both technical and financial assistance for the development of basic infrastructure and an improved system of product processing, distribution and marketing (Papaligouras, 1979:150). The European Fund Organization would further finance the training of the agrarian population and compensate workers who decided to work for another sector of the economy. By means of this aid, Greek agriculture would resolve many of the serious problems afflicting farm incomes as well as its level of productivity, as J. Boutos, Karamanlis’ Minister of Agriculture, would point out at the Annual meeting of the Greek Farmers Organization (PASEGES), on 15th December 1978 (Svolopoulos, 1995:409).

Equally significant in safeguarding and improving Greek agrarian income was the price support system. The Community, under the CAP, would provide guaranteed prices for a variety of farm products higher than the substantially lower Greek producer prices and even competing with those of the world market. To
accentuate such profitable returns for domestic farmers, Karamanlis would recite in a meaningful manner the Greek and EEC prices for a number of products. In his speech before the Parliament, on 28th May 1979, he maintained that:

‘olive oil in the world market costs 51 drachmas per kilo, while in the EEC 110. Durum wheat, in turn, is sold at 5,60 drachmas in world market prices as opposed to 14 drachmas in the common market … finally oranges cost 13,80 drachmas in the Common market while in the world market no more than 5,40’ (Svolopoulos, 1996; 174).

Besides income, the productivity and the living standards of the agrarian population would rise as the CAP system announced crops prices in advance, allowing peasants to plan their production. A drastic price increase, in turn, as well as an increased demand for a number of important farm products, could halt migration to the cities, meaning a beneficial effect on overall employment in Greece (European Parliament 1982; 21 Pepelasis, 1978; 166). All in all, the Community’s price guarantees could prove a powerful tool in assisting domestic agrarian development.

Last but not least, accession foresaw significant gains in trade as the EEC countries have traditionally been the main outlets for Greek agricultural products. In the mid 1970s about 50 percent of agricultural exports went to the Community, which also provided more than 30 percent of Greek agricultural imports (Marsh, 1979; 72, 78). Full membership would first increase the share of the EEC in Greek foreign trade. Imports from third countries for certain products, such as beef, milk and cereals would be replaced by imports from the Community. At the same time, Greece’s agricultural exports to the Community would a) benefit from complete exemption from customs duties and b) enjoy the high prices guaranteed by the price support system of the CAP. The removal of import restrictions in the EEC markets would further boost exports of certain agricultural products – i.e. olive oil, durum wheat, citrus, peaches etc, given the complementarity in product structures between the two sides. Meanwhile, import duties on products from non EEC members could prove beneficial to Greek exporters. Finally, the European community would finance the export of Greek product surpluses that could not be absorbed in the Common Market to non-EEC members. Trade relations with third countries would not decline, while the cost of protecting domestic agricultural production would be borne by the CAP rather than the Greek budget, as Karamanlis maintained in a ministerial meeting on the prospect of joining the EEC (Svolopoulos, 1995; 122).
Notwithstanding the multiplicity of benefits evoked by the governing elites, equally numerous reservations were expressed by the opposition. First, it was feared that EEC membership would not solve the structural problems of Greek agriculture, since 90 percent of the Community’s funding was meant to alleviate short term agrarian problems. In addition, the financial aid would be mainly absorbed by large landowners, leaving small independent farmers undefended before both domestic and international competition. Under these conditions the small Greek farm holdings would be deserted and a substantial amount of the agrarian labour force would be forced to leave the agriculture sector, seeking employment elsewhere (PASOK, 1978). To these accusations Karamanlis would reply that a decrease in agricultural employment did not constitute an irreparable harm for the economy, but rather a sign of its dynamic evolution. After all, it was not incidental that in Europe and the US the agrarian population did not rise above 4 or 6 percent while in underdeveloped countries it reached 50 percent. The main opposition party, PASOK, would then insist that via accession Greek agriculture would become dependent on foreign markets that would establish monopolies making decisions on domestic agricultural production and adversely affecting its growth. Against such ‘politics of exaggeration’ the New Democracy leader would forcefully argue that the Community under Articles 85 and 90 of the Treaty of Rome legislates against monopolies and aspires to protect its member states’ systems of free competition. Last but not least, the opposition leader, Andreas Papandreou, in favour of a policy of autonomous economic development, would sustain that the maintenance of the association status was preferable to full membership. The latter would increase dependency on the developed economies of the Nine, proving detrimental to the developing Greek economy and its need for protection of tariffs and from foreign monopolies. In a decisive manner Karamanlis would defy such arguments by claiming that an association, i.e. a special trade agreement with the EU, would guarantee neither free imports nor price support for their agricultural products. In addition, participation in the EEC would guarantee Greece a vote in the evolution of the CAP, raising the prospects for influencing Community decision making in favour of the domestic agrarian population (Svolopoulos, 1996: 172-176).

22 For a detailed analysis on the ‘politics of exaggeration’ pursued by both the leading and the opposition party see Tsoukalis, 1981.
On the basis of the preceding discussion it is clear that the significance of Community membership for Greek agriculture constituted a centripetal motive in the governing elites’ pursuit of membership. Yet, a characterization of the accession game as welfare based does not seem entirely convincing. To the vociferous reaction of the opposition over the drawbacks of membership for the Greek farming community, one should add the ruling elites’ emphasis on a speedy conclusion of the negotiations, at almost any cost. Not only did Greece accept the entire acquis without raising any objections, it also did its best to disentangle itself from intra EEC debates over the size and distribution of Community funds. Athens repeatedly emphasized that it would not be seeking enormous financial assistance, thereby sidelining the utilitarian interest of Greek farmers in ample funding (Wallace, 1979; 33 Yfantis, 2004; 81-82). Last but not least, the liberal intergovernmentalist emphasis on specific sectoral interests pushing for integration is only an illusion in the Greek context if ones considers the passive stance of Agricultural unions, such as the Pan-Hellenic Confederation of Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives (PASEGES). The latter were passive recipients of government policies and did not contribute to shaping them, as Pateras argues in his detailed study of the domestic debate over EEC entry (1984; 289). In this light the Utility Maximizing stance of the governing Right on joining the CAP is not as straightforward as a purely rationalist account would have us believe.

2.3 Benefits and Drawbacks for Greek Industry

Moving beyond agriculture to the impact of EU membership on the industrial sector, the drawbacks to be suffered outweighed the benefits to be reaped if one relies on scholarly opinion and various Commission reports. Even so, much of the suspicion on the risks to be taken is stifled in the governmental elite discourse, which opted for an optimistic reading of the implications of accession for the under-developed industrial sector.

More specifically, one much cited reason for caution related to the intensification of competition after accession, arising from the possibility of the free establishment of EEC firms in Greece and the reduced price of Greek imports from the Community. A competitive environment of this sort could be ill-afforded in semi-industrialized countries like Greece with a small industrial base and thus a low level
of exports of manufactured products and very low capital goods production. Most industrial output came from small and medium size enterprises with low technical standards and low productivity (Gourgiotis, 1976 Tomproyannis et al., 1978). These types of firms, having limited capital resources, would face further difficulties in finding external financing for expansion or modernization given that commercial banks were reluctant to finance small size projects (Mavroyannis, 1979, 203). What is more, Community membership implied some loss of control over government aid and subsidies as well as various export incentives, which had been instrumental not only in maintaining small Greek firms, but also in attracting investment by foreign firms (Tsoukalis, 1981; 185).

Beyond foreign direct investment, accession was also expected to be detrimental to the trade deficit. The latter would widen, as the acceding countries adopted the common customs’ tariff which was lower for most products than their own tariff, and abolish their non tariff barriers. Imports would increase as the domestic market competed against European products of better quality and lower price (Payno, 1983; 33). In addition, advanced social legislation and higher food prices under the CAP risked increasing the cost of wage goods and producing a reduction in the labour cost advantages enjoyed by Greece. Such an increase in industrial costs was then likely to have an inflationary impact, affecting the new entrant with a 5 percent increase in the consumer price index during the transition period, as an unpublished study indicated (Vaitsos, 1982; 255). Finally, industrial unemployment could prove to be one of the most critical economic and social costs of accession. If small and medium sized firms decided to respond dynamically to competition via extensive restructuring, this would have a significant impact on the employment situation. The competitive displacement of relatively inefficient producers, via the process of interregional trade creation, to activities in which the economy had a relative advantage would not necessarily lead to full employment. Rather, in times of economic sloth, such as the period that saw the Greek accession negotiations, the reabsorbing forces could be particularly weak, creating serious employment problems (Bienefeld, 1982; 109).

Notwithstanding the aforementioned reservations regularly evoked by the main opposition parties PASOK and KKE - the latter being an orthodox Moscow-oriented communist party - a spirit of optimism was maintained among the governing elites, who would evoke an equally long list of advantages. To begin with, a firm
belief in the flexibility and adaptability of small and medium sized Greek industrial units was expressed in response to those lamenting the detrimental effects of EEC competition. In his speech before the Parliament regarding the accession Treaty Karamanlis would confidently state that ‘accession to the big European market shall offer a wide range of opportunities to medium size enterprises so long as the latter develop the flexibility and adjustment capacity they undoubtedly possess’ (Svolopoulos, 1996:172). Arguing along similar lines the Governor of the Bank of Greece Xenophon Zolotas (1976) would claim that small and medium sized firms would be able to exploit their competitive advantages and become more efficient. The eventual merging of firms would increase the size of the corporate unit, achieve economies of scale, and diversify products for new markets. The smaller size of Greek industries, in other words, would enable them to react dynamically to increased competition from firms in the Community, because it would allow them to be flexible and easily adaptable.

In addition, aid from the community was regularly evoked as an antidote to concerns over the loss of national control over domestic market management. Structural imbalances in Western Europe between Southern periphery markets and the Northern industrial core would be alleviated by means of generous financial aid from the EEC, which would reach the level of 400 million dollars per year as Zolotas stated in his study. To the Community led ‘Marshall Plan’ for Southern Europe, one should add the beneficial effect arising from increased borrowing opportunities in the aftermath of accession. Entrants would have access to special EMS funds or to other borrowing options, such as the EEC ‘oil facility’ meaning significant help with the payment pressures they would face (Vaitsos, 1982:252). Finally, membership in the Community would increase the confidence of foreign investors in countries like Greece as it would guarantee the preservation of the political and economic status quo. Increased foreign direct investment, would lead to a large capital inflow that would assist in the establishment of additional projects benefiting domestic industry (Yannopoulos, 1979:47).

As regards the trade deficit fears, the government’s response, and one of its best debated arguments since the Association phase, was that membership would provide Greek firms with a new market horizon, with approximately 260 million
consumers of relatively higher incomes. The EEC market would offer Greek industrialists a greater export capacity because it is larger and protected from third countries through the use of non-tariff barriers to divert trade, in particular from some developing parts of the world. Last but not least, since Greek industrial investment involved a high level of imports of foreign plant and machinery, accession to the European market would ensure lower prices for these much needed imports of industrial goods (Vaitsos, 1982; Commission, 1978). Finally, with regards to unemployment the optimistic assumption made was that competition would lead to a beneficial displacement of labour from less desirable to more desirable productive activities in which the economy would enjoy a comparative advantage (Bienefeld, 1982).

The decisive promotion of optimistic scenarios by governing elites, however, inspired little enthusiasm in Greek business circles. This is hardly surprising given the low level of export orientation in the manufacturing sector. The small, family-run industries in Greece had more to lose than to gain from the opening of European export markets. Therefore, from Association onwards the Federation of Greek Industrialists (SEV) described the European option as ‘a trial for industry and the country’ (Pateras, 1984; Verney, 2002). Later, on the road to Brussels, the Federation developed a reactive stance towards EEC membership, tacitly supporting rather than actively promoting Karamanlis’ choice for Europe (Moshonas, 1990). Hence, on the eve of accession the SEV stated that ‘we are all engaged in the rhythm of Europe’ but did not fail to notice that ‘the endeavour will be harsh and the fatigue it entails unavoidable’ (Svolopoulos, 1996).

On the basis of the preceding discussion there is no doubt that welfare based theories, such as neoliberalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, offer little more than a partial explanation to Greek elite motives for seeking association and subsequently accession to the Community. EEC membership was certainly not a liberal aggregation of domestic societal demands, but an ‘intra-bourgeois’ affair that reflected the preferences and aspirations of the Greek premier Konstantinos Karamanlis. The latter feared bleak prospects for an isolated Greek economy in an

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23 As Mavroyannis points out in his 1979 study, in 1976 the average EEC GDP per capita was approximately 2.3 times higher than Greece’s GDP per capita. For Karamanlis’ relevant statements see the parliamentary debate of 16th January 1979 as quoted in Svolopoulos, 1996.

24 The reactions of other interest organizations were similar, stressing the political significance of Greek accession to the EEC rather than its expected beneficial outcomes. For more details see Svolopoulos, 1997.
increasingly interdependent world. This is why on the occasion of signing the Accession Treaty in Athens, he would openly admit that:

‘Isolation, tariff barriers and an illusionary sense of national self-sufficiency are historically overdue approaches of economic and political action constituting a passive reaction towards a pressing reality’ (Svolopoulos,1996;146).

Yet, as William Wallace has pointed out, the Greek government was slow to appreciate the implications of its application for its domestic economy, industry and agriculture. In reality, the calculations of the economic costs to be suffered or the benefits to be gained never really topped the agenda (1979;24).

2.3 EU MEMBERSHIP A VALUE ADDED FOR GREEK SECURITY?

In line with the arguments presented so far, most secondary sources present the Greek bid for membership as a strategic foreign policy decision rather than a clear cut economic bargain (Yfantis,2004 Verney,2002 Ioakimidis,1984 Tsoukalis, 1981). It is true that whenever confronted with rising suspicions over the economic details of enlargement, whether in the supranational or the national arena, Karamanlis would state that accession to the EEC was an act of utmost significance for national security.25 Yet, arguing against the classification of Greek accession to the EU as a typical neorealist example, it was apparent that the external balancing offered by the EEC against the age-old Turkish enemy could not allow for such an unconditional assertion. Karamanlis’ strategic choice for Europe makes better sense when imbued with a strong ideological flavour stemming from his belief in the integration of the peoples of Europe. In the remainder of this section all the evidence confirming or disconfirming the neorealist turn in Greek enlargement politics shall be presented, only to reach the conclusion that the missing pieces in the rationalist puzzle can be filled in by constructivism, thereby pointing to the Value Maximizing stance of Greek governing elites.

The primacy of security in Greek state motivations for accession is largely related to both the sensitive geostrategic location of the country in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, and its long experience of foreign occupation. Having spent no less

25 During the official visit of the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in December 1975 Karamanlis would underly the willingness of Greece to make concessions in economic affairs given the prevalently political nature of accession. (Svolopoulos,1994;115). That the economic implications of accession were never considered seriously also becomes apparent in the unconditional acceptance of the acquis communautaire by the Greek delegation. See Ioakimidis 1984;54.
than four centuries under Ottoman occupation and having won independence under
the protective wing of three leading foreign powers, the Greek ruling elites had no
option but to temper their fear of defeat and domination with dependence. To put it
in Roy Macridis’ words, ‘Greek foreign policy…was not made by the Greeks; it was
only cheerfully or reluctantly acquiesced to’ (1979;138). Similarly, between 1821
and the twentieth century, the old scenario of internal turbulence and foreign
intervention faithfully reproduced itself. More specifically, in the years between
1909 and 1974 Greece became involved in four international conflicts, two civil
wars (1917-18 and 1946-49), three periods of dictatorial rule (1925-26, 1936-41,
1967-74), and witnessed ten major military revolts between 1915 and 1936
(Couloumbis, 1994;189-190).

While foreign interference in Greek affairs was relatively low in the interwar
period, Greece emerged as a disguised protectorate of the US in the post-war era.
American strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Greece was the
only non-communist Balkan state, largely explain why the country became the target
of heavy US economic control and political influence. Greece received a massive
amount of aid in exchange for tacit acquiescence to US intervention in its domestic
and foreign affairs. Between 1947 and 1956 aid levels reached the lump sum of
2,565 million dollars - the highest per capita aid received by any under-developed
country (Couloumbis,1966;28). Yet, despite having secured national survival under
the shield of a world power like the US, Greece decided to associate itself with the
newly-born European Community in late 1950s. Several factors account for this
decision. Besides the drastic cuts in Marshall aid after 1954, the outbreak of the
Cyprus conflict in the mid-1950s proved that Greece was no longer the ‘enfant gâté’
of the American allies, who had begun to favour British and Turkish national
interests (Kazakos,2001;248 Yfantis,2004;73). Such a turnaround in US strategic
preferences clearly manifested itself in the 1964 Acheson Plan, which involved the
Turks in the Cyprus settlement at Britain’s request, asking for a partition of the island
between Turkey and Greece, as well as in John Kennedy’s decision to stop free
defence aid to the Greek state (Verney and Couloumbis,1991;106).

26 Russia, France and England
27 Balkan Wars 1912-13, the Greek Turkish War (1921-1922), World War I, and World War II.
28 Iatrides referring to US daily political intervention would argue that ‘the Americans supervising the
Ministry of National Economy not only signed all outgoing documents but personally checked all
carbon copies as well’ (1983;151).
Reactions to US tutelage emerged even more strongly as the threat from the Communist North receded, first with the Soviet-Yugoslav split and then with the death of Stalin, leaving an imminent threat from the East. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in other words, were no longer Greek foes, but the same did not apply for Turkey (Macridis, 1979:141-142). In this context, rational Greek state agents saw themselves as trapped in a ‘broken’ US-NATO security umbrella protecting them from fake threats and exposing them to real dangers. At the same time, internal pro-communist tendencies became instrumental in impelling Greece to seek closer links with the EEC. On the one hand, rising economic dependence on the Eastern block was greeted with unease. The latter absorbed 22 percent of Greek exports in 1959, encouraging suspicions of a Soviet plot for political domination. On the other hand, the internal communist worries grew during the 1958 elections, in which Greek pro-communist forces, under the banner of EDA, won 25 percent of the vote. The communist success was a clear indication of growing popular disenchantment over British and American attitudes to the issue of Cyprus. In response to these challenges, the right-wing Greek government redefined the country’s Western orientation via association with the EEC, thereby attaining a certain degree of independence from US interference (Tsakaloyannis, 1981:127).

In 1974, the fall of the junta signaled the first real opportunity for Greece to reconsider its foreign policy independently of its American allies. Seizing the moment, the Greek premier, Konstantinos Karamanlis, opened up space for an alternative alliance by reactivating the Association Agreement on August 22nd 1974 and applying for EEC membership on June 12th 1975 (Botsiou, 2002:22). In the internal domain US support for the military regime that had ruled the country between 1967 and 1974 had discredited the Americans. EEC declarations denouncing dictatorship made the nascent alliance of Western European states a more natural course for security minded state actors. The European Parliament’s resolution of 10 May 1967, and the Commission’s subsequent response, intimated to Greeks that a tyrannical regime could have no place among a European Community of democratic states (Coufoudakis, 1987:233 Siotis, 1981:88,95). Such a denouncement, apart from offering moral support to Greek people, exercised real

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29 For Further details on the US stance see Woodhouse 1980.
pressure on the Colonels. Given the intensity of Greek trade relations with the EEC the freezing of Association could have serious long term consequences on the domestic economy, delegitimising the politics of the military (Tovias,2002;190).

Besides internal balancing the prospect of accession offered Greek actors the opportunity to balance external threats emanating from their Turkish neighbours. The expansionist vision of the latter was ascertained in its double invasion of Cyprus in 1974. On 20 July the Greek Colonels’ attempted coup against President Makarios of Cyprus had offered Turkey alibi and opportunity to invade the island with a view to preventing its presumably de facto enosis with Greece. Even after the restoration of political order, both in Cyprus via the return of Kliridis, and in Greece via Karamanlis, Turkey not only refused to withdraw its troops but engaged in a fresh invasion in August 1974, occupying 40 percent of the island. The US could have interposed its fleet to stop the Turks, or used sanctions to prevent them from expanding their occupation of the island. The US\NATO stance of non-intervention triggered profound disappointment among Greek ruling elites and deep resentment among the wider public. Hence, the Cypriot affair of the 1970s became a catalyst for the reorientation of Greek foreign policy away from the US to the EEC (Botsiou 2001;141-155 Couloumbis and Dalis,2004;80).

Karamanlis’ government applied for membership only a few months after the partition of the island. In opting for the EEC the Greek premier nipped any new upsurge in communist trends stemming from strong anti-American feelings, and at the same time maintained the country’s pro western image without being subservient to US demands. In addition, membership would improve the country’s power position in the international arena and help it overcome the isolation following the seven year military coup and the Cyprus invasion, as Karamanlis pointed out in the parliamentary debate of 16 October 1975 (Svolopoulos,1994;76). After all, the Greek-Turkish power competition did not leave much room for manoeuvre to the Conservative government. In Karamanlis words, ‘if we distanced ourselves from the West, we would abide by the rules of Turkey; simply because in doing so we would multiply its power against Greece’ (ibid;447).

Notwithstanding the validity of such perceived threats, the EEC’s apprehension over the security implications arising from Greek membership and its cautious stance in not upsetting its strategic relationship with Turkey, cast doubt on the realist weight one can attach to the second enlargement round. Security
considerations do make up the larger part of the Greek accession puzzle. The incumbents’ reaction to Greek security concerns nevertheless, produces an ambiguous result in explaining Karamanlis’ enthusiasm and persistence in pursuing membership. As will become clear in the second part of this chapter, the incumbents were not only reluctant to become enmeshed in an ‘Aegean Cold War’, they would often take actions favouring Turkish rather than Greek strategic interests. As a result, confidence in the Community to guarantee Greek security was on the wane as the negotiations proceeded, and few would share the assumption prevalent in Greece in 1975 that ‘Turkey would think twice before attacking a member of the EEC’ (Tsakaloyannis,1981;149). Herewith, attention shall be shifted away from purely rational to constructivist explanatory variables, showing the tenacity of ideational factors behind the Conservative Government’s firm decision to join the EEC club.

2.4 ‘GREECE BELONGS TO EUROPE’: KARAMANLIS IDEATIONAL COMMITMENT TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Besides evoking economic and external security factors, Greek arguments for membership forcefully accentuated the country’s European destiny. The motivational repertoire of the Greek premier extended beyond pure instrumental reasoning to an indisputable ideological commitment to the process of European unification. Of course, in 1974, in the aftermath of the military coup, the often cited motto ‘Greece belongs to the democratic West’ served as an internal security buffer meant to subvert any remaining authoritarian temptations. In the years preceding accession, nevertheless, the uninterrupted political stability in the domestic sphere reduced the need for strategic appeals to Greece’s European vocation. That is not to say that Greek state actors refrained from manipulating their affective attachment to European democratic credentials. On the contrary, belief in European integration as a means of securing peace, stability, and prosperity for the participating peoples would be regularly evoked both in the national sphere, to overcome the opposition’s reservations and in the supranational domain, to ‘rhetorically entrap’ EU actors into acquiescing to Greek accession. To put it in Schimmelfennig’s words, the intersubjective liberal democratic ideas that made up the social world of both the

31 The quotation derives from an extract cited in the website of Konstantinos Karamanlis’ Foundation, which summarizes the views of the Greek premier on Greece’s association and membership in the European Community. For the exact wording see: http://www.karamanlis-foundation.gr/en/biografiko/video2.html
applicants and the incumbents provided Greek state actors with reference points and repertoires that became effective in the course of their strategic interaction (2003b, 198).

Before tracing Karamanlis’ pro-integrationist rhetoric, which effectively increased the low bargaining power of Greek interlocutors, it is important to note the historic continuity of a domestic discourse favouring European unification and underlining Greece’s European identity. The momentum the integration movement gained among European elites in the aftermath of the Second World War did not stir up any substantive debate in the Greek political scene. The unification argumentaire was a luxury the overstretched political and economic life in Greece could ill afford. Even so, there was some response to the constant influx of challenging ideas from Western Europe. A delegation of parliamentarians represented the Greek Constituent Assembly at the first Conference of the European Parliamentary Union (EPU) in September 1947, and members of the Constituent Assembly also took part in the Hague conference in September 1948. From then on, pro-European organizations emerged in the Greek territory, such as the Hellenic League for European cooperation, the Greek national Council of the European movement and the Socialist Movement for a United States of Europe. Their activities essentially drew little public attention. Their mere existence under the given circumstances, nevertheless, indicates the acceptance the pro-European ideal had gained among a wide spectrum of political forces in Greece (Veremis and Constanas, 1988:802-804 Minotou, 1998).

In the aftermath of the civil war, following the promulgation of the Constitution in 1952, the question of European integration took centre stage. Konstantinos Karamanlis retrigged the debate and set out Greece’s European policy after coming into power for the first time on 6 October 1955. In his term of rule, which lasted until 1963, Greece boarded the EEC train, applying for an Association Agreement with the Community. The latter no doubt served Karamanlis’ three instrumental objectives: a) to guarantee the external security of the country; b) to consolidate democracy; and c) to achieve rapid economic development. Association, nevertheless, also represented an act of belief in the European destiny of Greece and its historically entrenched right to cooperate on equal terms with the other peoples of Europe, with whom it shared a common cultural tradition and common political and economic interests (Kontogiorgis, 1985:34-35). Such a view, as expressed by Giorgos Kontogiorgis, Karamanlis’ Minister for European Affairs, was
further corroborated by John Pesmatzoglou, chairman of the inter-departmental Committee for European cooperation, who wrote in 1962 that:

‘it is vital to grasp that the success of the [Association] experiment goes hand in hand with the spread of Europe’s political and ideological influence…Athens Agreement is not merely confined to economic integration: it also shares the political aims of European integration- particularly that of establishing ever closer links between the peoples who believe in Europe’s future greatness. (Pesmatzoglou, 1962:8).”

Even before the politicisation of the European integration debate, national cultural discourse in Greece was inextricably bound to the wider notion of a European civilization. As Tsoukalas notes, respect for Greek classical antiquity constituted a pivotal element in European self-perceptions, rendering Shelley’s dictum ‘we are all Greeks’ more than a simple rhetorical exhortation. In turn ‘collective representations of what was to become modern Greece stemmed directly from the self images Europeans were seeking to recognize in their own historicized looking glass’ (2002:77-78). To put it in Nielsen’s terms:

‘The European idea has always had a strong following in Greece and Greeks…are aware that, after all, Europe was a mistress of Zeus. They are now keen to convert that love affair into a marriage. No doubt, as in every marriage, there is some interest in their desire. But it would be churlish to deny that there is also some love.’ (1979:29).

Besides such a strong ideational feedback loop between Greece and Europe, the European destiny of the applicant country was further consolidated after the reinstitution of democracy in 1974. The vigorous verbal European reactions against the Colonels and the shelter Europe had offered to numerous expatriated artists, intellectuals, and political dissenters rendered Karamanlis’ dictum of ‘we belong to Europe’ a plausible design. In this sense, we can talk of an ‘ideology of accession’ filling in the ideological vacuum that emerged in Greece after the collapse of the ‘Great Idea’ in the 1920s (Theodoropoulos, 1979 Ioakimidis, 1984:55-56). Of course, at this point one should not forget the passionate ideological opposition of PASOK, the main opposition party since 1977, as well as KKE the Communist party.

32 See also Karamanlis telegram to the Commission President W. Hallstein: ‘This association is not only a confirmation of the political, cultural and ideological ties uniting my country to the countries of the Community, it also offers vast scope for an economic cooperation which, by raising the standard of living of the Greek, will certainly play its part in achieving the general aim of a peace firmly rooted on stability and prosperity’ Bulletin of the EEC, No.9-10, September 1962, p14.
However, such ideological strife was only an indication of the seeds of a new political front involving the political image of Europe (Tsoukalas, 2001:86).

On the basis of the preceding discussion it is no wonder that the EEC liberal democratic ideology comprised a significant part of Karamanlis’ repertoire. In submitting the official Greek application for EEC membership on 12 June 1975 he would state before the Nine that ‘..after the restoration of democracy, Greece has expressed a strong desire to occupy the place that it considers its own within the European family of democratic states’ (as quoted in Svolopoulos, 2004:260). Similarly, on the occasion of Chancellor’s Schmidt visit to Greece at the beginning of 1976, Karamanlis expressed his firm belief in the integration of democratic Europe as a means of ‘consolidating international peace; revitalizing democracy and securing cultural progress’ and confirmed his country’s steady orientation towards Europe and the ideals the latter espouses (Svolopoulos, 1994:112,114).

Later on, in an attempt to surmount the obstacles the lukewarm Commission avis posed on the Greek accession negotiations, the Greek premier embarked on an ideational crusade. In his memorandum to the nine Community ambassadors of 31st January 1976, he characterised the Commission’s linking of accession with the settlement of Greek disputes with Turkey as ‘politically and morally indefensible’ not just because it rendered Greece a hostage of the Turkish authorities but also because it underestimated and ignored the serious political commitment behind his country’s decision to apply for full membership. The governments of the Nine had already publicly expressed their support for Greece’s attempt to join the democratic family of European states. For Karamanlis, therefore, the Commission’s Opinion was nothing more but an opposition to the incumbents’ decision and their strong political will to take Greece on board irrespective of security and economic considerations (ibid:153). The promptness and the vigour of the Greek response surprised both the Commission and the European foreign ministers, and made apparent the fact that the Community would lose face in the international arena if it denied the liberal democratic principles formally institutionalised as EEC treaty norms. By the end of the week, 7 February 1976, almost all the member states had given Athens assurances of support for the Council meeting of 9th February, which unanimously rejected the Commission’s opinion and ensured that the accession negotiations would begin (Siotis,1981:102).
Using the same line of reasoning, in spring 1977, Karamanlis fought against stagnation in the accession negotiations caused by the EEC incumbents’ fear that any concessions to Greece could be used as a precedent by the Spaniards and the Portuguese, who had also expressed their desire to enter the EEC club. In a note made public on 28th March 1977 Kontogiorgis, the deputy Minster of coordination, besides referring to the legal details, i.e. the early Association Agreement, that substantiated the Greek claim for accession irrespective of the progress made by Portugal and Spain, concluded that:

‘it is politically impossible to respond negatively to Greek peoples’ accession request without denouncing the aspirations of the founders of the European Communities and the objectives set by the Treaty of Rome, on the basis of which the peoples of Europe espousing these ideals are summoned to join the founding members in their successful realization’ (Svolopoulos, 1994; 413).

Similarly, on 26th April 1977, the Greek premier, in a letter addressed to the political authorities of the Nine besides downplaying the problems Greek agriculture could pose for the EEC, referred to the ‘pledges made by the Community towards Greece at the time of the military coup’ and argued that a failure to live up to these promises might endanger the future of European democracy assisting the cause of anti-democratic powers that hoped to benefit from the Greek people’s frustration against western democracies (Kontogiorgis, 1985; 105). The same argumentation would be employed during the official visits to Athens of the Prime Ministers of Italy (Andreotti), Luxembourg (Thorn), the Netherlands (Van der Stoel) and France (Barre). As a result, on 30th June 1977 the President of the Council declared to the Greek side that the accession negotiations were already at an advanced stage and that all member states agreed to their uninterrupted progress (Svolopoulos, 1994; 475).

Given that adherence to EEC liberal democratic credentials would effectively smooth incumbents’ resistance and strengthen the low negotiating power of Greece, it is not surprising that the same arguments were evoked in the final stages of the negotiations. Suffice it to mention that in his meeting with the members of the European Commission on 27th January 1978 Karamanlis emphatically stated that:

‘Greek people and its political leadership believe in the mission of Europe. And they also believe that Europe should speed up the process of its gradual unification

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33 For similar references see the letter addressed to J. Chirac on 9 October 1978 where he skilfully brought up the Greek people’s affective attachment to democratic Europe and the disastrous consequences a loss of public faith in Europe could have on domestic democratic institutions (Svolopoulos, 1995; 348).
if it is to respond to the challenge of history. In a different case Europe might jeopardize its democratic institutions’

He then went on, arguing that any economic difficulties raised by Greek application could be overcome because the significance of safeguarding higher values like democracy and freedom could not be measured in units of account (Svolopoulos, 1995:104-105). Likewise in his official visits to the EEC capitals, throughout 1978, he would repeatedly underline the European consciousness of Greece, its faith in the future of Europe and its contribution to the democratic construction of the EEC in the aftermath of accession (ibid, 153-172). In view of such skilful ideological pressure it was only natural that the Commission Vice president would describe the accession of Greece to the EEC as ‘an act of faith in Democracy’ on 4th April 1979, the concluding date of the negotiations (Svolopoulos, 1996:91).

In this light, it becomes apparent that shared institutionalised principles have a strong persuasive function in a community environment, for they impose legitimacy constraints on community members who become concerned about their image. Ideas, in line with the assumptions of integrative constructivism, had a causal weight in explaining human action because they influenced Greek state actors’ instrumentality, i.e. the means they employed to accomplish their instrumental interest in EEC membership. As the edited archival material presented in this section reveals, EEC liberal democratic ideals filled the gap created by a fragile economy and security in Greek bargaining resources. Last but not least, besides complementing the applicants’ repertoire under countervailing material circumstances, ideas cross-cut rather than complemented the incumbents’ interest repertoires causing them to sideline prevalent security and economic concerns (Parsons, 2002:48). Such ideas did not necessarily spring from deep moral value commitments on either side of the negotiating table, but they point to a Value Maximizing accession game, in which attachment to liberal democratic values prevailed over materialistic interests.
Supply Side Motivations for Granting EEC Membership to Greece

2.5 Greek Agriculture and Industry: A Source of Net Welfare Costs for EEC Member States

Greek membership entailed taking net economic risks at a time of stagnation for the Community. Rising unemployment and soaring inflation rendered EMU the biggest non-event of the 1970s. Divergent economic policies in turn made it difficult for member states to adopt a common energy policy in the mid-1970s, leaving the EC exposed to the impact of the 1973 hike in oil prices and the onset of the oil embargo (Dinan, 1999:68-71). In this adverse international context, the application by a poor underdeveloped country on 12th June 1975 threatened to place a serious handicap on the Community’s momentum, postponing not only the achievement of economic and monetary union but also the consolidation of its internal market. Even though Greek accession posed only marginal macro-economic worries, given the small size of the country, the inability of the applicant’s economy to combine homogeneously with the economies of the other member states was met with considerable apprehension in the Commission’s avis. (Commission, 1976:8-9). To make matters worse, Franco’s death in Spain in November 1975, and the Portuguese elections of 1976, added another two potential candidates to the Community’s waiting list, showing that the costs of Southern enlargement could weigh more heavily once the membership perspective extended beyond Greece to the two Iberian states. In this light, the structural weaknesses of the Greek economy loomed large in the Commission’s opinion, beyond the proportion warranted by the candidate’s size. The Commission, in clear contrast to the assurances given to Karamanlis by political leaders of the Nine, proposed a transitional period of indefinite duration for the introduction of an economic programme in Greece that would accelerate the necessary structural reforms (ibid:10). This was the first attempt to postpone the Greek accession and demonstrated the EC actors’zealous devotion to safeguarding the economic well-being of the Community. The Commission’s avis was, in other words, an accurate reflection of the Utility Maximizing doubts of the Nine over the desirability of integrating underdeveloped states.

Agriculture was the most controversial sector. In an overall evaluation of the Mediterranean applicants the Commission estimated that enlargement would more than double the number of persons engaged in agriculture, while overall agricultural
production would increase by only one fifth (Commission,1978b;33). In Greece the output per farmer was just about 40 percent of the Community average, even though the agricultural sector employed four times as many workers than in the Nine. Structural dissimilarities were further attested to the small size of Greek farm holdings and their limited modernization capacity. Such divergence threatened to impose immigration problems and budgetary costs. The budgetary consequences, though not exorbitant, would be immediately felt in the Guidance expenditure, which would increase by 18 percent, adding some 60 million units of account to what the Nine paid for the CAP (ibid;1976;14-15). Agricultural restructuring in Greece would further require a substantial decrease of those employed in farming, increasing not only domestic unemployment but also immigration to the Community. The latter seemed a promising destination, offering alternative types of employment and substantially higher wages. In this context, West German trade unions’ apprehensions over the prospect of free movement for Greek workers was warranted (Verney,2005;7).

What further reduced supply-side enthusiasm for the prospect of Greek membership was an expected change in the Community’s self-sufficiency for agricultural products, increasing competition and threatening to pile up new surpluses. Greek production in the late 1970s had been largely complementary to the Community’s. Even so, the Commission warned the Nine against the potentially explosive effect of higher EEC prices on the supply of fruit, vegetables and wine. Selective production in Greece would have adverse consequences for Community farmers concentrating on the same range of Mediterranean products. Of course the size of the Greek threat alone was not sufficient to arouse militant opposition. The formal membership applications of Portugal and Spain in 1977, nevertheless, resulted in a dynamic French and Italian reaction. Concessions to Greece might be taken by the Spanish and Portuguese negotiators as a starting point (Wallace,1979;22-23 Musto,1982;74-75). To avoid this, France and Italy presented memoranda to the Council of Ministers in July 1977 in which they asked for increased price support for Mediterranean products. France, in addition, proposed the introduction of minimum prices in intra-Community trade, while Italy emphasised structural reforms in the Mediterranean regions. The two memoranda had been preceded by numerous other reports in the two countries giving voice to domestic farmers’ concerns and by a special meeting of the COPA-the EEC farmers’ lobby-in
June 1977 (Tsoukalis, 1981:235-236). In other words, the welfare costs of the Southern enlargement account for the marked hesitation of certain incumbents, but fail to explain why Greece finally joined the EU club despite its adverse material conditions.  

At this point one may argue that irrespective of French and Italian misgivings over a prospective Mediterranean market failure, Northern incumbents could still function as proponents of enlargement, as the latter would profit from the opening of new export outlets for their products. Greece as a net importer of meat, dairy products, and cereal promised net trade gains mainly to Britain and, to a lesser extent, to Germany and Denmark (Stathatos, 1979:10). But the budgetary implications of supporting not just the Greek, but also the Spanish and Portuguese underdeveloped regions and financing potential new surpluses in sectors such as vegetables, fruit, and wine laid another straw on the camel’s back that the Community’s paymasters were reluctant to pay for. Similarly for industry, the marginal impact of Greek accession on industrial competition gave way to apprehension over the economic consequences of admitting three semi-industrialized applicants. Amidst the ongoing economic recession of the mid-1970s the incumbents’ seemed reluctant to sustain Greece’s weak industrial base. In addition, the increased production capacity of the applicant in certain sensitive sectors of the Community, such as steel, textiles, and shipbuilding, threatened to add competition problems to the industries of the Nine (Commission, 1978a:10). Greek membership thus put EU actors on the defensive. In the absence of net welfare gains both member state governments and the Commission tended to forsake their grand 1974 rhetoric on Western democratic ideals for the sake of peaches, olive oil and textiles.

2.6 INCUMBENTS’ RESERVATIONS OVER EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY

Just as economic considerations did not result in the unambiguous acceptance of the Greek membership request, security concerns also grew amongst incumbents, giving rise to strong centrifugal forces. Far from assisting in the external balancing of the Community, Greek membership threatened to disrupt the balance EEC had

34 A few months later, in September 1977, an additional report was submitted by Commissioner Natali where he called for an indefinite transitional period to reduce the economic gap between applicants and incumbents and argued in favour of setting up a special fund for all Mediterranean regions (Tsoukalis, 1981:141).
established in the Eastern Mediterranean by assigning the identical status of Associate to both Greece and Turkey. In direct response to incumbents’ uncertainty over the security implications of the second enlargement, the Commission made public a lukewarm and cautious Opinion on 29 January 1976. The prospect of Greek membership was met with considerable skepticism because it carried the risk of embroiling the Community in the Greek-Turkish dispute. Voicing a disproportionately deep concern in EC-Turkish rather than in EC-Greek relations the Commission would argue that:

‘specific steps will need to be taken…to the effect that the examination of the Greek application for membership will not affect relations between the Community and Turkey and that the rights guaranteed by the Association Agreement with Turkey would not be affected thereby.’

The Opinion would also implicitly link the preparatory work for Greek accession with the settlement of its disputes with Turkey (Commission,1976:7-8). Last but not least, despite the Commission’s recommendation that ‘a clear affirmative reply be given to the Greek request’, it basically proposed the establishment of an indefinite pre-accession stage to precede any transitional arrangement that might be agreed upon in the context of the accession negotiations (ibid:9-10).

Besides formal Commission statements a series of incumbents’ actions in the years preceding Greek accession further prove the strategic weight assigned to the Turkish factor at the expense of Greek external balancing interests. To begin with, the WEU, a channel for separate consultations on defense matters among Western Europeans, expressed the EEC incumbents’ reservations over a possible dispute between Greece and Turkey, and denied Greek accession to the WEU assembly following any eventual EEC membership (WEU,1976a:14). Moreover, WEU parliamentarians, in two reports published in May and November 1976, accentuated the strategic significance of Turkey in checking Soviet naval power in the eastern Mediterranean, and treated with apprehension the defence implications arising from Greek membership. Dashing the hopes of Karamanlis’ government the report suggested that West Europeans should make clear that:

‘Greece’s accession to the EEC (is) not to be considered as support, or the beginning of future support for the Greek cause, which implies that if Turkey so wishes it must be associated at the same time as Greece, with those elements of the future European Union in which it is possible for it to participate, particularly in foreign policy and defense matters’ (WEU,1976b:14).
The compromise solution reached in 1978 among the foreign ministers of the Nine regarding Turkey’s participation in the political committee of the EEC is further indicative of the incumbents’ aim of not losing their relative power by sidelining a strategic ally via the pending accession of Greece. The EEC Nine, faced with British-led pressure for allowing Turkish participation in the EPC, and French apprehension over indirectly promoting EEC-American consultation by such an initiative, finally agreed to keep Turkey informed over those decisions reached in the political committee of direct interest to her. What is of even greater interest is an additional step taken so as to ‘avoid hurting Turkey’s sensitivity’ over Greek accession. In the case of Greece presiding over the Council of Ministers, EEC contacts with Turkey would be maintained by a three party representation, that is the Greek president accompanied by his predecessor and successor in the chair (Tsakaloyannis, 1981:144-45). Last but not least, incumbents’ fear over reaping net security costs rather than benefits from Greek membership was registered in their reaction both to the 1976 Aegean crisis and to the lifting of the American arms embargo on Turkey, imposed after its 1974 invasion of Cyprus. On 24th July 1976 the Turks dispatched the controversial survey ship, Sismik I to the Aegean to carry out research on the Aegean sea bed, challenging the sovereign rights of Greece in that part of the Aegean. At the height of the crisis the Dutch Foreign Minister, Max Van der Stoel, President of the Council, arrived in Athens, urging the Greek side to refrain from taking any action which might complicate the latter’s negotiations for EEC membership (Svolopoulos, 1994:272-282). The European partners, most notably West Germany and Britain, would also appear to tilt towards Turkey in 1978 by exerting pressure on Washington to lift its arms embargo on Turkey. In this light, it would seem tenuous at best to claim that Greek accession would improve the EU’s net internal and external security. On the contrary, the security costs to be borne seemed to outweigh any immediate security advantages. Even so the accession negotiations proceeded and were concluded in a relatively short time span. To account for such a paradox attention shall be given to ideational factors that invoked the incumbents’ sense of responsibility towards their democratically underdeveloped neighbours.
2.7 GRANTING ACCESSION TO GREECE: AN ACT OF BELIEF IN DEMOCRACY

There is no doubt that the enlargement preferences of the EEC moved beyond the rationalist template in the 1970s, rendering the Union an exporter of liberal democratic values rather than a net importer of material gains. In the EEC environment liberal norms such as respect for human rights, the rule of law, and democratic political participation and representation, exerted a strong gravitational pull on participant states because they formed constitutive organizational rules that regulated their heavily institutionalised relationship. Moreover, such liberal political principles governed EEC policies towards non-members, as articles of the Treaty of Rome vociferously prove. Herewith, EEC incumbents could not openly oppose or threaten to veto the membership aspirations of fragile democracies like Greece in mid-1970s, without threatening to expose themselves to inconsistency between the formal rules they ratified in EEC treaties, and those they actually applied in real life interaction.

The EEC’s responsibility in safeguarding Greece against a possible return to dictatorship dates from before the country’s formal application for membership. The verbal renunciation of the Colonels’ regime by the active EEC democratic forces, i.e. the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council, is but indicative of a ‘rhetorical commitment’ by the pan-European democratic Community to the suffering Greek people. The Commission reacted soon after the coup of 21st April 1967, as Siotis maintains, sending officials discreetly to Athens to gather information and make sure that communication with the non-arrested democrats could be maintained (1981;95). On 10th May 1967 the European Parliament expressed its concern over the suspension of democratic life in Greece, declared its solidarity with the Greek people and stated that ‘the Association Agreement…cannot be implemented in its different phases unless the democratic structures, political freedoms and freedom of association are restored in Greece’.

35 On 26th September 1967 the Commission reaffirmed the freeze in EEC links with Greece so long as democratic life in the latter remained suppressed under the military coup. The Council too, in November 1967, condemned the Athens Regime and emphasized the Community’s will to develop the Greek association to its full after the restoration of

36 See Bulletin de l’Agence Europe, No. 2785, 26 September 1967
democracy. The rhetorical repudiation of the Colonels’ regime and the pledges of support towards the Greek people morally committed the Community to a positive response to this first associate after the reestablishment of democratic processes (Coufoudakis, 1977; Pesmazoglou, 1999:57).

Dashing Greece’s hope for investment in a democratic future of Europe would have resulted in a significant loss in the EEC’s international credibility. For this reason the cautious avis issued by the Commission on 29\textsuperscript{th} January 1976 would nevertheless point out that:

‘…the consolidation of Greece’s democracy which is a fundamental concern not only of the Greek people but also of the Community and its Member States, is intimately related to the evolution of Greece’s relationship with the Community. It is in the light of these considerations that the Commission recommends that a clear affirmative reply be given to the Greek request’ (Commission, 1976:9).

The promotion of democracy, in other words, became the mantra of the intra-Community debate on Greece, and enlargement turned into a value rather than an interest driven policy. Hence, as soon as the Commission voted against immediate membership for Greece it provoked an intra-commission crisis followed by strong member government reactions. First, the Italian Commissioner, A. Spinelli, circulated a press release on 30\textsuperscript{th} January 1976, two days after the avis was made public, in which he forcefully attacked the Commission’s request for an indefinite transition period (Haritos, 1981:200). On 4\textsuperscript{th} February 1976 the French governments criticized the Commission for making public statements on matters that were ‘political’ and therefore beyond its competence. Similarly, the German, British, and Dutch government perceived accession as a matter of principle, and tended to view the Commission’s handling of the application request as clumsy (Svolopoulos, 1994:155).

Hence, the Council’s reflections on the shaming costs to be borne in the event of its isolating its first associate member led to a green light for the opening of the accession negotiations. On 27\textsuperscript{th} July 1976, the day of the official opening of the negotiations, the Commission president, Francois-Xavier Ortoli, wisely covered up the inconsistencies between the Commission’s initial reluctance to take Greece on board and its rhetorical adherence to liberal democratic norms. He maintained that

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\textsuperscript{37} See Journal Officiel des Communautés Européennes, Seance du Mardi 18 Novembre 1967 pp.61-5

\textsuperscript{38} For a detailed summary of the Commission’s Opinion, the reactions it stirred in Greece and the Council’s position see Bulletin of the European Communities 1-1976 pp. 6-8
enlargement to include Greece would contribute to the emergence of a new European construction that would not solely promote people’s welfare, but also advance basic human, social and cultural values (Kontogiorgis, 1985:70).

Similarly, when faced with French and Italian reservations over the agricultural costs of Greek accession, the Commission came forward as the guardian of liberal democratic principles and reminded the Nine of their responsibilities towards politically underdeveloped neighbours. In Ortoli’s words, any rejection of the Southern candidates’ applications would be unacceptable since:

‘A straight refusal would be a severe blow to the fragile democratic regimes which have emerged with the open encouragement of the Community and which are already to some extent dependent on us’ (Bulletin of the European Communities, 10/1977:68).

After all, the Declaration on the European identity of December 1973 defined the EEC’s identity in terms of democratic values and proclaimed its commitment to defend representative democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The downfall of the dictatorship in Greece in July 1974 gave the EEC an opportunity to practically prove its commitment to democracy, as Susannah Verney rightfully contends in her authoritative study of the EEC’s second enlargement (Verney, 2005:9).

The restoration of Greek democracy confirmed, on the one hand, the Community’s perception of Greece’s European identity, and on the other reinforced its own European ideals that had been born in the shadow of the Acropolis. The statement of François-Poncet, President of the Council on the signing of the Greek Accession Treaty, underlined the new member’s contribution to EEC identity building:

‘Greece’s contribution is specific, irreducible. The member states of the Community know that democracy was born here, and that their common culture has been largely drawn from the sources of Hellenism, without which our languages are ethics, our sciences and our arts would not be what they are. But our relationship it is not merely rooted deeply in antiquity. It is timeless…’
(Bulletin of the European Communities, 5/1979:8)

Similarly, Roy Jenkins as president of the Commission characterized Greece as ‘at once the oldest and the newest member of Europe’ since the European idea ‘could be located in the far past of Greece when so much that we now count as characteristically European had its origins’. Last but not least, the French President Giscard d’Estaing epitomized the resonance between European and Greek cultural and political values, maintaining that ‘Europe is returning to the country of the
goddess Europa. We have turned full circle’ (ibid;11). On balance, it appears that arguments about enlargement to Greece were not defined along utilitarian lines on the supply side. EEC actors’ arguments were instead decisively refined by adherence to European democratic values. The promotion of democracy, in other words, became an ethical imperative among the Nine. Similarly, on the demand side, the Conservative elites balanced their imminent security and welfare interests with value based concerns over joining the European family of democratic states. This is how the second EEC enlargement was transformed into a Value Maximizing mission.
CHAPTER 3
BRITAIN: A RELUCTANT SUITOR OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Taking British preferences on EU membership seriously does not automatically lead to a ‘liberal theory of international politics’ as Andrew Moravcsik implies when pointing out the commercial dependence of Britain on the Six (1998;220). The evidence on both the ex-ante period of EU enlargement negotiations, i.e. the failed accession attempts of 1961 and 1967, and the dum phase comprising the 1970s intergovernmental bargain, does little to confirm the pre-eminence of economic incentives in shaping state actors’ attitudes to integration. The widening gap between domestic and EEC growth rates, the rise of the Community as a principal commercial power in the West, and the declining significance of Commonwealth trade for the British Market, partially account for the half-hearted British elite reorientation to Europe. Geopolitical concerns over the declining power of Britain in international affairs had a more special resonance in state actors’ motivational repertoire. In this light neorealism becomes the default drive in explaining the demand side of the EU enlargement negotiations. Last but not least, attention is shifted away from pragmatic concerns to the ideological turmoil triggered by the prospect of merging British sovereignty with a supranational organization. The latter ideas rooted in domestic identities and values, such as British constitutional democracy and the past splendour of the country in world politics, do not justify the British quest for membership, but pose considerable obstacles on the road to Brussels. Similarly, on the supply side of the negotiations a rational explanation dominates the constructivist one. Therefore, the evidence presented in this chapter substantiates a classification of the UK as a Utility Maximiser since geopolitics and, partially, economics prevail over adherence to liberal democratic ideas in justifying enlargement.

39 Abbreviations in the notes and references: HMSO: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office; PRO: Public Record Office; HAEU: Historical Archives of the EU: Florence.
DEMAND SIDE MOTIVATIONS FOR SEEKING ACCESSION

3.2 BRITISH AGRICULTURE AND THE CAP: AN AWKWARD PARTNERSHIP

The adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy had stirred up a passionate debate in Britain over the desirability of EEC membership. At first sight, the weight agricultural policy carried in discussions over the economic merits of joining the Community seems disproportionate. In the late 1960s agriculture accounted for only 3 percent of Britain’s gross domestic product, whereas the relevant share among the six rose to 7 percent. Similarly the percentage of the labour force employed in agriculture was 3 percent in the UK, while during the same period 15 percent of civilian employment in the EEC was in farming (Young, 1973:60). Yet, in order to appreciate the true weight agriculture posed for the UK, one should move beyond numbers to the problems stemming from an undiluted application of the existing CAP.

Britain’s position with regard to the agricultural problem was diametrically opposed to the general European position. British farmers had guaranteed prices for all their principal products by means of Exchequer payments that made up for the difference between the average price gained by farmers on the market and the guaranteed price determined by the Government. Thereby, consumers bought food at world free market prices while higher prices were secured for domestic producers. Under this system, the burden of agricultural support was still borne by the general taxpayer as among the Six. The British tax system, nevertheless, placed emphasis on a progressive income tax, meaning that richer citizens paid more towards the subsidy than the poorer. Within the CAP the indirect tax on food would weigh most heavily on the poorest, who spend the highest proportion of their income on food (George, 1994:51 Young, 1973:75).

Participation in the Common Market would also signal a trade diversion away from duty free Commonwealth imports. Community levies would be charged at British frontiers on all products from non-members and preferences would progressively shift to more expensive imports from the EEC. Likewise, all food produced in Britain would now be subject to the generally higher EEC prices. Bearing these factors in mind the White Paper produced by the Labour government in 1970 predicted a rise in food prices ranging between 18 and 26 percent as a
consequence of adopting the CAP (HMSO, 1970:15). The increase in food expenditure in turn, would not only compromise national growth, so as to combat the potentially inflationary pressure of higher food prices, it would also result in social injustice afflicting lower income groups with higher levels of food expenditure, as mentioned earlier (Marsh and Ritson, 1971:112).

Besides consumers, the financial repercussions of the application of the CAP would be felt by British producers too. The 1970 White paper indicated that:

‘Farmers’ net income would nevertheless be higher than it would otherwise have been, although its distribution, and so the gains and losses, would differ greatly between commodities, types of farm and areas of the country’ (HMSO, 1970:17).

Such a reticent forecast on the impact of EEC membership on farm incomes makes better sense if one compares UK producer prices in the 1970s with their EEC equivalents. Cereal and milk producers would enjoy a substantial gain in profits as a result of higher prices. Cattle, pig, poultry and egg producers, however, would be adversely affected by higher feed costs and find the increased prices of their products insufficient to offset this disadvantage (Josling, 1971:79). Moving beyond prices, British producers would face a slow-down in the improvement of agricultural structures in abandoning the structural grants the Exchequer system provided them with. The latter amounted to 273 u.a. compared to the 285 u.a. spent by the Community’s Farm fund (Pisani, 1969:20). Last but not least, the farming Community would suffer losses by forsaking the British Annual Review. The essential difference between the latter and the price-fixing procedure of the Community was that there was a statutory obligation on the UK government to consult producer representatives before determining the guaranteed prices for the coming year. Within the EEC the British Farmers’ Union would suffer a demotion in its officially recognised status (Pisany, 1969:18 Brown, 1967; paragraph 28).

The only favourable prognosis for British entry into the CAP was a substantial expansion in British agricultural production in response to higher prices (HMSO, 1971:12). An expansion of domestic food production would cut imports and presumably reduce the costs falling on the balance of payments. However, the optimism of such an estimate was subject to many reservations. Irrespective of increasing self-sufficiency Britain would remain a net importer of food, and the

40 According to the 1970 White Paper, agricultural production would increase between 3 and 10 percent.
imported farm products from EEC partners would cost more. The increased cost of imports, coupled with Britain’s contribution to the EAGGF, would be the total charge on the balance of payments, and due to the structure of the Community’s budget Britain faced the prospect of becoming one of the largest net contributors. On the basis of these restrictions the Confederation of British Industry estimated the total cost to the balance of payments (cost of food imports plus contribution to FEOGA less receipts from FEOGA) at 400 million pounds (1970;39).41

In this light, despite the persistent references to British agriculture in governing elites’ discourse throughout the failed accession attempts, the ease with which agricultural issues were finally removed from the scope of the last negotiations prove that ‘Britain has been led to apply for admission in the Common market, for reasons unconnected with agriculture’ as the author of a prestigious report to the Action Committee for the United States of Europe concluded (Pisany,1969;11). The prominence previously afforded them by successive British governments was more a gesture towards the farming community than an expression of serious anxiety. After all, even before the formal membership application the Minister of Agriculture Christopher Soames had argued in favour of changes in the domestic system of support with a view to alleviating the costs incurred on the Exchequer. To put it in his words:

‘I am now firmly of the opinion that not only could we with benefit alter the system of our support for agriculture in the interest of associating ourselves more closely with the Six, but that regardless of the issue of the Six, we should in any event be giving thought to this for the future health of the agricultural industry’ (as quoted in Ludlow, 1997b;109)

In terms of agriculture the balance of benefit tilted heavily towards the Six rather than the applicants’, making any welfare-based theoretical framework hard to substantiate. Therefore, even though in 1961 Heath as the chief negotiator of the British delegation would appear to defend the interests of the farming community in claiming that ‘I am sure you will understand that Britain could not join the EEC under conditions in which this trade connection (with the Commonwealth) was cut

41 The budget would earmark as the Community’s own resources all revenues from levies on imported food and receipts from the common external tariff on industrial goods (except for 10% which would be retained by member states to cover collection costs). Anthony Barber, the British chief negotiator at the opening of the last round of accession negotiations in Luxembourg on 30 June 1970, went to the heart of the matter in stating that the recent developments in the field of Communitarian budgetary arrangements made the problem of balance in sharing of financial burdens more severe (Barber, 1970; paragraph 14).
with grave loss and even ruin for some of the Commonwealth countries’ (Heath, 1961; paragraph 29), he would nonetheless appear confident that ‘solutions can be found to Commonwealth problems fully compatible with the substance and the spirit of the Treaty of Rome’ (ibid; paragraph 7). Corroborating this condescending attitude, Harold Wilson on 29th November 1967 would state that ‘on sources of supply and channels of trade (i.e. the Commonwealth) we accept the Treaty of Rome’. In addition the Prime Minister, despite acknowledging the substantial differences between the British and the Continental systems of support that ‘would bring far-reaching changes in the structure of British agriculture’, nonetheless insisted that they must come to terms with it. Such British willingness to bear the brunt of painful agricultural reforms and even swallow the stiff budgetary contribution pill hints at a theoretical explanation of enlargement in which economic advantages make up only some of the rational jigsaw pieces.

3.3 British Industry in the EEC: The Unquantifiable Blessing of Membership

On balance the CAP had been the main ‘price of entry’ for the UK to pay in order to join the European Community. Any sacrifices made on account of agriculture, would hopefully be offset by benefits to industrial exports and growth. The priority assigned to the commercial interests of domestic industry over the preferences of the farming population, nevertheless, does not automatically assert the pre-eminence of liberal intergovernmentalist explanations in accounting for Britain’s late conversion to Europe. Both primary and secondary sources employed in this section fail to produce proof in support of a commercial motivation. Rather, the preponderance of evidence suggests that the predicted economic gains in industry were contingent on a number of assumptions difficult to prove. Furthermore, the British European policy did not reflect any overriding state interest in achieving the maximum possible economic result consistent with domestic business goals.

Contrary to a liberal intergovernmentalist interpretation, domestic pressure groups had a subsidiary rather than a substantive role in shaping state attitudes to membership. As Wolfram Kaiser and Jorgen Elvert point out (2004), the Macmillan government did not even consult in any systematic way with representatives of the FBI before it decided to go ahead with the first EEC application. Edward Heath, who

was responsible for European affairs, only inquired about the likely FBI reaction to the envisaged application for the first time at the end of June 1961. The restrained reaction of British industrialists to the prospect of EEC entry resonates well with their initial, fervent interest in a Free Trade Area (FTA) over and above a Common Market. British industry in the face of a sharp fall in Britain’s share of world trade, from 25 to 20 percent in 1950-1955, urged the government to keep their commercial position from deteriorating further (Young, 1993; 58). The Government in direct response to such pressures, decided in November 1956 that it would be desirable to enter into negotiations for the establishment of an industrial Free Trade Area in Europe. Unlike the Common market, the FTA plan of British state actors was tailored to meet domestic preferences, opening European markets to British industry while preserving Commonwealth trade and protecting British agriculture. The collapse of the FTA talks in November 1958 did not overturn business leaders’ distrust in the Common Market. The latter strongly believed that the establishment of an EFTA would facilitate ‘bridge-building’ with wider Europe, allowing them to reap the best from both the Commonwealth and the West European world (Griffiths and Ward, 1996; 17-18 Lieber, 1970; 93).

Only in the 1960s did it become apparent that British industry had ‘nothing to lose and everything to gain’ by entering the EEC (FBI, 1961; 10). Domestic business turned a favourable eye to the Common Market in view of a major trade diversion away from the Commonwealth to Western Europe. In addition, it was hoped that membership would provide a competitive stimulus. However, the FBI was split on the issue of entry, having secured the support of only the biggest firms. Thus, even though the shift in domestic business was concurrent with Macmillan’s reorientation towards Europe, their role does not conform to a liberal integovernmentalist interpretation of enlargement. To put it in Lieber’s words, the author of the most authoritative study on the impact of domestic pressure groups on Britain’s entry into Europe (1970; 98):  

43 The FBI (Federation of British Industrialists) was established in 1916 to meet the need for a central body of manufacturers through which the government could mobilize industrial production for a full-scale war. By 1964 it represented 50,000 firms. In August 1965 the FBI merged with the NUM (National Union of Manufacturers) and the BEC (British Employers Confederation) to form the CBI (Confederation of British Industrialists).
44 Quoted in Lieber, 1970; 99.
45 In the words of the FBI review:
But faced with the question of whether Britain should come to terms with the six, the economic judgment of many is coloured, or even over-ridden by political considerations. If only for that reason
Similarly, when the Wilson government launched the second EEC application in 1967 it was hardly induced to do so by domestic interest groups. Despite the CBI’s concerted efforts to exert influence via the ‘Industrial Consultative Committee on the approach to Europe’, set up in November 1966, the latter evolved into a forum for one-way briefings by the government rather than two-way consultation (ibid, 1970:269-270). Even if we assume that domestic pressure groups grew in influence when the Conservatives under Heath reactivated the membership application on 30 June 1970, the content of the CBI report published in January 1970, as well as that of the two White Papers produced in 1970 and 1971 by the Labour and the Conservative governments respectively, function as yet another source for scepticism of liberal intergovernmentalist explanations of British preferences on Europe.

Beyond any doubt, the establishment of a common industrial policy with the Six was the government’s best card in selling EEC membership. Between 1953 and 1960, for example, the rate of British industrial production increased by only 21 percent as opposed to Germany’s 62 percent, Italy’s 58, France’s 52, and the Netherlands’ 39 percent (Shanks and Lambert, 1962:25). Similarly, between 1958 and 1967 industrial productivity in the Six rose by 68 percent while in the UK by only 37 percent (HMSO, 1970:30). The tenacious pursuit of British entry must also be set in the context of an almost obsessive citation of averse GNP comparisons from 1960 onwards. As Christopher Lord points out ‘the new Heath Cabinet in 1970 was apparently very much depressed by the league tables which showed other countries growing faster than Britain, especially by a report from Lord Rothschild’s think-tank that Italy would soon overtake Britain’ (1993:16-17). As time went on, the economic

the function of the FBI vis-à-vis the government could hardly be that of a pressure group, using a definite line of policy: it was bound to remain largely confined to those sounding board of opinion and adviser on technical problems (1961:33).

An optimistic approach on the decisive impact of CBI on EEC entry is taken by Rollings, 2003:115-134.

46 The CBI Overseas Committee, in recognition of its lack of formative influence on the Government’s European reorientation, would argue in 1966 that ‘there is no mechanism whereby on a continuing basis ministers and officials of the Board of Trade can be brought face to face with the thinking of leaders of industry on matters of long-term commercial strategy’ (as quoted in Rollings, 2003:27).
argument for the closer integration of British industry with the prosperous European market became increasingly clear.

All the economic arguments for entry, as laid out in great detail in both the CBI report and the 1970 and 1971 White Papers, posited ‘dynamic’ benefits for British industry stemming from opportunities for greater economies of scale, increased specialization, a competitive environment and faster growth. These advantages, nevertheless, were set against the ‘impact’ (or static) effects of membership, which would follow from an immediate application of EEC policies and which were uniquely unfavourable to Britain. It suffices perhaps to mention that Britain after membership would only receive 5 percent and contribute 31 percent to the EEC budget, due to its low agricultural share and its heavy import dependence on non-EC countries which resulted in large CET subsidies (Lord,1993;63 Ludlow,1997a;111). The applicants, in addition, would experience ‘impact’ losses from quitting their preferential trading relationships with the Commonwealth and the EFTA for the more costly produce of the EEC. Last but not least, an increase in food costs would raise the level of wage settlements, augmenting industrial costs and depleting the country’s competitive position. In total, the 1970 White Paper estimated, with notorious vagueness, that the impact cost to the balance of payments would range between 100 and 1100 million pounds; an estimate ‘too wide to afford any basis for judgment’ as the authors would prudently admit (HMSO,1970;43).

In this light, it is no wonder that a month before the release of these fuzzy forecasts, the CBI in its second industrial appraisal of Britain and Europe would acknowledge that:

‘Whereas it is possible to attach a quantitative estimate…to the costs of entry, the major benefits expected by industry from entry are for the most part unquantifiable’ (1970;17).

In reviewing the benefits accruing to British industrialists, the most often cited ‘dynamic’ advantage of membership was the opportunity of selling in a ‘domestic market’ five times as large as the present (HMSO,1971;14). Participation, in turn, in an enlarged European Market undistorted by tariff and non-tariff obstacles, would increase the opportunity for greater economies of scale in production and marketing.

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47 The 1971 White Paper makes a more optimistic estimate presenting only the lower extreme of this range and mentioning a net cost to Britain’s balance of payments of some 100 million in the first year. If the structure of the budget remained unchanged the net balance of payments cost would rise to some 200 million pounds in the fifth year.
affecting the prosperity of large sectors of British industry. Both the CBI and the
White papers, nevertheless, fail to explain exactly how the wider market would
improve Britain’s economic prospects. What is more, to the blurred blessing of the
market size the CBI report adds a vexatious compromise: ‘entry into the EEC will
not necessarily increase the market size and hence the opportunities for economies of
scale in all industries, or at least in the very long term’ (CBI,1970;18).

The operation of British industries in the wider EEC market would further
encourage the development and exploitation of modern industrial technology.
Working together British and Continental firms would ‘grow to the point where
adequate R and D expenditure became profitable and practicable in fields where
today it is not’ (HMSO,1970;33). Enlargement, then, promised an answer to the
question of whether the world could be divided into two centers of technological
development, or just one, the US. British aspirations for prospective European R and
D cooperation and its favourable returns for British industry, nevertheless, lay in the
very long run, and made only a qualitative contribution to the economic argumentaire
of EEC entry. After all, if one compares the R and D expenditure figures of the Six
and the UK, one sees that the latter in 1967 enjoyed an expenditure of over 40
percent of the former, while in unison they would only reach a quarter of the US
figure (CBI,1970;10).

Third, EEC membership would stimulate a higher degree of competition in
British industry, favouring productivity. In the competitive environment of the
enlarged Common Market British industrialists would not only resort to a more
efficient use of resources, thereby increasing output, but, most importantly they
would be able to check the monopoly position of large-scale firms, improving their
competitive position in relation to the Six and the rest of the world. There is a
spurious relationship, nevertheless, between competition and direct benefits accruing
to British industry - as much as the CBI report and the White Papers wished to hide
this under an air of optimism. In the CBI study the authors wisely contend that ‘one
cannot measure the effects of increased competition’ but optimistically conclude that
‘they are undoubtedly positive’ (CBI:1970;18).48

Finally, the correlation between participation in a wider market and an increase
in the rate of investment comes under scrutiny in all three of the aforementioned

48 For similar statements see HMSO,1970;32.
studies. EEC membership is seen as a positive step in favouring inward investment, since uncertainty would be reduced in a large market with no tariff barriers, and harmonization with the EEC tax system would end the discrimination against overseas investors built into the domestic corporation tax system. Between 1957 and 1966 there was a significant acceleration in American investment in the EEC, with a rise from 14.9 to 18.2 percent (CBI, 1970:19). Even though the rate of US investment in Britain remained stable in the same period, moving from 12.9 to 12.4 percent, both the CBI and the 1970 White Paper expressed strong fears of exclusion. If the United Kingdom remained outside the Community there were no guarantees that American investment in the Six would not be further stimulated at the expense of a slow growing British market (HMSO, 1970:32). EEC membership was thus seen as an antidote to potentially enfeebled inward investment in the UK. This constitutes another general rather than a concrete economic argument, contingent on an assumption difficult to prove.

Echoing the fuzzy nature of official reports, the economic arguments put forward by state elites were of a long term structural nature and therefore difficult to substantiate in quantifiable returns for British industry. Harold Wilson, in his speech at the parliamentary press lunch in November 1967, rather vaguely described the benefits to be reaped by domestic industry stating that:

‘none of us can meet the threat to our industrial independence unless we are prepared to work together within a single and wider economic Community, with a powerful technological base, the only foundation for economic and political independence, for a truly European voice in world affairs.’

Similarly, George Brown in his statement to WEU in 1967 would generally describe as urgent requirements

‘An integrated market and continuing progress toward economic union, the removal of national barriers which at present obstruct European industry from reaching its full potential and the consequent development of technological enterprises on a truly Continental scale’.

He would nonetheless admit that ‘we in Britain...do not see the issues only in economic terms. Some of the most decisive considerations for us have been political’ thus shifting the analytical balance of the accession negotiations away from commercial liberalism (Brown, 1967:paragraph 6).

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3.4 Neorealism: The Preeminence of Geopolitical Motivations in Britain’s European Policy

‘We are not feebly surrendering our birthright of sovereignty for a mess of economic pottage; we are trying to regain our political birthright by a means that will allow us our pottage too’

The words of John Pinder (1961:86) are very revealing of the pre-eminence of geopolitical concerns over and above commercial incentives in interpreting British European policy in its earliest stages. Following the historiography of Britain’s approach to European integration, it is hard not to observe a marked preference for neorealist explanations among many authors (George, 1994 Barker, 1971 Camps, 1964 Daddow, 2003). The difficulties encountered in the late fifties by state elites in maintaining the country’s place in the great power club added to the uncertainties surrounding the economic benefits of EEC membership readily justify such a choice in the theoretical treatment of British accession. To begin with, the Suez affair in 1956 was a painful moment of truth revealing Britain’s post-war political and military weaknesses. Britain proved unable to act in defiance of the US and protect, along with France, their vital stakes in the Suez Canal by preventing its nationalization by the Egyptian Colonel Nasser (May, 1999; 27-28 Lambert and Shanks, 1962; 26-27).

America’s preference for Afro-Asian interests over those of her traditional ally in addition to the Commonwealth’s vociferous opposition to the British invasion bitterly exposed the irrelevance of the Churchillian doctrine of the ‘three interlocking cycles’ in the late 1950s. According to the latter Britain stood at the heart of three great power blocks: the Atlantic Alliance with the US, the Commonwealth, and Western Europe. The special relationship with the US was the first of the three spheres of influence for Britain. Leadership of the Commonwealth followed suit, allowing Britain to speak with a louder voice in the international arena than other European states, while involvement in European affairs came last in the priority list of British foreign policy (Frankel, 1975:157-18). The humiliating defeat in the Suez Canal and the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth debacle, in 1961 against British wishes, functioned as a psychological watershed which led to a national reassessment of the ‘European cycle’ as a forum for protecting British interests (Greenwood, 1996:87-88 Northedge; 1983:28). Since Britain could no
longer act as either a privileged US partner or a Commonwealth principal, it could at least try to overcome the flimsiness of its special relationship with the US via EEC accession. The latter scenario was clearly presented to Macmillan during his visit to Washington in April 1961, where he was told by the Kennedy administration that the US-British partnership should now be supplanted by a special relationship between the European Six and the US with Britain acting as a decisive broker (George, 1991:45).

In this light it is no wonder that the Economic Steering Committee, made up of senior civil servants who studied British relations with the Six in 1960, concluded that on political grounds there was a strong argument for joining the Common market, while economic arguments were less important (Camps, 1964:281;293 Barker, 1971:168). In a similar vain, in the official discourse surrounding the 1961 application the political benefits of accession were brought to the fore with a view to counterbalancing the economic costs to be borne in agriculture and in trade relations with the EFTA and the Commonwealth. Macmillan, for example, when announcing the decision of his government to apply for EEC membership in the House of Commons described such a step as primarily political, as well as economic, in nature (1961:paragraph 3). Likewise Edward Heath, the minister responsible for EEC affairs, in a neorealist argumentaire driven by state interest in survival would claim that

'It is a world where political and economic power is becoming concentrated to such a great extent, a larger European Unity has become essential. Faced with the threats we can all see, Europe must unite or perish. The United Kingdom, being part of Europe, must not stand aside.' (1961, paragraph 6)\(^{50}\)

The key political arguments in favour of EEC membership remained virtually unchanged throughout the second EEC application submitted by the Labour government in 1967. As George Brown, the Foreign Secretary, wrote in his memoirs: ‘Britain was destined to become the leader of a new European bloc which would have the same power and influence in the world as the old British Commonwealth had in days gone by’ (1971:209-211). A series of political crises encountered after the failure of the first entry negotiations made the search for increased power in world politics through the ‘European cycle’ only natural. The

\(^{50}\) In the concluding remarks of this statement, after a careful presentation of the problems EEC membership would incur for different sectors of the British economy, Heath resorted once more to a neorealist line of argument, referring explicitly to the Communist threat and the steps European states should take in unison with a view to securing independence in an anarchic international context.
Rhodesian problem, to begin with, shattered Labour’s mythical devotion to the Commonwealth. In Southern Rhodesia the opposition of the colony’s small but powerful white minority to the prospect of black majority rule after independence brought about a rupture in British relations with South Africa. Moreover, the breach in Transatlantic relations caused by Britain’s refusal to send a military contingent to Vietnam pressured Wilson into applying in order to fill the gap left by the decline in the special relationship (Kitzinger, 1973).

Last but not least, for Elizabeth Barker (1971), Wilson’s conversion to Europe was merely a rational attempt to re-establish the country’s leading position in the first two Churchillian circles of foreign policy influence. First, British accession to the EEC would appease Washington by stabilizing the Atlantic Alliance following French withdrawal from NATO in March 1966. Second, by joining the EEC Britain would prevent Commonwealth countries from drifting into the orbit of the EEC, as a result of French opportunism. Hoping to expand their influence beyond the Francophone African states, the French demanded reciprocal trade preferences for Nigeria as a response to the latter’s association bid. This would entail Nigeria discriminating against British exports in favour of the EEC (Alexander, 2003; 196). Therefore, in order to prevent France from achieving disproportionate advances in its relative capabilities Wilson decided to strengthen Britain’s voice on the world stage. Seeking institutionalised ties with the stronger French partners should provide sufficient ‘voice opportunities’ to British actors in the process of deciding how European integration would proceed, thereby preventing domination by ‘the Continentals’ (Grieco, 1995; 34).

Nevertheless, under the Heath administration, which effectively ran the ‘dum stage’ of the accession negotiations, one sees that economic interests ran in parallel to geopolitical concerns under the spell of a disintegrating international economic system. As the entry negotiations progressed, the US suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold and imposed a ten percent surcharge on those imports into the US that were already subject to duties sending shockwaves across the entire capitalist world and the British economy in particular. At the same time Britain’s political partnership with the US was sidelined in view of the Americans’ increasing interest in extricating the country from the Vietnam war and on developing détente with the Soviet Union (George, 1994; 42-46) In such an anarchic environment it is only natural that the Heath administration placed excessive weight on gaining entry
as soon as possible, leaving any differences on economic matters (i.e. the CAP and the EEC budget) to be sorted out latter on. Even though in Heath’s motivational repertoire the economic merit of entry was boosted by due emphasis on expected industrial benefits, the Conservative leader still saw ‘Britain in Europe as being the way back to being a Great Power’. For that reason, Anthony Barber, the new Mr Europe - i.e. the minister responsible for EEC affairs - admitted in his statement at the opening of the accession negotiations that:

‘it is wholly unrealistic to separate the political and economic interests of Europe, because our place in the world and our influence, will be largely determined by the growth of our resources and the pace of our technological development’ (1970;paragraph, 8).

Politics intermingled with economics due to a prevalent feeling that ‘we were becoming increasingly side-tracked and insignificant’, as Sir Con O’Neill, the chief British negotiator claimed (Lord,1993;11). More specifically, as the latter maintained in his memoirs:

‘None of [the Community’s] policies was essential to us; many of them were objectionable… What mattered was to get into the Community and thereby restore or position at the centre of European affairs’ (Hannay,2000;355).

In this light, the fear of exclusion from the powerful EU club, and its impact on Britain’s world status, appear to have been the most often cited source of national interest in the third EEC entry attempt, complementing its uncertain economic payoff.

3.5 SOVEREIGNTY AND IDENTITY: OBSTRUCTING A CONSTRUCTIVIST INTERPRETATION OF BRITISH EUROPEAN POLITICS

There is one thing you British will never understand: an idea. And there is one thing you are supremely good at grasping: a hard fact. We will have to build Europe without you but then you will come in and join us

Jean Monnet

In reviewing the principled beliefs and collective identities that entered into the utility function of British state actors, one does not come across any relevant EU ideas that successfully complemented their prevailing cost-benefit calculations. A thin social constructivist interpretation of this enlargement process in fact constitutes a daunting task for the aspiring analyst. EU specific ideals, complementing the motivational repertoire of state elites, do not function as causes in Britain’s pursuit of membership. Rather, the values and norms evoked throughout the ex-ante and dum

51 as quoted in Kitzinger,1973;19
phases of the negotiations point to nation-specific ideational structures that have stirred, if not fierce opposition, then at least awkwardness towards the country’s European perspective. Value based explanations of British detachment from European norms often let geographical arguments set the pace of the debate. Britain’s peripheral location as an island on the north-west edge of Europe is seen as a factor inducing psychological independence from the Continent. Physical detachment, however, does not sufficiently explain the British cultural bias against European norms. Simply because geographical peripherality has not prevented other member states, like Greece, from espousing the EU liberal democratic value repertoire in the course of membership (Geddes, 2004:23-24).

A more promising interpretation of Britain’s ideational detachment emphasises historical experience and traditions that inculcate certain types of collective social identity, and set it apart from the ideas that inspired European integration. Will Huttton (1995) in his influential book ‘The State We’re In’ succinctly summarizes British historical exceptionalism:

The British are accustomed to success. This is the world’s oldest democracy. Britain built an empire, launched the Industrial Revolution and was on the winning side in the twentieth century’s two world wars. The British believe that their civilization is admired all over the world… To be born in these islands is still seen as a privilege’

On the basis of such a historical record Britain enjoys a heightened sense of national identity and pride, which is acculturated into succeeding generations of political elites and the general public, fostering an antipathy toward any form of integration with others (Wallace, 1986). The persistent invocation of the imperial past in politics, along with relentless efforts to preserve ties with the Commonwealth after the Second World War contributed much to this national myopia. In fact, Britain’s image as a ‘world island’ - committed to maintaining world order - made it a sceptical participant in any foreign policy plans for regional cooperation. It was feared that such integrationist designs would undermine the country’s ties with traditional partners outside Europe (Gillespie, 1996; 79 Diez Medrano, 2003; 216-217). The persistent references to Commonwealth affairs in three important statements by Edward Heath throughout the first membership bid, make plain Britain’s continuing belief in imperial hegemony. Before the House of Commons he would describe the Commonwealth as ‘a great source of stability and strength both to Western Europe and to the world as a whole’. Even in his speech before the EEC council, which was
designed for European ears, he expressed a firm belief in reconciling accession to the EEC with membership of the Commonwealth. Similarly, in his statement to the WEU Council, Heath went out of his way to make it clear that he saw no conflict between British participation in a political union and the Commonwealth connection:

‘We shall of course retain our constitutional ties ... with the Commonwealth... They will in no way prevent us from participating fully in the growth of a new Europe, and this in its turn will give fresh vitality to our Commonwealth connections’ (1962:88).

British illusions of grandeur were further encouraged by their 1945 successful resistance to Nazi invasion. The war had had a profound effect on national power and influence, transforming Britain from the world’s greatest creditor to its greatest debtor. Even so, the euphoria of military triumph rendered state actors less inclined to embrace continental Europe. Integration was dismissed as an inferior plot of the defeated (Sanders, 1990:72). In addition, the special relationship with the United States, Britain’s closest ally and great comrade in arms, thickened the ‘fog in the Channel’. Under the illusion that the Americans regarded them as equal partners in the Cold War, British elites and the wider public preferred to think of an international unity of the English-speaking peoples, dismissing plans for European political integration (Wallace, 1992 George, 1994). Mr. Heath, in his statement to the WEU Council on 10th April 1962, for example, made it clear that an eventual European political union should stand ‘shoulder to shoulder with the United States’. He further indicated that for the British, European political cooperation should focus on defence. European defence arrangements should, nevertheless, take place within an Atlantic context:

‘We must make clear beyond all doubt that the object of our common policy is to defend and strengthen the liberties for which the Atlantic Alliance is an indispensable shield’ (1962:87).

Besides psychological attachment to the US and the Commonwealth, British constitutional democracy was yet another source of cultural disengagement from EU political values and norms. As Young (1993:168) points out, Britain’s evolutionary unwritten constitution did not fit well with European integration. Given that elements from the Constitution dated from the Magna Carta of 1215, and political institutions had remained essentially unchanged since the Civil War in the mid seventeenth century, Britain could easily take pride in being the world’s oldest and most stable democracy. It was therefore no wonder that EEC membership was approached with
serious apprehension on the grounds that the biggest member states lacked the background of political stability Britain had enjoyed.

In addition, the reforms of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 had pushed forward a liberalising process that placed a large emphasis on parliamentary sovereignty. Parliamentary sovereignty, nevertheless, did not fit well with the doctrine of supremacy of the European law. In the absence of a constitutional court, the prospect of UK legislation being struck down by a higher body was a new and unwelcome experience (Lindsay, 1962; 278 George, 1992; 98-100). The Continental countries, unlike Britain, were more accustomed to EEC political intervention since the Community had assisted in their post-war political change, acting as an external source of legitimacy (Aspinwall, 2004; 10). Not having experienced a political break of this sort, Britain appeared naturally more reluctant to part with her democratic control over domestic decisions. Respecting such apprehension over the prospect of surrendering sovereignty, Edward Heath in his WEU speech of 10th April 1962 stated that:

‘As members of the Community we will, I am sure, want to see the European Parliament playing an important part. But it is not easy for us to commit ourselves, at this stage and before we have participated in the work of the Assembly, as to what that part should be or as to how it should be accomplished’ (1962; 90).

Even in the dumb stage of the accession negotiations, the Government White Paper on EEC membership (HMSO, 1971) would play it safe, remaining elusive on the impact of membership on British sovereignty. Although the supremacy of EEC law had already been established in the 1963 supremacy ruling and the 1969 direct effect rulings of the ECJ, the Paper stated that: ‘there is no question of any erosion of essential national sovereignty; what is proposed is a sharing and an enlargement of individual national sovereignties in the general interest’ (1971; 8). More specifically, the White Paper shifted attention away from parliamentary to national sovereignty. The latter was still a sensitive issue since within the UK there were nations other than England making claims for the exercise of separate sovereignty (Milward, 2002; 442).

On the basis of the preceding arguments it would be fair to claim that for the UK the EU functioned more as an awkward partner in terms of cultural beliefs and political values, rather than as a compelling force of inspiration that would help the country reinvigorate its long-standing democratic institutions and practices. In this
light, arguments of ideational allegiance to the European cause had, if any, a marginal role in state elite motivations for pursuing membership.

**SUPPLY SIDE MOTIVATIONS FOR GRANTING EEC MEMBERSHIP TO BRITAIN**

**3.6 THE 1963 AND 1967 FRENCH VETOES: GEOPOLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL RESERVATIONS PREVAIL OVER COMMERCIAL INTERESTS**

Having testified the relevance of a rationalist template in explaining the demand side of British enlargement politics, attention will now be shifted to the supply side. The reaction of the hosting organization is particularly relevant in a thorough analysis of any single case of EU widening. This is so because the attitudes of applicant state elites to integration are to a large extent determined by the reactions of EU actors to their membership bid. In the British case, the Utility Maximizing perspective provides an indisputable theoretical basis for looking at the EU incumbents’ stance.

In explaining how and why the EU door finally opened to the UK in 1973, a welfare-based interpretation does at first seem warranted. However, EU actors’ interest in reaping the benefits stemming from the admission of a prosperous candidate became apparent only gradually. More specifically, the realization that enlargement was a cost efficient means for EU member states grew as the geopolitical and ideational concerns of the 1960s withered away (Trachtenberg, 2000 Milward, 2000 Gillinham, 2000). The moment the supply side understood that the UK’s accession would not dilute the EEC via the mortal sin of Atlanticism, economic welfare came to be appreciated as an important source of power. The latter would help the Community to improve its position in the international arena vis-à-vis competitor states. Hence, EU actors’ considerations of economic prosperity do not challenge the neorealist interpretation of the British accession negotiations.

In reviewing both the content of and the context surrounding the two successive French vetoes in 1963 and 1967 neorealism and constructivism work in unison in justifying De Gaulle’s resistance to British entry. The General’s overall geopolitical design for France and the EEC did not coincide either with the broader British vision of Europe or with the concrete strategic plans state actors would pursue on the road to EEC membership. In building de Gaulle’s image via secondary historical analysis and primary sources (speeches and letters), it is not hard to identify the General’s ambition to create a ‘European Europe’, i.e. a political entity independent of the US. Britain’s devotion to the transatlantic partnership as
manifested in the Anglo-American nuclear arrangement at Nassau in December 1962 would openly defy such French geopolitical goals.\(^{52}\) In this light it is no wonder that almost a month before the ‘grand veto’ the General would confide in Peyrefitte that:

‘if the British do not have the same scruples—that the French have against depending on US nuclear weapons—that is a sign they are not yet suited to enter Europe’ (Peyrefitte, 1994: 336).

Repeating such fears of imposing American hegemony on Europe via British membership, de Gaulle stated in a press conference of 14\(^{th}\) January 1963 that:

‘it is foreseeable that…in the end there would appear a colossal Atlantic Community under American dependence and leadership, which would completely swallow up the European Community’. ‘This’ he said underlying his Europeanist vocation, ‘is not at all what France wanted to do and what France is doing, which is a strictly European construction’ (1963: 99).

Giving his unilateral, negative judgment on the outcome of the Brussels negotiations, de Gaulle did not sideline economic considerations. However, admitting that the General remained hostile, partly on economic grounds, to having Britain in the EEC falls short of proving the relevance of commercial liberalism in reflecting the French state of thinking regarding British accession. A close contextual analysis of de Gaulle’s notorious press conference of 14\(^{th}\) January 1963\(^{54}\) does not constitute concrete evidence for a commercial motivation outweighing geopolitical and ideational concerns, as Moravcsik would have us believe according to his revolutionary article that became the object of pungent historical commentary in 2000. British membership, the General argued, raised problems of ‘a very great dimension’ primarily because Europe was different both in economic structure and ideology from the ‘insular, maritime,…essentially industrial and commercial and only slightly agricultural’ Britain. The economic reservations put forward by de Gaulle, nevertheless, had wider geopolitical and ideational ramifications, boiling down to Britain’s disputable commitment to the European cause and its negative implications for Community’s standing and influence in the international arena. The question at issue in other words was whether:

\(^{52}\) Sir Edward Heath told Christopher Lamb that his firm view was that de Gaulle was intensely annoyed at the Nassau Agreement, and the patronizing way in which Kennedy and Macmillan offered France a share in a NATO nuclear deterrent subject to strong American conditions (Lamb, 1995: 193).

\(^{53}\) For similar references to de Gaulle’s conviction that the British would promote American interests and purposes see his press conference of 15\(^{th}\) May 1962 (in Kitzinger, 1973). There he expresses his fear that in the aftermath of British accession the plans of those advocating a supranational Europe would be distorted, because an integrated Europe would emerge along supranational lines, having a federator, but the federator would not be European.

\(^{54}\) For a reproduction of the entire text see Kitzinger, 1973.
‘Great Britain can at present place itself, with the Continent and like it, within a
tariff that is truly common, give up all preference with regard to the
Commonwealth, cease to claim that its agriculture be privileged and, even more,
consider as null and void the commitments it has made with the countries that are
part of its free trade area’ (1963;99).

The political implications of British entry into the Common Market were closely
bound to the genuine economic differences between the applicant and the Continent,
as raised by de Gaulle. Moravcsik insists that the opposite is true. Presenting the
General’s statements at confidential meetings prior to 1963 corroborates the
commercial focus of his press conference (2000;12-16). However, a careful reading
of the statements made by Heath, the leader of the British delegation, in the
aftermath of de Gaulle’s cannonade leaves no doubt as to the manifested willingness
of the applicants to search for compromises on all the major economic questions
raised by the General. In a speech delivered in Brussels on 29 January 1963 at a
ministerial meeting between the Six and the UK, the Lord Privy Seal strongly
repudiated the validity of the economic reservations expressed by the French.
Summarizing the appreciable British concessions, Heath first referred to the
acceptance of the Common external tariff as early as 1961, and the request for
changes in the tariff level for only 26 items of the 2,500 the agreement contained.
Next, with regards to the Commonwealth, Heath said that the government had
proved itself ready to phase out its preferences in respect of processed foods,
temperate foodstuffs and manufactured goods, accepting the discipline of the
Community. Finally, he sternly denied having sought a privileged position for
domestic agriculture, a point proved by British lenience over transitional
arrangements. The British actors had in fact accepted that the transitional period
should end at the end of 1969, succumbing to the original plans of the Six
(Lamb,1995;186).

The adaptability of the British delegation to the economic exigencies of the
negotiations is further attested to by the Commission president, Walter Hallstein. The
latter, assessing the accession bargain before the European Parliament on 5th
February 1963, admitted that ‘in the last few days of the negotiations it could be
noticed that the British delegation was preparing to reduce its demands’. And after a
detailed presentation of the concessions, he optimistically concluded that ‘there was
a reasonable chance for reaching an agreement’ (Hallstein,1963;127,128). His
prediction coincided with the appraisal of the negotiations carried out by the other
member governments. All five heads of state in their concluding statements regarding the failed British membership bid would marvel at the evocation of insuperable economic obstacles by the French, and go on to presume that the reasons behind the veto were of a political nature. All in all, the way in which Edgar Pisany, de Gaulle’s agriculture Minister, explained the 1963 veto to his British counterpart, Christopher Soames, leaves no doubt as to the relevance of power politics over economics, which were used merely as a pretext:

My friend it’s very simple, now with the six there are five hens and a cock. If you join [with other countries] there will be perhaps seven or eight hens but with two cocks. So it won’t be as pleasant’ (as quoted in Macmillan,1973;365)

In 1967 Britain’s dire economic straits reinvigorated French reservations over the economic and financial unpreparedness of the applicant. On the plea of the devaluation of the Pound Sterling, General de Gaulle again applied an unambiguous veto against British membership at his press conference of 27th November 1967. Using the Commission’s Opinion of 29th September 1967 as a reference guide, he insisted on the incompatibility between the Common Market and the British style of economic management. To the usual suspects of economic and ideational rapprochement, i.e. the British system of agricultural support and its links to the Commonwealth, the General now added pure financial reservations such as the chronic deficit in the balance of payments, the restrictions Britain had imposed on the movement of capital, and the fragility of the Pound Sterling, which was seriously aggravated by the enormous external debts weighing on it. The closing paragraph of his statement, nevertheless, is indicative of the geopolitical connotations of his economic misgivings about British membership.

‘This [i.e. British entry] would in no way be a course that could lead to a building of Europe by itself and for itself, so as not to be under the dependence of an alien economic, monetary and political system. In order that Europe may counterbalance the immense power of the United States, it must not weaken, but, on the contrary, tighten the bonds and rules of the Community’ (Kitzinger,1968;316).  

Preparing the ground for the General’s veto, Wormser, the French director of Economic and Financial affairs, had warned the government in June 1966 of the

55 The texts of speeches delivered by the Five at the seventeenth Ministerial meeting of the Six and the UK in Brussels on 29th January 1963 can be found in Mally, 1966;101-118.
56 The original text of the press conference can be found in the Pathé Journal, 27th November 1967, Pathé Archives Saint-Quen. For its retranscription see the Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe http://www.cvce.lu/mce.cfm.
debilitating effect British membership could have on French political stature in the Community. In the aftermath of the NATO crisis the fear of French isolation from its European allies loomed large. For Wormser the opening of new accession negotiations with the UK would risk further alienating the country from the Five undermining its so far indisputable political leadership in the Community. As to the reaction of the government his conclusion was firm and unequivocal:

‘A Community enlarged by the addition of Great Britain and its friends will necessarily be subject to centrifugal forces and liable to dissolution for political as well as economic reasons. This dissolution will take the form of an expanding Free trade area, something which, rightly or wrongly, we have until now opposed. The Government, if it accepts Britain into the Common Market, should have no illusions on this evolution’ (as quoted in Adamthwaite, 2003:161)

Last but not least, the strong reaction of the Five to President de Gaulle’s second torpedoing of British accession is indicative of their dismissal of the economic concerns the General had used as a pretext. In the communiqué the EEC Council issued on 19th December 1967 one reads the following

‘All the member states were of the opinion that the restoration of Great Britain’s economic and monetary situation is of fundamental importance to the question of its accession. Several member states, while fully in favour of re-establishing Great Britain’s economic equilibrium, do not think that the British economy must necessarily be completely re-established at the moment of accession (Nickolson and East, 1987:56).


French intransigence over the desirability and feasibility of British entry into the Community was decisively circumscribed in the late 1960s. Even before the resignation of the General in 1969, historical sources taking stock of the celebrated ‘Soames Affair’ present it as a significant turning point in French geopolitical priorities (Kitzinger, 1973:45-58 Haines, 1977:74-81 Young, 1996:265). On 4th February 1969, de Gaulle, in an impressive foreign policy shift proposed to the new British Ambassador in Paris, Christopher Soames, exploratory Franco-British talks on the possibility of constructing a European free trade area with an inner political association comprised by France, Britain, West Germany and Italy.57 French willingness to engage in bilateral talks with Britain formed part of de Gaulle’s

57 For an authoritative presentation of the French point of view over the Soames Affair, see, Couve de Murville, 1971:427-428.
A detailed account of British reservations over the Soames Affair can be found in: Wilson, 1971; 610-613 and in Heath, 1998:359-360.
growing realization that his principle of national self-determination and his policy of indifference toward the two major power blocks were no longer appropriate. The USA’s attempt to make peace in Vietnam in 1968 under President Johnson, involving the National Liberal Front as a broker, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet tanks on 20-21st August of the same year, were the major international events triggering such a crucial turnaround in French attitudes towards the Anglo-Saxons. In the domestic sphere the currency instability experienced in November 1968, and the German refusal to revalue the Deutschmark leaving the franc under severe pressure, further encouraged an ‘entente cordiale’ between France and Britain with a view to balancing growing German power (Castigliola, 1992; 162-163).

The gradual change in French attitudes to EEC enlargement following the election of President Pompidou and the formation of a new government in June 1969 paved the way for the resumption of contacts between the EEC and the applicant. The Hague Summit of 8th December 1969 instructed its permanent officials to start drawing up a common negotiating position for the six member states on a number of issues, predominantly economic in nature: a) adaptation to an enlarged Community of the agreements on financing the CAP; b) the Commonwealth countries’ special arrangements with Britain; c) the effects of British membership on Euratom and the ECSC; d) measures to be taken throughout the transition period and the length of this period; e) the effect of enlargement on Community institutions; and f) the economic and financial aspects of enlargement including the question of Britain’s balance of payments and Sterling balances (Nickolson and East, 1987; 61-62). In the ensuing communiqué the relevance of enlargement for the Community’s economic prosperity was established beyond any doubt:

‘The entry of other countries of this continent to the Communities - in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties of Rome - would undoubtedly help the Communities to grow to dimensions more in conformity with the present state of world economy and technology’. 59

The Commission’s Opinion submitted to the Council of Ministers two months earlier, i.e. on 2nd October 1969, had been instrumental in redirecting the negotiators’

58 At the end of October 1968 all bombing stopped and the National Liberation Front was accepted as a partner in the peace talks (Kitzinger, 1973; 42).

59 For a reproduction of the original text see Hannay, 2000; 421
attention away from purely geopolitical concerns towards economic factors. In the introduction one reads that:

‘As regards objectives, the enlargement of the Common market to include countries whose level of development is comparable to that of the six would have the further effect of creating a large economic entity which…should permit a more rapid improvement in living standards’ (Commission, 1969; 10).

In fact, before laying down the concrete economic advantages as well as the challenges facing an enlarged Community, the Commission took care to pre-empt any new Anglo-French geopolitical clashes, insisting that the candidates should accept in their entirety the Treaties and the decisions that had been taken since the Treaties came into force. Besides formal commitment to the Community rules Britain would also have to remove any conditions challenging the ‘acquis’ and the prosperity of the Six. These included fundamental uncompetitiveness and the international role of Sterling as a reserve currency, which threatened to destabilize the economies of the Six and make it difficult for Britain to implement its EEC obligations. Insisting therefore not only that a ‘European Europe’ should prevail, but most importantly an economically viable Community, the Commission expressed support for British entry, arguing that ‘negotiations should open as soon as possible’ (ibid; 44).

By the time the negotiations were formally opened on 30th June 1970, the Six had already reached an agreement not only on the CAP but most importantly on the Community budget. Under this system the UK would inevitably be a net contributor; a fact that whetted the appetite of its future partners (Heath, 1998; 364). The Belgians and the Luxembourgers, for example, effectively supported the French, in May 1971, in pressuring the British to make a full contribution to the budget. The Germans too supported enlargement as they would enjoy a substantive decrease in their share of Community financing apart from the tangible advantages accruing to German industry from the opening of the British and Scandinavian markets. The Dutch and the Italians, finally, were staunchly in favour of British entry due both to its favourable economic impact and the opportunities it opened up for political realignment within the Community, bypassing Franco-German hegemony (Kitzinger, 1973; 85). It was no wonder that the Belgian President of the Council, Pierre Harmel, in his statement at the opening of the accession negotiations would openly admit that:
‘We believe, Ladies and Gentlemen, that our European aims coincide with yours; they are concerned with, although at once going beyond, the economic progress which our governments expect from the enlargement of the Communities’.  

That is not to argue that all previous geopolitical preoccupations vanished into thin air in view of the substantial economic advantages awaiting the incumbents. They still played a part in the British accession story, obliging Heath to arrange an Anglo-French summit on 20 and 21st May 1971 so as to break any possible political deadlock. The communiqué following this meeting is indicative of the appeasement of age-old French geopolitical worries:

‘Many people believed that Great Britain was not and did not wish to become European, and that Britain wanted to enter the Community only so as to destroy it or to divert it from its objectives: Many people also thought that France was ready to use every pretext to place in the end a fresh veto on Britain’s entry. Well, ladies and gentlemen, you see before you tonight two men who are convinced of the contrary’ (Heath, 1998;372).

Overcoming such fears opened the door to resolving the remaining economic differences between Britain and the Six. On 23rd June 1971, Rippon, Britain’s last Mr. Europe, finalized the arrangements for British entry. The entry terms involved some EEC concessions on Commonwealth trade such as measures to protect New Zealand dairy produce for several years. The balance of concessions nevertheless tilted more heavily in the incumbents’ favour. Most critical of all was the financial settlement, which caused serious worries as to whether the dynamic gains of membership would be able to offset the direct costs. Much to the Treasury’s dismay Britain’s contribution would rise gradually from 9 percent of total EEC contributions on entry to about 19 percent by 1977 (Young,1996;273). On the basis of such a discussion it becomes apparent that incumbents’ resistance to British accession had been successfully circumscribed in the event of diluted geopolitical concerns over admitting an American Trojan horse into the Community. Only then did the economic advantages of having the UK in the Club become all the more apparent, proving that economic motivations formed only a small part of a greater power struggle. At the same time British willingness to swallow the bitter pill of offering ever greater economic concessions to the Six points in the same direction, diverting our interest from welfare based arguments. Even so, the analytical contribution of

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60 For a reproduction of the entire speech see Hannay, 2000; 426-427.
61 For a reproduction of the entire communiqué in French see Hannay, 2000;437-438.
neorealism in this case study enables us to place the UK within the camp of Utility Maximizing entrants.
CHAPTER 4
AUSTRIA
A SUITOR EXPERIENCED IN COURTING THE COMMON MARKET

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Evidence on the behaviour of incumbent governmental elites throughout the Austrian accession negotiations point to a liberal intergovernmentalist interpretation of the EEC membership initiative. First and foremost, the ‘bottom up’ view of domestic politics is verified as the interests articulated by leading economic agents promulgate Utility Maximizing state action (Moravcsik, 1997). Second, changes in the structure of the global economy following the creation of the Single European Market project in 1992 altered the costs and benefits of transnational economic exchange, putting pressure on the Austrian government to treat EU membership as a priority item in its foreign policy agenda. Neorealist interpretations occupy a secondary role in explaining the pursuit of membership. Even though security concerns over the maintenance of their neutral status arose in the first steps towards European integration, these significantly faded in the ‘dum stage’ of the accession negotiations, as the Cold War threat receded. Last but not least, EU liberal democratic ideals resonate well with the value repertoire of Austrian state actors, who regained full sovereignty only in 1955 after the forced annexation by the German Reich in 1938, and the ensuing ‘friendly’ but opportunist occupation by the allied powers. However, in overall terms, the Europeanisation of the neutral Austrian identity is a contested matter (Gehler, 2004; 142). Moreover, in interaction with the supply side of European integration, emphasis was placed on establishing intensive economic links rather than the special resonance of EU liberal democratic factors. In this light, empirical evidence confirms the poverty of a constructivist perspective in accounting for the Austrian conversion to Europe, substantiating instead the relevance of a rationalist template.

62 For the translation of Austrian documents from edited and unedited archival sources I am indebted to Thomas Paster, Christine Reh, Andrea Herrmann, Georgia Mavrodi and Afrodite Smagadi.
DEMAND SIDE MOTIVATIONS FOR SEEKING ACCESSION

4.2 AUSTRIAN AGRICULTURE AND THE CAP: EQUAL BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS

Austria’s early steps towards European integration mark the awakening of state elites to the exigencies of growing commercial interdependence among the European nations. The Europeanisation of the Austrian agricultural sector, nevertheless, was not a straightforward objective despite intense agricultural trade links between the applicant and incumbents. It suffices to mention that in 1989 the EU accounted for 65.4 percent of Austrian exports, and 51.7 percent of imports in agricultural and food products (Commission, 1992; table 10). Even so, there were oscillations in the pro-membership stance of Austrian farmers who were eager to reap the benefits of trade liberalization but reluctant to renounce the profits they made from protectionist national policies. In the early 1960s the farmers’ association urged closer contacts with the EEC in an attempt to counterbalance expected losses from the exclusion of agricultural trade from the EFTA and the 1972 free trade agreement. In the mid 1980s, nevertheless, a marked shift occurred in their pro-integrationist attitude, since agricultural prices in the EEC did not rise as fast as those in Austria (Luif, 1991; 130). In overall terms, the guarded posture of the farming community did not prevent it from joining the rest of the social partners in a joint declaration supporting the Austrian application.

The protectionist tendency in domestic agriculture that fostered farmers’ partial apprehension of EEC membership makes sense if one considers its special structural characteristics. In Austria cultivated land accounts for 13.2 hectares and is divided into small and middle sized farms. A high proportion of farming activity was sensitive to special climatic conditions, and a strong emphasis was placed on promoting ecological interests. In addition, agriculture employed 8 percent of the active labour force rendering farmers a non-negligible electoral group (Sardelis, 1993; 2 Pedersen, 1994; 192). In this light it is no wonder that a high degree of protection for domestic production had been established by means of export subsidies and import restrictions, and relatively high levels of financial support for social, regional, ecological and other similar agricultural functions.

63 Abbreviations in the notes HAEU: Historical Archives of the European Union: Florence. ;
GJLA: Deposit of Graham J.L. Avery ; EG Deposit of Emanuele Gazzo.
64 See Sozialpartnerstellungnahme, 1989; 11.
65 All statistical figures presented are valid for the early 1990s.
Owing to this ‘eco-social’ agricultural policy Austria had had some of the highest agricultural prices in Europe, approximately 10 to 40 percent more expensive than corresponding EU products (Commission,1992;12).

Despite marked similarities between the Austrian system of price support and the CAP, Austria’s adaptation to the Community’s agricultural policy would pose considerable difficulties. Agricultural prices would inevitably drop as domestic farm subsidies fell to the levels prescribed by the CAP. In addition, the opening of the Austrian market to EC competitors would result in a slower pace of Austrian export prices by 5 percentage points (Breuss,2005;32) . Exposure to internal market competition and to the marketing expertise of EU partners would also increase imports from the Community leading to a loss of domestic market share of up to 50 percent, as the Austrian position paper on agriculture openly admitted (1993;3).66

In view of these hard pressing problems, the government’s ambitious negotiating position on agriculture was warranted. The points raised by Chancellor Vranitzky and Foreign minister Mock in a joint report to the Cabinet of 21st January 1993, and later on by Austrian negotiators in the position paper on agriculture relate to the detailed sectoral requirements of the farming community over-represented at all political levels, but particularly so at state level (Rothacher,1993;4 Beiler,2000;92).67 Special emphasis was given to financial compensatory aid from the Community to cope with the estimated AS 8 billion (ECU 600 million) annual revenue losses to Austria’s farmers.68 Although the ÖVP chairman, Alois Mock, had in October 1988 already offered a generous compensation package from public funds, the Austrian delegation insisted on receiving EU restructuring aid amounting to AS 60,000 (ECU 4,200) per farm on average. In addition, a seven year transition period was requested for the agricultural sector to adapt to EU regulations, as well as sufficient national production quotas for milk and sugar, echoing the demands of Schwarzböck, Chairman of the Presidents’ Conference of Agricultural Chambers. Last but not least, Austria insisted on safeguarding its support system for hill and mountain farming, which was more socially oriented than the Community’s (Rothacher,1993;2-3).

68 The Bauernbund forming one of the major three federations that make up the ÖVP, which rendered the party prone to yielding to farm lobby’s negotiation requests.
This national strategy of inflated requests on agriculture owed much to the skilful pressure exercised by the political leadership of the Austrian farm lobby. Against the background of social restructuring and Austria’s bleak economic situation, the latter had realized that the opening of the sheltered agricultural sector was the only way forward and that EU membership was the only way of bringing this about. After all, the GATT Uruguay Round would lead to further free trade, undermining the sheltered farming sector anyway. In fact, limited price support as provided under the CAP was an exercise Austrian farmers would in any case have had to go through in order to conform with the results of the Uruguay Round, just as Switzerland was forced to restructure its agriculture despite its decision against closer ties with the EU (Beiler, 2000;62 Kaiser, 2001;21). Furthermore, Austrian farmers would have to accept the EU guidelines if they wanted to export to the Union. Membership would comfortably guarantee the right of co-decision in drawing up such guidelines. And the EU market constituted an attractive trading partner for the domestic farming community, not least because of Austria’s geographical position. In early 1988 Josef Riegler, the Minister for agriculture, had stressed that Austria’s huge trade deficit in agricultural products could only be reduced through EC membership. Until then, the most promising markets, southern Germany and northern Italy would remain completely inaccessible for Austrian products (Luif, 1991;130). In light of these considerations, the farm lobby’s participation along with the rest of the social partners, in the Working Group for European integration created by the government in 1987 makes perfect sense (Luif, 1995,118). Despite, expected integration losses Austrian farmers and their leadership could not turn a blind eye to EC membership as the latter would enable full participation in the internal market. Hence, the ‘bottom up’ pressure from the agricultural community became stronger in 1989 in the social partners’ joint declaration advocating EC membership, and finally left a decisive imprint on the stubborn negotiating stance of Austrian state actors who would stress that ‘the respect of the specific requirements of our agriculture will be an essential Austrian concern during the negotiations’ (Mock, 1993:5).69

Before concluding it should also be pointed out that besides catering for the interests of the farming community Austrian elites also pursued participation in the

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69 HAEU, GJLA 000112, Mock, A. Declaration at the Opening of Accession Negotiations, 1.02. 1993.
Common Market in view of the substantial benefits it would secure for consumers. EC membership would help Austrians overcome years of protection from foreign competition and a highly managed and internally regulated market that put the interests of producers ahead of those of the consumers. The latter, who exclusively bore the burden of higher subsidies to the farmers, would now be relieved (Kaiser, 1997; 139). As Wolfgang Pollan, an inflation specialist at the Austrian institute for Economic Research estimated, producer prices would fall by 30 to 40 percent—provided of course that retailers would pass on price reductions to the consumer (Engelmann, 1995). Such a drop in agricultural prices should in turn push Austrian consumer price inflation to lower levels, rendering participation in the CAP instrumental for the wider public.

All in all, the opportunities for economic gain presented by an Austrian conversion to the EU system of agricultural support and, most importantly, the imminent fear of commercial exclusion from the wider European market, did much to reorient state actors’ interests away from the protectionist policies of the past and towards the competitive challenge of membership. In this endeavour the farming community did not become an unequivocal supporter of accession. Any resistance, nevertheless, was successfully subsumed under the integrationist vision of the farmers’ political leadership. Herewith, the Utility Maximizing Austrian government functioned as a critical ‘transmission belt’ via which the preferences and social power of the farming group were translated into state policy.

4.3 AUSTRIAN INDUSTRY IN THE COMMON MARKET

In reviewing the attitude of the Austrian government to the prospect of participation in European integration as far back as the 1950s another significant explanatory factor needs to be taken into account: the preferences of Austrian business associations. The interests of particular societal actors are analytically central to understanding the country’s path to Europe, not least because industry accounted for 27 percent of Austrian GDP. Domestic and transnationally oriented business organizations had had different expectations of membership at different points in time, and it was basically their power in structural terms that would determine

Austria’s European politics (Angerer, 1998;41-46 Gehler, 2002;194). More specifically, the Austrian opening to the ECSC in 1956 owes much to the pro-integrationist stance of the ÖVP, the Christian Democratic Party in the coalition government with the Social democrats (ÖSP) that had long ruled the country. The latter represented the interests of internationally oriented private industry which stood to gain from enhanced competition in a free market economy. In the mid-1950s, nevertheless, the structural power of private capital like VÖI, i.e. the Federation of Austrian Industrialists, was marginal (Beiler, 2000;48-49). The preferences of Austria’s nationalized industries carried greater weight in domestic politics, as they accounted for about three quarters of total industrial capacity. Thereby, it was only natural that the cautious stance of the SPÖ on early European integration prevailed in inter-party politics, given its electoral dependence on public industry (Katzenstein, 1975;185-188 Angerer, 2002;36).

Sectoral integration in coal and steel among the Six was bearable for Austria despite its dependence on German coal supplies and its need for outlets for Austrian steel. However, when the treaty of Rome provided for the abolition of all internal tariffs and the introduction of a common external tariff among the EEC partners, the potential adverse consequences on Austrian trade with the Six seemed serious (Gehler and Kaiser, 2002;304-305). This is why the Austrian government welcomed with relief the British initiative for the creation of an EFTA that promised to avoid competitive disadvantages for the Austrian export industry in a common market of the Six. The EFTA was an ‘alliance for the self-protection of the outer Seven’ (Urlesberger, 1990;33). More specifically, the EFTA was an answer to the fears of private, export oriented business in Austria, that maintained strong links with the ÖVP but lacked the sectoral power of the national industrialists that would have enabled it to push for membership (Gehler and Kaiser, 1997;88). Up until 1989, the Association of Austrian Industrialists could neither effectively counteract strong sectoral opposition from nationalized industry, nor ignore the security threat of a potential Soviet Union veto (Gehler, 2004;135). As they formed the electoral backbone of the ÖVP, however, the VÖI was essentially behind the party’s opening

72 The new status quo, for example, threatened to disrupt Austria’s intense trade links with Germany as the former would no longer enjoy low tariffs in view of the substantially higher common external EEC tariff against third countries.
to European integration both in the form of EFTA participation and the establishment of a bilateral free trade agreement with the EEC in 1972. Translating the preferences of export oriented industrialists into state policy, the ÖVP Trade Minister, Fritz Bock, managed to have enshrined in the Preamble of the EFTA treaty that the latter would provide a bridge to the EEC and a wider economic solution acceptable to all sides. Later on (from 1963 to 1969), it was this same ÖVP Minister to fully support the policy of ‘going-it-alone’ in order to achieve a bilateral agreement with the EEC despite SPÖ reservations (Gehler and Kaiser, 2002;307 Luif,1992;69). The 1972 free trade agreement finally produced the much expected favourable return for Austrian trade, increasing exports to the EC. The aforementioned treaty satisfied the VÖI without posing major problems for powerful nationalized industries, while maintaining the country’s neutral status. In this light the ‘ex-ante’ phase of Austrian stepwise association with the EEC mirrors the salience of dominant interest associations in shaping the government’s attitude to Europe.

On the basis of the aforementioned discussion the doubts expressed by the historian Thomas Angerer over a one sided neorealist interpretation of the ex-ante phase of Austrian enlargement, seems warranted. Austria distanced itself from supranational integration partly because it could not participate as a result of security concerns. However, it is equally true that the Austrian government did not wish to do so either, responding to the competitive sectoral demands of domestic interest groups (1998;50). Only in the late 1980s did the Federation of Austrian Industrialists manage to intensify the debate over EEC membership, making skilful use of both internal crises and external changes. In the external domain, the completion of the common market and the implementation of the SEA challenged Austria’s preference for mere association. (Angerer,2002;41) In the domestic arena, Austria’s state owned industries were on the brink of bankruptcy. Despite governmental intervention, the public industrial sector began to dismiss workers on a massive scale. Austria’s small domestic market, its peripheral geographic location, and numerous barriers to capital imports provided few incentives to foreign investors, compounding the structural problems of nationalized industry.73 Social partnership and the paternalism of the governing parties had run out of luck and economic modernization seemed urgent

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73 Structural weaknesses are seen in low R and D investment and in a certain neglect of marketing mostly encountered in small scale family owned business that target the domestic market see HAEU, GJLA-000109, Rothacher, A. ‘Austria : Economic Report’, 8.07.1993.
Such internal challenges became a stimulus for privatisation rendering the VÖI - the organization representing the interests of private capital - a more powerful actor in structural terms.

Making full use of its increased weight in domestic politics the VÖI published a statement on 14 May 1987 asking the government to do ‘everything possible for Austria to become a full member of the EU as soon as possible’ (VÖI,1987a;42). Only membership would guarantee participation, including co-decision making power, in the dynamic integration process of the EU. The internal market would further require the dismantling of Austria’s protected sectors, thereby bringing about restructuring and increased competitiveness (ibid;32). Even though the ÖVP had generally stated on 16 January 1987 that ‘participation in the further development of the process of European integration is of primary importance to Austria’ (Vranitzky,1987;19) the VÖI’s lobbying proved decisive in convincing the government of the full membership option. The so-called ‘global approach’ put forward by Alois Mock consisted of participation in the internal market but fell short of full membership. The VÖI, in February 1987, asked for ‘less speculation and more focused discussion on Austria’s relations with the EC’ (VÖI,1987b;486), preparing the ground for the establishment of an interministerial ‘Working group on European integration’. The latter argued that only full EC membership would enable full participation in the internal market, confirming the VÖI’s perception of the ‘global approach’ as unrealistic. In this context, the ÖVP leadership officially declared its interest in seeking full ties with the Community at its annual meeting in Maria Plain (ÖVP,1988;245). Even in the negotiations with the EC on the EEA - the next step in Austria’s contacts with the Twelve - the VÖI made haste to declare that the EEA was only welcome as ‘an interim step on the way to full membership’, thereby preempting a potential alternative interpretation by the government (VÖI,1992;510).

Hence, if politics have generally been seen as ‘the art of the possible’, EU membership politics in Austria came to be seen as the art of ‘making the necessary possible’, and thus responding to the Utility Maximizing preferences of powerful sectoral groups (Schneider,1990).

4.4 Neorealism & Austrian Membership: Security Blocks on the Road to Brussels

Although the preceding discussion substantiated the liberal intergovernmentalist thesis, it is still fruitful to examine the ‘ex-ante’ period of Austrian European policy from the neorealist perspective. Apparently, the anarchic nature of the international system forced state actors to define their national interests in terms of survival and thereby reject an early European orientation that could have entangled the newly independent Austria in Cold War strife. In a fundamental sense, the neorealist interpretation is true, but remains less relevant than Moravcsik’s approach. Neorealism tells us why Austrian state actors did not achieve their original objectives, but does not explain why, despite adverse international pressures, Austria pressed ahead with association and later accession.

Immediately after the liberation of Austria from Nazi rule in 1945, the country experienced the ‘friendly’ but nevertheless real occupation of the four victorious Allies (France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and US), none of whom were in any hurry to end the four-zone division of Austria. On 27 April 1945 a democratically legitimate government was established in Vienna under Karl Renner, but the allied forces closely controlled its conduct (Gehler, 2004:131-133 Bischof, 2002:162-189). Post-war Austria became involved involuntarily in an East-West conflict in which the two opposing power groups were determined not to surrender Austria to the other side. For the Soviet Union an independent Austria might join NATO and progressively become a threat to her security due to its strategic geographical location. For the US and the Western allies, an independent Austria might become prey to communist expansionism. Under the circumstances Austrian elites striving for survival had no other option but to withdraw from East-West rivalry entirely, thereby protecting their fragile security and independence. Neutrality, was from this point onwards the strategic option of rational state actors that would prevent a partition of the country into a western democratic and a Soviet communist block (Zemanek, 1984:18 Rendl, 1998:162). More specifically, neutrality represented the ‘third way’ between US capitalism and Soviet Communism, acting as a safety shield for Austrian citizens.

Austria’s permanent neutrality was based on a separate federal constitutional law of October 1955 and was not formally enacted in the State treaty of May 1955. This decision underlined the Austrian government’s determination to define the
extent of its declared neutrality independently of the allied powers as well as its
desire to acquire substantial room for maneuver for a continued policy of Western
economic orientation (Kaiser and Gehler,1997;83). In this light, it is hardly
surprising that Chancellor Raab, while introducing the Bill to the Parliament on 26\textsuperscript{th}
October 1955, expounded a narrow interpretation of Austrian neutrality, as only
military in nature, and which would include ‘no obligations and commitments
whatsoever in the economic or cultural field’.\textsuperscript{75} Permanent neutrality, in other words,
performed a partial neorealist function in not politically antagonizing the Soviet
Union. Neorealism, nevertheless, fails to account for the decision of Austrian state
actors to avoid a broader Swiss-style interpretation of neutrality\textsuperscript{76} and thereby press
ahead for full membership in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The
government’s decision of 24\textsuperscript{th} October 1956 to test the existing possibilities for
negotiations with the ECSC appears to reverse all previous security conscious
policies and challenge the Soviets by seeking economic rapprochement with the
Western block (Luif,2001;134 Gehler,2004;133-134).

It was only in the second half of the 1950s, in the aftermath of the Hungarian
crisis, that a more restrictive understanding of neutrality began to develop. When the
Hungarian government declared its neutrality according to the Austrian model and
was invaded by Soviet tanks in November 1956 the Austrian government reacted
with a more cautious approach avoiding, to submit a formal application for ECSC
membership (Pelinka and Wodak,2001;3). Even so, the country did not renounce its
Western economic orientation since Leopold Figl the Austrian head of the foreign
office, welcomed in 1956 the creation of a European Free Trade Area as ‘an initiative
of special importance for Austria’ (as quoted in Weber,1997;55). Such an insistence
on maintaining trade links with European partners gives credence to Michael
Gehler’s argument that Austria’s ‘room for manoeuvre regarding [European]
integration was not only determined by the proviso of neutrality and consideration of

\textsuperscript{75} Policy Declaration of Austrian Chancellor Julius Raab , 26.19.1955 as quoted in Luif, 2003;284.
\textsuperscript{76} The Swiss understanding of neutrality enumerated three basic duties of permanent neutrality in
peacetime. 1. an obligation to begin no war; 2.an obligation to defend its neutrality and independence ;
and 3. the so-called secondary duties or Vorwirkungen (antecedent effects) of permanent neutrality.
These can be summarised as the obligation of a permanently neutral country to do everything so as not
to be drawn into a war. They include a) political neutrality i.e. the obligation of a neutral country to
arrange its foreign policy so that it will not be drawn into any war. More specifically, it must not
conclude any treaties which oblige it to wage war. b) military neutrality i.e. not conclude any military
arrangements with other countries and c) economic neutrality. i.e. not conclude any customs
agreement or economic union with any other country because it would relinquish its independence in
a political respect as well. (Luif,2001;133-134).
the Soviet Union but also by domestic pressures and interests’ (2004;134). In the late 1960s the priority awarded to securing Austria’s territorial integrity limited the country’s European options. In 1968 Kurt Waldheim the Austrian minister for Foreign affairs, emphasized the politically precarious situation of Austria, which could be marched through by Warsaw Pact troops in the aftermath of the repression of the Prague revolutionaries (Liebhart,2001;19). At around the same time diplomatic tensions with Italy as a result of its obstructing the promised autonomy for South Tyrol further lowered Austria’s integration chances. The international crises, unfolding at Austria’s borders in the south and the east did not, however, prevent state actors from concluding the bilateral free trade agreement with the Community in 1972, thus corroborating the priority of economic interests over geopolitical concerns. The free trade treaty allowed Austria partial economic participation in European integration while leaving its neutrality obligations untouched.

In the late 1980s the evolution of the Single Market project, as well as domestic pressures arising from an escalating crisis in the nationalized industries, gave new impetus to Austria’s integration policy. It should also be noted that the application for EU accession of 17th July 1989 took place amidst a receding Cold war threat. However, given that Austria was not, at the time, menaced from any side, a potential situation of danger over its territorial integrity was not a decisive factor for maintaining or abandoning neutrality, nor for joining the EC (Benke and Wodak,2001;37). What really drove Austria’s novel turn to Europe were economic factors, as most secondary sources maintain. Even the initially hesitant reaction of the Soviet Union to Austrian EC membership did not prevent the government from pushing ahead with its application. The aide-memoir presented by the Soviet ambassador to Austria recognized the significance of the internal market for the Austrian economy but expressed the conviction that

‘Membership of a permanently neutral state in an organization like the European Community would lead to the loss of the real possibilities for implementation of its policy of neutrality. Starting from this fact it [the Soviet Government] received with concern the news on Austria’s intention to begin negotiations on membership with the European Community’ (as quoted in Luif, 1992;86)

The extensive neutrality clause in Austria’s application was, nevertheless, included with a view to respecting the taboo subject of neutrality – a neutrality that

77 On the Soviet reaction in 1989 see also Hafner,1992; 176-177.
contributed more to national identity than to appeasing Soviet concerns. After all, in 1987 a study by two specialists in international law, commissioned by the federation of Austrian Industrialists, had already claimed that EC membership would be compatible with Austria’s neutrality. It was on the basis of such membership that Austria would secure real sovereignty in an increasingly interdependent world, complementing and enhancing the formal sovereignty so far granted by the permanent neutrality clause (Michalski and Wallace, 1992:34). Neutrality, in other words was no longer a sine-qua-non of national security and independence.

In addition, concessions made by the Austrian government throughout the accession negotiations prove the secondary status of security concerns relevant to neutrality. At the opening of the accession negotiations Alois Mock, the Austrian minister for Foreign affairs, refrained from raising the issue of neutrality as a matter of concern for the Austrian delegation and stated that:

‘Austria is...committed to the perspective of further development of security structures as provided for by the Treaty on European Union in order to achieve the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (Mock, 1993:112)\textsuperscript{78}

Arguing along similar lines, in September 1993 the Austrian ruling elites stated that ‘Austria’s neutrality is self-imposed and self-defined, and can in theory be amended or rescinded at any time by a two thirds majority in parliament’ (Cameron, 1993).\textsuperscript{79} Translating this statement into action, Austria introduced the new Article 23f in its Constitution, on the basis of which it would participate in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union. In the general wording of the article it was mentioned that this step would include participation in economic embargoes. Nevertheless, after the Maastricht Treaty came into effect on 1\textsuperscript{st} November 1993 it had already become clear that the CFSP would cover all areas of Foreign and Security policy, and that it would probably not be confined to ‘economic’ security matters, as the Austrian article so optimistically stated (Luif, 2001:143).

To conclude, in view of serving its economic goals the Austrian government took a pragmatic, step-by-step approach to the progressive abolition of neutrality through amendments and interpretations, but transmitted this reality to its people in riddles rather than in clear statements. A typical example is Chancellor Vranitzky’s comment during a press conference that ‘neutrality in Austria was overrated, but

\textsuperscript{78} HAEU, GJLA 000112, Mock, A. Declaration at the Opening of Accession Negotiations, 1.2.1993.

Austria will not abandon it over hastily because one cannot for the time being offer to the Austrians another security system.' This meant in plain language that neutrality would be formally renounced, but only when a proper European security system was in force. All in all, on the basis of both primary and secondary sources, one can safely conclude that neorealism has only partial resonance for theoretically explaining Austria’s EU membership.

4.5 AUSTRIAN VS EUROPEAN IDENTITY: AND THE TWAIN SHALL NEVER MEET?

The simplistic catch-phrase the Austrian government chose to campaign for EU entry - ‘We are Europe’ - is strongly reminiscent of the motto the Greek premier had used throughout the Mediterranean enlargement: ‘Greece belongs to Europe’. In analogy, it seems promising to follow a constructivist analytical path in reviewing Austrian elite attitudes to European integration. EU liberal democratic values, nevertheless, did not complement the applicant’s national interest reservoir. The lack of recourse to the EU’s democratic identity can be partially explained by taking into account the rigorous bargaining position of the wealthy Austrians. Applicant elites, unlike the Greek state actors, did not need to ‘rhetorically entrap’ the incumbents so as to achieve membership. More important still in explaining the poverty of constructivism is the fact that the Europeanisation of the Austrian identity was a contested issue.

In 1945 the first Chancellor of the Second Republic, Leopold Figl, viewed Europe as a new means of identification that would replace the post-war identity of Austria as a victim of National Socialist Germany, and counter the suspicion of remaining Anschluss-orientated (Angerer,2002;34 Thaler,2001). Therefore it seemed natural to promote a pro-European identity image, arguing that ‘Austria is Europe and Europe cannot exist without Austria’ (Angerer,2001;68). In 1955, nevertheless, possible EU membership exerted great pressure on the entrenched paradigms in which Austrians had learned to perceive themselves and the wider world since the Second World War and the 10 years of Allied occupation (Gehler and Kaiser,2002;317). To begin with, at that time emphasis was placed on the moral superiority of neutrality. Neutrality as a genuine symbol of Austrian identity allowed the country to follow a policy of de-Westernisation and maintain its newly

appreciated autonomy. This was particularly true for Bruno Kriesky, Austria’s new Foreign Minister who gave a non-Western definition to Austrian neutrality in the early 1960s and later on as Chancellor formed a strong self perception of Austrians as international mediators who should remain detached from European integration plans. For Kriesky, neutrality combined with EFTA membership, would facilitate the on-going identity building process of conscious demarcation from Germany. EFTA marked ‘a significant break from Austria’s traditional policy of close association with Germany’. On the contrary ‘to join EEC would indirectly mean to join Germany’ (Gehler and Kaiser, 1997: 89). To serve these purposes Kriesky, in 1960, strongly encouraged Austrian constitutional lawyers to develop a narrow interpretation of neutrality that included non participation in economic organizations that might prevent Austria from taking independent action in economic and trade policy in times of war (ibid). The early Austrian neutrality policy, therefore, opened up the possibility for fostering a national identity separate from Europe.

Similarly, the ‘active’ neutrality policy advocated by the afore-mentioned Austrian Chancellor between 1970 and 1983 emphasized the global aspects of Austrian foreign policy in contrast to concentrating on neighbouring countries and Western Europe (Luif, 2001: 137) Such a global neutrality policy was an expression of Austrian post-imperial identity. The country’s long imperial experience contributed much to establishing a post-war national identity as international mediators between East and West rather than submissive followers of the Western integration scheme. Assuming the role of a ‘bridge-builder’ between East and West, Austria refrained from establishing exclusive ties with Western Europe. The Austrian conceptualisation of integration thus bore a great resemblance to the British notion of imperial superiority, so eloquently expressed in the phrase ‘we are with Europe but not of it’ (Kaiser, 2001: 16-19).

Only in the late 1980s did a pro-Western bias emerge in Austrian identity. Not that EU liberal democratic values gained resonance, because the country had a long-established democratic tradition. Rather, a timid Europeanisation of the neutral Austrian identity was attempted. Nevertheless, emphasis remained on the economic consequences of EEC membership rather than its repercussions on the neutral image of the country, for such a reference threatened to bring popular resistance to European integration dynamics to the fore. In a 1993 poll by the Austrian Gallup institute 53 percent of respondents opposed EC membership if joining would require
giving up neutrality. Even though neutrality had outlived its mission with the end of the Cold War, it was still a great symbol of Austrian identity and an emotion-laden question that state actors tried to avoid (Rohwedder, 1993). Throughout the accession negotiations there were sporadic general references of belonging to Europe in the aide memoirs the Austrian government sent to Brussels. Austrian state actors, nevertheless, were deliberately trying to fudge the issue of neutrality. It was only natural, therefore, that after closing the CFSP chapter on 21st December 1993, the head of the Austrian delegation was advised by EU incumbents that:

‘Unless pressed there is no need to make any reference to the Neutrality Law. The line to take here is that whilst there is no compulsion to change the Law one expects that over time it will lose its relevance as Austria fulfils its commitment of participating fully in the development of a European security identity’ (Burghardt and Smidt, 1994).

In this context, EC political values and ideas were sidelined and due attention was given to the economic benefits of accession that formed a broader basis of consensus both among ruling elites and the wider public.

**SUPPLY SIDE MOTIVATIONS FOR GRANTING EU MEMBERSHIP TO AUSTRIA**

4.6 INCUMBENTS’ COST BENEFIT CALCULATIONS ON AUSTRIAN ACCESSION

Moving from the ‘demand’ to the ‘supply’ side of Austrian integration, empirical evidence from secondary and primary sources alike substantiates the neoliberal approach. The economic cost-benefit balance sheet of eventual Austrian membership was particularly attractive to EU member states. Consequently, the Utility Maximizing EU response to the integration demands of Austrian state actors reinforced the neoliberal preference reservoir of the latter. Due to its geographical location, other industrialized European countries have traditionally been Austria’s main trading partners. In 1958, 54 percent of Austrian imports came from the Six while 50 percent of her exports were directed to the Community. With a view to protecting such intense trade links the Council of Ministers on 3rd December 1958 expressed its desire to ‘continue the efforts to establish a multilateral association between the EEC and the other states of the OEEC’ (Camps, 1964:184). Similarly,

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after the breakdown of negotiations between the Community and the EFTA leader, i.e. the UK, in spring 1963, the Six indicated their willingness to discuss an arrangement with Austria (ibid,498). At the opening of formal negotiations on the renewed Austrian request for association, on 13th October 1964, the incumbents confirmed their desire for a solution to the problems which faced Austria, but remained divided over the terms under which the Commission should be authorized to start talks. Despite the incumbents’ geopolitical reservations over the implications of Austrian neutrality for the political evolution of the Community, another seven rounds of negotiations were held between September 1965 and December 1966. Further progress was delayed in view of the South Tyrol conflict, but as soon as the dispute was settled at the end of 1969 the incumbents started anew with negotiations with the Austrian delegation for a partial interim trade arrangement.

In 1969, 41 percent of Austria’s exports went to the Six, compared with 50 percent in 1958 before the establishment of the EEC, while imports had increased slightly over this period, from 54 to 56 percent. In relation to the EFTA countries the value of Austrian exports had increased five-fold, and in 1969 represented 26 percent of exports as opposed to 12 percent in 1959; the value of imports from the EFTA had quadrupled over the same period. Thereby, in view of reversing the declining importance of the EEC in Austria’s total foreign trade, a treaty establishing a bilateral free trade area between the Community and Austria as well as the rest of the EFTA partners, was signed on 22nd July 1972 to the benefit of both sides (Nickolson and East,1987;139).

A multilateral element was added to the EC-EFTA relationship via the Luxembourg declaration of 1984 in which the ministers stressed the ‘importance of further action to consolidate and strengthen cooperation, with the aim of creating a dynamic European Economic Space of benefit to their countries’ The new EES would expand cooperation across 4 areas:1) Research and development; 2) industrial cooperation through a truly free internal market; 3) common action at the international level with emphasis on international monetary disorder; and 4) cooperation towards the third world. This was clearly an attempt by the EU to face...

84 The treaties establishing free-trade areas between the EEC and the neutral countries aimed at dismantling all tariffs for industrial goods and requested the cancellation of non-tariff barriers such as quotas, charges equivalent to duties, restrictions on the transfer of payments relating to trade in goods, prevention, restriction or distortion of competition regarding the production or trade of goods (Luif,1992;59).

85 What in the 1990s came to be called European Economic Area.
up to the US-Japanese challenge in the field of high technology and industry, as well as in monetary policies. In the context of keener international competition, the EU urgently needed to overcome incipient ‘Euro-sclerosis’, and opted to do so by establishing tighter economic cooperation with Austria and the rest of the EFTA partners (Pedersen,1991a:20). Conducive to such a resurfacing of stronger cooperation between the EU and the EFTA was the 1981 Annual Report of the Committee of the Permanent Representatives (COREPER) on the EC-EFTA relationship. The latter strongly highlighted the significance of EFTA, as a trading partner pointing out that among all preferential agreements concluded by the Community only those with the EFTA countries granted it full reciprocity (Antola,1991;240).

Jacques Delors, in his annual presentation before the European Parliament on 17th January 1989, would recognize that ‘our relations with the EFTA countries at both multilateral and bilateral level need to be highlighted’. In this context the Commission President proposed a ‘new structured partnership with common decision making and administrative institutions’, going beyond the association agreements and based on successful, pragmatic cooperation.86 A year later, nevertheless, equality in the decision making process between the EC and the EFTA appeared unrealistic, since Delors openly declared that ‘this process [the EEA] must stop short of joint decision-making, which would imply Community membership and acceptance of the marriage contract. This would serve the interests of neither party, so a delicate balance will have to be struck during the negotiations’.87 The Delors initiative, in other words, was a way of facilitating inter-bloc trade, strengthening the EEC’s economic core while preserving the Community’s decision-making autonomy and safeguarding its internal integration. Deepening, i.e. achieving the internal market before 1993, setting on track an economic and monetary union, and strengthening the EC’s foreign and security policy, was given preference over widening. Enlargement at that time threatened to overload the EC’s crowded internal agenda (Preston,1997;96 Luif,1995;173). No doubt, economic factors underpinned the EC’s

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desire to engage in a more structured relationship with significant trading partners such as the members of the EFTA. And the asymmetrical power of the Community in the negotiations ‘game, allowed it to be not only a ‘player’ but most importantly a ‘referee’ and thereby regulate the EC-EFTA match to its favour via the EEA option.

In view of the Community’s deepening turmoil, the Austrian application for EC membership in July 1989, a few months after Delors’ setting out of the EEA option, should have been a cause for concern. Yet, this was not the case; partly because at that stage the Austrian move did not indicate a general preference for this option among the EFTA partners, and partly because of the tight economic ties between the demand and the supply side (Preston,1997;93). The economic interest in Austrian integration was affirmed in the Commission’s avis. In the conclusions one reads the following:

‘The Community will on the whole benefit from the accession of Austria, which would widen the circle of countries whose economic, monetary and budgetary performance will speed economic and monetary union on its way…On the basis of economic considerations, therefore, the Commission considers that the Community should accept Austria’s application for accession’ (1992;18).

Apart from a prosperous and dynamic economy whose main macroeconomic equilibria were under control, Austrian integration also promised substantial sectoral benefits. No other applicant had already established completely free trade in industrial products with the Community prior to accession. The existence of the free trade agreement since 1972 meant that Austrian and EC industries already had a long experience of competition and collaboration behind them, as the avis noted. The formal integration of Austrian industries, promised only to invigorate the Community’s overall industrial capacity and enhance its economic importance. In addition, a high degree of intra-industry integration would render the enlarged Community’s industries less vulnerable to asymmetric shocks, since branch shocks would affect the entire Community and could be met by common policies (Sardelis,1993;3-4). Last but not least, Austrian accession would further boost industrial trade. Despite accounting for 4.5 percent of Community imports and 6.5 percent of its exports, Austria occupied fifth place as Community supplier (after the US, Japan, Switzerland and Sweden), and third place as an export market (after the US and Switzerland). The bulk of trade had been in manufactured goods as the Commission observed, and the trade surplus in favour of the community had reached ECU 6 billion in the early 1990s (1992;10-11).
Austria’s main trading partner has traditionally been Germany, absorbing 38 percent of Austrian exports in 1990, and supplying 44 percent of Austria’s imports in the same period. In that context, German decision makers had always been in favour of rapid negotiations and did not see any real contradiction between deepening and widening (Pedersen, 1991b; Luif, 1995; 176). Italy, the second country to benefit most from Austrian trade links in the 1990s, developed a positive but guarded stance to the question of Austria’s membership. The Italian government along with the Spanish, the Greek, and the Portuguese, had some fears of strong competition from the technologically advanced EFTA economies, and were further worried about an eventual accentuation in the North-South division within the Community. Italy, along with the rest of the Southern members, risked losing political influence, as a realignment of the internal power structure of the EU in favour of northern and central European countries would occur in the event of Austrian accession. Italian reservations, nevertheless, along with those of Greece, Spain, and Portugal, were circumscribed in the face of clear economic benefits channeled through Austria’s contribution to their structural funds (Pedersen, 1991b; 113-114). France’s trade policy incentives for greater commitment to EC-Austria cooperation were rather limited. Even so, it still hoped to reap the benefits of a wider industrial European cooperation in research and development that would enable European economies to compete successfully with the US and Japan. Last but not least, any French geopolitical concerns over boosting the German factor via Austrian membership were overshadowed by the greater risk of a bilateral link between Austria and the FRG (Luif, 1995; 176). Among the proponents of Austrian membership were two former EFTA members: the UK and Denmark. Strong industrial trade links between Austria and the aforementioned countries within the EFTA framework were decisive in convincing Danish and British elites of the advantages of EFTA enlargement. In addition, the substantial Austrian transfers to the EC budget would alleviate the burden of these major contributors, and added much to their pragmatic attitude towards enlargement. Finally, the Benelux countries, lacking in trade incentives were hesitant supporters of Austrian integration, demanding that enlargement should not be accomplished at the expense of diluting the Union (Michalski and Wallace, 1992; Pedersen, 1994).
Summing up, the prevalence of welfare based incentives on the supply side of integration accelerated accession talks and contributed to the maintenance of a Utility Maximizing stance on behalf of the first EFTA applicant.

4.7 GEOPOLITICAL CONCERNS SURROUNDING THE AUSTRIAN ACCESSION

A neorealist reading of EU attitudes to Austrian integration can easily be called into question since the majority of historical evidence presented in the previous section has corroborated the relevance of neoliberal preferences. Of course one should not disregard the incumbents’ geopolitical reservations over the implications of Austrian neutrality for the evolution of European security. Neutrality, nevertheless, did not constitute an insurmountable problem, either in the early phase of the free trade agreement or throughout the membership negotiations. The geopolitical concerns of the EU regarding Austria made up a complicated but minor sideshow that did not prevent a successful resolution of the enlargement bargain.

Once Austria requested a special arrangement with the EEC on 12th December 1961, the majority of the Six member countries were sympathetic to Austria’s sensitive political situation, but cautious in granting it an association agreement. The Federal Republic of Germany was one of the few EU incumbents that seemed eager to discuss the Austrian application for association and even accepted the common neutral approach (Nickolson and East, 1987;136-137). Similarly in Luxembourg, the Foreign Minister Eugène Schaus would explicitly mention that ‘the formula of Association in the Treaty of Rome was broad enough to include neutral desires’. France, only temporarily considered the special treatment of Austrian neutrality, being inclined to follow President de Gaulle’s acceptance of the Austrian position (Rathkolb,1996;297). In 1963, after the veto against Great Britain’s membership application, French state actors appeared reluctant to deal with the Austrian application for association and began raising the issue of Soviet pressure as a pretext for opposing the Austrian case. In reality the French feared an ‘Anschluß’, an Austrian-German customs union that would disproportionately boost German influence in the internal EEC balance of power. The Netherlands, on the other hand, maintained a rather ambivalent position. Dutch politicians respected the geopolitical reasons that forced Austria to stick to neutrality but were reserved on their request for maintaining their treaty making power. Similarly, the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak was prepared to accept some reservation clause
for the neutrals concerning future political engagements, but if they should insist on treaty making power they ‘need not come to Brussels’. Italy was the most outspoken critic of an association with the neutral Austria. Association was seen as a temporary period of economic transition for countries that could not become full members immediately due to economic problems, but had accepted the political commitments of eventual EEC membership. Italy thereby proposed a free trade agreement according to Article 113 of the EEC treaty siding with the conclusions of a European Parliament Report issued in January 1962 (ibid;293-298). According to the latter, the neutrals should share political responsibility in the EEC and not just try to ‘pick the raisins out of the cake’ (Luif,1992;61). All in all, in the early 1960s there was little enthusiasm for integrating a neutral Austria. The centripetal EEC motive for refraining from association negotiations had little to do with neutrality. In the early 1960 the EC was much more concerned with the development of a common policy in agriculture, the association of the sixteen overseas territories, and the negotiations with Great Britain. Therefore, in a utility maximizing fashion, the EU incumbents strengthened cooperation with their significant Austrian trade partners, and postponed serious deliberation over the geopolitical implications of integrating neutral countries.

In 1967, the second round of negotiations with the EEC halted abruptly as the dispute with Italy over South Tyrol worsened. The Italian veto appeared to be an internal EEC security block to the Austrian road to Europe. Austria, nevertheless, fell short of posing any persistent geopolitical threat to the incumbents, who did not hesitate to safeguard their commercial interests, concluding a bilateral free trade agreement with Austria after the South Tyrol issue was settled (Luif,2001;138 Gehler and Kaiser,2002;311). Only in the late 1980s, after the formal Austrian application for EEC membership, did the neutrality question resurface on the EEC agenda. In the Opinion the Commission submitted to the Council of Ministers on 1st of August 1991 Austria’s permanent neutrality, dating back to 1955, was identified as a potentially serious problem ‘that no other member of the Community has posed hitherto’. The Commission thus, referred to the possibility of seeking assurances from Austria that the country was legally capable, as well as politically willing, to comply with

engagements in the CFSP. Despite voicing such concerns, however, the Commission pre-empted a neorealist block to Austria’s road to Europe by arguing that ‘these problems should not prove to be insurmountable in the context of the accession negotiations’ (1992;30).^89^ In a similar light, the internal documents of the Commission’s task force for Enlargement appeased the incumbents’ concerns over neutrality. ‘Given the sensitivity surrounding this chapter there is a strong argument for putting the ball into the applicants court and seeking political/legal assurances from them on the compatibility of their legislation with the CFSP. The Commission should maintain a low profile’.^90^ As Graham Avery points out while delineating the top ten dossiers in Austrian accession negotiations:

‘International developments since the collapse of the Soviet Union suggest that the problem of compatibility between Austria’s neutrality and the Common foreign and Security policy of the European Union will be less of a problem than initially supposed. Austria has explicitly accepted the provisions of the Union Treaty; it already shadows most of the Community’s positions in European Political cooperation; and it urges more effective EC action in matters affecting Austrian security, particularly in ex-Yugoslavia’ (Avery,1993).^91^ In the absence of serious geopolitical reservations, the talks on the CFSP were concluded in a short time span (Luif,1995;309). Moreover, the incumbents, at the ministerial meeting of the Conference on Accession of 21st December 1993, agreed that the following Joint Declaration would be added to the final act of the Accession Treaty.

The Union and the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden agree that:

- Accession to the Union should strengthen the internal coherence of the Union and its capacity to act effectively in foreign and security policy.
- The new Member States will, from the time of their accession, be ready and able to participate fully and actively in the Common foreign and Security Policy as defined in the Treaty on European Union
- The new Member States will, on accession, take on in their entirety and without reservation all the objectives of the Treaty, the provisions of Title V thereof, and the relevant declarations attached to it;

^89^ For an analysis on the Commissions Opinion see Pedersen,1994;82 and Luif,1995  
^90^ HAEU, GJLA 000123, Cameron, F. ‘Enlargement Negotiations: CFSP Chapter’, 29.09.1993  
The new Member States will be ready and able to support the specific policies of the Union in force at their time of their accession. With regard to Member States’ obligations deriving from the Treaty on the European Union concerning the implementation of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy it is understood that on the day of accession the legal framework of the acceding countries will be compatible with the ‘acquis’ (Luif1995;310).

Taking stock of these developments, the report prepared by the European Parliament on 17 February 1994, regarding enlargement and neutrality praised the applicants’ constructive attitude towards the CFSP. In particular, emphasis was given to the EFTAN’s assurance that they would not adopt the Danish model by asking for derogations in security and defence matters. The report thereby concluded that the applicant countries satisfied ‘the main criteria on which membership of the European Union should be based where the provisions of Title V of the Union Treaty are concerned’ (1994;14). Given that neutrality did not affect the vested security interests of the member states, the EEC side concluded the Austrian accession talks in just 14 months. In the absence of security considerations, then, the default drive for integration became the incumbents’ interest in reconciling the EFTA and the EEC models of economic development.

4.8 CONSTRUCTIVISM: COMMERCIAL INTERESTS OVER AND ABOVE THE INCUMBENTS’ POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY

Overall on the basis of the preceding discussion, it appears that the supply side of Austrian integration conceded to the membership request of Austrian state actors in view of the substantive economic gains that would accrue to several EU incumbents and the Union as a whole. The high rate of the EFTA candidates’ economic development, besides securing rewarding commercial links, further promised to speed the process to economic and monetary union. In geopolitical terms, any reservations regarding the neutral status of Austria and the problems it could create for the future common foreign and security policy dissolved, not only due to the collapse of Cold War dynamics but also because of the significant concessions made by Austrian state actors in redefining neutrality. In this context, little if any place was left for identity considerations regarding the contribution of Austria to strengthening liberal democratic traditions and boosting the international prestige of the Community. The supply side, in the accession negotiations, did not at any stage compromise its vested economic and geopolitical interests from a sense of political
responsibility towards the neutral candidates. In the Commission’s avis and the EU incumbents’ speeches at the opening and closing of accession negotiations there were sporadic references to Austria’s belonging at the heart of Europe. The material expectations of the incumbents, nevertheless, gave rise to a utility oriented stance towards the applicants that remained untouched by idealistic concerns of living up to liberal democratic standards by offering accession to like-minded candidates. After all, such a quasi-altruistic stance was not relevant to the EFTA enlargement, since the established democratic culture of the applicants required no EU inspiration or intervention. In this light, we may conclude that there were no overarching democratic legitimacy concerns on the EU side of the negotiations table to account for the solution of the Austrian membership bargain. Rather, the most potent bargaining asset of the applicants on which the incumbents focussed was their prosperous economy. Neoliberal theory thus establishes itself as the default drive of the Austrian accession negotiations, sidelining constructivist interpretations.
CONCLUDING REMARKS:
UTILITY AND VALUE MAXIMIZATION ACROSS GREECE, BRITAIN AND AUSTRIA

The conclusion of Part II of this study brings us to an enlargement of the enlargement research in both empirical and theoretical terms. A more comparative research design has been established, broadening the empirical focus beyond the thoroughly examined CEE enlargements to Greece, Britain and Austria - three applicants covering all the major rounds of EU widening prior to that concluded in 2004. Such a cross sectional and longitudinal project offers a systematic insight into the role of material self-interest in power and welfare, and the impact of EU values and community norms in guiding the politics of different applicants and EU incumbents. As far as the metatheoretical debate over the pertinence of rationalism and constructivism is concerned, it is apparent that their treatment as partially complementary and partially competing sources of explanation is warranted. More specifically, in line with the findings of Schimmelfennig, the case studies demonstrated the validity of theoretical differentiation within a single enlargement round. Put simply, it is clear that rationalism can shape certain aspects of individual enlargement rounds while constructivism can plausibly account for other aspects of the same enlargement episodes. More importantly, the overview also demonstrated the pertinence of theoretical differentiation between enlargement rounds, leading to the classification of the aforementioned entrants as Utility or Value Maximisers depending on the relevant shares of rationalism and constructivism in each case.

With regards to theoretical differentiation within individual cases of EU widening, table 1 is particularly instructive. In correspondence with Schimmelfennig’s proposition on Eastern enlargement, the Greek case study showed that the ‘supply’ side decision to open the EU door was a function of liberal community values rather than the outcome of material cost-benefit calculations. EU actors embarked on Mediterranean enlargement because of commitments to the promotion of democracy - a central tenet of EU community norms. Rhetorical action was an essential medium in forcing EU actors to respect the ethical imperative of supporting the applicant’s fragile democracy via admission to the Union’s democratic club. The Greek ruling elites pointed to the EU’s constitutive values of promoting democracy, peace and prosperity and strategically referred to the promises made throughout the dictatorial rule. If EU actors failed to support the restoration of
democracy in Greece they would betray the values and norms to which they had committed themselves and endanger their reputation in the international community. Constructivism, in the form of ‘rump idealism’ (i.e. on the instrumental use of ideas for selfish purposes) explains the outcome of the Greek accession bargain. As far as the input of the EU’s second enlargement is concerned, rationalism played a significant role but was not an indisputable carrier of analytical weight. Rationalism partially accounts for the inhibitions the Commission expressed in its 1976 avis, but fails to explain why the Commission in the same Opinion put forward a sense of democratic obligation as the fundamental rationale and the sole justification for accepting Greece. Similarly, material concerns over a) the future of Mediterranean agriculture; and b) the security implications of accession in the Eastern Mediterranean cannot account for the strong support for the Greek candidacy among the majority of EU incumbents. And if one claims that such attitudes were warranted by the small size of the country, it should be borne in mind that the accession negotiations were concluded despite it becoming clear that eventual Greek accession would be used as a precedent by Spain and Portugal, augmenting the size of the admission costs. Turning to the ‘demand’ side, the material preferences of ruling elites in improving security and welfare were decisively complemented by ideational references of belonging to Europe and sharing its democratic credentials. This firm ‘belief’ in Europe and its founding mission helped EU ruling elites to maintain the membership momentum despite the vociferous reactions of the opposition and the ambivalent stance of EU actors who at times ignored Greek security preferences. In this light, the traditional sequencing of rationalist and constructivist explanations observed in Schimmelfennig’s analysis of CEE enlargement, is not established in the Greek case study, where the applicants’ preferences are decisively infiltrated by adherence to a shared European identity. In essence, the prevalence of community values and norms in both the pursuit and the granting of Greek membership warrant the classification of the country as a core Value Maximiser. Reasoning by analogy, I extend the Value Maximiser (VM) label to the other two Mediterranean entrants - Portugal and Spain - who had also overthrown authoritarian dictatorships and looked to the EU for liberal democratic inspiration. Last but not least, among the old 15 member states, the VM label equally applies to the original Six who opted for integration with a view to establishing liberal democratic systems driven by similar
political ideals, thereby promoting uninterrupted economic cooperation and protecting Western Europe from the communist threat.

In contrast, the story of British accession can plausibly be told in rationalist terms. Changes in their share of international power, aggravated by the economic costs of trade interdependence, led successive British governments to recalculate the costs and benefits of EU membership on the basis of their material interest in power maximization.

Table 1. National and EU elite motivations for seeking and granting Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rationalism</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Austria</th>
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<tr>
<td>Neoliberalism</td>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>Supply</td>
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<td>Agric &amp; Industry</td>
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<td>Realism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security and Power</td>
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<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constructivism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adherence to EU Values</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
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+ positive attitudes, - negative attitudes, ± some times negative attitudes over and above positive. (+) positive attitudes of reduced salience, (±) some times negative attitudes over and above positive but of reduced salience.

Similarly, in the supply side rationalist explanations dominate, as changes in French geopolitical priorities paved the way to British membership after two failed attempts. The UK does not constitute a classical case of ‘sequencing’ where rationalism explains both applicants’ and incumbents’ enlargement preferences and constructivism the enlargement outcome. Both the input and the output of the accession game conform to the Utility Maximizing rules of increasing leverage in the international arena. Yet, the principle of ‘within theoretical differentiation’ holds, because some important controversies of this enlargement episode are factors that fit within a constructivist framework. On the supply side the geopolitical reservations enshrined in de Gaulle’s vetoes of 1963 and 1967 had an indisputably ideational flavour. The General feared that British entry would undermine French leadership within the Community. Such power positionality concerns were intimately linked to the French vision of Europe. What the French President aimed at was a truly European construction, independent of US influence. An enlarged Community including Britain, however, would be more solidly Atlanticist. Similarly, on the
demand side opposition to Europe was couched in terms of competing ideologies. Psychological attachment to the Commonwealth and the US rendered EEC membership an awkward option. In addition, the post-war European adherence to democracy was not a source of inspiration for a country whose political institutions had remained unbroken since the mid-seventeenth century. Rather, EEC membership triggered the fear of losing parliamentary sovereignty once the doctrine of the supremacy of European law was enacted. In this light, Britain finds itself at the centre of Utility maximization where the core interest in securing power in the international system prevails over national Value minimization concerns. Put simply, the successful resolution of negotiations despite the low resonance between domestic and community values places overwhelming analytical weight on a rationalist interpretation of the aforementioned membership bid.

Last but not least, a rationalist framework can also account for the 1995 enlargement to include Austria. However, the analysis reveals a different pattern of Utility Maximization from that detected in the British case study. To begin with, the enlargement preferences of the candidate and the member states reflected a purely material self-interest in welfare rather than calculations of power positionality. In the domestic arena powerful societal actors pushed the government to pursue membership so as to overcome the negative externalities resulting from the deepening of European integration. In turn, the EU incumbents had a strong interest in reconciling once and for all the EFTA and EEC models of economic development and in maximizing aggregate welfare by accepting a well-established market economy. Therefore, all possible controversies on Austrian membership linked to neutrality, including the hurdles EFTAN neutrality could pose for the evolution of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, were strategically sidelined by both interlocutors in search of welfare maximization. However, what substantiates the pertinence of 'within theoretical differentiation' is the marginal but overall positive value assigned to European constitutive values and norms. Unlike the British case study, where ideational factors were instrumental in torpedoing accession twice, identity concerns mattered less for Austria. To the pro-European political elites of the 1990s a new European identity appeared to be an ideal replacement for the dominant post-war identity of Austria as the first victim of National Socialist Germany. Yet, the demand side refrained from highlighting its adherence to the constitutive beliefs and practices of the EEC. This was due both to a prevalent material self-interest in
economics, as well as to the 1960s suspicion that joining Europe might render national identity ‘German’ or Anschluss-orientated. EU actors, on the other hand, lived up to their liberal democratic standards by offering accession to like-mined candidates who enjoyed a well-established democracy. Constructivism, in other words, is not called into question in the analysis of the first EFTA application, even though rationalism functions as the default drive in explaining the input and output of the accession negotiations. In this light, Austria is classified as a peripheral Utility Maximiser. The partial resonance between domestic and community beliefs and values moves the applicant away from the ‘core’ of Utility Maximization, where material self-interest superimposes itself on collective European identity concerns, to the ‘periphery’ of Utility Maximization, where strong and positive cost benefit calculations coexist with marginal but positive perceptions of collective norms and values. In essence, Austria is on the fringes of Value Maximization but still within the analytical territory of Utility Maximization. Reasoning once again by analogy, I apply the UM label to Sweden and Finland on the one hand, and Denmark and Ireland on the other.

Across all countries examined it is apparent that a theoretical synthesis in the rationalist-constructivist debate is plausible, and that through such a synthesis a classification can be established in elite motives for pursuing and granting membership. In essence, EU enlargement is best conceived of as a continuum of the applicants’ and incumbents’ interaction, extending between a rationally oriented Utility Maximizing stance and a constructively oriented Value Maximizing attitude (see figure 1). In the fourfold table representing the continuum, the A and D options are not taken into account because they represent two extremes unlikely to be supported by empirical evidence. In the D case enlargement would be a zero sum game for both parties at the negotiation table, and membership in the EU would remain fixed. On the other hand, if there existed a strong material interest in enlargement and a firm ideational commitment to European values for both interlocutors then enlargement would constitute an uncontroversial issue that would not be resolved via bargaining. Rather, EU widening is best presented as a two-way course from Utility to Value Maximization and vice versa. If the entrant is a Utility Maximiser then there is a largely favourable material interest constellation which constitutes the best justification for enlargement. Collective identity concerns are either positive and marginal - as in the case of Austria - or negative as in the UK, but
still not enough to obstruct accession. If the entrant is a Value Maximiser then EU constitutive values and norms become the main rationale behind enlargement, while material interests whether positive or negative, are not sufficient to justify the pursuit and granting of membership. It remains to be seen whether such theoretically informed distinctions between Utility and Value Maximizing elite attitudes make a difference in the evolution of popular attitudes towards Europe.

Figure 1. A theoretically flexible approach to Elite attitudes to European Integration
CHAPTER 5
BRIDGING THE EU LEGITIMACY GAP: A PASSAGE FROM EUROPE OF THE ELITES TO EUROPE OF THE ELECTORATES?

5.1 INTRODUCTORY NOTES

Easton’s notion of ‘authoritative outputs’ resonates well with the elite-controlled character of EU enlargement politics. While on some occasions people can vote against membership in national referenda, accession to the EU is by and large ‘a decision of the authorities that members of the system consider or are compelled to accept as binding’ (Easton, 1965, 352). Authoritative outputs, in turn, have become a significant starting point in the study of European Integration. In the writings of the neofunctionalist tradition one does not fail to notice that the ‘shift of loyalties’ from the national sphere to a new supranational centre (i.e. the EU) occurs among political elites rather than mass publics. The elite-driven transfer of loyalties then paves the way for ‘permissive consensus’; a passive popular acquiescence to national elite decisions, which allows governments to act in the peoples’ name in entering the EU club (Haas, 1968; Lindberg, 1971; 25-31).

Contradicting this view, the referenda on the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark, on EU membership in Austria, Sweden and Norway, on the Nice Treaty in Ireland, and, most recently, on the new Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands invalidate the assumption of permissive consensus and demonstrate that the public is much more concerned with the process of European unification. EU citizens are ready to raise the banner of popular legitimacy against Euro-bureaucracy the more the latter affects their daily lives. In essence, what matters most is not the ‘authoritative output’ of EU membership but its outcome, i.e. the popular input on elites’ binding decision to enter the EU club. In view of the Union’s expanded legitimacy aspirations to the ten new European countries that have joined and to an as yet indefinite number of prospective entrants, such popular legitimacy input becomes a basic motor of integration balancing the effects of elite enlargement output.
Despite the crucial links between enlargement and legitimacy, there is still no systematic research on the impact indirect elite legitimation can have on the evolution of direct popular EU acceptance in the aftermath of accession. In an attempt to address this gap in the current acquis academique the present study seeks to explain national variations in popular support for European integration on the basis of distinct elite motivations for seeking accession to the Union, as stated elsewhere. People’s attitudes to the EU, in other words, are decisively framed by elite attitudes starting from the time of accession (Medrano, 2003). More specifically, the steering research hypothesis argues that in Value Maximizing countries where elites consider EU membership a legitimate goal not only due to utilitarian factors—i.e. economic and security benefits—but also due to affective factors—i.e. political identification with a democratic Union of states, the population is expected to be more in favour of European integration. Conversely, in Utility Maximizing countries which enter by calculating the material gains and losses of membership, public support is expected to fluctuate depending on the magnitude of post-accession economic and power benefits. In this light, this chapter searches for an appropriate model of legitimacy for an ever-expanding Union of both governmental elites and mass publics, that will account for the operation of Utility Maximizing and Value Maximizing framing dynamics from the former to the latter.

Legitimacy is too unwieldy and complex a concept to be tackled head on, and virtually all empirical literature follows the tactic of breaking it into component parts (Weatherford, 1992:149). In the first part of this chapter, then, after citing a working definition of legitimacy, all the different components of the concept are laid out in an attempt to chart a typology of its distinctive characteristics. In the second part attention is shifted away from legitimacy in general to EU legitimacy in particular. The theoretical postulates of intergovernmentalism, federalism and multi-level governance (MLG) are revisited in search of a reliable guide to explaining legitimacy in the ever-evolving European polity. The intergovernmental model focuses on indirect elite support for the Union stemming from a utilitarian (i.e. output) legitimation mechanism that is triggered by EU policy effectiveness. Its applicability to the ever-enlarging European Union, nevertheless, is a controversial issue, as the strong policy-making functions of the EU also extend to polity-making elements. In addition, a unilateral focus on indirect elite legitimation prevents the researcher from pursuing an in-depth study of public attitudes and how the latter evolve in the
aftermath of accession. In the search for a more promising theoretical partner, attention is thus shifted to the federalist approach. Nonetheless, this theory's one-sided emphasis on a) affective (i.e. input) mechanisms of EU legitimation and b) direct popular support for the EU renders it an uneasy companion for the pursued research objective. For that reason, in the final section of the chapter, an extensive argument is made in favour of the MLG perspective. The latter, besides allowing for a full-scale application of the various aspects of legitimacy-i.e. direct and indirect, utilitarian and affective-to the EU, is particularly helpful in conceptualising the multi-layered legitimacy dilemmas stemming from the expansion of the EU into new territorial units. In the concluding comments of the chapter the relevance of MLG is tested in making a claim for *diverse geographical legitimation* in the enlarged EU, depending on how the membership question has been framed by national elites.

5.2 LEGITIMACY: DISENTANGLING AN AMBIGUOUS CONCEPT

Reflecting upon the notion of legitimacy, both contemporary and previous works of research are unable to reach a consensus, since the term is very elusive possessing ‘suggestive rather than analytically rigorous’ qualities, in Weiler’s words (1997a:249-251). Legitimacy is not a single quality that systems of power possess or not, but a set of multiple dimensions, and as such it would be useful to develop a taxonomy of its properties. To reach that end and tame the polyphony of academic debate, a working definition of legitimacy is in order. As Thomas Franck contends (1990:24),

> ‘Legitimacy is a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being or operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process’

In this light, legitimacy comprises both a *formal* aspect of conformity to established laws, and a *social* component of the wider recognition of such laws as normatively appropriate (Weiler,1999:77-86 *ibid*,1996:1-2). Put simply, political authority is legitimate to the extent that it is exercised according to established rules (*legality*) and is subsequently confirmed by the express consent of subordinates-be they other legitimate authorities (*indirect legitimation*) or individuals (*direct legitimation*). Such a conceptual approach is in line with that of the founding fathers of legitimacy,
as the likes of Max Weber (1978), Martin Lipset (1960), and Richard Merelman (1966) advocate. In their writings the cornerstone of political legitimacy is not just formal legality. Rather, much depends on the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the ‘belief in its legality’ (Weber, 1978:213). 92 Legitimacy, in other words, is a function of a system’s capacity to persuade members of its own appropriateness so that it will be granted with wider legitimation. The means through which such legitimation is to be accomplished remain to be discovered, pointing to additional elements in the definitional classification of legitimacy.93

After all, there is no necessary connection between the formal strands of legitimacy and its social manifestations. In a fascist regime for example, the legal form of exercising authority via certain administrative acts does not guarantee recognition in the long run. Similarly, in a liberal democratic order the constitutional rule of law, the delimitation of political authority by means of a written constitution, does not essentially proffer social approval, or ‘a readiness to conform with rules that are formally correct and that have been imposed by accepted procedure’ (Roth and Wittich, 1968; 37,131). Legality can at best have a masking function if the given system of authority cannot be legitimized independently of its legal form of exercising power. The tendency to reduce the many dimensions of legitimacy to a single one, to legality or procedural regularity alone, is therefore a crucial mistake. To tap the complexity of the concept and successfully descend the ladder of abstraction one should also take into account certain normative justifications of a legal order that impose a moral duty on citizens or other states to comply with it (Follesdal, 2004;8). As Beetham and Lord point out, the content of rules and their conformity to societal beliefs about the valid source of authority and the proper ends and standards of government can never be treated as irrelevant or inconsequential when seeking to solve the riddle of political legitimacy (1998;6). It therefore remains to be seen how the key normative principles of representation, political identity and

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92 Max Weber’s conception of legitimacy extends beyond a belief in legality, i.e. a belief in rules and procedures, to a belief in tradition, i.e. a belief in the sanctity of the past, and finally to a belief in charismatic authority. Each of these three types is analysed independently of the rest, as if they can be self-sufficient in conferring legitimacy upon a given system of power. For a detailed critique of the Weberian theory of legitimacy see Beetham, 1991:23-25.

93 Besides Weber, who separates the reasons for which citizens consider a given regime as legitimate, Merelman refers to both economic rewards and symbolic stimuli as factors that reinforce the popular base of legitimacy. Merelman, nevertheless, displays a selection bias in favour of symbols, arguing that over time symbols, if skilfully manipulated by rulers, may suffice to maintain supportive attitudes.
**effective governmental performance** build the bridge of normative justifiability that brings closer formal and social legitimacy.

The specific content of normative justifiability is deliberately shaped by liberal democratic standards in this study, since EU member states conform to the principles of liberal democracy. In a liberal democratic polity, legality is obviously not derived from custom or a sacred text but from a written constitution, which is adjudicated and enforced by independent courts. The constitutional rules in turn, offer subordinates with moral grounds for compliance where they conform to the liberal principles of promoting popular sovereignty and protecting uncontested civic rights such as liberty, life and property (Beetham, 1991). Democratic self-determination requires that the ultimate source of political authority is the people.\(^{94}\) From the principle of popular sovereignty one further derives the importance of the electoral authorization of government and the criteria of representation and accountability. Free, general elections constitute the central, though not the exclusive, mechanism for expressing the will of the people in all constitutional democracies.\(^{95}\) More specifically, in democratic regimes power is vested in the people, who are given the opportunity to articulate their interests and express their concerns in the parliament via their directly elected representatives. Representation enables and warrants government by the people, allowing the addressees of the law to participate in its making. Finally, regular electoral competition ensures that public office holders submit themselves to scrutiny and take responsibility for their decisions and actions before the wider public. Formal elections function as the ‘infrastructure of political accountability’ that effectively links those governing to those governed (Scharpf, 1999;14). Besides allowing citizens to lay the blame or praise at the door of the authorities, elections further ensure that the representative assembly will also hold the government to account for its measures, either through inquiries and investigations or through its capacity to approve and dismiss governments.\(^{96}\)

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\(^{94}\) Representation is an internal source of legitimacy existing independently of external sources such as divine will and scientific laws. For an extensive discussion on internal and external sources of legitimacy see Beetham, 1991:71-76.

\(^{95}\) Equally important are checks and balances among different levels of government, enforceable guarantees of free communication and association, and the de facto existence of a wide range of intermediary associations, political parties and credible media of mass communication (Scharpf, 1999:14 Schmitter, 1997:18).

\(^{96}\) In practice this capacity often does not exist in parliamentary systems (Vibert, 1995:204).
However, representative institutions and parliamentary majority rule work well and provide for the democratic legitimation of government only on condition that they are based on a ‘we-feeling’ among citizens (Abromeit, 1998;32). As Claus Offe argues, ‘my duty to accept the sacrifices imposed in the name of the collectivity rests on my trust in the benevolence of my fellow citizens’ (1998). In the absence of absolute win-win solutions that benefit all, the adversely affected minority accepts majority decisions so long as it believes in its essential sameness with the rest of the people making up the polity to which it sees itself as belonging (Chryssochoou, 2000;82). A collective identity that alleviates the threat of majority rule rests on a multiplicity of factors including linguistic affinity, a shared historical territory, common memories and myths of origin and a mass standardized public culture. Besides its ethnic dimension, collective identity also encompasses a civic aspect referring to common legal rights and duties for all polity members as well as a common economy with territorial mobility for all members in the homeland (Smith, 1992;60 Laffan, 1996;88-89). When popular belief in such a ‘binary’ collective identity can be taken for granted, then the majority rule is legitimised, ensuring a wider base of popular consent for its practices.

The thin version of collective identity, as manifested by shared civic rights and aspirations, cannot exist independently of its thick emotive counterpart in conferring legitimacy upon parliamentary representation and majority decision-making. Historical linguistic and cultural bonds function as a sine qua non in mobilizing a sense of community among citizens, which is subsequently translated into a morally sustainable justification of decisions taken by a directly elected majority. The thin civic identity is important in underlying the political continuity of a political community. It has, nevertheless, a complementary rather than a central role in boosting representative democracy (Wincott, 2002;492). For that reason it is sidelined in the writings of Scharpf, who first discussed the intimate links between representation and identity in his presentation of ‘input legitimacy’ - an intermediary step in the social legitimacy people ascribe to a political regime. Civic bonds, however, are at centre stage when discussing the second part of normative justifiability, i.e. popular belief in the proper ends of government. As long as the public identifies the delivery of socially defined rights, such as security, welfare and civic liberties, as the main purpose of representative democracy, the pareto-improving polity can be legitimised in a value-neutral sense that depends on a
common perception of civic interests (Beetham and Lord, 2001:447; Beetham, 1991:127). Output legitimacy can thus be achieved in constituencies with a thin civic identity. As Scharpf contends (1999:11), ‘output-oriented legitimacy has no difficulty in allowing for the coexistence of multiple, nested or overlapping, collective identities defined by specific classes of problem solving concerns, and organized according to territorial as well as functional criteria’.

In a nutshell, democratic self-determination requires that those exercising political power are not simply driven by the authentic preferences of the demos, but that they achieve a high degree of effectiveness in meeting the expectations of the governed (Menon and Weatherhill, 2002:115). Beneficial outputs stemming from the apt performance of political authorities give rise to a functional type of popular justification for the given political system. Legitimisation by results, i.e. what Easton calls ‘specific support’ (1965), Scharpf ‘output legitimacy’ (1999), and Føllesdal ‘liberal contractualism’ (1997) can be an important factor in short term political stability. Practical demand satisfaction generates the feeling of being well-governed and continues to evoke popular support (i.e. direct legitimation) as long as that feeling remains. Disappointment with particular substantive outcomes, however, very easily breeds discontent unless tempered by the conviction that the collective framework also protects embedded shared values (Wallace, 1993:100). Put simply, public respect for the regime - the underlying order of political life – can be maintained where collective identification with the political community exists even if people decide to throw the ‘scoundrels’ out of office. It is only in the absence of such affective ties that members of the political system cannot tolerate for long its inability to secure efficient outputs and ask for radical political change, a signal of political delegitimation (i.e. a loss in social legitimacy).

Consequently, output legitimacy should be assessed in combination with an unavoidable appreciation of the virtues of input legitimacy, or what Easton calls ‘diffuse support’, because the latter is more durable and cannot be dislodged due to temporary dissatisfaction with outputs. If both aspects of normative justifiability are in place then the passage from formal legality to social legitimation is guaranteed in liberal democratic systems of power. Having effectuated a full conceptual breaking-down of political legitimacy, it remains to be seen how such a multi-faced notion can be successfully transposed into the EU context. In the following section, therefore, much attention will be given to the distinct legitimacy traits diverse scholars attribute
to the EU, depending on the theoretical prism through which they perceive and analyse the process of European integration. More specifically, intergovernmentalism, federalism, and multilevel governance will be employed as genuine, heuristic tools to guide us in the search for an appropriate framework of legitimacy for the EU.

**Figure 5.1 A typology of Legitimacy**

- **Formal Legitimacy**
  - **(Legality)**

  **MECHANISMS OF LEGITIMATION**

  - **Input Legitimacy**
  - **Output Legitimacy**

  **Representation**
  - Ethnic
  - civic

  **Collective Identity Performance**

  **Social Legitimacy**
  - **(Legitimation)**

  **Indirect Elite Recognition**
  - **Direct Popular Consent**

*Source: Adapted from Beetham and Lord, 1998*
5.3 Legitimacy in the EU: Leaving Pandora’s Box Wide Open?

Much of the language used when discussing political legitimacy is indelibly marked by assumptions about the nation-state. Herein lies the crux of transferring the legitimacy debate to the European Union. The analyst almost inevitably makes the state a standard of reference against which the EU should be measured and peers at the complex process of its legitimation through the lenses of traditional statist perspectives. Intergovernmentalism and federalism, thus occupy the two extreme points of a state-inspired legitimacy continuum applied to the EU. The former presumes that the legitimacy of the Union is best located in the democratic systems of the participant states that drive the integration process. The latter views the EU not as an organization of sovereign nation states, but as a new sovereign super-state in the making. Put simply, in its federalist version the Union acquires the status of a potential producer rather than a mere consumer of political legitimacy. Devising a legitimate regime that corresponds to the EU’s ever-evolving nature, nevertheless, requires a transcendence of the orthodox continuum connecting the intergovernmental organization with the supra-national state. Hence, alternative models of legitimation shall be considered alongside the state centred ones in direct response to the multi-level system of European governance. (Banchoff, 1999; Schmitter, 1996).

Table 5.1 Theoretical Modes of EU Legitimacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modes of EU Legitimation</th>
<th>Relevant Concept of EU Legitimation</th>
<th>Relevant Mechanism of EU Legitimation</th>
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<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Indirect Elite Legitimation</td>
<td>• Output Legitimacy</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Emphasis on Europe of Member States</em></td>
<td>- Policy Effectiveness</td>
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<td>• Input Legitimacy</td>
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<td>- Representation via National</td>
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<td>Parliaments</td>
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<td>FG</td>
<td>Direct Popular Legitimation</td>
<td>• Input Legitimacy</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Emphasis on Peoples’ Europe</em></td>
<td>- Representation via the European</td>
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<td>Parliament</td>
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<td>- Overarching European Identity</td>
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<td>MLG</td>
<td>Indirect Elite Legitimation and</td>
<td>• Output Legitimacy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Direct Popular Legitimation</td>
<td>- Policy Effectiveness</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Emphasis on citizens qua organised interests</em></td>
<td>- Input Legitimacy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Representation via Interest Groups</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- EU civic id compatible with national id</td>
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5.3.a AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNT OF EU LEGITIMACY

I. Intergovernmentalism: All about formal legitimacy and indirect legitimation

In the intergovernmentalist tradition legality is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of legitimacy. The European regime is said to be legitimate by virtue of the rule of law, a principle deeply rooted in the process of European integration. This formal legitimacy is in turn, based on a series of treaties that each member state has signed and ratified in accordance with their standard legislative practices. The founding countries, for example, accepted the treaties by normal parliamentary methods, as did the United Kingdom in 1973. Other states, including Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Austria, and Finland asked their citizens directly whether they should abide by the Union law, in referenda preceding accession. Similarly, any reform of the founding treaties has to be accepted by each member state according to its own legal procedures (Arnull, 2002; Smith, 2002; 64). In essence, the principle of the ‘rule of law’ implies that both Member States and institutions act in accordance with fixed and identifiable rules and principles as embedded in the Treaties, and that sufficient judicial remedies are available to ensure respect for these rules and principles, as authoritatively interpreted by an independent court i.e. the ECJ (Obradovic, 1996; 196).

Formal legitimacy by virtue of the ECJ’s superior jurisdiction, to which national legal systems are subordinate, is the oldest and most prominent attempt to justify the European project, and at the same time an indispensable weapon that enables the Union to enforce its authority. The EU is entirely dependent on law to perform its functions as it has neither an army nor a police force. A widespread ‘belief in legality’ triggers obedience and acceptance on behalf of the Union’s constituent parts. The addressees of EU political legitimacy are primarily the member governments that formally approve the Community law via their own legal authorities. The institutional framework of the EU, therefore, enjoys a derivative, legal legitimacy i.e. one following the principle ‘that system of authority is legitimate whose authority is recognised and confirmed by the acts of other legitimate authorities’ (Beetham and Lord, 1998; 17). To put it in the German Constitutional Court’s terms, in the ‘Staatenverbund’ formed by the EU, democratic legitimation necessarily comes about through the feedback of the actions of the European
Institutions into the parliaments of the member states. As long as the EU does not fulfill the conditions of a legitimate state, lacking a true parliament where the participation of citizens is guaranteed, its legitimation must rely on the indirect democratic legitimation provided by national parliamentary systems (Hauser and Muller, 1995:29-30).

II. The privileged status of ‘output legitimacy’ in Intergovernmentalism.

As regards the content of EU legal rules, from which their indirect social justifiability by subordinate member states derives, it suffices to dwell on the language of the establishing Treaties. In Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome one reads the following:

‘The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies…to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities a high level of employment and of social protection…and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States’.

Evidently, indirect legitimation depends on the Union’s formal claim to serve a common interest in economic well-being, helping contracting states to attain efficiency in the domestic arena. Intergovernmentalists place due emphasis on the legitimation mechanism of efficiency, echoing the work of the economic historian, Alan Milward (1984 1992 Milward et al,1993), who argues that European integration is cautiously promoted and skillfully controlled by state actors with a view to overcoming the twin dilemmas of post-war growing interdependence and increased societal demands. Likewise, for Moravcsik the success and the justification of the European enterprise depends on its ability to achieve tangible results for the participating countries.

More specifically, Moravcsik acknowledges that the increasingly evident incapacity of individual states to secure the well-being of their citizens assigns great value to the ‘performance justification’ of EU power. Although such performance justification has a resonance that goes beyond the circle of national political elites, Moravcsik leaves no room for direct popular support in the European polity. Rather, he claims that the issues handled by the EU are relatively unimportant to European voters (2002b:20). In an optimistic analysis of the legitimacy deficit facing the EU, he extols the significance of derivative, intergovernmental legitimation, because the
substantive issues in which the EU specializes-trade liberalization, the removal of
non-tariff barriers, monetary policy, technical regulation in environmental and other
areas, foreign aid and general foreign policy coordination- require nothing more than
that.

Similarly, Sharpf appears to be an ardent supporter of indirect EU
legitimation via performance. Nevertheless, he does acknowledge that concerns
about social welfare at the national level may undercut substantive EU legitimacy, an
issue largely ignored by Moravcsik. Following the tradition of Joseph Schumpeter
(1954), Scharpf stresses the tension between democracy and capitalism. While
democracy presumes equality capitalism generates inequality. The greater the reach
of markets the more urgent the need for market-correcting mechanisms like social
welfare policies that will offset an upcoming social crisis. In this light, Scharpf
considers as the locus of EU legitimacy the balance between efficient market
liberalization at the EU level and appropriate social protection at the national level.

III. Intergovernmentalism and the implausibility of EU Input Legitimacy

Apart from consensus on the legitimating value of policy effectiveness, both these
intergovernmental oriented analysts find little scope for the EU to acquire input
legitimacy. Moravcsik’s attachment to an intergovernmental perception of the EU
leads him to consider the nation state the natural locus of democratic representation
and mock rising academic and political concern over the alleged democratic deficit
haunting the EU (2001 2002a 2004). The severe lack of fiscal authority at the EU
level, along with the Union’s narrow policy focus on areas that lie beyond the
substantive activities pursued by member states, and the constraints it faces in
overseeing policy implementation, clearly prove that the EU is not a ‘despotic
superstate’ but essentially depends on its member states. To this list Moravcsik adds
the procedural constraints in EU decision making as exemplified by unanimous and
super-majoritarian voting on the one hand, and institutional checks and balances on
the other. In view of these restrictive conditions it is primarily the member states
through representation in the Council of Ministers that provide the requisite input
legitimation of the Community action. National executives acting in the European
arena are democratically controlled by, and held accountable to, their national
parliaments. Moravcsik seems unperturbed by the objection that it is difficult to hold
the member states (i.e. national ministers) to account in their ‘European’ activities. For him, the bonds of such indirect accountability are tight because ‘these representatives can be re-instructed or recalled at will, often more easily than parliamentarians in national systems’ (2002a;612).

Arguing along these lines, the European Parliament (EP) is accorded an ancillary legitimating function. Working with an absolute majority of its members in the co-decision and assent procedures the EP prevents the EU from becoming an unaccountable technocracy giving confidence that it legislates in the interest of all European citizens (Hix et al,2002 Wessels and Diedrichs,1998;145). There is no doubt that the EP’s political role has evolved substantially (Corbett et al,1995; Neunreither,2000). Yet significant gaps in the EP’s capacity to contest policy choices are overlooked by Moravcsik, for whom the Parliament is powerful enough to perform its direct accountability function under the custody of the main suppliers of EU democratic legitimacy, the member states. Through the lens of such a heavily intergovernmental prism Moravcsik rightfully claims that ‘the EU is democratically legitimate as it stands…and widespread efforts to reform it in a more participatory or majoritarian direction, not least in the current constitutional convention, are…unwarranted’ (2002b;3).

Scharpf, in a less optimistic account of the EU’s legitimacy deficit, recognises that the member states as the most meaningful carriers of EU legitimacy. In his analysis the intergovernmental justification of EU power rests on an appraisal of output legitimacy and a dismissal of input democratic legitimation (1999;11,12). His point of departure, nevertheless, is different from that of Moravcsik. Instead of focusing on EU democratic accountability and the politics of representation, he places due emphasis on identity issues. ‘Government by the people’ is seriously impaired at the EU level, he contends, because there is no European people around which and for which representative democracy could be organised. Echoing Joseph Weiler’s ‘no-demos’ thesis (1997c)97, Scharpf acknowledges that the popular acceptance of EU decisions made by majority rule must rest on a deep sense of normative identity based on a shared history, language, ethnicity and culture (1999;8). In the absence of such thick collective ties the EU-wide electorate cannot accept the idea that ‘crucial areas of public life should be governed by a decision

97 On the no demos thesis see also: Wallace, 1993 and Laffan, 1996
process in which their national voice becomes a minority that may be overridden by a majority of representatives from other European countries’ (Weiler, 1993; 23). Bearing in mind the EU tendency towards the lowest common ideological denominator, Scharpf is at ease with an irremediable democratic deficit at the EU level and argues that the latter can be sidelined by output legitimation based on a common interest in material rewards rather than strong identity bonds.

In the intergovernmentalist perspective outlined above, EU input legitimacy - be it representation or identity - is an empty ritual without the existence of policy effectiveness, i.e. an output justification of EU power that serves as the main intermediary for an indirect, elite-led legitimation. For intergovernmentalists input legitimation, i.e. shared identity and democratic institutions, remain valid in the context of the nation state. Such a unilateral focus on policy outputs and their effectiveness in securing the support of the contracting member states resonates well with the original perception and evolution of the EU as a functional entity and an elite-driven experiment. In this study, nevertheless, the chosen conceptual approach to EU legitimacy shall move beyond the intergovernmental model. This is because the EU is not defined as a mere ‘policy-generating’ process but as a polity in the making i.e. ‘an entity that might develop into a form of direct governance in its own right’ (Wallace, 1993; 101). The intergovernmentalist approach has only been presented with a view to indicating the significance of policy effectiveness in producing legitimacy for the EU regime. An uncritical adoption of such a model, however, would indicate that the analyst is in favour of a static, functional perception of the Union and is blind to the political dynamics of integration fuelled not so much by the direct elections to the EP in 1979, as by the momentum generated by the Single European Act and the subsequent mobilization of wide sections of public opinion in the wake of the Maastricht treaty. In response to the growing politicisation of the European project, as manifested in various referenda, protests and opinion polls, and in respect of the changing face of the Union, as revealed in its various enlargements and the growing number of Treaties, attention will be paid to a federalist view of EU legitimacy - a legitimacy appropriate for a super state in the making (Williams, 1991).
5.3.b A Federal perception of EU legitimacy: problem solving gives way to democratic political ideology

I. Federalism and Direct Popular EU Legitimation

The sceptical intergovernmental view of direct EU legitimation is thoroughly revised in the federalist tradition. The legal validity of the Union as recognised by the signatories of the Treaties - the contracting member states - is unimpeachable. Legality, however, does not inevitably result in indirect elite consent to EU practices. Rather, a direct type of legitimation stemming from ordinary citizens is the sought-after objective in a federalist Union that wishes to justify and maintain its authority. In this light, Altiero Spinelli, a fervent Euro-federalist and among the most influential members of the first elected European Parliament, emphasized the need for an immediate leap to representative government above the nation state, based on the firm belief that this would trigger latent popular support legitimising the EU. Spinelli was driven by the conviction that people were longing for unity at the European level and were only held back by the short-sightedness of their governments. In his view such a large reservoir of popular support would help the integration project to move ahead, providing the EU authority with the essential credentials of social approval (Dinan, 1999; 12-13 Wallace and Smith, 1995; 141, 144).

Even though the federalist perspective did not gain ground in the construction of the EU, as its legitimacy was confined to elite agreement and a ‘permissive consensus’ on behalf of the public, it became all the more relevant as the deepening of integration proceeded. Since the mid 1980s, the launch of the ‘1992 project’ by the SEA, and the growth in community competences beyond economic to more obviously social and political spheres, have brought to the fore the direct impact the Union has on its citizens, underlying the significance of direct EU legitimation à la Spinelli. Simply put, as soon as negative integration i.e. the liberalization of trade activities, gave way to positive integration, i.e. direct economic regulation and the provision of public goods, citizens rather than states became the main source of the EU’s legitimacy. In this light it is only natural that the development of a ‘people’s Europe’ had been the main purpose of the Adonnino Committee, which convened in 1985 with a view to making proposals that would raise people’s consciousness of EU
political reality (Laffan, 1996:96). In addition, the popular legitimation of EU power became all the more apparent throughout the Maastricht ratification debate, letting Federalism creep onto the agenda of the European Union once again. The Danish no vote, alongside the French ‘petit oui’, stressed the dominance of technocracy and the weakness of direct popular legitimacy, thus highlighting the tension between ‘a Europe of the elites and a Europe of the electorates’ (Laffan, 1993:37).

In response to rising popular legitimation concerns federalists put forward as the most appropriate solution the establishment of robust, democratic institutions at the European level. The federalist view favours a political over a performance justification of EU power. The federalist perspective remains open to the functional idea that citizens seeing their material interests satisfied at the EU level will in turn support the profit-generating process of integration. However, in due recognition of the fact that effectiveness and democracy are at odds with each other, the federalist camp readily favours the latter over the former (Cristiansen, 1997:105 Follesdal, 2004:10). More specifically, the intensification of qualified majority voting, ever since the SEA, has undoubtedly increased the problem-solving capacity of the EU, but at the expense of representation and democratic accountability. The Council, taking decisions in favour of an EU-wide majority, is accountable to a shadowy institution removed from the mass public, rather than to a genuine European assembly, representative of its constituents and capable of exerting direct democratic control. Majoritarian decision making is not appropriate where segments of the EU’s population risk being in a permanent minority, especially if the majority cannot be trusted to consider the impact of its decisions on such minorities (Smith, 2002 Follesdal, 1997). For Federalists, therefore, the democratic deficit haunting the EU is the cornerstone of its social delegitimation rather than a sine-qua non of its policy deepening and output justification. Since the locus of legitimate power is in the constituent assembly, the successful attainment of the goals of integration lies in institutional rather than policy deepening.
II. Input prevails over Output EU Legitimacy: Favouring Representation over Performance

The European Parliament constitutes ‘the representative democratic element par excellence in the structure of the Union’ as it is the only directly elected body serving the EU (Blondel et al.,1998;10). Nonetheless, whether the EP can be regarded as a genuine democratic pillar of the EU is a matter of great controversy. Prima facie, the introduction of direct elections in 1979 was an essential step in reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of the whole European institutional apparatus (Tindemans,1976). Elections would ostensibly enable citizens to decide on the composition of EU wide authorities and help them have their say in critical EU policy choices by holding the executive branch accountable for its actions. However, the absence of vigorous political parties with distinct competitive programmes reduces EP elections to the status of ‘second order national contests’ merely reflecting the interests of domestic political cycles. European elections are fought by means of a series of parallel national campaigns whose actors scarcely relate to each other. As a result, the electorate usually votes according to issues permeating the national scene, leaving aside more relevant considerations over who runs the EU level. Strange as it may seem under national-specific parliamentary standards, the winning candidates are usually unknown to the citizens who have elected them. Hence, the EU has the trappings of democracy, but democratic practice, at least as measured by elections, is fragile (Schmitter,1997;19 Weiler,1997b;152).

Besides flawed electoral competition the European assembly is also debilitated by formidable gaps in parliamentary scrutiny. Both the Commission and the Council of Ministers are only peripherally subjected to the control of the Parliament. First, the elected European parliament has no say in the composition of the EU executive branch since ministers in the Council receive their mandate from national governments, as do the Commissioners who are nominated by member states according to fixed national quotas. The parliament can still dismiss the Commission en masse as well as block it from taking office under the terms of the Amsterdam Treaty, but this is not equivalent to holding a government accountable,  

98 An indirect democratic base is secured by the member governments represented in the Council of Ministers.
because the Commission is not a popularly authorised government in office (Muntean, 2000; 5). Nor does the Parliament affect critical EU policy choices, as it lacks true legislative capabilities. It only partially co-determines legislation, as it can block any decision by the Council without being able, however, to enforce legislation where there is resistance from the Council. (Wessels and Diedrichs, 1997; 6). Last but not least, the EP’s public forum function is severely compromised due to its language problem, its peculiar mode of operation (place and time) and the lack of media coverage stimulated by the Parliaments’ ineffective powers (Weiler et al, 1995; Wessels and Diedrichs, 1999; 146). In conclusion, the combination of these sad indictments of state-like democracy cripple the EP’s federal quest for direct popular legitimacy. The EU’s legitimacy crisis is therefore subsumed under the democratic deficit debate.

From a federalist perspective the democratic justification of the EU’s power should be irrevocably linked to a sense of collective identification among the addressees of the integration project - the wider public. Each federation is presumed to have a population that identifies predominantly with it. This does not preclude simultaneous identification with one or more of its sub-units, as federalism is uniquely capable of appeasing socio-cultural and even ethno-linguistic cleavages by allowing the existence of multiple nested identities. Even so, an overarching common identity is a necessity for any federation to survive (Schmitter, 2004; 14). That is why Spinelli, the founding father of EU federalism, referred to a ‘European people’ who would freely express their will via the election of a European assembly and contribute to EU decision making. The European people, in this early Eurofederalist discourse, alluded to a civic body linked via ethnic bonds, i.e. a shared sense of history and culture (Banchoff and Smith, 1999; 7). In sum, under the federal model a classical precondition for political democracy is an ‘organic identity’ forged by ethno cultural criteria that generates a sense of community amongst the subjects of majoritarian decision-making body.

In the Euro-federalist club, nevertheless, those who recognize the EP as the main repository of EU legitimacy, assume that it will almost automatically generate a sense of belonging to Europe simply by giving citizens the opportunity to participate in its election and by securing democratic accountability over the exercise of EU power. This argumentation induces an interlevel fallacy because it takes for granted the idea that strong identity links will grow among the people of an EU super-state as
long as it is provided with strong representative institutions. The means through which such a we-feeling is produced are left unexplored due to the conviction that an immediate leap to representative government will help release latent EU support, solving any legitimacy problems. In this manner the federalist perspective reaches an analytical dead end because it wrongly associates state-like federations with an imagined EU super-state. Reaching the classical understanding of a ‘people’ in relation to a collective organic identity is not only unlikely but impossible in a supranational parliamentary EU democracy (Kelstrup, 2000;25 Laming, 1995;117). Federalism, by conflating the democratic deficit with the legitimacy deficit debate, renders itself redundant as an adequate explanatory framework of EU legitimacy. For a start, the excessive weight assigned to representation over a performance justification of EU authority raises doubts over the federalist capacity to encapsulate all basic aspects of EU legitimation. In addition, the lack of an EU demos around which and for which federal democracy works highlights the insurmountable obstacles involved in employing a federal framework of analysis when elaborating on the legitimacy of the expanding Union.

5.3. C LEGITIMACY IN A MULTI-LEVEL AND POLY-CENTRIC EUROPEAN POLITY

1. MLG and the contested nature of the EU

Drawing upon the preceding argumentation it becomes clear that federalism, much like intergovernmentalism, is a deficient partner in helping us understand the legitimacy problem of the EU. The principal shortcomings of the aforementioned established approaches stem from their state-loaded explanations of the process of European integration. Nation states have fixed borders, unique identities, formal constitutions, well-established [institutional] practices, and sovereignty over other claimants to authority, as Philippe Schmitter rightfully contends (2001;2). In the ever-evolving European polity, however, none of the above holds. Circumscribed territorial boundaries are an illusion in the face of the Union’s continuous expansion to an as yet indefinite number of new countries. The multiple demois, operating autonomously within the member states, render the acquisition of a stable, overarching identity more a utopian dream than a concrete reality. The newly born constitutional treaty in turn is more of a surrogate than a blood relative of the genuine constitution. The multiplicity of institutional settings interacting with each other at
the EU level, as well as the expansion in the scope of the EU’s activities, blur the boundaries between the national and the supranational. Last but not least, sovereignty rests with the member states, which only engage in the exercise of merging their sovereignties with one another.

The EU, then, if not an ‘objet politique non-identifié’, is certainly less than a classic federation and more than a functional, intergovernmental regime. In symbolic terms, the EU is not a tricycle that one can safely steer and park anywhere because of its heavy dependence on traditional statist standards. Rather, an accurate description of European integration has more in common with a bicycle, because it is doomed to move forward - leaving behind its early intergovernmental cooperation profile - unless it is ready to risk toppling over and causing its member state riders to fall off (Schmitter, 1997; 35 Moravcsik, 2001; 163). Of course, the EU bicycle’s destination is not necessarily that of a superstate. Rather, the feasibility of the bicycle theory depends more on its promising depiction of the Union as a moving target and less on its federal connotations. In an attempt to invent new analogies that give a definable shape to the Union, many analysts have re-conceptualised the ever-evolving EU as a multi-level polity, where national and supranational institutions and practices intermingle (Wessels, 1997 Christiansen, 1997). The multi-level governance (MLG) perspective refers to the existence of overlapping functional competences among a multiplicity of actors - private and public - at different levels of territorial aggregation: subnational, national, and supranational (Marks et al. 1996; 41). And for Philippe Schmitter it is precisely such a ‘growing dissociation between territorial constituencies and functional competences’ at the EU level that proves the novelty of the emerging Euro-polity’ (1997; 29).

At this point however one may plausibly ask what the link between the MLG approach and the legitimacy deficit facing the EU is exactly? To begin with, the MLG analysis resets the EU legitimacy debate in more comprehensive terms because it unhinges the concept of legitimacy from that of the nation state. The political legitimacy standards of the EU now refer to a much looser form of territorial and functional arrangement between member states – what Schmitter calls condominium (1996). The latter refers to a polity where both functional and territorial

99 More specifically, Schmitter stresses the ‘multi-level’ and the ‘poly-centric’ nature of the EU in due recognition of both the territorial and functional dispersion of the EU. For that reason he prefers using the term ‘Multi-level and Polycentric Governance (Schmitter, 2004; 16).
constituencies vary (ibid;1997;33). Such a flexible conceptualisation in turn, allows for the simultaneous consideration of different sources and mechanisms of EU legitimation.

A pluralist portrait of legitimacy is a sine-qua non for an EU that is expanding its membership to an ever increasing number of member states. To begin with, the incorporation of both direct and indirect sources of legitimation in the multi-level perspective shows that the elite justification of EU power, as exemplified in the application for membership (ex-ante), and shaped in the accession negotiations (dum), may have significant implications in the ex-post formation of public attitudes towards the EU. As will become clear in the pages to come, the MLG approach makes no explicit reference to the wider public as a source of direct EU legitimation. Still, its emphasis on new patterns of political activity point to an emerging European demos whose civic personality remains to be consolidated via the intermediation of not only business groups but also grass roots interest groups such as women or consumers (Banchoff and Smith,1999;12-13 Chryssochoou,2000;16-17).

In addition, the reason for adopting such a pluralist vision of political legitimacy is that enlargement makes EU legitimacy a matter of both degree and substance. Put simply, some entrant states traditionally support the EU more than others, while, at the same time, their populations tend to attribute a different kind of legitimation to the EU. Such legitimation can be either output-utility oriented or input-affective in character. Due to the contested nature of the Union, not all member states share the same beliefs or normative ideas about why the EU is a legitimate polity. For some, the economic benefits stemming from membership function as the sole criterion of normative justification. For others, an affective attachment to the democratic credentials of the EU can help them surpass a purely utilitarian conviction about the rightfulness of EU governance. In this sense, the legitimacy of the EU, just like the legitimacy of any political system, is not a fixed quality that can be deduced from its institutional set-up. Instead, different EU member states, behaving like different groups in a society, assess the legitimacy of the EU political system differently (Jachtenfuchs et al.1998;413). Such divergent popular convictions over the Union’s legitimate hold on power, in turn, stem from diverse elite attitudes towards the EU starting as early as the time of accession. The MLG approach thus substantiates its relevance for the current research by highlighting the crucial links between the pluralist form of legitimacy it advocates and EU enlargement politics.
II. Multi-level sources of EU Legitimation: Indirect elite consent and broader civic approval meet

Unlike intergovernmentalism and federalism, the MLG perspective enables the analyst to find substitutes for the conventional ‘statist’ solutions regarding EU political legitimacy. The multi-level approach acknowledges the significance of national interests in the integration process, but does not conceive of the EU as the mere creation of nation states, for which indirect elite consent is the only possible source of legitimation since the state remains the natural locus of direct popular support and recognition. Nor does the MLG perspective fall into the federalist trap of exalting the significance of mass representative politics as the sole means of producing direct civic legitimation in a putative European super-state. Rather, the multi-level perspective, by emphasising the ‘multiple modalities of authority’ at the EU level, manages to relax the tension between indirect-elite and direct-popular EU legitimation, hinting at the crucial links between the two (Rosamond, 2000;111). Allowing for states, special interests and mass publics to coexist and interact at various stages of the integration process, MLG performs the more demanding task of departing from the real sources of political acceptance in the Union. Put simply, MLG follows an inductive rather than a deductive model in locating the sources of EU legitimation. It systematically evaluates the empirical evidence emanating from the EU reality instead of uncritically applying a fixed set of state-loaded criteria to a sui-generis polity (Wessels, 2003;104).

As stated above, a multi-layered perception of EU legitimacy implies that the participants in the legitimation process are not just a fixed number of national elites, but an enormous variety of sub-national units and networks, supranational associations and transnational firms (Schmitter, 2004;21). Attention is thus redirected away from indirect nation-state authorization towards the new patterns of political activity that foster EU legitimation. Such novel patterns are comfortably subsumed under the term ‘policy networks’ (Peterson, 1995b Richardson, 1996). The latter consist of policy making sites where interdependent actors mediate their interests in search of pareto-optimal solutions. European and national officials, technocrats, representatives of non-governmental organizations and other interest groups, journalists, and academics make up the clusters of various actors who share information and resources (Peterson, 1995a;76). In sum, network governance, by
bringing social actors into European decision-making and forging European wide advocacy coalitions, transforms the Community system from ‘a Union of States into a trans-national political space’ (Kohler-Koch,1999;12).

A policy network analysis capturing the dynamics of EU policy making may seem inappropriate in investigating the impact of a history making moment like enlargement on direct EU legitimation, not least because it would appear to challenge the intergovernmental emphasis on the primacy of nation-state actors and their preferences in the integration process. This means that EU enlargement should not be explained in terms of national elite motivations, nor should the analyst cater for the impact of such motivations on subsequent EU legitimation by the public. Policy networks, however, do not dismiss the importance of national elites in all phases of European integration. Rather, they only underline their varying effects in everyday EU policy making, where several other actors also have a stake. Policy networks in essence pinpoint the interactive relationship between national elites, European institutions, and transnational interest groups in EU politics. It is therefore perfectly legitimate to employ such a multi level perspective when studying the interaction between indirect elite approval of the EU as testified via membership negotiations, and the direct popular legitimation of the Union that evolves in the course of time.

The crucial question to be addressed at this point concerns the applicability of the MLG perspective to the study of the social legitimation of the EU via the wider public. Put simply, do policy networks and interest groups relate to public opinion? And if so, how? The multi-level approach, which emphasises a wide variety of societal actors and interest group consultation, opens up a new perspective in the democratic legitimation of the EU called ‘government with the people’, and which exists on a complementary basis with ‘government by the people’. Pluralist EU decision making, in other words, opens up to ‘citizens qua organized interests as opposed to qua voters’ (Schmidt,2004;985). In multi-layered EU governance the political activities of regional actors and new social movements, reveal an increasing readiness to bring the concerns of constituents to bear at the European level. In response to this increasing emphasis on the preferences of the public and the legitimation it may confer upon the EU structure, the Commission has grown particularly receptive to the arguments of civic interests. In an attempt to appease a growing suspicion that government with the people may end up as ‘government with some of the people’, the Commission has become particularly active in mobilizing
citizens and in creating grass roots interest groups, comprising consumers, environmentalists, women etc. Also indicative of the rising concern over direct popular legitimation stemming from multi-layered EU decision making are the studies conducted by the Forward Studies Unit (FSU) of the European Commission. In a paper promoting deliberative politics and participation at the EU level, the FSU urges for ‘a radical rethink of what is needed for legitimate rule production’. More specifically, it argues that social actors should negotiate forms of self-regulation among themselves, with EU institutions intervening only to ensure the following conditions of fairness: a) the inclusion of representatives of all those affected by a rule, b) compensation for inequalities in cognitive resources, and c) the substitution of public reason for purely sectional patterns of preference formation (as quoted in Lord and Beetham, 2001; 452-3).

All in all, the preceding discussion proves that the MLG perspective does not essentially restrict the analyst from considering the direct popular legitimation of the EU. Interest groups and social movements, depicted as the carriers of social legitimation in the multi-level European polity, function as the intermediaries of public concerns. It is in no way incidental that in the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance civil society is seen as a means of delivering services that meet people’s needs (Commission, 2001; 14). In the present study therefore, the MLG approach to EU legitimacy will be adopted in an attempt to study the evolution of public opinion in the aftermath of accession negotiations. After all, tracing the opinions of national-specific social actors and interest groups on the desirability of European integration constitutes an impossible mission, as there no such studies available. In view of this, the new patterns of political activity arising from the multi-level perspective will be conceived in a broader sense as encompassing the wider EU society.

**III. The MLG emphasis on Utilitarian legitimation: Policy effectiveness and the role of Subsidiarity**

The principal legitimating mechanism underlying the MLG perspective is utilitarian in character. Multi-level governance in the EU may be seen as ‘government for the

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100 Civil society includes the following: trade unions and employers’ organisations (social partners), non-governmental organisations; professional associations, charities, grass-roots organisations, organisations that involve citizens in local and municipal life with a particular contribution from churches and religious communities.
people’, i.e. as a functional type of organisation whose purpose is to promote the interests of the member states and the welfare of their citizens. Put simply, the success of the European multi-level enterprise depends on its ability to achieve tangible results not just for participating governments but also for the wider population at large. Legitimacy, in other words, is premised on an ongoing calculation of costs and benefits (Höreth, 1999; Eriksen and Fossum, 2004; Eriksen and Fossum, 2004; 251). The utility-oriented legitimacy of the MLG approach, however, differs substantially from the utilitarian logic of intergovernmentalism. To begin with, unlike intergovernmentalists who insist that ‘the EU specializes in those areas of modern democratic governance that tend to involve less direct political participation’, the MLG approach establishes the reach of the EU’s policy effectiveness beyond mere cross-border economic activities (Moravcsik, 2002a:606). More specifically, the proponents of MLG recognize the growing strain the EU’s economic policy places on areas of strong public concern such as social welfare, and comment positively on the extension of the Union’s competences in new policy fields (Menon and Weatherhill, 2002:130). Of course, they do acknowledge the impossibility of an EU-wide redistribution of resources between individuals, since Europeans would not accept heavy taxation to support Europeans from other nations in the absence of a strong EU identity. Even so the MLG advocates new modes of governance, such as the OMC\textsuperscript{101}, that give ‘welfare issues an unprecedented presence at the European level’, proving at the same time that the EU has made decisive inroads into areas of wide public concern (Wincott, 2002:493-494).

Moreover, for MLG the performance justification of the EU does not extend only to the member states. Citizens are also the addressees of the Union’s effective policy-making and their interests are catered for by the multi-layered policy networks operating at the EU level. EU recognition is not therefore exclusively premised on the democratic legitimacy of the member governments, but involves their wider publics as well. In turn, the combination of state-specific and popular legitimation in the MLG perspective echoes the relevance of the subsidiarity principle in a multi-level context of action. Subsidiarity in a dichotomous perspective represents the delineation of the respective spheres of competence of the EU vis-à-vis its member

\textsuperscript{101} The OMC was established in the Maastricht Treaty (Art 98-99) for economic policy coordination and applied to employment policy in the Amsterdam Treaty (Art.125-130) The Lisbon Summit then applied OMC to industrial and social-policy goals as well. For a discussion on the OMC procedure see Scharpf, 2002.
states on the one hand, while on the other it represents a means of localizing EU decision making, thereby bringing it closer to citizens via regional and local bodies (De Burca, 1996; 368). Subsidiarity, in other words, is a mechanism for strengthening indirect elite support for the EU, allowing member governments to avoid unwarranted EU intrusions, and transfer competences to the EU level only where they are not capable of acting effectively. At the same time it is also linked to the principle of democratic participation, because by dispersing power in the multi-layered Euro-polity, it pursues the objective of reducing the gap between the EU and its citizens (Hauser and Müller, 1995; 34-35; Laffan, 1993; 43).

All in all, subsidiarity is not merely intended to increase policy effectiveness and thus EU’s utilitarian legitimacy. It is also indicative of the multi-level functioning of the Union as it allows for the coexistence of a plurality of polities at different levels of aggregation: supranational, national and subnational. The varying functional competences distributed among the different territorial levels point to a poly-centric arrangement of authority in the EU, for which a multi-layered legitimacy would be appropriate. This type of multi-level legitimacy, apart from being both indirect and direct, could simultaneously exhibit variability in its degree. This means that in a multi-level polity one could perceive different member states with defined territorial boundaries and with variable levels in the utilitarian legitimacy they ascribe to the EU. In this light, the hypothesis stemming from such a multi-level version of EU legitimacy could easily account for variations in support for the EU among different types of EU entrants. Namely,

H1 Among Utility Maximizing candidates, whose accession is based on either economic or security criteria, utilitarian legitimacy is expected to fluctuate more depending on the actual benefits derived from membership.

On the contrary,

H2 Among Value Maximizing entrants, whose accession is based mainly on ideological-political criteria, utilitarian legitimacy is expected to increase irrespective of the degree of membership benefits, as utilitarian evaluations are filtered by an affective attachment to the EU.
IV. Multi-level EU Input Legitimation: Emphasis on Identity

In the MLG tradition, utilitarian and affective strategies for EU legitimation exist in a relationship of mutual reinforcement. EU legitimation factors are not merely rooted in the economic advantages of integration. Rather, the problem-solving capacity of the Union possesses a significant political dimension, given that the policy choices made by the multi-layered EU system of governance respond to the authentic preferences of ‘citizens qua organised interests’ (Schmidt, 2004; 985). Nonetheless, government by the people in a multi-level Euro-polity is not reminiscent of representative government at the nation state level, where decisions are delivered through ‘publicly mandated political programmes or electorally dismissible leaderships’ (Lord and Magnette, 2004; 189). The new forms of governance activated by the poly-centric Euro authority have their own, distinct, representative characteristics. For example, policy solutions are often negotiated in networks that include a wide range of actors. Deliberation prevails in the search for consensus, while the decision rules adopted make it hard for over-represented majorities to hog the benefits of cooperation for themselves (Heritier, 1999; Joerges and Neyer, 1997; Kohler-Koch, 1996). Interactive, decentralised institutions have also given rise to complex links between the state and society in Europe. The European Parliament, for example, due to its enhanced role in policy making, has become a magnet for intermediary groups, lobbies, and interest organizations following the path-breaking role of the Commission in institutionalising interaction between supranational institutions and national executives, civil servants and sub-national actors (Mazey and Richardson, 1996; 209; Kochler-Koch, 1997; 7). Besides interest groups, political parties are beginning to see themselves as ‘inextricably bound’ to the multi-level European polity. European Parliament party groups have strengthened their contacts with existing national parties, while interaction has also increased with sub-national politicians following the establishment of the Committee of Regions (Hix, 1995).

From the preceding discussion it is apparent that the EP is not the sole stronghold of affective legitimacy in the EU that could give rise to a collective personality called the EU people via its representative politics, as federalists argue, and that input legitimacy is not based on the member states with their distinct parliaments representing their distinct peoples, as intergovernmentalists contend.
Instead, EU affective legitimacy derives from pluralistic and fluid forms of representation. Such new forms of representation reflect the reality of the EU as a polity composed of multiple identities operating at multiple levels of governance. More specifically, the MLG perspective manages to surpass the pessimism of state-centric approaches regarding the evolution of affective support for the EU (input legitimation). Representation at the EU level is no longer an empty ritual due to the absence of an overarching, organic EU identity based on shared ethnic characteristics such as language, culture and history. Rather, the MLG approach introduces novel modes of representation that stop the Union from falling short of democratic accountability and policy responsiveness. Emphasis is shifted from purely institutional considerations (i.e. the EP) to grass roots political developments that enhance citizen participation and allow for the emergence of a transnational European demos. This multi-layered EU representation stems from and subsequently endorses a nesting of compatible regional, national and supranational identities (Banchoff and Smith, 1999; 15).

In multi-level politics, therefore, EU input legitimation is sustained via the emergence of an European civic identity which does not displace national identity links. The co-centric circles of identity in turn allude to European Constitutional patriotism (Habermas, 1992). An EU identity can be one based on common core political values that point not only to a common past but more importantly to an agreed shared political future (Habermas, 1992; 12). Liberal democratic values have the force to be detached from the specificities of nation state identities and become universal among societies that share those value commitments. Such shared civic values, in turn, successfully construct a ‘we’ in a context of diversity which reflects the core values of the ‘uniting’ parts, as Chryssochoou contends (ibid; 1996; 791). Only on these grounds can a transnational demos be realized, that is a body of common political and democratic beliefs which in the long-run shapes a real-political rather than an imagined-mythical community. A group consciousness of this sort, that presupposes respect for national identities while building upon a common liberal democratic culture for Europeans, will be central in the treatment of EU input legitimation (affective legitimacy), which will be translated as popular identification with the EU.

In conclusion, such a multi-level conceptualisation of EU identity is particularly significant for the current research framework. To begin with, the
intimate links it establishes with output legitimacy, in the sense that policy effectiveness can reinforce a civic sense of belonging to the EU, allow for a comprehensive treatment of legitimacy at the European level. At the same time the intermingling of the utilitarian and affective legitimation factors (effectiveness and identity) that operate among multiple territorial constituencies in an enlarged EU help us conceive of a Union which will exhibit considerable geographical variation with regard to which legitimation strategy is dominant (Eriksen and Fossum, 2004; 441). Last but not least, assuming a multi-layered identity among EU member states in general and their respective demoi in particular also allows the analyst to consider variations in the degrees of EU identification among the various territorial constituents. In this sense the following hypothesis seems particularly pertinent:

**H3** Among Utility Maximizing candidates, whose accession is based on either economic or security benefits to be derived from membership, affective legitimacy towards the EU is expected to be low because of a lack of identification with the integration project.

On the contrary,

**H4** Among Value Maximizing entrants, whose accession is mainly based on ideological-political criteria, affective legitimacy is expected to increase because of an affective attachment to the liberal democratic principles of the EU that decisively filter public attitudes.

### 5.4 Conclusions: Diverse Geographical Legitimation in the Enlarged EU

Overall, this chapter has tried to offer an answer to the intricate question of how the state-loaded concept of legitimacy can best be applied to a post-national entity, the EU. The gist of the thesis proposed is that a multi-level perception of legitimacy would better suit the multiple territorial constituencies and the poly-centric functional tasks making up the Union than either the intergovernmental or federalist models of legitimacy. The EU, in other words, is seen as neither an organization of sovereign democratic national states, where public support for its practices is highly inconsequential due to prevalently indirect elite legitimation, nor as a kind of supranational democratic state, where direct popular legitimation is taken for granted as soon as EU citizens acquire an overarching European identity that superimposes
itself on national bonds. Rather, the multi-level approach to legitimacy accounts for both indirect elite and direct popular legitimation, acknowledging the evolution of the EU from a horizontal system of interstate cooperation still operating at the super-systemic level of history-making political decisions (like enlargement), to a vertical and multi-layered policy making body acting in the name of organised interest groups who stand in as intermediaries of the wider public, helping them build thin identity links with the EU, which are compatible with national identities.

Combining indirect and direct elite legitimation, as previously argued, opens the way for considering the impact of indirect elite support for Union membership at the time of accession on the subsequent evolution of public support for the EU. Yet, more crucial, finally, is the fact that the multi-layered perspective permits a conceptualisation of the variable sources of EU legitimation – both utilitarian and affective (i.e. performance and identity) - operating distinctively among different territorial constituencies, i.e. different EU member states. In this sense, we can make a case for diverse geographical legitimation in the enlarged European polity, echoing Scharpf’s argument (2002) on legitimate diversity. Just as he advocates variable geometry - i.e. the application of nationally distinct policy solutions - in areas that have high political salience in the constituencies of member states, the present study advocates variable legitimation, both in substance (i.e. utilitarian or affective) and degree, among the multiple territorial units making up the enlarged EU, depending on elite attitudes to EU membership, that subsequently affect people’s support for the EU. In this sense, the multi-level perspective allows us to successfully address the question of why some countries are more in favour of European Integration than others.
CHAPTER 6
CONSIDERING THE LINK BETWEEN ENLARGEMENT POLITICS AND THE EVOLUTION OF UTILITARIAN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE EU

6.1 INTRODUCTION

By translating the multi-level model of EU legitimation into practice, this chapter seeks to shed further light on the debate over the determinants of public support for European integration. Mass opinion, for a significant number of scholars, is driven by short-term economic conditions and peoples’ cost-benefit calculations. This study challenges such a uni-dimensional utilitarian perception and proposes an alternative model in which elite opinions on Europe decisively infiltrate public economic calculations. In particular, the central question to be addressed is not what drives citizens to support or oppose the EU, but why support has in the long-run been higher in some countries and lower in others, irrespective of the short-run economic costs and benefits associated with membership. By proposing multi-level interaction between a) elite and mass opinion on European integration (i.e. between the two levels of EU legitimation), as well as b) performance and identity (i.e. between the two sources of EU legitimation), this model will help us uncover the dynamics behind the multiple degrees of popular legitimation that render certain countries Eurosceptic and others Europhoric. In turn, a correct understanding of international variation in support for European integration will enable us to predict with greater precision the evolution of the EU and what triggers certain countries’ preference for intergovernmentalism over a pro-integrationist consensus on the need to follow a supranational path.

The identity-framing capacity of EU enlargement politics is tested against national economic performance indicators. Hence, supranational politics intermingle with national macroeconomic management. In essence, the elite classification along the Utility Maximisation (UM) and the Value Maximisation (VM) axis becomes instrumental in accounting for the relatively constant chasm in popular support for integration among the countries that form the EU. Taking into account the prevalent elite motivations for seeking accession to the EU, the ‘supranational model’ attacks the exogeneity of national economic perceptions implicit in the ‘economic voting’ literature, which argues that domestic macroeconomic conditions are systematically
related to EU support. The model proposed here opts instead for an endogenous perception of EU benefits. This means that public utilitarian evaluations of the EU depend more on how national elites have framed EU membership, first in the supranational and then in the domestic arena, than on post-accession economic performance per se. Confirming such expectations, the regression analysis undertaken reveals that after controlling for a wide set of economic factors the mean level of support in UM countries is substantially lower than those of VM countries. In this light, the empirical evidence allows us to evaluate the relative causal power of the distinct identity frames offered by UM and VM elites. Future research can build on these results in order to theorize how economic calculations are cued by national elites. Given that the EU is rarely foremost in citizens’ minds, we need to understand how elites’ attitudes to membership, based on either material interests or on collective identity concerns, come to bear on European integration.

Before estimating the long-run impact of identity-framing elite attitudes on short-term utilitarian popular calculations and suggesting avenues for future research the following intermediary steps will be taken. In the first part of this chapter I identify the Eurobarometer questions that will help me construct a valid measure of utilitarian attitudes towards the EU. Then I expose the weaknesses of the ‘economic voting model’, which has prevailed in empirical studies of utilitarian EU support and advocate the ‘quasi-economic voting’ approach instead. I then identify the economic indicators that have functioned as explanatory variables in the relevant empirical literature. Finally, I set out the parameters of the ‘supranational model’ of utilitarian support for the EU, the implications of which I test across the fifteen ‘old’ member states, since the scarcity of public opinion data for the new entrants does not allow their inclusion in the analysis. All in all, I take stock of the field so as to define my point of departure and come up with a novel multi-level approach that seeks to explain the divide between pro-integration and Eurosceptic member states, and thereby account better for the course of European integration.
6.2 The Eastonian Objects of Support: A Useful Guide in Measuring Utilitarian EU Legitimacy

Utilitarian legitimacy has been central to the analysis of the EU, as the enterprise of European Unification was firmly grounded on economic perspectives. A utilitarian justification of this sort depends on the EU’s capacity to ensure pareto-optimal performance for its member states, especially in the economic realm. The question that needs to be tackled is thus how should one measure the utility oriented legitimacy mass publics ascribe to the EU (Chierici, 2005; Eichenberg, 1998).

In order to answer this question I refer to Easton and his conceptualisation of the political objects towards which mass public support is directed. According to the latter, there are three main elements of political systems, which become the objects of popular support in general: the political community, the regime and the political authorities. The political community is the cultural entity that transcends the particularities of formal governing structures. The regime is constituted of those principles, formal processes and institutions that transcend particular incumbents. Finally, the political authorities are those officials occupying governmental posts at a particular point in time. Specific support, in turn, which depends on the effects of daily outputs, i.e. how much EU membership has contributed to lower unemployment and higher economic growth, is mainly directed towards the political authorities. The latter are held responsible for the specific outputs that either satisfy or outrage the members of a political system (Easton, 1965; 267-8, 273; Niedermayer and Westle, 1995; 36-37).

Specific support in this sense helps us operationalise utilitarian legitimacy, translating the latter as the popular evaluation of the activities of political elites. Popular satisfaction or disenchantment with political office holders, nevertheless, cannot be used in the proposed research framework for it is a short-term, idiosyncratic evaluation which does not necessarily signal a rise or drop in support for the EU itself. If one takes into account the increased volatility of leadership evaluations, negative attitudes towards particular incumbents can exist with little loss in the legitimacy of the EU as a system of supranational governance (Dalton, 1999, 59). What is more, data on popular evaluations of particular EU elites are almost impossible to obtain, given the absence of relevant survey items. And, even if such questions were to be included, it is dubious whether the ensuing results would be valid in the absence of political leadership figures that the public can hold
accountable for the performance of the EU by voting them out at the next elections. For these reasons, I shall instead turn my attention to popular evaluations of EU regime performance (Weatherford, 1987; 13).

In light of the preceding argumentation, in order to measure the utilitarian legitimacy citizens’ ascribe to the EU regime one would ideally use an indicator that captures variation in support for specific EU policy outcomes over time and across nations. Unfortunately, such a specific EU ‘performance’ measure is not available for a substantial sequence of Eurobarometer (EB) surveys. Consequently, one must construct an indicator of utilitarian legitimacy from survey questions of a more general nature. Hence, in the ensuing analysis the dependent variable will be constructed from the ‘membership’ EB indicator\textsuperscript{102}, which has utilitarian overtones. In particular, a net measure will be employed subtracting the percentage of survey respondents who feel that their country’s membership in the EC is a good thing from those who feel it is a bad thing. Even though the EB question on ‘National Benefit’ evokes more direct utilitarian calculations, it does not have as many time points as the ‘Membership’ survey item, which fully covers the 29 year time-span I am interested in, i.e. 1973-2002, and can account for the evolution of support in all the EU entrant states that come under scrutiny. The 0.776 correlation between responses to these two questions suggests that there is nothing inherently wrong in preferring one over the other, as they both represent tangible appraisals of integration and broadly reflect citizens’ utilitarian attitudes towards the EU regime (see table 6.2).

6.3 A NATION STATE OR EU-DEPENDENT THEORY OF PUBLIC OPINION?

Having operationalised the dependent variable by means of the aforementioned Eurobarometer question, the impression given is that I employ an EU-dependent theory of public opinion. According to the latter, citizens directly judge the EU’s performance, developing an independent view of what it means to participate in the integration process. EU events and policies determine people’s orientations and the Union is considered to be the single most important actor in the formulation of mass attitudes. According to this perspective, citizens’ should express support for or reject the EU on the basis of a trade-off between integrative costs and benefits. However, the EU-dependent approach on the evolution of public opinion does not fit this research context, not only because respondents’ sophistication on EU matters is low,

\textsuperscript{102} For the exact wording of the ‘Membership’ and ‘Benefit’ EB questions see Appendix 1.
as a sequence of EB surveys have proved, but mainly due to the nature of the
independent variable. Assuming that there are two distinct elite motivations at the
time of accession that may affect the evolution of mass attitudes in different ways, I
immediately recognise the importance of both the supranational and national
contexts in shaping popular evaluations of the EU.

Hence, I shall seek to explain variations in EU support using a nation-state
dependent theory of public opinion. In other words, I assume that popular opinions
towards the EU are conditioned by the national environment (Anderson, 1998
Kritzinger, 2003: 220-221). In doing so, I first open the way for the exploration and
employment of an ‘economic voting’ model on the basis of which mass publics
independently use the performance of the nation-state as a ‘proxy’ that will help
them shape utilitarian attitudes towards the EU, despite their general ignorance about
integration. At the same time, I prepare the ground for the advanced model put
forward in this chapter, in which the causality is elite driven since mass publics may
also have their objective national economic evaluations mediated by domestic elites’
attitudes to Europe.

6.4 AN EU ADJUSTED ECONOMIC VOTING MODEL OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The argument that public support for the EU waxes and wanes with domestic
economic conditions originates from theories of economic voting (Lewis-
Beck, 1988). According to the latter, European electorates evaluate incumbent
governments on the basis of national economic policy outcomes that determine
application of economic voting assumptions to public support for European
Integration would, nevertheless, be problematic. First and foremost, at the EU level
there is no real government to hold directly accountable for economic policy failures.
And even if one regards the Commission as an ‘EU government’, effective electoral
accountability cannot be achieved via European Parliament elections, since the
composition of the EP does not affect the composition of the Commission or the
Council of Ministers, the executive organs of the Community. European Parliament
elections, however, will help me make the case for a ‘quasi economic voting model’
where an effective mechanism of direct electoral accountability is absent in a
practical sense, remaining present at a symbolic level only.
In other words, by transposing economic voting theory from the national to the supranational level I make some concessions, and thereby seize the middle ground between an ‘ideal’ and a ‘worst’ economic voting scenario (see figure 6.1). If the EU quasi-economic voting model was based on electoral accountability alone, the organization would be found on the right hand side of the continuum. This is because, as already mentioned, there are no real EU voters, and European parliamentary elections are reduced to the status of ‘second order national contests’ reflecting the interests of domestic political cycles rather than the preferences of the public for the development of Union policies (Smith, 1995; 200 and Bromley, 2001; 74-75). What nevertheless sustains the quasi-economic voting hypothesis for the EU case is the assumption that EU citizens, even if not highly sophisticated, are at least able to recognise the broad contours of the integration project and develop self-interested attitudes when assessing the EU in opinion polls.

Against this, evidence on self-perceived knowledge of the public towards the EU leads to suspicion over the sustainability of the ‘quasi economic-voting’ model. More specifically, in Eurobarometer surveys conducted between 2000 and 2003 only 27% of EU citizens said they knew quite a lot to a great deal about the EU (choosing the numbers 6 to 10 on the ten point scale), while a significant majority - around two thirds of the population - felt uninformed on

Figure 6.1 EU Quasi-Economic Voting

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<tr>
<th>EU Quasi Economic Voting</th>
<th>‘Ideal-Case’ Economic Voting</th>
<th>‘Worst-Case’ Economic Voting</th>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic accountability</td>
<td>Symbolic accountability</td>
<td>No democratic accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Respondent Sophistication</td>
<td>EU information using NS proxies</td>
<td>Respondent Ignorance</td>
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</table>
EU matters. People’s actual levels of knowledge on the European Union are rather disheartening if one takes into account the results of a short EB quiz conducted in 2002. Only 28% of respondents knew that the EU does not consist of 12 member states while more than half wrongly thought this to be true (54%). Such findings give credence to Janssen’s statement that ‘the issue of integration may be too difficult, too abstract or not interesting enough for the average citizen to form a well thought-out attitude’ (Janssen, 1991:467).

If the ‘information failure’ presented by Eurobarometer surveys accurately depicts reality then it makes little sense to use economic voting theory when measuring utilitarian support for the EU. In the absence of relevant information, mass publics can neither ‘reward’ the EU for economic prosperity, nor ‘punish’ it for any economic downturn in the polls (Key, 1968). However, if the EU public were unable to accurately connect economic policy cause and effect, then EU political actors would not be attentive to swings in public opinion and would certainly have little reason to represent the policy preferences of the mass public. The evolution of Eurobarometer Surveys by the European Commission, nevertheless, points to the opposite scenario, showing that public opinion matters at the EU level. In addition, the wide publicity for both the structural funds and the ‘Euro’ in all member states proves that supranational political actors try to represent, if not fully then at least partially, the policy preferences of EU citizens at large. More specifically in the latter campaign, the architects of the European project sell this as a means of improving citizens’ welfare by reducing regional inequality and strengthening the performance of national economies via the drastic reduction of transaction costs (Kaltenthaler and Anderson, 2001;146).

Empirical findings by Gelleny and Anderson further suggest that a quasi-economic voting model is not an empty construct when studying utilitarian support for the EU. In their article they examine whether the low levels of information about the EU along with a lack of democratic accountability affect citizens’ use of utilitarian motivations when judging the president of the Commission. According to their analysis, European citizens can be simultaneously utilitarian and ill-informed when evaluating the performance of the Commission president. Utilitarian

103 The EB question on self perceived knowledge about the EU is as follows: ‘How much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions’ Respondents are then asked to select from a card a number - on a scale from 1 to 10 - which best represents their perceived knowledge about the European Union.
considerations are important among both well and poorly informed Europeans (Gelleny and Anderson, 2000). Arguing along these lines, Anderson’s conceptualisation of national economic well-being as a proxy to which citizens resort in order to comprehend and form opinions about the EU is another piece of proof that less than fully informed EU citizens can form meaningful utilitarian opinions, holding the EU responsible for objective economic conditions (Anderson, 1998). Hence, national-specific indicators will help me in the specification of the ‘quasi economic voting model’ I shall employ for exploring the differences in utilitarian support for the EU among the two distinct groups of EU entrants.

6.5 THE QUASI - ECONOMIC VOTING MODEL INDICATORS

In an attempt to single out the parameters of the ‘quasi-economic voting model’, which will be used as predictors of utilitarian public support for the EU, I pose two central questions that will be addressed in sections 5 and 6 respectively. These are the following: what economic conditions influence aggregate popular evaluations of the EU? And how important are economic concerns compared to other factors operating on country-level support for the EU? To begin with, the economic parameters affecting the public perception of the benefits of EU membership can be both objective and subjective. Emphasis will be given to objective economic factors, both direct and indirect, that influence public utilitarian attitudes towards the EU. Subjective evaluations of economic well-being will also enter into this research equation. Attention, nevertheless, will be paid to sociotropic (i.e. collective) rather than egocentric (i.e. personal) economic concerns, since the unit of analysis is the nation state rather than the individual citizen.

6.5.a OBJECTIVE ECONOMIC FACTORS

INDIRECT BENEFITS

1. General Economic implications of EU membership: GDP, Inflation & Unemployment

Consistent with economic voting studies, the first scholars to build a utilitarian model of EU support made use of a well-established set of objective economic indicators: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation and unemployment (Palmer and Gabel, 1999 Gabel, 1998a Gabel and Whitten, 1997 Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996 Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). In the current analysis the annual rates of real GDP
will be used as indicators of national economic well-being: the higher the GDP growth, the greater public support for the EU should be. Conversely, an increase in the measures of economic hardship, unemployment and inflation, should trigger less favourable utilitarian attitudes towards the EU. Inflation is based on the quarterly percentage change in the Consumer Price Index, while unemployment is measured as a standardised quarterly percentage of the total labour force. All variables are coded from the OECD’s Historical Statistics and Main Economic Indicators, and one year lag is assumed in recognition of the fact that the consequences of changing rates of economic growth do not immediately impinge upon the general public.

II. Specific policy implications of EU membership: the pros of Liberalized Trade

Over the course of time, new objective measures of economic benefit have been added to those first established by Inglehart and Rabbier (1978). More specifically, the indirect economic implications of European integration have been complemented by trade (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993 Anderson and Reichert 1996 Gabel and Palmer, 1995). This is hardly surprising, since trade liberalisation within the EU market secures direct economic gains for the states involved. Higher levels of intra-European trade, in turn, should bring higher aggregate trends in public opinion, because citizens’ welfare is positively affected. In particular, liberalised trade can contribute to national economic growth and boost employment leading, in turn, to higher tax receipts and extended public services (Gabel, 1998b; 74). Transferring this ‘mercantilist hypothesis’ into the current research context, I employ two distinct variables. First, I measure a country’s trade intensity with the EU, i.e. intra-EU exports plus intra-EU imports as a percentage of total national trade, in order to see whether utilitarian support varies as a function of a nation’s trade flow with other EU member states. Second, taking into account the fact that gains from liberalised trade are felt to a greater extent in countries that enjoy a trade surplus with other EU member states, I calculate each country’s intra-EU trade balance (exports minus imports) as compared to its total international trade. In this manner, I can distinguish between countries which are in the best position to take advantage of the changes that the single market has produced, and those which are more vulnerable (Smith and Wanke, 1993; 534-535). All relevant data is collected from the OECD’s Monthly Statistics of International Trade and one-year time lag is assumed.
**DIRECT BENEFITS**

I. *The EU Budget: Dispensing Money to the Member States*

In addition to indirect financial benefits accruing to EU member states as a result of accession, direct economic advantages are secured for EU states in the form of budgetary flows. Budgetary benefits, in contrast to the above-mentioned national economic factors, are highly visible to the public, not only because EU spending on structural funds enjoys broad publicity in the member states, but also due to the fact that EU budgetary issues may often enter the agenda in national politics as ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ can be calculated with relative ease (Laffan and Shackleton, 2000; Carruba, 1997; Anderson and Reichert, 1996). The heated debate over the budgetary issue that marked the British political scene in 1979, and the degree of distrust it would prompt among an already eurosceptic public indicates the direct impact the union’s budget can have on public opinion. One would therefore expect net recipients of EU spending to support European integration, while net contributors will oppose the latter. Hence, financial transfers, defined as total receipts from the EU budget minus total contributions to the budget, will be calculated across all member states with a view to identifying whether direct economic benefits from EU membership elicit higher utilitarian evaluations of the EU. All relevant data is compiled from the Annual Report of the Court of Auditors.

6.5.b **SUBJECTIVE ECONOMIC FACTORS**

I. *Sociotropic vs Egocentric economic concerns*

In subsequent research these ‘aggregate’ objective economic data have either been complemented or in some cases replaced by, ‘individual’ perceptions of the state of the economy, both sociotropic and egocentric (Dalton and Eichenberg, 1991; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Gelleny and Anderson, 2000). Egocentric evaluations of economic well-being assume that the object of attention is the individual citizen rather than the nation state. Hence, ‘pocketbook’ measures of utilitarian support shall not enter into this research equation, which is concerned with country rather than individual-level differences in public support for the EU.

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104 At that time, the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, began to demand a structured rebate system, which would guarantee the UK a better balance between contributions and receipts.
Sociotropic evaluations of national economic performance, nevertheless, constitute a plausible explanatory factor. The reason for this is that subjective evaluations of this sort express collective rather than personal economic concerns and hence do not disturb the selected unit of analysis, i.e. the nation state. For the exact wording of the Eurobarometer question encapsulating citizens’ perceptions of national economic well-being see table 6.1.

Table 6.1 The Quasi-Economic Voting Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT EU MEMBERSHIP BENEFITS</th>
<th>INDIRECT EU MEMBERSHIP BENEFITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Budget ratio</td>
<td>National Macroeconomic Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits minus payments as a % of the budget</td>
<td>- GDP, Inflation, Unemployment, Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Trade balance (Intra-EU exports minus imports divided by total national trade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Trade Intensity (Intra EU imports plus exports as a % of total national trade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIO TROPIC</td>
<td>EGO CENTRIC (not included)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual perceptions of collective economic well-being</td>
<td>Individual perceptions of personal economic well-being</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 'How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months? (lot better, better, same, little worse, worse)' | 'How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago? (lot better, better, same, little worse, worse)'

6.6 MODEL SPECIFICATION: A SUPRANATIONAL MODEL OF EU PUBLIC OPINION

Research inspired by the economic voting model has been quite single-mindedly motivated by the quest to attribute variations in EU support to fluctuations in the above-mentioned indicators of economic well-being. Wishing to study how support for the EU evolves in the aftermath of enlargement, I essentially draw on the paradigm of this earlier literature. One question that arises, nevertheless, is whether simple gross fluctuations in national macroeconomic conditions and support for the EU as manifested through Eurobarometer surveys, are sufficient to lend support to the quasi-economic voting hypotheses. According to the latter, superior national economic performance, as measured by various indicators, should lead to more positive evaluations of the EU across different member states. This theoretical assumption is not, however, always proved by empirical results. As Gabel points out,
when economic conditions improve, utilitarian support can decrease (Gabel, 1998b: 104-105).\textsuperscript{105} Given that macroeconomic success is not always associated with a rise in support for the EU, I need to revisit the utilitarian theory of public support for European Integration, restate it and redefine the scope of its explanatory claims by taking into account not just national but also supranational factors such as the politics of EU enlargement. Since membership motivations differ among the various groups of EU entrants it would be interesting to detect the impact of diverse elite attitudes on the evolution of public support. In sum, my point of departure is that although I recognize that the economic voting approach contains an element of truth I advocate that other determinants, over and above economic conditions, may exist, which exert a significant and possibly longer-lasting impact on levels of public support.

Hence, I have elaborated an improved model of quasi-economic voting by taking into account the political dimension of European Integration. This choice is considered appropriate not only as a result of contradictory empirical evidence, but also because of the question posed by the current research framework. Namely, how will applicants behave in the aftermath of their accession to the EU club? In asking this question, I do not perceive EU membership as an authoritative output where the national elites’ decision to enter is the only thing that matters. As mentioned in chapter five, I am more interested in the contingent outcome of such a decision. And that depends on how EU membership is subsequently perceived and evaluated by the population. In this sense, political and economic factors are bound to intermingle in shaping popular attitudes towards the EU.

Current research, using a conventional form of Prisoner’s Dilemma, models support for European Integration either as a Pareto-optimal (A) or zero sum (D) outcome, in which gains by all in the national economy will boost support for the EU, and losses by most will trigger popular dissatisfaction. In this study, nevertheless, an improved model is proposed, in which EU support is the consequence of the interplay between national and supranational factors. Hence, the intermediate outcomes not catered for in the simple PD matrix (i.e. outcomes B and C) are also taken into account. Put simply, the possibility of having high support irrespective of objective losses in the domestic economy, and low EU support

\textsuperscript{105} See also Janssen, 1991 for evidence against traditional economic voting theory.
irrespective of objective gains, is considered. In countries where UM considerations have prevailed at the time of accession (UK, Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Finland, and Sweden), support is generally expected to vary in relation to net gains from membership. As a matter of fact, the greater utilitarian motivation at the supranational level, the more volatile the popular evaluations of the EU, depending on how well the economy performs (H1a). However, it may also be the case that economic gains result in pessimism towards the EU, possibly because the public held greater expectations than what was actually achieved (H1b). On the other hand, among VM countries, such as the Mediterranean entrants (Greece, Portugal, and Spain), and the original Six (France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy)\(^\text{106}\) support is once again expected to vary with the business cycle, since materialist considerations played a significant role in the membership decision of the latter, and the membership negotiations of the former, even though they didn’t shape the outcome. Yet fluctuations in the VM group should be milder, and the intensity of utilitarian support should be higher than that of the UM countries (H2a). In addition, among the VM group, net economic losses may have the same positive effect on EU support as net economic gains (H2b). In these countries the normative justification of EU membership as an occasion for improving domestic institutions by joining a community of shared democratic values, should be a powerful determinant of pro-EU attitudes, helping them either to be less vulnerable to the effects of economic shocks, or even to overcome purely rational cost-benefit calculations. All in all, Value Maximisers are expected to have a more monotonous upward trend in their utilitarian evaluation of the Union as opposed to the Utility Maximisers whose support for European Integration should vary more closely with the business cycle. In this sense, objective characterisations of the economy at the aggregate level may actually be the result of heterogeneity in economic evaluations at the country level due to different elite motivations at the time of accession. Distinct accession motivations are expected to give rise to distinct political cultures generating variation in public support for the EU.

\(^{106}\) For the classification of UM and VM countries see the conclusions of Part II.
By introducing elite motivations at the time of accession I aim to address the endogeneity of economic perceptions and its implications for popular support for European Integration. In this sense, I agree with Campbell et al. (1960) who, in their study of the American voter, take into account the possibility that perceptions of economic conditions may be determined by the ‘perceptual screen’ of the voters. Put simply, the causal feedback from political/ideological choices to economic evaluations and support for the incumbent government enters into their research equation. Considering the fact that the human capacity for calculation is far more limited than utilitarian models presume, a growing body of literature has directed its attention to political cues, that function as cognitive short-cuts and help citizens decide what is in their interest (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Ray, 2003a; Ray, 2003b; Gabel and Anderson, 2002; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). The emphasis is usually on national politics, assuming that political parties and the political ideologies they reflect shape popular attitudes towards the EU. However for public opinion in the aggregate, there appears to be no robust association between citizens’ right/left ideology and their position on European Integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Gabel and Anderson, 2002; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). With few exceptions, the political parties within the EU member states have decided that European Unification is good for their country and thus, have no major differences in regard to Europe.

For this reason, most of the more recent research on EU public opinion attempts to address the endogeneity of economic calculations, moving beyond the Right or Left political ideology argument. More specifically, Sánchez-Cuenca (2000), for example, puts forward a distinct model in which the quality of national governance determines popular attitudes to Europe. Likewise, Kritzinger (2003) and Rohrschneider (2002) emulate Anderson’s model (1998) in which satisfaction with national democratic performance boosts or constrains EU public opinion. Following
a somewhat similar line of reasoning, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2005) find that the higher the level of division among national elites over the desirability of integration the greater the extent to which an exclusive identification with the nation-state among the public produces Euroscepticism. In their model national identities, as constructed by domestic elite division, appear to exert a greater influence on EU support than conventional economic factors. Arguing along their lines, in the model put forward in this chapter I question the exogeneity of citizens’ economic calculations, which determine support for the EU, and test the hypothesis that the causality is elite-driven, depending on how membership was framed at the time of accession.

After all, since ‘political attitudes are organized into coherent structures by political elites for consumption by the public’ as Feldman claims, it would make sense to assume that popular attitudes towards the EU are shaped by prevalent elite attitudes towards the EU throughout the accession negotiations (Feldman, 1988:417). The argument advanced in this thesis regarding the significance of enlargement politics in the subsequent evolution of public opinion towards the EU follows Janssen’s suggestion for further research on ‘historical factors such as time of entry into the EC and political (elite) support for membership, (because they) seem likely to be much more important’ in explaining variation in popular evaluations of the EU (Janssen, 1991:467). It is also in line with Diez Medrano’s argument that ‘history and culture trump economics and geopolitics as the major forces behind European integration’ (2003:3). Certain utilitarian models attempt to account for such distinct national traditions, either by using dummy variables so as to capture the effect of outliers such as Britain, Denmark, France, Belgium, and Italy, or by making an apriori distinction between early joiners (i.e. the original six) and late joiners, assuming that those who joined later had publics that were reluctant to the idea of European unification and thus paid due attention to the guarded stance of their citizens (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993 Anderson and Reichert, 1996 Gabel, 1998b). In the model presented in this chapter, nevertheless, I renounce the image of ‘responsive politicians’ who adjust their preferences on EU membership on the basis of what the public wants, and assume instead a ‘responsive public’ that reacts to what national elites do and how they perceive European integration. After all, membership in the EU is a significant foreign policy option and as such is primarily handled by national political leaders.
Before concluding it should be mentioned that I do not identify the processes via which the elite meaning assigned to the idea of EU membership is conveyed to the public. Rather, I systematically follow the potential impact of such distinct elite perceptions of the EU on the willingness of the public to extend support to the new political system. In the case that the relationship between distinct elite motivations and utilitarian support is not valid this study will at least assist in the generalisation of the economic voting model of EU support, by using the fullest possible time-coverage and cross-national sample. If a significant relationship is detected, this study will establish itself as an important contribution to the nascent literature on political cues. In addition, if UM and VM membership motivations prove instrumental in mediating the effects of economic calculations, boosting or depleting public support for the EU, then this chapter will also have important implications for EU enlargement politics, uncovering their elite identity-building capacity.

6.7 Empirical Analysis

6.7.a Analytic Strategy: Methods and Data

On the basis of the preceding discussion it is apparent that although I recognize the economic voting approach as partially true, I also sustain that other determinants may exist, which exert a significant and possibly longer-lasting impact on levels of public support for the EU than economic conditions. As discussed earlier, one may identify two distinct groups of countries (emerging from their diverse elite attitudes towards EU membership), corresponding to: Utility Maximisers (UM) and Value Maximisers (VM). I am primarily interested in empirically investigating whether this distinction is relevant for the observed level of EU public opinion. In particular I conjecture that, after controlling for variations in economic conditions, UM countries will be associated with significantly lower levels of support. In other words, I propose that EU support is driven by two mechanisms which operate on different horizons and frequencies. The first mechanism captures the impact of economic factors and governs short-term variations in support. This mechanism may or may not be identical across UM and VM groups (I will return to this issue later). The second mechanism, which forms the thrust of this analysis, mirrors a set of structural characteristics of countries that eventually identifies these as either UM or VM. Essentially, while the first mechanism causes transitory variations in support, the
second affects overall predisposition as shown by longer term support, and determines the long-run path of support. Thus, while levels of support may from year to year reflect economic conditions, these fluctuations are tied to long term level of support, which acts as a centre of gravity. The observed level of support is in essence a mixture of two processes: long-term disposition towards the EU (determined by historical elite attitudes), and the current economic factors that govern short-term variations. This mixture results in a highly complex pendulum pattern of support where the reference point of motion is provided by the underlying elite attitudes to Europe. This set-up is flexible enough to account for the possibility that in a given year (or other spell of time) support levels between UM and VM countries remain equal. This may occur where structural differences in long-term support between the two groups are outweighed by current economic conditions. However, over longer periods, where positive and negative economic shocks cancel each other out, support from the VM group will on average outperform UM support towards the EU. The challenge now is to translate these ideas into testable hypotheses, which clearly calls for the use of longitudinal data that bring together information across countries and time periods. I discuss a procedure for testing these hypotheses using the parameters of the following regression model:

\[ (EUS)_{jt} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \gamma_j X_{jt} + \beta (UM)_{jt} + u_{jt} \tag{1} \]

Where \( i, t \) denote country and time period respectively, \( u \) is a spherical disturbance term and \( \alpha, \beta \) and \( \gamma \)'s are unknown parameters to be estimated. Finally, \( X \) stands for a set of economic variables (see table 6.1). The variable of interest; \( UM \), is an indicator taking into account elite attitudes. Effectively it is a dummy variable that dichotomises the sample of EU countries, attaining the value of unity when the country belongs to the Utility Maximisers group and zero when it belongs to the Value Maximisers group. The following hypothesis is in order:

**H1:** The distinction between UM and VM groups is irrelevant for EU public support, i.e. \( \beta = 0 \).

In case of rejection, which would indicate the relevance of the proposed distinction, the UM group should exhibit a significantly lower mean level of support as compared to the VM group, i.e. \( \beta < 0 \).
Of course, one may advocate that the VM and UM groups respond differently to variations in economic conditions, i.e. the vector of \( \gamma' \)'s is different across the two groups. This plausible scenario lies within the scope of the current analysis, and so I shall attempt to discern potential differences. More specifically, I shall attempt to discern whether the UM group demonstrates a pessimistic tendency at all times irrespective of moments of economic well-being, as a result of always expecting more than what is actually achieved. Conversely, I shall also control for whether the VM group perceives even moments of economic hardship positively due to their favourable ideational predisposition towards the EU, which would make up for short periods of economic disillusionment. In particular, the regression models testing these hypotheses stand as follows:

\[
(EUS)^{VM}_{i,t} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{K-1} \gamma_j X_{i,j} + u_{i,t}
\]  
\[
(EUS)^{VM}_{i,t} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{K-1} \gamma_j X_{i,j} + u_{i,t}
\]

In order to test the aforementioned hypotheses data is collected at the aggregate level, since the differences between countries rather than within individual citizens are under scrutiny. After all, it is the aggregate changes in support that matter most to politicians. As Stimson argues, ‘Politicians care about the views of states, districts, areas, cities, what-have-you. Individual opinion is useful only as an indicator of the aggregate. For a politician to pay attention to individual views is to miss the main game’ (as quoted in Anderson, 1995; 115). A pooled cross-sectional, time-series design is employed, including data for all fifteen EU member states. I rely on semi-annual measures of utilitarian support over a 29 year time span, 1973-2002, while all the economic indicators are measured on an annual basis, apart from inflation and unemployment for which quarterly data is available. More specifically, in the quarterly data the second and fourth quarters are being used in order to match the biannual Eurobarometer responses.\(^{107}\)

The analysis begins by developing three regression models with three alternative assumptions regarding error structure: (i) a Random-Effects model with identically and independently distributed errors; (ii) a Random-Effects model with first-order

\(^{107}\) Greece enters the analysis in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, while Austria, Finland and Sweden enter in 1995.
auto-correlated errors imposing the restriction of a common error structure across all cross sections (countries); and (iii) a Random-Effects model with first-order auto-correlated errors that are allowed to differ across cross sections. The third model is superior since it exhibits a significantly better fit to the data and is also compatible with the expectation that the countries’ dynamics may differ. Put simply, preference is assigned to GLS (Generalised Least Squares) models of support that regress the dependent variable (utilitarian support for the EU) on all independent variables (national economic conditions measured both objectively and subjectively) as well as on the UM dummy. Even though OLS is the model most often employed for pooled designs, the pooled structure of the data violates the uncorrelated error assumption of OLS. In addition, in the presence of auto-correlation the OLS coefficients are no longer the best, unbiased, estimators (Beck and Katz, 1995; Stimson, 1985). The GLS approach solves the pooled estimation problem by estimating and then specifying the time dependence process in the residuals (Stimson, 1985, 926). The GLS procedure, thereby, produces a model whose error term is auto-correlation free. Besides auto-correlation, GLS is a particularly appropriate estimation technique for pooled analyses like the one developed here, which have a greater number of time points than country cases, as Beck and Katz (1995) have shown. Last but not least, I employ an additional Random-Effects model with first-order auto-correlated errors that are allowed to differ across sections within the UM and VM groups so as to test Hypotheses H1b and H2b.

\[^{108}\] In pooled designs the observations are not independent along the time dimension within units (i.e. nations) as OLS assumes. When a shock affects a social system the effects of this shock tend to persist for some time. Hence, observations that are close to one another in a temporal sense may exhibit a high degree of correlation. The classical OLS assumption that errors are identically and independently distributed is therefore violated.
6.7.B EMPIRICAL RESULTS

As a prelude to the econometric analysis I present the following table summarising the sample descriptive statistics for public support metrics broken down by the two distinct groups (UM and VM).

Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics for EB questions on ‘Benefit’ and ‘Membership’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unconditional</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>obs</td>
<td>mean</td>
<td>St. dev</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Membership</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>45.85</td>
<td>24.75</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0.776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Benefit</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>29.55</td>
<td>28.61</td>
<td>-61</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UM only</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Membership</td>
<td>227</td>
<td><strong>22.90</strong></td>
<td>24.24</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Benefit</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>18.09</td>
<td>35.43</td>
<td>-61</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VM only</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Membership</td>
<td>472</td>
<td><strong>56.89</strong></td>
<td>15.81</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Benefit</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>35.09</td>
<td>22.71</td>
<td>-56</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The descriptive statistics indicate that for both metrics VM support is substantially higher than UM support, as the former is almost two times larger than the latter. However, this observed difference may be solely or partially attributed to differences in economic conditions. Formal inferences can only be drawn once a regression model is used that explicitly controls for differences in economic conditions.

Table 6.3 reports the estimation results obtained for the parameters of equation (1). At first glance, the numbers indicate that support for the EU waxes and wanes with the business cycle, as broadly measured. The significant variables, in other words, validate the traditional economic voting approach, since positive economic conditions in the domestic sphere regulate in a favourable manner utilitarian sentiments towards the EU, while poor domestic economic performances undermine popular support. More specifically, intra EU trade appears to be a major stimulus to pro-European public sentiment. Confirming one of the clearest uniformities of existing research, both trade intensity with the EU and intra-EU trade balance are among the strongest positive correlates of popular support for integration. Indeed, I know of no research that does not report this finding either for aggregate or individual level data (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993 Gabel and Palmer, 1995 Anderson and Reichert, 1996 Gabel and Whitten, 1997 Gabel, 1998a 1998b). Besides trade, the direct benefits stemming from the EU budget significantly and positively affect
support, a finding already empirically documented by Whitten Gabel and Palmer (1995) as well as by Anderson and Reichert (1996).

Table 6.3 Estimation Results for \((EUS)_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{K-1} \gamma^j X^j_{it} + \beta (UM)_{it} + u_{it}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[NM]</th>
<th>MODEL SPECIFICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regressors</td>
<td>GLS (Random-Effects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>-38.80*** (5.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-1.75*** (0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.66** (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>1.93*** (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-EU Trade Intensity</td>
<td>45.50*** (14.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-EU Trade Balance</td>
<td>86.68*** (16.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Budget</td>
<td>0.83** (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Economic Perception</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald (\left(\chi^2\right))</td>
<td>145.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis Testing, \(\left(\chi^2\right)\), (confidence interval)

| \(H_0: \beta = 0\) | 46.39 (0.00) | 67.63 (0.00) | 83.53 (0.00) |
| \(H_A: \beta \neq 0\) | (-49.96, -27.63) | (-43.42, -26.70) | (-42.40, -27.43) |

*significant at 10% threshold, ** significant at 5% threshold , *** significant at 1% threshold

Turning now to the ‘political economy’ indicators, namely inflation, unemployment, and GDP, we realise that these are not significant predictors of support in the third regression model. The non-robust contribution of unemployment and GDP in formulating positive popular attitudes towards the European project comes as no great surprise. In line with the findings of earlier research (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993 Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996 Gabel and Whitten, 1997) real GDP is a particularly weak economic variable and therefore we cannot reject the null that public support for EU is unrelated to real growth. Similarly, domestic unemployment rates are rarely significantly related to support (Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996), so that there is nothing inherently wrong in having citizens (and
at the aggregate level countries) that are disinclined to hold the EU responsible for not taking concrete employment policy initiatives that will combat the problem. Finally, as regards inflation, the results of the chosen model could be indicative of a popular ignorance of the EU’s anti-inflationary policy via VAT and the European Monetary System, and its effect on prices. The insignificant impact of inflation on support for integration is consistent with the empirical evidence offered by Gabel and Whitten (1997) as well as by Palmer and Gabel (1999). Apart from the objectively quantified measures of economic well-being, the subjective measure of satisfaction with national economic conditions was also found to be insignificant for EU support.

However, the main parameter in the analysis was the coefficient of the UM dummy, which, if significant, would imply that the two groups of EU member states exhibit different mean levels of support over and above the control variables. In other words, the fitted regressions lines would start from different intercepts for the two groups. Provided that their mean support levels differ, the hypothesis is that VM mean support should be higher than UM mean support. The point estimate of the UM dummy is -34.92 for which the null that is zero, is emphatically rejected ($\chi^2=83.53$) at all conventional levels of significance. We can therefore estimate with 95 percent confidence that the coefficient is located between -42.40 and -27.43, which indicates that after controlling for a wide set of factors, mean support levels in UM countries is substantially lower than that in VM countries. This finding verifies the informal pictorial and descriptive evidence. Note that the order of magnitude of the mean difference between the two is a minimum of 27 percentage points, reaching an upper limit of 42 points. This suggests that shocks in the remaining set of factors (economic, etc) that could eliminate this fundamental difference between the two groups must be of extreme magnitudes. This observation assists us in making sense of the fact that in most, if not all, time periods the VM group is an ardent supporter of the EU unlike the eurosceptic UM group.

Last but not least, table 6.4 reports the estimation results obtained for the parameters of equations 2a and 2b. On a theoretical level the vector of $\gamma$s should have been less significant and negative among the UM, and more significant and positive among the VM. Put simply, the introduction of the distinction between Utility and Value-oriented EU member states would, ideally, overturn the classic economic voting expectations rendering the former pessimistic (H1b) and the latter
optimistic (H2b) irrespective of the degree of received or perceived economic benefits. In reality, both the VM and UM groups conform to the general economic voting hypotheses. For the UM countries the only significant trigger of utilitarian sympathies towards the EU is intra EU trade, and this reaction only serves to confirm their perception of membership as a beneficial trade agreement. Even though among the VM countries more economic voting indicators positively and significantly regulate attitudes to EU membership (i.e. intra-EU trade, EU budget receipts, and subjective evaluations of the national economy), there is still no evidence of pessimism in the UM group to validate hypothesis H1b. What is more, among the UM group the insignificant contribution of the EU budget to utilitarian EU support comes as no surprise, since the majority of the six Utility Maximizing entrants (UK, Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Finland, and Sweden) are net contributors. Finally, the marginal propensity of VM countries to hold the Union responsible for deteriorating employment conditions is another indicator of their utilitarian reaction, disconfirming hypothesis H2b.

Table 6.4
Estimation Results for $\text{EUS}_{i,j}^{UM} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{K-1} \gamma_j X_{i,j} + u_{i,t}$ and $\text{EUS}_{i,j}^{VM} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{K-1} \gamma_j X_{i,j} + u_{i,t}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Within UM Countries</th>
<th>Within VM countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>0.32 (0.87)</td>
<td>-0.65 (0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.29 (0.51)</td>
<td>-0.74* (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>0.88 (0.65)</td>
<td>0.42 (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-EU Trade Intensity</td>
<td>144.54*** (28.68)</td>
<td>45.60*** (13.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-EU Trade Balance</td>
<td>252.82*** (31.50)</td>
<td>11.49** (4.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Budget</td>
<td>0.02 (0.44)</td>
<td>0.53*** (0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Economic Perception</td>
<td>0.00 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.03* (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant at 10% threshold, ** significant at 5% threshold , *** significant at 1% threshold
However, such findings do not prove that the distinction between Value and Utility Maximisers is not valid. The results indicate that, by and large, both types of EU entrants respond positively to favourable economic conditions and vice versa, but they do not capture the intensity of support among the two groups. Such differences in the intensity of utilitarian attitudes towards the EU are established via the UM dummy presented in table 6.3. On the basis of the aforementioned indicator, we come to conclude that as economic benefit increases, so support increases for both groups, but it is much lower among the Utility Maximisers. In this light, the supranational model of support advanced in this thesis, does prove useful in accounting for significant differences in the levels of popular support for the Union among different member states. Europeans are more supportive of the integration process if there are positive payoffs to be derived. Still, the intensity of public support for or opposition to the EU is regulated endogenously by national and EU elite attitudes towards membership. The greater the ideational or affective motivations for seeking and granting accession to the Union, the more positive the public perception of the EU in the long run. Herewith, an explanation emerges as to why some countries are more in favour of European integration than others. And such an explanation shows that integration history, in the form of EU enlargement negotiations and elite attitudes can trump economics and geopolitics as the major force behind European integration.

6.8 Concluding Remarks

The main objective of this study was to explain how different groups of EU applicants behave in the aftermath of their accession to the EU. The two hypotheses advanced in this chapter are as follows: 1) among Utility Maximizing countries the public should be particularly vulnerable to the ups and downs of the domestic economy (H1a), or even pessimistic (H1b) when passing utilitarian judgment on the EU, due the prevalently cost-benefit elite approach at the time of accession. 2) On the contrary, among Value Maximisers utilitarian support may vary with the business cycle, as materialist EU accession expectations existed alongside the prevalently ideational motivations, but the public should show a higher intensity of EU support (H2a) or even a monotonous upward trend (H2b), irrespective of the degree of economic benefits stemming from membership. This optimism would spring from
the positive ideational predisposition of domestic elites towards the EU, that assumes Pygmalion’s role on the national political scene.

The regression results provided evidence in favour of this supranational model of utilitarian support, which claims that public attitudes towards the EU are not exogenously determined by the degree of economic benefits received, but are shaped endogenously by the prevalent elite perceptions of the EU at the time of accession. While public support for the EU increases with favourable economic performances and decreases during times of economic hardship, the intensity of this support is significantly lower among the publics of the Utility oriented members. On the contrary, the Value Maximisers score significantly higher in terms of support even though this also fluctuates with the amount of received and perceived benefits. In this manner, the supranational model of public opinion accounts for a major fact: the existence of relatively constant differences in public support for the EU, which render some member states Euroenthusiastic and others Eurosceptic, irrespective of the economic impact of membership.

Such findings suggest that EU elites involved in accession negotiations should attempt to balance cost-benefit calculations with political-ideational considerations, because, establishing a higher ideational affinity between the EU and the entrant state at the time of accession brings about more positive results in EU public support, increasing the direct legitimacy of the European polity. In order to do so, EU actors should handle prospective EU enlargement rounds with caution and not focus unilaterally on ‘coercive persuasion’ tools such as accession negotiations, screening, accession partnerships, or peer reviews that merely strengthen the applicants’ capacity to respond to the economic and political challenges of membership. Rather, extra attention should be paid to ‘learning by doing’ tools such as participation in Community programmes, or ‘twinning’, and argumentative tools such as the European conference that gradually acculturate applicants in EU ways of thinking and acting, preparing the ground for a stronger affective link with the EU (Tamvaki, 2005).

In addition, as the results of this study indicate, special emphasis should be given to EU identity building initiatives in countries that have more utility oriented approaches to Union membership. Since different elite attitudes to accession, frame distinct public attitudes towards European integration, it is perfectly legitimate to make a case for a diverse geographical legitimation in the enlarged European polity.
Moving along the lines of Scharpf (2002) who argues in favour of ‘legitimate diversity’ i.e. the application of nationally distinct policy solutions in areas that have high political salience in the member states, the present study advocates the use of variable legitimation techniques among the multiple territorial units making up the enlarged EU. More specifically, given that an ideational-affective predisposition towards the EU can foster a higher utilitarian public sentiment, it would make sense to encourage community building strategies not only among all member states, but particularly among those that traditionally lack affective allegiance to the EU and are more vulnerable to the ups and downs of the domestic economy. Steps taken in this direction would more effectively tackle the popular legitimacy problem of the EU, as they would display an affective solidarity with the member publics that particularly suffer from euroscepticism, thus imitating the economic solidarity principle operating via the Regional funds. At the same time the utilitarian legitimation strategies of the rationally oriented entrants could provide a blueprint for the Value Maximizing countries, as the former have a more pragmatic audience to cater for and need to be more resourceful in justifying their utilitarian choice for Europe.109

Last but not least, the critical observations made regarding the distinct levels of public support for the EU stemming from diverse elite motivations for pursuing and granting EU membership, have significant connotations for both the theoretical perception and empirical investigation of the social legitimacy problems of the Union. Evidently, popular support for European integration cannot and should not stem from merely utilitarian grounds. As the growing euroscepticism of the wealthy club of Northern EU entrants indicates, the success of the European enterprise does not necessarily depend on its ability to achieve tangible results for participating governments and the wider population at large (Horeth,1999;251 Eriksen,2002;7-8). If legitimacy were premised on the performance of the regime - be it national or supranational - and thus on an ongoing calculation of costs and benefits, no political system would be regarded legitimate, since all occasionally fail to satisfy instrumental public demands. To solve this paradox and comprehend how it is possible to maintain a minimum level of popular acceptance for any political construction in general and the EU in particular, attention should be directed to the affective dimension of legitimacy. Affective legitimacy represents a ‘generalised

109 For further details on ‘diverse geographical legitimation’ strategies see the concluding remarks of this study.
attachment’ to political objects that grows independently of policy outputs and performances in the short run. It is a ‘reservoir of good will’ that helps people to accept or to tolerate decisions they see as damaging to their wants (Easton, 1975:444). In this sense, affective popular support is an indispensable complement to political stability, for it functions as a source of ‘political capital’ that can be used to confer legitimacy on unpopular decisions (Gabel, 1998:17). In recognition of the significance of affective popular support for the EU, which is triggered by the establishment of a collective identity between citizens and the European construct, the next chapter shall be devoted to a conceptual breaking down of the term and an empirical investigation of its determinants.
**APPENDIX I**

**UTILITARIAN LEGITIMACY SURVEY QUESTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National benefit: Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (our country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the EU?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response: a) benefited  b) not benefited  c) don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation of membership: Generally speaking, do you think that (our country’s) membership of the European Community is…</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response: a) good thing  b) neither good nor bad  c) bad thing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Eurobarometer 1973-2002, various issues*
CHAPTER 7

ENLARGEMENT POLITICS AND AFFECTIVE SUPPORT FOR THE EU: A NEGLECTED SUBJECT

7.1 INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

Having delineated the determinants of utilitarian support for the EU and how these vary after accession in different national settings, we find ourselves only halfway through in explaining the evolution of public support for European integration. Admitting that popular legitimacy is influenced by regime performance does not bring the discussion full-circle. If this were the case, legitimacy would be a far-fetched goal for any type of political system, since all occasionally fail to meet citizens’ instrumental self-interests. In order to solve this paradox and comprehend how it is possible to maintain a minimum level of popular acceptance for any political construction in general and the EU in particular, attention shall be directed to the affective dimension of legitimacy. Affective legitimacy represents a strong inner conviction of the moral validity of the political community in question (Easton, 1965:278). Such an emotional attachment, is not directly contingent on specific material rewards or inducements, and for that reason can persist in the face of output failures.

Despite the central role affective legitimacy plays in political life, it has received surprisingly little attention in empirical research. This is partly due to strong pressures within the social sciences to emphasize ‘value-free’ analytic methods, similar to those used in the natural sciences. Such ‘agnostic approaches’ have been further encouraged by the difficulties encountered in quantifying affective factors (Downs, 1991:144 Yee, 1996:71). Yet identifying what drives affective support for the Union is critical in the aftermath of the French non and the Dutch nee to the New Constitutional Treaty in May and June 2005. The failure of EU’s constitutional moment clearly showed the limits of European identity formation, i.e. the absence of a ‘we-feeling’ and a sense of community that would help citizens settle short-term utilitarian disputes for the sake of long-term political unity.

In direct response to these concerns, this study places itself within the identity-minded research on EU public opinion. In the previous literature the
variability in both the dependent and the explanatory variables left us with an inconclusive picture. Identity considerations matter, but it remains an open question whether they matter as anti-immigration feelings (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005), or as an exclusive national identity (McLaren, 2002 Christin and Trechsel, 2005 Luedtke, 2005) linked to national pride (Carey, 2002), or both. What is more, affective support is operationalised by means of either utilitarian survey items that overlook citizens’ affective identification with the EU, or by comprehensive indicators loading on both utilitarian and affective dimensions. Last but not least, the main research question so far has been: ‘why is support traditionally higher among certain groups of citizens and lower among others’? This study, however, is more interested in reaching a correct understanding of international variations in affective support for European integration. In order to broach this subject, it focuses on aggregate rather than individual level changes in EU affective attitudes over time and proceeds to a clear evaluation of the affective dimension of support.

Hence, in the first part, I proposed a theoretically informed process of operationalisation for EU affective support that justifies the selection of particular survey items. Subsequently, I mentioned the factors that impinge on country level affective allegiance to the EU. Building on the ‘socialization’ argument (Inglehart and Rabier, 1978 Inglehart, 1977), which associates the evolution of a ‘we-feeling’ for the Union with an abstract process of social learning that evolves over time (i.e. the longer a country is a member state), I propose new, more tangible indicators. First, using original data on EU officials, I investigate the degree to which identification with the EU depends on indirect socialization, i.e. civic participation in the integration process, as manifested by the collective presence of different nationalities in EU institutions. Second, I advocate a direct mode of socialization as measured by the citizens’ share of the vote in European elections. Last but not least, I propose a multi-level interaction between elite and mass affective opinion on European integration (i.e. between the two levels of EU legitimation). The identity-framing capacity of EU enlargement politics is tested against the aforementioned direct and indirect socialization factors. In particular, the elite classification along the Utility Maximization (UM) and the Value Maximization (VM) axes becomes instrumental.

110 I am indebted to Mr. Paul Linder for providing me with recruitment lists of EU Commission officials. For the relevant data from the European Parliament’s Secretariat I wholeheartedly thank Ms. Mairéad Cranfield. Special thanks also go to Professor Kostas Drakos for comments and useful hints on the full dataset. Errors of either data or judgement remain my own.
in accounting for the relatively constant gap in affective support for integration amongst EU member states. This means that identification with the EU depends more on how national elites frame EU membership, first in the supranational, and then in the domestic arena, rather than on post-accession socialization per se. Confirming such expectations, the regression analysis reveals that after controlling for a wide set of socializing factors the mean level of support in UM countries is substantially lower than in VM countries. In addition, among the UM group socialization relates negatively to affective EU support showing how impervious they can be to socialization efforts. Future research can build on these results to theorise how EU identity is cued by national elites. After all, we need to understand how elites’ attitudes to membership mould affective ties with European integration in recognition of the fact that the Union is too abstract for the average citizen to directly identify with, forming a reservoir of good-will.

7.2 The Eastonian Objects of Affective Support: Trust in the EU Regime or Identification with Europe as a Political Community?

Bearing in mind that affective support is a comprehensive term, and difficult to deal with empirically, I shall take due care when transposing it to the EU political sphere, since the latter is also surrounded by a high level of abstraction. More specifically, I shall draw on the three political entities presented by Easton (1965) as the main objects of public support: the regime, the political authorities, and the political community.

In sharp contrast to utilitarian support, which mainly depends on the general performance of the political authorities and only indirectly relates to the regime and the political community, affective support extends to all of the three political objects that Easton singled out. Nevertheless, the manner in which affective support expresses itself varies, according to the political object towards which it is directed. More specifically, Easton distinguishes between affective support that occurs in the form of trust and is directed towards the political authorities or the regime, and affective support which appears as a sense of ‘we-feeling’ and group-identification, and refers to the political community (Easton, 1975:437,447).

Affective support for the regime or political authorities may reveal itself in symbolic terms, as a deep-rooted trust in the regimes’ structures, rules, and goals, or as unreserved public confidence in particular incumbents’ actions. At the same time,
affective support for the afore-mentioned objects may also assume the characteristics of a more objectively oriented confidence, stemming from experience of the same incumbents over time. In this case, positive (or negative) evaluations of the performance of the authorities are expected to slowly nourish (or discourage) generalised sentiments of trust towards both the incumbent authorities and the regime. Objective trust, thus empirically morphs into utilitarian support, even though in theoretical terms Easton describes the two as distinguishable phenomena (ibid;447-449).

With this discussion in mind, I have reason to operationalise affective support for the EU as identification with a European political community, rather than as trust for the EU regime, since the latter represents the Trojan horse of utilitarian concerns. In addition, trust of particular incumbents does not enter into this research equation, for there are no distinguishable political authorities at the EU level to become the objects of affective popular sentiments. What further discourages me from using trust in the operationalisation of EU affective support is the fact that at the EU level a genuine symbolic-affective trust towards the EU regime cannot be established unless a we-feeling, or a group identification with Europe, exists. EU identification functions as a sine qua non for the evolution of affective attitudes, because it assists in arousing a sense of political community among Europeans. The more EU citizens identify with Europe, the more they will share a division of labour for the settlement of political problems.

A European identity that will underpin EU political community-building needs to be distinguished from national-specific identities. Such a conceptual clarification, however, does not necessarily entail the stark opposition of European and national identity links. More specifically, an EU identity cannot and should not be defined along a purely ethno-cultural dimension. The common linguistic, territorial, religious, historical, and cultural elements that underlie ‘primordial’ national ties cannot contribute to the evolution of a genuine collective identity at the EU level. Even though in many of these areas one can trace common European characteristics, for example most languages belong to the Indo-European family, the ethno-cultural boundaries of European identity are still loosely defined (Smith,1992;68-70). However, the failure to recreate a national-specific identification in Europe should not generate pessimism among scholars (see Smith,1992), for it is an ideologically questionable exercise based on an old-
fashioned conception of Europe that is contrary to the principles underlying the European political project. What is more appropriate for the post-national European polity is an identity based on a shared political future, like that envisaged by Habermas in evolving the notion of constitutional patriotism (Habermas, 1992 see also Weiler, 1997b).

By adopting the Habermasian notion of a politically significant EU identity, I assume that there is no a priori incompatibility between national identities and an European one. Put simply, I adopt the ‘nested identities’ argument according to which Europeans can have co-centric circles of allegiance that permit national identities to coexist with a collective European political identity (Gutierrez and Medrano, 2001 Marks, 1999 Duchesne and Frognier, 1995). Collective EU identification, in other words, is attributed an auxiliary status complementing well entrenched national identities (Chryssochoou, 1996 Laffan, 1996 Garcia, 1993). However, by arguing that an EU political identity bases itself on inclusive nation state identities, I do not wish to turn a deaf ear to those who advocate the exclusiveness of national identity. Hence, I ultimately draw on a double-edged argument, presenting a nested EU identity alongside an exclusive national identity that is ‘politically mobilized to nationalism’ and triggers opposition to European Integration. I have chosen not to leave aside the issue of exclusive national identity, as it has been evoked in a variety of national contexts to strengthen ethnocentrism and reject any further integration (Marcussen, 1999; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002). As a result, I operationalise affective EU support by means of a Eurobarometer survey item that measures the development of both a sense of belonging to Europe, and a sense of belonging to the nation state.\(^\text{111}\) Drawing on this question, I develop a net measure for identification with the EU, subtracting the percentage of nested identification from exclusive national identification (response a – b,c,d). Despite a change in the wording of the indicator from 1993 onwards,\(^\text{112}\) it remains sufficiently similar to the 1982 Eurobarometer question to allow a combination that will fully cover the time-span I am interested in, i.e. 1979-2002.

\(^{111}\) The EB questions on EU identity are as follows: Do you think of yourself not only as (nationality) citizen, but also as a citizen of Europe? Does this happen a) often b) sometimes or c) never?\(^{112}\) The wording of the 1992 EB indicator is the following: In the near future do you see yourself as… a) Nationality only b) Nationality and European c) European and Nationality d) European only'.
and account for the evolution of affective support in all fifteen EU member states that come under scrutiny.

7.3 Identifying the Sources of Mass Affective EU Support: EU Accession Socialization

In an attempt to pin down the determinants, i.e. the independent variables, of affective support for the EU I will take Easton’s argumentation as my starting point. David Easton singles out socialization as a plausible explanatory factor for popular affective attachment to a political community. Defining socialization is, nevertheless, a hard task to undertake, since it is a multi-faced concept that has attracted a wide range of interpretations. More specifically, Converse in 1964 was among the first to talk about political socialization, which he described as a process of ‘social learning’ by means of which political elites organise political attitudes and beliefs into coherent structures so as to facilitate their consumption by the public. In turn, the more the public is exposed to these structures, the better they comprehend them and the more socialized they become (Converse,1964). This conceptualisation was in line with Hyman’s earlier writings, in which he described political behaviour as ‘patently’ learned behaviour and argued that ‘humans must learn their political behaviour early and well and persist in it’ (Hyman,1959:9-10). Based on his propositions, Easton, some years later, talked about ‘childhood’ and ‘adult socialization’, claiming that ‘what is learned in childhood does carry over into later life… [having] positive or negative bearings on the level of support for such objects as political institutions and norms’. In addition, he went on, ‘we know that in each culture adults as well as children continue to be exposed to the …miranda of power… which contribute in one or another way to the reservoir of more deeply rooted sentiments’ By miranda of power he referred, among other things, to the pervasive ideological presuppositions cultivated by elites (as quoted in Easton,1975:446).

Transposing Easton’s conception of ‘childhood’ and ‘adult’ socialization into the EU reality and the context of enlargement, I talk about ‘EU socialization’. EU socialization starts from the membership application and refers to the process through which EU actors involved in the negotiations initiate new members in certain modes of behaviour that are preferred in the EU political community. National elites are then responsible for the transposition of such acculturated
loyalties in the domestic public sphere. Even after successful admission to the EU club, there is an on-going inculcation of political beliefs by both EU institutions and actors to national elites who operate in the national as well as the transnational domain. At the same time, the transposition of political norms and modes of behaviour from state elites to the masses continues. Socialization, thus refers to a top-down social-learning process ‘resulting in the internalisation of norms so that they assume their taken for granted nature’, defining the identities, interests, and social realities of either state actors or the mass public, depending on whether the targeted level of analysis is the macro or the micro (Risse, 2000; 28 Schimmelfennig, 2000; 111). Conceptualised in this manner, it seems only natural that socialization may assume the role of a significant independent variable in the development of an EU-wide political community and subsequently in the evolution of affective popular attitudes towards the EU regime in general.

7.3. A THE EMPIRICAL CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING SOCIALIZATION

Moving from the conceptual clarification to the empirical investigation of EU socialization is a hard task to undertake. Such difficulties become immediately apparent, if one looks at the operationalisation offered in the studies of EU public opinion. Starting as early as 1977, socialization makes its appearance in the scholarly literature. It remains, nevertheless, severely under-specified, as emphasis is placed on its temporal dimension rather than its substance. More specifically, the claim advanced in these studies is that the ‘length of membership’ can explain an increase in public support for the EU. Over time a diffuse socialization process presumably occurs within EU member states and renders the public more favourable towards the EU (Inglehart and Rabier, 1978 Anderson, 2002; 18).

Time may indeed have some socializing effects but these should not be overstated since empirical evidence suggests that the longer a country has been a member the less steep the increase in EU support (Anderson, 1995; 122, 126 see also APPENDIX I). As a matter of fact, upward trends in EU support can slow down or even reverse over time. For this reason, in the current research framework I do not simply replicate the socialization measures employed in earlier research by using a continuous variable that starts with each country’s length of membership in 1979 and increases by 1 in each subsequent Eurobarometer survey (Anderson and
Kaltenthaler, 1996; Kaltenthaler and Anderson, 2001). I include a squared time-trend variable in order to capture a potential non-linear relationship between the length of EU membership and affective EU support. At the same time, this study puts forward a more concrete empirical indicator of socialization, addressing the question of how we recognize EU socialization when we see it. In fact, I focus on the end product of socialization, that is the internalisation of EU values and norms in the national sphere, without taking into account the intervening process of social learning. After all, my aim is not to explain the dynamics of social learning, but to establish an observable degree of EU socialization that can explain cross-national differences in affective public support for integration.

7.3. B EU SOCIALIZATION: INDIRECT NATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE INTEGRATION PROCESS THROUGH COMMISSION AND EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT OFFICIALS

In order to trace the end result of EU socialization I consider the degree of effective national participation in the integration process. In turn, I distinguish between an indirect and a direct mode of participation (see table 7.1). The indirect mode corresponds to a micro-socialization perspective which accounts for the participation of member state nationals in the EU’s institutional structures. Indirect participation in European integration will be measured using the recruitment lists of the Commission and the European Parliament’s General Secretariat with a view to examining the proportion of officials from different nationalities who have actively participated in EU policy-making. Indirect participation, meanwhile, corresponds to a micro-level socialization process, because EU institutions become ‘sites of socialization in private settings’, as Checkel contends (2001a:6). At the same time this can be indicative of the success of EU socialization in the national sphere as effectuated by domestic political elites. In short, the higher the participation level of a specific nationality in the EU institutional matrix, the greater the impact of EU socialization is expected to have been at home, preparing citizens to pursue a more active role in the ongoing process of integration.

Even though the public cannot directly use such transnational participation as a proxy for the normative effects of European integration, due to its lack of knowledge on the precise proportion of co-nationals involved in EU administration, it can still be successfully employed in the current research design as an indicator of

113 For further details on socialization see also Checkel, 2001b.
indirect socialization. The more certain groups of citizens view EU institutions as ‘ours’ by adopting the role of EU civil servants, the greater the belief among the wider public that there is an ‘us’ to be served by the Union and its common institutions. This is so not because people are aware of the role of international executives, but because their overall distribution indirectly accounts for the success or failure of EU socialization at home. Arguing along similar lines Easton (1965:178) notes that:

‘a member of a system will be said to extend support to his political community insofar as he stands ready to act on behalf of maintaining some structure through which he and others may play their part in the making of binding decisions or is favourably oriented towards its perpetuation whatever form it may take…and however insignificant the role of the average member may be in the division’

Hence, the more the nationals of a particular member state successfully integrate themselves in the EU’s institutional structures, contributing in turn to their maintenance and perpetuation, the higher the affective support for the EU in that specific country. Identification with Europe starts at home, via a domestic process of EU socialization, and the degree of national participation in the EU institutional matrix can be used as an informative short-cut regarding the success of the socializing effort.

In examining the geographical distribution of EU civil servants I follow the staff classification system that is common to all EU institutions, turning a blind eye to the structure of the services of the Commission and the Parliament’s General Secretariat, most of which are called Directorates General (DGs). The reason I avoid the latter as a unit of analysis is that their number has never been fixed, ranging between 9 in the early days of the Commission and low-to-mid 20s in recent years. In addition to numbers, the titles and subject matters of the various DGs have also remained unstable over the years. Hence, turning to the formal grading system constitutes a more plausible candidate for the classification of EU officials.

More specifically I draw first on the permanent A grade staff. The A category is divided into eight grades, with the responsibility at each grade usually, but not invariably, as follows: A1 - director general or equivalent; A2 - deputy director

114 There are some Commission departments known as Special Services rather than DGs, i.e the Legal Service.
115 Numbers are not fixed in the Parliament’s General Secretariat either, and DGs range between five and eight in recent years.
116 At first there was a numbering system which was removed in September 1999. For further details on the Commission Services see Nugent,2001;134-161.
general, director, or principal adviser; A3 - Head of Unit; A4-A5 - Principal administrator, or in some cases head of unit; A6-A7 - Administrator; A8 - assistant administrator. The A grade officials are responsible for sovereign acts in the main areas of Commission and European Parliament activities that help mould the EU’s integrative efforts. More specifically, Commission officials propose new EU legislation, exercising the Commission’s right of initiative, and oversee compliance with the EU treaties, an act that fulfils the watchdog function. The European Parliaments’ permanent officials, who work in the Secretariat General, help the President, the Bureau, and the Parliament’s other organs to carry out the different tasks for which they are responsible. B, C or D grade officials, on the other hand, undertake relatively routine, non-policy oriented, administrative tasks, and hence it cannot be assumed that they play such an active part in the integration process as their A grade colleagues (for further details on the responsibilities assigned to these grades see APPENDIX II). Therefore, a high level of national participation in the A level of EU institutions is expected to have a significant and positive effect on the evolution of affective public allegiance to the Union (H1). Conversely, a high rate of participation in the other grades of EU institutions is expected to have a less significant, but still positive effect on the evolution of affective public support for the process of integration (H2).

A central question to be addressed, nevertheless, is whether employment in both EU institutions depends on merit or is strictly proportionate to member state populations. If recruitment is based on national quotas, then the territorial logic inherent in the national quota principle threatens to obscure the EU socialization argument because, irrespective of the supranational allegiance fostered at home, a fixed amount of officials from each country will enter the EU administration. On the contrary, if the merit principle is upheld, then the domestic socialization effect can be traced, as recruitment depends on competence rather than on political and territorial loyalties.\(^{117}\) Officially, nationality should not be a factor in the appointment of EU civil servants. As the 2003 Staff Regulations proclaim (article I-10):

> ‘recruitment shall be directed to securing for the institutions the services of officials of the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity recruited on the broadest possible geographical basis from among nationals of Member States of the

\(^{117}\) For an extensive discussion on national quotas vs. the merit principle and how these affect international executives’ decision making and role perceptions either in the direction of intergovernmentalism or supranationalism see Mouritzen, 1990 Egeberg, 2003a Trondal et al., 2004.
Communities … No posts shall be reserved for nationals of any specific Member State’

Despite the absence of a statutory system of nationality quotas, quotas do apply for the high management group – grades A1 to A3 - as most authors concede (Spence, 1994;82 Nugent, 1997;174 Stevens and Stevens, 2001;94). However, the primary criteria for recruitment on middle (A4 to A6) and low management appointments (A7 and A8) as well as in the lower categories, are merit and experience (Page, 1997;46). The fact that the meritocratic principle functions in these latter groups of EU officials is further attested to by Spencer, who claims that ‘in the lower grades, factors influencing the choice of the candidates relate more obviously to competence, personal networks and the interests of the service’ (1994,85).

Given that civil servants of various nationalities are recruited on the basis of competence and not on fixed quotas, their rate of participation in EU institutions is a good proxy for the intensity of EU socialization at home, which prepared them to seek an active role in the integration process. In particular, the supranational allegiance displayed by the latter groups of EU nationals is expected to function as an efficient predictor of the wider supranational allegiance held in their countries by the general public. Institutional participation thus becomes an indicator of composite identities constructed in the domestic sphere via the EU socialization dynamics set in motion by national elites. European institutions manage to shape identities and make them distinct from other national or cultural identities. Therefore, it is worth empirically investigating Mayer and Palmowski’s (2004;590) claim that ‘partaking as a full member of EU institutions becomes an expression of a country’s belonging to Europe’. More specifically, in order to test hypotheses 1 and 2, four indicators are constructed. Two account for the possible level of national overrepresentation in the A grades of the Commission and the EP, while the other two measure the rate of national participation in all other grades (B, C and D) in the aforementioned institutions (for further details see table 7.1). All relevant data are based on recruitment lists that were kindly made available to the author by the Commission and Parliament Personnel and Administration DGs, and cover the period 1979 - 2002.

118 Focusing on the Commission, Morten Egeberg (2003b) shows in his study that top Commission officials are recruited on the basis of merit and not on the basis of national flags, accompanying sectoral behaviour that is closely linked to their Commission portfolio.
7.3.c EU Socialization: Direct Popular Participation in European Parliament Elections

While the indirect mode of national participation in the EU integration process has not been employed before in the literature tracing EU public opinion, the direct mode has already appeared as a factor explaining degrees of popular affective allegiance to the EU. More particularly, I will turn to national participation in European parliament elections to see how voter turnout (controlled for participation in the national ballot) correlates with the degree of popular identification with the EU. This line of inquiry largely stems from Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson’s seminal work on EU legitimacy and participation in the EP elections. Their leading hypothesis states that a higher level of EU legitimacy, measured by four standard Eurobarometer indicators, would presumably lead to a higher turnout in European Parliamentary elections (Blondel et al; 1998 Frognier, 2002). In the present study I challenge the endogeneity of the aforementioned dependent variable, i.e. voter turnout in European elections, and see whether it can exogenously determine the levels of affective EU legitimacy.

Electoral participation corresponds to a macro-socialization perspective. As opposed to national participation in the EU institutional structures, which is private, participation in elections is public, and is therefore a direct manifestation of the socialization effects triggered by domestic elites. This direct public participation in European integration will be used as a proxy to study citizens’ affective allegiance to the Union. This is included in the study in response to those who may argue that survey data on degrees of identification with the EU do not reflect people’s affective attachment to the Union, simply because the latter are largely uninformed about the integration process and as a result cannot develop a sense of belonging to the EU. I argue, however, that participation in EP elections can be used as a proxy to fill gaps in people’s knowledge about the normative consequences of the integration process. In other words, the public, by participating or not in EP elections, substitutes its affective attitudes to the EU and implicitly helps its identity links grow, because it acknowledges the EU as a supranational form of government for which it feels the social obligation to vote. Hence, by tracing voter turnout we can implicitly trace EU popular allegiance or distrust, because the more the public participates in elections, the higher the degree of normative convergence with the Union. After all, empirical
evidence provided by Frognier highlights the link between turnout in European Parliamentary elections and the degree of identification with the EU observed in different member states. In his research, a greater identification with Europe entails more participation (Frognier, 2002). It remains to be seen whether the opposite also holds true, as hypothesized in this paper. Namely, whether widespread popular participation in the European polls can enhance affective popular support for the Integration project (H3). The data on country-level participation in European elections cover a 23 year time span (1979-2002) and were retrieved from the following website:


The data source on national electoral turnout that has been used as a control is http://www.idea.int/voter_turnout/Compulsory_Voting.htm

Table 7.1 Factors explaining the evolution of affective EU support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT SOCIALIZATION</th>
<th>INDIRECT SOCIALIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Participation in EP Elections</td>
<td>National Participation in the Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ratio of a country’s participation in European Parliament elections to its voter turnout in national parliamentary elections.</td>
<td>An indicator of over-representation(^1) of each country in the A grade of all Commission DGs. The participation of each country in the B, C and D grades of the Commission DGs to the participation of all member countries in the aforementioned grades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Participation in the European Parliament</td>
<td>An indicator of over-representation of each country in the A grade of all EP DGs. The participation of each country in the B, C and D grades of the Commission DGs to the participation of all member countries in the aforementioned grades.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) The overrepresentation formula is adapted by Page, E. (1997;58) and is as follows:

\[ O = N_i \frac{(T_{na}/T_A) \times T_i}{N} \]

where \(N_i\) is the number of officials of a particular nationality in the A grade; \(T_{na}\) is the number of officials of a particular nationality in all grades; \(T_A\) is the number of officials of any nationality in all grades; and \(T_i\) the number of officials of any nationality in the A grade.
7.4 EU AFFECTIVE SUPPORT AND DISTINCT NATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURES: THE AMENDED SOCIALIZATION HYPOTHESIS

It remains to be seen whether greater national participation in the integration process - direct or indirect - entails more identification with the European political Community across all different national contexts. Judging by the average impact of both institutional participation and EP electoral turnout on country-level identification with the EU as presented in figures 7.1 and 7.2, it makes sense to search for a pattern which accounts for more variation in aggregate affective allegiance with the Union. In the first six countries presented in the sample (UK, Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Finland, and Sweden) the average degree of participation in European integration – be it direct or indirect – does not coincide with an average positive increase in EU identification as is observed with the rest of the fifteen ‘old’ member states. On the X axis of the charts emphasis is placed on national affective ties, rendering those countries on average rather immune to the effects of EU socialization, and certainly more Eurosceptic than the rest.

Figures 7.1 and 7.2 (about here, see APPENDIX III)

In an attempt to account for this relatively constant gap in affective support for the Union, attention will be paid to elite attitudes to EU membership as shaped throughout supranational interaction in the accession negotiations. In this study the political dimension of integration mediates the EU socialization debate in an attempt to see whether national elites, as a ‘strong’ public, who engage in institutionalised deliberation over the desirability of membership, communicate a diverse message to their ‘general’ publics that decisively infiltrates the latter’s long term affective attitudes to Europe (Fraser, 1992). In sum, my point of departure is that although I recognize that the EU socialization approach may contain an element of truth, I advocate that other determinants, over and above direct and indirect socialization factors, may exert a significant and possibly longer-lasting impact on levels of affective public support. Following the classification established in the conclusions of Part II between rationally oriented (Utility Maximizing) and constructively oriented (Value Maximizing) national elites, two distinct hypotheses are in line. First, while EU socialization success or failure is expected to result in higher or lower levels of support among both groups of EU entrants, the Value Maximizing
countries may still exhibit a stronger affective popular support for the EU than the Utility Maximizing member states, given their relevant elites’ political-ideational commitment to Europe starting from the time of accession (H4). Second, the Value Maximisers may also exhibit an increased level of affective support in the face of EU socialization failures, as positive elite identification with Europe in these countries could cancel out such shocks (H5a). On the contrary, in Utility Maximizing countries identification with the EU is expected to be low even at times of successful socialization, because membership in the Union is associated with purely instrumental objectives rather than with community building aims (H5b).

In this sense, the amended socialization hypotheses present affective support for the EU as elite driven. On average, direct and indirect socialization successes and failures may result in Pareto optimal and zero sum outcomes in the degree of popular identification with the EU across the entire sample of countries (see figure 7.3; options A and D). In the amended model, the possibilities of high affective support in the case of EU socialization failure, and low support in the case of socialization success, are also taken into account (options B and C).

**Figure 7.3 The Amended Socialization Hypotheses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Affective Support</th>
<th>Socialization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Win Win A</td>
<td>UM B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Win VM C</td>
<td>Lose D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Essentially, I build a model of EU public opinion which does more than simply distinguish between country-specific socialization factors that have an impact on affective attitudes to Europe. Rather, what is at stake is to determine whether supranational factors such as accession negotiations can give rise to distinct national political cultures concerning the European integration project, rendering some groups of countries more favourable to the EU than others. National political culture refers to a set of widely shared beliefs, values, and norms concerning the relationship of citizens both to their government and, indirectly, to the supranational entity that has
intervened in matters affecting public affairs ever since accession. The public may easily absorb the major elements of political culture through a process of continual reinforcement and the language of political debate (Feldman, 1988:417-18). It remains to be seen whether the political debate prevalent during the accession negotiations successfu...
new, concrete indicators of socialization, enriching the existing literature on affective EU support. At the same time it will produce more comprehensive evidence of changes in EU public attitudes over time. Past research on the affective contours of public support for European integration has mainly been cross-sectional, collecting individual-level values for the fifteen member states at the same point in time (Luedtke, 2005; Marks and Hooghes, 2003; Kritzinger, 2003; Carey, 2003). This model, by utilizing panel data at the aggregate-level, is better suited to the study of the dynamics of change in public identification with the EU. Panel data are able not only to model or explain why individual countries have different levels of support, but also why they behave differently at different time periods. Finally, if UM and VM membership motivations prove significant in mediating the effects of socialization, this study will establish itself as an important contribution to the nascent literature on political cues and will uncover the distinct elite identity building capacity of EU enlargement politics.

7.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

7.5.a ANALYTIC STRATEGY: METHODS AND DATA

On the basis of the preceding discussion it is apparent that although I recognize the socialization approach as partially true I advocate that other determinants, over and above EU socialization factors, may exert a significant and possibly longer-lasting impact on levels of affective public support for integration. As discussed earlier, one may identify two distinct groups of countries (emerging from their diverse elite attitudes towards EU membership): Utility Maximisers (UM) and Value Maximisers (VM). I am primarily interested in empirically investigating whether this distinction is relevant for the observed level of affective support. In particular, I conjecture that, after controlling for variations in direct and indirect socialization, UM countries will be associated with significantly lower levels of EU identification. In other words, I propose that affective EU support, just like utilitarian support, is driven by two mechanisms which operate on different horizons and frequencies. The first mechanism captures the impact of socialization factors and governs short-term variations in support. The second mechanism, which makes up the thrust of this analysis, mirrors a set of structural characteristics of countries that eventually identifies them as either UM or VM. Essentially, while the first mechanism causes
transitory variations in support, the second affects overall predispositions as shown by longer term support, and hence determines the long-run path of affective EU public opinion.

Now, the challenge is to translate these into the form of testable hypotheses. In order to do so, I use the parameters of the following regression model:

\[(EAS)_{i,t} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{K} \gamma_j^i X_{i,t}^j + \beta (UM)_{i,t} + u_{i,t} \]  \hspace{1cm} (3)

Where \(i,t\) denote country and time period respectively, \(u\) is a spherical disturbance term, and \(\alpha, \beta\) and \(\gamma^i\)s are unknown parameters to be estimated. Finally, \(X\) stands for a set of direct and indirect socialization variables (see table 7.1) in which the 'length of membership' is also included.

The variable of interest, \(UM\), is an indicator taking into account elite attitudes. Effectively, it is a dummy variable that dichotomises the sample of EU countries, attaining the value of one, where the country belongs to the Utility Maximisers group, and zero where belonging to the Value Maximisers group. The following hypothesis is in order:

The distinction between UM and VM groups is irrelevant for affective public support; \(\beta = 0\).

In the case that this hypothesis were rejected this would indicate relevance of the proposed distinction, and my assumption is that the UM group should exhibit a significantly lower mean level of support as compared to the VM group, i.e. \(\beta < 0\).

Of course, one may advocate that the VM and UM groups respond differently to variations in socialization stimuli, i.e. the vector of \(\gamma^i\)s is different across the two groups. This plausible scenario lies within the scope of the current analysis, and so I shall attempt to discern potential differences by running the chosen regression model within the two groups.

\[(EAS)^{UM}_{i,t} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{K} \gamma_j^i X_{i,t}^j + u_{i,t} \] \hspace{1cm} (2a)

\[(EAS)^{VM}_{i,t} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{K} \gamma_j^i X_{i,t}^j + u_{i,t} \] \hspace{1cm} (2b)

In particular, in the Utility Maximizing countries an increase in direct and indirect socialization may result in negative affective attitudes towards the EU, since the
latter associate EU membership with a beneficial trade and security agreement and fail to identify with the political community. On the contrary, among Value Maximisers the same model parameters may always relate positively to affective EU support in view of their ideational commitment to membership, which renders the EU a familiar locus of common political values and norms.

To test the above-mentioned hypotheses I rely on panel data pooling time series and cross-sectional observations for the ‘old’ fifteen EU member states over a twenty-three year span, from 1979 to 2002. This type of modelling allows the explanatory variables of affective support to vary over two dimensions, individual units (i.e. countries) and time, yielding more efficient estimators than a series of independent cross-sections, where different countries are sampled for each period (Verbeek, 2000:310-313, Hsiao, 2003:1-8). In turn, the analysis begins by developing three regression models with three alternative assumptions regarding error structure: (i) an OLS model with panel corrected standard errors, (ii) a Random-Effects model with first-order auto-correlated errors imposing the restriction of a common error structure across all cross sections (countries), and (iii) a Random-Effects model with first-order auto-correlated errors that are allowed to differ across sections. The first model is superior since it exhibits a significantly better fit to the data. Even though the third regression has panel-specific corrections for auto-correlation and is compatible with the expectation that countries’ dynamics may differ, it tends to worsen the overall performance of the model in a similar manner to the second equation. In addition, the number of time periods T (T=23) in this empirical analysis is small in relation to the number of units (N=15) and using panel specific coefficients for autocorrelation would risk bias in my estimates of the standard errors, as Beck and Katz have shown (1995:639). Given that the cross-sectional units N are substantially less in number than the time points T, an OLS with panel corrected standard errors is a reasonable estimation strategy that still caters for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation of errors. Last but not least, I replicate the first model within the UM and VM groups so as to test Hypotheses H5a and H5b. Before closing it should be noted that all regression models are run first

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122 The length of the time series observations is determined both by the time span covered by the dependent variable, first measured in 1982, and the availability of data on Commission and European Parliament officials.

123 For an extensive discussion on the advantages and limitations of panel data see also Baltagi, 1995 and Wooldridge, 1999.
with the Commission and then with the European Parliament variables, as the two are co-linear by 0.768 for the A grade, and 0.756 for the other grades.

7.5.b Results

Turning now to the regression results, attention should be directed to the figures presented in table 7.2, which estimate the degree to which a country’s direct and indirect participation in the integration process, as well as its length of membership have had an effect upon its level of identification with the EU. Apparently, there is evidence to support the indirect socialization hypothesis regarding the positive impact of national representation in different EU institutions on a country’s affective support for the Union. The reported coefficients suggest a major role for the number of A grade officials each member state provides to the European Commission. The relevant variable is statistically significant at the 1 percent threshold, revealing that the secondment of A grade Commission civil servants is a reasonably good proxy for the degree of socialization a member state has achieved, giving a boost to its net level of EU identification. National participation in the Commission, in other words, becomes a significant reference point for the evolution of a Europeanised identity.

On the contrary, national participation in the A grade of the European Parliament has a marginally significant impact on EU affective support (with a \( p \)-value at the 0.01 level), while the coefficient is negative. The implication is that institutional participation in the EP, unlike the Commission, results in lower levels of identification with the EU. This curious finding could be the result of cross-purposes. Respondents in EU member states, in other words, indirectly participate in the institutional practices of the Parliament, but still fail to establish stronger affective ties with the Union through this institutional channel - not just because it is weaker than the Commission in shaping EU policy - but also because the EP, unlike the Commission, challenges more traditional forms of national representation.

The coefficients on the numbers of officials involved in the other grades confirm our theoretical expectations, as they are positive yet less significant predictors of EU affective support. The lower one delves into the EU hierarchy the less robust the proxy of EU socialization becomes losing explanatory power for member states’ identity links with the Union. The indirect socialization hypothesis in other words, is confirmed in that it predicted that A grade participation in EU
institutions should contribute more significantly in the evolution of affective ties with the Union, than lower grade involvement (H1 and H2). It is however common sense that national participation to routine secretarial and clerical tasks is not as important in shaping popular identification with the EU as participation in administration and bureaucratic entrepreneurship.

Moving now to the direct socialization hypothesis regarding the impact of national turnout in European elections on affective support, we may conclude that the data is in line with our hypothesis. Countries with higher levels of turnout in European elections have citizens that identify more with the integration project (H3). The null that such a relationship may not hold is emphatically rejected at the 0.001 level of significance. Hence, the reported coefficients complement previous research (Blondel et al;1998 Frognier,2002), showing that turnout in European elections and observed levels of affective EU support exist in a relationship of mutual reinforcement in which causality runs both ways. Finally, besides the concrete socialization factors, the ‘length of membership’ indicators are statistically different from zero across all models. The high significance level of the time trend variable is in line with the empirical findings of earlier studies (Anderson and Kaltenthalier,1996 Anderson and Reichert,1996). The difference in the coefficient sign of the level and the squared indicator enriches the existing literature showing that the relationship between time and affective support is not exclusively linear but u-shaped. This means that while affective support for the Union may be low for most EU member states in the initial stages of membership, this relationship can be overturned in the course of time.

The main parameter in this analysis was the coefficient of the UM dummy, which, if found to be significant, would partially confirm the amended socialization hypothesis (H4), implying that the two groups of EU member states exhibit different mean levels of support over and above the ‘socialization’ variables that were used as a control. In other words, the fitted regression lines would start from different intercepts for the two groups. Provided that their mean support levels differ, the hypothesis is that VM mean support should be higher than UM mean support. The point estimate of the UM dummy is -17.11 for which the null that is zero, is emphatically rejected ($\chi^2 = 60.16$) at all conventional levels of significance. We can therefore estimate with 95 percent confidence that the coefficient is located between
-21.43 and -12.78, which indicates that after controlling for a wide set of socialization factors, the mean support levels of UM countries are substantially lower than those of VM countries. This finding therefore verifies the informal pictorial evidence shown in section 7.3.a. Note that the order of magnitude of their mean difference is at minimum 13 percentage points, and may reach an upper limit of 21 points. This suggests that the shocks required in the remaining set of factors (institutional participation, EP elections, and length of membership) to eliminate this fundamental difference between the two groups must be of an appreciable magnitude. This observation assists us in making sense of the fact that in most time periods, the VM group identifies more with the European project unlike the Eurosceptic UM group.

Table 7.2 Estimation Results for $(EAS)_{i,t} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{K} \gamma_j X_{i,t}^j + \beta (UM)_{i,t} + u_{i,t}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Model 1 : OLS with PCSE</th>
<th>Model 2 : AR1</th>
<th>Model 3 : PSAR1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>-17.11*** (-2.20)</td>
<td>-19.16***</td>
<td>-22.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-24.78***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-25.65***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-27.42***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission A grade</td>
<td>0.01*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02** (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission Other grade Officials</td>
<td>0.06 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.30)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP A grade Officials</td>
<td>-0.08* (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.14** (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.14** (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Other grade Officials</td>
<td>0.55* (0.28)</td>
<td>0.35 (0.36)</td>
<td>0.65** (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in EP Elections</td>
<td>0.35*** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.20*** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.15** (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.85 (0.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.21*** (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.14** (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of membership</td>
<td>-1.12*** (0.33)</td>
<td>-1.04*** (0.31)</td>
<td>-0.88** (0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.81** (0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.81** (0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.83** (0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of membership squared</td>
<td>0.03*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.02*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.02*** (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis Testing, $(\chi^2)$, (confidence interval)

$H_0 : \beta = 0$

$H_1 : \beta \neq 0$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H_0 : \beta = 0$</td>
<td>60.16 (0.00)</td>
<td>62.15 (0.00)</td>
<td>56.53 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_1 : \beta \neq 0$</td>
<td>(-21.43 , -12.78)</td>
<td>(-23.92 , -14.39)</td>
<td>(-32.34 , -19.55)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant at 10% threshold, ** significant at 5% threshold, *** significant at 1% threshold
Last but not least, the lower mean level of support observed in UM member states is accompanied by diverse responses to socialization stimuli, as shown in table 7.3. In line with our theoretical expectations (H5a and H5b), the vector of \( \gamma' \)s is different across the two groups. Put simply, the diverse socialization factors not only lose predictive power when moving from the VM to the UM group, but also change from a positive to a negative sign. This uncovers the overly pessimistic predisposition of the UM countries towards Europe, which subverts the positive effects of direct and indirect socialization observed among the entire sample. In particular, both A grade and lower grade participation in the Commission and the Parliament is negatively associated with affective support for the EU among the UM group, while the relationship is positive within the VM group. In addition, the aforementioned variables are in overall terms more significant among the latter, implying that socialization factors fare better in predicting affective public attitudes within the VM countries. Arguing along similar lines, participation in EP elections proves to be negative and insignificant for the UM group, yet positive and significant (at the 5 percent level) for the VM group. In other words, the more the UM countries participate in European elections, the less they identify with and support the EU. This lies in sharp contrast with the VM member states, which have an overly positive stance towards integration. In this light it is no wonder that length of membership is also insignificant for the UM level of affective support, while in the VM group hesitant attitudes are decisively overturned in the course of time, as the squared time trend shows. All in all, the reported findings give credence to the ‘amended socialization hypotheses’ advanced in this chapter, proving that historical factors such as enlargement politics can better explain permanent differences in affective support for the EU among its member states.
Table 7.3

Estimation Results

\[(EAS)^{(UM)}_{i,t} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{K} \gamma_j X_{i,t}^j + u_{i,t} \quad \text{and} \quad (EAS)^{(VM)}_{i,t} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{K} \gamma_j X_{i,t}^j + u_{i,t}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Within UM countries</th>
<th>Within VM Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commission A grade</td>
<td>-0.06**</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission Other grade</td>
<td>-4.48*</td>
<td>0.58***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
<td>(2.32)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP A grade Officials</td>
<td>-0.64***</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Other grade Officials</td>
<td>-2.34**</td>
<td>0.90***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in EP Elections</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.39***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of membership</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>-1.83***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of membership squared</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant at 10% threshold, ** significant at 5% threshold, *** significant at 1% threshold

7.6 Conclusions

On the basis of the preceding discussion one can give an affirmative answer to the theoretical proposition advanced by Mayer and Palmowski (2004:586), namely that ‘European institutions could themselves become carriers of a European historical myth, since there is no European historical narrative on which a common identity could be founded’. Apparently, participation in the institutions of European integration is a significant predictor of popular identification with the European construction. More specifically, national representation in the A grade of the Commission triggers a collective sense of belonging to Europe that complements national identities and becomes a prime reference point in the evolution of a nested European identity. However, participation in the A grade of the European Parliament services is not only a less significant predictor of affective support, but relates negatively to it. If we take into account the implicit competition between the EP and
the national assemblies as strongholds of the democratic criteria of authorization, accountability, and representation the negative sign in the Parliament’s coefficient comes as no surprise. Civic participation in an EU assembly that threatens to substitute familiar elements of national politics may be perceived as more of a menace for the public than participation in the Commission, whose practices influence citizens through their elected governments. In addition, the lower significance level of this particular indicator is warranted by the relatively limited powers of the EP in shaping integration outcomes. The latter’s powers of scrutiny, amendment and approval of legislation leave much to be desired when compared to the Commission’s power of initiative in legislative and policy matters.

Moving to institutional participation in the other grades of both institutions we may conclude that the estimation results provide strong confirmation of the theoretical expectations. Unlike participation in bureaucratic entrepreneurship, national participation in routine secretarial tasks is a positive but not a significant predictor of affective support for the Union. Similarly, national participation levels in European elections successfully accounts for the degree of affective allegiance with the European cause. This means that the hypothesized link between European voter turnout and collective popular identification with Europe is confirmed. In this light, both of the socialization indicators proposed in this study have added much to our understanding of the affective ties member states establish with the Union over the course of time.

Besides building a general model of affective support for the EU, this chapter also shows that the relatively constant differences in cross-national affective support for the EU can be better understood if one takes into account integration history and national elite attitudes towards the European construction. The greater the ideational-affective motivations for seeking and granting accession to the Union, the more positive the impact of socialization on the public perception of the EU in the long run. On the contrary, where EU membership is premised on rational cost-benefit calculations, popular identification with European integration grows weaker. The public in Utility Maximizing countries view integration as a beneficial trade agreement rather than as a wider democratic construct that can successfully complement their national political values and identities. Therefore, neither institutional participation nor voting in European elections triggers a strong affective public sentiment in these countries, since people have been socialized into an
instrumental perception of the EU. In addition, the within group analysis also proves that it is not merely the intensity of affective support that differs between the two types of EU members. Rather, in line with our theoretical expectations, the UM countries tend to be immune to the effects of socialization, displaying an overly pessimistic affective attitude to the EU, unlike the VM countries which respond positively to socialization stimuli.

In turn, such findings suggest that EU elites at the time of accession negotiations should attempt to balance cost-benefit calculations with political ideational considerations. In order to do so, EU actors should not focus unilaterally on ‘coercive persuasion’ tools that strengthen the applicant’s capacity to respond to the economic and political challenges of membership. Rather, extra attention should be paid to ‘learning by doing’ instruments such as participation in Community programmes or ‘twinning’, and argumentative tools such as the European conference that gradually introduce applicants to EU ways of thinking and acting (Tamvaki, 2005). Only then can an increase in the direct legitimacy of the European polity be expected, in view of the higher ideational affinity established between the entrant state and the host organisation.

The critical observations made regarding the distinct levels of public support for the EU stemming from diverse elite motivations for pursuing and granting EU membership also have significant connotations for current elite-driven efforts to bring the European design closer to its citizens, thereby tackling the social legitimacy problems of the Union. Apparently, special emphasis should be given to EU identity-building initiatives in countries that have more utility oriented approaches to Union membership. Echoing Scharpf’s argument (2002) on legitimate diversity I make a case for a *diverse geographical legitimation* in the enlarged European polity. Just as he advocates legitimate diversity, in policy making - i.e. the application of nationally distinct policy solutions - in areas that have high political salience in the member states, the present study advocates the use of variable legitimation techniques among the multiple territorial units making up the enlarged EU. More specifically, given that an ideational-affective predisposition towards the EU can foster stronger affective links with the European construction it would make sense to encourage community building strategies not just among all member states but particularly

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124 Coercive persuasion tools refer to accession negotiations, screening, accession partnerships, or peer reviews.
among those that traditionally lack in affective allegiance towards the EU. Identity building initiatives comprise the classical mobility programmes for students and workers such as Erasmus, Comenius, and Grundtvig, research and development programmes that favour inter-industry networks, organised media debates over the implications of EU membership in daily life, as well as national or Union wide referenda, even without binding force, that would stimulate vigorous information campaigns. Institutional participation should also be strengthened - not necessarily by increasing the sheer number of EU officials from specific nationalities - but rather by disseminating information both on the role of the EU administration and the progress registered by country-specific officials in promoting integration. The latter could be accomplished by establishing a rating system among Brussels bureaucrats that would reward devotion to the European cause. Steps of this kind shall be discussed in greater detail in the concluding remarks of this study.
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX II

Information drawn from the 2003 STAFF REGULATIONS ANNEX 1

**B-grade:** Typical responsibilities in this grade include office manager, senior secretary and archivist. There are five points within the grade from B1 to B5
- B1 Principal Administrative Assistant
- B2-B3 Senior Administrative Assistant, Senior Technical Assistant, Senior Secretarial Assistant
- B4-B5 Administrative Assistant, Technical Assistant, Secretarial Assistant

**C-grade:** This grade is for clerical and secretarial staff. Like the B grade, C grade is divided into 5 points
- C1 Executive Secretary, Principal Secretary, Principal Clerical Officer
- C2-C3 Secretary/Shorthand-typist, Clerical Officer
- C4-C5 Typist, Clerical Assistant

**D-grade:** Employees in this grade undertake service and manual jobs such as porter, postman and cleaner. The grade is divided into four points, from D1 to D4
- D1 Head of Unit
- D2-D3 Skilled Employee, Skilled Worker
- D4 Unskilled Employee, Unskilled Worker
APPENDIX III

Figure 7.1 European Parliament Electoral Turnout and Net Identification with the EU

![Graph showing European Parliament Electoral Turnout and Net Identification with the EU](image)

Figure 7.2 EU institutional participation (A grade) and net identification with the EU

![Graph showing EU institutional participation (A grade) and net identification with the EU](image)
CONCLUSIONS

By considering the link between elite-driven EU enlargement politics and the evolution of public support for European integration, this study has served a dual research objective. On the one hand, it has provided an explanation of international variation in support for European integration, which moves beyond extant theories of economic voting and social identity. Popular attitudes towards the EU do not simply reflect the economic interests and identities of individuals faced with an objective, exogenously determined reality. Rather, citizens face an endogenously shaped world as filtered by elite attitudes to EU membership. European integration is not perceived uniformly across all EU member states but has acquired a different salience within distinct types of EU members who have approached membership and gained accession for diverse purposes. In treating elite attitudes to EU membership as the locus of the correct understanding of international variation in public support for integration, an enlargement of the EU enlargement research agenda has been accomplished, not least in theoretical terms. Enriching the current literature that has tended to place the analysis of EU widening within the mainstream of international relations theorizing, this study makes the case for theoretical differentiation within single enlargement cases and between enlargement rounds. This literally means that while within individual cases of EU widening rationalism and constructivism may intermingle in accounting for a successful resolution of the bargain, between enlargement rounds one may still control for their relative share in explaining actors’ initial preferences and the outcome of negotiations. Following this logic, I make a distinction between rationally oriented Utility Maximizing entrants and constructively inspired Value Maximizing elites and subsequently proceed with an estimation of their differentiated impact on public opinion formation.

More specifically, the first chapter of the thesis delineates the rationalist and constructivist hypotheses over who decides to knock on the Union’s door, how the negotiations evolve, and why existing member states concede to accession. On the one hand, neoliberalism and neorealism in the form of material self-interest in economic welfare and security appear to account for both the ex-ante enlargement phase of preference formation and the dum stage of accession negotiations. Under the auspices of rationalism, EU enlargement is a form of interest-based international cooperation. Actors’ behaviour conforms to the logic of expected consequences
leaving no space for collective identity considerations, common political values, and norms. Constructivism, on the other hand, advocates a value-based international political order which treats enlargement as an incidence of ‘appropriate’ behaviour regulated by norms shared among EU actors. Still, the arguments made by ‘modernist’ constructivists do not help the analyst form testable hypotheses that counteract those advanced by rationalist approaches. The ‘constitutive’ ontology of the modernist variant simply tells us which social meanings make up actors’ material preferences without altering their egoistic cost–benefit expectations. The distinct causal impact of shared norms and ideas, in other words, is left unexplored. For this reason, the constructivist variant, put forward in this study seeks to establish a causal role for ideas by detecting how the latter ‘cross-cut’ actors’ material interests. In the ‘integrative’ variant rhetorical action, i.e. the strategic employment of shared norms among members of a community, is the means by which material, self-interested behaviour is put aside for fear of betraying the norms to which actors’ have committed themselves. In this sense, EU enlargement can occur even amidst unfavourable material interest constellations, so long as shared EU values and norms can be strategically employed by applicants to silence their opponents in the accession bargain.

Part II (chapters 2, 3 and 4) in turn, shows that theoretical differentiation holds both within the three intensive case studies of Greece, Britain and Austria and between the enlargement rounds they stand for. By carefully tracing the historical evidence, I come to conclude that rational and constructivist explanations intermingle within the Mediterranean entrants, while material self interest gives way to collective identity considerations after the strategic employment of the Union’s democratic credentials by the Greek government. Liberal democratic ideas fill in the gap created by a fragile economy and security in Greek bargaining resources, imposing legitimacy constraints on EU incumbents. The latter would not endanger their reputation as community members for the sake of mere utilitarian concerns. Constructivism, in other words, prevails over rationalism, which is reduced to accounting for the Greek enlargement controversies rather than its tendencies. Similarly, the rationalist-constructivist debate replicates itself among the Northern entrants. For both Britain and Austria, nevertheless, national and EEC value homogeneity is marginal, while material interests in cooperation are strong for both applicants and incumbents. Rationalism therefore becomes the default drive for
explaining the tendencies in these accession games, while constructivism is reduced to accounting for controversies. All in all, apart from establishing a theoretical synthesis in the rationalist-constructivist debate (i.e. ‘within’ theoretical differentiation), Part II allows for a classification in elite motives for pursuing and granting membership (i.e. ‘between’ theoretical differentiation). EU enlargement is conceived of as a continuum of applicants’ and incumbents’ interactions extending between a rationally oriented Utility Maximizing (UM) stance and a constructively oriented Value Maximizing (VM) attitude. Classification depends on whether membership primarily represents interest-based cooperation or an identity-based project.

By extending the scope for a rationalist-constructivist theoretical synthesis beyond the thoroughly analysed Central and Eastern European candidates, this project has refined the comparability and generalisability of theoretically informed literature on EU enlargement. In addition, the causal factors (i.e. independent variables) employed in theory-oriented enlargement research are enriched, as the project focuses on both ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ elite attitudes to membership, and considers both the materialist and ideational implications of eventual accession. More specifically, in the incumbents’ discourse over Greek accession, EU liberal democratic values trumped both economic and security interests. Presenting membership as a matter of shared community principles allowed for the introduction of an economically and strategically weak candidate at a time of internal EU crisis. After all, it was easier to reach an agreement about the desirability of democracy than about peaches and tomatoes, or the implications of Greek and Turkish security disputes. Enlargement was also couched in terms of democratic ideals on the demand side of the negotiations. Karamanlis’ government made membership an issue of democracy whenever they encountered the opposition’s rising suspicions over the implications of accession for underdeveloped industry and agriculture, as well as over the desirability of orienting the country to the Western political and military camp. Presenting enlargement as an issue of democracy promotion silenced both national and supranational opponents, because no actor wanted to stand accused of obstructing the consolidation of Greek democracy. In this sense, the Mediterranean enlargement strengthened the EU’s image as a value-based international political community.
In contrast, within the two Northern candidates, accounting for the 1973 and 1995 enlargement rounds respectively, the EU primarily figured as a problem solving entity. For Britain in particular membership constituted a pragmatic policy option delivering partly economic and mainly political benefits. In fact, the economic weight of the Community mattered as a stimulus for British influence in the course of global political negotiations. Decolonisation alongside a series of crises in the country’s special relationship with the US throughout the 1960s, considerably strengthened pro-integration arguments. On the supply side, the economic and political advantages stemming from the accession of a former world power come to the fore in late 1960s. The French geopolitical antagonism towards the British, eloquently expressed in the 1963 and 1967 vetoes, receded the moment the French President realized that his policy of indifference towards the two major power blocs was no longer a viable solution. Enlargement, in other words, was a significant foreign policy option for both parts, rather than a noble project based on shared democratic values and a collective identity. After all, Britain had well-entrenched democratic institutions which nurtured her ideational detachment from a Community that threatened to breach her national sovereignty. Similarly, in the supply side the ideational reservations over admitting an American Trojan horse rendered the prospects for justifying enlargement by means of shared values rather bleak.

Turning now to the Austrian bid for membership, it was concluded that in this case too the EU as an exporter of shared liberal democratic values failed to become a centripetal force. Even though a new European identity opened up possibilities for replacing Austria’s post-war identity as the first victim of National Socialist Germany, due emphasis was given to strengthening trade rather than to political or cultural arrangements with the EEC. The negative externalities resulting from the completion of the internal market and the implementation of the SEA created incentives for a stronger institutional relationship. The social partners and export oriented firms were heavily involved in paving the way to Brussels in anticipation of net welfare gains. Hence, the Austrian government negotiated with the EU incumbents in order to achieve the maximum possible results consistent with domestic goals. Likewise, the EEC partners displayed a growing interest in consolidating and extending trade relations with an EFTA member - one of the EEC’s main suppliers. In this context, little space was left for ideational concerns over Austria’s contribution to the perpetuation of liberal democratic values. On the
basis of the preceding discussion a fine distinction is drawn between Utility Maximizing elites that focus exclusively on material welfare and security gains, pushing aside the positive or even negative ideational implications of membership, and Value Maximizing actors that place the emphasis on sharing EU liberal democratic values over and above a detailed cost-benefit analysis of membership. The above-mentioned classification extends beyond the selected case studies to the rest of the countries participating in the three enlargement waves as well as to the original Six. Hence, reasoning by analogy, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Ireland are part of the UM group along with Austria and the UK, while Spain, Portugal and the original Six are classified as VM.

The analysis of elite attitudes to European integration is useful as a device because it contributes to tracing the deeper structural causes of cross-country variation in support of the European Union. UM and VM elite attitudes become the most immediate causal link in explaining this variance, as attempted in part III of this study (chapters 6 and 7). However, before exploring the relationship between diverse elite attitudes and the evolution of variable degrees of popular support for the Union an analytical refinement of the concept of support (i.e. legitimacy) is attempted. Hence, in chapter 5 I put forward a multi-level model of legitimacy allowing for the full-scale application of its various aspects, i.e. direct (popular) and indirect (elite driven) legitimacy, or utilitarian and affective legitimacy, to the EU. A multi-level perception of legitimacy not only allows for a concurrent consideration of elite and public attitudes towards integration, but is also helpful in conceptualising the multi-layered performance and identity-driven dilemmas stemming from the expansion of the EU into new territorial units. In essence, support for the EU becomes both a matter of substance and degree. This means that while support for integration may vary in its expression as performance-oriented or identity-laden, it may also vary in intensity among the various countries making up the EU. Therefore, in the concluding comments of the chapter, the relevance of a multi-level model of support is tested, making a claim for a diverse geographical legitimation in the enlarged Union depending on how the membership question has been framed by national elites. In particular, Value Maximizing entrants are expected to outperform the Utility Maximizing group in terms of both utilitarian and affective support, since their favourable ideational disposition to integration can become a ‘reservoir of good-will’ enabling them to withstand short-term performance and identity crises.
Chapters 6 and 7 corroborate through quantitative analysis the interpretation of international variation in support for integration established in the preceding chapters, and clarify the link between the initial enlargement phases (ex-ante: preference formation and dum: accession negotiations) and the ex-post stage. This project, in other words, has not focused exclusively on the preferences and policy priorities of applicants and incumbents, but has extended enlargement research interest to a new range of variables relevant to public opinion. In particular, in chapter 6 utilitarian public support for the EU comes under scrutiny. The utilitarian approach to mass opinion argues that support is determined by short-term national economic performance and peoples’ cost-benefit calculations. In the model I advocate, national macroeconomic management instead intermingles with EU enlargement politics. Hence, elite attitudes to membership decisively infiltrate national economic evaluations and the subsequent utilitarian judgments citizens pass on the Union. In particular, Utility and Value Maximizing elite attitudes produce different mean levels of public support. Although the regression results disconfirm the expectation that the VM group would react positively to all different economic stimuli, unlike the pessimist UM entrants, the analysis still shows that intensity of support is significantly higher among the former. This means that while in both groups short-term support varies with the business cycle, long-run support is determined by a set of structural characteristics of countries that identify them as either UM or VM. The observed utilitarian support for the EU is thus a mixture of two processes: long-term disposition towards integration (determined by elite attitudes to membership), and the current economic conditions that govern short-term fluctuations. This mixture results in a highly complex pendulum pattern of utilitarian support, where the reference point of motion is the underlying elite attitudes to Europe.

Having espoused a multi-level model of legitimacy, the study moves beyond utilitarian support to the heavily under-researched area of affective support for the Union building a model that uses the widest time coverage available in the literature. Besides adding a longitudinal perspective to earlier, primarily cross-sectional, research (collecting individual-level values for the fifteen member states at the same point in time), chapter 7 also considerably enriches the research focus by adding new independent variables to the study of affective attitudes to Europe. In particular, following extant theorizing over the significance of socialization for the evolution of
affective support, I establish new, concrete indicators that complement and partially challenge the monopolistic attention previously directed to the ‘length of membership’ indicator. This study in fact moves beyond the claim that identification with Europe (i.e. affective support) is a product of time and argues that it can be the outcome of both indirect and direct civic participation in the process of integration (i.e. the higher the participation the greater the affective support). The ‘indirect’ dimension of EU socialization is then measured using original data on the national distribution of EU officials in two of the most important institutions of the EU – the Commission and the European Parliament, while the direct aspect is measured by national turnout in EP elections. Besides widening the empirical base of affective EU support this chapter demonstrates the existence of influence between elite and popular affective attitudes to Europe. The identity-building capacity of EU enlargement politics is established as the regression results indicate that identification with the EU depends more on how national elites have framed EU membership than on post-accession socialization per se. As was the case with utilitarian support, the mean level of affective support in UM countries is substantially lower than in VM countries. What is more important, however, is that the reaction of the UM group to socialization stimuli is the exact opposite of that observed among the VM members. More specifically, within countries whose national elites have framed EU membership as a materially beneficial engagement, socialization indicators have a negative impact on affective support. In other words, UM countries are immune to EU socialization and rarely manage to establish affective ties with the Union unlike the VM members, for whom membership is an identity-building project.

In essence this shows that affective attitudes are less permeable than utilitarian attitudes. While the public’s utilitarian sentiments can be partially regulated by short-term economic conditions (the UM and VM groups differ in intensity of support but not in fluctuations), affective attachment to the EU is more heavily dependent on elite stances to EU membership. In the latter case, the affective attitudes of the two groups not only differ in their mean levels of support (i.e. intensity) but also in their responses to direct and indirect socialization stimuli (i.e. fluctuations). Enlargement politics and the distinct elite culture they generate, influence the identity rather than the performance based aspect of support. While it may take a major economic shock to eliminate the fundamental difference in the levels of UM and VM public support,
it would certainly require an even greater socialization crisis to alter the propensity of VM countries to develop con-centric circles of allegiance with the EU, and the preference of UM entrants for exclusive national identities. In other words, EU enlargement politics and the distinct elite frames they produce increase the stickiness of affective attitudes to European integration.

In view of the aforementioned qualitative and quantitative results a change in the research agenda from an enlarged Europe of the elites to an enlarged Europe of the electorates is thoroughly justified, since popular attitudes towards the European project are decisively mediated by EU enlargement politics and the distinct elite attitudes toward membership they generate. The clues offered by this analysis on what determines international variation in public support for integration, will acquire their full strength when one examines the mechanisms underlying the transmission of distinct elite perceptions of membership to the general population. Hence, a fruitful new line of research would focus on a qualitative analysis of newspapers and media debates in Greece, the UK, and Austria so as to detect how Utility or Value maximizing approaches to membership are communicated to the people, and whether such elite attitudes persist over time. Equally promising would be further comparative research in the countries classified as UM and VM on the basis of the three selected case studies. Such work would further enrich the UM and VM classification axis by adding new representative cases, but would also detect potential outliers. In addition, it would be interesting to inquire into the ways in which the various enlargement tools the EU has used since the CEE candidates’ knocked on its door can be regulated in a manner that encourage Value over Utility maximizing elite attitudes. Last but not least, the implications of the findings for current efforts to bring the EU closer to its citizens will briefly be analyzed in the remaining part of the conclusions.

PAST AND CURRENT PROPOSALS ON THE FUTURE OF EU PUBLIC OPINION

In recognition of the significance of popular support for the EU, which is triggered partly by effective economic governance and mainly by the establishment of a collective identity, the EU authorities tried as early as the mid-1970s to build a European consciousness among the wider public. The first attempts comprised the Copenhagen declaration on European identity (1973) and the Leo Tindemans
Report (1976). The former identified the main determinants of a European identity as the principles of representation, democracy, the rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights, but fell short of making concrete proposals that would boost public affective sentiment toward the Union (Obradovic, 1996:210-211). Tindemans, nevertheless, made up for this earlier failure not only denouncing the Union’s legitimacy crisis, arguing that: ‘Over the years the European public has lost a guiding light, namely the political consensus between our countries on our reasons for undertaking this joint task’, but also trying to identify the sources of a new ‘raison d’ être’ that would help the public strengthen its affective bonds (1976:11). He argued in favour of extending member governments’ joint action to new sectors reflecting the will of the people (i.e. foreign policy, defence, economic and social policies) and made a case for ‘a Citizen’s Europe’ that would a) protect the rights of Europeans, where these could no longer be guaranteed by individual states, and b) display external signs of solidarity (i.e. enhance the movement of persons, encourage integration in educational matters etc). (ibid;14-28). Similarly, in the mid-1980s the EU continued to flesh out its desire to address the underlying causes of popular alienation via the Adonino Committee (1985). The latter put forward concrete measures meant to change peoples’ consciousness of the political domain to which they belonged. Still, the creation of a European anthem, passport cover, driving license, and flag as advocated by the Committee, followed by the largely empty concept of European citizenship envisaged in the TEU, offered little more than window-dressing for the popular legitimacy problem of the EU, as the Maastricht ratification crisis vociferously proved (Laffan, 1996:96).

Moving from Maastricht to the Amsterdam IGC, an array of reports poured from EU institutions,125 aspiring to rejuvenate and resolve the legitimacy debate. Yet, the impression conveyed by these is that institutions and member state representatives believe that high-sounding Treaty preambles and general declarations about peace, prosperity, and solidarity can placate the public. Partial emphasis is given to a modification of the EU’s institutional structure, but no reference is made

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to mechanisms for increasing public involvement in Euro-affairs. In addition, the modest proposals advanced are rarely if ever brought into the public sphere through the national media or within the national political fora in which citizens’ are represented. In a nutshell, the discussion on popular legitimacy in the aforementioned official reports resembles a public relations exercise more than a genuine attempt to stimulate public debate on the basic values and central policies of the EU (De Burca, 1996:374-75).

A novel elite-driven project emerged in 2001 with a view to addressing more systematically the ever-present challenge of popular apathy and discontent: the White Paper on European Governance. The latter, apart from identifying ways of improving policy, regulation and delivery that could strengthen utilitarian attachments to the EU, aspired to generate new forms of public participation in Euro-politics that might help affective links grow between the European project and its addressees. More specifically, the White Paper sought to improve involvement in Union processes through both decentralisation - i.e. reaching out to regional and local authorities - and civil society. However, better involvement was depicted as ‘providing a chance to get citizens involved in achieving the Union’s objectives’ rather than the other way round’ (European Commission, 2001:15). In this sense, a suspicion remains that ‘the White Paper privileges a desire to domesticate civil society over a concern to serve it’, as Wincott rightfully contends (2002:396). After all, by excluding democratically legitimated governments and national parliaments from the list of actors to be involved in the preparation of legislative initiatives, the White Paper authors’ seemed to be plotting a benevolent dictatorship. The Commission would unduly gain in discretion and concentration of power, while the representation of societal interests could remain unbalanced, giving more voice to business associations while leaving aside less organised grass-roots organisations that express wider European public opinion concerns. Last but not least, as with previous initiatives designed to grant citizens a genuine opportunity to participate in the process of integration, this project stalled, either because of the lack of interest on behalf of national politicians and local civil society, or because of the biased process of selecting stakeholders.

The weaknesses of the White paper were, nevertheless, addressed by the Convention, which dynamically fostered public debate over the future of the European polity. The Convention officially adhered to the norms of deliberation with
a view to creating a Constitution that would be understood and accepted by the citizenry at large. Even though its focus shifted in the final instance from an ideal speech community to bargaining between the various interests represented in the Convention, it was still more open, accessible, and transparent than other methods as yet attempted in EU decision-making, as Dobson and Follesdal point out (2004;4 Olsen,2004;76). In the interests of transparency, a Convention internet site published the contributions of all members of the Convention, along with the proceedings of the debates and the draft texts debated (http://european-convention.eu.int). Moreover, with a view to widening the debate, a plenary session of the Convention was devoted to listening to civil society, and contact groups were established (along the lines of the working groups) to enable civil society organisations to put forward their opinions. A forum was also opened for these organisations, granting them the opportunity to contribute to the ongoing debate on the future of the European Union (http://europea.eu.int/futurum/forum_convention). Last but not least, the new-born Constitutional Treaty incorporated an article on participatory democracy which can be seen as a further tangible step in increasing popular involvement in EU affairs and thereby affective support for the EU (see Article I-46; 39). In the fourth paragraph of Article I-46 a new instrument allowed for direct citizen participation through a ‘citizens’ initiative’. Citizens, numbering no less than one million, could invite the Commission to make a legislative proposal on a particular issue. This provision subverts the regular depiction of mass publics as ‘citizens qua organized interests’ assuming the form of civil-society associations (Schmidt,2004;985 Smismans,2004;136).

The incorporation of ‘participatory democracy’ in the provisions of the new Constitutional Treaty is in line with EU’s efforts to enhance links with citizens and increase mutual knowledge and understanding, as succinctly summarised in the ‘Civil Society dialogue between EU and candidate countries’ proposed in June 2005 by the Commission. Enhanced civic understanding first relates to full participation in the Socrates, Youth, Leonardo Da Vinci, Jean Monnet, and Marie Curie programmes of the Community. Socrates strengthens the European dimension of education at all levels (school, higher, and adult education) through transnational projects and the promotion of staff and learner mobility. The Youth

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126 Socrates consists of eight actions: 1) Comenius (school education); 2) Erasmus (higher education); 3) Grundtvig (adult education and other education pathways); 4) Lingua (learning and teaching of
programme allows for transnational exchanges between young people, youth workers, and youth organisations. *Leonardo Da Vinci* promotes cooperation between institutional players in vocational training in an effort to increase mobility, improve the quality of training, and boost the contribution of training to innovation. The *Jean Monnet Scholarships* in turn stimulate academic excellence in the field of European integration studies through support for new teaching, research, and debate activities at the university level. Last but not least, the *Marie Curie Actions* offer structured mobility schemes to researchers designed to enhance the transfer of research competencies and the promotion of excellence in European research.

Under the civil society dialogue, ‘town twinning’ projects are also encouraged. The concept of twinning between local municipalities in different EU member states serves the purpose of improving mutual knowledge, developing common projects, and encouraging participation at the grass roots level. Similarly, virtual twinning is also advocated by the Commission as a means of increasing awareness among young people of the European model of a multilingual and multicultural society. Intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding is further promoted by means of the *Culture 2000* and the *MEDIA Plus* and *Film on Line programmes*. Culture 2000 finances cooperative projects in all artistic and cultural fields (the performing arts, plastic and visual arts, literature, heritage, cultural history) and seeks to encourage cultural creation and mobility, access to culture for all, the dissemination of art and culture, intercultural dialogue, and knowledge of the history of the European peoples. The MEDIA Plus programme, on the other hand, aims at strengthening the competitiveness of the European audiovisual industry with a series of support measures dealing with: the training of professionals; the development of production projects and companies, the promotion of cinematographic works and audiovisual programmes, the support for cinematographic festivals. Finally, the Film Online services not only encourage the development and take-up of films online in Europe, but are also used as tools for promoting cultural diversity and mutual understanding among Europeans. Last but not least, in an attempt to let affective links grow, the 2005 ‘Civil society dialogue’

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European languages); 5) Minerva (information and communication technologies in education); 6) Observation and innovation of education systems and policies; 7) Joint actions with other European programmes; 8) Accompanying measures. For further information on these actions see [http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/socrates/socrates_en.html](http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/socrates/socrates_en.html)

For further details on e-twinning actions see [http://www.etwinning.net](http://www.etwinning.net).
envisaged open public debates on European integration through either the participation of key opinion leaders in media discussions or the creation of internet supported platforms that disseminate information and encourage ‘chats’ on EU related topics.

Besides direct civic participation in the aforementioned actions, the 2005 Commission document refers in passing to enhancing indirect civic participation, via sustained inter-parliamentary contacts between the European parliament and national assemblies. Fruitful exchanges are also envisaged between national and European parliamentary assistants as well as between EU and domestic political party members. In view of the findings of this study on the negative impact of national participation in the A grade of the European Parliament on affective support for the EU, measures in this direction are warranted. Sustained personal contacts between parliamentary assistants and party members of both sides will boost affective public sentiment, as people will grow to understand that the European Parliament supports rather than challenges traditional forms of national representation. In addition, since national participation in the Commission can be a powerful driver of affective attitudes, exchanges between A-grade Commission officials and national civil servants should also be encouraged through mutual visits and joint seminars. Steps in the same direction could also be envisaged for enhancing contacts between the European Court of Justice and National courts, or the Committee of the Regions and local communities. In turn, popular awareness of EU institutions and country-specific contributions to the workings of European integration could be stimulated by means of a rating system among Commission bureaucrats in the various DGs and services that would reward their devotion to the European cause and at the same time advertise the policies advanced in the various Directorate Generals. On the basis of the rating system, awards would then be distributed to leading supranational entrepreneurs that would be publicised in the media of the member states from which they originate.

From the preceding discussion it is apparent that a non-utilitarian basis for popular support has been favoured at the EU level, with due emphasis assigned to measures of direct (i.e. educational and cultural exchanges, internet debates etc.), and at times indirect (inter-parliamentary cooperation etc.) civic engagement in the process of integration. Although there do exist certain measures meant to serve citizens’ material interests in gender equality, health and safety at work, and non-
discrimination, as well as the sectoral interests of business associations in developing trade and investments, it has generally been understood that a European consciousness cannot be built purely on figures. It would be mistaking human nature to serve up nothing but clever sums.

Active civic engagement, nevertheless, and the affective bonds it generates, cannot on their own function as a successful antidote against falling popular approval of the EU. As the results of this study indicate, divergent national elite attitudes to EU membership produce distinct levels of popular support for the European project. In this sense, centralised legitimation techniques that apply the same solutions to all member states can hardly provide an effective solution to the popular legitimacy problem of the Union. What is needed instead is *diverse geographical legitimation strategies* that will accommodate divergent elite and popular attitudes to integration. This proposal builds on Fritz Scharpf’s (2002) recommendation for ‘legitimate diversity’, i.e. for the adoption of nationally distinct policy initiatives that address EU-wide policy conflicts rooted in differences between economic and institutional conditions, policy legacies, and normative orientations.

By the same token, uniform legitimation solutions cannot be imposed on both Utility and Value Maximizing members, because their different perceptions of the EU render the former more Eurosceptic, and the latter more Europhile in the long run. Of course both utility oriented proposals meant to boost the problem-solving effectiveness of the EU and value-based initiatives intended to establish affective links with the Union are needed in recognition of the multiple facets of the Union’s legitimacy problem. Yet, the challenge of nationally distinct levels of public support should be addressed via country-specific UM and VM legitimation strategies. The new modes of legitimation could operate along the lines of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which invites states to experiment at home and emulate one another. In particular, a report on the utility and affective legitimacy dilemmas facing the Union could be sent by the Commission to the European Council, with Council guidelines to follow based on a proposal from the Commission. In response to these guidelines member governments could present ‘national communication plans’ (i.e. communicating the problem-solving and affective aspects of EU membership to the public) and reports on actual measures taken. These could in turn be evaluated in light of comparative ‘benchmarks’ by the Commission and a permanent committee of senior civil servants. In this process of benchmarking care would be taken to allow
UM countries to ‘learn by monitoring’ (Sabel, 1995) the identity building initiatives favoured by the VM countries, since the latter significantly outperform the former in affective support, while the VM will learn from the utilitarian legitimation choices of the UM since the latter not only exhibit a strong pragmatic attitude to Europe but also have a more demanding audience to placate. Exposing their actual policy choices to comparative benchmarking and peer review would help not only to bridge the EU support gap between UM and VM members, but also provide favourable conditions for socialization, thereby increasing the level of identification with the EU and the ‘reservoir of goodwill’ it generates among the public. All in all, by means of such a process this study advocates an increased interaction and exchange of beliefs and practices among Europeans that will solidify the glue that binds us together i.e. the desire to be European. At the same time it shows that the EU motto of ‘unity in diversity’ should be more than window-dressing in a radically plural political community like the EU that is founded on the mutual recognition of diverse pragmatic desires and identities.
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