THE IRISH ROYALIST ELITE OF CHARLES II IN EXILE, C. 1649-1660

John Jeremiah Cronin

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization of the European University Institute

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Introduction & Section One
Introduction

This thesis on Irish elite exiles in Continental Europe, from c.1649-1660 will be a study of those politically, militarily, and socially influential Irish royalists, who are described as Ormondist in the existing historiography and who, in the wake of the victory of English Parliamentary forces in the civil wars of England, Scotland and Ireland of the 1640s and early 1650s, chose to follow the Court of the Stuart claimant to the thrones of those three kingdoms, Charles II, into exile on the Continent. The purpose of this thesis is to establish and advance a number of solutions to a particular set of questions. Principally, it will be concerned with assessing the extent of the impact that the exile had, if any, upon their lives. The thesis will examine what the particular problems that exile posed for this body of émigrés were and it will seek to look at how they attempted to deal with the difficulties that their predicament during these years forced upon them. As part of this, it will seek to resolve how being removed from patrimonies and their traditional zones of influence affected the way they handled their own personal concerns and interests, as well how it impacted upon the way they behaved in those other spheres of activity which were traditionally dominated by such an elite; namely governance and administration, court society and diplomacy. Aside from this, this work will also attempt to ascertain why exactly they ultimately chose exile in the first place and why they chose to use exile as a political and survival strategy.

It is hoped to achieve a number of goals through the analysis of this group. As part of achieving these objectives, it is my intention to further illuminate the experience of Irish migrants on Continental Europe in the Early Modern period through the detailed examination of a relatively tightly knit, politically active and yet religiously diverse group of persons, who were also generally of high social status, had close associations with a royal Court and were comparatively cohesive in terms of their outlook on the political and military events of the 1640s. In other words, this assemblage of persons was in many ways different from those other Irish on the Continent at the time and will provide an interesting comparison with their Early Modern compatriots. Many of these latter groups of Irish migrants, by contrast, have already been the subjects of a number of wide-ranging studies.
As part of this study of migrant experience, it is intended that this examination of noble/elite behaviour in exile will scrutinise their actions as part of a banished royal court. In effect, aside from being an examination of both an Early Modern elite outside of their normal environments and removed from their natural zones of power and influence it will be, in part, a micro-study of a major governmental institution outside of its traditional territory, with the intention of establishing if, and to what extent, it differed from its contemporaries or its predecessors. As such, it will act equally as a useful comparison and addition to the research already carried out within the wider academic community on both the nobility and royal courts generally. For the purposes of this study I will be defining a Court in its broadest sense, i.e., where the term Court does not just signify the royal family and the closest retinue of the Monarch, but signifies the sovereign, the royal family, their retinues, and the officers and advisers who make up the central institution of a kingdom’s government, or, as here, a kingdom’s government in exile, as well as others who “simply followed the Court” from time to time. This is a reasonable course to take as the term ‘court’ was generally used in this broad sense during the Early Modern period. The study will, therefore, not just examine life within the court itself, but it will also analyse the behaviour of the banished Irish elite as agents and ambassadors of this Court in its former kingdoms and on the wider European political stage generally.

There are a number of attractive reasons for pursuing this particular research topic. The first of these is the abundance of primary source material (though some would say that this is a mixed blessing). Next, it has the advantage of being both relatively clearly and reasonably definable in terms of the time period to be studied, beginning as it does with the creation of the first proper Stuart Court-in-exile at the time of the accession of Charles II to the title of King in January 1649 and ending with his return to London in May 1660. Aside from this, the persons who will be the subject of this thesis, once one has taken account of the fact that the label ‘Irish’ in its modern, nation-defining, sense does not fit them comfortably, are a relatively easily identifiable group of persons. They are persons of generally high social status who either (a) served the royal administration in Ireland prior to the outbreak of military conflict in the 1640s, (b) had close ties to the Earl, later Marquis of Ormonde, and

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supported his political interest during the 1640s, (c) both resided in, and had considerable personal interests in the kingdom, through landholding, etc., and (d) had an interest in the country through some combination of the above factors. Furthermore, they make for an interesting case-study, being both a workable number and a large enough sample to make the enquiry useful.

**The study set for this thesis**

This thesis will focus on the activities of a particular group of politically and socially influential Irish exiles and émigrés who, because of military defeat at the hands of their opponents, the English Parliament, left Ireland and Britain between the mid-1640s and mid-1650s and subsequently resided in Continental Europe, until the Restoration of the Stuarts to the thrones of England, Scotland, and Ireland in May 1660. During this time they were closely associated with the royalist cause and had close connections with the Stuart Court in exile. It will not cover a broad timeframe but instead will be a detailed examination of their activities on the Continent during the 1650s only; i.e. the period in which the vast bulk of them were in exile, during the years in which the various Interregnum regimes ruled Ireland and Britain. In total they amount to some thirty-two persons, though it must be pointed out that, as a result of such factors as the abandonment of exile or death, the numbers on the Continent at any one time vary. One also has to bear in mind that not all of these persons have left the same mark on the historic record and accordingly some will receive considerably greater treatment than others in this work.

Amongst these persons there is to be found a core group of nobles, both Protestant and Catholics in confession, from a variety of cultural backgrounds. Foremost amongst these was the Old English, and Protestant, James Butler, Charles I’s Lord Lieutenant in Ireland, along with his wife, Elizabeth, and their two sons, Thomas and Richard. Another prominent Protestant noble dynasty, though this time of Gaelic Irish origin, was that of the O’Briens of Inchiquin. This was made up of Murrough O’Brien, his wife, also called Elizabeth, and their two sons, William and

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2 As a result of point (a) this study will include persons who were not Irish ‘by birth’, but who had come to make their careers there. If one was to take the case of Sir George Radcliffe, for example, one would find a person who was native to England and who started his political career there. From the early 1630s onwards, he pursued his fortune in Ireland. Sir Leslie Stephen & Sir Sidney Lee (Eds.), *Dictionary of National Biography (DNB)* (Oxford, 1973 reprint), vol. XVI, p. 568.
John. Aside from these Protestant nobles there were also a considerable number of Catholic titled-persons who went into exile. These included the Catholic New English James Touchet, Earl of Castlehaven and the Catholic Gaelic Irish nobleman, Viscount Muskerry (later Earl of Clancarty from 1658). There were also Catholic Old English lords, including Edmund Butler, Lord Mountgarret, his wife and son; Viscount Taaffe and Viscount Dillon.

This titled nobility was joined in exile by a number of lesser gentry, all of whom had close connections to the latterly-named nobles. Moreover, as with the nobles, the confessional and cultural backgrounds of these persons were quite diverse. Confessionally speaking, these gentry were once again divided between Catholics and Protestants. Persons such as Richard Grace, Richard Bellings, senior and junior, Walter Dongan, Sir James Dillon and Richard Talbot were all practising Catholics of Old English descent. Other notable Catholic gentry included the New English George Hamilton, his wife, Mary Butler, and their children, among whom were James, George, Anthony, Thomas, Richard and Elizabeth. With regards to the Protestant members of this gentry group, many of these were likewise of varied descent, with their number including persons of Gaelic Irish ancestry, such as Daniel O’Neill, and of Old English origin, with Edward Wogan and George Lane being the persons in question here. This group of Protestant gentry was completed by the New English George Radcliffe. Finally, this set of elite exiles is completed by a number of clerics. These include John Bramhall, the Anglican Bishop of Derry, Henry Leslie, Bishop of Down and Conor and John Callaghan, a Catholic cleric of Gaelic Irish descent, who had strong pro-Ormondist associations during the 1640s.

There are a number of reasons for studying these particular exiles. Firstly, aside from those who returned to Ireland at the beginning of the Confederate wars of the 1640s and the Counter-Reformation Catholic clerics who came into the country throughout the Early Modern period, they were the only socially significant group of

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3 In total, George and Mary Hamilton had six sons and three daughters, though not all of these have been identified. Michael Wasser, ‘Hamilton, James, first earl of Abercorn (1575-1618)’, in Brian Howard Harrison & H. C. G. Matthew (Eds), *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004). This article was accessed on the 16th of February 2005 at the following link: http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.bibliosun.iue.it:80/view/article/12084.

4 For prosopographical information on many of these persons, see the following publications. *DNB. The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.*
exiles and émigrés who returned to Ireland after experiencing the politics, society and
general life of Continental Europe. Another distinctive feature of this set lies in the
fact that, whereas the movement of Irish persons to mainland Europe both before and
after the 1650s was dominated by members of either the Old English or Gaelic Irish
communities, this group of migrants included a significant number of persons from
the other cultural and religious parties that were represented in Irish society at the
time, i.e. members of Ireland’s Protestant communities. This in itself makes the
study of this body of exiles important, as the experiences of Ireland’s Protestant
communities in Continental Europe have rarely been documented.

The most important characteristic of this group, however, lies in its political
cohesiveness and its relative unity of action during its period in exile. Unlike many of
those Irish migrants and exiles who had previously gone to Europe in the Early
Modern period, the bulk of these persons had become closely associated with a
particular and reasonably time-specific political stance in Ireland and Britain prior to
their departure. Many of them, principally the Protestants, had been closely linked to
the administrative establishment, either formally or informally, prior to the 1640s.
Persons such as Radcliffe, Bramhall, Leslie and Ormonde were closely associated
with the administration of Lord Deputy Wentworth in this period. By the end of the
1640s all of them, regardless of their religious position, were either members of the
same political faction or else had become sympathetic to this group’s political
positions. In short, therefore, by the end of the decade, if not before, the greater part
of these persons, if not all of them, had become supporters of the pro-Ormondist
camp/royalist faction within Irish and British politics. This group of some thirty-two
individuals can then be justifiably referred to as ‘Ormondist’. One must qualify this
slightly as this does not mean that this group had a consistent history of adherence to
that nobleman’s interest. While they all came to espouse Ormonde’s political
concerns they had not always adhered to his interest. Edward Wogan and Murrough
O’Brien had fought with the English Parliament against him for much of the 1640s
and only changed allegiance late in the decade when they both became disenchanted
with the Parliament’s policies. During the 1630s, moreover, Ormonde’s close

6 Jane Ohlymeyer, *Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms: The career of Randall
association with Thomas Wentworth and his administration’s policies caused him to be estranged from many of his most-influential kin and the Catholic nobility who would join James Butler in exile in the 1650s had previously gone against his interests to join the revolt of the Confederate Catholics of Ireland. It was only the relatively extreme position of the papal nuncio Rinucini, who arrived in Ireland in 1645, that drove them back together. This Italian cleric had become, on his arrival in the country, the leader of a faction within the Catholic Confederates which demanded, amongst other things, the full legal recognition of the Roman Catholic Church and full and free Irish parliaments. The extremeness of this position, combined with its implicit attack on the Crown prerogative, drove many into the Ormondist camp, including those mentioned above.7

Despite these qualifications, however, it is fair to say that they had melded into a political faction with relatively cohesive political loyalties and views by the time of the regicide and the (final) exile. These shared political characteristics, moreover, continued to create a point of unity between the vast bulk of them during their time on the Continent and it gives them a unique status within the Irish migration to Continental Europe in the Early Modern period. For one, it led to them sharing at least part of their time in exile with the Stuart dynasty, namely the claimant to the British and Irish thrones, Charles II, his brother James and his mother Henrietta Maria. Not only did they share their period of banishment with a royal family, they also shared a common cause with them, because, unlike any of those émigrés that had gone before, (and, at the very least, unlike any other Irish exiles for at least two generations after) they were either part of the royal Court establishment and, indeed, government-in-exile, or they became so during this decade. This Court/government-in-exile (and arguably, at least some of the émigrés themselves) retained a considerable amount of support within their native lands at that time and was also, for the most part at least, actively attempting to recover its lost executive powers in those kingdoms while it was on the Continent. As well as being closely associated with this Court, they have been considered by the existing historiography on the exiled Stuart Court at least, supporters of a particular political faction within the general body of

royalist exiles. Through the person of James Butler, Earl of Ormonde, they became closely associated with what has been identified as the ‘old royalist’ faction within the Stuart Court.

Aside from the political, there were other links existing between these persons. Most notably, there were strong kinship ties between many of them. Once again, as with the political links between these persons, the Ormonde dynasty is of central importance here, as many of the exiles were related, either by blood or marriage, to James Butler. To give a few examples, aside from his own immediate family, the Marquis of Ormonde was also related by marriage to George Hamilton and to Viscount Muskerry: in each case these men had married sisters of James Butler. There were other kinship groups involved as well. George Lane and Edward Wogan were cousins, for instance, while Taaffe was related to the Dillons. Clearly then, this was quite a tight and well-integrated group of persons of high social standing who were bound together by a number of factors, including political and kinship links, as well as by shared experience. They had become associated with each other by the mid-1640s at the latest, with many of them actually enjoying close connections to others in this study-set from the previous decade, or even earlier. In many cases, furthermore, common experience and a shared political cause in the 1650s served to reinforce the bonds between the individuals involved. As such their common connections and experiences make them an appropriate group to study.

The historiographical situation regarding the Irish migration to Continental Europe in the seventeenth century.

The best and one of the most recent summaries of the current state of historical research into seventeenth century Irish migration to Continental Europe is to be found in the book *The Irish in Europe: 1580-1815*, edited by Thomas O’Connor. In Chapter one of this work, O’Connor makes the following, brief, opening statement: ‘...Early Modern migration from Ireland to Europe has been neglected by historians’. While this is certainly true, one should not get the impression (and it should be pointed out

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that O’Connor does not give it) that research into this area is completely lacking. The importance of Early Modern Irish migration to Europe as a field of historical investigation was certainly acknowledged in the mid-1970s when the ambitious survey of sixteenth and seventeenth century Irish History, *A New History of Ireland (NHI) volume III* included a chapter on this very topic.¹⁰ Prior to the 1990s publications such as *the Irish Sword*, the journal of Irish Military History, amongst others, had likewise drawn attention to the Irish émigré community on the Continent.¹¹ Patrick J. Corish, by including a chapter which gave a general overview of the European dimension to Irish Catholicism in his 1981 survey of the Irish Catholic community in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, similarly acknowledged the importance of the Irish Continental community.¹²

A number of studies, furthermore, have also been carried out in more recent times and many more are in progress. Many of these have focused on the Irish mercenary community on the Continent. R. A. Stradling, for instance, has written on both the dealings and relationship between the Spanish Monarchy and Irish mercenaries in the early-to-mid seventeenth-century. He also analyses the factors that affected the Spanish regime’s demand for troops at this time, describes the efforts it made to acquire them and examines the administrative and dynastic concerns that affected the way the Spanish Habsburg regime dealt with these troops once they had obtained them. He concludes that although there was generally a high demand for Irish mercenary troops, this was liable to fluctuate and the stress placed upon the administrative system by a large influx of soldiery in the 1650s created huge problems for both the Spanish government and the immigrants themselves.¹³ Karin Schüller, Enrique García Hernán and Oscar Recio Morales have also written on the military links, as well as the political and socio-economic connections, between Ireland and Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Like Stradling, the first three have drawn attention to the factors that created demand for Irish soldiers and to the

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¹¹ See for example, Piers Wauchope, ‘Some Irishmen abroad’, *The Irish Sword*, vol. XVIII, No.73 (summer, 1992), pp. 309-310.
administrative problems that an influx of a large number of soldiery created for Early Modern governments. Gráinne Henry has likewise studied elements of the Irish soldiery on the Continent in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, placing particular emphasis on Flanders. In her work she analyses the factors that encouraged the Irish mercenary trade and she concludes that kinship links with Continental Europe, as well as encouragement from the Crown government in Ireland helped to make it vibrant. She also draws attention to the large-scale movement of Irish mercenaries to Flanders during the period in question. So pronounced was this movement, the mercenaries were able to form their own distinct communities in the Southern Netherlands.

Not all of the research carried out in this area, of course, deals solely with the Irish mercenary community, though these particular migrants have certainly attracted a considerable amount of attention from historians. Within the European University Institute alone one doctoral thesis on other aspects of Ireland’s connections with Europe has been completed, while another is nearing completion. These works are Looking for ‘powerful friends’: Irish and English political activity in the Spanish monarchy by Igor Pérez Tostado and In Search of Honour and a Catholic Monarch - The Acculturation and Integration of the Old-Irish Aristocracy in Early-Seventeenth Century Castile, the research project of Ciaran O’Scea. The aforementioned publication, The Irish in Europe: 1580-1815, also highlights studies on other aspects of Irish settlement in Continental Europe during this era; most notably the description of the network of Irish Seminaries and Colleges in Spain, given by Patricia O’Connell, and the study carried out by Ciaran O’Scea on the devotional world of the Irish community in early seventeenth century Galicia, which draws attention to how


15 See, for example, Gráinne Henry, The Irish Military Community in Spanish Flanders 1586-1621 (Dublin 1992).
quickly this group adopted the Spanish Counter-Reformation model of piety. To add to all this, Louis Cullen has also researched the Irish Merchant community in Europe during the early Modern period, drawing attention to their continued connections with kinfolk and trading communities in Ireland, while Declan Downey has carried out research into both the cultural and diplomatic relationship between Ireland and the Habsburg kingdoms in the Early Modern period.

Adding further to this body of research, there are a number of biographical, prosopographical and family history works, dating from as early as the latter half of the 1800s, which deal with assorted aspects of Ireland’s connections to Early Modern Europe. Attention should also be drawn to the work carried out by such journals as Archivium Hibernicum and Collectanea Hibernica, amongst others, which have done much to calendar primary source material for Irish History on the Continent over the past decades. Their work has proven especially valuable, most particularly for Irish Catholic Church History in the Early Modern period. Taken altogether, the above works have not only thrown new light on the activities of Irish émigrés on the European Continent during the Early Modern era, but have also broadened our knowledge of Ireland’s national history.

On the whole however, while the situation has greatly improved and continues to develop (there is at present a ‘boom’ in the number of historians carrying out research into various aspects of this migration and, as is obvious from the aforementioned names, not all of these are Irish), it has to be said that recent


19 See for example, Benignus Millett, ‘Calendar of vol. I of the collection ‘Scritture riferite nei congressi, Irlanda’ (1625-1668) in Propaganda archives’, Collectanea Hibernica, no. 6-7, (1963-4).
compositions on Irish migration to Continental Europe in the 1600s and the Early Modern period generally are still few in number when compared to other aspects of Irish History. The fact that there are only two general accounts of the Irish in Continental Europe in the Early Modern period, one being the aforementioned chapter in *A New History of Ireland, volume III* and the other being a chapter by Louis Cullen in a collection of essays on European migration, speaks volumes about the lack of publications on this area of study. To give a further example, in the six volume survey of the Irish migratory experience, published under the title *The Irish World Wide: History, Heritage, and Identity*, by the University of Leicester in 1992, there are only two chapters on Irish migration to Continental Europe in the Early Modern period. The first, by John McGurk, gives a brief overview of the role of Irish mercenaries in Europe, while the second, by Gráinne Henry, deals with the experience of those women who accompanied Irish mercenaries to Flanders in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. This relative lack of research into, and also of writings on, Early Modern Irish migration to the European Continent continues to leave us with a number of important gaps in our understanding of the ‘exodus’. One such shortcoming, for example, is our understanding of the range of factors that led Irish persons to migrate to the Continent in the first place. This may be partly due to a lack of sources, but it may also be due to an unspoken assumption among Irish historians that the reasons for the migration to Europe are obvious. The continued existence of gaps in our knowledge of the primary sources available for such a study may also contribute to this.

Returning to more general criticisms, it is fair to say that while many of the pre-existing works are worthy in themselves and represent an important contribution

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20 Louis Cullen, ‘The Irish Diaspora of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, Nicholas Canny (Ed.), *Europeans on the move* (Oxford, 1995), pp. 113-150. John J. Silke, ‘The Irish abroad in the Age of the Counter-Reformation, 1534-1691’. Neither of these two studies is exclusively concerned with Irish migration to Continental Europe. Both contain sections which focus on Irish migration to North America during this era also.


to this area of study, the vast majority of these efforts are either studies of Irish-dominated institutions on the Continent, of ‘professional’/‘vocational’ groups (e.g. mercenaries), or are family histories. Also, these research projects have consistently been macro-studies, carried out within the context of a relatively broad chronological survey.\textsuperscript{23} The consistent placing of research on Early Modern Irish migration to Continental Europe in this kind of framework, though it certainly has been, and continues to be, useful, can lead to a certain amount of generalisation about Ireland’s relationship with the Continent in the Early Modern period. In certain cases it can even lead to oversimplification. For instance, the chronological frameworks which have been applied to many of these works cut across many different periods and important events in both Irish and European history. These events, such as the collapse of Gaelic Ireland in the early 1600s, or the Cromwellian era in the middle of the same century, effectively acted as ‘markers’, separating one phase or type of Irish migration to the Continent in the Early Modern era from another. Furthermore, all of these events altered the various cultural groups involved in these migrations from Ireland, along with the factors that caused members of these groups to leave the island and the very nature of the Irish exodus into Europe itself. To date, however, while this failing in the existing corpus of work on Early Modern Irish migration has, to a large extent at least, been acknowledged, it has not been corrected.

To give a more concrete example of the above failing, many works on Irish mercenaries in Europe during the early and middle part of the seventeenth century barely distinguish, if at all, between those who chose a mercenary career for economic reasons and those who took up soldiering on the Continent in the wake of military and political defeat. It should also be pointed out that, in all likelihood, there were considerable differences amongst those persons who migrated as a result of military and political defeat. These divisions within the Irish migrant community are often only referred to, however, and the impact of such splits on the Irish migrant experience does not receive any detailed treatment. The lack of any in-depth, micro-study of particular groups of Irish migrants, carried out within the context of a relatively short period of time, which would help correct this oversight by drawing attention both to inter-generational and intra-generational differences amongst the

\textsuperscript{23} See, for example, Patricia O’Connell, \textit{The Irish College of Alcala De Henares: 1649-1789} (Dublin 1997), pp. 49-65.
generality of Irish migrants therefore represents a major gap in the existing historical writings on the issue.\textsuperscript{24}

There are also other failings within the historiography on this subject, though, for one reason or another, their existence is certainly understandable. As mentioned earlier, one of these is that there is a marked tendency to concentrate only on Irish Catholics and, more specifically, on members of the Gaelic Irish and Old English cultural groups, in Continental Europe. This is hardly surprising. Catholics from the Old English and Gaelic Irish communities did, after all, dominate the migration to the European mainland in the Early Modern era. Persons from Ireland's smaller, but nonetheless influential, Protestant communities, namely the New English and the Ulster Scots, generally had less need to go to the Continent at this time. For many of them Ireland was the destination at the end of their travels. The New English also generally controlled and had the protection of government institutions at this time, a fact that, by and large, generally did not encourage them to leave Ireland. If any members of these communities did leave Ireland for any reason, they often chose to go to Britain or westwards to the New World colonies instead.

Yet, despite all these factors which limited their contacts with the Continent, it should not be forgotten that they too had their contacts with mainland Europe. Trade, war, religious instruction, culture and education all brought members of the New English and Ulster Scots groups to the Continent. The sons of landowning grandees went on ‘grand tours’ to Europe, for instance.\textsuperscript{25} Trade and smuggling likewise brought these communities onto the Continent.\textsuperscript{26} The wider Scottish world, which the Ulster Scots were part of, had considerable contacts with Scandinavia and other parts

\textsuperscript{24} For instance, in the work of R. A. Stradling on Irish mercenaries in the employ of the Spanish Monarchy these issues are referred to and mention is made of some of the problems that arose amongst the Irish mercenary community from them, most notably with regard to the defection of Richard Grace from the Spanish to the French Crown in 1653, but little is done to ‘close the gap’ in our knowledge. R. A. Stradling, The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries, p. 19.


of Protestant Europe. The Irish Catholic community on the Continent during this century also drew the attention of Ireland’s Protestants to the Continent from time to time. Not infrequently, they saw exiled and expatriate Catholics as posing a significant potential threat to their security. Nonetheless, in spite of these and other connections to the European mainland, there has been a tendency to exclude them in the histories of Early Modern Irish migration to the main European landmass.

To add to this, it is fair to say that, on the whole, recent studies of Irish migration to Continental Europe in the Early Modern period have still tended to be organised around those limited number of categories which dominated the earlier works in this area, though it is heartening to note that other aspects of Irish migrant activity, such as internal rivalries and ventures into international diplomacy, are being increasingly being dealt with. These traditional categories are as follows: vocations, with a great emphasis on mercenaries, Catholic clergy and, to a lesser extent, merchants; migrants associated with particular institutions (these institutions are almost always Irish seminaries and colleges); family histories and finally, the activities of Irish migrants in individual kingdoms and states. While these topics are certainly worthy of study, it is hoped that this thesis will help continue this process of diversification away from these traditional categories of study.

In further defence of the research that has recently carried out in this field, it has to be said that not only are the present generation of historians working to fill in the large gaps in our understanding of Early Modern Irish migration to Europe, but they are also attempting to counteract the shortcomings of any of the research carried out in this field in earlier years. Many of the studies in this area which predate the 1970s suffer from a variety of faults. The best description of the content of much of these earlier works again comes from the aforementioned text of Thomas O’Connor, which justly describes many of these studies as ‘historically naïve’. For a variety of


29 In order to see how new fields of investigation are opening up, while old categories still continue to dominate, see, Thomas O’Connor and Mary Ann Lyons (Eds) *Irish migrants in Europe after Kinsale, 1602-1820* (Dublin, 2003).
reasons, several of these early writings are lacking in some way or other. Firstly, there was often little concern shown for the details, nuances and subtleties within Early Modern Irish migration to the Continent. Little interest was shown in identifying the divisions within the Irish migrant community, for instance. A lack of the proper resources and knowledge necessary to conduct research in Continental archives likewise hindered such research projects. Also, for much of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, any study carried out in this area was, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, overly concerned with providing support for burgeoning nationalist ideals, promoting a sense of a separate Irish identity and also with advancing a particular image of Ireland as a country, and indeed, the Irish as a nation. This, consequently, led to a tendency to concentrate either on Catholic clerics, individual soldiers, particular army regiments and prominent families. Frequently, this research can be characterised as being either strictly prosopographical, genealogical, or even propagandistic in nature.\(^{30}\) One could even argue, though one might be guilty of oversimplification, that much of this research was really a search for Irish Catholic military and religious heroes in Continental Europe.\(^{31}\) There was little interest in understanding Early Modern Irish migration to the Continent in and of itself. Naturally, all of this was to the detriment of a wider historical understanding of the phenomenon.

Again though, while many of the writings on Irish migration to the European Continent which were carried out prior to the 1970s do have serious shortcomings, one should be careful not to paint too negative a picture. There certainly was some important and useful work done in this field during that period, much of which pertained to the cataloguing and calendaring of material. In this regard mention has already been made of *Archivium Hibernicum* and *Collectanea Hibernica.*\(^{32}\) The

\(^{30}\) Thomas O’Connor, ‘Ireland and Europe 1580-1815: some historiographical remarks’, pp. 9-27. For an example of a work which has these tendencies see, Matthew O’Connor, *Military History of the Irish Nation, comprising a memoir of the Irish Brigade in the service of France* (Dublin, 1845), pp. 74-87.


\(^{32}\) See p. 10, above.
labours of both the *Historical Manuscripts Commission (HMC)* and of the *Irish Manuscripts Commission (IMC)*, through its journal, *Analecta Hibernica*, in this field also deserve to be acknowledged. These assorted efforts at calendaring primary source material have proved invaluable and have made the life of present-day historians of this Early Modern migration much easier. They have not only made previously unknown or inaccessible material available, they have also raised awareness of both the amount and variety of primary source material that is obtainable throughout mainland and insular Europe for the study of Early Modern Irish migration. Some earlier historical writings, moreover, have also thrown important light on this topic, and it is fair to say that they cannot have the label ‘historically naïve’ applied to them.

Even these praiseworthy efforts cannot entirely escape censure, however. The journals *Archivium Hibernicum* and *Collectanea Hibernica* concentrate solely on the sources available for Irish Catholic clergy on the Continent. While the sources that these journals have made available to historians are of great importance and do cast light on many aspects of the immigration onto the Continent, the emphasis on Catholic ecclesiastical sources, ignoring as it does material that could potentially throw greater light on other areas of Irish migrant activity, does skew the perspective somewhat. The value of some of their work, moreover, particularly in their earlier publications, is limited. Frequently, it amounts to nothing more than a list of names of Irish people in specific institutions, though it must be acknowledged that even these have their uses, as they can often give an insight into the cultural make-up of the membership of these institutions, amongst other things. On the other hand, *Analecta Hibernica*, while it does provide details on sources for the study of Irish emigration and emigrants, has mainly concentrated on documenting the material available within Ireland itself, though there are some notable exceptions. This often contains little or no reference to Irish migrants and exiles on the European mainland. This problem is

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33 See, for example, *HMC*, Hastings Mss (vol. IV), pp. 93-100. This collection of documents contains various materials relating to Archbishop John Bramhall, Bishop of Derry, who was exiled in the United Provinces for most of the 1650s, but who, nonetheless, played a reasonably prominent part in the life of the exiled Stuart Court.

often compounded by the tendency to give brief and often superficial descriptions of the various collections of manuscripts that it refers to. Of course, having said all that, one has to acknowledge that, like the IMC and HMC, it was not actually established for the purpose of throwing light on Early Modern migration.

Similarly, many of the worthy biographical works on particular Irish emigrants to Europe in this epoch are, when it comes to obtaining a fuller understanding of Irish migration to the Continent, of limited use. While many of these texts are particularly informative on the life of the person at the centre of the study, they are of a restricted value when it comes to understanding the overall nature of Irish migration to Early Modern Europe. First, and most obviously, focusing on one person as these works invariably do, means that while they can throw light on particular aspects of the movement of Irish persons, there is generally no sense of the overall nature, scope, and experiences of migration. This, naturally, is understandable enough, but there are other, sometimes more serious, problems with using biographical works as a means of insight into the migration. In many earlier biographies of prominent exiles and migrants, the experience of emigration and exile receives only a relatively brief treatment within the overall work, something that leads to generalisation about the event, and which causes them to contribute to our understanding of this topic in only an incidental way. These treatments of a particular subject’s experiences while abroad, moreover, are often focused solely on certain aspects of their activities, be these political, intellectual, religious, or military, to the detriment of other elements of the migrants’ experiences. A further problem is that, until quite recently, many such biographies drew only on primary sources that were available in Britain or Ireland and neglected to use Continental material.

These difficulties with using existing biographies as a means of throwing light on the Early Modern Irish migration are compounded by other characteristics of this form of historical writing. Many of these works are purely descriptive in nature. Others are written solely for the purpose of producing entertainingly-readable


36 Ibid.
histories, though this is no bad thing in itself. Others still are written only to examine the role of the individual in history. This is a topic worth pursuing, but unfortunately it does not tell us much about the social history of the Irish migration. Moreover, older examples of biographical work, such as Carte’s ‘Life of Ormonde’ for example, were also frequently produced as apologias or as a means to educating through the provision of moral examples for their readers.

Overall, it is fair to say that, despite the achievements of both contemporary and previous generations of historians in recording, explaining and analysing Irish migration to Continental Europe in the Early Modern period, a cursory glance at the historiography clearly shows that there is still much to be done. My proposed course of study, by seeking to redress one of the gaps that have been identified in the historiography and also by taking a different approach to many of the earlier works on this topic, will vary from many, if not all, of the previous studies of Early Modern Irish migration in a number of ways. It will also throw important light upon the understudied, though not completely neglected, aspect of Early Modern European History, namely the activities of courtiers within a court-in-exile.

**A brief account of the historiography of the Early Modern court-in-exile**

Thanks to the groundbreaking work of Norbert Elias, the study of the Early Modern princely court is one of the most important fields of activity within modern-day historical research. Today there is no shortage of studies of this institution or, indeed, of studies of the historiography on this institution. Consequently, there is little need for an account of what has been written on this general topic except to say that the study of courts in exile in general has been largely neglected. This is not to say that it has been ignored completely, or that efforts are not under way to rectify this. Most notably from the point of view of this thesis, it is certainly true that a

37 Ibid.
certain, though far from an immense, amount of academic work has been done on the
exiled Court and households of Charles II and the Stuarts generally. Of prime
importance here is the unpublished PhD thesis by Neil Anthony Charles Reynolds,
which describes a number of elements of life in the exiled Stuart Court between 1644
and 1654. This dissertation focuses on two major features of Court life for the exiled
Stuarts: the make-up of the households of each of the major members of the dynasty
and the role of honour amongst the courtiers who attended upon the royal family.41

Useful as this thesis is, however, (and in many ways the groundwork done by
Reynolds has proven to be more than helpful to my research) it should be pointed out
that there are some inadequacies in it. The first, and most obvious, is that the Stuart
Court remained in exile for a further six years after 1654. Reynolds’ work focuses on
the exiled Court’s life in France and in so doing significantly adds to our
understanding of the Stuart court, through such measures as introducing historians of
the Stuarts to a wider variety of sources available in France and drawing attention
to the significance of each the individual household in the wider Court. Nonetheless,
by omitting the last six years of the exile from his study, he leaves a significant part of
the experience of the Court in Continental Europe unexamined. Among its other
inadequacies is numbered his tendency to treat the households in exile as if they
constituted a full royal court prior to 1649, even though the head of the dynasty,
Charles I, never actually went abroad. Aside from this, there is an implicit
assumption that it is sufficient to deal with the courtiers as if they were all Protestant
Englishmen; for instance, when he talks about the role of the oaths such as that of
supremacy, in the concepts of honour.42

These failings aside, one can still fairly say that Reynolds has drawn attention
to a significant gap in the understanding of British royal courts and of princely courts
generally. He is not the only British historian working on exiled courts. Edward Corp
has dedicated himself to the study of the later Jacobite exiled Court in France and
many of his findings can be usefully compared to the work that has been done or, as
with this thesis, is being done on the earlier exiled Stuart Court. Among his numerous
publications one can list the following works: A Court in Exile: The Stuarts in France,

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41 Neil Anthony Charles Reynolds, The Stuart Court and courtiers in exile 1644-1654 (Cambridge,

1689-1718, published in 2004, which includes contributions by persons such as Edward Gregg, Howard Erskine Hill and Geoffrey Scott; another edited collection of papers based on a conference delivered in Scotland, which goes by the title of The Stuart Court in Rome: the legacy of exile; a piece on the royal apartments in the palace at Saint Germain-en Laye in a collection of essays on the Stuart Court; a book on James II’s time in the aforementioned royal residence; and finally, a book from 1995, co-edited with Eveline Cruickshanks, on the exiled Jacobite court generally.43

These works, drawing as they do on the labours of other academics, are useful and firmly place the exiled Jacobite court within the existing historiography of Early Modern courts, studying it as they do in accordance to the many of the dominant categories within this field, namely, finance, patronage of the arts, ritual and ceremony, status and reputation, etc. Outside of these two, another exiled court of the seventeenth century, that of Elizabeth of Bohemia, is currently the subject of research of Nadine Akkerman. Her doctoral thesis, The Letters of Elizabeth Stuart, Electress Palatine, and Queen of Bohemia: A Scholarly Edition 1632-42, is expected to be submitted in 2007. She has, moreover, in conjunction with Paul R. Snellin, already published some articles on this Court.44

Aside from the work of these three scholars, however, there is little else done on these exiled institutions. One has only to look at the existing assorted collections of essays on the Stuart Court. Of these, only the above-mentioned volume, which was edited by the aforementioned Eveline Cruickshanks, contains a piece on either of the exiled royal households. This is the aforementioned essay by Corp on the royal apartments of Saint Germain-en-Laye. Prior to that, the only other notable work on the Jacobite Court in exile dates from 1911. Clearly, a study and survey of exiled


courts in the Early Modern period as a phenomenon in the Early Modern world is lacking. Yet, despite this lack of research, it has to be conceded that, for the historian of the Interregnum and from the viewpoint of the exiled Court of Charles II at least, an account of the historiography cannot end there. While not written as court histories per se, numerous other historic works still contribute to our understanding of this banished body. Foremost among these are the biographies of the key persons in this Court; most obviously those biographies written on either Charles II or his brother, James.45 Again, however, while useful (they do tell us of such things as key factional disputes etc.), many of the key criticisms levelled against biographies earlier in this chapter again apply here. Life within the exiled Court is often only covered in specific parts of these books, though there are one or two notable exceptions. Some biographies of Charles II, for instance, only deal with, or at least overwhelmingly deal with, his exile.46 Court life, nonetheless, is not the main focus of these works and a study of one person’s life, no matter how central he or she may have been to events, cannot be taken as a representative.

There are other notable and useful texts aside from these biographies. One of the most notable recent publications is Geoffrey Smith’s work on the cavaliers in exile.47 This publication serves as a useful introduction into the exile experience of many royalists. Once again, however, except for the interest shown for one of the more cosmopolitan of the Stuarts’ courtiers, Sir Daniel O’Neill, this is a somewhat Anglo-centric piece. Even then, it is argued in this work that this personage should be looked on as being more English than Irish, a view which, while not being without some justification, at the very least goes against the increasing tendency in


contemporary historiography to view the Stuart kingdoms as a multi-cultural political entity.\textsuperscript{48}

In summary, the field is not completely without works on exiled courts or, indeed, on exiles, particularly when it comes to the Stuarts. That being said, it is still a field dominated by only one or two historians and much of what we know of these bodies we have to learn from inferences drawn from other writings on the period. It is fair to conclude, therefore, that ample room still exists for a contribution to this area.

**Methodology**

This thesis is a work of micro-research on a particularly well-defined group in a specific historical context. As is typical of such a study, it will use a number of different methodological approaches in order to come to an understanding of their lives and actions in exile. Most notably, I will make use of the research methodologies used in the study of social networks, though without necessarily using the sociological terminology associated with this approach. Network analysis has proven useful in historical research before. It has been used, for instance, to study Norwegian island communities and to explain the rise of the Medici in late-medieval Florence. In a British and Irish context, it has been used to study the nature of the linkages between expatriate Scottish in the early-modern period.\textsuperscript{49}

In this thesis I shall make use of the specific methodology known as ‘Egocentric Network Analysis’. This research technique places great emphasis upon the study of the nature and extent of the personal networks of a particular individual. In certain circumstances it can also be used to study the nature of a particular institution’s contacts with individuals. It is intended to be used to trace the way that networks are used by individuals and institutions for such tasks as accessing resources (including both tangible resources, such as money, and intangible ones, such as information), making useful contacts and gaining assistance. It is also used to examine how the person or institution at the centre of the network (the ‘ego’ in social network terminology) can use individuals within his/her/its network (the ‘alters’ in the

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid, p. 13, & pp. 14-22. In the latter section the author talks almost exclusively of English cavaliers and at one point states that some royals went into exile in Ireland.

same terminology) aforementioned to both cut across and play upon pre-defined categories, orders and groups. For this thesis Egocentric Network Analysis will be availed of in order to see how persons used their personal connections in order to achieve particular goals; specifically acquiring resources, gaining assistance, protecting personal interests and advancing the royalist cause. It will also be used to look at how such personal connections were used to break free of the limits imposed by such pre-defined categories as faction, social status, religious affiliation, nation and even the Court itself. By studying the personal networks of the Irish exiles in this way, and by not focusing solely on their relationships within a particular well-defined group or organisation (for example, their relationships with each other or with other exiled elite royalists) we will able to see how the exiles used their complete range of their social relationships for their own benefit while on the Continent, while also seeing what influences they became subject to while abroad. We will also see how they were able to acquire resources for their political cause.

Of course, this does not mean that I shall ignore the relationships the exiles had within particular bodies or well-defined groups, or that I will be completely ignoring existing categories or classifications within historiography. Aside from the fact that it would be counter-productive to ignore existing scholarly work in such a manner, there can be no doubt that certain categories and bodies, such as factions and courts, actually existed for these people. Aside from this, the relationships between the individuals within such relatively clearly-defined groupings as, for example, the pro-Ormondist group of Irish exiles or the even exiled Stuart Court as a whole were undoubtedly vital and it would be foolish in the extreme to ignore them. That said, however, Egocentric Network Analysis will still be useful here as it will allow us to study relationships that cut across sub-classifications within such categories, including religion, faction and household. Egocentric Network Analysis, moreover, allows for the possibility, indeed, the probability, that a person may have links to more than one particular group or corporate interest and that these diverse interests may have come

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into conflict with each other at certain times. As this approach is quick to acknowledge this possibility it will allow us to look into how these exiles used their personal connections to overcome any potential conflict of interest. For example, one of the questions most asked about the Butlers of Ormonde in this period is how the head of that dynasty could reconcile his support for the Stuarts with his wife’s holding of property from the Interregnum regimes. Bearing in mind that this involved the Butlers maintaining contacts with figures aligned with two opposed political causes, this approach could prove useful in going some way to answer the previously referred-to question.51

To illustrate the further potential worth of this method of analysis, I shall refer to the problems that are endemic with the study of factions, particularly within the exiled Stuart Court. The traditional picture of the factions within the Stuart Court, which is to be found in the various biographies and autobiographies of the persons associated with it, is one of a fairly rigid and clear-cut division between competing blocs; most particularly between the old royalists and the Louvre Set.52 The question of how justified and accurate this notion is must be raised, however, particularly because it is now a given that factional alliances were much more fluid than previously supposed. In line with this, one of the recent biographers of Charles II, Ronald Hutton, has drawn attention to the frequent, and generally sympathetic, correspondence between Lord Hatton, the Queen-Mother’s secretary, Edward Nicholas and Edward Hyde, and thus makes the point that not everyone around the Queen-Mother was part of the Louvre Set.53 This questioning of the traditional picture of the factional divisions within the exiled Stuarts’ courtiers can be extended further. If we take the case of Sir George Radcliffe as an example we find someone who was personally disliked by Lord Hatton and who was frequently overlooked by Hyde and Nicholas. In the traditional picture of the old royalist faction, therefore, he is seen as a non-participant. While it is true to say that this man was politically alienated for long periods of the 1650s, he continued, nonetheless, to have close contacts with the other leading member of this faction, most notably Ormonde, throughout the decade, as well as with other close associates of this nobleman, including John Bramhall.

52 See pp. 226-34, below, for a fuller description of the factions.
Indeed, Ormonde was to make use of Radcliffe, much to the chagrin of Hatton, in one of the largest factional disputes in the exiled Stuart Court: the clash over the religious education of the Duke of Gloucester in late 1654. This traditional picture of the factions within the Stuart Court that has been handed down by the existing historiography also makes little mention of the possibility that a faction may have formed around the Duke of York in the Spanish Netherlands after 1656, even though there is considerable evidence to suggest that York and his followers favoured policies which differed significantly to those held by the councillors closest to Charles II in those years. It is reasonable to surmise, therefore, that the traditional picture of the factions in the exiled Court and of those who were involved in them is oversimplified and does not represent the true complexity of the situation.

There is also a problem of internal strife between members of a particular faction. John Bramhall, for instance, despite being a close associate of Ormonde, was implicated, albeit indirectly, in the attempt to remove this nobleman’s ally, Edward Hyde, from the presence of Charles II in late 1653, though he was to be reconciled with this councillor by the end of the decade. He was also, at various times during the 1650s, involved in disputes over privateering funds with both Hyde and Edward Nicholas. In the latter case Bramhall actually secured the post of royalist agent in charge of privateering endeavours ahead of Nicholas’ son in the mid-1650s. There is a strong likelihood that this was at the behest of Ormonde, as Bramhall had acted in this capacity for the Marquis in the early 1650s and was lobbying the Marquis about this post from early 1651 onwards. This faction, therefore, was not as cohesive as it has been traditionally represented and, given the right conditions, its members could be divided against each other. The study of personal networks, by examining which links and connections were important to people in particular circumstances and why, may help explain this.


55 See chapters 5 and 6, below, for further details on this.

Beyond this, examples of persons who were supposedly factional rivals cooperating occur frequently. With regards to Ormonde, the issue of his and his family’s contacts with members of the other factions has to be explained. To give an example, despite the fact that Lord Digby was a prominent member of the Louvre Set, Ormonde and his family had extensive contacts with him. Lady Ormonde sought his advice on the education of her sons for instance in 1650 and Ormonde himself helped this nobleman find accommodation in Paris in late 1651. More notably still, he helped Digby in his pursuit of the Order of the Garter.\footnote{British Library, (BL) Egerton Manuscripts (Eg Mss) 2533, Elizabeth Butler to Nicholas, 20 June 1649, f. 496. \textit{HMC}, Ormonde Mss, (N. S., vol. I), Ormonde to Digby, 23 November 1651, p. 231. Ibid, Digby to Ormonde, 15 February 1652, p. 255.} Relationships among the members of the Court, then, were more complex than portrayed by the traditional picture of factions and their members in simple opposition. Again, network analysis potentially offers a way of explaining when, how, and under what circumstances a person could co-operate with someone that was supposedly their rival.

To sum up, it is fair to say that, as historians of this period have acknowledged all along, factions were far from being solid, cohesive political structures. Their members were not necessarily united by common aims nor was the behaviour of all of those involved consistent. They did not necessarily act in a united way vis-à-vis the members of other factions and personal concerns and interests could divide them from their fellow faction members. Egocentric Network Analysis, through the study of the nature and extent of a particular individual’s personal network, offers a way to explain and account for these inconsistencies within the faction system. It shall help explain, for instance, why Radcliffe could only rely on Ormonde to assist him and why Ormonde was willing to favour some members of his faction over others. It may even help explain why Ormonde at times favoured members of other factions over his close political allies. As such it will act as a complement to the existing factional explanation of political division within the exiled Stuart Court.

Another reason for using this technique lies in the fact that the members of this Court were frequently dispersed over a great distance and did not have regular face-to-face contact with each other. As the numbers within the Stuart Courts were relatively low when compared to other such institutions and as many of these people were obliged, for one reason or another, to be away from the royal family, this was...
very often ‘a court of letters’, where the members were compelled to frequently write to each other in order to stay in touch with developments, look after their interests, and influence events. Murrough O’Brien, Baron (later Earl) of Inchiquin is a perfect example of this. Geographic separation did not stop him from staying in contact with the exiled Court, or its supporters. As we shall see, even while on military service with the French army, he was in correspondence with the Marquis of Ormonde, Charles II’s constant companion during the early part of the 1650s. This reality of their existence means that it is relatively easy to reconstruct the extent and nature of the personal contacts of the individuals involved in these networks.

Network analysis also offers the opportunity to explain how these exiles and their political cause was able to survive banishment. To elaborate further, as part of a body politic that had, to say the least, limited resources at its disposal (e.g. it had certainly lost the control of a state bureaucracy and the other traditional powers and resources which a princely court would normally have drawn on were, at the least, harder for it to access), the Irish nobility, and indeed the Court itself, were operating under unusual conditions and involvement in such a court made many demands upon them. To add to all this, the exiles themselves had lost some or all of the resources which they would have previously used to acquire and wield influence. They too had been removed from their traditional power bases, as well as their sources of wealth and authority. They had also been removed from the social and political environments in which they would normally have operated in. Consequently, guaranteeing both political and social survival in their new situation was always going to pose a challenge. Yet survive they did and one of the reasons that ensured their continued endurance while in exile was the personal networks of these gentry and nobility, be they kinship networks, patron-client networks, business networks, friendship and social networks, or some other, more protean, system of personal contacts. It was through these that they could exercise influence, gain resources, secure information and sway events to their advantage. In other words, personal networks could be used to replace those resources that the Court and its members had

58 See pp. 161-2, below.

59 One of the problems that the exiled Stuart Court faced, for example, was the shortage of documents bearing the correct royal seals, which were, in the minds of many of royalists, necessary to make documents legally valid. The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. IV, Rumbold to Ormonde, 22 March 1658 (O. S.), p. 30.
lost by going into exile. These networks were to prove vital not only to their own personal survival, but also to the survival of their political cause. In order to understand how each individual survived while in exile, therefore, it is necessary to understand the functioning of these networks which were used to compensate for the deficiencies created by the circumstances of exile.

Aside from the above reasons for using network analysis, this technique will be needed to help understand why, in spite of the fact that these nobles and gentry had been physically removed from the social and political environments from which they had traditionally drawn their power and authority, they were still able to wield influence in these places. It is fair to say that while in exile many of these nobles and gentry were still able to access and take advantage of many of those personal networks which had existed prior to their banishment and through these they were able to affect their traditional spheres of influence. In late February 1653 Bishop John Bramhall, through contacts with his son, and through the assistance of an unspecified ‘noble gentleman’, was able to secure the payment of a substantial debt that was owed to him from before the conflagrations of the 1640s.\(^6\) Kinship networks, and indeed other forms of connections, could therefore allow these exiles to continue to exercise influence in their traditional areas of activity and, more importantly when one considers their circumstances, provide them with access to the resources of their customary heartlands.

There are a number of important problems that need to be addressed when using network analysis. One question that must be asked about the personal networks of the Irish nobility and gentry during the exile is how they came into being. At this stage a number of reasons can be advanced. An obvious one for their existence is that, during the period c.1649 - May 1660, many of these exiles continued to support the royalist cause while on the Continent and consequently this group of Irish noble and genteel expatriates remained in close contact with each other. Reinforcing this inclination even further was the tendency to associate themselves, to varying degrees, and depending upon their personal circumstances, with the exiled Court of Charles II. Kinship was likewise a powerful bonding force within this group of exiles. Aside from his own wife and his two sons (Elizabeth Butler, Thomas, Lord Ossory, and Sir

\(^{60}\) Edmund Berwick (Ed.), The Rawdon Papers, Bramhall to his son, 27 February 1653 (O. S.) pp. 105-8.
Richard Butler), Ormonde shared at least part of his period of banishment with other members of his kinship group, including Sir George Hamilton and Viscount Muskerry. Indeed, his kinship networks spread throughout the exiled Court community. Ormonde was not the only one to have family members in exile with him. Inchiquin’s brother, wife and two sons were also on the Continent for at least part of the Interregnum, for instance, while Sir George Lane, the secretary to Ormonde, as we have already alluded to, was joined on the Continent by his cousin, Colonel Edward Wogan.

There is one drawback to studying these networks. Their extended, complex and sprawling nature makes them very hard to model successfully or to summarise easily. To illustrate this, it is only necessary to look at a number of diagrams which are to be found in the addenda to this thesis. The tendencies exhibited by these diagrams demonstrate the complex nature of personal networks, even for one individual, and it is not hard to make the imaginative leap which would allow one to see how impossible it would be to map the system as a whole in a comprehensive and comprehensible manner. Therefore, little effort shall go into mapping the complete network of the individuals in question. Instead, in order to make sense of the network and because the value of networks is best understood at the individual level (i.e. the system is easier to understand when one knows how a particular person fitted into it, benefited from it and contributed to it) I will instead concentrate on explaining how certain individuals attempted to use these complex of contacts to achieve their goals in particular cases.

Of course, as pointed out earlier, the use of Egocentric Network Analysis should not be taken to mean that other methodologies will not be employed in this thesis. Instead, it is seen as an analytical tool complimentary to other established research methods and procedures. What are these other complementary methodologies? For one, a number of comparative approaches will be used in this work. Most notably I shall draw upon pre-existing court studies, so as to contrast life in a court-in-exile with its more typical, non-exiled, equivalents. This contrast will then be used to highlight what was unique about the life of those members of the Irish

61 Jane Ohlymeyer, Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms, pp. 164-5.
elite who were courtiers to the banished Stuart dynasty. Similarly, the conclusions of those social histories upon nobility and elites in early Modern Europe will be set beside my findings in order to gauge the effect of exile, if any, upon the life of this social and political elite group. The most useful comparison, however, and in many ways an unavoidable one, will be made with the experiences of other royalist exiles. Considering how close they were to other displaced supporters of the Stuarts, be they from Scotland or England, and bearing in mind that strong arguments can be made for certain persons within the ‘study set’ of this thesis being of more than one nation, it will be impossible not to contrast their fortunes with those of the other persons who went into exile for the royalist cause at this time. This particular comparative approach will be put to good use in this thesis, as it will be used examine the current efforts being made by historians in Britain and Ireland to write a trans-national ‘British Isles’ history. It will also seek to contribute to the debate on what form this particular trans-national history should take. Finally, there will be no attempt made to take a chronological approach to this period. Other works have provided this. Instead, a number of individual events will be focussed on and will be used as case studies of exile behaviour.

Sources

This account of the sources used in carrying out my research is not exhaustive, nor is it meant to be. It is, nonetheless, necessary to give some explanation of what sources I employed in this thesis, the approaches taken to them and the problems I encountered when dealing with them. First of all, one of the major features of the source material available for this thesis is its existence in large quantities. While this means that many diverse areas of life in exile can be explored, it also creates problems with regard to such elements as accessing all the material and collating the evidence. With regard to carrying out the research, there are a large number of archives and collections of primary materials in Britain and Ireland which were usefully consulted while researching this topic. Indeed, work already carried out by historians, such as many of the aforementioned biographies of some of those persons within the exiled Stuart Court, have already benefited from them.63 These collections, containing as they do correspondence between the supporters of old royalist faction and others

outside of it, hold much information on the political activities of the exiled Stuart Court, on the internal politics and disputes within it, as well as information on both the public and private actions of the membership of that particular bloc.

Amongst the most important archives within Britain and Ireland for this thesis were the National Library of Ireland, the British Library in London and the Bodleian Library, in Oxford (with much of the material from the latter being available in microfilm in NUI Galway library). In these archives there were a number of important collections of documents and materials relating to some of the key figures in the exiled Stuart Court. These include the Clarendon papers, being the State papers of Edward Hyde, one of Charles II’s chief advisors during his period in exile, the Carte collection of Manuscripts relating to the Earl of Ormonde (both of which are to be found in the Bodleian Library, Oxford), and also the collection of other papers belonging to Ormonde, which are to be found in the National Library of Ireland. The above mentioned collections of materials are quite considerable. The calendar of the Clarendon State papers alone documents well in excess of 8,000 letters for the 1650s. Of course, as Edward Hyde was not Irish, not all of these papers contain information upon the particular individuals that it is proposed to study here. That said, however, there are still quite a large amount of relevant documents within this collection of primary material. Fortunately, the Clarendon correspondence has been extensively calendared, which made it easier to access and research.64 As for the Carte Manuscripts, the 1871 report on this collection of documents alone runs to eight volumes. Aside from this, account had also to be taken of the considerable collection of documents relating to the Butlers of Ormonde in the National Library of Ireland.65

These were, of course, not the only collections of private papers in Britain and Ireland that were of use. Other collections of documents, such as the Egerton manuscripts in the British Library, for instance, were certainly of value. Other


65 J. P. Prendergast & C. W. Russell, *Report on the Carte Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library* (Oxford, 1871). Regarding the documents in the National Library of Ireland, some of these are in microfilm form, while others are original manuscripts. A considerable portion of the latter are part of a boxed collection and are, to an extent at least, unsorted. See, for example, National Library of Ireland (NLI), *Ormonde Papers; Four volumes of letters and documents relating to James Butler, 1st Duke of Ormonde*, Mss. 2315-8.
documents, such as those found amongst the collections of state papers relating to the Commonwealth, and not just to Ireland, were also of benefit. It should be noted that while these state papers were calendared at the beginning of the twentieth century there are a number of inaccuracies within the volumes relating to Ireland so it was necessary to consult the original documents whenever possible.66

Outside of Britain and Ireland there were further collections of state papers and documents of relevance to this topic. The Huntingdon Library in California, for instance, contains some of the correspondence and papers of John Bramhall, though the documentation relating to the 1650s is sparse. There are also relevant collections of primary materials in Continental Europe relating to the kingdoms and states in which these exiles resided and were active. Some of these have been previously microfilmed by the National Library of Ireland, if only in part. It has, for instance, records relating to the ambassadorial activities of Lord Taaffe to the Duke of Lorraine in the early 1650s.67 Outside of these collections of Continental material which can be found in Ireland, other Spanish, Belgian and French materials proved to be of particular importance, as the exiled Stuarts spent most of their time abroad in territories which were controlled either by the Spanish or the French crowns. It consequently proved necessary to consult materials held in depositories in Continental Europe, such as the Archives Générale du Royaume, in Brussels. In the case of the latter archive, however, research was hindered by the lack of an adequate index to the material.

On the other hand, it has to be said that work on this project was aided by the fact that many collections of letters and manuscripts relevant to this exiled Court have previously been published and calendared, in one form or another. The papers of Sir Edward Nicholas, the king’s private secretary during the period in exile, for instance, have been in print since the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.68 Another useful set of sources will be the assorted writings of John Evelyn, one of the most

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66 Robert Pentland Mahaffy (Ed.), Calendar of the State Papers of Ireland (CSPI), 1647-1660 (London, 1903).
renowned English diarists of the seventeenth century, as well as a staunch supporter of the royalist cause. His printed letters and diaries include information on such persons as the Earl of Ossory and the Marquis of Ormonde.\textsuperscript{69} With regard to Ormonde himself, there are a number of important calendars and writings upon this nobleman. The publications containing the correspondence of this Marquis, brought out by Thomas Carte in the eighteenth century, certainly are useful.\textsuperscript{70} The collections of materials relating to Ormonde, compiled by the \textit{Historical Manuscripts Commission}, have over 170 pages of material relating to this nobleman during his time in exile.\textsuperscript{71} Some of the Continental material, as was alluded to earlier in this chapter, had likewise been previously calendared, either by journals such as \textit{Archivium Hibernicum}, or by archivists from the countries in which this material could be found.\textsuperscript{72}

Other calendars of materials, for example, those which have also been compiled by the \textit{HMC}, also contained research resources pertinent to this topic. Collections, such as the Rawdon-Hastings manuscripts, the Leybourne-Popham manuscripts, the papers of the Earl of Egmont, and the Jersey manuscripts, amongst others, were usefully consulted. The collection of papers and, indeed, the calendared material relating to John Thurloe, the man who was the Cromwellian regime’s head of security, also had material relevant to this topic, as his extensive spy system had gathered together detailed accounts of the activities of Charles II’s exiled supporters. Other collections which were consulted included the memoirs and letters of Ulick, Marquis of Clanricarde.\textsuperscript{73}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{70} Thomas Carte, \textit{A collection of Original letters and papers, concerning the affairs of England, from the years 1641 to 1660} 2 vols. (London, 1739).
\textsuperscript{71} See, for instance, \textit{HMC}, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I).
\textsuperscript{72} See, for instance, Joseph Cuvelier, Henri Lonchay & Joseph LeFevre, \textit{Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne sur Les Affaires des Pays Bas au XVII\textsuperscript{me} Siecle, tome IV}, (Bruxelles, 1933).
\end{footnotes}
Finally, aside from all the resources mentioned above, there exist a number of writings by those who were in exile with the Stuart Court, as well as by those who were in contact with the exiles. Many of these take the form either of ideological defences of the royalist cause, accounts of events in the recent past which were intended to rationalise earlier actions and attacks upon those opposed to the Stuart Court. These include the writings of Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, on the British and Irish Civil wars and the Interregnum period generally, as well as the writings of John Bramhall, which he produced during his exile. Amongst these latter works are his defences of Laudian Anglicanism against the attacks of the Irish Jesuit Peter Talbot and his responses to the philosophical writings of Thomas Hobbes.74

There are, of course, a number of problems with some of the main sources listed above. One obvious one is that they are dominated by the correspondence of only a handful of persons within the exiled Court; these persons being the Marquis of Ormonde, Sir Edward Hyde and Sir Edward Nicholas. Of these three, only one is central to this thesis. Furthermore, important and influential as these people were within the exiled Court, to rely solely on the sources which they have left us could cause the study to be overly-skewed towards them, thus exaggerating their importance even further. There are, moreover, no major collections of materials which specifically contain information on the correspondence or activities of those other Irish persons who were part of this Court. In order to counteract these problems, a number of steps had to be taken. First, it was necessary to go through all the obtainable sources (and not just the aforementioned main sources) and reconstruct, wherever possible, the correspondence of those other persons who are the subject of study. Furthermore, as part of this process of rebuilding the correspondence of the Irish royalist courtiers, it was necessary to plot the movements and locations of both the exiled Stuart Court and of those persons associated with it at various periods, so as to keep everything within its proper context. Finally, extensive research had to be carried out in order to turn up new material or, more commonly, little-known sources.

This proved fruitful, however, as little known publications of correspondence by persons such as John Bramhall, George Radcliffe and Lord Taaffe were unearthed.\footnote{Ibid. Timothy Crist (Ed.), \textit{Charles II to Lord Taaffe: Letters in Exile} (Cambridge, 1974). Thomas Durham Whitaker (Ed.), \textit{The life and Original Correspondence of Sir George Radcliffe, Knight, LL.D The Friend of the Earl of Strafford} (London, 1810).}

Another problematic factor with the available primary sources is that, while there is a great variety of research material available (diaries, political and intellectual correspondence, etc.), certain kinds of evidence proved difficult, if not impossible, to find. There is, to give one example, a dearth of information relating to the activities of rival factions within the exiled Stuart Court, which serves to limit the available information on how Irish members of the old royalist faction interacted with those others who were in exile with them.\footnote{This fact has already been commented on by those historians who have worked on Charles II and members of his court. See, for instance, Ronald Hutton, \textit{Charles the Second}, pp. 40-1.} Another obvious gap in the material is the lack, though not complete absence, of financial accounts and records. True, there are some general references to the financial situation that many of the courtiers found themselves in within the sources, including, among others, such persons as Richard Bellings junior and Ormonde. There are also some partial accounts relating to the business dealings between the exiles. For example, the activities of John Bramhall on behalf of Ormonde and Inchiquin, in his role as a royalist privateering agent, are recorded in some detail within the examined sources.\footnote{Edmund Berwick (Ed.), \textit{The Rawdon Papers}, Radcliffe to Bramhall, 21 July 1656, p. 101-3. \textit{The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. II}, Hyde to Nicholas, 2 November 1652, p. 220.} Useful as these were, however, they do not make up for the absence of detailed financial records, such as household and individual accounts, among the primary source material.

Finally, there may prove to have been some problems with the accuracy of the calendared material. As alluded to earlier, some calendars have already proven themselves to be problematic. Mention has already been made of inaccuracies within the calendars of the State papers of Ireland, though it must be conceded that in this particular case it has not proven to be a great problem. There were some problems with how the compilers of other calendars had selected and even copied the material they were working with, however. Frequently, the archivists working on these materials selected only papers with reference to high political events for publication, thus prejudicing the study of the social dimension of these exiles’ lives. The \textit{HMC}
compilation of the Ormonde manuscripts, for instance, chose to omit some material relating solely to privateering activities and it was necessary to trawl through the Ormonde manuscripts from the National Library of Ireland to fill in the gaps. Similarly, George F. Warner omitted the correspondence between Elizabeth Butler and Edward Nicholas from his otherwise praiseworthy compilation of the latter’s correspondence.

There was also a potentially a more serious problem; namely, how accurately was some of the material reprinted by their compilers. To give the best example, as part of his multi-volume biography of Ormonde, Thomas Carte published a selection of his collection of Ormonde’s letters, which was designed to support his account of the nobleman’s life. This publication has since been drawn upon by many historians. There is at least one case, however, where the version of a letter published by Carte has been questioned. In volume one of the collected letters of Sir Edward Nicholas, the editor of the series, George F. Warner, draws attention to a serious conflict between the version of a letter from Ormonde to Nicholas as found in the latter’s papers, and the version as published by Carte. It may, of course, be a conflict caused by the inaccurate copying of a letter into Ormonde’s letter-book. On the other hand, there is a danger that it is a case where the bias of the compiler has greatly influenced the contents of a published version of a letter. In order to protect against this, it was necessary to double-check, wherever possible, the printed account of a person’s correspondence against the existing originals.

On the whole, for all the problems that existed in dealing with these sources, I believe that a reasonable solution was found to most of them, at least most of the time, though it would be too much to say that they were always completely overcome. To give one illustration, Ormonde, though undoubtedly important, still remains a huge overshadowing personality in this thesis. Aside from that, while they have almost become academic clichés, one still has to say that certain gaps in the historical record could not be filled and the biases inherit within the sources, and within this reader of the sources, was not always be overcome. Finally, it must be admitted here that the task of identifying and finding solutions to the problems associated with these sources has been repeatedly aided by the efforts of earlier historians who have previously used these sources in their studies and writings.

The organisation of the thesis

The thesis is divided into three sections; with each then being further subdivided into a number of chapters. The first section deals with the personal and dynastic concerns of the exiled Irish elite, while section two deals with the Stuart Court in exile and the Irish courtiers within it. Finally, section three will cover their activities as ambassadors and representatives of the Stuart cause. The following is a resume of these sectional and chapter headings.

Section 1: The individual concerns and interests of the Irish royalist elite and the exile.

Chapter 1: Exile: a necessity or a choice? This chapter serves as an introduction to the section and it will examine the reasons for going into, quitting or staying in exile in the period 1649-1660. It will try to establish exactly to what extent this movement was obligatory upon those who participated in it and to what degree they had a choice in exile. As part of this it will look into how the reasons for moving abroad or for staying at home altered over time. This will entail examining the push-pull factors that sent people abroad, or kept people at home, at this time, as well as studying the role of personal networks in facilitating the movement of the exiles to the Continent. Other questions of particular importance for this chapter will include the issue of why the migration to the Continent was such a drawn out process and why certain persons were able to avoid taking the decision to go to the Continent, or could even reverse this choice in certain circumstances. The use of exile as a familial survival strategy will similarly be touched upon.

Chapter 2: Providing for themselves while on the Continent. This will essentially be an examination of how the exiles acquired the necessary resources that they needed to guarantee their personal survival while on the Continent in the 1650s. It will concentrate solely on those means that they acquired within the Continental landmass itself. To carry this study out, I will use the technique of Egocentric Network Analysis and will use case studies of certain individuals to investigate how the necessary wherewithal to survive was required. It will primarily focus on financial resources, but will also investigate how other different forms of assets, for instance social capital, were acquired. Beyond this, the chapter will focus on the use that these assets were put to by the exiles while on the Continent. Aside from this, the chapter will also focus on the impact that exile, and the various constraints that it
placed upon the persons in question, had upon each individual’s lifestyle. To facilitate this, studies of the life and culture of Early Modern Continental European and British nobility, such as those carried out by Jonathan DeWald and Toby Osborne (the latter having made a study of exile as a familial survival strategy during the Thirty Years War), etc., will be used as points of comparison and reference.

Chapter 3: The personal concerns of the Irish royalist elite and their contacts with their native countries. This chapter has to be written as the exiles’ home countries (the plural form is deliberate) continued to be a major part of their lives during the 1650s. As will become clear, they did, albeit indirectly for the most part, continue to be actors within their patrimonies during the exile and they could still make an impact on many different areas of activity from abroad. Most strikingly, they could influence events to the advantage of their own dynasties in their former domiciles. In exploring the issue of how they managed to do this I will, once again, take advantage of social network analysis. In doing this, the chapter will seek to address the following problems. It shall describe and analyse the nature and purpose of the expatriates’ personal contacts with home. Furthermore, it will attempt to examine if, and how, they were able to act to protect their personal estates and patrimonies from abroad. This chapter will also attempt to explain how they were able to draw upon resources from their mother countries to aid them through the exile and shall attempt to assess the value and importance of these connections to home to the expatriates.

Section 2: The Irish exiles in the Stuart Court: Life within the exiled court

Chapter 4: Companions and servants to a royal family: the Irish Courtiers and the organisation of life within the diverse households of the exiled Court. This chapter, and the others within this section, will concentrate on the Irish elite within the exiled Stuart Court. By doing this it will seek to draw attention to and partially fill some gaps in the existing Irish and British historiography of the period. It is noteworthy that the Caroline Stuart Court in exile has been the subject of only one study and that the role of Irish elites within a Court setting has never been studied. This section, though by no means constituting a full study of all the questions relating to life in a Court society, will nonetheless seek to provide some insight into this area and will attempt to open it up for a more in-depth study in the future. To do this a micro-historical empirical study of the Court will be combined, where appropriate, with a comparative perspective and social network analysis in order to give an insight
into how this exiled institution operated and how the Irish elite behaved within it. In particular, it will draw on a number of the studies of the Early Modern Court that have been undertaken in recent decades, most notably the sociological studies carried out by Norbert Elias and the criticisms of his conclusions that have been made in a number of subsequent works. Recent studies of the Early Modern Stuart Court (i.e. the pre-exile and pre-Civil war Court) and of the exiled Jacobite Court will serve as the points of comparison for this particular institution.

The first chapter in this division will look at the Irish elite as members of the semi-private households of the Stuart dynasty, their relationship and interaction with other courtiers within it and also their dealings with the royal family. The development and alteration, if any, in these relationships throughout the exile will also be assessed, as will the contribution of the Irish at Court to these changes. The contribution of these courtiers to the maintenance of the forms of a royal household during the exile will be described and evaluated. It will examine their roles in maintaining the ceremony and public display of the Court and their functions as organisers of the daily life of these households. Finally, it will also look at how the Court modified their behaviour in certain fields. In carrying out this a number of factors will have to be borne in mind. Most notably, the long-running tripartite division of the Stuart Court, the lack of a permanent base for arguably the most significant of the three constituent households and the impact that these factors may have had on the forms of daily court life will all have to be taken into account.

Chapter 5: Acting as ministers and administrators to a royal family without a kingdom: the Irish courtiers’ role within a Court seeking to re-establish its political authority. In contrast to the previous chapter, this one shall focus on the role of the Irish at Court as members of the Stuart government-in-exile. It will examine the responsibilities they held while helping the Court assert its claim to be the lawful central executive for Britain and Ireland. As such it will be, to a certain extent, a study of their role as the Stuarts would-be political and administrative functionaries. Beyond this it will analyse the part they played in the determining of policy and the political actions of the royal family and investigate their actions in the factional strife over these questions within the Court. The extent and limits of this inter-factional rivalry will also be investigated, with the intention of determining how widespread it was, how divisive it was, and the circumstances under which it arose. Once again, with regard to the competing factions, the division of the Stuart Court into three
distinct units for much of the 1650s has to be remembered here and the effects that this may have had upon the both the factional rivalries and the governmental decisions taken during this time will have to be accounted for. Therefore, in order to examine how the Irish courtiers attempted to exercise political influence in this tripartite Court and the extent to which factional loyalty determined their actions, the role of personal networks will be examined once again.

Chapter 6: flourishing and floundering within the exiled Stuart Court: a case study of an individual’s behaviour within the exiled royal households. This chapter, aside from assessing what life in the Stuart Court could entail for individual courtiers at a personal level, is perceived as one that will bring together the analysis, empirical data and conclusions of the previous two chapters. It will thus end the previously-employed, necessary, but artificial division between the household life and governmental activities of the Stuart Court. The chapter will examine how an individual courtier, namely Sir George Radcliffe, carried out his role as a member of both a private household and as functionary of a would-be government administration. It will examine how he set about maintaining and raising his status and influence within the exiled courts. It shall also focus on the factors that caused him to lose whatever position and authority he exercised within this environment. Attention shall also be paid to, moreover, how factors such as etiquette, faction, religion, etc., affected his behaviour. Aside from these questions, the issue of what individuals expected of the Court and what they could realistically receive from it will also be addressed. An examination of how he served those in his network of associates within the Stuart Court and of how they treated him will also be made here. Particular attention will be paid to how he aided persons in his own personal network and how they aided him. The limits of the assistance provided to him by the network will also be examined.

Concluding remarks: The overall impact of the exile on the Stuart Court and its courtiers. The last chapter of this section will seek to draw the information presented in the previous three together and will draw conclusions about the significance of the Irish elite’s behaviour within this institution, with special attention being paid to how they contributed to its activities and how they abetted in its survival. This chapter will also comment upon how exactly this Stuart Court fits into the historiography on Early Modern Courts generally and, more specifically, the other Stuart Courts of the era.
Section 3: International agents: The actions and behaviour of the Irish royalist elite as representatives of the Stuarts on the European political stage.

Chapter 7: Representing the royalist cause to the Continental powers and communities. This particular sectional sub-division will describe, analyse and assess the impact and success of the Irish exiles in their role, be it formally or informally carried out, as representatives of the exiled Court and the royalist cause on the wider European stage. It will therefore look at some, though not all, of their activities as ambassadors, diplomats, propagandists, for the royalist cause. It will, moreover, examine how the Stuart Court employed them as its agents on the international stage, as well as investigating how they attempted to gain resources for the royalist cause on the International arena and how successful they were in this. The resources in question will include both ‘solid’ and ‘abstract’ assets (e.g. military forces, political allies, money, popular support and sympathy, etc.). In carrying out this investigation of their function as representatives of the exiled body and its political cause, I will not just focus on how they spoke for the Stuart Court in their dealings with the kingdoms and states of mid-seventeenth century Europe. I will also look at their role as representatives to other types of institutions and bodies aside from states and kingdoms, such as churches, particular communities, certain vocational groups, etc. Once again, as the Irish exiles relied upon many of their personal connections to carry out the above-specified tasks, I will make use of egocentric network analysis in this chapter.

Chapter 8: Representing the Stuart interest at home from abroad: the Irish Courtiers, the royalist Cause and the lost Stuart kingdoms. As with one of the earlier chapters, this particular unit will concentrate on the connections between the Irish courtiers and the former Stuart kingdoms. Unlike previously, however, it will not focus on the personal dimensions of these contacts with their former homes, but on their activities in these kingdoms, be they directly or indirectly carried out, as representatives of the royalist cause. This chapter shall seek to examine how the exiles exercised influence in Ireland and Britain on behalf of the Stuarts. It shall also examine the nature and extent of their activities there on behalf of that dynasty. It shall attempt to explain how and to what degree they were able to gain resources for the exiled Court from the lost kingdoms, as well as examine the nature of these resources. It shall also attempt to elucidate on how they could still exercise enough influence in these countries in order to continue to carry out political, propagandistic,
and indeed military activity, against the Interregnum regimes. Finally, it shall assess the success of these efforts, their impact upon the exiles themselves, the English Commonwealth, and the Stuart Court and cause generally. As before, use shall be made of social network analysis, with particular reference to how they exploited their personal associations, whether they were based on patron-client connections, kinship obligations, or political and constitutional sympathies, on behalf of royalist interests in Britain and Ireland.

General Conclusions: the significance of the exile for the Irish royalist elite. This final segment will draw the findings of the earlier sectional analyses together, so as to formulate a complete set of conclusions, thus bringing to a close the analytical divisions that had been made earlier, while also demonstrating the links, associations and contradictions that existed between the various areas of activity in the exiles’ lives. Among other things, it will summarise the impact of the exile, at a personal level, on the life and culture of the displaced Irish nobility and other members of Ireland’s exiled elite. It will address the effect of the exile on their relationship with the royal family, the Stuart Court, both as a private household and as a governmental institution, and the Continent.

Finally, as the acknowledgements which open this work show, there are many people whose aid was vital to the completion of this work and I would like to re-iterate my thanks here. It goes without saying that any mistakes and failings in this thesis are my own and should not be imputed to any of those who have helped me in the carrying out of this study. Instead, only credit is due to them for all they have done.
Section One

Chapter 1

Exile: a necessity or a choice?

Exile before the parliamentary victory in the wars of the three kingdoms

In December 1650, in the face of continuing setbacks at the hands of Cromwell’s New Model Army and its allies, the Lord Lieutenant and commander of the Irish royalist forces, James Butler, Marquis of Ormonde, quit Ireland along with a number of companions and arrived in France in early 1651. Parliamentary victories were not the only factor that provoked this decision: opposition from discontented persons, most notably Catholic clerics, within the alliance of Confederate Catholics and royalists, previously formed in Ireland in January 1649, did not encourage him to stay either. This quitting of the country marked the beginning of his and, indeed, many others, extended time in exile.

Aside from those that went with him or followed him at this time (a not inconsiderable number, including such persons as Murrough O’Brien, Baron Inchiquin, Daniel O’Neill and Edward Wogan), there were also a substantial number of other elite Irish persons already waiting for Ormonde there. Many of his kin and his closest allies in Ireland, for instance, were already abroad at this time. These included his wife, Elizabeth Butler and their sons, as well as persons such as John Bramhall, the Anglican Bishop of Derry, who, with the exception of one year in Ireland (1648), had been on the Continent since the royalist defeat at Marston Moor in 1644 and Sir George Radcliffe, who had been in Caen since 1647. Amongst those


80 Michael Perceval-Maxwell, ‘Butler, Elizabeth, duchess of Ormonde … (1615-1684)’, The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. This article was accessed on the 10th of November 2004 at the
others who had removed themselves from Britain and Ireland prior to this were members of the royal family, most notably the Queen Mother, Henrietta Maria, and the Duke of York, as well as a number of other courtiers from the Stuarts’ three kingdoms. On the other hand, by the time Ormonde arrived in France Charles II had just left his initial period of exile behind and was in Scotland. As things would turn out, however, he was not to stay too much longer there and, following his defeat at the battle of Worcester in September 1651, he too would soon return to France and to the company of his Irish Lord Lieutenant and other elite followers from Ireland, as well as the other assorted royalist exiles.

This was not actually Ormonde’s first experience of exile. In 1647, in the aftermath of the failure of the First Ormonde Peace in Ireland in 1646, the (what would prove to be temporary) triumph of the anti-Ormondist, Catholic counter-Reformationist faction, led by Archbishop Rinucinni, and the defeat of the royalist forces in the first English civil war in 1646, he had previously fled the Stuart kingdoms and gone to France. Ormonde chose this course as, in the circumstances of that specific time, he felt that he could achieve nothing further for the royalist cause and he consequently chose to withdraw to France. He was not the only one to do so. A similar course was likewise adopted by one of his allies, James Touchet, the Earl of Castlehaven, at this time. In effect, they left Britain and Ireland behind when all political possibilities open to them at that moment had petered out and they fled to France to wait on events and to see what could be achieved from there. At this time Continental Europe was the scene of intense diplomatic activity on the part of the royalists, with persons such as Henrietta Maria actively trying to acquire foreign aid for Charles I’s cause. Following a shift in the political situation in Britain and Ireland in 1648, however, (specifically, Rinucinni’s influence and that of the anti-Ormondist party in Irish politics declined, while Charles I made an alliance with


Scottish Presbyterians, which allowed him to renew the war against the English Parliament) the Marquis and Castlehaven were to abandon their exiles and return to Ireland. This they did because, following the political changes in Ireland and Britain, there was now the renewed possibility that Ormonde could conclude an alliance with the Irish Confederates, acquire new troops for the royalist cause and thus, in conjunction with his King, open up a two-front war against the English Parliament. It was this very opportunity that drew him back to Ireland. His return, however, though it led to the signing of the Second Ormonde Peace, was, as we have seen, to eventually culminate in his re-withdrawal to France in early 1651. In some ways, it was quite an achievement for him to hang on as long as he did in Ireland on that occasion, as fleeing to France had been in consideration as a course of action since the previous spring. On the other hand, some others, most notably Viscount Muskerry, felt he made the decision to withdraw from the kingdom too hastily and before all possibilities had exhausted themselves.

Whether his withdrawal in late 1650/early 1651 was justified or not, it has to be said that Ormonde’s behaviour in the 1640s, though described in an incomplete way above, was not atypical. Many royalists, whether they were from Ireland or not, who had fled abroad in the face of the final triumph of the English Parliamentary forces in England in 1649 or, indeed, in the years immediately after, had likewise gained prior experience of exile earlier in the 1640s. As Geoffrey Smith points out in his study of English cavaliers in exile, many persons had previously fled to Continental Europe on a temporary basis at various times during the conflagrations in 1640s Britain and Ireland, leaving those kingdoms when the outlook seemed poor for the royalist cause and returning home from the Continent when circumstances changed and the political situation seemed more hopeful. It was certainly true of a few of Ormonde’s political and military allies and clients in Ireland and England during the 1640s, including persons like Bramhall. As we have seen, he too had left England in the wake of a major setback for the royalists and despite the fact that he

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83 Ibid, p. 32.
was to spend the greater part of the 1640s in the Netherlands he never actually meant his residence there to be as long-lasting as it proved to be. He had, for instance, expected to be recalled to Ireland to join Ormonde after the latter had returned there in 1648 and the Marquis had certainly hoped to be able to send for him at this time. Aside from this bishop, the Lord Lieutenant had hoped to bring his wife back to Ireland and even went so far as to make arrangements for her return.  

Another Irish Anglican bishop, Henry Leslie of the diocese of Down and Conor, had also previously quit Ireland and travelled to the Netherlands in the 1640s, but he too saw his exile as being only temporary. Writing to Ormonde in early 1651, he explained that

… when we were flattered with reports that matters went well in Ireland [i.e. that Ormonde’s alliance with he Confederate Catholics there was producing positive results], I endeavoured to get a passage thither, [but] by a strange providence was cast upon this isle [Jersey], where I remain with the governor.

Others who can be placed amongst this number include Daniel O’Neill, who had similarly fled to France from Ireland in 1647, only to leave again and return there in October 1648. He was to later return into exile again in 1651, not at the same time as Ormonde did, but instead following the defeat of Confederate forces at Scariffhollis later that year. In fact, he would continue to reproduce this pattern of movement throughout the 1650s, when he frequently moved between the former Stuart kingdoms and the Continent as royalist plots and conspiracies arose in Britain. This behaviour, moreover, though not carried out on anything like the same scale, or for as extended a time period, was also typical of one of his political associates, the English nobleman, Lord Digby. He too was to move back and forth between the Stuart kingdoms and the European mainland in the 1640s. Other exiles also moved back and forth between the Continent and the islands in the 1650s just as Daniel O’Neill did, though it must be

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86 HMC, Hastings Mss.; vol. IV, Ormonde to Bramhall, 21 August 1648, p. 93. Carte Mss. 24, Bramhall to Ormonde, 7 March 1649, f. 77. Ibid, Ormonde to Cape, 6 March 1649 (O. S.), f.56.

87 Carte Mss. 29, Leslie to Ormonde, 16 January 1651, f. 159b. Leslie was to return to Ireland after the fall of the Scilly Isles, where he had gone following his time in the United Provinces, to Parliamentary forces. The terms of the capitulation of these islands allowed him to return to his Irish estate and he was to see out the Interregnum there. NLI Mss. 10241, Townley Hall Papers: an account of the life of Henry Leslie, f. 7.
said that they did not follow this course to anything like the same extent. Furthermore, these trips frequently did not constitute a true return from exile as the movement in that direction in the previous decade had, simply because of the political and conspiratorial element to these returns, which imposed a need for secrecy upon those who made the voyage and curtailed their movements once there. Amongst these number can be included Richard Talbot, who went to England in the mid-1650s so as to participate in an assassination plot against Oliver Cromwell and was temporarily imprisoned for his role in it.88

Whether the movement back and forth from the Continent by certain conspirators in the 1650s constitutes a true return from exile or not, it is fair to say that the movement of key individuals between Ireland and Europe in 1640s shows that exile clearly was a political strategy for certain persons, particularly in those years prior to the defeat at Worcester. During those years there was still strong, active opposition being offered by royalists and their allies to the English Parliament. Exile was consequently not an act from which there was necessarily no going back from at that particular time: hope that the situation could turn and all those overseas could return still existed. True, one of the motives for fleeing to the Continent in those months was to avoid the impact of being subject to a range of discriminatory measures, ranging from execution to loss of property.89 Yet, that said, it was also realised by many that, in terms of their own livelihood at least, withdrawal to the Continent was not going to necessarily improve their personal situation. Writing to Ormonde from Paris in early 1651, just as the Lord Lieutenant was preparing to journey to France for the second time, Viscount Taaffe warned him of

… how subject you [Ormonde] will be to all manner of inconveniences. As for employment, you will get none worthy of you; as for friends, you will find none, but those that are poor; and as for money, you may not expect any. I am a better shifter, than your Excellency will ever be, and yet as like to starve in Paris, though


every person saluted me with *vostre tres humble serviteur jusqu’ a la mort* [1722 italics]. Without fooling, there is no such place to live in as Ireland.90

Clearly, with such warnings circulating, journeying to the Continent was not solely motivated by a desire to escape harassment by unfriendly political powers and for a better life than Ireland offered at the time. Instead, it is fair to say that the withdrawal in these initial years by most elite émigrés was motivated by the wish to be in a place from where they could safely await the next opportunity to carry out pro-royalist activity in Britain or Ireland. Indeed, even after Worcester, the behaviour of persons like O’Neill and Talbot, who returned to Britain during the 1650s either as *agents provocateurs* or when there was the slightest prospect of a royalist revival, is best seen as an extreme example of the political decisions that initially underpinned the move into exile.91 These two merely chose to abandon exile not when the situation definitely favoured it but when there appeared to be any opportunity at all to create a situation that would favour a royal restoration. Though it certainly was not followed to the same extreme by other royalists, particularly following the complete triumph of the Parliament in late 1651/early 1652, this movement back and forth from the Stuart kingdoms to the Continent was, during the 1640s and the very early 1650s, still a reasonably frequently employed political tactic, being used by many in those years. We have already seen how, following the defeat of the Crown forces in Britain in 1646 in the first English Civil war and the failure in Ireland of the First Ormonde Peace, many royalists, including a number of the subjects of this thesis, chose to leave their homelands and wait out the political impasse that their cause found itself in at that moment. They did not initially see this particular move to the Continent as permanent but instead viewed it as a temporary measure, forced on them by circumstances. Moreover, it was not necessarily perceived or seen as the act of the completely defeated. It was instead solely a tactical withdrawal to a place where royalist politicking could continue out of the reach of English parliamentary forces.

As with the Lord Lieutenant’s initial withdrawal from Ireland in 1647, the removal of persons like Ormonde (once again), O’Neill, Viscount Taaffe, Edward Wogan and the Lord Inchiquin to France in late 1650/early 1651 should be looked at


in this light. Once again, royalist fortunes had suffered a downturn, particularly in Ireland, where prospects were especially poor. The Parliamentary army was making slow but steady progress in its conquest of the country and the pro-Stuart alliance had split over the question of whether Ormonde was an appropriate commander. Consequently, many leading pro-royalists, and Ormonde especially, believing that another impasse had been reached in Ireland, withdrew to France once again. Once more, however, it was not a permanent abandonment of the field of battle, but instead represented a removal to a place from where they could, potentially at least, still contribute to royalist goals. It was, moreover, a withdrawal to a place from which they could always easily return to diverse parts of the Stuart archipelago, assuming of course the political situation changed and presented them with such an opportunity. This was not an unrealistic expectation in 1651. It must be remembered that when these persons reached France the leader of the royalist cause since 1649, Charles II, was already in Scotland, where he was seeking to benefit from an alliance with the more moderate Engager party amongst the Presbyterians there. This alliance would prove to be a difficult one, fraught with problems, but in 1651 it still posed a significant military threat to English Parliamentary forces and it held out the prospect of the exiled royalists being once again able to return and take the fight to Parliamentary forces on British soil in the near future.

Given all this, it may be suggested that those of the Irish royalist elite who went abroad before mid-1651 might not be considered true exiles at all, but rather the notion may be advanced that they were opportunistic émigrés and travellers who were expecting a turn of events that would allow them to go home to take place sooner rather than later. Indeed, it can be argued that those royalists who withdrew from Ireland at this time really had no choice but to try and return. Certainly, many of Ormonde’s closest associates, including those who had fled to the Continent themselves, expected that the Lord Lieutenant would definitely attempt to return home in pursuit of royalist political goals and that this would happen relatively soon. Lord Carteret, who supplied the frigate that brought Ormonde to France, had the vessel kept in a state of readiness, in case the Marquis needed to use it to quit his exile. Another royalist, Gervase Holles wrote to this nobleman in May 1651 stating that while it was understandable that Ormonde had quit Ireland, given the prevailing

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92 For a fuller account of this military alliance see, Ronald Hutton, *Charles II*, pp. 49-71.
circumstances there, he hoped that ‘...when you [Ormonde] return next into that kingdom it will be upon better terms’. Taaffe, for his part, viewed it as being in Ormonde’s personal interest to go back into Ireland and even asked the Lord Lieutenant what arrangements he had made to return into that kingdom.93

As a consequence of this expectation there was great pressure on Ormonde and, by implication, those who had travelled with him to seek to get back into Britain or Ireland. It therefore comes as no surprise to learn that some of those Irish nobles who had landed in France in early 1651 almost immediately began to make plans to leave and go to Scotland to join their King. Others’ expectations of them meant that they had little choice. In mid-January 1651, less than two weeks after he had arrived in France with Ormonde, Inchiquin let it be known that he intended to head for Holland and by February he was on his way. His whole purpose in travelling there was to try and get passage to Scotland so that he could join Charles II. Indeed, so convinced were certain persons about Inchiquin’s impeding departure for Scotland that some of them even started giving him letters for the King.94 Yet, despite all his efforts, his plans did not work out so well. The main reason for this lay in Charles II’s problems with his Scottish allies. One aspect of their fraught relationship was that the Scots, initially at least, were only allowing persons who held political and religious opinions that they agreed with access to the King and Inchiquin was hardly likely to be one of those who would be looked upon favourably in this respect.

In point of fact, some of those other Irish who attempted to join Charles II at this time, most notably Daniel O’Neill, were ignominiously turned back by the Scots as persons of untrustworthy views, who were unfit to keep company with their covenanted King. If this was not enough in itself, such actions only created tensions within the alliance, which meant that little positive progress was made.95

Consequently, in the summer of 1651, despite having previously believed that Inchiquin had journeyed to Norway in order to take a boat to Scotland, Ormonde was to learn that the latter had instead decided to wait upon events and had remained in the Low Countries. In the end, in spite of his desire to, Murrough O’Brien never actually

93 Carte Mss. 29, Carteret to Ormonde, 15 January 1651, f. 156. Ibid, Holles to Ormonde, 1 May 1651, f. 431. Ibid, Taaffe to Ormonde, January 1651, f. 167.
94 BL Eg. Mss. 2534, Elizabeth Butler to Nicholas, 12 January 1651, f. 44. Ibid, Ormonde to Nicholas, 12 February 1651, f. 48. Ibid, Taaffe to Inchiquin (for Charles II), March 1651, f. 61.
95 Ronald Hutton, Charles II, pp. 49-71.
got to join Charles Stuart in Scotland and in September 1651 he chose to leave the Low Countries and return to France. This was not to be the fate that befell those other Irish royalists who had fled to France with Ormonde in late 1650. As we have already seen, O’Neill had temporarily joined Charles II in Scotland, only to be ejected again. A subsequent shift in the balance of power between Charles II and the Scots later in 1651, however, was to allow him to return there again, where Edward Wogan also joined him. What is more, in summer of that year O’Neill was even able to give Ormonde some hope that he too would soon be called on to join the King, a prospect which was quite pleasing to the Marquis.

In the meantime, just as Wogan, O’Neill and O’Brien were attempting to use the Continent as a springboard from which they could launch themselves back into Britain, others were attempting to harness the political forces on the European mainland for the benefit of the royalist cause. Immediately after he had arrived in France, Taaffe made appeals to Cardinal Mazarin for aid for Irish Catholics and then he journeyed onto the Spanish Netherlands, where he became involved in protracted negotiations for military aid from the Duke of Lorraine, in the form of troops, money and supplies for those anti-Cromwellian forces still left in the west of Ireland. It is interesting to note, therefore, that whether they had quit Ireland before Ormonde had, or whether they had journeyed with him to France, or even if they had done so soon afterwards, as in O’Neill’s case, many of the Irish royalist elite immediately after arriving embarked upon measures that were designed to bolster their political cause in Britain and Ireland. It is also obvious that these efforts were part of an overall royalist strategy at the time which replicated, in broad terms at least, that which the Crown had followed between 1648 and 1649: namely, they attempted to support a joint military campaign of the Scots and the King (in this case, Charles II) by either fighting with them or, more significantly, by attempting to gain supplies in order to

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98 Memoirs of the Family of Taaffe, Taaffe to Mazarin, no date, pp. 11-12. Ibid, pp. 10-13. The internal evidence of the letter to Mazarin almost certainly means that it was written in early 1651.
sustain a second front in Ireland which would pin down and trouble the Parliamentary forces even further.  

The question of the appropriateness of exile after the Battle of Worcester

Yet, in the end, all these efforts to make the withdrawal to the Continent a short and temporary one availed their cause nothing. Defeat at the battle of Worcester in September 1651 definitively ended Charles II’s campaign in Britain and it forced him, as well as O’Neill and Wogan, into banishment once more. Meanwhile, for assorted reasons, ranging from unacceptable demands by Lorraine, the insincerity of the selfsame Duke, opposition from other Irish persons there and his own negotiating extravagancies, Taaffe was not successful in his quest to procure further aid for Ireland. The failure of these political and military schemes was cataclysmic for the royalist cause and effectively ended any hopes they had, in the short-to-medium term at least, to regain power in Britain and Ireland, with Ormonde himself admitting as much in a letter to Nicholas soon after he had learned of Worcester.

This trouncing was not just disastrous on a political and a military level. It has to be said that for many of those who had adhered to the royalist cause prior to this, regardless of their national background, the defeat changed the very question of whether exile was an appropriate option for them or not. Prior to Worcester there was a chance that exile would only be a temporary measure, as the Stuarts still had fighting forces in two of their three kingdoms. Yet, the events of the summer and autumn of 1651 put both England and Scotland completely in Parliamentary hands and with the failure of the Lorraine negotiations it became obvious that it was only a matter of time before Ireland fell. Moreover, with France and Spain, the major European powers, embroiled in national and international conflicts, there was little prospect of foreign aid. This did not just extend to the question of troops. Both Henrietta Maria and Charles II were reliant on the hospitality of the French Court for their own upkeep. Yet, despite assigning pensions to the Stuarts, the Bourbons were frequently unable to pay any sums of money for the support of the Stuart Court in


Paris because of the oncoming problems of the Fronde. Hence, while it would be an exaggeration to say that it was penniless the Stuart Court was certainly in great financial difficulty. Many of the exiles accordingly could not expect any great largesse from their royal overlords. This was a serious problem for many, though not necessarily for all, because they did not all have the requisite resources to maintain themselves.

Prior to Charles II’s defeat in the third English Civil war the question that cavaliers asked themselves about withdrawing to the Continent was, why should they choose this option, and the answer they had was so that they could continue to offer resistance to the English Parliament. Now, however, moving to Continental Europe stopped being a political strategy designed to facilitate the continuance of large-scale royalist resistance. With Parliamentary forces being apparently completely victorious, the question regarding whether one should withdraw abroad or not had mutated. Exile was now not going to be a short-term phenomenon. It was now almost certainly a measure to be taken for the medium-to-long term. In short, such a move abroad was now undoubtedly going to be a move into a longer-lasting exile. As a result of this change, the concern now was how viable an option was it and should those who had already gone abroad actually continue there. In these precise circumstances moving to the Continent to join the Stuart Court predictably looked less appealing.

It has to be said that even prior to Worcester some of the Irish elite had already seen the writing on the wall or, at least, they had begun to make alternative arrangements, just in case the royalist schemes of the early 1650s did not work out. Considering the intelligence they were receiving this was not too surprising. By August 1651 Ormonde, for one, was not hopeful about the situation in Ireland, as he felt that the negotiations with Lorraine would not produce anything positive, though he still retained some hope that the Scottish campaign would produce something positive. Soon after, however, reports were reaching the exiles on the Continent stating that the King’s campaign in Scotland was not going to plan and that he would

101 In his memoirs, the Cardinal De Retz, talked of how Henrietta Maria, even though she was a daughter of France, was left without many basic resources from time to time, including firewood, though it should be remembered that this was at the time of the Fronde, which was also a period of great difficulty for the French royal family, so it may not have been typical of the exile as a whole. Michel Pernot (Ed.), *Cardinal De Retz: Memoires* (Paris, 2003), p. 223.
be soon forced to fight with Cromwell in a last desperate gamble for victory.\footnote{102} Bearing this almost constant flow of ill-tidings for the royalist cause in mind, it comes as no surprise that even in early 1651, soon after her husband joined her in France, Lady Elizabeth Butler was talking of returning home to try to secure a share of her former patrimony from the Parliamentary regime. This she did, along with her two sons, though she did not leave France until August 1652. They were not the only ones to take this course. Elizabeth, Lady Inchiquin, similarly abandoned exile in early 1652 in order to attempt the recovery of her marriage jointure. Other high status women who had been abroad prior to this now also followed this path home. Another high-profile émigré, Richard Boyle, the second Earl of Cork, actually quit his exile in mid-1651, prior to Worcester, and went back to his estates in Britain and Ireland. Others, such as George Radcliffe, would also come to consider this option, though they did not all necessarily take this course.\footnote{103}

To sum up, for those on the Continent at the beginning of the decade the defeat at Worcester, and even the military and political circumstances that had immediately preceded it, raised the question of whether or not staying abroad (i.e. staying in exile) was a viable long-term option. It is equally fair to claim that this battle had a similar impact upon those who were in Ireland. With final defeat all the more imminent they too were now forced to consider the question of whether choosing what looked likely to be a long-term exile was a viable option for them as well. Some decided that it was not. In early 1652 Ulick Burke, Marquis of Clanricarde, was serving as the King’s Lord Deputy in Ireland, a post he had held since Ormonde’s departure some fourteen months earlier. As the military campaign in Ireland was drawing to an end at this time and as it was obvious that victory there would go to Parliament, Charles II issued him with a licence to quit the country. It is certain that Clanricarde was expected in France after this, as Hyde commented in

\footnote{102} HMC, Ormonde Mss. (N. S., vol. I), Ormonde to Inchiquin, 3 August 1651, p. 178. Ibid, Ormonde to Nicholas, 3 August 651, p. 179. Ibid, Ormonde to Inchiquin, 15 August 1651, p. 184.

spring of that year that the only reason that the Lord Deputy had not arrived there yet was that he still had not received the King’s licence. Burke was to subsequently travel to England and those royalists on the Continent continued to expect his arrival amongst them throughout the following year, in the belief that he would use the latter country as a staging post on his journey. This particular Marquis was never to arrive, however. Illness and the availability of comfortable accommodation with his wife in England meant that he was never to join his allies abroad. What most recognised as being an almost certain long-term exile just was not appealing enough to him in his condition.

Despite finally suffering defeat in Ireland over the course of 1652, others also attempted to avoid going abroad, though it must be said that they did so with considerably less success. The best example of this is Donough McCarthy, viscount Muskerry, who finally began negotiations with Parliamentary forces concerning his surrender in mid-1652. For one reason or another, this nobleman was always reluctant to go abroad. We have already seen how he had criticised Ormonde for leaving in late 1650. In the wake of his own surrender, Muskerry continued to attempt to avoid exile. In August 1652 he was petitioning the speaker of the English Parliament, William Lenthall. He did this for the purpose of seeking a settlement of his estate that would favour him. He clearly did not intend to withdraw to the Continent if he could avoid it. This effort to secure himself in Ireland availed him nothing, however, and instead he found himself exempted from pardon for his life and estate by the Parliament’s act for settling Ireland in that month. Consequently, despite his efforts to maintain his property, he was obliged to withdraw to the Continent.

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His withdrawal did not last long as he was to return to Ireland late in the following year, apparently claiming that opposition from clergy in Spain was hindering him abroad. This was not the wisest of moves as he was immediately put on trial by the Protectorate as an accessory to murder. While those royalists in France were to initially hear that Muskerry was found guilty and executed this was not the case. Instead the court acquitted the viscount, though once again he was obliged to leave Ireland and return to the Continent.\textsuperscript{108}

Donough McCarthy’s case history illustrates how certain royalists sought to avoid exile after the disasters of late 1651/early 1652. More importantly, however, it also demonstrates that while many persons either sought to avoid or to abandon exile, it was not generally possible for them to do so. In fairness to Muskerry, he did realise that banishment was always going to be the most likely scenario for him. In December 1651 this nobleman was making preparations to leave. Writing to one of those who acted as an agent between those in Ireland and on the Continent at this time he had the following to say:

If there be no hope of considerable supplies from the Duke of Lorraine, or the King be not in a growing condition to bear up in England, all is lost here, and it will be necessary in time, to think how to get conditions abroad, for there will be no living in this climate especially for a gentleman of any consideration or interest; at least if it come to that pass I am resolved to take some foreign course for a livelihood, for I am certain there are no trustings [sic] at home.\textsuperscript{109}

Of all the Irish Catholic royalist peers and gentry active at this time and who considered exile (see the appendix, below) one of the few who successfully managed to avoid going to the Continent was Clanricarde. Even then he did not get to remain in Ireland and he had to move to England and rely on his wife to provide for him. The


rest either withdrew by their volition, as Castlehaven did, or were obliged to leave by a parliamentary policy of removing the disaffected soldiery from the country, as Muskerry was. Amongst those others who were also obliged to withdraw by this policy was the Catholic Colonel Richard Grace, one of the most effective and ruthless guerrilla fighters on the pro-royalist side and also a kinsman of Ormonde’s. He finally surrendered in August 1652 after being defeated by Parliamentary forces, being the last pro-royalist commander in Ireland to do so. As part of his surrender he was obliged to go into exile and to take up mercenary employment on the Continent, along with his men.\textsuperscript{110} Being among the last to surrender, he was obviously not the only Catholic military commander required by the Parliament to follow this path. This form of capitulation agreement is what obliged the likes of Sir Walter Dongan and James Dillon to move abroad as well.\textsuperscript{111} Of all those Catholics who left, moreover, only Muskerry openly returned during the protectorate period, probably for the purpose of fetching more troops to the Continent as mercenaries, and, as we have seen, this was ill-advised.

The problem for the Irish Catholic peers lay in the fact that they were almost all closely associated with the Confederation of Kilkenny and the desire of the Interregnum regimes to punish those with such associations, as we have already noted, was strong. This aspiration for revenge upon the Catholic rebels of the 1640s was so strong in the 1650s that many of those affected by it found that exile was their best choice. Among these was James Touchet, Earl of Castlehaven. After travelling to the Continent in early 1652 with messages from Clanricarde to Charles II he chose not to return home, despite the impasse that the royalist exiles found themselves in at that time, but instead remained in France and subsequently found employment there as a mercenary. True, he was not content to take this course and he actually petitioned the Protectorate in 1656 for permission to return home. This came to


\textsuperscript{111} Charles McNeill, \textit{The Tanner Letters}, Commissioners for Ireland to the Council of State, 6 May 1652 (O. S.), pp. 361-2.
nothing, however, and, like many others, he remained abroad until the Restoration.\textsuperscript{112} Therefore, in the wake of Worcester, answering the question of why they should continue in exile was a straightforward one for many of the Catholic exiles, especially those ones of high social status. They simply had no choice.

The same can be said for the most important of those Protestant Irish peers who had gone abroad prior to Worcester. After this disaster it was equally unwise for them to consider returning and persons such as Inchiquin and Ormonde were to find that even though their wives could go back home, mainly because gender stereotypes led to them being considered innocent of making war, they themselves could not. In autumn 1651, for instance, Ormonde had word from Oliver Cromwell himself, through a servant, that he personally could expect no favourable treatment from the English Parliament.\textsuperscript{113} In any case, these peers, along with the bulk of the Irish Catholic exiles, found themselves excluded from pardon for life and estates by the act for settling of Ireland, which came into force in August 1652. After this, legally speaking at least, there was nothing for them to go home to.\textsuperscript{114}

Clearly then, a division has to be made amongst those who had gone abroad prior to Worcester. On the one hand there were persons like Lady Ormonde and Richard Boyle who could return home once it looked like that there was no short-to-medium term prospect of an improvement in royalist fortunes. On the other there were those persons, such as Ormonde and or the Catholic Viscount Taaffe, who found that their past actions had made them so detestable to the victorious Parliamentary forces that they could not safely return home. What is more, a similar, though much more quantitatively unbalanced, division developed amongst those defeated persons in Ireland who were still there in the wake of Worcester and the subsequent complete victory of the Parliament in 1652. Persons like Castlehaven and Muskerry either


\textsuperscript{113}\textit{HMC}, Ormonde Mss. (N. S., vol. I), Buck to Elizabeth Butler, 30 October 1651 (O. S.), pp. 224-5. See p. 114, below, for more details on this.

\textsuperscript{114} C. H. Firth & R. S. Rait (Eds), \textit{Acts and ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660, vol. II} (London, 1911), pp. 598-603. It should be noted here that ways around this act did exist in limited cases. Clanricarde was excepted from his estate by this act, but, as stated earlier, he lived in England between 1653 and his death. Jane Ohlmeyer, ‘Burke, Ulick, marquess of Clanricarde (1604-1658)’, \textit{The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography}. 

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decided or found out that they could not safely stay in the former Stuart kingdoms. They were doomed to exile not only by their association with Ormonde but also by their close relationship with the Confederation of Kilkenny throughout the 1640s. Consequently they had to leave. There were some Catholic royalist peers and gentry, however, who could avoid exile. The aforementioned Clanricarde, for one, having publicly refused in the early 1640s to have anything to do with the confederates, found that exile to the Continent was not inevitable for him. A more notable case, however, was that of the Catholic Baron Courtstown, John Grace, nephew to the aforementioned Richard Grace. He was able to maintain his estate in Kilkenny, despite his Catholicism and his close links to the Confederates at Kilkenny because it was found in 1654 that

\[\text{… John Grace of Courtstown castle, in the county of Kilkenny in Ireland, esq. was in the year 1641…in ward [to the Anglican Bishop of Ossory, his maternal grandfather] and under-age; and in the time of the said rebellion, he did relieve diverse of the English; and was no way accessory to the murders, massacres or robberies.}\]

115

In short, generosity to Protestant neighbours, his own Protestant upbringing and his relatively young age all combined to shelter John Grace and his estate from the vengeance of the English Parliament. Exile was not necessary for him either.

It must be emphasised, however, that amongst those defeated Catholic notables who had played a prominent role in events in 1640s Ireland, either as confederates and/or as royalists, and who still found themselves there in 1652, Clanricarde and John Grace were almost unique. As pointed out earlier, those other Catholic pro-royalist commanders who surrendered to the Parliament in late 1651/early 1652 ended up going into exile, having generally surrendered on terms which obliged them to withdraw to the Continent with the troops under their command. This, combined with the then developing, and historiographically well-documented, Interregnum Land Settlement in Ireland, which caused many Catholic property owners to be dispossessed, was more than enough to oblige many persons to leave Ireland after Worcester. No matter how bleak the situation was for the royalists on mainland Europe, for many Irish Catholic persons of status it was still preferable to go there rather than to wait on events at home.

Put in these terms, it is clear that in 1652 many of the Catholic social elite found themselves in a situation where going into exile after Worcester, though not a desirable option, was still the best one open to them. There simply was no chance of a rapprochement or of an honourable compromise with the triumphant regimes at home. The same was clearly true for many of those Irish elite personages, both Catholic and Protestant, who had previously withdrawn to Continental Europe. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that many of the Irish social elite who were still on the Continent by 1652, or who went into exile after 1652, did so in the knowledge that they were there for the long haul. After Worcester it was obvious that there was no prospect of a return to power by the Stuarts in the near future. Furthermore, those who went abroad prior to 1651 but who remained on the Continent after this did so either out of commitment to the Stuarts and the royalist cause or out of a sense that there was nothing to return to. Most likely, a combination of both factors played their parts in this decision.

Exile was obviously a bleak and unpopular choice. Yet, before one makes a judgement on exactly how bleak it was, it must be realised that, while such a banishment was far from ideal, removal from their traditional zones of authority was not altogether that unusual or completely onerous for many of these persons. One mitigating factor was that many of these Irish elite persons already had contacts with the Continent. Royalists had, after all, been going to the Continent since the 1640s. We have previously seen that Ormonde had been in France prior to 1651 and that his family were there when he arrived there for the second time. Aside from those, other members of his kin had been making their living as mercenaries fighting in the Thirty Years War prior to the 1640s. Adding to the network of Butler’s contacts on the Continent were traditional clients of his family. These included the noted Catholic cleric and historian, Thomas Carew, who continued to publicly support the Butlers throughout the 1640s, even while resident in the Holy Roman Empire.116 It was similar story for the others. Inchiquin’s brother, Sir Christopher O’Brien, was a well-established mercenary commander in Spain by the beginning of the 1650s. His wife also had family in the United Provinces. Another notable exile, Richard Talbot, also had family on the Continent prior to the Parliamentary victory in the British and Irish

civil wars. One of his elder brothers, the Jesuit priest Peter Talbot, had been a student of theology on the Continent in the 1630s, as well as a lecturer. This particular cleric had returned to Ireland during the 1640s, only to flee back to Spain after. Even allowing for the latter’s return home, however, it still meant that the younger Talbot had a support network to tap into when he journeyed to Spain. Muskerry, for his part, counted an Irish mercenary commander in Flanders, by name of John Murphy, as a good friend. These émigrés were not without other, more tangible, resources on the Continent either. Sir George Hamilton and Ormonde both had already acquired business interests on the Continent prior to their abandonment of Ireland, having previously invested sums with Irish privateers who operated there. Ormonde was receiving money from these ventures as early as 1647.117

All of these links would have provided some sort of support network for the exiles, as would the already established tradition of Irish persons residing on the Continent. Aside from this, and much more importantly, some of the exiles already had considerable experience of life on the Continent. Daniel O’Neill had spent much of the 1630s moving between Ireland, England and the United Provinces, where he had fought in the armies of the Prince of Orange. Indeed, he had become a frequent visitor to the court of that Prince and had become closely associated with the household of the exiled palatinate dynasty in those years. Richard Boyle had also travelled there in the late 1630s as part of his education.118

Whatever the level of mitigation provided by these factors, exile was still unpopular and it is no surprise that some abandoned it. We have already referred to those that took this course previously and, generally speaking, they were not risking their person in doing so. As mentioned earlier, Ladies Ormonde and Inchiquin were considered non-combatants in the wars of the 1640s because of their sex. As for the


Butler children, their youth protected them. The same was true of Inchiquin’s children. When one of them returned to Ireland without licence in 1658, Lord Deputy Henry Cromwell was reluctant to imprison him, as he was a young man. 119 With Richard Boyle, he was undoubtedly helped by a number of considerations, including his relative lack of involvement in the events of the 1640s and the closeness of his younger brother, Roger Lord Broghill, to the Cromwells. 120 The return of all of these persons to Britain and Ireland was motivated by a number of desires. Undoubtedly, it was partly a cost-cutting exercise. The fact that all of the above either went back to their estates or went back to attempt to recover their share of formerly-held estates also marks it out as an attempt to preserve a familial inheritance and a dynastic interest in the face of crisis. 121

It would be remiss, however, not to highlight some other aspects of this return. First, there was no guarantee that the return home for these persons would be permanent. For many of those above, it was not. If we take Ormonde’s sons, Thomas, Earl of Ossory, Richard, Earl of Arran, and John, none of these were to remain away from the Continent for the rest of the decade. The first two returned there in 1655, while John returned there in 1658. Thomas’s return was prompted by his having been previously imprisoned in London on suspicion of being active in the royalist cause. For him, as with his father, going into exile in 1655 was Hobson’s choice: it was either that or prison. For his younger brothers, however, returning to the Continent was not occasioned by any such pressure. Indeed, evidence suggests instead that it was more likely to have been a part of their general education. They were travelling rather than fleeing persecution. Richard’s father informed Lady Ormonde of how he had engaged a tutor for him in 1656 and a tutor travelled with John in 1659. 122 It was, broadly speaking, a similar story for Lady Inchiquin.

119 Thurloe State Papers, vol. VII, Henry Cromwell to Thurloe, 7 April 1658 (O. S.), pp. 56-7. For more on Elizabeth Butler’s return to Britain and Ireland, see pp. 112-35, below.
120 Patrick Little, Lord Broghill and the Cromwellian union with Ireland and Scotland (Suffolk, 2004), pp. 1-3.
121 See pp. 112-39, below, for more details on this.
return home to recover her marriage jointure proved unsuccessful and she subsequently returned to France by the mid-1650s. There was no compulsion to do so. It was simply the case that, not having recovered her land, there was no reason to stay in Ireland. With her husband being in French employ at this time, it was as easy for her to support herself there.

It has to be conceded, nonetheless, that the case of the Inchiquins and their relationship with exile goes beyond this. While Lady Inchiquin’s efforts to recover her jointure show that abandoning exile could be, for some, just as temporary a decision as going abroad was, her next abandonment of the exile, sometime in 1657, shows that there were other reasons, aside from pragmatic dynastic ones, for returning home. These were ideological. In this specific case, they were religious. In 1657 Lord Inchiquin converted to Catholicism; a move which was not welcomed by his wife. It led to a personal rift developing between the two and, more publicly, led to a dispute in France over the education of the couple’s youngest son, Charles. Inchiquin wanted his son raised a Catholic, while his wife wanted him to continue in his Protestantism and to achieve her goals she enlisted the support of Thomas Lockhart, the Cromwellian ambassador to the Commonwealth’s then ally, France, to help her. In the end Lord Inchiquin triumphed and his son was converted to Catholicism. Aside from this, however, the clash over their son’s education also caused Elizabeth, Lady Inchiquin, to quit France and return home in 1657, where she remained until the end of the exile, and led to her (temporarily) disowning her ties to the O’Briens. For her, exile had become a corrupting influence, exposing her family to Catholicism. Her husband’s conversion while abroad had led her to seek to protect herself and her family from this corrupting influence. To do this she first called upon the assistance of the Cromwellian regime in France and when this failed, she then chose to return to the Commonwealth. Living under its rule had become preferable to being in a Catholic state for her. That said, however, it must be pointed out that even after her return to England, she still retained her affection for the royalist cause, even to the


123 See pp. 112-39, below, for more details on the efforts of Ladies Inchiquin and Ormonde to recover their jointures. Thurloe State Papers, vol. VI, A letter of intelligence, 29 June 1657, p. 375.
point of passing on reports of prophecies of the imminence of the King’s return to the exiles. Her co-operation with the Protectorate had been motivated solely by religious and familial considerations, and not by political ones.

**Conclusions**

When looking at the reasons for our study set choosing exile we have to take a number of factors into account. The chronology of events is one of these. In this regard Worcester is vital as it marks a key watershed in royalist fortunes. Prior to that battle, even though the Stuarts’ cause had been ailing for some time, there was at least the possibility of a swift return to power in some manner in Britain and Ireland. Those who chose to remove themselves to the Continent before that knew living there would be difficult but they did so in the hope that they would get to return to the Stuart kingdoms soon after. Furthermore, some hoped that going abroad would allow them to garner resources with which they could aid the royalist cause and they thus became agents for the royalist cause in Continental Europe. Withdrawal from Britain and Ireland at that time was therefore largely a temporary and strategic move. Defeat in Britain in September 1651 and in Ireland in early 1652, however, meant an end to all immediate hopes of returning home for those key political players who had already withdrawn abroad. In these new circumstances many of those who had previously chosen to go to France, the Netherlands, or some other Continental country, now stayed there because it was a matter of survival to do so. The same turned out to be true for those of the Irish elite who chose to go overseas after this defeat. Muskerry’s comment of December 1651 summed up their situation and explained why they withdrew. He simply pointed out that ‘there will be no living in this climate’ for those who had previously sided with the royalists, the Catholic Confederates of Ireland, or both. Whether they had travelled to the Continent before Worcester or not, all the politically active members of the Irish elite who went into exile found that they had one other thing in common; in the wake of that particular defeat they chose exile (if

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one can talk of a choice given their particular circumstances) in the knowledge that there was no immediate prospect of a homecoming.

The second factor to be taken into account is the past political associations and actions of the persons involved. This, combined with the turn of events, often decided whether or not the exile was going to be a long-term or a short-term phenomenon. Those who went into exile and who had been linked with the Catholic Confederates of Ireland found that they could not hope for an immediate return after Worcester. The same was true for prominent royalist Protestants such as Bramhall and Ormonde. To be able to quit the Continent they all needed a royal restoration. On the other hand, those who had been more marginally involved with these political causes could abandon exile with relative ease. Richard Boyle is one case in point. Women and minors, finding that their sex, their age and their political disenfranchisement protected them from being considered culpable of political misdeeds, also had the ability to leave the Continent behind and return home. Indeed, these persons had a fair degree of choice in the matter and could even opt to move across the English Channel as they saw fit or as circumstances dictated. Though they undoubtedly shared many of the same views as persons such as the Marquis of Ormonde, Viscount Muskerry and other such people, the workings of the Common Law and gender stereotypes meant that they were not political refugees to anything like the same extent and were able to move with relative freedom.

It is not surprising then that those who were less implicated in these causes could and frequently did return home. They often did so with the encouragement of the other exiles. In doing so, moreover, they suffered little at the hands of the victorious Interregnum regimes. Indeed, their return may even have been seen as a boon for these governments. Though her husband had previously been exempted from any leniency by the English parliament in 1651, Elizabeth Butler’s request to be allowed to recover her share of the Ormonde estate, put before it in January 1651, was relatively graciously received by this assembly and it approved of her being allowed a share of this property. It was not done without a proviso being attached, however. Parliament insisted that ‘the said Countess of Ormond be ordered to bring her children
out of France; and that she take care they be educated within the territories of this
Commonwealth'. 126

With the exception of the Marquis himself, Parliament obviously saw the
presence of the Butler dynasty in their realms as positive. In all likelihood they felt
that not only could they supervise them through the control of such elements as their
education, but that their presence in the territory and their tacit acceptance of the
regime, through their taking of property from it, would only help to bolster the
Parliament’s position. If the Butlers held lands under this regime and exercised
influence in their traditional territories while the Long Parliament held power then, it
could be argued, they were tacitly accepting it as a legitimate government, regardless
of where their real political sympathies lay. 127 Of course, if this was Parliament’s
thinking, its success would rely on the Butlers eventually deciding to work with the
Interregnum regimes and not use their position to support royalism. Obviously, the
Protectorate seems to have realised that the latter option was an unwelcome
possibility and it did, after all, imprison the Butler heir for royalist activity later on.

That said, provided their past actions had not been too noxious, the
Interregnum regimes were willing to welcome influential Irish elite personages home
and they even allowed them to retain their social status. This is in contrast to persons
like Daniel O’Neill or Richard Talbot, who were seen as dangerous royalists and who
could therefore only return to Britain and Ireland surreptitiously, risking
imprisonment, or worse, in doing so. Generally speaking, then, it is fair to say that
those of the Irish elite who were in exile throughout the 1650s were those persons
who had been prominent, or were believed to have been prominent, in either the
royalist or the Catholic Confederacy’s cause. They ultimately found that after
September 1651 they had no choice but to attempt to bring about the Restoration of
the Stuarts from their Continental retreats.

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566-7. Ibid, vol. 7, 1 February 1653, pp. 252-3. NLI Mss. 2499, Order by the Parliament, 1 February
1653 (O. S.), f. 41.

127 It should be acknowledged that the Butlers similarly realised that Lady Elizabeth’s decision could be
interpreted in this manner. See pp. 119-20, below, for further details on this.
Chapter 2

Maintaining themselves while on the Continent

In the previous chapter we have looked at and examined how, in this particular historical context at least, and depending of course upon the specific circumstances of each individual involved, permanent exile was only one of a variety of survival mechanisms that the nobility could frequently choose between. Most obviously, we have seen how some chose not to go into exile, while we have seen how some individuals or families adopted a ‘half-way house’ approach. Some individuals went into exile until it was obvious that to choose to stay abroad was to absent oneself from home for too long a time and some families sent, or left, certain individuals at home to protect relatives’ interests there, while the other family members took refuge on the Continent. That said, once these Irish political refugees had chosen to go into exile, they had to ensure that they could survive there, no matter how long it lasted, and one can immediately identify a number of tasks that those who chose to flee abroad had to carry out in order to ensure their own personal survival, as well as the safeguarding of their interests.

The first and most important of these was getting the means to survive. This, of course, was not an easy thing to do as these persons were now members of an elite without direct access to one of the most important traditional resources of a privileged group in the Early Modern period; property. This certainly affected them financially throughout their time in exile. The core properties of the Marquis of Ormonde’s estate, for instance, had been worth nearly £3000 in 1646, during the middle of a war. The loss of such an income did not go unnoticed and the nobleman consequently had to curtail his lifestyle somewhat during the exile. He found it necessary at times to share carriages with others when travelling in order to cut down on the expense, for example.128 It also meant that they now had to find some alternative ways to provide for themselves, their families and their dependants. More than that, personal dynastic interests also demanded that they find a way to ensure that they maintained their family’s social status while abroad. Again, attempting to do this without property,

and a landed estate in particular, something which in the rhetoric of the European nobility and elites was of vital importance, and for more than just economic reasons, would not be an easy task.\textsuperscript{129}

**The acquisition of cash and other economic resources**

Financially speaking, the exile was clearly a difficult period for the bulk of the expatriates. We have referred to one of Ormonde’s cost-cutting measures already. Others amongst the exiles also felt the pinch. In her memoirs Lady Anne Fanshawe told of how many of the courtiers ran up debts on the Continent that they were never able to pay back.\textsuperscript{130} The Irish were no different in this regard. In a letter of 27 June 1653 Hyde was to mention that Ormonde was suffering from a lack of ready money, having only five livres in his pocket all month. Other exiles suffered as well. George Hamilton’s family, particularly his daughters, had to rely on the charity of the Jansenist convent of Port Royal des champs in the early part of the decade. The female members of Muskerry’s family also found their way to this convent and stayed there until 1655. A close attachment was obviously formed as Muskerry’s daughter, Helen, was to be back on that convent’s books in 1661. Some of the Talbots, on the other hand, had to rely on the goodwill of the Spanish Catholic clergy to get by during the early part of the decade.\textsuperscript{131} Yet, one should not exaggerate the extent to which poverty hampered the noble life of persons such as the Ormonde family, or indeed other exiles. While funds may have been, on the whole, relatively low and irregularly received during the exile, they were not always completely absent and even if financial means were lacking at a particular moment it may not have necessarily hampered the exiles’ lifestyle terribly. Lady Elizabeth Butler still sent her sons to a noble academy in Paris for their education in the early 1650s and in August 1651 Ormonde’s secretary, George Lane, passed on a message to John Bramhall from his


It is clear therefore that, while money was not easily come by at all times, it could still be procured at certain intervals or, at the very least, sufficient credit could be obtained to allow one to survive. It should also be pointed out here that, obvious as it may seem, the issues of indebtedness and lack of funds were not necessarily problems that these persons only came across while in exile. This was certainly the case with the Butlers of Ormonde. James Butler had inherited serious debts when he succeeded to the title of Earl of Ormonde in 1633 and the events of the next two decades and, indeed, of the decades after the Restoration did not allow him to break free of these. It is even possible that he never attempted to break free of them, seeking only instead to keep them at an affordable level. Bearing this in mind, it is fair to say that, for some of them at least, the problem of overcoming indebtedness and remaining financially solvent during the exile was not one that was completely new to these expatriates. On a less positive note, however, lack of access to one’s traditional patrimony did deprive this elite of the traditional means to obtain both credit and the funds to finance debts. It can therefore be argued that going into debt was not in itself a major problem for the exiles: rather it was the need to find funds so as to be able to finance these debts that was the key issue for many of the displaced. The question here is how was this done?

Unsurprisingly, to secure necessary funds and credit these refugees first relied upon the assets that they brought with them to the Continent. Naturally enough, many of them brought whatever money they could with them. Ormonde had some 500 pounds sterling on him when he arrived in France in January 1651, though, as his wife wryly commented, this was hardly enough to support himself and all those dependants who surrounded him. Aside from money, however, it was not unusual for these

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134 BL Eg. Mss 2534, Elizabeth Butler to Nicholas, 12 January 1651, f. 44. This is in marked contrast to what the Parliamentary newspaper, Mercurius Politicus, was reporting. It stated at that time that Ormonde had fled Ireland after having robbed the public purse there of considerable funds. Similar
persons to bring personal property with them, ranging from ships to jewellery, and these goods were often used to acquire ready cash when needed. This was indeed typical behaviour for the nobility throughout Europe, who often used portable goods as a means to acquire ready funds and emergency supplies. Elizabeth Butler, as is obvious from her correspondence, certainly brought a considerable amount of moveable property with her and used it as collateral with which to obtain funds, though it appears that she was not necessarily happy with the amount she received in return. In mid-1652, soon after she had returned to Britain from France, she stated in a letter to Nicholas that it was her intention to ‘...procure [the] wherewithal to redeem my goods that I left engaged upon very hard terms in France...’ These chattels that she was seeking to redeem probably included easily portable objects, such as jewellery. Certainly, jewellery was used in this manner by some other royalist exiles at this time, as is clear from a letter of George Radcliffe’s to Ormonde written in September 1654, in which the former informed the latter that one of his associates was seeking to redeem a gold chain that she had previously pawned. It is also worth noting that while certain goods were portable, it does not necessarily mean that they were small items. It is clear from some of James Butler’s correspondence that ships were numbered among the possessions that he brought with him to the Continent and he had Henry De Vic, the King’s ambassador in the Spanish Netherlands, sell one of these on his behalf in early 1653. His partner in privateering, Inchiquin, also brought ships with him and he likewise sold one of these in vessels in late 1651. Regardless of their size, these goods could be exchanged for cash and the Marchioness of Ormonde was not the only exile to rely on the selling or pawning of these items to get money. Others likewise partook in this activity throughout the exile. John Bramhall, unsurprisingly when one considers the extent to which he was concerned in publishing, involved himself in the selling and trading of books. In mid-1656 he was

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136 BL Eg. Mss 2534, Elizabeth Butler to Nicholas, 23 September 1652, f. 130.
137 HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Radcliffe to Ormonde, 4 September 1654, p. 306.
138 Ibid, Bramhall to Ormonde, 14 February 1651, p. 163. Ibid, Ormonde to Inchiquin, 3 August 1651, p. 179. Ibid, Bramhall to Ormonde, 1653, p. 292.
corresponding with that constant assistant George Radcliffe about the efforts of a Sir James Banatine to sell books on behalf of some unnamed child. The sums that were involved in the proposed transactions varied between 400 and 600 livres, with Radcliffe acting as an intermediary aide in the operation.  

Clearly, then, the pawning and selling of goods was a common means of obtaining money. It was not, however, the only way of acquiring money open to these émigrés. As we shall see later on, the borrowing of relatively small sums in order to meet short-term expenses was not uncommon either. It is fair to say, furthermore, that financial activities of this kind, though carried out throughout the decade, were most pronounced at the beginning of the exile, prior to Worcester, during the time when many still held on to the possibility that they could return home relatively soon. This hope that one would soon return to the traditional patrimony and that the banishment would be short-lived meant that such short-term measures were the favoured means of gaining money at this time. As we have seen however, this hope of a swift return disappeared in or around the time of the defeat at Worcester and for those who remained abroad following that setback it became necessary to find a more stable and long-term means of securing funds. One of the most obvious ways to do this was to find gainful employment and for many of the Irish elite the best way to do that was to become a mercenary commander and to trade in troops.

There were clear advantages to following this course of action. One of these lay in the continuing demand for troops in Western Europe at this time. Even in the wake of the conclusion of the treaty of Westphalia, France and Spain remained at war with each other and this conflict was further complicated by internal strife within both kingdoms, France being in the throes of the Fronde, while the Spanish Crown was attempting to crush both a peasants’ rising and the secession efforts of Portugal. With conflict taking place on so many fronts, experienced military commanders, such as many of the Irish elite exiles were, were always welcome. Furthermore, Irish troops had previously earned themselves a good reputation as mercenary soldiers and they

139 Edmund Berwick (Ed.), *The Rawdon Papers*, Radcliffe to Bramhall, 21 July 1656, p. 101. Interestingly, the books in question were written by one of the Boate brothers, who at this time were providing intellectual support for the Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland.

140 See pp. 80-1, below.

CRONIN, John Jeremiah (2007), The Irish Royalist Elite of Charles II In Exile, C. 1649-1660
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/10360
were accordingly very popular with the Continental powers.\textsuperscript{141} Also, the exiles themselves had extensive long-established links to this business. Richard Bellings senior had served both Spain and France as a military commander prior to the 1640s and Taaffe had been involved in attempts to send troops abroad in the late-1630s. Later on, in the years 1646-7, Daniel O’Neill, Ormonde, Muskerry and Taaffe all became involved in schemes to send Irish troops to France.\textsuperscript{142} It comes as no surprise then that many of the Irish royalists began to consider this option in 1651. Inchiquin, for one, was seeking Ormonde’s opinion on the possibility of him [Inchiquin] finding employment as a commander with one of the differing sides in France at this time. While favouring the cause of the French royal family, he still admitted that, ‘if my own master do not disapprove it [sic]’, his conscience would not be too bothered if he found employment with the frondeurs instead.\textsuperscript{143} O’Brien was not the only one to consider taking such employment. Soon after he arrived in France the Earl of Castlehaven found employment with the forces of one of the frondeurs, the Prince of Condé, after having first sought the approval of Charles II and Ormonde to do so.\textsuperscript{144}

From mid-1650 onwards, with the re-conquest of Ireland nearing completion, the exiles’ chances of finding employment as mercenaries was even boosted by the efforts of the English Parliament to pacify that country. As part of its efforts to remove discontented persons from Ireland this regime started either to allow or to oblige, depending on circumstances, surrendering royalist commanders to carry their troops overseas. Once presented with this opportunity to provide for themselves in the early-1650s, those persons who were about to go into exile, such as Lord Muskerry, sought to take advantage of it. By May 1652, Muskerry, amongst others, was coming to an agreement with the Parliamentary regime which would allow him to do this. Early the following year he was reported to be engaged in the raising of Irish troops for the Portuguese. Indeed, in its effort to get discontented persons out of Ireland, the Parliamentary regime even expanded this policy. They were in such a

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\textsuperscript{142} Pierre Gouhier, ‘Mercenaires Irlandais au service de la France (1635-1664)’, \textit{The Irish Sword}, vol. 7 (summer, 1965), p. 60. Ibid, pp. 64-5.
\textsuperscript{143} HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Inchiquin to Ormonde, no date, p. 248.
\textsuperscript{144} James Touchet, \textit{The memoirs of James, Lord Audley, Earl of Castlehaven}, p. 132. Carte Mss. 29, Castlehaven to Ormonde, 28 January 1651, f. 182.
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hurry to clear Irish troops out of Ireland in as cost-effective way as possible, they
started permitting merchants and those other traders in Irish troops who were already
established on the Continent to make contracts to transport surrendering Irish soldiers
abroad. Among these was Christopher O’Brien, brother to Inchiquin. The
expansion of this policy meant that those persons who were already abroad by this
time could start making arrangements to acquire troops if they so wished. It was such
a tempting prospect that Ormonde even gave the possibility some consideration.
Through his contacts with other Irish exiles he kept himself informed of the state of
the market for troops throughout 1651 and in a letter to Inchiquin in October he spoke
of the possibility of being able to bring troops over from Ireland (the soldiers he had
in mind were Muskerry’s) during the following winter. In this, he even talked of
going there to gather these forces together personally. The only impediment he could
see at the time was a lack of money to pay the necessary shipping costs, as well as the
cautions demanded by the Parliamentary regime, though he was confident this could
be overcome.

The net effect of the English Parliament’s policy, then, was to provide both
existing exiles and soon-to-be exiles with the means to support themselves abroad,
since it meant that they now not only had themselves to offer as soldiers to their
potential employers, but they could also provide troops if necessary. This proved to
be no short lived policy either, as succeeding Interregnum regimes continued it. As
late mid-1654 the Protectorate was making arrangements to allow Muskerry to
transport some four to five thousand men out of Ireland and it was even proposed that
this nobleman should not pay any financial caution before he did so as it would
‘hinder so good a work’. What is more, the possibility of pursuing a career as a
military commander offered more than just financial advantages to the émigrés.

Charles McNeill, The Tanner Letters, Commissioners for Ireland to William Lenthall, 6 May 1652,
Edgeman, 4 March 1653, p. 179.
146 Charles McNeill, The Tanner Letters, Commissioners for Ireland to the Council of State, 6 May
1652, p. 361. Carte MSS. 29, Taaffe to Ormonde, 28 January 1651, f. 183b. Ibid, 24 February 1651,
F. 251. Ibid, O’Neill to Ormonde, 4 March 1651, f. 272. HMC, Ormonde MSS (N. S., vol. I),
Ormonde to Inchiquin, 26 October 1651, p. 221.
There was also the obvious advantage of it providing them with a means to maintain their social status. It is a given in the historiography of this period that the concept of nobility was tied to a notion of military service and serving one of the European states as a military commander, even if such service was given as a mercenary commander, was therefore certainly not without its merits in this regard. There was also the question of being able to provide patronage; another important element to retaining one’s social position. Obtaining a military commission and having the command of an army regiment gave a person a considerable number of opportunities to be beneficent to others and this reality was not lost on the Irish royalist leaders. In October 1650 Daniel O’Neill, having gained a licence to transport 5,000 Irish troops to the Continent, was negotiating to bring a regiment of soldiers into the service of Spain. While doing this, the gentleman wrote to Lady Ormonde about this scheme and, furthermore, he offered to transport these troops out of Ireland not on his own behalf, but on behalf of the Marquis of Ormonde. The Marquis, O’Neill stated in his missive, ‘shall have all the advantages of my conditions, as well of command as appointments [sic], if he will make it his choice’. In other words, O’Neill was not only offering his patron the opportunity to profit from his venture, he was giving him the right to appoint whomsoever he wanted as officers in this regiment and to be their patron as well. The value of obtaining military employment, then, clearly went far beyond the purely financial.

Of course, it was not all plain sailing. There were obstacles that the Irish exiled elite had to overcome if they were to make a living for themselves as mercenaries while on the Continent. The fact of the matter was that, when it came to providing for themselves through mercenary activities, there were those factors, and indeed persons, that hindered them in their efforts to do so. One of the things that limited their ability to ‘earn their crusts’ came about as a result of their previous activities in the 1640s, particularly their reciprocated disdain of the political ambitions of those Irish Catholics who desired full legal recognition for their religion in Ireland; the so-called Rinuccini faction. Unfortunately for the Irish royalists, political activities often had personal consequences and this led to some persons interfering

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149 See p. 305, below, for more details.
with the efforts of particular individuals to gain appropriate employment. One example of this occurred in Spain in mid-1652. In that year an Irish priest, by name of Francis Fox, wrote a memorial to the King of Spain which was designed to get him to push the interests of Irish Catholics in the negotiations which were then going on between the Spanish and the Cromwellian regime. Further to this, however, he also provided a warning to the Crown against employing Viscount Muskerry, who at that time was offering troops to the Spanish.150 Such activities could not have helped this nobleman’s cause and it was not just Muskerry who was open to such attacks. It could potentially happen to any of them and they themselves realised this. As early as October 1650 Daniel O’Neill reported that his efforts to find employment both for himself and Ormonde as military commanders with the Spanish were being discouraged in Brussels. Disgruntled Irish Catholic clergy there had, as he put it, ‘made his name black on that side’.151

Arguably the biggest victim of this politically motivated victimisation, however, was Murrough O’Brien, Baron Inchiquin. Throughout the early 1650s he found his efforts to gain gainful military employment hampered at every turn by both pro-Rinuccinist clergy and indeed other, more politically moderate, Irish Catholics. Inchiquin was particularly reprehensible to these people, and indeed Catholics in general, for a number of reasons. Specifically, he had fought with the English Parliament for a considerable part of the 1640s and while doing so he had been noted for his vehement anti-Catholicism; even to the extent of being held responsible for a number of massacres and executions of Catholic clergy.152 Consequently, in late 1653 and early 1654, when Inchiquin actively sought to acquire command of the Irish troops in French service, he reportedly found his efforts blocked by Irish Catholic clergy, who apparently lobbied successfully against his appointment. Whatever about the specific accuracy of this report, it is certainly true that Nicholas French, was

152 John A. Murphy, ‘Inchiquin’s Changes of Religion’, pp. 60-2. It should be emphasised that not all of the Irish Catholic clergy on the Continent at this time were so vehemently opposed to the full body of the Ormondist elite exiles. For further details on this, see pp. 306-24, below.
protesting vehemently about him at this time and Hyde was to note in mid-1654 that Inchiquin faced considerable opposition from his compatriots, something that the Chancellor could not comprehend. 153

Aside from such opposition, the rules of supply and demand also played their part in hindering their efforts to gain military commissions. Simply put, though there was still a market for mercenary troops at the time that these elite exiles were looking for employment as military commanders, this had contracted somewhat in the wake of the treaty of Westphalia. Even where the market existed, this new Irish mercenary nobility soon learned that Spain, one of the major customers for such forces, was a poor potential employer, as its finances were overstretched. During the early 1650s, moreover, the English Parliament was not willing to grant licences to transport Irish troops to France, probably because that kingdom was providing shelter to the Stuarts, and the French, for their part, were not offering conditions that were conducive to encouraging foreigners to serve in their forces. 154 To make matters worse, it was not just traders in Irish troops that the exiles had to compete against. In the years immediately after the end of the Thirty Years War there were now many soldiers from that military theatre who were also available for hire. Daniel O’Neill was to note this, commenting that, ‘there are such numbers of men offered [out of Germany], and all at such cheap rates, that they [the Spanish in this instance] may have a reasonable army for the sum that must be given to raise and transport 3000 men out of Ireland’. 155

This was made even worse still, ironically enough, by the very policy that had aided the émigrés; namely the Parliamentary strategy of deporting troops from Ireland. While this allowed persons like O’Neill and Muskerry to gain licences to ship soldiers abroad, it also meant that other persons could get access to these forces as well and mercenary soldiering was clearly a market which many persons were trying to get into after the end of civil wars in Britain and Ireland. William Sparke, a royalist writing from Spain in early 1653 spoke of ‘…those many merchants that now find the miserable Irishman to be the best commodity in trade’. On top of this,

154 Carte Mss. 29, Taaffe to Ormonde, 28 January 1651, f. 183b.
there was the moral dilemma of transporting troops from Ireland under a Parliamentary licence, which coincidentally happened to be so strict that Taaffe described it as being ‘prejudicial to the King’s interest’. The net effect of all of these hindrances was that those Continental powers in the market for troops had a host of persons with whom they could bargain and there was a whole Irish army from which they could potentially choose soldiers and all of this changed the market for Irish troops around somewhat. In the 1640s France and Spain had sent representatives to Ireland in an effort to acquire troops. Now, in the early 1650s, Irish mercenary commanders had to pursue employment. By mid-1653 and mid-1654 Venetian ambassadors in various parts of Europe were to receive offers of Irish troops from diverse commanders, including Christopher O’Brien.157

The royalist émigrés, in the end, had to compete for employment with a host of other persons and, moreover, even though there was a willingness to aid one another in seeking military employment (as we have seen, they certainly used their personal networks to pass information to each other regarding the market for mercenaries in late 1650 and early 1651), there is no escaping the fact that they were all still competing with each other for military commissions as well. To top it all off, their own loyalty to the Stuart cause also placed limits upon the ability of the exiles to find employment. We have already seen how Inchiquin, though personally unconcerned about who he found employment with, was anxious not to compromise the royalist interest by taking up a command with a power that Charles II did not approve of. He was not the only one. Castlehaven likewise sought the Stuart Pretender’s permission to pursue the mercenary trade. This seeking of a licence to serve another prince was, of course, the act of a loyal servant to the Crown and it was something that he and others like him would have felt they were honour-bound to do. The sought-after consent of the King was not to serve any other prince, however. Castlehaven specifically sought permission to serve ‘some prince, his [Charles II’s] friend and ally’. Implicitly, the phrasing of the request in this way amounted to a

declaration of the value of the Irish elite to the Stuarts. The assumption clearly was that if Charles II was going to allow them to serve another prince then it was in his interest to have them serve someone who was well-inclined to the Stuart interest. Failure to do that would be damaging. When it came to finding employment that would, as he put it, allow him ‘to deserve his bread’, however, Castlehaven’s willingness to accept the King placing of such a restriction on him put another potential limitation upon his ability to find the sought after position. To all intents and purposes, therefore, Castlehaven’s sense of his own personal bond and loyalty to the King was a limiting factor in his search for suitable work as it potentially reduced the range of states that he could seek an appointment from.

When all of these difficulties are considered, it comes as no surprise then that they did not get the appointments they desired. Ormonde was never to take up a military command prior to the royalist alliance with Spain in 1656. (Even then it was a titular command.) The same was true of O’Neill. Inchiquin, likewise, was never to be the commander over all the Irish troops serving France. Moreover, even when they did receive a military appointment or placed troops with an employer, this does not necessarily mean that they were in receipt of a regular income. Indeed, considering the difficulty that governments generally had paying troops at this time, combined with the expectation that commanding officers would provide for those under their command until payments were made and that nobility would bear the expense of an official employment until compensated, a military appointment could frequently be a drain on financial resources, at least in the short-to-medium term. When Ormonde did eventually take up a military command as part of the Spanish-Stuart alliance after 1656, for example, he found the administration of the Spanish

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158 Carte Mss. 29, Castlehaven to Ormonde, 28 January 1651, f. 182.
159 There is some suggestion that this might partly be because the authorities in Ireland would not grant him a licence to transport troops out of the country. In May 1651 it was reported that Ormonde, along with other Protestant peers, had made an application to the Irish administration ‘for their security’ [i.e. the money to be paid prior to being allowed to transport troops] but their proposals were very firmly rejected. HMC, Leybourne-Popham Mss, William Robinson to Popham, 14 May 1651 (O. S.), p. 100.
Netherlands so cash-strapped that it was even more erratic in its payment of salaries than was usual by the standards of the time and he had to get the royalist ambassador in Brussels, Sir Henry De Vic, to lobby the Habsburg governor throughout late 1657/early 1658 to have his military salary paid. The delay in having this money handed over was seriously detrimental to Ormonde as he had to use his credit to support the soldiers under his command and, as he said himself, this would ‘not only fail as to their [the soldiers] further relief, but be utterly lost unless the orders [for payment] come quickly’. In short, being an army officer was not helping him financially as the bankruptcy of the Spanish Netherlands threatened to ruin him.  

That said, however, one should not paint too bleak a picture. Indeed, in terms of the search for employment, the fact remains that, while they may not have received the specific commands that they desired, many of those émigrés who sought some form of military income did get one. Indeed, one can argue that the hopes some of them held for higher military appointments prior to the royalist alliance with Spain points to a body of men who were doing relatively well for themselves in the military field at this time. We have already seen the examples of Castlehaven and Inchiquin in this regard. Many others, including Muskerry, Richard Grace and James Dillon, amongst others, ended up serving with the French under the command of the Duke of York. Muskerry, for his part, was even able to offer an Irish regiment to Poland in 1655. This he did with Charles II’s permission, though the scheme ultimately proved a failure. Inchiquin, on the other hand, prior to his seeking overall command of the Irish in those forces, had been made a commander of an Irish regiment in French service relatively early in the exile. He was to ultimately become the French governor of Catalonia in autumn 1654 and was to remain in French service throughout the 1650s. As for the Butlers, while Ormonde did not hold a military command prior to 1656, his brother, Richard did, having found employment with the French in 1654. 

161 Carte Mss. 30, Ormonde to De Vic, 8 January 1658, f. 417b.
As had been the case with previous generations of elite émigrés, the mercenary trade was once again good to the Irish royalist exiles in this period.

Finance and the role of personal networks: the Butlers and their network of support.

For the Butler family and, indeed, for the other exiles generally, there were a number of other potential sources of monetary resources, aside from those listed above. The reason that so many ‘financial springs’ existed and were accessible was at least in part due to the networks of personal contacts that the exiles were part of. As was mentioned earlier, in the early years of the exile the provision of personal loans from one person to another was important. This was certainly true for Elizabeth Butler between 1649 and 1650, a period during which Ormonde himself was still in Ireland, but during which she was based in Caen with her two sons. At this time it was her husband’s closest contacts who often supplied part of the funds that were necessary for her maintenance, frequently in the form of loans. This network of support proved to be an extensive one and it will be impossible to detail its full extent here. Yet, it is fair to say that certain individuals played greater roles than others within this complex of contacts. One of these key persons for the Butlers was Sir Edward Nicholas, a client of Ormonde’s and one of his closest political allies. His provision of loans to Lady Ormonde during her time in Caen greatly facilitated her in maintaining herself while there. Between late March and May 1649 Nicholas was to lend her some 260 pistoles; sums which were very welcome to her. Lady Ormonde eventually paid these loans back, with 133 pistoles being repaid in one instalment in 1651. The remainder of the debt was not repaid until early 1660, however. It has to be said though that part of the reason for this late reimbursement was that Nicholas and his family would not accept money from Lady Elizabeth Butler. In mid-1652, after Lady Ormonde had returned to England, she attempted to give £50 to Nicholas’ son, but he would not accept it. From their point of view the potential political capital to be gained from the provision of such aid to the wife of someone who, from the moment he arrived in France, was accepted into the inner circle of the King, and who was also at times consulted by other members of the Stuart dynasty (though it must be said, not consistently), was much more valuable.

163 BL Eg. Mss 2533, Elizabeth Butler to Nicholas, 24 March 1649, f. 479. Ibid, 6 May 1649, ff. 484-5.
164 BL Eg. Mss 2534, Elizabeth Butler to Nicholas, 23 September 1652, f. 130.
Like the pawning of goods referred to earlier, however, such small-scale loans could only be useful in the short-term and are again typical of the early part of the exile when the hope of being able to return home relatively quickly was still high. Once it became evident that many exiles were going to be on the Continent for an extended period of time there was an increased need to use one’s network to exploit more long-term sources of funding. One of the ways that the Butlers found they could use their complete range of contacts to do this included helping them to secure the profits that could potentially be gained through investment in privateering activities. The exiled Irish elite were not new to this activity. They had gained their experience of investing in privateering in 1640s Ireland, where it became quite a common wartime practice amongst the nobility. Those members of the Irish elite who went into exile continued to maintain contacts with the privateering community and it remained one of their areas of financial endeavour. Inchiquin and Sir George Hamilton were notable investors in this activity, along with Ormonde himself, who was actually in written communication with some of these privateers.

When it came to dealing with these privateers the Butlers were to make great use of their fellow exiles as their agents. In March 1650, in a case which was to show just how many people someone like Ormonde employed when he sought to access the financial resources of Continental Europe, Edward Nicholas acted as this nobleman’s representative to a privateer based in the port of Antwerp, in whose ship the Marquis had previously invested. The King’s secretary instructed this licensed pirate to pass funds onto Lady Elizabeth Butler and, more interestingly, even provided him with details on how this was to be done. Nicholas had arranged that a merchant based in Antwerp, by name of Mister Cullimore, should act as intermediary between the ship’s captain and the nobleman’s wife. These mediatory activities between Ormonde and those who were outside the exiled Stuart Court, but whom the nobleman was still engaged with in financial-military activities, were important. In carrying them out, and by getting persons such as the above-named Antwerp merchant to participate,

166 HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Ormonde to Inchiquin, 3 August 1651, p. 179. Ibid, Hamilton to Ormonde, 9 September 1651, pp. 201-2. Carte Mss 29, Corry to Ormonde, 6 May 1651, f. 441.
167 BL Eg. Mss 2534, Nicholas to Captain Michael Cransborough, 27 March 1650, f. 19.
Nicholas help spread the Marquis’ network of support outside the relatively closed world of the exiled Stuart Courtiers into a wider, more heterogeneous and more wide-ranging community. More importantly, he ensured that the Marquis could gain much needed resources from these persons. The King’s secretary was not the only person to do this for the Butlers. Others, such as Jerome Alexander and Sir Frederick Cornwallis, likewise aided in transferring funds to the Butlers in the early 1650s. The most notable personage amongst these persons, however, was Henrietta Maria’s chief councillor, Lord Henry Jermyn, who in March 1651 mobilised his own client network within the Louvre to gather privateering income on behalf of the Butlers, even to the point of insisting that they would have first claim upon the revenue garnered in this way at that time, and in so doing gave Ormonde access to royalist funds collected in ports as far away as Hamburg and Danzig.168

With regard to the privateering network, however, the most important person as far as the Butlers were concerned was Ormonde’s own long-time client, John Bramhall, as he had involved himself in the gathering of these funds on behalf of the Marquis and also Murrough O’Brien, Baron Inchiquin, since before 1651. This Anglican Bishop, and long-time client of Ormonde’s, acted as the agent for these noblemen in their business dealings with privateers in the Low Countries. Among other things, he agreed contracts with the privateers, argued on their behalf in disputes with assorted claimants and port authorities over captured goods, negotiated with those who wished either to purchase or recover the captured merchandise and facilitated the transfers of funds to both of the aforementioned noblemen and their dependants. In the latter activity, as with the aforementioned case of Nicholas, he did this not only by acting as the nobleman’s representative to his privateering business partners but also by bringing members of the Continent-based Irish and English merchant community into this particular business association. In January 1651 he was arranging for the transfer of funds to Elizabeth Butler and this, as is clear from his correspondence at that time, was not the first time that he had done so. The following April he sent over one thousand livres to her from Rotterdam, through two merchants, a Mister Cowak and a Mister Lowther respectively. Indeed, Bramhall incorporated other persons than merchants into this set of connections. In particular, two others

who assisted the Bishop in the collection of privateering dues, Ralph Parker and Luke Whittington, were also employed by him to care for Ormonde’s interests.\footnote{HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Bramhall to Ormonde, 26 April 1651, p. 167. David Edwards, ‘The Poisoned Chalice: the Ormond inheritance, sectarian division and the emergence of James Butler, 1614-1642’, Toby Barnard and James Fenlon (Eds), The Dukes of Ormonde 1610-1745 (Woodbridge, 2000), p. 81. NLI Mss 2317, Docket of John Bramhall, 10 May 1651, f. 361. Carte Mss. 29, Bramhall to Ormonde, 25 January 1651, f. 173b. Ibid, Ralph Parker to Ormonde, 7 March 1651, ff. 287-8. Parker and Whittington were not the only two to be employed by Bramhall. Another, William Hamilton, was commissioned by Bramhall to act as privateering agent in the ports of Ostend and Newport during 1651. Ibid, Whittington to Ormonde, 24 May 1651, f. 471.}

From these two examples alone, there can be no doubt that the willingness of members of Ormonde’s network to aid in his support and to contact other persons to help in this task, be it motivated by reasons of mutual profit, political alliance, clientage, or some other factor, was of great value to him. A further insight into the importance of these efforts comes from the accounts that Bramhall sent Ormonde in April 1651. These only survive in a partial state, but they clearly show that Bramhall had received over 1,600 guilders during the previous months from various privateers, with another 95 guilders being still due to him. Of course, these figures do not take account of the expenses that the bishop had accrued in collecting these funds, which were considerable. The same set of accounts also shows that he paid out over 1500 guilders in costs.\footnote{NLI Mss 2317, Bramhall to Ormonde, 26 April 1651, ff. 346-9.} Nonetheless, even allowing for these deductions, when one bears in mind the slight profit that these accounts show and also the aforementioned sums that were transferred to Ormonde and his family during this period by Bramhall, it was obviously still a valuable source of income for that family at that particular moment in time.

Of course, the successful functioning of this privateering support network depended on a number of factors. One of the most important of these was the issue of whether or not the people at the far end of the lines of communication were willing to co-operate. It was not always the case that they were and investors such as Ormonde consequently lost out at times. An account received by the Lord Lieutenant of prizes taken by royalist privateers and brought into the ports of the Spanish Netherlands between 1648 and 1650, and which did not have their dues paid on them, ran to some three and half pages. As the cargo of the various prizes brought into Dunkirk alone by
these privateers in that period fetched in excess of £60,000, the failure to receive payment represented a considerable loss both for the Crown and for investors.  

Bramhall himself was to complain in early April 1651 that the funds the privateers were paying to him were far short of what they had promised and, what is more, some captains were actively evading making payments. There were also problems in getting these persons to come to an agreement over the amount they should pay to Ormonde for royalist privateering commissions. In late April 1651 negotiations were stalled on the proposed cost of these, with Bramhall demanding 5,000 guilders, but the privateers offering only 4,000. This was compounded by difficulties in establishing what percentage of a prize’s value was to be paid to investors such as Ormonde, a dispute which arose out of the privateers sailing under commissions issued from different parts of the Stuart’s complex of kingdoms. Naturally the privateers, with the understandable desire to maximise their profits, did not want to pay out more than they had to. All of these snags eventually led to the clergymn becoming so infuriated by all of his dealings with these privateers, it caused him to proclaim to Ormonde in writing that ‘the world is full of deceit.’

Unsurprisingly, the problems with dishonest pirates, albeit licensed ones, did not end there. Later in 1651, one of the privateers, a certain captain Plunkett, with whom Ormonde had a business agreement and to whom he had apparently given a ship previously, actually removed himself to the island of Guadeloupe and sold the vessel in question. Another problem was whether the persons in the network actually had anything to offer and this affected more than just Bramhall. Between late 1650 and early 1651, for instance, Richard Grenville, the royalist governor of Jersey, with the co-operation of certain privateers that he had dealings with, attempted to repay a significant loan to the Butlers (some £4,300 sterling), which he had contracted previously. Despite great efforts on the part of all those involved with Grenville,

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171 Carte Mss. 29, Particulars of Prizes, 1650, ff. 110-1.
172 NLI Mss 2317, Bramhall to Ormonde, 28 February 1651, f. 259. HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Bramhall to Ormonde, 26 April 1651, pp. 167-8.
173 Ibid, 14 February 1651, p. 163. Edmund Berwick (Ed.), The Rawdon Papers, Radcliffe to Bramhall, no date, p. 98. It is interesting to note that there was a privateer by the name of Plunkett operating in the Caribbean during the 1650s, where he attacked a number of English ships and even raided the harbour of Bridgetown. This he did, he claimed, by virtue of a commission issued by the Marquis of Ormonde. Sean O’Callaghan, To Hell or Barbados (Dingle, 2000), pp. 179-80.
however, it was remarkably difficult for any of them to secure the necessary funds to repay the debt. In late November 1651, in another instance of the same problem, Jerome Alexander wrote to Elizabeth Butler with the news that, in spite of all his efforts to secure money that were due to the Butlers in the United Provinces from such activities, he could not do so. This was because the person that he tried to get to pay the funds, an English courtier by name of William Crofts, had already sent all the money he had to Paris in response to warrants that had been delivered to him on Charles II’s behalf.

The effectiveness of a financial support network, such as the privateering complex described above, was also influenced by the political and military environment that it operated in. In the immediate wake of the defeat of Charles II and his uneasy Scottish Presbyterian allies at the Battle of Worcester in mid-1651 Bramhall ran into difficulties in securing funds from privateers and in winning cases over the legitimacy of certain privateering acts, most notably over a prize worth some £5,000, previously taken by a frigate of Inchiquin’s, the Diligent. More importantly, because it became increasingly obvious that the English Parliament would be victorious even before Worcester, Bramhall found it increasingly more difficult to guarantee the continued goodwill of the governors of the Low Countries’ ports from which the royalist privateers operated; something demonstrated by the governor of Dunkirk’s seizure of the above ship for his own use early that year. Quite simply, in the ‘post-Worcester’ environment, there was less of an inclination on the Continent to alienate the victorious English Parliamentary regime by being seen to give succour to the royalists and this had detrimental knock-on effects for individual exiles. Privateering did not go unchecked by the Interregnum regime either and their efforts to quell it took its toll upon the royalist privateering fleet. Three of Ormonde’s privateering vessels, in the wake of capturing a number of prizes, found themselves bottled up in Flanders’ ports by Parliamentary ships in spring 1651. Such measures

174 Carte Mss. 29, Grenville to Lady Ormonde, 22 October 1650 (O. S.), f. 17. Ibid, Carey to Ormonde, 6 May 1651, f. 441. Ibid, Thomas Sambourne to Ormonde, 7 May 1651, f. 444.
175 HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Alexander to Elizabeth Butler, 30 November 1651, pp. 240-1.
eventually had a detrimental effect and later on, during the first six months of 1655 to be precise, royalist privateers operating from western France lost some two hundred men to the Protectorate navy.\textsuperscript{177}

Even allowing for all of these qualifications, however, it has to be said that the privateers continued to be of importance to Ormonde and Inchiquin. Their continued raiding activities, even allowing for the damaging political consequences of the defeat at Worcester, still allowed the Bishop of Derry to supply his patrons with funds for some time afterwards. He was able, for instance, to send another 1000 livres to Ormonde in April 1652 and, moreover, the nobleman continued to employ Bramhall as his agent in all such dealings throughout the decade. Inchiquin, for his part, also remained active in this field and continued his partnership with Ormonde throughout the decade.\textsuperscript{178} What is more, privateering income and the network involved in it facilitated the Butlers in their search for credit. We only have to return to Grenville’s efforts to repay a debt owed by him to the Butlers to see this. Despite the failure of this money to come through, Ormonde was nonetheless able to borrow funds from a merchant by name of Thomas Sambourne on the strength of the promise to repay it out of the funds that Grenville had promised to supply.\textsuperscript{179}

The sums gained from these privateering activities also proved to be vital to others and not just to noblemen such as Ormonde and Inchiquin, with persons who were not so directly involved in this activity gaining from them. Lord Hatton, to cite one example, had privateering money supplied to him by both Ormonde and Inchiquin, through the intermediation of Bramhall in June 1652, demonstrating that the Irish exiles were not the only persons acquiring the means to maintain themselves from these networks of personal connections. Indeed, despite the failings that existed in such a network, it seems that, if the intelligence reports meant for the English


\textsuperscript{178} \textit{HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I)}, Inchiquin to Ormonde, 11 April 1659, pp. 326-7. Ibid, 14\textsuperscript{th} report, Appendix, part VII, (London, 1895), Bramhall to Lane, 13 March 1655, p. 44. Ibid, Hastings Mss (vol. IV), Ormonde to Bramhall, 7 December 1655, pp. 94-5. Carte Mss. 29, Parker to Ormonde, 7 March 1651, f. 288.

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid, Ormonde to Sambourne, 1651, ff. 468-9. Ibid, Sambourne to Ormonde, 23 May 1651, f. 469b.
Parliamentary regime from the early 1650s can be believed, the Marquis actually expanded his contacts with the privateering community at this time, clearly indicating that this particular network only grew in importance to him. Clearly then, while Worcester made it harder for persons such as Ormonde and Inchiquin to benefit financially from their privateering networks, it still did not stop these contacts from being a source of funds for them, nor did it decrease the activity’s importance to them or, indeed, to others.

In actual fact, if we continue with Ormonde as an illustration, it is clear that such personal networks of support were to be found in areas other than privateering. Furthermore, there was a degree of reciprocity within these networks of personal associations and this detail required persons such as the Marquis to play a part in ensuring that other exiles could also maintain themselves and benefit from these links while abroad. Among those to take advantage of this and to benefit most were the Marquis’ kin and it is fair to say that he was expected to play a great part in assisting them. In autumn 1658, when one of the royalists’ most constant supporters on the Continent, Abbess Knatchbull, was seeking aid for the then indigent Richard Butler, she wrote to Edward Hyde in order to get him to tell Ormonde of his brother’s plight. Her assumption was that he had to help his own sibling. This expectation of assistance from Ormonde went beyond his direct kin and extended to more remote blood relations, including the progeny of Viscount Muskerry and the family of Sir George Hamilton. In Muskerry’s case Ormonde played a noteworthy role in providing for the Viscount’s eldest son, his nephew, Cormac McCarthy, upon his arrival in France and once again he used contacts with persons outside the exiled Stuart Court environment to do this. In early August 1651 the Viscount’s heir was in Paris under the care of one of his father’s supporters and clients, a John Roche. Muskerry had already sent a regiment to another of his contacts on the Continent, a certain Colonel Murphy, an officer serving with the Spanish in Flanders, with the intention of offering these troops’ services to one of the warring kingdoms on the  

Continent and using the money gained from this to provide for his son. All of this was to be done under the supervision of Ormonde.\textsuperscript{182}

The Marquis was in many ways a sensible choice of correspondent on this issue. His high social status certainly was not a disadvantage. More importantly, however, his position as a focal point for correspondence from a large network of individuals and his own interest in that market as a possible means of supporting himself meant that he was well advised on the demand for Irish troops at this time. In the process of ascertaining the feasibility of providing for himself through mercenary activities, he had garnered considerable information from his own band of supporters and clients about the mercenary market at this time. In obedience to his instructions from Muskerry to consult with the Lord Lieutenant, therefore, Roche wrote to Ormonde with details of an offer that Murphy had received from Flanders and tendered the advice that the offer should be rejected. He also informed Ormonde that, as there was no way to provide a secure income for the young man yet, he should take up residence in cheap lodgings in Paris. The Marquis promptly replied to Roche on the issue and agreed with all his suggestions. It was necessary for the young Cormac to live as cheaply as possible, the Lord Lieutenant advised, until either his parents or, significantly, Ormonde himself could find some way of supporting him. He also counselled Roche that, once he had settled the affairs of Muskerry’s son, he should return to Ireland to advise Muskerry on how best to provide for himself once he quit Ireland. Ormonde’s assistance to his nephew did not end with this brief correspondence but continued for some time after. In July 1653, for instance, the Stuart King, almost certainly on the prompting of Ormonde, formally recommended Muskerry’s son, who by this time was serving in the French army, to the French military commander, the Duke of Vendôme.\textsuperscript{183}

Almost contemporaneously with his original efforts to aid Muskerry’s son in 1651, Ormonde was asked by his brother-in-law, Sir George Hamilton, to assist him [Hamilton] in a moneymaking venture that was designed to take advantage of the

\textsuperscript{182} NLI Mss 2317, Roche to Ormonde, August 1651, f. 437. NLI Mss 2318, John Roche to Ormonde, 10 August 1651, f. 31. Brendan Jennings (Ed.), \textit{Wild geese in Spanish Flanders 1582-1700}, pp. 15-6.

political schemes of the Stuart Court in Paris. Through this Hamilton hoped to be able to earn money to provide for his family. At this time, one of Ormonde’s former military commanders and closest political supporters, Viscount Taaffe, was negotiating with the Duke of Lorraine for military assistance for the royalists, under the direction of Henrietta Maria. These discussions were designed to get troops and other military support sent to Ireland in order to aid those who still held out for the royalist cause there and also, in support of Charles II’s military operations in Scotland, to open a second front against the English Parliamentary forces. Hamilton saw an opportunity for profit in this strategy. As with the last case, where Ormonde’s kinship links to Muskerry were used as a means to involve him in providing for a newly arrived exile, Hamilton hoped to bring the Lord Lieutenant into the scheme, as he needed to make use of the Marquis’ personal connections to Taaffe. In late August 1651 Sir George wrote a letter to James Butler, in which he informed him of the plan he had to transport Lorraine’s mercenary troops to Ireland. It was his intention to get a number of frigates from merchants in Saint Malo. These vessels would then be offered to the exiled Court for the transportation of these soldiers, at a price that would allow Hamilton to make a tidy profit. In order to get the Court and Henrietta Maria to agree, however, he needed the support of Taaffe. To this end he asked Ormonde to see ‘if my Lord Taaffe may be by some means sounded in this particular.’\(^{184}\) In other words, Hamilton used his kinship links to Ormonde so as to encourage him to patronise the scheme and also to get him to secure the co-operation of Taaffe, another of Ormonde’s clients, in the venture.

The Marquis actually did more than requested. The following month he personally wrote to the Duke of York advocating Hamilton’s plan, though, in the end, the proposal came to nothing. This was partly due to one factor; namely, a failure of communication amongst the persons involved in the network. Taaffe never got to hear of Hamilton’s scheme or, more precisely, he never got to hear of it in time. Some two weeks after Hamilton first wrote to Ormonde on the matter, Taaffe sent the Irish Lord Lieutenant a letter on the negotiations with Lorraine and informed Butler that Lord Digby had proposed ‘...a most excellent way for transportation...’ of the troops. Bad enough as this was in itself, it is also likely that the scheme would have

\(^{184}\) NLI Mss 2317, Hamilton to Ormonde, 29 August 1651, f. 307.
had difficulty being accepted anyway, as Ormonde had fallen out of York’s favour by this time.\footnote{Ibid. \textit{HMC}, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Taaffe to Ormonde, 14 September 1651, p. 207. Ibid, Ormonde to Inchiquin, May 1651, pp. 168-9.}

In the end, the breakdown of the network on this occasion did not matter, as the royalist negotiations with Lorraine came to nothing anyway and the hoped-for troops never materialised. The case in point does highlight a number of important details, however. First, the exiled Irish elite did perceive that there was a chain of communication and mutual support between, and involving, each of them. In such a network one person could act as a go-between from one to another and could provide assistance for another through these links. Second, these personal networks of support only functioned if all the persons involved remained in constant and frequent contact with each other. Third, it only worked if all those involved were willing to co-operate. Finally, those persons entwined within the networks were willing to take advantage of both internal Court politics and the wider plight of the royalists generally so as to maximise the potential for providing for their associates.

Despite the failure of this particular scheme, it should be pointed out that Ormonde was still of some use to Hamilton at this time. Prior to this financial plot, for instance, Hamilton, while on royalist business in Utrecht, had forwarded bills to Ormonde in Caen to arrange for their payment. Also, as with the aforementioned case involving Muskerry’s son, Ormonde had a special eye on Hamilton’s eldest son, James, who was then away from his father. In early September 1651 this nephew of Ormonde’s appears to have got up into some unspecified mischief. Ormonde swiftly informed Hamilton of this and the gentleman wrote back, thanking him for his care, informing him that he will endeavour to prevent such activities in future and added that James’ mother, Ormonde’s sister, would pray for her son.\footnote{Carte Mss. 29, Hamilton to Ormonde, 12 April 1651, f. 400. \textit{HMC}, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Hamilton to Ormonde, 9 September 1651, pp. 201-2.} This care of Hamilton’s offspring by Butler continued for a considerable time afterwards, (at least until mid-1654, when Ormonde was again thanked by his brother-in-law for his diligence in this matter) as both his nephews ended up serving at the Court of Charles II in Cologne (the youngest, George, became a page to the King), while their father
remained in France.\textsuperscript{187} This willingness of Ormonde’s to assist his contacts, moreover, went beyond his own kin and extended to others who had bonds of friendship to the Butlers. In mid-1654, to provide one quick illustration, he wrote to Castlehaven recommending one Charles Dillon to his care. This he did because, as he put it, ‘I speak to one [i.e. Castlehaven] that knows him and my kindness to his family’.\textsuperscript{188} Bonds of friendship were enough to cause the Marquis to feel an obligation to help someone and, what is more, he expected those others who were tied to him to help in this. His friends were their friends too.

It was not all one-way traffic when it came to this assistance. Ormonde did not just have to provide support for other Irish exiles. The reciprocity of these ties meant that he too could rely on these very same persons to aid him in providing for himself and his own kin. While accompanying Charles II to the negotiations of the treaty of the Pyrenees in mid-1659 Ormonde left his financial concerns in the hands of his clients and associates, most notably the Earl of Castlehaven, his secretary, Sir George Lane and Edward Hyde. Lane took responsibility for receiving whatever funds were due to Ormonde from his various revenue sources in the Spanish Netherlands and, together with Castlehaven and Hyde, he dealt with the Marquis’ creditors. Hyde, meanwhile, took it upon himself to pass on news of their dealings to Ormonde.\textsuperscript{189} Contemporaneously Ormonde was also relying on many of the same persons to care for his wider dynastic interests. Specifically he was relying on Lane, along with his brother-in-law, George Hamilton and Robert Page, a servant of the Butlers, to oversee the marriage negotiations for the union between his son, Thomas, Earl of Ossory and the Dutch noblewoman, Aemilia, daughter of Lodewyk van Nassau. Lane himself went to The Hague to supervise these, in co-operation with Hamilton, and details were passed onto Hyde, who once again forwarded them onto

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid, Hamilton to Ormonde, 21 August 1654, pp. 300-1. The support of Hamilton’s family was greatly facilitated by such networks. Aside from Ormonde, aid, as mentioned earlier, was received from the Jansenist convent of Port Royal. In all likelihood this was gained as a result of the Hamilton family’s close association with John Callaghan, an Irish Jansenist cleric who was well respected at that convent. He also served as tutor to Muskerry’s son and as spiritual director to Lady Muskerry and to Lady Hamilton. Ruth Clark, \textit{Strangers and Sojourners at Port Royal}, p. 35n. Ibid, p. 41. Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve, \textit{Port-Royal}, vol. II, p. 109.

\textsuperscript{188} HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Ormonde to Castlehaven, 15 July 1654, p. 297.

\textsuperscript{189} Carte Mss. 30, Hyde to Ormonde, 22 November 1659, f. 505.
Ormonde. Indeed, Lane was so involved in these negotiations that it was he, and not Ormonde, who received Elizabeth Butler’s correspondence on this match and Ormonde learned of his wife’s consent to the union through the above chain of communication.190

It is clear also that Ormonde's aid network, as was the case with privateers, frequently extended beyond those from his own kingdom or beyond those who had followed him into exile. Hyde’s role in caring for Ormonde’s finances and familial concerns has been mentioned above and we have already seen how Sir Edward Nicholas could be relied upon to provide very direct personal assistance to Ormonde and his family. It should be pointed out that the King’s Secretary of State did not confine his efforts to providing funds for the wife of his political ally through the medium of loans or to the task of acting as his informal business agent. He was to provide financial assistance to the Butler family in one other way within the realm of internal Court politics. This he did by interceding on behalf of the nobleman with Charles II in order to get the sums of money that Ormonde had previously paid out of his own pocket for the royalist cause reimbursed to him. To cite one case, the Marquis sought Nicholas’ aid to do this while in Ireland in January 1650. He did this by asking him in a letter to advance a request to Charles II that 3000 l. from the profits of Prince Rupert’s privateering ventures, which Ormonde claimed was owed to him as a result of his previous money-raising efforts in Ireland on behalf of the Prince, be diverted to cancel the debts owed by the Crown to Ormonde. This sum was never to be repaid and later efforts to get Prince Rupert to pay money to the Crown only ended up causing divisions within the Stuart Court.191 Nonetheless, despite the failure (once again) of this scheme, the fact that Ormonde could activate his political contacts on the Continent from Ireland in order to aid him in his efforts to get funds from the banished Crown for his exiled family cannot be overlooked.

As we have seen then, there were a broad range of contacts which these exiled Irish courtiers could draw upon in order to provide for themselves. Frequently, the persons they used to protect their interests were persons whom they had long-

191 BL Eg. Mss 2534, Ormonde to Nicholas, 25 January 1650 (O. S.), ff. 8-11. Ronald Hutton, Charles the Second, p. 76.
established links with. Ormonde, as we have seen, frequently used his fellow Irish exiles, particularly those who were his own kin, clients and political adherents in Ireland to do this. Aside from those, other exiled royalists, particularly prominent English courtiers, featured heavily. These persons all had strong, long and even multiple, connections to the Lord Lieutenant and while all the efforts of these people to aid him were not successful, it can at least be said that there was a consistent willingness amongst these persons to aid him. Yet, this was not the full extent of the Ormonde support network. It did not confine itself to a small collegiate group of elite persons who had gone into exile with the Stuart Court, but instead spread far outside this clique of courtiers, into other groups based on the Continent, such as merchants, privateers and mercenaries. This it did in stages, with persons who received requests for assistance from the Butlers recruiting others into the process, thus creating a series of secondary, more indirect links, between Ormonde and other individuals. It should also be said that, as with the connections between the courtiers, these contacts with established communities from outside the exiled courtiers’ environment did not just involve the transfer of resources and services in one direction. Very often, as with the relations between the elite exiles themselves, there was a reciprocation of aid and assistance involved in these associations. Repeatedly the Irish courtiers and, indeed, the exiled Stuart Court intervened to aid members of the established Irish community on the Continent. Lord Taaffe’s son, Francis, to give one example, was appointed a page to the Emperor of Austria after the exiled Court intervened on his behalf in 1653.\textsuperscript{192} Certainly, the fact of the matter was that persons with even the vaguest kinship connection to them could rely upon the assistance of these Irish noblemen. In May 1653, for example, a Catholic Abbot, by name of Thomas Butler, was recommended to the Diet of the German Princes by the Stuart ambassadors there. He merited this recommendation simply because he was a kinsman to Ormonde.\textsuperscript{193}

It was not just those relatives of the courtiers who were outside the Stuart Court that benefited from this tendency. In the same way that persons outside the Stuart Court circle and who were not part of the kin group of the Irish courtiers could be brought into the network of personal contacts which aided these particular exiles,


the expatriate courtiers themselves, through the selfsame set of connections, could also be relied upon to aid persons who were at a distance from the Stuart dynasty and who only had the most tenuous of connections to them. Very often, this helping hand was provided to those who had previously been of assistance to the courtiers. Sir George Hamilton used Ormonde for this purpose in July 1654, when he got him to intercede with the governors of certain French towns on behalf of those Irish subjects who were in that kingdom. (Ormonde by this time was in Spa, in the Holy Roman Empire, having previously been obliged to remove himself from France by the French Crown’s pursuit of an alliance with Cromwell.) The Stuart Court, it should be noted, also formally intervened on behalf of certain Irish merchants during this decade, with requests being sent to the French Crown for special favour to be shown to specific individuals.194 Previously, and more to the point, in 1651, the Earl of Clanricarde, another one of Ormonde’s supporters in the Confederate wars in Ireland, recommended one of his [Clanricarde’s] clients to James Butler and asked him to intercede on this person’s behalf with the French Court. This body owed the individual in question money for soldiers that had previously been transported into France. Ormonde willingly did so, writing a number of letters supporting this person’s interest, most notably to the long established ambassador of the Stuarts to the French Court, Sir Richard Browne, who was requested to bring the case to the Louvre’s attention.195

It was not all plain sailing of course. As pointed out earlier, attempts to provide assistance through these networks did fail at times. This could be for a variety of reasons. A breakdown in communication between those involved was certainly one. Conflicting personal interests, as was the case with the dispute with the privateers in spring 1651 over the level of dues to be paid was another. Another, more recurrent, problem was the difficult reality faced by most exiles; as money or other resources were frequently lacking, there was no aid to be had no matter how hard the network tried to provide it. Beyond that, though, there were sometimes problems with the persons at the far end of an extended network. Once the network

195 NLI Mss 2318, Ormonde to Robert Walsh, 8 August 1651, ff. 103. Ibid, Ormonde to Browne, August 1651, ff. 117-8. Ibid, Clanricarde to Ormonde, undated, f. 125.
grew to have an extended, multi-branch, form and came to include a large number of persons who had weaker and less established personal associations with those at the centre difficulties arose.

This is best seen with Ormonde’s relationship to the privateers, in whom many of the exiles invested much time and capital. Assorted factors, such as the differing personal interests of these individuals, the inability to make any retort against unfavourable actions (as, for instance, with captain Plunkett), weaker personal bonds between all the people involved, conflicting pursuits of profit and unfavourable political circumstances all restricted the ability of those on the outer edge of Ormonde’s privateering network (i.e. the privateers) to assist him and made it less likely that they would. It was not just a problem that occurred with privateers. Sometimes those merchants who acted as the conduit for the transfer of funds in nearly all of the above financial transactions and who at other times provided loans failed to fulfil their part of the bargain. This was the case with a Mister Creagh of La Rochelle, who was supposed to advance 1,500 pistoles to Ormonde on his arrival in France in early 1651, but never did so; a failing which obliged to Marquis to seek to borrow alternative funds from the Earl of Clanricarde instead. Difficulties also arose when merchants who had previously loaned money to these persons sought a return from their investment. This led to a clash between Ormonde and the aforementioned Thomas Sambourne in early 1651 after the latter sought to have some of the funds he had advanced to the Marquis repaid. Similarly, John Shaw, a frequent provider of funds to the general body of exiled courtiers, sought in 1658 to have loans he had previously advanced to a cash-strapped George Hamilton repaid. In short, the social fabric binding Ormonde to persons such as merchants and privateers became somewhat more ragged the nearer one got to the edge and problems could accordingly occur with the transfer of resources. For all that, however, persons such as Ormonde still relied on such networks to provide for them, their families and their associates generally, and not without reason. Merchants frequently came through with money and loans and privateering funds still flowed to the likes of Ormonde, most frequently from the Low Countries, but from a variety of other places as well. In short, though

they failed at times, those persons in Ormonde’s network who had what can justifiably be called weak ties to him still delivered necessary resources.

**The exiled Stuart Court as a survival resource**

It must be said that the sources of funds detailed above, though hardly unexploited by elites previously, were now, for these exiles, of greater importance then they had ever been before. There were other, more traditional, sources of revenue, though, that this elite continued to rely upon, to a certain extent at least. Royal courts had always been a source of reward and profit for early-modern elites and this did not change here. As we have already seen in this chapter, particularly in the cases of Sir George Hamilton and Francis Taaffe, the Stuart Court was still perceived by many as a place through which they could either hope to gain the means to provide for themselves, or from which they could receive assistance in the task of providing for themselves.197 This was not just true of persons like Hamilton and Taaffe. There were others who still looked at it in this way also. Certainly, Sir George Radcliffe, for one, felt that the royal households were a source of the necessary means to survive while abroad. Indeed, he believed so strongly that the Court was honour-bound to provide for him because of his loyalty, at one stage he even argued that he could legitimately consider withdrawing from exile if it failed to do so.198 He was not alone in holding to the notion that the Court was honour-bound to provide for its members. In August 1651 Ormonde wrote to Inchiquin with details of his trip to see the Queen and the Duke of York in Paris. He did not rest there long, as neither York nor the Queen could provide for themselves, let alone the Marquis, and he could not stay without the promise of a more certain supply. He thus withdrew from the Court, not only because his being there was a burden on the Stuarts, but also because it would have been ‘vain and impertinent’ to press the royal family for the funds that would have allowed him to stay.199 In other words, Ormonde withdrew from Court not because he did not wish to get funds from the Stuarts. He left because, given the circumstances, it would have been useless to seek these moneys.

In the historiography of the Stuarts the households of the dynasty have traditionally been represented as being stricken financially during the Interregnum

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197 See pp. 165-71, below.
198 See pp. 268-70, below, for further details on this and on Radcliffe’s relationship to the Court.
and, even if one was to only judge by the last example, there is certainly a great deal of truth in this. A lack of financial wherewithal was definitely a constant problem for Charles II and his household throughout this decade. For example, later on, in early 1655, the transfer of the King’s household from Cologne to Brussels was hindered by this very problem, as it was feared that creditors would attempt to settle outstanding debts by seizing on some of Charles II’s goods while they were being moved. Yet, while the Stuarts, most especially the King, were almost constantly short of funds and could not always completely satisfy the financial needs of their courtiers, this does not necessarily mean that they were unwilling to provide for them. Before Ormonde withdrew from Paris in July 1651 because of the poverty of the Court there, he first heard the Queen and the Duke of York express their regret that they could not supply the requisite means to allow him to stay. Charles II likewise wished that he could provide for his courtiers and in 1651, despite his lack of funds, the Venetian ambassador in Paris commented on how the King still practised the generosity that was associated with his office.

Beyond this, while it is true that the exiled Stuart Court did suffer from a marked decline in available resources, it still had some partial ability to fulfil the financial expectations of its courtiers and for a group such as they any funds were welcome. George Hamilton may not have been able to profit at the Court’s expense from his proposed venture into the shipping of troops in 1651, yet he did receive money from the Court from time to time, even if only to defray the expenses of being a royalist activist. The summer of 1654, to give one example, saw Hamilton receive 1000 livres from Charles II. Others aside from Hamilton also received payments from the Court’s funds at this time, including George Lane, Ormonde and Daniel O’Neill. Aside from payments to offset expenses, moreover, all of the latter three received board wages from the Court. This was no mere token payment. Some 2558 rix dollars was disbursed in settlement of this charge on the King’s household in January 1655 and, according to Hyde at least, all who surrounded Charles II in Cologne were

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200 NLI Ms. 5066, Lane Papers, Nicholas to Lane, 9 May 1656, letter 7.
well enough satisfied with what money and board they received from his Court at that time.\textsuperscript{202}

It is clear that such payments from the Crown would have been vital to the Irish courtiers. Lane for one relied upon his board wages to a great extent. In late 1655, while on business in the Spanish Netherlands, he demonstrated just how much he depended upon this payment (and upon his personal contacts in the Court to obtain it) when he sought the aid of Richard Bellings junior and his then father-in-law, Edward Nicholas, in getting some forty rix dollars of his board wages forwarded to him from Cologne, so that he could meet the expenses that he accrued there in caring for his family. While the Court was to fail to come through at that moment for Lane, it was still the first place he turned to for funds in that crisis.\textsuperscript{203} It should come as no surprise, therefore, that positions within the Court were sought after. As late as January 1660 Lord Mountgarret, relying as others had done before on the claims of kinship, made an application to Ormonde on behalf of his son, in which he asked the Lord Lieutenant to find a position at Court for his young relative.\textsuperscript{204}

When it came to assisting in finding ways for the Irish elite exiles to provide for themselves the Court proved remarkably useful in other ways as well. In the Taaffes’ case, for instance, particularly regarding Francis’ appointment as a page in the Viennese Court, the Stuart Court was able to use its traditional contacts with other courts, the international prestige that it still commanded and the sympathy for its plight to extract concessions from the Habsburgs for this family. The Taaffes were not the only persons to benefit in this manner as the Court made use of these very abstract assets to successfully lobby other courts and administrations on behalf of


\textsuperscript{203} BL Eg Mss 2535, Lane to Nicholas, 18 November 1655, ff. 545-6. Ibid, 19 November 1655, ff. 547-8. NLI Ms. 5066, Lane Papers, Nicholas to Lane, 21 March 1656, letter 2. It should be noted that Lane was able to gain a supply to meet his needs from another unspecified source at this time.

\textsuperscript{204} Carte Mss. 30, Mountgarret to Ormonde, 8 January 1660, f. 521.
particular individuals as well. Simply put, the Court became part of the exiled elite’s network and brought them into contact with other institutions and persons, some of which proved useful in acquiring the wherewithal to survive. This was certainly the case for Ormonde. As early as mid-1651, during the months when he and Inchiquin were attempting to recover their frigate, the Diligent, Inchiquin suggested that Ormonde should ‘...use some means, at the Court of France, for the recovery of the frigate…’  

If James Butler had any influence in that Court at that time, it was because the Stuarts’ residence there at that time had given him access to the Louvre and to the courtiers in it.

More significantly and more tellingly, in 1656, at the time when the Stuarts and the Spanish Crown were being brought together by the international situation (France and the English Commonwealth had just completed an anti-Spanish military alliance), Ormonde, along with the Earl of Rochester, was sent to negotiate a treaty of alliance with the government of the Spanish Netherlands on behalf of his Monarch. Among the issues to be settled was the amount of the pension that both Charles II and the Duke of York would receive from their new allies. They were not the only ones to benefit financially from the alliance, as Ormonde took advantage of this issue and his role as the Stuarts’ agent to Spain in August 1656 to seek a pension of 500 écus a month for himself. He duly received this from his Spanish interlocutors, who probably saw him as the exiled Stuart Court’s equivalent to a favourite and as someone who would therefore be useful to have in their debt. Of course, over the next four years some difficulties in getting this sum paid developed. By November 1659 the pension was already some 26,000 écus in arrears, being the equivalent to just over two years payment of the sum and Ormonde had to have Father Peter Talbot intercede with the Spanish in early 1660 in an effort to get the arrears paid. Despite these problems, however, this still means that he had received the equivalent of one year’s pension. The pension itself, moreover, considering how much he borrowed in that period, was probably also used as collateral to obtain loans.  

205 Carte Mss. 29, Inchiquin to Ormonde, 25 May 1651, f. 481.
Spanish pension was a valuable source of funds to him during his time in Spanish Flanders, but he only received it because of his role and position in the Stuart Court had placed him in contact with financial fonts such as this.

Finally, one must also remember that even though some courtiers were disappointed in their efforts to acquire funds through the Court this was not always necessarily due to the poverty of that institution. It has to be acknowledged that while persons like Hamilton and Radcliffe were disappointed in some of their financial hopes of the Court, others were not and that the Court obviously did have some resources to distribute to its followers. Furthermore, if we look at some of those who were disappointed, even if only to a certain extent, by the Court’s failure to provide for them, it was not necessarily because the Court lacked the means to do so. Radcliffe’s failure to gain from the font of royal bounty had as much to do with his loss of the favour of the royal family during 1651 and 1652 as with a lack of resources at Court.208 Given the circumstances, which will be described later, even if they had the means it is doubtful that these princes would have provided him with much anyway. Hamilton’s scheme to profit from the transportation of troops, on the other hand, failed partly as a result of the successful lobbying of the royal family by others, partly because of the failure of his own patrons and partly because of the breakdown in the negotiations with the Duke of Lorraine. It was not because of the poverty of the Court. Simply put, it was the type of proposal that could have faltered even if the Court had not been in exile.

Finally, while the predicament of the Court deprived it of the means to patronise its courtiers in as full a manner as would have been wished for, the situation it found itself in and the efforts it made to resolve this, still opened some moneymaking opportunities for the banished elite. This was not only in the ways described above. As we shall see later on, this Court was continuously asserting its claim to be the proper seat of the central government of what had been the three kingdom complex of England, Scotland and Ireland. To do this it constantly acted as if it was a legitimate government, even to the point of attempting to uphold what had been proper day–today traditional administrative practices for previous Stuart courts.

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208 See pp. 252-68, below, for further details regarding Radcliffe’s loss of favour.
What is more, a considerable amount of people recognised the Court’s right to do this as legitimate. This meant that some of the Irish elite got to act as administrators within what was effectively a rival bureaucracy to that of the interregnum regimes. Bramhall, for one, was acting in this capacity when he collected dues from privateers. There were other Irish exiles filling other such posts and, in accordance with what had been best practice for Crown servants prior to the civil wars, they charged those who had need to avail of their services fees for doing so. George Lane, who was secretary to the King’s Privy Council by the middle of the decade, certainly did so. In March 1655, while in Paris, he was prepared to charge petitioners requesting the return of goods captured by royalist privateers operating out of the Spanish Netherlands fees for having the necessary documentation passed under the relevant royal seals. This he did in co-operation with Bramhall and his associates, including Ralph Parker, as they took responsibility both for passing on the relevant letters to the petitioners and for transmitting the fees owed to Lane to Paris. Funds garnered in this way were probably quite small. Beyond this, however, the Court’s claim to sovereignty was vital for the livelihood of this elite in other ways. After all, the whole justification underpinning privateering activities came from the Stuarts’ efforts to assert their claim to dominion over Britain and Ireland.

Clearly then, even if the Court was lacking the means to pay its household servants regularly throughout the exile and was frequently forced to rely upon irregularly-paid pensions from foreign powers to maintain itself, it could still provide some financial benefits to its courtiers. Yet, even after acknowledging this, one cannot get away from the reality that the Stuart Court, by the regular admission of its own courtiers, was strapped for cash in the 1650s and accordingly could not provide for its most important adherents in the manner that it might have, and they certainly, wished for. This is why Castlehaven wrote to Ormonde seeking the King’s permission to serve a foreign prince. The former was keenly aware that the Stuart Court could not provide for him. Yet Castlehaven’s letter was more than just a request to serve another royal family. The same missive contained another request that ‘some provision may be made for me amongst the list of his [Charles II’s]...

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209 See pp. 200-50, below, for more details on this.

210 Ibid. HMC, 14th report, Appendix, part VII, Bramhall to Lane, 13 March 1655, p. 44.
banished servants. For the membership of an elite such as this one, there was more to maintaining oneself than just acquiring money. One also had to maintain one’s social position and the Irish exiles were just as mindful of this as anyone else at the time. One way of preserving their rank in society was to serve their King, even if he was a banished one, as this brought honour and position and this was what Castlehaven was after when he sought a posting in Charles II’s household. For the Irish royalist leaders then, the Court itself was a vital node within their support network, as it too could, and did, act as a conduit for the transfer of the various resources, both solid and abstract, that were vital to the maintenance of their social position.

Putting the money to use: attempting to guard one’s status.

Maintaining oneself, for these people, was not just about getting money. It was also about being seen to be noble, or to being seen as part of an elite. For the exiled Irish elite, preserving their social rank was just as vital as getting the required means to survive. Therefore, let us now look at the question of how this elite sought to preserve their rank in society. Already we have seen how the Court was vital to this, as service there was still perceived as a source of honour and it goes without saying how vital this was to such an elite caste. Beyond that, as we shall see later, the Court continued to be, for many, a place where one could gain those social honours that would allow someone to climb up the social ladder. Furthermore, the value of soldiering in this regard has also been touched on. There was more to preserving one’s social status then just attending at Court or being a military commander, however. Other measures had to be taken and in order to understand what these were it is necessary to return to the question of money again. It has been established that there were some means of earning their keep open to the Irish exiles and that their range of personal contacts (as we have seen time and again) could be used to access these very resources. Of course, this does not change the fact that while these émigrés could get funds they never could acquire enough to meet their expenses. This is clear from reading both the primary sources and the assorted accounts of the exile, be these historical, biographical or even autobiographical. Reference has already been made in this chapter, moreover, to how some of the key Irish elite were lacking funds at times,

211 Carte Mss. 29, Castlehaven to Ormonde, 28 January 1651, f. 182.
212 For more on the Court as a font of honour and status, see p. 167, below.
most notably to the examples of Ormonde lacking ready money at particular moments of want or to his inability to receive payment from the Spanish for his military and political services. Indebtedness, unsurprisingly, was also a problem for this nobleman throughout the decade. Towards the end of the exile, when Ormonde had travelled to Spain with Charles II for the peace conference between France and Spain, Hyde constantly barracked him in letters about his debts in the Spanish Netherlands and the efforts of the Marquis’ creditors to receive payment. Financial problems struck at his family as well. We have already seen how his brother, Richard, was relying upon the charity of Abbess Knatchbull, for his survival in mid-1658.

Having given these examples of a lack of funds amongst the exiles, however, a number of qualifications must be added to them. First, when talking of the financial problems that the exiles had in France, and particularly Paris, in the early 1650s, we must remember that this elite had effectively exiled themselves in what could be described as a partial war zone. This undoubtedly impacted on the expenses that they had to bear and increased the drain on their resources. George Radcliffe, for one, realised the impact that war was having on the exiles ability to maintain themselves in mid-1652. Writing to Gervase Holles, he described the impact that the military campaigns of the Fronde were having on those exiles who resided in Paris.

I know not in what state we are here. The King’s [Louis XIV’s] army lies all about us, but suffer meat and provisions to come into Paris, yet intercepting some, for soldiers must eat, which makes all things for the belly very dear.

The fact of being exiled, therefore, was not enough in itself to explain the extent of their penury and it needed other conditions to exacerbate it. What was just as crucial to their lack of means was their being resident in troubled regions. This not only impacted upon the prices they had to pay for basic necessities, it also caused a degree of political instability which affected the French royal family and, crucially, their guests, the Stuarts. Pensions could not be regularly paid to Charles II and Henrietta Maria and this impacted negatively upon their dependants, amongst who were numbered many of the Irish elite. A similar argument could be advanced for

213 See p. 68 & pp. 78-9, above.
215 HMC, Marquis of Bath (vol. II), Radcliffe to Holles, 15 May 1651, p. 103.
Charles II’s time in the Spanish Netherlands. Once again the Irish elite found themselves in a war zone serving with a Crown that was severely overstretched financially.

Second, and most importantly with regard to their social status, it is clear that when the exiles sought to acquire funds they were not doing so for the solitary purpose of keeping body and soul together. It is a given that early modern elites sought to earn money so that they could spend it on ensuring their social success and status.\textsuperscript{216} This is also undoubtedly the case here and in doing so they placed themselves under extra financial strain. The exiles were not trying to live within their means and the level of available funds did not govern what they spent money on. Instead, whatever means they had were spent not just upon basics but, significantly, upon the maintenance of their own social standing. This is best illustrated by a story in Carte’s biography of Ormonde. The Marquis’ biographer tells of how, when Ormonde was quitting a French nobleman’s house in which he had stayed a few days, he left ten pistoles with the steward to be distributed amongst the servants, in accordance with ‘an inconvenient English custom’. This, according to Carte, was all the money the Lord Lieutenant had at the time but he did it, nonetheless, because it was expected of him. One other interesting element of the story points out that, despite his lack of funds, Ormonde had a personal attendant with him.\textsuperscript{217} This undoubtedly was because it was expected of him as well.

It is clear that Ormonde never attempted to live within his means. Aside from the above laying out of funds simply because it was expected of him, Ormonde was continually relying upon his credit. It is fair to say that he never sought to control his borrowing. Commenting on how overextended Ormonde’s credit was in mid-1659, Castlehaven claimed that the Lord Lieutenant ‘should never borrow money again’.\textsuperscript{218} The same is true of his wife while she was in exile. Her actions were not governed so much by financial considerations as by social ones. At the time that she was


\textsuperscript{217} Thomas Carte, \textit{An history of the life of James Duke of Ormonde, from his birth in 1610, to his death in 1688... vol. II} (London, 1735-6), pp. 159-60.

\textsuperscript{218} Carte Mss 30, Hyde to Ormonde, 22 November 1659, f. 505.
borrowing funds from Nicholas in 1650/51 she was also consulting with Lord Digby on the best place to have her sons educated in France and, based on his recommendations, she sent her sons to an academy for young noblemen in Paris. This was hardly cheap, but it was certainly the right sort of place for the sons of one of Ireland’s leading noble families to go.\textsuperscript{219} Beyond that, the Ormonde dynasty still indulged in the type of conspicuous consumption that was expected of their kind, using their social network to purchase goods in various parts of Europe for them, and they still sought to surround themselves with the household staff and the accoutrements appropriate to their station. The example of how Ormonde used his client Bramhall to purchase coach horses and lace has already been referred to, as has his employment of a personal attendant.\textsuperscript{220}

They were not the only ones amongst these émigrés to do so. In 1658 Daniel O’Neill was reported to have had ‘a little black man that waits upon him that speaks Spanish’. He also had a groom, who suffered the unfortunate fate of being murdered. Aside from him, many of the household staff of the Duke of York, including the grooms of his chamber, amongst whom Richard Talbot was numbered, kept carriages to travel in. Bramhall was not just purchasing goods on behalf of the Butlers either, but acted as an early modern version of a professional shopper for others as well, including Richard Browne, for whom he bought a gown in mid-1653.\textsuperscript{221} Lane provided the same service for his associates. In early 1656 Edward Nicholas employed him, along with Daniel O’Neill and the Earl of Norwich, in the task of finding a suitable residence in Brussels. Nicholas did specify that he wanted something cheap. At the same time, he requested that Lane should try and find a place that had five or six rooms and a small garden. He needed so many rooms because he had to house a servant. The most extreme example of this extravagant spending in some ways was Richard Butler. In December 1659, just over a year after

\textsuperscript{219} BL Eg Mss 2533, Elizabeth Butler to Nicholas, 20 June 1649, f. 496.
\textsuperscript{220} See p. 69, above, & p. 106, below.
he had been reliant on the charity of Abbess Knatchbull, he was boasting to Hyde of the fine Standish he had bought when he was last in Amsterdam.²²²

Of course, it is clear that the exiles could not continue to indulge themselves to the same extent that they previously had done prior to their banishment, nor could they have the size of household that they previously had. On one occasion in late 1655 Ormonde had to turn down a request for employment from a former servant who was seeking a position for his son, despite expressing the desire to be able to give him a position, because he only had the means to maintain two menservants about him, namely a valet de chambre and a footman. Still and all, it is clear that he still maintained a rudimentary household staff. More tellingly, however, some persons still obviously expected Ormonde to maintain himself and his household in a fashion that befitted his status and they still saw service in the noble’s household staff as being a potential source of employment. Even more strikingly, some three months after Bramhall passed on the original request and coinciding nicely with the negotiating of the Spanish alliance, there were reports circulating in Paris that Ormonde was seeking to employ a new servant.²²³

Exile or not, then, a household staff was maintained by this elite. It was done partly because they wanted to and partly because it was expected of them. So pressing was this expectation upon them, servants were employed even when the expense involved was beyond their means. As mentioned earlier, George Lane found himself short of funds in late 1655 and part of the reason for this, as he was to complain to his father-in-law, was that he had to support a wife, a child and a sick maid.²²⁴ Lane’s household budget may have been overstretched by the expense, yet it obviously would not do for the wife of the secretary of the King’s Privy Council to be without a maid. The pressure to act in the way that an elite was expected to act was undoubtedly a major drain on the funds of these Irish émigrés. It cannot be just put down to the pressure of the expectations that others had of them, however. Certainly there own sense of their position and honour would also have obliged them, to some

²²³ HMC, Hastings Mss (vol. IV), Ormonde to Bramhall, 7 December 1655, pp. 94-5. Carte Mss. 213, Radcliffe to Ormonde, 10 March 1656, f. 74.
²²⁴ BL, Eg. Mss. 2536, Lane to Nicholas, 4 January 1656, f. 4.
degree, to keep servants. Yet, this was an expensive way for a group whose resources were already stretched to demonstrate their status. The nature of Lane’s complaint in late 1655 should be remembered here, as he did not lack the means to maintain himself and his family. Rather, he lacked the means to support his family in the type of style that demanded a maidservant. Similarly, Ormonde’s contemporaneous regret at not being able to employ another servant was not a complaint about out and out poverty, but was instead a grumble on the lack of resources to maintain a proper noble household. All this should be borne in mind when looking at other writings on the exile. While some complaints about lacking funds were inspired by the shortage of moneys to purchase necessities, others were inspired by a shortage of moneys to support one’s position in society.

Conclusions

As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the Irish elite exiles of the 1650s had to fulfil a number of tasks to guarantee their personal survival while on the Continent. It is fair to say that they managed to discharge many of these responsibilities with a certain amount of success and, most notably, they did it without being able to draw support or capital from their estates in any significant way. True, as we shall see in the next chapter, there were those amongst them who could draw in some small way upon the resources of their traditional estates. In order to do this, however, they had to rely totally upon other persons to act as their representatives on these properties. How then did they get the means to survive? Certainly, as with those resources they drew on from their estates, personal networks were vital to this. One of the most important ways that networks benefited them was in the procuring of funds for their own and their family’s upkeep. These personal networks, moreover, were also important in getting other persons, with whom they might otherwise have had little contact, to act on their behalf.

The use of intermediaries by these exiles was of great importance in maintaining this system of contacts. As we have seen, these intermediaries could, quite literally, be anyone, with the Stuarts’ Irish courtiers taking advantage of their fellow exiles, merchants, soldiers and clergy to maintain contacts with others. This system, however, tied both the person at the centre and the intermediaries into an extended network system and made them part of it, thus cutting across social

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225 See pp. 122-39, below.
boundaries and expanding everyone’s range of contacts, while also creating new bonds and obligations within the whole communications complex. We have seen, for instance, how Ormonde and his allies frequently used merchants to transmit funds between each other. While this involved a payment of commission to these intermediaries, it also created other bonds of obligation. We have already noted, to revisit one example, how the Stuart Court found itself lobbying the French Court on behalf of Irish merchants in the mid-1650s. Yet, even when all this is taken into account, it has to be acknowledged that, despite their successes and their complexity, there were limits to the effectiveness of these networks. While it was relatively easy for Ormonde and the other noble exiles to rely on assistance from their closest and oldest contacts, and vice versa, because of their general dependability, it was harder for them to rely on the actions of persons in the network with whom they only had indirect contact and it was not easy to ensure that contacts with those who were not directly involved with the Stuart Court itself, but who were instead part of a more diverse and extensive community, would produce anything. This was certainly the case of the privateers that Ormonde received funds from, as the aforementioned case of captain Plunkett demonstrates.226

The effectiveness of the network, then, depended on the strength of the connections between the individuals involved. Nobles and gentry with strong, long-established, ties to each other, be they kinship links, old patron-client connections, or bonds created by long-shared politics, could almost certainly count on reciprocal assistance. In the same way, Irish courtiers could rely on the Stuart Court to at least try and provide them with financial assistance in some way or other. The weaker and more indirect the link, however, the less likely it was to produce anything. This was true if the persons involved were only vaguely connected with each other, if the links between them was one of convenience (e.g. the link with the Court and its exiled nobility provided the privateers with a nice and ostensibly legal justification for their activities), and if these bonds were relatively new. Having said all this, however, these weaker connections could still produce resources and support for all those involved in them and they were still important to the Irish nobility in exile. Funds, however limited, could still be secured from privateers and merchants could still be relied upon to pass on letters, goods, and cash.

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226 See p. 84, above.
Finally, it only remains to say that any and all resources garnered through these contacts were put to two uses. The first and most obvious one was the maintenance of the individual on a day-to-day basis. The second use was the maintenance of the individual’s social position and status in society. Exiles or not, these persons still saw themselves as an elite. They were nobles, gentry and crown servants. They were from families of established pedigree and the mere inconvenience of being removed from their patrimonies did not change this. As such they themselves and the society around them expected certain standards of display and behaviour from them. All this had a number of implications when it came to providing for themselves. First, the appropriate level of display and behaviour was costly and maintaining it was a strain on their purses. This inconvenience, nevertheless, did not stop this group from attempting to keep up appearances. Second, as nobility and gentry only certain employments and means of support were open to them. This is reflected in the major forms of financial support that are studied in this chapter. They were all proper employments and investments for a noble class in the early-modern period, as they involved military service, military action and the service of a prince. All else was beneath them.
Chapter 3

The personal interests of the exiles and their contacts with their native countries.\(^{227}\)

Despite the fact that they were in exile, home was frequently not that far away, in an abstract sense at least, for many of the expatriates during their period of banishment. This was partly because there was a general desire to remain in contact with their native lands and to retain some kind of an interest there. The reasons behind this interest in continuing to have such contacts varied. If we take George Radcliffe as an example we find that he remained in almost constant contact with associates in England throughout the mid-1650s, writing regularly to a person in London, who went by the pseudonym of Mrs Trapps. More often than not, there was no great business in hand. He was merely reporting personal news and gossip in this correspondence and it can be described as nothing more than sociable and informal, designed only to keep in touch with friends at home. For someone like Richard Talbot, on the other hand, Britain and Ireland were places where he could, from time to time, find the funds he needed to maintain himself.\(^{228}\)

Aside from those two, Sir George Hamilton also continued to have an interest at home, though it manifested itself differently once again. Despite a paucity of material on his contacts with Ireland, it is still obvious from the little that survives that he continued to have a strong interest there throughout the decade. In a letter from August 1654 to a Mary Taylor, written in response to a missive he had received the previous month, Hamilton spoke of a number of his business interests at home,

\(^{227}\) When we talk about the exiles’ home countries in this context, we must acknowledge that Ireland is not the sole focus of their attention. Many of these exiles had extensive contacts with and interests in England and Scotland prior to their departure for the Continent. Furthermore, for many of the expatriates in question here, Ireland was not their native land, but was actually a country that they had migrated to. This was certainly the case with, for example, John Bramhall. John McCafferty, ‘Bramhall, John (bap. 1594, d. 1663)’, The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.

including a debt that he had contracted with Mary Taylor prior to his exile. This debt had now been placed upon Mary Taylor’s head, he had learned, by a legal judgement. He informed his correspondent that, given his own circumstances, he was unable to pay his share. However, he advised her that, as his estate in County Tyrone was fully tenanted, she should attempt to have any future financial burdens levied on that land. From this letter alone, it is clear that Hamilton continued to be aware of his obligations in Ireland and that he was in correspondence with his Irish neighbours during the Interregnum; something which kept him informed of developments there. On top of that, he clearly knew what condition his lost landholdings in Tyrone were in as well. Exile certainly did not prevent him from keeping an eye on his interests in his former patrimony. Furthermore, this is not the only indication that he remained interested in his former estates at home, as by the end of the decade he had gathered together all the documentation relating to them that he could, including old rentals. What was more, according to Prendergast, he was able to inform Ormonde in 1659 that most of the Catholic gentry of Ulster had been moved to the county of Leitrim as part of the Cromwellian transplantation.229 Clearly, in order to be able to do all this, he must have been gathering the information on his own native lands together for a while. Exile, one can only conclude, certainly did not stop him from being an actor within his former zones of influence.

All of these aforementioned contacts with Ireland and Britain also show that the reasons that inspired the émigré elite to stay in contact with persons and events there were many and diverse. Furthermore, as in all such networks, these lines of communication frequently ran in both directions and it is fair to say that there were some people in Britain and Ireland who eagerly maintained associations with these émigrés. This was likewise done for a variety of motives. Consequently, these exiles were not excluded from dealing with those members of the noble order or, indeed, the general population who had chosen to remain in Britain and Ireland at this time. The same held true for those who had chosen to quit their exile and return home. These dealings with home even extended to having connections with persons who either actively supported the Interregnum regimes or who at least had reconciled themselves

to life under them. One example of this was Sir John King, the future Baron Kingston, a person who had, along with his father, previously fought against royalist forces in Ireland during the 1640s and early 1650s and who later made considerable property acquisitions during the Cromwellian transplantation. This did not stop him from corresponding with Ormonde during the Interregnum, however, and he even referred to the Marquis as his 'godfather'.

Through such channels of transmission and exchange many of the exiled Irish nobles, gentry and higher clergy were still able to gain access to, and take advantage of, many of those resources and personal networks which they had had the benefit of prior to their banishment; something which helped to make their banishment more tolerable, as well as preserving some of their interests in their native lands for the day of their hoped-for return. Because of the two-way nature of these links, however, persons in Ireland and Britain could also seek to benefit from their links to the banished and this, in certain cases, had the effect of placing extra burdens upon the émigrés. To an extent, we have already seen this in the case of George Hamilton’s contacts with Mary Taylor. In brief, despite exile, the banished were not denied complete access to some of the benefits or resources that life in their homelands would have offered them. By the same token, the exile did not spare them from some of the burdens and responsibilities that life in their homelands would have traditionally placed upon them in other, more normal, circumstances.

**Protecting the patrimony and taking care of family resources: a case study of the Butlers of Ormonde**

One such resource and font of responsibilities was the family patrimony. For a body of persons whose means, status and level of influence had, for the most part, been predominantly based upon the control of real estate wealth, the need to ensure that they could still draw upon, or exercise control over, their estates and demesnes was important, both from the socio-political and economic points of view. Arguably, however, dynastic considerations were most important, specifically with regard to using the patrimony to provide for future generations. It is no surprise, therefore, to

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learn that much effort went into trying to preserve and exploit these lands from abroad and that much of the communication with home revolved around efforts to do just that. To call upon and gain access to these resources in the wake of the Parliamentary victory in Britain and Ireland was not easy though. That said, many still attempted to do it and quite a number, though not all, succeeded, to some extent at least. The most widely-known example of this phenomenon, though certainly not the only one, nor necessarily a deeply scrutinised one, is the case of Lady Elizabeth Butler. Aside from being the wife of the Marquis of Ormonde, this noblewoman had also been the sole heir to the Earl of Desmond, making her the successor to the larger part of what had been, prior to the early seventeenth century, the traditional Ormonde estate in southern Ireland (this estate had been divided in the wake of a dispute that arose after the death of the tenth earl of Ormonde in 1614). She had subsequently brought this inheritance with her into her marriage to her cousin, James Butler, the future Marquis of Ormonde, in 1629.231

During the civil wars in Britain and Ireland, Lady Butler went into exile in France in the mid-1640s, taking her children with her and she was to remain there when her husband returned to Ireland to lead the royalist forces in late 1648. She took up residence in Caen, along with others who had left Ireland, including Richard Boyle, and she was not to be re-united with her husband until early 1651, when he returned into exile in France.232 Their reunion at that time was to be a relatively short-lived one and reasons of dynastic interest and personal survival were the main factors behind this. Just over a year after Ormonde’s re-entry in exile, Lady Elizabeth Butler was to return to the former Stuart kingdoms for the specific purpose of recovering those lands that she had brought with her when she married James Butler. The decision to do this was not a hastily-taken one. In the period prior to her husband’s return to France in 1651, Lady Elizabeth Butler had already been considering the possibility of ending her exile in order to petition for the return of her share of the family estate, admitting as much in a letter written to Edward Nicholas early that year.233

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232 Ibid. See also pp. 43-5, above, for further details on the Butlers entry into exile.
Such a move was rational, from a familial point of view at least, in a number of respects. First, if successful, it would provide her with a means of supply for both herself and her children. Also, if the royalist cause did not flourish, she would still have a patrimony to pass on to them afterwards. It would also, theoretically, mean that the Marquis of Ormonde would only have to worry about supporting himself while in exile and, moreover, if she recovered some of the dynastic estate then she could, potentially at least, help him to do this. There was also a greater chance that she would be successful in her efforts to regain the family property on her own. For one, she would be treated as a non-combatant and as someone who was not concerned in politics, simply on the grounds of her sex. She was also known for her efforts to protect English Protestant settlers at the outbreak of the rebellion in Ireland in the early 1640s and it was probable that this would win her some sympathy from a Parliament whose forces had entered Ireland in 1649 partly to punish those who had persecuted those very Protestants. Her husband, on the other hand, when his senior position in the royalist forces and amongst the royalist political elite is considered, was unlikely to be treated leniently if he made such a request. Indeed, Cromwell himself stated as much after an agent of the Butlers approached him on the issue in mid-1651. It was clear then that sending Elizabeth Butler back to attempt to recover part of the estate was a sensible choice for the Butler line as a whole.

It has to be acknowledged, however, that when it came to deciding whether or not to seek to recover part of their estate the Butlers of Ormonde were faced with two conflicting calls upon their loyalty. On the one hand personal interests, together with dynastic concerns and duties, meant that it behoved them to attempt to preserve as much as their estate as possible in their own hands. Aside from the personal advantages that would accrue to them as individuals James and Elizabeth Butler were

235 *HMC*, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Robert King to William Basil, 6 October 1652, p. 266. Many testimonies regarding the assistance she provided for Protestants that had been dispossessed during the confederate wars in Ireland were collected during the 1650s. *HMC*, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. II), letters and attestations testifying to the conduct of Elizabeth, Duchess of Ormond, during the rebellion, December 1652-January 1653, pp. 367-73. NLI Mss. 2499, Attestation of G. Piggott, 7 December 1652 (O. S.), f. 18.
236 *HMC*, Ormonde Mss. (N. S., vol. I), Buck to Elizabeth Butler, 30 October 1651 (O. S.), pp. 224-5.
likewise honour-bound to attempt the recovery of their family’s fortunes. Studies of the concept of honour in early Stuart England have drawn attention to the deep obligation that a man of honour owed to his own lineage and family. This duty to one’s own family was of paramount importance and even arguably bore more weight than those other duties that arose out of oaths and promises of service to others. To attempt to honour these responsibilities, however, was potentially problematic. Though speaking of mercenary troops when he said it, Viscount Lord Taaffe had pointed out during the early 1650s that attempting to come to terms with those they viewed as usurpers represented a moral dilemma for this elite. There is no reason to think that the same dilemma did not apply to a family’s estate, as this could mean tacitly accepting the right of the usurping regime to redistribute property. This could potentially be perceived as an implicit abandonment of the Stuart cause. The question for the Butlers then became how to reconcile these conflicting pressures and claims upon their loyalty.

They did this by taking a two-pronged approach to the problem. First of all Elizabeth Butler investigated the possibility of her being able to come to terms with the Republic and recover her inheritance. Secondly, and parallel to this, the Butlers continuously sought to assure others that their pursuit of their property would not amount to an abandonment of the royalist cause, while also seeking to ensure that it would not be construed as such. As part of Elizabeth’s efforts to carry out the first part of what can be loosely called a strategy, she began to draw upon the aid of persons in Britain and Ireland who were tied to the Ormonde dynasty through familial and/or personal bonds. Even before she abandoned exile, she used such individuals to sound out whether or not there was a chance of a successful claim being made by her. These persons, whether royalist in sympathy or not, then aided her further by preparing the ground for her return back into Britain and Ireland.

In one noteworthy example from the period immediately before she left exile, the Butlers employed one James Buck, a former servant of the Butlers and also an official in the Irish ante-bellum governmental establishment, as an intermediary to

Cromwell and others within the Parliamentary regime. Buck was sent with a letter to Cromwell prior to the summer of 1651, though it seems that it took some time for him to gain an audience with the General. Even then Cromwell was slow to give him anything but verbal assurances of favour. By the autumn of that year, however, he had succeeded in gaining an assurance from Cromwell that, with regard to the question of Lady Butler’s estates, he would move the Council of State on her behalf. Buck also secured a promise of protection for her from the Parliament’s Commander, which would allow her return to Britain.

Buck thus proved himself to be a good advocate of the Butlers’ interests. Not all of the Butlers’ eggs were in this one basket, however. They did not have to rely solely on one person to intervene with Cromwell for them and Elizabeth Butler was quick to get others to advance her case as well. Consequently, Buck was not alone in taking pains on the Marchioness’ behalf during these months. Cromwell also received solicitations on her behalf from others, most notably from Lady Roscommon and Lord Strafford and these appeals do not seem to have been co-ordinated with that of Buck. On the other hand, Buck was definitely co-operating with another pro-Ormonde advocate, Lady Pigot, who was charged with securing a pass into England for the Marchioness at this time. Others likewise aided him in his assigned task, including one Jack Stephens, who acted as Buck’s go-between to the Butlers. Similarly, various other individuals provided Buck with assistance in making his case. These individuals cannot be identified with any certainty, though there is some suggestion that they were kin to the Marchioness. What is more, the aid they provided to Buck was varied, ranging from advice to efforts to secure cash so that he could meet his expenses.


239 HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Ormonde to Inchiquin, 3 August 1651, p. 178.

240 Ibid, Buck to Elizabeth Butler, 30 October 1651 (O. S.), pp. 224-5. NLI Mss 2319, Elizabeth Butler to Lady Pigot, undated, ff. 273-4. Ibid, Unknown to Buck, 18 November 1651, ff. 95-7. Ibid, Buck to Elizabeth Butler, 20 November 1651 (O. S.), ff. 125-6. The reason some of those who aided the Butlers cannot be identified in this case is the tendency for correspondence to be coded. To cite one instance, Buck described in one letter how he had consulted with Lady Elizabeth’s ‘mother’ about her case. Her mother was not alive at this time and there is nothing to suggest that her mother-in-law was.
Having received imprecise but nonetheless positive news from Buck and others, the decision was taken that Elizabeth should return home. To this end the good Lady, having prepared the ground so well through her associates, now felt confident enough to write directly to Cromwell himself on the matter. In May 1652 she wrote to him from Caen seeking his assistance in her intended quest to recover her property. Her own words highlight how successful her contacts in England had been in acquiring information and assurances of goodwill from Cromwell on her behalf.

Having by a very general fame received assurance of your lordship’s inclinations to make use of your power for the obliging of such in general, as stand in need of protection and assistance from it, and having heard that some expressions have fallen from you, that may give me hope that I, in my particular, may be thought by you not uncapable [sic] of being made one of the instances of that disposition in you; I have adventured to make this address unto your lordship for your favour…241

It has already been pointed out that while all this was going on the Butlers still felt the need to re-assure their royalist associates about their own political attentions. This they did and it has to be stressed that none of their efforts to petition Cromwell for the return of Lady Ormonde’s estates were kept from the other exiles or from their wider circle of associates. As we have seen, Elizabeth Butler had already written to Edward Nicholas about her intentions. He had been completely supportive of her in this and had even been encouraging her to take such a course of action prior to 1651. This support continued throughout 1651 and he even wrote to the Lord Lieutenant in December of that year with news and advice on how his [Ormonde’s] wife should pursue her claim. Furthermore, an unspecified kinsman of Nicholas’ provided valuable assistance to Lady Butler during the early days of her quest in England.242 Considering Nicholas’ own position, there was little else that he could do. He himself had already become involved in negotiations, through a proxy, to regain some of the income from his English estates. Furthermore, his wife was also in negotiations with

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241 John Nickolls (Ed.), *Original letters and papers of state, addressed to Oliver Cromwell; concerning the affairs of Great Britain*… (London, 1743), p. 86.
the Republican regime for a share of her husband’s property at about this time, for the
undoubted purpose of providing the King’s secretary with funds to see him through
his exile.243

Nicholas was not the only associate of the Butlers to be so informed. Ormonde, during the summer of 1651, also told Inchiquin of these efforts and had assured him that this petition was being made on the advice of friends in England. Indeed, Inchiquin had independently given the very same advice to the Butlers as Nicholas previously had. Daniel O’Neill also chipped in with advice in April 1651.244

This confessing of intent was not just confined to those who had gone to the Continent. Ormonde remained jealous of his reputation in Ireland and he thus included those allies that he had left behind when he quit the country amongst those he told. In 1652 he wrote to the Marquis of Clanricarde with the news of his wife’s mission. He assured him that he (Ormonde) had the King’s permission and further added that Clanricarde should not believe that Ormonde would be ‘less industrious or zealous, in furthering the relief of the kingdom [i.e. Ireland] in way of opposition to the rebels…’245 Once again, if we can judge by the response of Geoffrey Browne, an agent of Clanricarde’s on mainland Europe, he need not have worried. Not only did Browne condone Elizabeth Butler’s pursuit of her share of the Ormonde inheritance, the letter in which he gave his approval gave expression to why such a course should be taken.

…insomuch as if honest conditions may be had, in my opinion they are not to be slighted, as well as for the towns and the public as for your Lordship’s private estate…although I know it will be a harsh and unwelcome motion to you, but when your Lordship will consider that the King’s power is totally broken and no expectation to dispute his interest till God work some other great alteration, to what purpose will your Lordship beggar yourself, your wife and your children, and give way to others to grow big on your fortune to oppose you when, if ever, the time comes that it may be fit for you to use power in your country.246


246 HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Geoffrey Browne to Ormonde, 24 September 1651, p. 213.
In other words, it was not just in the interest of the Butlers to recover as much of their estate as possible: it was in the public and royalist interest as well.

The Butlers made every effort to sound out their closest personal associates on this matter. Not only did they and others approve, they even provided advice on how to best to go about it. It was probably not just adherence to the Butler interest that inspired this. Some notion of it being good for the royalist cause to have the Butler interest secured at home probably also played a part. Moreover, for such as Nicholas and, as we will see later on, Inchiquin, the pains taken by the Butlers must not only have acted as a legitimisation of their own efforts in this regard; it must also have given them the confidence to believe that Ormonde would back them in the pursuit of their own estates as well. Why else would Nicholas have asked Ormonde in November 1651 to protect his (Nicholas’) reputation with Charles II after he revealed that he intended to send his son home to acquire the means of support for his dependants?247

More significantly than all this, however, James and Elizabeth Butler did not seek to keep their course of action secret from Charles II. One of Ormonde’s disclosed motives for telling Inchiquin about his wife’s proposed return home was so that the latter nobleman would inform their Monarch of the scheme (Inchiquin was intent on joining Charles II in Scotland at this time). Later on, after the King’s return to France following Worcester, Ormonde personally went to Charles II to seek his permission to quit his presence and return to Caen so that he could ‘dispose’ of his family i.e. send them out of France to Britain and so lessen the financial burden on Ormonde. Ormonde was certainly fastidious when it came to getting the King’s consent to his wife’s abandonment of exile. Obtaining it would undoubtedly have made it easier to win the approval of others for their proposed course of action. Even allowing for this, his efforts to gain the King’s consent were probably excessive as, prior to Ormonde’s quittance of Ireland in December 1650, Daniel O’Neill had spoken with Charles II in Scotland about the personal situation of the Butlers and this gentleman had not only subsequently advised Lady Ormonde that she should

247 Ibid, Nicholas to Ormonde, 6 December 1651, pp. 236-8.
compound with the English Parliament for her estate, he also informed her that the King had verbally consented to the Marchioness doing so.\textsuperscript{248}

The fact of the matter was, as can be clearly seen above, the Butlers were far from being alone in considering such an option and, in truth, many exiles had actually taken this step prior to their doing so. We have already seen how Richard Boyle abandoned his exile and had returned to his estates in Ireland by the summer of 1651.\textsuperscript{249} Note has also been made of how events in mid-to-late 1651 only accelerated the trend towards such a move within the exiled royalist community. The defeat of Charles II and his Scottish allies at Worcester, which seemed to put an end to any royalist hopes, at least in the short-term, only increased the number of émigrés who chose to abandon the Continent in order to return home. Ormonde himself realised that this would be the case at the time and gave expression to it in a letter to Nicholas:

> All imaginable trials for the recovery of the royal interest have been made and failed, there remains nothing to hope for but either a division amongst the rebels or some miracle as the peace of Christendom and then their election of the English rebels as a common enemy even before the Turk… [we need to know two things before a decision is taken, the fate of Charles II, and] what the Rebels will offer to persuade men to return to their own.\textsuperscript{250}

This new political reality could not have been lost on the members of the royal family either. They could not maintain themselves and simultaneously provide for all of their close adherents on the Continent after this defeat. They were not even able to do it prior to Worcester. The Stuarts must have likewise realised that many of their adherents abroad had hoped that their stay on the Continent would only amount to an extended sojourn abroad and, moreover, it could not have escaped their notice that their followers had their own personal interests to protect. It should come as no surprise then that Charles II sanctioned Lady Ormonde’s return. It cut down on his potential expenses, it arguably made the Butlers more indebted to their royal master.


\textsuperscript{249} Mss 2533, Elizabeth Butler to Nicholas, 20 June 1649, f. 496. T. C. Barnard, ‘Land and the limits of loyalty: the second earl of Cork and first earl of Burlington’, p. 181. See p. 54, above.

\textsuperscript{250} HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Ormonde to Nicholas, 19 October 1651, p. 218. See p. 268, below, for further details on exiles who reconsidered their position in exile in 1651.
and it also undoubtedly opened up the possibility of having an adherent providing financial and political support to the exiled royalists from home in the future.

Of course, these moves on the part of the Butlers have not gone unnoticed within Irish historiography. Indeed, the recent work carried out on seventeenth-century Ireland, in reacting against the overbearing influence of Carte’s *life of Ormonde* on the work of previous generations’ of historians, has increasingly drawn attention to the fact that the wife of someone who had been previously portrayed as a paragon of royalist virtue actively attempted to come to a personally beneficial arrangement with the very forces that the Butlers were meant to be opposing during the 1650s.²⁵¹ This reaction on the part of historians is understandable for two reasons. The first of these has to do with the nature of Carte’s biography of Ormonde. This work is more than just a mere, biased, apology for a nobleman that has come to have too much influence on the historiography of the period. It is a composition that becomes almost hagiographical in tone at times and in so doing barely touches on inconvenient details, such as the return of Elizabeth Butler to Britain and Ireland during the Interregnum. Bearing this in mind, it is no wonder that the present generation of historians are quick to challenge the impression of Ormonde that it has created.²⁵² Second, it was obvious to Ormonde that, even though other royalists were pursuing similar courses of action, others could look upon his wife’s abandonment of exile unfavourably and that it could reflect badly on him. In particular he was concerned that Charles II should hear his reasons for choosing to allow Elizabeth Butler to return home, so as to avoid the King hearing some unfavourable report later on. If this was to happen the nobleman feared that it could potentially cost him some of the King’s favour in the future.²⁵³

If Ormonde had fears about his contemporaries looking unfavourably upon his actions it can hardly be surprising that later generations should question the Butlers’ motives. Yet, despite this, one should realise that Lady Butler’s actions in preparing


²⁵³ *HMC*, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Ormonde to Inchiquin, 3 August 1651, p. 178.
to return home, though certainly personally advantageous, were not a betrayal of the royalist cause. After all, some persons, such as Marcus Trevor, saw her as a conduit for transmitting information to the royal Court abroad.  Aside from that, it has been pointed out that, in sending Elizabeth Butler home to attempt the recovery of part of her inheritance, the Ormonde dynasty was only falling into line with the actions of many other royalist refugees. Bearing in mind, moreover, the royalists’ political situation in the early 1650s and also the duty of the Butlers to their own noble family line, it is hardly surprising that they should choose to do so. It should therefore come as no shock that the Butlers would attempt to safeguard their own family’s interests through seeking to come to terms with the Republican regime, particularly at a time when the royalists’ political situation looked especially bleak. Nor is it surprising that they should be encouraged to do so by others, both inside and outside of the former Stuart kingdoms.

**Elizabeth Butler in Ireland**

So, as a consequence of all these forces and decisions and with the blessing of her husband, Lady Elizabeth Butler left the Continent with her sons, Thomas, Earl of Ossory, Richard, Earl of Arran, and John in August 1652, as well as with her daughter, Elizabeth, and together they returned to the Commonwealth of England in order to pursue the goal of recovering some of her inheritance. She would spend the next few years moving between Britain and Ireland in pursuit of this objective, though her sons would not always be with her, as they would return abroad later on in the decade. Yet, despite the support of Oliver Cromwell, the recovery of even a portion of her inheritance did not prove all that easy an objective to achieve and it took quite a few years to secure a regular income. Initially, even before her return to England from exile, Lady Ormonde found that there was a general tardiness in dealing with her case, caused both by other claims on the people being petitioned by her and by conflicts between different administrative institutions. She found also that she had to fend off those who were making rival claims to parts of the Ormonde estate in

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254 *Carte Mss 29, Hyde to Ormonde, 25 October 1659, f. 485.*

255 [National Archives of Ireland (NAI), *Miscellaneous Documents regarding the Butler Family, Mss. 2590*, p. 196. For details on Ossory’s return into exile, see p. 62, above.](https://www.icaireland.ie/archives/search?query=Butler)

256 NLI Mss 2319, Buck to Elizabeth Butler, 30 November 1651 (O. S.), ff. 3-4. Ibid, 20 November 1651 (O. S.), f. 125.
these years, based either on purported titles held from before the war or on claims for services rendered to the Parliamentary cause. Nonetheless, as the 1650s rolled on and in spite of these difficulties, she was eventually able to regain a sizeable part of her pre-marriage estates in Ireland, thanks in no small part to her husband’s pre-existing connections to particular individuals in Ireland.

In the pursuit of her inheritance it took some two to three years before Elizabeth Butler met with any concrete success. There had been some good progress made in the initial period after her return. November 1652 saw a committee appointed to investigate her claims for support, in response to an earlier petition of the Marchioness, which lay claim to a portion of her estate, partly on the grounds of the losses she suffered in caring for Protestants during the 1640s. This bore fruit almost immediately as in January 1653 £100 was assigned to her out of the Irish customs and excise to meet her urgent necessities and this was followed by a further order for £500 a year out of the revenue of Ireland in spring 1653.\(^{258}\) More importantly, a positive report on her petition was sent to Parliament and subsequently, in early February 1653, the Rump Parliament ordered that the Commissioners for Irish affairs should set aside Dunmore House and lands in Kilkenny, to the value of £2000 a year, for her and her children. It re-iterated this order on the following 1 April. All of these properties had previously descended to her from her mother. This came at a personal cost, however. In order to receive the favourable report to Parliament Elizabeth Butler was obliged to distance herself from her husband, at least publicly. When the report was submitted it stated that the commissioners were informed that ‘she [Elizabeth Butler] did bear testimony (as far as one in her relation could) against the sinful compliance with the enemy, which she observed in her husband…’\(^{259}\) This was not the only


\(^{258}\) NLI Mss 2499, Order to Mr Standish, 10 January 1653 (O. S.), f. 33. Ibid, The Commissioners of Parliament of the Commonwealth of England, 31 March 1653 (O. S.), f. 57.

problem. Due to some legal complications, arising out of difficulties in establishing which lands had previously belonged to Elizabeth Butler and her father, this directive did not take immediate effect. This difficulty was then further exacerbated by a tendency to dole out either wasteland or widely-dispersed holdings to her when assignments of property were made.260

Consequently, throughout the early 1650s the Countess of Ormonde (this was the title she used when making the petitions; she did not use Marchioness as that honorific designation had been granted by the King during the civil wars) had to send an almost-continuous series of petitions to the Parliamentary commissioners for Irish affairs in an effort to get the order honoured, both in word and in spirit. Indeed, by the spring of 1654 she was obliged to petition Cromwell (by now he was Lord Protector) to ask that the Parliament’s order of the previous year take immediate effect. More interestingly, however, in this petition she also requested that other lands she had put in a claim for, as well as the property originally granted by Parliament, would not be distributed to others. This renewed request was received favourably and in May 1654 an order was given by the Council of State to examine the legitimacy of her claims to these extra properties and the reasons, if any, for denying them to her.261

All this did in the short-term was set in motion yet another series of examinations into what property had previously descended to her from her father and had not been held by her husband. It would appear that she had no funds at this stage as another order to advance her £200 out of the Irish revenue to meet her needs had to be given. Even allowing for this, however, it is fair to say that by mid-1654 Elizabeth Butler had finally embarked upon the rebuilding of the family patrimony.

260 NLI Mss 2499, The commissioners of the Public Revenue in the precinct of Clonmel, 6 May 1653 (O. S.), f. 65. Ibid, Elizabeth Butler to Fleetwood, June 1653, f. 73. It was eventually established by a survey in 1653 that just over 63,000 acres in County Kilkenny belonged to her, though this was challenged later on. Ibid, A True and perfect Survey, 1653, ff. 163-84. Ibid, William Basil to the Committee sitting at the Court of Wards, 14 April 1654 (O. S.), ff. 199-216.

Some degree of success was finally achieved in this by late 1654, when trustees, who included Lord Broghill amongst their number, were appointed to manage Dunmore House and lands worth £2000 a year on behalf of Elizabeth and her heirs. This was done in fulfilment of Parliament’s original order of February 1653 on the Marchioness’ behalf and it is interesting to note that the trustees were ordered to take special care to ensure that none of the profits were diverted to the exiled Marquis of Ormonde.\textsuperscript{262} The next year was taken up with advancing Elizabeth’s claims to other lands. By March, the court of the commissioners for the adjudication of claims allowed Elizabeth and her children the lands that had previously been assigned by King James to her ancestor, Thomas Earl of Ormonde and the following June a new decree improved her position further as it allowed her to claim certain lands in Kilkenny that had previously descended to her from the Marchioness of Desmond for herself and her heirs in the future, after the death of her husband.\textsuperscript{263}

In the pursuance of her claim to all of these assorted properties in the wake of her return home, Lady Elizabeth received considerable aid from others in Britain and Ireland who had longstanding links to the Butlers. To give one example of how these connections aided her, she received notable financial, political and legal assistance on this issue from the one of the major landowning families in Munster, the Percivals. This family, most notably one Philip Percival, had been clients of the Butlers of Ormonde prior to the conflicts of the 1640s, but they had ended up fighting against the royalist cause and accordingly against Ormonde himself during the course of this decade. Like many of the Old Protestant landowners in Ireland during these years, they would also become reconciled to the Cromwellian regime during the 1650s. Indeed, the Percivals were seen as becoming so anti-royalist it led one nineteenth-

\textsuperscript{262} NLI Mss. 2499, The Commissioners for the Adjudication of Claims, 22 July 1654 (O. S.), ff. 359-407. NLI Mss. 2500, The Commissioners of the Commonwealth to James Standish, 10 August 1654, f. 5. Ibid, Order by Charles Fleetwood, 27 December 1654 (O. S.), ff. 81-125. The lands assigned to Lady Elizabeth under this order were actually valued at £1800 a year by the trustees. Ibid, A rental of such lands…, 1654, ff. 175-87.

\textsuperscript{263} Ibid, the Commissioners for the Adjudication of Claims, 17 March 1655 (O. S.), ff. 159-60. Ibid, A list of the lands…, 1655, f. 199-200.
century commentator on seventeenth-century Ireland to claim that they had permanently fallen out with the Butlers as a result of the events of the 1640s.\textsuperscript{264} Yet, it is obvious from an examination of the relevant documentation that the Percivals still continued to honour the pre-existing personal connections that they had had with the Ormonde dynasty during the 1650s, despite their own specific political loyalties during the Interregnum and the claims of those nineteenth-century archivists who catalogued the Egmont papers to the contrary.\textsuperscript{265} In the wake of the Council of State’s orders of mid-1654, Sir John Percival, the son of the aforementioned Philip, helped the Marchioness of Ormonde to gather documents proving that the lands she was laying claim to had been the property of her father and had not been previously set aside for the use of her husband. In late June 1654 he was writing to his uncle, Sir Paul Davys, about these papers. Davys was asked to tell Lady Ormonde that Sir John was making every effort to obtain some pertinent documents but had not yet received any response from his correspondent. He also included some advice on the legal significance of certain deeds that Lady Butler held. Davys, for his part, was more than happy to pass on this information on behalf of his kinsman.\textsuperscript{266}

Other kinsmen of Percival’s were similarly involved in helping Elizabeth Butler to prepare her case regarding this property. His cousin, George Carr, acted as a liaison between Elizabeth Butler and Percival at this time. September 1654 saw Carr presenting a paper to the Lady on his cousin’s behalf, and he reported back to Percival that the Marchioness ‘…took it [the paper] very kindly’.\textsuperscript{267} The assistance that John Percival gave also went beyond the legal field during this decade, extending into the area of property management. By 1660, after Lady Butler had secured control over part of her inheritance from the Protectorate, Percival was holding some lands on her behalf, including some property in the barony of Lackagh. When Lady Ormonde learned of the despoliation of some of the forests there, she turned to Percival to have it put right.\textsuperscript{268} Clearly then, in the case of the Percivals and the Butlers at least, debts

\textsuperscript{264} HMC, Egmont Mss, vol. I, p. lxiii. The Percivals also had contacts with the wife of the Earl of Inchiquin, who had similarly returned to Ireland at this time. Ibid, John Percival to Alexander Pigot, 18 February 1652 (O. S.), p. 504.
\textsuperscript{265} Ibid, Percival to Davys, 27 June 1654, pp. 544-5.
\textsuperscript{266} Ibid. Ibid, Davys to Percival, 27 July 1654, p. 552.
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid, Carr to Percival, 20 September 1654, p. 559.
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid, Lady Ormonde to Percival, 11 February 1660, p. 611.
of honour arising out of an old patron-client relationship still held good in these circumstances, despite the geographical exile and political peripheralisation of the head of one of the family’s involved. One must also realise that, aside from a relationship that pre-dated the civil wars in Britain and Ireland, there were other reasons for the Percivals to help such a notably royalist family. The other principal motive for doing this was that, despite the fact that his political sympathies (and, in all probability, his personal interests) had placed him and his father in opposition to the royalists for most of the 1640s, John Percival actually had strong connections with other exiled persons and, indeed, was on rather good terms with many royalists on the Continent after the regicide. Throughout the early 1650s, for example, he was in written contact with a certain Tom Whyte, who had taken refuge in Paris and the two of them even exchanged news on political developments. On one occasion Percival was even asked by Whyte to pass on news to the royalist soldier, Colonel Edward Wogan.269

Part of the reason for Percival maintaining strong contacts with the exiled royalist community lay in the characteristics of the forces opposed to the royalists during the 1640s and 1650s. Simply put, those forces aligned against the royalists in the 1640s were far from being a cohesive body and at times some of the anti-royalist forces had more in common with the people they were fighting against than with the people they were fighting with. The Percivals for their part had never been sympathetic to the independent faction within the Parliamentary forces and instead had more sympathy for the Presbyterian party, which had sought to compromise with the Monarch in the 1640s. Yet the Independents would ultimately be the triumphant interest within the Parliamentary forces and it was they who were ultimately responsible for the regicide of Charles I. Philip Percival, moreover, had been a client to, and a close confidant of, Inchiquin when the latter was fighting with the Parliament in Ireland in the 1640s and had co-operated with him in opposing the designs of the independents in Ireland during those years.270 There is no reason to

269 Ibid, Percival to Whyte, 22 April 1652, p. 508. Ibid, Whyte to Percival, 3 May 1652, p. 511. For further details on the political activities of Percival on behalf of the royalists see pp. 359-60, below.

disbelieve that all the reasons that caused Inchiquin to defect to the royalists in 1649, combined with their own discontent at the Independents triumph, would not have caused the Percivals to be sympathetic towards the partisans of Charles II in the 1650s.

Also, it is obvious that a close association had developed between Ormonde and Inchiquin on the Continent during the 1650s and so John Percival, in helping the Butlers, was simply aiding an associate of one of his own family’s patrons. Bearing all this in mind then, it is no surprise that Percival should have aided Lady Ormonde on her return. Indeed, aside from John himself, other members of Percival’s kin group likewise maintained contacts with the exiled royalist community and they did so for much the same reasons. His brother-in-law, Robert Southwell visited with some of the exiled royalists while travelling on the Continent in the late 1650s and he even passed on news of this community to Percival. Hence, aiding royalists, and the Butlers particularly, would not have been an unusual thing for John Percival to do and the Marchioness of Ormonde was certainly not the only royalist to benefit from his assistance in this decade.

There were also others who could be relied upon to assist Lady Elizabeth in the same way and for much the same reasons. One notable example is Sir Robert King, another of those Irish Old Protestants who had supported the English Parliament in the 1640s, but who, as we have already noted, also had close personal ties to the Butlers. His assistance to her cause came relatively soon after her return from France. In October 1652 he wrote a letter to the Attorney General of Ireland, William

Inchiquin, 9 March 1647, p. 369 & p. 371. Inchiquin’s political path was not an unusual one to take in the context of the 1640s. Edward Wogan had likewise changed allegiance from the Parliamentarians to the royalists in the 1640s. Diarmuid Murtagh, ‘Colonel Edward Wogan’, p. 43.


The Percivals also had contacts with the wife of the Earl of Inchiquin, who had similarly returned to Ireland at this time in an effort to recover some of her estate. Ibid, Percival to Alexander Pigot, 18 February 1652 (O. S.), p. 504. See p. 136, below.

Basil, in which he encouraged him to look favourably upon Lady Butler’s case, citing, among other things, her past care for English settlers during the 1640s and her need to provide for her children as reasons for doing this. 274 Lady Ormonde also received considerable legal help from the barrister and former advisor to her husband, Sir Maurice Eustace, who himself was to come to terms with the Protectorate on land issues during this decade. 275 He spent a considerable amount of effort at this time supporting her legal arguments to be restored to her share of the Butler estate and in providing this assistance Eustace co-operated closely with the wider Percival kin group. In early 1654 he was in communication with the aforementioned George Carr, with the latter informing him of developments in the Marchioness’ case. Soon after he was in contact with another supporter of Lady Butler, one Richard Beresford, about the documentation needed to bolster her claim to her inheritance. 276

It is also noticeable that many of the same persons were involved in other property schemes of Elizabeth Butler. These included securing leases of property at different times from the various Interregnum regimes and pursuing claims to other lands that had previously been part of her inheritance, but which had not been initially conceded to her. The pursuit of this property seems to have been part of a broad scheme to restore the family’s fortunes because, as we have already noted, she petitioned Oliver Cromwell in 1654 to prevent the distribution of lands that she might claim in the future. 277 By mid-1655 she was actively seeking, with the assistance of one of her agents, John Burdon, the aforementioned George Carr, as well as with the aid of many others, the return of former properties of hers in county Tipperary. 278 A petition to the Lord Protector on behalf of herself and her children followed this in May 1656. In this she sought to control the management of manors that had previously descended to her from the Marchioness of Desmond. These lands were being held by the Commonwealth at this time but, as mentioned previously, were to

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274 HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Robert King to William Basil, 6 October 1652, p. 266.
277 SPI, Petition of the Marchioness of Ormonde to the Protector, 1 May 1654 (O. S.), 63/286, 118.
descend to her and her heirs on the death of James Butler. The Marchioness now requested that, in order to preserve these lands for her and to make them more profitable, someone that she would nominate should be allowed to hold a lease of these lands in trust for her.279

This petition was passed onto the Lord Deputy of Ireland, Henry Cromwell, for his consideration and following a favourable report from him the Protectorate was to once more look favourably upon this request. Indeed, the aforementioned lands in Lackagh, which, as we noted previously, ended up in the hands of John Percival, made up a part of this property. On the whole this decision represented a significant coup for the Butlers. The lands in question consisted of some 48,000 Irish acres and, though valued at well over £2000 a year, a lease of the lands was obtained from the Commonwealth for £1350. Of course, there were one or two problems associated with this decision, mainly arising out of certain Cromwellian officers and soldiers claiming an interest in the lands in question but these issues were resolved over the course of 1657.280 Despite this triumph, Elizabeth Butler did not rest on her laurels. In early 1657 John Burdon presented yet another petition to the Council for Irish affairs on her behalf. In this appeal she sought to rent what were officially designated as ‘wastelands’ from the Protectorate.281

When it came to settling the question of the Butler patrimony, then, the type of assistance provided to the Marchioness was quite varied. What is more, the family had a significant number of persons who could be relied upon to aid them. Writing to the royalist Lord Lieutenant from the Spanish Netherlands in mid-1659 with news of home, Hyde informed Butler that he had ‘many good friends in the city of Dublin’. He demonstrated this by describing the joyous celebrations of that town’s populace

279 SPI, Petition of the Marchioness of Ormonde to the Protector, 8 May 1656 (O. S.), 63/286, 119. CSPI, 1647-1660, Orders of the Council of State, 8 May 1656, p. 829.
280 NLI Mss. 2500, Order of the lord-Protector’s Council for the Affairs of Ireland, 17 February 1657 (O. S.), ff. 255-6. Ibid, Order of the Lord Protector, 23 June 1657 (O. S.), f. 303.
281 HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), ‘Particulars humbly offered to His Highness the Protector’s Council for the Affairs of Ireland’, 10 February 1657 (O. S.), pp. 325-6. It should be pointed out that this is not an exhaustive list of all those who helped Elizabeth Butler. Toby Barnard, to give one further example, has highlighted the assistance that Richard Boyle, Earl of Cork, gave her in this regard during the 1650s. T. C. Barnard, ‘Land and the limits of loyalty: the second earl of Cork and first earl of Burlington’, p. 189.
when a case was decided in the Countess of Ormonde’s favour. It is clearly evident, then, that there were others aside from those named above who were keen to assist the Ormonde dynasty in the task of rebuilding the Ormonde fortune, though it is hard to pin down who all of these individuals were exactly and/or why they provided assistance. That said, however, some tantalising evidence as to who they were and what inspired these key individuals to provide assistance does exist. In the same missive Hyde described how two persons, Roger Boyle, Lord Broghill, and Lady Ranelagh (two individuals who owed their fortunes and influence to their support for the Protectorate) had been extraordinarily civil to Elizabeth Butler. This report came in the wake of the collapse of the Protectorate, the return to power of the Rump Parliament in Britain and Ireland and the resurgence of hope for the royalist interest, at least in Ireland. For those two, then, keeping on the good side of the Butlers and providing assistance to them may have been a form of political insurance, which might prove useful in the event of a royal restoration. If this was a motivation for them, then it may have also partly inspired others to aid the Butlers.

On the whole one would have to say that Elizabeth Butler’s efforts to rebuild the Butler patrimony in the 1650s met with a fair amount of success and at least part of the explanation for this must be found in the assistance that she received from what turned out to be quite a broad group of persons. Connections to persons such as John Percival, John King and Maurice Eustace certainly proved useful to the Ormonde dynasty as they obviously put a great deal of effort into assisting Elizabeth Butler. Yet, these men’s usefulness was not just limited to what they themselves did on her behalf. The Butlers’ links to these persons proved valuable in another way as well. These key individuals frequently recruited others into the task of aiding Elizabeth Butler in her quest to recover the Ormonde fortune and by doing so they extended the range and scope of this family’s support network. This creates a neat parallel between Elizabeth Butler’s assistance network in Ireland and that of her husband on the Continent, as they both seem to have functioned in the same way. Both Elizabeth and James Butler used old established links to particular individuals, be it Elizabeth using the Percivals, or Ormonde himself using Bramhall, to seek assistance for themselves, being confident that the bonds that tied them to these persons would prove strong and

283 Ibid.
reasonably effective. These individuals then employed others that they had contacts with on the Butlers’ behalf and thus extended the reach and pervasiveness of the network. We have seen previously how Bramhall, for one, involved others in the efforts to secure privateering funds for James Butler. John Percival used his own kin in this way as well. ²⁸⁴

As with Ormonde’s privateering network on mainland Europe, however, there were problems and it certainly was not all plain sailing for Elizabeth Butler after mid-1654. It is fair to say that from that date onward her efforts to protect the patrimony involved more than just adding to the properties she held. One problem that she faced was a bugbear for all landowning Irish Protestants in this decade, high taxation. This forced her to petition the Commonwealth’s commissioners for Irish affairs in August and September 1654 after she found that the assorted contributions that would be demanded from the lands she was seeking would exceed the income she would get from them. Despite this, she was to be exposed to high taxation levels throughout the rest of the decade and they did limit her ability to exploit her estate. Indeed, rather than lifting the burden on her, she instead found that extra charges were only placed upon the estate. In one instance, the cost of surveying the property assigned to her was deducted from the rents they generated. ²⁸⁵ Also, there was still the need to legally copper-fasten her hold on those lands that she had initially recovered in 1654 and 1655. She was obliged, for instance, to once again petition the Commonwealth’s commissioners in an effort to ensure that lands she had previously secured would not be erroneously distributed to the army. This need to secure her property became a particularly pressing problem in 1657 after the Parliament brought forward an act of attainder early that year. This initially worried Lady Butler, as it potentially could remove some of her rights to her property, but at the same time, she was unwilling to request that a specific exemption be inserted into the act, as she feared that to do so would anger those in Parliament who viewed her husband as an enemy. Nonetheless, she decided that if it became necessary to make such a request then she would have to do so. Again, in making this decision she relied heavily on the assistance and advice

²⁸⁴ See pp. 81-7, above.

of others, including unnamed friends with strong links to the Protectorate regime. As the year wore on and as the terms of the act became known her fears grew, as it seemed that the act would actually encompass her estate within its terms. As a result she chose, on the advice of others, to seek to have a clause inserted into it, which would protect her interests. This was duly done, with successful results. Aside from the help of assorted unnamed persons in getting the relevant clause included, Elizabeth Butler also benefited from the aid of some of her more regular helpers. Assistance was once again forthcoming from Sir Maurice Eustace and George Carr in this matter, for instance.286

Aside from the legal dimension, there was a political aspect to protecting the estate. Simply put, the Butlers were royalists and could be reasonably expected to act in the Stuart interest at some stage. To counteract such fears, therefore, the Marchioness had to promise not to lease any place of strength on her holdings to persons distrusted by those in power. Being caught supporting the Stuarts, though, still remained a potential pitfall for this family and those of the Butlers that returned home, most especially Thomas, were compromised in this way at least once. At one stage during the 1650s his mother was forced to concede in a petition that some unspecified actions by her sons had endangered her case for the return of her property. To counteract this, while claiming that there was no evidence against them, she nonetheless offered to send her boys into exile in a country that was friendly to the Commonwealth, so as to remove the cause of discontent. This petition is undated, but bearing in mind that Thomas was to return into exile in the United Provinces (a country that, after it had lost the first Anglo-Dutch war, fastidiously observed its neutrality towards the Cromwellian Protectorate) in the wake of Penruddock’s Rising of 1655 and, as we shall see, that he had had contact with one of the royalist conspirators that brought it about, it is likely that this appeal of Elizabeth Butler’s was made in that year.287 Successful as this petition seems to have been, it did remove the heir to the estate from directly enjoying the benefits of it. That said, when it came to protecting the patrimony, individual family members were clearly sacrifiable. First


287 NLI Mss, 2501, Elizabeth Butler to the Lord Deputy, undated, f. 81-2. Ibid, Elizabeth Butler to the Council of State, 1655 (?), f. 77. See p. 139, below.
Elizabeth had previously condoned a besmirching of her husband’s reputation when she bore witness against his dealings with ‘the enemy’. Now, she was willing to have her son sent abroad to protect the estate. The banishing of Thomas also reveals an interesting aspect of exile for these families. It was clearly part of the strategy used to protect the patrimony. By using it to remove the person or persons who were offensive to the regime in power, the dynasty increased its chances of maintaining its holdings and, more importantly, of passing them on to one of its number.

The final problem faced by Lady Butler was the one of profiting from the estate once she had secured it. Again, however, while admittedly reasons of their own personal advantage would once again have played a part here, there were those who were willing to help Elizabeth Butler profit from her lands once she had secured them. The family of the Earl of Meath fall into this category. Members of this family maintained contact with Lady Ormonde throughout the 1650s and she sought to financially benefit from these connections. Relations between them were friendly enough, as is witnessed by the fact that in early 1656 the latter proposed to enter into a business relationship with one of the Earl of Meath’s kin, a certain Edward Moore, by offering him the right to use those lands of hers which adjoined his. In contrast to Edward Moore, whom the Marchioness of Ormonde had to approach herself, there was also the example of Sir Robert Stirling, who actively sought to become a tenant of James Butler’s wife. In late 1656 he sought to enter into an agreement with others, namely the Cochranes, to rent property off her in county Wicklow. This he sought to do as ‘…I have ever been a real servant of your Ladyship, so have I had a longing [sic] desire to be your tenant also …’

All of this was well and good but it has to be conceded that it did not create a significant fortune for Elizabeth Butler. Writing to her husband in August 1659 Elizabeth told him of how she would have difficulty providing both for herself and her family (a remark which indicates that at least part of the profits were intended to support those members of the Butler dynasty who were abroad) out of the estate, as the financial encumbrances that lay upon it, in the form of debts, taxes and various other expenses, combined with the general poverty of the people, left her with only a

289 HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Stirling to Elizabeth Butler, 7 November 1656 (O. S.), p. 322.
pitiful sum of money. Such was her shortage of funds at the end of the decade that from time to time her agents had to negotiate abatements of certain dues demanded by the State. Meanwhile her legal advisors, Richard Beresford and Maurice Eustace, took to examining the question of whether or not Elizabeth Butler was liable to meet the considerable cost associated with pre-war mortgages on her lands.\textsuperscript{290} This problem, it has to be pointed out, was not one that would have surprised the Butlers. As early as 1651 the Marquis had claimed that the cost of recovering the estate would involve a considerable outlay and it would take time before any return would be seen from it. Anyway, for Elizabeth Butler, immediate advantage was not the point of the exercise, as the patrimony was not being managed for her own good. This is made evident by one of the financial encumbrances that was placed upon the estate in 1659; namely the undertaking to provide twelve hundred pounds a year for her son, Thomas, at the time of his marriage. This event was, as we shall see later, imminent. A significant amount of the estate’s revenue, therefore, was being set aside to maintain the Butler heir. In the end, all this effort was being made not on Elizabeth and James Butler’s behalf but was done on their progeny’s behalf. As she said herself in her letter to her husband, her own reduction did not trouble her as she could cheerfully submit to that, ‘if by it my children and family may be advantaged’.\textsuperscript{291}

**The patrimony of the other exiles**

As hinted before, the Butlers were not the only ones who sought to use friends and allies at home in order protect the patrimony of those elite dynasties that found their chiefs in exile. On the whole, it seems that, whenever possible, the sending of a female member of a dynasty home to reclaim a share of the family estate was quite a common strategy amongst all of the exiles. After all, the same advantages applied to them as to Lady Elizabeth Butler. It was, moreover, a strategy whose employment was not solely confined to those families’ whose head chose to stay in exile. The second Earl of Cork, for instance, after he had returned home from France managed to maintain control over lands that he previously gained in Yorkshire, through his wife.

\textsuperscript{290} NLI Mss. 2322, Elizabeth Butler to John Burden, 2 December 1656 (O. S.), f. 103. Carte Mss. 30, Elizabeth Butler to Ormonde, 1 August 1659, f. 470. NLI Mss. 2500, judgement of John Hughes on the tithes owed by Elizabeth, …, 30 July 1658, f. 403. NLI Mss, 2501, considerations of Eustace and Beresford, 23 November 1658, ff. 5-6. Ibid, judgement of Miles Corbet, Trinity Term, 1658, f. 25.

\textsuperscript{291} Ibid. HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Ormonde to Inchiquin, May 1651, p. 169.
This too was because she had brought these properties with her at the time of their marriage. The wife of the Marquis of Clanricarde, moreover, despite the fact that her husband had been a notable combatant on the royalist side in Ireland, likewise managed to maintain some of those properties that she had inherited in England (as well as, it should be said, some lands of her husband’s in Ireland) and it was on this estate that her spouse lived out the last years of his life.\footnote{292}

As with Elizabeth Butler, the wife of the Earl of Inchiquin, Elizabeth St. Leger, also made similar efforts to regain her marriage jointure at this time and she likewise attempted to draw upon the assistance of those at home to do so. Indeed, she sought support from some of the same persons that Elizabeth Butler got assistance from. Once again, John Percival and his kin found themselves being called on to aid a former exile who was seeking to recover part of the family estate. Like Lady Ormonde, Lady Inchiquin was in contact with persons about the possibility of recovering her marriage jointure prior to her return from Holland. Her main contact seems to have been Colonel Alexander Pigot, a cousin of John Percival’s. This time, however, the reports from the homelands do not seem to have been favourable, as Pigot advised against Lady Inchiquin’s return. Unfortunately, as Percival was to inform his cousin, the news did not reach Lady Inchiquin in time to prevent her travelling and news of Pigot’s poor tidings only reached her after she had arrived back in England. Once there, she decided that she had to try her case anyway and she endeavoured to recover her jointure.\footnote{293} Her efforts in this venture, which seem to have been quite drawn out, were closely followed by her husband on the Continent, though in the end he was not to hear good tidings of them. In mid-1659 he wrote to Ormonde with the news that his wife had been denied anything from the Inchiquin estate and had even been excluded from her jointure, on the grounds that she had not made her claim in time.\footnote{294} Clearly, contact was once again maintained between the exiles and the returned.

Whether they were successful or not, the womenfolk clearly had an important part to play in protecting a patrimony. Yet, they were not the only family members to


\footnote{293 HMC, Egmont Mss, vol. I, Percival to Alexander Pigot, 18 February 1652 (O. S.), p. 504.}

\footnote{294 HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Inchiquin to Ormonde, 11 April 1659, p. 326.}
do so. Very often, the exiles also had other relations, aside from female ones, who remained at home, or returned there. A good example of this is John Bramhall. In late February 1653, John Bramhall, through contacts with his son and through the assistance of an unnamed ‘noble gentleman’, was able to secure the payment of a substantial debt that was owed to him from a particular business venture, which had been embarked upon in the years before the conflagrations of the 1640s. The repayment of this sum proved to be very timely for the clergyman as it provided him, his son and others with much needed funds. More strikingly, however, in the letter that dealt with the question of this particular debt, Bramhall also instructed his son on a range of business issues that concerned both of them in Ireland. In particular, he instructed his offspring to send a copy of the accounts pertaining to this financial venture to him, so that he could see how much money was owed to him by those other persons who had also invested in it.\textsuperscript{295} Clearly, Bramhall saw this as a potential source of further revenue and he required his son’s assistance to help him to get it.

Bramhall’s son was not just assisting his father with his business interests. He had, like Lady Ormonde, also become the manager of the family property by default during this decade and it fell to him to protect it. As was previously the case when he was looking after the family’s business interests, however, the son still found that the exiled bishop could be of some assistance. May 1654, for instance, saw Bramhall advising his heir on a legal issue concerning his (i.e. Bramhall’s son) deceased uncle’s estates. This counsel was in relation to the sale of some of the uncle’s property and particular clauses in the property deeds pertaining to this. Bramhall’s son had the property deeds but it was Bramhall himself, relying on his memory, who told him what particular information to look for in them.\textsuperscript{296} The Lord Bishop of Derry, of course, could not always aid his son, but, as in the other cases cited, there were those associates of the bishop who were willing to help. In March 1658, for instance, Bramhall thanked the Dean of Ardagh, Nicholas Bernard, and also other friends, for some undisclosed assistance that they had given to his heir.\textsuperscript{297}

Protecting the family property and patrimony was clearly not just a prerogative of womenfolk or, indeed, of the high nobility amongst the exiles then. Other family

\begin{footnotes}
\item[295] Edmund Berwick (Ed.), \textit{The Rawdon Papers}, Bramhall to his son, 27 February 1653, pp. 105-8.
\item[296] Ibid, 19 May 1654, p. 108.
\item[297] HMC, Hastings Mss (vol. IV), Bramhall to Barnard, 11 March 1658, pp. 96-7.
\end{footnotes}
members and, indeed, family associates were of vital importance in this task. Not surprisingly, however, using family members to protect the family property does seem to have been almost completely a prerogative of the Protestants amongst all the Irish elite exiles. If we refer back to the example of the Catholic Clanricarde, while his wife was allowed to recover a share of the estate, the Marquis himself was specifically exempted from the possibility of recovering his property by the act of settlement for Ireland in 1652. The fact of the matter was that while persons such as the Marchioness of Ormonde, the Lady Inchiquin and Bramhall’s son had some hope of maintaining or recovering part of their families’ estate as non-combatant Protestants, the Irish Catholic elite exiles were effectively exempted from attempting to reclaim part of their former holdings by the Interregnum regimes’ desire to punish Catholics for the 1641 rebellion and the associated massacres, real or not.

Out of all the Catholic exiles only a handful found that any of their family could retain some interest in the traditional family estates. Richard Grace’s nephew managed to retain an interest in his lands in Kilkenny, for instance, but this was because of his being underage at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in the country and, more importantly, because he had been raised as a Protestant ward. He could, in short, successfully distance himself from the actions of his Catholic kin and neighbours. Even then, he still needed the assistance of the Marchioness of Ormonde to secure his property. Many of the Irish Catholic elite on the Continent at this time found that they and their families could not so easily deny participation in the political and military events of the early 1640s Ireland, however. Indeed, so problematic were their actions from that the point of view of the Protestant English interest, even their fellow royalist exiles had to almost apologise for it. To give one example, when Hyde spoke of the worthiness of Lord Muskerry in early 1654 during the latter’s trial by the Republican regime, he admitted that he [Muskerry] had participated in the Irish uprising, but claimed that he was driven to do so by the Irish Lord Justices, and that ‘…he had no hand in the contrivance of it, nor was in any way privy to it.’

Organising family life

All of the considerable efforts to protect family patrimonies by those who were either trusted by the exiles or who were former exiles themselves did not take place without contacts being maintained with the émigré community, though frequently such contacts were carried on through go-betweens. Reference has already been made to some of these. We have seen how Hyde kept Ormonde informed of the fortunes of his wife in Ireland in 1659. He was not the only one to do so. The Marchioness herself did, after all, inform him of her own financial position and of the state of the patrimony as well. Furthermore, it would seem that Ormonde was involved in at least some of the legal moves being made to secure the Butler patrimony. In early 1660 Stephen Smith apologised to the Marquis for the delay in transmitting certain deeds to him in the Netherlands, but stated that this was due to the instability of the times, all of which caused the Marchioness to believe that it would be dangerous ‘to adventure things of so great importance by post’. The deeds were therefore to be entrusted to James Buck, who intended to travel to the Netherlands as he wished to see that country, and it became his responsibility to pass them onto Ormonde.301

It has to be emphasised, however, that such contacts went beyond the purely economic. Indeed, it is clear that the reasons underpinning the continuing contact between the exiles and their associates at home were diverse in nature. In one case from September 1653 Ormonde received letters from his wife, written as she waited to make the crossing from England to Ireland.302 There were also definitely other communications of a more personal nature. In early 1655, while in England aiding with preparations for what would become known as Penruddock’s Rising, Daniel O’Neill wrote a letter to Secretary Nicholas from London. This mainly concerned the plans for the rebellion but it also included a coded personal message for Ormonde:

I pray you tell [Ormonde] I would have sent his two eldest boys to his uncle in Gloucestershire, but they would not. They said it was too melancholy a place and where they would have nothing to do. I liked so well their reasons that I forbore pressing them further.303

301 See pp. 91-2, above. Carte Mss. 213, Smith to Ormonde, 10 February 1660, f. 579.
303 BL Eg. Mss 2535, O’Neill to Nicholas, 8-9 March 1655 (O. S.), f. 77.
Clearly not even royal business could cut across personal connections or could prevent the functioning of the networks that maintained such contacts.

The repatriated members of the Ormonde dynasty did not just stay in contact with those of their family who were separated from them by the exile. Elizabeth Butler, for her part, also maintained contacts with other associates of her husband during this period. In mid-1652, for example, she informed Edward Nicholas of how her efforts to recover her share of the Ormonde estate were going and even recounted details of how she had attempted to give his son £50 in part-payment of a debt she owed to the family, with the intention that the sum be passed on to his father. This was more than just an account of a financial transaction, however, as Lady Ormonde informed Nicholas of how his son had refused to take the money. It was therefore more than just an acknowledgment of a financial debt. It was an acknowledgment of a debt of honour.\textsuperscript{304} Yet, even allowing for such evident diversity in the subjects of correspondence between those at home and those abroad, it is obvious that the transmission of certain kinds of news and information was more important than other kinds. As has been already highlighted, it was vital for the exiled and non-exiled members of a family to co-operate in arranging the affairs of the family patrimony during the 1650s and it undoubtedly accounted for much of the exiles’ interest in events at home. The organisation of family life amongst those who were separated by the exile must surely have been of equal importance, however.

Once again, the Butlers make the best case study here, as a considerable amount of their correspondence relating to this issue survives, particularly after 1655, the year when Ormonde’s two eldest sons, Thomas and Richard, made their way back to the European Continent. Their return prompted the beginning of a correspondence between the Marquis and the Marchioness on the subject of their maintenance and on the general question of providing for all their children. This interchange of information shows that close co-operation between both parents, despite their separation from each other, remained possible, though again intermediaries often greatly facilitated this exchange. In this, it is not dissimilar to the correspondence over the estate. Yet, there was some disparity between the care of the heirs and the care of the patrimony, however. While James Butler might have been consulted on some issues with regard to the family estate it is still evident that his wife had a

\textsuperscript{304} BL Eg. Mss 2534, Elizabeth Butler to Nicholas, 23 September 1652, f. 129.
greater responsibility in caring for it during the Interregnum. With the family, however, the relative poverty of Elizabeth Butler, even while she was in Ireland, combined with the mobility of the children meant that James Butler had to play as large a part as his wife did in caring for their offspring.

The Marquis’ assistance to his children and his co-operation with his wife on the question of their care began in mid-1656. His wife had by that stage sent her two eldest sons into the United Provinces in the care of a tutor, a Mister Page. One item she could not furnish them with was money, however, and so it fell to her husband to provide it. This he did through his associations with the merchant community on the European mainland. By summer that year he had borrowed four thousand pounds a year from a certain Mister Austin, which was then to be used to pay for his sons’ upkeep and arrangements were made to have the money transferred to the children at quarterly intervals. When he learned of the tutor, the Marquis managed to secure another one thousand pounds for his maintenance through another loan from Austin. The merchant, aside from providing the wherewithal to care for the children, also facilitated contacts between the Butler parents, as he provided the Marchioness with contact information for her husband. It was an effective division of labour. Elizabeth provided the carer; James arranged the necessary funds and Mister Austin acted as both go-between and supplier of funds. By this method all the required necessities to meet the situation were supplied. It was efficiently done as well. All of this took Elizabeth and James Butler just over a month to arrange.305

The latter situation, though efficiently dealt with, was a relatively straightforward one to deal with. In 1659, however, when a marriage agreement was concluded between Thomas, Lord Ossory, and a daughter of the Dutch noble family of Beverwart, by name of Aemilia, contacts between the two divided branches of the family were renewed so as to manage a slightly more complex situation. The Marchioness’ consent to the marriage agreement had to be secured, including her agreement to the financial provisions, as these called for the provision of an annuity of twelve hundred pounds to Lord Thomas and it would fall to her to supply it. This, as

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we noted earlier, she readily consented to. Again intermediaries were central to this as Ormonde himself was on his way to the treaty negotiations between Spain and France in the Pyrenees at this time and he had to leave the care of the marriage details in the hands of his associates in the Netherlands, most specifically George Lane. It was he that received the Marchioness’ consent to the union from Mister Page, who travelled between Ireland and the Netherlands with the news, and it also fell to Lane to pass this information onto Ormonde, using Hyde as his liaison.

The two parts of the divided Butler household took great care over this marriage. The union of Thomas and Aemilia was significant enough, as her family was one of the leading families in that state and this made it important enough to command a great deal of time. There was also more riding on the successful conclusion of the accord than just the marriage itself, however. The whole family’s welfare depended on it. Half of the dowry received from the match to Aemilia was to be sent home for the purpose of providing a dowry to Thomas’ sister, Elizabeth, in her proposed union to Philip Stanhope, Lord Chesterfield. Whatever remained was then to be disbursed between Ormonde himself and another of his son’s, John, who was in France at the time. Some of the debts which Elizabeth Butler had previously contracted during her residence on the Continent were also to be paid out of this windfall. The exchange of letters on the question of Thomas’ marriage therefore also included detailed plans for the disbursing of the dowry and for bringing the negotiations for Elizabeth’s marriage to fruition. This careful planning did not end with the conclusion of Thomas’ marriage in November of that year. When the proposed marriage of Elizabeth fell through later on the money had to be returned to the Continent to help Charles II out of a financial difficulty.

A striking amount of co-ordination went into this last set of correspondence. Information had to be exchanged between Ireland, where Elizabeth Butler was resident, England, where the family of Lord Chesterfield was, the United Provinces, being the scene of the marriage that provoked it all, the Spanish Netherlands, where

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306 Carte MSS. 30, Elizabeth Butler to Ormonde, 1 August 1659 (O. S.), f. 470. This financial encumbrance upon the Butler estate in Ireland has been referred to previously in this chapter.
308 Ibid. Carte MSS. 30, Elizabeth Butler to Ormonde, 1 August 1659 (O. S.), f. 470.
Hyde was residing and France, being the country which Ormonde was travelling through during the whole affair. What is more, the information exchanged between all those involved was nothing short of in-depth. Details on the financial situation of the family estate were supplied by Elizabeth to her husband, as were details on the defence of the patrimony and of the debts that the various children had built up. Once again, the situation was efficiently handled by the two branches of the family. Noteworthy as this is, however, it is not the most striking element of the whole affair. Elizabeth Butler’s letter to her husband on the marriage and other family affairs was written on in early August 1659. He did not receive it until the following 26 December. His travels with the King at this time effectively meant that he was not at the centre of the exchange of information and plans, despite being head of the dynasty. What he knew of it was learned second-hand from Hyde and his part in the whole affair was played by others, most notably George Lane. Ormonde, in short, was completely reliant on his associates and his support network to take care of his side of the family business at this time. Yet, all business was successfully concluded, aside from young Elizabeth’s proposed marriage, and even this was not a complete disaster as some good to the royalist cause came of it. Just as much as any other element of the exiles’ life, then, protecting their families’ interests was reliant on the co-operation of others and, once more, these personal associations could be confidently relied upon to carry out the required actions. This was particularly true of those associations which had been established over a long period of time and which came about as a result of close proximity between individuals.

**Conclusions**

Neither geographical distance nor separation from other family members prevented exiles from seeking to influence events at home or from seeking to look after their patrimonial and personal dynastic interests. Contacts were always maintained with home and this was done by using at least one of two strategies: through the maintenance of contacts with persons who avoided expatriation or through the stratagem of sending a family member home to protect dynastic interests there and also to act as interlocutor with the expatriates themselves. Frequently, though not always, both of these strategies proved to be remarkably efficient in addressing the concerns that the exiles felt for their interests at home. The question

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310 Carte MSS. 30, Elizabeth Butler to Ormonde, 1 August 1659 (O. S.), ff. 470-1.
needs to be asked, what were the types of the connections and contacts that these exiles used to maintain their links to Britain and Ireland? Predictably enough, the major forms were kinship networks (represented by a diversity of persons ranging from the aforementioned re-patriated family member to more distant relatives) and patron-client relationships, though it is undeniable that other connections, such as links to business associates (for instance, the Mister Austin who so generously aided the Butlers in 1656) could also allow the Irish elite exiles to continue to exercise influence within what had been their traditional areas of activity and territories of influence.

There is still more to be said on these networks that linked the Irish royalist elite to their homes. It is noteworthy, for instance, that in using their network of contacts to advance their case these émigrés do not seem to have placed a limit on the number of individuals that they employed in a task. Buck was not the only advocate Elizabeth Butler employed to sound out the feasibility of her returning home to claim her share of the Butler patrimony in late 1651 and John Percival was not the only person to aid her after she returned. Instead she used as extensive a range of persons as possible, so as to press her interests more forcibly and to maximise her chances of success. In doing this, she matched her husband’s approach to using his network of contacts to exploit privateering funds. While Ormonde may have relied heavily on Bramhall to gain and transfer privateering funds to him, others, such as Jermyn for one, were also employed in that task, whenever appropriate or possible.311 Calling on the assistance of many different persons within one’s range of contacts to overcome a particular problem, to achieve a specific goal and to maximise one’s chance of success was obviously a popular strategy. The application of this stratagem does not seem to have discriminated on the basis of political sympathies either. Personal interest repeatedly caused the exiles to see beyond their assistant’s political colours. It was certainly of little importance to the Butlers that some of those aiding them were former enemies on the battlefield and were, from a strictly royalist point of view, politically compromised by close links to the Interregnum regimes. Indeed, with regard to protecting family patrimonies and interests generally it may have actually been advantageous to have allies at home with such links. What seems to have been of more importance was the durability and strength of the links that they had to

311 See pp. 81-7, above.
particular individuals. To sum up, when it came to protecting one’s interest at home, there was little else of importance beyond ensuring that those you were relying on were reliable.
Section Two
Section Two

Chapter 4

Companions and servants to a royal family: the Irish courtiers and the organisation of life within the diverse households of the exiled Court.

Introduction to the section

In a review published in 1983 John Larner drew attention to two definitions of a court that were to be found in the Oxford English dictionary. The first of these describes a court as being ‘the body of courtiers collectively: the retinue…of a high dignitary’; that is to say the household of an elite personage. The second defines a court as ‘the sovereign with his ministers and councillors as a ruling power of a state…’ or, more commonly, a princely government.\(^1\) Larner’s purpose in highlighting this was to show how large a subject for study an early modern court was. It was both a semi-private social space and a political space combined into one, with this naturally leading to some overlap between the two functions.\(^2\) This second section of the thesis, in acknowledgement of the size of the subject, will be completely given over to the study of the Stuart Court in exile and of the role of the Irish elite within it. It will also adopt the dual classification and definition of a court used by Larner. Consequently, it will attempt to provide an overview of the exiled Stuart Court as both the semi-private household of a monarch (Charles II) and as the seat of his pretended (and this is used in the sense of claimant) government (i.e. the political space inhabited by monarchical government). This opening chapter to the section will therefore look at the exiled Court of Charles II as a social space and it will examine how the Irish elite exiles carried out their roles as servants to royal family within it.


\(^2\) Ibid, p. 676.
The following chapter will then concentrate on how these Irish attempted to aid the Court in its efforts to exercise its traditional executive functions.

While it will undoubtedly have to touch on it, the chapters within this section will not seek to fully describe the structure of the royal households in exile. Others, most notably N.A.C. Reynolds, have already attempted to do this. These chapters will also not seek to provide an estimate of the numbers at the Court. Focusing as they do only on Irish royalist exiles within this body, it would be an unnecessary task. It would also be impossible as, like many other courts, there are significant problems in attempting to provide such figures, such as the constantly changing numbers around the royal family and the definition of the scope of the Court itself. To illustrate the extent of these problems one has only to look at previous efforts to provide such a number. It has been estimated in one work that there were 76 personal attendants to Charles II in 1652, while another estimate puts the numbers of attendants at Court in the period 1656 to 1660 at anywhere from 50 to 80. These varying estimates do not give any indication of the complete figures for all the royal households together, however, and there is nothing to give a guide to the numbers at Court who held no formal position or who simply turned up from time to time, as some most definitely did. It is probably for all these reasons then that no one, including Reynolds, has attempted to estimate the full size of the Court at any one time during the exile.3

Instead, this section will seek to address questions relating to how, given the ostensible differences between this Court and others, the Irish courtiers would have behaved within such an environment. It will seek to examine how they would have participated in and contributed to the general life and activities of the Court. It will examine their roles within the private households of the royal family, their contribution to the ordering of the daily life of that dynasty, their parts in the display and ceremony of the Court, and how they assisted in expressing the power and status of the royal family. It will, furthermore, seek to get an insight into how they would have interacted with the other courtiers within it and how the Court impacted upon their lives and behaviour. This section, therefore, will be mainly concerned with

examining the nature of the Irish courtly émigrés’ relationship with the Stuart Court in exile, their behaviour within it and how their roles within a corporate body such as this affected their personal experiences of expatriation. Aside from the above motivations, however, this section is also partly written with the desire to see if this body conforms in any way to the model of the early-modern court that has been handed down to us by the existing historiography, or if, as a consequence of being stateless, it can be justifiably excluded from the canon of work on early-modern English courts, as some seem to have done.4

First, it has to be stated here that I am working on the assumption that this institution can still be considered to be a genuine royal court. I make this supposition simply because, even in the face of a reduction in its political power, it still continued to be the private household (or, as we will see later, households) of a royal dynasty. In the diplomatic correspondence of the Venetian ambassadors of the 1650s, for instance, Charles II is frequently referred to as a king, or as a prince. This Prince and his familial line, moreover, continued to be accepted by many others on the Continent as a legitimate royal family. They also retained considerable support and acceptance as such in Britain and Ireland at this time. There were even those intelligence agents who, despite being in the employ of the Cromwellian regime, would refer to Charles II as the ‘King of Scots’.5 This retention of support in their native kingdoms is hardly surprising. The fact of the matter was that those who supported the royalist cause and

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4 See, for example, John Adamson, ‘The Tudor and Stuart Courts; 1509-1714’, pp. 97-9.
5 CVSP, vol. XXXI, (London, 1931), 1657-1659, Francesco Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, 20 April 1657, p. 43. The Queen of Denmark’s letter to the King of Scots, now resident in the city of Paris… (London, 1652), pp. 1-6. Thurloe State papers, vol. V, A letter of intelligence, 19 August 1656, p. 294. Concerning the retention of support in Britain and Ireland by the exiled royal family, Irish Language poetry, a common medium for political views in Ireland at this time, frequently expressed support for the Stuarts and their adherents during this decade. For example, one poem written in the late 1650s by Eamonn an Dúna, entitled ‘Mo lá leóin go deó go n-eagad’, lamented the execution of Charles I, and prayed for the day that both the crowned King (Charles II) and the Duke of York, would return to power. Cecile O’Rahilly, Five seventeenth century poems (Dublin, 1952), pp. 99-100. Continued adherence to the Monarchy in Britain is well-documented in the general histories of the period. For Scotland, cf. Jane Mitchison, Lordship to Patronage: Scotland 1603-1745, pp.62-4. For England, one need only refer to such events as Penruddock’s Rising, and the activities of royalist groups there, such as the Sealed Knot. Cf. Robert Ashton, Reformation and Revolution 1558-1660 (London, 1984), p. 409.
monarchical government were generally representing the views of the vast majority of the political nation. In short, despite the exile, the Stuarts still had the power of traditional legitimacy (i.e. the belief that they were entitled to power and to the political loyalty of a particular people or peoples because political tradition said so) on their side and they were still seen as a royal dynasty by many. Consequently, it is no exaggeration to say that the collected households of Charles II and his family constituted a royal court. Within these households the daily lives of the members of a royal dynasty were organised, their welfare was provided for, representatives of foreign powers and diverse interests were received and the leading supporters of the Prince came together.

One Court or three?

Of course, this is not to say that this exiled Court was not unique in some ways. For instance, when looking at it in the 1650, and when seeking to define its principal characteristics, one ends up posing a question on whether or not this was actually the type of unified body that most historians and sociologists mean when they talk about a royal court. To illustrate this point more clearly, a comparison shall be made here between the exiled Court of Charles II of the 1650s and that of his brother, James II, in the wake of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The first point to be made is that the latter’s exiled Court and that of his successors, was based for a number of generations at the French palace of Saint Germain-en-Laye. Lack of funds, moreover, was not a major problem for James II and his courtiers. A generous provision from Louis XIV, the lack of any large overheads (e.g. maintaining a palace, which was done at the expense of the French kingdom) and the fact that he could still rely on monetary aid from many of his supporters in Britain and Ireland, allowed him great scope when it came to the matter of maintaining public displays in support of his claim to kingship. This Court, moreover, also had a palace and because it was not impoverished it meant that the rest of his exiled family could, and did, reside with

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7 This type of comparison has been made before, though for a slightly different purpose. Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac has drawn attention to the differences between those exiled with Charles II in the 1650s and those exiled with James II at the end of the Seventeenth century. Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac, ‘Jacobites in Paris and Saint-Germain-en-Laye’, Edward Corp and Eveline Cruickshanks (Eds) The Stuart Court in Exile and the Jacobites, p. 38.
King James at Saint Germain-en-Laye. This allowed all members of this deposed branch of the Stuart dynasty to participate in common rituals and etiquette, and permitted the courtiers who served it to be concentrated in one locale, if not in the same building.  

These were not advantages that Charles II’s exiled Court necessarily had, however, and for a number of reasons its constituent parts were divided from each other at certain times during the decade in exile. For one, there was the problem of a lack of a permanent palatial residence. All through the 1650s the second Charles Stuart was obliged to move between diverse states and kingdoms, including France, the Spanish Netherlands, the United Provinces, the Holy Roman Empire and Scotland. Even within kingdoms, he had to move between residences. In the latter part of 1653, to cite one instance, he found it convenient to move into the residence of the Prince of Condé in Paris. Therefore, it is fair to say that, unlike his brother and heir some four decades later, he lacked the advantage of a permanent abode. Bearing in mind the way that the physical layout of a prince’s palace is considered by historians to have been important to the organisation of his household then the lack of a permanent residence, with the consistent physical layout that this implies, suggests that there would have been some instability in the organisation of this Court’s daily life. It also would have meant that Charles II would have lacked a place in which he could gather his family and the most important of his followers around him and in which he could control etiquette, ceremony and ritual. Indeed, even when he and his brother, the Duke of York, resided in the Spanish Netherlands together, the lack of a permanent residence for the use of the Stuart dynasty meant that the brothers lived separately. On one occasion the Earl of Castlehaven rented a completely separate house for the Duke, despite Charles II’s advisors desire to sublet the King’s residence to his brother. This may have reduced his control over the various elements and groups amongst his supporters, including the members of his own family.

Yet, one should not become too carried away with the disadvantages of this situation for the Court of Charles II. After all, as many commentators have pointed out, it was not unusual for the courts of previous English monarchs to be on the move. This had certainly been the norm during the Tudor era and during the early Stuart period the royal Court moved around during the spring and summer seasons. The major differences were that these precursors of the exiled Court moved within their own territories and also had definite royal residences to return to. Even then, established residences for royal households in north-western Europe had only become the norm in the late-sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The problems that arose for Charles II, therefore, may not have been that his Court was peripatetic as such, but rather that it was peripatetic within kingdoms that were not its own and that it lacked a firm administrative and ceremonial centre around which it could arrange its movements, as well as the daily life and rituals of the complete royal family. Even this last disadvantage, however, may not have been so great. We know that Charles II modified the architecture of at least one of his residences in the Spanish Netherlands, which suggests that steps were taken to put some order on the physical environment in which this Court’s ceremony would have been carried out.

Aside from the absence of a permanent seat, there was also the issue of financial resources. Put simply, despite having the means of raising some money, which will be detailed in the next chapter, Charles II lacked sufficient funds to meet his needs throughout the exile. This curtailed the Court’s ability to provide hospitality and to indulge in public display; two of the very things that contemporaries would have expected of it. In 1651, for example, the Duke of York, while sojourning in Brussels, found it impossible to supply the number of meals that he was expected to

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14 For example, Edward Hyde frequently complained about the fact that promised financial assistance for Charles II never came and he was frequently involved in the search for money. *The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. II*, instructions from the King to Cottington and Hyde, 24 May 1649, p. 12. Ibid, Hyde to Cottington, 26 April 1650, p. 55. Ibid, Hyde to Nicholas, 26 July 1652, p. 141.
provide for himself and his entourage. This problem likewise meant that Charles II could not keep both members of his royal family and many of his most valuable supporters around him, on a permanent basis at least. Daniel O’Neill, who was a groom of the bedchamber since the 1640s and one of the King’s inner circle of councillors in the 1650s, spent much of that decade away from the King, either on royalist missions or in the United Provinces, at the Court of Princess Mary. This reality affected the whole royal family and their households early in the exile. From 1649 onwards they had to begin reducing the number of servants that they employed. Also, in late 1653, partly as a result of the need to keep costs under control, Charles II had to limit the number of people who followed him to the Holy Roman Empire. This created great concern among certain courtiers, who feared that they would become isolated from the King. Lord Hatton, to give one instance, was to lobby Ormonde very strongly at the end of 1654 in an effort to secure the post of governor to the Duke of Gloucester. He strongly desired to leave the Louvre and join Charles II in Cologne. The problem of providing for the royal family and the Court at large was also recognised in the early 1650s, when several of those closest to Charles II commented on the need for the Duke of York to stay on good terms with the French Court, as this was both a potential source of funds and employment for him.

As things turned out, the Heir Presumptive did find employment with the French as an army officer in the 1650s and this drew him away from both his brother and his mother. For large periods of the exile in fact, Charles II, James, Duke of York, and the Queen Mother, Henrietta Maria, arguably the most important members of the exiled dynasty, were separated from each other. Of these three, only Henrietta Maria and James had anything close to a fixed residence for large parts of the exile, in Paris; the Queen Mother having been assigned thirty furnished rooms for herself and

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her courtiers in the Louvre in 1644. In terms of ritual and ceremony at least, this would, if we accept the dominant models in the field of court studies, have given her a decided advantage over the head of the dynasty and it is noteworthy that Henrietta Maria immediately embarked upon displays typical of royalty, such as public dining, upon her arrival at the Louvre. The fact that Henrietta Maria was in receipt of a pension from the French Crown, estimated to be worth roughly thirty thousand livres per month in the mid-to-late 1640s, would have added to her advantage, as it would have added to her ability to dispense patronage, as Hyde later testified to, though it should be pointed out here that this stipend was rather irregularly paid and she did suffer from periodic bouts of poverty.18

James’ employment as a military officer by the French for much of the early part of his exile, on the other hand, did not hamper him here, as warfare was seasonal and he returned to the Louvre when the campaigning season ended and thus, up until 1656 at any rate, he could share in the advantages of this palace. His military appointments, on the other hand, complemented this nicely as it presented him with a reason to remove himself from the presence and influence of the other members of his dynasty, for the campaigning season at least, and thus would have reduced his dependence upon his mother’s household. It also made him more financially independent of both her and his brother for a noticeable part of the exile. Bearing in mind that, prior to his commission, he had embarked upon an extended quarrel with his mother in an effort to end her dominance over royalist affairs on the Continent in the early years of the decade, then it is clear that the freedom military service gave the Duke was valuable to him.19 It was not just York who gained freedom and an income by being a military officer. Many of his household also served beside him as military officers with the French or, later on, with the Spanish. This gave them incomes of their own and reduced the need for him to provide for his courtiers. From 1656 Richard Talbot, to cite one example, was both a soldier in the Spanish service and groom of the bedchamber to the Duke. Richard Grace, likewise, served as a military officer for the French and Spanish with York, while also being the Duke’s


19 For further details on this quarrel, see pp. 254-63, below.
In other words, they both had their own source of funds and were not dependant upon their offices in York's household for their daily bread. These military stipends certainly helped the Duke to maintain a fitting household during his time in Flanders and his courtiers found it easier to maintain themselves in a fashion befitting their status, as contemporary intelligence reports describing how they were able to maintain carriages for themselves demonstrate.

More importantly, if Charles II's efforts to keep his brother near him in the Spanish Netherlands in the wake of the royalist alliance with Spain in 1656 are anything to go by, it is clear that York became an important figure in the royalists' efforts as a result of his military employment. This is partly because he acquired a considerable amount of prestige through his military endeavours, as is made obvious from the honours that the Spanish offered him in the later part of the exile. When one considers the importance of military service to noble culture in the early modern period, this is hardly surprising. Aside from that, his military office also gave him a substantial amount of influence over the mercenary troops the Stuarts depended on and, from the point of view of the exiled Irish elite, it is clear that York became an important figure for many of them. This was because, as we have seen, many of them established themselves as military commanders in the early and middle years of the 1650s and this ultimately brought them into the circle of the Duke of York. Persons like James Dillon, Richard Talbot, Viscount Muskerry and Sir Richard Grace, though they followed different routes, ended up in the French service under the direct command of the Duke of York by the middle of the decade. We have also seen how some of them even ended up as part of his household. This was also true of other Irish commanders, who were brought into French service prior to 1656 by York and who received financial rewards for doing so through him. All this must have seen York become an alternative source of patronage and reward for the Irish elite, particularly those mercenary commanders amongst them and it is no surprise that he

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came to be seen as someone who had great influence over the expatriate Irish soldiery on the Continent.

One can take this line of argument about the increased power and independence of what should, under normal circumstances, have been the minor branches of the Stuart households even further, if one wishes. There is a strong case to be made that while the Courts of the Queen Mother and the Heir Presumptive may have become more independent of the household of Charles II, they may have, at the same time, become more dependent, to some degree at least, on other courts. This is certainly implied by N. A. C. Reynolds, who argues that, while Henrietta Maria was treated in a manner appropriate to her station by the French Court, this owed to more to the fact that she was a daughter of France and not the Queen Mother of Britain and Ireland.23 Her household, he argues, effectively became a sub-court within the wider Court of the French royal family. It may also partly-account for the fact that Henrietta Maria remained in Paris after 1656, at a time when her sons had all moved to the Spanish Netherlands as part of the Stuarts’ military alliance with Spain; a move which, of course, put the royalists at war with France.24 Even then, James Stuart was reluctant to move to the Spanish Netherlands for a number of reasons. Both he and his mother felt that he owed a debt of honour to the French. Furthermore, they believed that if he remained in Louis XIV’s service he would be keeping the possibility of royalists receiving French assistance in the future alive. Adding to this, York personally felt a strong attachment to Marshal Turenne, Louis XIV’s military

23 Neil Anthony Charles Reynolds, The Stuart Court and courtiers in exile 1644-1654, p. 48. This argument may need to be qualified to some extent, however. When describing some of the ritual surrounding Henrietta Maria on her arrival in France in 1644, while stating on one occasion that she was due deference because she was a daughter of France, Nicolas Sainctot also stated that she was at times received ‘de la même manière que si c’eût été le Roi.’ In this manner, rather than reducing her status, the exile may have elevated her, as it led to her being treated as a substitute for Charles I. Henriette Marie de France, Reine d’Angleterre (1609-1669): ses malheurs – se réfugie en France, p. 22. Ibid, p.24.

24 One should also bear in mind, however, that there were reports at this time that the Spanish, unsurprisingly, had a great distrust of Henrietta Maria. Thurloe State Papers, vol. IV, B. Wright to Walter Dongan, 28 March 1656, pp. 628-9.
commander, and was not above discussing Stuart concerns with him.\(^{25}\) Indeed, one can take this line of argument about royalist dependence on other courts further still and extend it to the household of the King himself. A strong case could be made for Charles II’s Court being both financially and politically dependent on other courts. This argument is exemplified equally well by its dependence on funds from the Spanish between 1656 and 1660, and by royalist fears of being politically isolated and abandoned in the lead-up to the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659.\(^{26}\)

The removal of other members of the royal family from Charles’ presence for long periods of the exile, their lack of material dependence of him and their integration into other royal courts all combined to make it hard for the King to control his own kin. One inter-familial dispute between the Stuarts during the 1650s, carried on between Henrietta Maria and Charles II over the education of the Duke of Gloucester in late 1654, demonstrates that geographical separateness and an imbalance in the distribution of material resources probably made it even harder for Charles II’s to control the actions of his family than it normally would have been. In the latter case Henrietta Maria was able to disobey her son’s orders simply because Gloucester resided with her in Paris while the King was a distant figure in Cologne. This situation had come to exist because Charles II lacked the means to provide for the young Duke. These problems, moreover, existed between the Stuarts even when they were within easy reach of each other. After 1656 James and Charles Stuart were physically quite close to each other, but there were still instances when the Duke of York blatantly went against his brother’s wishes. James, as noted earlier, had previously had a falling out with his Mother prior to this, in 1650, at a time when he was residing with her in Paris.\(^{27}\)

These particular disputes will be detailed later in this work, where it will be shown how assorted courtiers, including those Irish in the various households, provoked them and played on them in an effort to increase the influence and achieve their political goals. Nonetheless, it is enough to refer to them at this moment simply


\(^{26}\) Ronald Hutton, *Charles II*, p. 115. AGR, Secrétairerie d’État et De Guerre, Memorial of Henry Bennett to Don Luis de Haro, Registre 262, 26 May 1657; f. 112.

\(^{27}\) W. C. Turner, *James II*, p. 42. See pp. 254-63, below, for details of James’ dispute with his mother.
to show that inter-dynastic rivalry, even without the family members being removed from each other, was something that was a problem for the exiled Stuarts anyway. One should not make the mistake, moreover, of assuming that Charles II was the only monarch to have problems controlling the other members of his dynasty. This is certainly not true. Leaving the Stuarts aside for a moment, the role to be played by sub-households was a problem for all royal dynasties at this time, regardless of whether they were in exile or not. As a cursory glance at a history of the French wars of Religion, for example, will show, monarchs often found it difficult to control dynastic members anyway and the work of Elias has highlighted how tensions and divisions within a royal family were not uncommon. Furthermore, the problem of Stuart infighting was not unique to the exile and was certainly a cause of strife for the dynasty prior to the 1650s. Henrietta Maria’s household had already proven itself to be influential in the 1630s and 1640s, for instance, and tensions had developed as a result.28 Overall, it is no surprise that separate households should hold to diverse political views and have separate lives, as most of the non-monarchical royal households within early modern courts frequently acted as rival political and social centres to that of the monarch.

It is clear that, for long stretches of the 1650s, the royal households that constituted the Stuart Court were separated from, and independent of, each other, particularly in the middle part of the decade. In short, they lived separate lives and often had little to do with one another. They were, undoubtedly, for many years of the exile, though certainly not for all of it, separate courts which happened to be pursuing the same goal. This separation of the households can even be seen in the existing, but admittedly thin, historiography of the exiled Court. Most evidently, it can be seen in the descriptions of the factions within it. As we have seen, the two major factions mentioned included one which was supposedly centred on Henrietta Maria’s household, the eponymously-named Louvre set, and another which ultimately came to be dominated by those closest to the King, the old royalists. This is not an unreasonable division and it has to be said that when factional strife did take place it

did tend to put one household at loggerheads with another.\(^{29}\) Again we must be careful in drawing our conclusions on the nature of this exiled Court. Exile may have exaggerated the differences between the households but it did not necessarily create them. The cursory comparisons that we have drawn with other courts show that the problem of divisions between constituent households was not unique to the dethroned Stuarts. It may only have been a bit more pronounced. Besides, separate as the households clearly were, it does not mean that there were no channels of communication between them. Hutton, as we have already mentioned, drew attention to how Lord Hatton was a source of information on the Louvre’s actions to persons like Edward Nicholas. We shall also see later on how George Radcliffe fulfilled a similar function.\(^ {30}\)

Radcliffe was not the only Irish courtier involved in maintaining the links between all the households. It is also fair to say that while Ormonde was frequently an opponent of the political schemes that arose amongst the Queen Mother’s or the Heir’s courtiers, this did not mean that he was completely cut off from the persons that made up these households. As we have seen, and as we shall see later on, he could and did co-operate with key figures in these sub-courts on such issues as personal dynastic concerns, the distribution of patronage, or the organisation of personal maintenance. Most notable amongst these was Lord Jermyn, the Queen Mother’s chief councillor.\(^ {31}\) With regard to York’s household, we have already described how the Lord Lieutenant was connected in a variety of ways to the Irish mercenary officer elite that surrounded the heir in the mid-1650s. As we shall see, these bonds and social ties, combined with his own status, made him someone who could work with the persons who made up all three households and it is no surprise that it was he who was employed as a sort of unofficial ambassador from the King to the other sub-courts in the above-mentioned factional disputes. He had both the means, through his own contacts, and the status to make himself heard within them.\(^ {32}\) Through the intercession of persons such as Ormonde, then, these divided households could work with each other.

\(^{29}\) See pp. 229-48, below.

\(^{30}\) See p. 24, above. See also, pp. 270-82, below.

\(^{31}\) See p. 82, above. See also, pp. 185-90, below.

\(^{32}\) See pp. 87-91, above. See also, pp. 273-9, below.
The relationship of the Stuart households to the Courts within its host countries

It was not just the relationship between the households that made up the Stuart Court that was difficult. The nature of the associations between the Stuart households and the courts that hosted them during the Interregnum are likewise best described as mixed. On the one hand the Stuart royalty was received within them with great formality and ritual. When Charles II arrived in France in 1647 and in 1649 he was met in the manner of an honoured guest.33 We have also seen that resources, such as rooms and funds, were also given to these exiles, on paper at least. Yet, in practice, the presence of Charles II’s family at, or even near, the royal court of another kingdom could pose problems and the end result was that the Stuarts were not always treated in a royal manner by their hosts. Most strikingly, the Bourbons sometimes left Henrietta Maria without even the most basic of resources, such as timber for her fireplace.

There were a number of reasons for this kind of treatment. At the very least, the English households were an added financial burden and a strain on resources. Both the French and the Spanish ruling dynasties ended up granting pensions to the Stuarts over the course of the decade, yet neither were to pay them on time. Second, the paraphernalia that this exiled court brought with it was not necessarily welcome. It was a Protestant court with its own Protestant Church. For the host Catholic royal families this was potentially a serious problem. It is no wonder then that Charles II’s Protestant courtiers were forced to go outside the Louvre to the old royalist embassy for religious service. Of course, this meant that an important ceremonial part of the exiled King’s household was removed from his presence while he was in Paris. The Spanish went even further, being continuously reluctant to receive any part of the Stuart courts into their territories, even after they made an alliance with Charles II in 1656. Even after they allowed the King’s Court into the Spanish Netherlands that year, he was obliged to take up residence in Bruges, away from the political capital of the territory in Brussels.34 The English royal family could also be a diplomatic

34 BL Add. Ms 34702, Browne to Radcliffe, 8 October 1655, f. 133. AGR, Secrétairerie d’Etat et De Guerre, Account of the money to be paid out in Flanders (in arrears), 21 November 1659; Registre 265, f. 323. Memoires; Cardinal de Retz, p. 223. Ronald Hutton, Charles the Second, p. 102. See also pp. 346-54, below.
embarrassment. To cite the best example, Mazarin’s efforts to form an alliance with
the Commonwealth of England in the mid-1650s were hindered by Cromwell’s
suspicions of France. These arose out of the Lord Protector’s resentment at the
Bourbons providing shelter to the Stuarts. To allay these suspicions in mid-1653 the
Cardinal had to plead that the Stuarts had only been received into France as guests,
and only then because it would have been dishonourable for the Bourbons to turn
them away.35

This type of behaviour created problems for the Stuarts and France’s pursuit of a
foreign policy that was anathema to the royalists obviously forced Charles II to
reconsider his relationship with that kingdom. Yet there was little he could do about
the Bourbon’s stance: king though he was, he was not the master of the royal
household in which he lived and he could not give expression to his anger at the
policy in a kingly way (i.e. he could not reverse it). Instead, he could only manifest
his annoyance in a manner that was more typical of a mere courtier. He therefore
took on the attitude of a discontent and withdrew from the French court in late-1653,
taking up residence, as mentioned earlier, in one of the homes of the Prince of Condé.
Charles II was not the only one reduced to the status of a courtier within the French
Court. Henrietta Maria also ended up taking on at least part of a courtier’s aspect in
the Bourbon household. Though she had a great degree of access to the French royal
family it was also true that she had to apply to the chief ministers of that household,
especially Mazarin, almost in the manner of a client. For instance, writing to Mazarin
in the period just before Charles II went to Scotland, she informed Mazarin that her
eldest son was anxious to quit France. ‘He only waits the means, to which I beg you
to contribute, as you have always done to all that concerns us.’ Similarly, some seven
years later, she wrote to Mazarin asking him to take the part of her daughter Mary in a
dispute within the United Provinces. In short, Henrietta Maria was reduced to being a
supplicant for favour from the Cardinal.36

35 E. De Boccard (Ed.), Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France
depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu’a la Revolution Francaise, vol. XXIV; Angleterre, tome
M.A. Everett Green (Ed.), Letters of Queen Henrietta Maria: including her private correspondence
with Charles I, collected from the public archives and private libraries of France and England
The characteristics of a courtier in the exiled Court

When one talks of a particular court, one must deal with more than the royal family. One must also refer to the courtiers and it is necessary to explain who exactly these persons were; that is to say, describe what their backgrounds were, how one would have acted like a courtier in this specific setting and how one came to be defined as a courtier within it. One thing that can be said immediately is that constant, or even regular, attendance upon the monarch, or upon some other member of the royal family, cannot be listed as one of the exiled courtiers’ defining characteristics. In contrast to those courtiers who were at the centre of Elias’ thesis on the Early Modern court, those who were most closely associated with Charles II or, indeed, the other exiled Stuarts, were not always in their presence. During the period c.1649 - May 1660 the particular group of Irish émigrés under study here and other Stuart attendants, though they certainly associated themselves with the exiled Court of Charles II, were not always to be found around members of the royal family. Their level and frequency of attendance at Court varied greatly, depending upon their individual circumstances. Some of those who did not attend at Court for extended periods of time did so because they were employed elsewhere by their Monarch. A few, for instance, acted as ambassadors to the various states and kingdoms of Continental Europe on behalf of the Stuart Court. Others, however, involved themselves in different activities during their time in exile. Some, as described in an earlier chapter, followed one of the traditional career paths of many Irish exiles in Early Modern Europe and became mercenaries in the employ of other dynasties.

It should be emphasised here, though, that those who involved themselves in mercenary, or indeed, other activities, did not completely distance themselves from the exiled Stuart Court by doing so. One example of this is Murrough O’Brien, Baron (later Earl) of Inchiquin. Even though he made his living as a military commander in the employ of dynasties other than that of the Stuarts during the 1650s, he was also appointed as a councillor to Charles II during this time and his choice of military employer was, at certain times at least, affected by the political needs of the Stuart Court. This was even truer of Richard Grace. He initially distanced himself from the

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37 For example, Sir Daniel O’Neill acted as ambassador to the Court household of Mary, Princess of Orange in the early 1650s. Donal F. Cregan, ‘An Irish Cavalier: Daniel O’Neill in Exile and Restoration, 1651-64’, pp. 43-78.
Court by taking employment with the Spanish army but he quit their service to join the French and the Duke of York in 1653. Then, in 1656, he quit French service to rejoin the Spanish, following the Duke and moving closer to Charles II in doing so. It should also be acknowledged that these exiles were not the only courtiers to serve more than one dynasty and some of those at the centre of this study already had a long-established record of finding employment with princely dynasties that were not their natural overlords. In the 1630s Daniel O’Neill, to name one, fought as a soldier with the House of Orange in the Netherlands and became known in that Court and the household of the exiled Winter Queen. When the fighting season ended in that decade he had simply returned to Whitehall.

Murrough O’Brien’s case also illustrates other points which we should bear in mind. First, just because a courtier was geographically removed from the person of the King, or indeed, other members of the royal family, it did not mean that he (or she) could not contribute to life within the Court society, particularly a court society that found itself in this specific predicament. As the numbers within the Stuart Court were relatively low when compared with other such institutions and as many of these people were obliged, for one reason or another, to be away from the royal family, the royalist elite were compelled to frequently write to those at Court in order to stay in touch with developments, look after their interests, and influence events there; a practice that was common amongst most of the western European elite at the time and which, aside from aiding them in maintaining their network of contacts, would surely have allowed them to continue to play a part in the Court’s society. Inchiquin provides a perfect illustration of this. Geographic distance did not remove him from the network of the exiled Stuart Court nobility. Even while on military service with the French army he was in frequent correspondence with the Marquis of Ormonde, Charles II’s almost constant companion. In one letter, for instance, written in August 1654, Inchiquin lobbied Ormonde on behalf of a client who desired to be granted a baronetcy, while also seeking the title of Earl for himself. He also provided financial details of the privateering enterprises that both he and Ormonde had a stake in and


which were of some economic and political importance to both themselves and the Court. He provided Ormonde with details, moreover, of French army movements.\footnote{HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), 31 August 1654, Inchiquin to Ormonde, pp. 305-6.} For a group of persons whose fate seemingly depended upon gaining the assistance of foreign governments, particularly in the form of military aid, such information was potentially vital and would therefore have influenced the Court’s policy and actions.

It has been pointed out by many critics of Elias, of course, that constant attendance upon a monarch was far from the norm in most Early Modern European royal courts anyway and this was certainly true of the Stuart Court throughout the Early Modern period, whether it was in exile or not. Even major office holders within the household of the ante-bellum Stuart Court held their offices within a rota system, so as to allow them to be absent in the localities for up to three-quarters of the year. Furthermore, constant attendance was not even the norm at the Court of Louis XIV, which Elias studied, during the 1650s.\footnote{Jeroen Duindam, \textit{Myths of Power}, p. 49.} In this broad sense then, these courtiers were not unusual. The specific reasons for their non-attendance at the various Stuart courts frequently differ in important ways from those of ‘regular courtiers’ however. Ormonde, to cite one example, declined to attend on Henrietta Maria for an extended period in 1651 by expressing a desire not to be an expense to the royal family, though this was probably nothing more than a convenient excuse at the time to avoid attendance. That said, Lord Taaffe, who was definitely in Charles II’s favour in the mid-1650s, also cited a desire not to be a burden on the Monarch as a reason for not joining the latter’s court in 1655.\footnote{HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Ormonde to Inchiquin, 3 August 1651, pp. 178-9. Ibid, Taaffe to Ormonde, 23 April 1655, p. 317.} The relative poverty of the Court also stopped others from residing there, or at least forced them to consider the possibility of withdrawing. In October 1651 Sir George Radcliffe wrote a letter to Edward Nicholas, in which he spoke of withdrawing from the Court, then in Paris, and coming to terms with the Parliamentary regime in England, as the Stuarts would not provide for him anymore. In fact, it is fair to say that penury in general had a major role to

\footnote{HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), 31 August 1654, Inchiquin to Ormonde, pp. 305-6.}


\footnote{HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Ormonde to Inchiquin, 3 August 1651, pp. 178-9. Ibid, Taaffe to Ormonde, 23 April 1655, p. 317.}
play in preventing persons from residing with, or near, the Stuart Court. Aside from
the fact that the Court would not support him, Radcliffe also wished to withdraw from
Paris and the Stuart Court there in the mid-1650s, simply because he wished to live
somewhere less expensive.43

**The characteristics of a courtier in the exiled Court: reasons for absence from
the Court**

When we analyse the nature of attendance of the courtiers at Court during the
exile in order to identify their unique characteristics, if any, we find that we must
consider two distinct aspects of the question: their reasons for absence and their
reasons for attendance. Let us consider the former issue first. It is clear that there
were a number of reasons for temporary non-attendance at court during the exile. For
one, either the Court or necessity required them to be elsewhere. A person such as
Daniel O’Neill was removed from the King’s presence by the need to use all available
persons as ambassadors or agents, for instance. In the above-mentioned case of
Inchiquin, who was removed from Charles II’s company by his need to support
himself, it may be the case that the Court was grateful that he was away. After all, his
absence allowed him to supply potentially important information to the Court. He
was also helping maintain undoubtedly important contacts with the Irish mercenary
community and there is also the important consideration that his absence prevented
him from being a financial burden to the Crown. As pointed out earlier, relative
poverty, both on the part of the courtiers and the Court, also obliged persons to
remove themselves from the presence of the royal family. On the other hand, in
contrast to other courts, the usual obligation on the nobility to return home and look
after affairs within their own domains of influence was not something that could
usually draw these courtiers away from the Court on a temporary basis.44 To return
home in these circumstances was to potentially remove oneself permanently from the
Stuart Court, though not necessarily signifying an abandonment of the royalist cause.

All of the reasons that account for the courtiers’ temporary absences from the
Court highlight some unique characteristics that these persons shared. To begin with,

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43 Ibid, Ormonde to Inchiquin, 3 August 1651, pp. 178-9. BL Eg. Mss 2534, Radcliffe to Nicholas, 14
October 1651, ff. 112-3. Edmund Berwick (Ed.), *The Rawdon Papers*, Radcliffe to Bramhall, no
date, pp. 98-100. For further details on this, see p. 268, below.

these courtiers had to involve themselves in numerous tasks on the Crown’s behalf. They were more than just personal attendants and advisors on the King and the royal family generally. They were also ambassadors, agents and makeshift civil servants of sorts (and, in this sense, the governmental and household aspects of court life may have overlapped to an even greater extent than they did in those of other contemporary courts). All of these employments, though carried out in the Court’s service, frequently drew them away from it. Second, while there was some potential for monetary gain and the cash gained in this way would undoubtedly have been helpful to the exiles (something we have touched on in a previous chapter), the possibility of large-scale financial reward was not something that would have attracted persons to this Court and all those who attended it had to operate within unusual monetary constraints. To highlight one instance, the theft of plates reportedly caused uproar within the Court in 1655.\(^45\) Loyalty to this Court, then, was not inspired by the prospect of riches. Finally, the courtiers and nobility who attended on the royal family were not useful to it because they controlled and dominated large geographical areas and peripheral regions in the traditional manner of early modern elites and nobility. The value of these courtiers to the dynasty, as we shall see, instead lay in their willingness to serve the royalist cause and their ability to provide, through their personal networks, much needed resources, tangible and intangible, which could be potentially transformed into financial and political capital.

**The characteristics of a courtier in the exiled Court: why attend the Court in exile?**

We must now consider the courtiers reasons for waiting on the royal family. As said above, the potential for large-scale financial gain was not something that could have drawn people to the Court. It certainly experienced a diminution of its political power as well, though, as we will again see later, this may not have been as great as one would at first suppose. Aside from these exiled-induced problems, it is also interesting to note that this Court was often spoken of in the negative terms that were used to describe its early Stuart counterparts, and also many of its contemporaries.\(^46\) It was certainly a place which was assumed to be a drain on the


\(^{46}\) Robert Malcolm Smuts, *Court culture and the origins of a royalist tradition in early Stuart England*, p. 74.
courtier. When writing to George Radcliffe in mid-1651 Ormonde wrote in terms which suggested that attending on the Duke of York must have been having a debilitating effect on the former. ‘I am as unfitted’, he wrote, ‘for court attendance as you must be weary of it.’ Radcliffe, who was to soon after lose favour and be sidelined from the Court, actually was to claim to welcome his imminent withdrawal from the royal presence, stating that it was of ‘some contentment’ to him.47

Yet, having said all that, people still attended and we must establish why. To do this we must first of all acknowledge that there were good reasons for attending. For example, though it was certainly short of funds, we must obviously be careful, bearing in mind what we have already noted, not to paint too simple a picture of an impoverished court from which people stayed away simply because they could not make a profit from it. It is, after all, obvious that people did wait on the Stuarts, despite the dynasty’s relative lack of resources. What is more, those persons spoken of above, even though they were not all in constant attendance on the royal family, still attended on the various Stuarts at frequent intervals during the exile, so economic motives were not consistently influential here. All this, of course, suggests that economic factors had no role to play in motivating people to attend Court. This too is an oversimplification, however, and is not true. Firstly, even though the Stuart Court experienced a deficiency in financial wherewithal during the exile, this does not mean that its courtiers and adherents did not expect it to provide for them. Despite the Monarch’s poverty, Charles II was still expected to be generous and bountiful and he knew this. Indeed, at the time that the Court was in uproar over the theft of plate, the exiled King was presenting the Count of Neuburg with the gift of a horse. We have already commented on Henrietta Maria’s pension and the potential it gave her to be a source of patronage.48 Moreover, as we will see in the next chapter, there were means of raising funds available to the Court from which persons could profit, though they were never going to become rich from them. Aside from this, we have also

48 Thurloe State Papers, vol. III, A letter of Intelligence, 5 January 1655, p. 44. Neil Anthony Charles Reynolds, The Stuart Court and courtiers in exile 1644-1654, p. 42. Ibid, p. 48. Reynolds makes this point about the potential for bestowing patronage that Henrietta Maria’s French pension offered her, despite claiming earlier that, ‘for those attending the Stuart Court, the expected financial and honorific benefits were no longer available…’ Ibid, p. 1.
previously noted in this thesis how certain Irish courtiers sought to take advantage of the situation of the Court in order to gain funds. The case of Sir George Hamilton and his scheme for shipping troops to Ireland in mid-1651 has already been referred to.\textsuperscript{49} All that said, however, it still must be conceded that the Court, while not completely lacking in financial means, still found that the level of funds available could, and did, greatly fluctuate, and were, on the whole, greatly reduced by contemporary standards.

While it must have played some small role in motivating attendance, it must have been more than just financial benefit that drew the Irish elite exiles to the assorted Stuart households. The question is what exactly were these other attractions? Earlier in this chapter we referred to Inchiquin’s seeking of an earldom in 1653. His pursuit of this honour, and of a baronetcy for a client, demonstrates one reason why certain persons entered into Charles II’s Court. This was because it was still seen as a place where one could advance oneself socially. The titles dispersed by this Monarch were not seen as valueless and, indeed, seem to have been highly sought after by certain individuals. We should not therefore assume either, as others have done, that a lack of honorific benefits kept people away from the Stuart households.\textsuperscript{50} It is quite clear that persons did still seek to acquire honorific rewards from the Court and involved themselves with it for this reason, at least in part. Aside from the example of Murrough O’Brien and his pursuit of noble title both for himself and his client in 1654, there is also the case of Gervase Holles, who asked Sir George Radcliffe about the possibility of being made a baronet in mid-1652. There is also the case of Lord Wilmot to consider in the same year. When he was appointed ambassador to the Imperial diet at Ratisbon, in order to make up for his lack of financial wherewithal, he sought and obtained the title of Earl of Rochester.\textsuperscript{51} In this regard, Charles II’s Court compares quite favourably with that of his brother’s in the wake of the Glorious Revolution, where its adherents also valued the titles that that Monarch could dispense.\textsuperscript{52}

Of course, it is almost self-evident that there is much more needed than socio-economic reasons to explain why these courtiers came to the exiled household of

\textsuperscript{49} See pp. 204-13, below. See also pp. 88-90, above.

\textsuperscript{50} Neil Anthony Charles Reynolds, \textit{The Stuart Court and courtiers in exile 1644-1654}, p. 1.


Charles II. It is no surprise, therefore, to learn that other works which have studied expatriated royal courts in the Early Modern era have focussed on other motives to explain both the courtiers’ loyalty to the dynasty and the impulses behind such support. Reynolds’ study of the Stuart households in France, to mention one case, quite correctly lays a great deal of emphasis on the role of honour amongst the household officials there, seeing it as a factor which not only led to them adhering to the Court, but also greatly influenced their actions and which also led to personal rivalries forming between the persons involved and to frequent accusations of dishonourable behaviour. Indeed, so important is the question of honour among these courtiers for Reynolds, he devotes a whole chapter to its role in the mental world of the exiles. Within this he makes a strong argument for the concept of honour being one that was closely linked to such notions as the duty of honour imposed on a courtier by personal service to the monarch, the role of the King as ‘pater patriae’, the concept of a blood debt due for Charles I’s execution and the importance of the various oaths of loyalty which had been previously taken to the Crown, most notably the oaths associated with a particular office, as well as those of allegiance and supremacy.53

Without going into detail on how such a concept would have influenced their actions, one can justifiably say that notions of honour and its related duties, including the notion of the personal service due by the nobility and elite to their monarch, encouraged these persons to join the exiled royals. It is certainly demonstrable that this was the case. George Radcliffe, for one, when it was allegedly put to him in early 1655 that he could dispense with the duty of obeying the King’s command in a given situation responded that allegiance was owed to the Monarch by all and that no one could disregard it so easily. Richard Talbot, furthermore, stated in a letter of 1655 to Ormonde that one would have to become wicked in order to renounce the fidelity that one owed to their rightful prince and went on to claim that he had not put his own fortune above his duty to serve the King. His brother, Peter, also let it be known to Ormonde that he considered the Irish nobility and gentry to be correct in maintaining their loyalty to the Crown as it was ‘according [to] their duty’. Aside from these examples there is Ormonde’s letter to Digby from 1649 stating that they were honour-

bound as royal servants to attempt to restore Charles II or to share in his exile.\(^{54}\) All this is in keeping with accepted notions in historiography. Vale’s work on the princely courts of north-western Europe and Duindam’s survey of historiographical theory on the early modern court, *Myths of Power*, to cite two examples, all draw attention to the strong notion of honour and of personal service to a monarch that existed amongst the nobility in the late medieval and early modern period.\(^{55}\) Despite the disadvantages that the Stuarts operated under in the 1650s, it is fair to say that honour and the idea of personal service due to the body of the King and to the royal family generally, helped to keep adherents loyal to these royals.

The burden of oaths and the notion of an honour vendetta arising out of the regicide of Charles I also played their part. For the Protestant Irish elite the oaths of supremacy and allegiance would certainly have been just as binding on them as they would have been on their English counterparts and, as Reynolds points out, they would have been honour-bound by the terms of these vows. With regard to the Catholic Irish at Court, however, a certain nuance must be highlighted on the question of oaths. They, of course, could not take the previous two oaths in good conscience. Yet, it did not seem that this hindered them as royalist supporters in any way, nor did it hurt them within the Court itself. Other bonds, such as those of a traditional and personal loyalty to the office of Crown and to the King himself, and even to those around the Monarch, were enough to counteract the lack of these sworn oaths. Taaffe, when away from Cologne in 1655, wrote to Ormonde to inform him that he [Taaffe] would not be merry until he was with the Marquis and the King again. Besides this tie, other oaths may well have proven sufficient substitutes and may have been just as effective as bonds of honour. As many of the Irish Catholics had associated themselves with the 1641 rebellion, they would have had taken an oath of association,


which required them to pledge their allegiance to the King. In terms of the vendetta for the regicide, on the other hand, this was straightforward for all the Stuarts adherents abroad. For the Irish Anglican Bishop, Henry Leslie, as we shall see, the execution of Charles I was a crime equal to the deicide of Christ. It is unsurprising that something that was seen as being so heinous should be a source of grievance and Reynolds has highlighted a number of instances where the leading Irish exile, Ormonde, spoke of the duty of revenge placed upon him and other royalists by the killing of Charles I. This too, then, served as a tie of honour that bound the exiled Irish to the Stuarts.

To sum up then, one of the reasons that the Stuart Court could continue to attract adherents and courtiers throughout its exile was linked to concepts of honour and personal service. The belief that loyalty and duty were still personally owed to the royal family meant that many persons felt honour-bound to serve them and for many of the elite this meant not only obeying them but serving them as part of their household. Additionally, despite the exile, the Court still continued to be a relatively attractive place for Irish elite émigrés, and royalist exiles generally, to join. For one, though it is clear that huge fortunes could not be made there, these households were still places where some means could be obtained to support a person and his dependants, either through receiving employment there or, as noted earlier, through the intercession of the royal family with other institutions. For banished persons with uncertain incomes, then, it may still have been an attractive proposition. There was, similarly, still the potential to enhance one’s social status through being associated with exiled royalty. The fact that many persons sought honorific titles from Charles II clearly demonstrates this. In short, while loyalty to the deposed royal family and honour codes are certainly factors in explaining why certain persons became courtiers in the exiled Court, they are not the sole factors behind this. Other traditional explanations within the historiography on Early Modern courts for associating themselves with this body, such as financial and social reward, still carry some weight.


without, at the same time, corresponding exactly to the accepted model that part of the
reason for elite attendance at court was linked to the acquisition of wealth.\textsuperscript{58}

\textbf{The characteristics of a courtier in the exiled Court: gaining access to the royal
family}

In the defining of a courtier within an exiled Court, the question of who
exactly had access to the royals in this Court now arises. First, it almost goes without
stating that the office-holders within the various households all had access. The
dominant household, in theory at least, was that of the King. Prior to the exile this
had been constituted in five parts: the hall, the chamber, the privy lodgings of the
King, the bedchamber and the stables. Of these five departments, the last three were
particularly important, as to hold an office within any of them was to have access to
the King in his more private quarters.\textsuperscript{59} The other households, by the same token, had
traditionally been organised on the same lines as that of the ruling Monarch.

While the exile did force the Stuarts to diminish their establishments, it is still
ture that there were a number of well-placed Irish courtiers within the King’s
household in exile throughout this time. In August 1654, for instance, Hyde listed
three Irish courtiers, Ormonde, O’Neill and George Lane, amongst those he felt were
entitled to board-wages within the King’s household.\textsuperscript{60} It is also fair to say that many
of the elite Irish who made up the Charles II’s household held offices that were, in
name at least, associated with the five departments which constituted the Court prior
to the civil wars. Most of them who had access to the King’s household at this time,
for instance, gained this through their membership of the Privy Council, an office
which, aside from its conciliar function, would have entitled them access to the King’s
privy chambers. Ormonde, Lane, Inchiquin and Taaffe all became members of this
council during the 1650s. Ormonde, as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland was already an ex-
officio member of the Privy Council. George Lane probably initially gained access to
the council by being Ormonde’s secretary, but by 1653 he had been appointed clerk to
the council and by 1655 he was being described as secretary to the King and had
certainly been made clerk to the Privy Council by 1656. Inchiquin for his part was

\textsuperscript{58} See pp. 96-102, above.
\textsuperscript{60} The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. II, Hyde to Charles II, 1 August 1654, pp. 386-7.
appointed a privy councillor in 1652 and Taaffe had become a councillor in 1654. Aside from this means, there were also other offices which allowed Irish courtiers the right of membership of the household. Daniel O’Neill, for instance, had previously been appointed as a groom of the bedchamber to Charles I in 1644 and maintained this office right through until his death after the Restoration. Bramhall, on the other hand, gained access to the household partly as a result of his religious office, particularly from 1656 onwards. After Charles II moved to the Spanish Netherlands that year the bishop began to act as a cleric to the Court and attracted attention to himself through his anti-Cromwellian preaching to the courtiers.

Similarly a number of Irish courtiers were guaranteed access to the Stuart heir through the offices they held. Initially, the most influential Irish courtier within York’s household was Sir George Radcliffe, who seems to have been one of the dominant courtiers within that establishment between 1650 and mid-1651, without actually ever holding a formal position within it. He was to subsequently lose his position afterwards, however, though he was to remain on the edges of the heir’s Court in the following years. This is not to say that there were no Irish persons of influence in York’s household afterwards. Indeed, a number of Irish soldiery became close companions of the Duke after he became an officer in the French army. For example, one of York’s grooms of the bedchamber from the mid-1650s was Richard Talbot. Richard Grace, as already noted, was chamberlain to the Duke. Well-positioned as he was within it, Richard Talbot’s influence in York’s household could only have been added to by his two brothers, the Catholic priests Thomas and Peter, joining this Court in the mid-1650s and it seems that the former was quite an important figure in the heir’s Court by the end of the decade, as Hyde lists him as being amongst the most influential men around the Duke in 1659. Indeed, one can

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63 See pp. 251-87, below for fuller details on this.

argue that the influence of the Talbots would have extended much further than the
heir’s household. In 1654 Thomas had been described as chief almoner to Henrietta
Maria and during the years in Flanders he resided with the horse guard of the Duke of
York, being described there as ‘pro Vicario de las tropas del rey de la gran Bretaña’ in
1658; a position which would have given him great influence with the Irish troops
serving the Stuarts. Peter, meanwhile, was a Jesuit who frequently acted as an
ambassador for the Stuarts to various bodies and institutions during the interregnum.65

While it is evident that office-holding guaranteed access to royalty in this
Court, this is not to say that the five departments of the early Stuart Court were
transferred to the Continent and that the functions certain courtiers carried out
corresponded exactly with the offices they held. Cardinal de Retz described Taaffe as
being the King’s chamberlain, valet, squire and butler. Indeed, it seems that Taaffe
was quite important to the organising of entertainments as well. He was involved in
securing musicians for the Court in summer 1654, for instance. Moreover, the editor
of much of the published Carlingford papers, being the correspondence of the Taaffes,
has not unjustifiably described this lord as being Charles II’s ‘unofficial master of the
revels’.66 Despite all this, however, it seems that he held no other formal office within
the Court aside from that of privy councillor. This Court’s organisation, then, was
obviously not as its predecessor’s had been, with the key office-holders functions
taking on more roles than they normally would have and a more informal style of
personal service to the Monarch developing. That said, this does not mean that daily
life within the King’s household was not organised or haphazard, nor does it mean
that the functions of royal servants that were designed both to serve a royal and to add
to his/her dignity were not carried out. Taaffe may have had filled many roles but this
shows that there was a conscious effort made in the exiled Court to carry out all those
duties that were traditionally associated with serving a king. These duties included
those which involved public display and ritual designed to elevate the person of the

65 BL, Add Mss. 15856, Passes for Father Thomas Talbot, 25 November 1654, ff. 68-68b. HMC,
Marquis of Bath (vol. II), 14 September 1659, Hyde to Holles, p. 139. AGR, Archives de l’Audience,
Letters pertaining to foreign affairs, Grande Bretagne, Father Thomas Talbot … a l’audience’, 4
February 1658, Registre 2207. See pp. 314-24, below.
66 Mémoires; Cardinal de Retz, p. 448. The Letters, Speeches, and Declarations of Charles II, Charles
II to Elizabeth of Bohemia, 6 August 1654, p. 30. Timothy Crist (Ed.), Charles II to Lord Taaffe:
Letters in Exile, p. vi.
King before an audience, such as cup-bearer. This was not just the case with Charles II. When the Duke of York travelled to Brussels in 1650 he did so with a constricted household. Efforts were made, nonetheless, to put it into order. Advisory councils met and certain key functions were given over to particular individuals; most notably George Radcliffe, who had control of that household's finances.\(^{67}\)

As with its contemporaries, office-holding continued to be of key importance when attempting to gain access to the royal family in this Court. Yet, it was never the case in any early-modern Court that one had to be office-holder to be considered a courtier. Similarly, it was not just the officeholders who had the ability to gain access to royalty in this Court. The need for the Stuarts to acquire financial and political support and capital ultimately meant that it was more open to outsiders than was strictly normal. This meant that persons who would not usually have been allowed access to the monarch or his dynasty now had the opportunity to win favour with the royal family, providing that they had something useful to offer. In short, the Court’s predicament made it easier to become a courtier in this institution than one would normally expect it to be. Certainly, this was the case with regard to some of the Irish who attended on Charles II or other members of the royal family at one time or another during the 1650s. From the early days of Charles II’s reign in exile a large Irish community gathered around the Stuart Court in Paris, many of them touting schemes to restore royalist fortunes. So much so, in fact, that in 1653 Hyde was to complain about their numbers and about the variety of schemes to bring about a restoration that they were advocating.\(^{68}\) Many of these Irish, despite their diverse backgrounds, actually were able to gain access to, find favour, and also employment, with the Stuarts. For many of these persons this was a new experience. John Bramhall, for instance, attended the Court in Paris in December 1651 despite his relevant obscurity at that time, and later waited on the Duke of York in Flanders. Yet, as he had clearly stated in a letter to Charles II in early 1651, addressing royalty directly for him, even in letter form, was, at that time, a new experience for him. Nonetheless, the Stuarts’ employment of this cleric as a privateering agent, his role as a preacher and his links to Ormonde kept this bishop in contact with the King.


throughout the decade.69 Another cleric, this time the Catholic/Jansenist Doctor John Callaghan, was appointed as ambassador to the Papal Court in 1651, though he never took actually up the post, due to opposition from rival Catholic clerics and, possibly, an untimely death. Prior to his appointment, however, he was such an unknown figure that Hyde had to give an account of his background to Nicholas. His major qualifications for royal favour were his close links to Muskerry (he even described his family as traditional supporters and vassals of the latter’s family, citing Ormonde, Richard Bellings senior and George Hamilton as witnesses to this), his previous support for the Lord Lieutenant and his publishing of a work criticising Rinuccini.70

This was not just something that was experienced by Irish Churchmen, regardless of their affiliation. Indeed, many soldiers and members of the Irish mercenary community who held relatively low positions on the social ladder gained access to the royal family at this time. One Colonel John McNamara from county Clare, for instance, became a creditor to Charles II, lending him one hundred pounds and receiving a letter of thanks and a lock of the King’s hair from the Monarch as a mark of gratitude. Another Irish army officer, one of the Prestons, was able to persuade Charles II to write a letter of command to his brother in 1657, Sir James, who was at that time serving with the French.71 Members of the Browne family of Kenmare, in county Kerry, who had left Ireland to become mercenaries in the wake of

69 Ibid, Hyde to Lady Morton, 9 February 1651, p. 96. Mercurius Politicus, 25 December 1651-1 January 1652 (O. S.), no. 82, Thomason Tracts Microfilm/ 100:E.651 [15], p. 1311. It is reasonable to assume that the reports in this newspaper, as well as its companion, the moderate intelligencer, though clearly biased towards representing events in a way that suited the assorted Interregnum regimes’ interests, were quite factually accurate, as they were frequently based on intelligence reports received from abroad. Jason Peacey, ‘Cromwellian England: A Propaganda State?’, History vol. 91, issue, 2, no. 302, pp. 194-200. Edward Berwick, The Rawdon Papers, Bramhall to Charles II, 26 January 1651, pp. 103-5. HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Bramhall to Ormonde, 7 April 1651, p. 167.


Cromwell’s victory there, likewise became known to the King and the Duke of York during this decade and the latter Stuart was surrounded by a number of Irish officers while serving with the French and the Spanish in the 1650s.72

This is hardly surprising. For a court that needed adherents in order to maintain its political strength, willingness to serve the monarch, combined with an ability to provide resources would have been an important means of gaining access to and the favour of royals. Clearly then, clergy and soldiery who previously had not had access to a royal now found that they could gain it, because they added to the political and diplomatic weight of the Court in some way. Yet, even bearing all this in mind, it still should be realised that even with this increased ease of access to the royal family, the Court was still dominated by certain key figures and all those persons who wanted access to the Stuarts themselves, whether parvenus or not, still had to go through them. These key personalities in the Court, moreover, were frequently office-holders and/or persons who had had both influence and favour with various members of the royal family for quite a considerable amount of time. For many of the Irish at the Court of Charles II, for instance, Ormonde was a key figure when seeking to gain access to the Monarch. He owed his position of pre-eminence within the Court not so much to the new situation of exile, but rather to his long history of service to the Stuarts and to his past association with a favourite of Charles I. All of this had combined to make him a prominent courtier of Charles I by the mid-1640s and all he did afterwards was simply maintain his position of eminence in the King’s Court while in exile.73 Through the use of his prominent rank within the exiled Stuart Court Ormonde was able to control who had access to the royal family. To give one notable example, this noble was responsible for preventing Bishop Nicholas French from visiting Charles II in Paris in 1652 on the grounds of the latter’s

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72 Edward McLysaght, *The Kenmare Manuscripts*, pp. 462-8. Ormonde also acted as guardian to the future Lord Kenmare of the Browne dynasty. BL Eg. Mss 2535, Percy Church to Nicholas, 16 April 1655, ff. 130-1.

73 Toby Barnard, ‘Butler, James, first duke of Ormond (1610-1688)’, *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. This article was accessed on the 4th of November 2004 at the following link: http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.bibliosun.iue.it:80/view/article/4191.
opposition to the Lord Lieutenant’s interests in Ireland and on the Continent and this cleric was never to gain access to the King.74

It is probably no accident, moreover, that persons such as the Brownes of Kenmare and John Bramhall, who all gained access to the royal family during the exile, were recognised as long-standing clients and associates of Ormonde’s. As we have already seen, for instance, this was certainly true of persons like Inchiquin, who likewise relied on the Lord Lieutenant to intercede with the Monarch on his behalf when he was absent from the Court, and Sir George Hamilton, who sought, as previously described, to use Ormonde’s influence with the royal family to his benefit.75 In fact, it is fair to say that for the greater part of the Irish at the exiled Court their access to the Monarch and the royal family came about, either directly or indirectly, through their contacts with Ormonde and/or his wider client circle. In this sense, therefore, their access to the royal family depended in part on their patron, be it direct or indirect, and thus it comes close to the model of patron-client relations described previously by Linda Levy Peck for the early Stuart Court. This, moreover, was not unique to the Irish. Other persons, such as Lord Hatton for instance, attempted to use persons like Ormonde to gain access to the King.76 Once again, therefore, despite the banishment to the Continent, the royal household displayed a remarkable consistency with the past practices of its English-based predecessors. In summary, we can justifiably say that new men gained access to the royal family at this time. Yet, it is also fair to say that this access was frequently acquired through the following traditional means; that is to say through providing important resources to the Crown and by using long-established and favoured courtiers as their patrons and intermediaries to the royal family. It should also be pointed out that, new men or not, all these courtiers were still all members of the social elite from Ireland and Britain, being either from significant landowning and or titled families or leading clerics.


Arrivistes or not, the social background of these courtiers was still in line with that of a typical member of other early modern courts.

**Life in the Court: display, rites and entertainments**

It is a commonplace that an early modern court was a centre for display, entertainments and ritual. It was no different here. With regards to display, to be a courtier one had to meet certain standards of conspicuous consumption, even in a court such as this. It is fair to say that, financially embarrassed as most of them were (by which one means that they were embarrassed not to have more funds, though poor would be, all things considered, an overstatement of their overall financial situation during the 1650s) for considerable parts of the exile, all the Irish made significant efforts to keep up appearances. Of great importance here was the maintenance of their own social standing as nobles and/or attendants upon a royal family. Central to this was the acquisition of those items that were expected to be in the hands of such persons, something that was most evident when courtiers went to meet a travelling member of the Stuart dynasty. On learning of Charles II’s return to Paris in November 1651 after his adventures in Britain Ormonde prepared himself to leave Caen and to meet his master. He was not going to do this, however, until he acquired horses. No other means of transport would do for meeting a royal, as having a horse was the mark of a gentleman. So it would not do for a nobleman and a courtier to go without. This point is further supported by George Radcliffe’s behaviour in 1656. In that year Radcliffe prepared to himself to meet the Princess royal by borrowing horses. It was not actually necessary for him to have horses in order to travel to meet her as she was coming to Paris at the time, the city where he resided.77 For Radcliffe and Ormonde having a horse was simply an essential part of the show put on by a courtier when he met a royal and it was de rigueur to have one, even if you did not own it. Horses were not the only object that was needed by the courtier. Appropriate clothing was also a necessity and the courtiers indulged in the consumption of this, along with other paraphernalia, whenever they could. We have already seen how Ormonde at one time sought to purchase lace and three coach horses. Similarly, Daniel O’Neill sought to purchase an Indian gown and ‘stuff for drawers’ in mid-1655 and bought a gown on Hyde’s behalf in mid-1658. Radcliffe, too, also sought to

purchase new and more appropriate clothing for his rank in 1656. Charles II also took great care with his appearance as well. In 1656 he ordered clothes, shoes and, significantly considering he had entered into a military alliance at this time, a sword.

Of course display could, and did, take many forms and this extended beyond personal appearance into the area of the public image of the Court. Many of the courtiers that attached themselves to this body were deeply involved in the efforts to maintain the proper public appearance. Part of this was ensuring that the royal family did not lack the appropriate accoutrements. In March 1653, for instance, John Bramhall was making arrangements to ship some unspecified goods which he had bought on behalf of the Duke of York and Ormonde was in correspondence with a supporter regarding the acquisition of horses for Charles II in January 1660. Aside from this, mention has already been made of the emphasis placed upon the meeting of a travelling royal by his attendants and followers. Indeed, the formalities required and followed when meeting such a personage are constantly referred to in the sources. We have already seen how both Radcliffe and Ormonde sought to supply themselves with the appropriate accessories when greeting a royal. It was no different for the royal Stuarts either. They too needed to supply themselves with the appropriate trappings when travelling and failure to do this could have serious consequences. In November 1651, on Charles II’s return to Paris after his defeat at the battle of Worcester, the Venetian ambassador to France made the following comment.

Charles II entered Paris on Wednesday evening, being met by the Duke of Orleans, the Queen his Mother, the Duke of York, and many grandees of his Court. His suite consisted of a gentleman and a lackey. His dress was more calculated to move laughter than respect, and his aspect is so changed that those who were nearest believed him to be one of the lower servants.

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Clearly, inappropriate behaviour, the failure to make the proper display and lack of the apposite royal equipage was seriously damaging to the dynasty’s interests. It comes as no surprise, then, that all possible efforts were made to keep up appearances, to make the appropriate display and to ensure that the royal in question travelled with a fitting retinue and the mistake that the Stuart pretender made on his return from Worcester was only to be made once. Indeed, prior to this Charles II had always sought to adopt appropriate ceremony. Immediately after his father’s execution he stopped taking meals with the Princess of Orange and started to eat on his own, in accordance with the general practice of monarchs. This following of the proper ritual was found amongst the other Stuarts also. In late 1654 after the Duke of Gloucester had been removed from his mother’s household in Paris he travelled back to The Hague with Ormonde. After a sojourn there Daniel O’Neill took charge of the remainder of the journey to Cologne. Prior to his departure, however, considerable efforts were made to ensure that he travelled in the appropriate style, with Lord Hatton and Ormonde’s client, George Radcliffe, acting as sureties for a loan that was specifically taken out to provide for the Duke’s needs. Once Gloucester set out upon his journey assorted courtiers, as Ormonde had previously done when Charles II returned from his Scottish adventure, joined him and became part of his entourage along the way, including Ormonde’s client and kinsman, George Hamilton.  

Sustaining the royal image was not just something that had to be done while travelling. One other way of doing this and of making the appropriate display was the patronage of art, something which has previously drawn the attention of historians in their work on other courts. There is some evidence that this Crown similarly patronised art during this time and it seems to have been particularly active in this regard from 1656 onwards. Certainly, the Crown patronised the silversmith Antoon Kerckhof in Bruges, who made a silver shield bearing the royal coat of arms for the Stuarts in 1657, an object which, aside from its intrinsic aesthetic value, was also obviously made for display and ceremonial purposes. Architecture also came in for Stuart patronage during their sojourn in the Spanish Netherlands, with Charles II paying for the construction of a banqueting and meeting hall in the Saint Sebastian

82 Ibid, Condulmier to Contarini, 22 February 1649, p. 87. For details on this loan see pp. 277-8, below. BL Eg. Mss 2535, Alexander Hume to Nicholas, 14 May 1655, f. 179. BL Eg. Mss 2534, Radcliffe to Nicholas, 18 December 1654, f. 295.
guildhall (the main room in the complex) in Bruges. With regard to painting, Saint Martin’s abbey in Flanders had been promised portraits of both Charles II and Ormonde prior to 1660.83

This making of the appropriate display and the efforts to maintain a proper image did not end there. The court, like its predecessors, involved itself in entertainments, though often these were provided by those royal households and localities that were hosting the Stuarts and not by that dynasty itself. This was particularly true of the early part of the exile, when Charles II and his family resided in France. He was recorded as attending masques within months of his return to Paris after Worcester. This remained the case even when relations between Charles II and the Bourbons were poor. In April 1654, when Charles II was contemplating the definite probability of having to leave France because of the increasingly-friendly relations between that country and the English Commonwealth, he and some of his courtiers, including Ormonde and O’Neill, spent much of their time at what Hyde described as ‘masques and dancings [sic]’.84 Such behaviour continued after the King’s departure from France. On going to the Spanish Netherlands in 1656 Charles II once again attended local events and entertainments, and his courtiers accompanied him. In mid-April the King, accompanied by Ormonde and Rochester, went incognito to the Jesuits College in Brussels to hear music. Some eight months later, at a time when the Protectorate’s spies were informing London that many Irish lords were joining Charles II in Bruges, the Court was patronising a troupe of French comedians that were performing there. Aside from the theatre, sporting occasions also seem to have been popular amongst the courtiers in the Spanish Netherlands. An account of an assault that arose at a tennis match placed the King, the Duke of Gloucester and a


number of army officers from all three of the lost kingdoms as the attendance at the
game.\textsuperscript{85}

This is not to say that the Court did not put on its own entertainments, though it
is fair to say that these were not on anything like the grand scale of its predecessors.
Nevertheless, it is possible that some of the entertainments previously mentioned as
taking place from 1656 onwards could have been done at the Court’s own instigation.
Much more definitely, however, Charles II did employ a musician (a fiddler to be
specific) while in Cologne and those present at his Court there did participate in balls,
even learning the latest dances to do so. In a letter to Henry Bennett in Paris, written
in late-1654, Charles II wrote that ‘one of the greatest alterations you will find here is,
that my Lord Taaffe is become one of the best dancers in the country, and is the chief
man at all the balls’. This not only indicates that entertainments at the Court were
frequent, something which is corroborated by the intelligence received by the
Cromwellian regime, it also shows how Court attendance had changed some of the
Irish exiles’ habits. Taaffe is described by Charles II as someone who has learned to
dance well, an alteration from the situation that had existed in France.\textsuperscript{86} Court
attendance had undoubtedly changed him and participation in his ceremonies and
rituals had brought new skills.

As mentioned previously, Taaffe’s multi-tasking did not end there. He was
central to other public actions of this Court as well. In particular he probably acted as
a servant to Charles II when this monarch dined in public. Others did so as well, most
notably Ormonde and Inchiquin. This harked back to a traditional ritual of the Early
Stuart Court designed to emphasise the semi-divine nature of kingship and it was not
the only example of this. Charles II began dining alone in the immediate wake of his
succeeding to the Crown. In line with this semi–religious nature of the King’s dining
customs, much of the ceremonial of the Early Stuart Court had revolved around
religious festivities and sacred, or semi-sacred, practices. Adding further emphasis to
the sacral nature of such practices was the fact that attendance at a religious service
was central to many of these ceremonies. Those who have even given a cursory

\textsuperscript{85} Thurloe State Papers, vol. IV, Marigny to Barriere, 15 April 1656, pp. 677-8. Ibid, vol. V, A letter of
intelligence from J. Butler, 2 December 1656, p. 645. HMC, Marquis of Bath (vol. II), T. Ross to
Holles, 30 April 1659, pp. 129-30.

\textsuperscript{86} The Letters, Speeches, and Declarations of Charles II, Charles II to Elizabeth of Bohemia, 6 August
1654, p. 30. Ibid, Charles II to Henry Bennett, 22 December 1654, p. 34.
glance at the ritual of the exiled Court have established that this continued to be the case here. Semi-divine rituals which were designed to heighten the importance of royalty, such as touching for the King’s evil, continued to be important in the Court during the 1650s. This was also true of more formal religious ceremonies. In this regard it is noteworthy that those persons who provided intelligence about the Stuart Court to the Protectorate in 1656 should draw attention to the sermons of John Bramhall, which were given before the Monarch. First, the intelligence was given in December 1656, in the run-up to Christmas, which had been a traditional time for such religious-centred display in the Court. What is more, the content of the sermon was commented on, undoubtedly because it was a reflection of the ideology of the Court. In this particular homily Bramhall strongly criticised the Protectorate. It was, in other words, an attack on the ‘rebels’ in England and a public statement of the Stuarts’ right to rule. This latter element, moreover, was undoubtedly something that had motivated Stuart Court ceremonial since the beginning. Now, however, the Stuart Court was tying religious ceremony and Courtly ritual together for a specific purpose: to push the case for a royal restoration.

Bramhall was not the only cleric to tie royal rituals and religion together for this particular political purpose. For the royalist Anglican clergy who joined the Stuarts in exile following previous trends in ceremonial was not enough. They too had to assert the Stuart right to rule and attack the Interregnum regimes in Britain and Ireland through religious ritual. To this end these clerics sanctified the death of Charles I. Central to this was Henry Leslie, Anglican Bishop of Down and Connor and, for a brief time at least, royalist exile. In June 1649 he delivered a sermon before Charles II and his sister Mary in The Hague, in which he compared Charles I’s execution to the passion of Christ. In doing this he was not just following popular royalist practice, but he was adapting the tendency of Court ceremonial to portray a monarch as a demi-god to a new purpose, namely the representing of the executed King as a martyr and saint. After this sermon royalism now had a religious icon, and after the Restoration the Later Stuart regime was not going to fail to use such a figure

for their advantage. In 1660 it was enacted that each 30 January was to be a day of fasting and commemoration of Charles I’s execution, on which sermons would be delivered on the evils of rebellion against divinely-appointed authority. The Court itself observed this day as well. The exiled Court and its adherents therefore did more than just follow Early Stuart Court ritual wherever it could; it added to the lexicon of rituals used by British monarchs and set precedents for those courts that followed in its wake.88

Yet, for all this, the continued existence (and elaboration) of such ritual, ceremony and display does not mean that Stuart ceremonial practices were not curtailed in some way by the exile. Aside from lack of resources, something which impacted on everyone, forcing some, as we have seen, to hire horses rather than buy them, there was the problem that the Stuart Court was almost always resident in Catholic states during the Interregnum. For a court whose ceremony had traditionally been based around Protestant religious services this posed a problem. In Bruges in 1656/7, for example, the English Court was accused of practising its Protestantism too openly. This charge was refuted by the Catholic bishop of the diocese, however, who stated that the Court was notable for the discreet way in which it carried out the Anglican rite.89 This implies, nonetheless, that the great traditional rituals of the Stuarts, which had been previously been carried out on the major religious feast-days, were now notable for their lack of public demonstration. Adding to this was the hostility of one of the households which made up this Court, namely Henrietta Maria’s to Protestantism. This extended to efforts being made to ban Protestant worship in her household.90 In such circumstances, it would not have been easy to carry out the traditional rites. Yet, all that being said, in the end this Court was still demonstrably one where public performance, display and ritual took place. It was not shy about publicising its claim to authority and its royalty, along with its courtiers,

acted like members of a royal household and carried themselves like the servants of a royal family wherever possible.

**Life in the Court: patronage and clientage**

As in all early modern courts where benefits, either social or financial, could be gained, patronage and clientage were important aspects of life in these households. For a group who were seeking the means to maintain their social status it was hardly going to be any different, even if they were in exile. We have already seen how, in 1654, both Ormonde and Inchiquin acted as patrons for persons seeking advancement from the royal family. What is more, we have already seen in this example that the system of patronage was constructed in a hierarchical manner, with Ormonde acting as a kind of chief patron or favourite to the King and Inchiquin acting as a lesser patron who had to rely on the Marquis’ assistance in order to acquire benefits, both for himself and his client. In this regard the Court again shows a remarkable degree of consistency with the model laid out by Linda Levy Peck in her study of the Early Stuart households. 91 Aside from this instance, we also have examples from earlier chapters which also serve to illustrate the importance of patronage and clientage to the Irish exiles in the 1650s. More specifically, we have seen how Sir George Hamilton attempted to use Ormonde as his means to win a lucrative contract to ship troops and supplies as part of a proposed military expedition to Ireland in 1651 and we have seen how Ormonde was expected to encourage a client, namely Viscount Taaffe, to propose the scheme to the Duke of York. It is clear that throughout the exile, in order to gain socially and financially from the exiled Court, particularly from the King’s household, many of the Irish servants of the Crown had to accept Ormonde as one of the King’s favourites and consequently their chief patron. Indeed, it was vital to many others aside from the Irish as well, and these included many of the more senior figures at Court. Edward Nicholas in a letter to Ormonde from late-1651, referred to the Marquis as being his ‘noble patron’. 92

In truth, this was not a hard thing to do. After all, we have already seen that Ormonde was already patron to many of them prior to the exile and it was clear from early on in the new King’s ‘reign’ that he held a favoured position with Charles II.

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91 See p. 167, above. Linda Levy Peck, ‘“For a King Not to be Bountiful Were a Fault”: Perspectives on Court Patronage in Early Stuart England’, pp. 31-61.

92 See pp. 88-9, above. NLI Mss 2319, Nicholas to Ormonde, 15 November 1651, f. 61.
We have also noted that the title of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland guaranteed him access to the King. What is more, he was among those who were regularly consulted by the King with regard to his affairs and he was listed as being one of the principal members of Charles II’s household in 1654. At times he even acted as the voice of the King, relaying orders and writing to others on his monarch’s behalf. What was more, he was singled out for special attention by Charles II. He was, for instance, allowed to travel with the King in the latter’s coach on formal occasions and it was even reported that Charles II held interviews with supporters in Ormonde’s chambers.93 In this way the Lord Lieutenant differed from many of the other advisors and ministers who surrounded the King. What is more, this high opinion of Ormonde was shared by others. Many royalists in England, for instance, held that Ormonde was the person best fittest to represent the King and to act as his representative. Taking all this into consideration, a case can be made for the Marquis being one of the exiled Court’s equivalents to the minister-favourite of the early Stuart courts, though it is also fair to say that he never became a ‘Buckingham’ to Charles II.94

Yet, despite this preferred position, there were limits to what Ormonde could achieve for his clients, especially when it came to acquiring benefits from the other households which constituted the Court. We have, to cite one aforementioned case, already seen how the above-mentioned scheme of George Hamilton’s to profit from the transporting of troops to Ireland in 1651 failed, partly because others got their proposals into Henrietta Maria and the Duke of York first, and partly because of the collapse of negotiations with Lorraine.95 Overall, it is fair to say that in order to achieve his aims and acquire resources for his clients within the more minor Stuart households Ormonde often found that he had to petition others in order to achieve his ends. This was particularly true in 1651, when Charles II was away in Scotland and when the Marquis himself was spending little time with the rest of the royal family,

95 See pp. 88-9, above.
preferring instead to spend as much time as possible in the then family residence at 
Caen. When it became clear that the Duke of York was to be given a command in the 
French army in mid-1651 the possibility that a number of posts as officers to the heir 
would become available raised its head and Ormonde was quick to seek appointments 
for some of his clients. In order to get one of his clients appointed to a lieutenancy, 
however, he had to ask Sir Henry Bennett to intercede on that person’s behalf. This 
was because at that specific moment, for reasons to be comprehensively detailed later, 
the households of the King, the Queen Mother and the heir were separated from each 
other (York was even in dispute with his mother at that time and Ormonde, for one of 
the few times during the exile, was not in the presence of any other royal) and it was 
nigh on impossible for any person or group of persons to exercise influence within all 
of them at once. Ormonde, moreover, had learned that the Duke had begun to look 
unfavourably upon him and, consequently, in order to advance his own interests and 
those of others within the heir’s household he had to rely on others to argue his case 
for him.96

This was not the only instance of the Marquis having to rely on others. 
Towards the end of 1651 the Marquis had to ask Lord Digby to find a place for one of 
the former’s servants, a certain John Stephens. Digby was carrying out other services 
for Ormonde at the time as well. To name one, when Ormonde travelled from Caen 
to the Louvre to visit the households of the Stuarts in 1651 he resided at Digby’s 
lodgings.97 This need to use Digby to find employment for Stephens occurred just 
after Charles II had returned to France from his misadventures in Scotland: a moment 
when the King’s resources were probably at their lowest. It was a pattern that was to 
be repeated early the next year, when Ormonde was asked to find a position in the 
French Court for his brother-in-law, George Hamilton. It this circumstance he had to 
apply to Henrietta Maria’s chief courtier, Lord Jermyn, for his assistance. Once 
again, a contributory factor here was Ormonde’s poor relations with Henrietta Maria 
for large parts of the exile.98 Clearly then, when it came to the more minor

96 HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Bennett to Ormonde, 1 August 1651, p. 176. Ibid, Ormonde to 
97 Ibid, Ormonde to Digby, 23 November 1651, p. 231.
98 Ibid, Ormonde to Jermyn, 21 February 1652, p. 259. The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, 
vol. II, Hyde to Nicholas, 9 May 1653, p. 201. It should be pointed out that it was not always the case 
that Ormonde and the Queen Mother were at loggerheads, however. See pp. 233-4, below.
households, Ormonde could not gain anything for his clients, or even himself, through his own means, nor could he rely on the intercession of Charles II. These sub-courts had their own patronage hierarchy and he was therefore obliged to rely on the benefaction of others to provide for his clients.

The use of Digby by Ormonde for the purposes of aiding his client and also for material assistance demonstrates not only the limits of the Marquis’ influence it also highlights just how unimportant political factions were, with regard to certain matters at least. The latter noble was no political ally of Ormonde’s. When it seemed likely that Charles II would journey to Ireland in 1649 the Lord Lieutenant made sure that Digby would not be one of those persons travelling with the King.99 Yet, in late 1651, when all the multitude of royalist efforts to restore the monarchy had been exhausted, it was possible for these two to co-operate. The same holds true for Jermyn, who, as is obvious from any account of the various political factions which dominated the exiled Court, was no political ally of Ormonde’s either.100 When it came to the needs of patron-client relations actions, factions were transient and factional rivalries could be put aside.

Ormonde’s influence may have been limited within the households of the Duke of York and the Queen Mother, and he may have been forced to rely on those who normally allied themselves with different factions within the full Court to achieve his aims for his clients within them, but, as stated earlier, this was not true of the King’s household. Here he acted as the chief broker of patronage, particularly from late 1651 onwards, after Charles II had returned from Scotland. In the same letter in which he requested Digby’s assistance for John Stephens, Ormonde also let it be known that Charles II intended to order the Marquis to be his constant companion; another honour which further marked him out as this King’s favourite.101 Like Buckingham before him, Ormonde was now in a position to influence the dispensation of whatever patronage there was from the King’s household.

This he certainly did. He quickly became somebody that diverse persons, regardless of their background or social status, turned to in order to gain favours from the Monarch. He acted as their representative to the King and he was the one they

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100 See p. 233, below.
turned to when seeking reassurance regarding their status within the Court. In the
wake of Worcester Edward Nicholas decided to send his son into England in an effort
to regain part of his estate and he asked Ormonde to ensure that the King did not
misconstrue his intentions, particularly as, owing to illness, he could not do so
himself. When Inchiquin wanted the King to admonish Sir Lewis Dyves for allegedly
calling his honour into question he asked Ormonde to put his case to Charles II, which
the Marquis duly did. In early 1660 one of Charles II’s most important adherents on
the Continent, abbess Mary Knatchbull of the Community of English Nuns at Ghent,
asked Ormonde to give Lady Bristol ‘one comfortable word’ on her husband’s position at
the Court.102 These examples do not exhaust the list. Similar services were
performed for the Earl of Norwich, for example, while in early 1652 Digby had
sought Ormonde’s intervention in his efforts to become a knight of the garter. Also,
just as he had to use other patrons in the other royal households to achieve
advancement for his clients there, persons from the other households had to use him
as a chief patron in order to gain favour for their clients in the King’s Court. Once
again, allegiance to particular political faction does not seem to have played a part in
these arrangements either. Thus, we see Jermyn thanking Ormonde for intervening on
behalf of one of the former’s friends in February 1660.103

These examples do not exhaust the supply and it is fair to say that Ormonde’s
role as one of the chief brokers of patronage from the King was to continue
throughout the exile. He had a central role in securing the posts of master of the
requests and secretary of the Latin language for Sir Richard Fanshawe in late 1659.
Hyde, another of those who had great influence over the King’s largesse, was also
involved in securing posts for Fanshawe at this time, but his own correspondence
indicates that the main role in granting this particular favour lay not with him, but

102 Ibid, Nicholas to Ormonde, 6 December 1651, pp. 236-8. The Calendar of the Clarendon State
January 1660. For more on Knatchbull cf. Claire Walker, ‘Prayer, Patronage, and Political
pp. 1-23.
103 BL Eg. Mss 2535, Norwich to Nicholas, 25 May 1655, f. 205. HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I),
Digby to Ormonde, 15 February 1652, pp. 254-5. Edward Edwards, The Calendar of Carte
Manuscripts, Volume 30, Jermyn to Ormonde, 19 February 1660.
with the Lord Lieutenant. When Fanshawe sought the post of secretary of state, again in late 1659, he used Hyde as his patron. This time, however, he was not granted the post. Hyde himself did not take this kindly, complaining that it was promised to someone unworthy and that he had failed to receive an answer as to why this should be so, ‘both from the King and Ormonde’. This was not the only instance when the Chancellor had to defer to Ormonde’s opinion when it came to patronage. Previously, in June 1658, Hyde, who was seeking some favour for certain Catholic clergy, was informed by Charles II that Ormonde had informed him that it was impossible to do anything to aid these people. The next year, when Thomas Wentworth asked Hyde to intervene with the King on his behalf, the Chancellor advised his lordship to apply in writing to both the King and Ormonde. Clearly, it was the King and lord Lieutenant together who had the greatest say in who received offices and patronage, with Ormonde acting as the King’s final arbitrator on such matters.

Fanshawe himself saw this. In a letter written to Ormonde on 23 January 1660 he thanked the Marquis for the political employments that had been secured for him. Others were not blind to this reality, also. Not infrequently, Ormonde’s correspondence during the exile contained letters filled with effusive thanks and using the most hyperbolic language to thank their patron. In mid-1654 Henry Bennett wrote a letter acknowledging an obligation to Ormonde. In this he adopted the tone of a grateful child to a parent. ‘For God’s sake’, Bennett wrote, ‘then let somebody tell me how it happens that I love and honour your lordship as if you had procured me all the good in the world’. This sort of letter of gratitude was not just written by those in exile. There was even one example from Ireland. In May 1654 John King wrote from Roscommon to thank Ormonde for some favour that he had received from the Marquis. King claimed to be so grateful that he stated he could only claim to be a Christian from the time Ormonde had taken on his patronage. Others expressed their

gratitude through the giving of gifts. Ormonde, when asked to gain a favour for Henry Rumbold’s brother from the King in 1658, was promised some tobacco and wine as gifts in remembrance of past favours that the Rumbolds had received from that nobleman.\textsuperscript{107} All of this was more than just the currying of favour and the expression of thanks. Indeed, this giving of gifts and the use of a strong language of affection, and even of religious imagery, once again highlights the continuity between patron-client practices in the exiled Court and those in the world of the early Stuart court. As has been clearly demonstrated, these characteristics were also typical of patron-client relations in the English Court of the early-seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{108} Once more, Charles II’s exiled Court is more striking for its similarities to its immediate predecessors than for its differences.

For Ormonde the patron, the similarities with previous practice in earlier Stuart courts do not end there. In the pre-exile years patrons had to deliver for their clients and failure to do so was to invite, at the very least, criticism. More often than not, when it came to their relationship with their clients, patrons were more acted upon than acting and failure to deliver on a contract was potentially costly.\textsuperscript{109} It was no different here. In late 1654/early 1655 Lord Hatton and Ormonde both became involved in the efforts to remove the Duke of Gloucester from Henrietta Maria’s household in Paris to the King’s in Cologne. As part of this, Hatton had to act as a surety for a loan, which he expected the Court to repay. He also expected to receive visible marks of favour from Cologne for his services. For his part, Ormonde offered to be Hatton’s patron and to advance his interests with the King. By spring 1655, however, Hatton was dissatisfied. In a letter to Edward Nicholas, written in March, Hatton stated;

\begin{quote}
I confess sir I rest very unsatisfied and that with reason that Marquis Ormonde [sic] should invite me to employ him on my behalf and write me word how faithfully and effectually he would favour me and then at his arrival at Cologne when Mr Scott’s [the merchant who had loaned the money to Hatton] business brought me to his remembrance to pass over all that concerned myself as so inconsiderable is that I
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{107} The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. II, King to Ormonde, 26 May 1654, p. 364. Ibid, Rumbold to Ormonde, 10 March 1658, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{108} Linda Levy Peck, “For a King Not to be Bountiful Were a Fault”: Perspectives on Court Patronage in Early Stuart England”, pp. 39-43.
understand not. My business required not so many words as that at Mr Scott and had he sent me an account of that either affirmation or negative although he had cast Mr Scott’s business on my own hands to discharge I should have taken it as a testimony of his friendship…

Evidently, while Hatton was unwilling to abandon Ormonde’s patronage, he was still more than capable of complaining to others about the Marquis’ failings as a patron. It is also clear that these criticisms had an effect on Ormonde as he wrote to Hatton some eight days after the initial letter of complaint with the news that Charles II had addressed his [Hatton’s] concerns and interests. Clearly, Ormonde was as much a victim of the whims of his clients as they were of his. Beyond this Ormonde often found that those applying to him for his favour were not exclusively relying upon his aid. At the very same time Digby was asking the Marquis for his aid in securing the garter in early 1653, he was also asking Jermyn to intervene with the King on his behalf on the same issue. As with other patrons previously, Ormonde found that would-be clients were perfectly willing to play one would-be benefactor off against another so as to see who would be the most successful in acquiring the sought-after favour.

Of course, while Ormonde was a key figure amongst the Irish when it came to the disbursement of whatever largesse there was in the exiled Court, one should realise that there were others amongst them who also sought to gain particular favours from the Court for others. This they frequently did as a sort of middleman, applying to chief patrons, frequently Ormonde, though not always, on a client’s behalf. It is well established in court historiography that all courtiers, even if they did not have a major say in the dispensation of royal bounty and held only minor positions within a royal household, could and did attempt to influence its distribution in some way. More often than not, these lesser courtiers, even if they had to appeal to someone higher up the ladder to get what they wanted, could improve their influence and social status by setting themselves up as patrons for those who were completely removed from the Court environment. This was also the case within the exiled Carolingian

110 BL Eg. Mss 2535, Hatton to Nicholas, 12 March 1655, ff. 81-2. For further details on these events see pp. 273-9, below.
111 BL Eg. Mss 2535, Ormonde to Hatton, 20 March 1655, f. 89.
112 NLI Mss 2319, Digby to Jermyn, 15 February 1653, ff. 103
Court. We have already seen how Inchiquin played such a role in 1654. There were other examples. George Radcliffe, to mention one, also attempted to act as a broker of royal favour, the royalties in question being the Duke of York and the King, in mid-1652. This he did on Gervase Holles’ behalf. Holles was seeking both employment and a baronetcy from the Crown and Radcliffe, in his efforts to acquire these, sought the aid of a more senior figure in the Court; in this case, Sir Edward Hyde.\(^\text{114}\) When it came to the labours of the exiled Irish to act as patrons for others, even in such a middleman capacity, there are a number of other characteristics worthy of note. Firstly, attempts to influence the dispensation of royal favour often brought these courtiers into competition with others. What is more, these efforts to influence the dispensation of largesse were not just confined to the exiled Stuart households. They intruded into other royal courts as well.

These latter two points are perfectly illustrated by events in the respective courts of Charles II and his sister, Mary of Orange in May 1655. In that month a dispute broke out between Alexander Hume and Daniel O’Neill over the appointment of cupboard keeper to the Princess of Orange, with each of these two proposing their own candidates for the post. O’Neill, despite dividing his time between Teyling and Cologne, was well-placed to influence such an appointment. Aside from being a groom of the bedchamber to Mary’s kingly brother, he had been associated with the Orange court since the 1630s and was well known there. He was also closely linked to an influential lady-in-waiting to the Princess, one Lady Stanhope. Hume naturally feared that O’Neill would exploit this position on his own candidate’s behalf, so he took steps to counter it. In mid-May 1655 Hume contacted Cologne about the issue. He informed Nicholas of the situation and also requested Hyde to speak with O’Neill about the appointment on his behalf, which the chancellor undertook to do. By the end of the month Hyde had persuaded O’Neill to give way to Hume.\(^\text{115}\) Yet, even in apparent failure, it is clear that O’Neill’s social position and his role as a companion to a royal allowed him to act as a dispenser of princely favour, even if there were


those, such as Hyde, who could wield even greater influence over this than he. This role clearly brought O’Neill into competition with others who held similar positions, however. Yet, what is of most interest is that, for O’Neill and, indeed, for others, their role as associates of one monarch, even a dispossessed one, allowed them to influence events in those royal households that were closely connected to their own.

In this case, Hyde’s role as a patron in one court could allow him to interfere in events in Holland, as he could act upon a person, O’Neill in this case, who held a position of influence in both courts and thus achieve his goals. O’Neill’s influence in Teyling, on the other hand, was undoubtedly partly due to his close association with Mary of Orange’s brother, though his associations in the 1630s with the House of Orange probably also helped. There is also one other point to be made here. It should not be assumed that Hyde held the whip hand over O’Neill. Hyde may have been the more dominant courtier in Charles II’s household at this time, but in Teyling the situation was reversed. Hyde ultimately had to rely on O’Neill’s intercession there; something he conceded in his later writings when he explained how his family had come to be taken into the care of Mary of Orange. O’Neill had been the Hyde family’s patron and he gained the good offices of the Princess for them.¹¹⁶

This was not the only instance of Stuart courtiers being employed as patrons in other courts. Patron-client networks clearly allowed persons in one royal household to interfere in events in another. To an extent we had already seen how Ormonde had exploited such networks to achieve his aims within the other households of the exiled Stuart Court. We have also observed something similar with Ormonde and the French Court in the early 1650s, most notably with regard to his efforts to secure employment for his clients and to gain favour for himself.¹¹⁷ By the late 1650s the Stuart alliance with the Spanish gave Ormonde access to the vice-regal Court in the Spanish Netherlands as well and he came to act as a patron and lobbyist for some of those who required favour from the governor there. Thus, we see Ormonde acting as an intermediary between a Lady de Mol and the Spanish minister Caracena in February 1660.¹¹⁸ Yet, it was not that simple for Ormonde. In some ways his situation here

resembled Hyde’s with regard to Teyling. While he could intercede for some people with the vice-regal Court in Brussels in the late 1650s, he could not do it in all the various courts that the royalists had political connections with. This was particularly true of the Spanish Court in Madrid, where other royalists who were more closely connected to the household of the Duke of York had more favour. In this respect, Ormonde had to rely on the intercession of Peter Talbot with the Spanish Court in early 1660 in order to get arrears of his pension paid.119

To sum up, the division of the households in exile did create interesting disparities within the complete Stuart court. Each household developed its own hierarchical patron-client system. That said, they still continued to use the same basic method of structuring patronage that had existed prior to the exile. It is also obvious that there were other continuities between the dispensation of patronage in this Court and its immediate predecessors. Of note here is the importance of money, which Peck has commented on, and the reasons for this commodity being so important to both the Court and the courtiers were probably only slightly different then they had been before. Once again, a cash-strapped Crown was using patronage to acquire funds. The fact that the courtiers also felt themselves to be cash-strapped only added to the importance of money.120 We only have to refer back to the example of Inchiquin seeking a baronet for a client in 1654 to see this. When he told Ormonde of his client’s request for a baronetcy he included the detail that this person was willing to pay for the honour. Similarly, when Ormonde applied to Bennett regarding the post of Lieutenant to the Duke of York in 1651, the question of the cost of purchasing the office was discussed.121 Yet there are other interesting, and potentially unique, elements to the patron-client networks here. It is exceptionally striking how a chief patron in one court or household could become the client in another. Undoubtedly the division between the three major households contributed to this. Indeed, in these circumstances, while there were times when courtiers had to rely on their clients to act as their patrons, there were also moments when they had to rely on persons that


120 Linda Levy Peck, ‘ “For a King Not to be Bountiful Were a Fault”: Perspectives on Court Patronage in Early Stuart England’, p. 33.

121 *HMC*, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Inchiquin to Ormonde, 31 August 1654, pp. 305-6. Ibid, Bennett to Ormonde, 1 August 1651, p. 176.

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normally would have been considered political opponents. Yet this did not pose a problem. Once again, factional divisions did not enter into the equation. Finally, it is evident that patron-client networks did not just confine themselves to one court. The Irish courtiers in Charles II’s complete Court did gain access to other, non-Stuart, courts during the exile and this allowed them and their associates to enter into the competition for rewards and benefits in these institutions. In short, patron-client networks were also multi-court networks.

**Life in the Court: competition, violence and social control**

As the struggle over resources and rewards implies, this Court, like others, was a place of competition. The people who gathered here struggled for position and reward, and losing out in this caused discontent. This was even true of persons who were quite closely aligned politically, as both Edward Nicholas and John Bramhall were, being both allies of Ormonde. When Bramhall was appointed receiver of the moneys due to the Duke of York from privateering ventures in November 1652, Nicholas complained about it to Hyde.

I cannot marvel enough why the Bishop of Derry should covet so improper a province...I believe he is the first bishop that ever busied himself with such a maritime employment, and I doubt that some who wish not well to the King and the Ch of Eng have put his lordship upon it, that they may speak the louder against both.122

This lament was undoubtedly motivated by his desire to have that post for his son. Yet, angry as Nicholas was with the Irish bishop, his reaction was hardly surprising and relatively tame. Reactions could be more extreme and competition often went beyond the writing of angry letters. It has frequently been noted in the existing historiography that violent deeds, duels, brawls and other such disreputable actions were regular features of relations between the courtiers in Charles II’s Continental Court. In his biography of Charles II, for instance, Ronald Hutton has more than implied that this was a particularly prominent feature of life within the exiled Court of the 1650s, and it is true that duelling was not uncommon amongst the members of the various royal households during this decade.123 Of course, the role of

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123 Ronald Hutton, *Charles the Second*, p. 123. BL Eg. Mss 2535, Church to Nicholas, 16 April 1655, ff. 130-1.
violence in the life of courtiers within a court is, to a certain extent, linked to questions of honour. As has been noted in studies of the Early Stuart Court, questions of honour frequently led to duels and acts of violence amongst those within that particular setting. It is also something that occurred in other exiled courts. Nathalie Rouffiac, in her work on the banished Jacobite household of the post-Glorious Revolution era, has pointed to the tendency to violence which existed amongst many of those who were attached to it. Other, more general, surveys of court life in this era, meanwhile, have drawn attention to the propensity to violence in these institutions. This is ascribed to these institutions being places where warriors, competitors and rival suitors became concentrated around a prince. In a wider context, then, the tendency of the exiled courtiers’ of the 1650s to resort to violence to defend their honour and to resolve tensions is not unusual. In fact, as the earlier reference to duelling in the Early Stuart Court more than suggests, a close examination of this tendency to violence in the exiled Court again only serves to highlight its similarity to other such bodies in this regard.

A significant continuity that can be noted between the exiled Court and its ante-bellum predecessor was the ban imposed by both institutions on duelling. Both James I and Charles II made strenuous efforts to ensure peace between the nobility there, as did Charles I. Indeed, some historians have even seen Charles I’s failure to maintain peace between his courtiers as being a contributory cause to the outbreak of the British and Irish civil wars. Whatever the situation was with Charles I, it is clear that great effort went into preserving the peace amongst the courtiers at Charles II’s exiled Court. A declaration against duelling was issued by his Court in late 1658 and it was made clear in this that the disturbers of the King’s peace there faced his wrath. Further to this, after a fracas broke out between courtiers at a tennis match in mid-1659 a council of the King’s nobility sat in judgment on those involved and Charles II ultimately imposed bonds of friendship upon the disputants. Aside from highlighting the efforts at enforcing a peace amongst the courtiers, however, this council exposed the nature of some of the divisions amongst the courtiers as well.


The fracas had been between English and Scots and it is fair to say that the council split on national lines as well, with the Irish in the Council, most notably Ormonde and Taaffe, siding with the Scots there against the English, including Sir Edward Nicholas. Once again, when it was not a matter of policy, factional loyalties did not come into the equation.\footnote{G. F. Warner, \textit{The Nicholas papers, vol. I} (London, 1920), Declaration by Charles II, 24 November 1658, p. 263. \textit{HMC, Marquis of Bath (vol. II)}, T. Ross to Holles, 30 April 1659, pp. 129-31. The aforementioned declaration highlights other continuities with previous Stuart courts. Order was given that the declaration be read from the pulpit and by a court official, the Gentleman-Usher, in the Presence Chamber, a room which had traditionally been one of the English Court’s public spaces.}

Whatever the nation involved, however, the King remained the ultimate judge and Charles II demonstrated that position in the Court or being in his favour did not provide persons with immunity against his own regulations. One of those who benefited from the opportunities for advancement that the exiled Court offered during this decade was Viscount Taaffe and, as we have seen, he grew in the Monarch’s favour during these years. Yet, when he killed another courtier, Sir William Keith, in a duel over a wager at tennis in August 1658 he found himself banished from the King’s presence and from Court until the following year, despite his pleas to be forgiven.\footnote{Timothy Crist (Ed.), \textit{Charles II to Lord Taaffe: Letters in Exile}, p. v. \textit{The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. IV}, Taaffe to Charles II, 20 Aug 1658, p. 61.} His Monarch was not only teaching Taaffe to dance, he was teaching him not to duel as well.

\textbf{Conclusions}

As a body, the Stuart court in exile was undoubtedly different from its predecessor and many of its contemporaries. Amongst the most notable changes were the exaggerated division between its constituent households, the rise of new men, the lack of a fixed palace and ceremonial centre, the lack of other resources and, despite the difficulties involved in assessing numbers at a court, the undoubted reduction in the level of personnel attending the royal family. Aside from these changes, it also found itself in a reasonably unusual, if not unique, political situation. Yet, noticeable though these changes were, one should be careful not to exaggerate their significance or the problems they gave rise to. Having households at odds with each other was not unique to the exiled Stuarts of the mid-seventeenth century, nor was peripateticism,
the rise of new men, or even a relatively small royal household and reduced circumstances.

Allowing for these qualifications and for a reduction in the Court’s international prestige, it has to be said that there were still remarkable consistencies between this Court and other Stuart households. It continued to be a centre of prestige where persons competed for diverse rewards, be they social or financial. In this regard access to the royal family continued to be important, as did patron-client relationships, cultural patronage and other associated practices, such as gift-giving. The Court also continued to be, as Elias hypothesised and as Hibbard effectively argued, a place where efforts were made to modify noble behaviour, particularly with regard to duelling. Display, ceremony and ritual, moreover, were also elements that were found in this Court, even if they were more curtailed and less grand then they had previously been. The Stuart royal family may have been down on its luck in the 1650s. This clearly did not stop their Court from attempting to be a royal one, however. Efforts were made to maintain the constituent households’ regal image, and it has to be said that these did achieve some success.
Chapter 5

The Court and the Irish courtiers’ role within it: acting as ministers and administrators to a royal family without a kingdom

Introduction

This chapter will examine how the Irish courtiers participated in the Stuart Court’s efforts to assert its claim to be a government and to exercise what this Crown saw as its traditional governmental prerogatives. It will not seek to deal with or give an account of all, or even most, of the policy decisions made by the exiled Court during the Interregnum. It is simply impossible to do so in a work such as this. Moreover, while it will deal with a number of this Court’s efforts to assert its governmental prerogative, it will not attempt to deal with all of this Court’s efforts to do so. Once again, it is not possible to do so in a work of this type. In any case, even if it were possible, it would still be inappropriate as this thesis does not seek to deal with all those persons who influenced the Court’s actions. It is only a study of a particular group within that body; namely the Irish exiled elite. Besides, many other works, taken as a whole, have already done this.128

There are a number of other points and realities that must be made and acknowledged before we continue. First, in explaining how the Irish elite influenced the Court’s political policy and administrative actions during this period, we shall again make reference to many of the elements that featured in the previous chapter. This is inevitable. While one can assign separate chapters to the Court’s role as a semi-private household and to its efforts to function as a governmental institution, one must also realise and accept that, as many others have done already, that such a distinction is artificial. It is axiomatic in early modern court studies that courtiers who played important roles in the daily life of a royal household also had influence on those court activities that pertained to government, administration, policy-making and other such executive functions.129 Being noble servants meant that they had access to

128 See, Ronald Hutton, Charles the Second, pp. 34-132. Antonia Fraser, King Charles II, pp. 103-231.
the Crown and the entire royal family and this meant that they also had access to the ear of those who headed the governmental apparatus. Inevitably, then, those activities carried out by the noble servants of the royal family impacted upon the administrative actions of such a body.

Second, it has to be conceded that the Stuart Court and its courtiers, including those who are the subjects of this study, had done immense damage to their ability to assert their traditional governmental prerogative when they went into exile. Most obviously, the decision to leave the traditional Stuart kingdoms and go abroad meant that they surrendered control of key government institutions and administrative machinery to those persons who had forced them abroad. It also removed the Court from those that it claimed to govern. This creates a slight historiographical problem, because, for historians, courtly government in the early modern era has made courts the centres from which princes and their advisors carried out the major governmental and administrative functions within an early modern kingdom. This Court, however, did not have a bureaucracy to do this with and, more importantly, while it may have claimed the right to govern over England, Scotland and Ireland, it was a governmental institution that was not actually in situ. Nonetheless, as we shall see, this did not stop the Court from continuously asserting its right to be the executive government of these kingdoms and from acting as if it was the legitimate centre of government for those territories. In short, it did not stop the Court from acting as a political institution and from interfering in those spheres which are traditionally seen as pertaining to government.

This chapter therefore is not a study of an early modern governmental institution and its advisors/ministers at the work of governing a kingdom. It is, instead, an examination of the efforts of the Court, and of an early-modern elite within it, to assert the same Court’s right to be recognised as a legitimate government. It is, moreover, a study of the Court and its Irish courtiers outside of their normal environments, removed from their natural zones of power and influence, and lacking the support of institutional bodies that they would normally have used to aid them in their administrative duties. This chapter will therefore examine the nature of the activities of the royalist Government-in-exile and it will deal with how, in the absence of the traditional institutions and bureaucracies of the early Stuart kingdoms, and with what can be understatedly described as a considerably reduced presence in the
kingdoms themselves, the Irish nobility contributed to these continuing political operations and to its efforts to assert its right to govern.

As part of the analysis of these activities, the chapter will examine the actions of the Irish nobility and courtiers under certain headings. The first of these relate to what are traditionally seen as being among the major areas of concern for early modern governments; in this case, financial activities and military matters. This will be followed by a brief examination of the role of the Irish elite within the principal administrative and policy making organs of the Court; most notably, but not exclusively, the Privy Council. Finally, this chapter will conclude with an examination of the role of factions and of the differing households in the process of policy-making. By doing this, I will seek to gain an idea of just how much political power the Stuart Court in exile and its adherents had and will challenge the notion put forward by some that this body had lost complete control over the traditional prerogative powers of monarchical government. 130

**The Stuart Court in exile and early modern government**

Within the existing historiography the central tasks of early modern government have traditionally been broken into three sub-categories. These are the administration of justice, the defence of the kingdom or (most definitely in the Stuart case) kingdoms and also the prerogative to collect taxes. 131 When it came to exercising administrative and governmental prerogatives in these areas the Stuart Court faced a number of problems. Some have already been referred to. It is obvious, for instance, that a lack of administrative machinery and absence from the kingdoms where taxation proceeds would have been collected was going to have a negative impact on the revenue-generating capacity of the Court. The nature of its military power and its primary military task (i.e. the defence of a kingdom/kingdoms), moreover, were also radically different from those of other executive bodies in this period. To realise how much the exile had changed its situation here, one has only to realise that the Stuarts’ primary military task in the 1650s was not to defend their traditional kingdoms, but, instead, it was to attack and recapture them. There were other problems, aside from these, which the Monarch and his courtiers faced and

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which were not so easily overcome. For one, the fact that the courtiers were all removed from their traditional patrimonies and areas of dominance not only reduced their power, it impacted negatively on one of the features which traditionally would have made them valuable to a monarch, namely their ability to dominate particular regions of a kingdom and enforce a government’s policy within these areas.\(^{132}\)

Yet, while they might not have been able to dominate a particular region in the same manner as they would have done previously, this is not the same as being without influence in a given territory and, as we saw in the previous section, the Irish elite could still call upon some support within their abandoned country. There was every reason to think, therefore, that they could still have used this influence within and about their patrimonies for the benefit of the Stuart Court. This was not insignificant, especially when one considers that this kind of established elite, i.e. one which could command support from local populations, was something that was relatively thin on the ground in Ireland.\(^{133}\) Certainly, the Interregnum regimes did not have the support of any such elite. Instead it was relying on a relatively new group of landowners who had little or no connection to the wider population. Aside from that the Stuart Court had some assets and advantages which could be used to counteract the drawbacks associated with exile. First among these was a problem faced by all the various interregnum regimes. Among those who highlighted it was Lord Broghill, one of the most notable supporters of the Cromwellian Protectorate and also, coincidentally, a brother of one of those who had initially gone into exile (namely Richard Boyle, the second Earl of Cork). Broghill was one of those who backed the move to offer the Crown to Oliver Cromwell in the mid-1650s. As he pointed out when making the case for the acceptance of this offer in 1657, there was a question mark over the legitimacy of all the interregnum regimes. This existed simply because they were of a form that did not fit with the English constitution and laws, which only acknowledged a monarchical government. No interregnum regime could ever claim to fit with this. In contrast, the Stuart Court in exile had both tradition and a pro-monarchical constitution on its side. There could be no doubt that the Stuarts, deposed as they were, were the only legitimate claimants to the vacant thrones of

\(^{132}\) Jane Ohlymeyer, *Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms*, p. 191.

Britain and Ireland under the constitution. Royalists were also not slow to make the argument that sovereignty was vested in the person of the King under this constitution (and this was regardless of where he was). Consequently no other person or body could claim it. Bramhall, for one, had made this case as early as 1643. All of this went with a considerable amount of support, even if this was tacit, within the political nations in Britain and Ireland. It has to be said that there was a tendency to political instability and an inability to build to a broad support base amongst the Interregnum regimes as well.\textsuperscript{134} Banished as they were, then, the Stuarts’ claim to governance over Britain and Ireland was far from ignorable.

**Exercising prerogatives after a fashion: raising funds and taxation**

When dealing with the question of finance, and the traditional royal prerogative of raising taxes, while it is stating the obvious that this Court did not have the option of calling a parliament to raise such funds, one should still not assume that it had lost access to all of the traditional means for a government to raise money and even while in exile the Court did attempt to collect money from its supporters in its lost kingdoms. It has to be admitted that not all of these efforts were successful. In one example, from 1656 merchants refused to pay funds to the Crown because of they could not afford to. In another case from the late 1650s, royalist supporters in England would not pay money to the Court’s agents unless the demands observed traditional legal forms and the documentation seeking the funds bore the correct royal seals. Otherwise, efforts foundered. This latter example could, of course, be interpreted as being nothing more than a polite refusal to surrender money to the Court. One would still have to concede, however, the implication that proper legal forms be observed when making an appeal for funds did amount to an acknowledgment of the right of the exiled Stuart Court to seek money from its supporters, if only a tacit one. Yet it should also be pointed out that London


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European University Institute
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merchants had previously paid funds out to Charles II when circumstances allowed.\textsuperscript{135} It is fair to say then that the Court was able to go beyond a mere recognition from its followers of its right to gather funds. It actually did manage to levy funds from royalists in Britain throughout the 1650s. In early 1655, for instance, at a time when the Stuarts were seeking money to pay for the journey of the Duke of Gloucester and his train from Paris to Cologne, Lord Hatton was to report that he had seen a letter which indicated that enough money had been collected in England to meet the expense involved.\textsuperscript{136} Through a variety of means, then, one can say that the exiled royalist government did manage to tax its followers.

It was able to do this because, despite its banishment, it actually had many means of gathering revenue open to it. Many of these, moreover, were based on Tudor and Stuart administrative and governmental practices which predated the exile. One of the most notable of these was the issuing of privateering licences. This was a long-established method of revenue-raising, with English governments having been involved in it since the 1200s.\textsuperscript{137} Moreover, as we have already seen, many of the courtiers at the exiled Court were involved in this activity and this was particularly true of the Irish amongst them, many of whom had previous experience of privateering in 1640s Ireland. One notable Irish privateering ship of the 1650s, the \textit{Patrick}, had previously been used to supply Inchiquin with food in the 1640s. Ormonde for his part had issued Irish privateers with royal letters of marque in August 1649.\textsuperscript{138} In fact, many of the privateering ships captains employed by the exiled Court were Irish and had business arrangements with the exiled Irish nobility. As we have seen, this was the case with both Inchiquin and Ormonde.\textsuperscript{139} The


\textsuperscript{136}BL Eg. Mss 2535, Hatton to Nicholas, 23 March 1655, f. 92.


\textsuperscript{138}Jane Ohlymeyer, ‘Irish privateers during the civil war, 1642-50’, The Mariner's Mirror, no. 76 (May, 1990), p. 119. Ibid, p. 130. CSPI, 1647-1660, orders of the committee of both houses for Irish affairs, 17 February 1648, p. 6. HMC, Leybourne-Popham Mss, Narrative of the proceedings of the fleet by Colonel Edward Popham, 1 April 1651 to 7 August 1651 (O. S.), p. 84.

\textsuperscript{139}BL Add Mss 34702, Richard Browne to Radcliffe, 8 December 1655, f. 137. HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Bramhall to Ormonde, 26 April 1651, p. 167. Ibid, Inchiquin to Ormonde, 6 August
tendency to get involved in this activity was also a characteristic of the royal family. The Duke of York, to cite one example, used funds, or at least the profits he anticipated to get from these activities, to reward those close to him. The grantees who benefited included the Marquis of Ormonde. Charles II was not immune to the lure of the potential financial benefits from this activity either. In March 1655 Sir Richard Browne, the royalist ambassador to France and privateering agent for the Stuarts in the western French ports and Brittany, sent his accounts for the previous six years to Cologne. In these he detailed how he had sent £6000 to Charles II for the Monarch’s personal use in that period. This sum only represented a part of the takings. In his accounts Browne stated that he took in a total of £37642, 16s, 03d. Aside from the King’s personal purse, this money was used to support the Stuarts’ embassy in Paris, the Anglican chapel within it and various other royalist activities.140

There is considerable evidence that both the Crown and the courtiers themselves took a deep interest in privateering. In spring 1652, for example, after receiving news earlier in the year of the misappropriation of funds there and the subsequent loss of profits due to the Duke of York and others, the Court sent persons to examine the accounts of those who had been entrusted with the task of receiving the privateering profits from the port of Dunkirk and the Low countries generally. This process eventually led to the removal of one of those entrusted with this duty. This series of events was closely followed by many at the Stuart Court, including Sir George Radcliffe, who was closely allied to one of those involved in the gathering of these privateering funds, namely John Bramhall. Radcliffe was closely linked to another person, Gervase Holles, who hoped to have a debt owed to him by the Crown repaid from the profits as well.141 Indeed, so important were these funds to the royal court, particularly in the early stages of the exile, that they were often the cause of serious disputes within it. In early November 1652, for example, Hyde was to report to Sir Edward Nicholas that he was ‘read such a lecture as he never heard’ by John

1651, pp. 179-81. NLI Mss 2317, Docket of John Bramhall, 10 May 1651, f. 361. See pp. 81-7, above, for further details on this.


Bramhall on the delay in fitting out the privateering fleet. This source of funds contributed to the tensions within the Court in other ways also. The office of receiver of these moneys, both as a source of funds and patronage, was viewed as a desirable prize by many of the courtiers. As we have already seen, when John Bramhall was appointed to the office of receiver of the moneys due to the Duke of York as lord High Admiral in mid-November 1652 (one week, in fact, after he had taken Hyde to task on the fitting out of privateers) Sir Edward Nicholas, who had desired the appointment for his son, was to complain about it in a letter to Hyde, on the grounds that such a post was not fit one for a cleric.\(^{142}\)

Despite these objections to Bramhall’s appointment, however, he was to remain active as a royalist privateering agent throughout the exile. Other courtiers were to maintain an interest in it as well.\(^{143}\) Overall, it is hardly surprising that the Court and its followers continued to involve itself in this activity. Aside from the potential financial gain, which was admittedly quite low at times, it also had an important symbolic value. It did, after all, act as a means of continuing the conflict against the Interregnum regimes and of making the royalists’ presence felt in their former kingdoms and elsewhere. It also provided some continued legitimisation for the Stuart dynasty. Simply put, sailing with a privateering licence issued by Charles II’s Court and, moreover, in the case of certain ports, allowing these privateers to use them as a base, effectively amounted to an acknowledgement of the deposed Monarch’s right to issue such documents and thus acted as an implicit recognition of the continuing legitimacy of his government, both by those of his subjects who manned the ships and by the foreign states who sheltered them. The privateers also pressed this claim to governance on the part of the Court in a much more visible way. They sailed under the royal standard, as the well as the flag of Great Britain, and thus they themselves acted as a physical statement of the Stuart Court’s claim to be the


\(^{143}\) See, for example, The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. II, Hyde to Nicholas, 20 August 1653, p. 237. HMC, Hastings Mss (vol. IV), Ormonde to Bramhall, 7 December 1655, pp. 94-5.
legitimate government of Britain and Ireland. More importantly, the issuing of commissions to the privateers was important as it again served as a means of legitimising the Court’s claim to be a government. Without Court licence those involved in this activity could not have been considered as anything other than pirates. The privateering licence, however, acted as a means of legitimising their acts of violence. The legitimisation of violence in this way thus was, even in the early-modern era, a prerogative of government. Thus the granting of these commissions acted as another means for the Stuart Court to assert its claim to be a proper governmental centre.

Beyond this, sanctioning privateers even allowed Charles II to portray himself as the protector of his subjects and as a dispenser of justice at times. In May 1650, for instance, this King ordered his Irish privateering agent in France, Luke Whittington, to restore goods taken in a privateering operation to two English merchants based in Rotterdam who had been promised protection by the Crown. The document containing this order, moreover, explicitly stated that this command was given in the second year of Charles II’s reign. It thus also constituted a claim to governance by him. The dispensation of justice by the Crown in privateering cases went beyond that relatively informal example. By the early 1650s a royalist admiralty court, under the jurisdiction of the Crown’s Lord High Admiral, the Duke of York, was certainly operating in Brittany and was adjudicating on privateering matters. It was a not untypical early-modern government institution, being a combination of a finance-gathering and justice-dispensing body. Its main role here was to adjudge whether goods captured by these ships could be considered as enemy contraband and then arranged for their division amongst the privateers, the Crown and other interested officials and rules governing how this was to be done were laid down by the Court. The exiled Crown was, in short, using the Irish elite-supplied privateers as a fundraising mechanism, as an assertion of its right to rule, as a means to continue to the war and, ultimately, as an excuse to recreate a bureaucratic institution. It should also be highlighted that this admiralty court’s functions were not just confined to Brittany: appointments of officers to this court were being made in 1652, which stated that they

144 The moderate publisher of every daies intelligence from the Parliaments army, under the command of his Excellency the Lord General Cromwell, no. 93, 8-15 April 1653, Thomason tracts 37:E.211[17].
had jurisdiction in Picardy, Normandy, Ostend, Newport and ‘all ports in league and
amity with his Majesty’.146

Bearing all this in mind, it is no wonder that in 1656, while negotiating an
alliance between the Stuarts and the Spanish Habsburgs, the royalists made every
effort to have ships sailing under the King’s ensign admitted into the ports of
Flanders. This was conceded to them in principle, though for one reason or another
there were to be continuing difficulties in having it implemented over the course of
the next four years and it would eventually become a source of tension between the
Stuarts and their Spanish allies, with the royalists feeling aggrieved over the failure of
the powers in Brussels to keep their side of the bargain.147 This sense of grievance is
hardly surprising. The importance that privateering activities held for the exiled Court
was much more than just financial and the maintenance of this activity was important
to it on many levels. What is more, it is clear that this activity did concern the
Interregnum regimes. In May 1651 one Parliamentary colonel, an Edward Popham,
was writing to the governor of Dunkirk in an effort to have him put a halt to the
activities of Luke Whittington there. The latter person held the title of ‘agent for his
Majesty’s maritime affairs of his kingdom of Ireland at Dunkirk’ and he had
effectively been acting as the Stuarts’ representative on privateering affairs there since
at least 1649. Popham attempted to persuade the governor of Dunkirk to put a stop to
Whittington’s activities as privateering was wreaking great damage on English
shipping. More importantly for us here, he argued that the privateering commissions
should not be acknowledged as they came from a ‘pretending king’. In other words,
Popham felt the need to dispute the legitimacy of both the privateering commissions
and of Charles II’s claim to governance.148 Privateering was to remain a great

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146 The aristocracy, the state, and the local community: the Hastings collection of manuscripts from the
Huntington library in California, reel 6, box 19, Charles II to Luke Whittington, 3 May 1650, HA
to 1649, though she admits that this is not on very firm grounds. HMC, Marquis of Bath (vol. II),
147 AGR, Secrétairerie d’Etat et De Guerre, Answers to requests given to Ormonde by Don Juan, 20
August 1656, Registre 261, f. 236. Ibid, Don Juan to Philip IV, Registre 264, 18 January 1659, ff.
229-35. Igor Pérez Tostado, Looking for ‘powerful friends’: Irish and English political activity in the
117. HMC, Leybourne-Popham Mss, Popham to the Governor of Dunkirk, 17 May 1651 (O. S.), p.
concern to those in power in London throughout the decade. The intelligence reports of John Thurloe vouch to the concern of the Protectorate about the activities of the privateers. In autumn 1658, for instance, he received information about a certain Walter Poore in London, claiming that he had formerly been an Irish privateer. More notably, as one royalist privateering agent in France stated, great efforts were made to curtail the activities of these ships.¹⁴⁹

As is implicit, but still clear, from the above examples, the exiled Irish elite were important to the continuation of this pursuit throughout the decade. It was through this caste that the Court claimed command over these ships and exercised authority over them. The evidence from chapter 2 and the accounts from earlier in this chapter shows that it was they who, through their range of personal contacts, provided the Court with the bulk of its privateering resources, be they the men and ships used in these ventures or even the functionaries who interacted with the privateers and acted as the Court’s agents to these men (as mentioned previously, courtiers such as Bramhall, clients of nobility such as Ormonde, were these very representatives). By drawing on these they appreciably contributed to this particular means of acquiring funds, maintaining the resistance to the Interregnum regimes and asserting the Stuarts’ claim to be the lawful rulers of Britain and Ireland. They further contributed to royalist through their role as investors in these ventures, thus making them viable.¹⁵⁰ Quite clearly then, this activity, which provided financially, in part at least, for the Court and which also served to partly legitimise it as a rival claimant to be the government of Britain and Ireland, was an important one for the royalist cause and it could not have been carried out without the exiled Irish elite.

¹⁰⁰ Whittington continued in this post at least until early 1653. There is some suggestion that he may have been the previously-referred to official who was removed for irregularities in his accounts in the spring of that year. NLI Mss 2319, Whittington to Lane, 24 February 1652, ff. 422-5. HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Whittington to George Lane, 24 February 1652, p. 261. Ibid, Whittington to Bramhall, 24 February 1652, pp. 261-2.


¹⁵⁰ Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. II, Bramhall on the case of Mrs Proten, 22 April 1650, p. 53. See pp. 81-7, above, for further details on the activity of the Irish elite in this field.
Important as it was, privateering was not the only significant funds-raising venture that the exiled government embarked upon. It can likewise be said that, both from a financial and a symbolic point of view, that other attempts to gather money within the lost Stuart kingdoms were also equally as important to the Court. These efforts were generally done through the distribution of documents bearing royal seals (an official touch which arose from the aforementioned demand made by those who were being asked for funds that proper, traditional procedure should be followed in making such requests), which asked the King’s subjects to advance sums to their Monarch.\footnote{See p. 212, above.} Aside from the actual efforts to collect funds, the use of royal seals in itself was important. These constituted part of what G. E. Aylmer, the foremost expert on early modern English Crown government, described as the spine of the central executive, along with the Privy Council and the secretaries of state. The use of these seals, be it the privy seal or the great seal, on documents had previously marked them out as being communications and directions from the King and his Council to his subjects; the great seal being used to validate grants and orders from the King and Privy Council and the privy seal being used to validate royal financial dealings.\footnote{G. E. Aylmer, \textit{The King’s Servants: The Civil Service of Charles I 1625-1642}, pp. 13-6. The office of secretary of state was initially held by Robert Long, though its functions were later carried out by Sir Edward Hyde after the latter’s removal in 1652. Neil Anthony Charles Reynolds, \textit{The Stuart Court and courtiers in exile 1644-1654}, p. 273. The Privy Council shall be dealt with later on in this chapter.} They were therefore important administrative items, which served both to validate and legitimise royal commands. This government-in-exile did not fail to follow this practice or to use these to mark itself out as a claimant to the government of Britain and Ireland. By spring 1653 it had a new great seal made and Sir Edward Herbert had been appointed to the office of Lord Keeper (the officer who held the Seal).\footnote{The moderate publisher, no. 93, 8-15 April 1653, Thomason tracts 37:E.211[17].} It seems more than likely that the privy seal, meanwhile, was employed in its traditional role by the banished Court, being used to validate the financial actions of the Crown, as it would appear that this was the royal seal that was appended to letters requesting money from the King’s subjects in the lost kingdoms. After all, even before the exile letters bearing this very stamp had been used by the royalists in their efforts to raise money. In 1640s England letters bearing the privy seal had been distributed in
England for the purposes of raising money. Their distribution had been authorised by the royalist Parliament in Oxford in 1644 and they amounted to a request to royalist gentry for a loan. The exiled royalists of the 1650s, therefore, could claim that the distribution of these letters was validated both by precedent and by (an admittedly biased) parliament and they did not shirk from using them. The privy seal letters were undoubtedly being used for revenue-raising purposes in early 1658, at a time when efforts were being made to organise a rebellion in England. One royalist agent operating there wrote to Hyde at this time asking that more documents bearing privy seals be sent, as the shortage of them was hindering the procurement of funds because money would not be given up without them. Annoying as it was, this insistence on properly legitimised documents still amounted to an acknowledgment of the right of the Court to collect funds.

In effect, therefore, the Court was using these seals and the seal-bearing letters as a means of not only gaining funds but of asserting the administrative prerogatives of the Stuarts. This was particularly true with regard to its efforts to raise funds from its supporters and to all intents and purposes it amounted to an extra-parliamentary method of taxation. What is more, this was not an unusual practice forced on the royalist Court by its exile. This levying of what amounted to a tax in all but name through extra-parliamentary means by the Court was certainly not without precedent in English history. Most notably, Charles I had acquired funds through extra-parliamentary means with the ‘forced loan’ of 1626/7. There were older precedents also, dating from the Middle Ages, which allowed a monarch to obtain funds from his subjects through such means. In this sense then, in gathering funds from persons in Britain and Ireland through the issuing of letters bearing privy seals, this Court was once again acting like a legitimate government. Furthermore, while the funds raised in this way were undoubtedly useful, the efforts to collect them were probably just as valuable, as they acted as a means of reminding those persons who received these demands in the former Stuart patrimonies that the exiled Court was still pressing its claim to be the rightful power there. The fact that the funds gained from such activities frequently got diverted into forwarding the various military schemes

designed to retake the disputed kingdoms similarly meant that it bolstered the efforts that were being made to re-assert the authority of the Crown within the ‘Stuart archipelago’.

Once again, though we will not go into great detail at this point, the banished Irish nobility and elite were amongst those who aided the Court in asserting its claim to be a true government in this manner, and they certainly helped it to maintain some sort of grasp on the traditional royal prerogatives within the area of taxation and finance. They effectively did this by aiding in the informal tax-gathering on behalf of the Court. Often they did this at one remove from the lost Stuart kingdoms, through the co-operation of their personal contacts in Britain. George Radcliffe attempted to do just this through his family in 1655. By these means funds were collected on behalf of the Crown and were then either transferred to the Continent or were used to finance conspiratorial activities. Indeed, the money collected using these seals was often used in the various attempts to recover the kingdoms. The funds being collected in 1658, for example, were specifically to be used in the efforts to organise a rebellion that year. Such activity therefore, aside from helping to support royalist activities, did pose a threat to the Protectorate regime, as Oliver Cromwell implicitly admitted to his Parliament of 1655 when he warned its members about the distribution of the aforementioned royal seals in England.156

**Exercising prerogatives after a fashion: military efforts.**

Seeing that it continued to exercise some of its traditional financial prerogative, even in the limited way detailed above, it really should come as no surprise to learn that the exiled Court managed to retain some military power during this decade. Indeed, we have already touched upon it, insofar as we have dealt with the Court’s continuation of the war at sea through its privateering activities. Aside from this, it must be remembered that it was not unusual for exiled nobility to exercise martial might in the seventeenth century. The contemporaneous case of the Duke of Lorraine, who, despite dispossession, still controlled considerable military forces, fought in the conflicts of the 1650s either as an ally of Spain or of those involved in

the Fronde, and who was seen by some both as a potential ally and as a model for the Stuart King, illustrates the point. One should not be in a rush, therefore, to write off the military power of the royalists and their royal family, though one does have to admit that there were some interesting variations from the traditional military practices and goals of an early modern government. Of particular importance here, and as noted previously, was the reality that the Stuarts’ primary military task in the 1650s was to attack and recapture their traditional kingdoms. Additionally, unlike its predecessors, it also could not openly seek the support of its own subjects within its own kingdoms for its war effort. While it was known that the Court wanted to engage in military activities against those it saw as being rebels, it could not openly recruit or organise its military forces, within Britain and Ireland at any rate, but instead it had to try to make all military arrangements within those territories clandestinely.

One element of this covert organisation of military affairs at home was the issuing of military commissions to its supporters, particularly the appointment of officers and commanders of forces loyal to the Crown. This, predictably, was done when the Court was attempting to organise a royalist rising in Britain or Ireland. The issuing of commissions to particular supporters, designating them as the officers who would lead royalist supporters, was yet another way for the Court to show that it considered itself to be a true and rightful government, as it clearly paralleled the traditional means of appointing such commanders followed by previous princely regimes in those islands. The issuing of such commissions to its supporters in Britain and Ireland, giving them a claim to the status of officers in a royalist army (though these forces, in a strictly British context at least, may have been only imaginary at the best of times) also implied that these persons, by attempting organise military operations on behalf of the royalist cause, were not conspiring to rebel against a legitimate government but were instead acting on behalf of a legitimate government against rebel groups that were attempting to usurp executive authority that they had no right to.


158 The identification of the Interregnum regimes as rebels by royalists was a commonplace throughout the 1650s. Cf., for instance, HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Ormonde to Nicholas, 19 October 1651, p. 218.
The issuing of these commissions generally, but not always, followed a two-stage process: the identifying of the persons who were to receive them, followed by their distribution to the nominees. Once again, the banished Irish elite were key participants in these steps, being routinely involved in the identifying of those to be commissioned. On top of this, some of the exiled elite either took on the responsibility of distributing the commissions to the assorted nominees themselves or else they secured the services of others to carry out this task. Frequently the dispensers of these commissions were given great leeway in carrying out their chore as the Court often merged the two aforementioned steps together by issuing blank commissions to those persons who were trusted with their distribution. Those persons assigned to the task of delivering the commissions were thus effectively allowed to appoint whomever they saw fit as a royalist officer. Yet, no matter how it was done, handing out commissions was about more than just getting persons to fight for the King. The couriers carrying these commissions were acting as the Courts go-betweens to the persons it claimed sovereignty over and in so doing acted as communicants of the Crown’s claim to authority over its subjects. Thus, this role closely paralleled their function as distributors of documents bearing the privy seal and the great seal. They too had similarly acted as transmitters of the Stuart Court’s claim to authority over the populations of Britain and Ireland. It has to be said that there were those in those countries that had no problem with this. Some even applied for these posts off their own bat. Frequently, as with others seeking the Court’s patronage, the applicants for such commissions had to go through Ormonde to get them. Thus we see John Mordaunt seeking a commission to raise two horse regiments and one foot regiment in Surrey in early 1658, on the eve of a planned rebellion there. The Marquis was not the only one involved in commissioning officers. In mid-1654, prior to travelling to Ireland to seek aid for a royalist rebellion in Scotland, George Hamilton was entrusted with blank commissions, which he was to disperse to those he thought fit to hold them. Furthermore, such activities were not confined to Britain and Ireland. Richard Bellings junior was responsible for forwarding the names of soldiers in the Spanish Netherlands who were to be similarly commissioned to Edward Nicholas. The distribution of such military charges also took in naval
personnel and overlapped with royalist privateering activities. One captain Hackett, of the ship Saint Joseph, was in possession of such a commission in 1657.159

Yet, while issuing military commissions was one element of preparing militarily, it was not the key one for the royalists. Of much greater importance to the maintenance of whatever military might they had was the acquisition and control of one specific commodity; soldiers. Irish mercenaries were especially important in this regard. For the exiled Court controlling these troops not only meant that they could still pose some kind of threat to the Interregnum regimes in the English Commonwealth, it also meant that they had something to come to the negotiating table with when it came to dealing with the Continental powers. Simply put, they could offer a substantial amount of troops to those states that were willing to back them and for the warring kingdoms of the 1650s, particularly France and Spain, this was not to be ignored. It was this very resource, for instance, that Charles II offered the French when negotiating with them in the mid-1650s and it has to be said that a substantial number of troops were brought away from the Spanish as part of this.160

The Irish exiled elite’s connections to Irish regiments on the Continent, be they in the form of kinship links to their commanders, or as officers of these brigades in their own right, were central to the Court’s effort to control these troops. We have already seen how extensive these connections were when looking at the resources used by this elite to maintain themselves on the Continent. The very existence of such links also meant that this elite was well placed to aid the Monarch in securing the assistance of these Irish troops. To give one example, some of Ormonde’s closest kin and major political and military allies from the 1640s were prominent as commanders of Irish mercenary troops. Among these were leading Irish courtiers, including the Earls of Inchiquin and Castlehaven, as well as Viscount Muskerry. Other Irish mercenary commanders who had connections with Ormonde, having previously fought with him in 1640s Ireland and having consistently supported his political


160 R. A. Stradling, The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries, p. 80. See also pp. 346-54, below, for further details on the royalists’ military activities in the Spanish Netherlands after 1656.
interest there, included Walter Dongan, who had been transported to Spain with his regiment by the Parliamentary regime in 1653, and Sir James Dillon, who likewise found himself obliged to fight with the Spanish in the early 1650s.\(^{161}\) Aside from the military offices that they held among such troops themselves, the familial connections of these courtiers to others in the mercenary community were also important. Ormonde, if we examine the extent of his network within the Irish mercenary community once again, was distantly related to one captain Thomas Browne of Hospital in county Limerick. This captain had likewise followed the Stuarts into exile and served by turn both France and Spain as part of the Duke of York’s regiment until the Restoration.\(^{162}\) James Butler was not the only Irish royalist courtier with links into the mercenary community. The example of Sir Christopher O’Brien, brother to Inchiquin, makes it clear that these kinds of connections were quite extensive and shows that the familial connections of the courtiers to mercenary troop commanders went beyond links to middle-rank officers.\(^{163}\)

Apart from such connections, which must surely have facilitated contacts, the Irish courtiers were also helped in their task by a willingness amongst some of the commanders of the forces in question to abandon their employers and follow the Stuarts when required. This was not necessarily completely motivated by loyalty to the displaced royal family, though sympathy for their cause was certainly an important factor. This is quite evident if one examines Irish mercenary soldier behaviour during the Franco-Spanish conflict of the 1650s.\(^{164}\) In 1653, for instance, Irish troops defected from the Spanish armies to the French kingdom for three principal reasons. They were suffering a certain amount of mistreatment under the Spanish, they were being actively encouraged to do so by the Duke of York and they were being granted liberty by their new employers (in this case, the French) to join


\(^{163}\) Sir Christopher O’Brien was a long time servant of the Spanish Crown, having been in its employ since the 1640s. He was an important agent in the Irish-Spanish trade in troops in the 1640s and 1650s. R. A. Stradling, *The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries*, pp. 73-5.

\(^{164}\) They were present in the armies of both kingdoms, and in those of their allies, in not inconsiderable numbers.
Charles II when he would require them. These defections proved significant as they caused the Spanish and their ally, the Prince of Condé, to lose control of the city of Bordeaux in 1653. One of the outposts that had been defending this city, that of Lormont, had been garrisoned by Sir James Dillon’s regiment. This outpost fell, however, after Cormac McCarthy, Muskerry’s son, induced Dillon to defect to the French. Another instance, which saw Sir Richard Grace march his troops out of a garrison that he had been holding on the Spaniards behalf during the siege of Gerona, drew unfavourable comment from the Venetian ambassador to Spain, as that too led to the fall of that particular outpost into French hands. What is more, the sum total of these defections added eight regiments to French forces at this time.165 This loyalty to the Stuarts was manifested in other ways by Irish mercenaries as well. In 1654 Charles II was saluted by Irish troops and their officers as he passed from France into Flanders. It was not surprising, or even atypical, that this should happen. Such

165 It should be noted here that it was being reported in Spain at this time that Charles II had actively sought to bring about this change in allegiance amongst the Irish troops, as a way of thanking the French for allowing him to reside in France. There is actually a strong circumstantial case to be made for this. The claim that two of the most prominent Irish mercenary commanders in Spain, Colonel Richard Grace and Sir Christopher O’Brien, both of whom were central to the event in question, had gone to Paris was cited in support of this. An intercepted letter of mid-August 1653, sent from London to Viscount Tara in Paris, on the subject of seducing Irish troops from Spanish to French service, may also be cited in support of this opinion. A letter to be found amongst the Clarendon State papers, written by Edward Hyde to Richard Bellings in Ratisbon, on 8 August 1653, further strengthens the case. In this Hyde stated that the defection of the Irish from Spanish to French service was to be imputed [my italics] to the ill-treatment of the soldiery by Spain. He added, however, that while Spain was angry at what they believed they had lost because of the actions of Charles II, the French were not as grateful as they should be. Clearly the exiled Stuart Court was using Irish mercenaries for its political purposes at this time, while seeking to maintain a certain amount of plausible deniability. It is worth noting that the use of mercenaries in this fashion was typical of the state in the early-modern period. Commentarius Rinuccinianus, vol. V, p. 100. W. Dunn Macray (Ed.), The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. II, Hyde to Wright, 13 September 1653, pp. 251-2. CVSP, vol. XXIX, 1653-4, Giovanni Sagredo to the Doge and Senate, 3 June 1653, p. 80. Ibid, 10 June 1653, p. 84. Ibid, Giacomo Quirini to the Doge and Senate, 20 August 1653, pp. 113-4. Charles McNeill, ‘Reports on the Rawlinson Collection of Manuscripts preserved in the Bodleian Library, Oxford’, unknown to Viscount Tara, 18 August 1653 (O. S.), p. 16. W. Dunn Macray (Ed.), The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. II, Hyde to Bellings, 8 August 1653, p. 239. Pierre Gouhier, ‘Mercenaires Irlandais au service de la France (1635-1664)’, p. 66. Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, pp. 21. My thanks again to Padraig Lenihan.
behaviour and loyalty to the Stuarts was manifested by other mercenary communities on the Continent as well, most particularly by the some of the Scots. Those from that nation who had taken up employment with the French during the 1640s did so out of loyalty to the Stuarts. Like the Irish, moreover, there were those Scots whose choice of employer in the 1650s was dictated by concern for the Stuarts’ political interests.  

There were factors, however, which limited the influence that the Irish courtiers could exercise over these troops. For one, as is implicit in the example of the Irish defections from the Spanish army in the early 1650s, the ability to exercise influence over Irish mercenary troops was dependent upon their willingness to abandon their employers so as to join the royalist camp, or the camps of its Continental allies. It should be pointed out here that not all of those Irish troops who fought with the Spanish did defect in the early 1650s and Grace’s actions actually prompted some Irish mercenaries to petition the Spanish King to protest their loyalty. Amongst those was Sir Walter Dongan, who would later prove his loyalty to the Stuarts. Even given the fact, moreover, that these forces were, more often than not, willing to back the Stuart interest on the Continent, these soldiers were often dispersed over great distances and therefore were not always readily accessible by the Court. Persuading troops to abandon one kingdom or power so as to join another could also, just as easily, alienate potential allies. To cite one case, in July 1653 the Duke of Lorraine, in the wake of the Duke of York persuading Irish troops to abandon the former’s service and join the French army, threatened to arrest Charles II if he ever got the opportunity. In 1656, after Ormonde had been active in persuading Irish forces to leave the French army and join the Spanish cause, Cardinal Mazarin rebuked the Marquis and the exiled King in a public letter. Ormonde was subsequently forced to defend his actions in print. What was more, while officers could pledge their


CRONIN, John Jeremiah (2007), The Irish Royalist Elite of Charles II In Exile, C. 1649-1660
European University Institute
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loyalty to Charles II, it was another thing to get ordinary soldiers to follow. Their support often had as much to do with the conditions on offer as with bonds of loyalty to a king. In 1656, when the royalists were trying to get Irish troops to move from the French camp so as to join that of their new allies, the Spanish, they found that while troops did move in large numbers they did not stay long after receiving their initial payments or after they had examined what the conditions on offer were like. Indeed, this was not only a problem with the common soldiery. Inchiquin, for reasons that are still not clear, never joined his King in the Spanish Netherlands in 1656, despite being expected to do so.169

Yet, these handicaps and potential pitfalls did not stop the King’s Irish servants from appealing to the Irish mercenary community and it did not stop the royalists from playing a part in the major military conflicts of the decade. While it is not altogether clear how much of a role the Irish courtiers played in the above-mentioned defections from the Spanish to the French side in 1653, though it is obvious that they had some hand in it, it is possible to evaluate their influence on the behaviour of these regiments in the following year. Frequently, it was Ormonde’s personal contacts with individuals and the willingness of these persons to act on his instructions that were vital here. In July 1654, in a letter to the Earl of Castlehaven, who was then serving with the Prince of Condé and Spain against the French Crown, Ormonde urged this mercenary commander to ‘...keep my countrymen that have engaged with them from quitting them...’. To this advice, he added the following remark.

‘...and I give your Lordship liberty to tell all those that you think value my advice that it will be for their honour and...advantage to keep themselves to their engagements till their own King call for their service...’170

Evidently, the exiled royalist Court viewed the Irish mercenaries as a resource on which they could draw on at a time that would be more advantageous to them. This is further shown by a letter of Daniel O’Neill to the King in mid-March 1655, at a time when he was aiding in the organisation of a royalist rebellion in England. He

wrote to Charles II, stating that he should consider getting ‘liberty for the Irish to leave the Monsieur [i.e. French service], he [i.e. they] have served too long there, and he [i.e. they] will be a most useful servant to you when you come home’.\footnote{171 BL Eg. Mss 2535, Daniel O’Neill to Charles II, 9 March 1655 (O. S.), f. 76.} It is also evident, moreover, that while personal contacts with commanders were vital to ensuring the aid of these soldiers, the request for their continued support for the royalist cause was also at least partly based upon an appeal to their loyalty to their Monarch. To an extent this continued loyalty was not hoped for but was expected and was even seen to binding upon the commanders. After the alliance with Spain in 1656, which occurred in the wake of Cromwell forming a military alliance with France the previous year, it was reported that Ormonde wrote to Muskerry demanding that he join the King in the Spanish Netherlands and quit French service, on pain of high treason.\footnote{172 Thurloe State Papers, vol. V, Thurloe to Henry Cromwell, 26 August 1656 (O. S.), p. 349.} In these contacts with its subjects, then, the Court was still acting like a sovereign power.

The military value of Ormonde and the other Irish adherents to the Court did not end there. Those persons that were closest to James Butler regularly kept him informed of the behaviour of the various members of the Irish mercenary community and protected the royalist interest within it. In this informal way they acted as agents both for Ormonde and the Court to the troops. In mid-April 1655 Lord Taaffe informed Ormonde that his friends among the Irish mercenaries in Flanders had told him that many more Irish commanders were considering defecting to the French from the Spanish side, because of ‘ill-usage’. This obviously went against Ormonde’s advice of the previous year. Taaffe, nonetheless, informed them that he had succeeded in delaying their decision to do so and that he was sure they would not act until Charles II’s pleasure was known, as the majority would ‘...prefer begging before doing anything that might draw prejudice to his interest’.\footnote{173 HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Taaffe to Ormonde, 23 April 1655, p. 317.} Once again, an appeal made to the Irish soldiery which was based both on their personal links to the Irish courtiers and also their support for their Monarch’s cause was central to Taaffe’s success here. The tale, in addition, highlights the value of the Irish elite as ambassadors for the Crown, particularly when it came to dealing with the exiled soldiery.

\textsuperscript{171} BL Eg. Mss 2535, Daniel O’Neill to Charles II, 9 March 1655 (O. S.), f. 76.
\textsuperscript{172} Thurloe State Papers, vol. V, Thurloe to Henry Cromwell, 26 August 1656 (O. S.), p. 349.
\textsuperscript{173} HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Taaffe to Ormonde, 23 April 1655, p. 317.
From 1656 onwards, such personal contacts with Irish mercenaries, be they
direct or indirect, proved to be particularly valuable. This was, once again,
particularly true of those contacts that the Marquis of Ormonde had with the Irish
soldiery. We have seen how he got his brother-in-law, Viscount Muskerry, to quit
French service and join the Spanish. These persons were joined by other commanders
who had been serving with the French, including the aforementioned Sir Richard
Grace. This alone added three regiments to Spain’s armies in the Low Countries. The
next year Ormonde, in co-operation with his secretary, George Lane, followed this
trick by persuading the Irish troops defending the town of Saint Ghislain to defect to
the Spanish camp from the French, which directly contributed to the fall of the town.
This victory was one of the few successes that the Spanish had had in the war with
France up to that point.174

From the royalist point of view there was more to these activities than just
gaining political allies for their cause on the Continent and helping them acquire much
needed troops and victories. During Charles II’s time in the Spanish Netherlands
these Irish troops, along with Scottish and English mercenaries, were formed into a
military force numbering somewhere between three thousand and five thousand
persons under the King’s nominal command, with the Duke of York acting as field
commander and various other members of the Court acting as regimental officers.
The O’Farrell regiment (the very regiment which had been defending Saint Ghislain),
to give one example, was placed under the command of the Earl of Bristol. This
development was of great import for Charles II and his supporters, as this effectively
meant that they not only had allies with which they could threaten the Cromwellian
regime. They also had a small army at their disposal for that purpose. Furthermore,
the King added to his dignity by establishing a bodyguard troop for himself, in which
Irish troops were included. Further adding to his dignity was the fact that the King
now had a proper military force. Up to that point, even though the Irish courtiers,
through their role as his unofficial agents to Irish mercenary troops, had provided him
with some military power previously, he himself had been without anything
resembling an army of his own. Now, in this small way at least, he was on a par with
other potentates. Overall, the contacts that the Irish courtiers had with Irish

mercenaries and their ability to persuade them to act in Charles II’s interest therefore allowed the exiled Court to overcome the problem, to some extent, of a lack of military might and prestige. The alliance with Spain and the formation of a small army represented the culmination of this process. Aside from this, and more practically, the military power that was acquired in the latter half of the decade allowed the exiled royalists to directly threaten the Cromwellian regime. Quite simply, there was now the possibility that if a pro-royalist revolt broke out in Britain or Ireland, and there had been a number of them in the past decade, then the Court could, with Spanish logistical assistance, provide proper military support for it.\footnote{Brendan Jennings (Ed.), \textit{Wild geese in Spanish Flanders 1582-1700}, pp. 19-20. Ronald Hutton, \textit{Charles the Second}, p. 104. \textit{Thurloe State Papers}, vol. V, a letter of intelligence from Bruges, 29 September 1656, pp. 431-2. For details on the efforts to make this possibility a reality, see pp. 372-94, below.}

All in all, when one considers the military power and activities of the exiled royalists, one can challenge the notion that the Stuart Court was, in this regard, far from being a powerless body.\footnote{Neil Anthony Charles Reynolds, \textit{The Stuart Court and courtiers in exile 1644-1654}, p. 2.} It had military specific duties, goals and aims. It also could initiate and pursue policies to achieve these. These were not fanciful schemes. The Court was after all, able to gather an army together (admittedly a small one) to pursue these aims. This was no small feat when one considers how English monarchs had found it difficult to put together any armed force at all prior to the 1640s. This military might also allowed it to form military alliances with Continental powers as well. Support for its military endeavours, moreover, could be, and in fact was, as we shall see later, found within Britain and Ireland. Aside from planned risings in late 1657 and early 1658, there were a number of other such schemes during the 1650s and some of these came to fruition.\footnote{For details on these cf. pp. 372-94, below.}

The Irish courtiers played a not insignificant role in gaining all of this military power for the Court. The quality that made them so crucial to the Court’s armed endeavours in this regard was their range of personal contacts. Through these connections they could act as ‘substitutes’ for the government institutions that would previously have been involved in the raising of troops. Ormonde, along with many others amongst the exiled Irish nobility, played a major part in helping the royalists influence extend and maintain their control over Irish mercenaries. In short, it was
they who gave the Crown the necessary authority to command these troops and it was through them that this authority was exercised. They did all this by relying on kinship links, as in the previously given examples of Ormonde and his contacts with the likes of Muskerry, patron-client connections, as demonstrated by Ormonde’s links to Taaffe, or by taking advantage of their positions as commanders of these troops, the best example of this being Colonel Richard Grace. As a result, the Court was able to operate militarily in mid-seventeenth century Continental Europe. Aside from the instances detailed above, i.e. the military alliance with Spain that came about in 1656 and the assembling of an army in the late 1650s, it was also able to actively engage in military battle against its English opponents and its allies on Continental soil. Most notably, Irish troops under the command of James, Duke of York, fought in the battle of the Dunes in 1658, an encounter which was certainly seen by some of those who wrote about it subsequently as being a continuation of the conflict of the British and Irish civil wars.\(^\text{178}\)

Gathering troops, commanding them and participating in military conflicts, especially against your declared enemies, was certainly an activity of this Court and must to some extent mark it out as a body that could mount a relatively serious claim to being the centre of a government. Clearly the Court commanded a certain amount of loyalty from British and Irish soldiery on the Continent (and it must not be forgotten that these men were still the Crown’s subjects, despite their being on the European mainland) and it had the necessary authority over these men to order them to participate in military struggles, either on its own behalf and/or on behalf of its allies. As we have seen previously with the privateers, this authority exercised by the Court over the soldiery was once again frequently exercised through the Irish nobility. As we saw in chapter 2, these persons had either arranged for much of the Irish soldiery on the Continent to go there as part of their own efforts to provide for themselves, or they were closely connected to those who acted as brokers in the trading of mercenary troops. What is more, the banished Irish elite also frequently provided for themselves by acting as officers to these regiments.\(^\text{179}\) In this capacity they often sought to ensure that their troops were available to the Stuart Court and


they repeatedly allowed the requirements of royalist policy to dictate for whom they
took their trade. Those who were not directly engaged in soldiering during the
exile but instead remained close to the Stuart Court, on the other hand, often acted as
agents and envoys to these troops, ensuring their loyalty and their continued following
of a line of action favourable to the Crown.

**Exercising prerogatives after a fashion: justice**

As we have seen previously, Charles II maintained the right to settle disputes
and regulate behaviour within his own Court, particularly on the issue of duelling. 180
This he could do because his position as the chief figure within the Court gave him
the role of *pater familias* and this function allowed him to dispense justice to his
courtiers. Courtiers were also quick to go to him to settle issues of justice amongst
themselves, and these went beyond the violent clashes detailed earlier. Early in the
exile Inchiquin was worried about being dishonoured by the writings of a fellow exile,
Lewis Dyves, but robbed of the opportunity of taking the usual legal redress of suing
an author for libel, he appealed to the Crown to protect his reputation. This Charles II
did and, after investigating Inchiquin’s complaint, Dyves was prevailed upon by the
King to alter his text and to apologise to the Irish noble. 181

The exile, on the whole, seems to have had little impact on the King’s ability
to dispense justice within his own household. Even though the Court was outside its
traditional territories, there does not seem to have been any objection to Charles II
taking responsibility from local authorities for settling disputes amongst his own
courtiers. In order to make the Crown a true-dispenser of justice, however, it was
necessary to seek to go beyond the Court’s own boundaries, as the ability to intervene
in questions of justice was something that was normally expected of a prince and his
court in this period. Linked to the justice-dispensing facet of the Monarch’s role as
*pater familias* was his theoretical position as *pater patriae*, one which the Stuart
dynasty had been quick to claim before. The former fatherly role, furthermore,
constituted an enlargement of the latter, while the latter was supposed to serve as a

180 See pp. 196-8, above.

Magnatum, 1497-1773’, *The American Journal of Legal History*, vol. 22, no. 3 (July, 1978), pp. 216-
98. Ibid, Charles II to Inchiquin, 2 April 1652, p. 127.
Thus, it was partly through the filling of the latter role that monarchs claimed the right to dispense justice to their kingdoms and not just to their own households. Still, when it came to being the font of justice for those subjects that were outside his household, Charles II found that problems arose in matching theory to practice. We have already seen how this King received a petition from a subject regarding a prize taken by royalist privateers in mid-1650. The King’s order regarding this, while ostensibly directed to a royalist agent, was in reality just as much meant for the consumption of local authorities, as it was written in French. The King therefore could not completely rely on his own agent to control his Irish privateers, but had to rely on the co-operation of local forces to do so. During the Spanish alliance this pattern of reliance on local authorities was repeated. When a certain Captain Byrne, who had somehow displeased the Stuarts, was arrested in 1659 O’Neill reported that an effort would be made to persuade the Spanish send him to the galleys. The Court, unsurprisingly, could not easily dispense justice outside its own boundaries. It could only act as a suitor seeking justice from its hosts.

In spite of this, it was not that simple a division between the Court’s environs and an outside world. Once more, it is obvious that, through the agency of persons such as its Irish elite, the Crown found it could still interfere in issues in which it would previously have used its legal prerogatives to do so. The salient example once more comes from the publishing sphere. It involved Ormonde again acting like a favourite and fulfilling the roles of both buffer and ambassador between the King and his supporters. April 1653 saw Ormonde in contact with Major-General Edward Massey, a then resident of the United Provinces, on a number of topics, including the publication of a book on the Charles II’s actions in Scotland in 1650/1. Massey was a supporter both of the work and its author. Charles II, on the other hand, had some doubts on how it would represent his cause. Lacking the traditional legal recourse, however, the King found he needed to rely on Ormonde’s intervention with Massey, and on Massey’s with the author, to ensure that he was not libelled or misrepresented.

Ormonde duly wrote to this Scottish officer and prevailed on him to seek to have the book’s printing halted. Massey’s intervention to do this was too late but he did succeed in having offending passages removed.\footnote{HMC, Ormonde Mss, (N. S., vol. I), Massey to Ormonde, 8 May 1653, pp. 290-1.} Even without courts to require them to do so, the Crown’s subjects were sometimes willing to accept the judgement of the Crown and to act upon it. Persons such as Ormonde, however, were necessary to transmit this judgement and to bring moral pressure to bear on those involved. Rudimentary and limited as it was, it did serve as a kind of regulatory system.

**The Court and the constituent parts of an early modern government**

All of this interference in the traditional areas of governance was, obviously, limited, particularly when it came to taxation and, more obviously still, justice. Yet, it must be remembered that the efforts to act in these spheres were not necessarily made for the purposes of wielding power. Instead, the point was to assert a claim to the right of governance and to put up a show of opposition to the ruling regimes in London. The same was true when it came to administrative organs. This Court, even though it was without a kingdom, still re-established or maintained some of those that its predecessors had used in governing Britain and Ireland. Undoubtedly this was partly done to make a case for governance. It probably also motivated by the desire to be seen as the true successor of previous governments and consequently did not want to vary too much from established practice. Also, some of these administrative units were tied in to the household aspects of the Court and so would probably have existed in some form anyway, even if the Court had abandoned all pretence to being a government. One of the most important of these in an early modern British context had been the Privy Council and it was no different for Charles II. Like it forebears, the Privy Council of this Court was one of those points where a semi-private royal household and an early modern government met, as it was where the Monarch’s leading subjects and nobles advised and consulted with him privately on political matters, at a distance from the more public areas within the Court space. It was a body that Charles II was never to be without during his exile and, as we have seen, it was one on which many of the Irish exiled elite were represented, having being either...
appointed there after 1649, or, in Ormonde’s case, being entitled to sit on it as a result of the political office they held.  

The Marquis, being a councillor by right as a result of being Lord Lieutenant, was an example of the Stuart Court holding to the traditional procedures of the ante-bellum Privy Council. This is not to say that all of these traditional procedures survived, however, or that all went smoothly within this institution. With regard to the Irish councillors there were a number of points where the functioning of this Council went at least a little awry. For one, Inchiquin, though appointed to the Council, hardly ever sat on it after 1654, as he effectively disappeared from the King’s Court then, having previously taken up a post with the French army. He continued to hold this commission even after Charles II moved to the Holy Roman Empire. Taaffe, on the other hand, did participate in this Council’s activities throughout the decade. Yet, as a Catholic he should have been barred from doing so as councillors were supposed to take the oath of supremacy. Further, as is made clear from a grant of augmentation of arms to Sir George Lane in 1661, he filled the role as secretary to the Privy Council from 1651 onwards, despite not being formally appointed to that role until 1656. Yet, despite these breaches of traditional practice the Council existed and functioned, and it certainly fulfilled its role of advisory body to the King. It even did this at times when there was little prospect of an immediate improvement in royalist fortunes. At one time in late 1653 it arranged for Charles II to co-operate in having relief sent to a Colonel Murtagh O’Brien in Ireland, by means of a notable Irish émigré, O’Sullivan Beara, and other persons, described as ‘some secret congregations of late condemned jansenists’. So, even when fortunes were low, the Privy Council could make decisions impacting upon persons in the lost Stuart kingdoms.

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185 BL Eg. Mss 2534, Fanshawe to Nicholas, 14 June 1651, ff. 92-6. BL Eg. Mss 2535, Radcliffe to Nicholas, 26 February 1655, f. 63. The moderate publisher, no. 93, 8-15 April 1653, Thomason tracts 37:E.211[17]. See also p. 171, above.


Aside from the Privy Council, this Court also maintained another element of executive government from the Early Stuart period. This was the more secretive inner council of the King. This was a cabinet council of favoured advisors to the Monarch, which met apart from the main, or Privy, Council and which carried out its discussions privately.\textsuperscript{188} Once again, leading Irish exiles were involved in this, with Ormonde being the most prominent. Others, most notably Daniel O’Neill, were also involved, at least at certain times. This gentleman was undoubtedly included in such consultations due to his centrality to royalist conspiracies in Britain and unquestionably what was discussed with him there impacted on the home kingdoms, though it should be mentioned that O’Neill’s involvement in such discussions was a source of discontent to some senior exiles. Edward Nicholas was particularly annoyed that someone who was not a sworn privy councillor (which was true of O’Neill) should be allowed access to what he described as the secrets of state.\textsuperscript{189}

The King’s councillors and his various councils evidently continued to be important, both within the Court itself and to royalist actions in Britain and Ireland. Yet, for the Court to truly make an impact in the administrative sphere it was necessary for it to establish other bodies and institutions which could act as intermediary institutions between it and its supporters. This it attempted to do and these bodies, though controlled by the Court, were frequently not a constituent part of the royal household itself, as the Privy Council was. They were, in some cases, arguably strictly bureaucratic, designed to administer a particular area of interest to the Crown. To a degree, we have already touched on some of these when dealing with privateering; most notably in connection with the admiralty court in Brittany and the appointment of persons to various administrative offices pertaining to privateering activities. We have also noted it with regard to the appointment of a Lord High Keeper to keep the seals of state. Another interesting example of this phenomenon, though not one strictly relating to a ‘proto-civil service’, bureaucratic institution, is the effort made to continue the existence of the Church of England. Certainly, this was a key part of royalist efforts throughout the 1650s. George Radcliffe, as keeper of Sir Richard Browne’s ambassadorial residence while the latter was away on


privateering business in western France, played a key role in keeping the Anglican chapel contained therein open. This both he and Browne did, specifically on Charles II’s orders, and their concern to preserve the Anglican service there even led them to consider refusing the opportunity to move to a cheaper residence.190

Useful as it was, it was going to take more than keeping a chapel in Paris open to preserve the Church of England (though it must be conceded that the royalist ambassador in Brussels, Sir Henry De Vic, also maintained a chapel there). Efforts were going to have to be made to protect the administrative structure of the Church, particularly in its heartland, England. This was going to be a challenge as that religion was now officially proscribed there and the state of its clergy, particularly its episcopacy, was parlous. In particular, there were a number of vacant bishoprics to which appointments of suitable candidates who could support the Church had to be made. With the King being the head of that Church, the effort to redress this during the 1650s was vital to the Court, as to bolster that institution was to bolster Charles II’s claim to government. Among those active in seeking to redress this was John Bramhall, as he put himself at the centre of the efforts to resolve this problem. So much so, it was being reported that he had received authority from Charles II to appoint bishops to vacant dioceses. Whether this was true or not, he was certainly one of those consulted on the best way to nominate bishops to fill diocesan vacancies in 1659; a process which involved persons from both sides of the channel. The concern here was, as with other areas of government and administration that the Stuarts involved themselves in at this time, to stick as rigidly as possible to what had been traditional practice before the exile, or at least to vary from it in a way that was not contrary to previous procedure. There was no wish from the remaining Anglican clergy in England, moreover, to infringe upon the King’s prerogative.191

Bramhall’s contribution brought out fundamental differences in opinion regarding the scope of the King’s prerogative amongst the exiles and highlighted something that must have been a problem for royalists at Court; namely, having persons from three kingdoms and three slightly different administrative traditions operating in the same household. Though he was English by birth, much of

190 BL Add Mss 34702, Browne to Radcliffe, 27 August 1655, f. 131.
Bramhall’s experience of Church administration had been gained in Ireland, where Crown powers extended further than they did in England. These powers included the right to appoint bishops without the appointees having been elected by diocesan chapters first, and this is precisely what Bramhall proposed Charles II should do. In the end his suggestion was not adopted. Instead the King authorised the remaining bishops in England, again by commands given under the great seal, to elect members to fill what vacancies there were, though it would seem that the Crown played a great part in actually advancing the names of the candidates to be voted on by the bishops. This nomination role reserved to the Monarch and his advisors meant that Bramhall continued to have a role in this procedure, as he was responsible for the dispatching the names of the nominated to those in England who would supervise the process. It was only natural that he should do so. Just as the Irish and gentry and nobility had their contacts with kin, patrons and clients, Bramhall had his network of persons and many of these were English Anglican clergy. This, combined with his position as the leading intellectual defender of Anglicanism at the time and his relative prominence within the exiled Court, made him the obvious choice for carrying out such official correspondence.\(^{192}\) He was amongst the best people available to exiled Stuarts to carry out such work and to act in such an official capacity.

**The making of policy: the factions within the exiled Stuart Court**

Claiming to be a monarchical government went beyond the maintaining and upholding of those administrative and institutional units through which the Court had operated and expressed its power before. The Crown also had to decide which policies it would seek to implement through these aspirant administrative bodies and the people attached to them. There was one clear policy objective for the Stuart Court: to return to power within the three kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland. The crux of the question for the Stuarts was how to do this, as there were a variety of possible options available and they all had their advocates. As in all early-modern courts, the promoters of the differing policy options tended to divide themselves into different political factions, which then fought for control and influence over the policy-making apparatus of the court and the key figures amongst the royals.

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themselves. These groups’ struggles were central to policy-making within the exiled Court. In the various histories, biographies and the autobiographies of those persons who were closely associated with the banished Stuarts, it has been common practice to break the exiled Court into three competing factions; the ‘old royalists’, the ‘Louvre Set’, and ‘the Swordsmen’, respectively. This is because the exiled Court was certainly divided, if only in a general sense, along these lines. Indeed, the names given to the factions amongst the exiled courtiers in the existing, limited, historiography largely come from the labels applied by the participants in these groups themselves. Lord Hatton, for instance, in his letters to Sir Edward Nicholas from Paris, nearly always refers to the actions of the faction based around the Queen Mother as being the actions of ‘the Louvre’, the palace in which Queen Henrietta Maria resided for most of the exile. Fractional strife, similarly, is also a constant in many of the assorted histories of the exile and in several insiders’ accounts of Court life, as the descriptions of the attempts made to replace Hyde as one of Charles II’s advisors in late 1653/early 1654, bear out.

Many of the Irish at the Court, though by no means all of them, were closely associated with what has been traditionally identified as the ‘old royalist’ group, through the person of James Butler, Marquis of Ormonde. This faction has customarily been seen as being centred on three persons; Ormonde himself, Sir Edward Hyde, the Lord Chancellor and one of Charles II’s closest advisors, and Sir Edward Nicholas, the King’s Secretary of State. In the main, it has been perceived as being dominated by those who supported the Anglican Church, but who were also to some degree sympathetic towards Catholicism, or at least had more regard for it than they had for the various non-Anglican, Protestant, sects. It is deemed to have sought a form of return to traditional kingdoms which would have preserved most if not all the

193 BL Eg. Mss 2534, Hatton to Nicholas, 15 November 1650, f. 39. Cf. pp. 24-6, above, for an account of the historiography on these factions.


195 The exceptions to this general rule include, for instance, Father Barnwell, who, under the existing historiographical criteria for membership of the old royalist faction, cannot be considered to be part of that group, as he was more closely connected to the Court of Henrietta Maria. This is despite the fact that Ormonde seems to have valued him highly during the early 1650s. G. F. Warner, *The Nicholas papers, vol. I*, Ormonde to Nicholas, 2 March 1651, pp. 223. *DNB, vol. I*, p. 1181.
constitutional arrangement that existed prior to the cataclysm of 1642 and which would require the preservation of as much of the Monarch’s traditional prerogatives as was possible. This faction is also generally believed to have argued that the Restoration of the Monarchy to its former kingdoms should be at least partially brought about by the efforts of those within Britain and Ireland. ¹⁹⁶

The ‘Louvre Set’, on the other hand, is perceived to have been centred on the Queen Mother, Henrietta Maria. It took its name from the fact that she was, for the duration of the exile, resident in or near the Louvre in Paris. Unlike the old royalists, it is generally held that, in order to acquire allies (regardless of who they were) and resources to aid in the recovering of the lost kingdoms, its members were more willing to compromise upon the traditional prerogatives of the Stuart Monarchy and the constitution, in the belief that some commitments could be backtracked on later. ‘The Swordsmen’, finally, have been characterised as a diverse, and to an extent, rudderless, group of former soldiers, of which the most influential was Charles II’s cousin, Prince Rupert. In the existing historiography the ‘old royalists’ are frequently perceived as being involved in conflicts with these other factions, usually over such questions as the disposal of the Court’s limited resources and, more commonly, policy issues. ¹⁹⁷

By the mid-1650s the King’s Privy Council was dominated by the old royalist faction, with Ormonde and Hyde being the main managers of that body’s business. ¹⁹⁸ The seeds of this position of dominance had been planted in the latter stages of the King’s disastrous alliance with the Scottish Presbyterians. Prior to that it had been the Louvre set, the principal proponents of the Scottish alliance (though it must be pointed out that they objected to the final terms upon which this alliance was made), who had dominated in the giving of advice to Charles II and when he went to Scotland the exiled Stuarts’ affairs on the Continent had been left in their hands. The old royalists only began to recover their position when the Scottish alliance started to turn sour and they took advantage of this by sending Richard Fanshawe to Scotland to

¹⁹⁶ Some historians of this Court have questioned this notion of the uncompromising nature of those in this faction, however. See, for example, Neil Anthony Charles Reynolds, *The Stuart Court and courtiers in exile 1644-1654*, p. 16.
get the King to agree to their domination over his Council. After Charles II’s return the old royalists initially shared the Privy Council with the Louvre Set, though when he decamped to the Holy Roman Empire in 1654 he only brought old royalist courtiers with him and the Louvre Set was left behind in Paris. Thus was old royalist dominance over the Privy Council achieved and from that point onwards they had the ear of the King in exile.

As pointed out in the introduction to this thesis, then, the traditional picture of the factions within the Stuart Court is one of a fairly rigid and unambiguous split between the competing blocs, most particularly between the old royalists and the Louvre Set. Even the brief account of the rise and fall of the factions in the previous paragraph suggests this. Yet, as again highlighted in the introduction, questions can be asked about just how justified such a notion of a rigid divide is. Ronald Hutton’s comments on the frequent correspondence between Lord Hatton and Edward Nicholas have already been pointed out, as has the idea that this querying of the traditional picture of these factional divisions can easily be carried further. Aside from the points made in the introduction, one could also point out that, in making the aforementioned statement concerning the correspondence between Lord Hatton and Edward Hyde, Hutton also highlights the fact that one factor which skews the picture of the factions is the paucity of sources, other than those that the old royalists have left behind.

Though it may be overstating the case to say that the other factions have not left any records behind, it is fair to say that those left by the old royalists are by far the most numerous and the most influential on the existing historiography.

There is also the issue of internal strife between members of a particular faction. This has already been referred to in the introduction and in the previous chapter, where reference has been made to such examples as the competition between

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201 Ibid. See pp. 24-6, above.

202 One obvious collection of source material that has been generally overlooked is the collected letters of Henrietta Maria herself. M. A. Everett Green (Ed.), *Letters of Queen Henrietta Maria* (London, 1857).
Nicholas and Bramhall over the post of privateering agent to the Duke of York. It is fair to conclude from this that intra-factional conflict was not unusual. Indeed, it was not unique to the exiled Court. The existence of tensions between faction members has been noted in studies of early Stuart politics for instance, with members of the same factions struggling with each other over such issues as access to patronage and resources. In many ways, Ormonde’s career in exile illustrates that these tendencies were also at play within the exiled Stuart Court. With regard to his position in the various factional disputes, issues such as his and his family’s contacts with members of the other factions have to be explained. To give an example, despite the fact that Lord Digby was a prominent member of the Louvre Set, Ormonde and his family had extensive contacts with him. Lady Ormonde sought his advice on the education of her sons in 1650 and Ormonde himself helped this nobleman find accommodation in Paris in 1651. Another, more striking, example of this phenomenon can be found in the case of his relations with one of the leading member of the Louvre Set, Lord Jermyn. In fact, the latter person had been a not infrequent visitor to the Ormonde household when the Butlers resided in France, and Ormonde had asked him to assist a number of his clients prior to the outbreak of factional strife over the young Duke of Gloucester’s education.

One can make a case, moreover, for suggesting that Ormonde made moves to align himself with the Louvre Set in the early 1650s and was not therefore the constant old royalist that the traditional historiography of the period portrays him as being. Certainly, in the run up to Charles II’s alliance with the Engager party in 1650/1 and at a time when old royalists such as Edward Nicholas were expressing serious doubts about the wisdom of this policy and were questioning the actions of the Louvre set for having advocated it, Ormonde was defending the scheme. In doing this he supported an approach to dealing with the Stuarts’ problems that was remarkably like that which has been traditionally imputed to the Louvre set. In a letter written in spring 1651 to Nicholas, who had previously objected to this alliance on the Lord

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203 See pp. 24-6, above. See also p. 196, above.
205 BL Eg. Mss 2533, Elizabeth Butler to Nicholas, 20 June 1649, f. 496.
Lieutenant’s behalf, Ormonde supported the treaty with the Scots in the following terms:

If they [they being what Ormonde had earlier described as the King’s ‘ancient constantly loyal party’] may have admittance to co-operate in the destruction of the rebels without pressures inconsistent with honour and conscience I conceive they ought to direct all their endeavours towards it, and reserve their purpose of endeavouring to restore Church and State to their full right for a time when God may show them how it may be done.207

It has been frequently argued that there was an extreme tendency to factionalism within this Court and, indeed, within exiled governments generally. Yet, in this case at least, some aspects of that may be questioned. First, stating that governments and courts in exile are prone to factionalism implies that courts and governments that never went into exile were not prone to such divisions. While it is reasonable to assume that they were less so, there are, nonetheless, many examples of such courts and governments being riven by such factionalism. Moreover, the argument that this was a court which was riven by factionalism implies that the rival groups never co-operated. Yet, as the previous chapter shows, there was also much co-operation with political rivals on certain issues, particularly when it came to the question of patronage. One has only to look at the relationship between Ormonde and Jermyn to see this. Ormonde definitely saw himself as belonging to a distinct political grouping from that to which Henrietta Maria and Lord Jermyn belonged. He admitted as much to Inchiquin as early as May 1651, where he stated in a letter that the Duke of York’s growing indifference to him [Ormonde] at that time was probably due to the Stuart heir’s belief that he had been won over to the aforementioned leaders of the Louvre Set.208 For Ormonde, then, the political factions of the Stuart Court were one of the realities of life within it. Political differences, though, were not reason enough for him to avoid co-operating with others. As mentioned earlier, Ormonde did work with Jermyn when it came to dividing up the bounty on offer from the Court and on the questions of providing for their clients. Similarly, Jermyn had aided the Butlers on financial matters early in the exile.209 Policy may have distanced these two

207 BL Eg. Mss 2533, Ormonde to Nicholas, 3 November 1649, f. 505. BL Eg. Mss 2534, Ormonde to Nicholas, 23 March 1651, f. 55.
209 See p. 82 & p. 187, above.
noblemen from each other, but other areas of mutual interest served, to some extent at least, to counteract those forces that drove them apart. These points of contact also served to create bonds of obligation between them. When this is factored into the factional rivalry equation it is not surprising that James Butler could work with Jermyn on particular issues. These included, as we shall see later, policy.\textsuperscript{210}

When dealing with the factions in this specific Court and the extent of the divisions between them, it must be remembered that very often factionalism was exaggerated by the formulaic complaints of courtiers (something found in all such bodies). The divisions may also have been exaggerated by the writings of paid spies who, it must be remembered, needed something to report. Also, while the separation of households referred to in the previous chapter does split the Court in a dramatic way, it also meant that the rival factions which grouped around these households were frequently separated from each other and thus were unable to be in conflict with one another. Complaints about others might have been frequently reported in letters but the writing of these very missives with these reports actually demonstrates just how much rivals were separated from each other. The factionalism of the exiled Stuart Court, therefore, may not have been as pronounced as the existing historiography suggests. Moreover, all of the above is consistent with the historiography of the Early Stuart Court prior to the Civil war. Within these writings, factions are represented as something that only came together at times of policy decision-making and high political tension. They were effectively dormant and ineffectual the rest of the time.\textsuperscript{211} After all, when there was no policy decision to be made, what was there to cause political division? Relationships among this Court’s factions, clearly, were more complex than the traditional picture of factions and their members in simple opposition portrays. Therefore, in the light of all this, it is reasonable to suggest that, at the very least, the traditional picture of the factions and those who were involved in them, as handed down in the extant historiography on the exiled Court, is at best oversimplified and does not represent the complexity of the situation.

For all of these aforementioned qualifications of the traditional picture of a number of immovable factions constantly at loggerheads with each other, however, it has to be admitted that factional dispute did take place at times and these could often

\textsuperscript{210} See pp. 244-5n, below.

\textsuperscript{211} Linda Levy Peck, \textit{Court patronage and corruption in Early Stuart England}, p. 55.
be divisive. Reference has already been made to the dispute over the Duke of Gloucester’s education in 1654, of which further details will follow in the next chapter, and there were others. Reynolds has analysed two of these in great detail in his opus; namely the removal of Robert Long from the secretaryship of state in 1652 and the attempt to destroy Hyde by accusing him of treason in 1653 (and, in doing so, he has highlighted the part played by the Irish elite, especially those closely allied to Ormonde in these disputes). Yet, the details of these disputes do not change the picture previously given in this section. Reynolds draws attention in his work to the lack of any precisely definable factions in the Court and even to the noticeable volatility in the membership of these groups. The next chapter will also cast light into how being a faction member did not necessarily mean one was required to support a particular policy at a given moment or that one was always going to be subject to political attack from rival groups.\textsuperscript{212} Factional disputes happened and factions existed; this is certain. These disputes did not always pit the same persons against each other, however, as the factions themselves were protean in make-up and constantly altering.

**The making of policy: faction and influencing members of the royal family**

Since Elias’ initial study on the Court of Louis XIV one of the features of courtly studies has been the examination of the relationship between the Monarch and other members of the royal dynasty. At times these relations were tense and disputes between the various princes and princesses of the royal blood were not uncommon in princely courts. It was also common, moreover, for courtiers to play upon the divisions between the various members of a ruling dynasty, and to seek to influence policy and royal behaviour through these means.\textsuperscript{213} These kind of disputes were similarly a feature of the households of the Stuarts in exile and biographies of Charles II frequently refer to the clashes that he had with his mother and those who surrounded her in the Louvre during the 1650s, particularly on the issue of how policy decisions should be made and about who should be consulted on such issues.\textsuperscript{214} Such quarrels were not just a feature of the relationship between Henrietta Maria and her


\textsuperscript{213} Norbert Elias, *The Court Society*, pp. 108.

\textsuperscript{214} See for example, Ronald Hutton, *Charles II*, p. 86.
eldest son, however. It was also to be a notable aspect of the relationship between Charles II and his brother and heir, the Duke of York.

Prince James Stuart was not just inclined to have clashes solely with his elder brother. As we shall see in the next chapter, he had initially cut his teeth in the arena of inter-familial dispute between mid-1650 and mid-1651, during which time he fell out with his mother and withdrew from Paris. As will become clear, this withdrawal from Henrietta Maria’s Court was at least partly due to the influence of courtiers around the Duke, who were angered at how others were exercising greater influence on royalist policy at the time. Among the disgruntled persons was Sir George Radcliffe.215 This withdrawal was, in short, partly-motivated by a desire to wrestle influence over policy-making away from others. Comparable quarrels between James and his kingly brother also happened after 1656, when the heir was compelled, somewhat against his wishes, to leave the service of the French armed forces and join his elder brother in the Spanish Netherlands. Here he became commander of the royalist forces which were now to fight with the Spanish against not only the army of the English Commonwealth, but also against that of his former French employers.216 From then on he was to clash with his brother for diverse reasons and these incidences of inter-familial strife would see Irish courtiers in conflict with others in the Court over who should influence the direction of royal policy.

As pointed out, the first signs of tension between Charles II and his brother came when the former sought to have the latter join him in the Spanish Netherlands. James, it has to be said, eventually did do as his brother commanded and joined the royalist forces in the Spanish Netherlands in 1656, one must realise that this did not mean that he was there for his brother to command as he so wished. This was because by that stage the Duke of York was an influential figure in his own right. By the time the Stuart Court came to negotiate the alliance with the Spanish Crown the heir to the British and Irish crowns was already an established and well-known military commander. As his biographers have pointed out, his military deeds for the French prior to the 1650s had led to him being acclaimed as a kind of royalist war hero by the other exiles. It was also felt that he was the military commander that Irish mercenaries serving the French would follow and, therefore, if the Stuarts wished the

215 See pp. 254-63, below, for further details of this.
Irish to defect to the Spanish side, his co-operation was vital. This was not just believed by the royalists. The Venetian ambassador to England also spoke of how York’s defection from the French to join his brother was of vital importance in terms of bringing troops into Spanish service. So important was he to the Stuart cause, in fact, royalist negotiators sought a larger pension from Brussels for him than for Charles II himself, so as to ensure his defection from French service. When York eventually did embark upon his journey northwards orders were given that he be received in the places where he passed through in the Spanish Netherlands with great ceremony. One commentator spoke of York being received at these staging points on his journey in a manner appropriate for the King of Spain.217

James eventually joined his brother in September 1656, with there being some suggestion that he spent time in Madrid prior to this. He almost immediately demonstrated his power within the royalist camp at this time by getting his way in a dispute with his brother over who should be appointed to his [James’] council. It began with Charles attempting to assert his right to appoint councillors to his brother. In this he had the co-operation of his chief advisors, most notably Ormonde. A client of Ormonde’s, George Radcliffe, was appointed to York’s council, despite his having previously lost favour with that Prince. His appointment came at the expense of John Berkeley, a favourite of York’s who was distrusted by Charles. This was something that York would not accept and he refused to join his brother’s Court after he entered the Spanish Netherlands. The dispute was only ended after Charles II had climbed down and Ormonde had travelled to the Duke bearing the news that Berkeley would be allowed to be a councillor. George Radcliffe continued to be a councillor to the Duke, but he was effectively sidelined by Berkeley’s appointment and he never exercised much influence.218

In failing to have Radcliffe appointed as a councillor at Berkeley’s expense, Charles II and Ormonde had failed to assert control over James’s Court and it would


218 CVSP, vol. XXX, 1655-1656, Domenico Zane to the Doge and senate, 12 July 1656, Madrid, p. 240. See pp. 282-4, below, for further details on this.
soon after became a rival to that of the King. The Irish membership of these households has been sketched out previously and it should be pointed out that the connections described there between them indicate that these courtiers, irrespective of which royal they accompanied, were never in constant opposition to each other. Ormonde and Peter Talbot co-operated with each other at various times on matters of both personal and political interest, while Richard Grace was kin to that nobleman and he personally had been quick to come into Flanders on the Marquis’ orders. Yet, for all these links, Ormonde and those other Irish who supported the old royalist faction still found that, despite this co-operation on a personal level, some of these persons could not necessarily always be trusted to adhere to policies that Charles II and his advisors approved of. Thomas Talbot, aside from having previously been a member of Henrietta Maria’s household, was openly antagonistic to Ormonde and his ally, Hyde. Indeed both he and his clerical brother, Peter, believed Hyde to be an enemy of Catholicism. Richard Grace, though having close connections with Ormonde since the 1640s, was likewise closely associated with Henrietta Maria and her Louvre faction.

Another contributing cause of tension was that, while there were a number of Catholics aligned with the old royalist faction, particularly Irish exiles (such as George Hamilton and Taaffe), this group was most notable for having staunch defenders of Anglicanism within its ranks. Among the most noted of these was John Bramhall, who, aside from being a noted apologist for his faith in this decade, was

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220 The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. IV, Kingston to Hyde, 8 February 1658, pp. 7-8. Ibid, Hamilton to Hyde, 28 October 1659, p. 415. Joseph Wilhelm (Ed.), The Family of Grace: pedigrees and memoirs, pp. 86-7. It should be pointed out that some Irish Catholic exiles did not hold to this view of Hyde as anti-Catholic. George Hamilton was one such person. With regard to Peter Talbot, one must emphasise that while he found Hyde anti-Catholic, he did not necessarily believe this of Ormonde. He even described the Lord Lieutenant as being sympathetic to Catholicism to his superior at one stage. The Calendar of Clarendon State papers, vol. IV, Peter Talbot to Father Van Hollant, 21 January 1658, p. 4.
deeply distrustful of Catholics, particularly Jesuits. He even gave credence to a theory that a Jesuit conspiracy had ultimately been responsible for the regicide of Charles I. Besides many of those Irish Catholics who were around the King had, as we shall see later, close links to Jansenists. 221 In contrast, it is clear that many of those persons who had the ear of York, particularly the Irish, were quite staunch in their Catholicism. Peter Talbot was not only a forthright defender of Catholicism in print, he also used this medium to fiercely criticise Anglicanism and he had even entered into a ferocious print debate with Bramhall on these very matters. His brother, Thomas, similarly never hid the fact that one of his major political goals was to achieve liberty of conscience for Irish Catholics.222

Making matters worse were disputes over the holding of military appointments in the King’s army in Flanders, with Ormonde at one stage removing Gilbert and Richard Talbot from commands in favour of Cormac McCarthy, Muskerry’s son. This grieved Gilbert greatly. This was soon reversed, however, as York re-appointed the Talbotts to regiments under his command and Charles II, probably not wishing to offend his brother, refused to interfere to stop this. To top it all off, Gilbert could not have been popular with many around the King at this stage anyway as he had previously been found to be passing information to the Protectorate in England, though he escaped punishment for this, having claimed that he was doing it as part of a ruse to trick the Commonwealth out of some money.223 In view of this, and considering that prior to 1656 members of York’s Court would have previously spent at least some of their time at the Louvre when the campaigning season was over, it is not unreasonable to suggest that this household was to become, in some ways at least, an extension of the Louvre faction within Flanders, though, as we shall see, it would come to favour relying on Spanish assistance for an invasion much more than


222 Peter Talbot, A Treatise of the Nature of Catholic Faith and Heresie, with Reflexion upon the Nullitie of the English Protestant Church and Clergy (Rouen, 1657). Carte MSS. 30, Thomas Talbot to Ormonde, 6 December 1659, f. 449. See pp. 360-8, below, for details on Bramhall’s publishing activities in defence of Anglicanism.

Henrietta Maria’s household would ever do. It should be no surprise, then, that disagreements between Charles II’s household and that of his heir over policy occurred more than once during the Stuarts’s alliance with Spain and that the Irish in both princely households would be central to these.

One long-running dispute between York and Charles II started up in early 1658 and it unsurprisingly concerned a disagreement over how the Stuarts should go about recovering their patrimony. On this issue York was in favour of launching an invasion of England with Spanish assistance as soon as possible, without any diversionary rising taking place in the latter country. In this he was supported by a number of persons, most notably the Irish Jesuit, Peter Talbot and his brother, Thomas. Charles II, however, who at that time seems to have favoured waiting for a better opportunity to present itself, opposed this scheme. In particular it seems that he desired not only a diversionary rising in England but also to pursue a restoration with as little foreign assistance as possible. In this Ormonde supported him. The support of the Marquis for Charles II on this issue counted for nothing with York, however, as he had come to distrust those who counselled his brother, misgivings which, to judge from reports that Hyde received about Peter Talbot’s activities and that cleric’s supposed distrust of him, seem to have been shared by at least some of those who surrounded the Duke. It must be said, however, that by early 1658 the feeling was mutual, as neither Ormonde nor Hyde completely trusted Peter Talbot, as least when it came to policy issues.  

The result of all this was a major disagreement over how best to pursue their common goal, with both factions appealing to the Spanish to assist them in winning the argument. It was York’s faction which made the first move in May of that year, when it was decided to send Peter Talbot to Spain in order to acquire aid for York’s invasion scheme. Charles II immediately sought to counter this and was soon in communication with Don Juan of Austria, the Spanish governor of the Low Countries,

about ways to prevent Talbot’s mission from having any success, a prospect which was viewed as entirely possible as it was believed that this priest had great influence in Madrid. Matters were made worse the following August, when it was learned that Thomas Talbot had travelled to England, with others, for purposes unknown. It was soon rumoured by some, without much justification, that his intention was to seduce Irish troops away from the service of Spain and Charles II and into Cromwell’s camp. Furthermore, another story began to circulate, which stated that he had also offered Ireland to Mazarin and that Cardinal’s nephew.225

The Stuart Court in Flanders and also the Irish within it were now clearly divided amongst themselves. On one side the clerical Talbots were aiding York in his efforts to acquire support for his scheme, while Ormonde and others were assisting Charles II in trying to scupper it. Ironically a major setback for the royalists at this time provided impetus to the diplomacy of York’s household, as the victory of the French and Cromwellian forces at the battle of the Dunes in mid-June 1658 left Charles II with a force of less than one thousand soldiers and effectively ended any hope that the Stuarts could support any rising in Britain or Ireland with their own forces in the near future. That said, the defeat also had negative implications for ‘Yorkist’ policy, as it placed the military campaign of the Spanish in dire straits and left them without the necessary resources to support an invasion of Britain.226 This point aside, there was yet another element aiding York’s household in its mission to have its policy position approved by the Spanish. Quite simply, while the King and his closest advisors objected to Talbot’s mission, others approved of it or, at least, did not completely disapprove. These included Charles II’s ambassador at the Spanish Court, Sir Henry Bennet. Nonetheless, the royalist ambassador to Spain was obliged by the King to deliver a letter to Don Luis De Haro expressing the Monarch’s disapproval. Despite this expression of concern to the Spanish from the King, however, by late summer it seemed that Talbot’s suit was being favourably heard in Madrid. What was worse, Bennet could learn nothing of what exactly the cleric was


226 C. H. Firth, ‘Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders, 1657-1662’, p. 86.
negotiating and by early 1659 it was being reported that the division between the two households was having negative impacts upon royalists in England, as agents of York, most especially Thomas Talbot, were now reported to be actively disparaging those advisors around the King.227

Despite this, efforts to stymie Peter Talbot’s scheme continued and went further than making appeals to the Spanish. Charles’ household also attempted to influence his religious superiors and in early 1659 the King actively sought to have them order Talbot to desist in his scheming. As things worked out, those around Charles II need not have worried too much. All of Peter’s efforts availed him nothing and by spring 1659 he had travelled to England, reportedly at the invitation of Caracena and Cardenas, to participate in a new political plot. This, it was alleged by some, involved him proposing a peace between Spain and England to Cromwell. The accusations did not end there. Hyde explained Talbot’s later appearance at the negotiations of the peace of the Pyrenees by claiming that he was there as Cromwell’s ambassador.228 Why, then, had the Yorkist policy proposal foundered? One reason was that the Spanish were reluctant to get involved, most probably because they were unable to support York’s scheme. Don Juan of Austria advised Philip IV not to openly disapprove but to nevertheless insist that the Duke get a commission approving this policy from his brother first. This was something that was plainly not going to happen. Talbot’s religious superiors, furthermore, also aided the King. They not only insisted that Talbot stop his scheming, but they removed him from the Jesuit order for failure to follow their commands in summer 1659. What is more, those who backed the scheme were not firm in their loyalties. As if to emphasise the earlier point on how fluid factional alliances could be, Ormonde received word from Gilbert Talbot that he and his other brother Richard had never approved of Peter or Thomas Talbot’s actions in these matters. To cap it all off, Thomas Talbot himself wrote to

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Ormonde at the end of 1659, claiming his actions had always been in the King’s interest, that he had actually sought to limit his brother Peter’s activities and that none of the accusations levelled against him [Thomas] were true. Furthermore, he maintained that both the Marquis and Charles II had known about his actions all along, having been informed of them by the Earl of Clancarty.  

The dispute was over by mid-1659 and the old royalists had successfully prevented those around York from imposing an alternative approach towards bringing about the royal restoration on them. Yet, while the ‘Yorkists’ might have failed the old royalist approach to resolving the problem of restoration was also in trouble by this time. The favoured schemes of either faction both depended upon Spanish assistance. The old royalists’ plan, even if it called for an uprising in England first, still depended upon the Spanish providing logistic support in the shape of ships and arms, which would then be used to transport send support to the aforementioned insurrection. By July 1659, however, Spain had other concerns. For one, it was bringing the negotiations of the Peace of the Pyrenees with France to an end at this time. Aside from this, the move against Peter Talbot had hurt some Spanish ministers who supported the cleric, most notably Cardenas. This distraction of the peace talks for the Spanish coincided with yet another royalist effort to organise a rising in England; a scheme in which Charles II involved the Duke of York, probably in an effort to appease him for opposing schemes. Yet, by August this conspiracy was going the way of other such plans and was falling apart. Only one area, Cheshire, was to see a pro-royalist outbreak that month. Now known as Booth’s rising, this insurrection was all too quickly suppressed and had never been clearly pro-royalist to begin with. Bad enough as this was, James Stuart was obviously not totally appeased by his inclusion in the plan either, as he sent an ambassador to Spain on his own

behalf the following month. All this could not have come at a worst time as the Treaty of the Pyrenees, by ending the conflict between Spain, France and the English Commonwealth, potentially robbed the Stuart Court of the chance to exploit traditional divisions on the Continent and to ally themselves with one or other of the major western powers. They faced the possibility of being left isolated on the international stage and, considering this, it was clear that a new policy would have to be pursued.

This new policy centred on an effort to form a grand alliance of Spain, France and possibly the United Provinces, for the purposes of having them jointly support an attempt by the Stuarts to regain Britain and Ireland. What is notable about this policy is that it was supported by all the factions and households that made up the Stuart Court and they all joined together in an effort to bring it about. This is important because traditionally in the historiography of factions, and of the Stuarts in exile, emphasis has always been on the conflict between these groupings and the circumstances in which it happened (or did not happen). Yet, for all that, no one has talked of the possibility of co-operation between factions on policy matters, as this example here will clearly show, could happen. The first question to be addressed is why did all the factions begin to co-operate here? Part of the answer must lie in the fact that they had no other possibility open to them after the peace between France and Spain. Plotting in England had failed and the forces under the Crown’s control lacked the necessary resources and numbers to mount their own invasion. For many this meant that the restoration could not be achieved without foreign help and the old royalists were now forced to abandon their favoured schemes as well. Moreover, though external aid was now definitely required, the royalists’ formal ally, Spain, also clearly lacked the means to back such a measure by itself, as the war against France had been disastrous and conflict with Portugal was still ongoing. Other contributory factors must have included the obvious political instability in England at the time, which increasingly seemed to make it ripe for a counter-coup, and the existence of a

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231 Ibid, Jermyn to Charles II, 8 August 1659, p. 298. Carte MSS. 30, Thomas Talbot to Ormonde, 6 December 1659, f. 448.
general peace between the major powers in Western Europe for the first time in decades. This, at least, opened up the possibility of a grand alliance against England.

It must also be said that the new scheme offered something to all factions, as it allowed all of them all to play a part. Those around Henrietta Maria at the Louvre were best placed to negotiate with the French, as Mazarin would have little or nothing to do with those from the King’s household after their alliance with Spain, while the esteem that York and members of his household, most notably Peter Talbot, were held in by the Spanish allowed them to be the leaders in securing that kingdom’s assistance. Indeed, the latter cleric’s usefulness in this regard meant that he was back in favour with the King by October, much to the chagrin of the Jesuit superior who had removed him from the order. Charles II and his household also had key roles to play in this scheme. To this end the King, accompanied by Ormonde, travelled to Fuenterabia to participate in the peace negotiations between France and Spain in mid-1659. The purpose behind this was to gain assurances of support for his cause from those two kingdoms. Charles II returned to Brussels the following December, having received the required promises and re-established good relations with his mother in France in the course of the trip. Ormonde’s brother-in-law, George Hamilton also used the occasion of his nephew’s marriage (i.e. Ormonde’s son) in the Netherlands to seek the support of the Dutch for the scheme, while Ormonde himself subsequently became involved in negotiations with Caracena in the Spanish Netherlands.232

Also, it should be realised that the bitter as the dispute of mid-1658/early 1659 had been, this did not mean that relations had broken down completely between all of the faction members. Differ as they might over policy, it is fair to say that at least some of the individuals who made up these factions were often closely bound to each other in other ways. The Talbots may have previously felt slighted by Ormonde’s appointment of others to particular military posts and they may possibly have denigrated him and his favoured policies to other royalists. Nonetheless, they never completely broke with him. As they valued his patronage, they were careful to defend their actions to Ormonde, even during the dispute of mid-1658/early 1659. As we have seen, Gilbert and Richard, though they were the ones most offended against by

the earlier arguments over military appointments, were quick to distance themselves from the actions of their clerical brothers, while Tom was to justify himself to the royalist Lord Lieutenant later in 1659.\textsuperscript{233}

While all this was going on, and in the face of Hyde’s misgivings, Peter Talbot was to soon find himself back in the King’s favour. Thereafter, he was employed as a lobbyist for the royalists in Spain and he was also used by Ormonde as a means to pursue payments owed to him [Ormonde]. Undoubtedly Peter Talbot’s influence with the Spanish made him too valuable to cast aside. Yet, the Talbots’ long-established links to Ormonde and the cleric’s continued usefulness to that nobleman must also have helped to restore him to the King’s favour. Certainly, there is enough to suggest that Ormonde had some role in this, even if it was only one of passive complicity. After all, despite Hyde’s complaints to Ormonde about this turn of events, nothing seems to have been done to prevent it.\textsuperscript{234} Despite the earlier tension between him and the Talbots, it would seem that Ormonde protected his long-time associate from the King’s wrath, probably because of that cleric’s continued value to his own and the royalists’ interests. In short, the established links between Ormonde and the Talbots, along with the continuing worth of each to the other, allowed leading figures on both sides to make peace.

By early 1660, despite the continuing efforts of all involved and high hopes of aid from France and Spain, the scheme had come to nothing. Neither the French nor the Spanish were willing to commit aid without the other doing so first and nothing could be achieved.\textsuperscript{235} Yet, the sequence of events, from mid-1658 down to early 1660, is interesting as it shows how factional activity and, it has to be conceded, external factors combined to affect crown policy. The old royalist faction had initially successfully opposed the scheme for an invasion using Spanish resources, which had

\textsuperscript{233} A collection of Original letters and papers, concerning the affairs of England, from the years 1641 to 1660 vol. II., Hyde to Ormonde, 29 November 1659, p. 287. Carte MSS. 30, Thomas Talbot to Ormonde, 6 December 1659, f. 449.

\textsuperscript{234} Ibid, Hyde to Ormonde, 22 November 1659, ff. 504-5. See p. 99, above, for Peter Talbot’s continuing usefulness to Ormonde in this area at this time. Aside from Hyde’s objections, it would seem that many royalist supporters welcomed Talbot’s return to favour. See, for example, The Calendar of Clarendon State Papers, vol. IV, Knatchbull to Hyde, 20 November 1659, p. 439.

\textsuperscript{235} AGR, Secrétairerie d’Etat et De Guerre, Caracena to Philip IV, Registre 266, 17 March 1660, ff. 92-7. Carte MSS. 213, Memorandum to Ormonde on the Mission of Lord Jermyn and Mister Walter Montagu to the French Court, 19 February 1660, f. 602.
been advanced by those around York. This they were able to do because the personal intervention of the King, which undoubtedly impacted upon the attitudes of both the Spanish and the Jesuits to Peter Talbot, combined with outside influences, specifically the Spanish desire to stay out of any such scheme, to scupper it. This was a hollow victory, however. Old royalist policy founedered upon other rocks. The Stuart Crown lacked the means to organise its own invasion, all schemes for a royalist rebellion in England proved ineffective and Spanish weakness similarly did them no favours. These policy failings, combined with a sea-change in the international situation in mid-1659, led both royalist factions in the Spanish Netherlands, as well as that based in the Louvre, to co-operate in pursuing a new scheme to bring about a restoration. This new scheme sought to take advantage of the new political situation created by the Franco-Spanish peace and growing instability in Britain. More importantly, however, the new policy was a compromise, which, if anything, was more favourable to the households of the Queen Mother and the Duke of York than it was to that of the King. After all, though the new strategy allowed all the different households to play a part, it relied completely upon the securing of foreign assistance. The Crown’s inability to plough an independent furrow on the international scene, combined with the King’s inability to control his own family members and their households, eventually led to the Stuarts adopting a policy of complete reliance on foreign assistance by the beginning of 1660. To sum up policy was created in this Court by the interaction of a number of forces and factors. These were the political circumstances on the international stage, the level of resources available to the Court, processes of political infighting and compromise, and, finally, the necessity to reach a modus vivendi which would ensure that the concerns of certain prominent or useful individuals were met. It was in the reconciliation of all these elements that a policy was decided on.

Conclusions

This was a Court without a state, in the weberian sense at least. Yet, despite this, it claimed to be the true centre of executive government for Britain and Ireland. Constitutionally and theoretically speaking, it had a strong case. The problem for this Court was how to make this theoretical right to rule a reality. One obvious way to bring this about was to mount a challenge in any way possible to those forces that had driven it overseas. This the Court did. Most evidently, as we shall see in the next
section, it plotted and conspired to bring about a counter-revolution in Britain and Ireland. It took other steps besides these, however. For one, it took every opportunity possible to assert the Stuart claim to be the rightful rulers of Britain and Ireland. These extra measures also consisted of the Court attempting to assert its right to govern by actually seeking to interfere in all of those areas of government that the Long Parliament, and its successors, had appropriated from it. To this end, for instance, the Court collected funds through various means. These funds were not just confined to donations from sympathisers. They were often gathered through established extra-parliamentary methods, modelled on ante-bellum administrative procedures from Britain and Ireland. In one case, that of privateering, these revenue-gathering schemes overlapped with the Court’s efforts to continue a military conflict with those that it saw as rebels. Further to this, the Court sought control over troops, so as to allow it to military challenge its opponents. These soldiers were also a resource that allowed it to act on the international political stage. The troops, to give one example, allowed Charles II to enter into an alliance with Spain as the King of England, Scotland and Ireland and his forces did confront the forces of Cromwell’s protectorate in Flanders. This is to say nothing of the forces that were raised in Britain and Ireland during royalist uprisings there, which will be dealt with, once again, in the next section. Beyond this the Court also sought to dispense justice to those it saw as its subjects and it even attempted to maintain the institutions of central government, wherever possible. To this end we have touched on how it maintained key bodies like the Privy Council, re-created key paraphernalia of government, like the privy seal and the great seal, sought to established admiralty courts and made efforts to maintain the Anglican Church.

The exiled Court may not have been an early-modern government in the full sense but it is fair to say that its efforts to act like one did meet with some limited success, thanks in no small part to its Irish courtiers. Consequently, it was able to make an impact in its former kingdoms and to retain some political force on the European stage. In short, while it may not have been a government in the full sense of the word, the Court still continued to be a significant political space, with real policies. The political disputes that took place within it were consequently very real and were not just the products of an effort to maintain a fiction. Beyond this, its efforts to assert its right to govern certainly irked the Interregnum regimes, judging by Cromwell’s comments on the distribution on royalist documents in England, the
complaints made to European kingdoms that allowed the Stuarts to establish their institutions within them and the public efforts by anti-royalist publication to ridicule the Court’s efforts to act as a ruling Court should. One could even take this a stage further. In his book on royalist conspiracies during the Interregnum, David Underdown pointed out that while many of these schemes were complete failures they did keep loyalty to the Monarchy alive and highlighted the fact that there were those who would risk their lives for the King.236 In short, royalist conspiracies kept the notion of a possible return to Monarchical government alive. This idea can be extended to the governmental activities exiled Court also. By continuing to act like a legitimate government, by maintaining its claim to be the proper centre of power for the three Stuart kingdoms, by continuing to interfere in events in those territories and by seeking to maintain a certain amount of the prerogatives of royal government, (and thus by extension, maintaining a certain amount of political influence) it kept the notion that it could provide an alternative to those then in power in Britain and Ireland alive. In short, the Stuart Court’s efforts to act like a government and to interfere in politics meant that everyone knew that it was always there as an alternative to the Interregnum regimes.

Chapter 6

The individual courtier and the royal households: flourishing and floundering within the exiled Stuart Court.

The chapter will investigate how an individual courtier set about maintaining and raising his status and influence within the various households of the exiled Court, as well as examining the type of functions he would have filled in such a body and his (the gender bias is deliberate) general importance to it. It shall, moreover, also examine those factors which caused persons to lose whatever position and authority they exercised within this environment. Aside from these issues, the subject of what certain individuals expected of the Court, and what they could realistically get during the exile, will also be addressed. In order to do this, I shall examine the life of one individual within the Stuart Court and use him as a case study. The individual in question is Sir George Radcliffe, who started out as a councillor to the Duke of York, then lost his position after falling foul of both Henrietta Maria and Charles II, only to recover his standing with the King later on, though it ultimately availed him nothing.

Radcliffe is chosen as the subject of this study for a number of reasons. One of the principal motives for choosing him relates to the availability of source material for his exile other than that which has traditionally dominated the field of Stuart studies and other related academic endeavours. As stated in the introduction there has been an overwhelming reliance on three main bodies of sources in this field; the Clarendon state papers, the Carte manuscripts and the Egerton manuscripts. This is understandable, given their size and the importance of the individuals behind these collections but reliance on them has sometimes led to other collections, many of which are admittedly small, being overlooked or ignored. This has skewed the picture of the exiled Court somewhat and has led to the role of lesser courtiers, such as Radcliffe, being ignored.\(^{237}\) This chapter does not intend to replace these major

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\(^{237}\) Some, but not all, of these works include BL add. Ms 34702, Correspondence, political and private, of Sir Richard Browne, Resident at Paris (1641-1660). Edward Berwick, The Rawdon Papers, consisting of letters on various subjects, Literary, Political, and Ecclesiastical, to and from Dr. John Bramhall, Primate of Ireland (London, 1819), and Thomas Durham Whitaker (Ed.), The life and
sources with others. This would be impractical. Instead it hopes to merge the information garnered from them with that from those other materials which have been, at best, sidelined in order to give a richer understanding of both the functioning of the Stuart Court in exile and the impact of banishment on certain individuals.

Aside from this, as the major sources centre on three persons within the Stuart Court, Hyde, Edward Nicholas and Ormonde, these three individuals and their most frequent correspondents, Daniel O’Neill for example, have come in for a great deal of attention in the previous works on this period and subject. Yet, it has to be recognised that, important as they were, there were others in exile aside from these individuals. Radcliffe is one such person and it is hoped by concentrating on him, this chapter will go some way to correcting that, admittedly comprehensible and explicable, bias. As a corollary of this, it is intended that this case study will shift the spotlight somewhat onto the more minor, but still nonetheless vital, functionaries within a court setting and will thus enrich our understanding of the importance of their activities to courts and to the grandees within them.

The case of Sir George Radcliffe in exile

Born in 1599 in Yorkshire, George Radcliffe was educated at Oxford and afterwards practised as a barrister. By the mid-1620s, probably as a result of the kinship connections of his wife, he had become closely associated with one of the decades most notable actors on the English political scene, Sir Thomas Wentworth, later Earl of Strafford, and he later became one of this man’s most trusted advisors. Despite this connection, his road to political prominence in this decade was not a smooth one. He was imprisoned in 1627 for declining to contribute to a forced loan, for instance. It should be remembered though, that such opposition to royal policy in the 1620s was one of the ways through which both he and Wentworth came to the Crown’s attention during the period. This strategy ultimately proved successful and soon after he served with Wentworth when the latter was appointed President of the Council of the North in England towards the end of the decade.  

When Wentworth was made Lord Deputy of Ireland in January 1633 Radcliffe joined him there as his secretary and was soon made a member of the Irish Privy

original correspondence of Sir George Radcliffe (London, 1810). All of these throw light on the quotidian activities of Radcliffe in politics and his life in exile.

Council. This move proved significant for his future in one way, as it brought him into contact with James Butler, then Earl of Ormonde, and John Bramhall, the Anglican Bishop of Derry (who had also come into Ireland with Wentworth). All three of these persons had Wentworth as their political patron during this decade. Indeed, Radcliffe had a central role in bringing Ormonde and the Lord Deputy together as allies in the 1630s. In 1640, though, as the political crisis grew in Britain and Ireland, Radcliffe, like Wentworth (by then the Lord Deputy had become the Earl of Strafford), was impeached by the Long Parliament and was imprisoned. The charges against him ultimately came to nothing, however, unlike those brought against his patron, who was beheaded as a result. With the death of Wentworth, Ormonde now took on the role of Radcliffe’s chief patron.239

After his release from prison in June 1642 Wentworth’s former right-hand man was to spend the early part of the 1640s serving the royalist cause in England. He joined the Court of Charles I in Oxford, where he soon became an attendant to James, Duke of York, thus beginning his relationship with that Prince. This association with the Stuart Court in England was soon to be broken, however, when the capture of Oxford and the defeat of the royalists in the first English Civil war eventually compelled him, like many others, to abandon England. Consequently, by April 1647 he was residing in Caen, in France, a place that was very popular with many other exiles as a residence.240

By the time he went into exile, then, George Radcliffe was not only a long-standing servant of the Crown, but also a former courtier. He was also, it seems, quite well respected amongst the wider exile royalist community in Paris. This was in part based on his previous association with Thomas Wentworth, who was by that time considered to be somewhat of a martyr for the royalist cause. In his diary entry for 5 October 1649, for example, John Evelyn referred to him as ‘...that great favourite of the Earl of Strafford...’ It was not just Evelyn who felt this way. Hyde himself, writing during his second period in exile, after the Restoration, put Radcliffe’s previous association with Strafford forward as an explanation for the respect that he

was generally held in during the early 1650s. He was to use this high status to his advantage, because through it he was able to acquire a position close to the Duke of York in France, immediately before Charles II left that country for Scotland in 1650. It seems that he had been recommended to York by his elder brother and that the King had also made a vague promise of a position in York’s household to Radcliffe, yet the latter was not actually appointed to any specific position in the Duke’s household. Nonetheless, it was enough to bring the old political warhorse back into the Duke’s household, where he soon became a respected councillor.

With regard to his position at the exiled Court, however, things did not stay rosy for long. Problems began for Radcliffe in mid-1650, while Charles II was still in Scotland with the Kirk party. During this time a dispute broke out between the Duke of York and his councillors on the one hand, and the Queen Mother and her closest advisors on the other. There are no clearly discernible reasons as to the cause of this disagreement, though Reynolds, in his study of the exiled royal Households, does suggest a number of possibilities. These range from York’s disaffection at the way he was received in the Louvre in Paris, to a clash of personalities with his mother, through to a desire to act in a more independent manner and to make a greater contribution to the royalist cause. In his analysis of the clash Reynolds also places great emphasis on the fact that control of the household of James, with him being Heir Presumptive and with the King being away at war in Scotland, would have been seen as no mean prize by many courtiers. Consequently, many of those who may have felt discontented with their position in the Louvre, as well as with the dominance there of Jermyn and other members of the so-called Louvre Set, may have been only too glad to encourage York in his discontent and to subsequently advise him to flee Paris, so as to allow them to carve out a potentially more influential position for themselves in his household.

242 Ibid. *HMC, Marquis of Bath* (vol. II), Radcliffe to Holles, 22 November 1651, p. 98. BL Eg. Mss 2534, Fanshawe to Nicholas, 14 June 1651, f. 94. This latter letter mentions that Charles II described George Radcliffe as not having come into the service of the Duke of York ‘by the foredoor’ [sic].’ Carte Mss 213, Radcliffe to Ormonde, 14 January 1656, f. 38.
Whatever the reasons, it was definitely resolved by some of the Duke’s councillors in late September that he should quit Paris and travel to his sister Mary’s Court in the United Provinces, by way of Brussels. According to Lord Hatton, Radcliffe was not one of those who made this decision, but it was determined that he, along with some others, should be obliged to join the Prince at Brussels. It would seem that the treaty in negotiation in the Spanish Netherlands at the time between Lord Taaffe and the Duke of Lorraine was one of the factors that led to the fleeing Duke’s advisors choosing this city as a stopping-off point on their journey, as it offered the prospect of a more active involvement in royalist activities for the young Prince.244 Regardless of the reasons for going there, however, Radcliffe did join James Stuart in that city soon after and by early November Edward Nicholas was reporting to Hyde that he was considered to be one of the Duke’s closest advisors.245

As it turned out, the move to Brussels proved to be a failure. This was due to the simple reason that the Duke and his entourage were not welcome in the city. One reason for this was that, after having housed some exiled members of the Bourbon dynasty in the 1630s, the government of Flanders had too many negative memories of dealing with fleeing royals.246 There were also other, more pressing, reasons for refusing to aid the Duke. On 11 November 1650 Leopold-William, the Governor-

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244 G. F. Warner (Ed.) The Nicholas Papers, vol. I, Hatton to Nicholas, 23 September 1653, p. 195. Memoirs of the Family of Taaffe, pp. 10-13. It should be pointed out here that, in his autobiography, written during his second exile, Hyde stated that Radcliffe, despite the obvious problem of the former’s absence from Paris in September of that year, was one of two persons, the other being Sir Edward Herbert, who was most involved in getting York to leave Paris. The facts that he himself was not present in France at the time, that he wrote this account many years after the events in question took place, and that there seems to be no outside corroboration for some of his claims, tend to undermine the credibility of his account at times, however. Moreover, Radcliffe, in defending his actions the following year, was to claim that he had no part in the Duke’s decision to remove himself from Paris. Yet, these problems have not prevented others from accepting Hyde’s supposition. The life of Edward Earl of Clarendon, vol. I, p. 238. BL Eg. Mss 2534, Fanshawe to Nicholas, 14 June 1651, ff. 92-6. R. A. Beddard, ‘Six unpublished letters of Queen Henrietta Maria’, British Library Journal vol. 25, no. 2 (autumn, 1999) p. 134. John Miller, James II (New Haven, 2000), pp. 13-4.


246 Toby Osborne, ‘“Chimeres, monopoles and stratagems”: French exiles in the Spanish Netherlands during the Thirty years War’, The Seventeenth Century, vol. XV (autumn, 2000), pp. 149-75.
General of the Spanish Netherlands, wrote to Spain, informing them that the Duke had entered the city incognito. The Duke of York had explained this by saying that he was awaiting permission to continue onto Holland so as to join the House of Orange. The Governor-General had no wish to offer the fleeing Prince hospitality, as he did not want to offend the English Parliament and he was to learn in a missive from Philip IV, dated 5 December, that his royal master agreed with him. The Spanish King, moreover, wanted his Governor-General to persuade York to leave Brussels as quickly as possible. The fact that York’s mother lived in France, combined with the possibility of there being French spies in the Duke’s entourage, were further factors behind this reluctance to welcome the English Crown’s Heir Presumptive there.247

Even before the letter from Philip IV reached Leopold William, things had become increasingly difficult for the Heir Presumptive’s court in Brussels anyway. Aside from the unwillingness of Leopold William to grant him hospitality, the death of William of Orange in early November removed a strong ally of the Stuarts from them, weakened the position of James’ older sister Mary in the United Provinces and left the pro-Republican element dominant there. This, of course, made it harder for James Stuart to consider moving into the United Provinces, though he did not stop trying to get an invitation. As if to indicate his increasing desperation, however, he had to write to his mother in an effort to prevail on her to secure an invitation into that state for him.248 Lack of money was also a problem and one which may have pre-occupied Radcliffe greatly, as Hyde was later to state that he [Radcliffe] was responsible for funds during the Duke’s sojourn away from Paris. This dearth of funds was so grave a problem that it was reported that the Duke was reduced to having only two dishes with each meal and Hatton was to write to Nicholas from Paris in mid-November stating that the Louvre believed that York would be compelled to return to France sooner rather than later, and when he did so they would take the first

opportunity to cashier his councillors. This was particularly ominous for Radcliffe, as he was then being depicted in Paris as the ‘controller’ of the Duke.249

If all this was not enough, further problems were created by the way that the Duke’s Court entertained itself in Brussels. They frequently attended mass there, ostensibly to hear the music, and on one occasion to watch the investiture of three knights into the order of the Golden Fleece. In their defence, such attendance at a Catholic service by Protestants for the purposes of entertainment was not unusual over the course of the exile. Ormonde, for one, was also to do it on more than one occasion. There is documentary evidence to show that he did it in January and April 1656. On the second occasion, he went as the King’s companion. Nonetheless, for the person who was Heir Presumptive not only to the thrones of England, Scotland and Ireland, but also to the position of head of the established churches of these kingdoms, to attend such a service was to invite controversy. When one also considers that Charles II was at that time in Scotland, where he was engaged in a military alliance with the Scottish Kirk party, who could not by any measure be considered sympathetic to Catholicism, one can appreciate how insensitive such actions were.250

In fact, to make matters worse for the fugitive Court of the Duke of York, December 1650 was to see a reaction on the part of Charles II to their flight from France and it was not, on the whole, a positive one. On the twentieth of that month the King wrote to Henry Seymour from Stirling, with instructions for his brother. These required him to return to the Louvre and further ordered that, along with Lord Byron, who had previously been appointed to the post of governor to the Duke, some of the King’s Privy Council should attend him. This letter specifically named one councillor in particular who was to attend on the Duke immediately, and this was the Marquis of Ormonde, Radcliffe’s Irish patron.251 It must be said that the King’s


251 G. F. Warner (Ed.) *The Nicholas Papers, vol. I*, p. 209. Seymour did not just pass these instructions onto York. He also transmitted them to the Louvre. R. A. Beddard, ‘Six unpublished letters of Queen Henrietta Maria’, Henrietta Maria to York, 10 February 1651, p. 141.
actions in appointing new councillors to attend on James Stuart were widely supported by many within the exiled Court at large, and not just by those within the Louvre Set. Nicholas, for one, felt that there was a need to purge the Duke’s advisors, and also stated in a letter to Lord Hatton, written in early 1651, that he had ‘…heard of some jealousies that some honest men have had of George Radcliffe; how justly I cannot tell.’ Yet, while all of this does spell out that Radcliffe and those others who were attendance on York at that moment were in a difficult situation, Nicholas’ despatch to Hatton does at least indicate that Radcliffe was one of the key men at that Court in those days. In the same letter, the King’s secretary also mentioned that what he had heard of the situation led him to believe that the Louvre Set were going to make some proposals to those councillors near the Duke, and that they had good hopes of gaining Radcliffe for their faction, which, whether true or not, points to his centrality to life within the heir’s Court in the early part of 1651.  

Despite the general disapproval of their actions and the royal commands (which probably would not have arrived in time to prevent the subsequent move northwards in any case), the Duke’s Court did not stay long in the Spanish Netherlands and it travelled to the United Provinces in December. Mercurius Politicus, one of the Commonwealth’s newspapers, took joy in reporting that York, Radcliffe, as well as assorted others, had moved to Gulderland in the United Provinces and that they had not received any financial help from either the Spanish Netherlands or the Duke of Lorraine on doing so. By January 1651 the Duke’s Court was settled at The Hague, though this did nothing to improve the situation of York and his attendants. Aside from the aforementioned difficulties for the Stuarts in Holland, which were enough in themselves to make them unwelcome, there were other problems developing for the Stuart interest in Holland. Simply put, James’ sister, Mary, had her own troubles to deal with, and those of her brother would have to wait. The death of her husband in early November 1650 meant that a struggle was developing between her and her mother-in-law, the dowager princess of Orange, for the role of guardian to Mary’s son and William’s heir. Aside from this, debts had eaten into the revenues that she could hope to get from those estates inherited by her.

son and thus she was in no position to provide hospitality her brother. Some of the states in the United Provinces, moreover, were at this time arguing that the English Commonwealth should be granted official recognition, something which would have made life difficult for James to stay there. York’s Court was therefore in a politically difficult position and it was increasingly in need of whatever assistance it could get, no matter who it came from.

In these circumstances Radcliffe took the opportunity on 25 January 1651 to write to his old patron, and one of the most influential of the royalists, (as well as being, of course, the newly-appointed acting-governor to the Duke of York), Ormonde. This nobleman had just recently arrived in France from Ireland and Radcliffe immediately sought to recruit the Marquis to assist him and York in their stand-off with the Louvre. It was only natural that he should do so. Even though the calamities of the 1640s separated the two for long periods of time, contacts had been maintained between them. Radcliffe even had a hand in caring for Ormonde’s family on the Continent after the latter returned to Ireland in 1649. The same year, on hearing accusations that Ormonde intended to abandon the King’s service for that of France, he acted in defence of the Lord Lieutenant’s reputation and honour on the Continent. Now, in his letter of early 1651, Radcliffe welcomed the safe arrival of his patron on the grounds that,

…the preservation of your person for better times and the great assistance which the Duke of York may expect from your company with him, do in some sort recompense what is amiss in Ireland.

Yet, if Radcliffe hoped that his former patron would support him and the Duke of York in their stance and would join them in the Netherlands, he was to be seriously disappointed. When one remembers both Ormonde’s recent appointment by the King, as well as the official condemnation of the flight from Paris and, indeed, of Radcliffe himself from that quarter, then this lack of movement is hardly surprising. The fact that the behaviour of the Duke and his companions was unpopular with the Queen Mother and those around her in the Louvre, (and these people were, in the absence of

255 Carte Mss 24, Radcliffe to Ormonde, 7 March 1649 (O. S.), f. 71. Ibid, 11 march 1649 (O. S.), f. 111.
the King, the dominant group amongst the royalists on the Continent at the time) would have also disinclined Ormonde to aid his old client. The Marquis instead chose to remain in France, dividing his time between his family’s residence in Caen and the Louvre. He was to involve himself, indirectly, in the Duke’s dilemma, however, by means of sending one of his fellow exiles, the Lord Inchiquin, to meet James Stuart. Aside from Inchiquin, Ormonde also had another person through whom he could make contact with York. The Heir Presumptive had, by this time, involved himself in the negotiations between Lord Taaffe and the Duke of Lorraine. In some ways, indeed, York had become quite central to them, involving, as they did, the proposal of a marriage between him and Lorraine’s daughter. Aside from the role that Taaffe was playing in these negotiations, however, this Irish nobleman was also used by Ormonde to contact York and to keep track of him, and the young Prince was frequently mentioned in their correspondence during these months. It is clear that, rather than use his former client (i.e. Radcliffe) as a medium to deal with York, James Butler chose instead to use other members of his Irish circle, who were not implicated in the Duke’s original decision to flee Paris and who were consequently not subject to the wrath of other members of the royal family, to reach and control the Heir Presumptive. Radcliffe was becoming politically marginalised.

Given his failure to endear himself to Ormonde at this time and given the problems that faced the Duke’s Court (aside from the King’s disapproval, there was the lack of aid from Mary of Orange, and the general unwelcome from the United Provinces), it is no surprise that the situation did not look good for George Radcliffe, or for the Heir’s entourage generally. The only positive event for James and his courtiers was that the Duke, by becoming concerned in the negotiations with Lorraine, had managed to involve himself in one of the major pieces of Stuart diplomacy of the time. Yet, despite this one encouraging development, everything else managed to get worse. In early March 1651 it was being reported that the United Provinces had sent an embassy to the new Republican regime in England and it became clear that James Stuart could not continue to reside in a state that was about to officially acknowledge the legitimacy of the English Commonwealth. As a result, though Ormonde, for one,

257 Ibid, Ormonde to Taaffe, 13 March 1651, p. 165. BL Eg. Mss 2534, Taaffe to Inchiquin, March 1651, f. 61. For further details on these negotiations, see, Micheál Ó Siochru, ‘The Duke of Lorraine and the International Struggle for Ireland, 1649-1653’, pp. 905–32.
claimed in early March that he had heard nothing about it, talk of the Duke of York’s imminent return to France began to grow.\(^{258}\) By the end of the month Ormonde was better informed, however, and he wrote to Edward Nicholas on 30 March with the news that Henrietta Maria was endeavouring to get an invitation to France for James Stuart from the French Crown. By this stage, moreover, it had become public knowledge that Ormonde had been appointed as temporary governor to the Heir Presumptive by Charles II and that Radcliffe, along with some others, had been ordered to withdraw from the Duke’s Court. Reports to that effect had appeared in *Mercurius Politicus* in mid-February, along with the news that this was done so as to appease the Queen Mother’s discontent with Radcliffe and other assorted fugitive councillors.\(^{259}\) Evidently, and moreover, very publicly, Radcliffe’s days of influence within one, if not more, of the exiled royal households were clearly drawing to an end.

Yet, despite the endeavours to obtain an official invitation from the French Crown and the official appointment of new councillors to the Duke of York, it still took quite a considerable amount of time to resolve the Heir Presumptive’s circumstances and also to remove Radcliffe from his presence. One factor behind this was that the required invitation from France was not immediately forthcoming and, as a result, York stayed away from the Louvre and in the company of those who had fled with him in the first place. In fact, the efforts to secure the invitation were to drag on throughout the spring without much success. Meanwhile, the need to obtain it only grew, as the United Provinces formally received ambassadors from England in early April.\(^{260}\) This still did not speed along the process of obtaining the required official summons from France, however, and in a letter of 8 June 1651 Ormonde was to complain to Nicholas about the ill consequences that would result for the young Prince if he was forced to leave the United Provinces and come to France without being formally invited.\(^{261}\)

Another factor hindering the return of the Prince was the factional rivalries amongst the royalists themselves. By this stage Prince Rupert of the Rhine had involved himself with the Duke of York and, due to his antipathy towards the persons

\(^{258}\) BL Eg. Mss 2534, Ormonde to Radcliffe, 2 March 1651, f. 53.


\(^{260}\) HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Bramhall to Ormonde, 7 April 1651, p. 167.

\(^{261}\) BL Eg. Mss 2534, Ormonde to Nicholas, 8 June 1651, f. 90.
involved, was actively encouraging the Heir Presumptive to have nothing to do with either the Louvre Set or Ormonde, particularly as there were growing rumours that the latter had allied himself with the dominant faction in Paris. In the meantime, then, while the efforts to resolve his situation began to stall, the young Prince stayed in the United Provinces and continued to involve himself in the discussions between Taaffe and Lorraine, where the proposal of marriage between York and Lorraine’s daughter had continued to remain on the cards. In fact, Taaffe, who was more than willing to involve James in his negotiations, continued to talk positively on this proposed union right up until the end of May 1651. It must also be said that the growing centrality of the young Prince to these negotiations only helped to keep him away from France and in the United Provinces, which was conveniently close to where the continuing parley between Lorraine and Taaffe was taking place. Radcliffe’s day of reckoning for his involvement in York’s flight was, therefore, postponed.

The lack of the invitation from the French Crown and the negotiations aside, there was also one other question to resolve before York could, or would, return to Paris. This was the issue of how he would support himself. Prior to his flight James Stuart had not been in receipt of any pension and was accordingly dependant on what was allowed to him from his mother’s stipend from the French Crown for his survival. For the next-in-line to the Stuart thrones, this could hardly have been an acceptable situation and in the efforts to get him to return to Paris it now became a key issue. Labours to resolve this problem were made by Ormonde and others in Paris throughout the spring and early summer of 1651. On 4 May 1651 James Butler informed Nicholas that it had been decided to allow 4,000 pistoles a year to the Duke. On the face of it, this was a respectable sum, as it would amount to half of the Queen

262 HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Ormonde to Inchiquin, May 1651, pp. 168-9. The suspicion that Ormonde had thrown his lot in with the Louvre Set at this time was actually quite widely held and it was not without substance. Edward Nicholas himself came to fear the same thing during these months, being disturbed by Ormonde’s ostensible approval of the favoured strategies of the Louvre Set and the King’s consequent alliance with the Scottish Kirk Party. BL Eg. Mss 2534, Ormonde to Nicholas, 23 March 1651, f. 55.


Mother’s annual allowance. There was one great difficulty, however. This revolved around the ability of the French Crown to pay the sum in question. Both Ormonde and Hatton had their doubts about the certainty of payment of this pension and yet nothing could be done to resolve this problem. On the contrary, it would appear that the situation regarding the Duke’s pension only became less clear, as by the end of May Ormonde was reporting to Nicholas that the issue had, in fact, not actually been resolved at all.

This question, therefore, remained a significant stumbling block to the heir’s return to Paris throughout this time. It was also an issue that Radcliffe could involve himself in, as, aside from his possible role as the controller of the Prince’s funds, he was the perfect person to act as an intermediary between Ormonde and the Duke of York. By the end of May 1651, therefore, the former associates of Wentworth were back in contact with each other again over the question of the provision to be made for York. As was the case with Nicholas previously, however, Ormonde could not give Radcliffe any firm guarantees regarding what was to be done for the Prince in this respect. Nonetheless, the Marquis re-iterated to Radcliffe that remaining in the United Provinces, considering the dominance of the Republican faction there, was not really an option for York. Ormonde further reminded Radcliffe of the King’s disapproval of James’ flight, by informing him that letters had just arrived from Scotland with another associate of Ormonde’s, Sir Richard Fanshawe, and he urged Radcliffe to consult with this new arrival.

This was to be essentially Radcliffe’s final act as a member of York’s peripatetic Court at this time, as the Duke and his entourage soon set out for Paris and they had returned there by the end of June, as is evidenced by a meeting between Radcliffe and John Evelyn in the latter days of that month. Quite simply, in June 1651 York received orders from his mother to return to Paris and his Court found that they could not ignore them anymore. It was also becoming increasingly evident, despite York’s continued involvement in them, that the negotiations between Taaffe and Lorraine were going to come to nothing and therefore these could not be used as a

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265 BL Eg. Mss 2534, Inchiquin to Nicholas, 11 May 1651, f.71.
266 Ibid. Ibid, Hatton to Nicholas, 25 May 1651, f. 80. Ibid, Ormonde to Nicholas, 25 May 1651, f. 84.
reason to stay out of France. It also seems that some financial provision had finally been made in Paris for the Duke of York. Certainly, by mid-July, York was dispensing financial rewards in the manner of a royal prince. He granted a yearly pension to Ormonde of 5,000 guilders out of tenths that were to be due to him (York) from royalist privateering profits gained in the ports of Dunkirk, Picardy and Normandy, for instance. A more certain, and certainly more acceptable, source of income than privateering profits was also found for the Duke in the French army. Thanks to the endeavours of his mother, he was to be given command of a troop within France’s military, an employment that was more in keeping with royal dignity and which also offered the advantage of potentially taking him out of Henrietta Maria’s sphere of influence from time to time. True, these measures did little to relieve York’s shortage of funds in the short-term. There were continuing problems in confirming the military commission to the Duke throughout the summer and there were also delays in securing the privateering funds. Nonetheless, even the theoretical concession of these points to the Duke marked a significant improvement in his position vis-à-vis his mother from the time immediately before the flight and they must have been pleasing to him.

The return of York to France, however, effectively ended Radcliffe’s position as a major player within the household of the Duke. The return journey meant that there was now no way of avoiding the King’s order of the previous December, which required that the then councillors of York should withdraw in favour of new appointees. The Court, moreover, did not offer any alternative possibilities of employment for Radcliffe, because he had also, of course, lost favour with many of those who made up the Louvre Set, including the Queen Mother, and they were still the dominant group amongst the royalists in Paris. Those who were the leaders within


270 Ibid, warrant of James, Duke of York, 19 July 1651, p. 172. Ibid, Bennett to Ormonde, 1 August 1651, p. 176.
this faction still believed that Sir George had exercised too much control over the Duke of York in late 1650 and they continued to blame him for having a part in the prince’s removal from the Queen Mother’s household. In fact, some of this faction even went so far as to draw up formal charges against him, in which they effectively accused him of being an evil councillor and of misleading the Duke.271

There were also other factors that contributed to his fall from grace. Even though he had enemies within the Louvre, Radcliffe, it must be said, also had powerful allies and patrons at the Court, Ormonde and some of the leading members of the old royalists not being the least of these. Yet, somewhat surprisingly, many of these persons did not come to his aid now that he needed it. There are a number of reasons that explain his political alienation at this time, however. For one, this courtier was greatly and personally disliked by many in the Court and this even went beyond those who were in the ‘Louvre Set’. He was, for instance, very unpopular with Lord Hatton, a person who at first glance, as a fellow member of the old royalist faction, should have been a political ally of his and this helped to further marginalise Radcliffe politically.272 Others within that faction also proved to be remarkably unwilling to help him at that time. This was partly due to the fact that they had ‘other fish to fry’ at that particular moment.

Specifically, there was an effort being made in Scotland during those months to ensure that the old royalists would be the dominant group within the King’s Council in exile. This task was in the charge of Sir Richard Fanshawe, who was with Charles II in Scotland. The proposal that Fanshawe put to the King was that the Duke of York would be at the head of King’s Council in exile, where he would be surrounded by the likes of Ormonde, Inchiquin, Nicholas, Hyde and other like-minded persons (i.e. those who were effectively identified with the old royalist faction at that moment). Charles II was reluctant to grant this though, as he had no desire to alienate members of the Louvre Set by completely excluding them from his group of advisors, something which would certainly result from such a move. Unfortunately for Radcliffe, Fanshawe was also charged with advancing the former’s case and seeking

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272 Hatton’s hostility to Radcliffe was to be a notable feature of the latter’s life in exile. As early as 1649 Hatton was complaining to Edward Nicholas about Radcliffe’s ‘extravagant’ talk and his bragging, and he advised the King’s secretary ‘to be wary in any free communication’ with him. G. F. Warner (Ed.) *The Nicholas Papers, vol. I*, Hatton to Nicholas, 12 October 1649, pp. 147-8.
forgiveness from the King for him. It soon became evident to Fanshawe, however, that Charles II was not inclined to look favourably on Sir George, as he viewed him as both an interloper who had come into his position within York’s household through the back door and as someone who had also removed the Duke from those whose charge he was in, namely Lord Byron and Henrietta Maria. Bearing in mind the King’s strong feelings on this subject and not wishing to upset Charles Stuart at a time when he was pressing him on the more important business of the make-up of his Council abroad, Fanshawe decided that it was best to let Radcliffe’s case drop.  

In a sense then, Radcliffe’s associates had let him down. The network of individuals on whom he would have relied upon within the Court environment had sacrificed him. They had done this in order not to lose favour with the King, as that could potentially lead to their political goals being jeopardised. In fairness to Fanshawe, however, this was the rational step. Within any court environment the most important persons to have the support of were members of the royal family and to have the backing of one of them was a boon for any courtier and, by extension, that courtier’s associates. To alienate a royal from one’s network of associates on the other hand would be disastrous. All courtiers realised this. At the very same time that Fanshawe was lobbying Charles II to reconstitute his Council on the Continent Ormonde was seeking to distance himself from the actions of Viscount Taaffe, one of his clients, in his negotiations with the Duke of Lorraine. Taaffe, having offered the hand of the Duke of York to Lorraine’s daughter in his quest for military assistance, had subsequently neglected to tell Henrietta Maria of it, despite Ormonde having insisted that he do so. When the latter learned of Taaffe’s negligence and of the Queen Mother’s anger at it in June 1651, he quickly sought to excuse himself from involvement in the proposal. It must be remembered that Ormonde did this at the very time that Fanshawe was lobbying the King in Scotland to have those courtiers who were closest to the Queen Mother removed from his exiled Council and have them replaced with the Lord Lieutenant’s closest political allies in the Court. In other words, at the very time he was moving against the Queen Mother’s most trusted courtiers he was also taking steps to maintain some favour with her. No one wished...
to alienate a royal if they could possibly help it and other courtiers were willingly sacrificed in order to prevent this from happening. As a source of bounty and favour, they were simply too important too isolate.

Yet, despite these circumstances, Radcliffe was not to be completely without allies in this situation. Ormonde, in spite of the fact that he had previously distanced himself from his former Irish ally in mid-1651, did eventually respond to appeals for assistance from Radcliffe. He did intervene on this gentleman’s behalf with the Queen Mother in the wake of the Duke of York’s return to Paris. In an effort to restore his client to favour, the Marquis managed to arrange a private interview between Henrietta Maria and Radcliffe. In the end, however, notwithstanding these efforts on the part of Ormonde and despite the fact that Radcliffe was declared innocent of any of the specific charges that were brought against him by those in the Louvre Set, all of these efforts to protect him came to nought. Wentworth’s former right hand-man, despite his formal forgiveness, had effectively lost favour with both the Queen Mother and Charles II, and he quickly lost whatever formal position he had held within the immediate household of the Duke of York.

To make matters worse for him, Radcliffe’s fall from grace coincided with the lowest ebb in the fortunes of the royalists-in-exile. In early September 1651, after having been forced to flee southwards from Scotland by Cromwell, the army of Charles II was forced to give battle to parliamentary forces at Worcester, where it was soundly defeated. There seemed to be no other means for pursuing a restoration available to the royalists in the wake of this crushing defeat and for many it looked as if they were associated with a lost cause. The situation was all the worse for Radcliffe. Not only did the political cause that he had associated himself with have the appearance of being a completely defeated one, there now seemed to be no prospect of employment for him within the royal Stuarts’ households on the Continent.

The gravity of his situation was not lost on Radcliffe and it is hardly surprising to learn that he was re-evaluating his relationship with the Stuart Court in exile as

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275 Ibid, Radcliffe to Ormonde, 24 May 1651, f. 474. BL Eg. Mss 2534, Ormonde to Nicholas, 8 July 1651, f. 101. Later on, in early 1652, Radcliffe was also formally forgiven by the King. HMC, Marquis of Bath (vol. II), Radcliffe to Holles, 10 February 1652, p. 99.


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early as February 1651. Finding himself dishonoured and subject to vilification for
his actions he informed Ormonde in that month that he was reluctant to seek further
employment in the Court.\textsuperscript{277} In a sense, having already lost favour with the Stuarts
when he made this statement, he was only preparing himself for the inevitable loss of
employment anyway. Yet, if no position could be expected from the royal Court,
Radcliffe was then faced with the task of finding some other way of providing for
himself and his dependants. By On 14 October 1651 the clearly out-of-favour
courtier (as his own words below reveal) wrote to Nicholas outlining the options
before him. Serving the Stuarts had, he claimed, caused him to neglect his own estate
and had exposed him to ruin. He was now in need of a way to provide for himself and
at that moment in time one particular option seemed especially tempting to him.

After all my service and my sufferings; upon the private whisper of a
malicious groundless lie, cast off, disgraced and yet unheard, so as I conceive it
myself [sic] discharged in point of honour and conscience from offering my service
any further, but necessitated to provided [sic] for my poor ruined family: the
destruction of which is all the thanks I have gotten…I will take the best course I can
for myself, justly and fairly. And to that purpose I have sent for an honest man to
meet me at Calais…and there will advise and direct the best course I can to get
something out of mine [sic] old estate: whereby to get bread for my wife and son.\textsuperscript{278}

Clearly, now that the royal Court could not, or would not, provide employment
for him anymore and, moreover, feeling himself to have been mistreated by many
within it, Radcliffe, being in great want, had come to the conclusion that he was now
permitted to seek to come to terms with the Republican regime in England.
Evidently, there were some limits to Radcliffe’s loyalty to the royalist cause. Once
his honour had been compromised and once the Stuart Court could not provide for
him anymore, Radcliffe felt himself to be somewhat of a free agent who was entitled
to compromise his loyalty to the Stuarts by coming to terms with the usurping regime.

This declaration should not be read as an abandonment of royalism, however.
For one, the letter to Nicholas is dotted with expressions of good wishes towards
Charles II and the other Stuarts. All Radcliffe was seeking to do was obtain a more
sure income supply for himself and his family by, he hoped, regaining half his estate
through coming to terms with the Republican government in England. He grounded

\textsuperscript{277} Carte Mss. 29, Radcliffe to Ormonde, 24 May 1651, f. 474.
\textsuperscript{278} BL Eg. Mss 2534, Radcliffe to Nicholas, 14 October 1651, ff. 112-3.
his hopes on the notion that this regime might seek to gain support for itself by allowing former enemies to compound for their lands. It is also of note that Radcliffe’s wife was already regained possession of one fifth of her husband’s estates in Yorkshire anyway, having recovered them by order of the English Parliament in early 1648. Proposing to compound with the English Parliament was therefore not a radical departure for this family. Yet, this previous compromise had clearly not stopped Radcliffe from continuing his royalist activities. The same may even be true of his wife, who was imprisoned for a period of 1650 by the Commonwealth. It also has to be said that there is a certain irony in Radcliffe writing a letter to Nicholas on the subject of taking steps to recover part of the income from his English estates as Wentworth’s old companion was not the only person to be thinking on these lines. We have already seen how the Butlers and Edward Nicholas went beyond mere consideration of this possibility and clearly none of them saw it as a betrayal of the royalist cause. Radcliffe, in considering such an attempt so as to allow him to provide for his own needs, was not out of step with many leading exiled royalists. The only disparity between him and those others who gave it thought lay in his relative slowness to argue that this was a legitimate course of action.

Radcliffe’s return to favour with the King

By early 1652, it is fair to say that Sir George Radcliffe was, for certain important persons at least, almost a ‘persona non grata’ at the exiled Stuart Court and this undoubtedly placed him in a difficult position. Nevertheless, in the wake of his fall from favour, Radcliffe, despite his contemplation of the possibility of coming to terms with the Parliament in England and, later, his consideration of the possibility of withdrawing to less expensive towns in France, chose not only to remain in exile, but to stay near the various Stuart households in Paris. This was probably because he was to find that his situation was still not completely hopeless there. For one, Radcliffe, though he did not hold any formal position within any of the Stuart households anymore, still had access to the Duke of York and he certainly talked with


280 See pp. 112-39, above.

him on matters relating to his privateering ventures from time to time, which implies that he had some access to the income generated by this Court. It is hardly surprising that he should still have had some access to that Prince. Even though many within the household of Henrietta Maria were disinclined to look on Radcliffe favourably after the incident of that Prince’s flight from Paris in mid-1650, it has to be acknowledged that this action, by leading to a renegotiation of his relationship with his mother, had improved York’s position within the Stuart Court somewhat.

When one considers this and also bears in mind that the Duke of York continued to maintain close contacts with many of those who had played a central role in his flight from the Louvre on his return to Paris, despite his mother’s disapproval, (the most notable example being Sir Edward Herbert) it is unsurprising that Sir George should have continued to find some favour with the young Duke at this time. All that said, there is still, nevertheless, some qualification needed here. While he still had access to the Heir and could consult with him on various issues, this did not mean that he was held all that high in the Prince’s favour. It is clear from Radcliffe’s correspondence that his standing with York fluctuated greatly over the next few years. In early 1656 Radcliffe was to mention in a dispatch to a friend in London that York was very civil to him recently, which was something he had not been in some time. His contemporary correspondence with Ormonde on his relationship with the Duke, meanwhile, also highlighted the roller-coaster nature of this relationship.

This qualification aside, it was obvious that Radcliffe could still gain access to some amongst the royal family. Aside from this, it was also the case that, in the immediate wake of his tumble from grace, and at a time when others courtiers were unwilling to help him, some former allies were prepared to maintain some sort of a relationship with him. Ormonde, as we have seen, was one case in point. Indeed, the Marquis’s links to Radcliffe endured into the years following 1651. The old gentleman, for instance, was to act as an intermediary between Ormonde and English royalists during this time. In mid-1654 he delivered a personal letter to Ormonde from Lady Isabella Thynne, in which she asked the Marquis to redeem a golden cross

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282 Ibid, 28 February 1652, p. 100.
that she had previously pawned.\textsuperscript{285} It must also be said that Radcliffe, because of his contacts, and despite his alienation after his fall from grace, still remained politically useful to Ormonde in a number of ways. In late 1653, for example, at a time when some members of the Louvre Set were attempting to remove Hyde from the Charles II’s Privy Council by accusing him of treason, Ormonde, who was gathering evidence on the case on behalf of the King, used Radcliffe to contact Bramhall. This Bishop had earlier been named as one of those who had evidence against Hyde.\textsuperscript{286} When Charles II and his closest advisors withdrew to the Holy Roman Empire in 1654 Sir George proved to be of further use to the Marquis, as he kept the latter informed of the behaviour of those members of the royal family in Paris. On one occasion he talked of the difficulties that the Duke of Gloucester’s tutor was having with his young charge. Ormonde was not the only person to learn of the royal family’s movements from Radcliffe. He maintained close contacts with many others of those Irish exiles who associated themselves with the Court, most especially with those whom he had been closely associated with prior to the Civil wars in Britain and Ireland. This group included John Bramhall, who was likewise informed on the condition of the Duke of York by him.\textsuperscript{287} Others also continued to find it useful to stay in contact with Radcliffe during the early 1650s. Royalists, such as Sir Gervase Holles, received Court news from him and though he was not an officeholder in any of the households anymore, he still intervened with certain persons within these bodies on behalf of others, thus taking up the position of a patronage broker within the Court.\textsuperscript{288}

Because of this, and because he was to remain near Paris even after his fall from favour, and despite his oft-repeated desire to move away, Radcliffe continued to be of some value to certain persons. One person who found him particularly valuable

\textsuperscript{285} HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Radcliffe to Ormonde, 4 September 1654, p. 306. He continued to do this on Butler’s behalf well into 1656. In that year he was transmitting letters containing details regarding the care of the Butler patrimony between Ormonde and his wife. Thurloe State Papers, vol. V, An intercepted letter of George Radcliffe, 12 August 1656, p. 265.

\textsuperscript{286} The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. II, Bramhall to Radcliffe, 6 November 1653, p. 270.

\textsuperscript{287} HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Radcliffe to Ormonde, 4 September 1654, p. 306. Edmund Berwick (Ed.), The Rawdon Papers, Radcliffe to Bramhall, no date, pp. 98-100.

\textsuperscript{288} HMC, Marquis of Bath (vol. II), Radcliffe to Holles, 15 May 1652, pp. 102-3.
was Sir Richard Browne, the official royalist ambassador to France. The lack of personnel serving the royal Court meant that the King’s servants often had to fill two vacancies. This was no different for Browne, who, between 1650 and 1656, found himself being employed both as ambassador to France and as the King’s privateering agent for the ports of western France and Brittany. While this latter post required him to be frequently away from Paris there was no wish for him to abandon his first employment. Therefore there was a need to find someone who would care for his official residence while he was gone, and Radcliffe was the person to do this. This was to prove invaluable for Wentworth’s former secretary, as it not only gave him a role in maintaining the exiled Court’s claim to be a legitimate government, but it also gave him a means to support himself. As we have seen these were lean years for Radcliffe. In 1656 he wrote to his correspondent in London that

I am now labouring to get credit for a suit of clothes, which is more than I have made these five years; and now my old frippery grows thin, so that if so much cloth comes, as will make me a suit and cloak, I shall be overstored [sic].

Yet, despite this, his role as Browne’s assistant gave him a roof over his head, as the ambassador insisted that Radcliffe should live in the former’s residence. This was no bad thing, as Browne employed a servant and had a line of credit with a Parisian butcher and brewer. Browne, moreover, paid the bills with the income from the privateering ventures. There is also some evidence to suggest that this income was occasionally supplemented by funds sent from England. What is more, from mid-1654 to 1656, following the departure of Charles II for Cologne, maintaining this embassy had an important role in supporting both the Church of England and the policies of the old royalist faction against those of the Louvre Set, as its ambassadorial status allowed it to be one of the few places in Paris where the Anglican service could be heard. The Anglican service was continued there from 1654 at the insistence of Charles II, and this was important as Henrietta Maria and the French royal family

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289 BL add. Ms 34702, Correspondence, political and private, of Sir Richard Browne, Resident at Paris (1641-1660), ‘accounts of Sir Richard Browne…’ 27 March 1656, f. 141-141b.
actively sought to prevent Protestant services from being heard in the Louvre during these years.\textsuperscript{292}

Despite his fall from grace, therefore, Radcliffe was not without friends amongst the courtiers and he still carried out certain useful tasks on behalf of the Crown and its assorted supporters. As it turned out, his fall from the King’s favour was not to be permanent and from the mid-1650s onwards he was to recover his position. This was because, from mid-1654 onwards, a new factor in the relationship between the different royal households within the complete Stuart Court worked to his advantage. This was their geographical separation from each other, resulting from Charles II’s withdrawal to Cologne in that year. This, combined with the differing policy objectives of each of the different households, led to tension and conflict between the royals and would eventually create a situation where Radcliffe would be invaluable. This was because, when it came to maintaining influence on the complete royal family and on those surrounding them in such a situation, personal connections to those in or near the other households were to prove vital and anyone who could supply information to Cologne on the assorted occurrences and events in these other places to those who were geographically removed from them, or who could act as an agent on behalf of others in these distant households, was to be prized. Radcliffe offered these very connections.

As we have seen, Radcliffe almost immediately began to fill this role for persons like Ormonde after the King’s move to the Holy Roman Empire. Aside from those instances, and even though this old courtier was not at the centre of any of the major factions among the Stuarts’ followers, Ormonde was also to make use of Radcliffe in one of the largest factional and ‘inter-household’ disputes in the exiled Stuart Court: namely the clash over the religious education of the Duke of Gloucester in late 1654. This dispute arose when Henrietta Maria, who had been granted the care of her youngest son, Henry, Duke of Gloucester, while Charles II was in Cologne, attempted to bring pressure upon the youngest male Stuart to change his religion from Anglicanism to Catholicism. To this end she had him removed to a Jesuit seminary and she even had the young Prince publicly slighted in the presence of the French

\textsuperscript{292} Ibid, Browne to Radcliffe, 27 August 1655, f. 131. Thomas Carte, \textit{A collection of Original letters and papers, concerning the affairs of England, from the years 1641 to 1660 vol. 1}, Nicholas to Ormonde, 26 April 1651, p. 451.
royal family because of his refusal to co-operate with her.\textsuperscript{293} News of the attempt on Gloucester’s religion naturally caused immense concern to the King and those courtiers who were with him in the Holy Roman Empire. It was thus decided to send Ormonde to deal with the situation and to remove, if possible, Gloucester from his mother’s care. It is worth mentioning that Radcliffe, who was still based in Paris at this time, had played no small part in passing on the information to the Court in Cologne. He had relayed the news of this attempt to proselytise Gloucester to Ormonde at the end of October, and he actually chose to write to that nobleman first before he informed the Duke of York, despite being advised by Lord Hatton to do the opposite.\textsuperscript{294}

To facilitate the carrying out of the task entrusted to him, Ormonde immediately used his former Irish client both to get into contact with and to put pressure on Gloucester. The old gentleman proved to be effective in fulfilling his assigned task. For one thing Radcliffe told this young Duke that he would forfeit all rights of inheritance if he changed religion and that he would be a traitor to his eldest brother.\textsuperscript{295} He also passed on a letter to the young Duke from Charles II, which Ormonde had forwarded to him for this express purpose. Radcliffe, to further his mission, also took advantage of others within Ormonde’s circle of contacts. In this case, he made use of William O’Brien, one of the sons of the Earl of Inchiquin. The harassed Stuart Prince had formed a friendship with this young nobleman, and Radcliffe used this to bolster the resistance of Gloucester to his mother’s schemes. O’Brien was immediately instructed by the wily politician to pass on advice and instruction to the young Prince for the purposes of stiffening his opposition to the attempts to proselytise him. Aside from taking advantage of the assistance of those other Irish in exile, Radcliffe also kept other members of Ormonde’s group informed of events, writing to Bramhall about his parts in these proceedings.\textsuperscript{296}

There can be no doubt that Radcliffe’s role as the deliberately activated advance guard for Ormonde in the task of removing the Duke of Gloucester from the

\textsuperscript{293} BL Eg. Mss 2534, Hatton to Nicholas, 6 November 1654, ff. 254-7.
\textsuperscript{295} Ibid, Hatton to Nicholas, 6 November 1654, ff. 254-7.
\textsuperscript{296} Ibid, Radcliffe to Hatton, 20 November 1654, f. 265.
influence of the Louvre Court was an important one and it greatly facilitated the Marquis’ successful removal of the Prince from there in mid-December 1654. Curiously, it is also an unappreciated one, as the various accounts of the event make no mention of him. The most detailed relation of the events surrounding this clash only mentions Radcliffe twice and claims that Gloucester had to resist the efforts to pervert his religion by himself prior to Ormonde’s arrival.297 Clearly Radcliffe is a victim of a bias in the favoured sources among historians of this era, as most of the professional scholars rely on the writings left by the major figures in the various Stuart households for their interpretation of events. Radcliffe’s own accounts of the circumstances surrounding the attempt on Gloucester, however, show him to be a bigger player in the proceedings prior to the Lord Lieutenant’s arrival.

Important as he was prior to the Marquis’ arrival, Radcliffe’s role in Gloucester’s removal from his mother’s influence did not end with the arrival of Ormonde, however. If the young Prince was to be removed to Cologne, then the trip there had to be done in a way that fitted with his dignity. The funds for this journey were acquired by both Radcliffe and Hatton, who offered themselves as sureties for a loan to a member of the English merchant community in France for this very purpose, a certain William Scott of Rouen. Finally, in mid-December, at the time when Ormonde was beginning his journey away from Paris with Gloucester, there was one other task entrusted to Radcliffe by his patron and this was the charge of informing Cologne that the journey of the young Prince away from his mother had begun. This was duly carried out by Radcliffe, who wrote of the move in a letter to Nicholas, employing the not very original pseudonym of ‘De Colton’.298 Significantly, Hatton, even though he had long been in frequent contact with the Court in Cologne, was once again passed over by Ormonde for this task.


298 Ibid, Radcliffe to Nicholas, 18 December 1654, f. 295. BL Eg. Mss 2535, Radcliffe to Nicholas, 5 February 1655, f. 46. Ibid, Hatton to Nicholas, 19 February 1655, f. 56. The life and original correspondence of Sir George Radcliffe, Committee for the Militia of the County of York, 15 November 1650 (O. S.), pp. 257-8. Radcliffe, as his French pseudonym would suggest, was from a locality called Colton, in Yorkshire.
On the whole, one could argue that the removal of Gloucester from Paris and from Catholic influence there was greatly assisted by Radcliffe’s actions. Even those who disliked Radcliffe, such as Lord Hatton, had to admit that his part in the events was no small one. In fact, Hatton did more than this. In a letter to Edward Nicholas, in which he described how Radcliffe had acted in the affair, he both criticised the old politician (not an untypical action for him) for carrying out his actions through intermediaries, such as servants, for being unduly vain and for being scared of incurring the wrath of the Queen Mother, while at the same time admitting that Strafford’s former secretary had actually played his part in these affairs well.299

Yet, despite Hatton’s less than veiled criticisms of him, this sequence of events effectively marked the beginning of Radcliffe’s rehabilitation into Charles II’s favour. It is true that his actions did not endear him to the Queen Mother, as Radcliffe found out for himself in mid-January 1655 when, during a visit to the Louvre, Lord Jermyn, Henrietta Maria’s favourite, would not talk to him ‘in civil language’. The Queen Mother also publicly complained about his behaviour.300 These deeds, nonetheless, almost undoubtedly proved his worth to those at Charles II’s Court in the Holy Roman Empire and demonstrated that he was a person of influence within the wider Stuart Court again. This was also realised by those in Paris, including Jermyn. Despite the above report that this courtier would not speak to Radcliffe civilly in the Louvre, the fact of the matter was that Jermyn had actually approached Radcliffe in early January, along with some others, in order to get him to use his influence with the Duke of Gloucester. They desired that he would convince the young royal to write a letter to Cologne on their behalf, explaining that they had no part in the attempt to change his religion. This Radcliffe did, in co-operation with the Duke’s tutor, a Mister Lovell, and notwithstanding earlier claims by the young Prince that he would

299 BL Eg. Mss 2534, Hatton to Nicholas, 27 November 1654, ff. 269-71. BL Eg. Mss 2535, Radcliffe to Nicholas, 15 January 1655, f. 17. This fear of the Queen Mother is a clear sign that, even in those circumstances, Sir George had no wish to alienate members of the royal family again, if possible. Unfortunately for him, he failed miserably in keeping her favour after these events. What is noteworthy here is that Henrietta Maria reportedly claimed that Radcliffe had promised to help her in her scheme.

not write such a letter, the epistle was duly written. Others were quick to realise it also. In mid-1655 Richard Browne asked Radcliffe to explain to Cologne that a delay in sending some two thousand livres which George Carteret had previously promised the King was not the fault of the ambassador. Radcliffe was once again in a position to intervene on behalf of persons on whom he had previously been dependant.

Having thus re-established himself in the King’s favour by helping him maintain control over his younger brother, Radcliffe was quick to seek reward for his efforts from Cologne. In mid-January he wrote a letter to Edward Nicholas in which he described the previously mentioned uncivil conversation with Jermyn. He also gave an account of how the Queen Mother had publicly criticised him and how she had claimed that he had promised to aid her in the attempt on Gloucester’s religion immediately prior to the effort. This of course he denied, claiming not to have met with her for a month prior to the crisis. He concluded the report with a request that his patron, Ormonde, be informed ‘...by which my friends may see what favour I expect from this Court...’, and with an expression of worry for the Duke of York while he was in Paris, fearing that he had fallen under the influence of bad councillors there. While the information on York was typical of the type of information that he had previously provided to Ormonde while in Paris, the letter seems to have been written with another major goal in mind; namely the acquisition of a post at the Cologne Court. The old statesman seems to have been quite hopeful that this would be granted to him, as he told Hatton on a number of occasions that he expected to be called there presently, much to the latter’s chagrin.

Radcliffe did receive a visible sign of the Monarch’s favour in the immediate aftermath of the withdrawal of Gloucester from Paris, but it did not come in the desired form. In early February 1655 both he and Hatton were coming under pressure

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301 Ibid, Hatton to Nicholas, 1 January 1655, f. 1.
302 BL add. Ms 34702, Correspondence of Sir Richard Browne, Browne to Radcliffe, 10 June 1655, f. 124.
303 BL Eg. Mss 2535, Radcliffe to Nicholas, 15 January 1655, f. 17.
304 Ibid, Hatton to Nicholas, 22 January 1655, f. 31. Ibid, 19 February 1655, ff. 56-8. It should be pointed out that Hatton was pursuing the same goal at the time and even sought the office of governor to the Duke of Gloucester later in the year. HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Hatton to Ormonde, 25 December 1654, pp. 311-2.
from the aforementioned Mister Scott on the issue of the loan that they had secured from him on Gloucester’s behalf. The merchant wanted some extra guarantees that it would be repaid and to this end he wanted a letter from Charles II in Cologne acknowledging the debt owed to him. Radcliffe and Hatton both sought such a letter, but it was the former who received a reply first, with the desired note, signed by Charles II, being sent on 16 February and apparently promising that the sums owed would be paid to William Scott’s brother, Everard, in Holland. The missive had immediate effect, with Scott putting off the payment of the first part of the debt, which had been due that month, until Easter. The debt itself was to be eventually repaid in mid-May of that year. Once again, all of this irked Hatton, who had received no such letter, even though he had also sought it. Consequently he felt slighted, particularly by Ormonde, who had previously promised ‘to favour’ Hatton, as a result of his assistance in the issue of Gloucester’s education.

Despite Hatton’s disappointment, it is really no surprise that Radcliffe should have been more favoured, as he appears to have been a more important participant in the previous events. It is also interesting to note that Ormonde had preferred to use his long-established connections with Strafford’s old secretary to deal with the ‘Gloucester predicament’, rather than take advantage of the presence of Lord Hatton at the Louvre; a person who is perceived in the historiography as being more central to, and more closely interwoven into, the ‘old royalist’ faction as a whole. Clearly, Ormonde saw a long-established patron-client relationship as being both more valuable and more useful in dealing with the issue at hand. Despite Radcliffe’s

305 BL Eg. Mss 2535, Hatton to Nicholas, 19 February 1655, f. 56. This in itself is a sign that the Stuart Court still had prestige among the wider English community at this time. No other guarantee or surety, aside from an acknowledgement of the debt, seems to have been sought by Scott from Cologne at the time.

306 The life and original correspondence of Sir George Radcliffe, William Scott to Radcliffe, 1 April 1655, p. 261. Ibid, Richard Lovell to Radcliffe, 20 May 1655, pp. 263-4. BL Eg. Mss 2535, Hatton to Nicholas, 26 February 1655, f. 61. Ibid, Hatton to Nicholas, 5 March 1655, f. 70. Hatton may have had some justification for holding this sentiment. Scott was to actually accuse him of not representing the merchant’s interests to Cologne, despite the fact that he had and, later on, he even threatened Hatton with imprisonment. Ibid, Hatton to Nicholas, 12 March 1655, f. 81. Ibid, Hatton to Nicholas, 26 March 1655, f. 97. Ibid, Ormonde to Hatton, 20 March 1655, f. 89. See pp. 191-2, above, for an account of Hatton’s displeasure with Ormonde.

307 BL Eg. Mss 2534, Hatton to Nicholas, 6 November 1654, ff. 254-7.
relative alienation within the Court, his unpopularity with the most important members of the royal dynasty and also with other courtiers, he was still the first person that Ormonde turned to when the crisis broke out. He obviously believed that he could rely on Radcliffe to carry out all that he was entrusted with.

This effectively proved to be the case, because in the days before Ormonde’s arrival in Paris, as even his detractors reluctantly admitted, Radcliffe had done a good job in securing the constancy of Gloucester to his religion in the face of his mother’s pressure. The Marquis was able to trust particular tasks, such as the delivery of the King’s letter, to his client, in the certainty that it would be done. In this sense, he became the Marquis’ willing ‘cat’s paw’, who could be used to exercise influence on events from a distance. In using Radcliffe in this manner, Ormonde went outside the normal means of exercising influence and carrying out actions in Court politics. Instead of calling on more central figures in his Court faction to help him, or threatening the perpetrators of the unpopular deeds with the loss of the King’s favour, he used a relatively minor figure on the periphery of the Louvre to prepare the ground for his arrival and to ease the task of removing the young Prince from his mother’s sphere of influence.

These old ties and connections also held advantages for Radcliffe. It is obvious from the train of events described that he could similarly take advantage of long-established personal contacts and ties with leading members of the Court, most notably with Ormonde, as well as with others, such as the O’Briens of Inchiquin, to exercise influence on events, even if it was as a proxy for someone else. These ties allowed him to have an impact upon Court life, despite his alienation and loss of favour with most people in it. It also meant that he could still rely both on Ormonde and the nobleman’s closest allies, in this case the O’Briens of Inchiquin, to assist him. This fact, moreover, by allowing him to demonstrate his usefulness and loyalty to the Monarch’s interests, permitted him to eventually overcome what many would have seen as serious impediments to playing a part in Court life and politics. His relatively rapid receipt of the requested letter concerning the repayment of the debt owed to William Scott also shows how effective these networks could be in both securing and distributing favours.

As stated before, it is clear from Hatton’s letters of early 1655 that Radcliffe, as a result of his actions, expected to be called away from Paris. Nonetheless, despite his wishes, he was not to be granted a new position of trust in the King’s presence for
some time. The Court at Cologne was too impoverished and too small for that. Radcliffe therefore continued to live in Paris, where he continued to find it difficult to provide for himself in an adequate fashion. It was at this very time, for instance, that he was to complain of the quality of his clothes. His poverty did not stop him from playing the part of the courtier at this time, however. In early February 1656 he went to meet the Princess royal when she made a trip to Paris, borrowing some horses to do so. It also did not prevent him from being useful to the Crown and he still continued to be a valuable source of information for those in the Holy Roman Empire on events in France. In February 1655, for instance, he was among those who informed the Cologne Court of the peace talks between the English Commonwealth and Mazarin, and he was quick to advise them that this would put the Duke of York, employed as he was as a soldier in the French service at the time, in a difficult position. He was to later pass on York’s own opinion on the matter, in which the latter expressed a preference for going to serve the House of Savoy. Radcliffe himself disapproved of this, however, as it would have meant that York would still have been employed by the French. What is more, the Cologne Court also employed Radcliffe as their emissary to the Duke of York in these years, relying on him to convey their opinion to the Prince and to exercise influence over him. As he suggested himself, this might have made him too useful to call away from Paris, despite his desire to leave. Yet, once again, by his own admission, this was a role in which he was of little help to the King. By mid-1656 York had given his ear to other counsellors and though Radcliffe could get a hearing he was not always well received and he certainly was not listened to. Yet, this did not exhaust Radcliffe’s usefulness to Cologne in that city. Aside from this, he also was playing a role in transmitting funds to Cologne via Paris. Between 1654 and 1656 he and Browne co-operated in forwarding funds to the King, which included the profits of royalist, French-based, privateering activities.

This old Yorkshire gentleman was also to become active in religious matters in 1655 and 1656. He was certainly involving himself in efforts to create

309 Ibid, Radcliffe to Mrs Traps, 2 February 1656, p. 443. BL Eg. Ms 2534, Radcliffe to Nicholas, 5 February 1655, f. 46. Ibid, Radcliffe to Nicholas, 26 February 1655, f. 63.
311 BL add. Ms 34702, Correspondence of Sir Richard Browne, Browne to Radcliffe, 7 March 1653, ff. 63-4. Ibid, Browne to Radcliffe, 8 October 1655, f. 134. See p. 206, above, for details on this.
rapprochement between Anglicans and persons of Jansenist leanings, though there is some suggestion that he may also have been involved in such efforts prior to the mid-1650s. Be that as it may, it is certainly true that he was frequently to consult with his old colleague Bramhall when making such efforts in the mid-1650s. Sometime after February 1655 Radcliffe was asking the Bishop of Derry to acquire a book in French for him, entitled ‘Apologie pour la monarchie et l’église Anglicane’, which was reputed to have been written by a former minister of a French Church in London. He also asked Bramhall to give his opinion on a passage of another theological work which dealt with the specific question of how Protestants could consult with Papists on the external acts of religion without causing scandal.

Another letter, this time from July 1656, was even more forward in seeking the Bishop’s opinion on the question of consultations with heretics. In this communiqué Radcliffe described meetings he had had with what he described as ‘sundry learned men’ who, though supposedly Papists, nonetheless apparently agreed with the Anglican Church’s teachings on many religious points, most notably on the Pope’s jurisdiction and the sacrament of communion. He even advanced the opinion that ‘…the schism is only that which is now the block between us [sic]…’ All this religious activity also seems to have affected his political opinions during this period, as he seems to have become increasingly involved in schemes involving Catholics of one shade or another. In mid-1655 Hatton was complaining of Radcliffe’s activities in this regard. This time his grievances were about his companion’s attempts to strike a deal with Rome on behalf of the Stuarts, through the intercession of a French

312 The life and original correspondence of Sir George Radcliffe, p. 287. This work states that Radcliffe had co-operated in such efforts with Richard Steward, a former chaplain to Charles I. If this is true then it is reasonable to suggest that coming to an accord with Jansenists was a long-held goal of Radcliffe’s, as Steward died in late 1651. Aside from Steward, Radcliffe also had links to Matthew Kelly, an Irish Catholic cleric with Jansenist leanings, who also associated with other royalist exiles. Ruth Clark, Strangers and Sojourners at Port Royal, p. 54. Joseph S. O’Leary, The Irish and Jansenism in the Seventeenth Century. This online article was consulted at the following link. http://josephsoleary.typepad.com/my_weblog/2006/07/the_irish_and_j.html

313 Edmund Berwick (Ed.), The Rawdon Papers, no date, Radcliffe to Bramhall, p. 98-100. The internal evidence for ascribing a date of post-February 1655 to this letter is a reference to the treaty negotiations between France and the English Commonwealth.

bishop. Hatton naturally disapproved and concluded his letter with the comment that it was ‘…a subject wherein bussy [sic] bodies may do much hurt…’

Radcliffe therefore kept himself busy and remained quite an active figure throughout 1655 and early 1656, despite his failure to secure a post in Cologne. As things turned out, however, he was not to remain in Paris after mid-1656. The conclusion of the alliance between the Stuarts and the Spanish Habsburgs at this time was to lead to Charles II’s Court moving to the Spanish Netherlands, where it was soon rejoined by the household of the Duke of York. As part of this move Radcliffe was re-appointed to the office of councillor to the Heir Presumptive by Charles II, partly as a result of his own lobbying, and he subsequently moved north to Flanders in mid-September 1656. Yet, there was to prove to be one major drawback with his appointment to this position. It was not welcomed by Prince James Stuart.

**The last days of Radcliffe**

There were two elements which went to create the problem regarding Radcliffe’s appointment to the Duke’s council. The first of these was Radcliffe’s peripheral status within the Duke of York’s household after the events of late 1650 and early 1651. While he had obviously continued to have some involvement with the circle of York in the wake of the Duke’s flight from and return to Paris during the early days of his exile, it is fair to say that new persons had come to replace him as the major advisors to the Heir in the wake of these events. Amongst these was Sir John Berkeley, a figure whom Radcliffe did not approve of (he was one of York’s councillors about whom he had complained some years earlier). Nonetheless Berkeley was certainly very much in James’ favour from the mid-1650s onwards and Radcliffe, in spite of some favourable signs from the Prince, seems to have become increasingly pessimistic about regaining his former hold on York while this continued to be so. Yet Berkeley was not someone that Charles II or other courtiers at Cologne approved of and consequently the King did not appoint him to the Duke of York’s Council when the move to the Spanish Netherlands took place. The grounds for a

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clash between the Heir Presumptive and the King over who should be the former’s councillors had been put in place.

The second element that contributed to Radcliffe’s continuing peripheralisation after the appointment was the nature of the relationship between Charles II and his younger brother. In 1656, at a time when the Stuarts had to deliver on their promise to the Spanish to bring troops from the service of the French into that of the Habsburgs, James, in some ways at least, held the upper hand in the relationship. He was a respected military commander whom the Irish and English soldiers in French service would follow; therefore without his co-operation in the transfer of troops from one side to another the Stuart cause would suffer. It has been pointed out earlier that the Duke of York was somewhat reluctant to abandon France. Consequently when Charles II took the liberty of appointing councillors for his brother the aggrieved Prince felt that enough was enough. James objected to the removal of Berkeley and withdrew into the United Provinces in protest in late 1656. Charles II was thus placed in a serious quandary and the only way he could remove himself from it was to concede to his brother’s demands to have Berkeley re-instated, which he duly did in early 1657. Ironically it was Ormonde who went to the Duke with the news that Charles II had capitulated to his brother’s wishes. In other words, Radcliffe’s patron was co-operating in a process which would lead to the alienation of his client within the Duke’s council.

This was because this development, good news for Berkeley, meant that Radcliffe’s chief competitor for a position of influence in the Duke’s household would not now be removed from the heir’s presence. Hence, he faced the continuing prospect of remaining a courtier of only secondary importance. His situation certainly was not improved by the stroke he suffered at this time which, while it did not apparently damage his spirits, certainly hampered him physically. An old man suffering from the effects of a stroke was not in a position to be an effective

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318 Ibid, pp. 52-3. CVSP, vol. XXXI, 1657-1659, Francesco Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, 9 February 1657, p. 15-6. For details on James, Duke of York’s standing and importance at this time, see pp. 154-5, above. The point should also be made here that the background to this clash, ironically, only highlighted Radcliffe’s value to the King’s household. He had been the one who had informed Ormonde of James’ discontent at being called away from the French army. Carte Mss. 213, Radcliffe to Ormonde, 10 March 1656, f. 74.

319 The life and original correspondence of Sir George Radcliffe, p. 289.
councillor to a Prince who was also a military commander in the field and, as a result, Radcliffe once more left the centre stage of Court life. Then, he left the centre stage of life itself, dying at the beginning of June 1657. Sir George Radcliffe was buried in Flushing on the fourth day of that month, having never returned to his home from his exile and without ever really recovering the position of influence that, if the comments of the mourners at his funeral about his being one of the best councillors the Stuarts had can be believed, he was deemed to be capable of. 320

So ended Radcliffe’s career as a courtier. Having acquired a position of trust in the initial years of Charles II’s reign the old statesman soon lost it as a result of a number of factors. These included his rivalry with the some of the most powerful persons within the exiled royalist community, his loss of favour with prominent members of the royal family and the failure of his political allies to support him at key junctures. All this led to his alienation and peripheralisation within the Stuart Court between late 1651 and 1656 and even led to him considering abandoning exile and withdrawing from the presence of the royal family. Clearly, part of the reason for this was that he felt that the Court was not providing for him in the manner that he expected it should, something which clearly points to the reciprocal nature of the relationship between courtiers and royalty.

Yet, in the end he did not withdraw and instead he remained near members of the royal family in Paris and continued to have dealings with the other courtiers there. His alienation there was alleviated by the tendency of persons, most notably former members of his Irish circle, to continue to have dealings with him and to employ him in certain tasks. This culminated in his assisting Ormonde with the question of the Duke of Gloucester’s education, which led to his rehabilitation with the King, a process which led to his appointment to the Duke of York’s Council in 1656. Yet, despite this, Radcliffe did not recover his former influence in the Court. Ironically, having regained the favour of the King, a key factor in his being alienated in the first place, he now found that he was not looked upon favourably by the Duke of York, the Prince over whom he had previously exercised the most influence, or by those around him. Once again, the loss of favour with a key royal in 1656 and his failure to have the support of his allies at key moments, if Ormonde’s actions are anything to go by,

was once again to deprive him of a position of influence. For Radcliffe then, the Court was never really to reciprocate the support he showed it throughout the exile.

Conclusions

In a very personal way Radcliffe’s life exemplifies the old adage that all political lives end in failure. It has to be said though that despite his inability to acquire the position of influence within the Stuart Court that he longed for, particularly within the household of the Duke of York, and though he can only be considered a courtier of secondary importance, his deeds were still not without some import within this institution. First of all, it was with the co-operation of individuals such as Radcliffe that the grandees within the Court, most notably Ormonde in this case, operated. Radcliffe, as stated earlier, was this nobleman’s cat’s paw as well as his sacrificial pawn. Without a client and a supporter like him the Marquis’ influence would have been considerably lessened within the Court. Radcliffe’s co-operation with Ormonde allowed the Marquis to wield influence across the entire spectrum of the Court and to operate in a number of households at once. Beyond this, the supply of information provided by Strafford’s former secretary to his patron proved invaluable in managing relations between the various members of the Stuart dynasty. In the middle part of the decade, having a contact like Radcliffe in Paris meant that Ormonde, despite being resident in Cologne, could track the moves of the Louvre branch of the Stuart Court and could react to them promptly, if required. Radcliffe, in short, illustrates how individual elements in Ormonde’s network (sociology’s ‘alters’) could be valuable in providing the resources that the royalist Lord Lieutenant used to maintain his power.

Aside from his usefulness to Ormonde, the Court as a whole depended upon functionaries like Radcliffe to survive and ‘alters’ such as him proved to be just as useful to it. During his career in exile he secured funds for the Court, helped maintain the royalist embassy in Paris, and by extension the Church of England, aided in the supervising of royalist privateering endeavours, assisted in protecting the King’s influence over his family and acted as a conduit for both information and commands. He also attended upon royal persons in public ceremonies when required. Radcliffe thus helped to the Court assert its claim to be a legitimate government and aided in adding necessary presence and weight to what Court ceremony there was. The support of persons such as him even bolstered the prestige of the royal Court and of
the royal family themselves. Generally speaking, it was courtiers such as Radcliffe that were entrusted with carrying out the day-to-day tasks that kept the royal households running. Ultimately, they helped to keep the royalist cause alive.

Yet, the picture changes if we place Radcliffe at the centre of an egocentric network, with Ormonde and the various other members of the Stuart Court being put in the position of being his alters. At crucial moments his alters all failed him and did not provide the support that he needed. Ormonde distanced himself from Radcliffe after York’s flight from the Louvre in 1650, when it became clear that Sir George had upset those of the royal bloodline. The same held true for other members of the old royalist faction. This pattern repeated itself in 1656, when Ormonde acquiesced in allowing Radcliffe’s chief competitor for York’s favour, Sir John Berkeley, to be re-appointed as one of the Heir’s advisors. Radcliffe had never failed him so deliberately during the exile. The fact was that Radcliffe needed to do the bidding of persons like Ormonde, the King, or James Duke of York, as his position at Court depended so completely on them. Without their favour he was lost. On the other hand, while they all found him useful, Radcliffe was never so important as to be above sacrifice, particularly after he lost his grip on the Duke of York’s household in the early part of the decade. After that he really only wielded power within the Court as someone else’s proxy, and this made him completely dependant on the likes of Ormonde or on the good favour of a prince. He had no other source of power and influence to use when re-negotiating his relationship to others in the Court. Consequently, when he found himself in the middle of a power dispute at Court, he was, more often than not a pawn, and ultimately could be discarded if circumstances required.
Concluding remarks to section 2: The overall significance of the exile to the Stuart Court and its courtiers

The exiled Court of Charles II and the customary image of Early Modern courts

For historians, a royal court in the Early Modern era has been defined by its encompassing of the following two characteristics. First of all, it was the centre from which monarchs and their advisors carried out the major governmental and administrative functions of an Early Modern regime. Second, the court also acted as the principal household of the ruling dynasty. Within it the daily life of the Prince was organised, his welfare was provided for, the leading members of the ruler’s kingdom or kingdoms came together, and representatives of foreign powers were received. The royal household was thus a place which combined both public and private spheres in one.\(^{321}\) An exiled royal court, however, such as that of Charles II would be expected to differ from this traditional model in many ways and it is fair to say that there were some differences between it and other early modern courts.

Despite this, it can be argued that while the Stuart Court of the 1650s did vary from the standard historiographical picture in many ways, these deviations should not be over-emphasised or used to deny it full status as a royal court, as some have done previously. Those dismissing it, moreover, do not seem to have felt the need to justify their analysis to any great degree, undoubtedly assuming that the changes brought about by being relatively impoverished and in exile were grounds enough for discounting it. Indeed, much of the historiography on the Stuart Court in exile during the 1650s and on the persons associated with it, it is fair to say, assumes that this institution differed greatly from other royal courts simply because it was in exile. One scholar who has written specifically on this Stuart Court in exile has talked of the ‘fictive nature of a court without a kingdom’. Another, admittedly writing much earlier in the twentieth century, has talked of the exiled courtiers as being ‘…without more than the semblance of a court’. This was not an unprecedented point of view. One nineteenth-century survey of the Stuart courts, while giving a brief chapter over to Charles II’s foreign Court, dedicated much more time and space (over fifteen chapters) to Cromwell’s Protectorate Court. Furthermore, another, much more recent,

\(^{321}\) Robert Muchembled, ‘Manners, Courts, and Civility’, p. 158.
scholar, in a survey of the Tudor and Stuart courts did not refer to the exiled Court of Charles II at all. Instead he saw the Protectorate Court as the natural heir to that of Charles I. The Court of Charles II only came in for comment for the period after 1660. After some scrutiny, however, it is clear that this tendency to pass over the exiled Court and deny it ‘courtly status’ seems a little extreme. First, the point has been made already that it, at the very least, continued to be the semi-private household of a royal family. In this regard, it does meet at least one the two aforementioned criteria for being a princely court. Furthermore, while it is true that the exiled Stuart Court did differ from both its contemporaries and predecessors in many ways, it would not be accurate to suggest that (a) all of these differences were contingent on the fact that it had been banished from its traditional kingdoms, (b) that it did not have anything in common with other such non-exiled bodies or with its predecessors, and (c) that it could not wield any form of political power and influence. Indeed, in defence of this exiled institution, one could argue that, while it did differ from the norm in many areas, there were also many more points where it continued to bear remarkable similarities to traditional royal courts, most particularly to its Early Stuart predecessors. Besides, differences between courts were not uncommon anyway and thus being different from its contemporaries cannot be advanced as grounds for dismissing it.

This is in no way to claim that there were not notable changes brought about by the exile. Banishment meant that the Court was not based where it would normally have expected to be. The exile also led to the individual royal households becoming geographically separated from one another for long periods and meant that certain personal households, most notably that of the King, lacked a permanent seat. Additionally, banishment, by denying the Court many of the resources and facilities

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323 Since the publication of Norbert Elias’ groundbreaking work on the sociology of the Early Modern Court and the advance of ‘Civilisation’, a number of historians have used a considerable amount of empirical data to question the model advanced by him. In so doing, they have highlighted the differences that existed between royal courts in different times and eras. See, for example, Jeroen Duindam, *Myths of Power*, pp. 6-9.
that it would normally have expected to have, led to it having more modest means than its forebears and certainly led to it being considered of lesser standing. One can also say that not only did the Court lose control over the administrative institutions in its former kingdoms, the exile also affected the nature of the political responsibilities that the Stuart royal Court had and impacted upon its customary governmental prerogatives. The courtiers were not unaffected either, suffering a change in their relationship to their former patrimonies and having their means somewhat reduced as well.324 These are potentially significant differences. Yet, I do not believe that it deserves to be excluded form the canon of work on British early-modern courts or to be treated as some sort of deviant, insignificant, body. First, none of these differences stopped it from being a semi-private royal household. Second, this Court, though its status as a centre of government is certainly questionable, can still be viewed, for reasons that will be detailed below, as a significant political arena and space.

The Court as an administrative unit

Let us begin our summary of the Court as a political and administrative centre by first touching on the ways that it differed from the ‘norm’. One of the most obvious ways that it varied from the conventional representations of the Early Modern court lies in the fact that it had been banished from its traditional kingdoms. As a result of this unique characteristic, and unlike most other courts of the period, it had stopped being the central organ of a state’s states’ governmental administration and it had lost control over many of the traditional resources and administrative bodies that are generally considered to have made courts such powerful institutions; of particular importance here are the management of taxation in England, Scotland, and Ireland, and the associated governmental departments, as well as the control of the judiciary.325 The nature of its military power, moreover, and its primary military task (i.e. the defence of a kingdom, or of kingdoms) were also radically different from those of other courts. The exiled court’s variations from the norm did not end there. Aside from the above mentioned points, this banished institution was also a body which depended upon the sympathy of other courts and governments for its survival and which had been deprived of many of the administrative accoutrements of a court.

324 See pp. 67-109, above, for examples of these changes. For the diminished standing of the Court on the international stage see p. 345, below.

such as seals, which it would have used to validate and legitimise its administrative decisions.

All of these deficiencies were considerable and, if we accept the model proposed by Norbert Elias, they would also have robbed it of many of the ways that it would normally have rewarded, and indeed controlled, its members and supporters.\(^{326}\) When one takes all these unique features into account, it is understandable that some historians of Early Modern court society may not consider this banished Stuart household to be a court at all. Some historians have certainly accepted the view that this Court in exile had lost control over the traditional prerogative powers of monarchical government, namely control over the financial, military, and judicial resources of a kingdom or kingdoms.\(^{327}\) Yet, it is fair to say that while the Stuart Court was not at the centre of a government anymore, it was not without political authority either and it is too simplistic an approach to deny that it wielded any power or influence.

Why does it retain a certain amount of political power when it was so lacking in many of the so-called necessities? A number of reasons can be advanced. First, though it was without a full bureaucracy (and the emphasis should be on full), in an age where so much of government was carried out informally anyway, one should be careful not to overstate the impact of losing control of administrative institutions.\(^{328}\) Second, though it did not control the physical territory of a state anymore, this does mean that the Crown had lost the loyalty of the political nation within it. It is well-established that many in Britain and Ireland still saw the Stuarts as their legitimate rulers, including persons who had fought the royalists in the civil wars and many of the local elites within Britain and Ireland. These local elites were vital to the functioning of an early modern state and to retain the loyalty of so many of that group was a boon to the Stuarts, as it could be used to wield a surprising amount of political influence. Also, with regard to the accoutrements of courtly government, these could be replaced. Indeed, as we have seen previously with the royal seals, they were.\(^{329}\)


\(^{328}\) Linda Levy Peck, *Court patronage and corruption in Early Stuart England*, p. 82.

\(^{329}\) Michael Braddick, ‘The Early Modern English State and the Question of Differentiation, from 1550 to 1700’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 92-111. See also p. 211, above.
The political power that the Court maintained can be most clearly seen when we talk of military affairs and it is clear that it had not lost all of its former military might, though it is true that this was, to a degree, diminished.330 Despite this diminution, however, the Court still had a clear, though non-traditional, military task and it still had access to soldiery at this time, particularly Irish and British mercenary troops on the Continent, as well as to naval vessels. It could, moreover, exercise some control over these and all this meant that it could still wield some political and military influence on the Continent during the 1650s. As a result of this, and as a demonstration of how real its military power was, the Stuart Court was able to form a military alliance with Spain in 1656 and its forces were able to participate in the battle of the Dunes in 1658.331 The Spanish alliance and the conflict in the Southern Netherlands during the later part of the decade is not the only area of military strife where it made an impact. A low-level sea war was also fought out, through the medium of the privateers. The struggle between the French and the Spanish in southern France earlier in the 1650s was likewise affected by Stuart intervention with Irish troops. This is to say nothing of royalist rebellions at home.332

The exiled Stuart Court, therefore, while it did not exercise the traditional military prerogatives or responsibilities of a royal court in the customary manner, still had military influence and power and it still had very definite military responsibilities and aims. While its military powers and prerogatives might have been somewhat circumscribed and its martial duties might have differed from that of a traditional court, this is not the same thing as being completely deprived of military power and prerogatives. Instead it represents an alteration and a mutation in the nature of these powers and prerogatives. A similar argument can also be made for the traditional royal right of gathering taxes and funds to meet its responsibilities. Once again the

330 One should not exaggerate the extent of this diminution, however. Prior to the 1640s the English Court would not have had access to a large standing army anyway. English political tradition tended to demonise standing armies as instruments of repression. The greatest concentration of troops available to the Stuarts was frequently to be found in Ireland anyway. Alan J. Guy, ‘The Irish military establishment, 1660-1776’, Thomas Bartlett & Keith Jeffrey (Eds), A Military History of Ireland, p. 212.


332 See pp. 211-23 & pp. 372-94, below, for further details on these conflicts.
ability to act on these was a diminished one. It was denied access to parliamentary grants and it lacked a large-scale bureaucracy through which it could collect revenue. That said, however, early modern states rarely worked through a large bureaucracy but frequently functioned by co-operating with empowered local elites, especially when it came to the collection of taxes. Furthermore, parliaments had only been one among a variety of financial sources that this Court’s predecessors had used and a good number of extra-parliamentary means of raising revenue still remained open to it. Consequently, money came in through a variety of means, including, the issuing of financial demands by the Court to its supporters in British and Irish localities (with a new privy seal being used to validate them), the activities of licensed privateers, the selling of honours, as well as a variety of other ways that were based on early Stuart precedents. By using these methods, the Court managed to tax its followers, wherever they were. The sums brought in through these may not have been terribly significant. That said, the value of such activities was not just monetary: they were also a means of asserting a political claim.

When we look at the activities of the Stuart Court in the military and financial spheres, then, it is obvious that the scope of its powers were certainly more limited than they had been previously and, in the case of military matters, that its reasons for involving itself in these activities were different than they had been formerly. Yet, it is fair to say that they still managed to make a noticeable impact in these areas. In fact, of the three traditional governmental areas in which royal courts were usually involved, the judicial field was the only one in which the Stuart court did not wield any considerable power outside of its own boundaries during the exile. That said, however, one must still bear in mind the cases referred to previously where it did dispense justice. It did, amongst other things, manage to execute one courtier for treason during the 1650s and it did sit in judgement on the behaviour of its own members at various times, while also successfully appealing to local authorities on judicial matters from time to time. The Crown, likewise, sometimes received and responded to petitions for redress from persons outside of its own boundaries.\textsuperscript{333} The question remains, however, why other commentators have refused to acknowledge the political influence of this exiled Court. Part of the reason, I would suggest, lies in the way they conceive of the state. The previously-mentioned comment, for instance,

\textsuperscript{333} See pp. 225-7, above.
about the fictive nature of a court without a kingdom clearly sees a strong link between the territory of a kingdom and the government that rules it. In effect, it is implicitly making use of the weberian definition of a *modern state* [my italics], which makes the same connection between the institutions that make up a state’s government and the territory controlled by the state. Such a definition, as many commentators have pointed out, is problematic in an early modern context, however.334 For one, it assumes the existence of a competent, centralised bureaucracy, something which was not necessarily there in the 1600s. It also does not acknowledge a central government’s need to have the co-operation of local elites when it came to having its wishes carried out in peripheral areas, and of personal bonds of loyalty which would have served both to connect localities to a centre and to facilitate the transfer of resources to the centre. Bearing in mind that the Stuarts maintained the support of many of the local elite, had courtiers who could contact this elite and who could also arrange for the transfer of resources to the Court, then it is no surprise that it continued to have a certain amount of political competency.

**The court as a dynasty’s semi-private household**

Clearly there were also differences in the way that it organised its day-to-day life and in the way it provided for the royal personages at its centre. Most strikingly, we have established in the previous chapters that Charles II found it difficult to control the other households that altogether constituted the complete Stuart Court. As a corollary of this, it could also be argued that, by the mid-1650s, the Stuart dynastic interest was represented by three households, all following their own policy objectives and at times what would normally be considered the more minor households did this without consulting with the King. It goes beyond this. The reduction in the size of the household is notable here. Charles II’s exiled household was small and poor by the standards of his forebears, with his own attendants, regardless of which of the available estimates one uses, numbering less than 100 persons. The lack of a palatial centre, the reduction in ceremony and the increased accessibility which allowed persons such as John Bramhall to approach royalty when they would not normally have expected to are also key points to note here.

334 Michael Braddick, ‘The Early Modern English State and the Question of Differentiation, from 1550 to 1700’, pp. 110-1.
Yet, even though exile brought significant changes to the Court of Charles II and his family’s households, one should not exaggerate the extent to which change took place. The peripatetic nature of Charles II’s Court was not completely out of keeping with previous English courts, which had been nomadic in nature despite having a fixed royal residence.\textsuperscript{335} The lack of a palace cannot be considered unusual either, as established royal households only became the norm in the late-sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In terms of numbers, the French royal Court of the late fifteenth century only contained some 270 persons, for instance.\textsuperscript{336} Whatever exile-induced change there was within the Stuart households, then, was not without previous precedent. It seems that where change was forced upon the Stuart Court’s structure it simply reverted back to a form that was more typical of the late medieval period. This reversion to previous models allowed it to survive.

There is one other glaring difference, aside from the fact of exile itself, between this Court and others. This is the relative lack of control exercised by the King over other members of his dynasty. As we have seen, the Duke of York and Henrietta Maria maintained completely separate households. Furthermore, they both had the means of exercising social influence over royalist adherents, which challenged the King’s power. York had an independent income and the honour acquired by military service, while Henrietta Maria had a state pension and apartments within a proper royal palace. This independence had implications not only for the social activity of the Court, but also, as we have seen, for its political actions and it allowed some courtiers, including Irish ones, to play upon these divisions to their own ends.\textsuperscript{337} Once again, however, we should not exaggerate this. As pointed out previously, Charles II was not the only monarch to experience difficulties in dealing with his own family.\textsuperscript{338}

It should also be said that, aside from these above differences, it appears that, on the whole, there were still some significant continuities between this body and its predecessors. There are many examples of this. One of the most striking is the continuance of ritual and ceremony along traditional lines, even in a somewhat

\textsuperscript{335} Malcolm Vale, ‘The Princely Court in Northern Europe, 1270-1380’, p. 11.


\textsuperscript{337} See pp. 236-48, above.

\textsuperscript{338} See pp. 156-7, above.
curtailed manner. If we look at the courtiers’ lives, one could say that violence between them, and the Crown’s reaction to it, was not something that exclusive to this particular version of a Stuart royal court. Furthermore, as Reynolds has argued so persuasively, it is fair to say that the question of honour and the role this played in maintaining their loyalty to the Crown, and thus in causing them to wait on Charles II and other princes of the blood, took a unique form for these courtiers during the exile as a result of the events of the 1640s. One must, nonetheless, acknowledge that their concern over the issue of honour itself was not in itself unique, as it was something that concerned courtiers in the Early Modern world generally. It has also to be said that their notion of honour, while influenced by the events of the 1640s, still had its roots in the pre-war era, as Reynolds acknowledges.339

In addition, while resources were relatively scarce in this Court, this does not mean that there was no competition for those that existed and it clear that people did attend on the Stuarts in order to receive these very resources. This competition for benefits among the courtiers, moreover, took a similar form to that which had taken place in its predecessors, with the competitors drawing upon their patron-client connections with others to gain access to the royal family and the resources in question. This, as we have seen, was even true for those new courtiers who entered into the Court. They too had to rely on the traditional patrons and established courtiers in order to make their way in this institution. The rewards for attendance were varied. We have seen how Inchiquin sought an earldom from the Crown, so rewards of a social nature could be gained there. To cite another example of the resources the Court had the disposal of, the salaries and stipends given out by the Court were valuable sources of income for an expatriate nobleman.340 If we look at the case of Radcliffe again we see that financial concerns influenced his attendance on the Stuarts. He considered withdrawing from the Stuarts’ entourage in the wake of the battle of Worcester and once it became evident that the royal family would not provide for him. It should also be pointed out that it was not only a lack of resources that stopped the royal family from providing for him at this time. The fact of the matter was that, during this period, one of the major reasons for not endowing him with a living was that he had lost favour with both Charles II and Queen Henrietta

Maria. Radcliffe’s attitude to the Court and his implied belief that it could, if it wanted to, provide for him at this time cannot be considered to be completely based on completely misguided expectations either. After all, others, such as John Bramhall, actually did find employment with the Stuarts, despite this dynasty’s financial difficulties; in this specific case as a privateering agent. Radcliffe’s case also implies that one should not be in a hurry to dismiss the power of the royal family within this exiled court either. Their approbation of a courtier remained necessary and to lose favour with a royal, as Radcliffe did on a number of occasions, was to become alienated within this specific Court society. It should also be pointed out that the financial pool that the Court could provide for its courtiers went beyond the funds that it commanded itself. The Stuarts still had enough social status and prestige to allow them to intervene with other institutions on the Continent and acquire credit, funds and employment for its adherents. Francis Taaffe, as has already been pointed out, received his position as page in the Habsburg Court in Vienna through the intercession of the Stuarts. The Courts cause also legitimised certain financial endeavours that the exiles participated in, most noticeably privateering, and in doing so it received a quid pro quo in return.

The above examples, it must also be said, do not account for all of the ways that this exiled Court continued to act like its predecessors. In short, it is fair to say that there was a significant effort made to hold with past traditions and modes of operations. How does one explain the remarkable level of continuity between the exiled Court and its predecessors? In part, it must be due to the persons involved simply sticking to practices they were familiar with. A survey of the ceremonial of the Spanish Habsburg Court, written by Glyn Redworth and Fernando Checa, also suggests another possible explanation. They argue that Charles V’s adaptation of Burgundian Court ritual was inspired by a desire to send a strong political message to his subjects in Northern Europe. Essentially he wanted to let those spectators know

341 For further details on this, see p. 268, above. It should be pointed out again at this point that many persons withdrew from the Stuart Court after Worcester, once they were faced with the need to provide for themselves, and/or with the apparent failure of contemporary efforts at Restoration. John Evelyn is one example of this phenomenon.

342 HMC, Hastings Mss (vol. IV), Nicholas to Hyde, p. xxvi.

343 See p. 93, above.
that they were not forgotten. Applying the same argument here makes sense of the continuity in the exiled Stuart Court’s organisation of its daily life, as well in its ceremonial and administrative practices. Maintaining these, as far as was possible, in a manner that tallied with custom and traditional procedure amounted to an assertion of a right to rule in Britain and Ireland. It was highlighting its own descent from previous ruling courts and pointing out that its claim to power in Britain and Ireland was based on the political traditions of those kingdoms. This Court, in short, did not just give expression to royal power and the King’s sacral status. Its continued existence also amounted to a message to Charles II’s distant subjects that his claims to the thrones of England, Scotland and Ireland had not been forgotten and that he was still more than willing to claim the role of ruler.

The value of the Court to the courtiers and vice versa

All of the above benefits and rewards that could still be garnered there meant that a court such as this remained an attractive venue for persons like the Irish banished elite. It has also to be conceded that there were other reasons for attending. For one reason or another, the personal interests of the Court and the Stuarts’ concerns overlapped significantly. Exile brought financial and social problems for both the Court and the exiles. The best way for both to overcome these was to recover their position at home as soon as possible. Once again, however, it would be too simplistic to leave it at that. As pointed out in chapter one, many of the exiled royalists were effectively disbarred from returning home while the various Interregnum regimes dominated Britain and Ireland. Catholic landowners had lost their estates through their participation in the Irish Catholic confederacy and their opposition to the English Parliament. The latter action also held true for Irish Protestant landowners, while the clergy of the Church of Ireland (who had likewise actively opposed Parliament) needed, at the very least, a royal restoration in order to have a Church living to go back to. These impediments to a return home could only be removed by bringing about a royal restoration and so it was only natural that the Irish elite should join the Court and join in its effort to bring about the desired restoration. To summarise, the interests of the Crown and its political elite, most especially the nobility, overlapped and both could benefit from the relationship with each other, as both could co-operate.

in getting what the other wanted. The Court was frequently the place where this cooperation was made manifest. What is noteworthy about this is that, in general terms, this was not unusual. It has been argued in many works on early modern nobility that shared interests between a monarch and his elite is what brought them into contact with each other, most noticeably in a court setting, and led them to co-operate with each other.\textsuperscript{345} Exile only impacted on Irish elite behaviour in a courtly setting with regard to the detail of their life. True, they were participating in the daily life and political intrigues of a relatively impoverished court, which found itself in an unusual predicament and which was forced, in some regards, to be more like its medieval predecessors than its contemporaries. Yet, despite these drawbacks, the Irish elite did participate in the life of this Court and, broadly speaking, they did so for all the same reasons that motivated other courtly elites. In this regard exile made little difference.

There clearly continued to be a set of shared interests between the Court and its Irish elite. Yet, in the quest to redress their shared predicament, what did these persons bring to the Court and its cause? To answer this question it may be useful to look at it in terms of an egocentric support network, with the Court at the centre. Its ‘alters’, the Irish courtiers, along with those others who joined the Stuarts abroad, supplied two sets of vital commodities to it. The first was a willingness to serve the dynasty and the second was a variety of resources which the royalists could use to support their cause. This elite’s willingness to act as servants to royalty helped the Stuarts to maintain their dignity and some of their standing within the European social structure. The Irish émigrés social status, combined with their eagerness to act as personal attendants to the Stuart princes of the blood, as well as their participation in (and in some cases, thinking of Taaffe in particular, their organisation of) court ceremonial and entertainments helped to do this. By doing this, they also emphasised to those at home that the Stuart Court remained a viable political alternative that could be potentially turned to.

Aside from this, they continued to fill the traditional role of the ennobled peerage for a Crown government, by acting as agents to its subjects. This they did, in part, by staffing whatever bureaucratic and administrative units the Court had or attempted to maintain, such as the Privy Council, the Anglican Church, or the various posts associated with privateering. They combined this with a willingness to use their

\textsuperscript{345} Jonathan DeWald, \textit{The European Nobility, 1400-1800}, pp. 140-7.
personal influence and connections to get whatever decisions the Crown made obeyed, in much the same way that elites had previously facilitated government in Britain and Ireland. They therefore acted as a kind of informal royalist civil service, bringing pressure to bear to obey the will of Charles II and at times challenging the Interregnum regimes’ bureaucracies on persons. Of course, it has to be conceded that this Court did not have anything like a full bureaucracy at its disposal through which the Crown and the courtiers could work. This shortcoming was overcome to an extent, however, by the Irish courtiers, and others, acting, where no particular responsible office-holder existed, as multi-functional, personal agents for the Crown, much as their predecessors would have done, once again, in the late-medieval period.346 This willingness to act both as quasi-bureaucrats and as informal agents is exemplified by all the Irish at Court, from Ormonde right down to the frequently marginalised Radcliffe. In effect, the exiled Stuart Court, in the absence of proper governmental institutions, simply fell back upon the personal contacts and informal ties of its courtiers to carry out policies and gather resources. It was in this way that troops were garnered for the Stuarts, for instance.

As for resources, the Irish elite were largely responsible for securing the services of those privateers and soldiers that served the Stuarts during the 1650s. Vital as they were in securing military power for the Stuarts, the activities of these two groups brought more than that to the royalist cause. Other intangible assets, such as a means to claim legitimacy as a government, political influence, or even a way of reminding persons of the Stuarts continued existence, likewise flowed from their actions. Aside from this, one should not forget the other assets that these socially privileged outcasts secured for the Court, including, but not exclusively, funds. For these reasons one can conclude that they played a significant role in allowing the Stuart royal Court to continue to be a royal court during the Interregnum. In allowing it to continue to be a royal court and in providing it with the means to remind people of its continued existence, they helped keep the royalist cause alive and at the very least reminded people that the Stuarts’ claim to the right of governance within Britain and Ireland had not gone away. In doing this they kept the notion of a possibility of a return to the former monarchical government alive.

Section Three
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Conclusion
Section Three

Chapter 7

Representing the royalist cause to the Continental powers and communities

It goes without saying that the Irish courtiers of Charles II, in the interests of both themselves and the Stuart Court, had to continue to provide some kind of opposition to those who had forced them into exile. This was not just done for formality’s sake. Many of the royalists were not without hope that the political situation in Britain and Ireland could change in such a way as to allow them to make a play for a return to power there. It was obvious to most, after all, that all of the assorted interregnum regimes lacked a broad political base and were made up of alliances of uneasy bedfellows. It also seemed evident to many, however, including to royalists and those in power in Britain and Ireland, that the Stuarts would need logistical and military backing from at least one of the Continental powers to take advantage of this.¹ Interaction with Continental powers and institutions was therefore a political necessity for the exiles.

There were two main reasons for this. Aside from needing foreign aid to provide whatever resistance they could to the various Interregnum regimes in Britain and Ireland, there was also a requirement to provide for the royal family’s day-to-day maintenance, and also for the Court generally. If they failed to provide this then the physical and symbolic centre of the royalist cause would be weakened and would be less credible as a political force. Simply put, if the King did not look and act like a

¹ The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. II, Hyde to Nicholas, 23 August 1653, p. 145. Edmund Berwick (Ed.), The Rawdon Papers, Radcliffe to Bramhall, 21 July 1656, pp. 102-3. Wilbur C. Abbott, The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, vol. IV, p. 460. Thomas Brown, Miscellanea Aulica, Charles II to Bennett, 22 June 1655, p. 114. The belief that foreign assistance was necessary was widely held by many royalists but some, especially many of those within the old royalist faction, had certain reservations. As we have seen previously, many held the opinion that this should be limited in scope and that the initial impetus towards a royal restoration should come from within Britain or Ireland. See pp. 229-31, above.
proper king, and his court did not look and act like a proper court, then it would be harder to provide plausible opposition to those in power in their former kingdoms. We have already seen how the failure to look like a monarch damaged Charles II in the eyes of the Venetian ambassador in mid-1651. Two years earlier, however, in July 1649, the same ambassador was more sympathetic in his account of Charles II. In his report to Venice he commented that ‘...in spite of his [Charles II] fallen fortunes the King did not fail to practise the generosity that is proper to his condition’.  

Judging by the terms used in these previous missives, failing to look and act like a monarch clearly meant a loss of respect. Even if one was a sovereign without a kingdom, looking and acting like a royal was still necessary so as to avoid this, especially if one retained hopes of regaining one’s kingdom. After all, it was important that, in order to improve one’s chances of getting allies, a king who was in the position that Charles II found himself in during the 1650s make a positive impression on the international stage. Consequently, if Charles II, his cause, and his supporters wanted to be taken seriously by the various international powers it was vital that money, appropriate lodgings, credit, royal paraphernalia, and all other useful resources of that nature be acquired as well. Once again, the co-operation of Continental powers and institutions were necessary here.

All of these factors, i.e. the need to oppose their enemies, the need for allies, and the necessity of obtaining the appropriate resources for a court, meant that, in order to acquire the assistance they required, the Irish courtiers had to partake in various political and diplomatic activities on the Continent on behalf of the royalist cause. It comes as no surprise then to learn that many of those Irish persons who were associated with the exiled Stuart Court during the 1650s found themselves acting, either formally or informally, as ambassadors and representatives of the royalist cause within the Continent at large. The most obvious manifestation of this came in the appointment of certain individuals to the role of ambassador or agent to a particular ruler, noble, state, or kingdom. A number of the Irish exiles were to hold roles of this sort, both officially and unofficially, at certain times during the decade. Among these Irish envoys, for example, were Viscount Taaffe, who acted as a negotiator on behalf of the royal cause in their dealings with the Duke of Lorraine in 1651, and Richard

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Bellings junior, who was the secretary to the official embassy of Lord Rochester to the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire. Furthermore, it had been intended to send Inchiquin to the United Provinces as an ambassador in mid-1652. This making of representations to the states of the Continent was a demanding task. Among other things, it required of the ambassadors resources that they or the Stuart Court did not necessarily have, and which were hard enough for secure governing bodies to supply. It also meant trying to secure aid from states that, sympathetic as they may have been to the royalist cause, had their own concerns to think about and whose interests sometimes seemed to demand that they deal with the new island power that the English Commonwealth was.

It is likewise fair to say that, at the very least, the task that faced the Irish courtiers when it came to representing the Stuart cause to the Continent was a varied one. This was because, hard enough as the task of representing the royalist cause to a state was, the Stuart Court also had need to use its adherents in roles other than as representatives to the assorted kingdoms and countries of Europe. There were also a host of other groups and interests whom this Court could potentially call on for support and which it needed to get its case across to. Merchants, mercenary soldiers, the different migrant communities from the former Stuart kingdoms, churches, as well as various other groups, all had something to offer the Stuart cause, be it money, information, the ability to act as intermediaries between the Court and other institutions, or some other form of assistance. Hence, persons who could argue its case to these other interests and organisations were also required. Accordingly, many such groups were also subject to representations from the banished courtiers. The assorted churches of the Continent, for example, were bodies that could be, and were, tapped in this way by the Irish royalists during the course of the exile. As we shall see, the Catholic Church, and the clergy that constituted it, was to be contacted for

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this purpose on more than one occasion. The Protestant clergy of the Netherlands were similarly subject to approaches from John Bramhall. On one occasion, for example, he attempted to incite them to condemn the Interregnum regimes and publicly espouse the royalist cause. Bearing the variety of groups that could be appealed to in mind, then, it can be argued that the very cultural, religious and vocational diversity that could be found amongst the Irish courtiers as a whole made them collectively suitable to be representatives to a wide range of institutions and organisations.

The exiles, the pre-existing Irish community on the Continent and the royalist cause

Among the mainland European communities that the Irish exiles could use to gain resources and support for their cause were, obviously enough, those that included Irish residents of mainland Europe amongst their membership. In their search for political support on the Continent and the resources that this could bring, the Irish royalist exiles, and the Stuart Court generally, could not, and did not, remain aloof from dealing with this populace. It was too large a source of potential aid to ignore. For one, these particular Irish expatriates as a whole had established itself on the Continent for a considerable period of time by then. From the mid-sixteenth century onwards, the movement of Irish clergy, merchants, mercenaries, and others to the Continent had been, to say the least, noticeable. By the 1650s they had gained a firm footing on the Continent. Irish Catholic clergy had their own seminaries in various Catholic kingdoms, as well as definite links to the governments in these countries. Irish mercenaries made up noticeable parts of the armed forces of certain kingdoms and previous generations of Irish mercenaries, for instance in Spain, had successfully integrated themselves into their host societies. A number of Irish merchants had also successfully established themselves on the European mainland, particularly on the western seaboard of France. The events of the 1640s and 1650s in Ireland had, moreover, only increased the flow eastwards to the Continent. To give one some idea of the figures involved in this new movement, one of the few historians to have made

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an effort to calculate the scale of even part of the migration has estimated that some
18000 mercenary soldiers went to Spain between 1651 and 1655. Substantial as this
number is, however, it says nothing of those Irish mercenaries who went to other
employers, such as France, nor of the movement of clergy, merchants, or others who
escape the usual vocational pigeon-holes, such as women, at this time. As such it
would appear that, sizeable though Stradling’s figure is, it is not an accurate indicator
of the scale of Irish migration in that half-decade, and it probably underestimates the
scale of the exodus.

For the Stuart Court, the presence of these Irish persons of assorted vocations
and trades on the Continent meant that there were people in situ who could potentially
provide help accessing the necessary means to provide for itself and aid it in bringing
about an end to its exile. The obvious liaisons between this community and the
royalists were, needless to say, those Irish in the exiled Court. It has to be
acknowledged that, in many ways, the members of this Irish courtier group were well
placed to take advantage of this community. Aside from being part of a government-
in-exile which still potentially commanded considerable respect from within its native
kingdoms and, as a corollary, from within the migrant communities of those realms,
these nobles, because they were of high social status and because they too had been
highly respected by many while in Ireland, had the potential to command human,
financial and various other sundry resources from among the wider Irish migrant
community. Aside from their own status, moreover, they had a number of important
personal connections to the expatriate Irish community. The presence of Inchiquin’s
younger brother, Sir Christopher O’Brien, on the Continent is a case in point. He was
a long time servant of the Spanish Crown, having been in its employ since the 1640s.
Through him there was, potentially at least, a means of contacting the Irish mercenary
community in Spain. Inchiquin was not the only noble lord with kin on the
Continent, however. During the early years of his exile James Butler of Ormonde was
to receive a number of promises of fealty from various members of his wider kinship
circle. In November 1651 he received promises of service from a Colonel Hugh

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8 R.A. Stradling, The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries, p. 139.
9 For references to some of those involved see, for example, Ronald Hutton, Charles II, p. 15-132.
10 R.A. Stradling, The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries, pp. 73-5.
Butler in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{11} In late 1655 a ‘Mister Rice’ sent him an offer through John Bramhall, in which the former’s son was offered to the nobleman as a servant. As mentioned previously, Ormonde had to turn this offer down for reasons of poverty, but in his response to Bramhall he stated, ‘...I have reasons of alliance that would incline me to serve his family as far as I am able’. He also received promises of fealty from a former servant of his who had taken up residence in Tenerife in the late 1640s.\textsuperscript{12} Lord Taaffe’s son, Francis, had also been on the Continent from before the military conflicts of the 1640s, residing in Austria for most of the decade.\textsuperscript{13} Clearly then, for a variety of reasons, both personal and political, there were persons on the European mainland who could be reasonably expected to help the exiled Irish royalists.

That said, one should not get too carried away with extent of the loyalty and support that the noble Irish exiles could draw upon on the Continent. There were limits to what the Irish nobility could achieve when dealing with the Continental Irish community. One factor that limited their ability to control the Irish migrant community was their previous activities in the 1640s, particularly their reciprocated disdain of the political ambitions of those Irish Catholics who desired full legal recognition for their religion in Ireland. Ormonde actually claimed that the opposition that he faced in Ireland, especially from Catholic clergy there, was responsible for his decision to go to the Continent in December 1650.\textsuperscript{14} Many of these clerics, as we shall see, did not stay in Ireland either to await the Cromwellian forces and while on the European mainland together the memory of their rivalry at home only served to alienate the Irish courtiers from a considerable portion of the wider Irish population in Europe. One obvious consequence of this was that it caused a certain amount of strain in the relations between the exiled Court and the Papacy, particularly in the early part of the decade.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{HMC}, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Nicholas to Ormonde, 8 November 1651, pp. 223-4.
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{DNB}, vol. XIX, p. 245.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. II}, A letter from a Catholic gentleman…, February 1651, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{15} For details, see pp. 306-10, below.
Another feature that limited their ability to manipulate the Irish community to the royalists cause advantage was, quite simply, divergent needs. Sometimes what the royal Stuart Court required and what made sense for members of the wider Irish community could not be reconciled. During the Franco-Spanish conflict in the mid-1650s some Irish mercenaries found that it was in their own interest to defect from the Habsburg to the Bourbon forces and this simple fact hindered Viscount Taaffe’s previously referred to efforts to keep Irish mercenaries in Spain’s employ the mid-1650s.\textsuperscript{16} Finally, the cultural and religious background of some of the Court exiles was also another potential impediment to good relations between Irish royalists and the wider Irish migrant community. John Bramhall, the Anglican bishop of Derry, and Henry Leslie, the Anglican Bishop of Down and Connor, are two obvious cases in point. Both of these would have been distrusted by large parts of the Irish Catholic community. The former, certainly, was distrusted by many Catholics, especially clerics.\textsuperscript{17} That said, however, an exile’s cultural and religious background need not have been completely disadvantageous either. Bramhall’s theological views may have alienated him from Catholic clerics, yet they seem to have made little difference when it came to dealing with the privateering interest. Moreover, as hinted at earlier, these views made him suited to be an agent to other corporate bodies, particularly Protestant churches.

**The Irish courtiers and the Irish Catholic clergy**

The most obvious way that all of these difficulties in dealing with Irish émigrés manifested themselves was in the aforementioned strained relationship with many of the Irish Catholic clergy on the Continent and also with the Papacy. To begin with, it would have been somewhat problematic, no matter what the circumstances, for a court headed by a Protestant prince to acquire aid from the Papacy. Aside from the religious divide, Charles II risked alienating many of his own loyal subjects if the aid given was too public or was perceived to come with too many strings attached. Making matters considerably worse, however, the presence of a number of anti-Ormondist Irish clergy at the Papal Court, a group which had previously fled there in the wake of the Cromwellian conquest, only exacerbated this problem. Certainly, it cannot be doubted that these clerics managed to generate a


certain amount of distrust of the Stuarts’ courtiers, whether they were Protestant or Catholic, there. This was compounded by reports sent to the Papacy from other parts of Europe, which contained the accounts of events in Ireland from other anti-Ormondist Irish clergy.\textsuperscript{18}

The Papacy itself, aside from those accounts that it received from Irish clergy, had its own reasons to distrust the exiled Ormonde, his closest associates and, by extension, the Stuart Court itself. The fact that many of the Irish courtiers had previously provided the strongest opposition to the Counter-Reformation inspired activities of the Papal Nuncio to 1640s Ireland, Archbishop Rinucinni, reports of which the Curia had received from the Nuncio himself, was enough to foster its suspicion. What made matters worse again was Charles II’s pro-Presbyterian accord with the Scottish Kirk party in 1650, which had led to him renouncing Ormonde’s 1649 peace accord with what had been the least hard-line element among Irish Catholics.\textsuperscript{19} More problematic still, the Papacy had already given assistance to the anti-Parliamentarian cause in Ireland previously and had had its fingers burned in the process. Financial aid had been provided to the Confederates during the 1640s, with spectacularly little return.\textsuperscript{20} Now, in the 1650s, there was less willingness to provide similar aid to a Protestant prince who surrounded himself with figures that were, to say the least, somewhat unpopular with a certain, significantly large, body of Irish Catholic opinion.

It is no surprise then that efforts to acquire aid from the Vatican ran into difficulties almost as soon as they were made and this was to cause immense anger amongst some at the Stuart Court, damaging relations with the Papacy and Catholic clergy even further. In mid-1653, attempts were made to send two Irishmen as ambassadors from Charles II to Rome; these were Viscount Taaffe and Doctor John Callaghan, respectively. Despite apparently having some support for their embassy in Rome, however, their plans were scuppered almost immediately and the two representatives never actually got to travel. The mission’s failure partly came about

\textsuperscript{18} Benignus Millett, ‘Calendar of Irish Material in the catalogue of the Nunziatura di Fiandra’, pp. 93-101.
because of opposition from within the Stuart Court itself (the Queen Mother did not approve of Taaffe and Callaghan being appointed to this office and instead sent her own ambassador), but also because of antagonism from other Catholic clergy towards the latter agent; something which was not pleasing to Hyde for one. Callaghan’s association with the Stuart Court and the Irish nobility there (he had been tutor to Lord Muskerry’s son prior to the regicide), along with his pro-Ormondist leanings (he had been previously proposed for the post of Catholic Bishop of Cork in 1648 by the pro-Ormonde faction in the Confederation of Kilkenny in 1648) and his opposition to Rinucini in 1640s Ireland (he had written a book, published in Paris in 1650, condemning the nuncio’s activities) had previously led to accusations of jansenism being levelled against him. These, it must be conceded, were not without foundation and he already had to seek the help of numerous persons, including Richard Bellings junior, to defend himself against his attackers. What was more, a rumour was circulated that Callaghan had told the French Chancellor that Charles II was willing to convert to Catholicism if the Pope provided assistance, something that was not the case at all and which the cleric later strenuously denied. It was clear, however, that the proposed mission faced considerable opposition and in the face of all these problems, the King’s Privy Council felt obliged to reconsider the plan to send Taaffe and Callaghan to Rome and the scheme was effectively shelved.

This was not the end of the problems in dealings with the Catholic Church. Indeed, it is fair to say that relations with Rome and the Catholic Church continued to be strained for quite some time after this, partly as a result of the activities there of Nicholas French, the Bishop of Ferns, who had previously fallen out with Ormonde in Ireland. Such behaviour was not the first instance of French’s opposition to Charles II’s Irish courtiers, frustrating the policies of the exiled Stuart Court. Earlier, between

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22 Antoine Arnauld, Oeuvres de Messire Antonine Arnauld, Docteur de la Maison et Société De Sorbonne, tome trentieme, Calaghan [sic] to Arnauld, 24 December 1651, pp. 391-401. Ibid, Bellings junior to Callaghan, 5 January 1652, pp. 403-4. NLI Ms. 5065, Lane Papers, ‘Dr Callaghan denied he said the following things of his Majesty’, 14 April 1653: letter no. 8.

1651 and mid-1652, his rival appeals for assistance to the Duke of Lorraine and his condemnation of those Irish who were most closely associated with the Stuart Court had been one of the factors that Taaffe’s hindered attempts to secure supplies and troops for those royalists still fighting in Ireland from this mercenary commander. The Viscount was so outraged by this opposition that in mid-1651 he was to become involved in a bitter exchange of letters with the bishop, in which each of the correspondents condemned the other in the harshest terms. French chastised Taaffe for being an associate of Ormondes, a man who had betrayed Ireland’s interest, while the Viscount retorted that French had actually betrayed Ormonde by helping to undermine his position in the country. This quarrel was so bitter that the Duke of Lorraine himself was to complain of the divisions amongst those Irish making appeals to him. French’s anti-Ormondist activities did not end there. He journeyed onwards to Paris and in late-1651 he wrote a letter to the Archbishop of Paris, subsequently published in pamphlet form, defending his own efforts to acquire aid from Lorraine and condemning Ormonde and his adherents for their previous actions in Ireland, charging one of them (Inchiquin) with the murder of priests. This caused quite a stir and, amongst other things, caused Richard Bellings senior to publish a defence of Ormonde, which also criticised the Catholic hierarchy in Ireland under Rinucinn.

French’s behaviour during and after the negotiations with Lorraine, the scuppering of Callaghan’s diplomatic mission to Rome and poor relations with the Vatican during the early part of the decade, were just some of the ways that Irish Catholic clerical opposition to the Ormondist element within the exiled royalist

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25 The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. II, statement by someone employed by the Duke of Lorraine, April 1652, pp. 129-30. Belling’s work was Innocentiae suae impetitae per Reverendissimum Fernensem Vindiciae (Paris, 1652). It was later republished in, J. T. Gilbert, History of the Irish Confederation and the War in Ireland, 1641-49, 7 vols (Dublin, 1882-89). Jason McHugh, ‘Soldier of Christ’: the political and ecclesiastical career of Nicholas French, Catholic bishop of Ferns (1603-1678), 2 vols (unpublished PhD thesis, NUI Galway, 2005), pp. 296-302. My thanks to Jason McHugh for his help here. It should also be pointed out that there were a number of other works by Irish Catholic clergy criticising the exiled elite and they again had to publicly defend themselves. The Republican regime took great pains to publicise them, particularly when they called upon Charles II to embrace Catholicism. Mercurius Politicus, 13-20 January 1653 (O. S.), no. 136, Thomason Tracts Microfilm/ 105:E.684 [29], p. 2165.
community manifested itself. It did not end there; similar bad feeling certainly continued to be found in Rome throughout the 1650s. While negotiating with Spain in the middle of decade, for instance, the royalists found it necessary to warn their interlocutors that some Irish who were discontented with the Stuart Court were continuing to denigrate Charles II in the Vatican. So widespread was this opposition that those with an interest in hindering the Stuarts found it worth their while to try to exploit it. Mazarin certainly sought to use it to his advantage in 1656 after the Stuart alliance with the Spanish Habsburgs. In an effort to prevent Irish troops in French employ from joining the Stuart camp in Flanders, the Cardinal sought to employ Irish Catholic clergy amongst this soldiery, in the hope of preventing the feared defection. Most notable amongst the clerics employed by him in this task was the Bishop of Dromore, Oliver D’Arcy.26

Despite these potential and actual limitations in appealing to the Papacy for aid, however, and despite their fears about the damage that Irish Catholic clergy could possibly do to their cause, the royalist Irish nobility could still use contacts with these clerics on the Continent to their considerable advantage. This was because opposition to the Irish in Charles II’s Court from particular Catholic clerics did not reflect the disposition of all of the Irish ‘Romanist’ clergy on the European mainland and though there were many priests who objected to someone such as Taaffe or Ormonde, there were a number who were willing to provide assistance. The aforementioned Doctor Callaghan, a cleric who was obviously willing to act as an ambassador for the exiled Court, is a case in point.27 This priest was thought of in the highest terms by those who were closest to Ormonde, with Hyde himself lauding his personality and praising the opposition that he had shown to Rinucinni while in Ireland.28 Callaghan was not the only Irish priest to join the Stuart Court and support its cause at this time. In 1651 Ormonde welcomed a priest by the name of Barnewell, who had just fled Ireland, to France. Barnewell was not just fleeing abroad to avoid persecution. He was acting as an agent and courier to Ormonde, carrying news of developments in Ireland to him. Once again, this priest was someone who had defended the pro-Ormondist faction against the attacks of their Catholic opponents in Ireland. More importantly, and this

27 See pp. 307-9, above.
is a factor that could go some way to explaining his pro-Ormondist leanings, he was a member of a prominent Old English family in Ireland, and people of this cultural background had previously tended to support the King’s Lord Lieutenant during the 1640s anyway.29 Fortunately, for the Stuart Court, even priests could not escape their own cultural and political backgrounds and those from Old English backgrounds, with that community’s strong tradition of support for the Crown, at least in temporal matters, were frequently willing to back the Stuart cause.

Aside from this Old English priest, Catholic clerical assistance and support for the Court’s cause was also provided by those who were outside the spaces inhabited by the households of the Court. It was not inconsiderable either. In some cases it even provided diplomatic access to other royal courts. This was undoubtedly the case with the Earl of Rochester’s embassy to the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire, which began in 1652. The contacts that his secretary, Richard Bellings junior, had with the Irish community in and around the Court of the Holy Roman Emperor, combined with Rochester’s willingness to give the impression in the early 1650s that Charles II was on the point of conversion to Catholicism, were vital to this mission. One cleric in particular, a Father Nicholas Donnellan, who was a reader of Divinity in the College of Saint Sebastian and Saint Roch at Ratisbon as well as Vicar General of the Augustinians in Austria, proved to be of great assistance to this embassy throughout the 1650s, playing a part in the securing of a grant of money from the Diet for Charles II in late 1653, and was called on again in October 1658 to secure the payment of part of this subsidy which remained outstanding from the Archduke Leopold. For these efforts he was to earn the thanks of Hyde on more than one occasion, and was even promised special favour from Charles II in 1659.30 Donnellan was a particularly influential friend to have, as he was high in the Emperor’s favour at this time. In 1651 Ferdinand III had attempted to gain an Irish bishopric for him and he continued to be highly valued, as his appointed to the post of Privy Councillor in 1655 demonstrates.

What was most notable about this cleric, however, was his obscurity to the royalists prior to the embassy to Ratisbon. Indeed, it was Donnellan who advanced himself as an advocate to Bellings. This young man then passed on the offer to Hyde, who immediately wrote to the cleric, though, as he himself admitted to Bellings, he was not even sure that Donnellan understood English. Some Irish Catholic clergy obviously did not need to have established bonds and ties to their exiled elite countrymen in order to aid them. A sense of loyalty to the Stuarts was enough.

Other clerics, likewise, could provide access to other courts and centres of power. As in Donnellan’s case, moreover, there was not necessarily a need to have strong personal contacts with the clergy in question to get results. Instead, the Irish elite sometimes relied upon a sense of loyalty to the cause they represented to acquire aid from such people. Another example of this phenomenon involves the person of Dominic O’Daly, confessor to the Queen of Portugal in the early 1650s. O’Daly could not have been all that well-known to Ormonde except by reputation, as the former had been out of Ireland well before 1640. True the cleric did have some limited contact with Charles I’s Court prior to the latter’s execution, but this was brief and Ormonde was absent from the King’s presence for it. Indeed, when Ormonde spoke of O’Daly in 1652 he could only say that he had heard that priest was confessor to the Portuguese Queen and that he was held in good stead by that royal family. More than that, O’Daly had written to Ormonde in mid-1650 with a promise to seek assistance for the royalist cause in Ireland from the Spanish Catholic Clergy and to also to provide, if required a loan. He had, moreover, provided some assistance to royalist agents in Rome during the very early part of the decade. Such an offer probably made the Marquis feel secure enough to ask O’Daly for aid and he duly did so in early 1652 on behalf of Sir John Mennes. The latter person had an interest in a royalist privateer and that had taken a merchant ship as a prize. In order to secure the return of his goods, the merchant whose cargo had been captured agreed to make a payment to Mennes. Unfortunately the goods had ended up in Portugal and in order to get them back (and get his money) Mennes needed the King of Portugal to agree to release the goods back to him. It was hoped by Ormonde that O’Daly would act as their lobbyist for Mennes’ case in Lisbon. While it is unknown how this

specific case went, O’Daly must certainly have been of some use to the royalists, as he was described as a good and loyal subject in 1653.  

Diplomatically, then, Irish priests were more than useful to the Stuart Court, providing them with a means to access other courts and lobby their case there. Such aid was certainly vital financially as well, as funds, or at least their promise, was also obtained there as well. The assistance from Catholic clergy did not end there, of course. Militarily, clerics were vital. This was because their role as chaplains to Irish regiments and their general ability to approach the bulk of their co-religionists meant that they were ideal agents to assign to the undertaking of keeping troops loyal to the exiled Crown. This is seen in 1656 when the Court sent friars amongst the Irish troops in French service in order to bring them over to the Spanish army in Flanders. The clerical aid in bringing troops over to the Spanish service was widespread at this time and went through all ranks of the clergy. Even the Bishop of Dromore aided in the process of bringing Irish troops to the Spanish side, despite being employed to do the opposite by Mazarin.  

How could the Court and its Irish courtiers acquire such assistance from individual clerics, despite official Vatican reluctance to provide aid? Part of the reason behind the existence of this clerical assistance lay in the make-up of the body of Irish courtiers as a whole. There were a significant number of Catholics in this group and it was possible for them to approach Rome’s clergy as co-religionists. Aside from Donnellan, young Richard Bellings approached the Papal Nuncio in Ratisbon on the Stuarts’ behalf in 1653. Of even greater import here, though, was the nature of the Catholic Church and the Irish community within it at this time. The fact of the matter was there were a number of serious divisions within the Irish Catholic clergy and the corporate body of the Roman Catholic Church generally, and it was possible for some of the courtiers to play on these. Within the Catholic Church

as a whole, there were a number of increasingly serious theological and political issues to deal with. This was the age of the divisive Jansenist debate (amongst others) within the Catholic Church, which saw certain elements within it urging a return to the theological traditions of Saint Augustine of Hippo. This, however, was in conflict with the orthodoxy laid down at the Council of Trent and, making matters worse, it became confused with debates over the proper relationship between the Catholic Church and the civil government on the Continent, specifically on the extent of the loyalty owed by the clergy to the civil power as opposed to the Papacy and the powers of the Monarch in the religious sphere.  

These debates also impacted upon the Irish clergy. As they had received their religious education in France and other parts of the Continent, they could have hardly remained immune to them and we have seen how clerics such as John Callaghan became closely associated with the Jansenist movement. Indeed, there was a curious correlation between Irish clerical support for Jansenism and for the royalist cause (something that has been previously, and extensively, chronicled by Ruth Clark). Aside from Callaghan, other clerics who backed the royalists, including Barnwell and Matthew Kelly, were closely associated with this movement. This may be in part due to the potential for rapport that existed between Anglicanism and Jansenism, as highlighted in the religious views of George Radcliffe. Judging by Callaghan’s former position as a tutor within Muskerry’s household, however, it is also likely that many of the Irish Catholic elite had some sympathy with Jansenism.  

Aside from this, debates over such questions as whether or not the temporal power should have a say in the appointment of bishops were not new to them and they even participated in them. During the Interregnum certain pro-royalist Irish clergy (and in one case at least, that of the Jesuit Peter Talbot, there was no link between supporting this and being a jansenist) argued that the Stuarts should at the very least be consulted on diocesan appointments and took umbrage at the promotion of those who were seen to

36 Muskerry was not the only Irish exile to have close links to Jansenists. Ruth Clark has shown that the Bellings, both junior and senior, also had such links over the 1650s. Ruth Clark, *Strangers and Sojourners at Port Royal*, pp. 40-68. See also pp. 280-1, above.
be opposed to Ormonde and his allies. Important as such theological questions were on a broad scale, from the specific perspective of the Irish Catholic clergy the most important division amongst them arose in Ireland during the 1640s. Indeed, in many ways this divide was linked to the split that had affected the Confederation of Kilkenny during that decade. Essentially, it was a rift between those who came to oppose the Papal Nuncio Rinucinni (or who had what some have described as pro-Ormondist leanings) on the one hand and those who were opposed to Ormonde, sometimes known as anti-Ormondists (predictably enough), on the other. What was more, it came to incorporate elements of the wider debate on what the proper relationship between the Church and the civil power should be, as the question of how much loyalty was owed to the Monarch soon became a part of the argument between these two groups.38

While both sides in this debate claimed to be loyal to the Crown, the anti-Ormondist clergy, for their part, had come to support the demands for full legal recognition of their religion, which would lead to public Catholic worship and restoration of Church property, and guarantees that would ensure political dominance for Catholics in the 1640s. They thus ended up supporting the counter-Reformation policies of Rinucinni in Ireland after 1645. In contrast, there were those pro-Ormondist clergy (an admittedly small group) and laity who would have been happy, generally speaking, with guarantees that laws against the Catholic religion would not be enforced, even though this did not necessarily guarantee that they would be repealed. Furthermore, they were unsympathetic to the idea of making political demands of the King which would impinge upon his traditional prerogatives. This extended to the making of demands that would impinge on such monarchical rights as the King’s prerogative to appoint his own councillors and ministers.39 As well as this,

aside from loyalties created by theological and political preferences in the 1640s, there was a tendency for those clerics with personal links to Ormonde or other Irish courtiers and with an Old English cultural background, such as the aforementioned Father Barnewell, to back the cause of the Court during the Interregnum. This divide was amongst the Irish clergy was a very real one and was even recognised within the Catholic Church itself. In August 1655, to cite one example, the Papal internuncio of the Spanish Netherlands, Mangelli, when reporting to Rome on the efforts of one Catholic cleric to lobby him on behalf of the Stuarts, described this person to be of the party that opposed Rinucinni and backed the ‘King of Scotland’.40

This all meant that, from the point of view of the Irish courtiers of Charles II, though there was always going to be some opposition to their efforts from within Catholic circles, there would also always be someone amongst the Irish clergy on the Continent willing to assist them, even if only for a short while. It went beyond this. Another important consequence of these divisions was that, informally at least, the Stuart Court could always maintain some kind of contact with the Roman Catholic Church and there was always the possibility that a more sympathetic faction, and not necessarily an Irish one, would rise to power within the Catholic Church and come to their aid. They were also aided by the various interregnum regimes treatment of the Irish Catholic population. Simply put, though the Court of the exiled Stuart King was seen as a Protestant one, it was believed by many that the restoration of Charles II to power was a prerequisite of providing relief for Irish Catholics and this allowed the exiled Court to portray itself as being worthy of Papal assistance.

All of this is best illustrated by the Court’s reaction to the death of Pope Innocent X in 1655 and his replacement by Alexander VII. This was warmly greeted by Charles II’s adherents at Cologne and it almost immediately sparked a new round of diplomatic overtures by the royalists to the Vatican, which were inspired by the possibility that a new Pope could mean the chance of a new relationship between the Stuarts and the Catholic Church. These approaches, as with so much of royalist business, were made indirectly, using assorted intermediaries as messengers. Numbered among these agents was Cardinal De Retz. One of the papers prepared for this purpose emphasised the benefits that would accrue to Irish Catholics if the

40 Benignus Millett, ‘Calendar of Irish Material in the catalogue of the Nunziatura di Fiandra’, Mangelli to Rospigliosi, 21 August 1655, p. 94.
restoration of their proper King could be affected. Great play was made on the 1649 Ormonde peace, stating that it had conceded Catholics more than they had ever had before. What’s more, the paper placed great emphasis on Charles II’s intention to stick by the terms of that treaty. Clearly the Court believed that they had something to offer to the Papacy and that there was an element within the Catholic Church which they could work with.

As implied earlier when speaking of the negotiations with Spain, this attempt at rapprochement with the Vatican failed. Yet, the failure of all these labours did not prevent others from making or advocating similar efforts and it was not unusual to find individual exiles sponsoring such schemes. Inchiquin, for one, continued to be hopeful that, through the intercession of persons who were amenable to the royalist interest, some aid could be garnered from his Church for the royalists. In mid-1659, he wrote to Hyde proposing that a newly-appointed archbishop in Rome could be of some use to the royalist cause there. By that time the Earl had converted to Catholicism and he was a courtier in the most undoubtedly Catholic Court of Henrietta Maria in Paris as well. Inchiquin’s proposing of his new religion as the saviour of the Stuart cause is therefore not terribly surprising. Such an alliance had always been central to the policies advocated by the Queen Mother in the 1650s and Inchiquin’s association with that household at that time, if not his zeal for his new creed, goes a long way to explaining his suggestion. That said, he was not the only exile to advocate using particular factions within the Catholic Church to the Stuarts’ advantage and amongst those others who did so were die-hard Anglicans.

One such Protestant proponent of a Stuart-Papal alliance was George Radcliffe, who was most definitely not numbered amongst the friends of the Queen Mother. This thesis has already drawn attention to Radcliffe’s individual efforts to initiate contacts with Rome on behalf of his King. Mention has also been made of his dabbling in theological debates during his sojourn in Paris, as well as his associating with Jansenists and various other religious renegades from the Roman Church, though he still considered the latter to be papists. The two were not unrelated. Contacts he

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43 See pp. 280-1, above.
made in Paris led to his questioning of the nature of the theological divide between his own Anglican Church and Catholicism and, more importantly, led to him openly asking what was to prevent Catholics and Protestants working together. Dissident Catholics though they were, the Jansenists still convinced Radcliffe that there were points of contact between Anglicans and Catholics and consequently he came to believe that acquiring the Catholic Church’s assistance would be at the very least useful to his royal master.

In summary, theological differences within the corporate body of the Catholic Church, along with divergent views on the relationship between civil and ecclesiastical authority, and combined with political and cultural divisions amongst the Irish Romanist clergy proved useful to the Stuart cause. Though they never secured formal aid from the Papacy, nevertheless, the divisions described above allowed the Irish exiled elite to garner the assistance of individual clerics, which more often than not proved to be immensely useful. It should be pointed out, of course, that it was not just a simple case of the royalists being able to play upon divisions and dissensions within the Church of Rome or being able to take advantage of a pro-Ormondist/anti-Ormondist divide within the Irish Continental clergy. There are, after all, the examples of Fathers Dominic O’Daly and Peter Talbot to consider. Their cases show that it was not just a question of the Stuart Court using some willing elements of a divided clergy for its own ends. The reverse was also a possible scenario and that, in many ways, the Court was not always in charge of the relationship between itself and those priests loyal to it.

Focussing on O’Daly first, his assistance, or promise thereof, did not come without qualification. When he wrote to Ormonde in mid-1650 he made it clear that while he was sympathetic to the Stuart cause, he favoured a political settlement which would see the establishment of a free Kingdom of Ireland, answering directly to the Crown and without a council of English ministers having a say on the Kingdom’s governance. In other words, O’Daly was pushing the Confederation of Kilkenny’s old agenda, which had sought the repeal of Poyning’s Law and the establishment of full parliamentary independence for the Kingdom. This was, to say the least, unwelcome to Ormonde, who had always opposed such a measure.\(^{44}\) Judging by his

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other previously referred to actions, this pushing of a particular political agenda, disapproved of by Ormonde, seems not to have affected O’Daly’s willingness to help the Stuarts and their adherents too much, nor did it obviously prevent the Lord lieutenant from seeking to gain advantage through O’Daly. Broad support for the Stuarts was enough to keep them in contact with each other. Yet, while he may have seen them as the best hope for achieving his ambitions for Ireland, there were limits to O’Daly’s support for the royalists, however, and these became evident when the interests of the cleric’s own masters and patrons in the Portuguese Court clashed with those of the Stuarts. In late 1655, exactly at the time that France and England were drawing together to form a military alliance against Spain, O’Daly arrived at the French Court to propose that France and England embark upon a war against Spain with Portuguese support. The policy of keeping the Spanish tied down on a number of fronts had been a staple of Portuguese foreign relations during this period, but for royalists, who were drawing closer to Madrid and Brussels at that very moment, such an approach could not have been welcome, as they would not have wanted to see Spain’s resources extended further by such a triple alliance. Clearly O’Daly was not helping the Stuarts by being the messenger of the Portuguese Crown in this instance. His bonds and duties to his patrons in Lisbon, however, clearly outweighed any loyalty he felt he owed to Charles II. O’Daly may have given the Stuarts an entry point into the Portuguese Court but he was not going to push their cause at the expense of his own favoured policies or to the detriment of his Portuguese masters. The royalists themselves knew this. When O’Daly approached two Irish courtiers in Paris in 1655, namely Radcliffe and Inchiquin, with offers of assistance they would have nothing to do with him. This was because they doubted the sincerity of his offer and feared that any contacts with a Portuguese representative would endanger the prospect of an alliance with the Spanish Habsburgs.

As for Peter Talbot, he has already been mentioned in this work as someone who acted in a manner that many in the Stuart Court disapproved of in 1658. Yet, it must be remembered that prior to this his family had what one historian describes as excellent royalist credentials, with many of his closest kin having been active

supporters of James Butler in the 1640s Ireland. While he himself had been on the Continent for much of the 1640s, he had thereafter acted as an envoy of the claimant to the Portuguese throne, John IV and as a Catholic agent to Oliver Cromwell. After this, specifically from 1654 onwards, he was to spend a considerable amount of time at the exiled Stuart Court and he was to become a reasonably prominent actor in its affairs and an important agent on its behalf.\(^{47}\) From late 1654 onwards he acted as an intermediary between the General of the Society of Jesus and Charles II, in which role he sought the support of the order for royalist endeavours and also defended those Irish at the Court against charges of being enemies of Catholicism, though it seems evident that he did not have much success in this, at least initially. Also, from the year 1655 up until his brief fall from grace with Charles II in 1658, he frequently acted as an agent between the claimant to the Stuart thrones and the governors of the Spanish Netherlands, as well as the Papal internuncio there. He even spent a considerable amount of time lobbying the internuncio and Charles II to support an assassination attempt and coup that was being organised against Cromwell and his regime by the leveller Edward Sexby. What’s more, he was one of those who were annoyed by the failure of the Papacy to consult Charles II over Irish diocesan appointments and he aided the royalists by bringing willing sailors over to their cause from the Commonwealth’s navy.\(^{48}\)

Talbot had therefore been, as far as Charles II and many of his courtiers were concerned, a reasonably good royalist priest prior to 1658. For some courtiers, however, and these included Ormonde amongst their number, there were some problems with his activities and his opinions. His labours in support of Edward Sexby in 1655, for one, were not necessarily completely welcome to those around Charles II. It was feared that, at a time when the royalists were seeking to form an alliance with

\(^{47}\) Terry Clavin, ‘Talbot, Peter (1618/1620-1680)’, *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. This article was accessed on the 14th December 2004 at the following link: http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.bibliosun.iue.it:80/view/article/26937.

Spain, Sexby’s scheme would offer an alternative means for the Habsburgs to solve their problem with the English Commonwealth. What was more, Talbot pushed Sexby’s proposal because the latter, despite not wishing to see the State recognise a hierarchical church within England again, did favour giving the right of public exercise of their religion to Catholics. To those old royalist advisors around Charles II at this time, including Ormonde, this would have been somewhat unwelcome, as it amounted to an abandonment of Anglicanism and it allowed more than they were willing to concede to the Pope’s adherents. Talbot realised this himself and even advised the King in 1655 not to heed Hyde and Ormonde. The Marquis, for his part, while negotiations were going on with the governor of the Spanish Netherlands to bring about the alliance with Spain, stated that he did not want that cleric to have a part in them as his previous experiences of Catholic clergy did not encourage him to trust them.49 In a sense, Ormonde had a point. This priest, after all, was tailoring his activities in support of Charles II to suit his own agenda. Despite his family’s traditional support for the Lord Lieutenant and his aforesaid desire to remain in favour with that man, little of Ormonde’s own preferred policy appealed to Peter Talbot. Instead Sexby was attractive to him as that scheme, if had been successful, would have advanced the Catholic cause in Britain and Ireland, while also damaging the Church of England, one of Talbot’s bugbears.50

Though tension between Talbot and the King’s chief advisors were already evident by 1655, it was not until after he embarked on his mission to Spain in 1658 that he actually lost favour with the King and that efforts were made to remove him from the Court, with Charles II appealing to both the Papal internuncio and the Father Provincial of the Jesuits in Flanders to have him removed. It should also be remembered that while the King and his closest advisors objected to Talbot’s mission other adherents approved of it or, at least, did not completely disapprove. These included Charles II’s ambassador at the Spanish court at this time, Sir Henry Bennet, and, most notably, the Duke of York, who was clearly the sponsor of Talbot’s


50 For Talbot’s antipathy to the Anglican religion, see, Peter Talbot, *A Treatise of the Nature of Catholic Faith and Heresie, with Reflexion upon the Nullitie of the English Protestant Church and Clergy* (Rouen, 1657).
embassy. Talbot’s mission to Spain and the subsequent attempt to remove the turbulent priest from the royal household highlights a number of interesting features of the Court as an actor on the diplomatic stage; the noticeable extent to which the Stuart Court was subject to outside influence, its dependence on persons who could potentially be in any way useful, even if the same were troublesome to it as well, and the significant divisions that existed between Charles II on one side and his brother James, Duke of York on the other between 1656 and 1660.

Dealing with the latter first, it must be remembered that close connections had been established by this time between the Talbots and Charles II’s heir. Furthermore, just as Peter Talbot had, the Duke of York was increasingly discontented with those advisors who exercised the most influence on his elder brother during his time in Flanders and, if the governor of the Spanish Netherlands in 1658, Don Juan of Austria, is to be believed, he simply did not trust them. He and his household had consequently come up with their own scheme to overthrow the Protectorate by 1658 and Peter Talbot had gone to Spain on this Prince’s behalf in an effort to promote it. This Jesuit priest, therefore, was not so much acting against the wishes of the Court when he went as an envoy to Spain, but he instead was acting as an ambassador for a particular faction within the Court, which wished to see more of a direct military threat being posed to the Protectorate.

How was such a relationship between a Catholic cleric and the Court possible? A number of reasons go towards explaining it. One factor of note lay in the already established reality that, like the Catholic Church itself, the Stuart Court was not monolithic in character. A diversity of opinions, beliefs and motivations were to be found amongst the ‘King’s family’ at any one time and this meant that while some courtiers may not have approved of dealing with the Catholic Church or particular clerics at a given moment, there were always others who were willing to countenance doing so. Peter Talbot illustrates this perfectly. Up until the loss of the King’s favour he could work with Ormonde and his closest associates on various political schemes.

52 See pp. 172-3, above.
53 See pp. 236-48, above, for more details on this.
Yet, his fall from grace with the King still did not prevent him from maintaining a relationship with the wider Court, as there were still those in York’s household whom he could work with at that time. As we have seen, relations between Talbot and the Court were never completely severed, regardless of how the King looked upon him. Furthermore, even while there were political divisions between Ormonde and Talbot in the period 1658-9, other shared interests and ties led to the two of them maintaining their association with each other. Given such circumstances and divisions, there was always going to be a point of contact which would allow clerics such as Peter Talbot to maintain a relationship with some element of the Stuart Court and, by extension at least, the Irish within it. The same held true for O’Daly, though admittedly to a much more limited extent. While Ormonde plainly did not support his proposal for a ‘free kingdom’, Lord Jermyn held the view that O’Daly had ‘good intentions’.

For the Louvre Set, Dominic O’Daly was a potential ally and that priest’s political programme did not necessarily alienate them to the same degree that it alienated Ormonde.

It is also clear that priests such as Talbot and O’Daly did not just blindly choose to support the Court. More often than not they chose to do what they did in order to achieve specific ends, frequently religious in nature. They were not the only clergy to do so. Thomas Talbot defended the right of Catholics to seek liberty of conscience to Ormonde in 1659. Furthermore, with the aid of Richard Bellings senior, those Jansenists who associated themselves with the Court proposed a scheme to win widespread Catholic support for royalism to Charles II in 1657. This foresaw the conversion of the Duke of Gloucester to their brand of Catholicism. Having previously intervened to prevent the proselytising of his brother in 1654, however, the King was never going to agree. What is more, in seeking to achieve these goals the Catholic clergy could choose particular groups and persons over others within the royal households. In this sense, when it had dealings with the Catholic clergy, the Stuart Court could often be more acted upon than acting. The simple truth was the Stuart Court needed people like Talbot and had to put up with him, no matter how troublesome his behaviour was. His value as an informal ambassador and intermediary, and its lack of other options, meant that the Crown could not afford to alienate him. In this particular instance, moreover, Peter Talbot was not the only

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54 Carte Mss. 29, O’Daly to Ormonde, received 28 August 1650, f. 643.
person acting upon the Court for his own ends and this was highlighted by the efforts Charles II made to have him removed from the presence of the Duke of York. As we have already seen, the King actually had to appeal to persons outside his Court in his efforts to have Peter Talbot removed. This was not so easily accomplished, however. As the internuncio pointed out, despite a certain sympathy for the King’s request within the Catholic Church, Talbot was not so easily removed from York’s presence, as he had powerful patron protecting him, namely Don Alonso de Cardenas. A Spanish official was effectively hindering the carrying out of the English King’s will from outside. Clearly then, in seeking to manipulate the Catholic clergy to their own ends, the Irish elite exiles, and the Court generally, left themselves open to being manipulated.

**The exiled Stuart Court, military resources, mercenaries, and Irish courtiers**

Important as the Catholic clergy were, there was more to getting the support of the Irish community on the Continent then just getting the backing of the religious. Indeed, gaining the support of all the assorted churches and their personnel, useful as it would be, was far from being of prime importance to the Stuart cause. Instead, another vocational group found amongst Irish expatriates, namely mercenaries, was of much greater import to the exiled royalists. So significant a resource were these troops, it can even be argued that other groups aside from the royalists depended upon them to a certain extent for their importance in this particular circumstance. After all, it is clear that one of the principal reasons that the Irish Catholic clergy held any importance for the Stuart cause at all lay in the ability of individual clerics to influence the actions of Irish troops. If they had not had that then it is likely that Charles II and his Protestant followers, at the very least, would have been somewhat more reluctant to engage with these Papist priests. Consequently, one can argue that the close relationship between Irish soldiers and clergy bestowed a certain amount of political influence upon the latter group.

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56 AGR, *Secrétairerie d’État et De Guerre*, Considerations to be taken account of in negotiations with the Irish, Registre 261, 20 August 1656, ff. 239-40.
The same can be said with regard to the royalists’ relationship with mercenaries, as this body of soldiers also imbued the Stuarts with some importance on the international stage. It has been pointed out elsewhere that the exiled Court, though it had lost some of its former martial strength, was not without military power or influence during the exile. The retention of this albeit limited military prowess granted to the Stuart Court the (to them at least) pleasing possibility of participating in one particular manifestation of international relations; war. This is something that the Stuarts undoubtedly did during their exile and Irish mercenaries were clearly central to this. The support of these troops opened up more than that possibility to their exiled masters, however. As has been already highlighted in this work, they also provided the royalists with diplomatic leverage by simply giving them something to bargain with in negotiations with the Continental powers. Bearing all the benefits that flowed from having the support of these military forces in mind, it is no major revelation to state that a great deal of effort was put into maintaining contacts with these soldiers by the Irish courtiers, as well as into ensuring the soldiery’s continuing co-operation with the Stuarts.

To an extent, I have already detailed how this was done. The holding of commands amongst these troops by some of the very exiles studied here, combined with the taking advantage of a variety of links, such as bonds of kinship, clientage, etc., to commanders in these forces all helped to preserve the connections between the Stuarts and the mercenaries. The fact that there were Stuart loyalists ensconced amongst these soldiers, however, was not enough in and of itself to meet the royalists’ needs. The Court had to be able to make these loyalists, as well as other commanding officers and the soldiers under their command, do what the Crown wanted of them at any given moment. This forced the Irish royalists loyal to Charles II to track the movement and behaviour of these mercenaries, ensure that the soldiers would respond to any demands that the courtiers made of them and forced them to cater to the requirement of the troops in question whenever they could.

As a consequence of this, those Irish elite exiles who were not following the mercenary path spent much of their time following the movements of those courtiers

57 See pp. 213-25, above.
59 See pp. 213-25, above.
who did. Indeed, the activities of Irish troops in Western Europe were followed with
great interest by the Stuart Court as a whole. In 1654 reports on the movements and
actions of Castlehaven and Sir James Dillon were sent to Cologne, both by De Vic in
the Spanish Netherlands and Henry Bennet in France, respectively. Wherever and
whenever possible, furthermore, the courtiers acted as Crown agents to these soldiers,
with Ormonde being to the forefront in this. This was most noticeable after Charles
II’s departure from France in 1654, when royalist foreign policy became one of
waiting to see whether France or Spain would manage to secure an alliance with
Cromwell, thus creating an opportunity for the royalists to close with the power left
out in the cold. To do this the royalists needed to make themselves as attractive as
possible to their potential allies and Irish mercenary troops were part of the secret for
doing this. Consequently, it is easy to find among the archives references to the Irish
elite, particularly Ormonde, keeping in contact with the Irish mercenary community
so as to preserve a body of soldiers in the military forces of each of these two
Continental powers. Ormonde’s letter to Castlehaven in July 1654 has already been
mentioned in this regard. It is not the only instance of such contacts being
maintained by the Lord Lieutenant from this period, nor is it the most direct. By mid-
1655 Ormonde himself was going to visit the Irish troops in order to secure their
collaboration in royalist foreign policy.

When he could not do this himself, those persons closest to James Butler kept
an eye on the behaviour of the Irish mercenaries on his behalf and protected royalist
interests amongst them. In this informal way they acted as agents both for Ormonde
and the Court as a whole to the troops. Inchiquin’s letter to Ormonde of mid-1654, in
which he detailed the movement of his own body of soldiers has already been noted,
as has Taaffe’s letter of mid-April 1655 on Irish troops in Spanish Flanders, which,
following on from Ormonde’s request to Castlehaven to keep the Irish in the service
of Spain and its allies, warned of the possibility of defections to the French because of
‘ill-usage’. This work of keeping channels of communication to the mercenaries open
was not just carried out by the Irish at Court, or even by the mere courtier. At times

60 BL Eg. Mss 2534, De Vic to Nicholas, 25 September 1654, ff. 223-4. Ibid, Bennett to Nicholas, 9
October 1654, f. 230-1.
they were joined by their King in this labour. In the mid-1650s Charles II intervened directly with his brother, York, so as to prevent him from drawing more troops away from Spanish to French service.63 One should not give the impression that such exchanges were only a product of royalist policy between 1654 and 1656. As we have seen elsewhere in this thesis, they predated the King’s sojourn in the Holy Roman Empire and clearly indicate that there was more than an inclination to sustain good relations with these troops. This even extended to looking after the troops’ interests by, in some cases, acting as their employment agents. For example, when a particular body of soldiers informed Ormonde of their desire to switch employers and join the French in 1653 that nobleman approached the Duke of York on their behalf so as to facilitate this transfer of allegiance. The Duke and a certain captain Browne then took it upon themselves to approach Turenne and to negotiate the terms of their entry into the Bourbon forces. This, unsurprisingly, was not to be the only occasion when York oversaw the enrolment of Irish troops into French forces and in doing so he ensured that those Irish joining up received proper payment for their actions.64

All these efforts to secure at least a part of the Irish mercenary community to the royalist cause proved to be reasonably fruitful and it is fair to say that some notable successes in controlling the movements of Irish troops were achieved over the course of the exile. Two major defections of Irish troops were, after all, brought about by the Irish in the Stuart camp in the 1650s; namely, the transfer of allegiance of Irish troops from Spanish Habsburg to Bourbon in southern France in 1653 and the reverse movement of troops during the conflict in the Spanish Netherlands in 1656.65 Of course, not all of these defections were necessarily motivated by a feeling of total loyalty to the displaced royal family. For example, one Irish mercenary commander who had been licensed to take troops to Spain by the English Parliament in the early 1650s, but who was nonetheless unhappy at having no choice as to where he found

employment for himself or his soldiers, was conspiring to change sides and join the French even before he left Ireland in 1653. 66 This example aside, however, (and it is not even decisively clear that loyalty to the Stuarts not one of the factors that encouraged this commander to seek to quit Spanish employ and join the French) it is still evident that sympathy for the Stuart cause at this time was generally an important factor in determining the behaviour of many Irish mercenary commanders in the early 1650s. Aside from the close involvement of Irish courtiers and members of the Stuart royal family in these troop transfers, the aforementioned incident in 1654, which saw Irish soldiers salute Charles II as he passed through the Spanish Netherlands, clearly demonstrates this. 67

In order to see exactly how successful the Irish royalists, and the Court in general, were in this, one only has to look at the way they used Irish troops as a means to bring about an alliance with Spain in 1656. Initially, they made use of the Irish by seeking to keep those in Spain’s armies in Spanish employ. There were good reasons for attempting to do this in 1654 and 1655. Negotiations between France and the English Commonwealth, which were intended to lead to the forming of a military alliance against Spain, had commenced in 1654 and as part of the French effort to woo Cromwell Charles II had been compelled to withdraw from France to the Prince-bishopric of Cologne in that year. Yet, these Anglo-French negotiations, despite the fact that they proved to be extremely drawn out and difficult, and were matched by Spanish efforts to secure England’s neutrality in the Habsburg-Bourbon conflict, also presented the exiled Court with the political opportunity mentioned previously. It could form an alliance with the power that Cromwell disappointed and over time it became increasingly evident that this power would be Spain. 68 By mid-1655 the

royalists were making contact with the Governor-General of the Spanish Netherlands and various other officials there for the very purpose of making this alliance.69

In order to achieve this goal, it was necessary for the exiled Court to demonstrate its usefulness to the Spanish crown. Maintaining Irish troops in the Catholic King’s employment was one way to do this. Yet, this was easier said than done. Those officers that had expressed their discontent to Taaffe in April 1655 were not the only Irish soldiers to be disgruntled with their Spanish employers at this time. In the very same month, the royalists’ resident representative in the Spanish Netherlands, Henry De Vic, was writing to Nicholas with news that, as a result of being in great want, two Irish regiments had mutinied. The Earl of Norwich confirmed this report in late May, when he informed Nicholas that the Irish were likely to leave Spanish employment in Flanders, as a consequence of their ill usage there.70 Almost certainly, it was such actions and threats by the Irish soldiery that made Taaffe’s mission of pacification to the Spanish Netherlands necessary in the first place.

As far as the royalists were concerned, the efforts of Taaffe, Ormonde and others to keep Irish troops in the Spanish camp at this time were successful. When it came to the negotiations with Spain for the alliance they almost boasted about this accomplishment, citing it as proof of their potential usefulness. Such bragging was not unjustified, in truth. Mutiny had long been a problem for the Habsburgs in the Spanish Netherlands and it frequently had serious consequences military and financial consequences.71 Preventing mutiny among Spain’s armies, therefore, was something that should certainly have been appreciated. To this the royalists added another contention. They claimed that they would not only draw Irish soldiers away from the French, but that they would bring troops in Italy and Catalonia over to the Spanish camp as well. With these defections would come important garrisons, with those of Le Quesnoy, St Ghislain, Subasee and Arras being mentioned. The royalists even


asserted that they could cause personnel to defect from the Cromwellian army and navy as well. To top it all off, in order to reduce any ill will that the Spanish had towards the royalists, Charles II denied having any direct role in causing Irish troops to leave the service of Spain and its allies in 1653, though at the same time, no doubt for the purposes of increasing their own attractiveness as allies, it was suggested that these defections took place because of a misplaced sense of loyalty to the Stuart claimant.72 In short, mercenaries and troops, particularly Irish forces, were the major bargaining chip of the royalists and their prior success in manipulating these forces allowed them to talk their ability to control them up.

As we know, the negotiations bore fruit, with no small part being due to the offer of troops. It now fell to the royalists to deliver on their promises and, to an extent at least, they did. Some of the defections that were brought about have already been sketched out in this work, but the ability to communicate and influence Irish troops brought more than that. The fall of Saint Ghislain into Habsburg hands was also brought about; a significant enough achievement as this garrison was an outpost of the strategically vital fortress town of Mons.73 This was largely the work of the Irish courtier community. It was accomplished, once again, through their contacts with some of the officers among the Irish garrison there; with the principal officers in question being two cousins, Sir Connell O’Farrell (who received his knighthood from Charles II after the fall of this fortress), and Colonel Louis O’Farrell. These two were commanders of a regiment of Gaelic Irish from county Longford. The regiments had originally been put together during the Confederate wars by their own family and had served as part of the Confederate forces in Ulster. Significantly, George Lane was related to this family. During the latter conflict members of the O’Farrells had initially come to Ormonde’s attention after some of them took up positions in the royalist army there. The O’Farrell regiment later fought in his army, after the second Ormonde peace of 1649.

In 1653, after the Cromwellian conquest of Ireland was complete, the O’Farrells, like many others, made their way to the Continent to pursue a mercenary career, in which many of them first served the Spanish before defecting to the French


73 See p. 222, above.
army. It was through their employment in the army of Louis XIV that they had gained control of Saint Ghislain. Therefore, in order to gain control of the fortress on behalf of the Spanish, all Ormonde and Lane had to do was persuade their former adherents and current kinsmen to abandon the French and rejoin their interest and, in a demonstration of the strength of the ties between the Irish mercenary and royalist communities on the Continent, the O’Farrells duly did so. This victory was one of the few successes that the Spanish had had in the war in the Spanish Netherlands up to that point and it was one that they were grateful for. The O’Farrell brothers were granted pensions of 3,000 and 2,000 florins a year, respectively, for their roles in the reduction of Saint Ghislain, though, of course, the provision of these stipends may also have facilitated the defection of these troops to the Spanish side.  

One can safely conclude that both the troops and the Irish courtiers’ influence with them were certainly useful to Spain at this time. Of course, for royalists the central question regarding these troops was not how useful they would be to Spain or to other Continental powers, but how valuable they would be to the Stuart cause. Again, it is fair to say that they proved vital, particularly in the second half of the decade. They certainly helped secure an ally for the royalists and they likewise added to the King’s prestige by allowing him to renew rivalry with what he saw as the usurping powers in England. Undoubtedly, the King and his followers realised this and even as they were concluding the alliance with Spain they took steps to keep control over these soldiers. Ormonde in his negotiations with Don Juan of Austria in mid-1656, managed to secure a guarantee that those British and Irish troops that came over to the Spanish side would remain under the command of Charles II.

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75 AGR, Secrétairerie d’Etat et De Guerre, Don Juan to Philip IV, Registre 260, 20 August 1656, f. 236.
The desire to have such direct control over these forces sprang not only from their importance as a diplomatic tool but also from the old royalists faction’s conviction that these soldiers should form the basis of any military attempt to invade Britain and Ireland and re-secure the throne. Consequently, the usefulness of the Irish mercenaries to the exiled royalist community did not end with the outbreak of peace between France and Spain in 1659. Though the war in Spanish Flanders was hardly a victorious one from the exiles’ point of view, growing political instability in England at this time meant that there was an increasing possibility that any royalist attempt on the country could bring about a Stuart restoration. The soldiers therefore continued to be vital to royalist diplomatic efforts. In late 1659, when seeking to get aid from both France and Spain to mount such an invasion, it was emphasised by royalist negotiators, amongst whom Ormonde was once again numbered, that many of the troops to be used were those belonging to the royalist forces in Flanders and that the Continental powers being wooed for aid would only have to provide logistic support.\(^76\) In this regard, then, the soldiers proved to be a useful negotiating tool again, as their very existence seemed to suggest that an invasion of England could be undertaken and that supporting it would be relatively cheap.

Overall, it was not unreasonable for Irish courtiers to make such claims. Their agency to these soldiers was always successful to at least some extent and they definitely demonstrated an ability to control these armed forces over the course of the Interregnum. Yet, successful though they generally were in securing and controlling these troops, the Stuart Irish courtiers did on occasion suffer disappointments in their dealings with their compatriot professional soldiery. There are a number of reasons for this, some of which have been detailed already but others of which can be included here.\(^77\) For one, loyalty to the Stuarts was not always there and some mercenary troops could not be relied upon. This was because Irish mercenary troops, like the Irish Catholic clergy, were not a homogeneous body. There was a difference between those who took up employment with a Continental employer before the regicide of Charles I and those who did so after. Those who took employment after the Parliamentary victory in Britain and Ireland did so under duress. Compared to those who had left to serve foreign powers earlier, they had little choice about leaving.

\(^{76}\) Ibid, Registre 266, Benavides to Philip IV, 10 February 1660, f. 52.

\(^{77}\) See pp. 219-20, above.
who they (initially) served abroad under and the conditions under which they took up this employment. In the early 1650s many of them were obliged to serve what was generally recognised to be the impoverished Spanish Crown. It should come as no surprise then that, as we have seen, many took the opportunity to defect to a French Crown which was being served by an Irish nobility clique under whom many had soldiered previously and which was also giving shelter to a royal dynasty that they had always claimed to be loyal. This, naturally enough, created tensions between the established Irish mercenary community on the one hand and those Irish mercenaries that had arrived on the Continent during the Interregnum on the other. The divide became most evident after Richard Grace switched from the Spanish to the French camp in 1653 and Stradling has detailed how those Irish soldiers with a longer tradition of serving Spain subsequently felt obliged to re-assert their loyalty to the Habsburgs in a remonstrance.\textsuperscript{78}

Other problems revolved around this elite’s ability to deliver on their promises. When negotiating the alliance with Spain grand claims were made concerning the numbers of troops that would be brought into Spanish service. Significant numbers may have been brought over but they still fell short of their promised target. Inchiquin, the French governor in Catalonia at this time, never defected, despite apparently being named as one of those who would join Spain. Plans to bring in Irish troops serving in the Italian military theatre at this time never materialised either.\textsuperscript{79} On the other hand, when they did get the support of Irish mercenaries is was not always unequivocally given. In an earlier chapter we mentioned Ormonde’s order of 1656 to Muskerry to join the King in Flanders, on pain of being charged with treason. Muskerry was a devout royalist and he, of course, did join the King, but he did not do so promptly and the same was true of other commanders, such as Richard Grace and James Dillon. In the case of the first two, their loyalty to the Stuarts had to wait upon their honour. Grace did not defect immediately but waited for formal orders to be sent to him and even then he informed the French of his intentions. Muskerry would not come immediately either but instead let Ormonde know that, despite the Lord Lieutenant’s orders, he would not

\textsuperscript{78} R.A. Stradling, \textit{The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries}, p. 117.

compromise his own honour by abandoning the French without seeking their consent first. As for the other commanders, they did not just turn up either. The cash-strapped Spanish had to be induced to hand over a pension before James Dillon turned up.80

Even success in influencing these troops had its down side. Reference has already been made to Lorraine’s discontent with Charles II in 1653. French discontent, voiced by Mazarin, at the defection of troops to the royalists in the Spanish Netherlands in 1656 and re-iterated in letter from Louis XIV to Charles II should not be forgotten either.81 The anger generated by the Irish courtiers in wielding influence over the Irish mercenaries in such a way was indeed very real and did not dissipate quickly. Even after 1656, tension remained high between Mazarin on one side and Ormonde and Charles II on the other for a long time after. We have seen some of the repercussions of this earlier, when we spoke of the Cardinal’s refusal to see Ormonde and Charles II after the negotiation of the treaty of the Pyrenees. It did not take three years for Mazarin’s anger to find expression, however. He made his feelings known on this even earlier, when he refused Charles II a passport to travel to Spain in 1657. As we shall see later on, moreover, the same was to prove true with Spain, even after the alliance of 1656. It should really come as no surprise that this should be the case. Though, as the Venetian ambassador in England put it in 1656, the Irish nobility were only getting their mercenary compatriots ‘to serve their natural Prince’, they were also inducing them to break contractual agreements with kingdoms and princes, and this could not but generate discontent.82

To cap it all off, there was one fundamental fault with mercenary troops as a resource, particularly in this context: they were not completely a ‘renewable’ one. A great movement of troops from Ireland to the Continent had taken place in the early 1650s. By the time of the alliance with Spain, however, that had begun to dry up, mainly because they could not get new troops from Ireland to replace those that they lost. In 1653 eight Irish regiments were serving with the French. By 1656 this had been cut back to seven. The reverses suffered in the war from 1656-9 only did further

damage to royalist troop numbers in that theatre. True, the Stuarts were able to reconstitute their forces during that conflict, but, with replacements not coming out of Ireland on anything like the same scale as previously, there must be some question as to their ability to do that again if the circumstances had required. Troops may have been a useful diplomatic and political tool and they may have given the Stuarts status on the international stage, but if they and their adherents hoped to make use of them to achieve their goals (as they clearly did) then they really only had a limited number of years in which to do so. If their exile had gone any longer than 1660, the troops would have become less and less valuable to them.

**The Irish nobility, the Stuart Court and the Continental kingdoms and states**

Vital as vocational groups and other Irish émigrés were, when it came to international diplomatic relations, the kingdoms and states of Europe were the major players here and it was their support that the royalists craved most. The co-operation of these very states was required by the royalists for a number of reasons and it is only necessary to look at the situation of the Stuart Court with regard to its own military forces to see what most of these were. Even when it had many of its own troops together, something that was really only true from 1656 onwards, the Stuart Court in exile needed to find the means to provide for them. Victuals, arms, garrisons and money for soldiers’ pay were all necessities for their upkeep and only Continental states could supply the royalists with these. Prior to 1656, moreover, the co-operation of at least one state was needed to keep these forces in a situation that would allow them to serve the royalist cause later on, if and when they were needed. By this it is meant that a kingdom had to be willing to employ these soldiers while accepting the condition that they would later be allowed to move in order to serve the Stuart claimant to the throne. At the very least a state had to employ these troops in the knowledge that such a move was a possibility. Then there was a chance that some of these royalist forces would be used to invade some part of Britain or Ireland during the Interregnum. To do this, however, some territory/territories would have to (a) be willing to allow royalist forces march through, (b) allow the use of a port or ports for the purpose of launching the invasion and (c) provide shipping and other logistical support to these would-be invaders. To this must be added the calculation that Stuart

troops alone would not have been enough to affect an invasion, so an ally willing to supply forces of its own for the task was also a potential requirement. Vital as good relations with Continental states were for using its own troops, this is to say nothing of the need to promote these for other reasons. It was, after all, necessary to have at least one state that was willing to, amongst other things, shelter the Court, provide for it to some extent at least, supply money both to the Stuarts and their adherents and, at times, turn a blind eye to the activities of the royalists, such as smuggling arms, military items, and even people, to Britain and Ireland in support of royalist risings there. Beyond all this, the royalists needed foreign states to interact with their Court and to accept it as a player in the international diplomatic arena, as such acceptance served as a legitimising force for their cause and their political claims.84

Of course, needing so much assistance and being dependent on acquiring foreign allies to such an extent meant that the royalists’ position was weakened when it came to dealing with other courts and governments, and they naturally ran the risk of becoming clients to a kingdom other than their own. The danger in this lay in the possibility that the Stuart Court would thus end up with its political future in hock to a state with its own interests to pursue, while at the same time alienating public opinion at home, which presumably would not have been too willing to contemplate being ruled by a dynasty that was subject to potential foreign enemies or rival states. The assorted Commonwealth regimes also realised that the royalists ran this risk and were predictably quick to highlight any report that might indicate that the Stuarts were willing to sell out their own subjects’ interests in order to return to power. What was potentially worse this, though, was the prospect of being ignored by the Continental powers altogether. This was a very real danger and was again something that the Commonwealth took delight in publicising when it did happen, which, it has to be conceded, was not infrequently. In many ways, the worst example of this was the Dutch ignoring of the Stuarts during the first Anglo-Dutch war.85 France and Spain, for their part, while having sympathy for the royalist cause, were not inclined to make an alliance with the Stuarts if they could help it, particularly early in the 1650s. Their

84 AGR, Secrétairerie d’État et De Guerre, Leopold William to Philip IV, Registre 249, 31 January 1651, f. 112. NLI Ms. 5066, Lane Papers, Nicholas to Lane, 14 August 1656: letter no. 12.
85 The moderate publisher of every dates intelligence from the Parliaments army, under the command of his Excellency the Lord General Cromwell, no. 92, 1-8 April 1653 [Thomas on tract]. Mercurius Politicus, 6-13 January 1653 (O.S.), no. 136, Thomason Tracts Microfilm/105:E.684 [27], p. 2149.
own resources were stretched by internal and external problems and the last thing they wanted to do was to take on a militarised state on behalf of a deposed King.

As things turned out, both of these kingdoms even sought the Commonwealth of England as an ally, with France eventually succeeding in making the alliance in 1656. As regard other states, some initial assistance was provided to the Stuarts by the House of Orange, but the death of William of Orange in 1650, combined with the rise to power of the anti-Orangist (and consequently anti-Stuart) De Witt as well as Cromwell’s victory in 1654 over the United Provinces in the first Anglo-Dutch war ended that. From then on the ‘Hollanders’, in accordance with their 1654 treaty with the Commonwealth, were scrupulous almost up to the end of the exile in preventing the Stuarts and their adherents from sheltering within their territory.

These setbacks in the early years of the 1650s were serious disappointments to the royalists. While allowing for these, however, one must avoid assuming that the Stuarts were in a position of complete powerlessness on the international stage, or even that their situation was completely unlike those of other contemporary courts. For one, military, financial and political dependence on other monarchies and governments was not something unique to the exiled Stuart Court of the 1650s. True, its predicament during this decade made it particularly prone to the whims of other governments. Yet, the fact of the matter was that there were many other examples of courts and governments in similar positions in early modern Europe, and many of these were not in exile. This can even be taken further. Many governments which

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received subventions or aid from other kingdoms cannot really be considered to be client, or dependent, states. To give one example, and if one can be permitted to jump forward in time, to the decades after the Restoration in Britain and Ireland, then one would find Charles II’s foreign policies being influenced by receipt of French subsidies in the mid-1670s. Aside from this, there are numerous examples of royal courts and governments receiving financial subventions, from other powers that pre-date the Stuart exile. France, for instance, used its monetary resources to enable other states to maintain their resistance to the Habsburgs during the thirty years war. These included the Dutch Republic, and Sweden.88 No one would accuse these of being dependent courts in this period. Instead they were in a position to offer tangible benefits to France for its financial and logistic support. The transfer of funds and resources from one power to another in this situation was only a means to allow both to pursue common goals more effectively.

All of this is relevant because, like the realms that received the funds in the above examples, it was not beyond the bounds of possibility that the exiled Stuarts might offer similar benefits to the Commonwealth’s international enemies at this time, or that they might be able to trade with other courts on more equal terms than might be at first thought. In exchange for subventions of one sort or another, the Stuarts could not only offer the frequently aforementioned mercenary troops to a Continental power, they and their adherents could also have potentially destabilised Britain and Ireland by stirring up trouble within those countries. The royalists most definitely knew that, aside from the Irish mercenary soldiery, they had the prospect of creating disruption in Britain and Ireland to international trade. Thus, we see the offer of military and political disruption in England, as well as the possibility of defections from the Cromwellian forces, being made during the negotiations with the Spanish for an alliance in 1656. It is also fair to say that the Commonwealth regimes, be it the Rump Parliament or Cromwell’s Protectorate, aided the royalists by making such an offer more enticing looking. Quite simply, rather then consolidating power at home and leaving the international stage to take care of itself, they created enemies abroad, which the royalists could then subsequently cosy up to. The Rump did it by initiating a commercial war with the Dutch in 1652, while Cromwell’s vision of an anti-

Habsburg league ultimately helped to bring about the Stuarts’ alliance with Spain in 1656. Once these powers had become enemies of the English Commonwealth the possibility that the exiled royalists could provide any aid at all to their cause was one that these states had to take seriously and this possibility, when it arose, was one that gave joy to the exiles.

Such circumstances were enough to allow the exiled Monarch and his adherents to play a potentially meaningful part in Continental affairs and this kept them interested in developments on the international stage. This concern manifested itself amongst the royalists through their keeping a weather-eye on the international situation. Alignments and re-alignments of states were reported on and gossip on the likely disposition of kingdoms and realms, and on how amenable they would be to the Stuart interest, was traded between the assorted exiles like currency. In particular, information about the Continental states’ relationship to the regimes in Britain was especially valuable. George Radcliffe’s general correspondence was full of such news and suppositions. The impending war between the Dutch and the English Commonwealth in 1652, for instance, excited him greatly and he liberally questioned his correspondents on whether they had any news regarding it and on when it was likely to commence. In return he openly shared his view that if this breach coincided with the conclusion of a peace between the Spanish and the French then it would be of great benefit to the cavaliers. Over the next year and a half he followed this up with queries on the relationship of Spain and France with the powers in Britain and divulged the news in mid-1653 that Charles II’s continued residence in Paris depended upon two impending developments on the international stage; the peace between the United Provinces and the Commonwealth, and the conclusion of an alliance between the latter power and France.

Minor courtiers such as Radcliffe did not just follow the global power game as interested spectators. Where possible, they sent reports on international developments

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90 NLI Mss 2319, Taaffe to Ormonde, 23 November 1651, f. 119.

to the Stuarts’ main policy makers and they made efforts to persuade the various European territories to align themselves behind the royalists. Thus we see John Bramhall reporting to Ormonde on events in the United Provinces and of his efforts to sour relations between that country and the Commonwealth in 1653, by having the Dutch clergy ‘cry up his Majesty’s cause to the people’ and by spreading stories that were advantageous to the Stuarts. This was all done as ambassador from London were arriving in the Netherlands.\(^92\) Frequently these accounts also involved an attempt to sway the Stuart Court to pursue a particular alliance above others and to take a certain stance on the International scene. The role of all the assorted Irish in this was not atypical: they not only passed on information and sometimes in doing so their own personal bias, or lack of it, was plain to see. In this context, to mention one illustration of this, we have talked of how Radcliffe supplied news on France’s dealings with Cromwell in an earlier chapter. We have also referred to the case of the Catholic convert Inchiquin encouraging Hyde to have dealings with a particular cleric in Rome in mid-1659 in this chapter. In the same year, and in contrast to Inchiquin’s avocation of a pro-Vatican disposition to Stuart foreign policy, his co-religionist George Hamilton was reporting to Hyde about the increasingly pro-Stuart sentiment of certain leading political figures in the Protestant United Provinces and he even offered to approach them on Charles II’s behalf, making whatever religious proposals he was ordered to.\(^93\)

It then fell to the main players amongst the exiled royalist courtiers, such as the King’s favourite Ormonde, to take these reports and advices, evaluate them and act on them. In more than a few cases this meant modifying the proposal advanced by a lesser courtier and sometimes it even amounted to an outright rejection of their recommendations. This was not an uncommon task for the Marquis and frequently, while willing to allow others to make some diplomatic efforts on the part of the Stuarts, he acted to ensure that their efforts did not clash to too great an extent with what members of the old royalist faction, most notably himself, wanted. One instance of it has already been mentioned: Ormonde’s intervention in Peter Talbot’s negotiations with Spain regarding an alliance with Charles II and the promotion of

\(^{92}\) *HMC*, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Bramhall to Ormonde, 14 May 1653, p. 291.

Sexby’s plot in 1655/6. The Lord Lieutenant and others among the King’s chief advisors had been initially prepared to allow that priest to make some of the early running in those talks and they continued to avail of his services in the negotiations but they were ultimately unwilling to follow his advice completely regarding the links to Sexby or to Spain. Being generally of the old royalist persuasion, they were not going to allow him to endanger their own preferred programme by promoting an overly-Catholic friendly plot. Thus, to prevent this, Ormonde himself took a hand in the talks with Spain from early 1656.94

It was not just a case of stopping Catholics such as Talbot from endangering the old royalist, pro-Anglican, moderate Protestant programme. The efforts of those royalists with tendencies towards a Protestant alliance also had to be reined in. The Stuarts’ relationship with the United Provinces saw the most obvious demonstration of this. During the first Anglo-Dutch war, despite the rise of De Witt and the fall of the influence of the House of Orange, many royalists still felt that the Stuarts best hope lay in making common cause with the Dutch. Yet, to the amazement of some, no ambassador was formally appointed to the United Provinces by Charles II. This was all the more galling as ambassadors had previously been appointed to Catholic states and Courts: Hyde had been sent to Spain, while Rochester was appointed to the Diet of Ratisbon. Francis Wentworth and Edward Massey were forward in expressing their opinion on this to Ormonde, thinking it strange that an appeal had not been made to a state of the ‘reformed’ religion, which happened to share the same enemy. For Ormonde, however, the problem in their advice lay, once again, with their religious programme. Whereas Peter Talbot’s concerns in 1656 were with advancing Catholicism, Wentworth’s and Massey’s sympathies lay with Presbyterianism. Above all, in order to increase the likelihood of allying with the Dutch, they advocated that the King should honour the oath of the Covenant he had subscribed to when he had allied himself with the Scottish Presbyterians and he encouraged the Crown to abandon the policy of supporting Episcopal Church government (i.e. the Church of England). To all intents and purposes, their foreign policy recommendations amounted to another attack on the old royalist political programme; this time,

94 See p. 320, above. Arthur Bryant, The Letters, Speeches, and Declarations of Charles II, Charles II to Bennett, 2 April 1656, p. 46.
however, it was from the opposite side of the religious spectrum.\textsuperscript{95} Yet, despite their solicitations of Ormonde, and the appointment of an ambassador to the Untied Provinces, their recommendations regarding religion were never acted upon.

Clearly, foreign policy, like most other things in a Court environment, was open to being a factional battleground and the dominant faction often had to protect its own ‘foreign policies’ against the schemes of other groupings. In the two examples given above Ormonde acted to ensure that others did not move the King to adopt a policy in international relations other than the one that Ormonde himself and his closest political allies favoured. The correspondence of Wentworth and Massey with Ormonde does reveal one other reality of international relations that the royalists had to face up to, however. In order to have any hope of getting the required aid from the Continental states and kingdoms, the Stuart Court had to employ embassies and agents to these foreign powers. By the standards of the age the exiled House of Stuart did have a number of suitable potential ambassadors at its disposal. Nobility, and especially the high peerage, were seen as the natural ambassadors of monarchy at this time and the banished Court did have such persons in attendance.\textsuperscript{96} It would have been natural for many of them, including the Irish in their number, to play the part of a Crown representative to foreign powers. Though the Stuarts had a large number of potential ambassadors, however, there are still a number of issues to be examined regarding this. For instance, when it came to choosing ambassadors, which persons from within this elite were employed by the Stuarts, where were they employed and what criteria were used for selecting their missions?

The first part of this query is relatively easily answered. They nearly all were used in this capacity at some time or other. The Stuart Court was never so populous as to afford to keep back certain individuals from this task. As for the last part of the query, it seems that religious affiliation had a role to play, though not necessarily one of over-riding importance. True, as mentioned earlier, it may very well have been easier for Irish Catholic courtiers to approach other Catholics in the diplomatic arena.

Certainly, when approaching the Papal States, Catholics were desirable as ambassadors, as the appointment of Callaghan and Taaffe to this role in mid-1653 shows. The latter’s religion certainly led to his appointment as Crown agent to the Duke of Lorraine and his royally-endorsed approaches to Cardinal Mazarin for assistance. As a corollary, it was certainly feared that Irish Catholics would not be acceptable as Crown agents to Protestant governments. Hyde, who certainly desired Dutch aid because of that State’s Protestantism, voiced this objection to Hamilton taking on the role of Stuart representative to the United Provinces in mid-1659. Yet, for all that, it was not a hard and fast rule and there were many cases of Irish exiles taking on the role of Crown representative to courts and princes of a different religious persuasion. Certainly Taaffe found himself representing the Stuarts to a variety of courts. Aside from the above instances, he also acted as Stuart representative to the abdicated Queen Christina of Sweden, while Hamilton, despite Hyde’s objections, ended up acting as the Stuart agent to the ‘considerable persons’ of the United Provinces in mid-1659. The reason for Hamilton’s appointment here goes some way to answering the middle part of the question posed earlier. He was chosen as ambassador there because he was, after all, on the spot, having gone there to negotiate the Earl of Ossory’s marriage settlement on Ormonde’s behalf. Moreover, he was the one who had established the contacts with the relevant individuals in the first place and he had promised Hyde that he would do what was required of him on religious issues. It would seem then that the location of particular individuals predictably played a role on where they were employed as agents. Furthermore, if persons of a suitable religious background could not be appointed then the royalists were more than willing to have others deputise and it seems that many of the Irish elite were willing to do as Hamilton did on points of religion. For many, the Crown’s cause was as central to their conscience as their religion’s was.

In the business of appointing agents another factor that had to be taken into account was the suitability of a certain individual to a specific task. Though all of the Crown’s Irish elite were used in such diplomatic roles, certain people simply were not

97 Memoirs of the Family of Taaffe, Taaffe to Mazarin, no date, pp. 11-2.
appropriate to fill particular embassies at particular times and this was largely due to the personal relationships between individuals. In section two of this work reference has already been made to the efforts to obtain aid from France and Spain in mid-to-late 1659, in the wake of the treaty of the Pyrenees. It was noted there that Ormonde, who as one of Charles II’s chief advisors and magnates should have been most suitable to act as the King’s representative to Mazarin, had to leave that task to others. That nobleman’s role in bringing Irish troops from French to Spanish service in 1656, combined with his public defence of these actions in his published letter to the Catholic Bishop of Dromore, made him unpalatable by Mazarin and instead it fell to members of the Louvre set, most notably Jermyn and Henrietta Maria, to approach the French Chancellor, which they did with some success. Ormonde, meanwhile, had to content himself with approaching the governor of the Spanish Netherlands in an effort to ensure the Habsburgs’ co-operation.100

All of the preceding gives the impression that the Stuarts’ appointment of agents and ambassadors at this time had an air of informality and haphazardness about it and there is certainly some truth in this. A lack of a wide range of personnel to choose from, which created the need to use the same set of persons on a variety of diplomatic missions, and a dearth of the resources needed to maintain formal embassies all served to create this. It is, once again, not completely accurate to portray diplomatic efforts in this manner, however. Though wanting a full ambassadorial network, the Stuarts did manage to maintain some formality to diplomatic missions in particular states and it did have established consuls in certain centres. Two pre-exile ambassadors, Richard Browne and Henry De Vic, managed to maintain their embassies throughout most of the exile, in Paris and Brussels respectively. Aside from that, formal embassies were appointed by Charles II during the exile. Among the most important of these for the Irish at Court was Rochester’s appointment as ambassador to the Diet at Ratisbon in 1652, as his secretary was Richard Bellings junior, who played a central role in this mission. He was the individual who took responsibility for transmitting the proceedings of the mission to Hyde in Paris and for carrying out some of the actual diplomatic work, most notably

with regard to making contact with Nicholas Donnellan. So successful was Bellings in this, he was to be later trusted, in late 1655 to be exact, with the role of royalist agent to the Holy Roman Emperor. \(^{101}\) Rochester’s initial mission to the Holy Roman Empire, however, for all its good intentions and formality, highlights some problems with Stuart diplomatic efforts in this period. As with France and Spain in the early 1650s, the Stuarts’ agents to Ratisbon found that the states represented at the Diet were fearful of upsetting the English Commonwealth. This manifested itself in an initial reluctance to engage with Rochester and even extended to question of the form of recognition that would be granted to him at the Diet, with their being a doubt raised as to whether he would be received as a full ambassador or as a deputy. Ultimately, he was only received as a deputy, a clear indicator that the prestige of the Stuart Court had declined somewhat, as it was generally held in diplomatic circles at the time that only great powers and kings had the right to send full ambassadors. \(^{102}\)

Other problems affected other embassies. We have seen in the survey of Radcliffe’s exile that the embassy in Paris never got Ambassador Browne’s full attention, as he was engaged in privateering activities in western France and he had to rely on the former personage to maintain it in his absence. The old royalist tendencies of Radcliffe and Browne also alienated them from those other royalists in the Louvre set. Browne certainly saw his effort to maintain the embassy as being central to the opposition to the pro-Catholic tendencies within Henrietta Maria’s household. Such divisions within the Stuart Court also impacted on royal embassies and these became subject to factional disputes. As noted, part of the reason why Callaghan’s and Taaffe’s proposed mission to the Vatican failed in 1653 was because of opposition from within Henrietta Maria’s household. Likewise, in from mid-1658 to mid-1659 divisions within the Court led to the duplications of diplomatic efforts. We have seen how the Duke of York’s household, despite Henry Bennett being the official

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ambassador to Spain at the time, decided to send its own agent to Spain during those months, namely Peter Talbot, as York and his advisors wished to gain Spanish support for their own policy agenda. In mid-1659 York even added to his agents in Spain, sending Charles Berkeley there.  

Real as these problems were, they were all overcome, to some extent at least. The inability to establish formal relations with courts was overcome through informal methods, based upon approaches to individuals. These have been alluded to already. Ratisbon’s reluctance to deal with Rochester’s embassy was overcome by the establishment of contacts between Bellings and Nicholas Donnellan, for instance and with some success, as it would seem that the latter was central to the gaining of financial aid for the exiled Court from that Diet. Donnellan, moreover, continued to represent the Stuarts’ interests in the Court of the Holy Roman Emperor long after Rochester’s embassy had ended and right up to the end of the exile, much to the relief of Charles II and Hyde, who both acknowledged that this priest deserved considerable reward for the services he performed there. Ormonde, as noted previously, also established contacts with the Portuguese Court in the early 1650s using the exact same methods; specifically by making contact with the well-placed Dominic O’Daly. As we shall see later, these informal contacts proved vital in dealing with foreign courts and this was the case even where formal embassies existed.

The Stuarts, the Irish courtiers and foreign states: a case study of the Spanish alliance, 1656-1660.

Spain was to prove to be the royalists’ major foreign ally over the course of the exile, with the establishment of a political-military alliance in 1656. This partnership only came about after a long courtship, however, and it was, for one of the parties at least, a reluctant union. The exiled Charles II had attempted to initiate contacts with Spain soon after his theoretical accession to the throne in 1649, sending Lord Cottington and Edward Hyde to Madrid as ambassadors (the latter was to later boast that they were the only full ambassadors appointed by the Crown during the exile), where they received a reception befitting their status. These two, nonetheless,

were to find that the Spanish were so taken up with their own affairs and were so fearful of upsetting the English Parliament that they would provide no assistance. In truth this was no surprise and other royalists were to find the same attitude elsewhere in Spanish territories at this time, most notably when the Duke of York turned up with his household in Brussels in 1650. He too was reasonably well received but ultimately gained nothing by his venture there, as was the governor there also had no wish to offend those in power across the sea from him.105

As things turned out, the Habsburgs’ polite distancing of themselves from the quandary of the Stuarts was to be the highpoint of the relationship between the two dynasties in the early 1650s. Spain had more to gain at this time through cultivating a rapport with the English Parliament. Aside from keeping out of a conflict that it really did not have the means to participate in, namely that of British and Irish civil wars, fostering a connection with the Parliamentarians potentially offered the Spanish the very basic resource that was necessary for the maintenance of those wars that it was already bound up in; soldiers. After all, the victorious Parliament’s policy of clearing disaffected troops from Ireland was rebounding to Spain’s benefit at this time, as it provided new recruits for the Iberian power’s wars. Ultimately, it was these very troops, once they started to arrive on the Continent, which decided the nature of the relationship between the Stuarts and Spain over the next decade. Initially these forces served to create trouble between the two. The defection of Irish troops from Spanish to French service over the course of the 1652/3, and its ramifications, has already been brought up in this thesis. Suffice to say that it served to sour relations between the royalists and the Spanish, leading to much discontent with the Stuarts and the Irish from that quarter.106

From 1654, though, the international situation began to change and it was the actions of Cromwell on this stage that was fundamental to this shift. Wooed by both France and Spain, the Lord Protector found himself having to make a choice between these two potential allies and from that year on it was France that began to make the front running. This effectively culminated in the expulsion of Charles II from the latter kingdom and his withdrawal into the Prince-bishopric of Cologne. The next two

106 See pp. 217-25, above. _CVSP, vol. XXIX, 1653-4_, Sagredo to the Doge and Senate, 10 June 1653, p. 84. Ibid, Quirini to the Doge and Senate, 20 August 1653, p. 113-4.
years in the Holy Roman Empire have been characterised by some as the latter King’s lowest ebb in exile. Hutton has described the King as doing nothing because there was nothing to do.107 A case can also be made for it being his biggest break. Prior to that the King had been, metaphorically speaking, in limbo. He was no more than a guest of France, while the Dutch and the Spanish would have nothing to do with him. He had troops, which his adherents could manipulate, but he had no way of using them to relieve his situation. Now Cromwell came to his rescue by becoming increasingly cosy with Mazarin and increasingly cold to Spanish overtures. This development gave Charles II a foreign policy to follow. If England and France allied against Spain, then the Stuarts could close with that Crown against their mutual enemies, using troops and the creation of disruption in Britain and Ireland as lures. If, on the other hand, England reversed its policy and joined with Spain against France, then a return to Paris as an ally of the Bourbons would become the goal. It was only a matter of waiting, keeping their options open and seeing on whose side the Lord Protector fell.108

It is clear that during the sojourn in Cologne the activities of Charles II’s chief courtiers were geared to this strategy. Already in this thesis we have detailed how members of the Irish elite, such as Ormonde and Taaffe, sought to keep Irish soldiers in the employ of Spain and its allies for the purposes of curryng favour with the Spanish and advancing the possibility of an alliance with that power. Likewise, we have seen how persons such as Radcliffe kept the Court informed of the state of negotiations between France and England in that period. In these activities they were joined by other courtiers, who also supplied information on French diplomatic movements, as well as on English military manoeuvres, most notably on the actions of Admiral Pen’s fleet in his voyage to the West Indies.109 By mid-1655, the information reaching Cologne clearly indicated that there was going to be a breach between England and Spain, with France allying with the former, and consequently tentative diplomatic contacts were opened with the Spanish Netherlands and preparations for a war against the Protectorate were put in train.

107 Ronald Hutton, Charles II, p. 87.
Charles II’s Court had a resident ambassador in the Spanish Netherlands, Henry De Vic, and he was instructed to open negotiations with Spain towards the end of 1655. Prior to that, however, the Court carried out its diplomatic efforts in Brussels through other persons. Peter Talbot’s activities in this regard have already been accounted for. Another agent employed by the royalists was the Earl of Norwich, who likewise reported back to Cologne on his contacts with the governor in Brussels and the likelihood of a Stuart-Habsburg alliance at this time. Towards the end of 1655 George Hamilton found himself employed in this chore as well. Charles II and his chief councillors also used other means aside from their own network of adherents to promote their relationship with Spain. The sojourn in Cologne had led to closer relations developing between the Stuart King and the Duke of Newburgh. This rapport soon provided another means for the Stuarts to entice the Spanish into an alliance as Newburgh instructed his own network of contacts and adherents to aid the royalists. Ormonde was among the King’s councillors to see the benefits of such aid as he received information regarding Anglo-French negotiations from a number of Newburgh’s servants over the course of the summer of 1655. Once again, the Irish elite’s own personal contacts combined with the personal contacts of others to form an informal network of persons that could greatly facilitate the achievement of the Court’s goals; in this case, making diplomatic advances to Spain.

The overtures proved successful, partly because of the efforts of those described above and partly because the Spanish were willing to listen to them. Having spent years trying to avoid war with the Cromwellian regime, it found itself in need of an ally that could inflict damage on that very power, as well as on the French. Having already seen at first-hand how the royalists could control mercenary forces and with the Stuarts having inspired two rebellions over the previous three years in Britain, it was not unreasonable for the Spanish to think that Charles II was the answer. Indeed, as noted earlier, these troops and this disruption in Britain was the very commodities that the royalists brought to the table. Unsurprisingly then, by the end of 1655, true to his role as the King’s chief magnate and courtier, Ormonde was


delegated as the royalists official negotiator. This was followed up by the King travelling to Brussels and taking on the role of negotiator himself in March 1656. The league was agreed in early March and to the delight of the Spanish included clauses protecting Catholic worship in England. Charles, for his part, was also pleased with the treaty, declaring that he gained more than he expected from the Spanish and over the course of the spring and summer he and his followers began to take steps to put the alliance into effect. Orders were given to bring the Duke of York and the troops with him to the north, while those around the King prepared themselves for the big move to Brussels.112

Some of the events that followed on from this military union have already been reviewed in this thesis and shall not be re-iterated here.113 Suffice to say that we have seen how some successes were achieved by it, in no small way due to the royalist Irish, but ultimately it has to be conceded that the alliance was a failure. At least part of the reason for this was because there were a number of fundamental problems with the alliance between Charles II and his partisans on the one hand and the Spanish on the other. First of all, they wanted different things from the alliance and this became evident from the beginning when it became clear that the Spanish were reluctant to have Charles II enter into their territory, preferring instead that he meet his side of the bargain regarding troops and rebellion from Cologne and not be a financial burden on them in the Spanish Netherlands. Charles, however, had no intention of being a poor pawn in Cologne when he could be a commander-in-chief in (as it turned out) Bruges, and he went against his allies wishes and turned up in the Spanish Netherlands in May and burdened them with his Court.114

This highlighted the differing aims of the two partners. For the royalists, this coalition was, ultimately, to be a means to restore the Crown’s dignity and bring about the royal Restoration with Spanish assistance. For the Spanish, however, these aims


113 See pp. 221-3, above.

114 Ronald Hutton, Charles II, p. 102.
were not so important. For them, it was a part of their grand strategy for fighting the war against the French and the English Commonwealth more effectively and more cheaply. If troops and trouble in Britain were delivered by the Stuarts, and if this led to a peace with England, then they would be happy. Doing anything else, however, was potentially too big a burden on them. In mid-February 1658, as an illustration of this, the Spanish governor in Flanders, Don Juan of Austria, received compliments from Spain on his encouragement of Charles II in his plans to provoke a royalist rising in England in the immediate future. Madrid was happy with this because at the time they were looking to make peace with both France and the Cromwellian protectorate, and it was felt that if Charles II was successful in his proposed expedition it would help bring about the end of the war. If he was not, however, it would be considered no great loss, as it was felt that Spain could still make peace overtures to Cromwell through other means. The Spanish attitude to the royalists is even more openly, if somewhat extremely, expressed in a letter of Caracena’s to Philip IV in March 1660. In this missive he stated that, in his opinion, Spain had not been able to make peace with England earlier, particularly in the wake of the political instability that followed on from Richard Cromwell’s taking of power, as the treaty made with Charles II had actually served to reduce the possibility of doing so.

In the end, then, the alliance with Charles II was a means to an end for the Spanish, and the end in question was not exactly the one that the exiled royalists had in mind. Aside from these differing aims, moreover, there was also a serious problem of a lack of trust between the two allies. Aside from Caracena’s obvious problems with the alliance, many in the Spanish court in Madrid felt that Charles II’s court could not be trusted because of the Monarch’s familial links with the Bourbon dynasty in France. There was even open hostility to some amongst the Stuart dynasty. Reports in early 1656 that Henrietta Maria and others were to travel to Spain were rubbished by a royalist based in that kingdom, Sir Benjamin Wright in a letter to Sir Walter Dongan. The latter was enlightened with the knowledge that the Queen and others were not seen as friends of Spain and would not be welcome there. It was even claimed that some in the Spanish Court went so far as to say in 1658 that it would be

115 AGR, Secrétairerie d’Etat et De Guerre, 14 February 1658, Philip IV to Don Juan, Registre 263, f. 27.
116 Ibid, Caracena to Philip IV, 17 March 1660, Registre 266, f. 93.
better for Spain if Charles II was not restored to the former Stuart thrones, as his family were ‘wholly French’. Problems of trust existed with the adherents of the Stuarts as well. Richard Grace, having abandoned his Spanish employers so publicly in 1653 was not someone that was welcomed into Flanders with open arms and Ormonde had to intervene with the Spanish in order to secure terms which would allow him to come join his King’s forces.\(^{117}\) The royalists, for their part, also grew to distrust their allies. The unwillingness to accept the King into Flanders caused problems and the eventual establishment of his Court in Bruges must have come as a disappointment to them, especially as some of them had expected Charles II to set up his household in Brussels. On top of that, these royalists found that the Spanish did not deliver many of things that they expected them to. Charles II was left lacking funds by the Spanish over the course of the alliance, as his pension from them fell into greater and greater arrears (unlike his eldest brother’s pension which, while also being in arrears, was larger and was still more frequently paid) and other commitments, most notably the promise to open ports to royalist shipping were never delivered on. They could not have been encouraged by reports in 1658 that Spain was seeking to make peace with England either.\(^{118}\)

Contributing to this distrust was the failure of both sides to live up to their end of the bargain and some blame must be attached to the Irish at Court here. They never delivered their countrymen or the resources they had access to in large enough numbers. While the common soldiery did defect in relatively large numbers from the French this did not mean that they ended up in Spanish employ. Instead, many soldiers turned up and defected once again after receiving some initial payment. Even those troops who defected did not come over rapidly and this was partly due to the divisions in the Stuart Court. As mentioned earlier the Duke of York had become a


significant figure in his own right and his reluctance to quit French service delayed
the movement of troops into Spanish service. This was because those Irish officers
serving under him followed suit and did not come over quickly either. Muskerry,
having been ordered to quit French service immediately by Ormonde, refused to do so
and replied that he was honour-bound to ask for a passport from the French first.
Grace and another Irish officer, Colonel D’Arcy, followed the exact same course. All
this gave the French time to counteract the orders for bringing Irish troops into
Spanish service. Irish soldiers serving France in Italy never came to the Spanish side
either. There were other notable failures. Inchiquin never joined Spain, despite it
being stated that he would; a grave failure considering that he was acting as French
governor in Catalonia during these years. The royalists also suggested that they could
bring about the capture of garrisons such as Arras, Le Quesnoy and Saint Ghislain,
which all had Irish garrisons, but only the latter was delivered.119

Such failings must have irked the Spaniards, particularly when it is borne in
mind that no significant royalist rising was provoked in Britain or Ireland during these
years. It must be remembered, though, that, from the royalist point of view at least,
the Spanish failed as well. The royalists believed that their allies had promised to aid
in any attempt to bring about a Stuart invasion of their former kingdoms. Yet, the
cash-strapped kingdom wanted to cause trouble in Britain and Ireland on the cheap.
They would have preferred if the royalists had provoked a rising at home, after which
they would have then provided logistic help for a Stuart landing there. Consequently,
whenever the royalists proposed a scheme for a Spanish-backed invasion, it was shot
down. A plan advanced by Charles II for an invasion of Ireland in mid-1657, to cite
one instance, was shot down by the Spanish as they did not have the resources to back
it. Similar problems occurred even when the royalist were attempting to provoke a

II: His campaigns as Duke of York, 1652-1660, pp. 220-3. BL Add. Mss 61484, Lane to Bristol, 21
October 1656, ff. 91-2. Ibid, Memorial concerning the Irish in the French service, 1656, f. 123.
Carte Mss 30, ‘Considerations on an alliance with Spain’, no date, ff. 389-94. Ivar O’Brien,
Murrough the Burner: Murchadh na dTóiteán. A Life of Murrough, Sixth baron and First Earl of
rebellion at home, as was the case in early 1658. Without the actual outbreak of military action, however, the Spanish were reluctant to commit anything.\footnote{AGR, Secrétairerie d’Etat et De Guerre, Don Juan to Philip IV, Registre 262, 27 December 1657, f. 249. Ibid, Philip IV to Don Juan, registre 263, 17 May 1658, ff. 147-8.}

Ultimately the Stuart-Spanish alliance was one between two impoverished Courts who either could not deliver what they promised or could not deliver what their partners hoped for. Elements on each side were not fully committed to the league anyway. The Spanish had been trying to avoid such a union for years, while some in the Stuart camp had a distinctly pro-French leaning. This prevented each side from being able to bring their full resources behind the alliance and also led to an inability to decide on a common course of action. All that, combined with the problem of facing two militarily powerful enemies, meant that the likely result of the alliance was always going to be failure.

Conclusions

The Stuart Court did operate on the international stage, though it has to be conceded that it did so with a number of considerable handicaps. It lacked a complete corp of specialised diplomats and ambassadors. While claiming to be the legitimate government of Britain and Ireland, it faced stiff disputation of that title on the world stage from the ‘powers that were’ in London. This rival claim, backed as it was by a strong, relatively-well financed and experienced military force, was one that the very states the royalists were appealing to could not afford to ignore. Aside from this, the Stuarts’ cause desperate need for assistance, be it from states or institutions, left it open to manipulation and subjection from outside influences. These clouds did have silver linings, however. While states were reluctant to alienate the English Commonwealth, its aggressive foreign policy did eventually create enemies. Its revolutionary religious and political programme, meant that foreign states and institutions with a more conservative bent (such as the Catholic Church) were always likely to see it as some kind of threat to the status quo as well. To the royalists’ further advantage, there were those persons operating on the international stage who were to some degree sympathetic to their cause. Finally the Stuarts, though lacking a formal diplomatic bureaucracy, did have a means to compensate for this. First of all it was an age where much diplomacy was carried out not by specialist diplomats but by social elites and nobility. The Stuarts certainly had those amongst their adherents, and
the Irish certainly were included amongst them. It could almost compensate for its failings by using informal agents and supporters as representatives. More crucially, it did have some resources to bargain with.

Where did the Irish royalist elite fit in to the Stuarts’ efforts on the international stage? The first part of the answer to this question has already been given: they were numbered amongst the diplomats and ambassadors used by the royalists. In filling this role, much of the value of the Irish courtiers to the Stuart Court, and the royalist cause generally, once again lay in their range of contacts and the extent of their networks. These royal servants could still command, despite their exile from their traditional patrimonies, a considerable amount of support from other persons on the Continent. Their background, combined with their social prestige and their own network of personal contacts, allowed them to approach persons on the Crown’s behalf and this gave the Monarch the ability to exercise greater influence than one would normally expect him to while in exile, even if this influence was indirect. To see how this worked, one only has to look at how the Stuarts could make their case heard in such places as Lisbon and Ratisbon. Persons like Ormonde and Bellings could make contact with clerics like O’Daly and Donnellan and gain their help. Peter Talbot, though not an exile under the terms of this thesis, also took up the royalist cause in this period and this must be in part due to his siblings being numbered amongst the exiles, as well as his own family’s support for Ormonde during the 1640s. In effect, it was Father Peter’s links to the exiled adherents of the Stuarts that made him into an advocate of their cause on the European stage. One must re-concede, of course, that these clerics were not just blindly doing as the Court instructed. They had their own agendas and in O’Daly’s case this brought him into conflict with the aims of the entire Stuart Court. Yet, the dangers inherent in this were known and recognised by the Stuarts’ followers and it was the Irish elite who were amongst those persons who recognised this reality. Besides, these hazards were not enough to prevent the Stuarts using these clerics when it suited them. Dealing with them was no worse then dealing with factions within one’s own Court.

The Irish elite gave the Stuarts other advantages in this area. In particular, they gave them the resources that made them potentially valuable to would-be allies. One such area where they did this was in the field of military resources. The Irish courtiers played a not insignificant role in gaining military power for the Court, Once more, the thing that made them so crucial to the Court’s armed endeavours in this
regard was their range of personal contacts. Through these connections they could act as ‘substitutes’ for the government institutions that would previously have been involved in the raising of troops. Ormonde, along with many others amongst the exiled Irish nobility, played a major part in helping the royalists influence extend and maintain control over Irish mercenaries. This they did by relying on kinship links, as in the previously given examples of Ormonde and his contacts with the likes of Muskerry, patron-client connections, as demonstrated by Ormonde’s links to Taaffe, or by taking advantage of their positions as commanders of these troops, the best example of this being Colonel Richard Grace. As a result of this network of connections, the Court was able to go to the troops and, to a certain extent, bend them to their will. Foreign powers could be, and were then approached, and offered these resources.

Finally, the religious, vocational, geographical and cultural diversity to be found within the Irish elite was also of value. This allowed the Stuarts to appeal to a diversity of groups and interests on the Continent. Protestants and Catholics could be appealed to, for instance, and divisions within these institutions, most notably within the Catholic Church, could also be played on. This diversity also allowed them to appeal to a variety of states, or even to mercenary troops in different locations. For all their worth in this political theatre, however, there was a downside to the Irish elite. If they failed to deliver then the Stuart Court’s strength on the international scene diminished. This was most clearly seen in the alliance with Spain from 1656. Making this alliance damaged relations with France and it was done without gaining any significant reward in recompense as nothing came of the union with the Habsburgs. Though there were other contributing factors, such as divisions within the Court and Spanish weaknesses, this must in part be put down to the failure of the royalists to deliver on their side of the bargain, and this failure to deliver must in part go down to the Irish elite, who promised more than they could deliver, particularly with regard to soldiers.
Chapter 8

Representing the Stuart interest at home from abroad: the Irish Courtiers, the royalist Cause and the lost Stuart kingdoms

Important as the efforts on the international diplomatic stage were in and of themselves, the Irish Courtiers’ activities on behalf of the Court were not just confined to the Continental landmass during the 1650s. They were also, of necessity, supplemented by similar actions in the lost Stuart kingdoms. Aside from being the Crown’s representatives to states, groups and institutions on the Continent, the Irish exiles were also part of a body of persons who acted as the Crown’s ambassadors to its own subjects within its traditional kingdoms. This was a slightly unusual position for the Irish elite to be in. The realities of not being resident in their homeland and of being considered enemies of the dominant political power there meant that they had to act as covert Crown agents within territories where they would traditionally have acted openly as the Government’s representatives. They also had to involve themselves in organising an activity that they would not previously have been employed by the Crown for. They had to stir up unrest and rebellion. The unusualness of this situation was not lost on those involved and was even joked about. Charles II, in a letter to Henry Bennett, spoke of sending Daniel O’Neill to England and said that ‘neither he [O’Neill] nor I will repent ourselves for the venturing of that which so many of his forefathers have given him so good an example in’. Many of O’Neill’s forefathers, of course, had been, in the Crown’s eyes, noteworthy rebels in Ireland and his grand-uncle, Hugh O’Neill, had arguably come close to ending the

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121 This chapter will not focus on events before the return of Charles II to Paris following Worcester in September 1651. It is the author’s belief that the conflicts in Ireland, England and Scotland prior to this, though they overlapped with the period of exile studied here, are more properly considered to be part of those civil wars in the three kingdoms. Furthermore, others have already covered these instances of conflict more than sufficiently. See, for example, Micheál Ó Siochru, ‘The Duke of Lorraine and the International Struggle for Ireland, 1649-1653’, pp. 905–932. Ronald Hutton, Charles II, pp. 49-71.

122 Miscellanea Aulica, Charles II to Bennett, 25 May 1655, p. 112.
influence of the Tudors in the kingdom altogether. Now one of those O’Neills found himself plotting rebellion on behalf of that very Monarchy.

Whatever about the unusual characteristics of this interaction with home, it is fair to say that the various attempts made by these persons at advancing the royalist cause in the former homelands were carried out in many diverse spheres of activity. One of those persons who provided intelligence to the Protectorate claimed in 1654 that the Court had identified a number of different areas in which they should seek to make an impact at home. The King’s councillors, it was asserted, believed that they should seek to promote local resistance to the Interregnum regimes in Britain and Ireland, both by preparing their adherents there to rise at an opportune moment and also by infiltrating garrisons and other secure points. They also felt that funds should be collected at home, so as to provide for the King and also to finance political and military action. It was further asserted that the Court planned to win adherents for its cause from within the English army (and presumably from within the ruling regime generally). Conspiracy also apparently featured in the Court’s plans for home, as it was asserted that one of the schemes put before the King’s Council at this time was a plan to assassinate Oliver Cromwell.\footnote{Thurloe State Papers, vol. II, A paper of Colonel Bampfield’s, 1654, pp. 510-1.} Wide-ranging as this general strategy for activities at home was, it still does not comprise the complete array of activities of the Court and the exiles at home. For instance, whatever its scheme at home was at any given moment, the Court needed persons to act as liaisons with home in order to achieve anything. This meant establishing contacts with adherents and would-be adherents at home also ranked as a key activity. Finally, there was also a propaganda war to be waged on behalf of the exiled Court at home. After all, royalism still had to justify its claim to be viewed as a relevant political option in Britain and Ireland and it had to defend itself against the intellectual assaults of its opponents. Publicly undermining the arguments of these opponents wherever possible was also desirable.

The carrying out of such a wide variety of activities in Britain and Ireland by the exiles is hardly surprising. After all, the Irish Courtiers were trying to ensure that they and the other royalists would be restored to power in these territories and this alone required them to attempt to influence events in these places to the best of their ability. Furthermore, David Underdown’s important point about royalist conspiracy keeping the Stuart cause in the mind of the populace has to be acknowledged once
again. Reminding the populace of Britain and Ireland of the continued existence of the King, albeit in exile, and of the possibility of returning to monarchical government must also have provided part of the motivation for such continued politicking at home. Internal Court politics also demanded such efforts be made, particularly from the point of view of the membership of the old royalist faction. All Courtiers clearly acknowledged the need for foreign assistance in restoring the monarchy. It must be remembered, however, that the old royalists, or at least the leading members of that faction, while not renouncing foreign assistance, generally wanted the political developments that would bring about a restoration to begin within Britain and Ireland and they wanted the King’s own subjects to play as big a part as possible in bringing it about. This, it must be pointed out, was not an unreasonable political program, if looked at from an historical perspective. English History was replete with examples ofpretenders and claimants to the throne turning up on the country’s shores and subsequently going on to secure the Crown. There was, bearing the level of popular support that existed for monarchy in mind, no reason why Charles II could not do the same, given the right circumstances.

In order to have their political dreams come true, however, the old royalists needed to promote a counter-revolution at home. All of these considerations combined to ensure that few of those persons associated with imminent figures such as Ormonde were spared the requirement of attempting to exercise influence on the old homelands. It must be pointed out that they were not working alone in attempting to do this. There were those in Britain and Ireland who were willing to help them and this assistance did not just come from hard-line royalists either. We have already drawn attention to the wide range of support that the Crown could potentially draw upon in Britain and Ireland. Moreover, we have seen how Sir John Percival, to cite one instance, despite being a supporter of the Cromwellian regime, aided the exiled royalist community in many ways. At one point he was even asked by one exile to pass on news of political developments in France to Colonel Edward Wogan, one of the more prominent royalist commanders from Ireland who went into exile. Furthermore, there was a constant back and forth movement of royalists between the Commonwealth and the Continent during the decade, which of course facilitated the maintenance of links with the lost homelands. We have already noted how one of Elizabeth Butler’s servants, Robert Page, took part in this. Robert Southwell is another aforementioned example of the same phenomenon. They were not the only
royalists with Irish connections to indulge in this kind of peregrination. Francis Boyle, Viscount Shannon, brother to both the short-term royalist exile, the Earl of Cork, and the prominent Cromwellian adherent Lord Broghill, made the trip from home to the exiled Court on a number of occasions during the early 1650s. There would prove to be many others like these who were willing to help the exiles in their political efforts at home.

Royalist Propaganda and intellectual activity in Britain and Ireland; the role of John Bramhall

The perfect illustration of the all-inclusive nature of supporting and promoting royalism in the former ‘Stuart archipelago’ comes in the propaganda war that was waged on behalf of royalism. Those who ended up participating in it included the most unlikely of persons. Bishop Henry Leslie made his only political contribution to the cause during his short exile in this field, when his sermon on the execution of Charles I, which notably portrayed him as a martyr, was published soon after it was delivered to that King’s offspring. Even Ormonde, at best an infrequent visitor to the world of printed disputation, made his mark here. His letter to the Catholic Bishop of Dromore in defence of the drawing of Irish troops from French to Spanish service also, found its way to the printing press and there are indications that it did receive a reasonably wide distribution within the former Stuart kingdoms, as it turned up in a number of collections of printed material in both Ireland and Britain.

From the Irish exiles’ point of view, however, as well as from that of many other royalist expatriates, one of the most important persons in this field was John Bramhall. Aside from acting as a privateering agent during the 1650s and as a chaplain to the English community in the Netherlands, the Anglican Bishop of Derry, as one of the leading Protestant scholars on the cavalier side, was involved in the intellectual and propaganda campaign against the various Interregnum regimes. In this role he defended the deposed royal family and all that they represented, and also advocated a return to the pre-Civil war political and religious establishment in the


former Stuart kingdoms. This was nothing new to Bramhall in the 1650s, as he had established himself as a leading royalist intellectual and disputant during the previous decade. As early as 1643 he had printed a substantial work called ‘The Serpent-Salve’, in which he defended the Monarchy and attacked the pro-parliamentary writings of Henry Parker. In this piece he supported the English model of monarchical government over the republican model advocated by Parker and argued that the Monarchy of Britain and Ireland was one which had a self-limited, moderated, sovereignty (in the sense that it had agreed to raise money and to legislate in a certain number of limited ways) and that Parliament was a subordinate institution to the Crown, which shared in the governance of the kingdom, but not in the sovereign power itself.126

Prior to the exile, therefore, Bramhall had already established himself as one of the leading propagandists and intellectual champions of royalism, and he was to continue his activities in this field throughout the 1650s. As part of these quarrels, be they with Catholics or Protestants, Bramhall produced a number of pieces condemning the writings of his intellectual adversaries throughout the 1650s, in which he defended the tenets of the Anglican religion and, by extension, the Church of England and the Church of Ireland, championed the cause of the ante-bellum Monarchy and also attacked the political philosophies advanced by those he was in dispute with. Accordingly, during his exile he was involved in a number of public disputes with the likes of Thomas Hobbes, as well as with a number of Irish and English Catholic theologians who sought to use the difficult predicament that the Anglican Church found itself in during this decade to the advantage of their religion.127 Of course, this defence of Anglicanism was central to the defence of royalism, at least for many of the Anglican Protestant royalists who were in exile, as


they claimed it was the legally-established religion in both England and Ireland. They were also the Churches of which Charles II, as part of his assertion of his right to the Stuart thrones, claimed to be the head of. There can be little doubt, moreover, that all of these pro-Anglican works were at least partly-conceived of by Bramhall as defences of the royalist cause. In early March 1652, for instance, he sent two such pieces to Ormonde and Charles II, one being a defence of the Church of England against the charge of schism from the true Church (i.e. the Catholic Church), in order to get their approval for them. Commenting on his writings, he stated that he thought these particular works ‘...will [sic] say more than hath been yet said in that cause in defence of our Kings and Church,...’128

Such efforts on the part of the Bishop of Derry were not unappreciated by a particular coterie within the Stuart Court. News that he was to defend Anglicanism against the attacks of adherents to the Catholic faith, for instance, cheered some royalists in the spring of 1652. Edward Hyde, Charles II’s Lord Chancellor, also complimented Bramhall on another of his works in early January 1659 and encouraged him to continue.129 This is hardly surprising. The defence of the Church most closely associated with the royalist cause and the challenging of those who were perceived as the intellectual assailants of traditional English ‘mixed’ monarchy was never going to be unwelcome to supporters of the Stuarts such as Hyde. Clearly, persons who had what historians of the Stuarts would categorise as ‘old royalist’ leanings were going to be sympathetic to this prelate’s line of argumentation.

Bramhall, then, was doing more than just defending royalism and Anglicanism against attack. He was defending a particular brand of royalism; one which chimed well with the views of Ormonde, Hyde and the like. This is important to recognise because one of the curious features of his defence of royalism generally, and of the Anglican religion specifically, was that it frequently involved meeting challenges posed by persons who were also advocates of the royalist cause. This is certainly true of his attacks on the philosophy of Hobbes.130 It was also equally true of his defences

128 HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), Bramhall to Ormonde, 9 March 1652, p. 263.
130 I do not intend to go into the debate between Hobbes and Bramhall here as it has been more than sufficiently covered by more than capable scholars. Also, the debate between these two in the 1650s arose accidentally and neither interlocutor intended their discourse to go public. As such, Bramhall
of Anglicanism from the attacks of certain Catholics. One of Bramhall’s major disputants in the 1650s was Father Peter Talbot; a priest who simultaneously sought to advance the Stuarts’ political cause and to demonstrate that Protestantism, and the Anglican Church in particular, had never been valid. So insistent was he on the last point, he took his arguments on this to the printing presses on two occasions, producing *A Treatise of the Nature of Catholic Faith and Heresie, with Reflexion upon the Nullitie of the English Protestant Church and Clergy…* in 1657 and, in 1659, *The nullity of the prelatique clergy, and Church of England further discovered…* Here he argued that the Church of England had no spiritual inspiration underpinning it but instead was the product of temporal considerations. Furthermore, he strongly implied that the overthrow of the monarchy in Britain and Ireland was the product of Protestantism, arguing that the attack of Luther and those reformers who came after him set a template which the English Parliament followed. In addition, he claimed the Church of England had served the Monarchy badly, as it had only sheltered the various sects that drove the English revolution forward.131

The first of these works by Talbot inspired Bramhall to the defence of his own Church, as did reports of events in the exiled Court itself. He wrote and published, in 1658, *The consecration and succession, of Protestant bishops justified, the Bishop of Duresme vindicated, and that infamous fable of the ordination at the Nagges head clearly confuted…* As he pointed out in his introduction to this work, he had written it because, aside from it being an attack on the Anglican religion, it had also been put about:


131 Peter Talbot, *A Treatise of the Nature of Catholic Faith and Heresie, with Reflexion upon the Nullitie of the English Protestant Church and Clergy…* (Rouen, 1657), preface, pp. vi-vii. Ibid, p. 67. Peter Talbot, *The nullity of the prelatique clergy, and Church of England further discovered in answer to the plaine prevarication, or vaine presumption of D. John Bramhall in his booke, intituled, The consecration and succession of Protestant bishops justified, …*(Antwerp, 1659). The second piece was Talbot’s response to Bramhall’s refutation of his first work, more of which below.
In other words, while Bramhall’s dispute with Talbot largely arose out of a disagreement over the history of the Church of England, it also drew part of its motivation from the factional division of the late 1650s over the policy to be followed by the Crown with regards to recovering power in Britain and Ireland. Bramhall claimed he was being accused of damaging the interest of Talbot and, by implicit extension, the Duke of York because he had been bested in a theological dispute in front of the King. This paper was Bramhall’s response both to the claim of his being bested and to the accusation of subsequent political pettiness. It thus partly amounted to a political defence of the opposition to Talbot in 1658 and to the pro-Anglican leanings of the old royalist faction.

Indeed, the defence of the politics of the latter faction in this piece went even further. In his response to Talbot’s argument that Charles I would have done well to abandon the Church of England, he sought to tie his defence of Anglicanism to the memory of that monarch. In doing so he venerated both the dead King and the royalist cause. The martyred monarch had always defended the Church, he claimed,

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132 John Bramhall, *The consecration and succession of Protestant bishops justified, the Bishop of Daresme vindicated, and that infamous fable of the ordination at the Nagges head clearly confuted* (Gravenhugh, 1658), p. 5. This was later published in London as part of a composite work of some of Bramhall’s writings. John Bramhall, *The Church of England defended in two treatises against the Fabulous and Slanderous imputations cast upon her in those two points: Of Succession of Bishops and Schism* (London, 1659).

133 Talbot’s response to this work contained amongst its arguments a denial of the story of the dispute before Charles II and instead claimed that the Anglican Bishop of Derry had been told this by persons opposed to Talbot in a blatant attempt to poison his pen further. Peter Talbot, *The nullity of the prelatique clergy, and Church of England further discovered*, preface, p. ix.
and had reason on his side when he did so. The Bishop went on to state ‘that [this] wise Prince would not have much regarded your [i.e. Talbot’s] positive conclusions, upon hearsay premises’. He did not end there. Having tied the defence of Anglicanism and the royalist cause together, Bramhall went on to tie them both to the constitution and laws of England. Charles I, he said, could not have justly destroyed the Anglican clergy as, aside from being divinely ordained, they held their offices under the laws of England. This of course, was an implicit claim that the Church of England, outlawed by then powers-that-were in London, was in fact the established Church under the laws of England. It also set Charles I and his heirs up as the proper dispensers of justice within that Kingdom and thus was another restatement of the Stuart right to rule.134

The same was true of his other writings in defence of Anglicanism. In response to the attacks of an English Jesuit, John Sergeant, specifically, *Schism Disarm'd* and *Schism Dispatcht*, Bramhall wrote *Schism guarded, and beaten back upon the right owners*. While being another defence of Anglicanism against Catholic criticisms, the work was, like his previous efforts, more than a theological piece. Its politics were clear, and not just in its defence of the royal Church. In the introduction, when summing up what the aim of the tract was, Bramhall stated that the question before him was:

The true controversy is, whether the Bishop of Rome ought by divine right to have the external regiment of the English Church, and coactive jurisdiction in English Courts, over English subjects, *against the will of the King and the laws of the kingdom* [my italics].135

Once again, while defending Anglicanism, Bramhall was also implicitly, though nonetheless clearly, asserting that the proper government of England was vested in a King, supported by the laws and constitution of the kingdom. This he undoubtedly conceived to be (if the Serpent-salve is anything to go by) pro-monarchical in nature.

Aside from the predictably pro-royalist content of his not insignificant output, however, what is most noticeable about his assorted publications is that Bramhall was able to have his works published in England throughout the 1650s. Many of these writings were first printed on the Continent before they were published in Britain. Nevertheless, despite the fact that they received their initial public exposure on that landmass, these works were primarily intended for an English reading public. This is not only attested to by the fact that so much of his works during this decade were re-published in London. *Schism guarded* was initially published in Gravenhagh, in the Netherlands, in 1658 and was only later published in London, along with *The consecration and succession of Protestant bishops justified*, as part of a collection of his writings, entitled *The Church of England defended*. It had been initially addressed, however, to ‘the Christian readers, especially the Roman Catholics of England’. Bramhall’s writings were clearly meant to be read by those at home as defences of Anglicanism and, by extension, of royalism. They thus represent attacks upon the Interregnum regimes. It is also noteworthy, however, that his published debates with Talbot represented more than that. They are also an extension of the factional disputes within the exiled Court into England. The propaganda was not just an attack on the usurping powers; it was also opposed to those royalists who would alter royal policy.

No matter who they were aimed at, the publication of Bramhall’s writings in England is partly a testament to the relatively lax censorship policy followed by the Protectorate in Britain during the 1650s. Thanks to this, his writings managed to reach a wide audience in this time and found favour with many. There is more to their distribution at home than just this, however. Bramhall was also able to have his works published in England through his contacts with those Anglican clerics who had in some way reconciled themselves to the Interregnum regimes, and particularly to the government of Cromwell. Among the clerics he was in contact with at this time was James Ussher, the Anglican archbishop of Armagh, who at this time was in receipt of a pension from Cromwell’s regime. Contacts were maintained between the two prelates despite the fact that both Bramhall and Ussher had clashed with each other.

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Relations were not just continued with those clerics who had reconciled themselves with the Interregnum regimes. They also extended themselves to include those who had gone beyond reconciliation and who were actively working for the Cromwellian Protectorate. In March 1658, for instance, Bramhall was in contact with Nicholas Barnard, the former Dean of the diocese of Ardagh in Ireland, on the question of getting one of his papers printed in England. Barnard had been part of Bramhall’s clerical and political faction in Ireland during the 1630s, but had actually been serving as Oliver Cromwell’s almoner and chaplain since the early 1650s. This did not prevent him from aiding the displaced Bishop in getting his works attacking Thomas Hobbes printed, however.\footnote{DNB, vol. II, p. 385. The work in question here was the ‘*Castigations of Mister Hobbes his last animadversions...*’. This was a reply to Hobbes’ 1656 work, ‘*Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance*’. DNB, vol. IX, p. 935. HMC, Hastings Mss (vol. IV), Bramhall to Barnard, 11 March 1658, pp. 96-7.} In this particular case Barnard acted as an intermediary between Bramhall and his London publisher. At the same time the former Dean of Ardagh was aiding Bramhall in his research and scholarly activities. Specifically, Bramhall was seeking Barnard’s aid in obtaining information on one of his intellectual adversaries, the Roman Catholic controversialist, John Sergeant. This was not the only case of such assistance to each other, as Bramhall corresponded with Cromwell’s almoner on other religious questions also.\footnote{Ibid. John Vesey, *The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God, John Bramhall, D. D., vol. I*, Bramhall to Barnard, undated, pp. xcviii-ci.}

Here Bramhall’s activities paralleled Elizabeth Butler’s in her labours to recover a share of the family patrimony. He too took advantage of his personal network, particularly his pre-war connections to certain key persons, to achieve his goals; in this case propagandising on the Crown and its Church. As with Lady Ormonde, moreover, political divisions and new loyalties to particular regimes and individuals did not stop Bramhall’s old acquaintances from assisting him. The new element here was that persons such as Barnard, in aiding Bramhall, was effectively working against the regime that employed him, whereas the examples of such aid to
Elizabeth Butler were almost purely personal or familial in nature and could be represented as acts of charity and apolitical. In one sense, of course, Barnard was on relatively safe ground in aiding Bramhall in his publishing career during these years. Helping someone attack Hobbes, or Catholic apologists such as Sergeant or Talbot, was hardly likely to earn the opprobrium of Oliver Cromwell. On the other hand, these writings of Bramhall were more than just attacks on particular, and unpopular, views. As we have seen, these were also conceived of as defences of both royalism and Anglicanism and, as such, Barnard was taking somewhat of a risk by assisting in the writing of these works, in and in helping to have them printed in England.

What is even more noteworthy is that Bramhall could use contacts with someone who was, in many ways, hand-in-glove with the English Interregnum regime par excellence (the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell) to actually challenge it and also to defend the administration that it had replaced within the one of the disputed kingdoms. It has to be said that Barnard, as a former Anglican cleric, was in all likelihood sympathetic to Bramhall’s arguments and was probably more than willing to help in their articulation. It is important to note, nonetheless, that the networks of the exiles in question could and did allow them to gain the assistance of persons who were in some sense dependant upon the Cromwellian Protectorate to challenge the very same regime. Through such activities and with such assistance, moreover, they were able to remind persons in England of the claims that the Stuarts continued to make upon the loyalty of the population there. In short, these writings by Bramhall and others helped to remind people that there was an alternative regime abroad, just waiting for the opportunity to return.

**Finance, the Irish Courtiers, and the government in exile**

Propaganda and intellectual argument did not comprise the sum total of the exiles political activities at home. Some of their most important exploits at home revolved around the gathering of one key resource; money. It has previously been stated in this work that, even while in exile, the Stuart Court did attempt to collect funds from its supporters in its lost kingdoms. To return to one example we have already referred to from the late 1650s, royalist supporters in England would not pay money to the Court unless the demands observed traditional legal forms and the documentation requesting the money bore the proper royal seals. It has been pointed out that this refusal to give over money also amounted to an implicit
acknowledgement of the traditional financial prerogatives of the exiled Stuarts.\textsuperscript{141} Despite the failure in this specific case, however, the Stuart Court did in fact manage to levy funds from royalists in Britain and Irish exiles were central to this gathering of revenue. In early 1655, at a time when the Stuarts were seeking money to pay for the journey of the Duke of Gloucester and his train from Paris to Cologne, Lord Hatton was to report that he had seen a letter which indicated that enough money had been collected in England to meet the expense involved. This was not just an idle rumour. On 23 April of that year Radcliffe was to write to Nicholas with a report that the Countess of Sunderland, a kinswoman of his, had told a mutual friend that money was sent from England to the Duke’s Paris-based tutor, a mister Lovell, in order to cover the expenses of Gloucester’s trip (though it appears that Lovell was actually rather reluctant to surrender this money to the King’s service). In a later letter from Radcliffe on the question of funds from England, this mutual friend turned out to be Radcliffe’s wife, cousin to the self-same Countess. This second missive also bore the news that, if desired, more funds could feasibly be procured from the same source in order to cover the living expenses of the young Duke in Cologne.\textsuperscript{142}

The proposed provision of funds for Gloucester was not just a one-off. Funds did come from England relatively frequently and the King himself benefited from this revenue flow. Reports going back to London stated that over the two-year period encompassing the years 1653 and 1654, Charles II had received 14 - 15,000 pounds per annum out of England. Amongst those who reportedly brought this money to the King was Gilbert Talbot, who supposedly conveyed some eighteen hundred pounds out of that country during late 1652/1653. Radcliffe also played more than just a fleeting part in transferring these funds to the Crown, being used as a conduit for funds (some two thousand livres) due from George Carteret to the Court in Cologne in mid-1655.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{141} See pp. 212-3, above.
Such moneys, of course, were in part comprised of donations freely given and may not be properly considered taxes, or indeed, royal levies. It should be remembered, nonetheless, that many of the Court’s claims for funds were frequently based on traditional government prerogatives and followed traditional administrative practices and thus can be seen as an attempt to assert its right to tax its followers. The Court, moreover, did actually manage to get over the problem of persons failing to provide funds because requests were not made in proper legal fashion. This it did through the simple device of fashioning proper royal seals and moneys were gathered in with ‘valid’ documents that bore these official stamps as a result. The attention of the reader has already been drawn to early 1658, at the time of the aforementioned aborted attempt to organise a rebellion in England, when one royalist agent was writing to Hyde from there asking that more privy seals be sent, as the shortage of them was hindering the procurement of funds. The money he had already collected using those seals was used in the attempt to organise the previously referred to attempted rebellion of 1658. Once again, though, despite the increased availability of privy seals by the late 1650s, it still was not easy to get money from the Monarchy’s supporters. As it became increasingly obvious to all that there would be no rising in 1658, it was reported to the royal Court that it was becoming increasingly difficult to collect these levies.144

It is clear from this that many royalist agents, including Irish exiles such as Talbot and Radcliffe, were involved in these informal tax-gathering initiatives, either as the collectors of these sums, or as the contact person of the collectors within the royal Court. The evidence suggests that the exiled Court was at its most active in raising funds in the Commonwealth when there was a plot afoot there. Such activities caught the attention of the Cromwellian regime and did not go uncommented upon. In a speech to the Parliament of 1655, Cromwell remarked that royalist letters, with privy seals, had been issued to prominent persons in order to collect money from them. For the most part, there is some indication that these efforts to collect funds in 1655, like those of three years later, did meet with some success. Hatton’s comments, mentioned previously in relation to the removal of the Duke of Gloucester from Paris, date from this very time. As Hatton and Radcliffe had to borrow 5000 livres to cover

the expense of that particular journey, it suggests that a sizeable sum was collected in England. Following that, a certain Robert Halsall was collecting funds in England on the Crown’s behalf for the express purpose of using them to finance a proposed rebellion in Scotland in 1656.145

One should be careful not to dismiss these efforts at money gathering as only being typical of the period in or immediately before a royalist rebellion, however. The eighteen hundred pounds previously referred to as being brought into the Court by Gilbert Talbot was collected during a period when there was no great royalist outbreak in England. The flow of such funds to the Court remained a constant during the exile. Between 1654 and 1656, when Charles II and his Courtiers were to be found in Cologne, it is clear that one of their most notable sources of income while there came in the form of contributions from English royalists. The failure of 1655 did not change this. Mid-1656 saw London merchants being approached for sums by a Crown agent. These advances were not rebuffed and money was forthcoming, at least initially. Later on, however, excuses for not paying were being given to the agent by the selfsame merchants. They could not pay, they claimed, because they had been damaged by (ironically enough) privateering and exorbitant taxes. Once again, though, the refusal to pay was not based on a claim that the Crown lacked authority to gather such moneys. Fund-raising also continued after the failed attempt to organise a rising in early 1658. Efforts to collect funds for the King in England continued throughout that year, in spite of the failure to organise an insurrection, and these labours did meet with some success.146

**Promoting military resistance, risings and political instability in the three former Stuart kingdoms: the royalist rebellions in the Stuart kingdoms**

Important as these funds and these efforts at gathering were though, it was not the main thrust of their contacts with Britain and Ireland. There was still a more

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pressing reason to maintain contacts with home and to an extent the collection of funds was designed to forward this purpose. This was the need to pursue the goal of initiating or supporting armed action against the Interregnum regimes within the former Stuart kingdoms. The most obvious reasons for doing this have already been mentioned in the early part of this chapter. Aside from those, however, there was also a need to demonstrate the ability to interfere in events at home in order to attract international allies. It has been established that one of the factors that made the exiled royalists attractive as potential allies was that they could potentially destabilise an English Commonwealth which was to become increasingly aggressive on the international stage as the 1650s wore on. The royalists themselves realised this. We have seen that in January 1656, when Charles II was seeking to form an alliance with Spain one of the potential inducements offered to the Spanish was the fact that the Stuarts had many adherents in Britain and Ireland. When making this offer the latter country was particularly singled out, on the grounds that it had a very discontented population, as well as many good ports for staging an invasion. On the other hand, the clear corollary of this was that failure to initiate a rebellion at home would make the Stuarts and their adherents less attractive as potential partners. The failure to initiate a rebellion after the death of Oliver Cromwell in mid-1658, to cite one case, caused the Spanish to question their royalist allies about the calm that existed in Britain and Ireland.\footnote{AGR, Secrétairerie d’Etat et De Guerre, Philip IV to Leopold William, Registre 260, 5 January 1656, f 260. The Calendar of Clarendon State papers, vol. IV, Bennett to Hyde, 30 October 1658, p. 102. See p. 349, above.} For these reasons, therefore, the Stuart Court frequently attempted to initiate rebellions in various parts of the Commonwealth and also sought to take advantage of discontent with the Interregnum regimes within Britain and Ireland. Once again, the Irish exiled elite were frequently involved in these efforts to promote insurrections at home and such labours on their part were not just confined to the island of Ireland. Indeed, more often than not they found themselves engaged in this task either in England or Scotland, and only rarely, if ever, engaged in the Stuarts’ western kingdom.

Attempts to promote uprisings in Britain occurred relatively frequently during the 1650s. From late 1657 onwards, for instance, there were major efforts made to promote a rebellion against the Cromwellian Protectorate in England. It was hoped
that this uprising would be quite widespread, and would lead to the securing of a
number of eastern and southern ports. Once this was done, so the plan went, then
Charles II’s troops in the Spanish Netherlands could, with Spanish logistical aid, sail
to England to support the rebellion. In late December 1657 the exiled royalists were
actually quite hopeful that their plan would be successful and Charles II wrote to the
governor of the Spanish Netherlands informing him that they were ready to secure
three harbour towns, as well as two inland towns, and all they needed was a firm
commitment of support from Spain. In an effort to further this scheme, Charles II
stated that he had ordered both the Earl of Bristol and Ormonde to liaise with the
Spanish governor on the issue.148

Ormonde was to do more than just act as an agent to Don Juan on this issue,
however. He, along with another Irish Courtier, Sir Daniel O’Neill, was to act as a
liaison between the exiled Court and the would-be rebels in England, with both he and
O’Neill visiting that country clandestinely in 1658. Throughout the 1650s, as royalist
plots and conspiracies had arisen in Britain, O’Neill had moved between the former
Stuart kingdoms and the Continent. He seems to have returned to Britain whenever
there was even a slim chance that some blow against the Interregnum regimes could
be struck. In the course of the 1650s he travelled to England on at least three
occasions. Aside from late 1657, he travelled there to gathering information on the
political situation in late 1652 and he later played a not insignificant part in the
organising of Penruddock’s rising of March 1655. This he did after arranging his own
escape from prison, having been previously captured and incarcerated by the
authorities in Dover upon his arrival there from the Continent that February.149 He
was obviously quite an experienced and inventive operator in this environment. On
the other hand, Ormonde’s ‘visit’ to England, because he was one of the leading
royalists as well as being a close confidant of the King, was an altogether more
precarious undertaking. If captured, it would have been a major embarrassment for
royalists. For this reason his voyage there was carried out with great secrecy. In early
1658 word was put out that he was travelling to Frankfurt on the King’s business and
the Court’s agents on the Continent did their best to promote this impression. These

Arthur Bryant, The Letters, Speeches, and Declarations of Charles II, Charles II to Hyde, 13 March
1655, pp. 35-7.
efforts to misdirect persons regarding Ormonde’s trip also had another purpose; namely to prepare international opinion in order to allow for the garnering of support for upcoming royalist attempt to regain power. One of the Catholic clerics associated with Charles’ Court, Peter Talbot, wrote to his Jesuit superior in Ghent telling him that Ormonde was bound for the Holy Roman Empire. He also advocated the granting of assistance to this nobleman as, despite previously circulated accounts of his anti-Catholicism, he was on business which would benefit both the Habsburgs and the Catholic religion. These efforts at misdirection were quite successful, with numerous reports being sent to the Protectorate government in London that Ormonde was bound for Frankfurt.150

The reason the Marquis travelled to England at all was because of demands being made on the exiles by those conspirators at home. Since before Penruddock’s rising in 1655 royalists there had been requesting the presence of a significant figure from the Court in England, as they believed having someone of high social status who was known to be from the Charles II’s inner circle present would inspire confidence among other would-be rebels. The Court agreed with this opinion. So much so, whenever a royalist insurrection even seemed likely, plans were made to have Charles II travel there in support. These intentions were further reinforced by the making of arrangements to send over important courtiers as well, in line with the demand from England for the presence of a leading royalist. Ormonde clearly met this criterion. Consequently, there were designs made in 1655 to send the Marquis to England in support of Penruddock’s rising and he was only prevented from going on that occasion by the King’s unwillingness to risk losing him. Instead, the Earl of Rochester travelled to England as the Court’s appointed leader of the rising, much to the disappointment of the English royalists, who would have preferred to see Ormonde.151

Returning to the plot of 1658, the Lord Lieutenant arrived in London from
Amsterdam in mid-February, by which time O’Neill was already there. The former
immediately got in contact with some of those involved in the plan for the rising and
his talks with them made it obvious to him that this insurrection scheme was, at best,
under-prepared. On 10 February he wrote to Hyde to inform the Chancellor that some
of the leaders had been arrested and that plans for the rising in Gloucestershire were
abandoned. Two days later, disappointed with what he had found, Ormonde informed
Hyde that he planned to leave London and go to Paris. He added that he would only
return to England if there was any hope of an advance being made in the preparations
for the rising and if his presence there would help to bring this about.152

Ormonde’s gloomy prognosis was not shared by all those involved. Daniel
O’Neill, for one, was of the belief that the scheme should not be abandoned so lightly
and he was supported in this by many of those conspirators who were based in
England. Soon after Ormonde left, O’Neill wrote to Hyde advocating the
continuation of the scheme, as he felt that the enemy had never been so weak in
England and had rarely had so few friends there. These arguments had some impact
on the Chancellor and he himself was to write to Ormonde on the Lord Lieutenant’s
return to France advocating the continuation of the plan. To Hyde’s pleas were added
those of some of the other conspirators in England, including such important figures
as John Mordaunt and Edward Villiers. The latter even wrote to Ormonde stating that
he had recruited two considerable members of the Presbyterian camp to the royalist
cause. The Earl of Bristol, who had been negotiating with the Spanish for their
assistance in the proposed rising in the meantime, also joined in the making of these
pleas to the Lord Lieutenant. Ormonde, nevertheless, remained firm in his objections
and would not countenance it.153

Despite these unrelenting doubts of one of the most senior of the King’s
advisors, O’Neill continued in his efforts to organise a rising and sought to get
guarantees of co-operation from assorted prominent local personages in various parts
of England. In this he received some help from Sir William Legge, a former client of
Ormonde’s from the 1640s in Ireland, and a person who had been in exile with the

153 Ibid, Villiers to Ormonde, 18 February 1658 (O. S.), p. 13. Ibid, 8 March 1658 (O. S.), p. 15. Ibid,
Mordaunt to Ormonde, 25 February 1658 (O. S.), p. 15. Ibid, Bristol to Ormonde 28 February 1658,
Court during the early part of the 1650s. O’Neill even went as far as to supply details to the exiled Court on where the King’s forces should land in March of that year. All of his efforts were successful in the short term at least, in so far as the plan for a rising was not abandoned by the exiles on the Continent, despite Ormonde’s misgivings. Hyde, for his part, remained interested in the design and in mid-March he once again wrote to the Marquis asking for more details on the situation in England.

Yet, in the end, despite O’Neill’s efforts, everything came to nought. One major hindrance to bringing the scheme to fruition was the fact that no one would rebel in England unless they were sure of assistance from the King. A necessary precondition for this, however, namely the provision of aid by the Spanish, was not going to be fulfilled until the rebellion itself commenced. The Spanish, furthermore, did not really have the necessary resources at their disposal to support an insurrection. Divisions in England amongst the potential rebels did not help either. Aside from die-hard royalists, the conspirators also included a certain number of England’s moderate Presbyterian party, and these two groups of plotters did not make for natural bedfellows. There was also a lack of certainty with regard to what the English plotters were promising to do and what they were actually capable of doing. Besides these problems, the weather took a hand, with a severe frost disrupting preparations on both sides of the North Sea. The delay in initiating the rising also caused further problems. It gave the Protectorate time to renew a blockade of Flemish ports, which it duly did in early spring and this too aided in making the scheme unfeasible. It would also seem that the plot was not exactly a complete secret either. Indeed, rumours of the royalist conspiracy were circulating by mid-March and by that stage it had become widely known that Ormonde had been in London. Finally, and almost inevitably, as a consequence of all of these impediments, the whole scheme was postponed.

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156 Ibid, Villiers (?) to Ormonde, 8 March 1658; p. 15. Ibid, O’Neill to Hyde, 3 March 1658 (O. S.), pp. 20-1. Ibid, Hyde to O’Neill, 22 March 1658; p. 25. AGR, Secrétairerie d’Etat et De Guerre, Don Juan to Philip IV, Registre 262, 27 December 1657, f 249.
The dropping of the scheme did not go down well within royalist circles and some amongst the Stuarts’ adherents, as we have seen, laid the blame at the door of persons like Hyde and Ormonde. Yet, despite the failure of the plan and the bitterness caused by it, the whole story quite clearly highlights a number of points about royalist military efforts. First and foremost, the exiled Stuart Court actively pursued its military goal of recovering its position in its original territories. It did this by attempting to initiate rebellion there and also by seeking aid for these actions from its Continental allies as well. Second of all, if one is to judge by the range of negotiations carried out by both Ormonde and O’Neill, it could seek support for such actions, theoretically at least, from a considerable range of groups within the former Stuart patrimony. This wide support base not only included the traditional cavalier community, but also members of other discontented interest groups, such as the above-mentioned moderate English Presbyterians. This more than suggests that there were many persons within the three kingdoms that made up the English Commonwealth who still felt that the Court had a right to consider itself the legitimate seat of government of those in territories. At the very least there were persons willing to support the Court’s claims to governance once it had made some concessions to their particular points of view.

Also, despite the failure of this particular scheme, the Stuart Court’s plotting was not taken lightly by the Cromwellian Protectorate. Even prior to 1658, the Venetian resident in London was reporting home that it was his belief that the regime was greatly worried by the activities of the Charles II’s partisans in the wake of the alliance with Spain. This coalition, combined with political instability at home (the ambassador was writing in the wake of ‘The Humble Petition and Advice’ of 1657, which faced great opposition from the English army) led to fears in Whitehall about royalist activities. The steps taken by the Protectorate government once it learned of the plot of 1658 must only have added weight to his opinion. Aside from the arrest of prominent royalists and the spying activities carried out against the Court, referred to above, a number of other security measures were introduced by the Cromwellians at this time, including the confinement of all papists and those who had been in arms

E.1644[2]. Charles McNeill, *The Tanner Letters*, Robert Paston to Sir William Doyly, 18 March 1658, p. 384. It is assumed that this last letter dates from 1658, as it states that Ormonde ‘...has been in town’.

158 HMC, Marquis of Bath (vol. II), Ross to Holles, 5 May 1658, p. 122.
previously to within five miles of their homes, until the 28 April. In Ireland, meanwhile, Henry Cromwell was worried enough to have house searches carried out in Dublin city. The anxieties of the Protectorate government could not have been eased by the continuing reports that it received from its intelligence officers in the Spanish Netherlands in the spring of that year, which sometimes claimed that an invasion remained not only possible, but was actually imminent. The agitation and trepidation generated by such reports at this time even found expression in rumours that the exiles had managed to invade. Adding to the Protectorate’s uncertainty at this time was the constantly re-occurring problem of growing political instability at home, created this time by the declining health and eventual death of Oliver Cromwell.\textsuperscript{159}

Finally, the collapse of a particular plot did not necessarily mean the end to royalist plotting either. The failure of the planned rising of 1658 to come to fruition did not prevent some of the conspirators from pursuing their goals. Once again Protectorate intelligence reports continued to attest to continued royalist plotting and not without reason. Armorer, for instance, was still writing to Ormonde with conspiratorial information in October of that year. The exiles also continued to push the Spanish for aid to launch an invasion.\textsuperscript{160} William Legge and Lord Wentworth were likewise maintaining contacts with potential supporters of a royalist rising on behalf of Ormonde up until December of that year, though it has to be said with little response from the Marquis. Reports of military schemes revolving around Ireland also began to circulate in royalist circles in these months after the abandonment of the early 1658 uprising, with some claiming that Muskerry and George Hamilton were planning to invade that kingdom with a force of 5000 Spanish-based Irish troops.\textsuperscript{161}


\textsuperscript{161} The Calendar of Clarendon State papers, vol. IV, Rumbold to Ormonde, 2 December 1658 (O. S.), p. 116. Ibid, Wentworth to the King, 6 October 1658, p. 90. HMC, Marquis of Bath (vol. II), Ross to Holles, 5 May 1658, p. 122.
Clearly, support for the Court’s conspiratorial military endeavours at home could be, and in fact was, found, both within and without Britain and Ireland, and accordingly the Interregnum regimes always had to face up to the strong possibility that a pro-Stuart insurgency would break out. Aside from the planned rising of late 1657/early 1658, there were a number of other such schemes during the 1650s, and some of these, unlike the above example, did come to fruition, albeit with varying levels of success. Of particular note here is the resistance continued by hardliners against Parliamentary forces in Ireland after the fall of Galway in mid-1652, the Highland rebellion in Scotland of 1653-5 (for which efforts were made to supply arms, logistic support and some personnel), Penruddock’s rising of 1655 and Booth’s rising in Cheshire in 1659. The latter insurrection, moreover, was initiated by the English Presbyterian community and was not just a cavalier royalist scheme. These schemes likewise worried the Cromwellian Protectorate and, as happened later in late 1657/early 1658, this caused Commonwealth-wide worry. To give one example, in early May 1655, in the wake of Penruddock’s rising in England, the Cromwellian regime in Ireland, in order to ensure that there were no similar incidents in Ireland, ordered that a count be made of those Papists who were in the city of Dublin, and that their names be taken.162

So, how exactly did the Court involve itself in the planning and execution of those rebellions which actually took place in Britain and Ireland, how did it support resistance to the powers in London and to what extent were the Irish Courtiers involved in these efforts? The first opportunity that came the Court’s way to aid military efforts at home came in Ireland in the wake of Galway’s surrender in the wake of the fall of the city of Galway, the last major anti-Parliamentary outpost in Ireland. Here some organised groups continued the fight against the invading forces and even after the surrender of the last of these in July 1653 guerrilla attacks and torying remained a feature of the decade. In the immediate wake of Galway’s surrender, moreover, certain small, peripheral, but hard-line, pro-royalist garrisons managed to hold out against advancing Parliamentary

forces after the fall of that city. Foremost amongst these was Inisbofin on the west coast. Troops were still holding out there against the Parliamentary commander in Connacht, Sir Charles Coote, at the end of 1652 and it was able to maintain contacts with the exiles abroad, mainly thanks to the frequently aforementioned Irish privateers. Of considerable importance here were those ships operating out of Brest, where a certain Thomas Holder, privateering agent for the Duke of York in that port, was acting as the liaison between the Court and the garrison. During the winter and spring of late 1652/early 1653 Holder sought to acquire whatever the garrison needed from the Court. These included supplies of food and arms, but it did not end there. The garrison also sought political legitimacy for its stand. Specifically, the island’s governor sought military commissions, permission to negotiate with Coote and licence to establish a court of admiralty. At the very least, Inisbofin’s garrison received the desired military commissions.

This island’s stand did inspire some hope amongst the royalist expatriate community, mainly because there were other straws in the wind which seemed to suggest that something could be done for the cause in Ireland. The request of Inisbofin’s governor for permission to talk to Coote is of some relevance here, as many felt that he, along with some of the commanders in his forces, were potential converts to the King’s side. Reports also reached the exiles of some successes scored against Parliamentary forces in the country. These were supplemented by reports of other commanders either holding out against the Parliament or taking up arms against those forces again. One of the most notable of these was Murtagh

O’Brien. He was still active at the end of 1653 and the Court, in conjunction with ‘a congregation of jansenists’, made (unsuccessful) efforts to provide him with supplies. In addition, the Crown also sent agents into Ireland to stir up the country there and blank commissions were sent into the kingdom for those who requested them.\textsuperscript{166}

Yet, all these efforts at resistance in Ireland were ultimately small, sporadic, uncoordinated and inconsequential, however. Despite the enthusiasm first engendered in the Court by them, it was soon realised that they had no chance of succeeding. By early 1653 communications had begun to break down with Ireland and the Court was struggling to find a way to maintain them. It was also increasingly reluctant to commit resources to Inisbofin and a request to send the frigates the Patrick (which, as noted previously, had come into royalist service through Inchiquin) and the Francis to that island was refused. Instead the Court began to warn its adherents that it did not expect the island garrison to hold out much longer and by the following spring news reached Hyde that it had fallen. There was only one positive for the Court out of the whole venture and that was the identification of Charles Coote and his coterie as potential allies and it is fair to say that, even in the wake of the fall of Inisbofin the Court sought to take advantage of this information, with efforts being made to convert him and others to the royalist cause as early as 1654.\textsuperscript{167}

Though some contacts were maintained with those royalists still active in Ireland, Inisbofin and the other scattered efforts in Ireland were quickly surpassed in importance by a new outbreak of royalist resistance; this time in Highland Scotland. Prior to the alliance with Spain the most sustained military initiative taken by the Stuart Court was this Highland rebellion, known as Glencairn’s rebellion. It came about as a result of an initiative taken in the Highlands in November 1652, when clan chiefs there, resentful at Parliamentary policies designed to pacify the area, made contact with Charles II. This offer became the subject of extended consultations


amongst the King’s council in Paris, a body which at this time included both Ormonde and Inchiquin, and led to the decision that, if the Highland Scots were willing, the Earl of Glencairn should temporarily command a royalist rising there until a more established Scottish royalist soldier, the Earl of Middleton, could come over from the Netherlands to take control. 168 Ironically enough, whereas the exiled Irish elite seem to have had little to do with royalist resistance in Ireland in the early part of the decade (only their privateering vessels seem to have been drawn upon) they did play a much more considerable part in supporting the Scottish insurrection.

One possible explanation for this is that these figures were less divisive outside of their own country then they were within it. After all, Ormonde and his clique had been initially inspired to withdraw from Ireland by the opposition they faced within it. Getting them centrally re-involved in Irish affairs at that stage may have been potentially damaging to the royalist interest there. In contrast, Glencairn’s rising was a very acceptable movement to the exiled Court, having more in common with traditional royalism than with the strain of pro-Covenant political thought previously represented by the Kirk party in Scotland. This would have made it easier for many of those at Court to participate in it. It may also have gained more of their aid simply because it was a bigger affair; one that even re-awakened the possibility that the King and his leading courtiers would return to Scotland to lead it. 169 Whatever the reason, a number of the Irish exiles found themselves involved in it, most notably Daniel O’Neill, Edward Wogan and George Hamilton. The aid provided to the rebels in Scotland by these three can be divided into three different categories: acting as conduits for information, fighting with the insurrectionists and finally providing the means for the insurrectionists to fight.

In acting as a conduit for information O’Neill was acting in accordance with his main role concerning relations with Britain and Ireland: gathering intelligence for the Court on the situation at home and advancing conspiracies there. Some of this he did himself, by embarking on the previously-referred to secret missions to Britain.


This activity made him into the physical and approachable link in the line of communication linking royalists in Britain to those in exile. This was further supplemented, however, through the use of a network of contacts and ‘friends’ (the label applied to O’Neill’s connections by one source) to acquire information. His information-gathering mission to England in late-1652 had proven so successful partly because, in the words of one of the Republic’s spies, ‘he acts cunningly by two or three instruments’. These activities and his range of contacts further contributed to his being a pivot point in the transmission of information to and from the Court. Overall, it was a useful service, both for those royalists abroad, who obviously gained knowledge of what was going on through O’Neill and for those providing the information from home. They were able, through this gentleman, to influence opinions held at Court and to consequently impact on decisions taken there. As he was to do later on in early 1658, O’Neill transmitted the opinions of those involved in initiating the royalist action in Scotland to those who supported it from abroad. By this means those in Scotland were able to inform the Court of key concerns of theirs, including who amongst the exiles they wanted to have dealings with. It was in this manner (i.e. through O’Neill, who was then in the United Provinces) that the Scottish insurgents were able to let the Court know in March 1654 that they were willing to accept the Duke of York as a commander but that they took exception to Prince Rupert.

O’Neill’s role, though useful, was indirect and the evidence suggests that he was less involved in this rising than he was in others. Wogan, in contrast, was much more hands on in his aid to the Scottish royalists. He actually travelled there to fight. Wogan had gone into exile with Ormonde but had been one of the few Irish exiles who managed to journey to Scotland to fight with Charles II during the alliance

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170 The reader is also reminded that O’Neill carried out this task on one other occasion during the Interregnum: in the run-up to Penruddock’s rising of March 1655. Donal F. Cregan, ‘An Irish Cavalier: Daniel O’Neill in Exile and Restoration, 1651-64’, pp. 42–61. See also, pp. 389-91, below.


172 There is some suggestion that he was not the only exile to do so. For one, Captain Walter Dongan was recommended for favour to Sir Edward Nicholas in mid-1655 as a kinsman of Ormonde’s. It was also stated that he had commanded the English troop in Scotland and that Middleton desired that favour should be shown to him. BL Eg. Mss 2535, Peter Mews to Nicholas, 4 May 1655, ff. 163-4.
with the Scottish Presbyterians. Having returned to France after Worcester, the outbreak of the Glencairn rebellion afforded him the opportunity to return to Britain to fight and he took it. Initially he travelled to London in November 1653, where he put together a body of twenty-one mounted royalists. They then journeyed north to Scotland with him at the end of that month, collecting more men along the way. Eventually, numbering roughly 100 souls, they arrived in Glencairn’s camp. This adventurous undertaking caused great excitement amongst the exiles. Hyde referred to it as being as great a romance ‘as has been enacted in our time’ and rumours began to circulate about Wogan’s deeds. Most strikingly, it was being reported that he had ‘mounted five hundred gentlemen in London’ and had got them to come with him. Useful as this march may have been for morale, it also seems that Wogan performed some constructive military services, as he put together a horse regiment and led raids into lowland Scotland. All this time he managed to maintain contacts with the exiled Court, informing Hyde early in 1654 that while morale was good, arms and ammunition were wanting. It was to prove to be a short-lived adventure, however, as Wogan was killed in a skirmish in early February 1654.173

Short as it was, Wogan’s expedition had been somewhat useful. It had, by bringing royalists north from the southern Kingdom, created links between royalists from two different territories. The mission had also reinforced the insurgency and lifted morale. Information, which was confirmed by further reports later in the year, relating to the requirements of the Scottish royalists had also been passed on to the exiles. The next step for the Court was to make efforts to remedy this shortage of arms, as well as to supplement the resources available to the insurgents in other ways, including acquiring further troops to aid Glencairn and Middleton.174 A client and relative of Ormonde’s, Sir George Hamilton, was employed in this task. He was chosen because, in many ways, he was perfectly placed to lead these efforts. First, he and his family had established contacts with those the Irish and British persons who


made up part of the Jansenist community in France. As noted earlier, this community had already aided the Crown in providing succour for royalist combatants in Ireland. Hamilton also had previous experience in the efforts to ship money and arms to Britain and Ireland. On top of this, the troops that the Court hoped to send into Scotland were former Irish royalist soldiers, who were then residing in Ulster. This province was where Hamilton’s traditional power-base was to be found, as he had been a landowner in Donalong, near Strabane, in county Tyrone, prior to the civil wars and his connections there meant that he had a good chance of being able to influence the soldiers in question. More noteworthy still were his Scottish origins. George Hamilton was a younger son of the Scottish, and Protestant, Earl of Abercorn and he still had family members residing in that kingdom, including his brother, William.\footnote{See pp. 88-9, 91n & 110-1, above. Michael Wasser, ‘Hamilton, James, first earl of Abercorn (1575-1618)’, \emph{Oxford Dictionary of National Biography}. \emph{The Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. II}, papers in the handwriting of Sir George Hamilton, 1654, pp. 457-8.}

In brief, George Hamilton was chosen by the Crown to carry out this task partly for traditional reasons. Though exiled, this gentleman was still a trusted member of the social elite in the relevant localities and in seeking to use him to have its will carried out in those places the Crown was operating according to a traditional strategy for governance. There were other factors behind the choice of Hamilton than just his place of origin, however. His place of origin, his own religion, his kinship links to significant social figures of a different religion, his Irish connections, his links to the exiled Court and his associations in France all meant that he was perfectly positioned to tie a number of geographically and ideologically diverse networks together for the benefit of the Scottish royalists. Through him, persons from different kingdoms and of different religious backgrounds could co-operate in the channelling of resources from one place to another.

Consequently, Hamilton received orders in July 1654 detailing what was expected of him with regard to Scotland. He was ordered to that kingdom, where he was to use all means possible to gain assistance for Middleton. He was, moreover, to communicate with his own family and deliver a message from King to Duchess of Hamilton. If necessary, he was then to journey into Ireland and attempt to persuade Catholic troops previously levied for Foreign Service there to go to Scotland instead.
Finally, he was given orders for Middleton. Specifically, he was to ask him to raise money to pay for the arms and ammunition that Charles II was attempting to secure for his Scottish supporters. He was also to instruct him that the King wished that those men-of-war who were not at sea with his commissions would take up positions that would facilitate the supplying of the royalist army.176

Hamilton never succeeded in getting to Scotland, probably being permanently delayed by reports of the military setbacks then being inflicted on Middleton by General George Monck. That said, however, the letters entrusted to Hamilton from the Court for the Duchess of Hamilton, Middleton and Glencairn were delivered. In addition, Hamilton’s efforts to acquire supplies and soldiers for Scotland continued after the summer of 1654. It should be point out here that the pursuit of these troops was no idle dream. Irish forces had already aided royalist efforts in Scotland during the 1640s and the possibilities it could offer were too great to overlook this time around. As a result, efforts were made to re-establish these contacts, with Middleton being sounded out about the possibility of his bringing some Irish priests with him to Scotland so that correspondence could be initiated with the neighbouring western island. Conversely, from the Protectorate’s point of view the threat of this link being re-forged was a cause of great concern. So much so, specific security measures were taken to prevent it.177

In all of his efforts George Hamilton was assisted by a Jansenist priest, Father Malachy Kelly, an influential figure within the Jansenist community and a person not without influence on the international stage, having previously been a confessor to the then Queen of Poland. Kelly was informed By Charles II of Hamilton’s efforts to acquire troops for Scottish service in mid-1654 and the priest was ordered to aid the gentleman in this chore. He was to do this by assisting in the acquisition of both arms and the shipping necessary to bring Irish troops into Scotland. Initially Hamilton was delighted with the help that Kelly provided and he persuaded Ormonde to get a letter of credence for him from the King, which was duly supplied. Soon, however,

problems arose for both of them. First, money became an issue. Hamilton found that transportation from France would prove to be prohibitively costly, so it was decided to attempt to ship arms from Liege instead, being both cheaper and not requiring a licence. Internal French politics then interfered, however. Kelly’s association with Jansenism now proved to be a drawback as this ‘sect’ was suspected of supporting Cardinal De Retz. Unfortunately for Hamilton, this association meant that the increasingly-helpful Kelly now ran the danger of being banished as a supporter of enemy of the French King. To stave this off, Sir George sought a further letter of credence for Kelly from Charles II, which he hoped would prevent such a possibility from happening. The letter, written by Ormonde in mid-summer and addressed to other clerics with Jansenist leanings, was duly sent. But, it availed Hamilton nothing as all his efforts to avoid failure did not meet with success. Nothing came of either his scheme or, ultimately, of the Glencairn rebellion.

The collapse of Hamilton’s efforts serves to highlight the numerous hurdles that the exiled Court had to surmount when attempting to assist its own adherents at home. The distances involved, the relative unwieldiness of any mechanisms it had for providing aid, local political considerations, combined with its own lack of resources, all went to hinder the Court’s efforts in this area. Making matters worse still was the reality that all of the Interregnum regimes had considerable military resources at their disposal, which they could use to suppress revolt. It was no different for Scotland. Monck’s campaign in that kingdom, beginning in mid-1654, eventually proved fatal to royalist hopes there. Though it took until 1655 to end all resistance, the exiled Court was hearing negative reports from Scotland as early as autumn 1654. The Crown had one major advantage working in its favour though. A royalist revolt could potentially break out anywhere in the three-kingdom nexus. The proof of this came towards the end of 1654. Just as Glencairn’s revolt was winding down, moves for a

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new insurrection that would take its place started to happen in England. In November 1654 the Court was approached by a group of royalists from England, who were proposing to launch a royalist rebellion there. These men were members of the so-called ‘action party’; a group of persons who had become discontented with the organisation which was normally entrusted with forwarding royalist action in England, the sealed knot.\(^{180}\)

The events of the rising itself are not of great interest to us here. Suffice to say that it eventually took place after much struggle. Royalist Presbyterians, who were unwilling to get involved until the King made a declaration regarding future government, amongst other things, had to be won over, as did members of the sealed knot. Royal uncertainty and a lack of clear direction from that part was also a hindrance. Eventually, the insurrection took place in early March 1655, only to prove to be a complete failure.\(^{181}\) Of much greater concern is how, and how effectively, the diverse groups were reconciled, as Daniel O’Neill was centrally involved in this. After his successful escape from prison in Dover, O’Neill arrived in London in late February. Finding that the Protectorate’s intelligence system had disrupted much of the preparations, his initial assessment of the situation was gloomy. Yet, convinced by the leaders of the action party that a rising could be successful and armed with letters from the King requesting the leaders of the sealed knot and the English Presbyterians to join in the plot, O’Neill eventually threw his weight behind the scheme. 8 March was then set as the date for the outbreak of hostilities. Having thus altered his position, this adventurer, in conjunction with Rochester and his own long-time associate, Nicholas Armor, immediately involved himself in negotiations with diverse groups of Stuart supporters. The Court’s representatives initially set themselves the task of convincing pro-royalist Presbyterians to throw their lot in with the action party. To do this they had to get around the demands of this group, as they were reluctant to move without first gaining concessions on liberty of conscience, a declaration promising a form of government that would limit the royal prerogative.

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and assurances that objectionable advisors would not be employed as councillors to
the King. For some English Presbyterians, Ormonde was amongst those figures they
wanted to see excluded. O’Neill himself had little sympathy for the Presbyterians’
position, but he and his associates successfully overcame this obstacle and
incorporated this interest into the scheme, without actually making any concessions to
their political programme. Subsequently, despite the reservations of some of its
leading figures, the sealed knot was brought into the plan as well.182

O’Neill did not keep the fruits of these negotiations to himself, but instead
informed those around Charles II of their outcome. That said, however, he was not
prompt in doing so. The letters he wrote to the King detailing his actions were either
written on the day that the uprising was due to commence, or were composed the day
after. It was hardly much warning to the Court of English developments, especially
when one considers that Charles II hoped to travel to England to join his adherents
there. To add to the sin, O’Neill advised the King that he should consider
withdrawing Irish troops from French service to support the rising. Yet, this was not
something that, given the amount of notice of developments the exiles were getting,
could have been achieved anywhere near fast enough. Word of O’Neill’s actions in
his negotiations only reached Ormonde a week after the rising commenced and all he
knew then was that Rochester and other leaders had been sent into the English
provinces to begin preparations and that there was a possibility that Lord Fairfax
might join with the insurgents. Four days later, As if to further highlight O’Neill’s
failure to communicate, Ormonde was to report to Nicholas that he had learned from a
letter written by the Dutch ambassador to England that Cromwell had taken measures
to secure key garrisons. Aside from that, the Marquis had no other news to report.
Others were just as much in the dark, with some of the exiles writing letters to
Nicholas at this time, in which they repeated wild rumours of developments in

182 Arthur Bryant, *The Letters, Speeches, and Declarations of Charles II*, Charles II to Hyde, 13 March
1655, pp. 35-7. Donal F. Cregan, ‘An Irish Cavalier: Daniel O’Neill in Exile and Restoration, 1651-
Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, vol. II*, Heads of a declaration proposed to be issued by the
Presbyterians to Charles II, 27 May 1653 (O. S.), p. 211.
England, including sundry reports that Charles II had actually landed in Hull. By that stage, however, the rising was as good as quashed.

O’Neill’s role as the physical link that connected up and co-ordinated all the diverse threads of royalist plotting was somewhat successfully carried out in this instance, in so far as he successfully united diverse groups together and got the rising to take place. There were also obvious, and great, failings in the way he filled out this role, however. The collapse of the rising can be partly put down to him, as he was too easily convinced in the first place that it could succeed; a problem that, judging by his attitude in early 1658, did not resolve itself with time. His lack of regard for punctually informing the Court of developments in England was another serious shortcoming. It contributed to pushing all of the conspirators into a poorly-prepared rising and it effectively broke the link between the insurrectionists and the corporeal embodiment of their cause. Consequently, no support, be it moral or military in nature, could have come to the insurgents from the Continent. The rising failed, partly because the web of connections that had linked up different networks and interests broke down, and this happened because the person who acted as the point where all the networks overlapped, namely O’Neill, failed to do his job properly. The royalists did learn from this disappointment, however. From the Court’s point of view, one of the most important lessons it learnt from O’Neill’s networking in England was that an appropriate ambassador from the King would have to be sent home to lead any future insurrection. It also learned that the information it was getting from some of those in its network of informants in England was not always accurate and that it would need to be more cynical in assessing reports from its adherents. Judging by its actions in early 1658, it also came to the opinion that it was important to ensure that it received timely advice on the state of things at home in the run-up to any future insurgency. Ormonde’s return to England with O’Neill in 1658 can be ascribed to all of these lessons being learned.

These risings, along with Booth’s rebellion of mid-1659, were hardly what one could call successful and culpability for this must partly be laid at the door of the exiled Stuart Court, as their attempts to aid these outbreaks were not really that

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Nevertheless, for all the failures and for all the inability shown by the Crown’s courtiers, including the Irish, in advancing royalist conspiracies, these risings were not without their uses. Even in defeat, they were politically destabilising events for the Interregnum regimes, as they only served to highlight the general lack of support for those in power in London. They also reminded everyone that the Stuarts were still there as a political option and this in itself was something that discontented elements within Interregnum Britain and Ireland could use to their advantage. Simply put, the possibility that particular interests or elements within the political nation might re-align themselves with the deposed dynasty was both a source of fear for the ruling regime and a weapon to damage it with. In 1656, just as the Stuarts allied themselves with Spain, the Venetian ambassador in London was reporting that the Protectorate feared that discontented elements in the army might re-align themselves with the royalists. Such a re-alignment was not without precedent and one does not have to focus on the 1640s to find instances of it. In the wake of Cromwell’s forceful dissolution of Parliament in April 1653, discontented English Presbyterians made tentative approaches to the Stuarts in the late spring and summer of that year, via by the persons of John Bramhall and Ormonde. Their purpose in doing this was to see if a political agenda could be agreed with the King which would allow interest to support the other.\footnote{CVSP, vol. XXXI, 1657-1659, 20 April 1657, Francesco Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, p. 43. HMC, Ormonde Mss (N. S., vol. I), James Bunce to Ormonde, 8 May 1653, pp. 288-9. Ibid, Bramhall to Ormonde, 14 May 1653, pp. 291-2. Ibid, 18 June 1653, pp. 293-4.}

Royalist conspiratorial disasters, furthermore, were never so bad as to end conspiring either and the possibility of another uprising continued to be a source of worry for those in power in Britain and Ireland. Intelligence reports sent to London in late 1655 stated that the Court was making plans for another attempt in England. The following year Henry Cromwell was worried by rumours he had heard of a tri-nation rebellion, which royalists were supposedly organising. Reports were also circulating at this time that Ormonde was about to return to Ireland to lead insurgents there.\footnote{Thurloe State Papers, vol. IV, A letter of intelligence, 17 November 1655, p. 169. Ibid, vol. V, Lockhart to Thurloe, 27 August 1656, p. 319-20. Ibid, Henry Cromwell to Thurloe, 6 October 1656, p. 477.} Even when rebellions were not taking place, pro-royalist activities still were a continuing threat on western Europe’s offshore islands. For one, the interregnum
regimes did not have a monopoly on receiving intelligence reports about their enemies’ activities. Royalist agents were also sending reports to the Court about the situation at home as well. John Evelyn, for instance, was using the Dutch ambassador in London as a source for intelligence reports that he passed onto the Crown; an interesting piece of information when one recalls that Ormonde learned about Cromwellian security measures in early-1655 from a letter written by the same ambassador. A cleric named Hewet was also hung in 1658 for providing intelligence to Ormonde.\textsuperscript{186}

Assassination attempts on Cromwell were also another re-occurring possibility. Some Irish persons were reportedly implicated in such a plot in 1654. Some of the Irish exiles, namely Richard Talbot and Robert Dongan, even managed to get themselves involved as the would-be assassins in another one of these schemes in 1656. Aside from temporary imprisonment in England for all of them, followed by yet another royalist jail-break and subsequent (and apparently unfounded) accusations of collusion with the authorities being made in England against Talbot, nothing came of it. There are also some indications that at least some of these royalist actions in Britain were receiving direct aid from the Continent. Talbot was reportedly recruited for the assassination attempt by Daniel O’Neill and Edward Sexby’s plot of the same year received at least tacit support from the Court. Aside from the assassination attempts, there were also stories circulating of gunpowder being smuggled into Scotland by royalists in 1656.\textsuperscript{187}

Not atypically, however, the Court managed to limit the effectiveness of even these pro-royalist activities. Part of the reason for this was political. The approach made by English Presbyterians to Bramhall in mid-1653 did not result in anything concrete, probably because the political programme it proposed was unacceptable to important courtiers such as Ormonde. These Presbyterians sought six concessions from the King: an act of oblivion, liberty of conscience, frequent

\textsuperscript{186} \textit{The Diary of John Evelyn, vol. 3,} 22 September 1657, p.200. Ibid, 8 June 1658, p. 216.
parliaments, abatement of impositions, large grants of either land or money to the army (which Bramhall supposed could be supplied out of Ireland), the appointment of persons they trusted to key offices and places of strength for a time and, finally, the referring of all disputes to a parliament. Such a programme would have been unacceptable to many advisors to the King, however, as an attack on royal prerogative. It was also widely known that persons like Ormonde and Nicholas were disapproved of by the English Presbyterians. So, while a less central figure amongst the exiles like Bramhall approved of the opportunity it presented (he had even initially thought of writing up a declaration along these lines without first getting express approval from the King, arguing that any concessions made in it could be withdrawn at a later date) the Court itself let the opportunity go by. Aside from cases such as this, the internal disputes of the Court also caused problems for those who were actively promoting royalism at home. It has already been noted earlier in this work how the dispute between the advisors to Charles II and those around the Duke of York in 1658 led to claims from England that the King’s cause was being damaged by persons such as the Talbots and that such inter-factional strife was causing discontent at home.  

Even given these problems, however, the continuance of these activities at home, combined with the continued and continuous support for such deeds from the exiles, is testament to the continuing strength of the networks linking the Continent to Britain and Ireland, as well as to the fortitude of those involved in pro-Stuart conspiracy. In another way, it is also a comment of the failure of the Interregnum regimes, as their lapses contributed to the continuing problem of royalist conspiracy. They did this by repeatedly failing to come up with a settled form of government that was acceptable to all. The political instability this engendered only made royalism more attractive and created more opportunities for conspirators to do their work. This was evident in mid-1658, with the death of Oliver Cromwell, as the Court began to receive renewed approaches from a number of individuals, including the former exile, Henry Leslie. The same phenomenon occurred again in Ireland in mid-1659. When Henry Cromwell’s relatively popular Lord Deputyship was ended by the newly-

restored Rump at that time it led to discontented elements in Ireland renewing
contacts with the exiles on the Continent through the medium of the Elizabeth Butler
and her servants. The dissatisfaction of the political nation at the turn of events was
expressed to the Marchioness and one of her servants then carried the news to
Flanders that many were annoyed by the Court’s failure to send over commissions to
supporters in Ireland, as they could easily have seized Dublin Castle. In this instance
the failure to act may have been tactical. Hyde, for one, saw no reason to do it.\textsuperscript{189} It
is clear, nonetheless, that the inability to create political stability only allowed
royalists more opportunities to act, as it only added to the number of key figures who
were willing to contemplate associating themselves with the cause of the Stuarts.

\textbf{Conclusions}

The value of the Irish Courtiers as agents of the Court’s efforts in Britain and
Ireland cannot be ignored. Some of them proved to be somewhat useful in
propaganda and financial efforts there. The major value of the majority of them,
however, lay in the royalist efforts to foment rebellion in the Commonwealth during
the Interregnum. We have described the efforts of a number of them in this field,
including O’Neill’s and Ormonde’s activities in 1657/1658, when they tried to build a
support base for a rising in England. The activities of other Irish Courtiers, such as
Colonel Edward Wogan, Daniel O’Neill and George Hamilton, amongst others, have
not been ignored either. It is true that the propaganda efforts were, at best, small and
that the funds gathered were not very considerable. It is also true that none of the
risings promoted by these courtiers brought about the longed-for royal Restoration,
which was, after all, their main goal. Despite this, one should not class their labours
as complete failures. Such activities were still useful and valuable, insofar as they
brought the Court into the ‘country’, despite the country being at a considerable
remove from the Court.

The degree to which they actually did this was considerable. The exiles were
so successful at it they even managed to bring those disputes that were taking place
within the Court environment into the country. Bramhall brought his disputes with
Peter Talbot into England in print, while the divisions between those royal households
in the Spanish Netherlands in 1658 were brought home by the activities of Thomas

\textsuperscript{189} \textit{The Calendar of Clarendon State papers, vol. IV}, Herbert Price to Ormonde, 25 June 1658, p. 50.
Talbot. Similarly, old royalist attitudes on the need to protect the royal prerogative were brought back into England through their contacts and dealings with English Presbyterians. It is clear from all this that royalist activity in Britain and Ireland was not just aimed against the Interregnum regimes. To a certain extent at least, it was an extension of the factional disputes going on within the Court. It also was part of a battle over what should constitute the correct relationship between the Monarch and his subjects. In all of these ways the courtiers were influential beyond the parameters of the Court. As some have already recognised, most notably F. D. Dow, the significance of the exiles’ political contacts with home goes well beyond this, however. The following can also be added to his thesis on royalist conspiracy acting as a reminder of the Stuart claim to power and of the continued survival of that dynasty’s political agenda. Royalist plotting, and the exiles’ support of it, destabilised the Interregnum regimes and arguably hastened the return of the monarchy in 1660. By helping to generate a military threat to the powers within Britain and Ireland the Irish courtiers forced those in London to maintain an expensive and burdensome military establishment, numbering not less than 30,000 men, and sometimes reaching as high as 50,000. In a state that was financially overstretched this was a major problem, particularly as one of the major political grievances during the 1650s was high taxation. It also allowed the royalists to represent the powers in London as tyrannical and as being contrary to the constitution and to traditional political liberties, particularly within England.190 These weaknesses, combined with the inability to find a workable constitutional settlement which omitted monarchy but still appeared legitimate, caused the revolution to collapse. The only political option left standing once the dust settled was the traditional monarchical one represented by the Stuarts.

General Conclusions

The impact of the exile upon the Irish elite

Exile, in this case, had initially been a short-to-middle term strategic move. Unfortunately for many of the royalist exiles, it was one that backfired. Defeat at Worcester left many of those who chose this path stranded abroad. Some, of course, for assorted reasons, were able to return home. Many, in the short-term at least, were not able to do so, however. Those who could go back, usually Protestant non-combatants, found that they had to compromise with regimes that they did not approve of. Yet, for many of the Irish elite, because of the possibility of persecution, either as political enemies or on sectarian grounds, it was not possible to go home. They were therefore in a potentially grim situation. Still and all, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that, as a caste, they were resilient enough to survive the test. Those dynasties that could either sent family members home or left them at home, to protect or to reclaim, where possible, part of the family patrimony. It was a kind of reverse migration/human capital investment strategy. Essentially, individual family members, instead of going abroad to protect political interests, forsook a migratory strategy so as to diversify the family resources and to protect the core property.

In effect, families like the Butlers of Ormonde, the Bramhalls, and probably even the Graces, left family members at home to protect the traditional patrimony and to compromise with the dominant political forces at home. Others in the family, meanwhile, went abroad to protect the interests of royalism and to show their support for their traditional master. Those who had to go overseas did not just rely upon the Court for their daily bread, however. They continued to diversify their interests and resources while abroad. Some, such as Castlehaven, became mercenaries in the employ of others. The Taaffes managed to get a family member into the Austrian Court. The Butlers diversified by intermarrying into Dutch nobility. Even the Hamiltons did well for themselves abroad, with the children of Sir George eventually becoming significant enough figures in Louis XIV’s Court.191 This Continental version of the family diversification strategy should not be interpreted as a hedging of bets or as an abandonment of the royalist cause. Some of these moves, after all, were

facilitated by the Court and, as they extended the aid networks of the Court, they potentially held advantages for royalism.

Ultimately, the steps taken to survive abroad proved unnecessary. The exile came to an end and it has to be acknowledged that in many ways this group ultimately gained from having gone abroad. Service to the Crown traditionally brought reward and honour to the respective servants in the Early Modern Period, and service in extremis brought these men considerable amounts of both commodities. Taaffe became Earl of Carlingford, Ormonde became a Duke (and ultimately was represented as a paragon of royalist virtue) and Bramhall found himself promoted to the archbishopric of Armagh on his return. Daniel O’Neill was appointed postmaster-general in England, gained considerable lands in Ireland and acquired considerable wealth. Others, such as Lane and Inchiquin had risen in the social hierarchy while abroad and Lane continued to do so at home, becoming Baron Tulsk and first Viscount Lanesborough in 1676. He, likewise, managed to become quite wealthy. For these individuals, the impact of the exile went beyond that. Tastes also changed as a result of what they experienced. It is a given in history that French styles and fashions came to prominence in Britain and Ireland during the Restoration period and again no one exemplifies this better than George Lane, who had a mansion built in the French fashion for himself on his return to Ireland. Furthermore, ideologies changed as well. One has only to look at Inchiquin’s change of religion to see this.

Aside from the rewards they earned and their altered tastes on their return to Britain and Ireland, and these were significant in themselves, it has to be said that the actual exile itself allowed some of these persons, who had been merely members of a provincial elite within a peripheral kingdom, to become more than that. Of course, not all of the Irish elite had been provincial figures before 1649. Daniel O’Neill had

established himself as a courtier within two different courts by the end of the 1630s and Ormonde was too significant a figure in the political and social life of Britain and Ireland to be considered a mere local magnate. This was not true of all of them though and the exile certainly expanded their social and political horizons. It did so partly by allowing them to enter into a courtly world from which many of them had been sidelined before, even if the Court they were most closely connected during the 1650s to was a somewhat minor one. Though it was a relatively peripheralised body during this decade, nonetheless the Stuart Court gave its courtiers access into other European courts, be it the Louvre in Paris, Teyling in the United Provinces, the Court of the Holy Roman Emperor at Ratisbon, or the Spanish gubernial Court in Brussels. In this manner they not only became actors in courtly society but they also became participants in the wider political life of continental European society. Taaffe is the most stunning example of this expansion of horizons, though other noteworthy cases can be found, such as the younger Richard Bellings. The loyalty of this provincial elite to the Crown also allowed many persons to play larger roles on the international stage than they would have done heretofore, with persons like Bellings and Taaffe acting as ambassadors and agents for the Crown to the assorted powers and power-brokers of Europe. This trend continued after the Restoration with Carlingford being employed as a none-too-successful ambassador by Charles II.194

Clearly exile changed this group. One should not exaggerate the extent of this change, however. Many things, despite banishment, stayed the same. One of the most striking characteristics of this elite, and most particularly of the nobility within it, was the extent to which many of them continued to act as they had done prior to the exile. The most remarkable example of this was their continued reliance on those patron-client relationships and personal networks that pre-dated their banishment from Ireland and Britain. Even while abroad, their concerns remained consistent with their pre-banishment ones. Indeed, one can say that, exile or no, they continued to have concerns that were typical of early-modern European elites generally. For one, like their Continental counterparts, this elite used the Court, as well as portable goods and royal service, typically within the military, as a source of revenue.195 More outstandingly was their continued concern for the preservation of their social status

195 See pp. 71-80 & 96-102, above.
and position in society. They still, whenever possible, indulged in conspicuous consumption and complained when they could not. They still sought indicators of status, such as honorific titles. They only pursued those careers that were in keeping with their social standing. They sought to preserve their family patrimonies. If anything changed, it certainly was not the end goals. Only the means of achieving these goals altered. In this regard, we saw how the Butlers diversified the use of their dynasty’s human capital. As a consequence Elizabeth Butler suddenly found herself promoted to the family’s chief figure in Ireland. Even then, however, these new tactics for protecting a dynasty’s position did not take over completely. They had to work hand-in-hand with more established means, such as the forming of strategic marital alliances and the use of personal contacts.

**The significance of personal networks for the exiled Irish elite**

First of all it is clear from this study that the kinship links, the patron-client connections, and the assorted personal associations that the Irish noble exiles had prior to the exile continued to survive their banishment and they greatly benefited from them while on the Continent. It is also evident that these personal networks, whatever the nature of the connections between those involved, similarly allowed those participating in them to cut across the political, religious and social categories that they found themselves in. These networks, moreover, could be highly effective in distributing resources and they even permitted persons who were ostensibly enemies to provide support to each other at a personal, if not at a political, level. It is almost an understatement to say then that the networks were useful to the elite Irish exiles. In order to see just how much they benefited from them one has only to consider two of the examples referred to in this thesis. Bramhall’s efforts to defend Anglicanism and royalism, and also to aid his son, gained from his connections to those in Ireland and England, with Cromwell’s chief almoner proving particularly useful in his former efforts. Lady Elizabeth Butler’s attempts to secure the return of her patrimony during the Interregnum also benefited from the support of ‘former’ Ormondist clients who were either actively supporting the Interregnum regimes or who had at least reconciled themselves to them.\(^\text{196}\)

The importance of these networks was not lost on those who participated in them. There was certainly a consciousness of being part of a chain of communication

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\(^{196}\) See pp. 122-35, above.
in which one could use other people to pass both information and resources to others and also to mobilise support for themselves. This was clearly the case with Hamilton’s appeal to Ormonde to aid him in contacting Taaffe in August and September 1651. It is also demonstrated by the persistent request in letters from the individuals mentioned herein to pass on best wishes and offers of service to others. Richard Bellings senior asked George Hamilton to pass these very messages on to Ormonde in mid-1654. The fact that they saw themselves as links in a chain of communication is further evidenced by the fact that instructions on the sending of letters from one person to another often spoke of the intermediaries who should be used in this task. In early 1652, for instance, Bramhall asked Ormonde to ‘...direct your letters for me by Sir Richard Browne and Mister Booth of Calais...’

The palpable importance of these connections, moreover, led to the participants putting a great deal of effort into maintaining them. This was necessary because of the frequent physical separation of the partakers in these networks from each other. Writing was the most obvious way to preserve these. Aside from this means, they also relied on other, more individual, methods to maintain contacts. We have already seen how, in the early 1650s, Ormonde used Inchiquin’s presence in the Low Countries to stay in contact with Bramhall and to convey both information about privateering ventures and money between the two. Intermediaries, be they distributors of letters or persons who visited persons on the behalf of others, were therefore of great importance to maintaining this system of contacts and communication. As we have seen, these intermediaries could, quite literally, be anyone, with the Stuarts’ Irish courtiers making use of fellow courtiers, and also of merchants, soldiers and clergy to maintain these contacts. This created new bonds and obligations within the whole communications complex, as it tied the intermediaries into the network complex and made them part of it, thus cutting across social boundaries and extending everyone’s (i.e. not just the exiled elites’) range of contacts. We have seen not only how Ormonde and his allies frequently used merchants to transmit information and resources between each other, but also how

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198 Ibid, Bramhall to Ormonde, 9 March 1652, p. 263.
200 See pp. 80-96, above, for examples of the use of intermediaries.
these merchants could call on these exiles to support their interests as well: e.g. the Stuart Court did formally intervene with the French Crown on behalf of certain Irish merchants during this decade.\textsuperscript{201}

Because of this characteristic, which caused the networks to expand and spread out in many directions and created many new and different ties in the process, if one was to map these personal networks it would be found that they were multiplex, multi-dimensional, multi-junctional, multi-level, and multi-branched systems. They were made up of many different types of connections, had a wide variety of points where many communication lines between various individuals met, cut across many different spheres of influence and activity, and were, on the whole, quite sprawling in nature. Through these systems, the members of these networks could make contact, either directly or indirectly, with particular individuals in order to acquire some resource. If one may borrow a common idiom in the English language to describe this phenomenon, particular ends could be achieved ‘through a friend of a friend’. In other words, membership of a network entailed that not only could one take advantage of contacts with the other members of the complex to achieve particular ends or to gain particular resources, one could also use the personal connections of these persons within other networks to do this. This is why Ormonde could approach Father Dominic Rosario O’Daly. To give a further example to illustrate this, in 1654 Murrough O’Brien’s contacts with Ormonde and other members of the Stuart Court, then based in Paris, were of use to Sir Christopher O’Brien, Baron Inchiquin’s younger brother. When he wished to take up military employment with the French Crown he was able to take advantage of his brother’s connections to get himself an introduction to the Louvre.\textsuperscript{202}

On the whole, it is hardly surprising that this should be the case. After all, the strength and significance of kinship links, as well as of the bonds created by service and/or patron-client connections, is well documented in the historiography of the period. To demonstrate this, all one has to do is look at the historiography of the Interregnum in England for similar examples. David Farr’s study of the kinship networks of the Cromwellian major-General John Lambert, to cite one case study, has

\textsuperscript{201} See pp. 80-96, above.

highlighted how he provided considerable financial support for his relatives, despite the fact that many of them were royalists and, worse by the standards of the time, some of them were even Catholic. Clearly then, divisions resulting from such factors as religion, politics, military opposition, etc., could be circumvented by relationships based on other criteria, such as kinship, service and bonds of both patronage and clientage.

Yet, even when all this is taken into account it has to be acknowledged that, despite their successes and their complexity, there were limits to the effectiveness of these networks. First of all the persons involved in them had to overcome the antagonism of persons who were clearly opposed to them. The case of Bishop Nicholas French, who publicly antagonised Ormonde and his closest followers, both during and after the Interregnum, is enough to demonstrate this. Aside from this, while it was relatively easy for the noble exiles to rely on assistance from their closest and oldest contacts, and vice versa, it was not easy to ensure that contacts with those to whom they were not closely connected with would produce anything. Those persons who were not directly involved with the Stuart Court itself, but who were instead part of a more diverse and extensive community could not necessarily be relied on to come up with the required resource. This was certainly the case of the privateers. Many factors could prevent those on the outer edge of the exiles’ personal networks from assisting them. These included such things as the competing personal interests of these individuals, the distinct and differing political goals that some of these persons had (to cite one case, the difficulty that some Irish nobles had with Peter Talbot in 1658 and 1659 arose from his pursuit of his own political agenda), the inability to exercise any control over the actions of others (as, for instance, in the case of the Privateer Captain Plunkett and Ormonde), weaker personal bonds between the people involved and unfavourable political circumstances, such as those that existed immediately after the defeat at Worcester. Geographic separation and the simple


incapacity of those in the network to carry out the task or service required of them were also factors that reduced the effectiveness of these contacts.

The network was at its most effectual when the connections between the individuals involved were strong. Nobles and gentry with firm, long-established, ties to each other, such as those based on kinship links, old patron-client connections, or bonds created by long-shared political interests, could almost certainly count on some sort of effort at providing reciprocal assistance. Even then there were instances when these networks did not function perfectly, however. When a person was faced with a choice between assisting an associate or advancing a particular political program, or even aiding someone else and risk losing a political advantage then very often the network broke down. The best example of this phenomenon is seen in the relationship between Ormonde and Radcliffe. On two occasions the latter was left to his political fate by the former. If Ormonde had gone to his defence he would have ended up risking both his own position and the wider policies of his associates and/or cause. That said, however, Ormonde never completely abandoned Radcliffe. In the wake of York’s flight from Paris in 1650 the Marquis did actively seek to restore his associate’s fortunes within the Court. Similarly Radcliffe did not refuse to assist Ormonde when called upon to do so.205

In contrast, the weaker and more indirect the link, the less likely they were to produce anything positive. Indeed, they could even prove to be a source of difficulty. These weak links were likely to exist if the persons involved were only vaguely connected with each other, if the connection between the persons involved was one of convenience and if these bonds were relatively new. Having said all this, however, it has to be acknowledged that these weaker connections could still produce resources and support for all those involved in them, and they were still important to the Irish nobility in exile. Funds, however limited, could still be secured from privateers, influence could still be brought to bear on members of the royal family, merchants could be relied upon to pass on letters, goods and cash, and Irish mercenary soldiers could still be got to act according to the Stuart Court’s needs. Yet even while acknowledging the advantages of these weak associations, one must again concede that older and stronger ties were frequently necessary to make them work. When dealing with persons such as privateers, for instance, the Irish nobility often used

205 See pp. 251-85, above, for further details on this.
persons with whom they had already established strong connections in order to reach these persons. One has only to look at how Ormonde and Inchiquin used Bramhall to acquire funds from privateers to see this.

To summarise then, the personal networks of the expatriate Irish nobility were undoubtedly of value both to themselves and to their political cause. They allowed them to overcome serious political and economic handicaps, to help ensure their own personal survival, both socially and economically, to maintain influence on a wider political and diplomatic stage and to continue to pose a threat to their opponents. These personal networks were, in effect, an adequate replacement, in the short term at least, for many of the resources that the Irish nobility had lost in the civil wars of the 1640s. They also helped the Stuart Court to overcome some of the problems that the loss of key institutions and political assets had burdened it with.

The Stuart Court and its Irish courtiers

I have already given reasons for why one should not be too quick to write off the Stuart Court as a political force in the 1650s. Nonetheless, some of these bear repeating and they can even be added to. First let me re-iterate that while the Court may not have governed any geographical territory in the 1650s, it certainly could still claim to, and in many ways did, govern a considerable amount of people. We have already seen how the personal connections of the exiles could be used for its political benefit in this regard. What is more, the Court had a strong theoretical claim to legitimacy and many persons still continued to support the Stuarts as the true monarchs of Great Britain and Ireland at this time. As a result of this, a not inconsiderable amount of people and resources could be mobilised at various times in that dynasty’s interest. Therefore, while it is true that the Monarch’s and the Court’s power may have been circumscribed by the exile, that is not the same thing as being lacking in political power. As is clear from the examples given in this thesis, it could and did make its presence felt in some of those areas which were traditionally seen as being within the remit of an early modern government. One has to acknowledge of course, when talking of these areas of governmental activity, that during the exile there was a mutation in the nature of the responsibilities borne by the royal family and, by extension, its Court. The unusual nature of the military task facing Charles II in the 1650s is a case in point. One should be careful, nonetheless,

206 See pp. 200-49, above.
not put too much weight on this. While the nature of the prime military task of the King might have been unusual, this is not the same as saying that he and his Court did not bear some form of political and governmental responsibility in this area.

The Irish courtiers, by acting as the ministers and agents of the exiled Court, played their part in helping the exiled Stuart Court to make an impact in those areas of responsibility which were the concern of early modern governments. In order to do this, however, while efforts were made to maintain the proper forms of government, as in the example of the collecting of money through the issuing of privy seals, they had to act largely through unofficial channels, and through informal means. This was obviously because the Court lacked many of the proper administrative institutions through which it would normally have exercised authority. Once again, however, we should not let this fact play too much upon our thoughts. We have already drawn attention to the informal and personal nature of government in this period. In order to have their policies and decisions executed, governments generally relied both on the administrative institutions of the state and also on personal ties, such as those, most obviously, between patrons and clients. In effect, the exiled Stuart Court, in an effort to carry out policies and gather resources, and in the absence of proper governmental institutions, simply fell back upon the personal contacts and informal ties of its adherents. The Irish courtiers were particularly important in this regard because they had important personal links to many of the persons and resources that the Stuart Court most wanted to influence and control, namely mercenaries. These soldiers were especially important to the royalist cause, as securing control over a sufficient number of these troops allowed the Stuart Court to play a part on the international stage, as it had something to go to the negotiating table with or, in certain circumstances, to fight with.

There were other reasons why the continued ability to make one’s presence felt in governmental areas remained important to the Crown. In his book on royalist conspiracies during the Interregnum, David Underdown pointed out that, while many of these schemes were complete failures, they did keep loyalty to the Monarchy alive and highlighted the fact that there were those who would risk their lives for the

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207 Linda Levy Peck, *Court patronage and corruption in Early Stuart England*, p. 82. See p. 292, above.
King. In short, royalist conspiracies kept the notion of a possible return to Monarchical government under the Stuarts alive. This idea can be extended to the governmental activities of the exiled Court also. By continuing to act like a legitimate government, by maintaining its claim to be the proper centre of power for the three Stuart kingdoms, in continuing to interfere in events in those territories and by attempting to maintain a certain amount of the prerogatives of royal government (and thus by extension, maintaining a certain amount of political influence) it kept the notion that it could provide an alternative to those then in power in Britain and Ireland alive. Far from having a ‘fictive nature’ then, this Court was a body which had the means to make an impact on the political stage and could consequently back up its claims to be a legitimate government through its deeds.

As with the example of Underdown, another idea from early modern historiography can also be advanced and adapted to explain the continuing power and influence of this Court. This is the thesis advanced by Kirsten Neuschel in her work on the behaviour of the French nobility in the late-sixteenth century. In her book she pointed out that for the nobleman in late 1500s France there was more than one source of power and authority in an early modern state and it was therefore not something that was exclusively monopolised by the centre; the French royal Court in her case. Bearing this in mind, the support of a noble and elite caste was an imperative for any claimant to central gubernial authority in this period. If you wanted to control a peripheral area, or even an area away from where the centre was to be found, then you needed the co-operation of the elite in that region to do it. This is important to bear in mind because the Stuart Court in exile did retain the support of a considerable number of the British and Irish elites, including the Irish exiles dealt with in this thesis. These people, as a consequence of tradition, their own network of connections to persons throughout Britain, Ireland, and Europe, and also as a result of their continuing prestige, were a means of influencing an even wider group of people. Accordingly, their co-operation with, and provision of assistance to, the Stuart Court lent this institution authority, even during its period of banishment on the Continent. This,


after all, not only got them the oft-mentioned troops it also allowed the Stuarts to contemplate such possibilities as sending aid to royalists in Scotland from Ireland in the mid-1650s. The respect these elites were held in and their roles as representatives of the Crown also brought offers of assistance to the Stuarts. They were the conduits through which these offers were made. Indeed, the Stuart Court could not have operated either on the international political stage or at home without this elite. They were its agents, they were the means through which other agents were activated on behalf of the Stuart Court and they were the persons who provided the royalist cause with points of entry into diplomatic circles.

This ability of elites to lend weight and power to an institution, moreover, may also explain why certain Interregnum regimes were willing to allow individual members of the exile community to return home and reclaim some of their former patrimonies. By doing so they, potentially at least, gained the co-operation of an influential group of persons whose support, even if it was unwillingly given, could arguably have led to a strengthening of the position of one of the Interregnum regimes over time. Jane Ohlmeyer has made the same argument when seeking to explain why the Cromwellians allowed the Confederate Catholic Marquis of Antrim to retain some of his estates.\textsuperscript{210} It also offered the prospect of increasing the probability that royalists would come to accept the Interregnum regime (or, more precisely, whichever one was in power at the time) with the passing of each generation. After all, what personal reasons would the heirs of the Ormonde dynasty have to oppose the Protectorate, for instance, if in the course of time they came into their inheritance with the co-operation of the Lord Protector's regime? If the Protectorate regime had survived long enough for this to happen then its position would surely have been bolstered in the localities where this family had great sway. This possibility, allied with the fact that so many of its own supporters backed the Butlers in reclaiming their estates, made it too hard for the Interregnum regimes to resist the bait.

All this serves to highlight one thing: even in exile and even in the wake of political and military defeat, the members of this elite were just too influential to ignore. It took more than a revolution to destroy them. All that this revolution did was force them to diversify, to scatter abroad and to regroup there. Even then, their support remained a boon for whoever had it and their opposition was a heavy

\textsuperscript{210} Jane Ohlymeyer, \textit{Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms}, p. 254.
encumbrance. Their aid and support could help keep a defeated political cause alive and served to destabilise a seemingly all-conquering force. The exile, in short, ultimately served only as a testament to their resilience and their power.
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## Appendices

### Provisional List of Irish Exiles associated with the Stuart Court

#### Nobility
1. James Butler, Earl of Ormonde
2. Elizabeth Butler, Lady Ormonde
3. Thomas Butler, Earl of Ossory
4. Richard Butler
5. Murrough O’Brien, Earl of Inchiquin
6. Lady Inchiquin, Elizabeth St Leger
7. Viscount Muskerry, Later Earl of Clancarty
8. son of Muskerry
9. James Touchet, Earl of Castlehaven
10. Edmund Butler, Lord Mountgarret
11. Viscount Taaffe
12. Viscount Dillon

#### Soldiers/Gentry
1. Richard Grace
2. Edward Wogan
3. George Hamilton
4. Mary Hamilton
5. Anthony Hamilton
6. George Hamilton
7. Richard Hamilton
8. Elizabeth Hamilton
9. James Hamilton
10. Richard Bellings senior
11. Richard Bellings junior
12. Richard Talbot
14. George Lane
15. George Radcliffe
16. William O’Brien (Eldest son of the Earl of Inchiquin)
17. ? O’Brien (Younger son of the Earl of Inchiquin)

**Clergy**

1. John Bramhall, Bishop of Derry (Anglican)
2. Henry Leslie, Bishop of Down and Conor (Anglican)
3. Doctor John Callaghan (Catholic)

**(Total=32)**
Provisional List of Irish Exiles associated with the Stuart Court (Grouped), plus diagram illustrating their relationship

A: Kinship group of The Earl of Ormonde

1. Elizabeth, Lady Ormonde (Wife/cousin)
2. Thomas, Earl of Ossory (Son)
3. Richard Butler (Son)
4. Viscount Muskerry, Later Earl of Clancarty (Brother-in-law)
5. Edmund Butler, later Lord Mountgarret (the son)
6. Sir George Hamilton (Brother-in-law)

B: Persons associated with Lord Deputy Thomas Wentworth prior to outbreak of Ulster Rebellion (1641) & Confederate Wars (1642-1651)

1. Earl of Ormonde
2. John Bramhall, Bishop of Derry
3. Sir George Radcliffe
4. Sir George Lane
5. Henry Leslie, Bishop of Down and Connor (Nicholas Papers & DNB)

C: Members of the Pro-Ormondist faction in The Confederation of Kilkenny

Ruling Body

1. Richard Bellings
2. Viscount Taaffe
3. Viscount Muskerry, Later Earl of Clancarty
4. Edmund Butler, Lord Mountgarret (the Father)
5. Father Peter Talbot
D: Others with Pro-Ormondist sympathies in the 1640s

1. Richard Talbot
2. Doctor John Callaghan
3. Sir Nicholas Barnewell
4. Father Barnewell

E: Persons who fought with Ormonde at some stage in the Confederate wars

1. Murrough O’Brien, Earl of Inchiquin
2. Viscount Taaffe
3. Viscount Muskerry, Later Earl of Clancarty
4. Richard Grace
5. Edward Wogan
6. George Hamilton
7. William Legge

F: Persons who fought against Ormonde/Royalists at some stage in the Confederate wars

1. Murrough O’Brien, Earl of Inchiquin
2. Edward Wogan

G: Persons who had financial/business links with Ormonde in the 1650s

1. Sir George Hamilton
2. Murrough O’Brien, Earl of Inchiquin
3. John Bramhall, Bishop of Derry
4. Luke Whittington

**Key to following diagram**

- Arrows indicating overlapping connections between blocks
- Blocks indicating grouping of persons
- Lines indicating Ormonde’s link to various groups