

# **Paths towards resilience: examining EU and NATO responses to the Tunisian and Egyptian political transitions**

By Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré and Andrea Frontini

## **ABSTRACT**

The unfolding of the Arab uprisings has shown that fostering the ability of countries affected by regime change to withstand crises is necessary for the EU and NATO to ensure the stability of the broader Southern Mediterranean region. The political transitions in Egypt and Tunisia arose from pressures to democratise. Yet, as the region's security environment was deteriorating, EU and NATO have mostly addressed the symptoms of local instability, but largely neglected the long-term causes of insecurity in the two countries. While the former include terrorism, organised crime and human trafficking, the latter principally consist of domestic socio-economic challenges. By doing so, Euro-Atlantic diplomacy essentially enhanced state resilience at the expense of the broader societal resilience. In perspective, further political and operational coordination between NATO and the EU is needed to avoid risks of duplications and/or inconsistencies in their regional action.

## 1. Introduction

The unfolding of the Arab uprising has shown that enhancing the ability of countries affected by regime change to face crises is necessary for the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO or Atlantic Alliance) to ensure the stability of the European neighbourhood. This chapter aims at shedding light on EU and NATO policies, and on their efforts to project resilience in the Southern Mediterranean region. This is achieved by analysing those paths to resilience the EU and NATO chose to support, taking stock of past policies in this area, and assessing how the differing strategies adopted towards the Tunisian and Egyptian political transitions led to different results. Thus, even though Tunisia and Egypt were both subject to authoritarian rule, the 2011 crises took divergent trajectories in the two countries. Despite the persistence of socio-economic hardship and continued terrorist threats, transition to democracy in Tunisia seems to be heading toward consolidation. On the contrary, Egypt has returned to a non-democratic regime. Given the importance of Tunisia and Egypt for the stability, and hence the security, of the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, these countries constitute suitable case studies for examining transatlantic democracy promotion strategies in the region (Hassan, 2015). Furthermore, the Arab uprisings and subsequent regime changes represented the most significant test for the EU after the Lisbon Treaty (2009), and the innovations it introduced in EU foreign policy (Amadio Viceré, 2018). An examination of the cases at hand may also shed light on the inter- and intra-institutional practices of the EU and NATO.

The political transitions in Egypt and Tunisia arose from democratising pressures which had been suffocated by decades of authoritarian resilience (Pace and Cavatorta, 2012). And yet the Euro-Atlantic diplomacy's response to such transitions sought to ensure stability in North Africa by enhancing state resilience at the expense of broader societal resilience. Why was that so? Indeed, EU and NATO policies interacted with the countries' structural and cultural specificities (Nassif, 2018; Stepan, 2018), while adapting to the conditions on the ground as the events unfolded. Nevertheless, unlike scholarly works conceiving the EU as an ethical, normative power (Aggestam, 2008; Manners, 2002; Whitman, 2011), and in line with more critical approaches (Bicchi, 2006; Diez, 2013; Fisher Onar and Nicolaidis, 2013; Nicolaidis and Howe, 2002), this contribution shows that, as the response capabilities of the EU and NATO were challenged, both organisations focused on avoiding the risk of state failure rather than fostering an all-encompassing democratisation process.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The first section offers an overview of the origins and development of the Tunisian crisis and assesses EU and NATO responses to the

Tunisian political transition between late 2010 and the first anniversary of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS; June 2017), presented by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), Federica Mogherini, in June 2016 (EEAS, 2016). The second section outlines the roots and evolution of the Egyptian crisis, and examines EU and NATO policies towards the Egyptian transition, from the deposition of President Hosni Mubarak until summer 2017. Finally, the chapter draws some conclusions from the analysis.

## **Projecting Resilience in Tunisia**

### ***The Tunisian crisis: origins and developments***

The Tunisian upheaval was a momentous political breakthrough. Not only did it reshape the country's domestic politics, but it also influenced the broader wave of unrest that shook up MENA countries. A number of key economic and social factors contributed to this unrest, undermining the legitimacy and effectiveness of the regime (Kerrou, 2017). These include low growth, stagnating domestic and foreign investments, high youth unemployment, corruption of public authorities, and a generally weak rule of law. Events began to unfold in December 2010 (BBC, 2017), when Mohamed Bouazizi, a university graduate working as a fruit seller in the town of Sidi Bouzid, burnt himself to protest high unemployment and police violence. Bouzid's dramatic deed, leading to his death in hospital a few weeks later, resonated among many Tunisians as a symbol of political martyrdom, driving massive demonstrations against the two-decade-old authoritarian regime of President Ben Ali. Despite the initial abrupt suppression by the security forces, the mobilisation soon reached Tunis, forcing Ben Ali to flee to Saudi Arabia in January 2011, and leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi the following month. Amid early episodes of violence, the Tunisian political transition led to the establishment of a new regime. A 'Higher Authority for the Realisation of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition' was created and an Assembly, in charge of drafting a new Constitution, was elected in October 2011.

Cooperation between the new political forces, in particular the majoritarian moderate Islamist movement, Ennahdha, and secular parties such as Ettaktol, immediately proved uneasy. This led to occasional stalemates in the drafting of the constitutional text, and to a rise in ideological polarisation across the country. Domestic tensions and armed clashes, which also involved Salafists and loyalists of the old regime, reached a climax between February and July 2013, with the assassination of opposition leaders Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahimi. These tensions forced

Ennahdha to agree to an interim government (The Telegraph, 2011). Despite continuing unrest, including terrorist attacks, Tunisia's first free parliamentary elections were held in October 2014, and won by the Nidaa Tounes bloc. The latter was headed by Beji Caid Essebsi, who was elected President and has been leading the country until the present. The country's difficult transition towards a fully functioning democratic regime has been further complicated in the past few years by a multitude of unresolved socio-economic challenges. Such challenges are compounded by heightened security threats (Kerrou, 2017) such as smuggling activities by criminal organisations, as well as terrorist threats inside the country (e.g. the 2015 Bardo Museum attack) and along its borders (see chapter by Leonard and Kaunert in this volume). In addition to this, Tunisia has been the largest exporter of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq (Council of Europe, 2017).

### ***The Tunisian political transition: the EU response***

The unexpected outbreak and subsequent development of the Tunisian revolution had a defining impact on EU policy towards the country, and the MENA region more broadly. The Tunisian uprising challenged old foreign policy assumptions and prompted a reformulation of the overarching priorities and practical approaches of EU institutions and Member States. In many respects, Tunisia played a key role in shaping the EU's early cooperation with its Southern Neighbourhood. In fact, this was the first country to sign an Association Agreement with the bloc in 1998 and an Action Plan seven years later (EEAS, 2018). Within the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process), EU-Tunisia cooperation was established with the objective of promoting sustainable development (Ayadi and Sessa, 2016; see chapter by Badarin and Schumacher in this volume). Such cooperation was built on political dialogue as well as on economic and financial collaboration. However, the EU's cooperation with the Ben Ali regime in Tunis soon became pragmatic and transactional, in line with the EU's general approach towards authoritarian regimes in the MENA region before the Arab uprisings. Under the assumption that neo-liberal economic development and political change would ultimately coincide (Pace, 2014), Brussels fostered the region's resilience by focusing on its security and stability rather than promoting democracy and human rights to the full (Bicchi, 2010). Creating a free-trade area as a means to achieve peace and stability in the Arab world was already central to the Barcelona Process. Yet this approach was further enshrined in the 2003 European Security Strategy (EU, 2003), which neglected the issue of political democratisation in MENA countries. The same was true for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP, 2004)/Union for the Mediterranean (2005), which pursued democracy promotion through the narrow perspective of economic relations (Pace, 2009). Consequently, the EU pushed for trade liberalisation and structural modernisation at the

local level, along with security cooperation focussing on illegal migration and organised crime. By contrast, minimal attention was paid to the issues of rule of law and human rights in the country (Ayadi and Sessa, 2016).

The overthrow of Ben Ali and the beginning of a tumultuous and uncertain political transition in Tunisia challenged existing EU policy in the region. Brussels' response had to navigate through disagreements among Member States over the dynamics and actors at play in the country. The French Government's initial pro-regime stance (Guardian, 2011), and the difficulty of EU institutions to quickly adapt their policy toolbox to rapidly evolving events and crises are a case in point (Echagüe et al, 2011). However, diverging preferences amongst Member States within the Foreign Affairs Council were soon overcome by a wide consensus on the need to support the transition (Council of the European Union, 2011). Ultimately, the EU attempted to embrace democratisation (Dandashly, 2015) rather than continue to maintain an 'authoritarian resilience' (Pace and Cavatorta, 2012, p. 125) in Tunisia. Thus, the revision of the ENP (25 May 2011) introduced the concept of 'deep and sustainable democracy', envisaged new funds for civil society, and linked such funds to a conditionality approach entailing the three key areas of action of 'money, market and mobility' (Echagüe et al, 2011; see chapter by Badarin and Schumacher in this volume). Moreover, the EU supported the Tunisian path towards democracy through a range of tools and platforms under the umbrella of the SPRING Programme in late 2011. Brussels' prioritisation of a peaceful and pluralistic transition in Tunisia also took the form of high-level visits and technical missions advising the country's new authorities on the formation of a post-revolutionary regime, including the establishment of control authorities, the drafting of the constitution, and the conduct of free and fair elections (Ayadi and Sessa, 2016). These policy initiatives were coupled with the announcement of a Privileged Partnership in 2012, which paved the way to starting negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), and the setting up of a Mobility Partnership.

Despite the occasional stalemate brought by the political, security and socio-economic challenges affecting the country's stability, EU attempts to project societal and state resilience in Tunisia have been persistent in the past six years (Ayadi and Sessa, 2016). In more recent times, however, the EU's priorities towards the Southern neighbourhood have been shifting towards a more distinctive focus on security. The 2016 EUGS enshrined such a shift by adopting 'principled pragmatism' as a guiding concept of EU foreign policy (see chapter by Anholt and Wagner in this volume). Moreover, the EUGS explicitly introduced the notion of 'state and societal resilience', to

be fostered in order to enhance the EU's prevention and early warning capacity *vis-à-vis* any further instability (Colombo et al, 2018).

Although hailed in the EUGS as a 'prosperous, peaceful and stable democracy' (EEAS, 2016), a joint Communication by the HR/VP and the Commission in September 2016 acknowledged that 'the Tunisian transition is fragile and faces serious risks' (High Representative and European Commission, 2016; p. 2). According to the Communication, this is due to continuing terrorist threats, insufficient political resolve to fully implement key provisions of the new Constitution, and multiple weaknesses affecting the Tunisian economy. Against this background and in the context of the EUGS' implementation, EU policies on Tunisia have been re-centred on promoting the country's stability and security. This includes, in particular, the fight against terrorism, radicalisation, irregular migration and organised crime, as well as the strengthening of the Union's role as Tunisia's main trade partner via a renewed emphasis on the DCFTA negotiations (Dandashly, 2015; see chapter by Leonard and Kaunert in this volume).

### *NATO's response*

Compared with Tunisia's decade-old cooperation with the EU, NATO's role in the country has been far less comprehensive and visible. This is due to both the history and politics of security cooperation between the West and the MENA region. The Cold War had made the Southern Mediterranean less relevant for NATO, given the imperative of territorial deterrence against the perceived Soviet threat in Central and Eastern Europe. Although Middle Eastern crises in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly the Arab-Israeli wars, contributed to a greater awareness of the rising strategic importance of the region, the "Soviet prism" still dominated NATO's strategic planning and security projection (Gaub, 2012). In this context, the Atlantic Alliance's<sup>1</sup> relations with Tunisia in the almost fifty years that followed the signing of the 1949 Washington Treaty were virtually non-existent (see chapter by Larsen and Koehler in this volume).

The situation began to evolve with the end of the Cold War. The ensuing period of optimism over the transatlantic security environment, and the prospects for improved north-south relations in the Mediterranean - a political priority long pursued by NATO's Southern European Members like France, Italy and Spain (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013) - prompted NATO to launch the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) in 1994 (NATO, 2015).<sup>2</sup>

Within this framework, NATO-Tunisia bilateral cooperation until the 2011 regime change focussed on the fight against terrorism, military cooperation, scientific and technological collaboration, and public diplomacy (NATO, 2007). Nevertheless, while the break-up of diplomatic relations between Tunisia and Israel in 2000 contributed to making MD's multilateral approach largely unsuccessful (Filípková et al, 2012), the pre-2011 cooperation between NATO and Tunisia remained at the level of diplomatic dialogue and trust-building exercises. This lack of success was compounded by the broader constraints affecting the MD during that period. Such constraints included NATO's historically negative image in the country and the region at large; its limited understanding of local and regional complexities (Gaub, 2012); and the high degree of suspicion by the Ben Ali regime *vis-à-vis* potential interferences by Western partners in defence and security (Hanlon, 2012).

The political transition beginning in 2011 caused a stalemate in the cooperation between Tunisia and NATO. On the one hand, the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Alliance's traditional interlocutors of the armed forces and security apparatuses were deeply challenged by the outbreak of protests. On the other hand, despite the logistical support Tunisia regularly offered to anti-Ghaddafi insurgents, NATO's decision to launch Operation Unified Protector in Libya between February and October 2011 was not welcomed by the new political leadership in Tunis (Filípková et al, 2012) due to fears of violence spillovers across the border. Such fears notwithstanding, a meaningful dialogue resumed in 2014, with the signing of a new Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme centred on counter-terrorism and border security. Several factors drove the resumed cooperation between the Alliance and Tunisia. Firstly, the consolidation of the country's political leadership. Secondly, a deteriorating domestic and regional security landscape exacerbated by jihadist terrorism and the presence of foreign fighters, protracted civil war in Libya, state fragility in Algeria; and migration pressures from the Sahel. Finally, the push by NATO's Southern European Members to lessen the Alliance's focus on deterring Russia following the 2013 Ukraine crisis (Bianchi et al, 2017). The creation of the NATO Strategic Direction South – Hub in Naples (Italy), aimed at sharing information on regional security between Allies and Partners, epitomises this last aspect (NATO, 2017b). Another milestone in Tunisia-NATO *rapprochement* was reached a year later with the visit of Prime Minister Habib Essid to the Alliance's Headquarters in Brussels to discuss further cooperation (Profazio, 2018). Consequently, in the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, NATO Members announced new Defence and Related Security Capacity Building measures to further assist Tunisia in the areas of cyber defence, countering the use of improvised explosive devices, and the promotion of transparency in resource management (NATO, 2018b).

## **Projecting Resilience in Egypt**

### ***The Egyptian crisis: origins and developments***

When the first upheavals against the regime started in Cairo on 25 January 2011, Hosni Mubarak had been President for almost 30 years. Under his authoritarian rule, Egypt had been suffering from poor rule of law (Pace, 2009), deteriorating socio-economic conditions, and human rights' violations (El-Ghazaly et al, 2011). As the conflict between the military and the opposition deepened, the protests in Tahrir Square led to Mubarak's deposition. Presidential powers were assumed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) on 13 February 2011. Although slow political change, violent repression of dissent and human rights' violations characterised the immediate aftermath of the President's ousting (Freedom House, 2013), a second phase in the political transition seemed to begin in 2012 with the coming into power of the Muslim Brotherhood (Votolini and Colombo, 2018). Almost one year after Egyptians had taken to the streets, the Islamist Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) scored a major victory in the parliamentary elections of 21 January 2012. Not long afterwards, on 24 June the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate, Mohammed Morsi, became the first democratically-elected president in modern Egyptian history. Yet Morsi fell short of many citizens' expectations of genuine democratisation. At the end of December 2012, he attempted to introduce a decree promoting the exclusion of democratic control over presidential decisions, which was subsequently withdrawn due to popular protests. The rule of the Muslim Brotherhood also led to further polarisation of the Egyptian society (Dandashly, 2015). The fracture between religious and secular forces became all the more evident in late 2012, when the government proposed a constitution which would substantially limit the freedoms of speech and assembly (Albrecht, 2013). In fact, even though the new Egyptian constitutional text had been approved in a referendum on 15 and 22 December 2012, violent clashes between protesters and governmental forces followed its introduction.

Eventually, taking advantage of popular discontent and anti-government demonstrations, the Egyptian armed forces, guided by Army Chief Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, overthrew Morsi on 3 July 2013. From that moment on, Egypt began its path towards military authoritarianism. While the transitional authorities proposed a roadmap envisaging the constitution's revision and new parliamentary and presidential elections in 2014 (Ahram Online, 2013), repression of the Muslim Brotherhood started immediately after the military coup (Ardovini, 2017). By the end of 2013, the army-backed government had declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group (Bradley and El-Ghobashy, 2013). Later on, Al-Sisi's new constitution essentially banned religious parties in the country and envisaged increased military control over the government (18 January 2014; Arafa,



2012). The advent of the new Egyptian regime was finally formalised in the presidential elections of May 2014, when the former Army Chief obtained 93.3% of the votes in an electoral ballot harshly criticised for the repression of the opposition voices (Azeem, 2014). Since then, political repression and violence has escalated in Egypt, essentially casting a shadow over hopes for democratic reforms (Freedom House, 2018).

### ***The Egyptian political transition: the EU's response***

Despite Egypt being an authoritarian regime, the EU had maintained bilateral relations with Cairo during Mubarak's long mandate to serve its interests in the region, including cooperation on migration, counter-terrorism, and the Middle East Peace Process (Hassan, 2015). The outbreak of protests and the violent repression of demonstrators frustrated the alignment amongst the EU and its Member States on the strategies adopted towards Egypt until that moment. Although all Member States were initially reluctant to side with anti-government demonstrations (Reuters, 2011), a cleavage soon emerged between Northern and Southern European countries on how to handle the Egyptian political transition. While the former, particularly the UK, supported the resignation of the Egyptian President and the creation of a military-led transitory government (Waterfield, 2011), the latter, headed by Italy, insisted on the relevance of Mubarak's regime in containing the spreading of Islamic extremism and in preventing mass influxes of migrants (El Pais, 2011). To be sure, similarly to the Tunisian case, the EU reacted to the ousting of Mubarak by institutionalising the SPRING Programme. This Programme involved: expanding the mandates of the European Bank of Investment and the Neighbourhood Investment Facility; creating new policy instruments, such as the European Endowment for Democracy and the Civil Society Facility; and revising the ENP. However, concrete changes remained limited and EU efforts at democracy promotion in Egypt continued to be dominated by 'security concerns as a response to the threat of instability' (Dandashly, 2018, p. 37; See also Noutcheva, 2015).

After the victory of FJP's and the election of Morsi, EU Member States were divided among those, such as Germany and the UK, who feared the possibility of Egypt turning into an Islamist regime and the potential ensuing implications on the Arab country's relations with Israel (Hague, 2013; Steinberg, 2015), and those, such as France, who were keener to accept the election results after the tension triggered by their initial reluctance towards the Arab turmoil (Daguzan, 2013). Eventually, as the security conditions in Libya worsened and the fear of an instability contagion in neighbouring Egypt increased,<sup>3</sup> the EU continued to seek to avoid state failure by ensuring socio-economic prosperity in the country (Amadio Viceré and Fabbrini, 2017). During the Muslim

Brotherhood's rule, besides the DCFTA negotiation, the European Commission offered Egypt the opportunity to further develop trade relations, and increase macro-financial assistance and budget support (European Commission, The President, 2012). The creation of an EU-Egypt Task Force, intended to enhance aid coordination between the EU with third-countries' private and public sectors, constituted an exception to this trend (Huber, 2013). Nonetheless, its implementation proved difficult, as shown by the EU's inability to prevent the Egyptian government from excluding human rights groups from a Task Force meeting (ECFR, 2013; 13-14 November 2012).

In reaction to Morsi's presidential decree and to the new Egyptian constitution, the European Parliament went as far as to demand a suspension of economic support to Cairo in March 2013 (European Parliament, 2013). Meanwhile, several EU programmes devoted to civil society organisations were cancelled due to a lack of commitment by Egyptian authorities (Pinfari, 2013). The EU did, however, prioritise security concerns in its response to the July 2013 regime change. Whilst some national representatives had voiced their discontent towards Morsi's deposition (CBC, 2013), EU Member States and institutions all avoided the use of the word "coup". In spite of the army's violent political repression, EU representatives soon established bilateral diplomatic relations with Al-Sisi. To be sure, the EU decided to suspend a transfer of military equipment that could potentially be employed to repress civilians in August 2013 (Council of the EU, FAC, 2013). Yet, as the then HR/VP Catherine Ashton put it, Brussels continued to offer 'support' and 'help' to Egypt, but abstained from any 'interference' (High Representative, 2013, p. 1).

The EU's strategy to stabilise Egypt through its new regime, notwithstanding its crackdown on opposition forces and minorities, persisted as time went by. Although some criticism of Al-Sisi's constitution was raised by the European Parliament (6 February 2014; European Parliament, 2014), EU Member States welcomed its introduction and stated their intention to continue assisting the Egyptian people (Council of the EU, FAC, 2014). As for the victory of the Army Chief at the presidential elections, the EU congratulated Al-Sisi for having guaranteed peace and order during the voting period (EU, 2014). While the military regime consolidated itself, the EU continued to fund socio-economic initiatives and began revising the ENP. Although still focusing on the understanding that economic growth would lead to a stabilisation of the neighbourhood, contrary to its 2011 predecessor, the 2015 ENP did not aim at fostering substantive democratic reforms. Instead, it identified trade, energy security, transports, mobility and security as priorities, and acknowledged the unwillingness of some countries to abide to EU values (Poli, 2016).

Under the label of 'principled pragmatism', such an approach was reiterated in the 2016 EUGS. Rather than emphasising the need for democratisation, the official document considered the

increase of societal resilience as the most effective response to repressive states (EEAS, 2016a). While resilience building was embedded in one of the five lines of action identified in the October 2016 Roadmap on the Follow-Up to the Strategy (EEAS, 2016b), a Joint Communication by the HR and the Commission in June 2017 reiterated the importance of socio-economic development for enhancing broader societal resilience in authoritarian contexts (High Representative and European Commission, 2017). The same objectives are enumerated within the framework of the implementation of the EUGS and the EU-Egypt partnership priorities for 2017-2020 which cover three main areas: socio-economic development, ‘with a view to building a *stable* and prosperous Egypt’; foreign policy cooperation aimed at the ‘*stabilising*’ the MENA region; and ‘enhancing the *stability* of Egypt’ as a ‘modern and democratic state’, while cooperating with it on security, terrorism and migration [*italics added*] (Council of the EU, 2017).

### ***NATO’s response***

When the 2011 revolt began, Cairo was NATO’s most relevant partner in the region. While Egypt was one of the first countries to be involved in the 1994 Mediterranean Dialogue, its ties with the Alliance were further developed in 2007 through an Individual Cooperation Programme (ICP). In exchange for its cooperation, Egypt received technical assistance and training from NATO Members (Orfy, 2010). While cooperative security was defined as one of the Alliance’s main objectives in its 2010 Strategic Concept (NATO, 2010), the majority of its collaboration with this country was of a technical and military nature and, therefore generally insufficient at the political level (Gaub, 2012; see also chapter by Larsen and Koehler in this volume).

NATO did not distance itself much from the EU in its response to the events in Egypt. Initially, its reaction towards the Egyptian uprising was cautious because of the country’s strategic relevance for the Alliance. Whereas NATO’s Southern European Members felt particularly exposed to irregular migration and religious extremism, the US, who had been establishing a politico-strategic partnership with Egypt since the late 1970s (Sharp, 2011; Mcinerney, 2010), feared the impact on Israel’s security and energy flows (Isaac, 2011). Eventually, despite initial reluctance to side with anti-government forces, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen welcomed Mubarak’s decision to resign by stressing the relevance of a ‘speedy, orderly and peaceful transition to democracy’ (BBC News, 2011).

In a similar way to the EU, and in line with its core mission and approach to this area, the Alliance reacted to the Egyptian uprising by focusing on regional insecurity and state failure rather than on substantive democratic reforms. In April 2011, NATO offered MENA countries new terms

of cooperation, hitherto reserved for Euro-Atlantic partners (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013). Such terms included ‘enhanced political consultation on security issues of common concern’; ‘strengthened practical cooperation’; and ‘support for defence education, training and capacity building, within existing resources’ (NATO, 2011, p. 2). Hence, in the words of Rasmussen (2011, p. 1), the Arab uprisings had ‘shown the importance of intensifying political dialogue’ to achieve ‘lasting stability, security and prosperity across North Africa and the Middle East’. Furthermore, notwithstanding the SCAF’s violent repression and persistent human rights’ violations, in December 2011 NATO foreign ministers declared their readiness to consider new requests from MENA countries within the MD for partnership and cooperation for the reform of the security and defence sectors (NATO, 2011).

The Alliance’s approach did not change with the Muslim Brotherhood’s coming into power. Shortly after the FJP’s victory, in recognising a ‘time of unprecedented change in the Mediterranean and broader Middle East’, NATO heads of state and government reiterated their commitment to ‘strengthening and developing partnership relations with countries in the region to achieve ‘security and stability’ (NATO, 2012; Chicago Summit, May 2012). Thus, despite continuous civil unrest in the country, NATO continued to support Morsi’s regime through training programmes (NATO, 2014a). When the Egyptian army overthrew President Morsi in 2013, NATO Members ‘raised concerns over Mediterranean instability’, and declared that NATO would watch Egypt closely (Euractiv, 2013). Indeed, ‘growing instability’ in the MENA region and its implications for the peace and security of the Euro-Atlantic area were among the main issues discussed at the NATO Summit in Wales on 5 September 2014. On that occasion, NATO Members reiterated their ‘support to the legitimate aspirations of the people’, while stressing their intention to ‘explore options for possible NATO assistance to bilateral and international efforts to promote stability’ (NATO, 2014b). Thus in 2014, in the framework of the MD, the Netherlands offered the Egyptian military technical and material training (NATO, 2016a).

At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, NATO heads of state and government committed to ‘remain actively engaged in projecting stability and enhancing international security’, by deepening political dialogue and enhancing practical cooperation with its partners, including Egypt. Such practical cooperation involved increased ‘support in the areas of counter-terrorism, small arms and light weapons, counter-improvised explosive devices, and military border security’ (NATO, 2016b). While the formalisation of the Alliance’s partnership with Al-Sisi’s military regime occurred with the establishment of an Egyptian diplomatic mission to NATO (NATO, 2017a), such a commitment

resulted in the participation of Egypt in NATO-led political dialogue and the provision of material support and training throughout 2017 (NATO, 2018a).

## **Conclusions**

Significant differences exist between EU and NATO, particularly with regard to their structural characteristics and the final objectives they pursue. While the EU is a political system characterised both by supranational and intergovernmental features, NATO is an intergovernmental, security organisation with a prominently military profile. Furthermore, although most EU Member States are also part of NATO, the latter includes the US, Canada and Turkey as well. In spite of these obvious organisational differences, and of the presence of the US as a driving power within the Alliance, EU and NATO responses to the Arab uprisings essentially coincided. Indeed, while the EU initially revised its approach by focusing on the development of substantive democracy through socio-economic reforms, NATO shifted towards enhanced political cooperation with Tunisia and Egypt in the immediate aftermath of their regime changes. Still, as the time went by, the policies followed by the two organisations ultimately overlapped. As the EU and NATO focused on avoiding the risk of state failure, they both essentially enhanced state resilience at the expense of the broader societal resilience.

Resilience has become a political “mantra” underpinning Euro-Atlantic diplomacy in the Southern neighbourhood in the post-Arab uprising. In this context, however, particular emphasis has been placed on the need to increase the resilience of state institutions, whether democratic or not, rather than addressing the root causes of the general absences of societal resilience in the region. EU and NATO have primarily addressed the symptoms of local instability, but largely neglected the long-term causes of insecurity in Tunisia and Egypt. While the former include terrorism, organised crime and human trafficking, the latter mostly consist of domestic socio-economic challenges. All this considered, it is reasonable to argue that the chapter’s findings raise an important theoretical challenge for the concept of normative power Europe and, more in general for the qualifying features of the EU international identity compared to other actors (see Manners, 2011).

A reshaping of the pattern of resilience fostered by the EU and NATO in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as of the wider MENA region, is undoubtedly necessary. Such a revision would require the adoption of a more holistic notion of national and regional security, which should reach beyond the traditional parameters of institutional stability and effectiveness, and encompass measures targeting

socio-economic and human security matters. Certainly, the EUGS' recent differentiation among state and societal resilience is a step in this direction. However, such approach has not been fully implemented yet in the MENA region. In the cases under consideration, for instance, a predominant focus on pursuing EU's member states' interests on security, migration and trade, has hindered the EU's stated objective of increasing both state and societal resilience in these countries.

Given the persisting security challenges in the Southern Mediterranean area, the convergence of priorities between the EU and NATO is likely continue in the future (Lesser et al, 2018). As the cases of Tunisia and Egypt demonstrate, if an effective principle for dividing labour among the two organisations continues to be missing, rather than to a virtuous integration of efforts in the Southern Mediterranean region, such convergence in projecting resilience risks to lead to an inefficient duplication. A possible way forward could build upon the 2016 Warsaw Joint Declaration and its follow-up developments, in order to frame a solid coordination mechanism between the two organisations in countering regional insecurity. On the one hand, this could include a more regular use of joint analysis and information-sharing on potential threats to states and societies. On the other hand, the definition of a clear and sustainable division of labour in military and civilian security cooperation with local partners should be fostered through enhanced dialogue and coordination on the ground between EU Delegations and NATO Contact Point Embassies, aimed at both preventing or in tackling domestic and regional security crises.

---

<sup>1</sup> Hereafter simply Alliance.

---

<sup>2</sup> The MD pursued three main goals: achieving better mutual understanding-the political dimension; contributing to regional security and stability- the practical dimension; and dispelling misconceptions about NATO- the public diplomacy dimension (Lesser et al, 2018).

<sup>3</sup> At the time, the EU fear of the spread of Islamic extremism in the region originated from the murder of the American Ambassador to Libya, Christopher Steven, by militiamen in Benghazi on 11 September 2012.

## References

Aggestam, L. (2008) Introduction: ethical power Europe? *International Affairs* 84(1): 1-11.

Ahram Online (2013) Egypt military unveils transitional roadmap. 3 July. Available at: <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/75631.aspx> [Accessed 11 November 2018].

Albrecht, H. (2013) Egypt's 2012 constitution. Devil in the details, not in religion. *Peace Brief* 139. United States Institute of Peace, 25 January. Available at: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/159373/PB139.pdf> [Accessed 11 November 2018].

Amadio Viceré, M. G. (2018) *The High Representative and EU foreign policy integration. A comparative study of Kosovo and Ukraine*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Amadio Viceré, M. G. and Fabbrini, S. (2017) Assessing the High Representative's Role in Egypt during the Arab Spring. *The International Spectator* 52(3):64-82.

Arafa, M.A. (2012) Whither Egypt? Against religious fascism and legal authoritarianism: pure revolution, popular coup, or a military coup d'état. *Indiana International and Comparative Law Review* 24(4):859-97.

Ardovini, L. (2017) The politicisation of sectarianism in Egypt: 'creating an enemy' the state vs. the Ikhwan. *Global Discourse* 6(4):579-600.

Ayadi, R. and Sessa, E. (2016) EU policies in Tunisia before and after the revolution. Study for the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) of the European Parliament EP/EXPO/B/AFET/2015/04. Brussels, June 2016. Available at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578002/EXPO\\_STU%282016%29578002\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578002/EXPO_STU%282016%29578002_EN.pdf) [Accessed 11 November 2018].

Azeem, Z. (2014) Egypt's vote for repression. *Al Monitor*, 26 May. Available at: <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/egypt-elections-al-sisi-strongman-political-repression-votes.html#> [Accessed 11 November 2018].

Bianchi, M., Lasconjarias, G. and Marrone, A. (2017) *Projecting Stability in NATO's Southern Neighbourhood*. NDC Conference Report. NATO Defense College (NDC). July 2017. Available at: <http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1076> [Accessed 11 November 2018].

- 
- Bicchi, F. (2006) Our size fits all': normative power Europe and the Mediterranean. *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(2): 286-303
- (2009) Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean: An Overview. *Mediterranean Politics* 14(1):61–78.
- BBC News (2011) Hosni Mubarak resigns: World reaction. February. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12435738> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- British Broadcasting Corporation (2017) Tunisia profile – Timeline. 1 November. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14107720> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Bradley, M. and El-Ghobashy, T. (2013) Egypt declares Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. *The Wall Street Journal*, 25 December. Available at: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303799404579280260534285946> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- CBC News (2013) World leaders put Egypt on notice over democracy. 5 July. Available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/world-leaders-put-egypt-on-notice-over-democracy-1.1347854> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Colombo, S., Dessì, A. and Ntousas, V. (eds.) (2018) *The EU, Resilience and the MENA Region*. Brussels, Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and Rome, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Available at: <http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/eu-resilience-and-mena-region> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Council of Europe (2017) Terrorism: Tunisia fears the return of foreign fighters. February. Available at: [https://www.coe.int/en/web/corruption/bilateral-activities/ukraine/-/asset\\_publisher/plqBCeLYiBJQ/content/terrorism-tunisia-fears-the-return-of-foreign-fighters?inheritRedirect=false](https://www.coe.int/en/web/corruption/bilateral-activities/ukraine/-/asset_publisher/plqBCeLYiBJQ/content/terrorism-tunisia-fears-the-return-of-foreign-fighters?inheritRedirect=false) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Council of the EU (2011) Council conclusions on Tunisia. Brussels, 31 January. Available at: [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119051.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119051.pdf) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Council of the EU (2017) Association between the European Union and Egypt. Brussels, 16 June. Available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23942/eu-egypt.pdf>. [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Council of the EU, Foreign Affairs Council (2013) Council Conclusions on Egypt. Brussels, 21 August. Available at: [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/tradoc\\_151710.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/tradoc_151710.pdf). [Accessed 11 November 2018].



- 
- (2014) Council Conclusions on Egypt. Brussels, 10 February. Available at: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140971.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140971.pdf). [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Daguzan, J. F. (2013) France and Islamist movements: a long non-dialogue. In: L. Vidino (ed.) *The West and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring*. Dubai: Al Mesbar Studies and Research Centre and Foreign Policy Research Institute. Available at: [https://www.fpri.org/docs/201303.west\\_and\\_the\\_muslim\\_brotherhood\\_after\\_the\\_arab\\_spring.pdf](https://www.fpri.org/docs/201303.west_and_the_muslim_brotherhood_after_the_arab_spring.pdf) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Dandashly, A. (2015) The EU response to regime change: in the wake of the Arab revolt: differential implementation. *Journal of European integration* 37(1):37-56.
- (2018) EU democracy promotion and the dominance of the security-stability nexus. *Mediterranean Politics* 23(1):62-82.
- Diez, T. (2013) Normative power as hegemony. *Cooperation and Conflict* 48(2): 194–210.
- Echagië, A. Michou, H. and Mikail, B. (2011) Europe and the Arab Uprisings: EU Vision versus Member State Action. *Mediterranean Politics* 16(2):329-335.
- El-Ghazaly, S. Evers, E. and Shebaya, S. (2011) Entrenching Poverty in Egypt: Human Rights Violations that Contributed to the January 25 Revolution. *Yale Human Rights and Development Journal* 14(2):4.
- El Pais (2011) Shame on Europe. 31 January. Available at: [http://elpais.com/elpais/2011/01/31/inenglish/1296454847\\_850210.html](http://elpais.com/elpais/2011/01/31/inenglish/1296454847_850210.html) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Euractiv (2013) EU's top diplomat endeavours to resolve Egypt crisis amid NATO concerns. 31 July. Available at: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-s-top-diplomat-endeavours-to-resolve-egypt-crisis-amid-nato-concerns/> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- European Commission and High Representative (2015) Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels, 18 November. Available at: [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/documents/2015/151118\\_joint-communication\\_review-of-the-enp\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/documents/2015/151118_joint-communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- European Council (2011) Conclusions. EUCO 2/1/11 REV 1. Brussels, 4 February. Available at: [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119175.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119175.pdf). [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- European Council on Foreign Relations (2013) Middle East and North Africa' in European Foreign Policy. Scorecard 2012. London. Available at: <http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2013/mena/56> [Accessed 11 November 2018].

- 
- European External Action Service (EEAS) (2016) Roadmap on the follow-up to the EU Global Strategy. Bratislava, 16 September. Available at: <https://club.bruxelles2.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/feuilleteroute-strategieglobale@ue160922.pdf> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2018) Relations between the EU and Tunisia. Available at: [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage\\_en/16047/Relations%20between%20the%20EU%20and%20Tunisia](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/16047/Relations%20between%20the%20EU%20and%20Tunisia) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- European Parliament (2013) Situation in Egypt. Strasbourg, 14 March. Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0095+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>. [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2014) Resolution on the situation in Egypt. 2014/2532 (RSP). 6 February. Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1336888&t=d&l=en>. [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- European Union (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, December 2003. Available at: <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- European Union (2014) Declaration on behalf of the European Union on the presidential elections in Egypt. 10649/1/14 REV 1. Brussels, 5 June. Available at: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/143096.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/143096.pdf) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Filípková, L. *et alia* (2012) NATO and the Arab Spring: Challenge to Cooperation, Opportunity for Action?. Policy Paper 1/2012. Association for International Affairs. Available at: <http://www.amo.cz/en/prague-transatlantic-talks-en/nato-and-the-arab-spring-challenge-to-cooperation-opportunity-for-action-2/> [Accessed 11 November 2018]
- Fisher Onar, N. and Nicolaidis, K. (2013) The Decentring Agenda: Europe as a post-colonial power. *Cooperation and Conflict* 48(2): 283–303.
- Freedom House (2013) Timeline of Human Rights Violations in Egypt since the Fall of Mubarak. 9 August. Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/article/timeline-human-rights-violations-egypt-fall-mubarak> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2018) Egypt. Profile. Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/Egypt> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Gaub, F. (2012) Against all odds: relations between NATO and the MENA region. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Available at: <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1112> [Accessed 11 November 2018].

- 
- The Guardian (2011) 'French foreign minister resigns'. 27 February. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/27/french-foreign-minister-resigns> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Hague, F. (2013) International Policy Responses to Change in the Arab World. Foreign Secretary William Hague address to the London School of Economics event, March, 2012. In: L. Vidino(ed.) The West and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring. Dubai: Al Mesbar Studies and Research Centre and Foreign Policy Research Institute. Available at: [https://www.fpri.org/docs/201303.west\\_and\\_the\\_muslim\\_brotherhood\\_after\\_the\\_arab\\_spring.pdf](https://www.fpri.org/docs/201303.west_and_the_muslim_brotherhood_after_the_arab_spring.pdf) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Hanlon, Q. (2012) The Prospects for Security Sector Reform in Tunisia: A Year After the Revolution. Strategic Studies Institute. Available at: <https://issat.dcaf.ch/sqi/Learn/Resource-Library/Policy-and-Research-Papers/The-Prospects-for-Security-Sector-Reform-in-Tunisia-A-Year-After-the-Revolution> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Hassan, O. (2015) Undermining the transatlantic democracy agenda? The Arab Spring and Saudi Arabia's counteracting democracy strategy. *Democratization* 22(3):479-495.
- High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2013) Speech by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton to the European Parliament on the situation in Egypt. A 454/13. Brussels, 11 September. Available at: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-13-689\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-689_en.htm). [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- High Representative and European Commission (2016) Strengthening EU support for Tunisia. Brussels, 29 September. Available at: [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/communication\\_from\\_commission\\_to\\_inst\\_en\\_v6\\_p1\\_8\\_59678-2.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v6_p1_8_59678-2.pdf) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2017) A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action. Brussels, 7 June. Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/2017-joint-communication-strategic-approach-resilience-eus-externalaction\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/2017-joint-communication-strategic-approach-resilience-eus-externalaction_en). [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Huber, D. (2013) US and EU Human Rights and Democracy Promotion since the Arab Spring. Rethinking its Content, Targets and Instruments. *The International Spectator* 48(3):98-112.
- Isaac, S. K. (2011) NATO and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Security: Prospects for Burden Sharing. NATO Defence College Forum Paper, March. Available at: [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/128708/fp\\_16.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/128708/fp_16.pdf) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Kerrou, M. (2017) Challenges and Stakes of State and Societal Resilience in Tunisia. IAI Working Paper 17/31, Istituto Affari Internazionali and Foundation for European Progressive Studies

- 
- (FEPS), November. Available at: <http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiw1731.pdf> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Lesser, I. Brandsma, C. Basagni, L. and Lété, B. (2018) The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue - Perspectives on Security, Strategy and Partnership. The German Marshall Fund of the United States. June. Available at: <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/future-natos-mediterranean-dialogue> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Manners, I. (2002) Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(2): 235-258.
- Mcinerney, S. (2010) Redirection of U.S. democracy assistance in Egypt is raising questions about the Obama administration's interest in democracy promotion. Carnegie, 7 April. Available at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/40530> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Nassif, H. B. (2018) Patterns of civil-military relations and their legacies for democratization. Egypt versus Tunisia. In: in A. Stepan, (ed.) *Democratic transition in the Muslim World: a Global perspective*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Nicolaidis, K. and Howe, R. (2002) 'This is my EUtopia ...': narrative as power. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(4): 767-792.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (2007) Discours du Secrétaire général délégué Alessandro Minuto Rizzo à la conférence du Dialogue méditerranéen. June 2007. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_8774.htm?selectedLocale=fr](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_8774.htm?selectedLocale=fr) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2010) NATO's new strategic concept. 19 November. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>. [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2011) Final Statement. 7 December. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_81943.htm?mode=pressrelease](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_81943.htm?mode=pressrelease). [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2012) Chicago Summit Declaration. 20 May. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_87593.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87593.htm?selectedLocale=en). [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2014b) The Secretary General's Annual Report 2013. Brussels, 27 January. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_106247.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_106247.htm?selectedLocale=en). [Accessed 11 November 2018].

- 
- (2014b) Wales Summit Declaration. 5 September. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official\\_texts\\_112964.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm). [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2015) NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. Brussels, February 2015. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_60021.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_60021.htm) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2016a) ‘The Secretary General's Annual Report 2015’. Brussels, 11 February. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_127529.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_127529.htm) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2016b) ‘Warsaw Summit Communiqué’. 9 July. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm). [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2017a) Egypt Appoints Ambassador to NATO. 15 March. Available at: <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/egypt-appoints-ambassador-to-nato>. [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2017b) NATO Strategic Direction South Hub inaugurated. 5 September. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/news\\_146835.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/news_146835.htm). [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2018a) The Secretary General's Annual Report 2017. Brussels, 15 March. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_152773.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_152773.htm). [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2018b) Brussels Summit Declaration. Brussels, 11 July. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_156624.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm). [Accessed 11 November 2018].

Noutcheva, G. (2015) Institutional governance of European Neighbourhood Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. *Journal of European Integration* 37(1):19-36.

Orfy, M. M. (2010) *NATO and the Middle East: The Geopolitical Context Post-9/11*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Pace, M. (2009) Paradoxes and contradictions in EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean: the limits of EU normative power. *Democratization* 16(1):39-58.

\_\_\_\_ (2014) The EU's Interpretation of the ‘Arab Uprisings’: Understanding the Different Visions about Democratic Change in EU-MENA Relations. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 52(5):969-984.

- 
- Pace, M. and Cavatorta, F. (2012) The Arab Uprisings in theoretical perspective – An introduction. *Mediterranean Politics* 17(2):125-138.
- Pinfari, M. (2013) The EU, Egypt and Morsi's Rise and Fall: 'Strategic Patience' and Its Discontents. *Mediterranean Politics* 18(3):460-466.
- Poli, S. (2016) La revisione della politica europea di vicinato. *European Papers* 1(1):263-274.
- President of the European Commission (2012) Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Mr Mohamed Morsi, President of Egypt. SPEECH/12/596. Brussels, 13 September. Available at: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-12-602\\_en.htm?locale=en](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-602_en.htm?locale=en)
- Profazio, U. (2018) Tunisia's reluctant partnership with NATO. *International Institute for Strategic Studies*. 6 April. Available at: <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/04/tunisia-reluctant-partnership-nato> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Rasmussen, A. F. (2011) NATO and the Arab Spring. *The New York Times*, 31 May. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/01/opinion/01iht-edrasmussen01.html> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Reuters (2011) Factbox – International reaction to crisis in Egypt. 31 January. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-egypt-world-idUKTRE70U2KK20110131> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Reichborn-Kjennerud, E. (2013) NATO in the 'New' MENA Region Competing Priorities amidst Diverging Interests and Financial Austerity. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Available at: <https://www.nupi.no/en/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/NATO-in-the-New-MENA-Region> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Scharp, J. M. (2011) Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service, 28 January. Available at: [http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Egypt\\_Background\\_and\\_U-S\\_Relations.pdf](http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Egypt_Background_and_U-S_Relations.pdf) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- (2018) Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service, 7 July. Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Steinberg, G. (2015) Germany and the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Mesbar Center, 19 January. Available at: [https://www.fpri.org/docs/chapters/201303.west\\_and\\_the\\_muslim\\_brotherhood\\_after\\_the\\_arab\\_spring.chapter5.pdf](https://www.fpri.org/docs/chapters/201303.west_and_the_muslim_brotherhood_after_the_arab_spring.chapter5.pdf) [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Stepan, A. (2018) 'Introduction'. In: A. Stepan (ed.) *Democratic transition in the Muslim World: A Global perspective*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- 
- Telegraph (2011) Tunisia's coalition agrees new posts as it forms interim government. 22 November. Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/tunisia/8906335/Tunisias-coalition-agrees-new-posts-as-it-forms-interim-government.html> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Voltolini, B. and Colombo, S. (2018) The EU and Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab uprisings: A story of selective engagement. *Mediterranean Politics* 23(1): 83-102
- Waterfield, B. (2011) Egypt crisis: David Cameron reprimands Baroness Ashton at EU summit. *The Telegraph*, 4 February. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8303929/Egypt-crisisDavid-Cameron-reprimands-Baroness-Ashton-at-EU-summit.html> [Accessed 11 November 2018].
- Whitman, R. (ed.) (2011) *Normative Power Europe Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.