“THREE WAY APPROACH” TO MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF MIGRANT INCORPORATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: REFLECTIONS FROM A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE

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“Three Way Approach” to Meeting the Challenges of Migrant Incorporation in the European Union: Reflections from a Turkish Perspective

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Abstract

This paper advocates the idea that the European Union’s “two way process” approach to migration and integration should boldly be replaced by the notion of a “three way” approach for the better incorporation of immigrants in the EU.

The first part of the paper outlines the emergence of a “common” immigration and integration policy at the EU level, its main features and in particular the role of the European Commission in shaping this policy. The second part critically examines the place that is attributed to sending countries in efforts to draw up a “common” immigration and integration policy. Particular emphasis is laid on the ways the EU defines and frames the place and function of “sending countries” in its immigration policy. In the last section, the role that sending countries could play in the context of a “three way” approach to integration is explored against the background of the Turkish experience. In this section, the author makes various concrete suggestions in support of a “three way” approach whose aim is to assist Turkish immigrants’ integration into mainstream life within the EU.
Introduction

In the course of the last couple of years the incorporation of immigrants especially from Muslim countries has come to dominate the agendas of a number of European Union (EU) member countries as well as the institutions of the EU. An estimated 15 million Muslims lived in various countries of the EU before the 2004 enlargement. While some have become citizens of the respective countries in which they reside, many continue to hold the status of Third Country Nationals (TCNs). Although there are large numbers of Muslims, current or former immigrants, who have integrated and in some cases even assimilated into their host societies, there are also those who remain outside mainstream life. Poor labour market integration accompanied with low levels of education is often associated with these migrants as well as their descendants. Certain practices ranging from such as domestic violence against women, forced marriages, religious radicalism to the denial of schooling to young girls are seen by host societies as cultural characteristics attributed to the failure of these immigrants to integrate into host societies. The emergence and concentration of Muslim immigrant communities in major European cities have also rendered the integration “problem” visible. The “problem” is increasingly associated to a ‘security’ dimension. Some major terrorist attacks as well as crimes such as the assassination of the Dutch filmmaker Van Gogh are linked to the “Muslimness” of the perpetrators. Hence the presence of Muslim immigrants is seen by some in the West through the prisms of security concerns. Yet, at the same time there is also a recognition that the rise of anti-immigration or anti-immigrant feelings accompanied with Islamophobia in many host societies risks threatening the very liberal values that constitutes the basis of the European Union. A European Parliament Resolution in 2006 addressing the issue of the immigrants’ integration in the EU openly raises the danger of “fear among citizens subverting respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.”

This situation is leading to growing cooperation between most affected member states and the EU institutions. Immigration issues until the Maastricht Treaty (1992) remained strictly under the realm of national sovereignty. However, in the course of the last decade many immigration related issues such as asylum, combating illegal migration, management of visa policies have been moved to the community level. Since 2004, the European Commission has acquired the right to prepare legislation and take initiative while decision making on these issues can be reached on a qualified majority basis. Yet, the issue of regular immigration and integration policies is still addressed through unanimity decision making with a very restricted role granted to the European Commission. The European Commission had to go through an almost two-decade long political struggle to be able to draw the attention of member states to the issue of the immigrants’ integration let alone to develop common policies at the EU level. The Commission in 1985 even saw itself taken to the European Court of Justice for raising immigration and integration related issues with member states as a violation of

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1 I would like to acknowledge the support of Asli Okyay, former graduate student of the Department of Political Science and International Relations and author of the Master of Arts thesis entitled *The Evolution of Immigration and Asylum Policies in the European Union from a Public Good-Collective Action Perspective* (Boğaziçi University, 2007) to the research of this paper. The ideas developed in this report were presented and debated at a number of seminars and conferences such as “Immigrants as Citizens”, University of Sydney, 6-7 October 2007 and the Salzburg Seminar “Session 440: Immigration and Inclusion: Rethinking National Identity”, 27 March – 1 April 2007. I would like to thank all those participants who listened to my presentations and offered to me their advice and opinion. I would especially like to thank CARIM for giving me the possibility to write this report.


member state competences. Yet, member states have since 2004 accepted a greater role for the EU in designing their integration policies. The JHA Council adopted, in November 2004, a set of Common Basic Principles (CBPs) to guide the integration policies of member countries. The Commission on its part prepares annual reports on migration and integration and has also prepared two editions of a Handbook on Integration to offer guidance for member states in formulating and implementing their respective integration policies. More importantly in April 2007 the EU established a modest fund to support integration of TCNs.

These recent developments are a clear sign of a will on the part of member states not only to achieve a better integration of TCNs but also to cooperate more at the EU level. In that context the notion of approaching the integration of TCNs from a “two-way process” perspective is very critical. This CBP includes the idea that a successful policy inevitably has to view the integration exercise as a process that engages both the immigrant as well as the host society. In other words it is a process that has to engage both sides and whose objective is to reach in the long run a stage of better integration at both ends. In this respect considerable emphasis is laid on making sure that the design and implementation of integration policies involves the immigrants themselves. The process also expects and encourages greater interaction between immigrants and the host society in an effort to address the many problems and challenges that immigrant communities are facing. Yet, what seems to be conspicuously missing is the role that sending countries could play in assisting the integration of their current or former nationals.

Traditionally, sending countries and especially their governments have been seen as part of the “integration” problem. In the current EU integration policy sending countries’ role is construed in terms of controlling and curbing immigration, supporting return migration and to a limited extend assisting local development. The latter task is seen very much as a long term measure to help reduce unwanted migratory pressures from the sending country to the EU. However, the role of the sending country could also be envisaged from a much broader perspective. Often sending countries are facing and addressing problems similar to the ones that immigrants and their host societies encounter. They too suffer from violations of women’s rights, honor killings, ensuring the education of girls etc… They may not always be successful in resolving these problems but they may actually have an experience that if shared could benefit host societies’ efforts to develop effective integration policies. At a time when transnationalism has become an integral part of many immigrant communities in Europe, engaging sending countries at both civil society and governmental levels could indeed create a “win-win” situation for all parties involved.

Therefore this paper is going to advocate the idea that the “two way process” approach should boldly be replaced by the notion of a “three way” approach for the better incorporation of immigrants. This would mean the engagement of not just the immigrants and the receiving country but also of actors and ideas from the sending one. The paper will develop this idea by reflecting on it from the Turkish perspective. Turkey is a country from where an important proportion of the current immigrants and TCNs in the EU come, and there is also a general image that Turkish immigrants do not fare well in respect to integration. Turkey is also engaged by the European Union for possible eventual membership. This has of course led to major transformations in Turkey. Today, a vibrant civil society has emerged often addressing and trying to deal with problems that resemble those that

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7 It is interesting to note that the idea of integration being a “two way process” figures at the very top of 11 CBPs elaborated in considerable detail in the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Common Agenda for Integration - Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union. COM (2005) 389 final, Brussels, 1 September 2005.
host societies face with their immigrant communities experiencing integration problems. The government is also changing and showing increasing signs of wanting to play a more constructive role in addressing the problems of Turkish immigrant societies across Europe. Actually, the prime minister, Tayip Erdoğan, as well as the former minister of foreign affairs and the current president of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, on a number of occasions, during their visits in Europe, have emphasized the importance they give to integration and especially to learning the local language.

This paper is divided in to three parts. The first part will survey the emergence of a “common” immigration and integration policy at the EU level, its main features and in particular the role of the European Commission in the shaping of this policy. The second part will critically examine the place that is attributed to sending countries in efforts to draw up a “common” immigration and integration policy. Particular emphasis will be given to exploring the way in which the EU defines and frames the place and function of “sending countries” in its immigration policy. In the last section the role that sending countries could play in the context of a “three way” approach to integration will be explored through the experience of Turkey. In this section a number of concrete suggestions will be made in support of a “three way” approach to addressing the challenges of better incorporating Turkish immigrants into mainstream life within the EU.

Common immigration policy and integration:

The adoption of the Single European Act and the decision to complete the internal market by removing the frontiers between EU member states raised simultaneously the issue of how to regulate the movement of TCNs in and out of EU geography. Until then member states had been dealing individually with these matters, and these policy issues had constituted so far a well-established and entrenched aspect of national sovereignty. The actual removal of internal frontiers brought up the need to take concerted or coordinated action not only in respect to a common visa policy but also in respect to asylum and illegal migration. The Schengen meeting of 1985 among a group of EU member countries and their efforts to coordinate policies in anticipation of the imminent removal of internal frontiers was a precursor to the mounting need for a common approach. By introducing the third pillar, the Maastricht Treaty aimed at addressing precisely this increasing need. However, the third pillar allowed only for a very strict inter-governmental approach. The actual major breakthrough came with the Amsterdam Treaty that opened the possibility to move these issues to the first pillar and allowed the Commission to enjoy some rights. The Commission was also allowed to set up a Justice and Home Affairs Directory that would very quickly become an important advocate and developer of “common” policies. The Treaty also foresaw the right for the Commission to initiate legislation and the possibility for qualified majority voting, five years after the coming into force of the Treaty. In that respect the Tampere Programme adopted in October 1999 by the European Council was an important turning point as it aspired to put into place a first generation of EU common asylum and visa policy by 2004, and also to start addressing broader migration issues.8

In stark contrast to the above developments, acknowledging that there was a serious common problem concerning the incorporation of immigrants in many of the EU member countries encountered resistance. Member countries by and large refused to recognise that there was an integration problem, and furthermore resisted the idea of addressing such a problem at the “community” level. The Commission flagged out that immigrants from third countries were experiencing integration problems particularly in relation to the labour markets of member states as early as 1985.9 The Commission linked these problems to the major structural transformations in the economies of leading European countries occurring since the mid-1970s. These transformations had

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left the immigrants unable to develop new skills to enter successfully the labour market. In addition to
that, high levels of unemployment coinciding with growing immigration waves to EU member states
aggravated lingering problems. The Commission advocated that it was necessary to take action at the
Community level to deal with the challenges of integrating immigrants into the labour market. It
argued that these challenges existed in all member countries and demonstrated low labour market
integration was closely linked to low socio-economic performance as well as educational and
linguistic problems. This in turn was complicating the possibility of contacts between immigrants and
the broader society as well as exacerbating the problems of isolation and alienation. The Commission
went on to suggest that the right to free movement that Community nationals enjoyed should be
extended to legally resident TCNs and that measures should be adopted to ensure equal treatment and
equal life standards.

Subsequently, a proposal for a Council Decision by the Commission that would have set up a prior
communication and consultation procedure on migration provoked a crisis between the Commission
and some member states. These states considered the Commission’s intervention as unacceptable.
They complained to the ECJ arguing that this intervention violated the Commission’s powers as
defined by the Rome Treaty. The eventual ruling of the ECJ in 1987 did prevent the Commission’s
efforts from gaining competence over immigration related issues. However, this did not lead the
Commission to give up its interest in the issue of the integration of TCNs. Instead against the
background of the adoption of the Single European Act, the Commission went ahead and adopted
another Communication on immigration in October 1991. In this Communication, the Commission
developed ideas about possible measures to control and manage new migration flows. At the same
time in a rather avant garde manner, the Commission also argued for the need to adopt a joint
approach towards the integration of existing legal migrants in place of the emphasis put on return
migration by some leading member states. Some of the ideas associated with the CBPs adopted in
2004 were raised in this Communication. The need to grant TCNs new economic and social rights
including a right to family reunification was also discussed. With this Communication, the
Commission was tackling areas that bypassed mere labour market integration and that touched upon
social and cultural aspects of integration.

This second challenge by the Commission was pretty much ignored by the Council and member
states. The adoption of the Maastricht Treaty did not seem to change matters either. The Council and
member states remained focused on the control aspects of migration and the actual management of the
consequences of a common external border in terms of asylum, illegal migrations and visas. However,
the Commission again did not give up, and in February 1994, it adopted another Communication
addressing, inter alia, the integration of legal residents and the improvement of the situation of
TCNs. This Communication can also be seen as the first major EU document that introduced the idea
of integration being a “two way process” between the immigrant and the host society. Integration
actually was defined as “offering migrants and their descendants the opportunity to live ‘normally’ in
the host country. (…) From the immigrants themselves it requires the willingness to adapt to the
lifestyle of the host society without losing their cultural identity and acceptance of the fact that

10 A. Geddes, Immigration and European Integration: Towards a Fortress Europe? (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2000), p. 7, and D. Papademetriou, Coming together or Pulling a part? The European Union’s Struggle with
12 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Right of
13 European Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies,
equality of rights entails equality of obligations."\textsuperscript{14} The Communication in this respect provided a long list of measures to improve the situation of legal immigrants including calling on the Council to take action in terms of fighting racism and xenophobia. This coincided with a period when Europe was experiencing a rise in racist attacks on immigrants coming especially from outside Europe.

The Council and member states did not treat this Communication very differently from the earlier ones. Instead a JHA Council in June 1994 adopted a Resolution restricting rather than facilitating the accessibility of job vacancies to TCNs.\textsuperscript{15} Member states’ disinterest in addressing the issue of immigrants’ integration at the Community level was also reflected in the conspicuous absence of the matter in the European Council summits. The Presidency’s conclusions of summits just preceding the Amsterdam Treaty focused by and large on the restriction of new immigrant flows and the management of asylum waves. The intergovernmental conference drafting the Amsterdam Treaty paid neither much attention to the legal rights of TCNs nor to the issue of their better integration. The sole exception in this regard was the document adopted by the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs of the European Parliament. The Committee noted that it “considers it necessary to lay down rules governing relations with third countries, define the rights and obligations of citizens of third countries resident in the Union and encourage their integration.”\textsuperscript{16}

The Treaty of Amsterdam reflected a new mood among member states. Important steps were taken to communitarise policies in the area of asylum, border control and visa related issues. However, the issue of immigrant integration and the improvement of immigrants’ rights continued to receive less attention. Furthermore, the first set of issues was scheduled to be transferred to the First Pillar, and it was also convened that the subsequent decisions of the Council on these matters would be taken on a qualified majority basis five years after the coming into force of the Treaty. In stark contrast, issues relating to the immigrants’ status and their integration would remain strictly under the Third Pillar. Yet, one important development would be the extension of the Commission’s powers of initiating legislation accompanied by the establishment of the Directorate General (DG) for Justice and Home Affairs. The DG became an active and important vehicle in raising attention on integration related issues by adopting reports as well as developing informal links with interested non-governmental organisations and local governments. In this way the Commission began to fulfill an important agenda setting task. Even if the Amsterdam Treaty did not grant the Commission any rights to initiate legislation in the area of integration issues, the Commission did contribute to developing a common framework and set of networks between member states to foster and share best practices in respect to integration. These efforts were also followed by activities involving monitoring as well as funding of integration projects and policies.

In the post-Amsterdam period there were various modest but important developments in respect to addressing integration problems, and improving the rights of immigrants legally residing in the EU. The adoption of the Tampere Programme in October 1999 was a critical turning point. This Program for legislative action for the next five years primarily focused on issues dealing with border control, security, asylum, and migration policies. At the same time, it did call though for decisions and measures to ensure a fairer treatment of third country nationals and approximation of their rights with that of EU citizens. Furthermore, the Programme encouraged the development of common principles for the better integration of TCNs. These decisions gave the Commission the impetus to initiate a legislative process culminating in the adoption of four Directives with important consequences for the integration of TCNs. The first set of Directives adopted in June and November 1999 related to the issues of ensuring equal access to employment and related issues as well as combating discrimination on the basis of ethnic or racial origin. Although these directives aimed primarily at fighting

\textsuperscript{14} P. 32.
\textsuperscript{15} Papademetriou, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{16} Opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs (04/05/95) cited in European Parliament, Intergovernmental Conference Briefing, No. 39: Asylum and Immigration Policy, 22 August 1996.
discrimination in general, they nevertheless had important significance in terms of the rights of legal immigrants in the EU.\footnote{17}

The adoption of the next Directive related to the right to family reunification. The Commission considered the right to marry or to live together with one’s family as an indispensable part of the integration process. However, some member states showed resistance to the terms of the Commission’s proposal. This resistance included issues such as the maximum age of children that could benefit from reunification and the duration of stay by family members to qualify as long-term residents. This was also then accompanied with demands for some room for unilateral national legislation. As a result, the Commission saw itself putting forward three sets of proposals in December 1999, October 2000 and then in May 2002 to accommodate member state demands. The Directive on the right to family reunification was finally adopted in September 2003 but fell well short of the Commission’s initial proposal.\footnote{18} Lastly, the Commission’s proposal of March 2001 concerning the status of TCNs who are long-term residents also encountered difficulties, and could only be adopted in November 2003. The Directive did though provide for the equal treatment of TCNs with EU nationals with respect to employment, social security, tax benefits, access to public goods including housing, freedom of association and education.\footnote{19} However, the Directive also gave the possibility to limit these rights by member states. In contrast to the original proposal, the Directive also brought limitation to the right of TCNs to move and reside in another member state. Furthermore, the member states also succeeded in excluding refugees from the Directive. The Directive, though an important step in the direction of providing a legal basis for a better integration of TCNs, fell short of what the Commission had advocated.\footnote{20}

The Commission was less successful with its proposal of an “Open Method of Cooperation for the Community Immigration Policy.” The Commission with this proposal had hoped to assist member states through guidelines, national action plans, information exchange and reports to develop their own policies in a more coordinated manner on the issues covered by Tampere including the issue of the immigrants’ integration.\footnote{21} Yet, the proposal was rejected by the Council. Nevertheless, the Danish and Greek presidencies took interest in immigration related issues. Both presidencies encouraged conferences which addressed immigration related issues including the problem of the immigrants’ integration in general as well as into the labour market. It is against this background that the Commission was able to prepare its most elaborate document thus far on the idea of a common approach to the integration of immigrants, almost a decade after it had first tried to raise the attention of member states to the issue of integration. In its Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment of June 2003, the Commission surveyed the problem of integration across member states stressing how the problem was common across many countries. The Commission especially drew attention to low language competences, high levels of unemployment and poor educational performance among immigrants in the EU and stressed the need to act collectively at the EU level to address these problems. The Communication went ahead to define integration as “a two way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third country nationals and
the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant." Roughly a decade after its initial appearance, the concept of a “two way” approach to integration had made its comeback, this time in a more receptive environment.

This idea was also coupled with the need to take a holistic approach to integration. The Commission in this case stressed the necessity of focusing not only on social and economic areas of integration but also on areas touching upon cultural and religious diversity, citizenship, participation and political rights. The introduction of the idea of “two way” and “holistic” approaches to the policy debate on integration at the EU level can be considered as a major success on the part of the Commission. This is particularly significant considering that until less than a decade ago member states energetically objected to seeing the issue of “integration” being addressed at the EU level. Furthermore, they were not receptive to the idea that both the state and society would need to make an effort to engage immigrants in the exercise of integration. The general consensus then in many of the leading member states with a large immigrant population was still based on the idea of the temporary presence of immigrants and that those who would stay would basically need to assimilate.

The Communication was subsequently followed by a decision of the Thessaloniki Council to coordinate integration policies of member states by establishing National Contact Points on Integration. Governmental as well as civil society representatives and experts gathered in seminars and workshops to share information and projects about immigrant integration and also codify good practices. These efforts culminated in November 2004 in the publication of the first Handbook on Integration as a guide for policy makers. Another instrument that was developed as a consequence of the Communication was the practice of preparing Annual Reports on Migration and Integration. Three of such reports that have been prepared by the European Commission so far aim at monitoring national policy implementations on integration and highlighting good practices in member states.

Another significant breakthrough at the EU level came in November 2004 in the form of the Hague Programme prepared by the Dutch Presidency. The Programme identifies a set of policy priorities in respect to the creation of an area of justice, freedom and security. Among these priorities, the fifth one emphasizes the need to increase the contribution of migration to society and economy of member states. In order to achieve this priority the Programme also envisaged the establishment of a Coherent European Framework for Integration as well as a European Fund for Integration. The Fund was adopted in 2007 subsequent to the proposal prepared by the European Commission in April 2005. Most importantly, after the call by the European Council summit in the Hague, the JHA Council of 19 November 2004 adopted a set of Common Basic Principles (CBPs). The Commission

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then developed a Communication on a *Common Agenda for Integration* which expanded on these principles.\(^{27}\)

This Communication elaborates in great detail on measures that could guide member states’ policy in respect to the immigrants’ integration. Noteworthy is that the very first “principle” is actually the principle that ‘Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States’. This principle is followed by others that clearly aim at encouraging policies so as to involve immigrants in all aspects of life in host societies. The Commission goes into considerable detail in listing recommendations ranging from the need to improve the linguistic skills of immigrants to encouraging greater contact between immigrants and the host society. The Commission even makes as bold a suggestion as the need to introduce measures at the national level “strengthening the ability of the host society to adjust to diversity by targeting integration actions at the host population.”\(^ {28}\) The list clearly builds on the experience of preparing the *Handbook for Integration* and the thinking that has gone into operationalising the idea of integration as a “two way process.” Yet, what is striking is that no thought appears to have been given to the role that sending countries might or could play in respect to assisting their nationals’ integration or their descendents in EU member countries. At a time when a widespread recognition prevails that immigrants in general tend to maintain close links with their country of origin and that transnationalism is a conspicuous characteristic of immigration, this silence becomes quite puzzling.

**Place of sending countries:**

One of the striking aspects of the *Tampere Programme* of 1999 is that it identifies the need to develop “partnerships with countries of origin and third countries” as among one of the very first task to be addressed in developing “a common EU asylum and migration policy.” The Hague Programme (2004) goes one step further and introduces the idea of developing an “external dimension” to EU “common migration policy.” This means establishing a direct link between this “common” policy and other EU policy areas, such as enlargement, European neighborhood policy, development assistance, that bring the EU into contact with third countries especially third countries that happen to be immigration or transit countries. This section aims at exploring, with the help of a close study of a selection of EU documents addressing migration issues, the manner in which the content and nature of these “partnerships” is framed. The EU envisages three types of partnerships.\(^ {29}\)

The first type of partnership concerns the “management of migration” into third countries. These are countries from where migration to the EU occurs in the form of direct, legal or illegal migration of nationals or in the form of transit migration of asylum seekers or illegal migrants. European Commission Communication on *The Global Approach to Migration one year on*, for example, identifies “Romania, Morocco, Bulgaria, Turkey, Ukraine and Russia” as countries from where “most important flows” originated in 2004.\(^ {30}\) The list of course is not limited to these countries, and in the documents that have been examined, there are references to Asian countries such as China as well as African countries. The partnership is envisaged in the form of agreements involving return procedures,

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\(^{28}\) Ibid p. 5.

\(^{29}\) This list of selected documents can be seen in Appendix I. These documents were closely studied to determine the way in which the nature of cooperation and partnerships between the EU and third countries is actually framed and defined. Particular attention was given to identify the areas of cooperation and the nature of the cooperation.

conclusion of readmission agreements, combating human smuggling and enhancing border control of these countries. The fourth priority of the Hague Programme lays out the contours of such partnerships.\(^{31}\) The Annex of this document, in turn, lists the numerous policy oriented steps to be developed. One concrete manifestation of such steps is the European Commission’s Communication on Policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of third-country nationals.\(^{32}\) The Communication is important as an instrument that reveals the form and content of the “partnership” as one that very much shifts the burdens of “managing migratory flows” on the target country. Such a one-sided conceptualisation of “partnership” is recognised by the European Commission in its Communication on The Global Approach to Migration one year on.

Hence it is not surprising that the Commission advocates the need to provide, for example, through the Action Plans of the European Neighborhood Policy, “financial assistance in order to strengthen the capabilities of these countries to manage migration more effectively.” Furthermore, it also recognises the need for further incentives when it notes that “experiences have demonstrated that to broker a deal the EU needs to offer something in return.”\(^{33}\) These developments seem to suggest that the notion of “partnerships” is very much framed from the perspective of the receiving country. In fact, sending and transit countries have little of a say beyond expecting the EU to contribute to the cost of “management” of migration and at best bargain a deal that might bring some benefits to their country and nationals. The effort to develop these “partnerships” at the EU level is still in its early stages, and the approach to “managing migration” may gradually evolve in the direction of a “partnership” that both sides may define, frame and shape together.

The second area of partnership envisaged by the EU is in the context of linking migration and development together. The link between the two had long been ignored by the “development community.” However, in the course of the last decade the relationship between the two has started to receive growing attention.\(^{34}\) There had long been a recognition that development does lead to rural to urban migration and then also to emigration.\(^{35}\) However, more recently, considerable effort has been mobilised, notably in policy circles, so as to develop ideas and policy instruments that may achieve the reverse effect. Development has come to be seen as a means to partly transforming emigration countries, reducing, and preferably preventing unwanted migration into affluent countries.\(^{36}\) In the EU, this relationship has been again approached from a “management of migration flows’ perspective. The latter conceives this relationship as aiming to achieve two objectives. The first one is the idea that the EU could assist migrant communities in Europe to contribute directly to the development of their countries of origin. This would be achieved through facilitating the transfer of remittances and social capital as well as introducing programs to manage the adverse effects of “brain drain” and instead encourage return to foster brain gain. These measures in turn are to serve a second and much more important objective of controlling and reducing the pressure to emigrate through bringing about development in emigration countries.

The European Commission in its Migration and Development Communication develops a series of policy oriented ideas to assist development in countries of origin with especially the contribution of

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members from migrant communities. It offers the possibility of “helping developing countries map their diasporas and build links with them” (p. 5), facilitate “return migration” (p.7) and mitigate “the adverse effect of brain drain” as well as foster “institutional partnerships” (p.8). The Communication elaborates on these measures in an Annex. These measures are all construed and framed in a manner that aims at demonstrating a “generous” and “unselfish” effort on the part of the EU to contribute to the development of third countries. Even if the “real” objective is obviously to control and if possible discourage emigration, nowhere is this openly mentioned. However, the manner in which the term “management of migration flows” is employed leaves little doubt that the objective is control and prevention. Furthermore, there is no attempt to address the possibility or the notion that third countries that need “development” may themselves have something to contribute to the EU’s efforts to “manage migration.” The exception is the reference in the Communication to the need to “build on the best practices that have been or are being developed by individual Member States or by non-State actors and should also learn from practices in other parts of the world, including in developing countries” when formulating EU policy in this area. Yet neither this Communication nor any of the other documents consulted elaborate upon what the contribution from developing countries might be and how that could be sought. This attitude is also reflected when the Communication with some enthusiasm refers to a specific project funded “under EC budget line B7-667” that engages “highly skilled members of the Moroccan Diaspora in France set up innovative start-ups in Morocco.” Yet again the idea that the opposite might also be possible and that highly skilled nationals from Morocco could indeed offer ideas to the EU in how to pursue the relationship between “development and migration” is not envisaged.

The third area of partnership that is least developed but increasingly highlighted is legal economic migration. This is a particularly sensitive area as admission of economic migrants remains under the competence of member states. However, the Hague Programme does call for the need to address the issue at the EU level and encourages the European Commission to initiate a debate on economic migration into the EU. In this regard the Commission adopted a Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration so as to lead this debate and develop policy recommendations. This has subsequently led to the adoption of the Communication on Policy Plan on Legal Migration that constituted the first step to prepare proposals for directives to govern legal migration. The EU hopes in this area to address two objectives: on the one hand the consequences of a declining population in most EU member countries and hence the need for labour and on the other hand the “fight against illegal immigration and employment, including trafficking.”

This third area of partnership does not only aim to develop instruments in order to encourage countries of origin to cooperate with the EU in combating illegal migration but also to give to these countries the possibility of legal migration for their nationals as an incentive. The emphasis is however very much put on the idea of temporary and circular rather than permanent migration. There is clearly a concern to avoid the experience of the 1960s and 1970s that saw the arrival of the so called “guest workers” that then constituted the formation of today’s large immigrant communities. The Communication on circular migration tries to develop the modalities for this kind of migration and does attempt to frame it in a spirit of mutually beneficial cooperation by referring to the notion of

38 Ibid, p. 3.
41 Ibid, p. 4.
“Three Way Approach” to Meeting the Challenges of Migrant Incorporation in the European Union: Reflections from a Turkish Perspective

“mobility partnerships.” However, a close reading of the Communication reveals that once more “control and security” concerns shape the motivation behind the EU efforts. The Communication notes that circular migration will be made available in accordance to “the level of commitments which the third country is ready to take on in terms of action against illegal migration and facilitating reintegration of returnees, including efforts to provide returnees with employment opportunities.” The Communication goes on to elaborate at least eight commitments that third countries would have to meet before being included in the scheme and allowed to enjoy the benefits of circular migration. The Communication does then go on to develop an impressive set of measures or promises for third countries that the EU would introduce to realise circular migration. These measures also include “visa facilitation agreements” possibly the most important and tangible prize in terms of many third countries whose nationals have to have a Schengen visa before they can enter the EU.

In relation to “legal and economic migration”, compared to the other two sets of “partnerships”, the European Commission appears to be much more conscious of wanting to create a genuinely “win-win” and balanced approach to cooperation between the EU and third countries. Of course whether this approach will indeed be adopted by member states, translated into policy and actually implemented, has yet to be seen. In the case of the other two areas, the emphasis remains clearly on “control and security” and third countries’ role remains framed as a passive one with little to gain and benefit from the partnership other than in terms of acquiring and strengthening the tools of “control” in “managing migration flows.” The attitude of treating countries of origin as passive becomes even more conspicuous in the case of the “integration and incorporation” of third country nationals and migrants coming from outside Europe. In stark contrast to the aforementioned three issues of “migration” in the area of “integration”, no form of “partnership” is actually envisaged, and the notion is utterly missing in related EU documents. This is particularly puzzling considering the emphasis that the EU has put recently on the idea of a “global and comprehensive approach to migration”. The absence of “countries of origin” from the debate and from the efforts to develop policies of “integration” is noteworthy.

The idea that academics, non-governmental organisations let alone governmental institutions and officials from third countries, may actually have something to contribute to the efforts in EU member countries so as to better integrate their nationals or former nationals into mainstream life appears to be completely absent in the EU thinking on this issue. The leading EU document that is supposed to shape member state policies towards the issue of “integration” is the Common Basic Principles on Integration formally adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in November 2004. These principles were subsequently elaborated upon by the European Commission in the Communication on A Common Agenda for Integration - Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union. It has already been mentioned earlier that the CBPs is to a large extent revolutionary in the sense that at the top of the list of principles is included the idea that for “integration” to be successful, the process needs to be a “two-way process” encompassing the migrants as well as the host society. However, neither in the CBPs adopted by the Council nor in the Commission Communication is it possible to see any reference or allusion to the notion of a “three way” approach. In other words, the idea that the sending country or actors from the sending countries could be engaged in the debate on policy formulation and that the sending countries may have a contribution or some positive role to play is not entertained.

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43 Ibid, p. 3.
The only context in which the country of origin implicitly enters the CBPs is in respect to the fourth one. This principle states that “basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration.” In relation to this principle, the Commission in the Annex of A Common Agenda for Integration suggests the following: “As managed migration schemes are established, and within the context of developing a European approach to the admission of migrants, there is scope for paying more attention to pre-departure measures which can improve the integration process on arrival.” There is no elaboration offered on whether actors from the country of origin might have a role in formulating or shaping and implementing these pre-departure measures (Emphasis in original text). However, the tone and wording of these remarks give a distinct impression that neither the preparation nor the implementation of “pre-departure measures” would engage the sending country.

European Commission’s Global Approach to Migration one year on is another critical document that is silent on the role of the sending countries in respect to “integration”. Actually, this Communication has the objective of evaluating EU efforts in developing a “global and comprehensive approach” to migration. The document is striking in terms of the emphasis it puts on “control and security” dimension of migration. This is especially reflected in Annex B of the document that lists the work carried out in the EU in 2006. A good proportion of the work that is referred to appears to have had a security and control related agenda, and the impressive number of meetings held with representatives of African and neighboring countries seem also to reflect such a priority. None of these meetings appear to have addressed the role that sending countries might play in respect to “integration.” This is somewhat surprising because under the subheading “Reinforcing Coherence: A Comprehensive European Migration Policy” the document does explore future steps to be taken in respect to “integration and intercultural dialogue.” In this section the Commission foresees to develop instruments that “will allow for wider participation of the different stakeholders, including migrants themselves, thus contributing to the promotion of an effective integration strategy.” (P.8, emphasis in original text). The Commission also makes references to the awaited recommendations of the “High Level Group on the Social Integration of Ethnic Minorities and their Full Access to the Labour Market” and the 'European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008'. However, it is not clear whether any of these activities will indeed involve any consideration of the role that sending countries might be able to play.

The Communication on Global Approach to Migration one year on is not the only EU document that seems to come close to considering the idea of a “three way approach” to integration but obviously falls short of it. The case of “learning” from Moroccans has already been mentioned. The Council Decision establishing the European Fund for the Integration in April 2007 appears to have elements in its term of reference that may allow the funding of projects that could enable a “dialogue” on the “integration” of migrants to emerge. The funding of projects based on the idea of the “two way approach” to integration is openly encouraged by this decision. In Article 5-2b and 2c reference is made to transnational cooperation networks and awareness campaigns that could indeed open the way to exploring the idea of a “three way approach.” Beyond the Common Basic Principles on Integration is a document that was prepared by the European Policy Center and King Baudouin Foundation. This document appears to have played an important role in the debate and discussion process preceding the drawing up of the Commission A Common Agenda for Integration Communication. Temptingly this document comes close to the idea of a “three way approach.” The report actually says that “the

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46 Ibid, p. 17.
countries of origin should be considered as key actors in the development of integration policies” but then this role is restricted to ensuring that “immigrants are not cut off from their countries of origin.”

Earlier in the report the notion that integration is a “two-way” process is diligently raised and actors representing migrants are defined as “actors of integration.” The report then goes on to add the importance of mobilising “untapped resources” such as migrant organizations in developing “integration” policies. Yet, the report stops short of openly advocating the idea that sending countries may have a role or contribution to the actual making and shaping of integration policies.49 Most striking in this respect is the silence of the report of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) on such a possibility. It is noteworthy that this report was prepared after a long series of consultations, and that it is considered to be an avant garde report involving the contributions of experts and prominent personalities from across the world and including leading immigrant sending countries. This report highlights additionally the importance of the idea of the two-way approach to integration and considers that “integration is a long term and multi-dimensional process, requiring a commitment on the part of both migrants and non-migrant members of society to respect and adapt to each other…” It goes on to stress the importance of local and national authorities to work with migrants and their associations and goes on to make suggestions on concrete measures that could be taken.50 Yet, neither in the section on “diversity and cohesion” nor in the rest of the report is there any reference attributing a potential role to countries of origin.

The pattern that emerges from a study of a sample of EU document concerning the place of sending countries in the formulation of a “common migration policy” is fourfold. The EU is making a conscious effort to develop partnerships with such countries in respect to the “management of migration flows”, “development of legal migration” and “migration and development.” Secondly, this partnership is framed or defined in such a way that EU “control and security” concerns come before the interests or priorities of the sending countries. Thirdly, the partnership is defined very much in a hierarchical manner. The EU sets the agenda, and the EU is the active and the “giving” side of the partnership while the sending countries are construed as “passive” and/or at the “receiving” end. It is thus difficult to identify any signs of the idea that “sending countries” may have suggestions to make in the EU proposed “global and comprehensive approach” to migration. Fourthly, when it comes to the issue of “integration policies”, “sending countries” are not even in the picture at all. The thought that “countries of origin” might have even modest contributions to make in assisting host countries and societies in ensuring a better integration or incorporation of their nationals or former nationals into mainstream society is absent.

The intriguing question of course is why this is the case. One major reason seems to do with the image, conviction and belief that “sending countries” and especially their governments are actually part of the “integration” problem. As Castles and Miller note an important aspect of the “age of migration” has been the way in which the politics of countries of origin have often been replayed sometimes violently among the immigrant communities especially in Europe. Furthermore, they also note the manner in which the governments of sending countries have also tried to “control” immigrant communities composed of their nationals especially against the influence from dissident groups and movements.51 Some governments were also actively involved, often in cooperation with host country governments, in running programs in order to address the cultural, educational and religious needs of the immigrants. Retrospectively these programs that were based on the assumption — especially in the Turkish case — that the immigrants were simply “guest-workers” and that one day they would return

49 See Beyond the Common Basic Principles on Integration: The Next Steps, prepared by the European Policy Center and King Baudouin Foundation Multicultural Europe Team* Issue Paper 27 (Revised) 15 April 2005, p. 9, p. 6 and p. 16.
possibly inadvertently undermined or complicated their incorporation into the host societies. The governments of Morocco and Turkey, two countries with large immigrant communities in Europe, were very much known for their policies geared towards controlling their nationals. Furthermore, these were two countries in which the absence of pluralist democracy and widespread human rights violations not only pushed people to flee to Europe but also facilitated the transposition of the conflicts at home on to the receiving countries. The fact that these are Muslim countries and that many in Europe associate integration problems to Islam has been an additional factor reinforcing the idea of the “sending country” being part of the problem. This has been particularly the case especially in relation to violation of women’s rights, domestic violence and the issue of honor killings.

Another factor that may also help to understand why the notion that countries of origin could not make a positive contribution is what might be best described as “Euro-centrism” or “Euro-centric” view of the world that dominates the thinking of most European decision makers. This can be seen as a contemporary manifestation of the good old 19th century belief that the world beyond Europe needs Europe to assist it to modernise, to develop and catch up with Europe. The reverse, that is the idea that sending countries or people from such countries may have the experience, the knowledge, the social capital, the expertise etc... that could indeed help to resolve European problems, seems to be thought as being simply unthinkable. Nationals of traditional emigration countries are more often imagined or construed as individuals who desperately need work, and that this work would inevitably be of an unskilled nature (the sort of individuals good at best for picking up fruits in European orchards). Another manifestation of “Euro-centrism” is the notion that countries and societies outside Europe do not change. The “integration” problems of immigrant communities aggravate this phenomenon as host societies often form and perpetuate their image of sending countries through the image of the problematic “immigrants” in their midst. Yet, at least some sending countries change and evolve, economically, politically and socially. After all, Greece, Spain, Portugal and even Italy, until only a few decades ago, were emigration countries themselves. They have changed and even drastically to the point of becoming immigration countries. These changes bring with them major transformations in the way countries of origin relate to their immigrant communities.

In their edited book *Migration and Development: Perspectives from the South*, Castles and Delgado Wise offer contributions demonstrating the way in which five major emigration countries, India, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines and Turkey, have significantly changed their approach to their respective immigrant communities. By and large, all these countries approach their emigrants in a different way than it was the case in the past, and most governments actively court these communities for a variety of reasons ranging from economic and financial to social and political reasons. The relationship of control between the governments of sending countries and immigrant communities has been replaced by a much richer and diverse relationship. Democratisation and transition to liberal market economies have also had a deep impact on the form and nature of the relationships. Furthermore, transnationalism has also brought the immigrant communities into much greater contact and interaction with their countries of origin.

Surely these kinds of transformations ought to open avenues that should allow the possibility of reframing the relationship between countries of origin and host societies in respect to addressing the problem of “integration.” Such a reframing could be reflected in the way the EU is defining its “global and comprehensive approach” to migration. This would call for a substantial reconsideration of the current approach that relegated sending countries to a passive position in respect to the formulation and implementation of policy on most migration and integration related issues. It would be necessary to recognise that some sending countries have changed, often significantly, and that actors from these countries, governmental as well as non-governmental, may provide constructive experience and knowledge to be shared with their counterparts in host countries. It is worth adding that this suggestion

is not an attempt to introduce actors from sending countries into the decision making process of EU host countries. Clearly the latter are very sensitive towards any intrusion into their national competences in respect to economic migration and integration policies. This is a well recognized given.

Instead the idea proposed here would be to encourage, especially at the EU level, the evolution of the “two level approach” into a “three way approach”. This would simply mean that the EU would create possibilities for European actors, governmental and non-governmental, to interact and exchange views on how some of the “integration” problems might best be addressed and may be solved. Subsequently, it would be up to member states and EU institutions to decide whether these ideas are actually put into practice. In the meantime the “three way approach” would open the way to a much more balanced and fulfilling dialogue between the host country, the immigrants, and the country of origin that could indeed foster circumstances for a “win-win” outcome. The benefits would not be only restricted to the “integration” aspect of the migration agenda, but would spill over into the issues of the “management of migration flows”, “migration and development” as well as “legal migration.” This would also be closer to the spirit and letter of the notion of a “global and comprehensive approach.” Lastly, it would also contribute to confidence building between sending and host countries as well as between host countries and their immigrant communities.

What form might a “three way approach” to integration take and in which concrete ways a sending country might be able to play a constructive role? The answer to these two questions will be explored by looking at the case of Turkey. Examining the case of Turkey is pertinent to explaining the importance of the idea of a “three way” approach to integration for a number of reasons. Firstly, the immigrant community in Europe that has its origins in Turkey is one of the largest. Secondly, among the Muslim sending countries, Turkey is the one that has the closest and longest standing relations with some of the leading immigrant receiving countries of Europe. Furthermore, Turkey is engaged with the European Union in an accession process that is supposed to lead to membership, and hence one should expect a “deeper and more balanced” dialogue between Turkey and the EU on migration. Thirdly, “integration” problems—or at least part of them—that Turkish immigrant communities in Europe face are symptomatic of problems across other immigrant communities from Muslim countries. Finally, the engagement of Turkey by the EU as a candidate country since December 1999 precipitated important reforms and changes in the country. In Turkey, there is now a lively civil society that partly deals or tries to address social problems somewhat similar to the ones one can find among Turkish immigrant communities in Europe. These problems range from the issue of domestic violence against women, honor killings, forced marriages and the need to improve the schooling of girls especially in eastern parts of the country to education in general. The Turkish state has also been transformed to an important extent. There is much more cooperation between civil society, domestic as well as international, and government agencies in addressing social and political problems. More importantly, the current government is much more open to the idea of addressing the “integration” problems of Turkish immigrant communities in Europe. Both Premier Tayip Erdoğan as well as the current president Abdullah Gül, the former minister of foreign affairs, have on numerous occasions called upon Turkish immigrants to make a greater effort to “integrate” during their visits to EU member countries and especially to Germany. Less than a decade ago this would have not been usual, and the fact that this is advocated by a government that has an Islamist background lends additional significance to the matter.

53 A case in point is the speech that Erdoğan delivered at the opening of the Villa Turka in Berlin in November 2005 when he called on members of Turkish immigrants association as well as Turkish immigrants to learn the local language and become socially and politically active in host societies. See “Başbakan’dan AB’ye önemli çağrı” 6 November 2005 accessed at: http://www.delikanforum.net/archive/index.php/t-38841.html.
The Turkish case

The presence of almost 3.5 million Turks, including naturalised ones, in Europe has deeply marked European politics and social life.\(^5\) Many in Europe have highlighted the failure of Turkish immigrants to integrate into their host societies and have also used this to resist Turkey’s EU membership prospects. It is true that Turkish immigrants experience high levels of unemployment and many Turkish immigrant youth perform poorly at school. Arranged marriages and the serious problem of honor killings adversely affect public perceptions of Turkish immigrants. In parallel to the developments in Turkey, religion has also come to play an increasingly prominent role in the associational lives of many Turkish migrants. The \textit{Diyanet}, (The Directorate of Religious Affairs), the Turkish national bureaucracy of religious affairs, which had previously dominated the religious lives of immigrant communities, was increasingly challenged by \textit{Milli Görüş} (National View), an immigrant organisation with very close ties to political Islam in Turkey.\(^5\) For a long time Turkish immigrant civil society was organised very much around events and politics in Turkey rather than those of host communities. This situation is changing, as Turkish immigrants are becoming increasingly involved in local and national politics in the countries where they live.\(^5\) This of course has very important implications in terms of the integration process as well as in terms of the immigrant communities’ relations with the host state as well as Turkey.

The problems of integration that Turkish immigrants face are complicated and diverse.\(^5\) Firstly, just as there are many unemployed and poorly-integrated Turkish immigrants in Europe, there are also Turkish immigrants who have fared well in their host countries, including Turkish businessmen that actually employ local and other immigrants in their businesses.\(^5\) Some of these immigrants have actually become major public figures and politicians at the local, national as well as at the European Parliament level. On the other hand, the absence of an environment that can be of assistance to addressing the challenges that immigrants face has long been a reason that has aggravated the problem of integration. Many European governments until recently failed to acknowledge that they had become immigration countries. Many also shied from adopting active policies to support integration of immigrants. Anti-immigrant politics and racism remain major challenges. Nevertheless, the long-standing presence of immigrants is impacting on the culture of immigrants themselves as well as their host societies. A certain degree of cultural blending and interaction in the positive sense of the word does occur.

However, the EU and in particular the efforts of the European Commission on “integration” is of paramount importance. Considering that member states have been very sensitive in avoiding any element of supranationalism creeping into their policies on migration, the progress covered so far in the first section of this paper is impressive. This is particularly so in terms of the way in which the notion of the “two way approach” to integration has become a well established principle. Furthermore, documents such as the \textit{Handbook on Integration} and the \textit{Annual Reports on Integration} are critical.


\(^5\) For the role of religion and transnationalism among the Turkish immigrant communities see G. Avcı, “Religion, Transnationalism and Turks in Europe” \textit{Turkish Studies}, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2005).


contributions to improving “integration”. Yet, the introduction of the idea of “three way approach” would not only enrich the EU’s current efforts in the area of integration but it would serve the purpose of developing a “global and comprehensive approach” to migration. In the specific case of Turkey the “three way approach” could also create a tangible “win-win” situation for both sides. Turkey, at the governmental and civil society levels, could contribute to addressing and alleviating an old problem in Europe while at the same time help to create an adequate setting as to improve its image among the European public. In turn, a readiness on the part of the EU to take into account and include Turkey’s experience and knowledge and especially cooperate closely with government agencies and civil society would help to improve the deep mistrust felt towards the EU in Turkey.

The section below explores activities in three different but related areas in Turkey that could benefit “integration” efforts in the EU. The first area relates to ensuring and promoting women’s rights in Turkey. Turkey has been one of the first countries in Europe, well before France for example, to grant to women the right to vote. Women have also enjoyed rights since the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923 that women in many other, especially Muslim, countries lack to this day. However, there are still problems especially in respect to the actual practice and implementation of these rights. Domestic violence against women and especially honor killings is a particularly serious problem in Turkey. However, numerous Turkish non-governmental organizations together with international agencies such as the United Nations Population Fund and government agencies, especially the General Directorate on the status of women, have been engaged in numerous programs and campaigns. Every and each of these campaigns and programs is a reflection of the tremendous experience that is being accumulated in this area in Turkey. Still, the most striking one is the campaign launched to educate young Turkish conscripts about women’s rights. The campaign involves cooperation between the government, the military and various national and international civil society agencies. This campaign gains particular significance when one bears in mind how traditionally relations between the government and the military have not always been positive. Ironically, a government that is suspected by the military to have a hidden Islamist agenda and dominated by men has been able to develop such a campaign with the military, a male organization par excellence.

The case of KAMER is also particularly interesting. KAMER is a non-governmental organisation based in Diyarbakır and active on the subject since the mid-1990s in a particularly difficult region of Turkey where violence against women and especially honor killings is endemic. KAMER, an organization led primarily by Kurdish women, some of whom have been from a very Kurdish nationalist background, works very closely with the Turkish police and Gendarmerie. A member of KAMER actually pointed out to the author of this report that they consider the police and the gendarmerie to be their best and helpful allies in improving the situation of women in the region. The same person, incidentally with impeccable pro-Kurdish credentials, added that they had the greatest problems with the PKK, the Kurdish nationalist separatist group, whose members frequently argued with members of KAMER that the time was not ripe for women’s rights and that priority should be given for the right to self-determination. Surely, the members of KAMER who operate under such difficult circumstances would have an important experience to share in respect to “integration” problems in Europe. However, this member of KAMER added that she had been invited to Europe to address the problems of immigrants only twice. On the occasion of her visit to Sweden, she had the distinct impression that her Swedish counterparts seemed very open and willing to benefit from her

60 For a survey of the problem of violence against women in Turkey and efforts to improve the situation see A. G. Altnay and Y. Arat, Türkiye’de kadına yönelik şiddet (Istanbul: Punto, 2007).
61 On this particular campaign and its significance from the perspective of a woman journalist see M. Tamer, “Yetişkin Erkek Nasıl Eğitilir” Milliyet, 30 March 2006.
62 Interview held in Diyarbakır in 2 November 2006.
experience. Yet, her experience in Holland was very different, and her hosts seemed much more interested on that occasion to hear from her on how Kurdish immigrants could be encouraged to return to Turkey rather than learn from her knowledge about how to promote women’s rights among immigrants.

In the area related to the prevention of domestic violence, it was actually a Turkish daily *Hürriyet*, widely read by the Turkish immigrant community in Europe too, that came closest to putting the idea of a “three way approach” into practice. *Hürriyet* ran a series of conferences and meetings in Germany as part of a campaign it launched under the heading of “Aile İçi Şiddete Son!” (End to domestic violence within the family!) directed at the Turkish immigrants’ community. One of the meetings was actually attended by Maria Bühmer, the German state minister responsible for migration and integration. It is interesting that at this meeting the minister chose to note that “out of every four German women one is subject to domestic violence” and welcomed the campaign. Her Turkish counterpart, Nimet Çubukçu, state minister responsible for women and family affairs, in her speech stressed that she was ready to support efforts to learn from each other.63 A prominent Turkish female journalist reported the remarks of Walter Momper, speaker of the Berlin State Parliament, who maintained that he was impressed to see Turkish public opinion take interest in the problems of the West. The journalist clearly sensed the potential for a “three way approach” as she herself observed that Turkey owned up to a problem of Europe with this campaign.64

A second area in which Turkey has developed considerable governmental and civil society experience lies in increasing the rate of schooling among girls. In 2003, the newly elected government launched a campaign called “Haydi Kızlar Okula!” (Off to School, Girls!) led by the ministry of education in cooperation with UNICEF.65 The campaign focused particularly on eastern provinces in Turkey and aimed at persuading parents to send their girls to school. Of the more than 270,000 unregistered girls the campaign succeeded in getting more than 80 per cent of them to register and go regularly to school. The campaign also attracted the support of civil society. A number of non-governmental organizations with long standing experience in the area of education became involved such as the Foundation for Contemporary Education (Çağdaş Eğitim Vakfı) that is a staunch supporter of women’s rights as well as secular form of life. Furthermore, a prominent Turkish daily *Milliyet* started its own campaign called “Baba beni okula gönder” (Daddy do send me to school) in 2005 to mobilise both public as well as financial support for the government’s efforts.66

At first sight, this experience may not be directly relevant to the problems of Turkish immigrants. However, if one considers that through family reunification a considerable number of poorly educated brides join the Turkish immigrant community in Europe, the case may be different. Educational projects directed towards new brides and especially their children could surely make a contribution to the broader effort to ensure better incorporation of Turkish immigrants into mainstream life. In this context, the experience of the Turkish ministry of education as well as civil society in Turkey could be put into good use. Actually, a synergy could also be achieved if Turkish immigrants themselves would become involved in the campaign as donors or supporters.

A third area has to do with the fact that Turkey faces its own “integration” problems resulting from massive internal migration that has taken place over the last decade from rural areas into urban centers. This has led to a growth in the population of major urban centers like Antalya, Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, and migrants have had difficulties in adjusting to often very western ways of life in these urban centers. Honor killings and domestic violence against women are partly the expression of a failure to adjust or “integrate”. It is by a fascinating coincidence that the day the author of this paper

64 G. Benmayor, “’Aile İçi Siddete Son’la Avrupa’nın sorununa sahip çıktınız” *Hürriyet* 2 December 2006.
65 Details about the campaign can be reached at www.haydikizlarokula.org.
66 Details about the campaign can be reached at www.bababeniokulagonder.org.
was due to make a presentation at a Salzburg Seminar on the idea of a “three way approach” to integration that an article by a prominent senior columnist, Taha Akyol, on internal migration and integration appeared in the Turkish daily Milliyet. 67 In this article Akyol described the efforts and projects of a local government and civil society in the Istanbul township of Bağcılar to assist the integration of rural migrants into urban life. At least some of the “integration” problems did not seem very different than the ones that some Turkish immigrants encounter in Europe. There are at least two academic programs, the Migration Research Program at the Koc University and the Center for Migration Research at Bilgi University, that actively support research projects that look at “integration” related issues both in Turkey as well as in Europe. Quite a number of the papers presented at a major conference on migration and culture dealt with these issues. 68 Similarly, there is also a growing interest in the influence of religion and religious factors on Turkish immigrant communities not to mention their integration. One of the papers presented at this conference actually was based on a project commissioned by Diyanet aiming at understanding the role of religion and influence of Muslim religious movements as well as the position that these movements take on the issue of “integration” . 69 In other words, there is a growing academic and intellectual capital on “integration” that could easily be engaged should a “three way approach” to integration be adopted or advocated in the EU.

Lastly, it is important to note that the attitude of the government in general has considerably evolved over the last couple of years on the issue of cooperation with host countries in respect to integration. The position of the prime minister and the former minister of foreign affairs has already been mentioned. However, it should be noted that they are not the only ones who want to see Turkey play a more positive role in this regard. Mehmet Aydin, a professor of theology and state minister responsible for religious affairs too has on numerous occasions highlighted the importance of Turkish immigrants integrating themselves into their host countries. 70 It is not surprising that it should be during his term of office that Diyanet started a number of projects with the support of universities to train the imams to serve Turkish immigrant communities abroad in the realms of local languages and culture of the host country. This would have been unusual a couple of years ago. The Turkish Grand National Assembly has become interested in the problems of Turkish nationals living abroad too. The election in November 2002 of members of the Parliament with immigrant background or experience has played an important role in this. The Parliament constituted a commission in April 2003 to visit immigrant communities in Europe and investigate their problems. The Commission adopted an extensive report analysing a wide range of problems experienced by Turkish immigrants and submitted their recommendation in December 2003. 71

What form could the three way approach take? One obvious way would be to encourage contact between European non-governmental organizations and the Turkish ones. This should not be that


69 Ibid, paper presented by N. Subaşı, “Avrupa’lı Türkler: Referans Arayışları, Söylem ve Tasavvurlar”.

70 The minister at an international conference on migration in Istanbul acknowledged that in the past, mistakes had been made by respective Turkish governments in respect to the integration of Turkish immigrants in Europe, and went on to elaborate a “four stage integration plan”. See M. Aydin, “Küreselleşme, Komşuluklar ve Göçler” paper published in 8-11 December 2005 International Migration Symposium Communiqué (Istanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi, 2006). In terms of the “three way approach” to integration, the minister shares an interesting anecdote in his paper about how, in a European country that remains unspecified, two members of parliament asked to meet him for dinner in the evening after a seminar, but later called and excused themselves from the planned dinner fearing that it might be on TV news, and that this might not be welcomed by their respective voters, (p. 202).

difficult given the existence of numerous facilitating financial instruments. However, what is critical here is the Commission adopting the idea of a “three way approach” and actually encouraging non-governmental organisations to develop projects reflecting the spirit of the approach. The Commission in its Migration and Development Communication had offered the possibility of “helping developing countries map their Diasporas and build links with them.” It could maybe do the opposite by identifying non-governmental organisations in sending countries that may have something to offer. In the case of accession countries such as Turkey and ENP countries such as Morocco, this should not be that difficult. It would literally just require crossing the “corridor” from DG Justice and Home Affairs to Enlargement, and study the progress reports that the Commission prepares for candidate and ENP countries each year that are often rich in information on these countries and their civil societies. However, the more difficult task would actually require changing “hearts and minds” especially among the officials of member states. The image that sending countries are part of the problem of “integration” will not be easy to change.72

Additionally, the notion of “three way approach” to integration may appear to be too intrusive to some decision makers and analysts. Such an approach might provoke apprehensions over the fact that actors from sending countries might want to impact the decision making processes of the EU and member states from the back door. The most difficult of course will be to dismantle the dominant “Euro-centric” view of looking at some issues, and convince that sending countries may actually have something to contribute to resolving a problem of the EU. Yet, the Commission persevered for almost a whole decade to get EU member states to accept the “two way approach” to integration. It ought to be able to do the same with the “three way approach”. The Commission has already some of the tools to introduce the “three way approach” into the debate on “integration” in the EU without suggesting in any way that sending countries should become part of EU decision making processes. In its Communication on The Global Approach to Migration one year on, the Commission suggests the need “to establish Migration Support Teams (MISTs) composed of experts from EU Member States which could provide the necessary assistance to requesting African states”73 so as to help them deal with migratory flows. Why not consider similar MISTs on “integration”, composed of EU as well as third country experts, to assist EU member states that choose to seek help? The Commission goes on in the Communication, very rightly, to emphasize the importance of links between policy and research. It notes how, “Inspired by the academic network linking migration research institutes in Mediterranean countries (CARIM), the Commission will support initiatives stimulating the establishment of a pan-African network of migration ‘observatories’ and/or migration research institutes.”74 In this context, the Commission could perhaps encourage CARIM to set up a network of “integration observatories” composed of experts from the EU and some of the sending countries. This would enable both sides, the receiving and sending countries, to explore ways in which sending countries might be able to assist receiving countries in better integrating immigrants into mainstream life. The Commission could also encourage member states to organise events in the context of the ‘European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008’75 that would explore the idea of a “three way approach” to integration.

Agencies of member states could also try to engage and benefit from the experiences of sending countries. Most EU member states have tremendous experience in assisting candidate countries through twinning projects in their efforts to harmonise their policies and practices with that of the EU

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72 In this respect, Minister Aydin’s anecdote in his paper about how, in a European country that remains unspecified, two members of parliament asked to meet him for dinner in the evening after the seminar, but later called and excused themselves from the planned dinner fearing that the encounter might be on TV news and that this might not be welcomed by their respective voters, (Ibid p. 202) is very telling in terms of the extent of the transformation of “hearts and minds” needed to launch a successful “three way approach” to integration.


74 Ibid.

75 Mentioned in Ibid p. 8.
on a wide range of issues. Non-governmental organizations too have taken part in these projects. The author of this report has participated in numerous training seminars for the Turkish police, gendarmerie and judiciary concerning a wide range of issues from combating human smuggling and trafficking to the implementation of asylum law. Often the implementing partners of these training seminars were non-governmental organizations including the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC). Numerous middle and high rank officials have received certificates from ICMC with the name “Catholic” engraved on them. Would it not be impossible to envisage training programs in the other direction? Can’t one envisage that Turkish non-governmental organisations active on, for example, combating domestic violence against women, such as KAMER, run training seminars for the police or judges of EU member countries? An Austrian journalist participant at the above mentioned Salzburg Seminar mentioned how a number of Turkish immigrant women who were victim of domestic violence had approached the police in Vienna for help. The police had sent back these women to experience more violence and even death on the grounds that “in Turkish and Muslim culture domestic violence against women was normal and that they should submit themselves to their husbands.” Just as the Turkish police learns how to treat asylum seekers properly through the intermediary of EU and UNHCR officials in training seminars organised by ICMC, could it not be possible that English or German speaking Turkish women officials affiliated for instance to the General Directorate on the Status of Women in Turkey and KAMER run similar training programs for the Austrian police. Similar training programs could be envisaged for the judiciary of some member countries who believe that the Shari’a Law should be applied to Muslim immigrant women in Europe and are not aware that women’s rights are defined by secular law in Turkey.

A list of possible ways of cooperation in support of a “three way approach” to integration could be expanded ad infinitum. However, the critical point here is to recognise that in a globalising world characterised by transnationalism it would be difficult to address the “integration” problems of immigrant communities, especially the Muslim ones, without adopting a “three way approach” where possible. Turkey has been used here as an example, however, the same observations could possibly made for Morocco too. Even if not all sending countries might be in a position or for that matter willing to engage themselves as players in a “three way approach” to integration, the European Commission as well as other stakeholders with an interest in a better incorporation of immigrants into mainstream life of host countries ought to consider exploring the idea. It would fit well with the aspiration of developing a “global and comprehensive approach to migration” of the EU.

Conclusion:

The “control and security” as well as the “burden shifting” nature of the EU evolving common migration policy has been highlighted by a plethora of writings. A survey of the EU documents covered in this paper reinforces this in spite of the frequent employment of the term “partnerships” with sending and transit countries. The efforts of the EU to develop a “global and comprehensive approach to migration” are relegating third countries to “managing migration flows” by performing “control” duties in return for basic technical assistance and a vague promise of visa facilitation. The relationship would seem a little more balanced in the case of “migration and development” if it were not for the thinly veiled EU objective of encouraging development to stop “unwanted migration” from sending countries. In the case of “integration” of immigrants, sending countries are simply not in the picture, and no notion of “partnership” is envisaged.

Adopting and implementing the idea of “three way approach” to integration may contribute to a genuine dialogue between the EU and at least part of the migrant sending world. A genuine dialogue

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need not be understood to mean any sort of interference on the part of the sending countries in the EU decision making processes on “integration” policies. It would mean no more than acknowledging that sending countries may have the social capital, the experience and the interest to contribute to EU efforts to develop better “integration” policies. Members of academia and civil society as well as government experts from sending countries, where appropriate, could be engaged by the European Commission and willing member state governments and/or their civil society to share their experiences and ideas. This would also lead to the recognition that both sides may have something to contribute and actually help each other in concrete and meaningful ways. This would be a much more promising relationship and more genuine “partnership” than the existing one so far. This would also be closer to the idea of “dialogue” that is omnipresent in practically all of the EU documents studied for this paper.

Clearly not all sending countries may be in a position to participate in a “three way approach” to integration. However, all the countries mentioned in the Communication on The Global Approach to Migration one Year on more or less would have the capacity to do so. In any event two of them, Bulgaria and Romania on the list, have become EU members in the meantime. Turkey is on the other hand involved in the accession process for membership of the EU. The case of Turkey is also particular because of the large Turkish immigrant community but also because it is a Muslim country that has been significantly transformed partly thanks to the EU’s engagement of Turkey. Part of the Turkish buoyant civil society today addresses social problems that very much resemble the ones faced by Turkish immigrants who fail to integrate in Europe. In addition, the government’s attitude toward Turkish immigrant communities has been transformed, and also governmental institutions have become much more accustomed to cooperating with the international community. This ought to make Turkey a useful partner for the EU in formulating successful “integration” policies.

One additional and important factor is that a good proportion of the “integration” problem in Europe concerns Muslim immigrants. The arising danger in Europe is that the issue of “integration” is being deeply framed by growing Islamophobia. This is clearly exacerbating relations between the Muslim world and Europe. Furthermore, there is a lot of talk about “dialogue” that often remains theoretical and abstract. Introducing the idea of a “three way approach” as a concrete manifestation of “dialogue” involving “partners” could constitute a concrete step in the direction of confidence building not only between the EU and Turkey but also between Europe and the Muslim world. It would go well with the EU’s efforts to add an “external dimension” to its common migration policies. In this context, the Report of the High Level Group of the Alliance of Civilizations (AoC) is a particularly important document that does address the “challenge of migration” and acknowledges the problem of “integration” of Muslim immigrants especially in Europe. The Report also takes into account the importance of dialogue in addressing these problems. The fact that the AoC is co-sponsored by the prime ministers of Spain and Turkey and that its secretariat is led by a former president of Portugal may bode well in terms of developing the idea of a “three way approach” to integration.

In any event, a lot will depend on the European Commission. The Commission has more than a two-decade experience in trying to raise the issue of the “integration” of TCNs. This experience has not been an easy one, and the Commission has had to take a few dents along the way. Member states have been notoriously resistant to change and to new ideas in the area of migration. Nevertheless, the EU’s “common” migration policy has come a long way. At least today, the Commission has a much clearer role in respect to “integration” and has gotten member states to accept the wisdom of the “two-way approach”. As Geddes points out the Commission has an important agenda setting role to play in the area of migration issues.77

The idea of a “two way approach” to integration took almost a whole decade to percolate through the corridors of EU and member states policy thinking and making before it became part of the CBPs.

Should the Commission and the EP choose to adopt the idea of the “three way approach” hopefully on this occasion, a whole decade may not be needed. The documents and instruments concerning “integration” that the Commission has developed have more than enough room to incorporate this approach. The 'European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008' may well be the best occasion to start a debate and discussion on the topic.
Appendix I:

List of EU and other policy oriented documents relating to immigration and integration policies

**Immigration and integration (European Commission):**


European Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission):


Immigration and integration (EU legislative bodies):


Council Decision establishing the *European Fund for the Integration of third country nationals for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General Programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’*. Brussels, 18 April 2007, 16923/06.


Other documents:

*Beyond the Common Basic Principles on Integration: The next steps*, prepared by the European Policy Center and King Baudouin Foundation Multicultural Europe Team* Issue Paper 27 (Revised) 15 April 2005