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How Nationalism Evolves: Explaining the Establishment of New Varieties of Nationalism within the National Movements of Québec and Catalonia

Jaime Lluch
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Abstract

The national movements of sub-state national societies are divided into two or three competing currents. Thus, national movements tend to bifurcate into independentists and autonomists, or at times, trifurcate into independentists, autonomists, and federalists. These internal currents within national movements tend to vary over time, experiencing moments of foundation, growth, development, and decay.

Both the Catalan and Quebecois national movements experienced the foundation and growth of new political orientations within the institutional component of these national movements. I compare the process that led to the founding of the ADQ (autonomism) in Quebec in 1994, with the process that culminated in the transformation and de facto re-founding of ERC (independentism) in Catalonia during 1986-89. Using the cases of two nationalist parties in two different national movements that have successfully established new political orientations, we will explore the political origins of this form of temporal variation within national movements. My outcome variable is the “tipping point” at which these nationalist political parties get established. This “tipping point” was reached through a temporal sequence that evolved in four phases, which can be conceptualized as: the pre-embryonic period phase, the embryonic period phase (in Catalonia from 1975 to 1981 and in Quebec from 1982 to 1992), the impulse phase, and the formation and founding phase. In each of these phases, a key variable was involved: the existence of a preexistent ideology, the occurrence of a central state constitutional moment, an impulse from the sphere of sociological nationalism, and the consolidation of a new leadership nucleus.

Keywords

Nationalism; Nationalist movements; Political Parties; Québec; Catalonia
Evolution within National Movements

National movements are organized endeavors to achieve all the attributes of a fully-fledged “nation.” In the national movements of sub-state national societies, there is a recurring empirical pattern. Despite the diversity of particular histories, geographic characteristics, economies, demographics, political institutions, political cultures, etc., one observes that the political tendencies (i.e., parties) making up national movements tend to bifurcate or, at times, trifurcate, into two or three basic political orientations: independence, autonomy, and, oftentimes, federalism. Obviously, these differing orientations have a variable impact on the stability and on the continuity of state structures and institutions. Moreover, these internal currents within national movements tend to vary over time, experiencing moments of foundation, growth, development, and decay. At times, new political orientations within national movements are founded in the sphere of parliamentary politics. Previous scholars who have sought to explore the origins of variation between national movements have typically focused on across-case variation, not within-case temporal variation. In Europe, for example, the typical comparison has been between the Basque national movement and the Catalan national movement.

1 I use here the terminology of Miroslav Hroch. National movements tend to pursue three aims: (1) the development of a national culture, based on the native language; (2) the achievement of civil rights and political self-administration (autonomy or independence); and (3) the creation of a complete social structure from the ethnic group (Hroch 1993: 6; Hroch 1994: 4).
2 In general, “sub-state national societies” are historically settled, territorially concentrated, and previously self-governing societies with distinctive socio-linguistic traits whose territory has become incorporated into a larger state. The incorporation of such societies has in some cases been through imperial domination and colonization, military conquest, or the cession of the territory by an imperial metropolis, but in some cases reflects a voluntary pact of association (Kymlicka 1995). These are also known as “stateless nations,” “internal nations,” or “national minorities.” I prefer to use the term “stateless nation”, given that, as Michael Keating writes, the term “national minority” more often refers to a “people within a state whose primary reference point is a nation situated elsewhere” (Keating 2001: x; Brubaker 1997: 57). Examples of stateless nationhood include: Scotland, Quebec, and the Basque Country.
3 Independence is the realization of full political sovereignty for a nation. For stateless nations, it is the attainment of separate statehood, completely independent from the majority nation with which they have coexisted within the same state for some time. Also, proposals for Sovereignty-Association and Associated Statehood are variants of the independence option.
4 Autonomy proposals are political arrangements that generally renounce independence -- at least for the medium- to short-term -- but which seek to promote the self- government, self administration, and cultural identity of a territorial unit populated by a polity with national characteristics. The cases of autonomy vary widely and no single description will be applicable to all such situations. Contemporary instances of actually-existing autonomy relationships include: Åland Islands/Finland, Alto Adige/Italy, Faroe Islands/Denmark, Greenland/Denmark, Puerto Rico/USA. Most cases of actually-existing autonomy arrangements can be clearly distinguished from classic federations. Classic federations, where all the constituent units have substantially equal powers, may not be sufficiently sensitive to the particular cultural, economic, institutional, and linguistic needs of a sub-state national society, which require a greater degree of self-government (Ghai 2000: 8). Generally speaking, moreover, “autonomy is always a fragmented order, whereas a constituent...[unit of a federation] is always part of a whole...The ties in a...[federation] are always stronger than those in an autonomy” (Suksi (ed.) 1998: 25).
5 Federalists seek to have their nation remain (or become) a constituent unit of classic federations, which constitute a particular species within the genus of “federal political systems,” wherein neither the federal nor the constituent units’ governments (cantons, provinces, länder, etc.) are constitutionally subordinate to the other, i.e., each has sovereign powers derived directly from the constitution rather than any other level of government, each is given the power to relate directly with its citizens in the exercise of its legislative, executive and taxing competences, and each is elected directly by its citizens.
movement, with the goal of explaining why one national movement overall has been more independentist and radical, while the other has been autonomist or federalist, eschewing for the most part the use of violence (Conversi 1997) (Díez Medrano 1999). Therefore, temporal variation within national movements is an important and yet under-theorized area in the study of nations and nationalism.

For example, the Catalan national movement has historically had two dominant currents: federalist and autonomist. Similarly, the Quebecois national movement, ever since the coming to power of the Parti Québécois in 1976, has had in recent history two principal currents: independentism and federalism. Yet, in the course of the period 1976 through 2005, both national movements evolved and diversified, and both produced a new institutionalized political current within the movement, espoused by nationalist political parties. These are indeed nationalist parties, but with different orientations: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) is independentist and the Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ) is an autonomist party. Figures 1 and 2 depict graphically the temporal evolution of the Quebecois and Catalan national movements, during 1976-2005.

**Within-Case Temporal Variation**

**QUEBEC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>2005</th>
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<tr>
<td>Federalism (PLQ)</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Autonomism (ADQ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independentism (PQ)</td>
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**Figure 1. Within-Case Temporal Variation in Quebec, 1976-2005.**
Therefore, when and how do new political orientations within the institutional component of a national movement get successfully established? When and how do new varieties of nationalism become institutionalized? How do these nationalist orientations move from the substratum of “sociological nationalism” to the institutionalized sphere of parliamentary politics and electoral competition?

**Establishing the Comparison**
I am interested in stateless nations’ national movements, located within or belonging to states with a high level of socio-economic development, with long-standing liberal democratic regimes (25 year minimum duration), where the minority nation-majority nation relationship has lasted for at least one century, and where the principal cause for the differential between majority and minority nations is language, culture, history, and institutions, as opposed to race or religion. These are the scope conditions of my project (Mahoney and Goertz 2004: 660). The universe of cases encompassed by my scope conditions is the following: Scotland, Corsica, Québec, Flanders, Wales, Basque Country, Catalunya, Galicia, and Puerto Rico.

Of the universe of cases encompassed by my scope conditions, I have chosen to study the national movements of Quebec and Catalunya because these two stateless nations share similar sociocultural, political, and economic backgrounds. Specifically, they share the following important similarities: (1) these nations are examples of stateless nationhood, (2) they promote a form of peripheral nationalism, (3) all of the parties I am studying in these two cases are nationalist in the sense that they affirm and defend the existence of their nation as a foundational commitment, (4)

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6 The comparability of Québec and Catalunya has been previously noted. One symposium concluded that the Québec case offered one of the most appropriate and interesting comparisons with Catalunya (Manuel Pares and Gaetan Tremblay 1988: 9).
the three varieties of nationalism are represented in the political party systems of these two societies, (5) within the political party systems of these two nations, the identity axis often predominates over the left-right axis, (6) Quebec and Catalunya are comparable in socio-economic terms and levels of development, (7) Quebec and Catalunya are comparable in terms of their relative economic importance and demographic weight within their respective states (Canada and Spain), (8) Both the Quebecois and Catalan national movements promote at present a civic form of nationalism, renounce the use of violence to promote their goals, and emphasize the importance of the democratic process.

Both societies emerged out of a period of quiescence in their national movements in the last third of the 20th century. In 1976, the PQ won its first elections in Quebec, initiating a new political age. Also, in 1976 the national movement in Catalunya began a period of democratic normalcy. In sum, both societies were in the same stage of development of their national movements during the 1976-2005 period.

Moreover, during this period, both the Catalan and Quebecois national movements experienced the foundation and growth of new political orientations within the institutional component of the national movements, espoused by nationalist political parties. We will be comparing the process that led to the founding of the ADQ (advocating autonomist nationalism) in Quebec in 1994, with the process that culminated in the transformation and de facto re-founding of ERC (advocating independentist nationalism) in Catalunya during 1986-89. Using the cases of two nationalist parties in two different national movements that have successfully established new political orientations, we will explore the political origins of this form of temporal variation within national movements. This research design will make it easier to distill out the similarities shared in the process through which they were established as parliamentary political parties espousing a new political orientation. These two cases share a number of key explanatory factors that help to explain a common outcome: the establishment of a novel political orientation within the national movement.

**Explaining the Establishment of New Varieties of Nationalism**

At the outset, we should note that in any national movement, we have to distinguish between sociological nationalism and institutionalized nationalism. “Sociological nationalism” refers to the presence within any given society of nationalists that are organized in the sphere of civil society. These are groups of nationalists that form associations, cultural groups, pressure groups, and consciousness-raising political action groups.

Only formally constituted political parties are able to channel the collective national consciousness cultivated by the constituent elements of sociological nationalism into a clearly formulated political program, which, in turn, sets the political

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7 Please note that these insurgent orientations are “new” in the sense that they may have been present in sociological nationalism and in extra-parliamentary small groups or parties, but did not have a significant presence in the arena of parliamentary politics and electoral competition. Thus, for example, autonomism arguably may have been the political legacy of the Union Nationale regime of premier Maurice Duplessis, which began in 1936, and which ended with the Quiet Revolution in Quebec after 1960. But in the recent period, it is the ADQ, after its founding in 1994, that has been representing this political and constitutional orientation in the Quebec National Assembly in recent years.
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agenda, and determines which varieties of nationalism are available for consumption by nationalists.

Therefore, our attention will be centered on the evolution through time of the political and institutional component of the national movements at issue here, but we will be mindful of the role played by sociological nationalism and the possible influence of the latter on the former.

Explaining Temporal Variation

My outcome variable is the “tipping point” at which these nationalist political parties get established. This “tipping point” is of analytical significance because it represents the point at which a novel political orientation within the national movement is successfully established within the sphere of formal institutional politics. From that point on, the supply side of nationalism has been diversified and expanded. Providing a cogent political explanation of how this “tipping point” is reached is a significant analytical advance. After the “tipping point” has been reached, the new formations pass through a period of maintenance and growth, during which the political and constitutional orientation tends to mature, and reaches an ideological plateau that gives it an aura of permanence and legitimacy within the national movement.

I argue that four factors explain the process through which the “tipping point” was reached. This result is obtained through the sequential interaction of these four factors, which can be schematically described as Preexistent Ideology, Central State Constitutional Moment, Impulse from Civil Society, and Formation of Leadership Nucleus.

The Pre-Embryonic Period: Preexistent Ideology. In order for a new political orientation to be institutionalized within the national movement, there must have been some preexistent ideological carriers that espoused the orientation. These previous carriers served as the intellectual developers of the political and constitutional orientation incorporated by the contemporary parties and their leadership. Thus, it is essential to be attentive to the ideological history of the new political and constitutional orientation.

The Embryonic Period: Central State Constitutional Moment. The immediate catalyst that sets in motion the process that leads to the founding of a new political and constitutional orientation within a national movement is the occurrence of a significant constitutional transformative event at the central state (i.e., Canada or Spain). Such constitutional transformative moments tend to frame the embryonic period of the formation of a new political orientation. A constitutional transformative event is a higher order constitutional event, which impacts the relationship between the central state -- largely controlled by the majority nation -- and the minority nation embedded within the same state (Ackerman 1991). It is of a higher order than ordinary legislative activity. Such “constitutional moments” are relatively rare, and they represent a critical event that crystallizes the nature of the relationship between the central state and the embedded minority nation. These critical constitutional transformative events include: the adoption of a new constitution, the adoption or proposal of significant constitutional amendments, the adoption or proposal of a new organic statute for the government of the embedded minority nation, etc. Note that these critical constitutional transformative events may be either positive or negative in their final outcome. That is, the event could have led to the actual enactment of a constitutional amendment, organic statute, etc., or the event could have been the proposal of such an amendment, etc., even if it was later...
rejected. What matters is that the event set in motion the public policy discussion and critical reevaluation of the relationship between majority and minority nations, both coexisting within the same state. Such constitutional transformative events, originating at the central state level, tend to have a significant impact on the political party system of the embedded minority nation. The *embryonic period* of the formation of a new political orientation within the institutional component of a national movement is thus framed by a central state constitutional moment.

The Impulse: *The Contribution from Civil Society.* During the process that leads to the founding of a new political and constitutional orientation within a national movement, the organizations, entities, and individuals that represent sociological nationalism make a critical contribution. An impulse for the formation and founding (or de facto re-founding) of these parties is given by elements coming from civil society. Thus, we need to be attentive to the role played by associations, extra-parliamentary political action groups or parties, organizations formed by the intelligentsia, and cultural and language affirmation groups, etc. Such organizations and entities serve as the breeding ground for cadres and leadership, as the providers of organizational skeletons, and also as the cultivators of the ideological precedents and programs that facilitate the establishment of a new political orientation in the sphere of parliamentary politics and electoral competition.

The Formation and Founding of the New Nationalist Political Orientation: *Consolidation of Leadership.* Once the trigger event of a central state constitutional moment has occurred and the impulse for the founding of a novel political orientation has been given by elements coming from civil society, a new nucleus of leadership needs to consolidate, to steer the support being generated by civil society in the direction of founding a political party, which will be the carrier of the new political orientation. The nucleus of new leadership is also of critical importance because their political skill will determine whether they will be able to take advantage of the political opportunities presented by the central state constitutional event that set in motion this entire process. Whether the new nucleus of leadership can frame the central state constitutional moment in terms that are favorable to their plans is essential. Their skill in harnessing the contribution made by elements of civil society is also critical. The political skill of the newly formed nucleus of leadership is also important because it will determine whether or not they will be able to avoid sectarianism, and instead adopt a program that will agglutinate as many nationalist forces as possible.

The sequential interaction of these four factors determines whether or not the process reaches the “tipping point” at which these nationalist political parties get founded, or de facto re-founded.

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**The Pre-Embryonic Period: Preexistent Ideology**

**Preexistent Ideology in Catalonia**

*Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC) was founded in 1931. ERC won the municipal elections of April 12, 1931 and from that point onwards became the hegemonic party during the Second Republic (1931-36) (Ivern i Salva Vol. 1 1988: 76). ERC was the party that formed the government during the entire period of the Second Republic and its two principal leaders were the two presidents of the government: first, Francesc Macià, and, after his death in late 1933, Lluis Companys, until the defeat of the Republic in the Civil War (Molas 1972: 88).
ERC during the Second Republic had a program that had been approved at the *Conferencia d’Esquerres* in March 1931, and called for the formation of a “Catalan State” that would then form a federation with the other peoples of the Iberian peninsula. Thus, the structure of the state would be that of an Iberian Federal State or a Hispanic Federal State, all of which were terms that the party’s program used indistinctly. This federal state would be structured through a pact between the Catalan State and the other constituent states of the federation (Ivern i Salva Vol. 2 1988: 393). This program was that of a party in opposition to the system, but once the party found itself in the government, and the hegemonic force in the Second Republic, its actual trajectory was more moderate. Thus, for example, President Francesc Macia on April 14, 1931 made a dramatic declaration of the “Catalan Republic,” but three days later -- after its rejection by the provisional government of the Republic -- the Catalan government backed down and instead opted to accept the re-establishment of the *Generalitat* and to follow the autonomous route, eventually leading to the adoption of a Statute of Autonomy for the principate, enacted by the Spanish Parliament on September 9, 1932 (Rubiralta 2004: 213).

It has been said often that Catalan independentism is a relatively new constitutional and political orientation that was born during the period of the democratic transition (1975-1981). Once the Spanish Constitution was enacted in 1978 and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy was approved in 1979, several independentist organizations were born, including *Terra Lliure* and *Comites de Solidaritat amb els Patriotes Catalans*, etc. Before that, one can also point to the existence of organizations such as the *Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional* and *Front Nacional de Catalunya*. But, in general, political Catalanism from the 19th century to the democratic transition of 1975-82 was not a movement of secession, but of the reform of the Spanish State. It is hard to find evidence of an unambiguous independentist tendency within the national movement before the war of 1936-39, in spite of the existence of individual radical pronouncements or the appearance of *Estat Catala* (David Bassa et al. 1994: 19). The military coup of July 18, 1936, the social conflict and the war of 1936-39, represented a rupture. The physical annihilation of intellectuals, politicians, public opinion leaders, and militants of popular and Catalanist organizations was widespread. The repression of linguistic and cultural rights during the dictatorship of General Franco, and the massive immigration from Southern Spain during the 1960s promoted by the regime, further fed the rupture with the past. In fact during the Franco years, it was the PSUC and the PCE that were the protagonists in the resistance. Most notable is the appearance of a party that combined a clear independentist orientation with socialism. This was the *Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional* (PSAN), which had emerged from the *Front Nacional de Catalunya*. The PSAN incorporated a new generation, which had not experienced the war. Yet, the PSAN was not able to energize a mass national movement around the independentist banner. Plagued by internal divisions, the PSAN gave birth to the PSAN-Provisional in 1974. But the creation of a clear independentist option would be the task of another generation, those who were politically incorporated during the transition to democracy without having been part of the anti-Franco struggle. The embryonic period of the independentist current in Catalunya was thus between 1975 and 1981 (22).
The Pre-Embryonic Period: Preexistent Ideology in Quebec

Before the 1960s most of the political parties in Quebec were autonomist, or autonomist-federalist, in their political and constitutional orientation. They opposed, with more or less intensity, the Canadian federal government’s appropriation of the domains of competence that belonged to the provinces.

The two major parties of the province (Union Nationale and Parti Liberal du Québec) had contrasting identities at the end of the 1950s. The Union Nationale (UN) was committed to the defense of the autonomy of the province, just like the PLQ had been before it. Even independentists such as René Lévesque, the founder of the PQ, have recognized the UN’s credentials as a conservative nationalist party, which was steadfast in its quest to obtain more autonomy for the province (Cardinal, Lemieux, and Sauvageau 1978: 253). This is best exemplified by the UN’s struggle to give the provincial government the power to tax, and to share this power with the federal government. (Cardinal, Lemieux, and Sauvageau 1978: 256) But the UN was a strictly provincial party, without an equivalent at the federal level. In contrast, the PLQ had an alliance with the Liberal Party of Canada until 1964. The success of the Union Nationale, from 1944 to 1956, is due in part to its strategy of denouncing the association of the PLQ with the federal Liberal Party that governed Canada (Bernier, Lemieux, Pinard 1997: 23).

In that sense, the UN was the more autonomist party, more dependent on its nationalist allies in the interior of Quebec. In contrast, the PLQ was more federalist, and its principal ally was the federal government in Ottawa, which was Liberal since 1935 (Bernier, Lemieux. Pinard 1997: 6).

Maurice Duplessis had founded the UN and had given it, by the force of his remarkable personality, its sense of identity. (Cardinal, Lemieux, and Sauvageau 1978: 20) Duplessis was a committed patriot, convinced of the wisdom of the autonomist route. He said in 1946: “the great problem of the hour is how to safeguard the liberties and other prerogatives of the province…” In addition, he said in the 1940s that “the autonomy of the province is the soul of the people…For this cause, it is necessary to form a sacred union [i.e., national solidarity]” (ADQ-Corvée Place du Québec 2004: 6; Cardinal, Lemieux, and Sauvageau 1978: 254). Duplessis was never an independentist, refusing to make of the province of Quebec a “banana republic without bananas.” He had always believed instead that within the Canadian federation it would be possible to live in peace with the other provinces as long as the provincial rights guaranteed by the Constitution were respected. (255)

The death of Duplessis in 1959 explains in part the defeat of the UN in 1960. The PLQ won the provincial election of 1960, and with this new government, a new political era was inaugurated. There appeared the notion of the État du Québec, as well as the political will to construct an apparatus of government aiming to reduce the difference between the powers accorded to the provincial government and those of the central one, as well as establishing greater equality of opportunity and resources within Quebec society (Bernier, Lemieux, Pinard 1997: 7). Slowly, during the 1960s within the most advanced nationalist circles the quest for autonomy was substituted by the quest for sovereignty or independence (8).

By 1976, a major realignment had taken place in Quebec’s political party system, with the independentist Parti Québécois (PQ) replacing the Union Nationale as the Parti libéral du Québec’s (PLQ) chief rival (Lemieux 1993: 11). In fact, already in the elections of 1970 and 1973 the PQ had replaced the formerly dominant Union


Nationale as the main alternative to the federalist nationalism of the PLQ (Rocher, Rouillard, and Lecours 2001: 192) (A. Brian Tanguay 2003: 254). “Since the early 1970s, party competition in Québec has pitted the left-leaning, technocratic, étatiste and nationalist Parti Québécois against the centre-right, free-market and federalist Québec Liberal Party” (255). Therefore, the Quebecois national movement since the 1970’s has historically had two dominant currents: independentism and federalism.

I have outlined above how autonomist nationalism is a tendency within the national movement of Quebec that has existed at various points in the 19th and 20th centuries, through the 1960s. But the task of building the contemporary institutional embodiment of this political and constitutional orientation would be left to a younger generation in the 1990s. The embryonic period of the contemporary institutional expression of the autonomist political orientation would be from 1982 to 1992, as explained below.

**The Embryonic Period: Central State Constitutional Moments**

**Central State Constitutional Moment in Catalonia**

The Spanish Constitution was approved on December 8, 1978 with the opposition of Catalan independentism (David Bassa et al. 1994: 26). The Catalan independentists were organized in the Comite Catala Contra la Constitucio Espanyola, which was the first step in the articulation of a militant independentism (Vilaregut 2004: 71). The independentists argued that the new Constitution imposed a framework that was inimical to the collective rights of the Catalan people, denying their right to self-determination.

The Comite Catala Contra la Constitucio Espanyola was promoted by the Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional- Provisional (PSAN-Provisional), which was the first effort to give ideological cohesion to the independentist sentiment in view of the new juridical superstructure established by the constitutional moment of 1978-79 (Renyer 1995: 58) (Vilaregut 2004: 71). The Committee mobilized people throughout the principate in opposition to the new Spanish Constitution of 1978, and was the medium through which new cadres of independentists were formed. This group was the “embryo of a process of confluence of revolutionary independentism” and was focused on the opposition to the new Spanish Constitution, which was thought to be contrary to the national interests of Catalunya, since it placed obstacles to the free exercise of its right to self-determination. Moreover, in the eyes of the nationalists, it was seen as a Constitution embodying continuity with the Francoist institutions, the monarchy, the apparatus of state security, the army, etc., all of which maintained their pattern of repression against the independentist movement (Renyer 1995: 58). The committee disappeared once the Carta Magna was enacted, but it served to give shape to a radical independentism, which crystallized in the creation in the spring of 1979 of the Independentistes dels Països Catalans (IPC), born out of the fusion of the PSAN-Provisional and the Organitzacio Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional de la Catalunya Nord. In fact, after the enactment of the Constitution, with the participation of autonomist and federalist political parties in Catalunya, the independentist extraparliamentary political organizations were orphaned, and many of these organizations disappeared or were debilitated. The independentist political space was increasingly filled by radical organizations, such as Terra Lliure.

The new Catalan statute of autonomy was approved on October 15, 1979, and it was also opposed by the independentist movement, considering it another instance of
the domination of the Spanish state and contrary to popular interests (Bassa 1994: 27). The political space was now open to the creation of new organizations that channeled the independentist sentiment generated in reaction to the constitutional moment of 1978-79. Framed by this central state constitutional moment, the embryonic period of 1975-81 nurtured the nascent independentist tendency, which attained its full potential after 1979.

**The Embryonic Period: Central State Constitutional Moment in Quebec**


**The “patriation” of the Canadian Constitution in 1982.** In 1981-82, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau brilliantly maneuvered to bring home Canada’s Constitution from Britain -- a ‘patriation’ representing a final act of severance. In April 1982, Queen Elizabeth proclaimed a new Canadian Constitution in Ottawa, which became known as The Constitution Act, 1982, without the consent of the government of Quebec.

In the eyes of many francophones, the Constitution Act, 1982 represented the imposition by the Trudeau government of its own particular vision and conception of Canada. Seen from the viewpoint of Quebecois nationalists, Pierre Elliott Trudeau became the greatest champion of Canadian nationalism in the 20th century. Building the Canadian nation has always been one of the main tasks of the proponents of a strong federal government in Canada, and the central state’s contribution to nation building goes back to Confederation (Laforest 1995: 131). As noted by Philip Resnick, the invention of a Canadian national tradition by the federal state has progressed in stages. First there was the international recognition that the Canadian state received through membership in the League of Nations, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations. Second, there were the nation-building activities undertaken by crown corporations, such as the Canadian National Railways, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, etc. Third, there is the sense of national solidarity engendered by the social activism of the state – old age pensions, unemployment insurance, and family allowances. Fourth, there are the symbolic validations of post-1945 Canadian nationalism: the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1947, the Canada Council of 1957, the adoption of the new Canadian flag in 1965, and the patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982 (Laforest 1995: 132). As Resnick stresses, the symbols of nationhood and the sense of identity of English Canada are associated with the Canadian state. “‘From mounted police to railway projects to armed forces to national broadcasting, social programs, or the flag, the route for English Canadians has entailed use of that state’” (133).

The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Constitution Act, 1982 can therefore be seen in light of this progression, through which the central state and its political institutions have given form to the Canadian nation. “The fundamental objective of the authors of the 1982 constitution seems to have been to promote throughout Canada (including Quebec) a political culture capable of reinforcing in each citizen the feeling of belonging to a single Canadian nation.” (133) The Charter served as a unifying symbol, underscoring the importance of the freedoms and institutions they share in common (McRoberts 1997: 172).
The first constitutional moment that framed the embryonic period of the formation of the contemporary embodiment of autonomist nationalism in Quebec was the negotiation and enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982. This constitutional event embodied a pan-Canadian nationalism, and it had several repercussions in Quebec. First, it may have provoked a reaction among Quebeckers, reinforcing the independentist current within the national movement (McRoberts 1997: 174). Second, the national unity strategy of the Trudeau government incurred the “opposition of not just sovereigntists but also a good share of federalist opinion in Quebec. Indeed, Quebec federalists were to remain badly divided for years to come.” (174)(emphasis added) In short, the Constitution Act was badly out of step with majority opinion in Quebec, given that it was based on an idea of Canada that most Quebec francophones did not share. It set in motion a political reaction in the province that was compounded by the further responses to the next two constitutional moments during the 1982-1992 period. The end result, as we will see, is that a crisis was provoked within the federalist nationalist camp, which ultimately led to the birth of the contemporary institutional embodiment of autonomist nationalism, the ADQ.

The Meech Lake Accord Process of 1987-1990. Brian Mulroney of the Progressive-Conservative Party swept the federal election of 1984 with a promise to try to bring Quebec back into the Canadian constitutional fold. But the initiative was actually taken by premier Robert Bourassa of the federalist PLQ, who had won the provincial election of 1985. His government reiterated that even though they considered themselves federalists, they insisted that the Constitution Act as it was enacted was unacceptable to the Quebec government. The Bourassa government in Quebec released a five-point plan, outlining the conditions under which the Constitution Act would be acceptable to Quebec. Mulroney eventually identified the basis for a consensus, and their discussions resulted in the Meech Lake Accord of April 30, 1987, a set of constitutional revisions incorporating all of Quebec’s five proposals and adding a sixth. This package was formally approved by the first ministers on June 13, 1987 (McRoberts 1997: 192).

The Accord was well received in Quebec, given that in the eyes of many francophones it did away with the systematic refusal to meet Quebec’s demands that had been the hallmark of constitutional negotiations during the 14 years of the Trudeau era. It was ratified by the Quebec National Assembly on June 23, 1987, and then it was subject to a three-year process of ratification in the federal parliament and in all the provincial legislatures. Each of the ten provincial legislative assemblies was required to endorse the unanimous agreement that had given birth to the Accord (Laforest 1995: 108).

In the end, the Accord was not adopted, given that by the time the three-year limit had expired, the legislatures of two of the provinces, Manitoba and Newfoundland, had not yet approved the Accord. Therefore, on June 23, 1990, the Meech Lake Accord passed away, and the April 1987 compromise achieved on the shores of Lake Meech had been defeated. That same evening, the premier of Quebec, Robert Bourassa, gave a speech under a solemn ambiance at the National Assembly in which he declared: “No matter what anyone says or does, Quebec has always been, is now and will always be a distinct society, free and capable of taking responsibility for its destiny and development” (A. Brian Tanguay 2003: 262). This disappointing end for the Accord also initiated a period of crisis in the political party system in the province, and, in particular, within the federalist PLQ and those who composed its most nationalist wing,
which ultimately led to the formation of the contemporary institutional carrier of autonomist nationalism in the province, namely, the ADQ. The failure of Meech Lake thus led to the radicalization of the nationalist wing of the PLQ. Prof. Guy Laforest was the president of the ADQ from October 2002 to September 2004, and he believes “the birth of the ADQ in 1994 must be understood as one of the consequences of the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in June 1990” (Laforest 1994: 307).

The Post-Meech Period and the Charlottetown Accord Process of 1992. After the failure of the Meech Lake Accord process during 1987-1990, the disappointment was quite intense among francophones, compounded by a sense of rejection. Support for Quebec sovereignty reached unprecedented heights immediately after the failure of the Accord. By November 1990, it had reached 64% among Quebec residents, with only 30% opposed (McRoberts 1997: 204). In some public opinion surveys, seven out of ten persons pronounced themselves in favor of sovereignist positions (Lemieux 1993: 173). The Bourassa government announced it was withdrawing from any further constitutional talks. After this defeat, the federalist PLQ found itself without a constitutional program. In order to develop new positions, the party created an internal committee popularly known as the Allaire Committee, presided by Jean Allaire, a corporate law attorney from Laval who was a well respected militant of long standing in the PLQ. In addition, on September 4, 1990 the government announced it was creating a parliamentary commission of the National Assembly on Quebec’s constitutional and political future, popularly known as the Bélanger-Campeau Commission (Gagnon and Latouche 1991: 37).

The Allaire Committee’s Report was published at the end of January 1991, and it proposed a “minimal” federalism, wherein the competences of the federal government would be reduced to defense and security, customs and tariffs, currency and the debt held in common, etc. (Gagnon and Latouche 1991: 485).

The Allaire Report constituted a radical shift from the Liberal Party’s 1980 Beige Paper. Reflecting the nationalist animus of the PLQ at that time, the Congress of the PLQ of March 1991 adopted the Allaire Report with minor modifications. Two-thirds of the delegates at the Congress voted to adopt the Allaire Report as the official position of the PLQ (Béliveau 2002: 48; McRoberts 1997: 206). Shortly thereafter, in June 1991, Bill 150 was passed by the National Assembly, requiring the government to hold a referendum on sovereignty either in June or October of 1992.

In 1992, the Mulroney government initiated a new round of constitutional negotiations between itself, provincial governments, territorial leaders, and leaders of the four main aboriginal groups (McRoberts 1997: 207). An agreement was reached on July 7, 1992 between the federal government, nine provincial governments (excluding Quebec), two territories, and four aboriginal groups.

By August 1992, premier Bourassa had agreed to return to the constitutional negotiating table, and he participated in the negotiations between federal officials, the provincial first ministers, and autochthonous leaders, at Charlottetown. On August 26, 1992 all the parties subscribed what became known as the Charlottetown Accord. By that time, Bourassa was able to convince most of the PLQ -- with the important exceptions of Jean Allaire and Mario Dumont (leader of the PLQ’s youth wing, Commission-Jeunesse) -- to accept the Charlottetown Accord as an acceptable reform of the Canadian constitution. All the Liberal members of Parliament except one followed Bourassa. (A. Brian Tanguay 2003: 229) A referendum on the package of reforms known as the Charlottetown Accord was set for October 1992. The two most
notable leaders of the nationalist and autonomist wing of the PLQ, Allaire and Dumont, and many members of the youth wing of the Liberal Party, formed *Le Réseau des Libéraux pour le Non* and supported the “No” vote in the referendum now proposed for October on whether to approve the reform of the Canadian Constitution based on the set of reforms contained in the Charlottetown Accord. This solidified Allaire’s and Dumont’s position as dissidents within their own party, and further advanced the consolidation of a nationalist/autonomist nucleus of dissent within the federalist PLQ. On October 26, 1992 the referendum was held, with an 83% participation rate in Quebec. Of these, 56.6% voted for the “No” and 43.4% for the “Yes.” Outside Quebec, 54.3% voted against the Accord and 45.7% voted “Yes.” In the eyes of many francophone Quebecers, the Charlottetown Accord represented a step backward from the original Meech Lake proposal (Laforest and Gibbins 1998).

The third constitutional moment that framed the embryonic period of the formation of the contemporary embodiment of autonomist nationalism in Quebec was the negotiation and failure of the Charlottetown Accord in 1992. As explained previously, although the PLQ has throughout remained the most federalist party within the political party system of Quebec in its political and constitutional orientation, it has had periods where it has been strongly autonomist in orientation, such as in the period immediately following the failure of the Meech Lake agreement in 1990 (Lemieux 1993: 201). The clearest expression of this latent autonomist nationalism within the PLQ in the early 1990s was the Allaire Report and its formula for a radical devolution of powers to Quebec. For the nationalist/autonomist nucleus within the PLQ, their position within the party had become untenable, especially after they supported the “No” side in the campaign leading up to the October 26, 1992 referendum. In a sense, the autonomist nationalist political orientation had its embryonic period within the federalist PLQ between 1982 and 1992. But by 1992 its possibilities within the PLQ itself had been exhausted and another institutional carrier had to be found for the expression of the contemporary embodiment of autonomist nationalism.

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**The Impulse: The Contribution from Civil Society**

**The Impulse: The Contribution from Civil Society in Catalunya**

ERC in the early 1980s was not an independentist political party (Buch 2001: 186). It was at that time still far from embodying an independentist orientation, and was still immersed in the indefiniteness and ambiguity of this early period (Rubiralta 2004: 184, 224). In the early 1980s, the independentist political space in Catalunya was occupied by three blocs, which could well be regarded as constitutive elements of “sociological nationalism” (Alquezar, Marin, Morales 2001: 186-7).

The first bloc was radical independentism, which developed from the groups that gravitated towards the *Independentistes dels Països Catalans* (IPC), which came from the PSAN-P. This sector believed that in light of the new constitutional superstructure existing between Spain and Catalunya it was necessary to insist on a rupturist strategy. This sector was given organizational momentum by the *Comites de Solidaritat amb els Patriotes Catalans* (CSPC), by the actions of *Terra Lliure*, and by the creation of the *Moviment en Defensa de la Terra* (MDT).

The second bloc was formed by *Nacionalistes d’Esquerra*, a group formed in 1980 with the intention of participating in the electoral process.

The third bloc was civic independentism, i.e., organizations and entities of the civil society that were proponents and supporters of independentism. The most
prominent of these organizations was La Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua, la Cultura i la Nació Catalanies (“la Crida”), which was a cultural and linguistic pressure group. It was a social movement, very malleable, which aimed to strengthen the level of national consciousness in Catalan society, through direct action campaigns and mass public acts. It aimed to be active in civil society, renouncing all ambition to attain institutional power, and did not aim to transform itself into a political party. In response to a manifesto alleging that Castillian was being marginalized in Catalonia, the Centre Internacional Escarré per a les Minories Ètniques i Nacionals (CIEMEN) published in 1981 a formal response entitled Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua, la Cultura i la Nació Catalanies, with 130 signatures, calling for a public act of reflection. Out of this public assembly emerged the first secretariat of the newborn Crida, with Àngel Colom as its coordinator (Monné and Selga 1991: 32). Subsequent adhesions to the manifesto of the Crida exceeded 10,000 and dramatized the importance of associationism in Catalan society in the early 1980s. Among the organizations that supported the Crida were Omnium Cultural, Xarxa Cultural, Orfeo Catala, Club d’Amics de la UNESCO, Centre Excursionista de Catalunya, Coral Sant Jordi, and many others (19).

By the end of 1986, the Crida began a campaign to attract adherents based on the message of independence for Catalunya. “Independence is Possible: Come join the Crida” was the message diffused. It was meant to capitalize on the growing independentist sentiment and to attract younger folk. (117)

From its inception to 1986, when he left it to join ERC, the Crida’s principal and most charismatic leader was Àngel Colom. ERC’s transformation began in October, 1986 when Colom joined that historic party, “giving an impulse to the process of independentist refounding of ERC, supported by its historic president, Heribert Barrera” (Rubiralta 2004: 224, emphasis added). The idea was to crystallize the independentists’ long sought objective of attaining parliamentary representation, which had been denied them during the transition period (1975-1981). ERC’s new independentism put an end to its historic indefiniteness and ambiguity, and was consolidated in 1989 (224). The new ERC of Angel Colom is going to consolidate its independentist project by benefiting from the sociological independentism that had been generated during the decade of the 1980s, thanks to the activism of many organizations, including Terra Lliure, La Crida a la Solidaritat, and other cultural/linguistic affirmation groups (Vilaregut 2004: 113). Thus commenced a process of unloading of militants from the various small organizations of popular, civic, and militant independentism onto ERC (113). In June 1993, La Crida announced its self-dissolution, and a considerable portion of its militancy joined ERC (Rubiralta 2004: 204).

The Impulse: The Contribution from Civil Society in Quebec

As in the case of ERC in Catalunya, an impulse for the formation and founding of the party that eventually came to be known as the ADQ was given by elements coming from the sphere of sociological nationalism.

On November 26, 1992 the Executive of the PLQ decided to expulse Mario Dumont from the party. In the wake of Dumont’s expulsion, shortly thereafter Jean Allaire and some of his supporters resigned from the party (89). Thus, by November 1992, Allaire -- a member of the PLQ for 36 years and an acquaintance of premier Bourassa for 40 years -- and Dumont, a very young leader of the PLQ, found themselves in a political desert, devoid of a party.
Allaire has pointed out that at the root of the decision to found the ADQ was the outreach they did to elements from civil society and the feedback they received. In January 1993, Allaire and Dumont took the initiative to bring people together from all the regions of Quebec and from all the political tendencies in a group to reflect on the future of Quebec. This became known as the *Groupe Réflexion Québec*. It served as a civil society forum, helping to generate new ideas about the political options facing the province.⁸

In the Fall of 1993 the *Groupe Réflexion Québec* published its document entitled “*Un Québec Responsable*” widely and cheaply diffused by the journal *Agora*. The document’s introductory page, subscribed by Allaire and Dumont, explained that the group was “neither a political party nor an embryo of a political party…After having confirmed the impossibility of pursuing unimpeded reflection within the political parties, we decided to organize a group of reflection independent of the organized political parties. The organization of the group was undertaken at the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993…The conditions for admission into the group included not being an active member of a political party…” (*Agora* 1993: 3). According to Guy Laforest, who became a member of the ADQ in February 2000 and was its president from October 2002 to September 2004, the foundation of the ADQ was closely related to the [work realized and the] report released by the *Groupe Réflexion Québec* (Laforest 2004: 309).⁹

**The Founding of the New Nationalist Political Orientation: Consolidation of Nucleus of Leadership in Catalunya**

By 1987 sociological independentism had been gaining force, especially among the youth sector. Among the young, it was an independentism with a weak ideological component, but proudly displaying the ethnosymbolism of nationhood, such as the use of the *estelada* flag (David Bassa 1994: 100). Yet, by 1987 it was clear there was a demand for an independentist political party, but the growth of sociological independentism up to this time had not yet succeeded in establishing its own party with a presence in the Catalan Parliament. Thus, independentists started considering whether ERC, the party closest to their ideals, and one with distinguished historical credentials, could be somehow transformed and effectively re-founded.

In the election for the Catalan Parliament held in 1980, ERC decided to support the winning party in that election, CiU. Heribert Barrera negotiated ERC’s support of CiU in the government that was formed, and presided by Jordi Pujol. This pact with CiU in 1980 initiated a period of years in which ERC was essentially in its shadow (Lucas 2004: 99). This period ended in 1987, when a new team of leaders came to dominate the party, and rejected the policy of collaboration with CiU.

In 1984, Josep Lluís Carod Rovira, the former president of ERC, was in the small extra-parliamentary party known as *Nacionalistes d’Esquerra*, which he had helped found in 1980. They participated in the elections of that year, obtaining very meager results. This experience made him reflect and he came to the conclusion that there was no space in the Catalan party system for a new party (Sanchis 2003). Subsequently, in 1986, Carod was able to meet with Heribert Barrera, the secretary general of ERC at that point and one of the historic figures of the party. Barrera and Carod both agreed

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8 Personal interview with Jean Allaire, June 22, 2005, at UQAM, Montreal.
9 Personal interview with Guy Laforest, June 3, 2005, at Université Laval, Quebec City.
that the only way to agglutinate all the people who were progressive and had a national consciousness was to do so through ERC.

Subsequently, Carod met several times with Angel Colom, the Coordinator of *La Crida*, to discuss their plans for refounding ERC, and then met again with Heribert Barrera (Lucas 2004: 115). Both agreed that ERC was an agonizing party, without its own political personality, and having the leadership with the highest median age of any in the Parliament. Despite this general outlook, the two of them decided it was worth trying to resuscitate ERC, giving it a new political and generational profile. Barrera had announced that he would no longer be the secretary general. At the XV Congress held in 1987, Joan Hortala was elected secretary general, with a promise to incorporate Carod and Colom and the leadership that had promoted the *Crida Nacional a ERC*. A month later, Carod and Colom officially joined ERC. Colom set out to develop a style of tireless activism, similar to what he had done at the *Crida*. He set himself the mission of rebuilding ERC, taking on the task of attracting as many people as possible into it. Slowly people started adhering to their proposed plan. The new adherents came from three sectors. First, militants from the *Nacionalistes d’Esquerra* that came with Carod. Second, an important group coming with Colom from *La Crida a la Solidaritat* (Lucas 2004: 119). Finally, independent militants, who saw this proposed plan as an occasion to rejuvenate and energize a sagging and fragmented independentist movement (Sanchis 2003: 93). In the Catalan Parliament election of 1988, ERC improved slightly its position, passing from 5 to 6 members of Parliament. Both Angel Colom and Carod Rovira became members of Parliament. This new parliamentary group openly broke with CiU, accusing it of “defending the most conservative mechanisms of the country” (Lucas 2004: 126).

In 1989 the party celebrated its XVI Congress in Lleida, one of the most important in its recent history. Angel Colom won the post of secretary general by a narrow margin, with the support of Barrera and Carod, and remained in the post until he left ERC in October 1996 (134). Under Angel Colom’s leadership, ERC developed from 1989 onwards a monothematic, unswerving, and intransigent independentist discourse. The party shifted its focus to the identity/national axis. The social and political economy axes were inexistent in ERC’s discourse during the period of Angel Colom’s leadership (Sanchis 2003: 95). However, even Carod Rovira has recognized that Angel Colom’s unswerving independentism helped ERC to re-create and re-found its image, playing a positive role. It also helped to advance the independentist message among the citizenry, disassociating it from violence (98). After the Congress in Lleida in 1989, with the party’s new independentist message, the door was open for all sectors of independentism to enter the party. In the months following the Lleida Congress, the party received a wave of affiliations. Slowly, there was a movement of incorporation of many elements coming from radical independentism (Alquezar, Marin, Morales 2001: 190).

After the election of Angel Colom as its secretary general in 1989 at Lleida, the renovated and re-founded ERC experienced an unparalleled generational change, a rapid growth in its militant ranks, and a profound transformation in the profile of its leadership. For example, a study conducted by the *Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona* of the militants who attended the XIX Congress of ERC in 1993, showed that a third of the militants were between 25 and 34 years of age, and another third between 35 and 50, quite a different profile when compared to the pre-1989 gentrified party. The median age of the leaders with posts in the party was 37.3 In 1993, the data showed that 66.8%
of the attendees had entered the party since 1989. Only 15% of the attendees had been in the party before the Crida Nacional a ERC. Among those who stated they had a post of high responsibility, more than half had joined the party after 1989, attracted by the new independentist orientation. It was also determined that 70% of the attendees had come to ERC from other independentist (extra-parliamentary) parties and organizations. Only 7.8% had come from CiU. Thus, from 1989 on, ERC had become the political formation agglutinating the independentists (Lucas 2004: 137). The new leadership quickly gave concrete institutional shape to its new orientation, obtaining the approval in the Catalan Parliament of a resolution asserting the right to self-determination (140).

It can be said that ERC has grown and strengthened itself from the membership and the militancy of previously existing independentist organizations, i.e., from sociological nationalism. ERC had become the dominant expression of moderate independentism (Bassa 1994: 156). The entry into ERC of independentists from all ranks is dramatized by an analysis ERC’s members of Parliament who were active during the 4th (1992), 5th (1995), and 6th (2000) legislatures of the Catalan Parliament. Of a total of 21 members of Parliament active during this period, only two had entered ERC before 1987, while the majority had entered the party between 1987 and 1992. Four of them had been active in radical independentist organizations before joining ERC. Seven of them had been active in La Crida or civic independentism. Five of them had been active in Nacionalistes d’Esquerra. In total, 13 of the 21 members of Parliament had come from extra-parliamentary independentist organizations. None came from the orbit of CiU (Alquezar, Marin, Morales 2001: 192).

The Founding of the New Nationalist Political Orientation: Consolidation of Nucleus of Leadership in Quebec

When the participants in the Groupe Réflexion Québec met in early 1993, the participants were interested in elaborating a new project for Quebec, capable of bringing together many people from diverse strands of society. A “third way” seemed to be in the making, but it wasn’t clear yet that this process would culminate in the formation of a new party. Once the Report of the Group had been published, it dissolved itself, and it wasn’t clear what would follow it. One option was simply leaving it at that, and having each one return to his or her chores. Another option was to turn it into a foundation for a movement or a pressure group to express its opinion about topics of current interest, without taking any concrete, practical action. A third option was to turn it into the foundation for a new political party, responding to the demand that was felt among the population for a “third way” option. Among the participants of the Groupe Réflexion Québec, there were advocates of all three options (Allaire 1994: 53). On October 2, 1993, it was decided to turn the network of reflection into Groupe Action Québec, with a mandate to take the group’s report to the population to discuss and publicize the result. An intensive tour of the entire province was undertaken, in which more than 30 meetings were held and more than 2,000 persons were consulted (55).

On December 13, 1993, Allaire announced the formation of a new political party, the Action démocratique du Québec. A declaration of principles was adopted at Trois-Rivières on December 12, 1993 by an assembly of 165 delegates. On January 18, 1994 the Director General of Elections in Quebec authorized the formation of the ADQ. The ADQ held its first Congress on March 5-6 1994 (57). Allaire was selected as chef of the party and Dumont as President. Shortly thereafter Allaire announced that he would not be able to continue because of a cardiac condition, and Dumont replaced him.
In the 1994 provincial election, the new party received 6.5% of the vote, and Dumont became a member of the National Assembly. The PQ won that election with a comfortable majority in the National Assembly, and PQ premier Jacques Parizeau set course for holding a second referendum on sovereignty in 1995. The new party formed part of the coalition for the “Yes” (the pro-independence option) in the Referendum on sovereignty held on October 30, 1995, forming a triple alliance with the independentist formations, the PQ and the Bloc Québécois on June 9, 1994 (Beliveau 2002: Chap. 10). After the defeat of the pro-independence proposal by a narrow margin in the 1995 Referendum, the ADQ came to believe that the Quebeccois people did not at the moment want a radical rupture with Canada and deplored the constitutional obsession in Quebeccois politics. The party decided to adopt a moratorium for 10 years on the age-old constitutional dilemma between independentists and federalists (ADQ Corvée Place du Québec 2004: 11). For the ADQ, the classic independence-federalism dichotomy was in need of revision and rethinking. The ADQ argued that the province more than ever needed a strong autonomist voice, a current of autonomist thought, and an institutional carrier for the autonomist nationalist political orientation (11). During 2000 and 2001 the party undertook a programmatic consolidation, developing a more coherent set of values and principles. In the provincial elections of April 14, 2003, the party obtained 18% of the vote, but obtained only five members of the National Assembly, due to the distortion caused by the electoral system. In the provincial elections of March 26, 2007 -- to the surprise of many political observers -- the ADQ became the second most voted party in the province, beating the PQ and becoming the official opposition to the PLQ minority government of prime minister Jean Charest. It obtained 30.80% of the vote and 41 seats in the Quebec National Assembly. The party continues to be the carrier of autonomist nationalism in the province at present, and it represents the elusive third way, according to Guy Laforest, in between the politics of identity of the PQ and the politics of interest of the PLQ (Laforest 2004: 321; ADQ Corvée Place du Québec 2004).

**Conclusion: How Nationalism Evolves**

In the early 1980s, the Catalan national movement did not have an independentist national political party in the Catalan Parliament. Only two political orientations existed within the national movement in the sphere of parliamentary politics: autonomist nationalism and federalist nationalism. Thus, independism at that time existed only in the sphere of sociological nationalism, living a marginal existence, and was largely absent from the sphere of parliamentary politics. In the late 1980s, for the first time in the history of political catalanism, this situation changed dramatically. Similarly, in the 1980s, the Quebeccois national movement did not have an autonomist national political party in the National Assembly. Only two political orientations existed within the national movement in the sphere of parliamentary politics: independentist nationalism and federalist nationalism. Thus, autonomism at that time was politically voiceless, and was largely unrepresented in the sphere of parliamentary politics. This political configuration changed in the 1990s.

The “tipping point,” that is, the juncture at which a new political orientation is successfully established in the arena of electoral competition and parliamentary politics, was reached in 1989 in Catalunya and in 2004 in Quebec. At that point, these national movements diversified and expanded, and now three political orientations within these national movements are represented in the sphere of formal party politics.
I have traced the process through which this “tipping point” was reached. It was a temporal sequence that evolved in four phases, which can be conceptualized as: the pre-embryonic period phase, the embryonic period phase (in Catalunya from 1975 to 1981 and in Quebec from 1982 to 1992), the impulse phase, and the formation and founding phase. In each of these phases, a key variable was involved: the existence of a preexistent ideology, the occurrence of a central state constitutional moment, an impulse from the sphere of sociological nationalism, and the consolidation of a new leadership nucleus. Independentism in Catalunya and autonomism in Quebec are now part of the mainstream of their respective national movements and have acquired an aura of legitimacy and permanence within them. Once the “tipping point” has been reached, the newly institutionalized political orientations then undergo a period of maintenance and growth, reaching an ideological plateau that give them the imprint of permanence and legitimacy within their national movements. Also, the political orientation each of these nationalist parties proclaims has become more widely known and more widely supported among the citizenry. Nationalists in Catalunya now have a clear independentist alternative coexisting with the other two historically dominant political orientations: autonomist and federalist nationalism. Similarly, nationalists in Quebec now have a clear autonomist alternative competing with the other two post-1976 historically-dominant political orientations: independentist nationalism and federalist nationalism.

My work indicates that central state/majority nation nationalism plays a central role in configuring the trigger event that sets in motion the process that leads to the founding of a new political orientation within a national movement. The embryonic period of the formation of a new nationalist political orientation is framed by a central state constitutional moment, which itself is interpreted by the minority nationalists as an instance of majority nation nationalism. My analysis highlights the influence of central state constitutional transformative events on minority nations’ national movements. My argument also underscores the dynamic and fluid nature of nationalism, its contingent and non-deterministic nature, and the key role played by the ideological and political encounter between the central state, and the majority nation nationalism it sometimes promotes, and minority nations’ national movements.

Immediately following the embryonic period, two other variables came into play to give shape to the new political current: a critical contribution was made by individuals and organizations from the sphere of sociological nationalism, and eventually a new nucleus of leadership coalesced, which steered the process of founding the new nationalist political current.

My findings point us toward a renewed appreciation of the relevance of political factors in understanding how a novel nationalist political orientation is successfully established in the parliamentary sphere. The findings we have derived from our study of the Quebecois and Catalan national movements point us toward broader conclusions. We need to focus on the identification of the “trigger” event that serves as the immediate catalyst for the founding, growth, and strengthening of new nationalist orientations (led by nationalist parties) in other cases of stateless nationhood. I hypothesize that the impact of the central state’s majority nation nationalism on minority nations’ national movements plays a critical role in the emergence and strengthening of new nationalist parties within the national movements of sub-state national societies. The latter are embedded within a central state, which tends to promote the majority’s form of nationalism. Sub-state national societies, thus, are a
locus of political struggle between minority and majority nationalisms. My future research agenda, calling for further comparisons with other cases of stateless nationhood encompassed by my scope conditions, will serve to test the explanatory theses proposed here.

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