Browsing by Subject "D86"

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Browsing by Subject "D86"

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    Title: Asymmetric Awareness and Moral Hazzard  Author(s): AUSTER, Sarah Date: 2012 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: This paper introduces asymmetric awareness into the classical principal-agent model and discusses the optimal contract between a fully aware principal and an unaware agent. The principal enlarges the agent’s awareness ...
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    Title: Moral Hazard in Hierarchies and Soft Information  Author(s): ANGELUCCI, Charles; RUSSO, Antonio Date: 2012 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI RSCAS Abstract: We investigate the scope for supervisory activities in organizations in which information is non-verifiable (i.e. soft) and opportunism severe. A principal-supervisor agent hierarchy is considered. Side-contracts between ...
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    Title: Flexible Contracts  Author(s): GOTTARDI, Piero; TALLON, Jean Marc; GHIRARDATO, Paolo Date: 2011-01-01 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. The main focus of the paper lies in the analysis of the costs of ...
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    Title: Flexible Contracts  Author(s): GOTTARDI, Piero; TALLON, Jean Marc; GHIRARDATO, Paolo Date: 2009 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by ...
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    Title: Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must We Also Forget?  Author(s): ELUL, Ronel; GOTTARDI, Piero Date: 2008 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: In many countries, lenders are restricted in their access to information about borrowers’ past defaults. We study this provision in a model of repeated borrowing and lending with moral hazard and adverse selection. We ...