The DSpace digital repository system captures, stores, indexes, preserves, and distributes digital research material. http://cadmus.eui.eu:80 2012-05-17T02:04:31Z 2012-05-17T02:04:31Z SCHMITTER, Philippe C. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/21985 2012-05-16T15:48:39Z 1997-01-01T00:00:00Z

Intermediaries in the Consolidation of Neo-Democracies: The role of parties, associations and movements SCHMITTER, Philippe C.

1997-01-01T00:00:00Z SCHMITTER, Philippe C. TORREBLANCA, José Ignacio http://hdl.handle.net/1814/21984 2012-05-16T15:46:48Z 1997-01-01T00:00:00Z

Old "Foundations" and New "Rules" for an Enlarged European Union SCHMITTER, Philippe C.; TORREBLANCA, José Ignacio This paper presents a novel arrangement for the distribution of votes and the rules of decision-making in an enlarged European Union (EU). We make two assumptions: (1) that the EU is condemned to enlarge its membership in the near future; and (2) if it does this without changing the existing rules for voting in the Council of Ministers and distributing seats in the European Parliament, such an expanded EU would suffer severe distortions and disequilibria. However, if it were to adopt a new, simplified system that would combine arrangements for proportional proportionality in representation and concurrent majorities in decision-making, this impending dilemma could be avoided. Moreover, if these reforms were introduced sooner rather than later, they would be easier to agree upon, their impact would be phased in gradually, and their legitimacy could be stabilized in the face of far greater challenges in the future.

1997-01-01T00:00:00Z SCHMITTER, Philippe C. GROTE, Jürgen R. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/21983 2012-05-16T15:38:39Z 1997-01-01T00:00:00Z

The Corporatist Sisyphus: Past, present and future SCHMITTER, Philippe C.; GROTE, Jürgen R.

1997-01-01T00:00:00Z SCHMITTER, Philippe C. TORREBLANCA, José Ignacio http://hdl.handle.net/1814/21982 2012-05-16T15:33:02Z 1997-01-01T00:00:00Z

Old "Foundations" and New "Rules" for an Enlarged European Union SCHMITTER, Philippe C.; TORREBLANCA, José Ignacio This paper presents a novel arrangement for the distribution of votes and the rules of decision-making in an enlarged European Union (EU). It starts from the observation that if one merely transposes the present arrangement for the EU of 15 member states to prospective EUs with from 17 to 35 members, the result would be a very substantial distortion of one of the EU’s most important “foundational principles,” namely, its method for weighing the voting power of members according to their size of population. Under existing rules for qualified majority voting, it takes 62 out of 87 votes in the Council of Ministers -- needless to say, voting as a single body -- or 71% of the total to pass a measure and 26 votes out of 87 (30%) to veto one. This means that the five largest countries (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) can veto decisions, but cannot produce a qualified majority without help from either the five medium-size countries (Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, Hungary and Sweden) or the five smallest countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg). Hence, the small and medium countries together cannot possibly form a qualified majority without the five largest ones, but they are able collectively to veto a decision. In other words, for the actual system to work effectively, cooperation is needed between all three size categories and, hence, the results are likely to be consensual.

1997-01-01T00:00:00Z