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dc.contributor.authorCOURTY, Pascal
dc.contributor.authorKIM, Do Han
dc.contributor.authorMARSCHKE, Gerald
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-14T09:33:20Z
dc.date.available2009-01-14T09:33:20Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/10171
dc.description.abstractUsing data from a large, U.S. federal job training program, we investigate whether enrolment incentives that exogenously vary the ‘shadow prices’ for serving different demographic subgroups of clients influence case workers’ intake decisions. We show that case workers enroll more clients from subgroups whose shadow prices increase but select at the margin weaker-performing members from those subgroups. We conclude that enrolment incentives curb cream-skimming across subgroups leaving a residual potential for cream-skimming within a subgroup.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2009/03en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectH72en
dc.subjectJ33en
dc.subjectL14en
dc.subjectPerformance measurementen
dc.subjectcream-skimmingen
dc.subjectenrolment incentivesen
dc.subjectbureaucrat behavioren
dc.subjectpublic organizationsen
dc.titleCurbing Cream-Skimming: Evidence on Enrolment Incentivesen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorCOURTY|Pascal|aut|EUI70003
dc.neeo.contributorKIM|Do Han|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorMARSCHKE|Gerald|aut|
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