Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorALLEN, Franklin
dc.contributor.authorCARLETTI, Elena
dc.contributor.authorMARQUEZ, Robert
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-19T16:58:21Z
dc.date.available2009-02-19T16:58:21Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/10678
dc.description.abstractIn countries such as Germany, the legal system is such that firms are necessarily stakeholder oriented. In others like Japan social convention achieves a similar effect. We analyze the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers compared to pure shareholder-oriented firms. We show that in a context of imperfect competition stakeholder firms have higher prices and lower output than shareholder-oriented firms. Surprisingly, we also find that firms can be more valuable in a stakeholder society than in a shareholder society. With globalization stakeholder firms and shareholder firms often compete. We identify the circumstances where stakeholder firms are more valuable than shareholder firms, and compare these asymmetric equilibria with symmetric equilibria with stakeholder and shareholder firms. Finally, we show that, in some circumstances, firms may voluntarily choose to be stakeholder-oriented because this increases their value.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2009/10en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectstakeholder-oriented firmsen
dc.subjectshareholder-oriented firmsen
dc.subjectfirm valueen
dc.subjectglobalizationen
dc.subjectG34en
dc.subjectD43en
dc.titleStakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Valueen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorALLEN|Franklin|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorCARLETTI|Elena|aut|EUI70001
dc.neeo.contributorMARQUEZ|Robert|aut|
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


Files in this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record