Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value

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Show simple item record ALLEN, Franklin CARLETTI, Elena MARQUEZ, Robert 2009-02-19T16:58:21Z 2009-02-19T16:58:21Z 2009
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6704
dc.description.abstract In countries such as Germany, the legal system is such that firms are necessarily stakeholder oriented. In others like Japan social convention achieves a similar effect. We analyze the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers compared to pure shareholder-oriented firms. We show that in a context of imperfect competition stakeholder firms have higher prices and lower output than shareholder-oriented firms. Surprisingly, we also find that firms can be more valuable in a stakeholder society than in a shareholder society. With globalization stakeholder firms and shareholder firms often compete. We identify the circumstances where stakeholder firms are more valuable than shareholder firms, and compare these asymmetric equilibria with symmetric equilibria with stakeholder and shareholder firms. Finally, we show that, in some circumstances, firms may voluntarily choose to be stakeholder-oriented because this increases their value. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI ECO en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2009/10 en
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject stakeholder-oriented firms en
dc.subject shareholder-oriented firms en
dc.subject firm value en
dc.subject globalization en
dc.subject G34 en
dc.subject D43 en
dc.title Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.neeo.contributor ALLEN|Franklin|aut|
dc.neeo.contributor CARLETTI|Elena|aut|EUI70001
dc.neeo.contributor MARQUEZ|Robert|aut|
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