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dc.contributor.authorCHESTERMAN, Simon
dc.date.accessioned2009-05-28T09:07:16Z
dc.date.available2009-05-28T09:07:16Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.issn1831-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/11403
dc.description.abstractThough it lags behind the privatization of military services, the privatization of intelligence has expanded dramatically with the growth in intelligence activities following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. The recent confirmation by the Director of the CIA that contractors have probably participated in waterboarding of detainees at CIA interrogation facilities has sparked a renewed debate over what activities it is appropriate to delegate to contractors, and what activities should remain ‘inherently governmental’. The article surveys outsourcing in electronic surveillance, rendition, and interrogation, as well as the growing reliance on private actors for analysis. It then turns to three challenges to accountability: the necessary secrecy that limits oversight; the different incentives that exist for private rather than public employees; and the uncertainty as to what functions should be regarded as ‘inherently governmental’ and thus inappropriate for delegation to private actors.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThe ‘Regulating Privatisation of “War”: The Role of the EU in Assuring the Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights” (PRIV-WAR) project is funded by the European Community’s 7th Framework Programme under grant agreement no. 217405.en
dc.description.tableofcontentswww.priv-war.euen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI AELen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2009/02en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPRIV-WAR Projecten
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectLawen
dc.subjectRegulationen
dc.subjectHuman Rightsen
dc.subjectSecurityen
dc.subjectAccountabilityen
dc.subjectPublic Administrationen
dc.subjectCivilmilitary Relationsen
dc.subjectInternational Relationsen
dc.title‘We Can’t Spy … If We Can’t Buy!’: The Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing ‘Inherently Governmental Functions’en
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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