‘We Can’t Spy … If We Can’t Buy!’: The Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing ‘Inherently Governmental Functions’

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dc.contributor.author CHESTERMAN, Simon
dc.date.accessioned 2009-05-28T09:07:16Z
dc.date.available 2009-05-28T09:07:16Z
dc.date.issued 2009
dc.identifier.issn 1831-4066
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/11403
dc.description.abstract Though it lags behind the privatization of military services, the privatization of intelligence has expanded dramatically with the growth in intelligence activities following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. The recent confirmation by the Director of the CIA that contractors have probably participated in waterboarding of detainees at CIA interrogation facilities has sparked a renewed debate over what activities it is appropriate to delegate to contractors, and what activities should remain ‘inherently governmental’. The article surveys outsourcing in electronic surveillance, rendition, and interrogation, as well as the growing reliance on private actors for analysis. It then turns to three challenges to accountability: the necessary secrecy that limits oversight; the different incentives that exist for private rather than public employees; and the uncertainty as to what functions should be regarded as ‘inherently governmental’ and thus inappropriate for delegation to private actors. en
dc.description.sponsorship The ‘Regulating Privatisation of “War”: The Role of the EU in Assuring the Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights” (PRIV-WAR) project is funded by the European Community’s 7th Framework Programme under grant agreement no. 217405. en
dc.description.tableofcontents www.priv-war.eu en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI AEL en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2009/02 en
dc.relation.ispartofseries PRIV-WAR Project en
dc.subject Law en
dc.subject Regulation en
dc.subject Human Rights en
dc.subject Security en
dc.subject Accountability en
dc.subject Public Administration en
dc.subject Civilmilitary Relations en
dc.subject International Relations en
dc.title ‘We Can’t Spy … If We Can’t Buy!’: The Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing ‘Inherently Governmental Functions’ en
dc.type Working Paper en


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