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dc.contributor.authorCOURTY, Pascal
dc.contributor.authorPAGLIERO, Mario
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-06T10:25:43Z
dc.date.available2009-07-06T10:25:43Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/11916
dc.description.abstractWe measure friction in the matching of students and law schools as the number of unnecessary student applications and school admissions that have to be undertaken per actual matriculation. We show that friction increases with student and school attractiveness, but decreases for top schools and students. We discuss connections with the literature on frictional matching.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2009/25en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectCollege admissionen
dc.subjectfrictional matchingen
dc.subjectassortative matchingen
dc.subjectstudent portfolioen
dc.subjectschool standarden
dc.subjectD02en
dc.subjectC78en
dc.titleFrictional Matching: Evidence from Law School Admissionen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorCOURTY|Pascal|aut|EUI70003
dc.neeo.contributorPAGLIERO|Mario|aut|
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