| dc.contributor.author | SARTOR, Giovanni | |
| dc.contributor.author | RUDNIANSKI, Michel | |
| dc.contributor.author | ROTOLO, Antonino | |
| dc.contributor.author | RIVERET, Régis | |
| dc.contributor.author | MAYOR, Eunate | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-09-02T09:25:43Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2009-09-02T09:25:43Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1725-6739 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/12320 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and legal
institutions, by combining argumentation, game theory and evolution. We consider a population of
lawyers, having different postures, who engage in adversarial argumentation with other lawyers, obtaining
outcomes according the existing context and their chosen strategies. We examine the resulting games and
analyse the evolution of the population. | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI LAW | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2009/08 | en |
| dc.relation.hasversion | http://hdl.handle.net/1814/30408 | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.subject | law | en |
| dc.subject | game theory | en |
| dc.subject | evolution | en |
| dc.subject | argumentation | en |
| dc.subject | litigation | en |
| dc.title | Why Lawyers Are Nice (or Nasty). A Game-Theoretical Argumentation Exercise | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |
| eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
