Abstract:
This paper investigates local government practices during the first tenure of office of the Islamist
Moroccan Party of Justice and Development (PJD). We consider three cases of PJD governance, the
towns of Ksar al-Kebir, Temara, and Oued Zem. We evaluate the performance of PJD mayors
compared to their electoral promises and the average local governance in Morocco, marked by
widespread clientelism, inefficiency, and detachment from the populace. We study the role of the
program in PJD governance, the extent to which PJD mayors have been involved in corruption or have
used clientelistic practices, the implementation of the party's proximity promise, and how PJD mayors
have managed their budgets. Our analysis is based on qualitative and quantitative evidence gathered
through field research in 2003, 2007, and 2008. We find that, generally, PJD mayors fare better on
corruption and proximity as well as in increasing investment in their municipalities. At the same time,
they have governed in the same type of ad-hoc coalitions built on the distribution of office and some
evidence suggests that their governance has not been free from clientelistic practices. The increase in
investment has been achieved through de-cumulation of reserves or through borrowing, for they have
not succeeded in increasing tax collection, a sign of the limits to their efficacy.
