Abstract:
When economic disasters occur it is common to look to the managers of the economy and question the
decisions they made and the incentives that drove their decisions. In the financial crisis of 2007-2009
compensation was singled out as one of the most important and deeply flawed elements of the
incentive system that induced firms to accumulate enormous amounts of risk on their balance sheets.
In Clementi, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter (2009) we describe many of the flawed practices in
financial firms. But, executive compensation more broadly has long been a sensitive issue and
financial crises have a tendency to focus increased attention on it. In the past two decades there has
been much discussion of executive compensation, many public examples of lavish pay, but no real
consensus on the extent of the problem if indeed there is one. In part, this is because there is a lack of
clarity about what the facts are. In this lecture I describe recent research on executive compensation in
the United States in the period 1993– 2006 looking at both the cross-sectional and time series
variation. Most importantly I describe the extent to which compensation practices achieve the goal of
aligning the interests of managers and shareholders.
Description:
This lecture was delivered at Villa La Fonte, European University Institute, 21 October 2009.
I am grateful to my coauthor Gian-Luca Clementi with whom I have worked on the issues of executive
compensation both theoretically and empirically for several years. Also thanks to Matt Richardson
and Ingo Walter for deep discussions on these issues. I am most grateful to Ramon Marimon and to
the Max Weber Fellows of the EUI for lively discussion and to Susan Garvin for her kind support and
patience.
Thomas F. Cooley
New York University