From Uniform Auction to Discriminatory Auction: Assessment of the Restructuring Proposal for the Italian Electricity Day-Ahead Market
Title: From Uniform Auction to Discriminatory Auction: Assessment of the Restructuring Proposal for the Italian Electricity Day-Ahead Market
Series/Report no.: EUI RSCAS; 2009/69; Loyola de Palacio Serie
In the context of the 2009 debate on reforming the Italian market, a realistic agent-based computational model of the day-ahead market session of the Italian wholesale electricity market is simulated to compare market performances between uniform-price and pay-as-bid clearing mechanisms. An empirical validation of computational results at a macro-level is performed to test for accuracy of simulated outcomes with historical ones. The level of prices are accurately reproduced except for few peak hours. As far as concerns pay-as-bid auction, the computational experiments point out that it results in higher market prices than the uniform-price auction. In the pay-as-bid mechanism, sellers’ endeavours to maximize their profits are more costly thus leading to higher price levels.
Subject: Electricity markets; agent-based computational economics; auction design; uniform auction; discriminatory auction; reinforcement learning
Type of Access: openAccess
Files in this item
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
Title:Auction Price Anomalies: evidence from Wool Auctions in Australia Author(s):VELLA, Frank; JONES, Chris; MENEZES, FlavioDate:2004Citation:The Economic Record, 2004, 80, 250, 271-357Type of Publication:Article
Title:Does Publicity Affect Competition? Evidence from Discontinuities in Public Procurement Auctions Author(s):COVIELLO, Decio; MARINIELLO, MarioDate:2008Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECO; 2008/04Abstract:Calls for tenders are the natural devices to inform bidders, thus to enlarge the pool of potential participants. We exploit discontinuities generated by the Italian Law on tender's publicity to identify the effect of ...
Title:An Econometric Analysis of 3G Auction Spectrum Valuations Author(s):BOHLIN, Erik; MADDEN, Gary; MOREY, AaronDate:2010Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI RSCAS; 2010/55; Florence School of RegulationAbstract:Scarce radio spectrum is assigned to mobile network operators (MNOs) by national regulatory authorities (NRAs). Spectrum is usually assigned by beauty contest or an auction. The process requires that winners make a payment ...