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Abstract:
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The current paper explores the capacity of the Argentine, Italian and Romanian Legislatures to hold the Executive branch of government accountable for its policy initiatives issued by emergency Executive decree, rather than normal legislative proposals (NPL). The major questions the paper attempts to answer are: what makes Executives prefer to promote their policy views extensively by Decree, rather than NPL, even when the situation is not of emergency and necessity? W hat explains the capacity and/or willingness of the Legislatures to hold the Executive accountable by amending or rejecting the Executive decrees that infringe with their primary legislative function? I argue that the issuing of Executive decrees is a rational policy promotion strategy when the Executive faces bargaining problems in Legislature, while the level of Executive accountability to Legislature function of amending and rejection rates of Decrees is determined by the constitutional definition of these acts in favour of either one of the two branches of government. Furthermore, when the Decree is constitutionally defined to enable to the Executive to prevail over the Legislature, the former will issue them excessively, namely at a rate that is higher than required by the bargaining problems that it confronts in Legislature. |