Still Elected Dictators? A study of Executive accountability in multi-party democracies - the issuing of Executive decrees and their treatment in the Legislature in different institutional settings across time: Italy (1947-2006), Argentina (1983-2006) and Romania (1992-2007)

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author STINGA, Laurentiu
dc.date.accessioned 2010-01-07T16:00:54Z
dc.date.available 2010-01-07T16:00:54Z
dc.date.issued 2009
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6755
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/13033
dc.description.abstract The current paper explores the capacity of the Argentine, Italian and Romanian Legislatures to hold the Executive branch of government accountable for its policy initiatives issued by emergency Executive decree, rather than normal legislative proposals (NPL). The major questions the paper attempts to answer are: what makes Executives prefer to promote their policy views extensively by Decree, rather than NPL, even when the situation is not of emergency and necessity? W hat explains the capacity and/or willingness of the Legislatures to hold the Executive accountable by amending or rejecting the Executive decrees that infringe with their primary legislative function? I argue that the issuing of Executive decrees is a rational policy promotion strategy when the Executive faces bargaining problems in Legislature, while the level of Executive accountability to Legislature function of amending and rejection rates of Decrees is determined by the constitutional definition of these acts in favour of either one of the two branches of government. Furthermore, when the Decree is constitutionally defined to enable to the Executive to prevail over the Legislature, the former will issue them excessively, namely at a rate that is higher than required by the bargaining problems that it confronts in Legislature. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI SPS en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2009/04 en
dc.subject Executive decrees en
dc.subject Legislature en
dc.subject accountability en
dc.subject veto players en
dc.subject democracy en
dc.subject Italy en
dc.subject Argentina en
dc.subject Romania en
dc.title Still Elected Dictators? A study of Executive accountability in multi-party democracies - the issuing of Executive decrees and their treatment in the Legislature in different institutional settings across time: Italy (1947-2006), Argentina (1983-2006) and Romania (1992-2007) en
dc.type Working Paper en
eui.subscribe.skip true


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record