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dc.contributor.authorNIEPMANN, Friederike
dc.contributor.authorSCHMIDT-EISENLOHR, Tim
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-18T15:48:46Z
dc.date.available2010-02-18T15:48:46Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/13342
dc.description.abstractFinancial institutions are increasingly linked internationally and engaged in cross-border operations. As a result, financial crises and potential bail-outs by governments have important international implications. Extending Allen and Gale (2000) we provide a model of international contagion allowing for bank bail-outs financed by distortionary taxes. In the sequential game between governments, there are inefficiencies due to spillovers, free-riding and limited burden-sharing. When countries are of equal size, an increase in cross-border deposit holdings improves, in general, the non-cooperative outcome. For efficient crisis managment, ex-ante fiscal burden sharing is essential as ex-post contracts between governments do not achieve the same global welfare.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2010/05en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectbail-outen
dc.subjectcontagionen
dc.subjectfinancial crisisen
dc.subjectinternational institutional arrangementsen
dc.subjectF36en
dc.subjectF42en
dc.subjectG01en
dc.subjectG28en
dc.titleBank Bail-Outs, International Linkages and Cooperationen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorNIEPMANN|Friederike|aut|
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