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dc.contributor.authorMORELLI, Massimo
dc.contributor.authorYANG, Huanxing
dc.contributor.authorYE, Lixin
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-30T15:44:58Z
dc.date.available2010-03-30T15:44:58Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/13666
dc.description.abstractIn an economy where agents are characterized by different productivities (vertical types) and different abilities to move (horizontal types), we compare a unified nonlinear optimal taxation schedule with the equilibrium taxation schedule that would be chosen by two competing tax authorities if the same economy were divided into two States. The overall level of progressivity and redistribution is unambiguously lower under competitive taxation than under unified taxation; the “rich” are always in favor of competing authorities and local governments, whereas the “poor” are always in favor of unified taxation. The constitutional choice between fiscal regimes depends on the preferences of the middle class, which in turn depend on the initial conditions in terms of the distribution of abilities (incomes), the relative power of the various classes, and mobility costs. In particular, as mobility increases, it becomes increasingly likely that a reform in the direction of unification of fiscal policies in a federation will receive majority support, while a decreased average wealth can have the opposite effect.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2010/14en
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/30727
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectCompetitive nonlinear taxationen
dc.subjectMobilityen
dc.subjectIntegrationen
dc.subjectInequalityen
dc.subjectType preferences over institutionsen
dc.titleCompetitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choiceen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorYANG|Huanxing|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorYE|Lixin|aut|
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