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dc.contributor.authorMEEUS, Leonardo 
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-01T10:00:16Z
dc.date.available2010-06-01T10:00:16Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/14095
dc.descriptionFlorence School of Regulation The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) is a partnership between the RSCAS at the EUI and the Council of the European Energy Regulators (CEER), and it works closely with the European Commission. The Florence School of Regulation is sponsored by leading European energy companies. The objectives of the FSR are to promote informed discussion of key issues; to provide state-of-the-art training for practitioners; and to produce analytical studies in the field of regulation. It is a European forum dedicated to economic regulation. While its primary focus is on energy regulation, particularly in the electricity and gas markets, it is extending its coverage to other areas of regulation. This series of working papers aims at disseminating the work of scholars and practitioners on current regulatory issues. For further information Florence School of Regulation Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies European University Institute Via Boccaccio, 151 I-50133 Firenze Tel.: +39 055 4685 751 Fax: +39055 4685755 E-mail: fsr@eui.eu http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/ProfessionalDevelopment/FSR/en
dc.description.abstractCross-border capacities in Europe are currently inefficiently used. Implicit auctioning is about eliminating these cross-border trade inefficiencies by internalizing the arbitrage into the auction procedures of the Power Exchanges that are organizing trade nationally. On the Kontek Cable, implicit auctioning has been implemented without price coordination between the involved Power Exchanges. This implementation, referred to as “volume or dome coupling” as opposed to “price coupling”, has been argued to be institutionally easier to implement. The Kontek Cable experimented with three different implicit auctioning implementations whose performance we analyze empirically in this paper. We find that the third implementation is significantly outperforming the previous two implementations, but in this third implementation stakeholders partly abandoned the volume coupling approach they initially believed to be a viable alternative to price coupling.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2010/49en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesFlorence School of Regulationen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectelectricityen
dc.subjecttransmissionen
dc.subjectmarket couplingen
dc.subjectcongestion managementen
dc.titleImplicit Auctioning on the Kontek Cable: Third Time Lucky?en
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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