An Econometric Analysis of 3G Auction Spectrum Valuations

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dc.contributor.author BOHLIN, Erik
dc.contributor.author MADDEN, Gary
dc.contributor.author MOREY, Aaron
dc.date.accessioned 2010-07-02T10:13:20Z
dc.date.available 2010-07-02T10:13:20Z
dc.date.issued 2010
dc.identifier.issn 1028-3625
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/14237
dc.description.abstract Scarce radio spectrum is assigned to mobile network operators (MNOs) by national regulatory authorities (NRAs). Spectrum is usually assigned by beauty contest or an auction. The process requires that winners make a payment to the government. MNOs seek scarce spectrum to enable the provision of wireless services for profit. While MNOs are imperfectly aware of their costs, NRAs rely solely on MNOs for this information. As such, NRAs set spectrum assignment conditions (including minimum bid price) largely ignorant of MNO operating conditions. This study examines the performance of 3G auction outcomes in terms of the prices paid by winners via an econometric analysis of a unique sample of national 3G spectrum auctions. These winning bids depend on national and mobile market conditions, spectrum package attributes, license process, and post-award operator requirements. Finally, model estimation accounts for the censored nature of these data. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI RSCAS en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2010/55 en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Florence School of Regulation en
dc.subject Mobile telephone markets en
dc.subject spectrum allocation en
dc.subject spectrum bid price en
dc.subject D44 en
dc.subject L96 en
dc.title An Econometric Analysis of 3G Auction Spectrum Valuations en
dc.type Working Paper en
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