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dc.contributor.authorBISIN, Alberto
dc.contributor.authorGEANAKOPOLS, John
dc.contributor.authorGOTTARDI, Piero 
dc.contributor.authorMINELLI, Enrico
dc.contributor.authorPOLEMARCHAKIS, Herakles
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-06T12:26:42Z
dc.date.available2010-07-06T12:26:42Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/14255
dc.description.abstractEconomies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common with economies with default, incomplete contracts or price rigidities. Competitive equilibria exist and anonymous markets are viable. But, for a generic economy, there exist Pareto improving interventions via linear, anonymous taxes.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2010/29en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectasymmetric informationen
dc.subjectcompetitive marketsen
dc.subjectequilibriumen
dc.subjectD50en
dc.subjectD52en
dc.subjectD82en
dc.titleMarkets and Contractsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorBISIN|Alberto|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorGEANAKOPOLS|John|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorGOTTARDI|Piero|aut|EUI70004
dc.neeo.contributorMINELLI|Enrico|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorPOLEMARCHAKIS|Herakles|aut|
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