Financial Connections and Systemic Risk

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Show simple item record ALLEN, Franklin BABUS, Ana CARLETTI, Elena 2010-07-06T12:29:42Z 2010-07-06T12:29:42Z 2010
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6704
dc.description This Working Paper (EUI ECO 2010/30) is a revised version of EUI ECO Working Paper 2010/26. en
dc.description.abstract We develop a model where institutions form connections through swaps of projects in order to diversify their individual risk. These connections lead to two different network structures. In a clustered network groups of financial institutions hold identical portfolios and default together. In an unclustered network defaults are more dispersed. With long term finance welfare is the same in both networks. In contrast, when short term finance is used, the network structure matters. Upon the arrival of a signal about banks’ future defaults, investors update their expectations of bank solvency. If their expectations are low, they do not roll over the debt and there is systemic risk in that all institutions are early liquidated. We compare investors’ rollover decisions and welfare in the two networks. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI ECO en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2010/30 en
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.title Financial Connections and Systemic Risk en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.neeo.contributor ALLEN|Franklin|aut|
dc.neeo.contributor BABUS|Ana|aut|
dc.neeo.contributor CARLETTI|Elena|aut|EUI70001
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