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dc.contributor.authorMORELLI, Massimo
dc.contributor.authorROHNER, Dominic
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-27T10:36:59Z
dc.date.available2010-08-27T10:36:59Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/14439
dc.description.abstractWe examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and fighting capacities of different groups matter for ethnic con.ict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential conflicts (and hence multiple threat points) is identified. The theory predicts conflict to be more likely when the geographical distribution of natural resources is uneven and when a minority group has better chances to win a secessionist rather than a centrist conflict. For sharing rents, resource proportionality is salient in avoiding secessions and strength proportionality in avoiding centrist civil wars. We present empirical evidence that is consistent with the model.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2010/33en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectNatural Resourcesen
dc.subjectConflicten
dc.subjectStrength Proportionalityen
dc.subjectResource Proportionalityen
dc.subjectSecessionen
dc.subjectBargaining Failureen
dc.subjectC72en
dc.subjectD74en
dc.subjectQ34en
dc.titleNatural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil Waren
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorMORELLI|Massimo|aut|EUI70015
dc.neeo.contributorROHNER|Dominic|aut|
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