Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War

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Show simple item record MORELLI, Massimo ROHNER, Dominic 2010-08-27T10:36:59Z 2010-08-27T10:36:59Z 2010
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6704
dc.description.abstract We examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and fighting capacities of different groups matter for ethnic con.ict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential conflicts (and hence multiple threat points) is identified. The theory predicts conflict to be more likely when the geographical distribution of natural resources is uneven and when a minority group has better chances to win a secessionist rather than a centrist conflict. For sharing rents, resource proportionality is salient in avoiding secessions and strength proportionality in avoiding centrist civil wars. We present empirical evidence that is consistent with the model. en
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI ECO en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2010/33 en
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject Natural Resources en
dc.subject Conflict en
dc.subject Strength Proportionality en
dc.subject Resource Proportionality en
dc.subject Secession en
dc.subject Bargaining Failure en
dc.subject C72 en
dc.subject D74 en
dc.subject Q34 en
dc.title Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.neeo.contributor MORELLI|Massimo|aut|EUI70015
dc.neeo.contributor ROHNER|Dominic|aut|
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