This collection of papers addresses the issue of ‘objective vs. subjective’ knowledge in the social sciences and humanities: how we may get ‘objective’ knowledge out of ‘subjective’ perceptions; how ‘induction’ and ‘deduction’ should interact; how we can make policies or legal recommendations based on ‘objective knowledge’; how social agents’ knowledge should be modelled. Drawing on the structure of the conference, the papers are organized in sections which address a set of interrelated questions, against a common thematic background provided by Popper’s contribution on objective knowledge in the social sciences and humanities: the ‘induction problem’ and the accumulation of ‘subjective’ knowledge out of ‘objective’ knowledge; ‘objectivity’ of the law and of social policies; objectivity of facts and causal relations in the social sciences and humanities; the objective/subjective rationality of social agents.
Table of Contents:
Foreword
Ramon Marimon 1
Introduction
Chiara Valentini 3
Section I
From ‘Subjective’ To ‘Objective Knowledge’: The ‘Induction Problem’ Revisited
Simon Blackburn: Popper and His Successors 9
Carol Cleland: Common Cause Explanation and the Asymmetry of Overdetermination 17
Section II
Objectivity of The Law and of Social Policies
Gerald Postema: Hayek and Popper on the Evolution of Rules and Mind 33
Section III
Objectivity of Facts and Causal Relations in the Social Sciences and Humanities
Harry Collins: Demarcation Criteria and Elective Modernism 55
Justin Cruikshank: The Importance of Nominal Problems 61
Section IV
Modeling Individual and Social Agents as Objective/Subjective ‘Rational’ Agents’
Frédéric Vandenberghe: Falsification Falsified. A Swansong for Lord Popper 73