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dc.contributor.authorNOVAK, Stéphanie
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-25T09:18:19Z
dc.date.available2011-02-25T09:18:19Z
dc.date.issued2010-01-01
dc.identifier.citationSocial Science Information/Information sur les Sciences Sociales, 2010, 49, 1, 83-97, Special Issue: Rules of collective decision/Les règles de décision collectiveen
dc.identifier.issn0539-0184
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/15799
dc.description.abstractWhen a group has to make a decision, one can assume that the members’ incentives to state their position vary according to the different decision rules. Decision-making in the Council of the European Union offers an opportunity to study how a decision rule influences the way members of a group state their position. Indeed, in several areas, decisions must be made by qualified-majority voting. But the combination of this rule and of social norms specific to the Council discourages the minority from expressing itself at different stages of decision-making. Decisions seem to be made without opposition at two main stages of the decision-making process: during the plenary sessions, representatives do not vote; according to the official Council records, a high proportion of measures are adopted without opposition.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.titleDecision Rules, Social Norms and the Expression of Disagreement: The case of qualified majority voting in the Council of the European Unionen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/0539018409354473


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