Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value

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dc.contributor.author ALLEN, Franklin
dc.contributor.author CARLETTI, Elena
dc.contributor.author MARQUEZ, Robert
dc.date.accessioned 2011-03-08T10:03:30Z
dc.date.available 2011-03-08T10:03:30Z
dc.date.issued 2009
dc.identifier.uri http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/09/0928.pdf
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/15983
dc.description.abstract In countries such as Germany, the legal system ensures that firms are stakeholder oriented. In others, like Japan, social norms achieve a similar effect. We analyze the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers compared to shareholder-oriented firms in a model of imperfect competition. Stakeholder firms are more (less) valuable than shareholder firms when marginal cost uncertainty is greater (less) than demand uncertainty. With globalization shareholder firms and stakeholder firms often compete. We identify the circumstances where stakeholder firms are more valuable than shareholder firms, and compare these mixed equilibria with the pure equilibria with stakeholder and shareholder firms only. The results have interesting implications for the political economy of foreign entry. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Wharton Financial Institutions Center en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2009/28 en
dc.title Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.neeo.contributor ALLEN|Franklin|aut|
dc.neeo.contributor CARLETTI|Elena|aut|EUI70001
dc.neeo.contributor MARQUEZ|Robert|aut|


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