Bini Smaghi vs. the Parties: Representative government and institutional constraints

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dc.contributor.author MAIR, Peter
dc.date.accessioned 2011-04-15T12:08:59Z
dc.date.available 2011-04-15T12:08:59Z
dc.date.issued 2011
dc.identifier.issn 1028-3625
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/16354
dc.description.abstract Although it is generally seen as desirable that parties in government are both responsive and responsible, these two characteristics are now in increasing tension with one another. Prudence and consistency in government, as well as accountability, requires that governments conform to external constraints and past legacies, and not just answer to public opinion, and while these external constraints and legacies have grown in weight in recent years, public opinion, in its turn, has become harder and harder for governments to read and process. Meanwhile, because of changes in their organizations and in their relationship with civil society, parties in government are no longer in a position to bridge or ‘manage’ this gap, or even to persuade voters to accept it as a necessary element in political life. This problem is illustrated by extensive reference to the current fiscal crisis in Ireland, and is also used to question some of the assumptions that are involved in principal-agent treatments of the parliamentary chain of delegation. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI RSCAS en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2011/22 en
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUDO - European Union Democracy Observatory en
dc.subject Responsive government en
dc.subject responsible government en
dc.subject fiscal austerity en
dc.subject Ireland en
dc.subject European Union en
dc.title Bini Smaghi vs. the Parties: Representative government and institutional constraints en
dc.type Working Paper en
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