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dc.contributor.authorBALKENBORG, Dieter
dc.contributor.authorSCHLAG, Karl H.
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-19T12:46:39Z
dc.date.available2011-04-19T12:46:39Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Theory, 2007, 133, 1, 295-315
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/16393
dc.description.abstractIt is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combination is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. We use an extension of the notion of a strict Nash equilibrium to sets of strategy combinations called 'strict equilibrium set' and show the following. For a large class of evolutionary dynamics, including all monotone regular selection dynamics, every asymptotically stable set of rest points that contains a pure strategy combination in each of its connected components is a strict equilibrium set. A converse statement holds for two-person games, for convex sets and for the standard replicator dynamic. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherAcademic Press Inc Elsevier Science
dc.subjectevolutionary dynamics
dc.subjectreplicator dynamic
dc.subjectregular selection dynamics
dc.subjectstrict equilibrium set
dc.subjectNash equilibrium component
dc.titleOn the Evolutionary Selection of Sets of Nash Equilibria
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.008
dc.neeo.contributorBALKENBORG|Dieter|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorSCHLAG|Karl H.|aut|
dc.identifier.volume133
dc.identifier.startpage295
dc.identifier.endpage315
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dc.identifier.issue1


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