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dc.contributor.authorCARLIER, Guillaume
dc.contributor.authorRENOU, Ludovic
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-19T12:46:51Z
dc.date.available2011-04-19T12:46:51Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.identifier.citationEconomic Theory, 2005, 25, 2, 497-504
dc.identifier.issn0938-2259
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/16410
dc.description.abstractIn simple models of borrowing and lending with ex-post asymmetric information, Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986) have shown that optimal debt contracts are simple debt contracts where borrowers repay a fixed interest rate whenever possible and lenders seize all the profit when borrowers default. In this note, we depart from their works by assuming that borrowers and lenders have heterogeneous beliefs, and show that simple debt contracts do not necessarily survive as optimal contracts.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.subjectcostly state verification
dc.subjectheterogeneity of beliefs
dc.titleA Costly State Verification Model with Diversity of Opinions
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00199-003-0429-5
dc.neeo.contributorCARLIER|Guillaume|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorRENOU|Ludovic|aut|
dc.identifier.volume25
dc.identifier.startpage497
dc.identifier.endpage504
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue2


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