Banking Panics and Policy Responses

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dc.contributor.author ENNIS, Huberto M.
dc.contributor.author KEISTER, Todd
dc.date.accessioned 2011-04-19T12:47:26Z
dc.date.available 2011-04-19T12:47:26Z
dc.date.issued 2010
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Monetary Economics, 2010, 57, 4, 404-419
dc.identifier.issn 0304-3932
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/16454
dc.description.abstract When policy makers have limited commitment power, self-fulfilling bank runs can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. We study how such banking panics unfold in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. A run in this setting is necessarily partial, with only some depositors participating. In addition, a run naturally occurs in waves, with each wave of withdrawals prompting a further response from policy makers. In this way, the interplay between the actions of depositors and the responses of policy makers shapes the course of a crisis. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.language.iso en
dc.publisher Elsevier Science Bv
dc.subject Bank runs
dc.subject Limited commitment
dc.subject Time consistency
dc.subject Suspension of convertibility
dc.title Banking Panics and Policy Responses
dc.type Article
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.04.005
dc.neeo.contributor ENNIS|Huberto M.|aut|
dc.neeo.contributor KEISTER|Todd|aut|
dc.identifier.volume 57
dc.identifier.startpage 404
dc.identifier.endpage 419
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dc.identifier.issue 4


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