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dc.contributor.authorENNIS, Huberto M.
dc.contributor.authorKEISTER, Todd
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-19T12:47:26Z
dc.date.available2011-04-19T12:47:26Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Monetary Economics, 2010, 57, 4, 404-419
dc.identifier.issn0304-3932
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/16454
dc.description.abstractWhen policy makers have limited commitment power, self-fulfilling bank runs can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. We study how such banking panics unfold in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. A run in this setting is necessarily partial, with only some depositors participating. In addition, a run naturally occurs in waves, with each wave of withdrawals prompting a further response from policy makers. In this way, the interplay between the actions of depositors and the responses of policy makers shapes the course of a crisis. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevier Science Bv
dc.subjectBank runs
dc.subjectLimited commitment
dc.subjectTime consistency
dc.subjectSuspension of convertibility
dc.titleBanking Panics and Policy Responses
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.04.005
dc.neeo.contributorENNIS|Huberto M.|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorKEISTER|Todd|aut|
dc.identifier.volume57
dc.identifier.startpage404
dc.identifier.endpage419
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue4


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