| dc.contributor.author |
ENNIS, Huberto M. |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
KEISTER, Todd |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2011-04-19T12:47:26Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2011-04-19T12:47:26Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2010 |
|
| dc.identifier.citation |
Journal of Monetary Economics, 2010, 57, 4, 404-419 |
|
| dc.identifier.issn |
0304-3932 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/16454 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
When policy makers have limited commitment power, self-fulfilling bank runs can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. We study how such banking panics unfold in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. A run in this setting is necessarily partial, with only some depositors participating. In addition, a run naturally occurs in waves, with each wave of withdrawals prompting a further response from policy makers. In this way, the interplay between the actions of depositors and the responses of policy makers shapes the course of a crisis. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
|
| dc.language.iso |
en |
|
| dc.publisher |
Elsevier Science Bv |
|
| dc.subject |
Bank runs |
|
| dc.subject |
Limited commitment |
|
| dc.subject |
Time consistency |
|
| dc.subject |
Suspension of convertibility |
|
| dc.title |
Banking Panics and Policy Responses |
|
| dc.type |
Article |
|
| dc.identifier.doi |
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.04.005 |
|
| dc.neeo.contributor |
ENNIS|Huberto M.|aut| |
|
| dc.neeo.contributor |
KEISTER|Todd|aut| |
|
| dc.identifier.volume |
57 |
|
| dc.identifier.startpage |
404 |
|
| dc.identifier.endpage |
419 |
|
| eui.subscribe.skip |
true |
|
| dc.identifier.issue |
4 |
|