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dc.contributor.authorGUISO, Luigi
dc.contributor.authorMINETTI, Raoul
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-19T12:47:52Z
dc.date.available2011-04-19T12:47:52Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Money Credit and Banking, 2010, 42, 6, 1037-1071
dc.identifier.issn0022-2879
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/16488
dc.description.abstractWhen firms borrow from multiple concentrated creditors such as banks they appear to differentiate their allocation of borrowing. In this paper, we put forward hypotheses for this borrowing pattern based on incomplete contract theories and test them using a sample of small U.S. firms. We find that firms with more valuable and more homogeneous assets differentiate borrowing more sharply across concentrated creditors. Moreover, borrowing differentiation is inversely related to restructuring costs and positively related to firms' informational transparency. The results suggest that the structure of credit relationships is used to discipline creditors and entrepreneurs, especially during corporate reorganizations.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc
dc.subjectcredit relationships
dc.subjectmultiple creditors
dc.subjectborrowing allocation
dc.titleThe Structure of Multiple Credit Relationships: Evidence From US Firms
dc.typeArticle
dc.neeo.contributorGUISO|Luigi|aut|EUI70005
dc.neeo.contributorMINETTI|Raoul|aut|
dc.identifier.volume42
dc.identifier.startpage1037
dc.identifier.endpage1071
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue6


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