Imitation and Selective Matching in Reputational Games

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dc.contributor.author VIGNOLO, Thierry
dc.date.accessioned 2011-04-19T12:49:40Z
dc.date.available 2011-04-19T12:49:40Z
dc.date.issued 2010
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2010, 20, 3, 395-412
dc.identifier.issn 0936-9937
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/16632
dc.description.abstract This paper investigates imitation and selective matching in reputational games with an outside option. We identify two classes of such games, ultimatum and trust games. By selective matching we mean that short-run players have the possibility of selecting the long-run player they play against. We find that selective matching (unlike random matching) favors the equilibrium associated to reputation in the ultimatum game, but not in the trust game.
dc.language.iso en
dc.publisher Springer
dc.subject Reputation
dc.subject Long-run equilibria
dc.subject Selective matching
dc.subject Games with an outside option
dc.title Imitation and Selective Matching in Reputational Games
dc.type Article
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s00191-009-0156-6
dc.neeo.contributor VIGNOLO|Thierry|aut|
dc.identifier.volume 20
dc.identifier.startpage 395
dc.identifier.endpage 412
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dc.identifier.issue 3


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