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dc.contributor.authorVIGNOLO, Thierry
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-19T12:49:40Z
dc.date.available2011-04-19T12:49:40Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Evolutionary Economics, 2010, 20, 3, 395-412
dc.identifier.issn0936-9937
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/16632
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates imitation and selective matching in reputational games with an outside option. We identify two classes of such games, ultimatum and trust games. By selective matching we mean that short-run players have the possibility of selecting the long-run player they play against. We find that selective matching (unlike random matching) favors the equilibrium associated to reputation in the ultimatum game, but not in the trust game.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.subjectReputation
dc.subjectLong-run equilibria
dc.subjectSelective matching
dc.subjectGames with an outside option
dc.titleImitation and Selective Matching in Reputational Games
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00191-009-0156-6
dc.neeo.contributorVIGNOLO|Thierry|aut|
dc.identifier.volume20
dc.identifier.startpage395
dc.identifier.endpage412
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue3


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