Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorZWART, Sanne
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-19T12:49:46Z
dc.date.available2011-04-19T12:49:46Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationSocial Choice and Welfare, 2010, 34, 4, 643-677
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/16640
dc.description.abstractThe majority of the participating voters in referenda does not necessarily reflect the majority of the whole population since voters can abstain. This paper shows that although the quorum can be set such that the outcome of the referendum coincides with the population preference, the necessary assumptions make practical implementation unrealistic. Moreover, a second equilibrium can exist in which the proposal is always rejected. When insufficient information makes the optimal quorum unknown, it is in general more harmful to set the quorum too high than too low. Robustness of the results is analyzed by allowing pressure groups to encourage or discourage participation after the quorum is set.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.titleEnsuring a Representative Referendum Outcome: The Daunting Task of Setting the Quorum Right
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-009-0422-4
dc.neeo.contributorZWART|Sanne|aut|
dc.identifier.volume34
dc.identifier.startpage643
dc.identifier.endpage677
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue4


Files in this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record